Islaw C-E

G.R. No.
92020 October 19, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ELISEO MARTINADO y AGUILLON, HERMOGENES MARTINADO y AGUILLON and JOHN
DOE, alias "ROLLY", accused-appellants.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the decision 1 of Branch 124 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalookan
City, in Criminal Case No. C-27858, promulgated on 2 February 1989, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds both the accused ELISEO MARTINADO y

AGUILLON and HERMOGENES MARTINADO y AGUILLON guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide as defined and
penalized under paragraph 1 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. There being no appreciable aggravating nor (sic) mitigating
circumstances, this Court hereby sentences each of the accused to suffer
imprisonment under the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. The two accused are
also directed to indemnify the heirs of Juan Matias jointly and severally the
(sic) amount of P30,000.00; to return the money and the pieces of jewelry,
subject matter of the robbery, and if unable to do so, to pay the entire value
thereof in the total amount of P5,100.00 to the legal heirs of the victim and to
pay the costs.
The accused HERMOGENES MARTINADO shall be credited in the service

of his sentence with the full time that he has undergone preventive
imprisonment pursuant to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code provided the
conditions prescribed thereon have been complied with.
SO ORDERED.
At the outset, this Court, has to resolve the propriety of the interposed appeal insofar as accused
Eliseo Martinado is concerned.
The promulgation of the decision on 22 February 1989 was made in his absence because he had
earlier escaped on 6 August 1988, 2 exactly five (5) days after the defense rested its case, from the
Kalookan City Jail. The escape, however, was reported to the trial court only on 8 August 1988. 3
Consequently, the trial court issued a warrant for his arrest on 10 February 1988 4 which was
returned unserved on 28 February 1989 because "per information gathered from the resident (sic)
thereat revealed that accused cannot (sic) be seen for long (sic) period of time." 5
It was only on 10 April 1989 that Eliseo was re-arrested in Palo, Leyte by a Special Action Team of
the Kalookan Police Station. 6
On March 1989, Atty. Domingo M. Ballon, counsel of record for Hermogenes and Eliseo, filed a
notice of appeal for both accused. It reads:
NOTICE OF APPEAL
Accused, by their undersigned counsel to this Honorable Court hereby gives
(sic) notice that they are appealing the decision of this Honorable Court,
dated February 2, 1989, and promulgated on Feb. 22, 1989, convicting the
accused to suffer and undergo an imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua, to
the Supreme Court, for the reason that said decision is contrary to law and
evidence. 7
In view of such appeal, the trial court issued on the same date an order directing the transmittal to
this Court of the records of the case together with the transcripts of stenographic notes and exhibits.
8
In promulgating judgment in absentia with respect to Eliseo, and in giving due course to the appeal of both accused, the trial court must have
had in mind the third paragraph of Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court which reads:
xxx xxx xxx
The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused personally or
through his bondsman or warden and counsel, requiring him to be present at
the promulgation of the decision. In case the accused fails to appear thereat
the promulgation shall consist in the recording of the judgment in the criminal
docket and a copy thereof shall be served upon the accused or counsel. If
the judgment is for conviction, and the accused's failure to appear was
without justifiable cause, the court shall further order the arrest of the
accused, who may appeal within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision
to him or his counsel. (6a).
Indeed, no cause for non-appearance during promulgation is more justified than the escape of the
accused from the city jail where he was confined during the trial of the case. However, in the recent
case of People vs. Mapalao, 9 decided on 14 may 1991, this Court, applying by analogy Section 8,
Rule 124 of the 1985 Rules, of Criminal Procedure, held that an accused who had escaped from
confinement during trial on the merits and who merits at large at the time of promulgation of the
judgment of conviction loses his right to appeal therefrom unless he voluntarily submits to the
jurisdiction of the court or is otherwise arrested within fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment. The
reason therefor is that an accused who escapes from detention, jumps bail or flees to a foreign
country loses his standing in court; unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court,
he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief therefrom. This Court then took the opportunity
to suggest a modification of the last sentence of the aforequoted third paragraph of Section 6 of Rule
120. Thus:
To this effect a modification is in order of the provision of the last sentence of

Section 6, Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides:
If the judgment is for conviction, and the accused's failure to

appear was without justifiable cause, the court shall further
order the arrest of the accused, who may appeal within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the decision to him or his counsel.
It should provide instead that it upon promulgation of the judgment, the

accused fails to appear without justifiable cause, despite due notice to him,
his bondsmen or counsel, he is thereby considered to have waived his right
to appeal. However, if within the fifteen (15) day period of appeal he
voluntarily surrenders to the court or is otherwise arrested, then he may avail
of the right to appeal within said period of appeal.
By the same token, an accused who, after the filing of an information, is at
large and has not been apprehended or otherwise has not submitted himself
to the jurisdiction of the court, cannot apply for bail or be granted any other
relief by the courts until he submits himself to its jurisdiction or is arrested. 10
If We were to apply this ruling to the case of Eliseo, his appeal should not be given due course.
Considering, however, that Mapalao announces a new doctrine by making the second paragraph of
Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
Sec. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to prosecute. —
xxx xxx xxx
The Court may also, upon motion of the appellee or on its motion, dismiss
the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail
or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal.
apply by analogy to the last sentence of the third paragraph of Section 6 of Rule 120, and that
application thereof to Eliseo would be prejudicial to him, this Court, guided by the rule that laws shall
have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided 11 and judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of our legal system 12 and, further taking into
account the principle that once a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted,
the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and not retroactively to parties who had relied on
the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof, 13 hereby declares that the rule enunciated in Mapalao
should not be applied to Eliseo. Thus, his appeal is hereby given due course.
Having cleared the way for the appeal of both accused, We shall now take up the appeal proper.
Accused Hermogenes Martinado and Eliseo Martinado, together with a certain John Doe alias
"Rolly" who remains to be at large, were originally charged with the crime of murder in an Information
prepared and filed by Assistant City Fiscal Arturo A. Rojas on 17 November 1986. 14 The information
fails to mention anything about robbery. Consequently, a motion for reinvestigation was filed by the
offended party. On 4 March 1987, an Amended Information 15 was filed by 1st Assistant City Fiscal
Rogelio M. de Leon charging the accused with the crime of Robbery with Homicide. This was further
amended on 10 March 1987 by a 2nd Amended Information, 16 the accusatory portion of which
reads:
That on or about the 14th day of November 1986 in Caloocan City, Metro
Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring together and mutually helping with one another, with
intent of (sic) gain and with intent to kill, by means of violence and
intimidation employed upon the person of JUAN MATIAS y REYES that is by
attacking and stabbing the latter with a sharp pointed instrument, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and carry away the
following articles, to wit:
1. Seiko men's watch (5) worth — P 800.00
2. Men's ring worth — P1,800.00
3. Wallet containing cash in the amount of — P2,500.00

Total — P5,100.00
all belonging to the said Juan Matias y Reyes, to the damage and prejudice
of the latter in the aforementioned total amount of P5,100.00; and as a result
thereof, Juan Matias sustained serious physical injuries, which injuries
caused his death (DOA) at the Quezon City General Hospital.
Contrary to Law.
Eliseo and Hermogenes Martinado were arraigned with the assistance of counsel on 22 September
1987; 17 both entered pleas of "Not Guilty". The other accused, John Doe @ Rolly, has not been
formally identified and is still at large. Immediately after arraignment, a motion for bail was heard by
the trial court; the same was eventually denied. 18
Trial subsequently ensued with the prosecution presenting Margarita Padrinao, Elizabeth C. Carillo,
Dr. Mariano Cueva, Jr. (Medico-Legal Officer), Nicanor Matias, Angel Nieto, Gerardo Arellano,
P/Sgt. Manuel Buenaobra and David Nerza; for the defense, both accused were presented.
On 22 February 1989, the trial court promulgated its decision based on the prosecution's version of
the incident summarized as follows:
The following is the version as shown by the evidence adduced by the

Prosecution:
At about 6:15 o'clock in the afternoon of November 14, 1986, Margarita

Padrinao, a maid, was watching television at the house of her master, Juan
Matias. She then entered the sari-sari store of her master which is three
arms' length away from the place where she was watching television in order
to feed the pigs. She saw Juan Matias tending the sari-sari store. She also
saw two customers drinking softdrinks outside the window grills of the store.
(TSN-Nov. 10, 1987, M. Padrinao, pp. 6-7). She identified them as Eliseo and
Hermogenes Martinado.
At about this time, Elizabeth Carillo, a neighbor and a government employee

(sic), passed by the same sari-sari store on her way to make a phone call at
a house located at nearby Villa Maria Subdivision. She saw Juan Matias
attending to three customers drinking softdrinks at the sari-sari store. She
identified them as Eliseo Martinado, Hermogenes Martinado and "Rolly".
(TSN-Nov. 19, 1987, E. Carillo, pp. 6-8).
A short while later, Margarita who had just feed the pigs heard a loud snore
coming from the store. She hurriedly went back to the store she saw Eliseo
and Hermogenes helping one another in stabbing Juan Matias. (TSN, Nov.
10, 1987, M. Padriano, pp. 8; 32). Each of these accused was armed with
pointed, thin instruments which each used in the stabbing. The stabbing took
place inside the store near the place where rice was being kept. Margarita
then shouted in a loud voice, "Tulungan ninyo po kami." The two accused
then fled thru the gate at the fence of the house. After she shouted, some
people approached the store but Hermogenes and Eliseo Martinado had
already fled. (TSN-Nov. 19, 1987 M. Padrinao, pp. 9-10). She then
approached Juan Matias who lay on the flooring of the store. Mrs. Dominga
Matias, the wife of Juan, likewise approached Juan Matias whom they found
to be bloodied with several stab wounds at (sic) the neck, breast and
abdomen. (TSN-Nov. 19, 1987, M. Padrinao, pp. 11).
In the meantime, Elizabeth Carillo had to pass the said store on her way back
to her residence, having failed to contact a friend thru the phone. She heard
somebody shouting "saklolo" and she saw three persons running from the
sari-sari store of Juan Matias. These were the same three persons she
previously saw drinking softdrinks. "Rolly" was running ahead of the other
two, Eliseo and Hermogenes Martinado. The she saw Rolly stop and retrace
his steps to pick up a watch near the gate of the fence surrounding the house
of Juan Matias before resuming his flight. The two brothers continued to run
away. Eliseo was seen holding something in his bloodied hand and
Hermogenes was also seen holding something in his hand which was
bloodied. Elizabeth then entered the sari-sari store and she saw Juan Matias
lying down, face upward, inside the sari-sari store and had (sic) stab wounds
on (sic) his bloodied neck. He was still snorting, so Elizabeth called for help
to bring Juan to the hospital. (TSN-Nov. 10, 1987, E. Carillo, pp. 8-11). Juan
was brought to the Quezon City General Hospital where he was pronounced
dead on arrival.
At about the same time, Angel Nieto, the Tanod executive officer of the
Barangay, was at the house of his brother also at Deparo street when he
heard people shouting "Harangin, harangin." He went out of the house into
the street and he was able to see three men coming from the direction of the
house of Juan Matias and being chased by the residents. He was able to
observe two of the said three men. These two men had bloodied hands and
bloodied clothes. He then asked the residents why they were chasing the
three men and they replied that these men had just stabbed Juan Matias.
(TSN-Dec. 22, 1987, A. Nieto, pp. 4-5)
Gerardo Arellano, a Barangay tanod of the place where the incident

