Title: JOHN JOSEPH LUMANLAW y BULINAO, Petitioner, vs. Hon. EDUARDO B.

PERALTA JR., in His Capacity as Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court (Branch
13), Manila, Respondent.

Ponente: PANGANIBAN, CJ.

Date Published: February 13, 2006

Quick Facts:

Petitioner Lumanlaw was apprehended by the Western Police District near San Diego
Street, Sampaloc, Manila, on the evening of November 26, 2002, for illegal possession
of a dangerous drug. He was charged in an Information filed with Branch 13 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.

The resolution of these matters was overtaken by Judge Arranz’s retirement from
public service. Thus, the arraignment scheduled for February 21, 2003, had to be
postponed. This Court designated herein respondent, Judge Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr., as
acting presiding judge of Branch 13, Regional Trial Court, Manila, in Administrative Order
No. 27-2003 issued on February 18, 2003.

On March 26, 2003, the newly designated acting presiding judge issued an Order
setting the arraignment of petitioner on April 23, 2003. On the latter date, the
arraignment was reset to June 25, 2003, due to the public prosecutor’s absence.

On June 25, 2003, petitioner’s counsel received the lower court’s Order granting
Lumanlaw’s Petition to Reduce Bail and denying his Motion for Preliminary Investigation
for having been filed beyond the reglementary period. In the same Order, the trial court
set petitioner’s arraignment on August 6, 2003.

The arraignment was postponed again, this time due to the absence of petitioner’s
counsel. According to him, he requested the court to proceed with the arraignment, with
the public defender assisting the accused, but that respondent judge denied the request
on the ground that petitioner was already represented by a counsel de parte.12 The trial
court then re-scheduled the arraignment on September 24, 2003.

Again, the arraignment did not occur on December 10, 2003, because petitioner had
not been brought to the court by the wardens of the Manila City Jail. According to the trial
court’s Order, there was no proof of service on the Manila City Jail. The arraignment was
thus reset to March 1, 2004.
Notably, a year had passed since the filing of the Information, yet Lumanlaw remained
uninformed of the charges against him, while continuing to be in detention and despair all
throughout that period of limbo. Owing to this insufferable state of affairs, petitioner’s
counsel manifested his intention to file a motion to dismiss on account of the
violation of his client’s right to a speedy trial. Accordingly, an Urgent Motion to
Dismiss was filed on December 19, 2003. The Motion was heard on February 20, 2004,
but was promptly denied by the trial court. The arraignment was reset yet again to
March 17, 2004.

The arraignment did not take place, however, because the accused was not produced
in court by the jail wardens concerned. It turned out that the trial court had not issued a
"produce order" to the Manila City Jail. Another resetting was ordered for April 16,
2004.

Now frustrated with the repeated postponements, petitioner filed a Second Urgent Motion
to Dismiss on March 22, 2004. Relying on the provisions of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, mandating that arraignment should be held within thirty (30) days from
the date the court acquired jurisdiction over the accused, petitioner argued that the
protracted delay of his arraignment violated his constitutional right to speedy trial.

Summary:

A. Petitioner/Appellee: JOHN JOSEPH LUMANLAW y BULINAO

B. Respondent/Appellant: Hon. EDUARDO B. PERALTA JR., in His Capacity as

Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court (Branch 13), Manila

C. Resolution of the Lower Court:

The Motion was heard on February 20, 2004, but was promptly denied by the trial
court.

D. Issues Raised by Petitioner/Appellee:

Whether or not the failure of public respondent to conduct the arraignment of the petitioner
despite the delay of one (1) year, nine (9) months and four (4) days constitute undue and
unjustifiable delay in violation of his constitutional right to speedy trial.

Whether or not such undue and unjustifiable delay would warrant the dismissal of the
Information filed against the petitioner.

E. Issues raised by Respondent/Appellant:

Whether the Petition for Mandamus should be given due course.

 F. Resolution of the SC:

Right to Speedy Trial

Arraignment is a vital stage in criminal proceedings in which the accused are formally
informed of the charges against them. The proper conduct of the arraignment is provided
in Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. A perusal of the provision shows
that arraignment is not a mere formality, but an integral part of due process. Particularly,
it implements the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against them and their right to speedy trial.

x x x. [T]he right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed
violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when
without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the
party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine
whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition
of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant
are weighed, and such factors as length of the delay, reason for the delay, the defendant’s
assertion or non-assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant resulting from the
delay, are considered.

Reasonable Postponements

The delay caused by Judge Arranz’s retirement may be deemed a normal part of the
ordinary conduct of court business and was not necessarily unreasonable.

Unjustified Delay

This Court reviewed the other reasons for the postponements in this case, but finds them
far from being reasonable. There were fourteen postponements in all. Going over the
causes for the delays, we see the lack of earnest effort on the part of respondent to
conduct the arraignment as soon as the court calendar would allow. Most of the
postponements could have easily been avoided if he had been more keen on respecting
and upholding petitioner’s constitutional right to speedy trial and speedy disposition.

Postponement Due to Absence of Counsel

The appointment of a counsel de oficio in the absence of the defendant’s counsel de parte
is not prohibited, not even by the Constitution, especially when the accused themselves
request that appointment. In fact, the court has a mandatory duty to appoint a counsel de
oficio when the accused have no counsel of choice at the time of their arraignment.
Responsibility of Judges in Minimizing Delay

The foremost cause for the lengthy delay in this case was the repeated failure of the jail
wardens to bring the accused to court. No less than four court settings,spanning seven
months, were postponed on this ground alone. To be sure, this recurring circumstance
was caused, in different instances, by the failure of the court personnel to issue the
produce order on time and by the dereliction of the jail wardens. Remarkably, although
respondent judge was justified in deferring the arraignment until the accused was
presented, the problem could have been easily averted by efficient court management.

