A.C. NO.

6198, September 15, 2006

RENATO M. MALIGAYA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. ANTONIO G. DORONILLA, JR., RESPONDENT.
 


CORONA, J.:
Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. of the Judge Advocate General's Service is before us on a charge of unethical conduct for having uttered a falsehood in open court during a
hearing of Civil Case No. Q-99-38778.[1]

Civil Case No. Q-99-38778 was an action for damages filed by complainant Renato M. Maligaya, a doctor and retired colonel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, against
several military officers for whom Atty. Doronilla stood as counsel. At one point during the February 19, 2002 hearing of the case, Atty. Doronilla said:
And another matter, Your Honor. I was appearing in other cases he [complainant Maligaya] filed before against the same defendants. We had an agreement that if we
withdraw the case against him, he will also withdraw all the cases. So, with that understanding, he even retired and he is now receiving pension.[2] (emphasis
supplied)
Considering this to be of some consequence, presiding Judge Reynaldo B. Daway asked a number of clarificatory questions and thereafter ordered Atty. Doronilla to put his
statements in writing and "file the appropriate pleading."[3] Weeks passed but Atty. Doronilla submitted no such pleading or anything else to substantiate his averments.

On April 29, 2002, Maligaya filed a complaint against Atty. Doronilla in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline.[4] The complaint, which
charged Atty. Doronilla with "misleading the court through misrepresentation of facts resulting [in] obstruction of justice," [5] was referred to a commissioner[6] for investigation.
Complainant swore before the investigating commissioner that he had never entered into any agreement to withdraw his lawsuits.[7] Atty. Doronilla, who took up the larger part
of two hearings to present evidence and explain his side, admitted several times that there was, in fact, no such agreement.[8] Later he explained

in his memorandum that his main concern was "to settle the case amicably among comrades in arms without going to trial" [9] and insisted that there was no proof of his having
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility or the lawyer's oath.[10] He pointed out, in addition, that his false statement (or, as he put it, his "alleged acts of falsity") had no
effect on the continuance of the case and therefore caused no actual prejudice to complainant.[11]

In due time, investigating commissioner Lydia A. Navarro submitted a report and recommendation finding Atty. Doronilla guilty of purposely stating a falsehood in violation of
Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility[12] and recommending that he be "suspended from the government military service as legal officer for a period
of three months."[13] This was adopted and approved in toto by the IBP Board of Governors on August 30, 2003.[14]

There is a strong public interest involved in requiring lawyers who, as officers of the court, participate in the dispensation of justice, to behave at all times in a manner
consistent with truth and honor.[15] The common caricature that lawyers by and large do not feel compelled to speak the truth and to act honestly should not become a
common reality.[16] To this end, Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility state:
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS, AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
By stating untruthfully in open court that complainant had agreed to withdraw his lawsuits, Atty. Doronilla breached these peremptory tenets of ethical conduct. Not only that,
he violated the lawyer's oath to "do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court," of which Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 are but restatements. His act infringed on every
lawyer's duty to "never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law."[17]

Atty. Doronilla's unethical conduct was compounded, moreover, by his obstinate refusal to acknowledge the impropriety of what he had done. From the very beginning of this
administrative case, Atty. Doronilla maintained the untenable position that he had done nothing wrong in the hearing of Civil Case No. Q-99-38778. He persisted in doing so
even after having admitted that he had, in that hearing, spoken of an agreement that did not in truth exist. Rather than express remorse for that regrettable incident, Atty.
Doronilla resorted to an ill-conceived attempt to evade responsibility, professing that the falsehood had not been meant for the information of Judge Daway but only as "a sort
of question" to complainant regarding a "pending proposal" to settle the case.[18]

The explanation submitted by Atty. Doronilla, remarkable only for its speciousness,[19] cannot absolve him. If anything, it leads us to suspect an unseemly readiness on his part
to obfuscate plain facts for the unworthy purpose of escaping his just deserts. There is in his favor, though, a

presumption of good faith[20] which keeps us from treating the incongruity of his proffered excuse as an indication of mendacity. Besides, in the light of his avowal that his only
aim was "to settle the case amicably among comrades in arms without going to trial,"[21] perhaps it is not unreasonable to assume that what he really meant to say was that he
had intended the misrepresentation as a gambit to get the proposed agreement on the table, as it were. But even if that had been so, it would have been no justification for
speaking falsely in court. There is nothing in the duty of a lawyer to foster peace among disputants that, in any way, makes it necessary under any circumstances for counsel
to state as a fact that which is not true. A lawyer's duty to the court to employ only such means as are consistent with truth and honor[22] forbids recourse to such a tactic.
Thus, even as we give Atty. Doronilla the benefit of the doubt and accept as true his avowed objective of getting the parties to settle the case amicably, we must call him to
account for resorting to falsehood as a means to that end.

Atty. Doronilla's offense is within the ambit of Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which in part declares:
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit x x x or for any violation of the oath which he is required
to take before admission to practice x x x.
The suspension referred to in the foregoing provision means only suspension from the practice of law. For this reason, we disagree with the IBP's recommendation for Atty.
Doronilla's suspension from the government military service. After all, the only purpose of this administrative case is to determine Atty. Doronilla's liability as a member of the
legal profession, not his liability as a legal officer in the military service. Thus, it would be improper for us to order, as a penalty for his breach of legal ethics and the lawyer's
oath, his suspension from employment in the Judge Advocate General's Service. Of course, suspension from employment as a military legal officer may well follow as a
consequence of his suspension from the practice of law but that should not be reason for us to impose it as a penalty for his professional misconduct. We would be going
beyond the purpose of this proceeding were we to do so. Therefore, we shall treat the IBP's recommendation as one for suspension from the practice of law.

At any rate, we are not inclined to adopt the IBP's recommendation on the duration of Atty. Doronilla's suspension. We need to consider a few circumstances that mitigate his
liability somewhat. First, we give him credit for exhibiting enough candor to admit, during the investigation, the falsity of the statement he had made in Judge Daway's
courtroom. Second, the absence of material damage to complainant may also be considered as a mitigating circumstance. [23] And finally, since this is Atty. Doronilla's first
offense, he is entitled to some measure of forbearance.[24]

Nonetheless, his unrepentant attitude throughout the conduct of this administrative case tells us that a mere slap on the wrist is definitely not enough. Atty. Doronilla, it seems,
needs time away from the practice of law to recognize his error and to purge himself of the misbegotten notion that an effort to compromise justifies the sacrifice of
truthfulness in court.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for TWO MONTHS. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
misconduct shall be dealt with more severely.

A.C. No. 7054, November 11, 2014

CONRADO N. QUE, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR., RESPONDENT.
 

PER CURIAM:

For the Court's consideration is the Profound Appeal for Judicial Clemency[1] filed by Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. (respondent), who seeks to be reinstated as a member of
the Philippine Bar.

Factual Background

In a Decision[2] dated December 4, 2009, this Court disbarred the respondent from the practice of law on the following grounds: abuse of court procedures and processes;
filing of multiple actions and forum-shopping; willful, intentional and deliberate resort to falsehood and deception before the courts; maligning the name of his fellow lawyer;
and fraudulent and unauthorized appearances in court.
The material portions of the subject Decision provide:

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the respondent committed various acts of professional misconduct and thereby failed to live up to the exacting ethical standards
imposed on members of the Bar. We cannot, agree, however, that only a penalty of one-year suspension from the practice of law should be imposed. Neither should we limit
ourselves to the originally recommended penalty of suspension for two (2) years.

Given the respondent's multiple violations, his past record as previously discussed, and the nature of these violations which shows the readiness to disregard court rules and
to gloss over concerns for the orderly administration of justice, we believe and so hold that the appropriate action of this Court is to disbar the respondent to keep him away
from the law profession and from any significant role in the administration of justice which he has disgraced. He is a continuing risk, too, to the public that the legal profession
serves. Not even his ardor and overzealousness in defending the interests of his client can save him. Such traits at the expense of everything else, particularly the integrity of
the profession and the orderly administration of justice, this Court cannot accept nor tolerate.

Additionally, disbarment is merited because this is not the respondent's first ethical infraction of the same nature. We penalized him in Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo Garcia
versus Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla for his willful and intentional falsehood before the court; for misuse of court procedures and processes to delay the execution of a judgment;
and for collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law. We showed leniency then by reducing his penalty to suspension for six (6) months. We cannot similarly
treat the respondent this time; it is clear that he did not learn any lesson from his past experience and since then has exhibited traits of incorrigibilily. It is time to put a finis to
the respondent's professional legal career for the sake of the public, the profession and the interest of justice.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM Resolution No. XVII-2005-164 dated December 17, 2005 and Resolution No. XVII-2008-657 dated December 11,
2008 of the Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline insofar as respondent Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr. is found liable for professional misconduct for
violations of the Lawyer's Oath; Canon 8; Rules 10.01 and 10.03, Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon 12; and Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and Sections 20(d), 21 and 27 of
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. However, we modify the penalty the IBP imposed, and hold that the respondent should be DISBARRED from the practice of law.

SO ORDERED.

On July 8, 2010, the respondent filed a Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion [3] praying that his license to practice law be restored based on humanitarian
considerations, but the Court En Banc resolved to deny the petition for lack of merit.

The respondent subsequently filed on January 11, 2011, an Appeal for Grace, Succor, and Mercy [4] asking the Court to take a second look at the penalty imposed upon him.
He maintained that Conrado N. Que (complainant) failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he committed grossly immoral conduct meriting the severe penalty
of disbarment. He also attempted to pass the blame on another individual (a certain Gerolin Piedad, General Manager of Kalayaan Development Corporation) to free himself
from liability by claiming that one of the charges leading to his disbarment was not of his own doing.

In a Resolution[5] dated February 8, 2011, the Court denied the appeal.

The respondent again wrote the Court on July 13, 2011, reiterating his pleas for the Court's compassion and mercy. [6] He sought the Court's forgiveness stating that he has
learned his lesson; but at the same time, questioning the Court's finding for lack of factual support. He appended to his appeal proofs of his updated payment of IBP
membership dues,[7] MCLE compliance,[8] and a letter from the Bishop of Marinduque.[9] His appeal, however, was denied by a Resolution[10] dated August 2, 2011.

On May 17, 2012, the respondent sent a letter[11] addressed to the Members of the Court En Banc once again reiterating his prayer to lift the order of disbarment. He alleged
among others that for more than three years that he has been disbarred in the practice of law, he has never been involved in any immoral or illegal activities, has devoted
himself in the services of St. Peter Parish and Shrine, Commonwealth Avenue as Eucharistic Minister leader, has conducted regular monthly lectures on the subject of
marriage at the Diocese of Novaliches, and has participated as monthly financial contributor to Mr. Carmel Church, Lucena City. He also begged the Court to no longer
prolong his penalty since it had already served its purpose. The plea was also denied on July 3, 2012. [12]

On August 30, 2012, the respondent once more prayed for his reinstatement professing repentance and remorse for what he did.[13] He pleaded for the Court's consideration,
and vowed that he will no longer misuse the rules of procedure but instead, devote his time and energy for its proper observance and implementation. He also stated that for
almost three years of being disbarred from the practice of law, he has never been involved in any unlawful, dishonest, and immoral activities. He promised to maintain at all
times a high degree of legal proficiency, morality, integrity, and fair dealings to the courts, clients, and the legal profession in accordance with the values and morals embodied
in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In a Resolution[14] dated October 9, 2012, the Court denied his petition for lack of merit.

Aggrieved, the respondent filed on March 27, 2013 a letter[15] pleading the Court to revisit his previous requests for reinstatement.

Treating his letter as a motion for the reconsideration of the resolutions dated August 2, 2011, July 3, 2012, and October 9, 2012, the Court, on June 4, 2013 denied the
motion with finality.[16]

On July 18, 2014, the respondent filed a Profound Appeal for Judicial Clemency[17] reiterating his apologies to the Court. He stressed that the penalty of disbarment has
already taken its toll on his health; he has now become most frail and weak; and he had been diagnosed with chronic kidney disease at stage five (5) and undergoing dialysis
thrice weekly. He also stressed that in the years that he had been excluded from the practice of law, he devoted his time to Christian and charity pursuits serving with all
humility as a Lay Minister and a regular lecturer on Legal Aspect of Marriage at St. Peter Church, Quezon City.

The respondent also pleads for clemency, not because he intends to practice law again, but to be made whole, to recover from being shattered, and to finally have peace of
mind. He expressed his sincere repentance and deep remorse by taking full responsibility for his misdemeanor. He also prayed that his disbarment be lifted and that he be
reinstated as a member of the Philippine bar. As part of his petition, he submitted a Medical Abstract [18] evidencing his diagnosis for chronic kidney disease, and a
certification[19] from St. Peter Parish, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City, proving that he and his family are dedicated parishioners.

The Court's Ruling

We deny the present appeal.

Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions.[20] It is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right granted to everyone who demands it, but rather, a special
privilege granted and continued only to those who demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral character.[21] The same reasoning applies to
reinstatement of a disbarred lawyer. When exercising its inherent power to grant reinstatement, the Court should see to it that only those who establish their present moral
fitness and knowledge of the law will be readmitted to the Bar. Thus, though the doors to the practice of law are never permanently closed on a disbarred attorney, the Court
owes a duty to the legal profession as well as to the general public to ensure that if the doors are opened, it is done so only as a matter of justice.[22]

The basic inquiry in a petition for reinstatement to the practice of law is whether the lawyer has sufficiently rehabilitated himself or herself in conduct and character. [23]
Whether the applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to a great extent on the sound discretion of the Court.[24] The lawyer has to demonstrate and prove by
clear and convincing evidence that he or she is again worthy of membership in the Bar. The Court will take into consideration his or her character and standing prior to the
disbannent, the nature and character of the charge/s for which he or she was disbarred, his or her conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed in
between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement.[25]

In the present case, we note that before his admission to the Bar, the respondent had demonstrated an active involvement and participation in community and church
activities by joining Youth For Christ, Catechism, and Bible Study and Sharing. Likewise, upon admission to the Bar, the respondent worked as Municipal Attorney in Sta.
Cruz, Marinduque rendering free legal assistance to his town mates who were in need of legal service. Thereafter, the respondent was appointed as a Municipal
Administrator and had continued extending assistance to the indigent residents.

The respondent also actively engaged and participated in various community projects, through the Marinduque Jaycees, where he served as President from 1980 to 1981,
and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Marinduque Chapter, where he served as a member, Director, and President from 1982 to 1987.

In his present appeal for judicial clemency, the respondent acknowledged his indiscretions and claimed to have taken full responsibility for his misdemeanor. Unlike in his
previous petitions/appeal for judicial clemency, the respondent no longer questioned the Court's decision. According to him, he has long expressed deep remorse and genuine
repentance.

The respondent also claimed that the long period of his disbarment gave him sufficient time to reflect on his professional conduct, to show remorse and repentance, and to
realize the gravity of his mistakes. After his disbarment, the respondent continued lending assistance, and deviated his time and effort in pursuing civic and religious work that
significantly contributed to his character reformation. He professed that during his almost five (5) years of disbarment, he has been an active member of the Couples for
Christ, Marriage Encounter, and Knights of Columbus; and through his affiliations with these groups, he had served in the ecclesial affairs in his parish as an Extraordinary
Minister for Holy Communion and a lecturer on Legal Aspect of Marriage Pre-Cana and Marriage Preparation Seminar at the Parish Church of St. Peter in Commonwealth
Avenue, Quezon City.

Although the Court believes that the respondent is not inherently lacking in moral fiber as shown by his conduct prior to his disbarment, we are not convinced that he had
sufficiently achieved moral reformation.

In Rodolfo M. Bernardo v. Atty. Ismael F. Mejia,[26] the Court, in deciding whether or not to reinstate Atty. Mejia, considered that 15 years had already elapsed from the time he
was disbarred, which gave him sufficient time to acknowledge his infractions and to repent. The Court also took into account the fact that Atty. Mejia is already of advanced
years, has long repented, and suffered enough. The Court also noted that he had made a significant contribution by putting up the Mejia Law Journal containing his religious
and social writings; and the religious organization named "El Cristo Movement and Crusade on Miracle of the Heart and Mind." Furthermore, the Court considered that Atty.
Mejia committed no other transgressions since he was disbarred.

Similarly in Adez Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[27] the Court granted the reinstatement of the disbarred lawyer (found to be guilty of intercalating a material fact in a CA
decision) and considered the period of three (3) years as sufficient time to do soul-searching and to prove that he is worthy to practice law. In that case, the Court took into
consideration the disbarred lawyer's sincere admission of guilt and repeated pleas for compassion.

Also in Valencia v. Antiniw,[28] the Court reinstated Atty. Antiniw (who was found guilty of malpractice in falsifying a notarized deed of sale and subsequently introducing the
document in court) after considering the long period of his disbarment (almost 15 years). The Court considered that during Atty. Antiniw's disbarment, he has been persistent
in reiterating his apologies to the Court, has engaged in humanitarian and civic services, and retained an unblemished record as an elected public servant, as shown by the
testimonials of the numerous civic and professional organizations, government institutions, and members of the judiciary.

In all these cases, the Court considered the conduct of the disbarred attorney before and after his disbarment, the time that had elapsed from the disbarment and the
application for reinstatement, and more importantly, the disbarred attorneys' sincere realization and acknowledgement of guilt.

In the present case, we are not fully convinced that the passage of more than four (4) years is sufficient to enable the respondent to reflect and to realize his
professional transgressions.

We emphasize that this is the second time that the respondent was accused and was found guilty of gross misconduct. The respondent, in an earlier case of Plus Builders,
Inc. v. Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr.,[29] was likewise found guilty of gross misconduct for committing willful and intentional falsehood before the court; misusing court
procedure and processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law - mostly the same grounds on which the
Decision dated December 4, 2009 (2nd disbarment) was based. In Plus Builders, we granted the respondent's motion for reconsideration and reduced the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law from two (2) years to six (6) months out of compassion to the respondent.

Considering the respondent's earlier disbarment case (and subsequent reduction of the penalty imposed as an act of clemency), and another disbarment case against him still
pending review by the Court, we are not fully and convincingly satisfied that the respondent has already reformed. The period of five (5) years is likewise not considerably long
considering the nature and perversity of the respondent's misdeeds. We believe that it is still early for the Court to consider the respondent's reinstatement.

Furthermore, we are not persuaded by the respondent's sincerity in acknowledging his guilt. While he expressly stated in his appeal that he had taken full responsibility of his
misdemeanor, his previous inclination to pass the blame to other individuals, to invoke self-denial, and to make alibis for his wrongdoings, contradicted his assertion. The
respondent also failed to submit proof satisfactorily showing his contrition. He failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he is again worthy of membership in the
legal profession. We thus entertain serious doubts that the respondent had completely reformed.

As a final word, while the Court sympathizes with the respondent's unfortunate physical condition, we stress that in considering his application for reinstatement to the practice
of law, the duty of the Court is to determine whether he has established moral reformation and rehabilitation, disregarding its feeling of sympathy or pity. Surely at this point,
this requirement was not met. Until such time when the respondent can demonstrate to the Court that he has completely rehabilitated himself and deserves to resume his
membership in the Bar, Our decision to disbar him from the practice of law stands.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Profound Appeal for Judicial Clemency filed by Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. is hereby DENIED.

A.C. NO. 5653, February 27, 2006

JOHN SIY LIM, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. CARMELITO A. MONTANO, RESPONDENT. 
 
 D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Atty. Carmelito A. Montano stands charged with gross misconduct relative to his filing of Civil Case No. C-19928 entitled Spouses Tomas See Tuazon and Natividad See
Deecho v. John Siy Lim and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City.[1]

It appears that complainant John Siy Lim was the defendant in Civil Case No. C-14542 for reformation of contract, quieting of title, with damages, then pending before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 131.[2] The subject of the dispute was a 650-square meter conjugal lot along A. del Mundo Street, 7th Avenue, Caloocan
City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 860. After trial, the RTC ruled in favor of defendant (complainant herein), and declared that the deed of sale the parties
executed on July 15, 1987 was an absolute and unconditional conveyance of subject property by the plaintiff in favor of such defendant. On motion for reconsideration,
however, the trial court reversed itself and declared that the sale was in fact an equitable mortgage. It thus ordered the cancellation of TCT No. 152621 and the reinstatement
of the previous title on the subject property.

The complainant appealed the case to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 40167. In its Decision dated March 31, 1995, the appellate court reversed the ruling
of the RTC, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Order dated November 16, 1992, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the original Decision of the trial court, dated December 2, 1991,
hereby REINSTATED, with the modification that plaintiff-appellee is ordered to pay defendant-appellant the sum of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos a month as reasonable
rental for the use and occupation of Apartment No. 161 from July 15, 1988 until the premises shall have been vacated and possession thereof peacefully turned over to
defendant-appellant.

The counterclaim for attorney's fees of defendant-appellant is DENIED. There is no clear showing that the action taken by plaintiff-appellee was done in bad faith. There
should be no penalty on the right to litigate.[3]
The aggrieved party elevated the matter to this Court, and the petition was docketed as G.R. No. 119794. On October 3, 2000, the Court affirmed the ruling of the CA and
denied the petition.[4] Entry of judgment was made of record on October 3, 2000.[5]

On January 4, 2002, respondent filed a Notice of Appearance[6] as counsel of Tomas See Tuazon (the losing party) in the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch 131 in Civil Case No.
C-14542. On January 7, 2002, he filed, in behalf of his client, a "Motion to Comply to [sic] Decision without Writ,"[7] worded as follows:
1. Plaintiff is aware that pursuant to the decision of the court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, the decision on the present case had already
become final and executory.

2. In order to avoid undue inconvenience on the part of herein defendant, plaintiff shall voluntarily settle the money judgment as stated in the decision sought to be
enforced.

3. The plaintiff will be filing Eight Hundred Ten Thousand (P810,000.00) Pesos, equivalent to 162 months of rent as per decision and the same to be covered by supersedeas
bond issued by a reliable insurance company to answer for said obligation.

4. Every month starting February 15, 2002, plaintiff shall deposit to the court the amount of P5,000.00 as monthly rent.[8]
On the same date, respondent, in behalf of his clients (the spouses Tomas See Tuazon) filed the Complaint [9] for nullity of TCT and other documents, reconveyance,
maintenance of physical possession before the RTC of Caloocan City, eventually raffled to Branch 121 thereof (Civil Case No. C-19928).

Meantime, on February 19, 2002, Judge Luisito C. Sardillo of Branch 126[10] issued an Order[11] in Civil Case No. C-14542 granting the Motion for Execution with Manifestation
earlier filed by the prevailing party (complainant herein), and denying for lack of merit, the "Motion to Comply to [sic] Decision without Writ" filed by respondent counsel.

This prompted the complainant to file the instant complaint for disbarment against respondent. In his Complaint-Affidavit[12] dated March 20, 2002, complainant alleged that
respondent filed the complaint in Civil Case No. C-19928 out of malice, pointing out that it involves "the same parties, the same causes of action and relief prayed for as that
of Civil Case No. C-14542." Thus, the complainant prayed that the respondent be "disbarred and/or suspended from the practice of law for his gross misconduct," on the
following allegation:
6. Evidently, I have been subjected to harassment by the antics of the respondent in filing a recycled case docketed as Civil Case No. C-19928 on January 07, 2002.
Respondent is guilty in abetting the conduct of his clients, Sps. Tuazon. He has clearly violated his lawyer's oath not to promote or sue groundless, false or
unlawful suits among others. Instead of counseling his clients to abide and obey the decision of our Supreme Court, the final arbiter of all controversies and
disputes, he is showing disrespect to a final and executory decision of our court.[13]
In his Comment,[14] respondent denied the allegations against him. While he admitted that he filed Civil Case No. C-19928 as counsel for the plaintiff therein, he claimed that it
was not filed with malicious intent. Moreover, while the new case involved the same party, it was for a different cause of action and relief, and, as such, the principle of res
judicata did not apply. He further explained that the complaint in Civil Case No. C-14542 was for declaratory relief or reformation of instrument, while Civil Case No. 19928
was for annulment of title. He accepted the case based on "his professional appreciation that his client had a good case."

In his Reply,[15] the complainant stressed that the respondent was guilty of forum shopping; Civil Case No. C-19928 was nothing but a revival of the old complaint; and "the
lame excuse of the respondent that the present case is an action in rem while the other case is an action in personam" did not merit consideration.

On November 25, 2002, the Court resolved to refer the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. [16]

On September 1, 2003, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline assigned the case to Commissioner Salvador L. Peña. Only the counsel for the respondent appeared at the
mandatory conference held on September 30, 2003. Finding that there were no factual issues in the case, Commissioner Peña terminated the mandatory conference and
ordered the parties to submit their respective verified Position Papers, and, thereafter, considered the case submitted for resolution.

The case was re-assigned to Commissioner Doroteo B. Aguila who submitted his Report and Recommendation dated May 9, 2005, finding the respondent guilty of
misconduct. It was recommended that respondent be meted a two months' suspension from the practice of law.

According to the Investigating Commissioner, the elements of res judicata are present in this case as to bar the filing of Civil Case No. C-19928 since (a) the judgment in Civil
Case No. C-14542, upholding the validity of the absolute deed of sale, had attained finality; (b) the court which rendered the decision had the required jurisdiction; and (c) the
disposition of the case was a judgment on the merits.

On October 22, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline issued Resolution No. XVII-2005-108, adopting said Report and Recommendation
with the modification that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.

We agree that respondent is administratively liable.

In this case, it is clear that respondent is guilty of forum shopping. By his own admission, he was aware that Civil Case No. C-14542 was already final and executory when he
filed the second case (Civil Case No. C-19928). His allegation that he "was not the original counsel of his clients" and that "when he filed the subsequent case for nullity of
TCT, his motive was to protect the rights of his clients whom he believed were not properly addressed in the prior case for reformation and quieting of title," deserves scant
consideration. As a responsible member of the bar, he should have explained the effect of such final and executory decision on his clients" rights, instead of encouraging them
to file another case involving the same property and asserting the same rights.

The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of
obtaining a favorable judgment. It exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another, or when he institutes two or more
actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause to increase the chances of obtaining a favorable decision. An important factor in determining its existence is the vexation
caused to the courts and the parties-litigants by the filing of similar cases to claim substantially the same reliefs. [17] Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis
pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another.[18] Thus, the following requisites should concur:
(a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions, (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same facts, and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to
res judicata in the action under consideration. x x x[19]
The fact that the parties in the first and second cases are not identical will not prevent the application of the principle of res judicata. Mere substantial identity of parties, or a
community of interests between a party in the first case and a party in the subsequent case, even if the latter was not impleaded in the first case, is sufficient.[20] Moreover, a
party cannot, by varying the form of action or adopting a different method of presenting his case, escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action
shall not be twice litigated between the same parties or their privies.[21] This was what respondent resorted to in order to give some semblance of merit to the complaint for
annulment of title. He should have realized that the ruling of the Court in Tuazon v. Court of Appeals[22] effectively determined with finality the rights and obligations of the
parties under the questioned deed of sale.

A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client but not at the expense of truth and the administration of justice. [23] The filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the
Court's processes and improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the administration of justice and will be punished as contempt of court. Needless to state,
the lawyer who files such multiple or repetitious petitions (which obviously delays the execution of a final and executory judgment) subjects himself to disciplinary action for
incompetence (for not knowing any better) or for willful violation of his duties as an attorney to act with all good fidelity to the courts, and to maintain only such actions as
appear to him to be just and are consistent with truth and honor. [24]

The filing of another action concerning the same subject matter, in violation of the doctrine of res judicata, runs contrary to Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which requires a lawyer to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. By his actuations, respondent
also violated Rule 12.02[25] and Rule 12.04[26] of the Code, as well as a lawyer's mandate "to delay no man for money or malice." [27]

Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration of justice. Any conduct which tends to delay, impede or obstruct the
administration of justice contravenes such lawyer's duty. Indeed, the Court has time and again warned not to resort to forum shopping for this practice clogs the court
dockets.[28]

While we rule that the respondent should be sanctioned for his actions, we also note that the power to disbar should be exercised with great caution, to be imposed only in a
clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar. Disbarment should never be
decreed where any lesser penalty could accomplish the end desired.[29]
WHEREFORE, for violating Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent Atty. Carmelito A. Montano is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of six (6) months. He is STERNLY WARNED that any future violation of his duties as a lawyer will be dealt with more severely. This Decision is immediately executory. Atty.
Montano is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of receipt of this decision.

A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, June 07, 2011

RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED RESTORING INTEGRITY: A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES
COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT
 
 R E S O L U T I O N
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

For disposition of the Court are the following:

(a) the Motion for Reconsideration [1] dated April 1, 2011 filed by respondent University of the Philippines (UP) law professors Tristan A. Catindig and Carina C. Laforteza; and

(b) the Manifestation [2] dated April 1, 2011 filed by respondents Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen and Prof. Theodore O. Te.

In support of their Motion for Reconsideration, Professors Catindig and Laforteza relied on the following grounds:

GROUNDS

A. THIS PROCEEDING, WHILE OSTENSIBLY DOCKETED AS AN ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER, IS PREMISED ON A FINDING OF INDIRECT CONTEMPT.
ACCORDINGLY, WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENTS BREACHED THEIR ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS
WITHOUT OBSERVANCE OF THE DUE PROCESS SAFEGUARDS GUARANTEED IN AN INDIRECT CONTEMPT PROCEEDING.

B. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT (1) THE PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION ISSUES IN THE VINUYA CASE AND
IN A.M. NO. 10-7-17-SC HAVE NO RELATION TO THE RESTORING INTEGRITY STATEMENT AND THE SHOW CAUSE RESOLUTION, AND THEREFORE (2) THE
RESPONDENTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ACCESS AND ADDRESS THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED IN A.M. NO. 10-7-17-SC, TO PRESENT THEIR OWN EVIDENCE IN
RESPECT OF THE PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION ISSUES, AND TO SUPPORT THEIR RESPONSE TO THE SHOW CAUSE RESOLUTION WITH SUCH
EVIDENCE.

C. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENTS ARE IN BREACH OF THEIR ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS FOR
HAVING ISSUED THE RESTORING INTEGRITY STATEMENT. [3]

In their Motion for Reconsideration, respondents pray that (a) the Court's Decision dated March 8, 2011 be reconsidered and set aside and the respondents' Compliance
dated November 18, 2010 be deemed satisfactory, and (b) the Court expunge the reference in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC to the respondents (i.e., "joined by some faculty members
of the University of the Philippines school of law") effectively finding them guilty of making false charges against Associate Justice Mariano C. del Castillo (Justice Del
Castillo). In the alternative, they pray that they be afforded their full rights to due process and provided the full opportunity to present evidence on the matters subject of the
Show Cause Resolution dated October 19, 2010. [4]

Anent the first ground, Professors Catindig and Laforteza insist that, notwithstanding the docketing of this matter as an administrative case, there was purportedly a finding
that respondents were guilty of indirect contempt in view of (1) the mention made in the Show Cause Resolution dated October 19, 2010 of In re Kelly, [5] a case involving a
contempt charge; and (2) the references to respondents' "contumacious language" or "contumacious speech and conduct" and to several authorities which dealt with
contempt proceedings in the Decision dated March 8, 2011.

The shallowness of such argument is all too easily revealed. It is true that contumacious speech and conduct directed against the courts done by any person, whether or not
a member of the Bar, may be considered as indirect contempt under Rule 71, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. - After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon
within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
xxxx

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice.

A charge of indirect contempt, if proven in due proceedings, carry with it penal sanctions such as imprisonment or a fine or both. [6]

The very same contumacious speech or conduct directed against a court or judicial officer, if committed by a member of the Bar, may likewise subject the offender to
disciplinary proceedings under the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prescribes that lawyers observe and promote due respect for the courts. [7] In such disciplinary
cases, the sanctions are not penal but administrative such as, disbarment, suspension, reprimand or admonition.

Contrary to Professors Catindig and Laforteza's theory, what established jurisprudence tells us is that the same incident of contumacious speech and/or behavior directed
against the Court on the part of a lawyer may be punishable either as contempt or an ethical violation, or both in the discretion of the Court.

In Salcedo v. Hernandez, [8] for the same act of filing in court a pleading with intemperate and offensive statements, the concerned lawyer was found guilty of contempt and
liable administratively. For this reason, two separate penalties were imposed upon him, a fine (for the contempt charge) and reprimand (for his failure to observe his lawyerly
duty to give due respect to the Court).

The full case title [9] of In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen [10] and the sanction imposed indubitably show that the proceeding involved therein was disciplinary. Notwithstanding
the fact that the Court in Almacen adverted to a few principles and authorities involving contempt proceedings aside from jurisprudence on ethical responsibilities of lawyers,
Atty. Almacen was only meted out an administrative sanction (indefinite suspension from the practice of law) and no penal sanction was imposed upon him. Indeed, in
Almacen, the Court explicitly stated that whether or not respondent lawyer could be held liable for contempt for his utterances and actuations was immaterial as the sole issue
in his disciplinary case concerns his professional identity, his sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an officer of the Court. [11]

Conversely, In re Vicente Sotto [12] was purely a contempt proceeding. Nonetheless, the Court in that case saw fit to remind Atty. Sotto that:

As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes
fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other
institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation. [13]

Atty. Sotto was expressly found liable only for contempt and accordingly fined the amount of P1,000.00 payable within 15 days from promulgation of judgment. The
unmistakable reference to Atty. Sotto's failure to observe his ethical duties as a lawyer did not convert the action against him into a disciplinary proceeding. In fact, part of the
disposition of the case was to require Atty. Sotto to show cause, within the same period given for the payment of the fine, why he should not be disbarred for his
contemptuous statements against the Court published in a newspaper.

Similar to Salcedo, Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan [14] involved both contempt and disciplinary proceedings for the lawyer's act of making public statements to the media that were
offensive and disrespectful of the Court and its members relating to matters that were sub judice. This was evident in the May 2, 1988 Resolution of the Court which required
respondent lawyer to "explain in writing within ten (10) days from notice hereof, why he should not be punished for contempt of court and/or subjected to administrative
sanctions." [15] In Zaldivar, however, although the Court found that respondent's act constituted both contempt and gross misconduct as a member of the Bar, he was only
administratively sanctioned with an indefinite suspension from the practice of law.

The lesson imparted by the foregoing authorities is that, when the Court initiates contempt proceedings and/or disciplinary proceedings against lawyers for intemperate and
discourteous language and behavior directed at the courts, the evil sought to be prevented is the same - the degradation of the courts and the loss of trust in the
administration of justice. For this reason, it is not unusual for the Court to cite authorities on bar discipline (involving the duty to give due respect to the courts) in contempt
cases against lawyers and vice versa.

Thus, when the Court chooses to institute an administrative case against a respondent lawyer, the mere citation or discussion in the orders or decision in the administrative
case of jurisprudence involving contempt proceedings does not transform the action from a disciplinary proceeding to one for contempt. Respondents' contrary position in their
motion for reconsideration is bereft of any rational merit. Had this Court opted to cite respondents for contempt of court, which is punishable by imprisonment or fine, this
Court would have initiated contempt proceedings in accordance with the Rules of Court. Clearly, the Court did not opt to do so. We cannot see why respondents would
stubbornly cling to the notion that they were being cited for indirect contempt under the Show Cause Resolution when there is no basis for such belief other than their own
apparent misreading of the same.

With respect to the second ground offered for reconsideration of the Decision dated March 8, 2011, respondents continue to insist on their theory, previously expounded in
their Compliance, that the evidence and proceedings in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC was relevant to their own administrative case and thus, it was necessary for them to be granted
access to the evidence and records of that case in order to prove their own defenses in the present case. The Decision already debunked at length the theory that if
respondents are able to prove the bases for their "well founded" concerns regarding the plagiarism charge against Justice Del Castillo, then they would be exonerated of the
administrative charges against them. It bears repeating here that what respondents have been required to explain was their contumacious, intemperate and irresponsible
language and/or conduct in the issuance of the Restoring Integrity Statement, which most certainly cannot be justified by a belief, well-founded or not, that Justice Del Castillo
and/or his legal researcher committed plagiarism.

To dispel respondents' misconception once and for all, it should be stressed that this Court did not call the attention of respondents for having an opinion contrary to that of the
Court in the plagiarism case against Justice Del Castillo. Notably, even their co-respondent Prof. Raul T. Vasquez stood fast on his opinion regarding the plagiarism issue.
Still, he was able to simply relate to this Court how he came to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement and candidly conceded that he may have failed to assess the effect of
the language of the Statement. This straightforward and honest explanation was found satisfactory despite the lack of reference to the evidence in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC or
the holding of any formal trial-type evidentiary hearing, which respondents know fully well was not mandatory in administrative proceedings. This circumstance belied
respondents' justification for seeking access to the evidence and records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC and their assertion that they have in any way been denied their due process
rights. For the same reason that A.M. 10-7-17-SC and the present case are independent of each other, a passing mention of respondent law professors in the Resolution
dated February 8, 2011 in A.M. 10-7-17-SC is not proof that this Court has found respondents guilty of falsely accusing Justice Del Castillo of plagiarism nor is it any
prejudgment of the present case. For if so, no one would be exonerated or none of the compliances would be found satisfactory in this administrative case. Again, the case of
Prof. Vasquez confirms that this Court duly considered respondents' submissions in this case before coming to a decision.

To buttress their third ground for reconsideration, respondents mainly contend that the Court erred in taking the "emphatic language" in the Statement in isolation from the
other statements evidencing the good intentions of respondents and calling for constructive action. Again, these arguments have been substantially addressed in the Decision
dated March 8, 2011 and there is no need to belabor these points here. Suffice it to say that respondents' avowed noble motives have been given due weight and factored in
the determination of the action taken with respect to submissions of respondents.

In all, the Court finds that respondent Professors Catindig and Laforteza have offered no substantial arguments to warrant a reconsideration of the Decision dated March 8,
2011 nor to justify the grant of the reliefs prayed for in their motion.

As for the Manifestation dated April 1, 2011, Dean Leonen and Professor Te alleged that "they support the Motion for Reconsideration which was filed by Respondents
Professors Tristan Catindig and Caren Laforteza on April 1, 2011." The rest of the assertions therein are mere restatements of arguments previously proffered in respondents'
compliances and have been extensively taken up in the Decision dated March 8, 2011.

Since the Manifestation, apart from being an expression of support for Professors Catindig and Laforteza's motion for reconsideration, did not raise any new matter nor pray
for any affirmative relief, the Court resolves to merely note the same.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby RESOLVES to (a) DENY the Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 2011 filed by respondent Professors Tristan A.
Catindig and Carina C. Laforteza; and (b) NOTE the Manifestation dated April 1, 2011 filed by Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen and Professor Theodore O. Te.

A.M. No. 05-3-04-SC, July 22, 2005

RE: LETTER DATED 21 FEBRUARY 2005 OF ATTY. NOEL S. SORREDA.
 
 R E S O L U T I O N
GARCIA, J.:

In a letter[1] to the Chief Justice bearing date February 21, 2005, with copies thereof furnished all the Associate Justices of the Court and other government entities, RTC
judges and counsels listed thereunder, Atty. Noel S. Sorreda, who identified himself as "member, Philippine Bar", expressed his frustrations over the unfavorable outcome of
and the manner by which the Court resolved the following cases filed by him, to wit:
5. UDK-12854, Ramon Sollegue vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
6. G.R. No. 149334, Artemio Dalsen vs. Commission on Elections
7. G.R. No. 148440, Lilia Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals
8. G.R. No. 152766, Lilia Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
9. G.R. No. 154310, Noel Sorreda vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
10. G.R. No. 155446, Allan Reynold Cu vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
11. G.R. No. 156630, Ronilo Sorreda vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
12. G.R. No. 157046, Ronilo Sorreda vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.
13. G.R. No. 164163, Glenn Caballes vs. People, et al.
14. G.R. No. 164677, Marissa Macarilay vs. Hon. Alba-Estoesta, et al.
In said letter, Atty. Sorreda recounted the alleged circumstances surrounding the dismissal on February 7, 2000 [2] of the very first case he filed with the Court, UDK-12854,
entitled Ramon Sollegue vs. Court of Appeals, et al. Frustrated with the adverse ruling thereon, Atty. Sorreda had previously written a letter[3] dated April 2, 2001 addressed to
the Chief Justice, copy furnished all the Associate Justices of this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Office of the Solicitor General, denouncing the Court, as follows:
Mr. Chief Justice, I believe the manner the Court comported itself in the aforesaid case is totally execrable and atrocious, entirely unworthy of the majesty and
office of the highest tribunal of the land. It is the action not of men of reason or those who believe in the rule of law, but rather of bullies and tyrants from whom
"might is right." I say, shame on the High Court, for shoving down a hapless suitor's throat a ruling which, from all appearances, it could not justify.
Reacting to the above, the Court, in an en banc Resolution dated August 14, 2001,[4] required Atty. Sorreda to show cause why he should not be properly disciplined "for
degrading, insulting and dishonoring the Supreme Court by using vile, offensive, intemperate and contemptuous derogatory language against it".

In response to the "show cause" order, Atty. Sorreda addressed two (2) more letters to the Court dated December 2, 2001 [5] and June 16, 2002,[6] arguing for the propriety of
his action and practically lecturing the Court on his concepts of Legal and Judicial Ethics and Constitutional Law. In its Resolutions of January 15, 2002[7] and August 27,
2002[8], the Court merely noted said two letters.

Quoted from his earlier communications are the following statements of Atty. Sorreda disparaging the Court with intemperate, insulting, offensive and derogatory language, to
wit:
"SOMETHING HAS GOT TO BE SERIOUSLY AND TERRIBLY WRONG WITH THE COUNTRY'S JUSTICE SYSTEM" [9]

"WHAT IS HAPPENING TO THE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN THIS COUNTRY, MR. CHIEF JUSTICE?

xxx xxx xxx

I therefore deplore and condemn in the strongest term such strong-handed actuations as the Honorable Court has displayed. They are as one might expect in a dictatorship
or authoritarian regime."[10]
Persistent in imputing to the Court and its Justices offensive and uncalled remarks, Atty. Sorreda again went on a rampage in his subject letter of February 21, 2005:
xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Chief Justice, I do not doubt that these ten cases are among the most palpably meritorious cases that have ever been brought before the Supreme Court, or any court of
justice for that matter. I cannot doubt that were it not for the Sollegue "miscounting," and the other incidents that ensued from it, at least some of these ten cases would have
met with entirely different endings, so obvious and patent are their merits to any reasonable and impartial mind.

In short, Mr. Chief Justice, it is obvious that the High Court has taken it personally against me. To the detriment of my innocent clients. And of justice.

Mr. Chief Justice, why should this be? If the Court had anything against me, I stood ready to have the ax fall on my own neck, if it came to that. As I had stated in one
communication-
[I]f there is one thing I agree with in the High Court's position, it is that x x x if indeed I had wronged the Court in the way it had described, and if indeed my explanations and
arguments "lack merit," I should indeed be disciplined; and surely no less than DISBARMENT will do. It should also be done as swiftly as possible, given the gravity of the
charge and the high dignity and importance of the institution attacked. Now on January 22, 2002 and May 7, 2002, the Court has resolved to deny to the undersigned the "full
opportunity" for self-defense that he request ... therefore he is now left without any defense, and he can only wonder why no sanction has come down until the present time.
Might it be because I had continued, "Of course, I shall also only expect that such judgment, when it does come, will be a fully-reasoned one, as thoroughly discussed perhaps
as that in In re Almacen, 31 SCRA 562, for the proper guidance of all concerned"- and the Court knows that it is not able to give such a "fully-reasoned judgment" as I ask?
But rather than admit it has done wrong and rectify the same, it would rather "get back" at me by means of unfavorable rulings in the cases I elevate to it- let the innocent
litigants, whose only mistake was to hire me as their counsel, and the cause of justice suffer as they may.

Mr. Chief Justice, that is not only unjust; that is craven cowardice, to deal with an adversary like that. It is not something I would have expected from the supreme
judges of the land.

I can only view other happenings in the Honorable Court in such light. The same verifications that were previously unfaulted, suddenly became course for dismissal. What
other interpretation can I give it, than that the court had run out of excuses to dismiss, since I was being careful not to repeat the same adjudged "shortcomings"; and was now
scrounging every which way for one, just so to make sure I continue to get my "comeuppance."

That of the first nine cases, not one was assigned to the Third Division- only either to the Second Division, then chaired by Justice Josue N. Bellosillo, which handled the
Sollegue case; or the First Division, chaired by the Chief Justice, to whom I have directly written afterwards. Could it be only a coincidence - or is it a more likely explanation
that the powers-that-be in the Court wanted to be very sure I never get favorable ruling? Especially when it is considered that, following Justice Bellosillo's retirement on
November 12, 2003, for the first time in the history of the nation's judiciary a vacancy in the Supreme Court was filled up way beyond the constitutionally prescribed period of
90 days- and after so much mystery and intrigue has surrounded the appointment of his successor, Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario. In fact Justice Nazario was sworn in on
July 14, 2004, just one day before a new retirement took place, this time of Justice Jose C. Vitug. It was only following this latest retirement, that for the first time this counsel
had a case assigned to other than the First and Second Division. Could it be that Justice Vitug, then Chairman of the Third Division, and Justice Nazario, erstwhile presiding
Justice of the Sandiganbayan, had redoubtable reputations for independent-mindedness; and the powers-that-be in the court exercised their utmost influence to at least
prevent the both of them sitting in the bench at the same time, lest together they should "buck the system" and divide the Court, if not successfully sway the Court to favorably
rule on the undersigned counsel's cases before it?

xxx xxx xxx

But this time, in these ten cases I have recounted, I am wholly convinced that the court is in the wrong. I cannot but thus be filled with both acute sadness and burning
indignation. Sadness as counsel, to come to the realization that the high institution of which I am an officer has sunk to such a low. Indignation as a citizen, that
the public officers who are supposed to serve him and help him find justice, should instead give judgments that so insult the intelligence and glare with iniquity.

Mr. Chief Justice, whatever gave the Court the notion that it could pronounce 29 days as greater than 60 days, and not to have to account for it? Who can believe that the
supposedly most illustrious legal minds of the land, would miss seeing grave abuse of discretion in the actions of an agency that directly contravened numerous laws and
rules all at once? How could democracy's vaunted "last bulwark" suffer a widow and her children to thereafter live in their toilet, by sanctioning the plainly void sale and illegal
demolition of their erstwhile family home? Did the court pause for even three minutes to put itself in the shoes of an evidently innocent man kept locked up for three years now
on a manifestly false and fabricated charge, before it so blandly invoked its "discretion" not to entertain his appeal at all? Where did the Court get such brazenness, such
shameless boldness, as to dismiss on the ground that the docket fees had not been paid, when the evidence clearly show they in fact were? What manner of men
are you- even challenging the citizenry to inform on the corrupt, and the bar to become like "Frodo" in the fight against society's evils in your public speeches
and writings, and yet you yourselves committing the same evils when hidden from public view. Are all these rulings in the ten cases not the clearest
manifestation that the supreme magistrates have bought into the "What-are-we-in-power-for" mentality? (Underscoring ours)
Upon instructions of the Chief Justice, Atty. Sorreda's aforesaid letter of 21 February 2005 was included in the March 15, 2005 en banc agenda of the Court.

In an en banc Resolution[11] dated March 15, 2005, the Court again required Atty. Sorreda to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for
maliciously attacking the Court and its Justices.

By way of compliance to the second "show cause" order, Atty Sorreda, in his letter of May 10, 2005 [12], again with copies thereof furnished the Justices, judges and lawyers
thereunder listed, states that he "does not see the need to say any more" because the "cause" has "already been shown as clear as day" in his earlier letter of 21 February
2005, adding that "[T]he need is for the High Tribunal to act on the instant matter swiftly and decisively". While admitting "the great seriousness of the statements and
imputations I have leveled against the Court", he dared the Court whether "it is capable of a judgment that will be upheld by the 'Supreme Judge'".

After going over the records of the cases in which Atty. Sorreda accuses the Court of being unfair in the resolution thereof, the Court stands by its rulings thereon. Atty.
Sorreda mockingly stated that the Court does not know how to count when it dismissed the Sollegue case on ground of failure to file the petition therein within the
reglementary period. For the enlightenment of the good counsel, the Court dismissed the petition in Sollegue not only for failure to have it filed within the period fixed in Sec.
4, Rule 65 but also for failure to submit the duplicate original or certified true copy of the questioned resolution of the Court of Appeals dated June 28, 1999 in accordance with
Sec. 1, Rule 65 and Sec. 3, Rule 46, in relation to Sec. 2, Rule 56.[13] In another case, Ronilo Sorreda vs. CA, Atty. Sorreda claimed that said case was dismissed on the mere
ground of insufficient verification. Again, Atty. Sorreda must be reminded that the petition was dismissed not merely for defective verification but more so because the petition
was evidently used as a substitute for a lost remedy of appeal.[14] We see no need to belabor the grounds for the dismissal of the other cases enumerated by counsel, said
grounds having been stated in the respective minute resolutions which were plain, clear, simply worded and understandable to everyone, even to those who do not have a
formal education in law. Suffice it to say that the dismissal of those petitions was the result of a thorough deliberation among members of this Court.

