POLITICAL

 LAW  REVIEW
ACADEMIC  YEAR    2018-­‐2019
COLLEGE  OF  LAW
BULACAN  STATE  UNIVERSITY
 GENERAL  OUTLINE  AND  COVERAGE
• CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW
• ADMINISTRATIVE  LAW
• ELECTION  LAW
• LOCAL  GOVERNMENTS
• PUBLIC  INTERNATIONAL  LAW
POLITICAL  LAW
• Branch  of  public  law
• Deals    with  the  organization  and  operations  of  the  governmental  
organs  of  the  State  
• Defines  the  relations  of  the  State  with  the  inhabitants  of  its  territory
Constitution,  defined
• It is through the Constitution that the fundamental powers of
government are established, limited and defined, and by which these
powers are distributed among the several departments. The
Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws
must conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials
of the land, must defer. Constitutional doctrines must remain
steadfast no matter what may be the tides of time. It cannot be
simply made to sway and accommodate the call of situations and
much more tailor itself to the whims and caprices of government and
the people who run it. (Biraogo vs. Philippine Truth Commision [2010]
Constitutional  Supremacy
• A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and
administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable
except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the
fundamental and paramount law of the nation. It prescribes the permanent
framework of a system of government, assigns to the different departments their
respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which
government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a
supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which
all private rights must be determined and all public authority
administered.] Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or
contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether
promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by
private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and
effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme
law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. (Manila
Priince Hotel vs. GSIS [1997])
Parts;  Three  Constitution  in  One
Part Provision and  importance Provisions in  the  1987  Constitution
Constitution of  Liberty/Rights The  series of  provisions   setting   ARTICLE III
forth   the  fundamental   rights  of   Civil  and  Political  Rights
• Freedom   of  Belief citizens  and  imposing   limitations  on  
• Personal  Freedom the  powers  of  government   as  a  
means  of  securing  the  enjoyment  
of  these  rights.
Constitution of  Government The  series  of  provisions outlining   ARTICLE VI,  VII,  VIII,  IX,  XI
the  organization  of  government  
enumerating   its  powers,  laying  
down  certain  rules  relative  to  its  
administration   and  defining   the  
electorate
Constitution of  Sovereignty The  provisions containing  the  mode   PREAMBLE, ARTICLE II,  XVII
or  procedure   in  accordance  with  
which  formal  changes  in  the  
fundamental   law  may  be  brought  
about.
AMENDMENTS  AND  REVISION  (Constitution  
of  Sovereignty)
• Historical  Evolution  under  the  1935,  1973  Constitution
• Article  XVII,  1987  Constitution
• Distinction  between  amendment
• Revision  in  light  of  “initiative  and  referendum”
 Distinctions
Amendment Revision
Envisions  an  alteration  of  one  or  more  specific and   A  re-­‐examination of  the  entire  document,   to  
separable  provisions. determine   how  and  to  what  extent  ,  or  of  provisions  
of  the  document   which  have  over-­‐all  implications  for  
the  entire  document,   to  determine   how  and  to  what  
extent  they  should   be  altered.  
The  intention   of  an  act  to  amend   is  not  the change  of   Revision    may  involve  re-­‐writing  the  entire  
the  entire  constitution,   but  only  the  improvement   of   constitution.
specific  parts  or  the  addition   of  provisions   deemed  
essential  as  a  consequence   of  new  conditions   or  
elimination   of  parts  already  considered  obsolete   or  
unresponsive   to  the  needs  of  the  times.

Source:  Constitutional   Commission   Records

Key  Questions
Move  to  change  from  bicameral  to  unicameral  system?