occurred, also heard the aforesaid shouting from his house which is located
also at Deparo street. He came to know Elizabeth Carillo and Margarita
Padrinao that Juan Matias was stabbed to death. Together with other tanods
and residents of the place, they began looking for Eliseo Martinado,
Hermogenes Martinado and Rolly as these were the suspects mentioned by
Elizabeth Carillo and Margarita Padrinao. (TSN-Feb. 9, 1988, G. Arellano,
pp. 5-6).
Gerardo Arellano and his companions proceeded to the house of "Rolly" at

the Sterling compound and after they were granted permission by the wife of
"Rolly" they enter. They found Hermogenes Martinado under a lavatory
trembling. Then they went to the Visayan Motors and after obtaining
permission from the owner thereof, they went inside the premises and found
Eliseo Martinado who was packing his clothes ready to leave. (TSN-Feb. 9,
1988, Arellano, pp. 9-13). Eliseo and Hermogenes Martinado were invited to
go to the house of Juan Matias and both were identified by Elizabeth Carillo
and Margarita Padrinao as two of the persons (sic) who barged into the
house of Juan Matias. (TSN-Feb. 9, 1988, Arellano, p. 14). The two suspects
were then brought to the Urduja Police Sub-Station and were then turned
over to Sgt. Manuel Buenaobra of the Caloocan City Police Station. They
were later brought to the Caloocan City Police Headquarters by Sgt.
Buenaobra. (TSN-Feb. 15, 1988, M. Buenaobra, p.8).
During the investigation conducted at the house of Juan Matias by the police
on November 14, 1986, Margarita Padrinao discovered that the Seiko V
watch worn everyday by Juan Matias was no longer in his wrist. She also
found that the wallet which Juan Matias kept at the back pocket of his pants
was missing. (TSN-Nov. 10, 1987, M. Padrinao, pp. 16-17).
This robbery was reported by Dominga Matias, the widow of the victim, to the
Caloocan City Police Headquarters on November 16, 1986. (TSN-Feb. 15,
1988, M. Buenaobra, p. 16). (See Police Blotter, page 188 of the Caloocan
City Police Station dated November 16, 1986, EXHIBIT "J"). Mrs. Dominga
Matias listed the articles found missing from their store at Deparo street,
Caloocan City, after the death of Juan Matias, as follows:
Seiko wristwatch –– P 800.00

Gold ring –– P1,800.00
Cash contained in missing wallet –– P2,500.00
Nicolas Matias, a son of Juan Matias, corroborated the loss of the above
articles and estimated their value in his testimony of December 21, 1987. He
discovered the loss on the night of November 14, 1986, after reaching the
Quezon City General Hospital where his mother told him that these articles
could no longer be found in the body of the victim. When he returned to his
father's residence at Deparo street, Caloocan City, also on the evening of
November 14, 1986, he verified after a search of the sari-sari store and the
house that those articles were indeed missing. (TSN. Dec. 21, 1987, N.
Matias, pp. 4-6). 19
xxx xxx xxx
It is undisputed that Juan Matias, 70 years old, died on November 14, 1986.
The cause of death was hemorrhage secondary to stab wounds, neck and
chest. (EXHIBIT "E"). Dr. Mariano Cueva, NBI Medico-Legal Officer, stated
that he found contusions on the front portion of the neck of the victim; 4
incised wounds, one on the left arm and three on the left forearm; four stab
wounds, one over left front of the neck and three at the left front chest. (TSN.
Nov. 20, 1987, Dr. Cueva, pp. 7-8). (EXHIBITS "F" and "G"). The most mortal
of the wounds was that found over the left front chest. (TSN. Nov. 20, 1987,
pp. 8-9). 20
xxx xxx xxx
Dr. Cueva narrated that the incised wounds found on the body of the victim
could have been brought about by contact with a sharp cutting edge like the
edge of a knife or sharp metal object. He also said that the stab wounds
could have been produced by a pointed, single-edged or single-bladed
instrument like a kitchen knife or dagger. He added that the number of
wounds inflicted on the victim does not preclude the fact that there was more
than one assailant using similar instruments. (TSN. Nov. 20, 1987, pp. 9-10;
20). 21
The trial court concluded that the prosecution established convincingly that Juan Matias was robbed
at about 6:30 o'clock in the evening of 14 November 1986 by the accused Hermogenes and Eliseo
Martinado who conspired with each other and with Rolly. Under the circumstances above narrated,
the special complex crime of robbery with homicide penalized under paragraph 1 of Article 294 of
the Revised Penal Code was committed. The motive of the accused was to rob Juan Matias.
As earlier adverted to, the accused through counsel filed a Notice of Appeal on 2 March 1989.
Despite the trial court's order to forward the records of the case to this Court, the clerk of court of the
court a quo erroneously transmitted the same to the Court of Appeals on 19 February 1990. 22 The
latter subsequently forwarded the records to this Court on 22 February 1990. 23
In a Resolution dated 12 March 1990, We accepted the appeal interposed by the accused. 24
The accused filed their Appellants' Brief on 20 December 1990 25 while the Office of the Solicitor
General filed the Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee on 30 January 1991. 26
The appeal is anchored on the following assignment of errors:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED

HERMOGENES MARTINADO AND ELISEO MARTINADO ARE GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH
HOMICIDE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANTS

HERMOGENES MARTINADO AND ELISEO MARTINADO CONSPIRED
WITH A CERTAIN "ROLLY" TO COMMIT THE CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH
HOMICIDE. 27
In discussing the first error, appellants focus on the arguments that proof of robbery is wanting that
their guilt for the homicide has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
As to the first, the appellants underscore the fact that it was only two (2) days after the alleged killing
that the loss of the victim's personal belongings was reported to the police authorities. They then
suggest that "[t]he wristwatch and the money contained in the wallet could have been stolen when
the cadaver was already in the Hospital or probably in the Morgue;" 28 that Elizabeth Carillo's
declaration on the witness stand that she saw a certain "Rolly" return and pick up a watch as he,
together with the accused, were fleeing from the victim's house, is not sufficient to support the
conclusion that a robbery was committed as the watch could have been Rolly's; and that the loss of
money was not proven and the witness who claims to have seen the alleged killing, Margarita
Padrinao, did not testify on the actual taking of property.
We have closely perused through the entire records of the case and are convinced that the crime of
robbery was not proven to have been committed. No conclusive evidence proving the physical act of
asportation thereof by the accused themselves was presented by the prosecution. 29 This Court takes
note of the fact that the original information filed three (3) days after the incident in question was for
Murder and no hint whatsoever of robbery was made therein. The evidence further discloses that it
was only at around 10:30 o'clock in the evening of 16 November 1986 that the widow of Juan Matias
reported to the Investigation Division of the Kalookan City Police Station that "they found out that the
Seiko wristwatch worth P800.00; GOLD ring worth P1,800.00 and the amount of P2,500.00
contained in the wallet of his (sic) slain husband, JUAN MATIAS were missing presumably (sic)
taken by suspects (sic)." 30
It is settled that in order to sustain a conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide, it is imperative
that the robbery itself be proven as conclusively as any other essential element of a crime. In the
absence of such proof, the killing of the victim would only be simple homicide or murder, depending
on the absence or presence of qualifying circumstances. 31
The trial court based its finding of the existence of robbery on Margarita Padrinao's and Elizabeth
Carillo's respective testimonies. There is also the testimony of the victim's son, Nicanor Matias, a
substantial part of which is hearsay as he constantly alluded to the information his mother had given
him. While Padrinao gave the following statements during her direct examination:
FISCAL SILVERIO:
xxx xxx xxx
Q And what did the police find out during the investigation, if
any?
A Things were missing, sir.
Q Did you come to know what were those missing things?
A Watches (sic), wallet.
Q How did you come to know that?
A Because he was not wearing his wristwatch and his wallet

was missing.
Q Whose wallet was missing?
A Juan Matias, sir.
Q Do you know what kind of watch is owned or being worn by