In the light of the numerous and unreasonable delays in the arraignment of

petitioner, the sought for dismissal of the Information filed against him is in order.

Second Issue:

Propriety of a Petition for Mandamus

It is the policy of this Court not to deny a writ of mandamus on purely technical matters, if
a party would be deprived of substantive rights. Procedural rules should not be strictly
enforced when their enforcement would result in a miscarriage of justice. This principle
holds, especially when a petition is meritorious and the trial judge clearly violated
petitioner’s constitutional right. The protection of our people’s civil liberties overwhelms
all rules of procedure. These rules are mere tools for facilitating the attainment of justice.
As explicitly provided in the Rules of Court itself, they "shall be liberally construed in order
to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every
action and proceeding.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Criminal Case No. 02-208425-26 pending

before Branch 13 of the Manila Regional Trial Court is DISMISSED. Petitioner is
hereby ordered RELEASED from the Manila City Jail, where he is currently
detained, unless he is being held for any other lawful cause.

G. Relevance to the topic:

Arraignment is a vital stage in criminal proceedings in which the accused are formally
informed of the charges against them. The proper conduct of the arraignment is provided
in Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. A perusal of the provision
shows that arraignment is not a mere formality, but an integral part of due process.
Particularly, it implements the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against them and their right to speedy trial.
Title: Estrella Taglay vs. Judge Marivic Daray and Loverie Palacay
Ponente: Justice Peralta
Date Published: August 22. 2012

Quick Facts:

This case arose from the criminal case filed by the respondent at MCTC of Davao del Sur
on the ground of Qualified Trespass to Dwelling.

Finding Probable Cause to indict petitioner, the public prosecutor assigned filed
Information before the court on November 19, 2001.

June 7, 2002, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Pre-trial was set on August 13, 2002.
However, MCTC issued an order transferring the case to the RTC for lack of jurisdiction.

The respondent is a minor.

RA 8369 or the Family Court’s Act of 1997, which took effect on November 23, 1997.
Section 5, (a) clearly stated that Family Court has exclusive jurisdiction over criminal
cases where one or more of the accused is below 18 years of age but not less than 9
years of age, or one or more of the victims is a minor at the time of the commission of the
offense.

Petitioner filed a case for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction and also for lack of arraignment
in the RTC.

Summary:

A. Petitioner/Appellee: Estrella Taglay

B. Respondent/Appellant: Judge Marivic Daray and Loverie Palacay
C. Resolution of the Lower Court:

RTC – deny the petition for Dismissal and for Motion for Reconsideration

D. Issues Raised by Petitioner/Appellee:

A. The case should be dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Circular no. 11-99, which authorizes the transfer of Family Court cases
filed with first level courts to RTC is applicable only before the effectivity
of said circular on March 1, 1999.

In this case, it could no longer be transferred to RTC but instead be dismissed.

B. Petitioner also insists that there should be a new arraignment under RTC and the
arraignment in the MCTC should not be counted because the proceeding therein was
void.

E. Issues raised by Respondent/Appellant:

A. the defect of lack of jurisdiction was already cured on the ground that the petitioner’s
counsel did not object the lack of jurisdiction and actively participated in the trial and the
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses.

B. the accused was already arraigned in the MCTC. Under Admin. Matter 99-1-13-SC
and Circular no. 11-99 mandated to transfer the case to RTC.

F. Resolution of the SC:

The petition is meritorious.

It is true that petitioner was arraigned in the MCTC but the latter has no jurisdiction in the
present case. It settled that cases like this be considered null and void. The arraignment
of the petitioner is also null and void. Thus, there is a need of new arraignment in the
RTC.

It is true that petitioner did not object however, the jurisprudence presented by the
respondent is not applicable in this case since all the accused in the latter are arraigned
though belatedly. In this case, the petitioner was not arraigned. More importantly, what
justifies the dismissal in the MCTC was that the information did not allege the minority of
the respondent.

Arraignment is the formal mode and manner of implementing the constitutional right of an
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The
purpose of arraignment is, thus, to apprise the accused of the possible loss of freedom,
even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him, or at the very least
to inform him of why the prosecuting arm of the State is mobilized against him. As an
indispensable requirement of due process, an arraignment cannot be regarded lightly
or brushed aside peremptorily. Otherwise, absence of arraignment results in the nullity
of the proceedings before the trial court.

Petition is granted. The decision of the RTC was reversed and set aside without
prejudice to refiling the same in the proper court.

G. Relevance to the topic: Arraignment.

Title: People vs Madraga
Ponente: Justice Buena
Date Published: Nov. 15, 2000

Quick Facts:
The case involves an automatic review of the Decision of the RTC of Isabela, Basilan,
Branch 2, which has found herein accused-appellant, Rodolfo Oling Madraga, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed against his 16-year old
daughter.

Madraga was charged with 2 counts of rape committed against his own 16-year old
daughter, Fe C. Madraga. At the arraignment, accused-appellant, with the assistance of
Atty. Banico, entered separate pleas of not guilty for each case.