Atty. Sorreda's imputation of manipulation in the assignment and raffle of cases is utterly baseless and at best a mere figment of his imagination.

Unfounded accusations or allegations or words tending to embarrass the court or to bring it into disrepute have no place in a pleading. Their employment serves no useful
purpose. On the contrary, they constitute direct contempt of court or contempt in facie curiae and a violation of the lawyer's oath and a transgression of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

In Ang vs. Castro[15], this Court held that if a pleading containing derogatory, offensive and malicious statements is submitted in the same court or judge in which the
proceedings are pending, it is direct contempt, equivalent as it is to a misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of
justice. Direct contempt is punishable summarily.[16]

Atty Sorreda's conduct likewise violated the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically -
CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

xxx

Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the courts.
Rule 11.04 - A lawyer shall not attribute to a judge motives not supported by the record or having no materiality to the case.
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his client's genuine interest and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights,
as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and ability,[17] he must do so only within the bounds of the law.[18] A lawyer is entitled to voice his criticism within the context of the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech which must be exercised responsibly. After all, every right carries with it the corresponding obligation. Freedom is not freedom
from responsibility, but freedom with responsibility. The lawyer's fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and orderly administration of justice. It must
be done within the confines of reason and common sense.[19]

Atty. Sorreda, as a citizen and as an officer of the court, is entitled to criticize the rulings of this Court, to point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed with error. But,
certainly, this does not give him the unbridled license to insult and malign the Court and bring it into disrepute. Against such an assault, the Court is duty-bound "to act to
preserve its honor and dignity and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession".[20]

The eloquent words of the late Justice Conrado V. Sanchez in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer[21] are enlightening:
By now, a lawyer's duties to the Court have become commonplace. Really, there could hardly be any valid excuse for lapses in the observance thereof. Section 20(b), Rule
138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical terms, spells out one such duty: "To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers." As explicit is
the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that "[i]t is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary
incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance." That same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support
the courts against "unjust criticism and clamor." And more. The attorney's oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be "with all good fidelity xxx to the courts." Worth
remembering is that the duty of an attorney to the courts "can only be maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which he is bound to
uphold."
In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel,[22] Justice Sanchez further elucidated:
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice." His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the
courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the administration of justice." Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial
edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people." Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the court, it is
his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice."
Likewise, in Zaldivar vs. Gonzales,[23] we held:
Respondent Gonzales is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No one seeks to deny him that right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems unaware
of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs an occasion to be adjusted to and
accommodated with the requirement of equally important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning
of the administration of justice. There is no antimony between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of
freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, with the context, in other words, of viable
independent institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general community.
As officer of the court, Atty. Sorreda has the duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts and to promote confidence in the fair administration of justice.[24] No less
must this be and with greater reasons in the case of the country's highest court, the Supreme Court, as the last bulwark of justice and democracy

Atty. Sorreda must be reminded that his first duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice, to which his client's success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought
to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascription can hardly be justified nor can it have a place in the
dignity of judicial forum. Civility among members of the legal profession is a treasured tradition that must at no time be lost to it.[25]

Here, Atty. Sorreda has transcended the permissible bounds of fair comment and constructive criticism to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice. Free
expression, after all, must not be used as a vehicle to satisfy one's irrational obsession to demean, ridicule, degrade and even destroy this Court and its magistrates. [26]

We have constantly reminded that any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private capacity, puts his moral character in serious doubt as a member of
the Bar, and renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law.[27]

In the very recent similar case of Tacardon, et al vs. Ponce Enrile,[28] we imposed on the respondent therein the penalty of suspension from the Bar. Here, as in Tacardon, we
find the exclusion of Atty. Sorreda from the Bar a fitting sanction until he proves himself worthy to enjoy the privileges of membership to the profession. It is imperative to instill
in him sense of discipline that should teach him anew of his duty to respect courts of justice, especially this Tribunal. This rehabilitation must be done outside the brotherhood
he has dishonored and to which he will be allowed to return only after he has purged himself of his misdeeds. [29]

WHEREFORE, ATTY. NOEL S. SORREDA is found guilty both of contempt of court and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility amounting to gross misconduct
as an officer of the court and member of the Bar. He is hereby indefinitely SUSPENDED as a member of the Bar and is prohibited from engaging in the practice of law until
otherwise ordered by this Court.

G.R. No. 120654, September 11, 1996

MARIA LOURDES PAREDES-GARCIA, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND HON. ESCOLASTICO M. CRUZ, JR., RESPONDENTS. 
 
 D E C I S I O N
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set aside the decision of 19 June 1995[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 37081
dismissing the petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari to annul the order of respondent Judge Escolastico M. Cruz, Jr., which cited the petitioner for contempt and ordered
her to pay a fine of P100.00.

The pleadings and the annexes thereto disclose the following uncontroverted facts:

The petitioner, an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal, was deputized at the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City and assigned at the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 58, Makati City. The respondent is the presiding judge of the said branch.

At 8:30 a.m. of 11 April 1995, the respondent Judge commenced the session of his court. When Criminal Cases Nos. 93-7434 to 39 (People of the Philippines vs. Ofelia Baja)
was called, the petitioner, who was the prosecutor assigned to the said case, was not yet around. She arrived ten minutes later, just when the second case in the calendar
was on its first call. The respondent Judge forthwith ordered the petitioner to explain within seventy-two hours her failure to come to court on time.

Before the "finalization of the aforesaid open court order," the petitioner filed her Explanation. [2] She alleged therein that she actually reported to her office at 8:00 a.m., as
shown by a copy of a page of the Prosecutor’s logbook, and that she went to the respondent Judge’s court. However, she returned to her office to attend to some matters
prior to the hearing. She thereafter proceeded back to the respondent Judge’s court for the hearings, but was late for ten minutes. At the time, the second case was just on
its first call. She asserted further that she had never been late in any of the hearings of the court nor previously fined or ordered to explain for tardiness in any hearing, which
is the respondent Judge’s usual practice for lawyers and litigants who come late.

On 12 April 1996, the respondent Judge issued the following order, [3] which cited the petitioner in contempt of court and directed her to pay within seventy-two hours from
receipt of the order a penalty in the amount of P100.00.
In an open court order dated April 11, 1995, the Public Prosecutor and the Public Attorney were ordered to explain their failure to come to court at 8:30 in the morning.

On even date and before the finalization of the aforesaid open court order, Public Prosecutor Maria Lourdes P. Garcia submitted an ‘Explanation’ alleging, among other things,
that on April 11, 1995, she reported for work at around 8:00 a.m. as shown by the logbook, a photocopy of which she appended to her ‘Explanation.’

In paragraph 5 of her ‘Explanation,’ she contends that she had never been late in any of the court hearings as in fact she had never been ordered to explain nor imposed a
fine, a usual practice as a matter of course.

The time has come for the Court to advice [sic] Asst. Prosecutor Garcia of the need to disabuse her mind with the thought that the xerox copy of the logbook she attached to
her ‘Explanation’ has evidentiary value insofar as coming to court on time is concerned. She maybe [sic] in her office at 8:00 a.m. or even earlier, but it does not follow that
she is also in the court room before sessions begin. Under the law on physics, no creature can occupy two different spaces at the same time. Coming to her office on time is
certainly different from coming to court on time.

On the argument that she had never been ordered to explain nor imposed a fine, Asst. Prosecutor Garcia is well aware that her allegation of ‘for the record, undersigned had
never been late in any of the hearings of this Court x x x’ is a downright lie. If only she will examine her conscience, she would know that paragraph 5 of her ‘Explanation’ is a
falsity. The only reason why the court never ordered her to explain her tardiness is because of PAKIKISAMA (‘companionship’ as translated into the English language by Mr.
Leo James English).

Asst. Prosecutor Garcia’s verbal clash with the branch clerk of court yesterday, April 11, 1995 is the proverbial ‘last straw that broke the camel’s back.’ The branch clerk’s
refusals to let her enter the undersigned’s chambers are all orders of the undersigned out of propriety. Propriety dictates that no lawyer with a pending case -- government or
private -- should be allowed to talk with the undersigned. Asst. Prosecutor Garcia has not only been improper in her several attempts to enter the undersigned’s chambers --
she has also been improper in asking the staff of this court to carry her travelling bags/paraphernalias [sic] for her, to buy food, to deposit her pay checks, to run errands for
her -- all reaching the knowledge of the branch clerk of court and the undersigned. Worse, if the Asst. Prosecutor would perhaps ‘get down to brass tacks’ and remain in the
court room while criminal proceedings are going on, no case on technicality could have been lost (re: People vs. Cawili).

In defiance of Memorandum # 1-95 dated March 28, 1995 conspicuously posted right at the court room door, she still attempted several times to talk to the undersigned in
chambers, prompting the branch clerk of court to exercise her ‘administrative powers’ to rightfully prevent as she did, the Asst. Prosecutor from doing so.

WHEREFORE, with all these and more, finding the ‘Explanation’ a downright lie, Asst. Prosecutor MARIA LOURDES P. GARCIA is hereby cited in CONTEMPT of
Court. Consequently, she is hereby ordered to pay within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt of this order, a penalty in the amount of P100.00 to the branch clerk, this court,
who in turn is directed to turn over the fine to the Office of the Clerk of Court after issuing the corresponding receipt therefor.
The petitioner filed a motion for a reconsideration of the order, which was, however, denied by the respondent Judge. Pertinent portion of the order of denial reads:
Paragraph 9 of Asst. Prosecutor Maria Lourdes P. Garcia’s Motion for Reconsideration alleging that "x x x this being the first incident at that, she does not deserve such cruel
and harsh treatment from this Honorable Court’; is false, for the truth is what is stated in page 2 of the contempt order reproduced hereunder, thus:

On the argument that she had never been ordered to explain nor imposed a fine, Asst. Prosecutor Garcia is well aware that her allegation of ‘for the record, undersigned had
never been late in any of the hearings of this court x x x’ is a downright lie. If only she will examine her conscience, she would know that paragraph 5 of her "Explanation" is a
falsity. The only reason why the court never asked her to explain her tardiness is because of PAKIKISAMA (‘companionship’ as translated in the English language by Mr. Leo
James English).[4]
Aggrieved by the aforementioned orders, the petitioner instituted with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 37081,
wherein she challenged the orders in this manner:
FIRST: BEING UNINTENTIONALLY LATE FOR TEN (10) MINUTES DUE TO THE PERFORMANCE OF OTHER OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS BY THE PETITIONER W HO IS AN
ASSISTANT PUBLIC PROSECUTOR ASSIGNED IN MAKATI CITY IS NOT A CALLOUS DISREGARD TO THE ORDERS OF THE COURT NOR A CONTUMACIOUS ACT
AGAINST THE DIGNITY OF THE COURT AND AGAINST THE SOLEMNITY OF ITS PROCEEDINGS.

SECOND: THE CONTEMPT ORDER AND THE SUBSEQUENT ORDER OF THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION ARE HARSH AND CRUEL AND THAT THEY WERE DONE AND ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

THIRD: THE ISSUANCE OF A WARRANT OF ARREST IS A MISAPPLICATION AND A CLEAR MISAPPRECIATION ON THE PART OF THE HONORABLE PUBLIC
RESPONDENT OF SECTION 1, RULE 70 OF THE RULES OF COURT.

FOURTH: THE ASSAILED ORDERS AND THE PENALTIES IMPOSED BY THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT WILL WORK GREAT INJUSTICE TO THE
PETITIONER.

FIFTH: THERE IS NO OTHER PLAIN, SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE REMEDY IN THE ORDINARY COURSE AND LAW AVAILABLE TO THE HEREIN PETITIONER. [5]
In his comment on the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 37081, the respondent Judge defended the correctness of his orders and attached thereto, among other things, (a) his
Office Memorandum 1-95 of 28 March 1995 outlining his policy on those who wish to see him in his chambers; (b) his own affidavit narrating his policies on how to conduct
sessions in relation to tardiness and imposition of fines in particular, the instances when the petitioner personally apologized to him for her tardiness, and the reason why he
cited the petitioner for contempt; (c) copies of eight of his orders imposing fines on government and private prosecuting lawyers and litigants who arrived late in court; (d)
separate affidavits of the personnel of his sala (branch clerk of court, Criminal Cases in-charge, legal researcher, two court stenographers, branch sheriff, process server,
court aide, two casual employees), a prosecution witness, and a private complainant, attesting to instances of tardiness of the petitioner.

The Court of Appeals limited the issues to whether the petitioner was tardy and whether she committed falsehood in her explanation. [6]

In its decision of 19 June 1995,[7] the Court of Appeals dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 37081. As to the first issue, it held that the petitioner herself admitted the fact of her
tardiness. As to the second issue, it found that the petitioner was not honest about her punctual attendance in court, which if considered together with her tardiness, may be
punished with contempt. Thus:
The possibility is, the petitioner was penalized for contempt not only because she was late or tardy, but also because of falsehood in her April 11, [1995]
"explanation". Precisely, the respondent said, despite her tardiness, she offered no apology and worst she allegedly lied. Her "temerity" in alleging a falsehood is a "callous
disregard" of the dignity of the court and a "manifestation of disregard" of the virtue of honesty. Besides, petitioner’s "blatant allegation of an obvious falsehood" is a wrongful
act.[8]
The Court of Appeals gave credence to the affidavits of the respondent Judge and several court employees attesting to the tardiness of the petitioner on certain occasions. It
concluded that although "a late appearance by only about 10 minutes does not per se amount to a stubborn or perverse disobedience," that "tardiness coupled with
statements less than truthful should certainly be castigated." It went on to state that:
The respondent Judge should not be faulted for being strict in the matter of time attendance during trials. He has . . . consistently penalized private as well as government
lawyers, litigants, witnesses and court personnel who are remiss in their duties to come to court on time, a policy he adopted without exemptions, since 1989 when he was still
a Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila.[9]
The petitioner then came to this Court through the instant petition for review contending that the decision of the Court of Appeals is based on a mere possibility, thereby
depriving her of her constitutional right to be presumed innocent. She would never have the nerve or temerity to violate the court’s rules, indulge in any falsehood, or commit
any act which would taint her record and jeopardize her burning ambition to join the judiciary in the future. She argues that if indeed she had been late, the best evidence
would have been a reprimand or admonition in an order issued by the respondent Judge; no such order exists. The fact that she immediately submitted her explanation
indicated her unfailing respect to the court. She also attacks the value of the affidavits submitted by the respondent Judge before the Court of Appeals for having been
executed through the respondent Judge’s influence, who exercises moral ascendancy over the affiants. She attached to her petition machine copies of several pages of the
Prosecutor’s Logbook showing her daily attendance from 16 August 1994 to 11 April 1995.[10]

The petitioner also alleges that the contempt order was a retaliatory act because she had spurned the respondent Judge’s amorous advances to her. Describing herself as a
young woman, who is, by standards of physical beauty, "well-endowed and physically attractive," she claims that the respondent Judge had been extending unusual
courtesies to her. There were numerous occasions when he would visit her in her office or invite her for lunch at his chambers or elsewhere; he also allowed her frequent
access to his chambers and provided her an electric fan and a cellular phone. These were discreet ministrations for her to give in to his offers for cocktails or a date at
karaoke clubs. But prior to the issuance of the contempt order, she earned the ire of the respondent Judge, because on a trip to Cagayan de Oro City, she failed to call him
despite his numerous requests to do so. She explained to him that she had lost the phone. At another time, he sought her for the jurat in his affidavit; but when she
requested him to personally appear before her and take his oath, the respondent Judge was apparently insulted and had the affidavit retrieved and referred to another
prosecutor instead. She was, in fact, the prime target of Memorandum No. 1-95, to sever whatever free access she had previously enjoyed.

Finally, the petitioner asserts that the respondent Judge acted with unusual haste in dismissing her explanation and motion for reconsideration. If she were indeed guilty of
anything, it would only be an indirect contempt.

In his Comment, the respondent Judge questions the viability of this petition for its failure to raise questions of law and to show that it falls within the exceptions to the rule on
conclusiveness of the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals. He underscores the fact that the petitioner admitted her tardiness. The affidavits he submitted cannot be taken
lightly, for they have been obtained from various affiants whose positive assertions cannot prevail over the petitioner’s self-serving denial. He also observes that some
annexes[11] of the petition readily show that the petitioner had been late seven times when she logged her time of arrival at her office at 8:30 a.m., 8:35 a.m., and 8:45
a.m. Evidently, if she arrived at her office at 8:30 a.m., she could not have been in court at the same time. He claims that he has consistently fined public and private lawyers
and litigants who arrived late in court.

The respondent Judge further alleges that the electric fan was lent to the petitioner by the officer-in-charge of the court, not by him, and that the cellular phone was just
borrowed from him by the petitioner. He denies the alleged amorous advances and claims that the petitioner is suffering from some delusion of beauty. [12]

Finally, the respondent Judge avers that all these years his record as a trial court judge remains unsullied. He had been the recipient of several awards, such as the (1) Jose
Abad Santos Award for Most Outstanding Metropolitan Trial Court Judge of the Philippines [1991] given by the Foundation for Judicial Excellence; (2) Presidential Lingkod
Bayan Award [1991] given by the Office of the President; and the (3) Outstanding Pillar of Justice Award [1994] given by the city government of Manila. On the other hand, he
bemoans the petitioner’s competence as a prosecutor and cites an instance where her neglect in requesting the complainant to identify the signature of the drawee of
bounced checks caused the acquittal of the accused in a case[13] involving a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law). In another case,[14] she deliberately attempted
to mislead the court by offering exhibits different from that presented and marked in court.

In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General prays for the dismissal of the petition, as (a) it raises pure questions of fact; and (b) contrary to the petitioner’s assertion, the
challenged decision is supported by the evidence on record notwithstanding the Court of Appeals’ use of the word "possibility." In any event, the error thus raised refers to the
application of evidence. As regards the petitioner’s contention that the Court of Appeals disregarded certain relevant facts showing the "oppressive and vindictive attitude" of
the respondent Judge, the Office of the Solicitor General avers that the same cannot be entertained for having been raised for the first time on appeal.

In her Reply to the Comments, the petitioner brings into focus the Court of Appeals’ alleged error in upholding the nature of the contempt as direct contempt; in sustaining the
legality of the contempt order, although it was issued without due process; and in failing to consider the ulterior motive of the respondent Judge in issuing the contempt order
and to correct "the patent cruelty, the latent vindictiveness, oppressiveness, and the retaliatory nature" of the said order. She attached thereto a copy of her performance
rating sheet and the affidavit of Ma. Enrina Talag-Pascual. The former shows that her performance score for 1995 was 90%, earning for her a "very satisfactory" rating. She
was, as well, evaluated to possess good public relations and an integrity that is beyond reproach. In the latter, affiant Enrina, a former acting branch clerk of court and
interpreter of Branch 13, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, declared that when the respondent Judge was the presiding judge of the said branch, he did certain acts leading
toward a special personal relationship with her. When he later noticed her frequent male visitor and her preference for that visitor, the respondent Judge would no longer talk
to her nor give her anything to do. Eventually, another person got the appointment to the position she was aspiring for. Feeling cheated and taken advantage of, she
resigned.

We resolved to give due course to this petition, and the parties submitted the required memoranda.

We find for the petitioner.

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts. It is indispensable to their right of self-preservation, to the execution of their powers, and to the maintenance of their
authority, and consequently to the due administration of justice.[15] It is an essential element, or is possessed as part, of judicial authority vested by the Constitution in the
courts.[16] Put a little differently, the power is an "implied constitutional power."[17]

The power, however, is not limitless. It must be used sparingly with caution, restraint, judiciousness, deliberation, and due regard to the provisions of the law and the
constitutional rights of the individual. It should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, it should not
be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of justice.[18] For, as observed in People vs. Estenzo:[19]
There is a compelling and exigent need therefore for judges to take utmost care lest prejudice, innate or covert hostility to personality of counsel, or previous incidents lead
them to characterize conduct susceptible of innocent explanation as slights on the dignity of the court. It is ever timely to remember how easy it is to overstep the dividing line
that should separate the prosecutor from the judge, when both roles are merged in the same person. The infusion of personal element may go unnoticed. Even if such were
not the case, objectively viewed, such an impression may be difficult to avoid by laymen. That is a consideration that cannot be overlooked.
Indeed, the contempt power could easily tempt a judge to make its exercise nothing more than a camouflage for a wounded pride, a burning prejudice, revenge, a misplaced
passion, or selfish motives.

We do not hesitate to rule that the respondent Judge failed to observe the rule of conduct in the exercise of the power to punish the petitioner for contempt of court. In our
considered opinion, he acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in holding the petitioner guilty of contempt without complying with the
requirements of due process.

It must be underscored that in open court on 11 April 1995, the respondent Judge merely ordered the petitioner to explain her failure to come to court on time or at 8:30 a.m.
of that day. That order did not yet amount to a show-cause order or a citation directing an explanation why she should not be held in contempt of court for
tardiness. Tardiness could be a valid ground for contempt. Justice Malcolm remarked:
All too frequently, a Court of First Instance finds it necessary to impose a small fine on attorneys for failure to be present at the session of the court at the hour and on the day
named and for unseemly behavior in the presence of the court.[20]
Failure of counsel to appear in court for trial despite due notice was held to constitute indirect contempt, [21] for it is a misbehavior committed not in the presence of or so near a
court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice.[22]

The Explanation of the petitioner which was forthwith submitted was an explanation of her failure to come on time, as was, in fact, called for in the order.

The respondent Judge issued the challenged order of 12 April 1995 mainly because of his perception that the explanation was a "downright lie," and for the other grounds
enumerated in the order, viz., the petitioner’s (a) verbal clash with the branch clerk of court on 11 April 1995 when the latter prevented the former from entering the Judge’s
chamber; (b) previous improper attempts to enter the said chambers; (c) improper conduct in asking the staff of the court to carry her travelling bags or paraphernalia, buy
food, deposit her pay checks, or run errands for her; (d) defiance of the respondent Judge’s Memorandum No. 1-95, dated 28 March 1995; and (e) failure to remain in court
while criminal proceedings were going on resulting in the dismissal of a case due to technicality.

Clearly then, the petitioner was cited and punished for contempt not only because of her "failure to come to court on time" in the morning of 11 April 1995, but also because of
the foregoing acts or omissions. Her tardiness as a ground for contempt was, however, relegated to the background, for the respondent Judge had found other grounds for
contempt.

The grounds or reasons enumerated by the respondent Judge could constitute grounds for indirect contempt under Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, probably under
paragraphs (a) and (d) thereof.[23] He cannot, therefore, immediately impose a penalty, but must faithfully comply with the due process requirements prescribed in the said
Section 3, namely, the filing of a charge in writing and giving the accused an opportunity to be heard by himself or by counsel. The charge under this section may be made by
the judge himself.[24] And considering that the latter seemed to have personal knowledge of such alleged grounds, it was even his duty if he were honestly convinced of the
viability of such grounds to institute the proceedings.[25] If the answer to the charge is satisfactory, the contempt proceedings ends. Otherwise, it shall proceed in accordance
with the Rules.[26] On the day set for the hearing, the court shall proceed to investigate the charges and consider such answer or testimony as the respondent may make or
offer.[27] Since contempt of court proceedings are commonly treated as criminal in their nature, the mode of procedure and rules of evidence therein are assimilated to criminal
prosecutions.[28] Accordingly, if reasonable doubt in fact or in law exists as to the alleged contemner’s guilt, the doubt shall be resolved in favor of the alleged contemner.[29]
The penalty, if warranted, can only be imposed after the alleged contemner shall have been heard.[30]

In finding the petitioner guilty of the aforementioned acts and imposing upon her the penalty of a fine without granting her an opportunity to answer the imputed falsehood and
improprieties and an opportunity to be heard, the respondent Judge disregarded the requirements of due process in contempt proceedings and, therefore, acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.[31]

Even assuming arguendo that the respondent Judge’s order of 12 April 1995 was meant to be a resolution on the issue of the petitioner’s tardiness in the morning of 11 April
1995, and that it could be summarily dealt with as a direct contempt and forthwith punished, the penalty of P100.00 is unreasonable. The petitioner admitted that she was late
by ten minutes and that she arrived when the second case in the calendar was on its first call. This reference to a first call, which is not denied by the respondent Judge,
presupposes the existence of a practice where at the commencement of the sessions at 8:30 a.m. the cases are called to determine which are ready and to call the second
time those which were not ready on the first call. Of course, it cannot be expected that two cases ready on the first call would be tried at the same time. The delay then of ten
minutes was of de minimis importance, especially considering the fact that there is no showing at all that another case was ready for trial at 8:30 a.m.

As to the alleged "lie" which the respondent Judge characterized as "downright," no evidence supports it except his appeal to the petitioner to examine her conscience
because she knew that if the court never ordered her to explain her tardiness it was due to "pakikisama." This appeal to the petitioner’s conscience was itself an admission
that there was no evidence to prove the petitioner’s prior tardiness or of any order calling her attention to it or admonishing her for that. If it was the respondent Judge’s
practice or policy to impose a fine on lawyers and litigants -- and he was able to attach to his Comment in CA-G.R. SP No. 37081 copies of eight orders imposing such fines --
then he should have done so against the petitioner if she were tardy in the past. Yet, he could not produce any order intended for the petitioner; he was then unfair or
discriminatory in the implementation of his policy or practice. If the petitioner had in fact been tardy to a point of habituality, no "pakikisama" can warrant the respondent
Judge’s tolerance, unless we are to believe the petitioner’s version that she had been the object of the respondent Judge’s special attention or grant of privileges in the past.

Moreover, since what was filed was a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which is an available remedy in appropriate cases of judgments in
contempt proceedings,[32] the only issue which the respondent Court had to resolve was whether the respondent Judge has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the challenged orders.[33] It should not have taken into account in resolving the merits of the case the affidavits and other documents
submitted by the respondent Judge to prove the alleged falsehood in the petitioner’s Explanation and the correctness of his orders. These pieces of evidence, obtained when
this case was already before the Court of Appeals, were not available to or considered by the respondent Judge when he issued the orders.

The above pronouncements should not be understood as absolving the petitioner from any liability for her tardiness or from her solemn duty as an officer of the court. As a
lawyer, she is bound by her oath to conduct herself as a lawyer according to the best of her knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to her
client. She should never forget that punctuality is not only a practice mandated by the Code of Professional Responsibility [34] and Canons of Professional Ethics,[35] it is a
virtue which must be faithfully maintained as part of her contribution in the task of ensuring a speedy, efficient, and effective administration of justice. If the petitioner then had
committed a breach of her duty to the court she should accordingly be dealt with but in accordance with established procedure. The right to do so is hereby reserved to the
respondent Judge.

We close with the sad observation that both the petitioner and the respondent Judge have resorted to personal attacks against each other in this case. They failed to limit
themselves to the issues and even exchanged tirades on their competence and physical being. They did not observe the proper decorum of civility and refinement even in
times of disagreement. Such is not expected of them as officers of the court. What happened in this case may not easily be forgotten by them. If the petitioner would thus
remain detailed at the branch of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City presided over by the respondent Judge the soured relationship may affect the administration of
justice. The petitioner then must be re-assigned somewhere else.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged decision of 19 June 1995 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 37081 and the challenged
orders of respondent Judge Escolastico M. Cruz, Jr., of 12 April 1995 and 20 April 1995 in Criminal Cases Nos. 93-7434 to 39 are SET ASIDE.

The Department of Justice and the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal are requested to recall the designation of the petitioner to Branch 58 of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City and to detail her to other courts if these have not been done yet.

No pronouncement as to costs.

A.C. No. 6252, October 05, 2004

JONAR SANTIAGO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. EDISON V. RAFANAN, RESPONDENT. 
 
 DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Notaries public are expected to exert utmost care in the performance of their duties, which are impressed with public interest. They are enjoined to comply faithfully with the
solemnities and requirements of the Notarial Law. This Court will not hesitate to mete out appropriate sanctions to those who violate it or neglect observance thereof.

The Case and the Facts

[1]
Before us is a verified Complaint filed by Jonar Santiago, an employee of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP), for the disbarment of Atty. Edison V.
Rafanan. The Complaint was filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on January 16, 2001. It charged Atty. Rafanan
with deceit; malpractice or other gross misconduct in office under Section 27 of Rule 138[2] of the Rules of Court; and violation of Canons 1.01, 1.02 and 1.03[3], Canon 5[4],
and Canons 12.07[5] and 12.08 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

In his Report, IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid Jr. summarized the allegations of the complainant in this wise:
“x x x. In his Letter-Complaint, Complainant alleged, among others, that Respondent in notarizing several documents on different dates failed and/or refused to: a)make the
proper notation regarding the cedula or community tax certificate of the affiants; b) enter the details of the notarized documents in the notarial register; and c) make and
execute the certification and enter his PTR and IBP numbers in the documents he had notarized, all in violation of the notarial provisions of the Revised Administrative Code.

“Complainant likewise alleged that Respondent executed an Affidavit in favor of his client and offered the same as evidence in the case wherein he was actively representing
his client. Finally, Complainant alleges that on a certain date, Respondent accompanied by several persons waited for Complainant after the hearing and after confronting the
latter disarmed him of his sidearm and thereafter uttered insulting words and veiled threats.”[6]
On March 23, 2001, pursuant to the January 19, 2001 Order of the CBD, [7] Atty. Rafanan filed his verified Answer.[8] He admitted having administered the oath to the affiants
whose Affidavits were attached to the verified Complaint. He believed, however, that the non-notation of their Residence Certificates in the Affidavits and the Counter-
affidavits was allowed.

He opined that the notation of residence certificates applied only to documents acknowledged by a notary public and was not mandatory for affidavits related to cases pending
before courts and other government offices. He pointed out that in the latter, the affidavits, which were sworn to before government prosecutors, did not have to indicate the
residence certificates of the affiants. Neither did other notaries public in Nueva Ecija -- some of whom were older practitioners -- indicate the affiants’ residence certificates on
the documents they notarized, or have entries in their notarial register for these documents.

As to his alleged failure to comply with the certification required by Section 3 of Rule 112[9] of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, respondent explained that as counsel of the
affiants, he had the option to comply or not with the certification. To nullify the Affidavits, it was complainant who was duty-bound to bring the said noncompliance to the
attention of the prosecutor conducting the preliminary investigation.

As to his alleged violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR, respondent argued that lawyers could testify on behalf of their clients “on substantial matters, in cases where [their]
testimony is essential to the ends of justice.” Complainant charged respondent’s clients with attempted murder. Respondent averred that since they were in his house when
the alleged crime occurred, “his testimony is very essential to the ends of justice.”

Respondent alleged that it was complainant who had threatened and harassed his clients after the hearing of their case by the provincial prosecutor on January 4, 2001.
Respondent requested the assistance of the Cabanatuan City Police the following day, January 5, 2001, which was the next scheduled hearing, to avoid a repetition of the
incident and to allay the fears of his clients. In support of his allegations, he submitted Certifications [10] from the Cabanatuan City Police and the Joint Affidavit[11] of the two
police officers who had assisted them.

Lastly, he contended that the case had been initiated for no other purpose than to harass him, because he was the counsel of Barangay Captain Ernesto Ramos in the cases
filed by the latter before the ombudsman and the BJMP against complainant.

After receipt of respondent’s Answer, the CBD, through Commissioner Tyrone R. Cimafranca, set the case for hearing on June 5, 2001, at two o’clock in the afternoon.
Notices[12] of the hearing were sent to the parties by registered mail. On the scheduled date and time of the hearing, only complainant appeared. Respondent was unable to do
so, apparently because he had received the Notice only on June 8, 2001.[13] The hearing was reset to July 3, 2001 at two o’clock in the afternoon.

On the same day, June 5, 2001, complainant filed his Reply[14] to the verified Answer of respondent. The latter’s Rejoinder was received by the CBD on July 13, 2001. [15] It
also received complainant’s Letter-Request[16] to dispense with the hearings. Accordingly, it granted that request in its Order [17] dated July 24, 2001, issued through
Commissioner Cimafranca. It thereby directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within fifteen days from receipt of the Order, after which the case was to be
deemed submitted for resolution.

The CBD received complainant’s Memorandum[18] on September 26, 2001. Respondent did not file any.

The IBP’s Recommendation

On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2003-172[19] approving and adopting the Investigating Commissioner’s Report that
respondent had violated specific requirements of the Notarial Law on the execution of a certification, the entry of such certification in the notarial register, and the indication of
the affiant’s residence certificate. The IBP Board of Governors found his excuse for the violations unacceptable. It modified, however, the recommendation[20] of the
investigating commissioner by increasing the fine to “P3,000 with a warning that any repetition of the violation will be dealt with a heavier penalty.”

The other charges -- violation of Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; and Canons 1.01 to 1.03, 12.07 and 12.08 of the CPR --were dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence.

The Court’s Ruling

We agree with the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.

Respondent’s Administrative Liability

Violation of the Notarial Law

The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public. They are required to certify that the party to every document acknowledged before them has
presented the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence tax); and to enter its number, place of issue and date as part of such certification.[21] They are also
required to maintain and keep a notarial register; to enter therein all instruments notarized by them; and to “give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged
before [them] a number corresponding to the one in [their] register [and to state therein] the page or pages of [their] register, on which the same is recorded.” [22] Failure to
perform these duties would result in the revocation of their commission as notaries public.[23]

These formalities are mandatory and cannot be simply neglected, considering the degree of importance and evidentiary weight attached to notarized documents. Notaries
public entering into their commissions are presumed to be aware of these elementary requirements.

In Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos,[24] the Court explained the value and meaning of notarization as follows:
“The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be overemphasized. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public
interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document into a public document thus making that
document admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative
agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.”
For this reason, notaries public should not take for granted the solemn duties pertaining to their office. Slipshod methods in their performance of the notarial act are never to
be countenanced. They are expected to exert utmost care in the performance of their duties,[25] which are dictated by public policy and are impressed with public interest.

It is clear from the pleadings before us -- and respondent has readily admitted -- that he violated the Notarial Law by failing to enter in the documents notations of the
residence certificate, as well as the entry number and the pages of the notarial registry.

Respondent believes, however, that noncompliance with those requirements is not mandatory for affidavits relative to cases pending before the courts and government
agencies. He points to similar practices of older notaries in Nueva Ecija.

We cannot give credence to, much less honor, his claim. His belief that the requirements do not apply to affidavits is patently irrelevant. No law dispenses with these
formalities. Au contraire, the Notarial Law makes no qualification or exception. It is appalling and inexcusable that he did away with the basics of notarial procedure allegedly
because others were doing so. Being swayed by the bad example of others is not an acceptable justification for breaking the law.

We note further that the documents attached to the verified Complaint are the Joint Counter-Affidavit of respondent’s clients Ernesto Ramos and Rey Geronimo, as well as
their witnesses’ Affidavits relative to Criminal Case No. 69-2000 for attempted murder, filed by complainant’s brother against the aforementioned clients. These documents
became the basis of the present Complaint.

As correctly pointed out by the investigating commissioner, Section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly requires respondent as notary -- in the
absence of any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official authorized to administer the oath -- to “certify that he has personally examined the affiants and that he is
satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.” Respondent failed to do so with respect to the subject Affidavits and Counter-Affidavits in the belief that
-- as counsel for the affiants -- he was not required to comply with the certification requirement.

It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes.[26] They are expected to be in the
forefront in the observance and maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries with it the obligation to be well-informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal
developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence.[27] It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they
may not be able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing mistakes.

Where notaries public are lawyers, a graver responsibility is placed upon them by reason of their solemn oath to obey the laws.[28] No custom or age-old practice provides
sufficient excuse or justification for their failure to adhere to the provisions of the law. In this case, the excuse given by respondent exhibited his clear ignorance of the Notarial
Law, the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the importance of his office as a notary public.

Nonetheless, we do not agree with complainant’s plea to disbar respondent from the practice of law. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution.[29] Disbarment
will be imposed as a penalty only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of
the bar. Where any lesser penalty can accomplish the end desired, disbarment should not be decreed.[30] Considering the nature of the infraction and the absence of deceit on
the part of respondent, we believe that the penalty recommended by the IBP Board of Governors is a sufficient disciplinary measure in this case.

Lawyer as Witness for Client

Complainant further faults respondent for executing before Prosecutor Leonardo Padolina an affidavit corroborating the defense of alibi proffered by respondent’s clients,
allegedly in violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR: “A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client.”

Rule 12.08 of Canon 12 of the CPR states:

“Rule 12.08 – A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client, except:

a) on formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or custody of an instrument and the like;

b) on substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is essential to the ends of justice, in which event he must, during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to another
counsel.”
Parenthetically, under the law, a lawyer is not disqualified from being a witness,[31] except only in certain cases pertaining to privileged communication arising from an
attorney-client relationship.[32]

The reason behind such rule is the difficulty posed upon lawyers by the task of dissociating their relation to their clients as witnesses from that as advocates. Witnesses are
expected to tell the facts as they recall them. In contradistinction, advocates are partisans -- those who actively plead and defend the cause of others. It is difficult to
distinguish the fairness and impartiality of a disinterested witness from the zeal of an advocate. The question is one of propriety rather than of competency of the lawyers who
testify for their clients.

“Acting or appearing to act in the double capacity of lawyer and witness for the client will provoke unkind criticism and leave many people to suspect the truthfulness of the
lawyer because they cannot believe the lawyer as disinterested. The people will have a plausible reason for thinking, and if their sympathies are against the lawyer’s client,
they will have an opportunity, not likely to be neglected, for charging, that as a witness he fortified it with his own testimony. The testimony of the lawyer becomes doubted and
is looked upon as partial and untruthful.”[33]

Thus, although the law does not forbid lawyers from being witnesses and at the same time counsels for a cause, the preference is for them to refrain from testifying as
witnesses, unless they absolutely have to; and should they do so, to withdraw from active management of the case.[34]

Notwithstanding this guideline and the existence of the Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan in favor of his clients, we cannot hastily make him administratively liable for the
following reasons:

First, we consider it the duty of a lawyer to assert every remedy and defense that is authorized by law for the benefit of the client, especially in a criminal action in which the
latter’s life and liberty are at stake.[35] It is the fundamental right of the accused to be afforded full opportunity to rebut the charges against them. They are entitled to suggest all
those reasonable doubts that may arise from the evidence as to their guilt; and to ensure that if they are convicted, such conviction is according to law.

Having undertaken the defense of the accused, respondent, as defense counsel, was thus expected to spare no effort to save his clients from a wrong conviction. He had the
duty to present -- by all fair and honorable means -- every defense and mitigating circumstance that the law permitted, to the end that his clients would not be deprived of life,
liberty or property, except by due process of law.[36]

The Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan was clearly necessary for the defense of his clients, since it pointed out the fact that on the alleged date and time of the incident, his
clients were at his residence and could not have possibly committed the crime charged against them. Notably, in his Affidavit, complainant does not dispute the statements of
respondent or suggest the falsity of its contents.

Second, paragraph (b) of Rule 12.08 contemplates a situation in which lawyers give their testimonies during the trial. In this instance, the Affidavit was submitted during the
preliminary investigation which, as such, was merely inquisitorial.[37] Not being a trial of the case on the merits, a preliminary investigation has the oft-repeated purposes of
securing innocent persons against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecutions; protecting them from open and public accusations of crime and from the trouble as well as
expense and anxiety of a public trial; and protecting the State from useless and expensive prosecutions. [38] The investigation is advisedly called preliminary, as it is yet to be
followed by the trial proper.

Nonetheless, we deem it important to stress and remind respondent to refrain from accepting employment in any matter in which he knows or has reason to believe that he
may be an essential witness for the prospective client. Furthermore, in future cases in which his testimony may become essential to serve the “ends of justice,” the canons of
the profession require him to withdraw from the active prosecution of these cases.

No Proof of Harassment

The charge that respondent harassed complainant and uttered insulting words and veiled threats is not supported by evidence. Allegation is never equivalent to proof, and a
bare charge cannot be equated with liability.[39] It is not the self-serving claim of complainant but the version of respondent that is more credible, considering that the latter’s
allegations are corroborated by the Affidavits of the police officers and the Certifications of the Cabanatuan City Police.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Edison V. Rafanan is found guilty of violating the Notarial Law and Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby FINED P3,000 with
a warning that similar infractions in the future will be dealt with more severely.

ADM. CASE No. 7006, October 09, 2007

RE : SUSPENSION OF ATTY. ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO, FORMER SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR
AZCUNA, J.:

This administrative case stemmed from the events of the proceedings in Crim. Case No. 5144, entitled People v. Luis Bucalon Plaza, heard before the sala of Presiding
Judge Jose Manuel P. Tan, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City, Branch 29.

Crim. Case No. 5144 was originally raffled to the sala of Judge Floripinas C. Buyser, RTC of Surigao City, Branch 30. In an Order dated March 14, 2002, Judge Buyser denied
the Demurrer to the Evidence of the accused, declaring that the evidence thus presented by the prosecution was sufficient to prove the crime of homicide and not the charge
of murder. Consequently, the counsel for the defense filed a Motion to Fix the Amount of Bail Bond. Respondent Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo, then Senior State Prosecutor
and the deputized prosecutor of the case, objected thereto mainly on the ground that the original charge of murder, punishable with reclusion perpetua, was not subject to
bail under Sec. 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.[1]

In an Order dated August 30, 2002,[2] Judge Buyser inhibited himself from further trying the case because of the “harsh insinuation” of Senior Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo
that he “lacks the cold neutrality of an impartial magistrate,” by allegedly suggesting the filing of the motion to fix the amount of bail bond by counsel for the accused.

The case was transferred to Branch 29 of the RTC of Surigao City, presided by Judge Jose Manuel P. Tan. In an Order dated November 12, 2002, Judge Tan favorably
resolved the Motion to Fix the Amount of Bail Bond, and fixed the amount of the bond at P40,000.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated November 12, 2002, which motion was denied for lack of merit in an Order dated February 10, 2003. In
October, 2003, respondent appealed from the Orders dated November 12, 2002 and February 10, 2003, to the Court of Appeals (CA).

Instead of availing himself only of judicial remedies, respondent caused the publication of an article regarding the Order granting bail to the accused in the August 18, 2003
issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily. The article, entitled “Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing murder suspect to bail out,” reads:
SENIOR state prosecutor has lashed at a judge in Surigao City for allowing a murder suspect to go out on bail.

Senior state prosecutor Rogelio Bagabuyo lambasted Judge Manuel Tan of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 29 based in Surigao City for ruling on a motion that
sought a bailbond for Luis Plaza who stands charged with murdering a policeman . . . .

Plaza reportedly posted a P40-thousand bail bond.

Bagabuyo argued that the crime of murder is a non-bailable offense. But Bagabuyo admitted that a judge could still opt to allow a murder suspect to bail out in cases when
the evidence of the prosecution is weak.

But in this murder case, Bagabuyo said the judge who previously handled it, Judge F[lori]pinas B[uy]ser, described the evidence to be strong. B[uy]ser inhibited from the
case for an unclear reason.

xxx
Bagabuyo said he would contest Tan’s decision before the Court of Appeals and would file criminal and administrative charges of certiorari against the judge.

Bagabuyuo said he was not afraid of being cited in contempt by Judge Tan.

“This is the only way that the public would know that there are judges there who are displaying judicial arrogance.” he said. [3]
In an Order dated August 21, 2003, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, directed respondent and the writer of the article, Mark Francisco of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily, to
appear in court on September 20, 2003 to explain why they should not be cited for indirect contempt of court for the publication of the article which degraded the court and its
presiding judge with its lies and misrepresentation.

The said Order stated that contrary to the statements in the article, Judge Buyser described the evidence for the prosecution as not strong, but sufficient to prove the guilt of
the accused only for homicide. Moreover, it was not true that Judge Buyser inhibited himself from the case for an unclear reason. Judge Buyser, in an Order dated August
30, 2002, declared in open court in the presence of respondent that he was inhibiting himself from the case due to the harsh insinuation of respondent that he lacked the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge.

On the scheduled hearing of the contempt charge, Mark Francisco admitted that the Mindanao Gold Star Daily caused the publication of the article. He disclosed that
respondent, in a press conference, stated that the crime of murder is non-bailable. When asked by the trial court why he printed such lies, Mr. Francisco answered that his
only source was respondent.[4] Mr. Francisco clarified that in the statement alleging that Judge Buyser inhibited himself from the case for an unclear reason, the phrase “for
an unclear reason,” was added by the newspaper’s Executive Editor Herby S. Gomez.[5]

Respondent admitted that he caused the holding of the press conference, but refused to answer whether he made the statements in the article until after he shall have filed a
motion to dismiss. For his refusal to answer, the trial court declared him in contempt of court pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.[6] The Court’s Order dated
September 30, 2003 reads:
ORDER

Mr. Mark Francisco for publishing this article which is a lie clothed in half truth to give it a semblance of truth is hereby ordered to pay a fine of P10,000. Prosecutor
Bagabuyo, for obstinately refusing to explain why he should not be cited for contempt and admitting that the article published in the Mindanao Gold Star Daily on August 18,
2003 and quoted in the Order of this Court dated August 21, 2003 which is contemptuous was caused by him to be published, is hereby adjudged to have committed indirect
contempt of Court pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court and he is hereby ordered to suffer the penalty of 30 days in jail. The BJMP is hereby ordered to
arrest Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo if he does not put up a bond of P100,000.00.

SO ORDERD.[7]
Respondent posted the required bond and was released from the custody of the law. He appealed the indirect contempt order to the CA.

Despite the citation of indirect contempt, respondent presented himself to the media for interviews in Radio Station DXKS, and again attacked the integrity of Judge Tan and
the trial court’s disposition in the proceedings of Crim. Case No. 5144.

In an Order dated October 20, 2003, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, required respondent to explain and to show cause within five days from receipt thereof why he
should not be held in contempt for his media interviews that degraded the court and the presiding judge, and why he should not be suspended from the practice of law for
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 11.05 of Canon 11[8] and Rule 13.02 of Canon 13.[9]

In the Order, the trial court stated that respondent was interviewed by Jun Clergio, and that the interview was repeatedly aired on September 30, 2003 and in his news
program between 6:00 and 8:00 a.m. on October 1, 2003. He was also interviewed by Tony Consing on October 1 and 2, 2003, between 8:00 and 9:00 a.m. in his radio
program. In those radio interviews, respondent allegedly called Judge Tan a judge who does not know the law, a liar, and a dictator who does not accord due process to the
people.

The hearing for the second contempt charge was set on December 4, 2003.

On November, 20, 2003, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer to Contempt alleging that he was saddled with work of equal importance and
needed ample time to answer the same. He also prayed for a bill of particulars in order to properly prepare for his defense.

In an Order dated November 20, 2003, the trial court denied the motion. It stated that a bill of particulars is not applicable in contempt proceedings, and that
respondent’s actions and statements are detailed in the Order of October 20, 2003.

On the scheduled hearing of December 4, 2003 respondent neither appeared in court nor informed the court of his absence. The trial court issued an Order dated December
4, 2003 cancelling the hearing “to give Prosecutor Bagabuyo all the chances he asks for,” and ordered him to appear on January 12, 2004 to explain in writing or orally why
he should not be cited in contempt of court pursuant to the facts stated in the Order dated October 20, 2003. However, respondent did not appear in the scheduled hearing of
January 12, 2004.

On January 15, 2004, the trial court received respondent’s Answer dated January 8, 2004. Respondent denied the charge that he sought to be interviewed by radio station
DXKS. He, however, stated that right after the hearing of September 30, 2003, he was approached by someone who asked him to comment on the Order issued in open
court, and that his comment does not fall within the concept of indirect contempt of court. He also admitted that he was interviewed by his friend, Tony Consing, at the latter’s
instance. He justified his response during the interview as a simple exercise of his constitutional right of freedom of speech and that it was not meant to offend or malign, and
was without malice.

On February 8, 2004, the trial court issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding preponderant evidence that Prosecutor Bagabuyo has grossly violated the Canons of the legal profession and [is] guilty of grave professional
misconduct, rendering him unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law.

Likewise, he is also found guilty of indirect contempt of court, for which he is hereby ordered to suffer the penalty of IMPRISONMENT for ninety (90) days to be served at the
Surigao City Jail and to pay the maximum fine of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00). Future acts of contempt will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of the relevant records be immediately forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review and for further determination of grounds for [the] disbarment of
Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo.[10]
The trial court found respondent’s denials to be lame as the tape of his interview on October 2, 2003, duly transcribed, showed disrespect of the court and its officers, thus:
TONY CONSING : Fiscal, nanglabay ang mga oras, nanglabay ang gamay’ng panahon ang samad sa imong kasingkasing nagpabilin pa ba ni. O ingnon na

(Fiscal, after the lapse of time, are you still hurt? Or have you not changed your mind yet?)