Juan Matias?
A Seiko V, sir.
Q How did you come to know that?
A I used to see that watch because I have been staying there

for a long time.
Q You said that wallets (sic) was missing, do you know if

there are (sic) money contained in that wallet?
xxx xxx xxx

COURT:
How did you know that a wallet was missing?
A Because the wallet was no longer at the back pocket of his

pants.32
Carillo declared that:
FISCAL SILVERIO:
Q When you said that you saw Rolly, Eliseo and Hermogenes
Martinado running out from the sari-sari store, what happened
next, if nay?
A I saw Rolly returned (sic) and picked (sic) up something, sir.
Q Did you see what Rolly picked up at that time?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was that?
A A watch, sir.
Q Could you describe the watch picked up by Rolly at that

time?
A I cannot describe the make, sir, the trademark but it is a

watch. 33
It is at once apparent that nobody was able to observe that immediately before the incident, Juan
Matias was wearing a wristwatch and a gold ring and had a wallet in his pocket which contained
money; moreover, nobody witnessed the actual taking by the accused of Juan Matias' personal
belongings. While Margarita Padrinao saw Matias being repeatedly stabbed, she failed to notice the
latter being actually divested of his personal effects. Further scrutiny of Padrinao's testimony reveals
that at the time she declared that "things were missing," the victim was no longer in front of her for
she had likewise testified that latter was rushed to the hospital soon after the stabbing. The
investigation during which she uttered such statements was conducted by police authorities who
arrived at the crime scene long after the victim had been removed. It would thus be highly doubtful
that Padrinao could credibly assert right then and there that the said items were missing as,
presumably, she was not able to get a clear glimpse of the victim as he was being brought to the
hospital. In fact, if there was any person who could have testified about the missing items, it would
have been Elizabeth Carillo. Together with a neighbor, the victim's wife and brother, she brought
Juan Matias to the hospital where the latter was pronounced dead on arrival. 34
With respect to Carillo's testimony, the fact that Rolly returned and picked up a watch is no proof at
all that the watch belonged to the victim for unfortunately, the prosecution failed to elicit from her any
information about the precise place where the watch was picked up in relation to the place where
Juan Matias was stabbed, or the person possessing the same before it was picked up. In short, she
did not testify that the said watch belonged to and was taken from the victim. Absent such proof, it is
highly possible that the watch could have been, as suggested by the accused Rolly's.
The testimony of Nicanor Matias, on the other hand, merely recounts his own discovery that certain
items were missing when he arrived at his parents' house after the incident; he also described these
missing items and estimated their respective values. As earlier observed, much of the information he
volunteered was based on what his mother had told him, thus making the same objectionable on the
ground of hearsay.
As basis for the assertion that the crime of homicide has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt,
both accused emphasize that "the contradiction between the statement of Ms. Margarita Padrinao in
her Affidavit to the effect that "Rolly" was the last person to leave the sari-sari store and was in fact
seen by her "INANG" holding a knife, and that of her testimony in Court to the effect that she did not
see "Rolly" anymore for she immediately went outside the store shouting for help, had created a
semblance of falsehood." 35
The suggested flaw, more apparent than real, betrays strained and tenuous reasoning. Padrinao's
aforesaid statement does not at all clash with her testimony during cross-examination. All that she
declared during the latter was that:
ATTY. BALLON:
Q I am going to quote your answer: "Oho, ito hong dalawang

ito (affiant pointing to the persons inside the Investigation
Office, who gave their names as Eliseo Martinado y Aguillon
alias ELISEO, 20 years old, single, helper, native of Dagami,
Leyte, resident of Visayan Auto Repair Shop, Deparo,
Caloocan City, and HERMOGENES MARTINADO y Aguillon,
23 years old, single, laborer, native of Dagami, Leyte,
resident of Sterling Subd., Caloocan City) at isa pa na
magbobote ang pangalan ay Rolly", did you give that
answer?
A Yes, sir, because they were three but I did not see the third
man because I only reached (sic) inside the store the two
(referring to the two accused).
Q Now, could you say now, Miss Padrinao, that there were
three inside the store?
xxx xxx xxx
Q Was this Rolly inside the store when you saw him?
A I did not see him inside the store but the ones I reached
(sic) inside the store were Eliseo and Hermogenes Martinado,
because right after I saw it (sic) I immediately went out and
shouted.
Q And so it is clear that you did not see the actual stabbing of
Mang Juan, during the stabbing of Mang Juan you did not see
this Rolly?
A Yes, sir.
Q And this Rolly was not inside the store before Mang Juan
was stabbed?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Why did you mention in your affidavit that the three who killed
Juan Matias were Eliseo, Hermogenes and this Rolly who
was magbobote (sic)?
A I did not see that Rolly anymore because as I have said

when I saw the two (referring to Eliseo and Hermogenes)
helping one another in stabbing Mang Juan, I ran away and
shouted for help.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. BALLON:
Q While (sic) ago, during your direct testimony and even on

the cross examination by this representation you stated
categorically that you only saw two people drinking softdrinks
in the store of Mang Juan on November 14, 1986, at about
6:00 o'clock in the afternoon and in your statement Exhibit "A"
you stated that also a certain Rolly magbobote who (sic) was
with the two drinking softdrinks, which of them is now correct?
There seems to be a conflict.
A I only saw the two of them drinking softdrinks, that is what I

saw. 36
Padrinao's failure to notice Rolly inside the store could be explained by the fact that she immediately
left upon seeing Juan Matias being stabbed by the two (2) accused. 37 It is very likely that this third
person, Rolly, could have just been hidden or covered by the other two. Thus, it was only when the
stabbing was consummated that she saw all three because they naturally had to leave the scene of
the crime. It is to be observed that Rolly's presence was confirmed by two (2) other witnesses,
namely Elizabeth Carillo 38 and Angel Nieto. 39
Besides, such a minor contradiction does not effect the credibility of a witness. Inconsistencies in the
testimonies of witnesses which refer to minor and insignificant details cannot destroy their credibility.
In fact, such minor inconsistencies guarantee sincere and candid evidence of what actually
transpired. 40 Discrepancies in minor details do not impair the credibility of a witness. In the course of
a prolonged direct examination, more so during cross-examination, the witness is usually subjected
to unfriendly questioning. As a result thereof, it is usually the case that the witness, uncomfortable
and fidgety in a courtroom scene, may often fall into lapses. It is not infrequent for a witness to
commit minor mistakes in his narration of the facts. 41 Rather than effect the credibility of the
witnesses, they are badges of truthfulness and candor. 42
Margarita Padrinao's narration of the incident is coherent in its essential parts and intrinsically
believable; hence, it must be accorded due deference. 43
In any event, even if We are to give weight to the implication suggested by the said discrepancy,
only Rolly's liability would be put in doubt as it is only as to his participation that there would exist
any reservation or question. As to the accused-appellants, Padrinao was firm in her identification of
them.
Coming to the second assigned error, this Court is hard put at giving the same any credence. For
one, counsel for the accused harps once again on the alleged inconsistencies that supposedly
plague the testimonies of the witnesses; this issue has already been resolved and needs no further
elaboration.
Furthermore, the accused capitalize on the Medico-Legal Officer's statement that "the wounds would
have been inflicted by one person because of the nature of the wounds." 44 The accused would
attempt to mislead this Court by such conclusion because they deliberately omitted the phrase
immediately preceding the quoted declaration — "It is possible . . ." 45 Thus, all that the said witness
did was to suggest that there could have been one (1) assailant. It was only the accused who made
the categorical declaration to that effect.
Finally, the accused suggest that the evidence necessary to prove conspiracy was not established
because "at the time the Martinado Brothers were accounted for, Hermogenes Martinado was at the
house of Aling Espie, while Eliseo was at Visayan Auto Repair Shop at Reparo (sic) Street,
Kalookan City." 46
We have time and again ruled that alibi is at best a weak defense and easy of fabrication. 47 It cannot
prevail over a positive identification made by a prosecution witness. 48 For such a defense to prosper,
it is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed but
that he must also demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of
the crime. 49
As found by the trial court, both accused were apprehended in the vicinity of the crime scene shortly
after the felony was committed. While Hermogenes was found trembling under the lavatory in Rolly's
house, Eliseo was accosted in the premises of the Visayan Auto Repair Shop in the act of packing
his clothes. Such deportment on the part of the two accused displays guilty consciences. On the part
of Eliseo Martinado, such a conclusion is even bolstered by the fact that the escape from the
Kalookan City Jail on 6 August 1988.50 Flight of the accused is an indication of his guilt or of a guilty
mind. 51
As to conspiracy, the trial court correctly declared that:
The conspiracy was shown by the fact that the two accused were seen buying and
drinking softdrinks together with "Rolly" at the store of the victim and by the fact that
they fled together. (People vs. Ramos, 122 SCRA 139). The Prosecution has also
established that the same two accused and "Rolly" helped each other in stabbing the
accused (sic), each using a pointed and bladed instrument in stabbing the same
victim to death. 52
This Court hereby adopts the aforequoted exposition. These facts prove beyond reasonable doubt
that the accused had a common purpose and were united in its execution. There is conspiracy when
two (2) or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. 53 Conspiracy to exists does not require an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the
occurrence; it exists if, at the time of the commission of the offense, the accused had the same purpose
and were united in its execution. 54 Direct proof of previous agreement to commit a crime is not
necessary. It may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, 55 or
inferred from acts of the accused themselves when such point to a joint purpose and design, concerted
action and community of interest. 56 Conspiracy having been adequately established by the testimony
of the prosecution witnesses, all the conspirators — the accused herein — are liable as co-principals
regardless of the extent and character of their respective individual participation for in contemplation
of law, the act of one is the act of all. 57
As We have earlier declared, however, the finding that robbery was committed on the occasion of
the killing cannot be sustained. Hence, the accused are liable only for homicide. This Court,
nevertheless, appreciates against both accused the generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength 58 which although not alleged in the second amended information, was duly proven
by the prosecution and may therefore be properly taken into consideration. 59 The victim, Juan
Matias, a septuagenarian, was unarmed at the time he was assaulted; Eliseo Martinado was about
21 years old 60 while Hermogenes Martinado was only 28 years old. 61 They both ganged up on the
old man who never had the slightest inkling that the accused, who pretended to be his customers,
would attack him simultaneously with bladed instruments. It is obvious that they took advantage of
their individual and collective strength. The penalty then for the crime of homicide under Article 249
of the Revised Penal Code must be imposed in its maximum period pursuant to the third paragraph
of Article 64 of said Code.
Conformably with the policy of this Court enunciated in several cases, the indemnity for the death of
Juan Matias should be increased to P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of Branch 124 of the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City in Criminal
Case No. C-27858 finding both accused Eliseo Martinado y Aguillon and Hermogenes Martinado y
Aguillon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide defined and penalized
under paragraph 1 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code is hereby modified. As modified, the two
accused are found guilty of the crime of Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. In
view of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, and the absence of any mitigating
circumstance to offset it, and applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Hermogenes
Martinado y Aguillon is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from Ten (10)
years and One (1) day of prision mayor maximum as minimum to Seventeen (17) years, Four (4)
months and One (1) day of reclusion temporal maximum as maximum.
Accused Eliseo Martinado, however, shall not be entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law as he had escaped from confinement. 62 Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of imprisonment of Seventeen (17) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of reclusion temporal
maximum.
The indemnity for the death of the deceased Juan Matias is hereby increased from P30,000.00 to
P50,000.00.
The Decision is AFFIRMED in all other respects.