The accused-appellant pleaded guilty to the first rape case, wherein he claimed to be
drunk, in the condition that the other rape case will be tried on another date. The trial court
convicted the accused-appellant Madraga GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
committing the said crime of rape against his daughter and sentenced him with death
penalty. Thus, the automatic review and appeal submitted to the Supreme Court.

Summary:

Petitioner/Appellee: People of the Philippines

Respondent/Appellant: Rodolfo O. Madraga
Resolution of the Lower Court: The trial court convicted the accused-appellant
Madraga GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of committing the said crime of rape against
his daughter and sentenced him with death penalty.
Issues Raised by Petitioner/Appellee: None
E. Issues raised by Respondent/Appellant:

Accused-appellant was denied due process. - Appellant contends that he was illegally
arrested, because there was no warrant of arrest issued for his arrest. Worse, appellant
avers, his right to preliminary investigation was not observed, although there is no
showing that he waived his right thereto. Appellant further alleges that there was
irregularity in the filing of the information in that a criminal complaint was filed on
September 10, 1996.
The plea of guilt of accused-appellant is null and void as the trial court violated Section 3,
Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. - Appellant, through the FLAG (Free
Legal Assistance Group), argues that the trial judge failed to conduct a searching inquiry
into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the accused’s plea of guilty to the capital
offense, as mandated in Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the New Rules on Criminal Procedure. Thus,
this case should be remanded to the court of origin for further and appropriate
proceedings.

F. Resolution of the SC:

The contentions have no merit.

Accused-appellant was denied due process - In the recent case of People vs. Galleno,
the Court held that an accused, as in this case, is estopped from questioning any defect
in the manner of his arrest if he fails to move for the quashing of the information before
the trial court, or if he voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court by entering
a plea, and by participating in the trial.

With regards to the absence of preliminary investigation, this Court ruled in Sanciangco,
Jr. vs. People 10 and cited in Larranaga vs. Court of Appeals, that “the absence of
preliminary investigation does not affect the court’s jurisdiction over the case. Nor does it
impair the validity of the (complaint) or otherwise render it defective.

The plea of guilt of accused-appellant is null and void - According to the court FLAG’s
contention would have been correct were it not for the circumstance that accused-
appellant did not, in fact, plead guilty to a capital offense in the first place. On this matter,
Atty. Banico correctly pointed out that only the first paragraph of the complaint mentions
the age of the private complainant and the relationship of the accused to the private
complainant, i.e., that the accused is the father of the private complainant. Atty. Banico is
correct in arguing that the first paragraph of the complaint is not part of the allegation of
the charge for rape to which appellant pleaded guilty. Therefore, said complaint charges
only simple rape under Art. 335, for which the penalty is only reclusion perpetua, and not
for rape under R.A. 7659, qualified by the circumstance that the offender is the father of
the victim who is a minor, for which the penalty is death.

In other words, since the appellant did not plead guilty to a capital offense, he cannot
properly invoke Sec. 3, Rule 116, and People vs. Estomaca, to have this case remanded
to the trial court for compliance with said rule.

The court tackled the issue of whether or not the prosecution was able to prove appellant’s
guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and the appropriate penalty to be imposed on appellant.
But first, they identified the manner in which appellant entered his plea of guilt. Accused-
appellant entered a plea of guilty, but it appears from the records of the proceedings
before the court a quo that the same was a conditional plea, because appellant’s counsel
argued that the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and drunkenness should be
appreciated in favor of the appellant.

A conditional plea of guilty, or one entered subject to the provision that a certain penalty
be imposed upon him, is equivalent to a plea of not guilty and would, therefore, require a
full-blown trial before judgment may be rendered. The question now arises: Was a
fullblown trial conducted? The court said yes. The prosecution presented evidence to
prove the commission of the crime as charged in the Complaint. The victim testified and
was cross-examined. An examination of the victim’s testimony shows that she testified in
a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner, and remained consistent.

The Court affirmed RTc’s decision but reduced the penalty imposed to reclusion
perpetua.

G. Relevance to the Topic:

Validity of a plea of guilt and conditional plea of guilt and its effects.
Title: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIIF AND APPELLEE, VS. JAIME
SANTOS, ALIAS "LA PERLA", ALIAS "VELASCO", ALIAS "SANTOS" ET AL.,
DEFENDANTS. JAIME SANTOS, APPELLANT.

Ponente: FELIX, J.

Date Published: September 17, 1958

Quick Facts:

A total of 10 separate informations were filed before the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, charging the defendants therein with the complex crime of rebellion with
murders, robberies, etc.

Summary:

E. Petitioner/Appellee: People of the Philippines

F. Respondent/Appellant: Jaime Santos

G. Resolution of the Lower Court:

 charging the defendants therein with the complex crime of rebellion with
murders, robberies,
This Court finds the accused Jaime Santos, alias Velasco, La Perla, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the complex crime of rebellion, with multiple murder, arson,
and robbery, etc.

H. Issues Raised by Petitioner/Appellee: None

E. Issues raised by Respondent/Appellant:

(1) In not sentencing the appellant to suffer imprisonment of 1 year, 1 month and 10
days of prision correctional;

(2) In imposing upon the appellant the penalty of life imprisonment;

(3) In not following the doctrine laid down in the cases of People vs. Hernandez (52 Off.
Gaz. [12] 5506; 99 Phil., 515) and People vs. Gerdnimo (53 Off. Gaz., [1] 68; 100 Phil.,
90). Appellant Santos does not controvert the findings of fact of the trial court so the case
is limited to the single issue of whether or not there exists a complex crime of rebellion
with murders, robberies, etc., defined and punished under the Revised Penal Code.

