Strategic Comments

ISSN: (Print) 1356-7888 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tstc20

Hong Kong’s protests

To cite this article: (2019) Hong Kong’s protests, Strategic Comments, 25:6, xi-xiii, DOI:
10.1080/13567888.2019.1662983

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/13567888.2019.1662983

Published online: 02 Sep 2019.

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 Strategic Comments
Hong Kong’s protests
Hong Kong is now in the 11th week of
demonstrations that, though initially
peaceful, have become increasingly violent
and disruptive. Beijing, which at the start
of the protests imposed a news blackout
in the mainland Chinese media, has since
published a series of ever more critical
editorials in the party state’s flagship
publication, the People’s Daily, writing
of Hong Kong facing the abyss, blaming
foreign ‘black hands’ for fomenting the
protests and characterising the protesters’
behaviour as terrorism. The attitudes
of both the protesters and the Chinese
government have hardened to the point
where compromise seems impossible. The
fear is growing that if the Hong Kong
authorities cannot restore order, China may
intervene militarily to resolve the situation.
While Beijing hopes to avoid direct
intervention if possible, it will prioritise
the need to quash perceived challenges
to the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP)
legitimacy over all other considerations.
Increasing encroachments
The proximate cause of this situation is
the administration of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region’s (SAR)
introduction – in February 2019 – of
legislation enabling criminal suspects to be
transferred to jurisdictions with which the
Hong Kong SAR does not have extradition
agreements – including mainland China.
The justification for the legislation was
a case involving a Hong Kong resident
accused of murdering his girlfriend in
Taiwan then fleeing to Hong Kong, where
no action could be taken against him.
The draft legislation elicited widespread
concern that it could lead to critics of the
Chinese regime and others deemed guilty
by China of political crimes being sent for
trial on the mainland, where courts are
controlled by the CCP.
Under the terms of the Sino-British Joint
Declaration of 1984, the international treaty
that set out the basis on which China
recovered sovereignty over Hong Kong in
1997, the Hong Kong SAR enjoys a high
degree of autonomy, with an administration
led by an elected chief executive. Under the
treaty, Hong Kong retains its own legal
system based on common law and its
citizens enjoy a range of freedoms denied
to mainland Chinese citizens, including the
rights to free expression, peaceful assembly
ISSN: 1356-7888
and unrestricted internet access. Beijing has
generally respected these arrangements,
adhering to Deng Xiaoping’s concept
of ‘one country, two systems’. In recent
years, however, there have been worrying
indications that China is encroaching on
Hong Kong’s autonomy, fuelling locals’
fears that it will eventually become ‘just
another Chinese city’.
The earliest indication of this
erosion occurred in 2002 when the SAR
government, at Beijing’s behest, sought to
introduce legislation – Basic Law Article 23
– relating to treason, subversion, sedition
and secession. In the face of public protests,
the legislation was withdrawn and has not
subsequently been revisited.
More recently, during the 2014 Occupy
Central movement, large numbers of
mainly young Hong Kong residents staged
weeks of protests in the main commercial
and government district against Beijing’s
insistence that candidates for the post of
chief executive had first to be vetted by
China. This largely peaceful demonstration
– also known as the ‘Umbrella Movement’
due to the umbrellas used by protesters
to protect themselves against the police’s
pepper spray – eventually dissipated and
its leaders were subsequently sentenced
to brief imprisonment for public-order
offences. Yet the fact that a picture posted
on Chinese social media of President
Xi Jinping holding an umbrella was
immediately censored illustrated Beijing’s
sensitivity about the movement.
