DENNIS A. B. FUNA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, GR No.

184740, 2010-02-11
Facts:
On October 4, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed respondent Maria Elena
H. Bautista (Bautista) as Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC)
Bautista was designated as Undersecretary for Maritime
Transport of the department under Special Order No. 2006-171 dated October 23, 2006
On September 1, 2008, following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator Vicente T.
Suazo, Jr., Bautista was designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the Administrator,
MARINA, in concurrent capacity as DOTC Undersecretary
On October 21, 2008, Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and
lawyer, filed the instant petition challenging the constitutionality of Bautista's
appointment/designation, which is proscribed by the prohibition on the President, Vice-
President, the
Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants to hold any other office or
employment
Issues:
Petitioner argues that Bautista's concurrent positions as DOTC Undersecretary and
MARINA OIC is in violation of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
He points out that while it was clarified in Civil Liberties Union that the prohibition does not
apply to those... positions held in ex-officio capacities, the position of MARINA Administrator
is not ex-officio to the post of DOTC Undersecretary
The fact that Bautista was extended an appointment naming her as OIC of MARINA shows
that she does not occupy it in an ex-officio capacity since an ex-officio position does not
require any "further warrant or appoint.
Petitioner further contends that even if Bautista's appointment or designation as OIC of
MARINA was intended to be merely temporary, still, such designation must not violate a
standing constitutional prohibition
Petitioner likewise asserts the incompatibility between the posts of DOTC Undersecretary
and MARINA Administrator... respondents submit that the petition should still be dismissed
for being unmeritorious considering that Bautista's concurrent designation as MARINA OIC
and DOTC Undersecretary was... constitutional. There was no violation of Section 13,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution because respondent Bautista was merely designated
acting head of MARINA on September 1, 2008. She was designated MARINA OIC, not
appointed MARINA Administrator.
The sole issue to be resolved is whether or not the designation of respondent Bautista as
OIC of MARINA, concurrent with the position of DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime
Transport to which she had been appointed, violated the constitutional proscription against
dual or multiple... offices for Cabinet Members and their deputies and assistants.
Ruling:
These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the President and his official family,
which prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public officials or employees such as
the Members of Congress, members of the civil service in general and members of... the
armed forces, are proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the President and his
official family as a class by itself and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or
employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the
primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and... assistants
may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself.
Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose a stricter
prohibition on the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants with respect to holding multiple offices or employment in the government during...
their tenure, the exception to this prohibition must be read with equal severity. On its face,
the language of Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it must be understood as
intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple...
government offices or employment.
Respondent Bautista being then the appointed Undersecretary of DOTC, she was thus
covered by the stricter prohibition under Section 13, Article VII and consequently she cannot
invoke the exception provided in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B where holding
another... office is allowed by law or the primary functions of the position.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The designation of respondent Ma. Elena H.
Bautista as Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Administrator, Maritime Industry Authority, in a
concurrent capacity with her position as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, is...
hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution and therefore, NULL and VOID.
Principles:
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure,... directly or indirectly
practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including... government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct
of their office.
Sec. 7. x x x
Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no appointive
official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations
or... their subsidiaries.
Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an
individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its
confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for the... person chosen unless
he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office. Designation, on the other
hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official, as
where, in the case before us, the Secretary of Tourism is designated
Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under the
Constitution, three Justices of the Supreme Court are designated by the Chief Justice to sit
in the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of Representatives. It is said that...
appointment is essentially executive while designation is legislative in nature.
Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it likewise involves the
naming of a particular person to a specified public office. That is the common understanding
of the term. However, where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the...
implication is that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced
at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only an acting
or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on the... person named.
VOL. 338, AUGUST 15, 200081Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. ZamoraG.R. No. 141284.
August 15, 2000.*INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.H O N .
R O N A LD O B . ZAMORA, GEN. PANFILO M. LACSON, GEN. EDGAR B.
AGLIPAY, and GEN.ANGELO REYES, respondents.Judicial Review; Requisites.—When
questions of constitutional significance areraised, the Court can exercise its power of
judicial review only if the followingrequisites are complied with, namely: (1) the
existence of an actual and appropriatecase; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the
party raising the constitutionalquestion; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at
the earliest opportunity;and (4) the constitutional question is the lis motaof the case.Same;
Same; Parties; “Locus Standi”; Words and Phrases; “Legal Standing” or“Locus Standi,”
“Interest,” Explained.—“Legal standing” or locus standihas beendefined as a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that the party hassustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of the governmental act that isbeing challenged. The term
“interest” means a material interest, an interest in issuea f f e c t e d b y t h e d e c r e e , a s
d i s t i n gu i s h e d f r o m m e r e i n t e r e s t i n t h e q u e s t i o n involved, or a mere incidental
interest. The gist of the question of standing iswhether a party alleges “such personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy asto assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of issues uponwhich the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.”Same; Same; Same; Integrated Bar of the Philippines; The mere invocation
bythe Integrated Bar of the Philippines of its duty to preserve the rule of law
andnothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this
case—this is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole
citizenry.—The IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the
rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no
other basis in support of its locus stand. The mere invocation byte IBP of its duty to preserve
the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with
standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups
and the whole citizenry. Based on the standards above-stated; the IBP has failed to
present a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the case._____________*EN
BANC.8282SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs.
Zamora Its fundamental purpose which, under Section 2, Rule 139-A of the Rules of
Court, is to elevate the standards of the law profession and to improve the
administration of justice is alien to, and cannot be affected by the deployment of the
Marines.
 Francisco vs. House of Representatives,
G.R. No 160261, November 10, 2003
SEPTEMBER 16, 2018