F. Resolution of the SC:

Santos admitted in his confession that he participated in the raids:

  On the ground of the multiplicity of offenses charged therein in violation of Section
2-(e) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court- cannot be considered as independent
common crimes.

 the latter are either absorbed by the crime of rebellion if committed in pursuance
of the aims, purposes and objectives of the rebels and in furtherance of their
intention to overthrow the duly constituted government by force
 holding that the lower Court erred in finding appellant guilty of the complex crime
of rebellion with murders, arson and robbery and that appellant should be only
found guilty of simple rebellion

G. Relevance to the topic:

CRIMINAL LAW; REBELLION; CRIME CANNOT BE COMPLEXED WITH OTHER

COMMON CRIMES. — There is no question that appellant committed the crime of
rebellion, but as this Court already held in the cases of People v. Amado V. Hernandez
Et. Al., 99 Phil., 515 and the later case of People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil., 90 (by a voting
of 7 against 4) this crime cannot be complexed with other common crimes, because the
latter are either absorbed by the crime of rebellion if committed in pursuance of the aims,
purposes and objectives of the rebels and in furtherance of their intention to overthrow
the duly constituted government by force, or are independent common crimes which had
no connection with the rebellion and must be separately prosecuted in the proper court
within the territorial jurisdiction of which the same had been committed.
Title: People vs Halil Gambao y Esmail
Ponente: Justice Perez
Date Published: Oct. 1, 2013

Quick Facts:

The case involves an Automatic Review of the Decision of the CA which affirmed with
modification the Decision of the RTC of Pasay City finding the accused-appellants Halil
Gambao y Esmail, et al, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping for ransom.

The accused-appellants, along with an unidentified person, were charged for Kidnapping
for Ransom of Lucia Chan y Lee. Chan was a fish dealer based in Manila. On Aug. 12,
1998, accused-appellants Gambao, et al abducted Chan in her home. The police
surveillance team successfully apprehended the accused-appellants resulting in the safe
rescue of Chan.

During the hearing, after the victim and her son testified, Karim manifested his desire to
change his earlier plea of "not guilty" to "guilty." The presiding judge then explained the
consequences of a change of plea; that the court will outrightly sentence the accussed to
the penalty provided by law after the prosecution shall have finished the presentation
of its evidence. After the judge explained the consequences, Karim still plead guilty. On
hearing this clarification, the other appellants likewise manifested, through their counsel
who had earlier conferred with them and explained to each of them the consequences of
a change of plea, their desire to change the pleas they entered. The trial court separately
asked each of the appellants. All of them answered in the affirmative.

Thereupon, the trial court ordered their re-arraignment. After they pleaded guilty,
the trial court directed the prosecution to present evidence, which it did.

Then RTC rendered a decision convicting Gambao, et al of Kidnapping for Ransom.

Hence, they appealed to the CA. The appellate court affirmed with modifications the
decision of the trial court. Imposing to pay moral damages of Php50,000.

The accused-appellants submitted their various briefs and manifestations to the SC.
Summary:

I. Petitioner/Appellee: People of the Philippines

J. Respondent/Appellant: HALIL GAMBAO Y ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM Y USO,

EDWIN DUKILMAN Y SUBOH, TONY ABAO Y SULA, RAUL UDAL Y KAGUI, THENG
DILANGALEN Y NANDING, JAMAN MACALINBOL Y KATOL, MONETTE RONAS Y
AMPIL, NORA EVAD Y MULOK, THIAN PERPENIAN Y RAFON A.K.A LARINA
PERPENIAN AND JOHN DOES, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS

K. Resolution of the Lower Court:

RTC rendered a decision convicting Gambao, et al of kidnapping for ransom after the
accused-appellants’ plea of guilt and petitioners’ presentation of evidence.

L. Issues Raised by Petitioner/Appellee:

None.

E. Issues raised by Respondent/Appellant:

a. WON the accused-appellants’ plea of guilt is improvidently done.

b. WON the conviction is erroneous because it was based on an improvident plea of
guilt.

F. Resolution of the SC:

A. YES. It is evident from the records that the trial court has not fully complied its
duties when accused pleads guilty to a capital offense. The questions propounded by the
trial court judge failed to ensure that accused-appellants fully understood the
consequences of their plea.

In fact, it is readily apparent from the records that one of the accused had the mistaken
assumption that his plea of guilt would mitigate the imposable penalty and that both the
judge and his counsel failed to explain to him that such plea of guilt will not mitigate the
penalty pursuant to Article 63 of the RPC. He was not warned by the trial court judge that
in cases where the penalty is single and indivisible, like death, the penalty is not affected
by either aggravating or mitigating circumstances

This Court, in People v. Oden, laid down the duties of the trial court when the accused
pleads guilty to a capital offense. The trial court is mandated:

(1) to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of the plea of guilt
(2) to require the prosecution to still prove the guilt of the accused and the precise
degree of his culpability, and
(3) to inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence in his behalf and
allow him to do so if he desire.

Anent the first requisite, the searching inquiry determines whether the plea of guilt was
based on a free and informed judgement. The inquiry must focus on the voluntariness of
the plea and the full comprehension of the consequences of the plea.