BAGABUYO : Ang akong huna-huna kon aduna man ugaling pagbag-o ang pagsiguro, ang mga Huwes nga dili mahibalo sa balaod tangtangon pagka

(If my mind has changed at all, it is that I ensure that all judges who are ignorant of the law should be disbarred. That’s it.)

xxx
BAGABUYO : Mao kana ang tinuod, Ton, ug kining akong guibatonan karon nga hunahuna mahitungod nianang mga Huwes nga dili kahibalo sa b
ako. Nagabasa ako sa mga bag-ong jurisprudence ug sa atong balaod aron sa pagsiguro gayod nga inigsang-at unya nako sa kaso n
gayod ako nga katangtangan siya sa lisensiya . . . . Ang kini nga Huwes nga dili mahibalo sa balaod, pagatangtangon na, dili lamang s
gyod kining iyang gibuhat nga Order, Ton, ang iyang pagkabakakon . . . .

(That's true, Ton, and this conviction I have now about judges who are ignorant of the law is made firmer by time. I study everyday. I r
file the disbarment case against this Judge who does not know his law, I am certain that he loses his license. . . . This judge who is ignor
should also be disbarred. Just take a look at his Order, Ton, and see what a liar he is . . . .)

xxx

BAGABUYO : Yes, nag-ingon ang iyang Order. . . . Ngano nga nakaingon ako nga bakakon kini, nag-ingon nga kini konong order given in open court
mag-ingon ug kantidad nga P100,000.00 nga bail bond. . . .

(Yes, his Order said that . . . . Why did I say that he is a liar? It states that this Order was “given in open court,” a
of P100,000.00 as bail bond. . . .)

BAGABUYO : Kay dili man lagi mahibalo sa balaod, ako siyang gui-ingnan, Your Honor, I have the right to appeal. Mibalik dayon, ug miingon siya, BJM

(Because he does not know the law, I said, "Your Honor, I have the right to appeal." Then he came back and said, “BJMP, arrest Bagabu

xxx

BAGABUYO : . . . P100,000.00 ang iyang guipapiyansa. Naunsa na? Dinhi makita nimo ang iyang pagka gross ignorance of the law. . . .

(He imposed a bail of P100,000.00. How come? This is where you will see his gross ignorance of the law. . . . )

xxx

TONY CONSING : So karon, unsay plano nimo karon?

(So what is your plan now?)

BAGABUYO : Sumala sa akong gui-ingon moundang lang ako kon matangtang na siya sa pagka abogado. . . .

(As I have said, I will only stop if he is already disbarred. . . .)

xxx

BAGABUYO : Nasuko siya niini kay hambugero kuno, pero angayan niyang hibaw-an nga ang trabajo sa Huwes dili ang pagtan-aw kon ang tawo h
balaod nga siya in fact at that time I said he is not conversant of the law, with regards to the case of murder. . . .

(He got angry because I was allegedly bragging but he should know that it is not for a judge to determine if a person is a braggart. . . .And
said he is not conversant of the law, with regards to the case of murder . . . .)

xxx

BAGABUYO : Ah, mi sit down sab ako, contempt ra ba kadto . . . . Mao kana, pero unsa may iyang katuyoan – ang iyang katuyoan nga ipa-adto a
sikopon, iya kong ipa-priso, pero kay di man lagi mahibalo sa balaod, ang iyang gui orderan BJMP, intawon por dios por Santo, M
Tan? Unsa may imong hunahuna nga kon ikaw Huwes, ikaw na ang diktador, no way, no sir, ours is a democratic country where all and
accord me due process of law . . . .

(I sat down. . . . That's it. But what was his purpose? He made me come in order to humiliate me because he wanted me arrested, he w
law, he ordered the BMJP. For God’s sake, Mr. Tan, what's wrong with you, Mr. Tan? Please read the law. What is your thinking? Tha
no sir, ours is a democratic country where all and everyone is entitled to due process of law - you did not accord me due process of law.

TONY CONSING : So mopasaka kang disbarment, malaumon kita nga maaksiyonan kini, with all this problem sa Korte Suprema.

(So you are filing a disbarment case? We hope that this be given action with all the problems in the Supreme Court.)

BAGABUYO : Dili ako mabalaka niana kay usa ka truck ang akong jurisprudence, nga ang mga Huwes nga di mahibalo sa balaod pagatangtangon ga
ang balaod ang iyang gibasa niini nadunggan ko nga kini kuno siya madjongero, mao bitaw na, madjong ang iyang guitunan?

(I am not worried because I have a truckload of jurisprudence that judges who are ignorant of the law must be removed from the Bench.
 mahjong aficionado (mahjongero) and that is why he is studying mahjong.[11]
The trial court concluded that respondent, as a member of the bar and an officer of the court, is duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the court, and should
not promote distrust in the administration of justice.

The trial court stated that it is empowered to suspend respondent from the practice of law under Sec. 28, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court [12] for any of the causes mentioned
in Sec. 27[13] of the same Rule. Respondent was given the opportunity to be heard, but he opted to be silent. Thus, it held that the requirement of due process has been duly
satisfied.

In accordance with the provisions of Sec. 29,[14] Rule 138 and Sec. 9,[15] Rule 139 of the Rules of Court, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, transmitted to the Office of the
Bar Confidant the Statement of Facts of respondent’s suspension from the practice of law, dated July 14, 2005, together with the order of suspension and other relevant
documents.

In its Report dated January 4, 2006, the Office of the Bar Confidant found that the article in the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily, which maligned the
integrity and independence of the court and its officers, and respondent’s criticism of the trial court’s Order dated November 12, 2002, which was aired in radio station
DXKS, both in connection with Crim. Case No. 5144, constitute grave violation of oath of office by respondent. It stated that the requirement of due process was complied
with when respondent was given an opportunity to be heard, but respondent chose to remain silent.

The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended the implementation of the trial court’s order of suspension dated February 8, 2004, and that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for one year, with a stern warning that the repetition of a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

The Court approves the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant. It has been reiterated in Gonzaga v. Villanueva, Jr.[16] that:
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent disregard of his duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming an attorney. Among the grounds
enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court are deceit; malpractice; gross misconduct in office; grossly immoral conduct; conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude; any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to the practice of law; willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; corrupt or
willful appearance as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The grounds are not preclusive in nature even as they are broad enough as to cover
practically any kind of impropriety that a lawyer does or commits in his professional career or in his private life. A lawyer must at no time be wanting in probity and moral fiber
which are not only conditions precedent to his entrance to the Bar, but are likewise essential demands for his continued membership therein.
Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved
by law as a consequence.[17] Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations.[18] Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates a lawyer to
“observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and [he] should insist on similar conduct by others.” Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 states that a lawyer
“shall submit grievances against a judge to the proper authorities only.”

Respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 when he admittedly caused the holding of a press conference where he made statements against the Order dated November 12,
2002 allowing the accused in Crim. Case No. 5144 to be released on bail.

Respondent also violated Canon 11 when he indirectly stated that Judge Tan was displaying judicial arrogance in the article entitled, Senior prosecutor lambasts
Surigao judge for allowing murder suspect to bail out, which appeared in the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily. Respondent’s statements in the
article, which were made while Crim. Case No. 5144 was still pending in court, also violated Rule 13.02 of Canon 13, which states that “a lawyer shall not make public
statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.”

In regard to the radio interview given to Tony Consing, respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for not resorting to the proper
authorities only for redress of his grievances against Judge Tan. Respondent also violated Canon 11 for his disrespect of the court and its officer when he stated that Judge
Tan was ignorant of the law, that as a mahjong aficionado, he was studying mahjong instead of studying the law, and that he was a liar.

Respondent also violated the Lawyer’s Oath, as he has sworn to “conduct [himself] as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as
well to the courts as to [his] clients.”

As a senior state prosecutor and officer of the court, respondent should have set the example of observing and maintaining the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers. Montecillo v. Gica[19] held:
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude. As an officer of the court, it is his duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court to which
he owes fidelity, according to the oath he has taken. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of our democratic institutions which, without such respect, would be
resting on a very shaky foundation.
The Court is not against lawyers raising grievances against erring judges but the rules clearly provide for the proper venue and procedure for doing so, precisely because
respect for the institution must always be maintained.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo is found guilty of violating Rule 11.05, Canon 11 and Rule 13.02, Canon 13 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and of violating the Lawyer’s Oath, for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year effective upon finality of this Decision, with a STERN
WARNING that the repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent’s personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
the Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

No costs.

A.C. NO. 6155, March 14, 2006

MA. GINA L. FRANCISCO, JOSEPHINE S. TAN AND CARLOS M. JOAQUIN, COMPLAINANTS, VS. ATTY. JAIME JUANITO P. PORTUGAL, RESPONDENT 
 
 D E C I
SION
TINGA, J.:

Complainants filed before this Court an affidavit-complaint[1] on 15 August 2003 against Atty. Jaime Juanito P. Portugal (respondent) for violation of the Lawyer's Oath, gross
misconduct, and gross negligence. Complainants are related to petitioners in G.R. No. 152621-23 entitled SPO1 Ernest C. Francisco, SPO1 Donato F. Tan and PO3 Rolando
M. Joaquin v. People of the Philippines, in whose behalf respondent filed the Petition for Review on Certiorari (Ad Cautelam) in the case.

The complaint against respondent originated from his alleged mishandling of the above-mentioned petition which eventually led to its denial with finality by this Court to the
prejudice of petitioners therein.

The facts are as follows:

On 21 March 1994, SPO1 Ernesto C. Francisco, SPO1 Donato F. Tan and PO3 Rolando M. Joaquin (eventually petitioners in G.R. No. 152621-23, collectively referred to
herein as the accused) were involved in a shooting incident which resulted in the death of two individuals and the serious injury of another. As a result, Informations were
filed against them before the Sandiganbayan for murder and frustrated murder. The accused pleaded not guilty and trial ensued. After due trial, the Sandiganbayan[2] found
the accused guilty of two counts of homicide and one count of attempted homicide.

At that juncture, complainants engaged the services of herein respondent for the accused. Respondent then filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Sandiganbayan but it
was denied in a Resolution dated 21 August 2001. Unfazed by the denial, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for Reconsideration, with the
attached Second Motion for Reconsideration.[3] Pending resolution by the Sandiganbayan, respondent also filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari (Ad
Cautelam) on 3 May 2002.
Thereafter, complainants never heard from respondent again despite the frequent telephone calls they made to his office. When respondent did not return their phone
inquiries, complainants went to respondent's last known address only to find out that he had moved out without any forwarding address.

More than a year after the petition was filed, complainants were constrained to personally verify the status of the ad cautelam petition as they had neither news from
respondent about the case nor knowledge of his whereabouts. They were shocked to discover that the Court had already issued a Resolution[4] dated 3 July 2002, denying the
petition for late filing and non-payment of docket fees.

Complainants also learned that the said Resolution had attained finality and warrants of arrest [5] had already been issued against the accused because respondent, whose
whereabouts remained unknown, did nothing to prevent the reglementary period for seeking reconsideration from lapsing.

In his Comment,[6] respondent states that it is of vital significance that the Court notes that he was not the original counsel of the accused. He only met the accused during the
promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision convicting the accused of two counts of homicide and one count of attempted homicide. He was merely requested by the original
counsel to be on hand, assist the accused, and be present at the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision.

Respondent claims that there was no formal engagement undertaken by the parties. But only because of his sincere effort and in true spirit of the Lawyer's Oath did he file the
Motion for Reconsideration. Though admitting its highly irregular character, respondent also made informal but urgent and personal representation with the members of the
Division of the Sandiganbayan who promulgated the decision of conviction. He asserts that because of all the efforts he put into the case of the accused, his other
professional obligations were neglected and that all these were done without proper and adequate remuneration.

As to the ad cautelam petition, respondent maintains that it was filed on time. He stresses that the last day of filing of the petition was on 3 April 2002 and on that very day, he
filed with this Court a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review,[7] seeking an additional thirty (30) days to file the petition. Subsequently, on 3 May 2002, he filed
the petition by registered mail and paid the corresponding docket fees. Hence, so he concludes, it was filed within the reglementary period.

Soon thereafter, respondent recounted all the "herculean" efforts he made in assisting the accused for almost a year after the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision.
He considered the fact that it was a case he had just inherited from the original counsel; the effect of his handling the case on his other equally important professional
obligations; the lack of adequate financial consideration for handling the case; and his plans to travel to the United States to explore further professional opportunities. He then
decided to formally withdraw as counsel for the accused. He wrote a letter to PO3 Rolando Joaquin (PO3 Joaquin), who served as the contact person between respondent
and complainants, explaining his decision to withdraw as their counsel, and attaching the Notice to Withdraw which respondent instructed the accused to sign and file with the
Court. He sent the letter through registered mail but unfortunately, he could not locate the registry receipt issued for the letter.

Respondent states that he has asked the accused that he be discharged from the case and endorsed the Notice of Withdrawal to PO3 Joaquin for the latter to file with the
Court. Unfortunately, PO3 Joaquin did not do so, as he was keenly aware that it would be difficult to find a new counsel who would be as equally accommodating as
respondent. Respondent suggests this might have been the reason for the several calls complainants made to his office.

On 9 February 2004, the Court resolved to refer the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

The case was assigned to Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. (Commissioner Villadolid) who sent notices of hearing to the parties but of the three
complainants, only complainant Carlos Joaquin appeared. Thus, in the mandatory conference held, the other two complainants were declared as having waived their rights to
further participate in the IBP proceedings.[8]

The parties were directed to file their respective position papers and on 27 May 2005, Commissioner Villadolid submitted his Report and Recommendation finding respondent
guilty of violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility[9] and recommended the imposition of penalty ranging from reprimand to suspension of six (6) months. [10] On 12
November 2005, the Board of Directors of the IBP resolved to adopt and approve Commissioner Villadolid's recommendation to find respondent guilty and specifically to
recommend his suspension for six (6) months as penalty.

The only issue to be resolved in the case at bar is, considering all the facts presented, whether respondent committed gross negligence or misconduct in handling G.R. No.
152621-23, which eventually led to the ad cautelam petition's dismissal with finality.

After careful consideration of the records of the case, the Court finds the suspension recommended by the IBP proper.

In a criminal case like that handled by respondent in behalf of the accused, respondent has a higher duty to be circumspect in defending the accused for it is not only the
property of the accused which stands to be lost but more importantly, their right to their life and liberty. As held in Regala v. Sandiganbayan:[11]
Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct and duties that breathe life into it, among those, the fiduciary duty to his client which is of
very delicate, exacting and confidential character, requiring a very high degree of fidelity and good faith, that is required by reason of necessity and public interest x x x .

It is also the strict sense of fidelity of a lawyer to his client that distinguishes him from any other profession in society. x x x[12]
At the onset, the Court takes notice that the ad cautelam petition was actually filed out of time. Though respondent filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Motion for Leave
to File Second Motion for Reconsideration with the attached Second Motion for Reconsideration, he should have known that a second motion for reconsideration is a
prohibited pleading[13] and it rests on the sound discretion of the Sandiganbayan to admit it or not. Thus, in effect, the motion did not toll the reglementary period
to appeal. Having failed to do so, the accused had already lost their right to appeal long before respondent filed his motion for extension. Therefore, respondent cannot now
say he filed the ad cautelam petition on time. Also important to note is the allegation of complainants that the Sandiganbayan denied the second motion for reconsideration in
its Resolution dated 7 February 2002. This respondent does not dispute.

As to respondent's conduct in dealing with the accused and complainants, he definitely fell short of the high standard of assiduousness that a counsel must perform to
safeguard the rights of his clients. As aptly observed by Commissioner Villadolid, respondent had not been quite candid in his dealings with the accused or complainants. The
Court notes that though respondent represented to the accused that he had changed his office address, still, from the examination of the pleadings[14] he filed, it can be
gleaned that all of the pleadings have the same mailing address as that known to complainants. Presumably, at some point, respondent's office would have received the
Court's Resolution dismissing the petition. Of course, the prudent step to take in that situation was to at least inform the client of the adverse resolution since they had
constantly called respondent's office to check the status of the case. Even when he knew that complainants had been calling his office, he opted not to return their calls.

Respondent professed an inkling that the several phone calls of complainants may have been about the letter he sent PO3 Joaquin regarding his desire to be discharged as
counsel of the case. However, though aware of such likelihood, respondent still did not return their calls. Had he done so, he and complainants could have threshed out all
unresolved matters between them.

Had respondent truly intended to withdraw his appearance for the accused, he as a lawyer who is presumably steeped in court procedures and practices, should have filed
the notice of withdrawal himself instead of the accused. At the very least, he should have informed this Court through the appropriate manifestation that he had already given
instructions to his clients on the proper way to go about the filing of the Notice of Withdrawal, as suggested by Commissioner Villadolid. In not so doing, he was negligent in
handling the case of the accused.

Certainly, respondent ought to know that he was the one who should have filed the Notice to Withdraw and not the accused. His tale that he sent a registered letter to the
accused and gave them instructions on how to go about respondent's withdrawal from the case defies credulity. It should have been respondent who undertook the
appropriate measures for the proper withdrawal of his representation. He should not have relied on his client to do it for him if such was truly the case. Without the
presentation of the alleged registry receipt (or the return card, which confirms the receipt of the mail by the recipient) of the letter he allegedly sent to PO3 Joaquin, the Court
cannot lend credence to respondent's naked claim, especially so that complainants have been resolute in their stand that they did not hear from respondent after the latter had
filed the ad cautelam petition. He could relieve himself of his responsibility as counsel only first by securing the written conformity of the accused and filing it with the court
pursuant to Rule 138, Section 26 of the Rules of Court.[15]

The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relation at anytime with or without cause. The right of an attorney to withdraw or
terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is, however, considerably restricted. Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who
undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion. He is not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable cause. A lawyer's right to withdraw from a
case before its final adjudication arises only from the client's written consent or from a good cause.[16]

We agree with Commissioner Villadolid that the dismissal of the ad cautelam petition was primarily due to the gross negligence of respondent. The Court has stressed in
Aromin v. Boncavil[17] that:
Once he agrees to take up the cause of the client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must
serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to
the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of the his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken
or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is
authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted
privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with
diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to
the legal profession.[18]
Respondent has time and again stated that he did all the endeavors he enumerated without adequate or proper remuneration. However, complainants have sufficiently
disputed such claim when they attached in their position paper filed before the IBP a machine validated deposit slip in the amount of P15,500.00 for the Metro Bank savings
account of one Jaime Portugal with account number 7186509273.[19] Respondent has neither admitted nor denied having claimed the deposited amount.

The Court also rejects respondent's claim that there was no formal engagement between the parties and that he made all his efforts for the case without adequate and proper
consideration. In the words of then Justice Panganiban (presently Chief Justice) in Burbe v. Atty. Magulta:[20]
After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and client, even if the client never paid any fee for the attorney-client relationship.
Lawyering is not a business; it is a profession in which duty of public service, not money, is the primary consideration. [21]
Also to the point is another case where this Court ruled, thus:
A written contract is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice
and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession. x x x [22]
Hence, even if respondent felt under-compensated in the case he undertook to defend, his obligation embodied in the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility still remains unwavering. The zeal and the degree of fervor in handling the case should neither diminish nor cease just because of his perceived insufficiency of
remuneration.

Lastly, the Court does not appreciate the offensive appellation respondent called the shooting incident that the accused was engaged in. He described the
incident, thus: "the accused police officers who had been convicted of [h]omicide for the 'salvage' of Froilan G. Cabiling and Jose M. Chua and [a]ttempted [h]omicide of
Mario C. Macato."[23] Rule 14.01[24] of the Code of Professional Responsibility clearly directs lawyers not to discriminate clients as to their belief of the guilt of the latter. It is
ironic that it is the defense counsel that actually branded his own clients as being the culprits that "salvaged" the victims. Though he might think of his clients as that, still it is
unprofessional to be labeling an event as such when even the Sandiganbayan had not done so.

The IBP Board of Governors recommended the suspension of respondent for six (6) months, the most severe penalty recommended by Commissioner Villadolid, but did not
explain why such penalty was justified. In a fairly recent case where the lawyer failed to file an appeal brief which resulted to the dismissal of the appeal of his client in the
Court of Appeals, the Court imposed upon the erring lawyer the penalty of three (3) months' suspension.[25] The Court finds it fit to impose the same in the case at bar.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months. Let a copy of the Resolution be furnished the Bar
Confidant for appropriate annotation in the record of respondent.

G.R. No. 93707, January 23, 2001

ROSITA TAN, PETITIONER, VS. ATTY. JOSE L. LAPAK, RESPONDENT.
 
 D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:

This is a complaint filed by Rosita Tan against Atty. Jose L. Lapak for misconduct, based on respondent’s failure to file with this Court a petition for review on certiorari of a
resolution of the Court of Appeals dismissing complainant’s appeal. Complainant alleged that despite the fact that this Court had granted respondent an extension of the time
to file the petition for review on certiorari and she had paid respondent his fee, the latter nonetheless failed to file the petition in this Court. Complainant’s letter, dated January
10, 1991, addressed to then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan, stated:
Ako po ay sumusulat sa iyo upang ihingi ng tulong ang aking suliranin na may kaugnayan sa aking kaso, G.R. No. 93707 ROSITA TAN v. CA, et al. na dahilan sa
kapabayaan ng aking abogado na si Atty. Jose Lapak ay hindi nakapagfile ng Certiorari nasa ngayon kanyang inihihinging palugit ay naibigay naman, at ako po ay nagbigay
naman ng halagang P4,000.00 upang gawain lamang ang petition sa pagrerepaso ng Certiorari subalit inuulit pang hindi gawain.

Kgg. Na Chief Justice ako po’y pinaasa lamang ng aking abogado na wala man lamang nagawa kung ano ang nararapat. Ako naman ay isang walang karanasan sa bagay na
ito ay naniwala at naghintay. Nang makausap ko po siya ay aking tinapat kung ano na at walang nadating na resulta sa ginawa niya ang sagot sa aking maghintay na lamang
daw ako. Ngunit ng ako po ay pumunta sa Maynila at napadaan ako sa Korte Suprema saka ko pa lamang napag-alaman na ang aking abogado ay hindi nakapaggawa ng
brief ng Certiorari at kaya napawalaan ng bisa ang aking apelasyon.

Akin pong naisip na idulog ang aking kaapihan sa Pangulo ng IBP ng Camarines Norte ang mga bagay na ito ang sagot po sa aking ay maari akong maghain ng demanda
laban sa aking abogado na si Atty. Jose L. Lapak ngunit ako po ay mahirap lamang at isa pa wala akong matutustos sa aking abogado. Isa pa po wala akong pera at sapat na
pinag-aralan kaya po hindi ko alam kung sino ang aking dudulungan para tumulong sa mahihirap. Kaya naisip ko pong sumulat sa opisina ninyo, para ihain ang aking
karaingan. Kung inyo pong mamarapatin ako ay humihingi ng tulong sa iyo bilang pinakamataas na hustisya ang aking kaapihan.
Respondent denied the allegations against him. In his manifestation and comment, dated March 4, 1991, he contended:
a) Ms. Rosita Tan was formerly represented by Atty. Juanito Subia in Civil Case No. 5295, Rosita Tan vs. Wilfredo Enriquez before the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Nor
and his (sic) counsel to appear during the scheduled Pre-Trial of the case; . . .said Order of dismissal was however reconsidered;

b) On November 11, 1986, Atty. Marciano C. Dating, Jr. entered his appearance for the said Rosita Tan as her original counsel, Atty. Juanito Subia, had withdrawn for reasons
an Amended Complaint;

c) That on September 20, 1988, the Court, through Hon. Luis Dictado, who heard the case, rendered a decision dismissing Rosita Tan’s complaint;

d) That on October 13, 1988, Atty. Dating, Rosita Tan’s counsel, appealed from the adverse decision against her to the Court of Appeals;

e) That Atty. Marciano Dating also withdrew later as Rosita Tan’s counsel and certain Leopoldo P. San Buenaventura entered his appearance as new counsel for the said Rosi
which was docketed as C.A. G.R. CV No. 20669;

f) On October 26, 1989, Atty. Leopoldo E. San Buenaventura filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Brief for Rosita Tan;… however, for reasons only known to said lawyer,
20, 1990, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution dismissing the appeal for failure of Rosita Tan’s counsel to file Appellant’s Brief despite extension of time granted to him;

g) That upon receipt by Ms. Rosita Tan of said Resolution dismissing her appeal due to the failure of her Manila lawyer to file Appellant’s Brief, she came to the law office of
Gloria Gatan, to employ the latter’s services to seek reconsideration of the Order of dismissal and file Appellant’s Brief to enable her to pursue her appeal; Rosita employe
Petition for Review but to seek reconsideration of the order of dismissal of her appeal; considering then that she does not have the papers to the case on appeal, Rosita Tan
the records of the case in the Court of Appeals, file a Motion for Reconsideration and prepare Appellant’s Brief for her; she was able to pay P3,000.00 only instead of P5,000
 undersigned counsel filed an URGENT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION with the Court of Appeals….;

h) Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals denied said Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution promulgated on May 2, 1990 ….;

I) That upon receipt by the undersigned counsel of said Resolution of the Court of Appeals denying the Motion for Reconsideration, the undersigned counsel summoned the app
of P2,000.00 so that a Petition for Review on Certiorari could be filed with the Supreme Court; however, the said appellant Rosita Tan upon knowing of the adverse Resolut
she came to the law office of the undersigned she expressed her misgivings of bringing the case to the Supreme Court and told counsel that she has no more money; despite
counsel filed a Motion for Extension of Time to file a Petition for Review with the Supreme Court paying the docket fees therefore in behalf of said appellant; in the mea
researches preparatory to the filing of the Petition for Review with the Supreme Court; …The undersigned counsel then requested the appellant Rosita Tan to pay him the bala
prepare the Petition for review in Manila and file it with the Supreme Court; but said appellant hesitantly paid only P1,000.00 which was her only money available promis
undersigned counsel went to the Court of Appeals to get certified true copies of the Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration; he then learned that there was alre
dismissing the appeal had already become final; the undersigned then informed Rosita Tan of her misfortune and informed her that he would study the propriety of filing
discovery of an anomaly which resulted in a mistrial; because of continuous setbacks she suffered from beginning to end; Rosita Tan said she had lost all hope and was unw
P4,000.00 from the undersigned; when the undersigned gave back the P1,000.00 he received from her, she refused to receive the amount insisting that the whole am
undersigned counsel had not done anything for her anyway; hence the misunderstanding which culminated in her sending a letter complaint to the Honorable Chief Justice of
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report, and recommendation. On July 29, 2000, the IBP passed a resolution aadopting the
report and recommendation of its Investigating Commissioner Jaime M. Vibar that respondent be reprimanded and ordered to restitute to complainant the amount of
P1,000.00.

In finding respondent guilty of betrayal of his client’s trust and confidence, the investigating commissioner said in his report:
Regardless of the agreement on the total amount of fees, it is clear that respondent committed to prepare and file a “petition with the Supreme Court” and for which he
received P1,000.00 from the complainant (annex “B”, Sagot, dated May 31, 1991). Despite such commitment, he failed to file the petition.

It is not explained why the payment of PHP1,000.00 was made by complainant for the “petition” on August 8, 1990. At that time, the period to file the petition for review as
contemplated by respondent and which was the subject of an extension motion, dated May 18, 1990, filed with and granted by the Hon. Supreme Court, had already expired.
It is to be noted that respondent’s motion sought an extension of “thirty (30) days from May 26, 1990 or up to June 25, 1990”. It would appear that respondent received
P1,000.00 on August 8, 1990 from complainant at a time when the remedy of a review of the dismissal order of the Court of Appeals was no longer available. Yet, complainant
was never informed or favored with an explanation that a petition for review was no longer possible, or perhaps that another remedy was still open to the complainant. To
aggravate his situation, respondent alleges in his comment to the complaint (at page 3) that after he received P1,000.00 from the complainant he immediately went to the
Court of Appeals to get certified copies of the resolution denying his motion for reconsideration and that thereat he discovered that an “Entry of Judgment” had already been
issued. Respondent should have known that when he went to the Court of Appeals after reciept of P1,000.00, or after August 8, 1990. The period he requested from the Hon.
Supreme Court to institute the petition for review had long expired.

But the silence of respondent at the time of receipt of the amount of P1,000.00 on august 8, 1990 and the “petition with the Supreme Court” was no longer an available
remedy smacks of a betrayal of a client’s cause and the trust and confidence reposed in him. If indeed his client’s cause was no longer worth fighting for, the lawyer should
not have demanded a fee…and made representations that there is merit in her case. He should have dealt with his client with all candor and honesty by informing her that on
August 8, 1990 the period to file the petition had already expired.

Complainant has been a victim of negligence on the part of the law firm of San Buenaventura, et al., or particularly Atty. Leopoldo San Buenaventura, for their failure to file the
Appellant’s Brief in behalf of complainant within the period allowed. The dismissal of the appeal gave complainant a slim chance, if not a futile remedy, with the Hon. Supreme
Court. Atty. Lapak would have been shackled in any disquisition for complainant’s cause considering that she alredy lost in the trial court and her appeal had been dismissed
without any argument being advanced in her behalf. Atty. Lapak should have been candid with complainant. He should not have asked more at a time when nothing fruitful
could be done anymore.
With respect to respondent’s offer to return the amount of P1,000.00 paid to him to file the petition for review on certiorari, the investigating commissioner stated:
…[T]his willingness to return P1,000.00 does not erase his breach of the Code of Professional Responsibility for lacking in honesty, diligence and fairness in dealing with his
client as shown by the very fact that he received the amount at a time when he could no longer file the “petition with the Supreme Court”. His client deserved the information
that on such date the decision of the Court of Appeals was already final. Respondent’s actuation of filing an extension motion with the Hon. Supreme Court and yet not filing
an extension motion with the Hon. Supreme Court and yet not filing the pleading within the period requested and granted speaks well of respondent’s lack of candor, honesty
and judicious conduct in dealing with his client or in the handling of his case. This conduct violates Canon 17, & Rule 18.03, Rule 18.04 of Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
The investigating commissioner recommends that respondent only be reprimanded considering his old age and the negligent conduct of complainant’s previous counsel. The
commissioner reasoned that it was the negligent conduct of complainant’s previous counsel which caused the dismissal of the appeal and rendered inutile any further legal
action before the Supreme Court.

The investigating commissioner’s findings are supported by the evidence. However, we hold that the appropriate sanction should be reprimand and order respondent to return
the amount of P4,000.00 which he received from complainant.

Respondent advances two reasons why he did not file a petition for review on certiorari in this Court, to wit: (1) because he found that the resolution of the Court of Appeals to
be appealed to the Supreme Court had become final on May 27, 1990 and (2) because complainant failed to pay the balance of P1,000.00 of his fee.

First. With respect to the first reason, Rule 18.03 thereof which provides that “A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.” Respondent alleges that upon receipt of the Court of Appeals resolution denying the motion for reconsideration which he had filed, he
summoned complainant and told her that it was imperative that a petition for review on certiorari be filed with this Court.

At this point, it is important to note the material dates on record to determine if respondent’s justification for his failure to file a petition for review is tenable. The resolution of
the Court of Appeals dismissing complainant’s appeal for failure to file an appellant’s brief was promulgated on February 20, 1990. Within the reglementary period for filing an
appeal, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied on May 2, 1990. Respondent received a copy of this resolution (denying the motion
for reconsideration) on May 11, 1990 so that respondent had 15 days from May 11, 1990, or until May 26, within which to file a petition for review on certiorari with the
Supreme Court. Respondent therafter asked for, and was granted by this Court, an extension of 30 days “counted from the reglementary period,” or until June 25, 1990, within
which to file the petition. As respondent failed to file the petition within the extended period, the Supreme Court issued a resolution on August 20, 1990 declaring the judgment
sought to be reviewed to have become final and executory.

It is not true, therefore, that respondent failed to file a petition for review on certiorari because the judgment sought to be reviewed had become final on May 27, 1990.

When respondent summoned complainant and told her that in view of the denial of his motion for reconsideration it was imperative that a petition for review be filed with this
Court, the resolution of the Court of Appeals was not yet final. In fact, this Court granted respondent’s motion for extension of time to file the petition for review, because the
resolution of the Court of Appeals denying the motion for reconsideration had not yet attained finality. Despite having been granted an extension, however, respondent failed
to file the petition within the reglementary period. This constitutes a serious breach. Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that “A lawyer shall not,
after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.”

The filing of a petition for review is similar to the filing of an appellant’s or appellee’s brief. In Mariveles v. Mallari, [1] it was held that the lawyer’s failure to file an appellant’s
brief despite numerous extensions of time to file the same constitutes a blatant violation of Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As already noted, this Rule
provides that after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda, or briefs, a lawyer should not let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an
explanation for his failure to do so.

In Re: Santiago F. Marcos,[2] the Court considered a lawyer’s failure to file a brief for his client as amounting to inexcusable negligence. Said the Court:
An attorney is bound to protect his client’s interest to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence. (Del Rosario v. CA, 114 SCRA 159). A failure to file a brief for his client
certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence on his part. (People v. Villar, 46 SCRA 107) The respondent has indeed committed a serious lapse in the duty owed by him to his
client as well as to the Court not to delay litigation and to aid in the speedy administration of justice. (People v. Daban, 43 SCRA 185; People v. Estocada, 43 SCRA 515).
At any rate, even assuming that the resolution of the Court of Appeals expired on May 27, 1990, he should not have asked on August, 8, 1990 for the balance of P5,000.00
which complainant had agreed to pay since the resolution had already become final at that time. As the investigating commissioner pointed out in his report:
To aggravate his situation, respondent alleges in his comment to the complaint (at page 3) that after he received P1,000.00 from the complainant he immediately went to the
Court of Appeals to get certified copies of the resolution denying his motion for reconsideration and that thereat he discovered that an “Entry of Judgment” had already been
issued. Respondent should have known that when he went to the Court of Appeals after receipt of P1,000.00, or after August 8, 1990, (t)he period he requested from the Hon.
Supreme Court to institute the petition for review had long expired.[3]
It would, therefore, appear that if an entry of judgment had been made in the Court of Appeals, it was precisely because respondent failed to file a petition for review with the
Supreme Court within the extended period granted him. He cannot, therefore, excuse his breach of the duty to his client by his own negligent act.

Second. Respondent asserts that complainant only engaged his services to pursue her appeal in the Court of Appeals which was dismissed due to the failure of complainant’s
former counsel, Atty. Leopoldo E. San Buenaventura, to file the appellant’s brief. Whether or not he was engaged to represent complainant only in the Court of Appeals and
not also in the Supreme Court is immaterial. For the fact is that respondent already commenced the representation of complainant in the Supreme Court by filing a motion for
extension of the time to file a petition for review. In fact, according to respondent, upon receipt of the Court of Appeals resolution denying reconsideration of the dismissal of
complainant’s appeal, respondent summoned complainant to his office precisely to tell her that it was imperative that a petition for review be filed with the Supreme Court.
Once he took the cudgels of his client’s case and assured her that he would represent her in the Supreme Court, respondent owed it to his client to do his utmost to ensure
that every remedy allowed by law was availed of. As this Court has held:
It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to become his client. He has the right to decline employment,
subject, however, to Canon 14 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must
always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latter’s cause with wholehearted
fidelity, care and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client’s rights, and the
exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, saved by the rules of law legally applied. This simply means that his
cleint is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or
defense.[4]
Third. Nor can respondent excuse himself for his failure to file the petition for review on certiorari on the ground that complainant failed to pay what she promised to pay.
Complainant agreed to pay P5,000.00. Of this amount, she paid respondent P3,000.00 and later P1,000.00, leaving only a balance of P1,000.00. Even if this balance had not
been paid, this fact was not sufficient to justify the failure of respondent to comply with his professional obligation which does not depend for compliance on the payment of a
lawyer’s fees.

As respondent utterly failed to comply with his professional commitment to complainant, it is, therefore, not just for him to keep the legal fee of P4,000.00 which complainant
paid him. He has not rightfully earned that fee and should return it to complainant.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Jose L. Lapak is REPRIMANDED and ORDERED to refund to complainant Rosita Tan the amount of P4,000.00. He is admonished henceforth to
exercise greater care and diligence in the performance of his duties towards his clients and the courts and warned that repetition of the same or similar offense will be more
severely dealt with.

A.C. No. 2040, March 04, 1998

IMELDA A. NAKPIL, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. CARLOS J. VALDES, RESPONDENT. 
 
 D E C I S I O N
PUNO, J.:

The friendship of JOSE NAKPIL and respondent CARLOS J. VALDES dates back to the ‘50s during their schooldays in De La Salle and the Philippine Law School. Their
closeness extended to their families and respondent became the business consultant, lawyer and accountant of the Nakpils.
In 1965, Jose Nakpil became interested in purchasing a summer residence in Moran Street, Baguio City. [1] For lack of funds, he requested respondent to purchase the Moran
property for him. They agreed that respondent would keep the property in thrust for the Nakpils until the latter could buy it back. Pursuant to their agreement, respondent
obtained two (2) loans from a bank (in the amounts of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00) which he used to purchase and renovate the property. Title was then issued in
respondent’s name.
It was the Nakpils who occupied the Moran summer house. When Jose Nakpil died on July 8, 1973, respondent acted as the legal counsel and accountant of his widow,
complainant IMELDA NAKPIL. On March 9, 1976, respondent’s law firm, Carlos J. Valdes & Associates, handled the proceeding for the settlement of Jose’s estate.
Complainant was appointed as administratix of the estate.
The ownership of the Moran property became an issue in the intestate proceedings. It appears that respondent excluded the Moran property from the inventory of Jose’s
estate. On February 13, 1978, respondent transferred his title to the Moran property to his company, the Caval Realty Corporation.
On March 29, 1979, complainant sought to recover the Moran property by filing with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Baguio City an action for reconveyance with
damages against respondent and his corporation. In defense, respondent claimed absolute ownership over the property and denied that a trust was created over it.
During the pendency of the action for reconveyance, complainant filed this administrative case to disbar the respondent. She charged that respondent violated professional
ethics when he:
I. Assigned to his family corporation the Moran property (Pulong Maulap) which belonged to the estate he was settling as its lawyer and auditor.
II. Excluded the Moran property from the ‘inventory of real estate properties’ he prepared for a client-estate and, at the same time, charged the loan secured to purchase
the said excluded property as a liability of the estate, all for the purpose of transferring the title to the said property to his family corporation.
III. Prepared and defended monetary claims against the estate that retained him as its counsel and auditor. [2]
On the first charge, complainant alleged that she accepted respondent’s offer to serve as lawyer and auditor to settle her husband’s estate. Respondent’s law firm then filed a
petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Nakpil but did not include the Moran property in the estate’s inventory. Instead, respondent transferred the property to his
corporation, Caval Realty Corporation, and title was issued in its name. Complainant accused respondent of maliciously appropriating the property in trust knowing that it did
not belong to him. She claimed that respondent has expressly acknowledged that the said property belonged to the late Nakpil in his correspondences[3] with the Baguio City
Treasurer and the complainant.
On the second charge, complainant alleged that respondent’s auditing firm (C. J. Valdes and Co., CPAs) excluded the Moran property from the inventory of her husband’s
estate, yet included in the claims against the estate the amounts of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00, which respondent represented as her husband’s loans applied “probably for
the purchase of a house and lot in Moran Street, Baguio City.”
As to the third charge, complainant alleged that respondent’s law firm (Carlos J. Valdes and Associates) filed the petition for the settlement of her husband’s estate in court,
while respondent’s auditing firm (C. J. Valdes & Co., CPAs) acted as accountant of both the estate and two of its creditors. She claimed that respondent represented
conflicting interests when his accounting firm prepared the list of claims of creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. against her husband’s estate which was represented by
respondent’s law firm. Complainant averred that there is no distinction between respondent’s law and auditing firms as respondent is the senior and controlling partner of both
firms which are housed in the same building.
We required respondent to answer the charges against him. In hisANSWER,[4] respondent initially asserted that the resolution of the first and second charges against him
depended on the result of the pending action in the CFI for reconveyance which involved the issue of ownership of the Moran property.
On the merit of the first charge, respondent reiterated his defense in the reconveyance case that he did not hold the Moran property in trust for the Nakpils as he is its absolute
owner. Respondent explained that the Nakpils never bought back the Moran property from him, hence, the property remained to be his and was rightly excluded from the
inventory of Nakpil’s estate.
As to the second charge, respondent denied preparing the list of claims against the estate which included his loans of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00 for the purchase and
renovation of the Moran property. In charging his loans against the estate, he stressed that the list drawn up by his accounting firm merely stated that the loans in
respondent’s name were applied “probably for the purchase of the house and lot in Moran Street, Baguio City.” Respondent insisted that this was not an admission that the
Nakpils owned the property as the phrase “probably for the purchase” did not imply a consummated transaction but a projected acquisition.
Respondent also disclaimed knowledge or privity in the preparation of a letter (Exhibit “H”) of his accounting firm to the Baguio City treasurer remitting the real estate taxes for
the Moran property on behalf of the Nakpils. He contended that the letter could be a mere error or oversight.
Respondent averred that it was complainant who acknowledged that they did not own the Moran property for: (1) complainant’s February 1979 Statement of Assets and
Liabilities did not include the said property, and; (2) complainant, as administratrix, signed the Balance Sheet of the Estate where the Moran property was not mentioned.
Respondent admitted that complainant retained the services of his law and accounting firms in the settlement of her husband’s estate.[5] However, he pointed out that he has
resigned from his law and accounting firms as early as 1974. He alleged that it was Atty. Percival Cendaña (from the law firm Carlos Valdes & Associates) who filed the
inestate proceedings in court in 1976.
As to the third charge, respondent denied there was a conflict of interest when his law firm represented the estate in the inestate proceedings while his accounting firm (C. J.
Valdes & Co., CPAs) served as accountant of the estate and prepared the claims of creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. against the estate. He proffered the following
reasons for his thesis: First, the two claimants were closely related to the late Nakpil. Claimant ENORN, Inc. is a family corporation of the Nakpils of which the late Nakpil was
the President. Claimant Angel Nakpil is a brother of the late Nakpil who, upon the latter’s death, became the President of ENORN, Inc. These two claimants had been clients
of his law and accounting firms even during the lifetime of Jose Nakpil. Second, his alleged representation of conflicting interests was with the knowledge and consent of
complainant as administratrix. Third, there was no conflict of interests between the estate and the claimants for they had forged a modus vivendi, i.e., that the subject claims
would be satisfied only after full payment of the principal bank creditors. Complainant, as administratrix, did not controvert the claims of Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc.
Complainant has started paying off the claims of Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. after satisfying the banks’ claims. Complainant did not assert that their claims caused
prejudice to the estate. Fourth, the work of Carlos J. Valdes and Co. as common auditor redounded to the benefit of the estate for the firm prepared a true and accurate
amount of the claim. Fifth, respondent resigned from his law and accounting firms as early as August 15, 1974. [6] He rejoined his accounting firm several years later. He
submitted as proof the SEC’s certification of the filing of his accounting firm of an Amended Articles of Partnership. Thus, it was not he but Atty. Percival Cendaña, from the
firm Carlos J. Valdes and Associates, who filed the intestate proceedings in court. On the other hand, the claimants were represented by their own counsel Atty. Enrique O.
Chan. Sixth, respondent alleged that in the remote possibility that he committed a breach of professional ethics, he committed such “misconduct” not as a lawyer but as an
accountant who acted as common auditor of the estate and its creditors. Hence, he should be held accountable in another forum.
On November 12, 1979, complainant submitted her REPLY.[7] She maintained that the pendency of the reconveyance case is not prejudicial to the investigation of her
disbarment complaint against respondent for the issue in the latter is not the ownership of the Moran property but the ethics and morality of respondent’s conduct as a CPA-
lawyer.
Complainant alleged that respondent’s Annexes to his Reply (such as the Statement of Assets & Liability of the Nakpils and the Balance Sheet of the Estate) which showed
that complainant did not claim ownership of the Moran property were all prepared by C. J. Valdes and Co. as accountant of the estate of Jose Nakpil and filed with the
intestate court by C. J. Valdes and Associates as counsel for the estate. She averred that these Annexes were not proofs that respondent owned the Moran property but were
part of respondent’s scheme to remove the property from the estate and transfer it to his family corporation. Complainant alleged that she signed the documents because of
the professional counsel of respondent and his firm that her signature thereon was required. Complainant charged respondent with greed for coveting the Moran property on
the basis of defects in the documents he himself prepared.
Complainant urged that respondent cannot disown unfavorable documents (the list of claims against the estate and the letter regarding Nakpil’s payments of realty tax on the
Moran property) which were prepared by his law and accounting firms and invoke other documents prepared by the same firms which are favorable to him. She averred that
respondent must accept responsibility not just for some, but for all the representations and communications of his firms.
Complainant refuted respondent’s claim that he resigned from his firms from March 9, 1976 to “several years later.” She alleged that none of the documents submitted as
evidence referred to his resignation from his law firm. The documents merely substantiated his resignation from his accounting firm.
In his REJOINDER,[8] respondent insisted that complainant cannot hold him liable for representing the interests of both the estate and the claimants without showing that his
action prejudiced the estate. He urged that it is not per se anomalous for respondent’s accounting firm to act as accountant for the estate and its creditors. He reiterated that
he is not subject to the jurisdiction of this Court for he acted not as lawyer, but as accountant for both the estate and its claimants.
He alleged that his accounting firm merely prepared the list of claims of the creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. Their claims were not defended by his accounting or law
firm but by Atty. Enrique Chan. He averred that his law firm did not oppose these claims as they were legitimate and not because they were prepared by his accounting firm.
He emphasized that there was no allegation that the claims were fraudulent or excessive and that the failure of respondent’s law firm to object to these claims damaged the
estate.
In our January 21, 1980 Resolution,[9] we deferred further action on the disbarment case until after resolution of the action for reconveyance between the parties involving the
issue of ownership by the then CFI of Baguio. Complainant moved for reconsideration on the ground that the issue of ownership pending with the CFI was not prejudicial to
her complaint which involved an entirely different issue, i.e., the unethical acts of respondent as a CPA-lawyer. We granted her motion and referred the administrative case to
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for investigation, report and recommendation.[10]
In 1983, the CFI of Baguio dismissed the action for reconveyance. The trial court ruled that respondent held the Moran property in trust for the Nakpils but found that
complainant waived her right over it.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. The appellate court held that respondent was the absolute owner of the Moran property. The Decision was elevated
to this Court.
On February 18, 1986, during the pendency of complainant’s appeal to this Court, the OSG submitted its Report [11] on the disbarment complaint. The OSG relied heavily on
the decision of the Court of Appeals then pending review by this Court. The OSG found that respondent was not put on notice of complainant’s claim over the property. It
opined that there was no trust agreement created over the property and that respondent was the absolute owner thereof. Thus, it upheld respondent’s right to transfer title to
his family corporation. It also found no conflict of interests as the claimants were related to the late Jose Nakpil. The OSG recommended the dismissal of the administrative
case.
Prefatorily, we note that the case at bar presents a novel situation as it involves the disbarment of a CPA-lawyer for his demeanor in his accounting profession and law
practice in connection with the property of his client.
As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the business transaction must be characterized with utmost honesty and good faith.[12] The measure of good
faith which an attorney is required to exercise in his dealings with his client is a much higher standard than is required in business dealings where the parties trade at “arms
length.”[13] Business transactions between an attorney and his client are disfavored and discouraged by the policy of the law. Hence, courts carefully watch these transactions
to assure that no advantage is taken by a lawyer over his client. This rule is founded on public policy for, by virtue of his office, an attorney is in an easy position to take
advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client. Thus, no presumption of innocence or improbability of wrongdoing is considered in an attorney’s favor. [14]
In the case at bar, we cannot subscribe to the findings of the OSG in its Report. These findings were based mainly on the decision of the Court of Appeals in the action for
reconveyance which was reversed by this Court in 1993.[15]
As to the first two charges, we are bound by the factual findings of this Court in the aforementioned reconveyance case. [16] It is well-established that respondent offered to the
complainant the services of his law and accounting firms by reason of their close relationship dating as far back as the ‘50s. She reposed her complete trust in respondent
who was the lawyer, accountant and business consultant of her late husband. Respondent and the late Nakpil agreed that the former would purchase the Moran property and
keep it in trust for the latter. In violation of the trust agreement, respondent claimed absolute ownership over the property and refused to sell the property to complainant after
the death of Jose Nakpil. To place the property beyond the reach of complainant and the intestate court, respondent later transferred it to his corporation.
Contrary to the findings of the OSG, respondent initially acknowledged and respected the trust nature of the Moran property. Respondent’s bad faith in transferring the
property to his family corporation is well discussed in this Court’s Decision,[17] thus:
“x x x Valdes (herein respondent) never repudiated the trust during the lifetime of the late Jose Nakpil. On the contrary, he expressly recognized it. x x x (H)e
repudiated the trust when (he) excluded Pulong Maulap from the list of properties of the late Jose Nakpil submitted to the intestate court in 1973. x x x
xxx
“The fact that there was no transfer of ownership intended by the parties x x x can be bolstered by Exh. “I-2,” an annex to the claim filed against the estate proceedings of the
late Jose Nakpil by his brother, Angel Nakpil, which was prepared by Carlos J. Valdes & Co., the accounting firm of herein respondent. Exhibit “I-2,” which is a list of the
application of the proceeds of various FUB loans contracted as of 31 December 1973 by the late Jose Nakpil, x x x contains the two (2) loans contracted in the name of
respondent. If ownership of Pulong Maulap was already transferred or ceded to Valdes, these loans should not have been included in the list.
“Indeed, as we view it, what the parties merely agreed to under the arrangement outlined in Exh. “J” was that respondent Valdes would x x x ‘take over the total loan of
P140,000.00 and pay all of the interests due on the notes’ while the heirs of the late Jose Nakpil would continue to live in the disputed property for five (5) years
without remuneration save for regular maintenance expenses. This does not mean, however, that if at the end of the five-year period petitioner (Nakpil) failed to
reimburse Valdes for his advances, x x x Valdes could already automatically assume ownership of Pulong Maulap. Instead, the remedy of respondents Carlos J.
Valdes and Caval Realty Corporation was to proceed against the estate of the late Jose M. Nakpil and/or the property itself.” (emphasis supplied)
In the said reconveyance case, we further ruled that complainant’s documentary evidence (Exhibits “H”, “J” and “L”), which she also adduced in this administrative case,
should estop respondent from claiming that he bought the Moran property for himself, and not merely in trust for Jose Nakpil. [18]
It ought to follow that respondent’s act of excluding Moran property from the estate which his law firm was representing evinces a lack of fidelity to the cause of his client. If
respondent truly believed that the said property belonged to him, he should have at least informed complainant of his adverse claim. If they could not agree on its ownership,
respondent should have formally presented his claim in the intestate proceedings instead of transferring the property to his own corporation and concealing it from
complainant and the judge in the estate proceedings. Respondent’s misuse of his legal expertise to deprive his client of the Moran property is clearly unethical.
To make matters worse, respondent, through his accounting firm, charged the two loans of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00 as liability of the estate, after said loans were obtained
by respondent for the purchase and renovation of the property which he claimed for himself. Respondent seeks to exculpate himself from this charge by disclaiming
knowledge or privity in the preparation of the list of the estate’s liabilities. He theorizes that the inclusion of the loans must have been a mere error or oversight of his
accounting firm. It is clear that the information as to how these two loans should be treated could have only come from respondent himself as the said loans were in his name.
Hence, the supposed error of the accounting firm in charging respondent’s loans against the estate could not have been committed without respondent’s participation.
Respondent wanted to “have his cake and eat it too” and subordinated the interest of his client to his own pecuniary gain. Respondent violated Canon 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to his client’s cause and enjoins him to be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him.
As regards the third charge, we hold that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. It is generally the rule, based on sound public policy, that an attorney cannot
represent adverse interests. It is highly improper to represent both sides of an issue.[19] The proscription against representation of conflicting interests finds application where
the conflicting interests arise with respect to the same general matter[20] and is applicable however slight such adverse interest may be. It applies although the attorney’s
intentions and motives were honest and he acted in good faith. [21] However, representation of conflicting interests may be allowed where the parties consent to the
representation, after full disclosure of facts. Disclosure alone is not enough for the clients must give their informed consent to such representation. The lawyer must explain to
his clients the nature and extent of conflict and the possible adverse effect must be thoroughly understood by his clients.[22]
In the case at bar, there is no question that the interests of the estate and that of it creditors are adverse to each other. Respondent’s accounting firm prepared the list of
assets and liabilities of the estate and, at the same time, computed the claims of two creditors of the estate. There is clearly a conflict between the interest of the estate which
stands as the debtor, and that of the two claimants who are creditors of the estate. In fact, at one instance, respondent’s law firm questioned the claims of creditor Angel
Nakpil against the estate.
To exculpate himself, respondent denies that he represented complainant in the intestate proceedings. He points out that it was one Atty. Percival Cendaña, from his law firm
Carlos J. Valdes & Associates, who filed the intestate case in court. However, the fact that he did not personally file the case and appear in court is beside the point. As
established in the records of this case and in the reconveyance case, [23] respondent acted as counsel and accountant of complainant after the death of Jose Nakpil.
Respondent’s defense that he resigned from his law and accounting firms as early as 1974 (or two years before the filing of the intestate case) is unworthy of merit.
Respondent’s claim of resignation from his law firm is not supported by any documentary proof. The documents on record [24] only show respondent’s resignation from his
accounting firm in 1972 and 1974. Even these documents reveal that respondent returned to his accounting firm on July 1, 1976 and as of 1978, the intestate proceedings for
the settlement of Jose’s estate had not yet been terminated. It does not escape us that when respondent transferred the Moran property to his corporation on February 13,
1978, the intestate proceedings was still pending in court. Thus, the succession of events shows that respondent could not have been totally ignorant of the proceedings in the
intestate case.
Respondent claims that complainant knew that his law firm Carlos J. Valdes & Associates was the legal counsel of the estate[25] and his accounting firm, C.J. Valdes & Co.,
CPAs, was the auditor of both the estate and the two claimants against it. [26] The fact, however, that complainant, as administratrix, did not object to the set-up cannot be
taken against her as there is nothing in the records to show that respondent or his law firm explained the legal situation and its consequences to complainant. Thus, her
silence regarding the arrangement does not amount to an acquiescence based on an informed consent.
We also hold that the relationship of the claimants to the late Nakpil does not negate the conflict of interest. When a creditor files a claim against an estate, his interest is per
se adverse to the estate. As correctly pointed out by complainant, if she had a claim against her husband’s estate, her claim is still adverse and must be filed in the intestate
proceedings.
Prescinding from these premises, respondent undoubtedly placed his law firm in a position where his loyalty to his client could be doubted. In the estate proceedings, the duty
of respondent’s law firm was to contest the claims of these two creditors but which claims were prepared by respondent’s accounting firm. Even if the claims were valid and
did not prejudice the estate, the set-up is still undesirable. The test to determine whether there is a conflict of interest in the representation is probability, not certainty of
conflict. It was respondent’s duty to inhibit either of his firms from said proceedings to avoid the probability of conflict of interest.
Respondent advances the defense that assuming there was conflict of interest, he could not be charged before this Court as his alleged “misconduct” pertains to his
accounting practice.
We do not agree. Respondent is a CPA-lawyer who is actively practicing both professions. He is the senior partner of his law and accounting firms which carry his name. In
the case at bar, complainant is not charging respondent with breach of ethics for being the common accountant of the estate and the two creditors. He is charged for allowing
his accounting firm to represent two creditors of the estate and, at the same time, allowing his law firm to represent the estate in the proceedings where these claims were
presented. The act is a breach of professional ethics and undesirable as it placed respondent’s and his law firm’s loyalty under a cloud of doubt. Even granting that
respondent’s misconduct refers to his accountancy practice, it would not prevent this Court from disciplining him as a member of the Bar. The rule is settled that a lawyer may
be suspended or disbarred for ANY misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor. [27] Possession of good moral character is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a continuing requirement to the practice of law.
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar. Thus, a lawyer should determine his conduct by
acting in a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. Members of the bar are expected to always live up to the standards embodied
in the Code of Professional Responsibility as the relationship between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature and demands utmost fidelity and good faith. [28] In
the case at bar, respondent exhibited less than full fidelity to his duty to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in his dealings and transactions with his clients. [29]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court finds respondent ATTY. CARLOS J. VALDES guilty of misconduct. He is suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year
effective from receipt of this Decision, with a warning that a similar infraction shall be dealt with more severely in the future.