Move  to  change  from  presidential  to  parliamentary  or  federal  system?
Importance  of  distinction
• Important  in  light  of  limited  scope  of  initiative  and  referendum
• If  the  change  made  de  hors  (outside)  of  the  Constitution  is  made  by  
the  sovereign  people,  the  resultant  alteration  is  not  unconstitutional  
but  extra-­‐constitutional.  (Bernas,  “ The1987  Constitution  of  the  
Republic  of  the  Philippines,”   [2009])
• Revolution  and  Revision  (1973  Ratification  Cases)
Proposal  of  Amendments  and  Revision
• Article  XVII,  SECTION  1.  Any  amendment  to,  or  revision  of,  this  
Constitution  may  be  proposed  by:

(1)  The  Congress,  upon  a  vote  of  three-­‐fourths  of  all  its  Members;  or
(2)  A  constitutional  convention.
Key  Questions:
• Joint  Session?

• Voting  separately?

• Nothing  is  said  about  a  joint  session,  each  house  may  separately  formulate  
amendments  by  a  vote  of  ¾  of  all  its  members,  and  then  pass  it  on  to  the  other  
house  for  a  similar  process.  Disagreements  to  be  settled  through  a  conference  
committee.

• Alternatively,  Congress  may  decide  to  come  together  in  joint  session  and  vote  
separately  on  proposed  amendments  and  revisions.  Both  houses  must  vote  
separately.  Why?    
• Congress  Is  bicameral  and  not  unicameral.
Initiative  and  Referendum
• INITIATIVE   -­‐ Method  whereby  the  people  directly  propose  amendments  
to  the  constitution.

• Article XVII, SECTION 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be

directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at
least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum
of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution
nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this
right.
Initiative  and  Referendum
• A peoples initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an
amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision. In contrast,
Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments
and revisions to the Constitution. (Lambino vs. COMELEC [2006])

• The Constitution entrusts to the people the power to directly propose

amendments to the Constitution. The Court trusts the wisdom of the
people even if the members of this Court do not personally know the
people who sign the petition. However, this trust emanates from a
fundamental assumption: the full text of the proposed amendment is
first shown to the people before they sign the petition, not after they
have signed the petition.
Logrolling  in  people’s  initiative  to  amend
• Logrolling -­‐ when the initiative petition incorporates an unrelated
subject matter in the same petition. This puts the people in a
dilemma since they can answer only either yes or no to the entire
proposition, forcing them to sign a petition that effectively contains
two propositions, one of which they may find unacceptable.

• Under  American  jurisprudence,  the  effect  of  logrolling  is  to nullify  the  
entire  proposition and  not  only  the  unrelated  subject  matter.
Constitutional  Convention
• Article  XVII,  SECTION  3.  The  Congress  may,  by  a  vote  of  two-­‐thirds  of  
all  its  Members,  call  a  constitutional  convention,  or  by  a  majority  vote  
of  all  its  Members,  submit  to  the  electorate  the  question  of  calling  
such  a  convention.

• Question:  Voting  separately?

Ratification  
Article  XVII,  SECTION  4.  Any  amendment  to,  or  revision  of,  this  
Constitution  under  Section  1  hereof  shall  be  valid  when  ratified  by  a  
majority  of  the  votes  cast  in  a  plebiscite  which  shall  be  held  not  earlier  
than  sixty  days  nor  later  than  ninety  days  after  the  approval  of  such  
amendment  or  revision.

Any  amendment  under  Section  2  hereof  shall  be  valid  when  ratified  by  
a  majority  of  the  votes  cast  in  a  plebiscite  which  shall  be  held  not  
earlier  than  sixty  days  nor  later  than  ninety  days  after  the  certification  
by  the  Commission  on  Elections  of  the  sufficiency  of  the  petition.
Self-­‐Executing  and  Non-­‐Self  Executing  
Provisions  of  the  Constitution
• As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are considered
self-­‐executing, and do not require future legislation for their
enforcement. For if they are not treated as self-­‐executing, the
mandate of the fundamental law can be easily nullified by the
inaction of Congress.