Although there is no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge must conduct a
“searching inquiry,” has held that the following guidelines should be observed:

1. Ascertain from the accused himsel

(a) how he was brought into the custody of the law;

 (b) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and
preliminary investigations; and

(c) under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the
investigations. This is intended to rule out the possibility that the accused has been
coerced or placed under a state of duress either by actual threats of physical harm coming
from malevolent quarters or simply because of the judge’s intimidating robes.

2. Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with,
and completely explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of
guilty.

3. Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socio-
economic status, and educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy index
of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.

4. Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under
the law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. For not infrequently, an
accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because
of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or
express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to ensure that the accused does not labor
under these mistaken impressions because a plea of guilty carries with it not only the
admission of authorship of the crime proper but also of the aggravating circumstances
attending it, that increase punishment

5. Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and fully explain to
him the elements of the crime which is the basis of his indictment. Failure of the court to
do so would constitute a violation of his fundamental right to be informed of the precise
nature of the accusation against him and a denial of his right to due process.

6. All questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and understood
by the latter.
7. The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading guilty, is truly guilty.
The accused must be required to narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or furnish its
missing details

B. No. Although the pleas rendered were improvidently made, the Court still did not set
aside the condemnatory judgment. Despite the trial court judge’s shortcomings, the Court
still agrees with his ruling on accused-appellants’ culpability.

As a general rule, convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside and the
cases are remanded for further proceedings if such plea is the sole basis of judgement.
If the trial court, however, relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the
accused, as it did in this case, the conviction must be sustained, because then it is
predicated not merely on the guilty plea but on evidence proving the commission of the
offense charged. The manner by which the plea of guilty is made, whether improvidently
or not, loses legal significance where the conviction can be based on independent
evidence proving the commission of the crime by the accused.

Contrary to accused-appellants’ assertions, they were convicted by the trial court, not on
the basis of their plea of guilty, but on the strength of the evidence adduced by the
prosecution, which was properly appreciated by the trial court.47 The prosecution was
able to prove the guilt of the accused-appellants and their degrees of culpability beyond
reasonable doubt

The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS.

Accused-appellants HALIL GAMBAO y ESMAIL, et al are found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principals in the crime of kidnapping for ransom and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, without eligibility of parole.

G. Relevance to the topic:

A question on plea of guilt and the conviction based on such plea.

Title: People v Villasco et al

Ponente: Padilla, J.

Date published: July 24, 1951

Background:

On 27 September 1950, Pascasio Villasco, together with three persons, was charged with
illegal possession of firearms and a hand grenade. The weapons and explosive were
found in their possession on 19 July 1950. They were conspiring and confederating
together and acting in common accord, did then and there, unlawfully and feloniously
have in their possession and under their custody and control the following firearms and
explosives without having been provided with the necessary permit or license.

Before trial, Pascasio Villasco moved to quash the information on the ground that it does
not plead facts constituting a violation of section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code,
as amended by Republic Act No. 4. The Court denied the motion.

After entering a plea of not guilty, he moved to be allowed to withdraw it and to enter one
of guilty.

Summary:

a. Petitioner/appellee
The people of the Philippines
b. Respondent/appellant
Pascasio Villasco
c. Resolution of the lower court
Court sentenced him to suffer five (5) years imprisonment and to pay one-fourth
of the costs.
d. Issues raised by petitioner/appellee

Both counsel and the Solicitor General recommend that the sentence be
reversed and the appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio, on the ground that it
does not appear in the information under what circumstances the firearms and
the hand grenade were seized from the appellant. It is not alleged that the
appellant used or was carrying them when they were seized from him.

e. Issues raised by respondent/appellant

 None

f. Resolution of the supreme court

Section 1, Republic Act No. 482, approved on 10 June 1950, provides:

Any person who holds or possesses any firearm and/or ammunition without permit
or license may, without incurring any criminal liability, surrender the same within a
period of one year from the date this Act shall take effect: Provided, however, That
this section shall not be interpreted to mean as in any way exempting from such
liability any person, without the requisite permit or license, found, within the
aforementioned period of time, making use of said firearm and ammunition or
carrying them on his person except for the purpose of surrendering them as herein
required: Provided, further, That this section shall not in any way affect any case
pending in court, on the date of the passage of this Act, for violation of existing
laws on firearms and ammunition.

For the purpose of this Act, the terms "firearms" and "ammunition" shall include
the types of arms and ammunition enumerated in section two of this Act.

It has been seen that mere possession or custody of any of the articles specified
in that Act, within the time designated in the proclamation, was not illegal unless
the possessor made use of them or carried them on his person.

In People vs. Santos Lopez y Jacinto, 45 O. G. 2089, where the information

charged possession, custody and control of a .45 caliber pistol and one clip
containing seven rounds of ammunition, and section 2, Republic Act No. 4, similar
to section 1, Republic Act No. 482, was applied, this Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Tuason, said:

. . . Under Republic Act No. 4, the use or the carrying of firearms and/or
ammunition was an ingredient, if it was not the sole ingredient, of the offense, the
very acts which were punished subject to certain conditions. It has been seen
that mere possession or custody of any of the articles specified in that Act, within
the time designated in the proclamation, was not illegal unless the possessor
made use of them or carried them on his person. What the accused could have
been obliged to allege and prove, if he had been prosecuted for using or carrying
on his person a firearm, was that he defended himself with the arm or was on his
way to give it up, as the case might be.
 The judgment appealed from is reversed and the appellant acquitted.