G.R. No. 173188, January 15, 2014

THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF THE SPOUSES VICENTE CADAVEDO AND BENITA ARCOY-CADAVEDO (BOTH DECEASED), SUBSTITUTED BY THEIR HEIRS,
NAMELY: HERMINIA, PASTORA, HEIRS OF FRUCTUOSA, HEIRS OF RAQUEL, EVANGELINE, VICENTE, JR., AND ARMANDO, ALL SURNAMED CADAVEDO,
PETITIONERS, VS. VICTORINO (VIC) T. LACAYA, MARRIED TO ROSA LEGADOS, RESPONDENTS. 
 
 D E C I S I O N
BRION, J.:

We resolve in this Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari[1] the challenge to the October 11, 2005 decision[2] and the May 9, 2006 resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 56948. The CA reversed and set aside the September 17, 1996 decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, of Dipolog City in Civil Case No.
4038, granting in part the complaint for recovery of possession of property filed by the petitioners, the Conjugal Partnership of the Spouses Vicente Cadavedo and Benita
Arcoy-Cadavedo against Atty. Victorino (Vic) T. Lacaya, married to Rosa Legados (collectively, the respondents).
The Factual Antecedents
The Spouses Vicente Cadavedo and Benita Arcoy-Cadavedo (collectively, the spouses Cadavedo) acquired a homestead grant over a 230,765-square meter parcel of land
known as Lot 5415 (subject lot) located in Gumay, Piñan, Zamboanga del Norte. They were issued Homestead Patent No. V-15414 on March 13, 1953 and Original
Certificate of Title No. P-376 on July 2, 1953. On April 30, 1955, the spouses Cadavedo sold the subject lot to the spouses Vicente Ames and Martha Fernandez (the spouses
Ames). Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-4792 was subsequently issued in the name of the spouses Ames.
The present controversy arose when the spouses Cadavedo filed an action[5] before the RTC (then Court of First Instance) of Zamboanga City against the spouses Ames for
sum of money and/or voiding of contract of sale of homestead after the latter failed to pay the balance of the purchase price. The spouses Cadavedo initially engaged the
services of Atty. Rosendo Bandal who, for health reasons, later withdrew from the case; he was substituted by Atty. Lacaya.
On February 24, 1969, Atty. Lacaya amended the complaint to assert the nullity of the sale and the issuance of TCT No. T-4792 in the names of the spouses Ames as gross
violation of the public land law. The amended complaint stated that the spouses Cadavedo hired Atty. Lacaya on a contingency fee basis. The contingency fee stipulation
specifically reads:
10. That due to the above circumstances, the plaintiffs were forced to hire a lawyer on contingent basis and if they become the prevailing parties in the case at bar,
they will pay the sum of P2,000.00 for attorney’s fees[.][6]
In a decision dated February 1, 1972, the RTC upheld the sale of the subject lot to the spouses Ames. The spouses Cadavedo, thru Atty. Lacaya, appealed the case to the
CA.
On September 18, 1975, and while the appeal before the CA in Civil Case No. 1721 was pending, the spouses Ames sold the subject lot to their children. The spouses Ames’
TCT No. T-4792 was subsequently cancelled and TCT No. T-25984 was issued in their children’s names. On October 11, 1976, the spouses Ames mortgaged the subject lot
with the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) in the names of their children.
On August 13, 1980, the CA issued its decision in Civil Case No. 1721, reversing the decision of the RTC and declaring the deed of sale, transfer of rights, claims and interest
to the spouses Ames null and void ab initio. It directed the spouses Cadavedo to return the initial payment and ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel the spouses Ames’
TCT No. T-4792 and to reissue another title in the name of the spouses Cadavedo. The case eventually reached this Court via the spouses Ames’ petition for review on
certiorari which this Court dismissed for lack of merit.
Meanwhile, the spouses Ames defaulted in their obligation with the DBP. Thus, the DBP caused the publication of a notice of foreclosure sale of the subject lot as covered by
TCT No. T-25984 (under the name of the spouses Ames’ children). Atty. Lacaya immediately informed the spouses Cadavedo of the foreclosure sale and filed an Affidavit of
Third Party Claim with the Office of the Provincial Sheriff on September 14, 1981.
With the finality of the judgment in Civil Case No. 1721, Atty. Lacaya filed on September 21, 1981 a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution.
On September 23, 1981, and pending the RTC’s resolution of the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution, the spouses Ames filed a complaint [7] before the RTC against
the spouses Cadavedo for Quieting of Title or Enforcement of Civil Rights due Planters in Good Faith with prayer for Preliminary Injunction. The spouses Cadavedo,
thru Atty. Lacaya, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata and to cancel TCT No. T-25984 (under the name of the spouses Ames’ children).
On October 16, 1981, the RTC granted the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No. 1721, and the spouses Cadavedo were placed in possession of the
subject lot on October 24, 1981. Atty. Lacaya asked for one-half of the subject lot as attorney’s fees. He caused the subdivision of the subject lot into two equal portions,
based on area, and selected the more valuable and productive half for himself; and assigned the other half to the spouses Cadavedo.
Unsatisfied with the division, Vicente and his sons-in-law entered the portion assigned to the respondents and ejected them. The latter responded by filing a counter-suit for
forcible entry before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC); the ejectment case was docketed as Civil Case No. 215. This incident occurred while Civil Case No. 3352 was pending.
On May 13, 1982, Vicente and Atty. Lacaya entered into an amicable settlement (compromise agreement)[8] in Civil Case No. 215 (the ejectment case), re-adjusting the area
and portion obtained by each. Atty. Lacaya acquired 10.5383 hectares pursuant to the agreement. The MTC approved the compromise agreement in a decision dated June
10, 1982.
Meanwhile, on May 21, 1982, the spouses Cadavedo filed before the RTC an action against the DBP for Injunction; it was docketed as Civil Case No. 3443 (Cadavedo v.
DBP). The RTC subsequently denied the petition, prompting the spouses Cadavedo to elevate the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari. The CA dismissed the petition in
its decision of January 31, 1984.
The records do not clearly disclose the proceedings subsequent to the CA decision in Civil Case No. 3443. However, on August 18, 1988, TCT No. 41051 was issued in the
name of the spouses Cadavedo concerning the subject lot.
On August 9, 1988, the spouses Cadavedo filed before the RTC an action[9] against the respondents, assailing the MTC-approved compromise agreement. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 4038 and is the root of the present case. The spouses Cadavedo prayed, among others, that the respondents be ejected from their one-half
portion of the subject lot; that they be ordered to render an accounting of the produce of this one-half portion from 1981; and that the RTC fix the attorney’s fees on a quantum
meruit basis, with due consideration of the expenses that Atty. Lacaya incurred while handling the civil cases.
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 4038, the spouses Cadavedo executed a Deed of Partition of Estate in favor of their eight children. Consequently, TCT No. 41051 was
cancelled and TCT No. 41690 was issued in the names of the latter. The records are not clear on the proceedings and status of Civil Case No. 3352.
The Ruling of the RTC
In the September 17, 1996 decision[10] in Civil Case No. 4038, the RTC declared the contingent fee of 10.5383 hectares as excessive and unconscionable. The RTC reduced
the land area to 5.2691 hectares and ordered the respondents to vacate and restore the remaining 5.2692 hectares to the spouses Cadavedo.
The RTC noted that, as stated in the amended complaint filed by Atty. Lacaya, the agreed attorney’s fee on contingent basis was P2,000.00. Nevertheless, the RTC also
pointed out that the parties novated this agreement when they executed the compromise agreement in Civil Case No. 215 (ejectment case), thereby giving Atty. Lacaya one-
half of the subject lot. The RTC added that Vicente’s decision to give Atty. Lacaya one-half of the subject lot, sans approval of Benita, was a valid act of administration and
binds the conjugal partnership. The RTC reasoned out that the disposition redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership as it was done precisely to remunerate Atty.
Lacaya for his services to recover the property itself.
These considerations notwithstanding, the RTC considered the one-half portion of the subject lot, as Atty. Lacaya’s contingent fee, excessive, unreasonable and
unconscionable. The RTC was convinced that the issues involved in Civil Case No. 1721 were not sufficiently difficult and complicated to command such an excessive award;
neither did it require Atty. Lacaya to devote much of his time or skill, or to perform extensive research.
Finally, the RTC deemed the respondents’ possession, prior to the judgment, of the excess portion of their share in the subject lot to be in good faith. The respondents were
thus entitled to receive its fruits.
On the spouses Cadavedo’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC modified the decision in its resolution [11] dated December 27, 1996. The RTC ordered the respondents to
account for and deliver the produce and income, valued at P7,500.00 per annum, of the 5.2692 hectares that the RTC ordered the spouses Ames to restore to the spouses
Cadavedo, from October 10, 1988 until final restoration of the premises.
The respondents appealed the case before the CA.
The Ruling of the CA
In its decision[12] dated October 11, 2005, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC’s September 17, 1996 decision and maintained the partition and distribution of the subject
lot under the compromise agreement. In so ruling, the CA noted the following facts: (1) Atty. Lacaya served as the spouses Cadavedo’s counsel from 1969 until 1988, when
the latter filed the present case against Atty. Lacaya; (2) during the nineteen (19) years of their attorney-client relationship, Atty. Lacaya represented the spouses Cadavedo in
three civil cases – Civil Case No. 1721, Civil Case No. 3352, and Civil Case No. 3443; (3) the first civil case lasted for twelve years and even reached this Court, the second
civil case lasted for seven years, while the third civil case lasted for six years and went all the way to the CA; (4) the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya entered into a
compromise agreement concerning the division of the subject lot where Atty. Lacaya ultimately agreed to acquire a smaller portion; (5) the MTC approved the compromise
agreement; (6) Atty. Lacaya defrayed all of the litigation expenses in Civil Case No. 1721; and (7) the spouses Cadavedo expressly recognized that Atty. Lacaya served them
in several cases.
Considering these established facts and consistent with Canon 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (enumerating the factors that should guide the determination
of the lawyer’s fees), the CA ruled that the time spent and the extent of the services Atty. Lacaya rendered for the spouses Cadavedo in the three cases, the probability of him
losing other employment resulting from his engagement, the benefits resulting to the spouses Cadavedo, and the contingency of his fees justified the compromise agreement
and rendered the agreed fee under the compromise agreement reasonable.
The Petition
In the present petition, the petitioners essentially argue that the CA erred in: (1) granting the attorney’s fee consisting of one-half or 10.5383 hectares of the subject lot to Atty.
Lacaya, instead of confirming the agreed contingent attorney’s fees of P2,000.00; (2) not holding the respondents accountable for the produce, harvests and income of the
10.5383-hectare portion (that they obtained from the spouses Cadavedo) from 1988 up to the present; and (3) upholding the validity of the purported oral contract between the
spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya when it was champertous and dealt with property then still subject of Civil Case No. 1721.[13]
The petitioners argue that stipulations on a lawyer’s compensation for professional services, especially those contained in the pleadings filed in courts, control the amount of
the attorney’s fees to which the lawyer shall be entitled and should prevail over oral agreements. In this case, the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya agreed that the latter’s
contingent attorney’s fee was P2,000.00 in cash, not one-half of the subject lot. This agreement was clearly stipulated in the amended complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1721.
Thus, Atty. Lacaya is bound by the expressly stipulated fee and cannot insist on unilaterally changing its terms without violating their contract.
The petitioners add that the one-half portion of the subject lot as Atty. Lacaya’s contingent attorney’s fee is excessive and unreasonable. They highlight the RTC’s
observations and argue that the issues involved in Civil Case No. 1721, pursuant to which the alleged contingent fee of one-half of the subject lot was agreed by the parties,
were not novel and did not involve difficult questions of law; neither did the case require much of Atty. Lacaya’s time, skill and effort in research. They point out that the two
subsequent civil cases should not be considered in determining the reasonable contingent fee to which Atty. Lacaya should be entitled for his services in Civil Case No. 1721,
as those cases had not yet been instituted at that time. Thus, these cases should not be considered in fixing the attorney’s fees. The petitioners also claim that the spouses
Cadavedo concluded separate agreements on the expenses and costs for each of these subsequent cases, and that Atty. Lacaya did not even record any attorney’s lien in
the spouses Cadavedo’s TCT covering the subject lot.
The petitioners further direct the Court’s attention to the fact that Atty. Lacaya, in taking over the case from Atty. Bandal, agreed to defray all of the litigation expenses in
exchange for one-half of the subject lot should they win the case. They insist that this agreement is a champertous contract that is contrary to public policy, prohibited by law
for violation of the fiduciary relationship between a lawyer and a client.
Finally, the petitioners maintain that the compromise agreement in Civil Case No. 215 (ejectment case) did not novate their original stipulated agreement on the attorney’s
fees. They reason that Civil Case No. 215 did not decide the issue of attorney’s fees between the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya for the latter’s services in Civil Case
No. 1721.
The Case for the Respondents
In their defense,[14] the respondents counter that the attorney’s fee stipulated in the amended complaint was not the agreed fee of Atty. Lacaya for his legal services. They
argue that the questioned stipulation for attorney’s fees was in the nature of a penalty that, if granted, would inure to the spouses Cadavedo and not to Atty. Lacaya.
The respondents point out that: (1) both Vicente and Atty. Lacaya caused the survey and subdivision of the subject lot immediately after the spouses Cadavedo reacquired its
possession with the RTC’s approval of their motion for execution of judgment in Civil Case No. 1721; (2) Vicente expressly ratified and confirmed the agreement on the
contingent attorney’s fee consisting of one-half of the subject lot; (3) the MTC in Civil Case No. 215 (ejectment case) approved the compromise agreement; (4) Vicente is the
legally designated administrator of the conjugal partnership, hence the compromise agreement ratifying the transfer bound the partnership and could not have been
invalidated by the absence of Benita’s acquiescence; and (5) the compromise agreement merely inscribed and ratified the earlier oral agreement between the spouses
Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya which is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and public policy.
While the case is pending before this Court, Atty. Lacaya died.[15] He was substituted by his wife - Rosa - and their children – Victoriano D.L. Lacaya, Jr., Rosevic Lacaya-
Ocampo, Reymar L. Lacaya, Marcelito L. Lacaya, Raymundito L. Lacaya, Laila Lacaya-Matabalan, Marivic Lacaya-Barba, Rosalie L. Lacaya and Ma. Vic-Vic Lacaya-
Camaongay.[16]
The Court’s Ruling
We resolve to GRANT the petition.
The subject lot was the core of four successive and overlapping cases prior to the present controversy. In three of these cases, Atty. Lacaya stood as the spouses
Cadavedo’s counsel. For ease of discussion, we summarize these cases (including the dates and proceedings pertinent to each) as follows:
Civil Case No. 1721 – Cadavedo v. Ames (Sum of money and/or voiding of contract of sale of homestead), filed on January 10, 1967. The writ of execution was granted on
October 16, 1981.
Civil Case No. 3352 – Ames v. Cadavedo (Quieting of Title and/or Enforcement of Civil Rights due Planters in Good Faith with Application for Preliminary injunction), filed on
September 23, 1981.
Civil Case No. 3443 – Cadavedo v. DBP (Action for Injunction with Preliminary Injunction), filed on May 21, 1982.
Civil Case No. 215 – Atty. Lacaya v. Vicente Cadavedo, et. al. (Ejectment Case), filed between the latter part of 1981 and early part of 1982. The parties executed the
compromise agreement on May 13, 1982.
Civil Case No. 4038 – petitioners v. respondents (the present case).
The agreement on attorney’s fee consisting of one-half of the subject lot is void; the petitioners are entitled to recover possession
The core issue for our resolution is whether the attorney’s fee consisting of one-half of the subject lot is valid and reasonable, and binds the petitioners. We rule in the
NEGATIVE for the reasons discussed below.
A. The written agreement providing for a contingent fee of P2,000.00 should prevail over the oral agreement providing for one-half of the subject lot
The spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya agreed on a contingent fee of P2,000.00 and not, as asserted by the latter, one-half of the subject lot. The stipulation contained in
the amended complaint filed by Atty. Lacaya clearly stated that the spouses Cadavedo hired the former on a contingency basis; the Spouses Cadavedo undertook to pay their
lawyer P2,000.00 as attorney’s fees should the case be decided in their favor.
Contrary to the respondents’ contention, this stipulation is not in the nature of a penalty that the court would award the winning party, to be paid by the losing party. The
stipulation is a representation to the court concerning the agreement between the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya, on the latter’s compensation for his services in the
case; it is not the attorney’s fees in the nature of damages which the former prays from the court as an incident to the main action.
At this point, we highlight that as observed by both the RTC and the CA and agreed as well by both parties, the alleged contingent fee agreement consisting of one-half of the
subject lot was not reduced to writing prior to or, at most, at the start of Atty. Lacaya’s engagement as the spouses Cadavedo’s counsel in Civil Case No. 1721. An agreement
between the lawyer and his client, providing for the former’s compensation, is subject to the ordinary rules governing contracts in general. As the rules stand, controversies
involving written and oral agreements on attorney’s fees shall be resolved in favor of the former. [17] Hence, the contingency fee of P2,000.00 stipulated in the amended
complaint prevails over the alleged oral contingency fee agreement of one-half of the subject lot.
B. The contingent fee agreement between the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya, awarding the latter one-half of the subject lot, is champertous
Granting arguendo that the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya indeed entered into an oral contingent fee agreement securing to the latter one-half of the subject lot, the
agreement is nevertheless void.
In their account, the respondents insist that Atty. Lacaya agreed to represent the spouses Cadavedo in Civil Case No. 1721 and assumed the litigation expenses, without
providing for reimbursement, in exchange for a contingency fee consisting of one-half of the subject lot. This agreement is champertous and is contrary to public policy.[18]
Champerty, along with maintenance (of which champerty is an aggravated form), is a common law doctrine that traces its origin to the medieval period.[19] The doctrine of
maintenance was directed “against wanton and inofficious intermeddling in the disputes of others in which the intermeddler has no interest whatever, and where the
assistance rendered is without justification or excuse.”[20] Champerty, on the other hand, is characterized by “the receipt of a share of the proceeds of the litigation by the
intermeddler.”[21] Some common law court decisions, however, add a second factor in determining champertous contracts, namely, that the lawyer must also, “at his own
expense maintain, and take all the risks of, the litigation.”[22]
The doctrines of champerty and maintenance were created in response “to medieval practice of assigning doubtful or fraudulent claims to persons of wealth and influence in
the expectation that such individuals would enjoy greater success in prosecuting those claims in court, in exchange for which they would receive an entitlement to the spoils of
the litigation.”[23] “In order to safeguard the administration of justice, instances of champerty and maintenance were made subject to criminal and tortuous liability and a
common law rule was developed, striking down champertous agreements and contracts of maintenance as being unenforceable on the grounds of public policy.”[24]
In this jurisdiction, we maintain the rules on champerty, as adopted from American decisions, for public policy considerations. [25] As matters currently stand, any agreement by
a lawyer to “conduct the litigation in his own account, to pay the expenses thereof or to save his client therefrom and to receive as his fee a portion of the proceeds of the
judgment is obnoxious to the law.”[26] The rule of the profession that forbids a lawyer from contracting with his client for part of the thing in litigation in exchange for conducting
the case at the lawyer’s expense is designed to prevent the lawyer from acquiring an interest between him and his client. To permit these arrangements is to enable the
lawyer to “acquire additional stake in the outcome of the action which might lead him to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client or to accept a settlement which
might take care of his interest in the verdict to the sacrifice of that of his client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to his client’s cause.”[27]
In Bautista v. Atty. Gonzales,[28] the Court struck down the contingent fee agreement between therein respondent Atty. Ramon A. Gonzales and his client for being contrary to
public policy. There, the Court held that an agreement between a lawyer and his client that does not provide for reimbursement of litigation expenses paid by the former is
against public policy, especially if the lawyer has agreed to carry on the action at his expense in consideration of some bargain to have a part of the thing in dispute. It violates
the fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and his client.[29]
In addition to its champertous character, the contingent fee arrangement in this case expressly transgresses the Canons of Professional Ethics and, impliedly, the Code of
Professional Responsibility.[30] Under Rule 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, a lawyer may not properly agree with a client that the lawyer shall pay or beat the expense
of litigation.[31] The same reasons discussed above underlie this rule.
C. The attorney’s fee consisting of one-half of the subject lot is excessive and unconscionable
We likewise strike down the questioned attorney’s fee and declare it void for being excessive and unconscionable. The contingent fee of one-half of the subject lot was
allegedly agreed to secure the services of Atty. Lacaya in Civil Case No. 1721. Plainly, it was intended for only one action as the two other civil cases had not yet been
instituted at that time. While Civil Case No. 1721 took twelve years to be finally resolved, that period of time, as matters then stood, was not a sufficient reason to justify a
large fee in the absence of any showing that special skills and additional work had been involved. The issue involved in that case, as observed by the RTC (and with which we
agree), was simple and did not require of Atty. Lacaya extensive skill, effort and research. The issue simply dealt with the prohibition against the sale of a homestead lot within
five years from its acquisition.
That Atty. Lacaya also served as the spouses Cadavedo’s counsel in the two subsequent cases did not and could not otherwise justify an attorney’s fee of one-half of the
subject lot. As asserted by the petitioners, the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya made separate arrangements for the costs and expenses for each of these two cases.
Thus, the expenses for the two subsequent cases had been considered and taken cared of.
Based on these considerations, we therefore find one-half of the subject lot as attorney’s fee excessive and unreasonable.
D. Atty. Lacaya’s acquisition of the one-half portion contravenes Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code
Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code forbids lawyers from acquiring, by purchase or assignment, the property that has been the subject of litigation in which they have taken part
by virtue of their profession.[32] The same proscription is provided under Rule 10 of the Canons of Professional Ethics.[33]
A thing is in litigation if there is a contest or litigation over it in court or when it is subject of the judicial action.[34] Following this definition, we find that the subject lot was still in
litigation when Atty. Lacaya acquired the disputed one-half portion. We note in this regard the following established facts: (1) on September 21, 1981, Atty. Lacaya filed a
motion for the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No. 1721; (2) on September 23, 1981, the spouses Ames filed Civil Case No. 3352 against the spouses Cadavedo;
(3) on October 16, 1981, the RTC granted the motion filed for the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No. 1721 and the spouses Cadavedo took possession of the
subject lot on October 24, 1981; (4) soon after, the subject lot was surveyed and subdivided into two equal portions, and Atty. Lacaya took possession of one of the
subdivided portions; and (5) on May 13, 1982, Vicente and Atty. Lacaya executed the compromise agreement.
From these timelines, whether by virtue of the alleged oral contingent fee agreement or an agreement subsequently entered into, Atty. Lacaya acquired the disputed one-half
portion (which was after October 24, 1981) while Civil Case No. 3352 and the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No. 1721 were already pending
before the lower courts. Similarly, the compromise agreement, including the subsequent judicial approval, was effected during the pendency of Civil Case No. 3352. In all of
these, the relationship of a lawyer and a client still existed between Atty. Lacaya and the spouses Cadavedo.
Thus, whether we consider these transactions – the transfer of the disputed one-half portion and the compromise agreement – independently of each other or resulting from
one another, we find them to be prohibited and void[35] by reason of public policy.[36] Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are contrary to public policy and
those expressly prohibited or declared void by law are considered inexistent and void from the beginning. [37]
What did not escape this Court’s attention is the CA’s failure to note that the transfer violated the provisions of Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code, although it recognized the
concurrence of the transfer and the execution of the compromise agreement with the pendency of the two civil cases subsequent to Civil Case No. 1721.[38] In reversing the
RTC ruling, the CA gave weight to the compromise agreement and in so doing, found justification in the unproved oral contingent fee agreement.
While contingent fee agreements are indeed recognized in this jurisdiction as a valid exception to the prohibitions under Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code, [39] contrary to the
CA’s position, however, this recognition does not apply to the present case. A contingent fee contract is an agreement in writing where the fee, often a fixed percentage of
what may be recovered in the action, is made to depend upon the success of the litigation. [40] The payment of the contingent fee is not made during the pendency of the
litigation involving the client’s property but only after the judgment has been rendered in the case handled by the lawyer.[41]
In the present case, we reiterate that the transfer or assignment of the disputed one-half portion to Atty. Lacaya took place while the subject lot was still under litigation and the
lawyer-client relationship still existed between him and the spouses Cadavedo. Thus, the general prohibition provided under Article 1491 of the Civil Code, rather than the
exception provided in jurisprudence, applies. The CA seriously erred in upholding the compromise agreement on the basis of the unproved oral contingent fee agreement.
Notably, Atty. Lacaya, in undertaking the spouses Cadavedo’s cause pursuant to the terms of the alleged oral contingent fee agreement, in effect, became a co-proprietor
having an equal, if not more, stake as the spouses Cadavedo. Again, this is void by reason of public policy; it undermines the fiduciary relationship between him and his
clients.[42]
E. The compromise agreement could not validate the void oral contingent fee agreement; neither did it supersede the written contingent fee agreement
The compromise agreement entered into between Vicente and Atty. Lacaya in Civil Case No. 215 (ejectment case) was intended to ratify and confirm Atty. Lacaya’s
acquisition and possession of the disputed one-half portion which were made in violation of Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code. As earlier discussed, such acquisition is void; the
compromise agreement, which had for its object a void transaction, should be void.
A contract whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy is inexistent and void from the beginning. [43] It can never be
ratified[44] nor the action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of the contract prescribe; [45] and any contract directly resulting from such illegal contract is likewise
void and inexistent.[46]
Consequently, the compromise agreement did not supersede the written contingent fee agreement providing for attorney’s fee of P2,000.00; neither did it preclude the
petitioners from questioning its validity even though Vicente might have knowingly and voluntarily acquiesced thereto and although the MTC approved it in its June 10, 1982
decision in the ejectment case. The MTC could not have acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the void compromise agreement; its judgment in the ejectment case
could not have attained finality and can thus be attacked at any time. Moreover, an ejectment case concerns itself only with the issue of possession de facto; it will not
preclude the filing of a separate action for recovery of possession founded on ownership. Hence, contrary to the CA’s position, the petitioners – in filing the present action and
praying for, among others, the recovery of possession of the disputed one-half portion and for judicial determination of the reasonable fees due Atty. Lacaya for his services –
were not barred by the compromise agreement.
Atty. Lacaya is entitled to receive attorney’s fees on a quantum meruit basis
In view of their respective assertions and defenses, the parties, in effect, impliedly set aside any express stipulation on the attorney’s fees, and the petitioners, by express
contention, submit the reasonableness of such fees to the court’s discretion. We thus have to fix the attorney’s fees on a quantum meruit basis.
“Quantum meruit — meaning ‘as much as he deserves’ — is used as basis for determining a lawyer’s professional fees in the absence of a contract x x x taking into account
certain factors in fixing the amount of legal fees.”[47] “Its essential requisite is the acceptance of the benefits by one sought to be charged for the services rendered under
circumstances as reasonably to notify him that the lawyer performing the task was expecting to be paid compensation” [48] for it. The doctrine of quantum meruit is a device to
prevent undue enrichment based on the equitable postulate that it is unjust for a person to retain benefit without paying for it.[49]
Under Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court[50] and Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,[51] factors such as the importance of the subject matter of the
controversy, the time spent and the extent of the services rendered, the customary charges for similar services, the amount involved in the controversy and the benefits
resulting to the client from the service, to name a few, are considered in determining the reasonableness of the fees to which a lawyer is entitled.
In the present case, the following considerations guide this Court in considering and setting Atty. Lacaya’s fees based on quantum meruit: (1) the questions involved in these
civil cases were not novel and did not require of Atty. Lacaya considerable effort in terms of time, skill or the performance of extensive research; (2) Atty. Lacaya rendered
legal services for the Spouses Cadavedo in three civil cases beginning in 1969 until 1988 when the petitioners filed the instant case; (3) the first of these civil cases
(Cadavedo v. Ames) lasted for twelve years and reaching up to this Court; the second (Ames v. Cadavedo) lasted for seven years; and the third (Cadavedo and Lacaya v.
DBP) lasted for six years, reaching up to the CA; and (4) the property subject of these civil cases is of a considerable size of 230,765 square meters or 23.0765 hectares.
All things considered, we hold as fair and equitable the RTC’s considerations in appreciating the character of the services that Atty. Lacaya rendered in the three cases,
subject to modification on valuation. We believe and so hold that the respondents are entitled to two (2) hectares (or approximately one-tenth [1/10] of the subject lot), with the
fruits previously received from the disputed one-half portion, as attorney’s fees. They shall return to the petitioners the remainder of the disputed one-half portion.
The allotted portion of the subject lot properly recognizes that litigation should be for the benefit of the client, not the lawyer, particularly in a legal situation when the law itself
holds clear and express protection to the rights of the client to the disputed property (a homestead lot). Premium consideration, in other words, is on the rights of the owner,
not on the lawyer who only helped the owner protect his rights. Matters cannot be the other way around; otherwise, the lawyer does indeed effectively acquire a property right
over the disputed property. If at all, due recognition of parity between a lawyer and a client should be on the fruits of the disputed property, which in this case, the Court
properly accords.
WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we hereby GRANT the petition. We AFFIRM the decision dated September 17, 1996 and the resolution dated December 27,
1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 10, in Civil Case No. 4038, with the MODIFICATION that the respondents, the spouses Victorino (Vic) T. Lacaya and
Rosa Legados, are entitled to two (2) hectares (or approximately one-tenth [1/10] of the subject lot) as attorney’s fees. The fruits that the respondents previously received from
the disputed one-half portion shall also form part of the attorney’s fees. We hereby ORDER the respondents to return to the petitioners the remainder of the 10.5383-hectare
portion of the subject lot that Atty. Vicente Lacaya acquired pursuant to the compromise agreement.

A.C. NO. 6711, July 03, 2007

MA. LUISA HADJULA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. ROCELES F. MADIANDA, RESPONDENT. 
 
 D E C I S I O N
GARCIA, J.:

Under consideration is Resolution No. XVI-2004-472 of the Board of Governors, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), relative to the complaint for disbarment filed by herein
complainant Ma. Luisa Hadjula against respondent Atty. Roceles F. Madianda.

The case started when, in an AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT[1] bearing date September 7, 2002 and filed with the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant charged Atty.
Roceles F. Madianda with violation of Article 209[2] of the Revised Penal Code and Canon Nos. 15.02 and 21.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In said affidavit-complaint, complainant alleged that she and respondent used to be friends as they both worked at the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) whereat respondent
was the Chief Legal Officer while she was the Chief Nurse of the Medical, Dental and Nursing Services. Complainant claimed that, sometime in 1998, she approached
respondent for some legal advice. Complainant further alleged that, in the course of their conversation which was supposed to be kept confidential, she disclosed personal
secrets and produced copies of a marriage contract, a birth certificate and a baptismal certificate, only to be informed later by the respondent that she (respondent) would
refer the matter to a lawyer friend. It was malicious, so complainant states, of respondent to have refused handling her case only after she had already heard her secrets.

Continuing, complainant averred that her friendship with respondent soured after her filing, in the later part of 2000, of criminal and disciplinary actions against the latter. What,
per complainant's account, precipitated the filing was when respondent, then a member of the BFP promotion board, demanded a cellular phone in exchange for the
complainant's promotion.

According to complainant, respondent, in retaliation to the filing of the aforesaid actions, filed a COUNTER COMPLAINT [3] with the Ombudsman charging her (complainant)
with violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019,[4] falsification of public documents and immorality, the last two charges being based on the disclosures complainant
earlier made to respondent. And also on the basis of the same disclosures, complainant further stated, a disciplinary case was also instituted against her before the
Professional Regulation Commission.

Complainant seeks the suspension and/or disbarment of respondent for the latter's act of disclosing personal secrets and confidential information she revealed in the course
of seeking respondent's legal advice.

In an order dated October 2, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline required respondent to file her answer to the complaint.

In her answer, styled as COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT,[5] respondent denied giving legal advice to the complainant and dismissed any suggestion about the existence of a lawyer-
client relationship between them. Respondent also stated the observation that the supposed confidential data and sensitive documents adverted to are in fact matters of
common knowledge in the BFP. The relevant portions of the answer read:
15. I specifically deny the allegation of F/SUPT. MA. LUISA C. HADJULA in paragraph 4 of her AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT for reason that she never WAS MY CLIENT nor we
ever had any LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP that ever existed ever since and that never obtained any legal advice from me regarding her PERSONAL
PROBLEMS or PERSONAL SECRETS. She likewise never delivered to me legal documents much more told me some confidential information or secrets. That is
because I never entertain LEGAL QUERIES or CONSULTATION regarding PERSONAL MATTERS since I know as a LAWYER of the Bureau of Fire Protection
that I am not allowed to privately practice law and it might also result to CONFLICT OF INTEREST. As a matter of fact, whenever there will be PERSONAL
MATTERS referred to me, I just referred them to private law practitioners and never entertain the same, NOR listen to their stories or examine or accept any
document.
7. I specifically deny the allegation of F/SUPT. MA. LUISA C. HADJULA in paragraph 8 of her AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT, the truth of the matter is that her ILLICIT
RELATIONSHIP and her illegal and unlawful activities are known in the Bureau of Fire Protection since she also filed CHILD SUPPORT case against her lover. .
. where she has a child . . .
Moreover, the alleged DOCUMENTS she purportedly have shown to me sometime in 1998, are all part of public records . . . .

Furthermore, F/SUPT. MA. LUISA C. HADJULA, is filing the instant case just to get even with me or to force me to settle and withdraw the CASES I FILED AGAINST HER
since she knows that she will certainly be DISMISSED FROM SERVICE, REMOVED FROM THE PRC ROLL and CRIMINALLY CONVICTED of her ILLICIT, IMMORAL,
ILLEGAL and UNLAWFUL ACTS.
On October 7, 2004, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline came out with a Report and Recommendation, stating that the information
related by complainant to the respondent is "protected under the attorney-client privilege communication." Prescinding from this postulate, the Investigating Commissioner
found the respondent to have violated legal ethics when she "[revealed] information given to her during a legal consultation," and accordingly recommended that respondent
be reprimanded therefor, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent Atty. Roceles Madianda be reprimanded for revealing the secrets of the complainant.
On November 4, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-472 reading as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and , finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering the actuation of revealing information given to respondent during a legal consultation, Atty. Roceles Madianda is hereby REPRIMANDED.
We AGREE with the recommendation and the premises holding it together.

As it were, complainant went to respondent, a lawyer who incidentally was also then a friend, to bare what she considered personal secrets and sensitive documents for the
purpose of obtaining legal advice and assistance. The moment complainant approached the then receptive respondent to seek legal advice, a veritable lawyer-client
relationship evolved between the two. Such relationship imposes upon the lawyer certain restrictions circumscribed by the ethics of the profession. Among the burdens of the
relationship is that which enjoins the lawyer, respondent in this instance, to keep inviolate confidential information acquired or revealed during legal consultations. The fact that
one is, at the end of the day, not inclined to handle the client's case is hardly of consequence. Of little moment, too, is the fact that no formal professional engagement follows
the consultation. Nor will it make any difference that no contract whatsoever was executed by the parties to memorialize the relationship. As we said in Burbe v. Magulta,[6] -
A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment complainant asked respondent for legal advise regarding the former's business. To constitute
professional employment, it is not essential that the client employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion.

It is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for which his service had
been sought.

It a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily
permits or acquiesces with the consultation, then the professional employments is established.

Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal relationship between the lawyer and the complainant or the non-payment of the former's fees.
Dean Wigmore lists the essential factors to establish the existence of the attorney-client privilege communication, viz:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in
confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be waived.[7]
With the view we take of this case, respondent indeed breached his duty of preserving the confidence of a client. As found by the IBP Investigating Commissioner, the
documents shown and the information revealed in confidence to the respondent in the course of the legal consultation in question, were used as bases in the criminal and
administrative complaints lodged against the complainant.

The purpose of the rule of confidentiality is actually to protect the client from possible breach of confidence as a result of a consultation with a lawyer.

The seriousness of the respondent's offense notwithstanding, the Court feels that there is room for compassion, absent compelling evidence that the respondent acted with ill-
will. Without meaning to condone the error of respondent's ways, what at bottom is before the Court is two former friends becoming bitter enemies and filing charges and
counter-charges against each other using whatever convenient tools and data were readily available. Unfortunately, the personal information respondent gathered from her
conversation with complainant became handy in her quest to even the score. At the end of the day, it appears clear to us that respondent was actuated by the urge to retaliate
without perhaps realizing that, in the process of giving vent to a negative sentiment, she was violating the rule on confidentiality.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Roceles F. Madianda is hereby REPRIMANDED and admonished to be circumspect in her handling of information acquired as a result
of a lawyer-client relationship. She is also STERNLY WARNED against a repetition of the same or similar act complained of.
A.C. NO. 5303, June 15, 2006
HUMBERTO C. LIM, JR., IN BEHALF OF PENTA RESORTS CORPORATION/ATTORNEY-IN-FACT OF LUMOT A. JALANDONI, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. NICANOR
V. VILLAROSA, RESPONDENT. 
 
 R E S O L U T I O N
CORONA, J.:

Humberto C. Lim Jr.[1] filed a verified complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Nicanor V. Villarosa on July 7, 2000. [2] On February 19, 2002, respondent moved for
the consolidation of the said complaint with the following substantially interrelated cases earlier filed with the First Division of this Court:
16. Administrative Case No. 5463: Sandra F. Vaflor v. Atty. Adoniram P. Pamplona and Atty. Nicanor V. Villarosa;
17.
18. Administrative Case No. 5502: Daniel A. Jalandoni v. Atty. Nicanor V. Villarosa.
In a resolution dated February 24, 2003, this Court considered Administrative Case No. 5463 closed and terminated. [3] On February 4, 2004, considering the pleadings filed in
Administrative Case No. 5502, the Court resolved:

(a) to NOTE the notice of the resolution dated September 27, 2003 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines dismissing the case against respondent for lack of merit; and

(b) to DENY, for lack of merit, the petition filed by complainant praying that the resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines dismissing the instant case be reviewed and that

No motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid denial in Administrative Case No. 5502 appears in the records. The Court is now called upon to determine the merits of this
remaining case (A.C. No. 5303) against respondent.

The complaint read:

AS FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

xxx xxx xxx

- II -

That respondent is a practicing lawyer and a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Bacolod City, Negros Occidental Chapter.... That sometime on September 19,
1997, Lumot A. Jalandoni, Chairman/President of PRC was sued before RTC, Branch 52 in Civil Case No. 97-9865, RE: Cabiles et al. vs. Lumot Jalandoni, et al. The latter
engaged the legal services of herein respondent who formally entered his appearance on October 2, 1997 as counsel for the defendants Lumot A. Jalandoni/Totti Anlap
Gargoles.... Respondent as a consequence of said Attorney-Client relationship represented Lumot A. Jalandoni et al in the entire proceedings of said case. Utmost trust and
confidence was reposed on said counsel, hence delicate and confidential matters involving all the personal circumstances of his client were entrusted to the respondent. The
latter was provided with all the necessary information relative to the property in question and likewise on legal matters affecting the corporation (PRC) particularly [involving]
problems [which affect] Hotel Alhambra. Said counsel was privy to all transactions and affairs of the corporation/hotel....

- III -

That it was respondent who exclusively handled the entire proceedings of afore-cited Civil Case No. 97-9865 [and] presented Lumot A. Jalandoni as his witness prior to
formally resting his case. However, on April 27, 1999 respondent, without due notice prior to a scheduled hearing, surprisingly filed a Motion to withdraw as counsel, one day
before its scheduled hearing on April 28, 1999.... A careful perusal of said Motion to Withdraw as Counsel will conclusively show that no copy thereof was furnished to Lumot
A. Jalandoni, neither does it bear her conformity.... No doubt, such notorious act of respondent resulted to (sic) irreparable damage and injury to Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al
since the decision of the court RTC, Branch 52 proved adverse to Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al.... The far reaching effects of the untimely and unauthorized withdrawal by
respondent caused irreparable damage and injury to Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al; a highly meritorious case in favor of his client suddenly [suffered] unexpected defeat.
 - IV -

That the grounds alleged by respondent for his withdrawal as counsel of Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al. was that he is [a] retained counsel of Dennis G. Jalbuena and the
Fernando F. Gonzaga, Inc. It was Dennis G. Jalbuena who recommended him to be the counsel of Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al. It is worthy to note that from the outset,
respondent already knew that Dennis G. Jalbuena is the son-in-law of Lumot A. Jalandoni being married to her eldest daughter, Carmen J. Jalbuena. The other
directors/officers of PRC were comprised of the eldest sibling of the remaining children of Lumot A. Jalandoni made in accordance with her wishes, with the exception of
Carmen J. Jalbuena, the only daughter registered as one of the incorporators of PRC, obviously, being the author of the registration itself [sic].... Respondent further stated
that he cannot refuse to represent Dennis G. Jalbuena in the case filed against the latter before the City Prosecutors Office by PRC/Lumot A. Jalandoni due to an alleged
retainership agreement with said Dennis G. Jalbuena. [He] likewise represented Carmen J. Jalbuena and one Vicente Delfin when PRC filed the criminal complaint against
them.... On April 06, 1999, twenty-one (21) days prior to respondent's filing of his Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al., respondent entered his
appearance with Bacolod City Prosecutor OIC-Vicente C. Acupan, through a letter expressly stating that effective said date he was appearing as counsel for both Dennis G.
Jalbuena and Carmen J. Jalbuena and Vicente Delfin in the "Estafa" case filed by the corporation (PRC) against them.... Simply stated, as early as April 6, 1999 respondent
already appeared for and in behalf of the Sps. Carmen and Dennis Jalbuena/Vicente Delfin while concurrently representing Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al. in Civil Case No. 97-
9865�. However, despite being fully aware that the interest of his client Lumot A. Jalandoni [holding an equivalent of Eighty-two (82%) percent of PRC's shares of stocks]
and the interest of PRC are one and the same, notwithstanding the fact that Lumot A. Jalandoni was still his client in Civil Case No. 97-9862, respondent opted to represent
opposing clients at the same time. The corporation's complaint for estafa (P3,183,5525.00) was filed against the Sps. Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena together with UCPB
bank manager Vicente Delfin. Succeeding events will show that respondent instead of desisting from further violation of his [lawyer's] oath regarding fidelity to his client, with
extreme arrogance, blatantly ignored our laws on Legal Ethics, by palpably and despicably defending the Sps. Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena in all the cases filed against
them by PRC through its duly authorized representatives, before the Public Prosecutors Office, Bacolod City (PP vs. Sps. Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena for False
Testimony/Perjury, viol. of Art. 183 RPC under BC I.S. No. 2000-2304; viol. of Art. 363, 364, 181 and 183 RPC under BC I.S. 2000-2343, PP vs. Carmen J. Jalbuena for viol.
of Art. 315 ... under BC I.S. 2000-2125 and various other related criminal cases against the Sps. Dennis and Carmen Jalbuena)....