FACTS:

In late 2001 House of Representatives (HOR) of the 12th Congress adopted its Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings. The new rules superseded impeachment Rules of the
11th Congress. Secs. 16 and 17 of these Rules state that impeachment proceedings are deemed
initiated (1) if House Committee on Justice deems the complaint sufficient in substance, or (2) if
the House itself affirms or overturns the findings of the House Committee on Justice on the
substance of the complaint, or (3) by filing or endorsement before the HOR Secretary General by
one-thirds of the members of the House.

A few months later, HoR passed a resolution directing the Committee on Justice to conduct an
investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by Chief
Justice Davide of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).”

In June 2003, former President Estrada files the first impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Davide and 7 Associate Justices of SC for “culpable violation of the Constitution,
betrayal of public trust and other high crimes.” The complaint was referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
Constitution.

On October 13, 2003, the HOR Committee on Justice found the first impeachment complaint
“sufficient in form.” However, it also voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being
insufficient in substance. Ten days later, on October 23,2003, Teodoro and Fuentebella filed a
second impeachment complaint against CJ Davide, founded on the alleged results of the
legislative inquiry on the JDF. The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a
“resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least one-third of all the Members of the
House of Representatives.

Several petitions were filed with the SC by members of the bar, members of the House of
Representatives, as well as private individuals, all asserting their rights, among others, as
taxpayers to stop the illegal spending of public funds for the impeachment proceedings against
the Chief Justice. The petitioners contend that Article XI, Section 3 (5) of the 1987 Constitution
bars the filing of the second impeachment complaint. The constitutional provision states that
“(n)o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within
a period of one year.”

Speaker Jose de Venecia submitted a manifestaiton to the SC stating that the High Court does not
have jurisdiction to hear the case as it would mean an encroachment on the power of HoR, a co-
equal branch of government.

ISSUES/HELD:

1.) Whether the filing of the second impeachment complaint violates Sec. 3(5), Article XI of the
Constitution—YES

2) Whether Sec. 16 & 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings

approved by the HoR are unconstitutional – YES
3.) Whether or not the certiorari jurisdiction of the court may be invoked – YES

RATIO:

1. The second impeachment complaint falls under the one-year bar under the Constitution.

2. Sec 16 and 17 of House Impeachment Rule V are unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court employed three principles in deciding the case:

1) Whenever possible, the words in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning
(verbal egis);

2) If there is ambiguity, the Constitution must be interpreted according to the intent of the
framers; and

3) The Constitution must be interpreted as a whole.

Applying these principles, to “initiate” in its ordinary acceptation means simply to begin. The
records of the debates by the framers affirm this textual interpretation. From the records of the
Constitutional Convention and the amicus curiae briefs of its two members (Maambong and
Regalado), the term “to initiate” in Sec 3(5), Art. XI of the Constitution refers to the filing of the
impeachment complaint coupled with taking initial action by Congress on the complaint.

By contrast, Secs. 16 and 17 state that impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if
House Committee on Justice deems the complaint sufficient in substance, or (2) if the House
itself affirms or overturns the findings of the House Committee on Justice on the substance of the
complaint, or (3) by filing or endorsement before the HOR Secretary General by one-thirds of
the members of the House.

In this light, Secs. 16 and 17 of the House Rules of Procedure for Impeachment are
unconstitutional because the rules clearly contravene Sec. 3 (5), Art. XI since the rules give the
term “initiate” a different meaning from filing and referral.

Hence, the second impeachment complaint by Teodoro and Fuentebella violates the
constitutional one-year ban.

3. The certiorari jurisdiction of the court may be invoked.

The Supreme Court, in exercising its expanded power of judicial review, only carried out its duty
as stated in Section 1, Article VIII, which mandates the judicial department to look into cases
where there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the different branches of
government. Here, it only reviewed the constitutionality of the Rules of Impeachment against the
one-year ban explicitly stated in the Constitution. Consequently, the contention that judicial
review over the case would result in a crisis is unwarranted.

The judiciary, with the Supreme Court at its helm as the final arbiter, effectively checks on the
other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law. It must declare executive and
legislative acts void if they violate the Constitution. The violation of Article XI, Section 3(5) of
the Constitution is thus within the competence of the Court to decide.
 CASE DIGEST
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs. THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES
G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003.

FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by
Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an
investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former
President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide
Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of
the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T.
Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the House
Committee. The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment
complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being
insufficient in substance. To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the
House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four
months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23,
2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment
complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on
the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This
second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment"
signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the
Constitution.