G.R. No. 176317 July 23, 2014
MANOLITO GIL Z. ZAFRA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
In convicting an accused of the complex crime of malversation of public fund!: through falsification of a public document, the
courts shall impose the penalty for the graver felony in the maximum period pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code,
plus fine in the amount of the funds malversed or the total value of the property embezzled. In addition, the courts shall order the
accused to return to the Government the funds malversed, or the value of the property embezzled.
The Case
This appeal by petition for review on certiorari is taken from the judgment promulgated on August 16, 2006,1 whereby the Court of
Appeals affirmed the consolidated decision rendered on February 17, 2004 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in San Fernando,
La Union in Criminal Cases Nos. 4634 to Nos. 4651, inclusive,2 finding Manolito Gil Z. Zafra, a Revenue Collection Agent of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) assigned in Revenue District 3 in San Fernando, La Union guilty of 18 counts of malversation
of public funds through falsification of public documents.3
Antecedents
The CA summarized the factual antecedents as follows:
Appellant was the only Revenue Collection Agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), Revenue District 3, in San Fernando,
La Union from 1993-1995. Among his duties was toreceive tax payments for which BIR Form 25.24 or the revenue official
receipts (ROR) were issued. The original of the ROR was then given to the taxpayer while a copy thereof was retained by the
collection officer.
Every month, appellant submitted BIR Form 12.31 of the Monthly Report of Collections (MRC) indicating the numbers of the
issued RORs, date of collection, name of taxpayer,the amount collectedand the kind of tax paid. The original copy of the MRC
with the attached triplicate copy of the issued RORs was submitted to the Regional Office of the Commission on Audit (COA).
The Assessment Division of the BIR Regional Office, likewise, kept a copy of the duplicate original of the Certificate Authorizing
Registration (CAR) relating to the real property transactions, which contained, among other data, the number of the issued ROR,
its date, name of payor, and the amount the capital gains tax and documentary stamp tax paid.
On 06 July 1995, an audit team composed of Revenue Officers Helen D. Rosario, Maria Lourdes G.Morada, Marina B. Magluyan
and Norma Duran, all from the central office of the BIR, was tasked to audit the cash and non-cash accountabilities of the
appellant.
Among the documents reviewed by the audit team were the CARs furnished by the Assessment Division ofthe BIR; triplicate
copies of the RORs attached to the MRCs submitted by appellant to COA; and appellant’s MRCs provided by the Finance
Division of the BIR. The audit team likewise requested and was given copies of the RORs issued to the San Fernando, La Union
branch of the Philippine National Bank (PNB). A comparison of the entries in said documents revealed that the data pertaining to
18 RORs with the same serial number, i.e., (a) 1513716, (b) 1513717, (c) 1513718, (d) 1513719, (e) 1529758, (f) 2016733, (g)
2018017, (h) 2018310, (i) 2023438, (j) 2023837, (k) 2617653, (l) 2617821, (m) 2627973, (n) 3095194, (o) 3096955, (p) 3097386,
(q) 3503336, (r) 4534412, vary with respect to the name of the taxpayer, the kind of tax paid, the amount of tax and the date of
payment. Of particular concern to the audit team were the lesser amounts of taxes reported in appellant’s MRCs and the
attached RORs compared to the amount reflected in the CARs and PNB’s RORs.
The CARs showed that documentary stamp tax and capital gains tax for ROR Nos. 1513716, 1513717, 1513718, 1513719,
2018017, and 2023438 totalled Php114,887.78, while the MRCs and COA’s copies of the RORs submitted by appellant, the sum
of the taxes collected was only Php227.00, or a difference of Php114,660.78. ROR Nos. 2018017 and 2023438, mentioned in
CAR as duly issued to taxpayers and for which taxes were paid, were reported in the MRC as cancelled receipts.
Likewise, PNB’s RORs bearing Serial Nos. 1529758, 2016733, 2018310, 2023837, 2617653. 2617821, 2627973, 3095194,
3096955, 3097386, 3503336, and 4534412, show that it paid the total sum of Php500,606.15, as documentary stamp tax. Yet,
appellant’s MRCs yielded only the total sum of Php1,115.00, for the same RORs, or a difference of Php499,491.15.
The subject 18 RORs were the accountability of appellant as shown in his Monthly Reports of Accountability (MRA) or BIR Form
16 (A). The MRA contains, among others, the serial numbers of blank RORs received by the collection agent from the BOR as
well as those issued by him for a certain month.
In sum, although the RORs bear the same serial numbers, the total amount reflected in the CARs and PNB’s 12 copies of RORs
is Ph₱615,493.93, while only Php1,342.00 was reported as tax collections in the RORs’ triplicate copies submittedby appellant to
COA and in his MRCs, or a discrepancy of Php614,151.93, Thus, the audit team sent to appellant a demand letter requiring him
to restitute the total amount of Php614,151.93. Appellant ignored the letter, thus, prompting the institution of the 18 cases for
malversation of public funds through falsification of public document against him."4
On his part, the petitioner tendered the following version, to wit:
Appellant denied that he committed the crimes charged. He averred that as Revenue Collection Officer of San Fernando, La
Union, he never accepted payments from taxpayers nor issued the corresponding RORs. It was his subordinates, Andrew Aberin
and Rebecca Supsupin, who collected the taxes and issued the corresponding RORs. To substantiate his claim, he presented
Manuel Meris, who testified that when he paid capital gains tax, at the district office of BIR in Sam Fernando, La Union, it was a
female BIR employee who received the payment and issued Receipt No. 2023438. Likewise, Arturo Suyat, messenger of PNB
from 1979 to 1994, testified that when he made the payments to the same BIR office, it was not appellant who received the
payments nor issued the corresponding receipts but another unidentified BIR employee."5
Decision of the RTC
On February 17, 2004, the RTC rendered its consolidated decision convicting the petitioner of 18 counts of malversation of public
funds through falsification of public documents,6 decreeing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused GUILTY of the crime with which he is charged in:
1) Criminal Case No. 4634 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision
mayoras minimum up to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual
special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱19,775.00;
2) Criminal Case No. 4635 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 2 years, 4 months and 1 day
of prision correccionalas minimum up to 6 years and 1 day of prision mayoras maximum; to suffer perpetual
mayoras minimum up to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayoras maximum; to suffer perpetual special
disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱11,309.20;
mayoras minimum up to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayoras maximum; to suffer perpetual special
disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱9,736.86;
8) Criminal Case No. 4641 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 10 years and one 1 day of
prision mayoras minimum up to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer
perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱38,878.55;
9) Criminal Case No. 4642and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 10 years and one 1 day of
prision mayoras minimum up to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum; to suffer
14) Criminal Case No. 4647 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 10 years and 1 one day of
perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine ₱75,489.76;
perpetual special disqualification; and to pay fine of ₱45,330.18; 18) Criminal Case No. 4651and sentences him
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 10 years and one 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17 years, 4
months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual special disqualification; and to pay a fine
of ₱37,842.05;
And to pay costs.
SO ORDERED.
Judgment of the CA
On appeal, the petitioner asserted that the RTC had erred as follows:
I. x x x IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS THRU FALSIFICATION

OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS BASED ON THE PRESUMPTION THAT HE WAS NEGLIGENT IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF HIS OFFICIAL DUTIES.
II. x x x IN TAKING IT AGAINST THE ACCUSED THE FAILURE TO FILE AND PROSECUTE PERSONS WHO
COULD HAVE POSSIBLY COMMITTED THE CRIMES CHARGED.
III. x x x IN FINDING THAT ALL THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE CRIMES CHARGED ARE PRESENTED
IN THIS CASE.
IV. x x x WHEN IT DID NOT DECIDE TO ACQUIT THE ACCUSED BASED ON REASONABLE DOUBT. 7
On August 16, 2006, the CA promulgated its assailed judgment affirming the conviction of the petitioner and the penalties
imposed by the RTC,8 observing that he had committed falsification through his submission of copies of falsified MRCs and had
tampered revenue receipts to the BIR and COA;9 that he was presumed to be the forger by virtue of his being in the possession
of such public documents;10 and that he had certified to the MRAs and had actually issued the tampered receipts.11
Anent the malversation, the CA opined:
All the elements of malversation obtain in the present case. Appellant was the Revenue Collection Agent of the BIR. As such,
through designated collection clerks, hecollected taxes and issued the corresponding receipts for tax payments made by
taxpayers. He was accountable for the proper and authorized use and application of the blank RORs issued by the BIR District
Office, not the least for the tax payments received in the performance of his duties. The unexplained shortage in his remittances
of the taxes collected as reflected in the CARs and PNB’s receipts, even in the absence of direct proof of misappropriation, made
him liable for malversation. The audit team’s demand letter to appellant, which he failed to rebut, raised a prima facie
presumption that he put to his personal use the missing funds.12
The CA explained that even if it were to subscribe to the petitioner’s insistence that it had been his assistants, not him, who had
collected the taxes and issued the RORs, he was nonetheless liable,13 because his duty as an accountable officer had been to
strictly supervise his assistants;14 and that by failing to strictly supervise them he was responsible for the shortage resulting from
the non-remittance of the actual amounts collected.15
After the CA denied his motion for reconsideration by its resolution16 promulgated on January 11, 2007, the petitioner appeals via
petition for review on certiorari.
Issues
The petitioner claims that the CA erred:
I. x x x IN FINDING THAT THE PETITIONER WAS NEGLIGENT YET HE WAS CONVICTED OF THE CRIME
OF MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS THROUGH FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC [DOCUMENTS].
II. x x x IN APPLYING THE RULE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY IN A COMPLEX CRIME OF

MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS THROUGH FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS.
III. x x x IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER IS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE.17
The petitioner contends that the RTC and the CA erroneously convicted him of several counts of malversation of public funds
through falsification of public documents on the basis of the finding that he had been negligent in the performance of his duties
as Revenue District Officer;18 that the acts imputed to him did not constitute negligence; and that he could not be convicted of
intentional malversation and malversation through negligence at the same time.19
Ruling
We DENY the petition for review for its lack of merit.
The RTC stated in its decision convicting the petitioner, viz:
The particular pages of the Monthly Reports from which witness Magluyan based her examination to determine the discrepancies
in the Official Receipts listed by the accused therein, bore only the typewritten name of the accused without any signature.
However, prosecution witness Rebecca Rillorta showed that those individual pages were part of a number of pages of a report
submitted for a particular month, and she showed that the last pages of the related reports were duly signed by the accused.
Witness Rillorta brought to the Court the original pages of the questioned monthly reports and demonstrated to the Court the
sequence of the pagination and the last pages ofthe monthly reports bearing the signature of accused Zafra x x x. By these the
prosecution demonstrated that the individual pages of the Monthly Collection Report which listed receipts for lesser amounts
were part of official reports regularly submitted by the accused in his capacity as Collection Agent of the BIR in San Fernando
City, La Union. While counsel for accused called attention to the absence of accused (sic) signatures on Exhibit "A", accused did
not deny the monthly report[s] and the exhibits as he chose to remain silent.
In addition, Maria Domagas, State Auditor of the BIR showed Monthly Report of Accountabilities (Exhibit "D") which the accused,
as Collection Officer submits on the first week of the following month for a particular month. The testimony of Maria Domagas
establishes that the questionable receipts were within the series of receipts accountability of accused for a particular month. x x
x. The testimony of State Auditor Domagas established the link of accused accountable receipts, with the receipts numbers
reported in his Monthly Collection Report as well as to the receipts issued to the taxpayers. Thereby prosecution showed that
while the receipts issued to the taxpayer were not signed by the accused, these receipts were his accountable forms. Such that
the use thereof is presumed to be sourced from him. Even the defense witness admitted that the receipts emanated from the
office of the accused.
Notably, there is a big disparity between the amount covered by BIR Form No. 25.24 issued to the taxpayer, and the amount for
the same receipt number appearing in the Monthly Collection Reports indicating the falsification resorted to by the accused in the
official reports he filed, thereby remitting less than what was collected from taxpayers concerned, resulting tothe loss of revenue
for the government as unearthed by the auditors."20 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The findings of fact of the RTC were affirmed by the CA. Hence, the petitioner was correctly convicted of the crimes charged
because such findings of fact by the trial court, being affirmed by the CA as the intermediate reviewing tribunal, are now binding
and conclusive on the Court. Accordingly, we conclude that the Prosecution sufficiently established that the petitioner had
beenthe forger of the falsified and tampered public documents, and that the falsifications of the public documents had been
necessary to committhe malversations of the collected taxes.
Anent the petitioner’s defense that it was his subordinates who had dealt with the taxpayers and who had issued the falsified and
tampered receipts, the RTC fittingly ruminated:
x x x If this Court were to believethat the criminal act imputed to the accused were done by the employees blamed by the
accused, the presumption of negligence by the accused with respect to his duties as such would attach; and under this
presumption, accused would still not avoid liability for the government loss.21 (Italics supplied)
The petitioner relies on this passage of the RTC’s ruling to buttress his contention that he should be found guilty of malversation
through negligence. His reliance is grossly misplaced, however, because the RTC did not thereby pronounce that he had
beenmerely negligent. The passage was nothing but a brief forensic discourse on the legal consequence if his defense were
favorably considered, and was notthe basis for finding him guilty. To attach any undue significance to such discourse is to divert
attention away from the firmness of the finding of guilt. It cannot be denied, indeed, that the RTC did not give any weight to his
position.
Initially, the CA’s disquisition regarding malversation through negligence had the same tenor as that of the RTC’s,22 and later on
even went to the extent of opining that the petitioner ought to be held guilty of malversation through negligence.23 But such
opinion on the part of the CA would not overturn his several convictions for the intentional felonies of malversation of public funds
through falsification of public documents. As can be seen, both lower courts unanimously concluded that the State’s evidence
established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt for malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents. Their
unanimity rested on findings of fact that are nowbinding on the Court after he did not bring to our attention any fact or
circumstance that either lower court had not properly appreciated and considered and which, if so considered, could alter the
outcome in his favor. At any rate, even if it were assumed that the findings by the CA warranted his being guilty only of
malversation through negligence, the Court would not be barred from holding him liable for the intentional crime of malversation
of public funds through falsification of public documents because his appealing the convictions kept the door ajar for an increase
in his liability. It is axiomatic that by appealing he waived the constitutional protection against double jeopardy, leaving him open
to being convicted of whatever crimes the Court would ultimately conclude from the records to have been actually committed by
him within the terms of the allegations in the informations under which he had been arraigned.
Yet, we see an obvious need to correct the penalties imposed on the petitioner. He was duly convicted of 18 counts of
malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents, all complex crimes. Pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code,24 the penalty for each count is that prescribed on the more serious offense, to be imposed in its maximum period.
Falsification of a public document by a public officer is penalized with prision mayor and a fine not to exceed ₱5,000.00.25 Prision
mayor has a duration of six years and one day to 12 years of imprisonment.26 In contrast, the penalty for malversation ranges
from prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods to reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua
depending on the amount misappropriated, and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or to the total value of the
property embezzled, to wit:
Article 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation. — Any public officer who, by reason of the
duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall
consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds, or property, wholly or
partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision correccionalin its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved in the
misappropriation or malversation does not exceed two hundred pesos.
2. The penalty of prision mayorin its minimum and medium periods, if the amount involved is more than two
hundred pesos but does not exceed six thousand pesos.
3. The penalty of prision mayorin its maximum period to reclusion temporalin its minimum period, if the amount
involved is more than six thousand pesos but is less than twelve thousand pesos. 4. The penalty of reclusion
temporal, in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved is morethan twelve thousand pesos but is
less than twenty-two thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporalin
its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to
the amount of the funds malversed or equal tothe total value of the property embezzled. x x x x
To determine the maximum periods of the penalties tobe imposed on the petitioner, therefore, we must be guided by the
following rules, namely: (1) the penalties provided under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code constitute degrees; and (2)
considering that the penalties provided under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Codeare not composed of three periods, the time
included in the penalty prescribed should be divided into three equal portions, which each portion forming one period, pursuant to
Article 65 of the Revised Penal Code.27
Accordingly, the penalties prescribed under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code should be divided into three periods, with the
maximum period being the penalty properly imposable on each count, except in any instance where the penalty for falsification
would be greater than such penalties for malversation. The tabulation of the periods of the penalties prescribed under Article 217
of the Revised Penal Code follows, to wit:
[[reference - http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2014/july2014/176317.pdf]]
TABLE 1
Amount Penalty Duration Minimum Periods Maximum

Misappropriated prescribed Medium
Not exceeding Prision 2 years, 2 years, 3 years, 4 years,

₱200.00 correccional 4 months 4 months 6 months 9 months
in its and 1 day and 1 day and and 11 days
medium and to 6 years to 3 years, 21 days to to 6 years.
maximum 6 months 4 years,
periods and 20 days 9 months
and 10
days
More than ₱200 Prision 6 years and 6 years and 7 years, 8 years,
pesos but not mayorin its 1 day to 10 1 day to 4 months 8 months
exceeding minimum years 7 years and and 1 day and 1 day
₱6,000.00 and medium 4 months to 8 years to 10 years
periods and 8
Months
More than Prision 10 years 10 years 11 years, 13 years,

₱6,000.00 but mayor in its and 1 day and 1 day 6 months 1 month
less than maximum to 14 years to 11 years, and 21 and 11 days
₱12,000.00 period to and 6 months days to to 14 years
reclusion 8 months and 20 days 13 years, and
temporal in 1 month 8 months
its minimum and
period 10 days
More than Reclusion 14 years, 14 years, 16 years,
₱12,000.00 temporal in 8 months 8 months 5 months
but less than its medium and 1 day and 1 day and 11 days to
and to 20 years to 16 years, 18 years,
maximum 5 months 2 months
periods. and 10 days and
20 days
18 years,
2 months<
and 21 days
to 20 years/td>
More than Reclusion 17 years, 17 years, 18 years, Reclusion

₱22,000.00 temporal in 4 months 4 months 8 months perpetua
its maximum and 1 day and 1 day and 1 day
period to to to 18 years to 20 years
reclusion reclusion and
perpetua perpetua 8 months
Under Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, an indeterminate sentence is imposed on the offender consisting of a
maximum term and a minimum term.28 The maximum term is the penalty under the Revised Penal Code properly imposed after
considering any attending circumstance; while the minimum term is within the range of the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by the Revised Penal Codefor the offense committed.
The Indeterminate Sentence Lawwas applicable here, save for the counts for which the imposable penalty was reclusion
perpetua. Considering that each count was a complex crime without any modifying circumstances, the maximum term of the
penalty for each count is the maximum period as shown in Table 1, supra, except for the count dealt with in Criminal Case No.
4635 involving the misappropriated amount of ₱4,869.00, for which the corresponding penalty for malversation as stated in Table
1 was prision mayorin its minimum and medium periods. However, because such penalty for malversation was lower than the
penalty of prision mayor imposable on falsification of a public document under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, it is the
penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period that was applicable.
On other hand, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence for each count should come from the penalty next lower than that
prescribed under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, except in Criminal Case No. 4635 where the penalty next lower is
prision correccional in its full range, to wit:
TABLE 2
Penalty Penalty next Range of minimum term

prescribed lower in degree
under Art. 217
Prision Arresto mayor in 4 months and 1 day to 2 years and
correccional in its maximum 4 months
its medium and period to prision
maximum correccional in
periods its minimum
period
Prision mayor in Prision 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years
its correccional in
minimum and its medium and
medium maximum
period periods
Prision mayor in Prision mayor in 6 years and 1 day to 10 years

its its minimum and
maximum period medium periods
to
reclusion
temporal in
its minimum
period
Reclusion Prision mayor in 10 years and 1 day to 14 years and