More concerning yet was the abduction
in 2015 of the owner and four employees
of the Hong Kong publisher Causeway
Bay Books. For some years, Causeway Bay
Books had been publishing books about
mainland Chinese leadership politics,
including sensitive and often racy details of
the leaders’ private lives, almost certainly
leaked by their political rivals. Mainland
visitors to Hong Kong purchased such
publications in large numbers. At the time
of his abduction from Thailand, the owner
of Causeway Bay Books, Gui Minhai –
born in Hong Kong but by then a Swedish
national – was supposedly working on a
book about Xi Jinping entitled Xi and His Six
Women. This seems to have prompted the
CCP’s decision to terminate this lucrative
trade. Phillip Hammond, then the United
Kingdom’s foreign secretary, referred to the
booksellers’ abduction as a ‘serious breach
of the Sino-British Joint Declaration’. A
similar incident occurred in January 2017,
when Chinese security agents abducted
the wealthy Chinese-Canadian financier
Xiao Jianhua from his Hong Kong hotel
apartment, where he had been living for the
preceding three years. Xiao was the financier
used by many in the Chinese leadership to
move their money overseas and therefore
possessed valuable information about their
activities. By abducting Xiao, Xi was able to
signal to potential adversaries in the run-up
to the 19th National Congress of the CCP
that he had the information he needed to
pursue them for corruption if they stepped
out of line.
An additional cause for concern was an
agreement in 2018 that enabled hundreds
of Chinese police officers to be based at
Hong Kong’s new cross-border high-speed
rail terminus, where they would enforce
Chinese national law. While this decision
alarmed many Hong Kong residents, it
did not result in protests. This lack of
response may have encouraged Hong
Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam to pursue
the extradition bill, on the basis that she
enjoyed a reliably large pro-establishment
(i.e., pro-Beijing) majority in Hong Kong’s
Legislative Council. In fact, by persisting
with a second reading of the bill even after
large-scale peaceful demonstrations had
revealed the level of public concern, Lam
simply confirmed what many Hong Kong
residents had come to believe: that the
Hong Kong government was insensitive
and unresponsive to their concerns.
The protests
The June protests mobilised a large
proportion of Hong Kong’s residents:
on 16 June, an estimated two million
people marched peacefully, out of a total
population of around seven million. The
protesters are overwhelmingly young and
well educated. Their motivations appear
to consist of a mixture of frustration with
living conditions and a lack of economic
opportunity; a fear that Hong Kong’s
autonomy is being squeezed by China; and
frustration that their concerns are unheeded
by an administration that they consider
uncaring, out of touch and in thrall to the
interests of a small group of oligarchs.
The protest movement has attracted wider
support, including from lawyers, civil
servants and private-sector employees.
Volume 25 Comment 24 August 2019
 A smaller, youthful subsection of the
protesters have engaged in more direct and
occasionally violent activities. On 1 July,
the anniversary of Hong Kong’s handover
to China, protesters occupied and defaced
the Legislative Council Building. The Hong
Kong police, who have been left to handle the
protests by an administration that has kept
an extremely low profile, have struggled
to keep up with a leaderless movement
that coordinates activities using messaging
application Telegram to stay one step
ahead of the authorities and that minimises
direct confrontations. The protesters have,
however, been angered both by what they
perceive as an increasingly violent police
response – including the use of tear gas in
confined spaces – and by the perception
that the police failed to take action when
a mob, apparently comprised of Triad
members mobilised by Beijing, attacked
protesters in Yuen Long station as they
were returning home.
On 9 July, as the protests escalated,
Lam announced the suspension of the
extradition bill and subsequently declared
it to be ‘dead’ and ‘a complete failure’
– without, however, committing to
withdrawing it. That was insufficient to
assuage the concerns of the protesters,
who were by then campaigning under the
slogan ‘Recover Hong Kong, Revolution
for Our Time’ – guangfu xianggang,
shidai geming. The protesters issued five
demands: the bill’s formal withdrawal,
Lam’s resignation, an inquiry into police
conduct, the release of those arrested and
greater democratic freedoms. The Hong
Kong government has made clear that it
will accede to none of these demands.