2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question – has resulted in a political crisis.

HELD:
1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint
and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of
Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the
foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period
following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment
complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along
with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on
Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates
the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same
impeachable officer within a one-year period.

2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear
that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the
mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion
hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly
political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political
questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions." Truly
political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of
separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political in nature.
 [G.R. NO. 187883: June 16, 2009]

ATTY. OLIVER O. LOZANO and ATTY. EVANGELINE J. LOZANO-

ENDRIANO, Petitioners, v.SPEAKER PROSPERO C. NOGRALES,
Representative, Majority, House of Representatives,Respondent.

[G.R. NO. 187910 : June 16, 2009]

LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner, v. SPEAKER PROSPERO C.

NOGRALES, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Congress of
the Philippines, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PUNO, C.J.:

This Court, so long as the fundamentals of republicanism continue to guide

it, shall not shirk its bounden duty to wield its judicial power to settle "actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government."1 Be that as it may, no amount of
exigency can make this Court exercise a power where it is not proper.

The two petitions, filed by their respective petitioners in their capacities as

concerned citizens and taxpayers, prayed for the nullification of House
Resolution No. 1109 entitled "A Resolution Calling upon the Members of
Congress to Convene for the Purpose of Considering Proposals to Amend or
Revise the Constitution, Upon a Three-fourths Vote of All the Members of
Congress." In essence, both petitions seek to trigger a justiciable
controversy that would warrant a definitive interpretation by this Court of
Section 1, Article XVII, which provides for the procedure for amending or
revising the Constitution. Unfortunately, this Court cannot indulge
petitioners' supplications. While some may interpret petitioners' moves as
vigilance in preserving the rule of law, a careful perusal of their petitions
would reveal that they cannot hurdle the bar of justiciability set by this Court
before it will assume jurisdiction over cases involving constitutional disputes.

It is well settled that it is the duty of the judiciary to say what the law
is.2 The determination of the nature, scope and extent of the powers of
government is the exclusive province of the judiciary, such that any
mediation on the part of the latter for the allocation of constitutional
boundaries would amount, not to its supremacy, but to its mere fulfillment
of its "solemn and sacred obligation" under the Constitution.3 This Court's
power of review may be awesome, but it is limited to actual cases and
controversies dealing with parties having adversely legal claims, to be
exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited
further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis
motapresented.4 The "case-or-controversy" requirement bans this court from
deciding "abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions,"5 lest the court give
opinions in the nature of advice concerning legislative or executive
action.6 In the illuminating words of the learned Justice Laurel in Angara v.
Electoral Commission7 :
Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal
questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its
function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of
wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord
the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only
because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also
because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies
must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the
government.

An aspect of the "case-or-controversy" requirement is the requisite of

"ripeness." In the United States, courts are centrally concerned with whether
a case involves uncertain contingent future events that may not occur as
anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.8 Another approach is the
evaluation of the twofold aspect of ripeness: first, the fitness of the issues
for judicial decision; and second, the hardship to the parties entailed by
withholding court consideration.9 In our jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is
generally treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff. Hence, a question
is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct
adverse effect on the individual challenging it.10 An alternative road to
review similarly taken would be to determine whether an action has already
been accomplished or performed by a branch of government before the
courts may step in.11

In the present case, the fitness of petitioners' case for the exercise of judicial
review is grossly lacking. In the first place, petitioners have not sufficiently
proven any adverse injury or hardship from the act complained of. In the
second place, House Resolution No. 1109 only resolved that the House of
Representatives shall convene at a future time for the purpose of proposing
amendments or revisions to the Constitution. No actual convention has yet
transpired and no rules of procedure have yet been adopted. More
importantly, no proposal has yet been made, and hence, no usurpation of
power or gross abuse of discretion has yet taken place. In short, House
Resolution No. 1109 involves a quintessential example of an uncertain
contingent future event that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may
not occur at all. The House has not yet performed a positive act that would
warrant an intervention from this Court.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl
lαω lιbrαrÿ

Tan v. Macapagal presents a similar factual milieu. In said case, petitioners

filed a petition assailing the validity of the Laurel-Langley resolution, which
dealt with the range of authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. The
court resolved the issue thus:

More specifically, as long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on by

it, there is no room for the interposition of judicial oversight. Only after it
has made concrete what it intends to submit for ratification may the
appropriate case be instituted. Until then, the courts are devoid of
jurisdiction. That is the command of the Constitution as interpreted by this
Court. Unless and until such a doctrine loses force by being overruled or a
new precedent being announced, it is controlling. It is implicit in the rule of
law.12
Yet another requisite rooted in the very nature of judicial power is locus
standi or standing to sue. Thus, generally, a party will be allowed to litigate
only when he can demonstrate that (1) he has personally suffered some
actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and
(3) the injury is likely to be redressed by the remedy being sought.13 In the
cases at bar, petitioners have not shown the elemental injury in fact that
would endow them with the standing to sue. Locus standi requires a
personal stake in the outcome of a controversy for significant reasons. It
assures adverseness and sharpens the presentation of issues for the
illumination of the Court in resolving difficult constitutional questions.14 The
lack of petitioners' personal stake in this case is no more evident than in
Lozano's three-page petition that is devoid of any legal or jurisprudential
basis.

Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the claim of petitioners that
they are instituting the cases at bar as taxpayers and concerned citizens. A
taxpayer's suit requires that the act complained of directly involves the
illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.15 It is undisputed
that there has been no allocation or disbursement of public funds in this case
as of yet. To be sure, standing as a citizen has been upheld by this Court in
cases where a petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental
importance or when paramount public interest is involved.16 While the Court
recognizes the potential far-reaching implications of the issue at hand, the
possible consequence of House Resolution No. 1109 is yet unrealized and
does not infuse petitioners with locus standi under the "transcendental
importance" doctrine.

The rule on locus standi is not a plain procedural rule but a constitutional
requirement derived from Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which
mandates courts of justice to settle only "actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable." As stated in
Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, Jr.,17 viz.:

x x x [C]ourts are neither free to decide all kinds of cases dumped into their
laps nor are they free to open their doors to all parties or entities claiming a
grievance. The rationale for this constitutional requirement of locus standi is
by no means trifle. It is intended "to assure a vigorous adversary
presentation of the case, and, perhaps more importantly to warrant the
judiciary's overruling the determination of a coordinate, democratically
elected organ of government." It thus goes to the very essence of
representative democracies.

xxx

A lesser but not insignificant reason for screening the standing of persons
who desire to litigate constitutional issues is economic in character. Given
the sparseness of our resources, the capacity of courts to render efficient
judicial service to our people is severely limited. For courts to
indiscriminately open their doors to all types of suits and suitors is for them
to unduly overburden their dockets, and ultimately render themselves
ineffective dispensers of justice. To be sure, this is an evil that clearly
confronts our judiciary today.
Moreover, while the Court has taken an increasingly liberal approach to the
rule of locus standi, evolving from the stringent requirements of "personal
injury" to the broader "transcendental importance" doctrine, such liberality is
not to be abused. It is not an open invitation for the ignorant and the
ignoble to file petitions that prove nothing but their cerebral deficit.

In the final scheme, judicial review is effective largely because it is not

available simply at the behest of a partisan faction, but is exercised only to
remedy a particular, concrete injury.18 When warranted by the presence of
indispensible minimums for judicial review, this Court shall not shun the duty
to resolve the constitutional challenge that may confront it.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are dismissed.

SO ORDERED.
August 2010 Philippine Supreme Court
Decisions on Political Law
Posted on September 13, 2010 by Vicente D. Gerochi IV • Posted in Constitutional Law • Tagged agrarian reform, Civil Service
Commission, compensation, due process, eminent domain, equal protection, evidence, just compensation, public
officers, warrantless arrest, warrantless search
Here are selected August 2010 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on political law:

Constitutional Law
Civil Service Commission; jurisdiction. The civil service encompasses all branches and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, like the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), or those created by special law. Thus, GSIS employees are part
of the civil service system and are subject to the law and to the circulars, rules and regulations issued by the
Civil Service Commission (CSC) on discipline, attendance and general terms and conditions of
employment. The CSC has jurisdiction to hear and decide disciplinary cases against erring employees. Winston
F. Garcia vs. Mario I. Molina, et al./Winston F. Garcia vs. Mario I. Molina, et al., G.R. No. 157383/G.R. No.
174137, August 18, 2010.
Double compensation. Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitution provides that no elective or appointive
public officer or employee shall receive additional, double or indirect compensation, unless specifically
authorized by law, nor accept without the consent of the Congress, any present emolument, office or title of
any kind from any foreign government. Pensions and gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double
or indirect compensation. This provision, however, does not apply to the present case as there was no double
compensation to the petitioners. The questioned resolutions of the Monetary Board are valid corporate acts of
petitioners that became the bases for granting them additional monthly representation and transportation
allowance (RATA), as members of the Board of Directors of Philippine International Convention Center Inc.
(PICCI), a government corporation whose sole stockholder is the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). RATA is
distinct from salary as a form of compensation. Unlike salary which is paid for services rendered, RATA is a
form of allowance intended to defray expenses deemed unavoidable in the discharge of office. Hence, RATA
is paid only to certain officials who, by the nature of their offices, incur representation and transportation
expenses. Indeed, aside from the RATA that they have been receiving from the BSP, the grant of RATA to
each of the petitioners for every board meeting they attended, in their capacity as members of the Board of
Directors of PICCI, in addition to their per diem, does not violate the constitutional proscription against double
compensation. Gabriel C. Singson, et al. vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 159355, August 9, 2010.
Eminent domain; voluntary agreement by landowner. Where the landowner agrees voluntarily to the taking of
his property by the government for public use, he thereby waives his right to the institution of a formal
expropriation proceeding covering such property. Failure for a long time of the owner to question the lack of
expropriation proceedings covering a property that the government had taken constitutes a waiver of his right
to gain back possession. The landowner’s remedy in such case is an action for the payment of just
compensation, not ejectment. Here, the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the eviction of petitioner from the
property that it has held as government school site for more than 50 years. The evidence on record shows that
the respondents intended to cede the property to the City Government of Lipa permanently. In fact, they
allowed the city to declare the property in its name for tax purposes. And when they sought to have the bigger
lot subdivided, the respondents earmarked a specific portion for the City Government of Lipa. Under the
circumstances, it may be assumed that the respondents had agreed to transfer ownership of the land to the
government, whether to the City Government of Lipa or to the Republic of the Philippines, but the parties
never formalized and documented such transfer. Consequently, petitioner should be deemed entitled to
possession pending the respondents’ formal transfer of ownership to it upon payment of just
compensation. Republic of the Philippines vs. Primo Mendoza and Maria Lucero, G.R. No. 185091, August 8,
2010.
Equal protection clause. There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills
in Congress and municipalities that did not have similar pending bills for purposes of the income requirement
for converting a municipality into a city under Republic Act No. 9009. The pendency of such a bill does not
affect or determine the level of income of a municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in
Congress might even have lower annual income than municipalities that did not have pending cityhood
bills. Thus, the classification criterion − mere pendency of a cityhood bill in Congress − is not rationally
related to the purpose of RA 9009, which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting into
cities. Moreover, the fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in Congress limits the exemption (from the income
requirement) to a specific condition existing at the time of passage of RA 9009. That specific condition will
never happen again. This violates the requirement that a valid classification must not be limited to existing
conditions only. Also, the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws gives the 16 respondent municipalities a
unique advantage based on an arbitrary date − the filing of their cityhood bills before the end of the
11th Congress – as against all other municipalities that may want to convert into cities after the effectiveness of
RA 9009. Lastly, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the Constitutional requirement
that the classification must apply to all those who are similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income
as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while those 16 municipalities can. Clearly, as
worded, the exemption found in the Cityhood Laws would be unconstitutional for violation of the equal
protection clause. League of Cities of the Philippines represented by LCP National President Jerry P. Trenas,
et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al. G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R. No. 178056, August 24,
2010.
Judicial review; justiciable controversy; moot case. Private respondent was not elected President in the May
10, 2010 election. Since the issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase “any reelection” in Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution will be premised on a person’s second (whether immediate or not) election as
President, there is no case or controversy to be resolved in this case. No live conflict of legal rights
exists. There is in this case no definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy that touches on the legal
relations of parties having adverse legal interests. No specific relief may conclusively be decreed upon by the
Court in this case that will benefit any of the parties. As such, one of the essential requisites for the exercise of
the power of judicial review, the existence of an actual case or controversy, is sorely lacking in this case. As a
rule, the Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. It is not empowered to decide moot
questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result as to
the thing in issue in the case before it. When a case is moot, it becomes non-justiciable. An action is considered
“moot” when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become academic
or dead or when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial
intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the parties. There is nothing for the Court to
resolve as the determination thereof has been overtaken by subsequent events. Assuming an actual case or
controversy existed prior to the proclamation of a President who has been duly elected in the May 10, 2010
election, the same is no longer true today. Following the results of that election, private respondent was not
elected President for the second time. Thus, any discussion of his “reelection” will simply be hypothetical and
speculative. It will serve no useful or practical purpose. Atty. Evillo C. Pormento vs. Joseph “Erap” Ejercito
Estrada and Commission on Elections. G.R. No. 191988. August 31, 2010.
Operative fact doctrine. Under the operative fact doctrine, the law is recognized as unconstitutional but the
effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of
equity and fair play. However, in this case, the minority’s novel theory, invoking the operative fact doctrine, is
that the enactment of the Cityhood Laws and the functioning of the 16 municipalities as new cities with new
sets of officials and employees operate to constitutionalize the unconstitutional Cityhood Laws. This novel
theory misapplies the operative fact doctrine and sets a gravely dangerous precedent. Under the minority’s
view, an unconstitutional law, if already implemented prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality by the
Court, can no longer be revoked and its implementation must be continued despite being
unconstitutional. This view will open the floodgates to the wanton enactment of unconstitutional laws and a
mad rush for their immediate implementation before the Court can declare them unconstitutional. This view is
an open invitation to serially violate the Constitution, and be quick about it, lest the violation be stopped by the
Court.
The operative fact doctrine is a rule of equity. As such, it must be applied as an exception to the general rule
that an unconstitutional law produces no effects. It can never be invoked to validate as constitutional an
unconstitutional act. The operative fact doctrine never validates or constitutionalizes an unconstitutional
law. The unconstitutional law remains unconstitutional, but its effects, prior to its judicial declaration of
nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. The doctrine affects or modifies only the
effects of the unconstitutional law, not the unconstitutional law itself. Applying the doctrine to this case, the
Cityhood Laws remain unconstitutional because they violate Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution. However, the effects of the implementation of the Cityhood Laws prior to the declaration of
their nullity, such as the payment of salaries and supplies by the concerned local government units or their
issuance of licenses or execution of contracts, may be recognized as valid and effective. League of Cities of
the Philippines represented by LCP National President Jerry P. Trenas, et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et
al. G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R. No. 178056, August 24, 2010.
Search warrant; requirements for validity. The validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the
following factors: (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the
judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the
judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce;
and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be
seized. On the first requisite, a magistrate’s determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search
warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that
determination. Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining judge brought out such facts and
circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the place sought to be
searched. On the last requirement, a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer serving
the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other
places in the community. A designation or description that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion
of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of
definiteness. People of the Philippines vs. Estela Tuan y Baludda. G.R. No. 176066, August 11, 2010.
Warrantless arrest. Appellant was arrested during an entrapment operation where he was caught in flagrante
delicto selling shabu. When an arrest is made during an entrapment operation, it is not required that a warrant
be secured in line with Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that a peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. A buy-bust operation is
a form of entrapment which in recent years has been accepted as a valid and effective mode of apprehending
drug pushers. If carried out with due regard for constitutional and legal safeguards, a buy-bust operation, such
as the one involving appellant, deserves judicial sanction. Consequently, the warrantless arrest and warrantless
search and seizure conducted on the person of appellant were allowed under the circumstances. The search,
incident to his lawful arrest, needed no warrant to sustain its validity. Thus, there is no doubt that the sachets
of shabu recovered during the legitimate buy-bust operation are admissible and were properly admitted in
evidence against him. People of the Philippines vs. Michael Sembrano y Castro. G.R. No. 185848, August 16,
2010.
Administrative Law
Administrative agencies; findings. Findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, like
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, which have acquired expertise because their
jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded respect. In this case, there is no ground to
disturb the DARAB’s findings, which affirmed those of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
after due hearing and appreciation of the evidence submitted by both parties.Heirs of Jose M. Cervantes, et al.
vs. Jesus G. Miranda. G.R. No. 183352, August 9, 2010.
Administrative cases; preliminary investigation; due process. Section 45 of the Government Service Insurance
System Act of 1997 gives the President and General Manager of GSIS the authority and responsibility to
remove, suspend or otherwise discipline GSIS personnel for cause. However, this power is not without
limitations for it must be exercised in accordance with civil service rules. While the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (Civil Service Rules) do not specifically provide that a formal charge
issued against a government employee without the requisite preliminary investigation is null and void, it is
required that, upon receipt of a complaint which is sufficient in form and substance, the disciplining authority
shall require the person complained of to submit a counter-affidavit or comment under oath within three days
from receipt. The use of the word “shall” quite obviously indicates that it is mandatory for the disciplining
authority to conduct a preliminary investigation or at least give the respondent the opportunity to comment and
explain his side. This must be done prior to the issuance of the formal charge, and the comment required is
different from the answer that may later be filed by respondents. Contrary to petitioner’s claim, no exception is
provided for in the Civil Service Rules, not even an indictment in flagranti as claimed by petitioner.
The above rules apply even if the complainant is the disciplining authority himself, as in this case. To comply
with such requirement, petitioner could have issued a memorandum requiring respondents to explain why no
disciplinary action should be taken against them instead of immediately issuing formal charges. With
respondents’ comments, petitioner should have properly evaluated both sides of the controversy before making
a conclusion that there was a prima facie case against respondents, leading to the issuance of the questioned
formal charges. It is noteworthy that the very acts subject of the administrative cases stemmed from an event
that took place the day before the formal charges were issued. It appears, therefore, that the formal charges
were issued after the sole determination by the petitioner as the disciplining authority that there was a prima
facie case against respondents. To condone this would give the disciplining authority an unrestricted power to