temporal in its maximum 8 months
its medium and period to
maximum reclusion
periods. temporal in its
minimum period
Reclusion Not applicable in the present case since the proper imposable penalty to
temporal in be imposed upon the accused in already reclusion
its maximum perpetua
period to
reclusion
perpetua
Penalty Penalty next Range of minimum term

prescribed lower in degree
under Art. 171
Prision mayor Prision 6 months and 1 day to 6 years

correccional
To illustrate, the count involving the largest amount misappropriated by the accused totaling ₱75,489.76 merited the penalty of
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua, and a fine of ₱75,489.76. Obviously, the penalty is that
prescribed for malversation of public funds, the more serious offense.
In its consolidated decision of February 17, 2004, the RTC erred in pegging the maximum terms within the minimum periods of
the penalties prescribed under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
It committed another error by fixing indeterminate sentences on some counts despite the maximum of the imposable penalties
being reclusion perpetua. There is even one completely incorrect indeterminate sentence. And, as earlier noted, the penalty for
falsification under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code was applicable in Criminal Case No. 4635 involving ₱4,869.00 due to its
being the higher penalty.
The Court now tabulates the corrected indeterminate sentences, to wit:
TABLE 3
Amount Indeterminate sentence
misappropriated
Minimum term Maximum term
₱19,775.00 10 years and 1 day of 18 years, 2 months and 21 days

prision mayor of reclusion temporal
₱4,869.00 2 years of prision 10 years and 1 day to 12 years of
correccional prision mayor29
₱13,260.90 10 years and 1 day prision 18 years, 2 months and 21 days
mayor of reclusion temporal

₱11,390.00 6 years and 1 day of prision 13 years, 1 month and 11 days of

mayor prision mayor
₱9,736.86 6 years and 1 day of prision 13 years, 1 month and 11 days of
mayor prision mayor
₱39,050.00 - Reclusion perpetua




One more omission by the CA and the RTC concerned a matter of law. This refers to their failure to decree in favor of the
Government the return of the amounts criminally misappropriated by the accused. That he was already sentenced to pay the fine
in each count was an element of the penalties imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and was not the same thing as finding
him civilly liable for restitution, which the RTC and the CA should have included in the judgment. Indeed, as the Court
emphasized in Bacolod v. People,30 it was "imperative that the courts prescribe the proper penalties when convicting the accused,
and determine the civil liability to be imposed on the accused, unless there has been a reservation of the action to recover civil
liability or a waiver of its recovery," explaining the reason for doing so in the following manner:
It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA disregarded their express mandate under Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules
of Courtto have the judgment, if it was of conviction, state: "(1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts
committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the participation
of the accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the
accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the
offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived."
Their disregard compels us to actas we now do lest the Court be unreasonably seen as tolerant of their omission. That the
Spouses Cogtas did not themselves seek the correction of the omission by an appeal is no hindrance to this action because the
Court, as the final reviewing tribunal, has not only the authority but also the duty to correct at any time a matter of law and justice.
We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to avoid omitting reliefs that the parties are properly entitled to by law or in
equity under the established facts. Their judgments will not be worthy of the name unless they thereby fully determine the rights
and obligations of the litigants. It cannot be otherwise, for only by a full determination of such rights and obligations would they
betrue to the judicial office of administering justice and equity for all. Courts should then be alert and cautious in their rendition of
judgments of conviction in criminal cases. They should prescribe the legal penalties, which is what the Constitution and the law
require and expect them to do. Their prescription of the wrong penalties will be invalid and ineffectual for being done without
jurisdiction or in manifest grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. They should also determine and set the civil
liability ex delictoof the accused, in order to do justice to the complaining victims who are always entitled to them. The Rules of
Court mandates them to do so unless the enforcement of the civil liability by separate actions has been reserved or waived.31
In addition, the amounts to be returned to the Government as civil liability of the accused in each count shall earn interest of 6%
per annum reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment by the accused. 1âwphi 1
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on August 16, 2006 by the Court of Appeals subject to the
modification of the penalties imposed as stated in this decision.
ACCORDINGLY, the dispositive portion of the consolidated decision rendered on February 17, 2004 by the Regional Trial Court
is hereby AMENDED to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused GUILTY of the crime with which he is charged in:
1) Criminal Case No. 4634 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty from 10 years and one
day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 18 years, two months and 21 days of reclusion temporal, as
maximum; and to pay a fine of ₱19,775.00;
2) Criminal Case No. 4635 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty from two years of
prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum; and to pay a
fine of ₱5,000.00;
5) Criminal Case No. 4638and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penaltyfrom 10 years and one
day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 13 years, one month and 11 days of reclusion temporal, as
day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 13 years, one month and 11 days of reclusion temporal, as
7) Criminal Case No. 4640 and sentences him to suffer reclusion perpetua; and to pay a fine of
₱39,050.00;
₱38,878.55;
day of prision mayor, as m inimum, to 18 years, two months and 21 days of reclusion temporal, as
₱42,573.97;
₱40,598.40;
₱42,140.45;
13) Criminal Case No. 4646 and sentences him to suffer reclusion perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱47
,902.60;
14) Criminal Case No. 4647 and sentences him to suffer reclusion perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱52, 7
40.66;
15) Criminal Case No. 4648 and sentences him to suffer reclusion perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱75,489.
76;
₱54,948.47;
₱45,330.18;
₱37,842.05;
In addition, the accused shall pay to the Government the total amount of ₱614,268.73, plus interest of 6% per annum reckoned
from the finality of this decision until full payment, by way of his civil liability.
The accused shall further pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 186227 July 20, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ALLEN UDTOJAN MANTALABA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For this Court's consideration is the Decision1 dated July 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00240-MIN, affirming the Omnibus Judgment2 dated September 14, 2005, of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Butuan City in Criminal Case No. 10250 and Criminal Case No.
10251, finding appellant Allen Udtojan Mantalaba, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act (RA) 9165.
The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:
The Task Force Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) in Butuan City received a
report from an informer that a certain Allen Mantalaba, who was seventeen (17) years old at the
time, was selling shabu at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao District, Butuan City. Thus, a buy-bust team
was organized, composed of PO1 Randy Pajo, PO1 Eric Simon and two (2) poseur-buyers who
were provided with two (2) pieces of ₱100 marked bills to be used in the purchase.
Around 7 o'clock in the evening of October 1, 2003, the team, armed with the marked money,
proceeded to Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao District, Butuan City for the buy-bust operation. The two
poseur-buyers approached Allen who was sitting at a corner and said to be in the act of selling
shabu. PO1 Pajo saw the poseur-buyers and appellant talking to each other. Afterwards, the
appellant handed a sachet of shabu to one of the poseur-buyers and the latter gave the marked
money to the appellant. The poseur-buyers went back to the police officers and told them that the
transaction has been completed. Police officers Pajo and Simon rushed to the place and handcuffed
the appellant as he was leaving the place.
The police officers, still in the area of operation and in the presence of barangay officials Richard S.
Tandoy and Gresilda B. Tumala, searched the appellant and found a big sachet of shabu. PO1
Simon also pointed to the barangay officials the marked money, two pieces of ₱100 bill, thrown by
the appellant on the ground.
After the operation, and in the presence of the same barangay officials, the police officers made an
inventory of the items recovered from the appellant which are: (1) one big sachet of shabu which
they marked as RMP-1-10-01-03; (2) one small sachet of shabu which they marked as RMP 2-10-
01-03; and (3) two (2) pieces of one hundred pesos marked money and a fifty peso (₱50) bill.
Thereafter, a letter-request was prepared by Inspector Ferdinand B. Dacillo for the laboratory
examination of the two (2) sachets containing a crystalline substance, ultra-violet examination on the
person of the appellant as well as the two (2) pieces of one hundred pesos marked money. The
request was brought by PO1 Pajo and personally received by Police Inspector Virginia Sison-Gucor,
Forensic Chemical Officer of the Regional Crime Laboratory Office XII Butuan City, who immediately
conducted the examination. The laboratory examination revealed that the appellant tested positive
for the presence of bright orange ultra-violet fluorescent powder; and the crystalline substance
contained in two sachets, separately marked as RMP-1-10-01-03 and RMP-2-10-01-03, were
positively identified as methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Thereafter, two separate Informations were filed before the RTC of Butuan City against appellant for
violation of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165, stating the following:
Criminal Case No. 10250
That on or about the evening of October 1, 1003 at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao, Butuan City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without
authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sell zero point zero four one
two (0.0412) grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu which is a
dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW : (Violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165).3
Criminal Case No. 10251
That on or about the evening of October 1, 2003 at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao, Butuan City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without
authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess zero point six one
three one (0.6131) grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu, which is a
dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW: (Violation of Section 11, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165).4
Eventually, the cases were consolidated and tried jointly.
Appellant pleaded NOT GUILTY to the charges against him. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
In its Omnibus Judgment5 dated September 14, 2005, the RTC found the appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged, the dispositive portion of which, reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds accused Allen Mantalaba y Udtojan GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 10250 for selling shabu, a dangerous drug, as defined and
penalized under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. As provided for in Sec. 98 of R.A.
9165, where the offender is a minor, the penalty for acts punishable by life imprisonment to death
shall be reclusion perpetua to death. As such, Allen Mantalaba y Udtojan is hereby sentenced to
RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00).
In Criminal Case No. 10251, the Court likewise finds accused Allen Mantalaba y Udtojan GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt for illegally possessing shabu, a dangerous drug, weighing 0.6131 gram
as defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and accused being a
minor at the time of the commission of the offense, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
he is accordingly sentenced to six (6) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to eight (8) years, as
maximum of prision mayor and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱300,000.00).
SO ORDERED.6
The CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. It disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Butuan City dated September 14,
2005 appealed from finding the accused-appellant Allen Udtojan Mantalaba guilty beyond
reasonable doubt with the crime of Violation of Section 5 and Section 11, Article II of Republic Act
9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, is AFFIRMED in toto, with
costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.7
Thus, the present appeal.
Appellant states the lone argument that the lower court gravely erred in convicting him of the crime
charged despite failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
According to appellant, there was no evidence of actual sale between him and the poseur-buyer. He
also argues that the chain of custody of the seized shabu was not established. Finally, he asserts
that an accused should be presumed innocent and that the burden of proof is on the prosecution.
The petition is unmeritorious.
Appellant insists that the prosecution did not present any evidence that an actual sale took place.
However, based on the testimony of PO1 Randy Pajo, there is no doubt that the buy-bust operation
was successfully conducted, thus:
PROS. RUIZ:
Q: Will you explain to this Honorable Court why did you conduct and how did you
conduct your buy-bust operation at the time?
A: We conducted a buy-bust operation because of the report from our civilian assets
that Allen Mantalaba was engaged in drug trade and selling shabu. And after we
evaluated this Information we informed Inspector Dacillo that we will operate this
accused for possible apprehension.
Q: Before you conducted your buy-bust operation, what procedure did you take?
A: We prepared the operational plan for buy-bust against the suspect. We prepared a
request for powder dusting for our marked moneys to be used for the operation.
Q: Did you use marked moneys in this case?
xxxx
Q: Then armed with these marked moneys, what steps did you take next?
A: After briefing of our team, we proceeded immediately to the area.
Q: You mentioned of poseur-buyer, what would the poseur-buyer do?
A: We made an arrangement with the poseur-buyer that during the buying of shabu
there should be a pre-arranged signal of the poseur-buyer to the police officer.
Q: What happened when your poseur-buyer who, armed with this marked
moneys, approached the guy who was selling shabu at that time?
A: The poseur-buyer during that time gave the marked moneys to the suspect.
Q: Where were you when this poseur-buyer gave the moneys to the suspect?
A: We positioned ourselves about 10 meters away from the area of the poseur-buyer
and the suspect.
Q: You mentioned of the pre-arranged signal, what would this be?
A: This is a case-to-case basis, your Honor, in the pre-arrangement signal