AS SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

xxx xxx xxx

-I-

xxx xxx xxx

There is no dispute that respondent was able to acquire vast resources of confidential and delicate information on the facts and circumstances of [Civil Case No. 97-9865]
when Lumot A. Jalandoni was his client ... which knowledge and information was acquired by virtue of lawyer-client relationship between respondent and his clients. Using
the said classified information which should have been closely guarded ... respondent did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously conspired and confabulated with
the Sps. Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena in concocting the despicable and fabricated charges against his former clients denominated as PP vs. Lumot A. Jalandoni, Pamela
J. Yulo, Cristina J. Lim and Leica J. Lim for viol. of Art. 172 of Revised Penal Code due to a board resolution executed by the corporation which the Sps. Jalbuena, with the
assistance of herein respondent, claimed to have been made without an actual board meeting due to an alleged lack of quorum, [among other things]. Were it not for said
fiduciary relation between client and lawyer, respondent will not be in a position to furnish his conspirator spouses with confidential information on Lumot A. Jalandoni/PRC,
operator of Alhambra Hotel.

- II -

Adding insult to injury, respondent opted to deliberately withhold the entire case file including the marked exhibits of the Cabiles case for more than three (3) months after his
untimely unilateral withdrawal therefrom, despite repeated demands from [his] client. On July 26, 1999, capitalizing on his knowledge of the indispensability of said
documents particularly the marked exhibits, which deadline to file the formal offer of exhibits was continually impressed upon the new counsel by the court, respondent
suddenly interposed an amount of five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos as consideration prior to or simultaneous to the turnover of said documents.... [On] July 29, 1999, left with
no other alternative owing to the urgency of the situation, PRC issued Check No. 2077686 for P5,000.00 in payment thereof. This was duly received by respondent's office on
the same date.... Such dilatory tactics employed by respondent immensely weakened the case of Lumot A. Jalandoni eventually resulting to (sic) an adverse decision against
[her]....

Further demonstrating before this Honorable Court the notoriety of respondent in representing conflicting interest which extended even beyond the family controversy was his
improper appearance in court in Civil Case No. 99-10660, RE: Amy Albert Que vs. Penta Resorts Corp., this time favoring the party opponent of defendant who is even
outside the family circle. During the pre-trial hearing conducted on May 5, 1999, while still [holding] exclusive possession of the entire case file of his client in Civil Case No.
97-9865, respondent brazenly positioned himself beside Atty. Adoniram P. Pamplona, counsel of plaintiff [in] a suit against his client Lumot A. Jalandoni/PRC, coaching said
counsel on matters [he was privy to] as counsel of said client. Facts mentioned by said counsel of the plaintiff starting from the last par. of page 25 until and including the
entire first par. of page 26 were the exact words dictated by respondent. The entire incident was personally witnessed by herein complainant [who was] only an arms length
away from them during the hearing.... However, the particular portion showing the said irregular acts of respondent was deliberately excluded by the court stenographer from
the transcript, despite her detailed recollection and affirmation thereof to herein complainant. This prompted the new counsel of Lumot A. Jalandoni/PRC to complain to the
court why Atty. Nicanor Villarosa was coaching Atty. Pamplona in such proceedings.... Said corrections were only effected after repeated demands to reflect the actual events
which [transpired] on said pre-trial....[5] (emphasis ours)
In an addendum to the July 4, 2000 complaint, Lim also pointed to certain acts of respondent which allegedly violated the Rules of Court _- perpetration of falsehood and
abuse of his influence as former public prosecutor. These supposedly affected the status of the cases that Lim filed against the clients of respondent.[6]

In a motion to dismiss dated October 30, 2000, respondent claimed that the complainant violated Circular No. 48-2000 because, in his verification, Lim stated:
3. That [he] prepared this instant complaint for disbarment against Atty. Nicanor V. Villarosa, read its contents, the same are all true and correct to [his] own personal
knowledge and belief.[7] (emphasis ours)
Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that:
SEC. 4. Verification. - Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit. (5a)

A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic
records.

A pleading required to be verified which contains verification based on "information and belief" or upon "knowledge, information and belief," or lacks a proper
verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading. (As amended, A.M. 00-2-10, May 1, 2000.) (emphasis ours)
While the Rules provide that an unsigned pleading produces no legal effect,[8] the court may, in its discretion, allow such deficiency to be remedied if it appears that the same
was due to mere inadvertence and not intended for delay.[9] We find that Lim was not shown to have deliberately filed the pleading in violation of the Rules.

In his comment dated December 1, 2000, respondent, reiterating his ground for the dismissal of the complaint, added:
[that] complainant Humberto C. Lim, Jr. has not only violated the Rule on Civil Procedure but he was/is NOT duly authorize[d] by the Penta Resorts Corp. (PRC) nor [by]
Lumot A. Jalandoni to file this complaint against [him]. Neither [was Lim] a proper party to file this complaint. This fact is an additional ground to have his case dismissed
because Humberto C. Lim Jr. exceeded whatever authority was granted to him as embodied in a resolution and the Special Power of Attorney allegedly granted to him by the
complainants.[10]
To bolster his assertion that the complaint against him was unfounded, respondent presented the following version in his defense:
FACTS OF THE CASE

xxx xxx xxx

That Mrs. Jalandoni has two sons-in-law, namely Dennis G. Jalbuena married to her daughter, Carmen J. Jalbuena, and Humberto C. Lim Jr., the herein complainant married
to her daughter, Cristina J. Lim.
That Mrs. Lumot Jalandoni organized a corporation namely the Penta Resorts Corporation (PRC) where she owned almost ninety seven percent (97%). In other words, in
reality, Penta Resorts Corporation is a single proprietorship belonging to Mrs. Jalandoni. That the only property of the corporation is as above-stated, the Alhambra Hotel,
constructed solely through the effort of the spouses Jalbuena on that parcel of land now claimed by the Cabiles family.

That sometime on the year 1997 the case above-cited (Civil Case No. 97-9865) was filed before the court against the sisters.

That [he], being RETAINED counsel of the spouses Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena was RECOMMENDED by the spouses to the sisters to answer the complaint filed
against them.

II.

That as counsel to the sisters, [he] filed a Motion for Extension Of Time To File Answer ... and ultimately, [he] filed an Answer With Counter-Claim And Prayer For Issuance Of
Writ Of Preliminary Injunction....

That reading the Answer ... it is clear that the defense of the sisters totally rest on public documents (the various titles issued to the land in question because of the series [of
changes] in ownership) and the sisters' and their parents' actual occupation and possession thereof. xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Lim['s] accusation against [him] in the light of the above-facts is the best evidence of Humberto C. Lim, Jr.'s penchant for exaggeration and distortion of the truth. Since
the defense of the sisters to retain ownership of the land in question is based on PUBLIC documents, what delicate and confidential matters involving personal circumstances
of the sisters allegedly entrusted to [him], is Mr. Humberto C. Lim, Jr. talking about in paragraphs I and II of his Complaint? What [privity] to all transactions and affairs of the
corporation/hotel is he referring to? Whatever transactions the corporation may have been involved in or [may be getting involved into], is totally immaterial and irrelevant to
the defense of the sisters.

There was nothing personal [about the] circumstances of the sisters nor transactions of the corporation [which were] discussed. The documents being offered as evidence,
[he] reiterate[s] for emphasis, are public; the presumption is that the whole world knows about them....

That [he] [also] vehemently den[ies] another distorted allegation of Mr. Lim that [he] represented Mrs. Jalandoni [in] the entire proceedings of [the] case. [Lim] himself
attested that [he] [filed] [his] Motion to Withdraw As Counsel, dated April 26, 1999 ... , before the trial court, sometime on April 27, 1999. How then could [he] have
represented Mrs. Jalandoni for [the] entire proceedings of the case?

Further, Mr. Lim intentionally hid from this Honorable Court the important fact that [his] Motion to Withdraw was APPROVED by the trial court because of the possibility of a
conflict of interest. xxx xxx xxx. [11]
Respondent discredited Lim's claim that he deliberately withheld the records of the cited civil case. He insisted that it took him just a few days, not three months, to turn over
the records of the case to Lim.[12] While he admitted an oversight in addressing the notice of the motion to withdraw as counsel to Mrs. Totti Anlap Gargoles instead of Mrs.
Jalandoni at Hotel Alhambra, he maintained that it was the height of hypocrisy to allege that Mrs. Jalandoni was not aware of his motion to withdraw[13] since Mrs. Gargoles is
Mrs. Jalandoni's sister and Hotel Alhambra is owned by PRC which, in turn, actually belongs to Mrs. Jalandoni. Respondent also argued that no prejudice was suffered by
Mrs. Jalandoni because she was already represented by Atty. Lorenzo S. Alminaza from the first hearing date.[14] In fact, respondent contended, it was he who was not
notified of the substitution of counsels.[15]

As to the bill of P 5,000, respondent stated:

That Mr. Lim begrudge[s] [him] for billing Mrs. Jalandoni Five Thousand (Php5,000.00) Pesos. Mr. Humberto C. Lim Jr. conveniently forgets that the net worth of the property
together with its improvements, under litigation in that Cabiles, et al. vs. Gargoles et al. case, is a minimum of THIRTY MILLION (Php30,000,000.00) PESOS then, and more
so now. [He] cannot find any law which prohibits a counsel from billing a client for services in proportion to the services he rendered.[16]
In view of these developments, respondent was adamant that:
the only real question to be answered in this complaint is why Mr. Lim so consistently [determined] to immerse the Jalandoni family [in] a series of criminal and civil suits and
to block all attempts to reconcile the family by prolonging litigations, complaints and filing of new ones in spite of the RESOLUTION of the corporation and the UNDERTAKING
of the members....[17]
On June 18, 2001, the Court resolved to refer the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation. Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro made the following
report and recommendation:
xxx xxx xxx

After going over the [pieces of evidence] submitted by the parties[,] the undersigned noted that from the onset, PRC had a case wherein respondent was its counsel. Later
on, complainant had a case against spouses Jalbuena where the parties were related to each other and the latter spouses were represented by the respondent as their
retained counsel; after respondent had allegedly withdrawn as counsel for the complainant in Civil Case No. 97-9865.

Being the husband of one of the complainants which respondent himself averred in his answer, it is incumbent upon Humberto Lim Jr. to represent his wife as one of the
representatives of PRC and Alhambra Hotel in the administrative complaint to protect not only her interest but that of the [family's].

From the facts obtaining, it is evident that complainant had a lawyer-client relationship with the respondent before the latter [was] retained as counsel by the Spouses
Jalbuena when the latter were sued by complainant's representative.

We cannot disregard the fact that on this situation for some reason or another there existed some confidentiality and trust between complainants and respondent to ensure the
successful defense of their cases.

Respondent for having appeared as counsel for the Spouses Jalbuena when charged by respondent's former client Jalandoni of PRC and Alhambra Hotel, represented
conflicting interests ... in violation of the Canon of Professional Responsibility.

As such therefore, the Undersigned has no alternative but to respectfully recommend the suspension of the respondent from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months
from receipt hereof.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

Pasig City, June 20, 2002.[18]

The IBP Board of Governors (Board), however, reversed the recommendation of the investigating commissioner and resolved to dismiss the case on August 3, 2002.[19] Lumot
A. Jalandoni filed a motion for reconsideration (MR) on October 18, 2002 but the Board denied the MR since it no longer had jurisdiction to consider and resolve a matter
already endorsed to this Court.[20]

Before delving into the core issues of this case, we need to address some preliminary matters.

Respondent argues that the alleged resolution of PRC and the special power of attorney given by Lumot A. Jalandoni to Humberto did not contemplate the filing of an
administrative complaint.[21] Citing the Rules of Court, respondent said that:
[s]uch complaints are personal in nature and therefore, the filing of the same, cannot be delegated by the alleged aggrieved party to any third person unless expressly
authorized by law.
We must note, however, the following:
SECTION 1. How instituted. - Proceedings for disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu propio, or by the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person. The complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits or
persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents a may substantiate said facts.

The IBP Board of Governors may, motu propio or upon referral by the Supreme Court or by a Chapter Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and
prosecute proper charges against any erring attorneys....[22] (emphasis ours)
Complaints against members of the Bar are pursued to preserve the integrity of the legal profession, not for private vendetta. Thus, whoever has such personal knowledge of
facts constituting a cause of action against erring lawyers may file a verified complaint with the Court or the IBP. [23] Corollary to the public interest in these proceedings is the
following rule:
SEC. 11. Defects. - No defect in a complaint, notice, answer, or in the proceeding or the Investigator's Report shall be considered as substantial unless the Board
of Governors, upon considering the whole record, finds that such defect has resulted or may result in a miscarriage of justice, in which event the Board shall take such
remedial action as the circumstances may warrant, including invalidation of the entire proceedings.[24] (emphasis ours)
Respondent failed to substantiate his allegation that Lim's complaint was defective in form and substance, and that entertaining it would result in a miscarriage of justice. For
the same reason, we will no longer put in issue the filing at the onset of a motion to dismiss by respondent instead of an answer or comment.[25]

The core issues before us now are:

8. whether there existed a conflict of interest in the cases represented and handled by respondent, and

9. whether respondent properly withdrew his services as counsel of record in Civil Case No. 97-9865.
CONFLICT OF INTEREST

Petitioners alleged that as an offshoot of representing conflicting interests, breach of attorney-client confidentiality and deliberate withholding of records were committed by
respondent. To effectively unravel the alleged conflict of interest, we must look into the cases involved.

In Civil Case No. 97-9865, respondent represented Lumot A. Jalandoni and Totti Anlap Gargoles. This was a case for the recovery of possession of property involving Hotel
Alhambra, a hotel owned by PRC.

In BC I.S. No. 99-2192, Lim v. Vicente Delfin, Spouses Dennis and Carmen Jalbuena, respondent was counsel for Delfin and the spouses Jalbuena. In this case, plaintiff
Cristina Lim sued the spouses Jalbuena and Delfin on the basis of two checks issued by PRC for the construction of Hotel Alhambra.[26] The corporate records allegedly
reflected that the contractor, AAQ Sales and Construction (AAQSC), was already paid in full yet Amy Albert Que of AAQSC still filed a collection case against PRC for an
unpaid balance.[27] In her complaint-affidavit, Cristina averred:
11. That it was respondent Carmen J. Jalbuena, who took advantage of [her] signatures in blank in DBP Check Nos. 0865590 and 0865591, and who filled up the spaces of
the payee, date and amount without the knowledge and consent of any officer of the corporation and [herself], after which she caused the delivery of the same checks to her
husband Dennis Jalbuena, who encashed without [their] knowledge and consent, and received the proceeds of the same checks... (as evidenced by his signature in receipt of
payment on the dorsal side of the said checks) with the indispensable participation and cooperation of respondent Vicente B. Delfin, the Asst. Vice President and Branch
Head of UCPB....[28]
Notably, in his comment, respondent stated:
There was a possibility of conflict of interest because by this time, or one month before [he] filed [his] Motion to Withdraw, Mrs. Jalandoni /Penta Resorts Corporation, Mr. Lim,
through his wife, Cristina J. Lim, by another counsel, Atty. Lorenzo S. Alminaza, filed a criminal complaint against the spouses Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena on March
26, 1999... under BC-I.S. Case No. 99-2192.[29]
Similarly, in BC I.S. Nos. 00-1370, 2000-2304, 2000-2343, 00-2125, 00-2230, 00-880, respondent positioned himself against PRC's interests.

And, in Civil Case No. 99-10660, a collection case against PRC, Atty. Alminaza of PRC was alarmed by the appearance of respondent at the table in court for AAQSC's
counsel.[30]

Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) highlights the need for candor, fairness and loyalty in all the dealings of lawyers with their clients. Rule 15.03 of the
CPR aptly provides:
Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
It is only upon strict compliance with the condition of full disclosure of facts that a lawyer may appear against his client; otherwise, his representation of conflicting interests is
reprehensible.[31] Conflict of interest may be determined in this manner:
There is representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to do anything which will injuriously affect his first client
in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation, to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their
connection.[32] (emphasis ours)
The rule on conflict of interests covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or
will be used.[33]
Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and
loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance thereof, and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against
his first client any knowledge acquire in the previous employment. The first part of the rule refers to cases in which the opposing parties are present clients either in the same
action or in a totally unrelated case; the second part pertains to those in which the adverse party against whom the attorney appears is his former client in a matter which
is related, directly or indirectly, to the present controversy.[34] (emphasis ours)
The rule prohibits a lawyer from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or
in totally unrelated cases. The cases here directly or indirectly involved the parties' connection to PRC, even if neither PRC nor Lumot A. Jalandoni was specifically named as
party-litigant in some of the cases mentioned.
An attorney owes to his client undivided allegiance. After being retained and receiving the confidences of the client, he cannot, without the free and intelligent consent of his
client, act both for his client and for one whose interest is adverse to, or conflicting with that of his client in the same general matter.... The prohibition stands even if the
adverse interest is very slight; neither is it material that the intention and motive of the attorney may have been honest. [35] (emphasis ours)
The representation by a lawyer of conflicting interests, in the absence of the written consent of all parties concerned after a full disclosure of the facts, constitutes professional
misconduct which subjects the lawyer to disciplinary action.[36]

Even respondent's alleged effort to settle the existing controversy among the family members[37] was improper because the written consent of all concerned was still
required.[38] A lawyer who acts as such in settling a dispute cannot represent any of the parties to it.[39]

WITHDRAWAL AS COUNSEL IN CIVIL CASE NO. 97-9865

The next bone of contention was the propriety of respondent's withdrawal as counsel for Lumot A. Jalandoni in Civil Case No. 97-9865 to fulfill an alleged retainership
agreement with the spouses Jalbuena in a suit by PRC, through Cristina Lim, against the Jalbuenas and Delfin (BC I.S. No. 99-2192). In his December 1, 2000 comment,
respondent stated that it was he who was not notified of the hiring of Atty. Alminaza as the new counsel in that case and that he withdrew from the case with the knowledge of
Lumot A. Jalandoni and with leave of court.

The rule on termination of attorney-client relations may be summarized as follows:

The relation of attorney and client may be terminated by the client, by the lawyer or by the court, or by reason of circumstances beyond the control of the client or the
lawyer. The termination of the attorney-client relationship entails certain duties on the part of the client and his lawyer. [40]
Accordingly, it has been held that the right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is considerably restricted. Canon 22 of the CPR
reads:
Canon 22 - A lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice appropriate in the circumstances.
An attorney may only retire from a case either by written consent of his client or by permission of the court after due notice and hearing, in which event the attorney should see
to it that the name of the new lawyer is recorded in the case.[41] A lawyer who desires to retire from an action without the written consent of his client must file a petition for
withdrawal in court.[42] He must serve a copy of his petition upon his client and the adverse party at least three days before the date set for hearing, otherwise the court may
treat the application as a "mere scrap of paper."[43] Respondent made no such move. He admitted that he withdrew as counsel on April 26, 1999, which withdrawal was
supposedly approved by the court on April 28, 1999. The conformity of Mrs. Jalandoni was only presumed by Atty. Villarosa because of the appearance of Atty. Alminaza in
court, supposedly in his place.
[A client] may discharge his attorney at any time with or without cause and thereafter employ another lawyer who may then enter his appearance. Thus, it has been held that
a client is free to change his counsel in a pending case and thereafter retain another lawyer to represent him. That manner of changing a lawyer does not need the consent of
the lawyer to be dismissed. Nor does it require approval of the court.[44]
The appearance of Atty. Alminaza in fact was not even to substitute for respondent but to act as additional counsel. [45] Mrs. Jalandoni's conformity to having an additional
lawyer did not necessarily mean conformity to respondent's desire to withdraw as counsel. Respondent's speculations on the professional relationship of Atty. Alminaza and
Mrs. Jalandoni find no support in the records of this case.

Respondent should not have presumed that his motion to withdraw as counsel [46] would be granted by the court. Yet, he stopped appearing as Mrs. Jalandoni's counsel
beginning April 28, 1999, the first hearing date. No order from the court was shown to have actually granted his motion for withdrawal. Only an order dated June 4, 1999 had
a semblance of granting his motion:
When this case was called for hearing Atty. Lorenzo Alminaza appeared for the defendants considering that Atty. Nicanor Villarosa has already withdrawn his
appearance in this case which the Court considered it to be approved as it bears the conformity of the defendants.[47] (emphasis ours)
That Mrs. Jalandoni continued with Atty. Alminaza's professional engagement on her behalf despite respondent's withdrawal did not absolve the latter of the consequences of
his unprofessional conduct, specially in view of the conflicting interests already discussed. Respondent himself stated that his withdrawal from Civil Case No. 97-9865 was
due to the "possibility of a conflict of interest."[48]

Be that as it may, the records do not support the claim that respondent improperly collected P5,000 from petitioner. Undoubtedly, respondent provided professional services
to Lumot A. Jalandoni. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the documents belonging to Mrs. Jalandoni were deliberately withheld. The right of an attorney to retain
possession of a client's documents, money or other property which may have lawfully come into his possession in his professional capacity, until his lawful fees and
disbursements have been fully paid, is well-established.[49]

Finally, we express our utter dismay with Lim's apparent use of his wife's community tax certificate number in his complaint for disbarment against respondent.[50] This is not,
however, the forum to discuss this lapse.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Nicanor V. Villarosa is hereby found GUILTY of violating Canon 15 and Canon 22 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year, effective upon receipt of this decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this resolution be entered into the records of respondent and furnished to the Office of the Clerk of Court, the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and all courts in the Philippines, for their information and guidance.

A.C. NO. 6708 (CBD CASE NO. 01-874), August 25, 2005
FELICITAS S. QUIAMBAO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. NESTOR A. BAMBA, RESPONDENT.
 
 RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

We are aware of the hapless fact that there are not enough lawyers to serve an exploding population. This unfortunate state of affairs, however, will not seize this Court from
exercising its disciplinary power over lawyers culpable of serious indiscretions. The incidence of public force must be deployed to bear upon the community to eventually forge
a legal profession that provides quality, ethical, accessible, and cost-effective legal service to our people and whose members are willing and able to answer the call to public
service.

In this administrative case for disbarment, complainant Felicitas S. Quiambao charges respondent Atty. Nestor A. Bamba with violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for representing conflicting interests when the latter filed a case against her while he was at that time representing her in another case, and for committing other
acts of disloyalty and double-dealing.

From June 2000 to January 2001, the complainant was the president and managing director of Allied Investigation Bureau, Inc. (AIB), a family-owned corporation engaged in
providing security and investigation services. She avers that she procured the legal services of the respondent not only for the corporate affairs of AIB but also for her
personal case. Particularly, the respondent acted as her counsel of record in an ejectment case against Spouses Santiago and Florita Torroba filed by her on 29 December
2000 before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Parañaque City, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 11928. She paid attorney's fees for respondent's legal services in
that case.[1] About six months after she resigned as AIB president, or on 14 June 2001, the respondent filed on behalf of AIB a complaint for replevin and damages against her
before the MeTC of Quezon City for the purpose of recovering from her the car of AIB assigned to her as a service vehicle. This he did without withdrawing as counsel of
record in the ejectment case, which was then still pending.[2]

Apart from the foregoing litigation matter, the complainant, in her Position Paper, charges the respondent with acts of disloyalty and double-dealing. She avers that the
respondent proposed to her that she organize her own security agency and that he would assist her in its organization, causing her to resign as president of AIB. The
respondent indeed assisted her in December 2000 in the formation of another security agency, Quiambao Risk Management Specialists, Inc., (QRMSI), which was later
registered under complainant's name, with the respondent as a "silent partner" represented by his associate Atty. Gerardo P. Hernandez. The respondent was paid attorney's
fees for his legal services in organizing and incorporating QRMSI. He also planned to "steal" or "pirate" some of the more important clients of AIB. While serving as legal
counsel for AIB and a "silent partner" of QRMSI, he convinced complainant's brother Leodegario Quiambao to organize another security agency, San Esteban Security
Services, Inc. (SESSI) where he (the respondent) served as its incorporator, director, and president. The respondent and Leodegario then illegally diverted the funds of AIB to
fund the incorporation of SESSI, and likewise planned to eventually close down the operations of AIB and transfer the business to SESSI.[3]

For his part, the respondent admits that he represented the complainant in the aforementioned ejectment case and later represented AIB in the replevin case against her. He,
however, denies that he was the "personal lawyer" of the complainant, and avers that he was made to believe that it was part of his function as counsel for AIB to handle even
the "personal cases" of its officers. Even assuming that the complainant confided to him privileged information about her legal interests, the ejectment case and the replevin
case are unrelated cases involving different issues and parties and, therefore, the privileged information which might have been gathered from one case would have no use in
the other. At any rate, it was the complainant herself who insisted that he stay as her counsel despite the perceived differences among her, her brother, and AIB over the
motor vehicle subject of the replevin case. The complainant even asked him to assist her in her monetary claims against AIB.[4]

The respondent also denies the charge raised by the complainant in her position paper that he agreed to be a "silent partner" of QRMSI through his nominee, Atty. Gerardo P.
Hernandez, who was his former law partner. He declined complainant's offer to assume that role and suggested Atty. Hernandez in his place; thus, 375 shares of stock were
registered in Atty. Hernandez's name as consideration of his (Atty. Hernandez's) legal services as corporate secretary and legal counsel of QRMSI. The respondent also
denies that he convinced complainant's brother Leodegario to organize another security agency and that the funds of AIB were unlawfully diverted to SESSI. It was to
complement the business of AIB, which was then in danger of collapse, that SESSI was established. Leodegario's wife and her son have the effective control over SESSI.
Respondent's subscribed shareholdings in SESSI comprise only 800 shares out of 12,500 subscribed shares. He serves AIB and SESSI in different capacities: as legal
counsel of the former and as president of the latter.[5]

In his Report and Recommendation[6] dated 31 August 2004, the investigating commissioner of the IBP found the respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests based
on the following undisputed facts: first, the respondent was still complainant's counsel of record in the ejectment case when he filed, as legal counsel of AIB, the replevin case
against her; and second, the respondent was still the legal counsel of AIB when he advised the complainant on the incorporation of another security agency, QRMSI, and
recommended his former law partner, Atty. Gerardo Hernandez, to be its corporate secretary and legal counsel and also when he conferred with Leodegario to organize
another security agency, SESSI, where the respondent became an incorporator, stockholder, and president. Thus, the investigating commissioner recommended that the
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the investigating commissioner's report and recommendation, but reduced the penalty from one year to a stern
reprimand.[7]

The issue in this case is whether the respondent is guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting interests in contravention of the basic tenets of the legal profession.

Rule 15.03, Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: "A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts." This prohibition is founded on principles of public policy and good taste. [8] In the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all
the facts connected with the client's case, including the weak and strong points of the case. The nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the
highest degree.[9] It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can
litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.[10]

In broad terms, lawyers are deemed to represent conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is their duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires them
to oppose.[11] Developments in jurisprudence have particularized various tests to determine whether a lawyer's conduct lies within this proscription. One test is whether a
lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other client.[12] Thus, if a lawyer's argument for one
client has to be opposed by that same lawyer in arguing for the other client, there is a violation of the rule.

Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to
the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty.[13] Still another test is whether the lawyer would be called upon in the new
relation to use against a former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment.[14]

The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation where the opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated action.
It is of no moment that the lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be no
occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated. It is enough that the opposing parties
in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyer's respective retainers with each of them would affect the
performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients.[15]

In this case, it is undisputed that at the time the respondent filed the replevin case on behalf of AIB he was still the counsel of record of the complainant in the pending
ejectment case. We do not sustain respondent's theory that since the ejectment case and the replevin case are unrelated cases fraught with different issues, parties, and
subject matters, the prohibition is inapplicable. His representation of opposing clients in both cases, though unrelated, obviously constitutes conflict of interest or, at the least,
invites suspicion of double-dealing. While the respondent may assert that the complainant expressly consented to his continued representation in the ejectment case, the
respondent failed to show that he fully disclosed the facts to both his clients and he failed to present any written consent of the complainant and AIB as required under Rule
15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Neither can we accept respondent's plea that he was duty-bound to handle all the cases referred to him by AIB, including the personal cases of its officers which had no
connection to its corporate affairs. That the representation of conflicting interest is in good faith and with honest intention on the part of the lawyer does not make the
prohibition inoperative.[16] Moreover, lawyers are not obliged to act either as an adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to become their client. They have the right
to decline such employment, subject, however, to Canon 14 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[17] Although there are instances where lawyers cannot decline
representation,[18] they cannot be made to labor under conflict of interest between a present client and a prospective one.[19]

Additionally, in his position paper, the respondent alleges that when the complainant invited the respondent to join QRMSI, he "vehemently refused to join them due to his
perception of conflicting interest as he was then (and still is at present) the Legal Counsel" of AIB, which is also a security agency.[20] To bolster his allegation, he invoked
the affidavits of complainant's witnesses which contained statements of his apprehension of conflict of interest should he join QRMSI.[21]

Surprisingly, despite his apprehension or awareness of a possible conflict of interest should he join QRMSI, the respondent later allowed himself to become an incorporator,
stockholder, and president of SESSI, which is also a security agency. He justified his act by claiming that that while both AIB and SESSI are engaged in security agency
business, he is serving in different capacities. As the in-house legal counsel of AIB, he "serves its legal interest the parameter of which evolves around legal matters" such as
protecting the legal rights and interest of the corporation; conducting an investigation or a hearing on violations of company rules and regulations of their office employees and
security guards; sending demand letters in collection cases; and representing the corporation in any litigation for or against it. And as president of SESSI, he serves the
operational aspects of the business such as "how does it operate[ ], how much do they price their services, what kind or how do they train[ ] their security guards, how they
solicit clients." Thus, conflict of interest is far-fetched. Moreover, the respondent argues that the complainant, not being a stockholder of AIB and SESSI, has no right to
question his alleged conflict of interest in serving the two security agencies.[22]

While the complainant lacks personality to question the alleged conflict of interests on the part of the respondent in serving both security agencies, we cannot just turn a blind
eye to respondent's act. It must be noted that the proscription against representation of conflicting interests finds application where the conflicting interests arise with respect
to the same general matter however slight the adverse interest may be. It applies even if the conflict pertains to the lawyer's private activity or in the performance of a function
in a non-professional capacity.[23] In the process of determining whether there is a conflict of interest, an important criterion is probability, not certainty, of conflict.

Since the respondent has financial or pecuniary interest in SESSI, which is engaged in a business competing with his client's, and, more importantly, he occupies the highest
position in SESSI, one cannot help entertaining a doubt on his loyalty to his client AIB. This kind of situation passes the second test of conflict of interest, which is whether the
acceptance of a new relationship would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or
double-dealing in the performance of that duty. The close relationship of the majority stockholders of both companies does not negate the conflict of interest. Neither does his
protestation that his shareholding in SESSI is "a mere pebble among the sands."

In view of all of the foregoing, we find the respondent guilty of serious misconduct for representing conflicting interests.

Furthermore, it must be noted that Republic Act No. 5487, otherwise known as the Private Security Agency Law, prohibits a person from organizing or having an interest in
more than one security agency. From respondent's position paper, it can be culled that Leodegario Quiambao is the president and managing director of AIB, holding 60% of
the outstanding shares; while his four other siblings who are permanent residents in the United States own the remaining 40%.[24] This prohibition notwithstanding, the
respondent organized SESSI, with Leodegario's wife and son as majority stockholders holding about 70% of the outstanding shares and with him (the respondent), as well as
the rest of the stockholders, holding minimal shares.[25] In doing so, the respondent virtually allowed Leodegario and the latter's wife to violate or circumvent the law by having
an interest in more than one security agency. It must be noted that in the affidavit[26] of Leodegario's wife, she mentioned of their conjugal property. In the absence of evidence
to the contrary, the property relation of Leodegario and his wife can be presumed to be that of conjugal partnership of gains; hence, the majority shares in AIB and SESSI are
the conjugal property of Leodegario and his wife, thereby placing themselves in possession of an interest in more than one security agency in contravention of R.A. No. 5487.
Thus, in organizing SESSI, the respondent violated Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates lawyers to promote respect for the law
and refrain from counseling or abetting activities aimed at defiance of the law.

As to the recommendation that the penalty be reduced from a suspension of one year to a stern warning, we find the same to be without basis. We are disturbed by the
reduction made by the IBP Board of Governors of the penalty recommended by the investigating commissioner without clearly and distinctly stating the facts and reasons on
which that reduction is based.

Section 12(a), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court reads in part as follows:
SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. -

(a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report.
The decision of the Board upon such review shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is based.
We may consider the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors as a memorandum decision adopting by reference the report of the investigating commissioner. However, we
look with disfavor the change in the recommended penalty without any explanation therefor. Again, we remind the IBP Board of Governors of the importance of the
requirement to announce in plain terms its legal reasoning, since the requirement that its decision in disciplinary proceedings must state the facts and the reasons on which its
decision is based is akin to what is required of the decisions of courts of record. [27] The reasons for handing down a penalty occupy no lesser station than any other portion of
the ratio.

In similar cases where the respondent was found guilty of representing conflicting interests a penalty ranging from one to three years' suspension was imposed. [28] In this
case, we find that a suspension from the practice of law for one year is warranted.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nestor A. Bamba is hereby held GUILTY of violation of Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 and Rule 1.02 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR effective from receipt of this Resolution, with a warning that a similar infraction in the
future shall be dealt with more severely.
 A.C. NO. 6836, January 23, 2006
LETICIA GONZALES, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. MARCELINO CABUCANA, RESPONDENT. 
 
 R E S O L U T I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before this Court is a complaint filed by Leticia Gonzales (Gonzales) praying that Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, (respondent) be disbarred for representing conflicting interests.

On January 8, 2004, Gonzales filed a petition before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) alleging that: she was the complainant in a case for sum of money and
damages filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Santiago City, docketed as Civil Case No. 1-567 where she was represented by the law firm CABUCANA,
CABUCANA, DE GUZMAN AND CABUCANA LAW OFFICE, with Atty. Edmar Cabucana handling the case and herein respondent as an associate/partner; on February 26,
2001, a decision was rendered in the civil case ordering the losing party to pay Gonzales the amount of P17,310.00 with interest and P6,000.00 as attorney's fees; Sheriff
Romeo Gatcheco, failed to fully implement the writ of execution issued in connection with the judgment which prompted Gonzales to file a complaint against the said sheriff
with this Court; in September 2003, Sheriff Gatcheco and his wife went to the house of Gonzales; they harassed Gonzales and asked her to execute an affidavit of desistance
regarding her complaint before this Court; Gonzales thereafter filed against the Gatchecos criminal cases for trespass, grave threats, grave oral defamation, simple coercion
and unjust vexation; notwithstanding the pendency of Civil Case No. 1-567, where respondent's law firm was still representing Gonzales, herein respondent represented the
Gatchecos in the cases filed by Gonzales against the said spouses; respondent should be disbarred from the practice of law since respondent's acceptance of the cases of
the Gatchecos violates the lawyer-client relationship between complainant and respondent's law firm and renders respondent liable under the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR) particularly Rules 10.01, [1] 13.01, [2] 15.02, [3] 15.03, [4] 21.01 [5] and 21.02. [6]
[7]
On January 9, 2004, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline ordered Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr. to submit his Answer to the complaint.

In his Answer, respondent averred: He never appeared and represented complainant in Civil Case No. 1-567 since it was his brother, Atty. Edmar Cabucana who appeared
and represented Gonzales in said case. He admitted that he is representing Sheriff Gatcheco and his wife in the cases filed against them but claimed that his appearance is
pro bono and that the spouses pleaded with him as no other counsel was willing to take their case. He entered his appearance in good faith and opted to represent the
spouses rather than leave them defenseless. When the Gatchecos asked for his assistance, the spouses said that the cases filed against them by Gonzales were merely
instigated by a high ranking official who wanted to get even with them for their refusal to testify in favor of the said official in another case. At first, respondent declined to serve
as counsel of the spouses as he too did not want to incur the ire of the high-ranking official, but after realizing that he would be abdicating a sworn duty to delay no man for
money or malice, respondent entered his appearance as defense counsel of the spouses free of any charge. Not long after, the present complaint was crafted against
respondent which shows that respondent is now the subject of a "demolition job." The civil case filed by Gonzales where respondent's brother served as counsel is different
and distinct from the criminal cases filed by complainant against the Gatcheco spouses, thus, he did not violate any canon on legal ethics. [8]

Gonzales filed a Reply contending that the civil case handled by respondent's brother is closely connected with the cases of the Gatchecos which the respondent is handling;
that the claim of respondent that he is handling the cases of the spouses pro bono is not true since he has his own agenda in offering his services to the spouses; and that the
allegation that she is filing the cases against the spouses because she is being used by a powerful person is not true since she filed the said cases out of her own free will. [9]

The Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP sent to the parties a Notice of Mandatory Conference dated March 1, 2004. [10] On the scheduled conference, only a
representative of complainant appeared. [11] Commissioner Demaree Raval of the IBP-CBD then directed both parties to file their respective verified position papers. [12]

Complainant filed a Memorandum reiterating her earlier assertions and added that respondent prepared and notarized counter-affidavits of the Gatcheco spouses; that the
high-ranking official referred to by respondent is Judge Ruben Plata and the accusations of respondent against the said judge is an attack against a brother in the profession
which is a violation of the CPR; and that respondent continues to use the name of De Guzman in their law firm despite the fact that said partner has already been appointed
as Assistant Prosecutor of Santiago City, again in violation of the CPR. [13]

Respondent filed his Position Paper restating his allegations in his Answer. [14]

On August 23, 2004, Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes issued an Order notifying both parties to appear before his office on October 28, 2004 for a clarificatory question
regarding said case. [15] On the said date, only respondent appeared [16] presenting a sworn affidavit executed by Gonzales withdrawing her complaint against respondent. It
reads:

SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY
TUNGKOL SA PAG-UURONG NG DEMANDA
Ako, si LETICIA GONZALES, nasa tamang edad, Pilipino, may asawa, at nakatira sa Barangay Dubinan East, Santiago City, makaraang manumpa ayon sa batas ay
nagsasabing:

Ako ang nagdedemanda o petitioner sa CBD Case No. 04-1186 na may pamagat na "Leticia Gonzales vs. Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr." na kasalukuyang nahaharap sa
Commission on Bar Discipline ng Integrated Bar of the Philippines

Ang pagkakahain ng naturang demanda ay nag-ugat sa di-pagkakaintindihan na namamagitan sa akin at nina Mr. and Mrs. Romeo and Anita Gatcheco.

Dahil sa aking galit sa naturang mag-asawa, idinawit ko si Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr. sa sigalot na namamagitan sa akin at sa mag-asawang Gatcheco, gayong
nalalaman ko na si Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana ay walang nalalaman sa naturang di pagkakaintindihan.

Makaraang pag-isipang mabuti ang paghain ko ng demanda kontra kay Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr., nakumbinsi ako na ang pagdedemanda ko kay Atty. Marcelino C.
Cabucana, Jr. ay isang malaking pagkakamali dahil siya ay walang kinalalaman (sic) sa di pagkakaintindihan naming(sic) ng mag-asawang Gatcheco.

Si Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr. ay di ko rin naging abogado sa Civil Case No. 1-567 (MTCC Br. I Santiago City) na inihain ko kontra kay Eduardo Mangano.

Nais kong ituwid ang lahat kung kaya't aking iniuurong ang naturang kasong inihain ko kontra kay Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr. at dahil dito ay hindi na ako interesado
pang ituloy and naturang kaso, at aking hinihiling sa kinauukulan na dismisin na ang naturang kaso.

Ginawa ko ang sinumpaang salaysay na ito upang patotohanan sa lahat ng nakasaad dito. [17]
Commissioner Reyes issued an Order dated October 28, 2004 requiring Gonzales to appear before him on November 25, 2004, to affirm her statements and to be subject to
clarificatory questioning. [18] However, none of the parties appeared. [19] On February 17, 2005, only respondent was present. Commissioner Reyes then considered the case
as submitted for resolution. [20]

On February 24, 2005, Commissioner Reyes submitted his Report and Recommendation, portions of which are quoted hereunder:
The Undersigned Commissioner believes that the respondent made a mistake in the acceptance of the administrative case of Romeo Gatcheco, however, the Commission
(sic) believes that there was no malice and bad faith in the said acceptance and this can be shown by the move of the complainant to unilaterally withdraw the case which she
filed against Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr. However, Atty. Cabucana is reminded to be more careful in the acceptance of cases as conflict of interests might arise.

It is respectfully recommended that Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr. (be) sternly warned and reprimanded and...advised to be more circumspect and careful in accepting
cases which might result in conflict of interests. [21]
On June 25, 2005, a Resolution was passed by the Board of Governors of the IBP, to wit:
RESOLUTION NO. XVI-2005-153
CBD CASE NO. 03-1186
Leticia Gonzales vs.
Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr.
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering that respondent made (a) mistake in the acceptance of the administrative case of Romeo Gatcheco, Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr. is hereby WARNED and
REPRIMANDED and advised to be more circumspect and careful in accepting cases which might result in conflict of interests. [22]
Before going to the merits, let it be clarified that contrary to the report of Commissioner Reyes, respondent did not only represent the Gatcheco spouses in the administrative
case filed by Gonzales against them. As respondent himself narrated in his Position Paper, he likewise acted as their counsel in the criminal cases filed by Gonzales against
them. [23]

With that settled, we find respondent guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
Rule 15.03 – A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
It is well-settled that a lawyer is barred from representing conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. [24] Such
prohibition is founded on principles of public policy and good taste as the nature of the lawyer-client relations is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. [25] Lawyers
are expected not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to
entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice. [26]

One of the tests of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty
to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty. [27]

As we expounded in the recent case of Quiambao vs. Bamba, [28]

The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation where the opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated action.
It is of no moment that the lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be no
occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated. It is enough that the opposing parties
in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyer's respective retainers with each of them would affect the
performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients. [29]
The claim of respondent that there is no conflict of interests in this case, as the civil case handled by their law firm where Gonzales is the complainant and the criminal cases
filed by Gonzales against the Gatcheco spouses are not related, has no merit. The representation of opposing clients in said cases, though unrelated, constitutes conflict of
interests or, at the very least, invites suspicion of double-dealing which this Court cannot allow. [30]

Respondent further argued that it was his brother who represented Gonzales in the civil case and not him, thus, there could be no conflict of interests. We do not agree. As
respondent admitted, it was their law firm which represented Gonzales in the civil case. Such being the case, the rule against representing conflicting interests applies.

As we explained in the case of Hilado vs. David: [31]

"[W]e" can not sanction his taking up the cause of the adversary of the party who had sought and obtained legal advice from his firm; this, not necessarily to prevent any
injustice to the plaintiff but to keep above reproach the honor and integrity of the courts and of the bar. Without condemning the respondent's conduct as dishonest, corrupt, or
fraudulent, we do believe that upon the admitted facts it is highly inexpedient. It had the tendency to bring the profession, of which he is a distinguished member, "into public
disrepute and suspicion and undermine the integrity of justice." [32]
The claim of respondent that he acted in good faith and with honest intention will also not exculpate him as such claim does not render the prohibition inoperative. [33]

In the same manner, his claim that he could not turn down the spouses as no other lawyer is willing to take their case cannot prosper as it is settled that while there may be
instances where lawyers cannot decline representation they cannot be made to labor under conflict of interest between a present client and a prospective one. [34] Granting
also that there really was no other lawyer who could handle the spouses' case other than him, still he should have observed the requirements laid down by the rules by
conferring with the prospective client to ascertain as soon as practicable whether the matter would involve a conflict with another client then seek the written consent of all
concerned after a full disclosure of the facts. [35] These respondent failed to do thus exposing himself to the charge of double-dealing.

We note the affidavit of desistance filed by Gonzales. However, we are not bound by such desistance as the present case involves public interest. [36] Indeed, the Court's
exercise of its power to take cognizance of administrative cases against lawyers is not for the purpose of enforcing civil remedies between parties, but to protect the court and
the public against an attorney guilty of unworthy practices in his profession. [37]

In similar cases where the respondent was found guilty of representing conflicting interests a penalty ranging from one to three years' suspension was imposed. [38]

We shall consider however as mitigating circumstances the fact that he is representing the Gatcheco spouses pro bono and that it was his firm and not respondent personally,
which handled the civil case of Gonzales. As recounted by complainant herself, Atty. Edmar Cabucana signed the civil case of complainant by stating first the name of the law
firm CABUCANA, CABUCANA, DE GUZMAN AND CABUCANA LAW OFFICE, under which, his name and signature appear; while herein respondent signed the pleadings for
the Gatcheco spouses only with his name, [39] without any mention of the law firm. We also note the observation of the IBP Commissioner Reyes that there was no malice and
bad faith in respondent's acceptance of the Gatchecos' cases as shown by the move of complainant to withdraw the case.

Thus, for violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and taking into consideration the aforementioned mitigating circumstances, we impose
the penalty of fine of P2,000.00.

WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVI-2005-153 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is APPROVED with MODIFICATION that respondent Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr. is
FINED the amount of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) with a STERN WARNING that a commission of the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

A.C. No. 5804, July 01, 2003

BENEDICTO HORNILLA AND ATTY. FEDERICO D. RICAFORT, COMPLAINANTS, VS. ATTY. ERNESTO S. SALUNAT, RESPONDENT.
 
 R E S O L U T I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

On November 21, 1997, Benedicto Hornilla and Federico D. Ricafort filed an administrative complaint [1] with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar
Discipline, against respondent Atty. Ernesto S. Salunat for illegal and unethical practice and conflict of interest. They alleged that respondent is a member of the ASSA Law
and Associates, which was the retained counsel of the Philippine Public School Teachers Association (PPSTA). Respondent's brother, Aurelio S. Salunat, was a member of
the PPSTA Board which approved respondent's engagement as retained counsel of PPSTA.

Complainants, who are members of the PPSTA, filed an intra-corporate case against its members of the Board of Directors for the terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1997 before the
Securities and Exchange Commission, which was docketed as SEC Case No. 05-97-5657, and a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman, docketed as OMB Case No.
0-97-0695, for unlawful spending and the undervalued sale of real property of the PPSTA. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the PPSTA Board members in
the said cases. Complainants contend that respondent was guilty of conflict of interest because he was engaged by the PPSTA, of which complainants were members, and
was being paid out of its corporate funds where complainants have contributed. Despite being told by PPSTA members of the said conflict of interest, respondent refused to
withdraw his appearance in the said cases.

Moreover, complainants aver that respondent violated Rule 15.06[2] of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he appeared at the meeting of the PPSTA Board and
assured its members that he will win the PPSTA cases.

In his Answer,[3] respondent stressed that he entered his appearance as counsel for the PPSTA Board Members for and in behalf of the ASSA Law and Associates. As a
partner in the said law firm, he only filed a "Manifestation of Extreme Urgency" in OMB Case No. 0-97-0695.[4] On the other hand, SEC Case No. 05-97-5657 was handled by
another partner of the firm, Atty. Agustin V. Agustin. Respondent claims that it was complainant Atty. Ricafort who instigated, orchestrated and indiscriminately filed the said
cases against members of the PPSTA and its Board.

Respondent pointed out that his relationship to Aurelio S. Salunat was immaterial; and that when he entered into the retainer contract with the PPSTA Board, he did so, not in
his individual capacity, but in representation of the ASSA Law Firm. He denied that he ensured the victory of the PPSTA Board in the case he was handling. He merely
assured the Board that the truth will come out and that the case before the Ombudsman will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, considering that respondents therein are not
public officials, but private employees. Anent the SEC case, respondent alleged that the same was being handled by the law firm of Atty. Eduardo de Mesa, and not ASSA.

By way of Special and Affirmative Defenses, respondent averred that complainant Atty. Ricafort was himself guilty of gross violation of his oath of office amounting to gross
misconduct, malpractice and unethical conduct for filing trumped-up charges against him and Atty. De Mesa. Thus, he prayed that the complaint against him be dismissed
and, instead, complainant Ricafort be disciplined or disbarred.

The complainant was docketed as CBD Case No. 97-531 and referred to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. After investigation, Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months. The Board of Governors thereafter adopted Resolution No. XV-3003-230 dated June
29, 2002, approving the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

Respondent filed with this Court a Motion for Reconsideration of the above Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.

The pertinent rule of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

RULE 15.03. - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's
duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for
the other client."[5] This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will
be used.[6] Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any
matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection.[7]
Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and
loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.[8]

In this jurisdiction, a corporation's board of directors is understood to be that body which (1) exercises all powers provided for under the Corporation Code; (2) conducts all
business of the corporation; and (3) controls and holds all property of the corporation. [9] Its members have been characterized as trustees or directors clothed with a fiduciary
character.[10] It is clearly separate and distinct from the corporate entity itself.

Where corporate directors have committed a breach of trust either by their frauds, ultra vires acts, or negligence, and the corporation is unable or unwilling to institute suit to
remedy the wrong, a stockholder may sue on behalf of himself and other stockholders and for the benefit of the corporation, to bring about a redress of the wrong done
directly to the corporation and indirectly to the stockholders.[11] This is what is known as a derivative suit, and settled is the doctrine that in a derivative suit, the corporation is
the real party in interest while the stockholder filing suit for the corporation's behalf is only nominal party. The corporation should be included as a party in the suit.[12]

Having thus laid a suitable foundation of the basic legal principles pertaining to derivative suits, we come now to the threshold question: can a lawyer engaged by a
corporation defend members of the board of the same corporation in a derivative suit? On this issue, the following disquisition is enlightening:
The possibility for conflict of interest here is universally recognized. Although early cases found joint representation permissible where no conflict of interest was obvious, the
emerging rule is against dual representation in all derivative actions. Outside counsel must thus be retained to represent one of the defendants. The cases and ethics opinions
differ on whether there must be separate representation from the outset or merely from the time the corporation seeks to take an active role. Furthermore, this restriction on
dual representation should not be waivable by consent in the usual way; the corporation should be presumptively incapable of giving valid consent.[13] (underscoring ours)
In other jurisdictions, the prevailing rule is that a situation wherein a lawyer represents both the corporation and its assailed directors unavoidably gives rise to a conflict of
interest. The interest of the corporate client is paramount and should not be influenced by any interest of the individual corporate officials. [14] The rulings in these cases have
persuasive effect upon us. After due deliberation on the wisdom of this doctrine, we are sufficiently convinced that a lawyer engaged as counsel for a corporation cannot
represent members of the same corporation's board of directors in a derivative suit brought against them. To do so would be tantamount to representing conflicting interests,
which is prohibited by the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In the case at bar, the records show that SEC Case No. 05-97-5657, entitled "Philippine Public School Teacher's Assn., Inc., et al. v. 1992-1995 Board of Directors of the
Philippine Public School Teacher's Assn. (PPSTA), et al.," was filed by the PPSTA against its own Board of Directors. Respondent admits that the ASSA Law Firm, of which
he is the Managing Partner, was the retained counsel of PPSTA. Yet, he appeared as counsel of record for the respondent Board of Directors in the said case. Clearly,
respondent was guilty of conflict of interest when he represented the parties against whom his other client, the PPSTA, filed suit.

In his Answer, respondent argues that he only represented the Board of Directors in OMB Case No. 0-97-0695. In the said case, he filed a Manifestation of Extreme Urgency
wherein he prayed for the dismissal of the complaint against his clients, the individual Board Members. By filing the said pleading, he necessarily entered his appearance
therein.[15] Again, this constituted conflict of interests, considering that the complaint in the Ombudsman, albeit in the name of the individual members of the PPSTA, was
brought in behalf of and to protect the interest of the corporation.

Therefore, respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Considering however, that this is his first offense, we find the penalty of suspension, recommended in IBP
Resolution No. XV-2002-230 dated June 29, 2002, to be too harsh. Instead, we resolve to admonish respondent to observe a higher degree of fidelity in the practice of his
profession.

ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Ernesto Salunat is found GUILTY of representing conflicting interests and is ADMONISHED to observe a higher degree of fidelity in the
practice of his profession. He is further WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

A.C. No. 5804, July 01, 2003

BENEDICTO HORNILLA AND ATTY. FEDERICO D. RICAFORT, COMPLAINANTS, VS. ATTY. ERNESTO S. SALUNAT, RESPONDENT.
 
 R E S O L U T I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

On November 21, 1997, Benedicto Hornilla and Federico D. Ricafort filed an administrative complaint [1] with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar
Discipline, against respondent Atty. Ernesto S. Salunat for illegal and unethical practice and conflict of interest. They alleged that respondent is a member of the ASSA Law
and Associates, which was the retained counsel of the Philippine Public School Teachers Association (PPSTA). Respondent's brother, Aurelio S. Salunat, was a member of
the PPSTA Board which approved respondent's engagement as retained counsel of PPSTA.

Complainants, who are members of the PPSTA, filed an intra-corporate case against its members of the Board of Directors for the terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1997 before the
Securities and Exchange Commission, which was docketed as SEC Case No. 05-97-5657, and a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman, docketed as OMB Case No.
0-97-0695, for unlawful spending and the undervalued sale of real property of the PPSTA. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the PPSTA Board members in
the said cases. Complainants contend that respondent was guilty of conflict of interest because he was engaged by the PPSTA, of which complainants were members, and
was being paid out of its corporate funds where complainants have contributed. Despite being told by PPSTA members of the said conflict of interest, respondent refused to
withdraw his appearance in the said cases.

Moreover, complainants aver that respondent violated Rule 15.06[2] of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he appeared at the meeting of the PPSTA Board and
assured its members that he will win the PPSTA cases.

In his Answer,[3] respondent stressed that he entered his appearance as counsel for the PPSTA Board Members for and in behalf of the ASSA Law and Associates. As a
partner in the said law firm, he only filed a "Manifestation of Extreme Urgency" in OMB Case No. 0-97-0695.[4] On the other hand, SEC Case No. 05-97-5657 was handled by
another partner of the firm, Atty. Agustin V. Agustin. Respondent claims that it was complainant Atty. Ricafort who instigated, orchestrated and indiscriminately filed the said
cases against members of the PPSTA and its Board.

Respondent pointed out that his relationship to Aurelio S. Salunat was immaterial; and that when he entered into the retainer contract with the PPSTA Board, he did so, not in
his individual capacity, but in representation of the ASSA Law Firm. He denied that he ensured the victory of the PPSTA Board in the case he was handling. He merely
assured the Board that the truth will come out and that the case before the Ombudsman will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, considering that respondents therein are not
public officials, but private employees. Anent the SEC case, respondent alleged that the same was being handled by the law firm of Atty. Eduardo de Mesa, and not ASSA.
By way of Special and Affirmative Defenses, respondent averred that complainant Atty. Ricafort was himself guilty of gross violation of his oath of office amounting to gross
misconduct, malpractice and unethical conduct for filing trumped-up charges against him and Atty. De Mesa. Thus, he prayed that the complaint against him be dismissed
and, instead, complainant Ricafort be disciplined or disbarred.

The complainant was docketed as CBD Case No. 97-531 and referred to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. After investigation, Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months. The Board of Governors thereafter adopted Resolution No. XV-3003-230 dated June
29, 2002, approving the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

Respondent filed with this Court a Motion for Reconsideration of the above Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.

The pertinent rule of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

RULE 15.03. - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's
duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for
the other client."[5] This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will
be used.[6] Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any
matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection.[7]
Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and
loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.[8]

In this jurisdiction, a corporation's board of directors is understood to be that body which (1) exercises all powers provided for under the Corporation Code; (2) conducts all
business of the corporation; and (3) controls and holds all property of the corporation.[9] Its members have been characterized as trustees or directors clothed with a fiduciary
character.[10] It is clearly separate and distinct from the corporate entity itself.

Where corporate directors have committed a breach of trust either by their frauds, ultra vires acts, or negligence, and the corporation is unable or unwilling to institute suit to
remedy the wrong, a stockholder may sue on behalf of himself and other stockholders and for the benefit of the corporation, to bring about a redress of the wrong done
directly to the corporation and indirectly to the stockholders.[11] This is what is known as a derivative suit, and settled is the doctrine that in a derivative suit, the corporation is
the real party in interest while the stockholder filing suit for the corporation's behalf is only nominal party. The corporation should be included as a party in the suit.[12]

Having thus laid a suitable foundation of the basic legal principles pertaining to derivative suits, we come now to the threshold question: can a lawyer engaged by a
corporation defend members of the board of the same corporation in a derivative suit? On this issue, the following disquisition is enlightening:
The possibility for conflict of interest here is universally recognized. Although early cases found joint representation permissible where no conflict of interest was obvious, the
emerging rule is against dual representation in all derivative actions. Outside counsel must thus be retained to represent one of the defendants. The cases and ethics opinions
differ on whether there must be separate representation from the outset or merely from the time the corporation seeks to take an active role. Furthermore, this restriction on
dual representation should not be waivable by consent in the usual way; the corporation should be presumptively incapable of giving valid consent.[13] (underscoring ours)
In other jurisdictions, the prevailing rule is that a situation wherein a lawyer represents both the corporation and its assailed directors unavoidably gives rise to a conflict of
interest. The interest of the corporate client is paramount and should not be influenced by any interest of the individual corporate officials.[14] The rulings in these cases have
persuasive effect upon us. After due deliberation on the wisdom of this doctrine, we are sufficiently convinced that a lawyer engaged as counsel for a corporation cannot
represent members of the same corporation's board of directors in a derivative suit brought against them. To do so would be tantamount to representing conflicting interests,
which is prohibited by the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In the case at bar, the records show that SEC Case No. 05-97-5657, entitled "Philippine Public School Teacher's Assn., Inc., et al. v. 1992-1995 Board of Directors of the
Philippine Public School Teacher's Assn. (PPSTA), et al.," was filed by the PPSTA against its own Board of Directors. Respondent admits that the ASSA Law Firm, of which
he is the Managing Partner, was the retained counsel of PPSTA. Yet, he appeared as counsel of record for the respondent Board of Directors in the said case. Clearly,
respondent was guilty of conflict of interest when he represented the parties against whom his other client, the PPSTA, filed suit.

In his Answer, respondent argues that he only represented the Board of Directors in OMB Case No. 0-97-0695. In the said case, he filed a Manifestation of Extreme Urgency
wherein he prayed for the dismissal of the complaint against his clients, the individual Board Members. By filing the said pleading, he necessarily entered his appearance
therein.[15] Again, this constituted conflict of interests, considering that the complaint in the Ombudsman, albeit in the name of the individual members of the PPSTA, was
brought in behalf of and to protect the interest of the corporation.

Therefore, respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Considering however, that this is his first offense, we find the penalty of suspension, recommended in IBP
Resolution No. XV-2002-230 dated June 29, 2002, to be too harsh. Instead, we resolve to admonish respondent to observe a higher degree of fidelity in the practice of his
profession.

ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Ernesto Salunat is found GUILTY of representing conflicting interests and is ADMONISHED to observe a higher degree of fidelity in the
practice of his profession. He is further WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

G.R. No. 173188, January 15, 2014

THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF THE SPOUSES VICENTE CADAVEDO AND BENITA ARCOY-CADAVEDO (BOTH DECEASED), SUBSTITUTED BY THEIR HEIRS,
NAMELY: HERMINIA, PASTORA, HEIRS OF FRUCTUOSA, HEIRS OF RAQUEL, EVANGELINE, VICENTE, JR., AND ARMANDO, ALL SURNAMED CADAVEDO,
PETITIONERS, VS. VICTORINO (VIC) T. LACAYA, MARRIED TO ROSA LEGADOS, RESPONDENTS. 
 
 D E C I S I O N
BRION, J.:

We resolve in this Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari[1] the challenge to the October 11, 2005 decision[2] and the May 9, 2006 resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 56948. The CA reversed and set aside the September 17, 1996 decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, of Dipolog City in Civil Case No.
4038, granting in part the complaint for recovery of possession of property filed by the petitioners, the Conjugal Partnership of the Spouses Vicente Cadavedo and Benita
Arcoy-Cadavedo against Atty. Victorino (Vic) T. Lacaya, married to Rosa Legados (collectively, the respondents).
The Factual Antecedents
The Spouses Vicente Cadavedo and Benita Arcoy-Cadavedo (collectively, the spouses Cadavedo) acquired a homestead grant over a 230,765-square meter parcel of land
known as Lot 5415 (subject lot) located in Gumay, Piñan, Zamboanga del Norte. They were issued Homestead Patent No. V-15414 on March 13, 1953 and Original
Certificate of Title No. P-376 on July 2, 1953. On April 30, 1955, the spouses Cadavedo sold the subject lot to the spouses Vicente Ames and Martha Fernandez (the spouses
Ames). Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-4792 was subsequently issued in the name of the spouses Ames.
The present controversy arose when the spouses Cadavedo filed an action[5] before the RTC (then Court of First Instance) of Zamboanga City against the spouses Ames for
sum of money and/or voiding of contract of sale of homestead after the latter failed to pay the balance of the purchase price. The spouses Cadavedo initially engaged the
services of Atty. Rosendo Bandal who, for health reasons, later withdrew from the case; he was substituted by Atty. Lacaya.
On February 24, 1969, Atty. Lacaya amended the complaint to assert the nullity of the sale and the issuance of TCT No. T-4792 in the names of the spouses Ames as gross
violation of the public land law. The amended complaint stated that the spouses Cadavedo hired Atty. Lacaya on a contingency fee basis. The contingency fee stipulation
specifically reads:
10. That due to the above circumstances, the plaintiffs were forced to hire a lawyer on contingent basis and if they become the prevailing parties in the case at bar,
they will pay the sum of P2,000.00 for attorney’s fees[.][6]
In a decision dated February 1, 1972, the RTC upheld the sale of the subject lot to the spouses Ames. The spouses Cadavedo, thru Atty. Lacaya, appealed the case to the
CA.
On September 18, 1975, and while the appeal before the CA in Civil Case No. 1721 was pending, the spouses Ames sold the subject lot to their children. The spouses Ames’
TCT No. T-4792 was subsequently cancelled and TCT No. T-25984 was issued in their children’s names. On October 11, 1976, the spouses Ames mortgaged the subject lot
with the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) in the names of their children.
On August 13, 1980, the CA issued its decision in Civil Case No. 1721, reversing the decision of the RTC and declaring the deed of sale, transfer of rights, claims and interest
to the spouses Ames null and void ab initio. It directed the spouses Cadavedo to return the initial payment and ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel the spouses Ames’
TCT No. T-4792 and to reissue another title in the name of the spouses Cadavedo. The case eventually reached this Court via the spouses Ames’ petition for review on
certiorari which this Court dismissed for lack of merit.
Meanwhile, the spouses Ames defaulted in their obligation with the DBP. Thus, the DBP caused the publication of a notice of foreclosure sale of the subject lot as covered by
TCT No. T-25984 (under the name of the spouses Ames’ children). Atty. Lacaya immediately informed the spouses Cadavedo of the foreclosure sale and filed an Affidavit of
Third Party Claim with the Office of the Provincial Sheriff on September 14, 1981.
With the finality of the judgment in Civil Case No. 1721, Atty. Lacaya filed on September 21, 1981 a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution.
On September 23, 1981, and pending the RTC’s resolution of the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution, the spouses Ames filed a complaint [7] before the RTC against
the spouses Cadavedo for Quieting of Title or Enforcement of Civil Rights due Planters in Good Faith with prayer for Preliminary Injunction. The spouses Cadavedo,
thru Atty. Lacaya, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata and to cancel TCT No. T-25984 (under the name of the spouses Ames’ children).
On October 16, 1981, the RTC granted the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No. 1721, and the spouses Cadavedo were placed in possession of the
subject lot on October 24, 1981. Atty. Lacaya asked for one-half of the subject lot as attorney’s fees. He caused the subdivision of the subject lot into two equal portions,
based on area, and selected the more valuable and productive half for himself; and assigned the other half to the spouses Cadavedo.
Unsatisfied with the division, Vicente and his sons-in-law entered the portion assigned to the respondents and ejected them. The latter responded by filing a counter-suit for
forcible entry before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC); the ejectment case was docketed as Civil Case No. 215. This incident occurred while Civil Case No. 3352 was pending.
On May 13, 1982, Vicente and Atty. Lacaya entered into an amicable settlement (compromise agreement)[8] in Civil Case No. 215 (the ejectment case), re-adjusting the area
and portion obtained by each. Atty. Lacaya acquired 10.5383 hectares pursuant to the agreement. The MTC approved the compromise agreement in a decision dated June
10, 1982.
Meanwhile, on May 21, 1982, the spouses Cadavedo filed before the RTC an action against the DBP for Injunction; it was docketed as Civil Case No. 3443 (Cadavedo v.
DBP). The RTC subsequently denied the petition, prompting the spouses Cadavedo to elevate the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari. The CA dismissed the petition in
its decision of January 31, 1984.
The records do not clearly disclose the proceedings subsequent to the CA decision in Civil Case No. 3443. However, on August 18, 1988, TCT No. 41051 was issued in the
name of the spouses Cadavedo concerning the subject lot.
On August 9, 1988, the spouses Cadavedo filed before the RTC an action[9] against the respondents, assailing the MTC-approved compromise agreement. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 4038 and is the root of the present case. The spouses Cadavedo prayed, among others, that the respondents be ejected from their one-half
portion of the subject lot; that they be ordered to render an accounting of the produce of this one-half portion from 1981; and that the RTC fix the attorney’s fees on a quantum
meruit basis, with due consideration of the expenses that Atty. Lacaya incurred while handling the civil cases.
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 4038, the spouses Cadavedo executed a Deed of Partition of Estate in favor of their eight children. Consequently, TCT No. 41051 was
cancelled and TCT No. 41690 was issued in the names of the latter. The records are not clear on the proceedings and status of Civil Case No. 3352.
The Ruling of the RTC
In the September 17, 1996 decision[10] in Civil Case No. 4038, the RTC declared the contingent fee of 10.5383 hectares as excessive and unconscionable. The RTC reduced
the land area to 5.2691 hectares and ordered the respondents to vacate and restore the remaining 5.2692 hectares to the spouses Cadavedo.
The RTC noted that, as stated in the amended complaint filed by Atty. Lacaya, the agreed attorney’s fee on contingent basis was P2,000.00. Nevertheless, the RTC also
pointed out that the parties novated this agreement when they executed the compromise agreement in Civil Case No. 215 (ejectment case), thereby giving Atty. Lacaya one-
half of the subject lot. The RTC added that Vicente’s decision to give Atty. Lacaya one-half of the subject lot, sans approval of Benita, was a valid act of administration and
binds the conjugal partnership. The RTC reasoned out that the disposition redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership as it was done precisely to remunerate Atty.
Lacaya for his services to recover the property itself.
These considerations notwithstanding, the RTC considered the one-half portion of the subject lot, as Atty. Lacaya’s contingent fee, excessive, unreasonable and
unconscionable. The RTC was convinced that the issues involved in Civil Case No. 1721 were not sufficiently difficult and complicated to command such an excessive award;
neither did it require Atty. Lacaya to devote much of his time or skill, or to perform extensive research.
Finally, the RTC deemed the respondents’ possession, prior to the judgment, of the excess portion of their share in the subject lot to be in good faith. The respondents were
thus entitled to receive its fruits.
On the spouses Cadavedo’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC modified the decision in its resolution [11] dated December 27, 1996. The RTC ordered the respondents to
account for and deliver the produce and income, valued at P7,500.00 per annum, of the 5.2692 hectares that the RTC ordered the spouses Ames to restore to the spouses
Cadavedo, from October 10, 1988 until final restoration of the premises.
The respondents appealed the case before the CA.
The Ruling of the CA
In its decision[12] dated October 11, 2005, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC’s September 17, 1996 decision and maintained the partition and distribution of the subject
lot under the compromise agreement. In so ruling, the CA noted the following facts: (1) Atty. Lacaya served as the spouses Cadavedo’s counsel from 1969 until 1988, when
the latter filed the present case against Atty. Lacaya; (2) during the nineteen (19) years of their attorney-client relationship, Atty. Lacaya represented the spouses Cadavedo in
three civil cases – Civil Case No. 1721, Civil Case No. 3352, and Civil Case No. 3443; (3) the first civil case lasted for twelve years and even reached this Court, the second
civil case lasted for seven years, while the third civil case lasted for six years and went all the way to the CA; (4) the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya entered into a
compromise agreement concerning the division of the subject lot where Atty. Lacaya ultimately agreed to acquire a smaller portion; (5) the MTC approved the compromise
agreement; (6) Atty. Lacaya defrayed all of the litigation expenses in Civil Case No. 1721; and (7) the spouses Cadavedo expressly recognized that Atty. Lacaya served them
in several cases.
Considering these established facts and consistent with Canon 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (enumerating the factors that should guide the determination
of the lawyer’s fees), the CA ruled that the time spent and the extent of the services Atty. Lacaya rendered for the spouses Cadavedo in the three cases, the probability of him
losing other employment resulting from his engagement, the benefits resulting to the spouses Cadavedo, and the contingency of his fees justified the compromise agreement
and rendered the agreed fee under the compromise agreement reasonable.
The Petition
In the present petition, the petitioners essentially argue that the CA erred in: (1) granting the attorney’s fee consisting of one-half or 10.5383 hectares of the subject lot to Atty.
Lacaya, instead of confirming the agreed contingent attorney’s fees of P2,000.00; (2) not holding the respondents accountable for the produce, harvests and income of the
10.5383-hectare portion (that they obtained from the spouses Cadavedo) from 1988 up to the present; and (3) upholding the validity of the purported oral contract between the
spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya when it was champertous and dealt with property then still subject of Civil Case No. 1721.[13]
The petitioners argue that stipulations on a lawyer’s compensation for professional services, especially those contained in the pleadings filed in courts, control the amount of
the attorney’s fees to which the lawyer shall be entitled and should prevail over oral agreements. In this case, the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya agreed that the latter’s
contingent attorney’s fee was P2,000.00 in cash, not one-half of the subject lot. This agreement was clearly stipulated in the amended complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1721.
Thus, Atty. Lacaya is bound by the expressly stipulated fee and cannot insist on unilaterally changing its terms without violating their contract.
The petitioners add that the one-half portion of the subject lot as Atty. Lacaya’s contingent attorney’s fee is excessive and unreasonable. They highlight the RTC’s
observations and argue that the issues involved in Civil Case No. 1721, pursuant to which the alleged contingent fee of one-half of the subject lot was agreed by the parties,
were not novel and did not involve difficult questions of law; neither did the case require much of Atty. Lacaya’s time, skill and effort in research. They point out that the two
subsequent civil cases should not be considered in determining the reasonable contingent fee to which Atty. Lacaya should be entitled for his services in Civil Case No. 1721,
as those cases had not yet been instituted at that time. Thus, these cases should not be considered in fixing the attorney’s fees. The petitioners also claim that the spouses
Cadavedo concluded separate agreements on the expenses and costs for each of these subsequent cases, and that Atty. Lacaya did not even record any attorney’s lien in
the spouses Cadavedo’s TCT covering the subject lot.
The petitioners further direct the Court’s attention to the fact that Atty. Lacaya, in taking over the case from Atty. Bandal, agreed to defray all of the litigation expenses in
exchange for one-half of the subject lot should they win the case. They insist that this agreement is a champertous contract that is contrary to public policy, prohibited by law
for violation of the fiduciary relationship between a lawyer and a client.
Finally, the petitioners maintain that the compromise agreement in Civil Case No. 215 (ejectment case) did not novate their original stipulated agreement on the attorney’s
fees. They reason that Civil Case No. 215 did not decide the issue of attorney’s fees between the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya for the latter’s services in Civil Case
No. 1721.
The Case for the Respondents
In their defense,[14] the respondents counter that the attorney’s fee stipulated in the amended complaint was not the agreed fee of Atty. Lacaya for his legal services. They
argue that the questioned stipulation for attorney’s fees was in the nature of a penalty that, if granted, would inure to the spouses Cadavedo and not to Atty. Lacaya.
The respondents point out that: (1) both Vicente and Atty. Lacaya caused the survey and subdivision of the subject lot immediately after the spouses Cadavedo reacquired its
possession with the RTC’s approval of their motion for execution of judgment in Civil Case No. 1721; (2) Vicente expressly ratified and confirmed the agreement on the
contingent attorney’s fee consisting of one-half of the subject lot; (3) the MTC in Civil Case No. 215 (ejectment case) approved the compromise agreement; (4) Vicente is the
legally designated administrator of the conjugal partnership, hence the compromise agreement ratifying the transfer bound the partnership and could not have been
invalidated by the absence of Benita’s acquiescence; and (5) the compromise agreement merely inscribed and ratified the earlier oral agreement between the spouses
Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya which is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and public policy.
While the case is pending before this Court, Atty. Lacaya died.[15] He was substituted by his wife - Rosa - and their children – Victoriano D.L. Lacaya, Jr., Rosevic Lacaya-
Ocampo, Reymar L. Lacaya, Marcelito L. Lacaya, Raymundito L. Lacaya, Laila Lacaya-Matabalan, Marivic Lacaya-Barba, Rosalie L. Lacaya and Ma. Vic-Vic Lacaya-
Camaongay.[16]
The Court’s Ruling
We resolve to GRANT the petition.
The subject lot was the core of four successive and overlapping cases prior to the present controversy. In three of these cases, Atty. Lacaya stood as the spouses
Cadavedo’s counsel. For ease of discussion, we summarize these cases (including the dates and proceedings pertinent to each) as follows:
Civil Case No. 1721 – Cadavedo v. Ames (Sum of money and/or voiding of contract of sale of homestead), filed on January 10, 1967. The writ of execution was granted on
October 16, 1981.
Civil Case No. 3352 – Ames v. Cadavedo (Quieting of Title and/or Enforcement of Civil Rights due Planters in Good Faith with Application for Preliminary injunction), filed on
September 23, 1981.
Civil Case No. 3443 – Cadavedo v. DBP (Action for Injunction with Preliminary Injunction), filed on May 21, 1982.
Civil Case No. 215 – Atty. Lacaya v. Vicente Cadavedo, et. al. (Ejectment Case), filed between the latter part of 1981 and early part of 1982. The parties executed the
compromise agreement on May 13, 1982.
Civil Case No. 4038 – petitioners v. respondents (the present case).
The agreement on attorney’s fee consisting of one-half of the subject lot is void; the petitioners are entitled to recover possession
The core issue for our resolution is whether the attorney’s fee consisting of one-half of the subject lot is valid and reasonable, and binds the petitioners. We rule in the
NEGATIVE for the reasons discussed below.
A. The written agreement providing for a contingent fee of P2,000.00 should prevail over the oral agreement providing for one-half of the subject lot
The spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya agreed on a contingent fee of P2,000.00 and not, as asserted by the latter, one-half of the subject lot. The stipulation contained in
the amended complaint filed by Atty. Lacaya clearly stated that the spouses Cadavedo hired the former on a contingency basis; the Spouses Cadavedo undertook to pay their
lawyer P2,000.00 as attorney’s fees should the case be decided in their favor.
Contrary to the respondents’ contention, this stipulation is not in the nature of a penalty that the court would award the winning party, to be paid by the losing party. The
stipulation is a representation to the court concerning the agreement between the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya, on the latter’s compensation for his services in the
case; it is not the attorney’s fees in the nature of damages which the former prays from the court as an incident to the main action.
At this point, we highlight that as observed by both the RTC and the CA and agreed as well by both parties, the alleged contingent fee agreement consisting of one-half of the
subject lot was not reduced to writing prior to or, at most, at the start of Atty. Lacaya’s engagement as the spouses Cadavedo’s counsel in Civil Case No. 1721. An agreement
between the lawyer and his client, providing for the former’s compensation, is subject to the ordinary rules governing contracts in general. As the rules stand, controversies
involving written and oral agreements on attorney’s fees shall be resolved in favor of the former.[17] Hence, the contingency fee of P2,000.00 stipulated in the amended
complaint prevails over the alleged oral contingency fee agreement of one-half of the subject lot.
B. The contingent fee agreement between the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya, awarding the latter one-half of the subject lot, is champertous
Granting arguendo that the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya indeed entered into an oral contingent fee agreement securing to the latter one-half of the subject lot, the
agreement is nevertheless void.
In their account, the respondents insist that Atty. Lacaya agreed to represent the spouses Cadavedo in Civil Case No. 1721 and assumed the litigation expenses, without
providing for reimbursement, in exchange for a contingency fee consisting of one-half of the subject lot. This agreement is champertous and is contrary to public policy.[18]
Champerty, along with maintenance (of which champerty is an aggravated form), is a common law doctrine that traces its origin to the medieval period.[19] The doctrine of
maintenance was directed “against wanton and inofficious intermeddling in the disputes of others in which the intermeddler has no interest whatever, and where the
assistance rendered is without justification or excuse.”[20] Champerty, on the other hand, is characterized by “the receipt of a share of the proceeds of the litigation by the
intermeddler.”[21] Some common law court decisions, however, add a second factor in determining champertous contracts, namely, that the lawyer must also, “at his own
expense maintain, and take all the risks of, the litigation.”[22]
The doctrines of champerty and maintenance were created in response “to medieval practice of assigning doubtful or fraudulent claims to persons of wealth and influence in
the expectation that such individuals would enjoy greater success in prosecuting those claims in court, in exchange for which they would receive an entitlement to the spoils of
the litigation.”[23] “In order to safeguard the administration of justice, instances of champerty and maintenance were made subject to criminal and tortuous liability and a
common law rule was developed, striking down champertous agreements and contracts of maintenance as being unenforceable on the grounds of public policy.”[24]
In this jurisdiction, we maintain the rules on champerty, as adopted from American decisions, for public policy considerations.[25] As matters currently stand, any agreement by
a lawyer to “conduct the litigation in his own account, to pay the expenses thereof or to save his client therefrom and to receive as his fee a portion of the proceeds of the
judgment is obnoxious to the law.”[26] The rule of the profession that forbids a lawyer from contracting with his client for part of the thing in litigation in exchange for conducting
the case at the lawyer’s expense is designed to prevent the lawyer from acquiring an interest between him and his client. To permit these arrangements is to enable the
lawyer to “acquire additional stake in the outcome of the action which might lead him to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client or to accept a settlement which
might take care of his interest in the verdict to the sacrifice of that of his client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to his client’s cause.”[27]
In Bautista v. Atty. Gonzales,[28] the Court struck down the contingent fee agreement between therein respondent Atty. Ramon A. Gonzales and his client for being contrary to
public policy. There, the Court held that an agreement between a lawyer and his client that does not provide for reimbursement of litigation expenses paid by the former is
against public policy, especially if the lawyer has agreed to carry on the action at his expense in consideration of some bargain to have a part of the thing in dispute. It violates
the fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and his client.[29]
In addition to its champertous character, the contingent fee arrangement in this case expressly transgresses the Canons of Professional Ethics and, impliedly, the Code of
Professional Responsibility.[30] Under Rule 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, a lawyer may not properly agree with a client that the lawyer shall pay or beat the expense
of litigation.[31] The same reasons discussed above underlie this rule.
C. The attorney’s fee consisting of one-half of the subject lot is excessive and unconscionable
We likewise strike down the questioned attorney’s fee and declare it void for being excessive and unconscionable. The contingent fee of one-half of the subject lot was
allegedly agreed to secure the services of Atty. Lacaya in Civil Case No. 1721. Plainly, it was intended for only one action as the two other civil cases had not yet been
instituted at that time. While Civil Case No. 1721 took twelve years to be finally resolved, that period of time, as matters then stood, was not a sufficient reason to justify a
large fee in the absence of any showing that special skills and additional work had been involved. The issue involved in that case, as observed by the RTC (and with which we
agree), was simple and did not require of Atty. Lacaya extensive skill, effort and research. The issue simply dealt with the prohibition against the sale of a homestead lot within
five years from its acquisition.
That Atty. Lacaya also served as the spouses Cadavedo’s counsel in the two subsequent cases did not and could not otherwise justify an attorney’s fee of one-half of the
subject lot. As asserted by the petitioners, the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya made separate arrangements for the costs and expenses for each of these two cases.
Thus, the expenses for the two subsequent cases had been considered and taken cared of.
Based on these considerations, we therefore find one-half of the subject lot as attorney’s fee excessive and unreasonable.
D. Atty. Lacaya’s acquisition of the one-half portion contravenes Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code
Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code forbids lawyers from acquiring, by purchase or assignment, the property that has been the subject of litigation in which they have taken part
by virtue of their profession.[32] The same proscription is provided under Rule 10 of the Canons of Professional Ethics.[33]
A thing is in litigation if there is a contest or litigation over it in court or when it is subject of the judicial action. [34] Following this definition, we find that the subject lot was still in
litigation when Atty. Lacaya acquired the disputed one-half portion. We note in this regard the following established facts: (1) on September 21, 1981, Atty. Lacaya filed a
motion for the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No. 1721; (2) on September 23, 1981, the spouses Ames filed Civil Case No. 3352 against the spouses Cadavedo;
(3) on October 16, 1981, the RTC granted the motion filed for the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No. 1721 and the spouses Cadavedo took possession of the
subject lot on October 24, 1981; (4) soon after, the subject lot was surveyed and subdivided into two equal portions, and Atty. Lacaya took possession of one of the
subdivided portions; and (5) on May 13, 1982, Vicente and Atty. Lacaya executed the compromise agreement.
From these timelines, whether by virtue of the alleged oral contingent fee agreement or an agreement subsequently entered into, Atty. Lacaya acquired the disputed one-half
portion (which was after October 24, 1981) while Civil Case No. 3352 and the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No. 1721 were already pending
before the lower courts. Similarly, the compromise agreement, including the subsequent judicial approval, was effected during the pendency of Civil Case No. 3352. In all of
these, the relationship of a lawyer and a client still existed between Atty. Lacaya and the spouses Cadavedo.
Thus, whether we consider these transactions – the transfer of the disputed one-half portion and the compromise agreement – independently of each other or resulting from
one another, we find them to be prohibited and void[35] by reason of public policy.[36] Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are contrary to public policy and
those expressly prohibited or declared void by law are considered inexistent and void from the beginning.[37]
What did not escape this Court’s attention is the CA’s failure to note that the transfer violated the provisions of Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code, although it recognized the
concurrence of the transfer and the execution of the compromise agreement with the pendency of the two civil cases subsequent to Civil Case No. 1721.[38] In reversing the
RTC ruling, the CA gave weight to the compromise agreement and in so doing, found justification in the unproved oral contingent fee agreement.
While contingent fee agreements are indeed recognized in this jurisdiction as a valid exception to the prohibitions under Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code,[39] contrary to the
CA’s position, however, this recognition does not apply to the present case. A contingent fee contract is an agreement in writing where the fee, often a fixed percentage of
what may be recovered in the action, is made to depend upon the success of the litigation.[40] The payment of the contingent fee is not made during the pendency of the
litigation involving the client’s property but only after the judgment has been rendered in the case handled by the lawyer.[41]
In the present case, we reiterate that the transfer or assignment of the disputed one-half portion to Atty. Lacaya took place while the subject lot was still under litigation and the
lawyer-client relationship still existed between him and the spouses Cadavedo. Thus, the general prohibition provided under Article 1491 of the Civil Code, rather than the
exception provided in jurisprudence, applies. The CA seriously erred in upholding the compromise agreement on the basis of the unproved oral contingent fee agreement.
Notably, Atty. Lacaya, in undertaking the spouses Cadavedo’s cause pursuant to the terms of the alleged oral contingent fee agreement, in effect, became a co-proprietor
having an equal, if not more, stake as the spouses Cadavedo. Again, this is void by reason of public policy; it undermines the fiduciary relationship between him and his
clients.[42]
E. The compromise agreement could not validate the void oral contingent fee agreement; neither did it supersede the written contingent fee agreement
The compromise agreement entered into between Vicente and Atty. Lacaya in Civil Case No. 215 (ejectment case) was intended to ratify and confirm Atty. Lacaya’s
acquisition and possession of the disputed one-half portion which were made in violation of Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code. As earlier discussed, such acquisition is void; the
compromise agreement, which had for its object a void transaction, should be void.
A contract whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy is inexistent and void from the beginning.[43] It can never be
ratified[44] nor the action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of the contract prescribe; [45] and any contract directly resulting from such illegal contract is likewise
void and inexistent.[46]
Consequently, the compromise agreement did not supersede the written contingent fee agreement providing for attorney’s fee of P2,000.00; neither did it preclude the
petitioners from questioning its validity even though Vicente might have knowingly and voluntarily acquiesced thereto and although the MTC approved it in its June 10, 1982
decision in the ejectment case. The MTC could not have acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the void compromise agreement; its judgment in the ejectment case
could not have attained finality and can thus be attacked at any time. Moreover, an ejectment case concerns itself only with the issue of possession de facto; it will not
preclude the filing of a separate action for recovery of possession founded on ownership. Hence, contrary to the CA’s position, the petitioners – in filing the present action and
praying for, among others, the recovery of possession of the disputed one-half portion and for judicial determination of the reasonable fees due Atty. Lacaya for his services –
were not barred by the compromise agreement.
Atty. Lacaya is entitled to receive attorney’s fees on a quantum meruit basis
In view of their respective assertions and defenses, the parties, in effect, impliedly set aside any express stipulation on the attorney’s fees, and the petitioners, by express
contention, submit the reasonableness of such fees to the court’s discretion. We thus have to fix the attorney’s fees on a quantum meruit basis.
“Quantum meruit — meaning ‘as much as he deserves’ — is used as basis for determining a lawyer’s professional fees in the absence of a contract x x x taking into account
certain factors in fixing the amount of legal fees.”[47] “Its essential requisite is the acceptance of the benefits by one sought to be charged for the services rendered under
circumstances as reasonably to notify him that the lawyer performing the task was expecting to be paid compensation” [48] for it. The doctrine of quantum meruit is a device to
prevent undue enrichment based on the equitable postulate that it is unjust for a person to retain benefit without paying for it.[49]
Under Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court[50] and Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,[51] factors such as the importance of the subject matter of the
controversy, the time spent and the extent of the services rendered, the customary charges for similar services, the amount involved in the controversy and the benefits
resulting to the client from the service, to name a few, are considered in determining the reasonableness of the fees to which a lawyer is entitled.
In the present case, the following considerations guide this Court in considering and setting Atty. Lacaya’s fees based on quantum meruit: (1) the questions involved in these
civil cases were not novel and did not require of Atty. Lacaya considerable effort in terms of time, skill or the performance of extensive research; (2) Atty. Lacaya rendered
legal services for the Spouses Cadavedo in three civil cases beginning in 1969 until 1988 when the petitioners filed the instant case; (3) the first of these civil cases
(Cadavedo v. Ames) lasted for twelve years and reaching up to this Court; the second (Ames v. Cadavedo) lasted for seven years; and the third (Cadavedo and Lacaya v.
DBP) lasted for six years, reaching up to the CA; and (4) the property subject of these civil cases is of a considerable size of 230,765 square meters or 23.0765 hectares.
All things considered, we hold as fair and equitable the RTC’s considerations in appreciating the character of the services that Atty. Lacaya rendered in the three cases,
subject to modification on valuation. We believe and so hold that the respondents are entitled to two (2) hectares (or approximately one-tenth [1/10] of the subject lot), with the
fruits previously received from the disputed one-half portion, as attorney’s fees. They shall return to the petitioners the remainder of the disputed one-half portion.
The allotted portion of the subject lot properly recognizes that litigation should be for the benefit of the client, not the lawyer, particularly in a legal situation when the law itself
holds clear and express protection to the rights of the client to the disputed property (a homestead lot). Premium consideration, in other words, is on the rights of the owner,
not on the lawyer who only helped the owner protect his rights. Matters cannot be the other way around; otherwise, the lawyer does indeed effectively acquire a property right
over the disputed property. If at all, due recognition of parity between a lawyer and a client should be on the fruits of the disputed property, which in this case, the Court
properly accords.
WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we hereby GRANT the petition. We AFFIRM the decision dated September 17, 1996 and the resolution dated December 27,
1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 10, in Civil Case No. 4038, with the MODIFICATION that the respondents, the spouses Victorino (Vic) T. Lacaya and
Rosa Legados, are entitled to two (2) hectares (or approximately one-tenth [1/10] of the subject lot) as attorney’s fees. The fruits that the respondents previously received from
the disputed one-half portion shall also form part of the attorney’s fees. We hereby ORDER the respondents to return to the petitioners the remainder of the 10.5383-hectare
portion of the subject lot that Atty. Vicente Lacaya acquired pursuant to the compromise agreement.

A.C. No. 5280, March 30, 2004

WILLIAM S. UY, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. FERMIN L. GONZALES, RESPONDENT.
 
 R E S O L U T I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

William S. Uy filed before this Court an administrative case against Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales for violation of the confidentiality of their lawyer-client relationship. The
complainant alleges:

Sometime in April 1999, he engaged the services of respondent lawyer to prepare and file a petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title. After confiding with
respondent the circumstances surrounding the lost title and discussing the fees and costs, respondent prepared, finalized and submitted to him a petition to be filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Tayug, Pangasinan. When the petition was about to be filed, respondent went to his (complainant’s) office at Virra Mall, Greenhills and demanded a
certain amount from him other than what they had previously agreed upon. Respondent left his office after reasoning with him. Expecting that said petition would be filed, he
was shocked to find out later that instead of filing the petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title, respondent filed a letter-complaint dated July 26, 1999 against him
with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Tayug, Pangasinan for “Falsification of Public Documents.” [1] The letter-complaint contained facts and circumstances pertaining
to the transfer certificate of title that was the subject matter of the petition which respondent was supposed to have filed. Portions of said letter-complaint read:
The undersigned complainant accuses WILLIAM S. UY, of legal age, Filipino, married and a resident of 132-A Gilmore Street corner 9th Street, New Manila, Quezon City,
Michael Angelo T. UY, CRISTINA EARL T. UY, minors and residents of the aforesaid address, Luviminda G. Tomagos, of legal age, married, Filipino and a resident of
Carmay East, Rosales, Pangasinan, and F. Madayag, with office address at A12, 2/F Vira Mall Shopping Complex, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila, for ESTAFA THRU
FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS, committed as follows:

That on March 15, 1996, William S. Uy acquired by purchase a parcel of land consisting of 4.001 ha. for the amount of P100,000.00, Philippine Currency, situated at Brgy.
Gonzales, Umingan, Pangasinan, from FERMIN C. GONZALES, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale executed by the latter in favor of the former…; that in the said date, William
S. Uy received the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-33122, covering the said land;

That instead of registering said Deed of Sale and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-33122, in the Register of Deeds for the purpose of transferring the same in his
name, William S. Uy executed a Deed of Voluntary Land Transfer of the aforesaid land in favor of his children, namely, Michael Angelo T. Uy and Cristina Earl T. Uy, wherein
William S. Uy made it appear that his said children are of legal age, and residents of Brgy. Gonzales, Umingan, Pangasinan, when in fact and in truth, they are minors and
residents of Metro Manila, to qualify them as farmers/beneficiaries, thus placing the said property within the coverage of the Land Reform Program;

That the above-named accused, conspiring together and helping one another procured the falsified documents which they used as supporting papers so that they can secure
from the Office of the Register of Deeds of Tayug, Pangasinan, TCT No. T-5165 (Certificate of Land Ownership Award No. 004 32930) in favor of his above-named
children. Some of these Falsified documents are purported Affidavit of Seller/Transferor and Affidavit of Non-Tenancy, both dated August 20, 1996, without the signature of
affiant, Fermin C. Gonzales, and that on that said date, Fermin C. Gonzales was already dead… ;

That on December 17, 1998, William S. Uy with deceit and evident intent to defraud undersigned, still accepted the amount of P340,000.00, from Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales,
P300,000.00, in PNB Check No. 0000606, and P40,000.00, in cash, as full payment of the redemption of TCT No. 33122…knowing fully well that at that time the said TCT
cannot be redeemed anymore because the same was already transferred in the name of his children;
That William S. Uy has appropriated the amount covered by the aforesaid check, as evidenced by the said check which was encashed by him…;

That inspite of repeated demands, both oral and in writing, William S. Uy refused and continue to refuse to deliver to him a TCT in the name of the undersigned or to return
and repay the said P340,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of the undersigned.[2]
With the execution of the letter-complaint, respondent violated his oath as a lawyer and grossly disregarded his duty to preserve the secrets of his client. Respondent
unceremoniously turned against him just because he refused to grant respondent’s request for additional compensation. Respondent’s act tarnished his reputation and social
standing.[3]

In compliance with this Court’s Resolution dated July 31, 2000,[4] respondent filed his Comment narrating his version, as follows:

On December 17, 1998, he offered to redeem from complainant a 4.9 hectare-property situated in Brgy. Gonzales, Umingan, Pangasinan covered by TCT No. T-33122 which
the latter acquired by purchase from his (respondent’s) son, the late Fermin C. Gonzales, Jr.. On the same date, he paid complainant P340,000.00 and demanded the
delivery of TCT No. T-33122 as well as the execution of the Deed of Redemption. Upon request, he gave complainant additional time to locate said title or until after
Christmas to deliver the same and execute the Deed of Redemption. After the said period, he went to complainant’s office and demanded the delivery of the title and the
execution of the Deed of Redemption. Instead, complainant gave him photocopies of TCT No. T-33122 and TCT No. T-5165. Complainant explained that he had already
transferred the title of the property, covered by TCT No.T-5165 to his children Michael and Cristina Uy and that TCT No. T-5165 was misplaced and cannot be located despite
efforts to locate it. Wanting to protect his interest over the property coupled with his desire to get hold of TCT No. T-5165 the earliest possible time, he offered his assistance
pro bono to prepare a petition for lost title provided that all necessary expenses incident thereto including expenses for transportation and others, estimated at P20,000.00, will
be shouldered by complainant. To these, complainant agreed.

On April 9, 1999, he submitted to complainant a draft of the petition for the lost title ready for signing and notarization. On April 14, 1999, he went to complainant’s office
informing him that the petition is ready for filing and needs funds for expenses. Complainant who was with a client asked him to wait at the anteroom where he waited for
almost two hours until he found out that complainant had already left without leaving any instructions nor funds for the filing of the petition. Complainant’s conduct infuriated
him which prompted him to give a handwritten letter telling complainant that he is withdrawing the petition he prepared and that complainant should get another lawyer to file
the petition.

Respondent maintains that the lawyer-client relationship between him and complainant was terminated when he gave the handwritten letter to complainant; that there was no
longer any professional relationship between the two of them when he filed the letter-complaint for falsification of public document; that the facts and allegations contained in
the letter-complaint for falsification were culled from public documents procured from the Office of the Register of Deeds in Tayug, Pangasinan.[5]

In a Resolution dated October 18, 2000, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.[6]

Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala ordered both parties to appear on April 2, 2003 before the IBP.[7] On said date, complainant did not appear despite due notice.
There was no showing that respondent received the notice for that day’s hearing and so the hearing was reset to May 28, 2003. [8]

On April 29, 2003, Commissioner Villanueva-Maala received a letter from one Atty. Augusto M. Macam dated April 24, 2003, stating that his client, William S. Uy, had lost
interest in pursuing the complaint he filed against Atty. Gonzales and requesting that the case against Atty. Gonzales be dismissed.[9]

On June 2, 2003, Commissioner Villanueva-Maala submitted her report and recommendation, portions of which read as follows:
The facts and evidence presented show that when respondent agreed to handle the filing of the Verified Petition for the loss of TCT No. T-5165, complainant had confided to
respondent the fact of the loss and the circumstances attendant thereto. When respondent filed the Letter-Complaint to the Office of the Special Prosecutor in Tayug,
Pangasinan, he violated Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which expressly provides that “A lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his client
even after the attorney-client relation is terminated.” Respondent cannot argue that there was no lawyer-client relationship between them when he filed the Letter-Complaint
on 26 July 1999 considering that as early as 14 April 1999, or three (3) months after, respondent had already terminated complainant’s perceived lawyer-client relationship
between them. The duty to maintain inviolate the client’s confidences and secrets is not temporary but permanent. It is in effect perpetual for “it outlasts the lawyer’s
employment” (Canon 37, Code of Professional Responsibility) which means even after the relationship has been terminated, the duty to preserve the client’s confidences and
secrets remains effective. Likewise Rule 21.02, Canon 21 of the Rules of Professional Responsibility provides that “A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use
information acquired in the course of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a third person, unless the client with the full knowledge of the
circumstances consents thereto.”

On 29 April 2003, the Commission received a letter dated 24 April 2003 from Atty. Augusto M. Macam, who claims to represent complainant, William S. Uy, alleging that
complainant is no longer interested in pursuing this case and requested that the same be dismissed. The aforesaid letter hardly deserves consideration as proceedings of this
nature cannot be “interrupted by reason of desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the
same. (Section 5, Rule 139-B, Rules of Court). Moreover, in Boliver vs. Simbol, 16 SCRA 623, the Court ruled that “any person may bring to this Court’s attention the
misconduct of any lawyer, and action will usually be taken regardless of the interest or lack of interest of the complainant, if the facts proven so warrant.”

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, we find respondent Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales to have violated the Code of Professional Responsibility and it is hereby recommended that he
be SUSPENDED for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS from receipt hereof, from the practice of his profession as a lawyer and member of the Bar.[10]
On June 21, 2003, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued Resolution No. XV-2003-365, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex “A”; and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and applicable laws and rules,
and considering that respondent violated Rule 21.02, Canon 21 of the Canons of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for six (6) months.[11]
Preliminarily, we agree with Commissioner Villanueva-Maala that the manifestation of complainant Uy expressing his desire to dismiss the administrative complaint he filed
against respondent, has no persuasive bearing in the present case.

Sec. 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court states that:

….

No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the complainant to
prosecute the same.
This is because:
A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken
for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as
an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no
interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be
suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the charges.[12]
Now to the merits of the complaint against the respondent.

Practice of law embraces any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, as well as legal principles, practice or procedure and calls for legal knowledge,
training and experience.[13] While it is true that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him
to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court, [14] complainant failed to prove any of the
circumstances enumerated above that would warrant the disbarment or suspension of herein respondent.

Notwithstanding respondent’s own perception on the matter, a scrutiny of the records reveals that the relationship between complainant and respondent stemmed from a
personal transaction or dealings between them rather than the practice of law by respondent. Respondent dealt with complainant only because he redeemed a property
which complainant had earlier purchased from his (complainant’s) son. It is not refuted that respondent paid complainant P340,000.00 and gave him ample time to produce
its title and execute the Deed of Redemption. However, despite the period given to him, complainant failed to fulfill his end of the bargain because of the alleged loss of the
title which he had admitted to respondent as having prematurely transferred to his children, thus prompting respondent to offer his assistance so as to secure the issuance of
a new title to the property, in lieu of the lost one, with complainant assuming the expenses therefor.

As a rule, an attorney-client relationship is said to exist when a lawyer voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation of a person, who in respect to a business or
trouble of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view of obtaining professional advice or assistance. It is not essential that the client should have employed the attorney on any
previous occasion or that any retainer should have been paid, promised or charged for, neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case
about which the consultation was had, for as long as the advice and assistance of the attorney is sought and received, in matters pertinent to his profession.[15]

Considering the attendant peculiar circumstances, said rule cannot apply to the present case. Evidently, the facts alleged in the complaint for “Estafa Through Falsification of
Public Documents” filed by respondent against complainant were obtained by respondent due to his personal dealings with complainant. Respondent volunteered his service
to hasten the issuance of the certificate of title of the land he has redeemed from complainant. Respondent’s immediate objective was to secure the title of the property that
complainant had earlier bought from his son. Clearly, there was no attorney-client relationship between respondent and complainant. The preparation and the proposed filing
of the petition was only incidental to their personal transaction.

Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility reads:

Canon 21 – A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCE AND SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATION IS TERMINATED.

Rule 21.01 – A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of his client except:
a) When authorized by the client after acquainting him of the consequences of the disclosure;
b) When required by law;
c) When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his employees or associates or by judicial action.
The alleged “secrets” of complainant were not specified by him in his affidavit-complaint. Whatever facts alleged by respondent against complainant were not obtained by
respondent in his professional capacity but as a redemptioner of a property originally owned by his deceased son and therefore, when respondent filed the complaint for
estafa against herein complainant, which necessarily involved alleging facts that would constitute estafa, respondent was not, in any way, violating Canon 21. There is no way
we can equate the filing of the affidavit-complaint against herein complainant to a misconduct that is wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or that
renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. To hold otherwise would be precluding any lawyer from instituting a case against anyone to protect his personal or
proprietary interests.

WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XV-2003-365 dated June 21, 2003 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the administrative case filed
against Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales, docketed as A.C. No. 5280, is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

A.C. No. 2144, April 10, 1989

CELEDONIO QUILBAN, ROMUALDO DALAGAN, FORTUNATO RAMIREZ, AMADOR ALARCON AND LUIS AGAWAN, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. SANTIAGO R.
ROBINOL, RESPONDENT. 
 
 [A.C. NO. 2180. APRIL 10, 1989]
 
 ATTY. SANTIAGO R. ROBINOL, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. A. R. MONTEMAYOR, RESPONDENT.


RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:

Subjected to frustrations were the dreams of thirty-two (32) squatter families to own the land of approximately 50 square meters each on which their respective homes were
built. To vindicate their rights they have aired their plight before this Court. Thwarted, too, was the benevolence shown by the original owner of the land which parted with its
property at a give-away price thinking that it was accommodating the landless squatters.
The antecedent facts follow:
The Colegio de San Jose, a Jesuit corporation, (Colegio, for short) used to own a parcel of land at the Seminary Road, Barrio Bathala, Quezon City. Through its
administrator, Father Federico Escaler, it sold said land to the Quezon City Government as the site for the Quezon City General Hospital but reserved an area of 2,743 square
meters as a possible development site. Squatters, however, settled in the area since 1965 or 1966.
Sometime in 1970, the Colegio, through Father Escaler gave permission to Congressman Luis R. Taruc to build on the reserved site a house for his residence and a training
center for the Christian Social Movement. Seeing the crowded shanties of squatters, Congressman Taruc broached to Father Escaler the idea of donating or selling the land
cheap to the squatters. Congressman Taruc then advised the squatters to form an organization and choose a leader authorized to negotiate with Father Escaler. Following
that advice, the squatters formed the "Samahang Pagkakaisa ng Barrio Bathala" (Samahan, for brevity), with Bernabe Martin as President (Exhibit "24", Robinol), who was
entrusted with the task of negotiating on their behalf for the sale of the land to them.
But instead of working for the welfare of the Samahan, Martin went to one Maximo Rivera, a realtor, with whom he connived to obtain the sale to the exclusion of the other
Samahan members. On 28 March 1971, the land was ultimately sold to Rivera at P15 per square meter or a total consideration of P41,961.65. The prevailing price of the
land in the vicinity then was P100 to P120 per square meter. It was evident that Father Escaler had been made to believe that Rivera represented the squatters on the
property. On the same date, 28 March 1971, Rivera obtained TCT No. 175662 to the property in his name alone.
In 1972, thirty-two heads of families of the Samahan filed Civil Case No. Q-16433, Branch IV, Quezon City, entitled "Celedonio Quilban, et al., Plaintiffs, vs. Maximo Rivera, et
al., Defendants," with the principal prayer that said defendants be ordered to execute a deed of conveyance in favor of said plaintiffs after reimbursement by the latter of the
corresponding amount paid by Rivera to the Colegio. The Court of First Instance of Quezon City, however, dismissed the case.
To prosecute the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Samahan members hired as their counsel Atty. Santiago R. Robinol for which the latter was paid P2,000.00 as
attorney's fees on 8 October 1975 (Exhibit "1"). Atty. Robinol was also to be given by the members a part of the land, subject matter of the case, equal to the portion that
would pertain to each of them. What was initially a verbal commitment on the land sharing was confirmed in writing on 10 March 1979 (Exhibit "2").
On 14 November 1978, the Court of Appeals reversed the CFI Decision by:
"(1) ordering defendant Maximo Rivera and all his co-defendants to execute a deed of conveyance of the land in question in favor of herein plaintiffs after the payment
of the corresponding amount paid by the defendants to the Colegio de San Jose, Inc., and in case of refusal or failure on their part to do so, ordering the Clerk of Court to
execute the same in favor of plaintiffs and declaring TCT No. 175662 (Annex E) null and void and ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel said certificate and
issue a new one in lieu thereof in the name of plaintiffs-appellants, upon presentation of the deed of conveyance to be executed in favor of appellants and (2) ordering
appellees jointly and severally to pay appellants the sum of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus costs." (p. 30, Report and Recommendation)
To raise the amount of P41,961.65 ordered paid by the Court of Appeals, plus expenses for ejectment of the non-plaintiffs occupying the property, conveyance,
documentation, transfer of title etc., the five officers of the Samahan collected, little by little, P2,500.00 from each head of family. The Treasurer, Luis Agawan, issued the
proper receipts prepared by Atty. Robinol.
On 18 May 1979, the sum of P68,970.00 was turned over to Atty. Robinol by the officers; on 31 May 1979 the amounts of P1,030.00 and P2,500.00 respectively; and on 2
June 1979, the sum of P2,500.00, or a total of P75,000.00.
After almost a year, the five officers discovered that no payment had been made to Rivera. When queried, Atty. Robinol replied that there was an intervention filed in the civil
case and that a Writ of Execution had not yet been issued by the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. However, it turned out that the motion for intervention had already
been dismissed. After confronting Atty. Robinol with that fact, the latter gave other excuses, which the officers discovered to have no basis at all.
On 6 March 1980, 21 out of 32 plaintiffs arrived at a “first consensus” to change their counsel, Atty. Robinol (Exhibit "3"). The officers of the Samahan thereafter approached
Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor, who agreed to be their counsel, after he was shown the document of 6 March 1980 containing the consensus of the Samahan members to
change Atty. Robinol as their lawyer. Upon Atty. Montemayor's advice, the officers sent Atty. Robinol a letter dated 17 March 1980 informing the latter of their decision to
terminate his services and demanding the return of the P75,000.00 deposited with him (Exhibit "5"). Atty. Robinol turned deaf ears to the demand. A subsequent letter of the
same tenor, dated 31 March 1980 (Exhibit "6"), was similarly disregarded by Atty. Robinol.
On 20 March 1980, Atty. Montemayor formally entered his appearance in Civil Case No. Q-16433 as counsel for the plaintiffs (Exhibit "8"), vice Atty. Robinol, on the strength
of the authority dated 18 March 1980 given him by plaintiffs in said civil case through the five officers (Exhibit "9"). Atty. Montemayor then filed on 20 March 1980 a Motion for
Execution praying that the defendants and/or the Clerk of Court be directed to execute a deed of conveyance in favor of the plaintiffs (Exhibit "10"). At the hearing of the
Motion for Execution on 5 June 1980, Atty. Robinol manifested that he had no objection to the appearance of and his substitution by Atty. Montemayor (Exhibits "11" & "11-
A").
Because Atty. Robinol, however, still questioned the first consensus dated 6 March 1980, another document labelled the "second consensus" (Exhibit "E") was signed by 21
plaintiffs during a meeting held for the purpose on 24 November 1980 to the effect that they had decided to change Atty. Robinol as their counsel because he had delayed
paying for their land notwithstanding the Decision of the Court of Appeals in their favor.
Administrative Case No. 2144
On 15 April 1980 the Samahan officers filed this Administrative Complaint before this Court requesting the investigation of Atty. Robinol for refusal to return the P75,000.00
and praying that the Court exercise its power of discipline over members of the Bar unworthy to practice law. The details of their Complaint were embodied in their Joint
Affidavit executed on 14 April 1980 describing what had transpired between them and Atty. Robinol.
In his defense, Atty. Robinol maintains that he was hired by Complainants to appeal their case to the Court of Appeals after they had lost in the lower Court; that their
agreement as to attorney's fees was on a contingent basis - if he obtains a reversal of the lower Court Decision, they will give him a portion of the property subject matter of
the litigation equal to the portion that will pertain to each of the 32 plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-16433; that he did not receive P70,000.00 from Complainants on 18 May 1979
but only P56,470.00; that he prepared and signed the receipt dated 18 May 1979 showing that he received P70,000.00 only to save Complainants from embarrassment and
shame should their co-plaintiffs ask for proof that they (Complainants) have paid their shares, which they have not; that the correct amount in his possession is only
P62,470.00 - it would really be P75,000.00 had the five Complainants paid their shares in the amount of P12,500,00 at P2,500.00 each and one Fortunate Ramirez paid his
balance of P30.00; that he had the right to hold the money in is possession as guarantee for the payment of his attorney's fees - instead of getting a portion of the property
that will pertain to each of the plaintiffs, he wants his portion converted to cash, and the cash equivalent of his portion is P50,000.00 (2,743 square meters divided by 32
plaintiffs equals 85 square meters for each plaintiff, multiplied by P500.00 up per square meter); that considering that P50,000.00 is even less than one-half (1/2) per cent of
the total value of the property, which is more than a million pesos, such amount is not unreasonable; that he is ready to give back the amount of P12,470.00, representing the
difference between P50,000.00 and the amount of P62,470.00 in his possession; that complainants cannot make this Court a collection agency and that while this Court has
the exclusive disciplinary power over members of the Bar, it is equally true that the Court cannot pass judgment on Complainants' plea that the amount deposited by
respondent be returned to them as this prayer should be ventilated in an ordinary action; that he does not have the slightest intention to appropriate the money in his
possession (P62,470.00) for himself, but he is holding it until his attorney's fees are satisfied there being no guarantee for its satisfaction because of Complainants' adamant
refusal to pay him; that there was no previous notice to him of his discharge; and that Atty. Montemayor accepted the case without his (Robinol's) formal withdrawal and
conformity.
Administrative Case No. 2180
Pursuing that tack, on 29 July 1980, Atty. Robinol filed a complaint for Disbarment against Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor for alleged gross unethical conduct unbecoming of a
lawyer in that Atty. Montemayor readily accepted the case without his (Robinol's) formal withdrawal and conformity and knowing fully well that there was no consensus of all
the plaintiffs to discharge him as their counsel.
For his part, Atty. Montemayor denied that the attorney's fees agreed upon by plaintiffs and Atty. Robinol were purely on a contingent basis, the truth being that the attorney's
fees were payable on a cash basis of P2,000.00 retainer fee, as evidenced by the receipt signed by Atty. Robinol (Annex "1"), plus whatever amount is adjudicated as
attorney's fees by the Court of Appeals; that the contingent fee referred to by Atty. Robinol was the result of his insistent demand after the Court of Appeals Decision in Civil
Case No. Q-16433 was already final, as shown by the date of the agreement (Annex "2"); that twenty [20] out of thirty-two [32] members of the Samahan signed the
agreement to discharge Atty. Robinol and hire a substitute counsel as shown by Annex "3", which is a majority of the membership and, therefore, a valid consensus; that he
agreed to act as counsel if only to arrest the growing belief of the Samahan that most members of the Philippine Bar are unprincipled; that although there was no formal
Motion for substitution, there was substantial compliance with Sec. 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, as shown by the formal entry of appearance in Civil Case No. Q-16433
(Annex "8"), the written consent of the clients (Annex "9"), notice to Atty. Robinol of his discharge and substitution (Annexes "10" and "11"), non-objection by Robinol of his
appearance as counsel (Annex "12'), and implied consent of the Court to the substitution as shown by its Order of 29 May 1980 (Annex "13"); that his professional and
personal actuations as counsel for the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-16433, CFI-Quezon City, do not cause dishonor either to himself or to the Philippine Bar; and that the
Complaint against him should be dismissed.
On 1 September 1980 and on 17 December 1980, the Court referred Adm. Case No. 2144 and Adm. Case No. 2180, respectively, to the Office of the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. On 15 December 1988, the Solicitor General submitted his compliance and recommended:
"1. That Atty. Santiago R. Robinol be suspended for three months for refusing to deliver the funds of the plaintiffs in his possession, with the warning that a more severe
penalty will be imposed for a repetition of the same or similar act, and that he be ordered to return to the plaintiffs, through the complainants in Adm. Case No. 2134, the sum
of P75,000.00.
"2. That the case against Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor, Adm. Case No. 2180, be dismissed, since he has not committed any misconduct imputed to him by Atty. Robinol."
(pp. 59-60, Rollo)
Except for the disciplinary sanction suggested for Atty. Robinol, we concur with the recommendations.
Re: Atty. Santiago R. Robinol
Atty. Robinol has, in fact, been guilty of ethical infractions and grave misconduct that make him unworthy to continue in the practice of the profession. After the Court of
Appeals had rendered a Decision favorable to his clients and he had received the latter's funds, suddenly, he had a change of mind and decided to convert the payment of his
fees from a portion of land equivalent to that of each of the plaintiffs to P50,000.00, which he alleges to be the monetary value of that area. Certainly, Atty. Robinol had no
right to unilaterally appropriate his clients' money not only because he is bound by a written agreement but also because, under the circumstances, it was highly unjust for him
to have done so. His clients were mere squatters who could barely eke out an existence. They had painstakingly raised their respective quotas of P2,500.00 per family with
which to pay for the land only to be deprived of the same by one who, after having seen the color of money, heartlessly took advantage of them.
Atty. Robinol has no basis to claim that since he was unjustly dismissed by his clients he had the legal right to retain the money in his possession. Firstly, there was justifiable
ground for his discharge as counsel. His clients had lost confidence in him for he had obviously engaged in dilatory tactics to the detriment of their interests, which he was
duty-bound to protect. Secondly, even if there were no valid ground, he is bereft of any legal right to retain his clients' funds intended for a specific purpose - the purchase of
land. He stands obliged to return the money immediately to their rightful owners.
The principle of quantum meruit applies if a lawyer is employed without a price agreed upon for his services in which case he would be entitled to receive what he merits for
his services, as much as he has earned. In this case, however, there was an express contract and a stipulated mode of compensation. The implied assumpsit on quantum
meruit, therefore, is inapplicable.
But Atty. Robinol seeks to impress upon the Court that he had received only the sum of P62,470.00 and not P75,000.00 claiming that five (5) officers of the Samahan had not
yet paid their shares totalling P12,500.00.
We agree with the Solicitor General that complainants' evidence on this score is the more credible and that he had, in fact, received the total sum of P75,000.00 inclusive of
the share of P12,500.00 of the five (5) officers of the Samahan. For, in the pleadings filed by Atty. Robinol himself in the civil case below, namely, the Motion for Execution on
5 June 1979; the Motion for Postponement on 31 August 1979; and the Motion to Set Hearing of Motion for Execution on 10 March 1980, he made mention of seven (7)
persons, who, as of that time, had not yet submitted their corresponding shares which list, however, did not include any of the five (5) officers of the Samahan.
Inevitable, therefore, is the conclusion that Atty. Robinol has rendered himself unfit to continue in the practice of law. He has not only violated his oath not to delay any man
for money and to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his clients. He has also brought the profession into disrepute with people who had reposed in it full faith and reliance
for the fulfillment of a life-time ambition to acquire a homelot they could call their own.
Re: Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor
In so far as Atty. Montemayor is, concerned, we agree with the findings of the Solicitor General that he has not exposed himself to any plausible charge of unethical conduct in
the exercise of his profession when he agreed to serve as counsel for the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-16433.
Of the thirty-two (32) plaintiffs in said civil case, twenty-one (21) had signed the first consensus of 6 March 1980 expressing their resolve to change their lawyer. In as much
as Atty. Robinol sought to exclude seven (7) of the plaintiffs (out of 32) for non-payment of their shares, only twenty-five (25) of them should be considered in determining the
majority. Consequently, twenty-one (21) out of twenty-five (25) is sufficient to make the said consensus binding. It is more than a simple majority.
Moreover, the following developments estop Atty. Robinol from questioning his discharge as counsel: On 17 March 1980 he was informed in writing by plaintiffs of the
termination of his services (Exhibit "5"). That was followed by another letter of 31 March 1980 of the same tenor (Exhibit "6"). In his Memorandum of 12 December 1985 and
during the proceedings before the lower Court on 5 June 1980 he had stated that he had no objection to Atty. Montemayor's appearance in Civil Case Q-16433. When the
latter did enter his appearance, therefore, on 20 March 1980 it was only after assuring himself that Atty. Robinol's services had been formally terminated. He had in no way
encroached upon the professional employment of a colleague.
There is no gainsaying that clients are free to change their counsel in a pending case at any time (Section 26, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and thereafter employ another lawyer
who may then enter his appearance. In this case, the plaintiffs in the civil suit below decided to change their lawyer. Atty. Robinol, for loss of trust and confidence. That act
was well within their prerogative.
In so far as the complaint for disbarment filed by Atty. Robinol against Atty. Montemayor is concerned, therefore, we find the same absolutely without merit.
ACCORDINGLY, 1) In Administrative Case No. 2144, Atty. Santiago R. Robinol is hereby DISBARRED for having violated his lawyer's oath to delay no man for money,
broken the fiduciary relation between lawyer and client, and proven himself unworthy to continue in the practice of law. By reason of his unethical actuations, he is hereby
declared to have forfeited his rights to attorney's fees and is ordered to return the amount of P75,000.00 to the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-16433 through the complainant in
the aforementioned Administrative Case.
2) Administrative Case. No. 2180 against Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor for disbarment is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the respective personal records of Attys. Santiago R. Robinol and Anacleto R. Montemayor.
This Resolution is immediately executory.

A.C. No. 6210, December 09, 2004

FEDERICO N. RAMOS, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. PATRICIO A. NGASEO, RESPONDENT.
 
 DECISION
YNARES-SATIAGO, J.:

This is a complaint for suspension of respondent Atty. Patricio A. Ngaseo for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Article 1491 of the Civil Code by
demanding from his client, complainant Federico N. Ramos, the delivery of 1,000 square meters of land, a litigated property, as payment for his appearance fees.

The facts as narrated by the complainant are as follows:

Sometime in 1998, complainant Federico Ramos went to respondent Atty. Patricio Ngaseo’s Makati office to engage his services as counsel in a case[1] involving a piece of
land in San Carlos, Pangasinan. Respondent agreed to handle the case for an acceptance fee of P20,000.00, appearance fee of P1,000.00 per hearing and the cost of meals,
transportation and other incidental expenses. Complainant alleges that he did not promise to pay the respondent 1,000 sq. m. of land as appearance fees.[2]

On September 16, 1999, complainant went to the respondent’s office to inquire about the status of the case. Respondent informed him that the decision was adverse to them
because a congressman exerted pressure upon the trial judge. Respondent however assured him that they could still appeal the adverse judgment and asked for the
additional amount of P3,850.00 and another P2,000.00 on September 26, 2000 as allowance for research made.[3]

Although an appeal was filed, complainant however charges the respondent of purposely failing to submit a copy of the summons and copy of the assailed decision.
Subsequently, complainant learned that the respondent filed the notice of appeal 3 days after the lapse of the reglementary period.

On January 29, 2003, complainant received a demand-letter from the respondent asking for the delivery of the 1,000 sq. m. piece of land which he allegedly promised as
payment for respondent’s appearance fee. In the same letter, respondent also threatened to file a case in court if the complainant would not confer with him and settle the
matter within 30 days.

Respondent alleged that sometime in the late 1997, a former client, Federico Ramos and his brother, Dionisio, went to his Makati office to engage his professional services in
connection with a 2-hectare parcel of land situated in San Carlos, Pangasinan which the complainant’s family lost 7 years earlier through an execution sale in favor of one
Alfredo T. Castro. Complainant, who was deaf and could only speak conversational Tagalog haltingly, was assisted by his brother Dionisio. They came all the way from
Pangasinan because no lawyer in San Carlos City was willing to handle the case. Complainant, through Dionisio, avers that he has consulted 2 local lawyers but did not
engage their services because they were demanding exorbitant fees. One local lawyer was willing to handle the case for at least one-half of the land involved as his attorney’s
fee, plus cash expenses, while the other asked for ¼ of the land in addition to a large sum of money. Respondent agreed to handle the case for an acceptance fee of
P60,000.00 plus an appearance fee of P3,000.00 per hearing. Complainant told him that he would consult his siblings on the matter.

Six months later, i.e., in April 1998, complainant, assisted by one Jose Castillo, went to respondent’s office to discuss the legal fees. Complainant, through Castillo, told
respondent that he was willing to pay an acceptance fee of P40,000.00, P20,000.00 of which shall be paid upon engagement and the remaining P20,000.00 to be paid after
their treasure hunt operations in Nueva Viscaya were terminated. Further, complainant offered, in lieu of P3,000.00 per appearance, 1,000 sq. m. of land from the land subject
matter of the case, if they win, or from another piece of property, if they lose. In addition, complainant also offered to defray the expenses for transportation, meals and other
incidental expenses. Respondent accepted the complainant’s offer.

Respondent claims that after the trial court dismissed Civil Case No. SCC 2128, he filed a timely notice of appeal and thereafter moved to be discharged as counsel because
he had colon cancer. Complainant, now assisted by one Johnny Ramos, implored respondent to continue handling the case, with an offer to double the 1,000 sq. m. piece of
land earlier promised and the remaining balance of P20,000.00 acceptance fee. Johnny Ramos made a written commitment and gave respondent’s secretary P2,000.00 of
the P3,850.00 expenses for the preparation of the appellant’s brief.

On July 18, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered a favorable decision ordering the return of the disputed 2-hectare land to the complainant and his siblings. The said decision
became final and executory on January 18, 2002. Since then complainant allegedly failed to contact respondent, which compelled him to send a demand letter on January 29,
2003.

On February 14, 2003, complainant filed a complaint before the IBP charging his former counsel, respondent Atty. Ngaseo, of violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for demanding the delivery of 1,000 sq. m. parcel of land which was the subject of litigation.

In a report dated July 18, 2003, IBP Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala found the respondent guilty of grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a lawyer in
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for 1 year.[4]

On August 30, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2003-47 the full text of which reads:[5]
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex “A”; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, with modification, and considering that respondent have violated the Code of Professional Responsibility for grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a lawyer
Atty. Patricio A. Ngaseo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months.
On December 11, 2003, respondent filed a petition for review assailing IBP Resolution No. XVI-2003-47 for having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction.[6]

Respondent argues that he did not violate Article 1491 of the Civil Code because when he demanded the delivery of the 1,000 sq. m. of land which was offered and promised
to him in lieu of the appearance fees, the case has been terminated, when the appellate court ordered the return of the 2-hectare parcel of land to the family of the
complainant.

Respondent further contends that he can collect the unpaid appearance fee even without a written contract on the basis of the principle of quantum meruit. He claims that his
acceptance and appearance fees are reasonable because a Makati based legal practitioner, would not handle a case for an acceptance fee of only P20,000.00 and P1,000.00
per court appearance.

Under Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code, lawyers are prohibited from acquiring either by purchase or assignment the property or rights involved which are the object of the
litigation in which they intervene by virtue of their profession.[7] The prohibition on purchase is all embracing to include not only sales to private individuals but also public or
judicial sales. The rationale advanced for the prohibition is that public policy disallows the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved, i.e., the relation of trust
and confidence and the peculiar control exercised by these persons.[8] It is founded on public policy because, by virtue of his office, an attorney may easily take advantage of
the credulity and ignorance of his client and unduly enrich himself at the expense of his client.[9] However, the said prohibition applies only if the sale or assignment of the
property takes place during the pendency of the litigation involving the client’s property. Consequently, where the property is acquired after the termination of the case, no
violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code attaches.

Invariably, in all cases where Article 1491 was violated, the illegal transaction was consummated with the actual transfer of the litigated property either by purchase or
assignment in favor of the prohibited individual. In Biascan v. Lopez, respondent was found guilty of serious misconduct and suspended for 6 months from the practice of law
when he registered a deed of assignment in his favor and caused the transfer of title over the part of the estate despite pendency of Special Proceedings No. 98037 involving
the subject property.[10] In the consolidated administrative cases of Valencia v. Cabanting,[11] the Court suspended respondent Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting for six (6) months
from the practice of law when he purchased his client's property which was still the subject of a pending certiorari proceeding.

In the instant case, there was no actual acquisition of the property in litigation since the respondent only made a written demand for its delivery which the complainant refused
to comply. Mere demand for delivery of the litigated property does not cause the transfer of ownership, hence, not a prohibited transaction within the contemplation of Article
1491. Even assuming arguendo that such demand for delivery is unethical, respondent’s act does not fall within the purview of Article 1491. The letter of demand dated
January 29, 2003 was made long after the judgment in Civil Case No. SCC-2128 became final and executory on January 18, 2002.

We note that the report of the IBP Commissioner, as adopted by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XVI-2003-47, does not clearly specify which acts of the
respondent constitute gross misconduct or what provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility have been violated. We find the recommended penalty of suspension for
6 months too harsh and not proportionate to the offense committed by the respondent. The power to disbar or suspend must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear
case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of the bar will disbarment or suspension be imposed
as a penalty.[12] All considered, a reprimand is deemed sufficient and reasonable.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Patricio A. Ngaseo is found guilty of conduct unbecoming a member of the legal profession in violation of Rule 20.04
of Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is REPRIMANDED with a warning that repetition of the same act will be dealt with more severely.

G.R. No. 210554, August 05, 2015

DAVID YU KIMTENG, MARY L. YU, WINNIE L. YU, VIVIAN L. YU, ROSA GAN, LILIAN CHUA WOO YUKIMTENG, SANTOS YU, MARCELO YU, AND SIN CHIAO YU
LIM, PETITIONERS, VS. ATTY. WALTER T. YOUNG, ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR., ATTY. JOVITO GAMBOL, AND ATTY. DAN REYNALD R. MAGAT, PRACTICING
LAW UNDER THE FIRM NAME, YOUNG REVILLA GAMBOL & MAGAT, AND JUDGE OFELIA L. CALO, PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 211 OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, MANDALUYONG CITY, RESPONDENTS.
 
 DECISION
LEONEN, J.:

A disbarred lawyer's name cannot be part of a firm's name. A lawyer who appears under a firm name that contains a disbarred lawyer's name commits indirect contempt of
court.

Through this Petition,[1] petitioners ask that law firm, Young Revilla Gambol & Magat, and Judge Ofelia L. Calo (Judge Calo), be cited in contempt of court under Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court.[2] Anastacio Revilla, Jr. (Revilla) was disbarred on December 2009 in an En Banc Resolution of this court in A.C. No. 7054 entitled Que v. Atty. Revilla, Jr.[3]

David Yu Kimteng, Mary L. Yu, Winnie L. Yu, Vivian L. Yu, Rosa Gan, Lilian Chua Woo Yukimteng, Santos Yu, Marcelo Yu, and Sin Chiao Yu Lim are the majority
stockholders of Ruby Industrial Corporation.[4]

In Majority Stockholders of Ruby Industrial Corporation v. Lim, et al.,[5] this court ordered the liquidation of Ruby Industrial Corporation and transferred the case to the
appropriate Regional Trial Court branch to supervise the liquidation.[6]

The liquidation was raffled to Branch 211 of the Regional Trial Court in Mandaluyong City,[7] presided by Judge Calo.[8]

Walter T. Young (Atty. Young), Jovito Gambol (Atty. Gambol), and Dan Reynald Magat (Atty. Magat) are lawyers practicing under the firm, Young Revilla Gambol & Magat. [9]
They entered their appearance in the liquidation proceedings as counsels for the liquidator.[10]

An Opposition[11] was filed against the appearance of Young Revilla Gambol & Magat on the ground that Revilla was already disbarred in 2009. [12]

Young Revilla Gambol & Magat filed a Reply[13] to the Opposition stating that the firm opted to retain Revilla's name in the firm name even after he had been disbarred, with
the retention serving as an act of charity.[14]

Judge Calo overruled the opposition to the appearance of Young Revilla Gambol & Magat and stated that Atty. Young could still appear for the liquidator as long as his
appearance was under the Young Law Firm and not under Young Revilla Gambol & Magat.[15] Young Law Firm does not exist.

Thus, petitioners David Yu Kimteng, Mary L. Yu, Winnie L. Yu, Vivian L. Yu, Rosa Gan, Lilian Chua Woo Yukimteng, Santos Yu, Marcelo Yu, and Sin Chiao Yu Lim filed this
Petition under Rule 71 to cite respondents Atty. Walter T. Young, Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr., Atty. Jovito Gambol, Atty. Dan Reynald R. Magat, and Judge Ofelia L. Calo in
contempt.

This court required respondents to comment on the Petition.[16] Respondent law firm Young Revilla Gambol & Magat filed its Comment [17] on April 14, 2014, while respondent
Atty. Gambol filed a separate Comment.[18]

On April 16, 2014, petitioners filed a Motion for Leave to File Consolidated Reply.[19] This was granted in the Resolution[20] dated June 18, 2014. In the same Resolution, this
court denied petitioners' Motion to Consider Case Submitted without Comment from [Judge Calo][21] and ordered the parties to await Judge Calo's comment.[22]

Counsel for petitioners subsequently filed a Manifestation,[23] informing this court that they have yet to receive a copy of Judge Calo's Comment. [24] No Comment was filed by
Judge Calo.

Petitioners cite San Luis v. Pineda[25] and United States v. Ney, et al.[26] to support their argument that the use of a disbarred lawyer's name in the firm name is tantamount to
contempt of court.[27]

Private Respondents Atty. Young and Atty. Magat counter that they maintained Revilla's name in the firm name for sentimental reasons.[28]

Atty. Young and Atty. Magat explained that they did not intend to deceive the public [29] and that in any case, the retention of Revilla's name "does not give added value to the
[law firm] nor does it enhance the standing of the member lawyers thereof."[30]

They further argue that:

The non-deletion of [Anastacio E. Revilla's] name in the Young Law Firm's name is no more misleading than including the names of dead or retired partners in a law firm's
name. It is more for sentimental reasons. It is a fraternal expression to a former brother in the profession that the Private Respondents fully understand, his [referring to
Revilla] principled albeit quixotic advocacy.[31]
Private respondents point out that the Balgos Law Firm is derailing the liquidation of Ruby Industrial Corporation by filing this Petition for contempt because the Balgos Law
Firm resents that its nominee was not elected as liquidator.[32] Private respondents add that petitioners have continuously blocked Ruby Industrial Corporation's unsecured
creditors from obtaining relief, as shown by the number of times that Ruby Industrial Corporation's cases have reached this court.[33]

Private respondents also raise the issue of forum shopping in their Comment because petitioners allegedly filed a disbarment Complaint against them before the Commission
on Bar Discipline, Integrated Bar of the Philippines. One of the grounds for disbarment cited by petitioners was the use of Revilla's name in their firm name.[34]

Private respondent Atty. Gambol filed a separate Comment,[35] arguing that from the time Revilla was disbarred, he no longer practiced law.[36]

Private respondent Atty. Gambol stated that he passed the 1990 Bar Examination but took his oath in July 2006. [37] He is a junior member of the Young Revilla Magat &
Gambol law firm and "has no power and/or authority [to decide] who should be removed from the firm's name[.]" [38]

Private respondent Atty. Gambol argues that in all the cases he handled after Re villa's disbarment, he omitted Re villa's name from the firm name in the pleadings that he
signed. Such deletion was through his own initiative.[39]

Petitioners filed their Reply,[40] with petitioners addressing respondents' allegations that they remained silent on the disbarment case they had filed by citing Rule 139-B,
Section 18 of the Rules of Court,[41] which provides that:
Rule 139-B. Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys

....

Section 18. Confidentiality. — Proceedings against attorneys shall be private and confidential. However, the final order of the Supreme Court shall be published like its
decisions in other cases.
Petitioners argue that liability for contempt is separate from disciplinary action; hence, no forum shopping was committed. [42]

Petitioners did not address private respondents' allegations regarding the delay in the liquidation of Ruby Industrial Corporation.
The issues in this case are:

First, whether private respondents Atty. Walter T. Young, Atty. Jovito Gambol, and Atty. Dan Reynald R. Magat are in contempt of court when they continued to use
respondent Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr.'s name in their firm name even after his disbarment;

Second, whether private respondents Atty. Walter T. Young, Atty. Jovito Gambol, and Atty. Dan Reynald R. Magat are in contempt of court for deliberately allowing a
disbarred lawyer to engage in the practice of law;

Third, whether private respondent Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. is in contempt of court for continuing to practice law even after disbarment;

Fourth, whether public respondent Judge Ofelia L. Calo is in contempt of court when she held that respondent Atty. Walter T. Young can appear in court as long as it is under
the Young Law Firm, which is a non-existent firm; and

Lastly, whether the filing of this Petition despite the pendency of a disbarment complaint before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines constitutes forum shopping.

II

Rule 71, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing.— After charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment
thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect
contempt:

(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions;

(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real
property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of
executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;

(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule;

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;

(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;

(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;

(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him. (Emphasis supplied)
This court has defined contempt of court as:
a willful disregard or disobedience of a public authority. In its broad sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or orders of a legislative or judicial body or
an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent language in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its proceedings or to impair the respect due to
such a body. In its restricted and more usual sense, contempt comprehends a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of a court. The phrase contempt of court is generic,
embracing within its legal signification a variety of different acts.[43] (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
In this case, respondents committed acts that are considered indirect contempt under Section 3 of Rule 71. In addition, respondents disregarded the Code of Professional
Responsibility when they retained the name of respondent Revilla in their firm name.

Canon 3, Rule 3.02 states:

Rule 3.02. In the choice of a firm name, no false, misleading or assumed name shall be used. The continued use of the name of a deceased partner is permissible provided
that the firm indicates in all its communications that said partner is deceased.
Respondents argue that the use of respondent Revilla's name is "no more misleading than including the names of dead or retired partners in a law firm's name."[44]

III

Maintaining a disbarred lawyer's name in the firm name is different from using a deceased partner's name in the firm name. Canon 3, Rule 3.02 allows the use of a deceased
partner's name as long as there is an indication that the partner is deceased. This ensures that the public is not misled. On the other hand, the retention of a disbarred
lawyer's name in the firm name may mislead the public into believing that the lawyer is still authorized to practice law.

The use of a deceased partner's name in the firm name was the issue in the consolidated cases Petition for Authority to Continue Use of the Firm Name "Sycip, Salazar,
Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo" and In the matter of the Petition for Authority to Continue Use of the Firm Name "Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta & Reyes."[45] Petitioners
prayed that they be allowed to continue including Atty. Alexander Sycip's and Atty. Herminio Ozaeta's names in their firm names.[46] This court denied the petitions, explaining
that there is a possibility of deception in the use of a deceased partner's name.[47] Also, Article 1815 of the Civil Code[48] shows that the partners in a partnership should be
"living persons who can be subjected to liability."[49] Further, the use of a deceased partner's name is not a custom in the Philippines. [50] On the contrary, the local custom
shows that the firm name usually identifies the senior members or partners of a law firm.[51] Justice Aquino dissented, stating that:
I am of the opinion that the petition may be granted with the condition that it be indicated in the letterheads of the two firms (as the case may be) that Alexander Sycip, former
Justice Ozaeta and Herminio Ozaeta are dead or the period when they served as partners should be stated therein.

Obviously, the purpose of the two firms in continuing the use of the names of their deceased founders is to retain the clients who had customarily sought the legal services of
Attorneys Sycip and Ozaeta and to benefit from the goodwill attached to the names of those respected and esteemed law practitioners. That is a legitimate motivation.

The retention of their names is not illegal per se. That practice was followed before the war by the law firm of James Ross. Notwithstanding the death of Judge Ross, the
founder of the law firm of Ross, Lawrence, Selph and Carrascoso, his name was retained in the firm name with an indication of the year when he died. No one complained
that the retention of the name of Judge Ross in the firm name was illegal or unethical.[52]
The use of a deceased partner's name in a law firm's name was allowed upon the effectivity of the Code of Professional Responsibility, with the requirement that "the firm
indicates in all its communications that said partner is deceased."[53]

On the other hand, this court has ruled that the use of the name of a person who is not authorized to practice law constitutes contempt of court.

In San Luis v. Pineda, this court has held that "[n]eedless to say, [the] practice of law by one who is disbarred constitutes contempt of court." [54] United States v. Ney, et al.
involved J. Garcia Bosque who was denied admission to the bar because he chose to remain a Spanish subject during the cession of the Philippines under the Treaty of
Paris.[55] Bosque entered into an arrangement with Ney, a practicing attorney, and established "Ney & Bosque." [56] Bosque did not personally appear in courts but the papers
of their office were signed "Ney and Bosque-C.W. Ney, Abogado."[57] The matter was referred to the then Attorney-General, and contempt proceedings were instituted.[58] At
that time, Section 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure defined contempt of court as:
1. Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or judge;

2. Misbehavior of an officer of the court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions.[59]
This court found that Atty. Ney was in contempt of court and held that:
Under the second subdivision of [Section 232], Bosque is obviously not answerable, inasmuch as he was not an officer of the court. On the other hand, under this subdivision,
the defendant Ney, as an admitted attorney, is liable if his conduct amounted to misbehavior. We are of the opinion that it did. In the offense of Bosque in holding himself out
as a general practitioner Ney participated, and for the improper signature of the pleadings he was chiefly and personally responsible.[60]
In Cambaliza v. Atty. Cristal-Tenorio,[61] Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-Tenorio used a letterhead indicating that Felicisimo Tenorio, Jr. was a senior partner in the Cristal-Tenorio
Law Office when, in fact, he was not a lawyer.[62] This court held that:
A lawyer who allows a non-member of the Bar to misrepresent himself as a lawyer and to practice law is guilty of violating Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which read as follows:
Canon 9 — A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law.

Rule 9.01 — A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding oneself out to the public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of livelihood or in consideration of his
services. Holding one's self out as a lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that purpose like identifying oneself as attorney, appearing in court in representation of a client,
or associating oneself as a partner of a law office for the general practice of law. Such acts constitute unauthorized practice of law.

The lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the
practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege
subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the
incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is
attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible the
unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the
unauthorized practice of law.[63] (Citations omitted)
From the time respondent Revilla was disbarred in 2009, it appears that no efforts were exerted to remove his name from the firm name. Thus, respondents Atty. Young and
Atty. Magat are held liable for contempt of court.

Rule 71, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the imposable penalties for indirect contempt:
SEC. 7. Punishment for indirect contempt.—If the respondent is adjudged guilty of indirect contempt committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or
higher rank, he may be punished by a fine not exceeding thirty thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or both. If he is adjudged guilty of contempt
committed against a lower court, he may be punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) month, or both. If the contempt
consists in the violation of a writ of injunction, temporary restraining order or status quo order, he may also be ordered to make complete restitution to the party injured by such
violation of the property involved or such amount as may be alleged and proved.

The writ of execution, as in ordinary civil actions, shall issue for the enforcement of a judgment imposing a fine unless the court otherwise provides. (Emphasis supplied)
In view of Rule 71, Section 7, a fine of P30,000.00 each is imposed on respondents Atty. Young and Atty. Magat.

IV

Respondent Atty. Gambol filed a separate Comment, explaining that he dropped respondent Re villa's name from the firm name in the pleadings that he filed in several courts.
Respondent Atty. Gambol's explanation is supported by the allegations in the Comment filed by respondents Atty. Young and Atty. Magat stating:
In fact, when co-Private Respondent Gambol, initially cowed perhaps, by the same intimidation worked upon him by the Complainants' counsel in another case, asked
permission to delete [Anastacio E. Revilla's] name in the Young Law Firm's name in the pleadings that he (i.e. Private Respondent Gambol) would subsequently file,
Respondent Young allowed him to do so.[64]
This court recognizes respondent Atty. Gambol's effort to avoid misleading the public by removing respondent Revilla's name in the pleadings he filed. Thus, the Complaint
against him is dismissed.

Petitioners included Revilla as a respondent, but they did not serve copies of the Petition and subsequent pleadings upon him. Respondent Revilla also did not receive a copy
of this court's Resolution requiring respondents to comment. Thus, this court shall refrain from ruling upon respondent Revilla's liability.

With regard to respondent Judge Calo, petitioners pray that she be cited in contempt for allowing respondent Atty. Young's appearance as long as it was under the Young Law
Firm. A photocopy of the Order[65] was attached to the Petition. A portion of Judge Calo's Order states:
Although this court grants the appearance of Atty. Walter Young for the Liquidator, his appearance however shall be allowed only if in the name of the Young Law Firm,
managed by the said counsel, and not under the name of the Law Firm of Young Revilla Gambol and Magat. This is to avoid any misconception that a disbarred lawyer,
Revilla, continues to practice law.[66]
Petitioners argue that respondent Judge Calo's Order is an indirect violation of "the proscription against the participation of ... disbarred lawyer[s]" [67] in court. Further, the
Young Law Firm does not exist.[68]

Respondent Judge Calo was required to file a Comment on the Resolution[69] dated February 24, 2014, but she did not comply.

From petitioners' allegations, it appears that respondent Judge Calo committed an error in judgment when she allowed respondent Atty. Young's appearance under the Young
Law Firm. However, this Petition to cite respondent Judge Calo in contempt is not the proper remedy. Maylas, Jr. v. Judge Sese[70] discussed the remedies available to
litigants as follows:
[T]he law provides ample judicial remedies against errors or irregularities being committed by a Trial Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies against
errors or irregularities which may be regarded as normal in nature (i.e., error in appreciation or admission of evidence, or in construction or application of procedural or
substantive law or legal principle) include a motion for reconsideration (or after rendition of a judgment or final order, a motion for new trial), and appeal. The extraordinary
remedies against error or irregularities which may be deemed extraordinary in character (i.e., whimsical, capricious, despotic exercise of power or neglect of duty, etc.) are
inter alia the special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, a petition for change of venue, as the case may be.

Now, the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against Judges are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for,
these judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in the corresponding action or
proceeding, are pre-requisites for the taking of other measures against the persons of the judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or criminal nature. It is only after
the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil or administrative
liability may be said to have opened, or closed.[71] (Citation omitted)
Whether petitioners availed themselves of judicial remedies was not stated in their Petition. Nevertheless, this court cannot ignore the possible effect of respondent Judge
Calo's Order. Thus, the Complaint against respondent Judge Calo shall be re-docketed as an administrative matter. Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
SECTION 11. . . . The Supreme Court en bane shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who
actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
Also, Rule 4, Section 3(a) of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court [72] provides that the administrative functions of this court include "disciplinary and administrative matters
involving justices, judges, and court personnel[.]"

VI

As to the allegation of forum shopping, petitioners do not deny that they filed a Complaint for disbarment. They argue, however, that they did not mention the disbarment
proceedings against respondents in view of Rule 139-B, Section 18 of the Rules of Court, which states that disbarment proceedings are private and confidential.[73] In addition,
a Petition for contempt under Rule 71 and a Complaint for disbarment are different from each other.

The filing of a Complaint for disbarment before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the filing of this Petition for contempt under Rule 71 do not constitute forum shopping.
Forum shopping has been defined as:
when a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the
same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court.[74]
The elements of forum shopping are:
(a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions;
(b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and

(c) the identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the
action under consideration.[75]
This court has explained that disbarment proceedings are sui generis, and are not akin to civil or criminal cases.[76] A disbarment proceeding "is intended to cleanse the ranks
of the legal profession of its undesirable members in order to protect the public and the courts." [77]

Also, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines' findings are recommendatory, and the power to sanction erring members of the bar lies with this court.[78]

As discussed by this court in Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan:[79]

The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is broader [than] the power to punish for contempt. Contempt of court may be committed both by lawyers and
non-lawyers, both in and out of court. Frequently, where the contemnor is a lawyer, the contumacious conduct also constitutes professional misconduct which calls into play
the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. Where the respondent is a lawyer, however, the Supreme Court's disciplinary authority over lawyers may come into play
whether or not the misconduct with which the respondent is charged also constitutes contempt of court. The power to punish for contempt of court does not exhaust the scope
of disciplinary authority of the Court over lawyers. The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is but corollary to the Court's exclusive power of admission
to the Bar. A lawyers [sic] is not merely a professional but also an officer of the court and as such, he is called upon to share in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice
and resolving disputes in society. Any act on his part which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede and degrade the administration of justice constitutes both professional
misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary action against him and contumacious conduct warranting application of the contempt power.[80] (Citations omitted)
WHEREFORE, respondents Atty. Walter T. Young and Atty. Dan Reynald R. Magat are found in contempt of court for using a disbarred lawyer's name in their firm name and
are meted a fine of P30,000.00 each.

The Complaint against Atty. Jovito Gambol is DISMISSED. This is without prejudice to any disciplinary liabilities of respondents Atty. Walter T. Young, Atty. Dan Reynald R.
Magat, and Judge Ofelia L. Calo.

The counsels are ordered to make the necessary amendments in relation to the use of the disbarred lawyer's name including changes in their signage, notice of appearances,
stationeries, and like material within a period of five (5) days from receipt.

The Complaint against respondent Judge Ofelia L. Calo is also ordered re-docketed as an administrative matter.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to private respondents' personal records as attorneys, to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and to the Office of the Court Administrator for their information and guidance.

G.R. No. 133090, January 19, 2001

REXIE EFREN A. BUGARING AND ROYAL BECHTEL BUILDERS, INC., PETITIONERS, VS. HON. DOLORES S. ESPAÑOL, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE
OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 90, IMUS, CAVITE, RESPONDENT.
 
 D E C I S I O N
DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated March 6, 1998 of the Court of Appeals [1] affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch
90, Imus, Cavite, declaring petitioner Rexie Efren A. Bugaring guilty in direct contempt of court.

The incident subject of the petition occurred during a hearing held on December 5, 1996 of Civil Case No. 1266-96 entitled "Royal Becthel[2] Builders, Inc. vs. Spouses Luis
Alvaran and Beatriz Alvaran, et al.", for Annulment of Sale and Certificates of Title, Specific Performance and Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order in the sala of respondent judge Dolores S. Español of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite.

Pursuant to a motion filed by the previous counsel of Royal Bechtel Builders, Inc., the trial court issued an order on February 27, 1996 directing the Register of Deeds of the
Province of Cavite to annotate at the back of certain certificates of title a notice of lis pendens. Before the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite could comply with said
order, the defendant Spouses Alvaran on April 15, 1996, filed a motion to cancel lis pendens. On July 19, 1996, petitioner, the newly appointed counsel of Royal Bechtel
Builders, Inc., filed an opposition to the motion to cancel lis pendens. On August 16, 1996, the motion to cancel lis pendens was granted by the court. Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration, which was opposed by the defendants. On November 5, 1996, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Resolve, and on November 6, 1996, filed a Rejoinder to
Opposition and a Motion for Contempt of Court.[3]

During the hearing of the motion for contempt of court held on December 5, 1996, the following incident transpired:
ATTY. BUGARING: For the plaintiff, your Honor, we are ready.