judge by himself the nature of the act complained of as well as the gravity of the charges. Thus, respondents
here were denied due process of law. Not even the fact that the charges against them are serious and evidence
of their guilt is – in the opinion of their superior – strong can compensate for the procedural shortcut taken by
petitioner. The filing by petitioner of formal charges against the respondents without complying with the
mandated preliminary investigation or at least giving the respondents the opportunity to comment violated
their right to due process. Accordingly, the formal charges are void ab initio and may be assailed directly or
indirectly at anytime. Winston F. Garcia vs. Mario I. Molina, et al./Winston F. Garcia vs. Mario I. Molina, et
al. .G.R. No. 157383/G.R. No. 174137, August 18, 2010.
Administrative cases; decision rendered without due process. The cardinal precept is that where there is a
violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted from their jurisdiction. The violation of a party’s right
to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where
the denial of the fundamental right to due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is
void for lack of jurisdiction. This rule is equally true in quasi-judicial and administrative proceedings, for the
constitutional guarantee that no man shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process is
unqualified by the type of proceedings (whether judicial or administrative) where he stands to lose the same.
Although administrative procedural rules are less stringent and often applied more liberally, administrative
proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental procedural principles, such as the right to due process
in investigations and hearings. Winston F. Garcia vs. Mario I. Molina, et al./Winston F. Garcia vs. Mario I.
Molina, et al., G.R. No. 157383/G.R. No. 174137, August 18, 2010.
Administrative cases; quantum of evidence. In administrative cases, the requisite proof is substantial
evidence, i.e., the amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion. In this case, substantial evidence consisted of the uniform findings of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon and the Court of Appeals that
petitioner connived with his co-defendants to destroy the improvements introduced by respondent on the
subject property so they could construct their own cottages thereon. Josephil C. Bien vs. Pedro B. Bo, G.R. No.
179333, August 3, 2010.
Public officers; statement of assets and liabilities. Even an asset that was acquired through chattel mortgage
must be declared and included in the Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SSAL). The law requires that
the SSAL be accomplished truthfully and in detail without distinction as to how the property was acquired.
Respondent, therefore, cannot escape liability by arguing that the ownership of the vehicle has not yet passed
to him on the basis that it was acquired only on installment basis. The requirement to file the SSAL not later
than the first 15 days of April at the close of every calendar year must not be treated as a simple and trivial
routine, but as an obligation that is part and parcel of every civil servant’s duty to the people. It serves as the
basis of the government and the people in monitoring the income and lifestyle of officials and employees in the
government in compliance with the Constitutional policy to eradicate corruption, promote transparency in
government, and ensure that all government employees and officials lead just and modest lives. It is for this
reason that the SSAL must be sworn to and is made accessible to the public, subject to reasonable
administrative regulations.Hon. Waldo Q. Flores, et al. vs. Atty. Antonio F. Montemayor. G.R. No. 170146,
August 25, 2010.
Local Government
Abuse of authority. Addressing the argument of petitioner, a barangay official, that there was no abuse of
authority because the incident complained of occurred in another barangay over which he has no authority and
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals that petitioner is liable for abuse of
authority on the basis that he participated in the unlawful act as a higher authority that gave a semblance of
legality over that act and influenced the actions of his co-defendants. Here, petitioner was president of the
organization of barangay officials in his municipality and sat as ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Bayan,
which has power to review barangay ordinances and authority to discipline barangay officials. His co-
defendants were officials in the barangay where the incident occurred. Josephil C. Bien vs. Pedro B. Bo, G.R.
No. 179333, August 3, 2010.
Creation of local government unit. The Constitution states that the creation of local government units must
follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one
Local Government Code. The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all
the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress
cannot write such criteria in any other law. The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of
cities and other political units must follow the same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the
Local Government Code. Any derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government
Code violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
Republic Act No. 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the income
requirement from Php20 million to Php100 million for the creation of a city. This law took effect on 30 June
2001. Hence, from that moment the Local Government Code required that any municipality desiring to become
a city must satisfy the Php100 million income requirement. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as
amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption from this income requirement. In enacting RA 9009,
Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent municipalities, even though their cityhood bills were
pending in Congress when Congress passed RA 9009. The laws converting these municipalities into cities, all
enacted after the RA 9009 became effective, explicitly exempt respondent municipalities from the increased
income requirement in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Such exemption
clearly violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid,
such exemption must be written in the Local Government Code and not in any other law. League of Cities of
the Philippines represented by LCP National President Jerry P. Trenas, et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et
al. G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R. No. 178056, August 24, 2010.
Special Laws
Agrarian reform; deposit of provisional compensation. The amount of provisional compensation that the Land
Bank of the Philippines (LBP) is required to deposit in the name of the landowner if the latter rejects the offer
of compensation of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6657
should be the LBP’s initial valuation of the land and not, as respondent argues, the sum awarded by DAR’s
adjudication bodies as compensation in a summary administrative proceeding. The deposit of such provisional
compensation must be made even before the summary administrative proceeding commences, or at least
simultaneously with it, once the landowner rejects the initial valuation of the LBP. Such deposit results from
the landowner’s rejection of the DAR offer (based on the LBP’s initial valuation). Both the conduct of
summary administrative proceeding and deposit of provisional compensation follow as a consequence of the
landowner’s rejection. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Heir of Trinidad S. Vda. De Arieta. G.R. No. 161834,
August 11, 2010.
Agrarian reform; just compensation. Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 is the principal basis for computing