because in the pre-arranged signal we used a cap and a towel. (sic) In the case,
of this suspect, there was no towel there was no cap at the time of giving the
shabu and the marked moneys to the suspect and considering also that that
was about 7:00 o'clock in the evening. The poseur-buyer immediately
proceeded to us and informed us that the shabu was already given by the
suspect.
Q: What did you do next after that?
A: After examining the sachet of shabu that it was really the plastic containing white
[crystalline] substance, we immediately approached the suspect.
Q: Who was with a (sic) suspect when you conducted the buy-bust operation[?] Was
he alone or did he had (sic) any companion at that time?
A: He was alone.
Q: When you rushed up to the suspect what did you do?
A: We informed the suspect that we are the police officers and he has this
constitutional rights and we immediately handcuffed him.
Q: Where were the marked moneys?
A: The marked moneys were thrown on the ground. After we handcuffed the suspect,
we did not immediately searched in. We called the attention of the barangay officials
to witness the search of the suspect.
Q: How many sachets of shabu have you taken from the suspect during the buy-bust
operation?
A: We took from the possession of the suspect one big sachet of shabu.
xxxx
Q: What was the result of the searched (sic) for him?
A: We confiscated one big sachet of suspected shabu and the retrieval of 2 pieces of
100 peso bills as marked moneys.8
What determines if there was, indeed, a sale of dangerous drugs in a buy-bust

operation is proof of the concurrence of all the elements of the offense, to wit: (1) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.9 From the above testimony of the
prosecution witness, it was well established that the elements have been
satisfactorily met. The seller and the poseur-buyer were properly identified. The
subject dangerous drug, as well as the marked money used, were also satisfactorily
presented. The testimony was also clear as to the manner in which the buy-bust
operation was conducted.
To corroborate the testimony of PO2 Pajo, the prosecution presented the testimony
of Police Inspector Virginia Sison-Gucor, a forensic chemical officer, who confirmed
that the plastic containing white crystalline substance was positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride and that the petitioner was in possession of the
marked money used in the buy-bust operation, thus:
PROS. RUIZ:
Q: What was the result of your examination or what were your findings on the
sachets of suspected shabu?
A: After the preliminary and confirmatory tests were conducted on the stated
specimen, the result was positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug.
xxxx
Q: What were your findings when you examined the living person of the accused, as
well as the marked money mentioned in this report?
A: According to my report, the findings for the living person of Allen Udtojan
Mantalaba is positive to the test for the presence of bright orange ultra-violet
flourescent powder. x x x10
The above only confirms that the buy-bust operation really occurred. Once again, this Court stresses
that a buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven procedure, sanctioned by law, for
apprehending drug peddlers and distributors.11 It is often utilized by law enforcers for the purpose of
trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their nefarious activities.12 In People v. Roa,13
this Court had the opportunity to expound on the nature and importance of a buy-bust operation,
ruling that:
In the first place, coordination with the PDEA is not an indispensable requirement before police
authorities may carry out a buy-bust operation. While it is true that Section 8614 of Republic Act No.
9165 requires the National Bureau of Investigation, PNP and the Bureau of Customs to maintain
"close coordination with the PDEA on all drug-related matters," the provision does not, by so saying,
make PDEA's participation a condition sine qua non for every buy-bust operation. After all, a buy-
bust is just a form of an in flagrante arrest sanctioned by Section 5, Rule 11315 of the Rules of the
Court, which police authorities may rightfully resort to in apprehending violators of Republic Act No.
9165 in support of the PDEA.16 A buy-bust operation is not invalidated by mere non-coordination with
the PDEA.
Neither is the lack of prior surveillance fatal. The case of People v. Lacbanes17 is quite instructive:
In People v. Ganguso,18 it has been held that prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of
an entrapment operation, especially when the buy-bust team members were accompanied to the
scene by their informant. In the instant case, the arresting officers were led to the scene by the
poseur-buyer. Granting that there was no surveillance conducted before the buy-bust operation, this
Court held in People v. Tranca,19 that there is no rigid or textbook method of conducting buy-bust
operations. Flexibility is a trait of good police work. The police officers may decide that time is of the
essence and dispense with the need for prior surveillance.20
The rule is that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great
respect because trial courts have the advantage of observing the demeanor of the witnesses as they
testify. This is more true if such findings were affirmed by the appellate court. When the trial court's
findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally binding upon this
Court.21
In connection therewith, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, was also correct in finding that the
appellant is equally guilty of violation of Section 11 of RA 9165, or the illegal possession of
dangerous drug. As an incident to the lawful arrest of the appellant after the consummation of the
buy-bust operation, the arresting officers had the authority to search the person of the appellant. In
the said search, the appellant was caught in possession of 0.6131 grams of shabu. In illegal
possession of dangerous drugs, the elements are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or
object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and
(3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.22
As a defense, appellant denied that he owns the shabu and the marked money confiscated from
him. However, based on his cross-examination, such denial was not convincing enough to merit
reasonable doubt, thus:
PROS. RUIZ:
Q: So it is true now that when these police officers passed you by they
recovered from your possession one sachet of shabu?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And it is true that after you were arrested and when you were searched they
also found another sachet of shabu also in your pocket?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you mentioned in your counter-affidavit marked as Exhibit H for the