• However, some provisions have already been categorically declared

by the Court as non self-­‐executing.
Jurisprudence  (Tondo Medical  Employees  
Association,  et.,  vs.  Court  of  Appeals  [2007])
• In Tanada v. Angara, the  Court  specifically  set  apart  the  sections  
found  under  Article  II  of  the  1987  Constitution  as  non  self-­‐executing  
and  ruled  that  such  broad  principles  need  legislative  enactments  
before  they  can  be  implemented:

• By  its  very  title,  Article  II  of  the  Constitution  is  a  declaration  of  
principles  and  state  policies.  x x x. These  principles  in  Article  II  are  not  
intended  to  be  self-­‐executing  principles  ready  for  enforcement  
through  the  courts. They  are  used  by  the  judiciary  as  aids  or  as  guides  
in  the  exercise  of  its  power  of  judicial  review,  and  by  the  legislature  in  
its  enactment  of  laws.
Jurisprudence  (Tondo Medical  Employees  
Association,  et.,  vs.  Court  of  Appeals  [2007])
• In Basco v.  Philippine  Amusement  and  Gaming  
Corporation,this Court  declared  that  Sections  11,  12,  
and  13  of  Article  II;  Section  13  of  Article  XIII;  and  
Section  2  of  Article  XIV  of  the  1987  Constitution  are  
not  self-­‐executing  provisions.
Jurisprudence  (Tondo Medical  Employees  
Association,  et.,  vs.  Court  of  Appeals  [2007])
• In Tolentino v.  Secretary  of  Finance,the Court  referred  to  Section  1  of  
Article  XIII  and  Section  2  of  Article  XIV  of  the  Constitution  as  moral  
incentives  to  legislation,  not  as  judicially  enforceable  rights. These  
provisions,  which  merely  lay  down  a  general  principle,  are  
distinguished  from  other  constitutional  provisions  as non self-­‐
executing  and,  therefore,  cannot  give  rise  to  a  cause  of  action  in  the  
courts;  they  do  not  embody  judicially  enforceable  constitutional  
rights.
Jurisprudence  (Tondo Medical  Employees  
Association,  et.,  vs.  Court  of  Appeals  [2007])
• In  the  remaining  provisions,  Sections  11  and  14  of  Article  
XIII  and  Sections  1  and  3  of  Article  XV,  the  State  accords  
recognition  to  the  protection  of  working  women  and  the  
provision  for  safe  and  healthful  working  conditions;  to  the  
adoption  of  an  integrated  and  comprehensive  approach  to  
health;  to  the  Filipino  family;  and  to  the  right  of  children  to  
assistance  and  special  protection,  including  proper  care  
and  nutrition.
Jurisprudence  (Tondo Medical  Employees  
Association,  et.,  vs.  Court  of  Appeals  [2007])
• Like  the  provisions  that  were  declared  as  non  self-­‐executory in  the  
cases  of Basco v.  Philippine   Amusement  and  Gaming  Corporation[
and Tolentino v.  Secretary  of  Finance, they  are  mere  statements  of  
principles  and  policies. As  such,  they  are  mere  directives  addressed  
to  the  executive  and  the  legislative  departments.  If  unheeded,  the  
remedy  will  not  lie  with  the  courts;  but  rather,  the  electorates  
displeasure  may  be  manifested  in  their  votes.
General  Considerations
• National  Territory

• Archipelagic  Doctrine

• Maritime  Baselines  Law

• Jurisprudence
The  National  Territory
• ARTICLE  I
NATIONAL  TERRITORY
• The  national  territory  comprises  the  Philippine archipelago,  with  all  
the  islands  and  waters  embraced  therein,  and  all  other  territories  
over  which  the  Philippines  has  sovereignty  or  jurisdiction, consisting  
of  its  terrestrial,  fluvial  and  aerial  domains,  including  its  territorial  sea,  
the  seabed,  the  subsoil,  the  insular  shelves,  and  other  submarine  
areas.  The  waters  around,  between,  and  connecting  the  islands  of  the  
archipelago,  regardless  of  their  breadth  and  dimensions,  form  part  of  
the  internal  waters  of  the Philippines .
National  Territory

• Both   the  1973  and  the  1987  constitutions  divide  the  national  
territory  into  two  main  groups:  (1)  the  Philippine  archipelago  and  (2)  
other  territories  belonging  to  the Philippines.
Archipelagic  Principle
• ……..The  waters  around,  between,  and  connecting  the  islands  of  the  
archipelago,  regardless  of  their  breadth  and  dimensions,  form  part  of  
the  internal  waters  of  the Philippines.

• Archipelago  is  defined  as  a  unit  of  water  studded  with  islands.    Based  
on  this  definition,  the  land  area  is  everything  that  comes  within  the  
water  area.  
Magalllona vs.  Ermita [2011]
• In  March  2009,  Congress  amended  RA  3046  by  enacting  RA  9522,  the  
statute  now  under  scrutiny.  The  change  was  prompted  by  the  need  to  
make  RA  3046  compliant  with  the  terms  of  the  United  Nations  
Convention  on  the  Law  of  the  Sea  (UNCLOS  III), which  the  Philippines  
ratified  on  27  February  1984.Among  others,  UNCLOS  III  prescribes  the  
water-­‐land  ratio,  length,  and  contour  of  baselines  of  archipelagic  
States  like  the  Philippines and  sets  the  deadline  for  the  filing  of  
application  for  the  extended  continental  shelf. Complying  with  these  
requirements,  RA  9522  shortened  one  baseline,  optimized  the  
location  of  some  basepoints around  the  Philippine  archipelago  and  
classified  adjacent  territories,  namely,  the  Kalayaan Island  Group  (KIG)  
and  the  Scarborough  Shoal,  as  regimes  of  islands  whose  islands  
generate  their  own  applicable  maritime  zones.
Magalllona vs.  Ermita [2011]
• Petitioners,  professors  of  law,  law  students  and  a  legislator,  in  their  
respective  capacities  as  citizens,  taxpayers  or  x  x  x  legislators,as the  
case  may  be,  assail  the  constitutionality  of  RA  9522  on  two  principal  
grounds,  namely:  (1)  RA  9522  reduces  Philippine  maritime  territory,  
and  logically,  the  reach  of  the  Philippine  states  sovereign  power,  in  
violation  of  Article  1  of  the  1987  Constitution,embodying the  terms  of  
the  Treaty  of  Paris1 and  ancillary  treaties, and  (2)  RA  9522  opens  the  
countrys waters  landward  of  the  baselines  to  maritime  passage  by  all  
vessels  and  aircrafts,  undermining  Philippine  sovereignty  and  national  
security,  contravening  the  countrys nuclear-­‐free  policy,  and  damaging  
marine  resources,  in  violation  of  relevant  constitutional  provisions.
Magalllona vs.  Ermita [2011]
• UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a
multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-­‐use rights over maritime zones
(i.e., the territorial waters 12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone
[24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone 200 nautical
miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits.
UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-­‐long negotiations among United
Nations members to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the worlds
oceans and submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States
graduated authority over a limited span of waters and submarine lands along
their coasts.

• On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III
States parties to mark-­‐out specific basepoints along their coasts from which
baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting
points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf.
Magalllona vs.  Ermita [2011]
• Baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III
States parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime
zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of
the international community of the scope of the maritime space and
submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-­‐based
rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters
(Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration,
and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right
to exploit the living and non-­‐living resources in the exclusive
economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77).
Magalllona vs.  Ermita [2011]
• Whether  referred  to  as  Philippine  internal  waters  
under  Article  I  of  the  Constitution or  as  archipelagic  
waters  under  UNCLOS  III  (Article  49  [1]),  the  
Philippines  exercises  sovereignty  over  the  body  of  
water  lying  landward  of  the  baselines,  including  the  
air  space  over  it  and  the  submarine  areas  underneath.  
UNCLOS  III  affirms  this:
• Article  49. Legal  status  of  archipelagic  waters,  of  the  air  space  over  archipelagic  waters  
and  of  their  bed  and  subsoil.