just compensation, and the factors set forth therein have been translated into a formula outlined in DAR
Administrative Order No. 5, series of 1998 (DAR AO 5). While the determination of just compensation is
essentially a judicial function vested in the Regional Trial Court acting as a Special Agrarian Court, a judge
cannot abuse his discretion by not taking into full consideration the factors specifically identified by law and
its implementing rules. Special Agrarian Courts are not at liberty to disregard the formula laid down in DAR
AO 5, because unless an administrative order is declared invalid, courts have no option but to apply it. Courts
cannot ignore, without violating the agrarian reform law, the formula provided by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) for determining just compensation. In this case, the court adopted a different formula in
determining the land value by considering the average between the findings of DAR using the formula laid
down in Executive Order No. 228 and the market value of the property as stated in the tax declaration. This is
obviously a departure from the mandate of the law and DAR AO 5. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Rizalina
Gustilo Barrido, et al., G.R. No. 183688, August 18, 2010.
Agrarian reform; sale of land. Petitioners’ title shows on its face that the government granted title to them on
January 9, 1990, by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27. This law explicitly prohibits any form of transfer of
the land granted under it except to the government or by hereditary succession to the successors of the farmer
beneficiary. Upon the enactment of Executive Order No. 228 in 1987, however, the restriction ceased to be
absolute. Land reform beneficiaries were allowed to transfer ownership of their lands provided that their
amortizations with the Land Bank of the Philippines have been paid in full. In this case, petitioners’ title
categorically states that they have fully complied with the requirements for the final grant of title under PD
27. This means that they have completed payment of their amortizations with Land Bank. Consequently, they
could already legally transfer their title to another. Heirs of Paulino Atienza vs. Domingo P. Espidol, G.R. No.
180665, August 11, 2010.
Agricultural land; conversion. Conversion of the subject landholding under the 1980 Kasunduan is not the
conversion of landholding that is contemplated by Section 36 of Republic Act No. 3844, which governs the
dispossession of an agricultural lessee and the termination of his rights to enjoy and possess the landholding.
Conversion here has been defined as the act of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into
some other use as approved by the Department of Agrarian Reform. More to the point is that for conversion to
avail as a ground for dispossession, Section 36 implies the necessity of prior court proceedings in which the
issue of conversion has been determined and a final order issued directing dispossession upon that ground. In
this case, however, respondent does not profess that there had been at any tine such proceedings or that there
was such court order. Neither does he assert that the lot in question had undergone conversion with authority
from the Department of Agrarian Reform. Emilia Micking Vda. De Coronel, et al. Vs. Miguel Tanjangco,
Jr., G.R. No. 170693, August 8, 2010.
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission; powers. The Court rejected respondent’s contention that he was deprived
of his right to due process when the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) proceeded to investigate him
on the basis of an anonymous complaint in the absence of any documents supporting the complainant’s
assertions. Section 4(c) of Executive Order No. 12 states that the PAGC has the power to give due course to
anonymous complaints against presidential appointees if there appears on the face of the complaint or based on
the supporting documents attached to the anonymous complaint a probable cause to engender a belief that the
allegations may be true. The use of the conjunctive word “or” in the said provision is determinative since it
empowers the PAGC to exercise discretion in giving due course to anonymous complaints. Because of the said
provision, an anonymous complaint may be given due course even if the same is without supporting
documents, so long as it appears from the face of the complaint that there is probable cause. Hon. Waldo Q.
Flores, et al. vs. Atty. Antonio F. Montemayor. G.R. No. 170146, August 25, 2010.
Water districts; government-owned and controlled corporations. A local water district is a government-owned
and controlled corporation with special charter since it is created pursuant to a special law, Presidential Decree
No. 198 (1973). PD 198 constitutes the special charter by virtue of which local water districts exist. Unlike
private corporations that derive their legal existence and power from the Corporation Code, water districts
derive their legal existence and power from P.D. No. 198. Section 6 of the decree in fact provides that water
districts “shall exercise the powers, rights and privileges given to private corporations under existing laws, in
addition to the powers granted in, and subject to such restrictions imposed under this Act.” Therefore, water
districts would not have corporate powers without PD 198. Engr. Ranulfo C. Feliciano vs. Hon. Cornelio C.
Gison. G.R. No. 165641, August 25, 2010.
What court
may
exercise
judicial
review?
J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 3 SCRA 696, No. L-18128, No.
L-18672 December 26, 1961
10JAN
En Banc
[REYES, J.B.L., J.]
FACTS: Bruna Rosete and Tranquilino Dizon, petitioned the Court of First
Instance to suspend the order of demolition of their houses, on the ground
that they were tenants of the Tatalon Estate; that Republic Act No. 2616,
after specifically authorizing the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate.
However, Judge Nicasio Yatco of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City
denied the suspension because no expropriation proceedings had been
actually filed. On certiorari, the Court of Appeals ordered the issuance ex
parte of the preliminary injunction.
Respondent Tuason & Company, Inc., moved to dissolve the preliminary
injunction of the Court of Appeals, that the prohibition proceedings a
question of constitutionality of a statute is not appealable to the Court of
Appeals; It is urged by amicus curiae that Courts of First Instance have no
jurisdiction to entertain actions assailing the constitutionality of statutes or
treaties, because section 10 of Article VIII of the Constitution prescribes
that — No treaty or law may be declared unconstitutional without the
concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of the (Supreme) Court.
ISSUE: Are trial courts vested with jurisdiction to decide on the
constitutionality of statutes or treaties?
HELD: YES.
[T]he Constitution itself inhibits Congress from depriving the Supreme
Court —

of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal,

certiorari or writ of error, as the law or the rules of court may provide,
final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in —
(1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law,
ordinance or executive orders or regulations is in question (Emphasis
supplied).

Plainly the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should have
jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it
speaks of appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases
where such constitutionality happens to be in issue. Construing both
provisions together, it is readily discerned that the two-third vote of the
Supreme Court, required by Section 10 of Article VIII, conditions only the
decisions of the Supreme Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.