China’s calculations
The disturbances in Hong Kong are likely
an unwelcome development for a Chinese
government facing a particularly difficult
and sensitive year. It marks the 30th
anniversary of the violent suppression of
China’s democracy movement in 1989,
though this anniversary passed without
incident on the mainland. It is also the
70th anniversary of the establishment of
the People’s Republic of China, due to
be celebrated on 1 October. Meanwhile,
China is embroiled in a trade war with
the United States that is, at its core, a
contest for global power and influence that
involves conflicting values and ideology.
This confrontation, which seems unlikely
to be resolved in the foreseeable future, has
serious implications for China’s economic
development and ambitions to become a
world leader in advanced technologies.
That said, US President Donald Trump has
shown no inclination to champion Hong
Kong’s cause and appears to see it as just
another bargaining chip in his confrontation
with Beijing. The Hong Kong protests,
which indicate a growing disenchantment
with the mainland, represent a humiliation
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Shaanxi Henan
Jiangsu
Anhui
Hubei
CHINA
Hunan Jiangxi
Fujian
Guangxi
Guangdong
Hong Kong
Hainan
© IISS
for China’s leadership. Xi will want to see
the situation resolved before the national-
day celebrations on 1 October.
The Hong Kong situation also has
unwelcome implications for China’s
efforts to secure peaceful reunification
with Taiwan, for which ‘one country, two
systems’ was meant to serve as a model.
Taiwan represents important unfinished
business for the CCP, whose claims to
legitimacy rest on the delivery of national
reunification as well as economic growth.
China has pursued a carrot-and-stick
policy with Taiwan, seeking to develop
ever-closer economic and individual ties
while reserving the right to resort to
military force in the event that Taiwan
declares independence. As China has
become increasingly repressive and
authoritarian in recent years, however, a
younger generation of young Taiwanese
voters, lacking their parents’ sense of
connection with the mainland, have
become more disenchanted with China
and increasingly inclined to identify
as Taiwanese rather than Chinese.
Developments in Hong Kong make it
more likely that President Tsai Ing-wen’s
Democratic Progressive Party, which
Beijing believes to harbour separatist
ambitions, will be returned to power in
the presidential elections next January.
Chinese anxiety has been exacerbated by
Washington’s recent decision to authorise
sales of main battle tanks, armoured
vehicles and anti-aircraft missiles worth
US$2.2 billion to Taiwan, and is likely
to be inflamed further by a prospective
additional US$8bn sale of F-16 aircraft.
Shanghai
Zhejiang
TA I W A N
Due to the mainland’s rapid economic
growth, Hong Kong has become much
less important to China than it was
when sovereignty was transferred. Still,
it remains useful as an interface with
global financial networks, and its secure
property rights offer significant value
to Chinese elites. It continues to present
advantages as a location for foreign
enterprises wishing to do business with
China in an environment where the rule
of law is relatively robust, and Hong
Kong remains the location of choice for
Chinese companies to launch initial public
offerings. Through the 1992 Hong Kong
Policy Act, Hong Kong enjoys preferential
treatment over China in terms of US
trading privileges. China has sought to
use this status to access technology that
has been denied to China under US
sanctions and to develop the territory
as a centre for technology interaction
with the rest of the world. The trade war
has increased the significance of Hong
Kong’s exemption from sanctions. If
the US Congress introduces legislation
making the continued validity of this act
dependent on China respecting Hong
Kong’s autonomy, China could suffer
significant financial losses.
Beijing’s strategy
As the protests began, China was content
to leave Hong Kong’s government and
its police to deal with the issue, while
offering them its full support. As the
protests gathered momentum, however,
Beijing undertook a policy review that
concluded with a revised strategy, reflected
Volume 25 Comment 24 August 2019
in a front-page editorial in the 5 August
edition of the People’s Daily. This editorial
sought to establish the presence of violent
extremists who use the extradition bill
as a pretext to pursue a wider agenda,
distinguishing them from the majority
of the Hong Kong populace who desire
peace and stability. Carrie Lam essentially
repeated the editorial’s words in a press
conference at which she emphasised that
no ground would be given to the demands
of the protesters. It was reported that Lam
had offered to resign but that Beijing had
refused to accept her resignation.
The outlines of China’s strategy for
dealing with the Hong Kong protests are
becoming clearer. Within China itself, the
CCP propaganda organs have launched a
major information campaign directed at
the Chinese people. This emphasises the
violent, terrorist nature of the protests while
ignoring the fact that (at least initially) most
protests were peaceful and well disciplined.
The campaign also highlights the supposed
role of hostile foreign forces in fomenting
an insurrection. An example of this is a
social media post by Hu Xijin, editor of
the nationalist newspaper Global Times,
in which he claimed that the Hong Kong
protests amount to a colour revolution and
that Western countries wish to destroy Hong
Kong’s financial system and turn Hong
Kong into a base from which to overthrow
the Chinese political system. While there
is no evidence for these assertions, the
notion that the demonstrations represent
foreign interference allows Beijing to
ignore the valid grievances motivating
them and to depict their participants as
go.iiss.org/stratcom
Editor: Benjamin Rhode
Volume 25 Comment 24 August 2019
treasonous separatists. This propaganda
campaign, which appeals to a carefully
nurtured sense of nationalism, appears to
be gaining traction.
Within Hong Kong, the Chinese
strategy consists of continued support for
heavy-handed police action to contain the
demonstrations and to charge protesters
with rioting, which carries a ten-year
prison sentence. A key imperative is to
galvanise the pro-establishment camp,
which has shown ambivalence towards
and, in some cases, open support for the
protesters’ cause. Beijing has made it clear
to Hong Kong’s business community that
any stance short of outright opposition
to the protest movement risks incurring
retaliation or boycott. For example, Beijing
has demanded that Cathay Pacific, Hong
Kong’s flagship airline, not allow any
of their staff involved with the protest
movement to board any flights entering
Chinese airspace, on the pretext that
their presence would jeopardise aviation
security. Cathay Pacific has already
dismissed a number of staff in response.
Its CEO has also resigned, apparently
under pressure from Beijing; Chinese
state television announced the resignation
before the airline itself revealed it.
On 12 and 13 August, protesters brought
Hong Kong’s airport to a virtual standstill.
Lam gave an emotional press conference in
which she warned that Hong Kong might
be ‘pushed into an abyss’ and that violent
protests would place Hong Kong ‘down
a path of no return’, prompting many to
speculate that Beijing might soon intervene
to restore order.
© The International Institute for Strategic Studies
Outlook
Beijing is adopting a strategy of attrition
designed to undermine the will of the
protesters, while counting on the desire
of many Hong Kong residents and the
business community to return to normality.
If that does not happen, Beijing will reserve
the right to deploy its own forces in support
of the Hong Kong police, most likely in
the form of its gendarmerie, the People’s
Armed Police, units of which have already
been deployed across the border from
Hong Kong in response to the protests.
While Beijing wishes, if possible, to
avoid the international opprobrium and
sanctions that might result from direct
intervention in Hong Kong, it will probably
have calculated that the repercussions will
be less severe than those it suffered in
1989 following the violent suppression
of the democracy movement, which
culminated in the Tiananmen Square
massacre. China may gain support from
the growing number of countries that
are either economically dependent on it
or whose leaders’ authoritarian instincts
match Beijing’s own. Beijing will have
taken comfort from the failure of Muslim-
majority countries to offer any objection to
the Chinese government’s brutal treatment
of Xinjiang’s Uighurs. While Beijing would
prefer not to use force or martial law to
undermine Hong Kong’s role as a financial
centre, it considers that role secondary
to concerns about internal stability and
will not tolerate overt challenges to the
CCP’s rule. The prospects for Hong Kong’s
retaining its current level of autonomy are
not encouraging.
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