1. The sovereignty  of  an  archipelagic  State  extends  to  the  waters  enclosed  by  the  
archipelagic  baselines drawn  in  accordance  with  article  47,  described  as  archipelagic  
waters,  regardless  of  their  depth  or  distance  from  the  coast.
2. This  sovereignty  extends  to  the  air  space  over  the  archipelagic  waters,  as  well  as  to  
their  bed  and  subsoil,  and  the  resources  contained  therein.
• x  x  x  x

4.  The  regime  of  archipelagic  sea  lanes  passage  established  in  this  Part shall  not  in  other  
respects  affect  the  status  of  the  archipelagic  waters, including  the  sea  lanes, or  the  
exercise  by  the  archipelagic  State  of  its  sovereignty  over  such  waters  and  their  air  space,  
bed  and  subsoil,  and  the  resources  contained  therein.  (Emphasis  supplied)
The  National  Territory
• ARTICLE  I
NATIONAL  TERRITORY
• The  national  territory  comprises  the  Philippine archipelago,  with  all  
the  islands  and  waters  embraced  therein,  and  all  other  territories  
over  which  the  Philippines  has  sovereignty  or  jurisdiction, consisting  
of  its  terrestrial,  fluvial  and  aerial  domains,  including  its  territorial  sea,  
the  seabed,  the  subsoil,  the  insular  shelves,  and  other  submarine  
areas.  The  waters  around,  between,  and  connecting  the  islands  of  the  
archipelago,  regardless  of  their  breadth  and  dimensions,  form  part  of  
the  internal  waters  of  the Philippines .
Philippines’  National  Territory  (see  Magallona
Case)
 • Archipelagic  states  instead  of  
Baselines drawing  normal  baselines  have  
drawn  “straight  baselines.”    The  
straight  lines  are  drawn  
connecting  selected  points  on  the  
coast  without  applicable  
departure  from  the  general  shape  
of  the  coast.
 • Also  referred  to  as  inland  waters.  
Internal  Waters   Internal  or  inland  waters  consist  of  
all  parts  of  the  sea  landwards  from  
the  baseline  as  well  as  inland  
rivers  and  lakes.  All  of  them  are  
subject  to  the  sovereingy of  the  
state  to  the  same  extent  that  the  
land  domain  is.  Unlike  territorial  
waters,  they  are  not  subject  to  the  
right  of  innocent  passage  by  other  
states.
 • 1. The seabed and subsoil of the submarine
areas adjacent to the coastal state but
Insular  Shelf outside the territorial sea, to a depth of two
hundred meters or, beyond that limit, to
ARTICLE  I where the depth allows exploitation;
NATIONAL  TERRITORY
The  national  territory  comprises  the  
Philippine archipelago,  with  all  the  islands   • 2. The seabed and subsoil of areas adjacent
and  waters  embraced  therein,  and  all  other   to islands. The coastal state has the right to
territories  over  which  the  Philippines  has   explore and exploit its natural resources, to
sovereignty  or  jurisdiction, consisting  of  its   erect installations needed, and to erect a
terrestrial,  fluvial  and  aerial  domains,  
including  its  territorial  sea,  the  seabed,  the  
safety zone over its installations with a
subsoil,  the  insular  shelves,  and  other   radius of 500 meters. The right does not
submarine  areas.  The  waters  around,   extend to non-­‐resource material in the shelf
between,  and  connecting  the  islands  of  the   area such as wrecked ship and their cargoes.
archipelago,  regardless  of  their  breadth  and  
dimensions,  form  part  of  the  internal  waters  
of  the Philippines .
Right  to  Innocent  Passage
• A  state  exercises  sovereignty  over  its  territorial  sea  subject  to  the  
right  of  innocent  passage  by  other  states.
• Innocent  passage  is  understood  as  passage  not  prejudicial  to  the  
interests  of  the  coastal  state  nor  contrary  to  recognized  principles  of  
international  law.  Note  Art.  19  (2)  of  UNCLOS.
….  Other  territories  over  which  the  PH  has  
sovereignty  or  jurisdiction