g. Relevance to the current topic

The plea of guilty entered by the appellant admits the facts set out in the
information and, if those do not constitute a crime or a violation of law, such plea
does not have the effect of admitting the commission of a crime or the violation of
a law, for there is none charged in the information, or of supplying what has been
omitted or what has not been pleaded therein, to the extent of curing a defective
information or one that does not allege facts sufficient to constitute a public offense
or a violation of law.
Title: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. SALVADOR ABAD
SANTOS, RICARDO NEPOMUCENO, AND JOSE P. VELUZ, ALL ASSOCIATE
JUDGES CONSTITUTING THE SECOND ARCACHE, RESPONDENTS

Ponente: DE JOYA, J.
Date Published:
June 17,1946

Summary:

M. Petitioner/Appellee: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

N. Respondent/Appellant: SALVADOR ABAD SANTOS, RICARDO
NEPOMUCENO, AND JOSE P. VELUZ, ALL ASSOCIATE JUDGES CONSTITUTING
THE SECOND ARCACHE

O. Resolution of the Lower Court:

Joseph Arcache has been accused of the crime of treason before the People's Court;
different kinds of properties alleged to have been sold by him to the Japanese Imperial
Forces, in the City of Manila, during the enemy occupation, added the phrase "and other
similar equipments"
- allegation objected to was too broad and too indefinite to enable the accused to properly
defend himself, the respondent judges granted the petition, and, at the request of the
prosecution, postponed the trial of the case

P. Issues Raised by Petitioner/Appellee:

Instead of submitting a bill of particulars, the special prosecutor filed a motion for
reconsideration of said order court, on the ground that it was contrary to law that the court
had acted in excess of its jurisdiction and/or with abuse thereof; on the ground that the
alleged defect in the information could be cured by amendment, which might be
properly ordered, in the interest of justice, so that the accused might is clearly informed
of the charges against him, and thus avoid any possible surprise, without necessity in the
part of the accused to plead anew to the amended information.

E. Issues raised by Respondent/Appellant:

Joseph Arcache verbally petitioned the respondent judges that the prosecution should
make more specific said phrase "and other similar equipments"; be stricken from he
infromation therefrom, unless the prosecution should furnish a bill of particulars specifying
what those other similar equipments were.

F. Resolution of the SC:

In the absence of specific provisions of law prohibiting the filing of specifications or bills
of particulars in criminal cases, their submission may be permitted, as they cannot
prejudice any substantial rights of the accused. On the contrary, they will serve to apprise
the accused clearly of the charges filed against them, and thus enable them to prepare
intelligently whatever defense or defenses they might have;
To avoid all possible surprise, which might be detrimental to their rights and interests; and
ambiguous phrases should not, therefore, be permitted in criminal complaints or
information; and if any such phrase has been included therein, on motion of the defense,
before the commencement of the trial, the court should order either its elimination as
surplusage or the filing of the necessary specification, which is but an amendment in mere
matters of form.

G. Relevance to the topic:

Bill of particulars
Title: Brig. Gen. Jose Ramiscal, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan and PP
Ponente: Justice Carpio
Date Published: Sept. 15, 2010

Quick Facts: This is a special civil action for certiorari seeking to annul the
decision of decision of Sandiganbayan and the resolution of Ombudsman finding
probable cause in filing information while the case for reconsideration was filed.

Petitioner Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr. was a retired officer of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), with the rank of Brigadier General, when he served as President of the
AFP-Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS) from 5 April 1994 to 27
July 1998.
Petitioner and Atty. Flaviano executed and signed bilateral deeds of sale over the
subject property, at the agreed price of ₱10,500.00 per square meter. Petitioner forthwith
caused the payment to the individual vendors of the purchase price of ₱10,500.00 per
square meter of the property.
Subsequently, Flaviano executed and signed unilateral deeds of sale over the same
property. The unilateral deeds of sale reflected a purchase price of only ₱3,000.00 per
square meter instead of the actual purchase price of ₱10,500.00 per square meter. On
24 September 1997, Flaviano presented the unilateral deeds of sale for registration. The
unilateral deeds of sale became the basis of the transfer certificates of title issued by the
Register of Deeds of General Santos City to AFP-RSBS.
Luwalhati R. Antonino, the Congresswoman representing the first district of South
Cotabato, which includes General Santos City, filed in the Ombudsman a complaint-
affidavit7 against petitioner, along with 27 other respondents, for (1) violation of Republic
Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; and (2)
malversation of public funds or property through falsification of public documents. The
case was docketed as Case No. OMB-3-98-0020.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OMB-OSP) recommended that petitioner be
excluded from the informations. On review, the Office of Legal Affairs (OMB-OLA), in a
memorandum dated 18 December 2001, recommended the contrary, stressing that
petitioner participated in and affixed his signature on the contracts to sell, bilateral deeds
of sale, and various agreements, vouchers, and checks for the purchase of the subject
property
A panel of prosecutors was tasked to review the records of the case. After thorough
review, the panel of prosecutors found that petitioner indeed participated in and affixed
his signature on the contracts to sell, bilateral deeds of sale, and various agreements,
vouchers, and checks for the purchase of the property at the price of ₱10,500.00 per
square meter.
His motion for reconsideration was denied.
26 January 2006, petitioner filed his second motion for reconsideration of the
Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against him. On the same date, petitioner was
arraigned. For his refusal to enter a plea, Sandiganbayan entered not guilty.
Thus, this petition.