prosecution that no money was taken from you because you have none at that time,
is it not?
A: None sir, only the ₱250.00 which Jonald Ybanoso left to me.
Q: This ₱250.00 which Jonald left to you was also confiscated from your
possession?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Were not ₱200 of the ₱250.00 was thrown to the ground during the time you were
arrested by the police?
A: No, sir.
Q: It was taken from your possession?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And when the policemen brought you to the crime laboratory and had your hands
tested for ultra-violet fluorescent powder, your hands tested positively for the
presence of the said powder?
A: Yes, sir.23
Incidentally, the defenses of denial and frame-up have been invariably viewed by this Court with
disfavor for it can easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in prosecutions
for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. In order to prosper, the defenses of denial and frame-up
must be proved with strong and convincing evidence.24
Another contention raised by the appellant is the failure of the prosecution to show the chain of
custody of the recovered dangerous drug. According to him, while it was Inspector Ferdinand B.
Dacillo who signed the request for laboratory examination, only police officers Pajo and Simon were
present in the buy-bust operation.
Section 21 of RA 9165 reads:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof.
Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long as there is
justifiable ground therefor, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
confiscated/seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team.25 Its non-
compliance will not render an accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him
inadmissible.26 What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused.27 In this particular case, it is undisputed that police officers Pajo and
Simon were members of the buy-bust operation team. The fact that it was Inspector Ferdinand B.
Dacillo who signed the letter-request for laboratory examination does not in any way affect the
integrity of the items confiscated. All the requirements for the proper chain of custody had been
observed. As testified to by PO2 Pajo regarding the procedure undertaken after the consummation
of the buy-bust operation:
Prosecutor
Q: What did you do next after that?
A: After examining the sachet of shabu that it was really the plastic containing white
[crystalline] in substance, we immediately approached the suspect.
xxxx
Q: When you rushed up to the suspect, what did you do?
A: We informed the suspect that we are the police officers and he has this
[constitutional] rights and immediately handcuffed him.
Q: Where were the marked moneys?
A: The marked moneys were thrown on the ground. After we handcuffed the suspect,
we did not immediately searched in. We called the attention of the barangay officials
to witness the search of the suspect.
xxxx
Q: Now, before you searched the suspect you requested the presence of the
barangay officials. Now, when these barangay officials were present, what did you do
on the suspect?
A: We immediately searched the suspect.
Q: What was the result of the searched for him? (sic)
A: We confiscated one big sachet of suspected shabu and the retrieval of 2 pieces of
₱100.00 peso bills as marked moneys.
Q: You said the suspect threw the marked moneys when you searched him, where
were the marked moneys?
A: On the ground.
Q: Who picked these marked moneys?
A: I was the one who picked the marked moneys.
Q: And then after you had picked the marked moneys and after you had the 2 pieces
of sachets of shabu; one during the buy-bust and the other one during the search,
what did you do [with] these 2 pieces of sachets of shabu and the marked moneys?
A: I recorded those items recovered, sir, during the search to the Certificate of
Inventory.28
As ruled by this Court, what is crucial in the chain of custody is the marking of the confiscated item
which, in the present case, was complied with, thus:
Crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking29 of the seized drugs or other related items
immediately after they are seized from the accused. Marking after seizure is the starting point in the
custodial link, thus, it is vital that the seized contraband are immediately marked because
succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the markings as reference. The marking of the
evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related
evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of
criminal proceedings, obviating switching, "planting," or contamination of evidence.30
Anent the age of the appellant when he was arrested, this Court finds it appropriate to discuss the
effect of his minority in his suspension of sentence. The appellant was seventeen (17) years old
when the buy-bust operation took place or when the said offense was committed, but was no longer
a minor at the time of the promulgation of the RTC's Decision.
It must be noted that RA 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, while the RTC promulgated its decision
on this case on September 14, 2005, when said appellant was no longer a minor. The RTC did not
suspend the sentence in accordance with Article 192 of P.D. 603, The Child and Youth Welfare
Code31 and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law,32 the
laws that were applicable at the time of the promulgation of judgment, because the imposable
penalty for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 is life imprisonment to death.
It may be argued that the appellant should have been entitled to a suspension of his sentence under
Sections 38 and 68 of RA 9344 which provide for its retroactive application, thus:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of
age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court
shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed.
However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict
with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That
suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen years (18) of age
or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the court
shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court [Rule] on
Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
xxxx
Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentence. - Persons who have been
convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the
age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for which they were
convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act.
xxx
However, this Court has already ruled in People v. Sarcia33 that while Section 38 of RA 9344
provides that suspension of sentence can still be applied even if the child in conflict with the law is
already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt, Section
40 of the same law limits the said suspension of sentence until the child reaches the maximum age
of 21. The provision states:
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. - If the court finds that the objective of
the disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if
the child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the condition of his/her disposition
or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before the court for
execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended
sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to
order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period
or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.
Hence, the appellant, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one (21) years can no longer avail of the
provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of RA 9344 as to his suspension of sentence, because such is
already moot and academic. It is highly noted that this would not have happened if the CA, when this
case was under its jurisdiction, suspended the sentence of the appellant. The records show that the
appellant filed his notice of appeal at the age of 19 (2005), hence, when RA 9344 became effective
in 2006, appellant was 20 years old, and the case having been elevated to the CA, the latter should
have suspended the sentence of the appellant because he was already entitled to the provisions of
Section 38 of the same law, which now allows the suspension of sentence of minors regardless of
the penalty imposed as opposed to the provisions of Article 192 of P.D. 603.34
Nevertheless, the appellant shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Section 51 of RA No.
9344, which provides for the confinement of convicted children as follows:35
SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and other Training Facilities. - A
child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve
his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and
other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the
BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
In finding the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165,
the RTC imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua as mandated in Section 9836 of the same law. A
violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 merits the penalty of life imprisonment to death; however, in
Section 98, it is provided that, where the offender is a minor, the penalty for acts punishable by life
imprisonment to death provided in the same law shall be reclusion perpetua to death. Basically, this
means that the penalty can now be graduated as it has adopted the technical nomenclature of
penalties provided for in the Revised Penal Code. The said principle was enunciated by this Court in
People v. Simon,37 thus:
We are not unaware of cases in the past wherein it was held that, in imposing the penalty for
offenses under special laws, the rules on mitigating or aggravating circumstances under the Revised
Penal Code cannot and should not be applied. A review of such doctrines as applied in said cases,
however, reveals that the reason therefor was because the special laws involved provided their own
specific penalties for the offenses punished thereunder, and which penalties were not taken from or
with reference to those in the Revised Penal Code. Since the penalties then provided by the special
laws concerned did not provide for the minimum, medium or maximum periods, it would
consequently be impossible to consider the aforestated modifying circumstances whose main
function is to determine the period of the penalty in accordance with the rules in Article 64 of the
Code.
This is also the rationale for the holding in previous cases that the provisions of the Code on the
graduation of penalties by degrees could not be given supplementary application to special laws,
since the penalties in the latter were not components of or contemplated in the scale of penalties
provided by Article 71 of the former. The suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code to special
laws, as provided in Article 10 of the former, cannot be invoked where there is a legal or physical
impossibility of, or a prohibition in the special law against, such supplementary application.
The situation, however, is different where although the offense is defined in and ostensibly punished
under a special law, the penalty therefor is actually taken from the Revised Penal Code in its
technical nomenclature and, necessarily, with its duration, correlation and legal effects under the
system of penalties native to said Code. When, as in this case, the law involved speaks of prision
correccional, in its technical sense under the Code, it would consequently be both illogical and
absurd to posit otherwise.
xxxx
Prefatorily, what ordinarily are involved in the graduation and consequently determine the degree of
the penalty, in accordance with the rules in Article 61 of the Code as applied to the scale of penalties
in Article 71, are the stage of execution of the crime and the nature of the participation of the
accused. However, under paragraph 5 of Article 64, when there are two or more ordinary mitigating
circumstances and no aggravating circumstance, the penalty shall be reduced by one degree. Also,
the presence of privileged mitigating circumstances, as provided in Articles 67 and 68, can
reduce the penalty by one or two degrees, or even more. These provisions of Articles 64(5), 67
and 68 should not apply in toto in the determination of the proper penalty under the aforestated
second paragraph of section 20 of Republic Act No. 6425, to avoid anomalous results which could
not have been contemplated by the legislature.
Thus, paragraph 5 of Article 61 provides that when the law prescribes a penalty in some manner not
specially provided for in the four preceding paragraphs thereof, the courts shall proceed by analogy
therewith. Hence, when the penalty prescribed for the crime consists of one or two penalties to be
imposed in their full extent, the penalty next lower in degree shall likewise consist of as many
penalties which follow the former in the scale in Article 71. If this rule were to be applied, and since
the complex penalty in this case consists of three discrete penalties in their full extent, that is, prision
correccional, prision mayor and reclusion temporal, then one degree lower would be arresto menor,
destierro and arresto mayor. There could, however, be no further reduction by still one or two
degrees, which must each likewise consist of three penalties, since only the penalties of fine and
public censure remain in the scale. 1avvphi 1
The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances may be appreciated to determine the
periods of the corresponding penalties, or even reduce the penalty by degrees, in no case should
such graduation of penalties reduce the imposable penalty beyond or lower than prision
correccional. It is for this reason that the three component penalties in the second paragraph of
Section 20 shall each be considered as an independent principal penalty, and that the lowest penalty
should in any event be prision correccional in order not to depreciate the seriousness of drug
offenses. Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Such interpretation is to be
adopted so that the law may continue to have efficacy rather than fail. A perfect judicial solution
cannot be forged from an imperfect law, which impasse should now be the concern of and is
accordingly addressed to Congress.38
Consequently, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority39 can now be appreciated in fixing
the penalty that should be imposed. The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, imposed the penalty of
reclusion perpetua without considering the minority of the appellant. Thus, applying the rules stated
above, the proper penalty should be one degree lower than reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion
temporal, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority having been appreciated. Necessarily,
also applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLAW), the minimum penalty should be taken from
the penalty next lower in degree which is prision mayor and the maximum penalty shall be taken
from the medium period of reclusion temporal, there being no other mitigating circumstance nor
aggravating circumstance.40 The ISLAW is applicable in the present case because the penalty which
has been originally an indivisible penalty (reclusion perpetua to death), where ISLAW is inapplicable,
became a divisible penalty (reclusion temporal) by virtue of the presence of the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority. Therefore, a penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, would be the proper imposable penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 00240-MIN, affirming the Omnibus Judgment dated September 14, 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 1, Butuan City in Criminal Case No. 10250 and Criminal Case No. 10251, finding
appellant Allen Udtojan Mantalaba, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and 11,
Article II of RA 9165 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty that should be
imposed on appellant's conviction of violation of Section 5 of RA 9165, is six (6) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.

Islaw C-E

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G.R. No.

92020 October 19, 1992

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds both the accused ELISEO MARTINADO y

The accused HERMOGENES MARTINADO shall be credited in the service

xxx xxx xxx

To this effect a modification is in order of the provision of the last sentence of

If the judgment is for conviction, and the accused's failure to

It should provide instead that it upon promulgation of the judgment, the

Sec. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to prosecute. —

xxx xxx xxx

1. Seiko men's watch (5) worth — P 800.00

2. Men's ring worth — P1,800.00

3. Wallet containing cash in the amount of — P2,500.00

The following is the version as shown by the evidence adduced by the

At about 6:15 o'clock in the afternoon of November 14, 1986, Margarita

At about this time, Elizabeth Carillo, a neighbor and a government employee

Gerardo Arellano, a Barangay tanod of the place where the incident

Gerardo Arellano and his companions proceeded to the house of "Rolly" at

Seiko wristwatch –– P 800.00

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

The appeal is anchored on the following assignment of errors:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANTS

xxx xxx xxx

A Things were missing, sir.

Q Did you come to know what were those missing things?

A Watches (sic), wallet.

Q How did you come to know that?

A Because he was not wearing his wristwatch and his wallet

Q Whose wallet was missing?

A Juan Matias, sir.

Q Do you know what kind of watch is owned or being worn by

Q How did you come to know that?

A I used to see that watch because I have been staying there

Q You said that wallets (sic) was missing, do you know if

xxx xxx xxx

How did you know that a wallet was missing?

A Because the wallet was no longer at the back pocket of his

Carillo declared that:

A I saw Rolly returned (sic) and picked (sic) up something, sir.

Q Did you see what Rolly picked up at that time?

Q What was that?

Q Could you describe the watch picked up by Rolly at that

A I cannot describe the make, sir, the trademark but it is a

Q I am going to quote your answer: "Oho, ito hong dalawang

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

A I did not see that Rolly anymore because as I have said

xxx xxx xxx

Q While (sic) ago, during your direct testimony and even on

A I only saw the two of them drinking softdrinks, that is what I

As to conspiracy, the trial court correctly declared that:

The Decision is AFFIRMED in all other respects.

MANOLITO GIL Z. ZAFRA, Petitioner,

The CA summarized the factual antecedents as follows:

On his part, the petitioner tendered the following version, to wit:

Decision of the RTC

And to pay costs.

I. x x x IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS THRU FALSIFICATION

Anent the malversation, the CA opined: