STAT CON DIGEST

People vs conception
Facts:
On the facts recounted, Venancio Concepcion, as President of the Philippine National Bank and
as member of the board of directors of this bank, was charged in the Court of First Instance of
Cagayan with a violation of section 35 of Act No. 2747. He was found guilty by the Honorable
Enrique V. Filamor, Judge of First Instance, and was sentenced to imprisonment for one year
and six months, to pay a fine of P3,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and
the costs. Section 35 of Act No. 2747, effective on February 20, 1918, just mentioned, to which
reference must hereafter repeatedly be made, reads as follows: "The National Bank shall not,
directly or indirectly, grant loans to any of the members of the board of directors of the bank nor
to agents of the branch banks." Section 49 of the same Act provides: "Any person who shall
violate any of the provisions of this Act shall be punished by a fine not to exceed ten thousand
pesos, or by imprisonment not to exceed five years, or by both such fine and imprisonment."
These two sections were in effect in 1919 when the alleged unlawful acts took place, but were
repealed by Act No. 2938, approved on January 30,1921.
Counsel for the defense assign ten errors as having been committed by the trial court. These
errors they have argued adroitly and exhaustively in their printed brief, and again in oral
argument, Attorney-General Villa-Real, in an exceptionally accurate and comprehensive brief,
answers the propositions of appellant one by one.

ISSUE:
Was the granting of a credit of P300,000 to the co-partnership, "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." by
Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank, an "indirect loan" within the
meaning of section 35 of Act No. 2747?
HELD:
Counsel argue that since the prohibition contained in section 35 of Act No. 2747 is on the bank,
and since section 49 of said Act provides a punishment not on the bank when it violates any
provision of the law, but on a person violating any provision of the same, and imposing
imprisonment as a part of the penalty, the prohibition contained in said section 35 is without
penal sanction.
The answer is that when the corporation itself is forbidden to do an act, the prohibition extends
to the board of directors, and to each director separately and individually
ALONZO VS IAC
FACTS:
Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in the
name of their deceased parents under OCT No. 10977 of the Registry of Deeds of Tarlac. On
March 15, 1963, Celestino Padua transferred his undivided share to the herein petitioners for the
sum of P550.00 by way of absolute sale. On April 22, 1964, his sister sold her own share to the
same vendees for the sum of P440.00. By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied,
after the said sales, an area corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot, representing the portions
sold to them. The vendees subsequently enclosed the same with a fence. In 1975, with their
consent, their son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a semi-concrete house on a part of the
enclosed area. On February 25, 1976, one of the five co-heirs, sought to redeem the area sold to
the spouses Alonzo, but his complaint was dismissed when it appeared that he was an American
citizen. On May 27, 1977 another co-heir, filed her own complaint invoking the same right of
redemption claimed by her brother. During the trial court it dismisses this complaint, on the
ground that the right had lapsed, not having been exercised within thirty days from notice of the
sales in 1963 and 1964. Although there was no written notice, it was held that actual knowledge
of the sales by the co-heirs satisfied the requirement of the law.

ISSUE:
(1) Was there a valid notice? Granting that the law requires the notice to be written,
would such notice be necessary in this case? Assuming there was a valid notice
although it was not in writing, would there be any question that the 30-day period for
redemption had expired long before the complaint was filed in 1977?
(2) Now, when did the 30-day period of redemption begin?

HELD:
(1) In the face of the established facts, we cannot accept the private respondents' pretense
that they were unaware of the sales made by their brother and sister in 1963 and 1964.
By requiring written proof of such notice, we would be closing our eyes to the obvious
truth in favor of their palpably false claim of ignorance, thus exalting the letter of the law
over its purpose. The purpose is clear enough: to make sure that the redemptioners are
duly notified. We are satisfied that in this case the other brothers and sisters were
actually informed, although not in writing, of the sales made in 1963 and 1964, and that
such notice was sufficient.
(2) While we do not here declare that this period started from the dates of such sales in 1963
and 1964, we do say that sometime between those years and 1976, when the first
complaint for redemption was filed, the other co-heirs were actually informed of the sale
and that thereafter the 30-day period started running and ultimately expired. This could
have happened any time during the interval of thirteen years, when none of the co-heirs
made a move to redeem the properties sold. By 1977, in other words, when Tecla Padua
filed her complaint, the right of redemption had already been extinguished because the
period for its exercise had already expired. "While the general rule is, that to charge a
party with laches in the assertion of an alleged right it is essential that he should have
knowledge of the facts upon which he bases his claim, yet if the circumstances were
such as should have induced inquiry, and the means of ascertaining the truth were
readily available upon inquiry, but the party neglects to make it, he will be chargeable
with laches, the same as if he had known the facts.