ATTY CORDERO: Same appearance for the defendant, your Honor.

ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor please, we are ready with respect to the prosecution of our motion for contempt, your Honor. M
properly notified for today's hearing.

COURT: Will you call on the Register of Deeds.

INTERPRETER: Atty. Diosdado Concepcion, He is here, your Honor.

ATTY. BUGARING: We are ready, your Honor.

COURT: There is a motion for contempt in connection with the order of this Court which directed your office to register lis
Royal Becthel Builder, Inc. versus spouses Luis Alvaran and Beatriz Alvaran, et al.

ATTY. CONCEPCION: Your Honor, I just received this morning at ten o' clock [in the morning] the subpoena.

ATTY. BUGARING: May we put it on record that as early as November 6, 1996, the Office of the Register of Deeds was furnished
record will bear it out. Until now they did not file any answer, opposition or pleadings with respect to this motion.

ATTY. CONCEPCION: Well I was not informed because I am not the Register of Deeds. I am only the Deputy Register of Deeds an
regarding this case. As a matter of fact I was surprised when I received this morning the subpoena, your Honor.

ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor please, may we put that on record that the manifestation of the respondent that he was not informed
COURT: That is recorded. This is a Court of record and everything that you say here is recorded.

ATTY. BUGARING: Yes your Honor please, we know that but we want to be specific because we will be [filing] a case against this re
with this manifestation of the Deputy of the Register of Deeds that is irregularity in the performance of the official

COURT: Counsel, the Court would like to find out who this fellow who is taking the video recording at this proceed
proceedings should be taken.

ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor, my Assistant. I did not advise him to take a video he just accompanied me this morning.

COURT: Right, but the video recording is prepared process and you should secure the permission of this Court.

ATTY. BUGARING: Actually, I did not instruct him to take some video tape.

COURT: Why would he be bringing camera if you did not give him the go signal that shots should be done.

ATTY. BUGARING: This Court should not presume that, your Honor please, we just came from an occasion last night and I am no
Honor please, that the contents of that tape is other matters your Honor please. I was just surprised why he too
of this Court if that offend this Court your Honor please.

COURT: It is not offending because this is a public proceedings but the necessary authority or permission should be secu

ATTY. BUGARING: In fact I instructed him to go out, your Honor.

COURT: After the court have noticed that he is taking a video tape.

ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor, in fact that is not my personal problem your Honor please, that is personal to that guy your Hon

COURT: That is very shallow, don't give that alibi.

ATTY. BUGARING: At any rate, your Honor please, we are going to mark our documentary evidence as part of our motion for contem

COURT: What has the Register of Deeds got to say with this matter?

ATTY. CONCEPCION: Well as I have said before, I have not received any motion regarding this contempt you are talking. I am willing n

ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor I am still of the prosecution stage, it is not yet the defense. This is a criminal proceedings, contempt

ATTY. CONCEPCION: Your Honor please, may I ask for the assistance from the Fiscal.

COURT: If this is going to proceed, we need the presence of a Fiscal or a counsel for the Register of Deeds.

ATTY. CONCEPCION: Can I appoint an outside lawyer not a Fiscal but a private counsel, your Honor.

COURT: That is at your pleasure. The Court will consider that you should be amply represented.

ATTY. CONCEPCION: As a matter of fact I have a lawyer here, Atty. Barzaga if he is willing

ATTY. BARZAGA[4]: Yes, your Honor, I will just review the records.

ATTY. BUGARING: Anyway your Honor please, I will not yet present my witness but I will just mark our documentary exhibits whic
Honor please....

COURT: You wait for a minute counsel because there is a preparation being done by newly appointed counsel of the r
hired counsel of the register of deeds and the respondent of this contempt proceedings. How much time do yo
call the other case in the meanwhile.

ATTY. BARZAGA: Second call, your Honor.

--------------------------------

COURT: Are you ready Atty. Barzaga?

ATTY. BARZAGA: Yes, your Honor. Well actually your Honor, after reviewing the record of the case your Honor, I noticed that the
1966 and in paragraph 6 thereof, your Honor it is stated that, `the record of the case shows up to the filing of
Diosdado Concepcion of the Office of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite, did not comply with the
respectively.' However, your Honor, Atty. Diosdado Concepcion has shown to me a letter coming from Atty. Efr
the Register regarding this notice of Lis Pendens pertaining to TCT Nos. T-519248, 519249 and 519250 and th
pendens clearly shows that it has been already entered in the book of primary entry. We would like also to i
Contempt of Court was filed on November 6, 1996. The letter for the annotation of the lis pendens was made by
your Honor. However, your Honor, as early as August 16, 1996 an Order has already been issued by the Hon. C
the motion of the defendant is GRANTED and the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite, is hereby directe
back of Certificate of Title Nos. 519248, 51949 (sic) and 51950 (sic).'

ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor please, may we proceed your Honor, will first mark our documentary evidence.

COURT: You wait until the Court allows you to do what you want to do, okay. The counsel has just made manifestation,
finished and then wait for the direction of this Court what to do to have an orderly proceedings in this case.

ATTY. BARZAGA: Considering your Honor, that the issues appear to be a little bit complicated your Honor, considering that the
already been revoked by the Hon. Court your Honor, we just request that we be given a period of ten days fr
written opposition your Honor.

COURT: Counsel, will you direct your attention to the manifestation filed earlier by Atty. Tutaan in connection with the refu
because of certain reasons. According to the manifestation of Atty. Tutaan and it is appearing in the earlier part
there was a pending subdivision plan, it is so stated. I think it was dated March, 1996. May I have the record plea

ATTY. BARZAGA: Yes, your Honor.

COURT: This Court would like to be enlightened with respect to that matter.

ATTY. BARZAGA: Well, according to Atty. Diosdado Concepcion he could already explain this, your Honor.

COURT: Have it properly addressed as part of the manifestation so that this court can be guided accordingly. Because th
that. After the submission of the .... what are you suppose to submit?

ATTY. BARZAGA: Comment your Honor, on the motion to cite Atty. Diosdado Concepcion in contempt of Court.

COURT: After the submission of the Comment and furnishing a copy of the comment to the counsel for the plaintiff, this C
time within which to submit his reply.

ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor please, it is the position of this representation your Honor please, that we will be marking first our d
today, your Honor please.

COURT: If you are going to mark your evidence and they do not have their comment yet what are we going to receive as

ATTY. BUGARING: If your Honor please...

COURT: Will you listen to the Court and just do whatever you have to do after the submission of the comment.

ATTY. BUGARING: I am listening, your Honor please, but the record will show that the motion for contempt was copy furnished with

COURT: Precisely, if you are listening then you will get what the Court would want to do. This should be an orderly proce
comment has to be in first then in your reply you can submit your evidence to rebut the argument that is going
hear the case smoothly.

ATTY. BUGARING: My point here your Honor please, is that the respondent had been long time furnished of this contempt proceedi
due time in accordance with the rules and because it is scheduled for trial, we are ready to mark our evidence an

COURT: (Banging the gavel) Will you listen.

ATTY. BUGARING: I am listening, your Honor.

COURT: And this Court declares that you are out of order.

ATTY. BUGARING: Well, if that is the contention of the Court your Honor please, we are all officers of the Court, your Honor, please
Honor.

COURT: If you know your procedure then you follow the procedure of the Court first and then do whatever you want.
ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor please, because we could feel the antagonistic approach of the Court to this representation
record that I will be filing an inhibition to this Hon. Court.

COURT: Do that right away. (Banging the gavel)

ATTY. BUGARING: Because we could not find any sort of justice in town.

COURT: Do that right away.

ATTY. BUGARING: We are ready to present our witness and we are deprive to present our witness.

COURT: You have presented a witness and it was an adverse witness that was presented.

ATTY. BUGARING: I did not.

COURT: With respect to this, the procedure of the Court is for the respondent to file his comment.

ATTY. BUGARING: Well your Honor please, at this point in time I don't want to comment on anything but I reserve my right to inhibit

COURT: You can do whatever you want.

ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor, that is our prerogative your Honor.

COURT: As far as this Court is concerned it is going to follow the rules.

ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor, we know all the rules.

COURT: Yes, you know your rules that's why you are putting the cart ahead of the horse.

ATTY. BUGARING :No your Honor, I've been challenged by this Court that I know better than this Court. Modestly (sic) aside your H
your Honor.

COURT: Okay, okay, do that, do that. I am going to cite you for contempt of Court. (Banging the gavel) You call the police
Sheriff)

ATTY. BUGARING: I am just manifesting and arguing in favor of my client your Honor please.

COURT: You have been given enough time and you have been abusing the discretion of this Court.

ATTY. BUGARING: I am very sorry your Honor, if that is the appreciation of the Court but this is one way I am protecting my client, yo

COURT: That is not the way to protect your client that is an abuse of the discretion of this Court. (Turning to the Sheriff)
Rollo)
Hence, in an Order dated December 5, 1996, Judge Español cited petitioner in direct contempt of court, thus:
During the hearing of this case, plaintiffs and counsel were present together with one (1) operating a video camera who was taking pictures of the proceedings of the case
while counsel, Atty. Rexie Efren Bugaring was making manifestation to the effect that he was ready to mark his documentary evidence pursuant to his Motion to cite (in
contempt of court) the Deputy Register of Deeds of Cavite, Diosdado Concepcion.

The Court called the attention of said counsel who explained that he did not cause the appearance of the cameraman to take pictures, however, he admitted that they came
from a function, and that was the reason why the said cameraman was in tow with him and the plaintiffs. Notwithstanding the flimsy explanation given, the counsel sent out the
cameraman after the Court took exception to the fact that although the proceedings are open to the public and that it being a court of record, and since its permission was not
sought, such situation was an abuse of discretion of the Court.

When the respondent, Deputy Register of Deeds Concepcion manifested that he needed the services of counsel and right then and there appointed Atty. Elpidio Barzaga to
represent him, the case was allowed to be called again. On the second call, Atty. Bugaring started to insist that he be allowed to mark and present his documentary evidence
in spite of the fact that Atty. Barzaga was still manifesting that he be allowed to submit a written pleading for his client, considering that the Motion has so many ramifications
and the issues are complicated.

At this point, Atty. Bugaring was insisting that he be allowed to mark his documentary evidence and was raring to argue as in fact he was already perorating despite the fact
that Atty. Barzaga has not yet finished with his manifestation. As Atty. Bugaring appears to disregard orderly procedure, the Court directed him to listen and wait for the ruling
of the Court for an orderly proceeding.

While claiming that he was listening, he would speak up anytime he felt like doing so. Thus, the Court declared him out of order, at which point, Atty. Bugaring flared up and
uttered words insulting the Court; such as: `that he knows better than the latter as he has won all his cases of certiorari in the appellate Courts, that he knows better the Rules
of Court; that he was going to move for the inhibition of the Presiding Judge for allegedly being antagonistic to his client,' and other invectives were hurled to the discredit of
the Court.

Thus, in open court, Atty. Bugaring was declared in direct contempt and order the Court's sheriff to arrest and place him under detention.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and the fact that Atty. Rexie Efren Bugaring committed an open defiance, even challenging the Court in a disrespectful, arrogant, and
contumacious manner, he is declared in direct contempt of Court and is sentenced to three (3) days imprisonment and payment of a fine of P3,000.00. His detention shall
commence immediately at the Municipal Jail of Imus, Cavite.[5]
Pursuant to said Order, the petitioner served his three (3) day sentence at the Imus Municipal Jail, and paid the fine of P3,000.00.[6]

While serving the first day of his sentence on December 5, 1996, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order citing him in direct contempt of court. The next day,
December 6, 1996, petitioner filed another motion praying for the resolution of his motion for reconsideration. Both motions were never resolved and petitioner was released
on December 8, 1996.[7]

To clear his name in the legal circle and the general public, petitioner filed a petition before the Court of Appeals praying for the annulment of the Order dated December 5,
1996 citing him in direct contempt of court and the reimbursement of the fine of P3,000.00 on grounds that respondent Judge Dolores S. Español had no factual and legal
basis in citing him in direct contempt of court, and that said Order was null and void for being in violation of the Constitution and other pertinent laws and jurisprudence.[8]

The Court of Appeals found that from a thorough reading of the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing held on December 5, 1996, it was obvious that the petitioner
was indeed arrogant, at times impertinent, too argumentative, to the extent of being disrespectful, annoying and sarcastic towards the court.[9] It affirmed the order of the
respondent judge, but found that the fine of P3,000.00 exceeded the limit of P2,000.00 prescribed by the Rules of Court, [10] and ordered the excess of P1,000.00 returned to
petitioner. On March 6, 1998, it rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed order dated December 5, 1996 issued by the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED with the
modification that the excess fine of P1,000.00 is ORDERED RETURNED to the petitioner.
Before us, petitioner ascribes to the Court of Appeals this lone error:
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE ASSAILED ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH TO PETITIONER'S
SUBMISSIONS SMACKS OF OPPRESSION AND ABUSE OF AUTHORITY, HENCE IT COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR OF LAW IN ITS QUESTIONED DECISION. [11]
Petitioner insists that a careful examination of the transcript of stenographic notes of the subject proceedings would reveal that the contempt order issued by respondent judge
had no factual and legal basis. It would also show that he was polite and respectful towards the court as he always addressed the court with the phrase "your honor please."

We disagree.

Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as amended by Administrative Circular No. 22-95 provides:
Direct contempt punished summarily. - A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the
same, including disrespect toward the court or judge, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or
deposition when lawfully required to do so, may be summarily adjudged in contempt by such court or judge and punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos or
imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it be a superior court, or a judge thereof, or by a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment not exceeding
one (1) day, or both, if it be an inferior court.
We agree with the statement of the Court of Appeals that petitioner's alleged deference to the trial court in consistently addressing the respondent judge as "your Honor
please" throughout the proceedings is belied by his behavior therein:
19. the veiled threat to file a petition for certiorari against the trial court (pp. 14-15, tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 41-42, Rollo) is contrary to Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which mandates that "a lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts".

20. the hurled uncalled for accusation that the respondent judge was partial in favor of the other party (pp. 13-14, tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 40-41, Rollo) is against Rule
11.04, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins lawyers from attributing to a judge "motives not supported by the record or have no
materiality to the case".

21. behaving without due regard to the trial court's order to maintain order in the proceedings (pp. 9-13, tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 36-40, Rollo) is in utter disregard to Canon
1 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which makes it a lawyer's duty to "maintain towards the courts (1) respectful attitude" in order to maintain its importance in
the administration of justice, and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates lawyers to "observe and maintain the respect due to the
Courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others".

22. behaving without due regard or deference to his fellow counsel who at the time he was making representations in behalf of the other party, was rudely interrupted by the
petitioner and was not allowed to further put a word in edgewise (pp. 7-13, tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 34-39, Rollo) is violative of Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Canon 22 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which obliges a lawyer to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor
toward his professional colleagues, and

23. the refusal of the petitioner to allow the Registrar of Deeds of the Province of Cavite, through counsel, to exercise his right to be heard (Ibid) is against Section 1 of Article
III, 1997 Constitution on the right to due process of law, Canon 18 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which mandates a lawyer to always treat an adverse
witness "with fairness and due consideration," and Canon 12 of Code of Professional Responsibility which insists on a lawyer to "exert every effort and consider it
his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice."
The Court cannot therefore help but notice the sarcasm in the petitioner's use of the phrase "your honor please." For, after using said phrase he manifested utter disrespect to
the court in his subsequent utterances. Surely this behavior from an officer of the Court cannot and should not be countenanced, if proper decorum is to be observed and
maintained during court proceedings.[12]
Indeed, the conduct of petitioner in persisting to have his documentary evidence marked to the extent of interrupting the opposing counsel and the court showed disrespect to
said counsel and the court, was defiant of the court's system for an orderly proceeding, and obstructed the administration of justice. The power to punish for contempt is
inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and
consequently, to the due administration of justice.[13] Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge, as in the case at bar, and can be punished
summarily without hearing.[14] Hence, petitioner cannot claim that there was irregularity in the actuation of respondent judge in issuing the contempt order inside her chamber
without giving the petitioner the opportunity to defend himself or make an immediate reconsideration. The records show that petitioner was cited in contempt of court during
the hearing in the sala of respondent judge, and he even filed a motion for reconsideration of the contempt order on the same day.[15]

Petitioner argued that while it might appear that he was carried by his emotions in espousing the case of his client - by persisting to have his documentary evidence marked
despite the respondent judge's contrary order - he did so in the honest belief that he was bound to protect the interest of his client to the best of his ability and with utmost
diligence.

The Court of Appeals aptly stated:

But "a lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his client's cause" (Buenaseda v. Flavier, 226 SCRA 645, 656). He should not forget that he is an officer of the court,
bound to exert every effort and placed under duty, to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice pursuant to Canon 12, Canons of Professional Responsibility
(Gomez v. Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 15, Ozamis City, 249 SCRA 432, 439). He should not , therefore, misuse the rules of procedure to defeat the ends of justice per Rule
10.03. Canon 10 of the Canons of Professional Responsibility, or unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes, in accordance with
Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the same Canons (Ibid).

"Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration of justice. Any conduct which tends to delay, impede or obstruct the
administration of justice contravenes such lawyer's duty."[16]
Although respondent judge was justified in citing petitioner in direct contempt of court, she erred in imposing a fine in the amount of P3,000.00 which exceeded the ceiling of
P2,000.00 under Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 22-95 which took effect on November 16, 1995. It was not established that the fine was imposed in bad faith. The
Court of Appeals thus properly ordered the return of the excess of P1,000.00. Aside from the fine, the three days imprisonment meted out to petitioner was justified and within
the 10-day limit prescribed in Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, as amended.

It is our view and we hold, therefore, that the Court of Appeals did not commit any reversible error in its assailed decision.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated March 6, 1998 of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite is
ordered to return to the petitioner, Rexie Efren A. Bugaring, the sum of P1,000.00 out of the original fine of P3,000.00.
G.R. No. 170404, September 28, 2011
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, PETITIONER, VS. JUDGE HENRICK F. GINGOYON,[Deceased] JUDGE JESUS B. MUPAS, ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT BRANCH 117, PASAY CITY, RESPONDENT.
 
 D E C I S I O N
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

While there are remedies available to a party adjudged in contempt of court, same may only be availed of when the procedures laid down for its availment are satisfied.

By this Petition for Certiorari,[1] petitioner Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) assails the Order[2] dated November 25, 2005 issued by the now deceased Judge Henrick F. Gingoyon
(Judge Gingoyon) of Branch 117, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City (respondent court) citing him in direct contempt of court, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, Ferdinand Cruz is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of DIRECT CONTEMPT OF COURT.

Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer TWO (2) DAYS of imprisonment and to pay a fine of P2,000.00.

SO ORDERED.[3]

Essentially, petitioner prays for this Court to declare the assailed Order void and that Judge Gingoyon abused his discretion in citing him in contempt, as well as in denying his
motion to fix the amount of bond.

Antecedent Facts

This case stemmed from a Civil Complaint[4] filed by petitioner against his neighbor, Benjamin Mina, Jr. (Mina), docketed as Civil Case No. 01-0401 in the RTC of Pasay City
for abatement of nuisance. In the said case, petitioner sought redress from the court to declare as a nuisance the "basketball goal" which was permanently attached to the
second floor of Mina's residence but protrudes to the alley which serves as the public's only right of way.

Mina was declared in default[5] hence petitioner presented his evidence ex-parte.

After trial, Judge Gingoyon, in his Decision[6] dated October 21, 2005, declared the basketball goal as a public nuisance but dismissed the case on the ground that petitioner
lacked "locus standi." Citing Article 701 of the Civil Code, Judge Gingoyon ruled that the action for abatement of nuisance should be commenced by the city or municipal
mayor and not by a private individual like the petitioner.

In the same Decision, Judge Gingoyon also opined that:

Plaintiffs must learn to accept the sad reality of the kind of place they live in. x x x Their place is bursting with people most of whom live in cramped tenements with no place to
spare for recreation, to laze around or doing their daily household chores.

Thus, residents are forced by circumstance to invade the alleys. The alleys become the grounds where children run around and play, the venue where adults do all sorts of
things to entertain them or pass the time, their wash area or even a place to cook food in. Take in a few ambulant vendors who display their wares in their choice spots in the
alley and their customers that mill around them, and one can only behold chaos if not madness in these alleys. But for the residents of the places of this kind, they still find
order in this madness and get out of this kind of life unscathed. It's because they all simply live and let live. Walking through the alleys daily, the residents of the area have
become adept at [weaving] away from the playthings that children at play throw every which way, sidestepping from the path of children chasing each other, dodging and
[ducking]from awnings or canopies or clotheslines full of dripping clothes that encroach [on] the alleys. Plaintiffs appear to be fastidious and delicate and they cannot be
faulted for such a desirable trait. But they can only do so within their own abode. Once they step outside the doors of their home, as it were, they cannot foist their delicacy
and fastidiousness upon their neighbors. They must accept their alleys as the jungle of people and the site of myriad of activities that it is. They must also learn to accept the
people in their place as they are; they must live and let live. Unless they choose to live in a less blighted human settlement or better still move to an upscale residential area,
their only remaining choice is for them to live in perpetual conflict with their neighbors all the days of their lives.[7]

Petitioner sought reconsideration of the Decision. In his Motion for Reconsideration,[8] he took exception to the advice given by Judge Gingoyon thus:

The 12th and 13th paragraphs of the assailed decision, though only an advice of the court, are off-tangent and even spouses illegality;

Since when is living in cramped tenements become a license for people to invade the alleys and use the said alley for doing all sorts of things, i.e., as wash area or cooking
food? In effect, this court is making his own legislations and providing for exceptions in law when there are none, as far as nuisance is concerned;

The court might not be aware that in so doing, he is giving a wrong signal to the defendants and to the public at large that land grabbing, squatting, illegal occupation of
property is all right and justified when violators are those people who live in cramped tenements or the underprivileged poor, as the court in a sweeping statement proclaimed
that "residents are forced by circumstance to invade the alleys;"

For the enlightenment of the court, and as was proven during the ex-parte presentation of evidence by the plaintiff, Edang estate comprises properties which are subdivided
and titled (plaintiffs and defendants have their own titled properties and even the right of way or alley has a separate title) and not the kind the court wrongfully perceives the
place to be;

Moreover, the court has no right to impose upon the herein plaintiffs to accept their alleys as a jungle of people and the site of myriad of activities that it is. For the information
of the court, plaintiffs have holdings in upscale residential areas and it is a misconception for the court to consider the Pasay City residence of the plaintiffs as a blighted
human settlement. Apparently the court is very much misinformed and has no basis in his litany of eye sore descriptions;

Undersigned is at quandary what will this court do should he be similarly situated with the plaintiffs? Will the court abandon his residence, giving way to illegality in the name of
live and let live principle?

Nonetheless, what remains bugling [sic] is the fact that the court in his unsolicited advice knows exactly the description of the alley where the complained nuisance is located
and the specific activities that the defendants do in relation to the alley. The court should be reminded that the undersigned plaintiff presented his evidence ex-parte and
where else can the court gather these information about the alleys aside from the logical conclusion that the court has been communicating with the defendant, off the record,
given that the latter has already been in default.[9] (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner requested the respondent court to hear his motion for reconsideration on November 18, 2005.[10]

In an Order[11] dated November 11, 2005, Judge Gingoyon set the motion for hearing on November 18, 2005, a date chosen by petitioner, [12] and directed him to substantiate
his serious charge or show cause on even date why he should not be punished for contempt.[13] Judge Gingoyon also opined that:

This court, more specifically this Presiding Judge, has not seen the faintest of shadow of the defendant or heard even an echo of his voice up to the present. Plaintiff
Ferdinand Cruz is therefore directed to substantiate his serious charge that he "has been communicating with the defendant off the record, given that the latter has already
been declared in default". He is therefore ordered to show cause on November 18, 2005, why he should not be punished for contempt of court for committing improper
conduct tending directly or indirectly to degrade the administration of justice.[14]

On November 18, 2005, petitioner, however, did not appear. Judge Gingoyon then motu proprio issued an Order[15] in open court to give petitioner another 10 days to show
cause. The Order reads:

In his Motion for Reconsideration, plaintiff Ferdinand Cruz specifically prayed that he is submitting his Motion for Resolution and Approval of this court today, Friday,
November 18, 2005, at 8:30 A.M. Fridays have always been earmarked for criminal cases only. Moreover, long before plaintiff filed his motion for reconsideration, this court no
longer scheduled hearings for November 18, 2005 because there will be no Prosecutors on this date as they will be holding their National Convention. Nevertheless, since it is
the specific prayer of the plaintiff that he will be submitting his motion for resolution and approval by the court on said date, the court yielded to his wish and set his motion for
hearing on his preferred date.
When this case was called for hearing today, plaintiff did not appear. The court waited until 9:45 A.M. but still no appearance was entered by the plaintiff or any person who
might represent himself as an authorized representative of the plaintiff. Instead it was the defendant and his counsel who appealed and who earlier filed an Opposition to
Motion for Reconsideration.

xxxx

In view of the failure of the plaintiff to appear in today's hearing, the court considers the motion for reconsideration submitted for resolution. As for the Order of this court for the
plaintiff to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt of court, the court [motu proprio] grants plaintiff last ten (10) days to show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt of court. After the lapse of the said period, the court will resolve the issue of whether or not he should be cited for contempt. x x x[16]

In his Compliance[17] to the Show Cause Order, petitioner maintained that the alleged contumacious remarks he made have a leg to stand on for the same were based on the
circumstances of the instant case. He even reiterated his insinuation that Judge Gingoyon communicated with Mina by posing the query: "...where then did this court gather
an exact description of the alley and the myriad of [sic] activities that the inhabitants of interior Edang do in relation to the alley, when the defendant was held in default and
absent plaintiff's evidence so exacting as the description made by this court in paragraphs 12 and 13 of his Decision dated October 21, 2005."[18]

On November 25, 2005, Judge Gingoyon issued an Order[19] finding petitioner guilty of direct contempt of court. The Order reads:

Ferdinand Cruz was ordered to substantiate with facts his serious charge that the Judge "has been communicating with the defendant off the record". But instead of
presenting proof of facts or stating facts, Cruz simply shot back with a query: "Where then did this court gather an exact description of the alley and the myriad activities that
the inhabitants of interior Edang do in relation to the alley, when the defendant was held in default and absent plaintiff's evidence so exacting as the description made by this
court..." By this token, Cruz adamantly stood pat on his accusation, which now appears to be wholly based on suspicion, that the Judge has been communicating with the
defendant off the record.

The suspicion of Ferdinand Cruz may be paraphrased thus: The only way for the Judge [to] know the blight in his place in Pasay City is for the Judge to communicate with the
defendant. It is only by communicating with the defendant and by no other means may the Judge know such blight.

Blinded by his suspicion, Cruz did not consider that as State Prosecutor, the Judge was detailed in Pasay City in 1991 and that he has been a judge in Pasay City since 1997.
The nuisance that Cruz complained of, or the blight of his place, is not a unique feature of that particular place. It is replicated in many other places of the city. Indeed, it is but
a microcosm of what is prevalent not only within the urban areas within Metro Manila but also in many other highly urbanized areas in the country. Judges are no hermits that
they would fail to witness this blight. Cruz did not care to make this allowance for the benefit of preserving the dignity of the court.

Cruz's open accusation without factual basis that the judge is communicating with the defendant is an act that brings the court into disrepute or disrespect; or offends its
dignity, affront its majesty, or challenge its authority. It constitutes contempt of court. (People vs. De Leon, L-10236, January 31, 1958). x x x By alleging that the judge
communicated with the defendant, Cruz is in effect charging the judge of partiality. Since there is not an iota of proof that the judge did the act complained of, the charge of
partiality is uncalled for and constitutes direct contempt (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724; Lualhati vs. Albert, 57 Phil.86; Malolos vs. Reyes, 111 Phil. 1113).

WHEREFORE, Ferdinand Cruz is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of DIRECT CONTEMPT OF COURT.

Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer TWO (2) DAYS of imprisonment and to pay a fine of P2,000.00.

SO ORDERED.[20]

An Order of Arrest[21] was issued against the petitioner on even date.

On December 1, 2005, at 10:00 A.M., petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Post Bond and Quash Warrant of Arrest (Ex-Parte Motion)[22] with the respondent court. In
said Ex-Parte Motion, petitioner averred that:
xxxx

2. To date, undersigned has already filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court;

xxxx
The respondent court denied the Ex-Parte Motion in its Order[23] dated December 1, 2005 based on petitioner's failure to attach the alleged duly filed Petition for Certiorari with
the Supreme Court. The respondent court held that unless petitioner has shown proof of filing said petition for certiorari, he cannot avail of the remedy provided in Section 2,
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.

Meanwhile, Judge Gingoyon was slain on December 31, 2005. In a Resolution[24] dated February 1, 2006, this Court directed the incumbent Judge of Branch 117, RTC of
Pasay City, Judge Jesus B. Mupas, to submit a comment on the petition "inasmuch as direct or indirect contempt pertains to the misbehavior or disrespect committed towards
the court and not to judges in their personal capacities."[25]

Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues:

A.

WHETHER X X X PETITIONER [IS] GUILTY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT.

B.

WHETHER RESPONDENT COURT HAS ENOUGH FACTUAL BASIS FOR CITING PETITIONER IN CONTEMPT.

C.

WHETHER THE RESPONDENT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION TO FIX BOND.[26]

The issues may be summed up as follows: whether the respondent court properly adjudged petitioner in direct contempt of court and whether abuse of discretion was
committed by respondent court in denying the Ex-Parte Motion.

Petitioner contends that the alleged contumacious remark is merely a fair observation or comment and a logical conclusion made based on the detailed description given by
the respondent court of what has been happening in the alley subject of the civil case. Petitioner avers that no other conclusion can be had except that Judge Gingoyon was
communicating with the defendant off the record, since the exact description of what was happening in the alley was not adduced in evidence during trial. Further, petitioner
contends that fair and logical conclusion founded on circumstances of the case cannot be considered contemptuous.

Petitioner likewise insists that the respondent court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to fix bond, therefore violating due process.

Our Ruling

We find the petition unmeritorious.

A pleading containing derogatory, offensive
or malicious statements submitted to the court
or judge wherein proceedings are pending is
considered direct contempt.

"[C]ontemptuous statements made in pleadings filed with the court constitute direct contempt." [27] "[A] pleading x x x containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements
submitted to the court or judge in which the proceedings are pending x x x has been held to be equivalent to `misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or
judge as to interrupt the proceedings before the same' within the meaning of Rule 71, § 1 of the Rules of Court and, therefore, constitutes direct contempt."[28]

Based on the abovementioned facts and consistent with the foregoing principles set forth, we agree with the finding of respondent court that petitioner is guilty of direct
contempt of court.

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner with the respondent court contained a serious allegation that Judge Gingoyon has been communicating with the defendant
off the record, which is considered as a grave offense. This allegation is unsubstantiated and totally bereft of factual basis. In fact, when asked to adduce proof of the
allegation, petitioner was not able to give any, but repeatedly argued that it is his "fair observation or conclusion." [29]

Petitioner vehemently stood by his suspicion and repeated the allegation in the Compliance to the show-cause Order dated November 11, 2005 which he filed with the
respondent court. The allegation was repeated despite Judge Gingoyon's outright denial of communicating with the defendant and explanation in the Order[30] dated
November 25, 2005 that Judge Gingoyon was familiar with the area as he was detailed in Pasay City since 1991 as State Prosecutor, and thereafter, as judge since 1997.

Instead of showing proof of the alleged communication between Judge Gingoyon and the defendant off the record, petitioner stubbornly insisted that there is nothing
contumacious about his allegation against the Judge as he was just giving his fair and logical observation. Clearly, petitioner openly accused Judge Gingoyon of wrongdoing
without factual basis. Suffice it to say that this accusation is a dangerous one as it exposes Judge Gingoyon to severe reprimand and even removal from office.

On the other hand, a careful perusal of the description as provided by Judge Gingoyon in the Decision shows but a general description of what is normally seen and what
normally happens in places such as Edang Street, to wit: "x x x place is bursting with people most of whom live in cramped tenements with no place to spare for recreation, to
laze around or [do] their daily household chores x x x. The alleys become the grounds where children run around and play, the venue where adults do all sorts of things to
entertain [themselves] or pass the time, their wash area or even a place to cook food in x x x. Ambulant vendors who display their wares in the alley and their customers that
mill around them; x x x children chasing each other, dodging and [ducking] from awnings or canopies; x x x clotheslines full of dripping clothes that encroach [on] the
alleys x x x."[31]

The act of petitioner in openly accusing Judge Gingoyon of communicating with the defendant off the record, without factual basis, brings the court into disrepute. The
accusation in the Motion for Reconsideration and the Compliance submitted by the petitioner to the respondent court is derogatory, offensive and malicious. The accusation
taints the credibility and the dignity of the court and questions its impartiality. It is a direct affront to the integrity and authority of the court, subjecting it to loss of public respect
and confidence, which ultimately affects the administration of justice.

Furthermore, assuming that the conclusion of petitioner is justified by the facts, it is still not a valid defense in cases of contempt. "Where the matter is abusive or insulting,
evidence that the language used was justified by the facts is not admissible as a defense. Respect for the judicial office should always be observed and enforced."[32]

Moreover, the charge of partiality is uncalled for, and there being no scintilla of proof that Judge Gingoyon did the act complained of, petitioner's act amounts to direct
contempt of court.[33]

Denial of the Ex-Parte Motion to Post Bond and

Quash Warrant of Arrest is proper; there is no
abuse of discretion on the part of respondent court.

Petitioner avers that the respondent court abused its discretion in denying his Ex-Parte Motion. Petitioner insists that the respondent court should have granted his Ex-Parte
Motion since he already filed a Petition for Certiorari before this Court pursuant to Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. He further avers that respondent court violated his right to
due process by fixing the bond only on December 5, 2005 or 10 days after the Orders of contempt and arrest were issued.

Petitioner's contention lacks merit.

The respondent court was well within the bounds of its authority when it denied petitioner's Ex-Parte Motion.

A person may be adjudged in direct contempt of court pursuant to Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court[34] without need of a hearing but may thereafter avail of the
remedies of certiorari or prohibition.[35]

Section 2, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 2. Remedy therefrom. - The person adjudged in direct contempt by any court may not appeal therefrom, but may avail himself of the remedies of certiorari or
prohibition. The execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of such petition, provided such person files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the
judgment and conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment should the petition be decided against him. (Emphasis supplied.)

In this case, we find that the respondent court properly denied petitioner's Ex-Parte Motion there being no proof that he already filed a petition for certiorari. Notably, the Ex-
Parte Motion was filed with the respondent court on December 1, 2005 at 10:00 A.M. [36] and therein petitioner stated that he already filed a Petition for Certiorari with this
Court. However, perusal of the records would show that the Petition for Certiorari was filed with the Supreme Court on the same day but at 1:06 P.M.[37] Clearly, when the
motion was filed with the respondent court, it cannot be accurately said that a petition for certiorari was already duly filed with this Court. Significantly, the records show that
respondent court was furnished a copy of the Petition for Certiorari by registered mail and which was received only on December 5, 2005. [38] It is therefore clear that at the
time that petitioner filed the Ex-Parte Motion with the respondent court, he has not yet availed of the remedy of certiorari. In fact, it was only after filing the Ex- Parte Motion
with respondent court that petitioner filed the Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court. This explained why no proof of such filing was presented by petitioner to the
respondent court thus prompting it to declare that unless petitioner has shown proof of filing said petition for certiorari, he cannot avail of the remedy provided in Section 2,
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.[39] Petitioner thus cannot attribute abuse of discretion on the part of respondent court in denying the Ex-Parte Motion. To reiterate, at the time
the said Ex-Parte Motion was filed and acted upon by the respondent court, petitioner was not yet entitled to the remedy prayed for. Clearly, the respondent court did not
commit error, nor did it overstep its authority in denying petitioner's Ex-Parte Motion.

All told, we take a similar stand as Judge Gingoyon and affirm the Order adjudging petitioner guilty of direct contempt. However, as to the penalty imposed upon petitioner,
we find the fine of P2,000.00 commensurate with the acts committed.

We also find the necessity to emphasize strict observance of the hierarchy of courts. "A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for
the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (`inferior') courts should be filed with the [RTC], and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals (CA). A direct
invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition."[40] For the guidance of the petitioner, "[t]his Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive."[41] Its jurisdiction is concurrent with the CA, and with the RTC in proper cases. [42] "However, this concurrence of
jurisdiction does not grant upon a party seeking any of the extraordinary writs the absolute freedom to file his petition with the court of his choice. This Court is a court of last
resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial tradition."[43] Unwarranted demands upon this Court's
attention must be prevented to allow time and devotion for pressing matters within its exclusive jurisdiction.

Adhering to the policy on judicial hierarchy of courts, "[w]here the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the [CA] or a [RTC], it is in either of these
courts that the specific action for the writ's procurement must be presented." [44] In consequence, the instant petition should have been filed with the CA as there is no
allegation of any special or compelling reason to warrant direct recourse to this Court. However, to avoid further delay, we deem it practical to resolve the controversy.

Finally, it must be pointed out that on April 28, 2010, we directed petitioner to cause the entry of appearance of his counsel[45] within 15 days from notice. Petitioner failed to
comply hence we directed him to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with in our Resolution dated September 6, 2010.[46] Still, petitioner failed to comply
hence he was fined P1,000.00 in our Resolution dated January 17, 2011[47] which was increased to P3,000.00 in our Resolution of June 29, 2011. Consequently, petitioner is
hereby directed to pay said fine of P3,000.00 otherwise he would be dealt with more severely.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. The Order dated November 25, 2005 of Branch 117 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City finding petitioner
Ferdinand A. Cruz guilty of direct contempt is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is hereby sentenced to pay a fine of P2,000.00. In addition, petitioner is ordered to
PAY a fine of P3,000.00 for his repeated failure to heed the directives of this Court. Petitioner is sternly WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt
with more severely.

G.R. NO. 158971, August 25, 2005

MARIANO Y. SIY, IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY, AS WELL AS IN HIS CAPACITY AS OWNER OF PHILIPPINE AGRI TRADING CENTER, PETITIONER, VS.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND ELENA EMBANG, RESPONDENTS.
 
 R E S O L U T I O N
CORONA, J.:

For resolution is private respondent Elena Embang's motion to cite Atty. Frederico P. Quevedo, counsel of petitioner Mariano Y. Siy, in contempt of court for delaying this case
and impeding the execution of the judgment rendered herein, in violation of Canon 12[1] and Rule 12.04[2] of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

This case originated from a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of holiday pay and holiday premium pay filed by Embang against petitioner and Philippine Agri
Trading Center. The labor arbiter ruled in favor of Embang. The dispositive portion of his September 29, 2000 decision [3] read:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring [Embang] to be a regular employee of the PHIL-AGRI TRADING CENTER and ordering the latter to reinstate her to her
former position and pay her backwages from the date of her dismissal on February 18, 2000 until her reinstatement which computed as of today amounts to P37,771.50
(P5881 x 6.5 months) plus 1/12 thereof or the amount of P3,147.62 as corresponding 13th month pay for the period.

An additional award of 5% of the total award is also rendered since [,] compelled to litigate [,] [Embang] had to engage the services of counsel.

All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
On March 8, 2002, the Third Division of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) denied petitioner's appeal and affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter with
modification. Thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit and the Decision dated September 29, 2000 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in [that
Mariano Y. Siy] should be made jointly and severally liable together with Phil. Agri Trading Center and that [Embang] is entitled only [to] the ten (10%) percent of his awarded
13th month pay as attorney's fees.

SO ORDERED.[4]
After the NLRC refused to reconsider its March 8, 2002 resolution, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) by way of a petition for certiorari. Finding the
petition to be without merit, the appellate court dismissed the same.[5] The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was likewise denied.[6]

Undaunted, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari before this Court questioning the CA's decision (dismissing his petition) and resolution (denying his motion for
reconsideration). Since we found no reversible error on the part of the appellate court, we denied the petition in our September 22, 2003 resolution. Petitioner sought a
reconsideration of our resolution but we resolved to deny the same with finality. Thereafter, entry of judgment was made on December 30, 2003.

In accordance with the rules of procedure of the NLRC, Embang's counsel filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution dated February 16, 2004 before the labor
arbiter. Subsequently, Atty. Quevedo entered his appearance for the petitioner and filed a comment to the motion for writ of execution.[7] He alleged that Embang rejected the
various offers of reinstatement extended to her by petitioner; hence, she should be entitled to backwages only up to September 29, 2000, the date of the promulgation of the
labor arbiter's decision.

This was followed by a protracted exchange of pleadings and motions between the parties.[8] Finding that his office was never informed by petitioner and Philippine Agri
Trading Center of any intention on their part to reinstate Embang to her former position, the labor arbiter issued an order dated July 30, 2004[9] granting the February 16, 2004
motion and directing that a writ of execution be issued.

Atty. Quevedo refused to be deterred. He filed an appeal with the NLRC on August 12, 2004. He insisted that the labor arbiter committed grave abuse of discretion in failing to
specify in his order that the backwages should be computed until September 29, 2000 only and that no backwages should accrue thereafter because of Embang's refusal to
be reinstated.

Embang's counsel moved to dismiss the appeal. He contended that the appeal was not perfected because petitioner and Philippine Agri Trading Center did not post the
required cash or surety bond. Pending the resolution of the appeal, Embang filed the instant motion to cite Atty. Quevedo in contempt of court.

By way of comment, Atty. Quevedo maintains that he did not delay the execution of the decision but only sought the consideration of Embang's refusal to be reinstated in any
writ of execution that may be issued. He claims that such refusal on Embang's part constituted a supervening event that justified the filing of an appeal _ - notwithstanding the
finality of the decision. He also asserts that an appeal was the proper remedy to question the July 30, 2004 order of the labor arbiter.

Meanwhile, the Third Division of the NLRC issued a resolution[10] on February 28, 2005 resolving not to give due course to the appeal and to remand the case to the regional
arbitration branch for further proceedings. The NLRC held that the July 30, 2004 order was not appealable. Despite the denial of the appeal, however, Atty. Quevedo filed a
motion for clarification/partial reconsideration of the NLRC's February 28, 2005 resolution.

For his obstinacy in refusing to respect a final and executory judgment, we hold Atty. Quevedo in contempt of court.

Contempt of court is disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the court's
orders but also conduct tending to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due administration of
justice.[11] Under the Rules of Court, contempt is classified into either direct or indirect contempt. Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as
to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same.[12] Indirect contempt is one not committed in the presence of a court. [13] It is an act done at a distance which tends to
belittle, degrade, obstruct or embarrass the court and justice.[14]

Atty. Quevedo should be sanctioned for indirect contempt. Indirect contempt is committed by a person who commits the following acts, among others: disobedience or
resistance to a lawful writ, process, order or judgment of a court;[15] any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting
direct contempt;[16] and any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice. [17]

We denied with finality the petitioner's petition for review on certiorari almost two years ago. But the decision of the labor arbiter (affirmed with modification by the NLRC and
upheld by the CA and this Court) remains unsatisfied up to now because of Atty. Quevedo's sly maneuvers on behalf of his client.

Once a case is decided with finality, the controversy is settled and the matter is laid to rest. The prevailing party is entitled to enjoy the fruits of his victory while the other party
is obliged to respect the court's verdict and to comply with it. We reiterate our pronouncement in Sacdalan v. Court of Appeals:[18]
...well-settled is the principle that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.
The reason for this is that litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a
judgment has become final, the winning party be not deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result and must
frown upon any attempt to prolong the controversies.

The only exceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and
whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.
This case does not fall under any of the recognized exceptions. Contrary to Atty. Quevedo's contention, there existed no supervening event that would have brought the case
outside the ambit of the general rule on the immutability of final and executory decisions.

Supervening events refer to facts which transpire after judgment becomes final and executory or to new circumstances which develop after judgment acquires finality.[19] The
"refusal" of Embang to be reinstated happened, assuming it really happened, before the finality of our September 22, 2003 resolution, i.e., before the decision of the labor
arbiter as modified by the NLRC became final and executory.

In fact, the issue of the alleged offer of reinstatement and Embang's rejection of the same was not a new one and had already been passed upon by the courts. Atty. Quevedo
himself admits that petitioner brought the issue before the CA in his June 6, 2002 petition for certiorari and December 3, 2002 memorandum. The appellate court brushed it
aside and found neither factual nor legal merit in the petition. The matter was again raised in petitioner's June 3, 2003 motion for reconsideration which was denied on the
ground that the basic issues had already been previously considered by the court. Embang's alleged refusal to be reinstated was also alleged in the petition for review on
certiorari filed by petitioner before this Court. We denied it for failing to show that a reversible error had been committed by the CA.

Atty. Quevedo's client was bound by the finality of our affirmance of the modified decision of the labor arbiter. He should not have tried, under the guise of a flimsy appeal to
the NLRC, to reopen a case already decided with finality. Nor should he have raised anew matters previously considered and issues already laid to rest.

Atty. Quevedo's act of filing a baseless appeal with the NLRC was obviously intended to defeat the implementation of a final and executory decision. Elementary is the rule
that an order granting a motion for a writ of execution is not appealable.[20] Thus, Atty. Quevedo's deceptively "innocent" appeal constituted either a willful disregard or gross
ignorance of basic rules of procedure resulting in the obstruction of justice.

By his acts, Atty. Quevedo has tried to prevent Embang from enjoying the fruits of her hard earned legal victory. In effect, he has been tying the hands of justice and
preventing it from taking its due course. His conduct has thwarted the due execution of a final and executory decision. By appealing an order which he knew to be
unappealable, he abused court processes and hindered the dispensation of justice. His dilatory tactics were an affront to the dignity of the Court, clearly constituting indirect
contempt.

We note that the ground cited in the motion to cite Atty. Quevedo in contempt of court was his violation of Canon 12 and Rule 12.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. While a lawyer's violation of his duties as an officer of the court may also constitute contempt, the grounds for holding a person in contempt and for holding him
administratively liable for the violation of his lawyer's oath are distinct and separate from each other. They are specified in Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. A finding of contempt
on the part of a lawyer does not preclude the imposition of disciplinary sanctions against him for his contravention of the ethics of the legal profession. Thus:
x x x the power to punish for contempt and the power to disbar are separate and distinct, and that the exercise of one does not exclude the exercise of the other. A contempt
proceeding for misbehavior in court is designed to vindicate the authority of the court; on the other hand, the object of a disciplinary proceeding is to deal with the fitness of the
court's officer to continue in that office, to preserve and protect the court and the public from the official ministrations of persons unfit or unworthy to hold such office. The
principal purpose of the exercise of the power to cite for contempt is to safeguard the functions of the court [while that] of the exercise of disciplinary authority by the Supreme
Court is to assure respect for orders of such court by attorneys who, as much as judges, are responsible for the orderly administration of justice.

Moreover, it has been held that the imposition of a fine as a penalty in a contempt proceeding is not considered res judicata to a subsequent charge for unprofessional
conduct. In the same manner, an attorney's conviction for contempt was not collaterally estopped by reason of a subsequent disbarment proceeding in which the court found
in his favor on essentially the same facts leading to conviction. It has likewise been the rule that a notice to a lawyer to show cause why he should not be punished for
contempt cannot be considered as a notice to show cause why he should not be suspended from the practice of law, considering that they have distinct objects and for each
of them a different procedure is established. Contempt of court is governed by the procedures laid down under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, whereas disciplinary actions in
the practice of law are governed by Rules 138 and 139 thereof.

Although apparently different in legal bases, the authority to punish for contempt and to discipline lawyers are both inherent in the Supreme Court and are equally incidents of
the court's basic power to oversee the proper administration of justice and the orderly discharge of judicial functions. As was succinctly expounded in Zaldivar v.
Sandiganbayan, et al.:
There are, in other words, two (2) related powers which come into play in cases like that before us here: the Court's inherent power to discipline attorneys and the contempt
power. The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is broader [than] the power to punish for contempt. Contempt of court may be committed both by
lawyers and non-lawyers, both in and out of court. Frequently, where the contemnor is a lawyer, the contumacious conduct also constitutes professional misconduct which
calls into play the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. Where the respondent is a lawyer, however, the Supreme Court's disciplinary authority over lawyers may come
into play whether or not the misconduct with which the respondent is charged also constitutes contempt of court. The power to punish for contempt of court does not exhaust
the scope of disciplinary authority of the Court over lawyers. The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is but corollary to the Court's exclusive power of
admission to the Bar. A lawyer is not merely a professional but also an officer of the court and as such, he is called upon to share in the task and responsibility of dispensing
justice and resolving disputes in society. Any act on his part which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede and degrade the administration of justice constitutes both
professional misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary action against him, and contumacious conduct warranting application of the contempt power.[21]
We therefore refer the complaint against Atty. Quevedo's behavior to the Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for an investigation of his
possible liabilities under Canon 12 and Rule 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Frederico P. Quevedo is hereby found GUILTY of INDIRECT CONTEMPT for which a FINE of P30,000 is imposed upon him, payable in full within five
days from receipt of this resolution.