Summary:

A. Petitioner/Appellee: Brig. Gen. Jose Ramiscal, Jr.

B. Respondent/Appellant: Sandiganbayan and PP
C. Resolution of the Sandiganbayan:
His second motion for recommendation is prohibited.
D. Issues Raised by Petitioner/Appellee:
- He should have been excluded from the information based on the first
findings of the Ombudsman
- The arraignment should be suspended on the ground of Motion for
Recommendation filed before the Ombusman.

E. Issues raised by Respondent/Appellant:

- the information was filed by the Ombudsman after the panel of the
prosecutors found probable cause that the petitioner allegedly participated in the
falsification which can be gleaned from his signature. The petitioner cannot feign
ignorance.
- The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by
Administrative Order No. 15, Series of 2001, sanction the immediate filing of an
information in the proper court upon a finding of probable cause, even during the
pendency of a motion for reconsideration.

F. Resolution of the SC:

Petition has no merit.
 If the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the resolution finding probable
cause cannot bar the filing of the corresponding information, then neither can it bar the
arraignment of the accused, which in the normal course of criminal procedure logically
follows the filing of the information.
An arraignment is that stage where, in the mode and manner required by
the Rules, an accused, for the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise
charge that confronts him. The accused is formally informed of the charges against him,
to which he enters a plea of guilty or not guilty.
Under Section 7, Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman, petitioner can no longer file another motion for reconsideration questioning
yet again the same finding of the Ombudsman. Otherwise, there will be no end to
litigation.

G. Relevance to the topic:

Section 1(g), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which implements Section 7 of RA 8493,
provides:

Section 1. Arraignment and plea; how made. -

(g) Unless a shorter period is provided by special law or Supreme Court circular, the
arraignment shall be held within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the accused. xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(g), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court and the last clause of Section 7 of RA 8493
mean the same thing, that the 30-day period shall be counted from the time the court
acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused, which is when the accused appears
before the court.

The grounds for suspension of arraignment are provided under Section 11, Rule 116 of
the Rules of Court, which applies suppletorily in matters not provided under the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman or the Revised Internal Rules of the
Sandiganbayan, thus:

Sec. 11. Suspension of arraignment. - Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment
shall be suspended in the following cases:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which
effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead
intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if
necessary, his confinement for such purpose.
(b) There exists a prejudicial question; and
(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the
Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; provided, that the period of
suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the
reviewing office
Title: PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. EDGARDO V.
ODTUHAN, Respondent.

Ponente: Peralta, J
Date Published:
July 17, 2013

Summary:

Q. Petitioner/Appellee: People of the Philippines

R. Respondent/Appellant: Edgardo Odtuhan
S. Resolution of the Lower Court:

On February 23, 1999, the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 70 granted respondent’s
petition and declared his marriage with Modina void ab initio for lack of a valid
marriage license

On September 4, 2008, the RTC13 issued an Order14 denying respondent’s Omnibus

Motion. The RTC held that the facts alleged in the information – that there was a valid
marriage between respondent and Modina and without such marriage having been
dissolved, respondent contracted a second marriage with Alagon – constitute the crime
of bigamy. The trial court further held that neither can the information be quashed on the
ground that criminal liability has been extinguished, because the declaration of nullity of
the first marriage is not one of the modes of extinguishing criminal liability. Respondent’s
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in an Order 15 dated February 20, 2009.

The CA applied the conclusion made by the Court in Morigo v. People,19 and held that
there is cogent basis in looking into the motion to quash filed by respondent, for if the
evidence would establish that his first marriage was indeed void ab initio, one essential
element of the crime of bigamy would be lacking.20 The appellate court further held that
respondent is even better off than Morigo which thus calls for the application of such
doctrine, considering that respondent contracted the second marriage after filing the
petition for the declaration of nullity of his first marriage and he obtained the favorable
declaration before the complaint for bigamy was filed against him. 21 The CA thus
concluded that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying respondent’s motion to
quash the information, considering that the facts alleged in the information do not charge
an offense.

T. Issues Raised by Petitioner/Appellee:

With the denial of the motion for reconsideration before the CA, petitioner filed a
petition before the court in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court based on the following grounds:

-The CA committed reversible error when it rendered its decision granting

respondent’s petition for certiorari and the resolution denying the petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration, considering that:

I. The information charging respondent of bigamy sufficiently alleges all the

elements constituting said offense

II. The subsequent court’s judgment declaring respondent’s first marriage void ab
initio did not extinguish respondent’s criminal liability which already attached prior
to said judgment

E. Issues raised by Respondent/Appellant:

Respondent move for quashal of the information on two grounds:

1. That the facts do not charge the offense of bigamy

2. That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished

F. Resolution of the SC:

CA erred in granting the petition. RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
denying the motion to quash and to allow the respondent to present evidence to
support his motion.

As defined in Antone, "a motion to quash information is the mode by which an accused
assails the validity of a criminal complaint or information filed against him for insufficiency
on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the information."
It is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information. The fundamental test
in determining the sufficiency of the material averments in an Information is whether or
not the facts alleged therein, which are hypothetically admitted, would establish the
essential elements of the crime defined by law. Evidence aliunde or matters extrinsic of
the information are not to be considered. To be sure, a motion to quash should be based
on a defect in the information which is evident on its fact.Thus, if the defect can be cured
by amendment or if it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense, the prosecution is given by the court the opportunity to correct the defect by
amendment. If the motion to quash is sustained, the court may order that another
complaint or information be filed except when the information is quashed on the ground
of extinction of criminal liability or double jeopardy.

An examination of the information filed against respondent, however, shows the

sufficiency of the allegations therein to constitute the crime of bigamy as it contained all
the elements of the crime as provided for in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:

(1) That the offender has been legally married;

(2) That the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;

(3) That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and

(4) That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.

Here, the information contained the following allegations: (1) that respondent is legally
married to Modina; (2) that without such marriage having been legally dissolved; (3) that
respondent willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously contracted a second marriage with
Alagon; and (4) that the second marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
Respondent’s evidence showing the court’s declaration that his marriage to Modina is null
and void from the beginning because of the absence of a marriage license is only an
evidence that seeks to establish a fact contrary to that alleged in the information that a
first valid marriage was subsisting at the time he contracted the second marriage. This
should not be considered at all, because matters of defense cannot be raised in a motion
to quash. It is notproper, therefore, to resolve the charges at the very outset without the
benefit of a full blown trial. The issues require a fuller examination and it would be unfair
to shut off the prosecution at this stage of the proceedings and to quash the information
on the basis of the document presented by respondent. With the presentation of the court
decree, no facts have been brought out which destroyed the prima facie truth accorded
to the allegations of the information on the hypothetical admission thereof.

Thus, as held in Antone:

To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and
respondent only after the latter contracted the subsequent marriage is, therefore,
immaterial for the purpose of establishing that the facts alleged in the information for
Bigamy does not constitute an offense. Following the same rationale, neither may such
defense be interposed by the respondent in his motion to quash by way of exception to
the established rule that facts contrary to the allegations in the information are matters of
defense which may be raised only during the presentation of evidence.

G. Relevance to the topic:

Motion to quash- a motion to quash information is the mode by which an accused assails
the validity of a criminal complaint or information filed against him for insufficiency on its
face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the information." It is
a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information. The fundamental test in
determining the sufficiency of the material averments in an Information is whether or not
the facts alleged therein, which are hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential
elements of the crime defined by law. Evidence aliunde or matters extrinsic of the
information are not to be considered. To be sure, a motion to quash should be based on
a defect in the information which is evident on its fact.Thus, if the defect can be cured by
amendment or if it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense, the prosecution is given by the court the opportunity to correct the defect by
amendment. If the motion to quash is sustained, the court may order that another
complaint or information be filed except when the information is quashed on the ground
of extinction of criminal liability or double jeopardy.
Title: Suy Sui vs People of the Philippines
Ponente: Chief Justice Paras
Date Published: February 17, 1953

Quick Facts:

The petitioner, the owner of a grocery store located at Quezon Boulevard, Manila, was
found by the Court of Appeals to have sold on July 17, 1950 a 10-pound bag of refined
sugar to Faustino Caraan for the price of P2, allegedly in excess by twenty centavos of
the ceiling price fixed in Executive Order No. 331.

Summary:

U. Petitioner/Appellee: Suy Sui

V. Respondent/Appellant: People of the Philippines

W. Resolution of the Lower Court:

RA 509: AN ACT DECLARING NATIONAL POLICY, AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT

OF THE PHILIPPINES FOR A LIMITED PERIOD TO FIX CEILING PRICES OF
COMMODITIES AND TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS REGARDING
PRICES OF COMMODITIES TO EFFECTUATE SUCH POLICY, AND AUTHORIZING
THE APPROPRIATION OF A CERTAIN SUM OF THE PURPOSE

EO 331: FIXING THE CEILING PRICES OF COMMODITIES AND OTHER PURPOSES

The petitioner was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with a violation
of Executive Order No. 331 in relation to Republic Act No. 509.
X. Issues Raised by Petitioner/Appellee:

In his first assignment of error, the petitioner contends that the classification of refined
sugar into two groups contained in Executive Order No. 331 is ambiguous.

In other words, the petitioner claims that, for the same refined sugar, two ceiling prices
for one kilo are fixed, namely, P0.40 and P0.45.

E. Issues raised by Respondent/Appellant:

The petitioner failed to raise the point not only in the Court of First Instance by a motion
to quash but also in the Court of Appeals, as consequence of which he must be deemed
to have waived the objection.

F. Resolution of the SC:

Under section 10, Rule 113, of the Rules of Court, failure to move to quash amounts
to a waiver of all objections which are grounds for a motion to squash except when the
complaint or information does not charge an offense, or the court is without
jurisdiction of the same. It is apparent that the point now raised by the petitioner is in
effect that the information does not charge an offense. In the second place, as an appeal
in criminal proceedings throws the whole case open for review, it should have been the
duty of the Court of Appeals to correct such errors as might be found in the appealed
judgment, whether they are assigned or not.
On the other hand, in Villareal vs. People, (47 Off. Gaz., 191),we held that
notwithstanding the absence of assignments of error, the appellate court will review the
ecord and reverse or modify the appealed judgment, not only on grounds that the court
had no jurisdiction or that the acts proved do not constitute the offense charged, but also
on prejudicial error to the right of accused which are plain, fundamental, vital, or serious,
or on errors which go to the sufficiency of the evidence to convict; although the rule doing
away with formal assignments of errors does not dispense with the necessity of pointing
out technical and non-fundamental errors which do not affect the substantial rights of an
accused to a fair trial, and are not patent.
G. Relevance to the topic:
Section 10, Rule 113, of the Rules of Court, failure to move to quash amounts to a
waiver of all objections which are grounds for a motion to squash except when the
complaint or information does not charge an offense, or the court is without jurisdiction of
the same