• Covers  islands  over  which  the  PH  has  historic  or  legal  title.
• It  includes  as  well  territory  should  temporarily  be  controlled  by  an  
invading  force,  and  any  other  territory  over  which  the  Philippines  
might  establish  sovereignty  or  jurisdiction  in  the  future.
Declaration  of  Principles  and  State  Policies
• ….As  the  Court  explained  in Taada v.  Angara,[7] the  provisions  of  
Article  II  of  the  1987  Constitution,  the  declarations  of  principles  and  
state  policies,  are  not  self-­‐executing.  Legislative  failure  to  pursue  such  
policies  cannot  give  rise  to  a  cause  of  action  in  the  courts.  (Espina vs.  
Zamora  [2010].
• Do  they  have  usefulness  in  litigation?
• They  obligate  the  judiciary  to  be  be  guided  by  the  provisions  in  the  
exercise  of  the  power  of  judicial  review.
Article  II,  section  2  
• Renunciation  of  war
• Incorporation  of  international  law
• Adheres  to  the  policy  of  peace,  equality,  justice,  freedom  of  
cooperation  and  amity  with  all  nations
Renunciation  of  War
• As  a  signatory  to  the  UN  Charter,  we  do  not  merely  renounce  war,   we  also  
adhere  to  Article  2  (4)  that  says,  “all  members  shall  refrain  in  their  
international  relations  from  the  threat  or  use  of  force  against  the  territorial  
integrity  or  political  independence  of  any  state,  or  in  any  other  manner  
inconsistent  with  the  purposes  of  the  United  Nations.”  
• REPUBLIC  ACT  NO.  9851
• AN  ACT  DEFINING  AND  PENALIZING  CRIMES  AGAINST  INTERNATIONAL  
HUMANITARIAN  LAW,   GENOCIDE  AND  OTHER  CRIMES  AGAINST  HUMANITY,  
ORGANIZING  JURISDICTION,  DESIGNATING  SPECIAL  COURTS,  AND  FOR  
RELATED  PURPOSES
Incorporation  of  International  Law
• Incorporation  Doctrine
• [G]enerally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the
incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the
land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. The classical
formulation in international law sees those customary rules
accepted as binding result from the combination [of] two elements:
the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of
States; and a psychological element known as
the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity).
Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question
is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.
(Pharmaceutical Health Care Association vs. Duque [2007])
Transformation  and  Incorporation
• Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the
sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation.[The
transformation method requires that an international law be transformed
into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local
legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional
declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.

• Treaties become part of the law of the land

through transformation pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the
Constitution which provides that [n]o treaty or international agreement
shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-­‐thirds of all
the members of the Senate. Thus, treaties or conventional international
law must go through a process prescribed by the Constitution for it to be
transformed into municipal law that can be applied to domestic conflicts.
Generally  Accepted  Principles  of  Law
• Generally accepted principles of international law refers to norms of
general or customary international law which are binding on all
states, i.e., renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy,
the principle of sovereign immunity, a person's right to life, liberty and
due process, and pacta sunt servanda.
• Note case of Knights of Rizal vs. DMCI [2018]

• Venice Charter as a guideline and not as law.

Ang Ladlad Case
• We  refer  now  to  the  petitioner‟s invocation  of  the  Yogyakarta  
Principles  (the  Application  of  International  Human  Rights  Law  In  
Relation  to  Sexual  Orientation  and  Gender  Identity),  which  petitioner  
declares  to  reflect  binding  principles  of  international  law.  
• At  this  time,  we  are  not  prepared  to  declare  that  these  Yogyakarta  
Principles  contain  norms  that  are  obligatory  on  the  Philippines.  There  
are  declarations  and  obligations  outlined  in  said  Principles  which  are  
not  reflective  of  the  current  state  of  international  law,  and  do  not  find  
basis  in  any  of  the  sources  of  international  law  enumerated  under  
Article  38(1)  of  the  Statute  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice.  X  x  x  
• Using  even  the  most  liberal  of  lenses,  these  Yogyakarta  Principles,  
consisting  of  a  declaration  formulated  by  various  international  law  
professors,  are  – at  best  – de  lege refenda – and  do  not  constitute  
binding  obligations  on  the  Philippines.  X  x  x  (Ang LADLAD  LGBT  Party  
v.  COMELEC,  G.R.  No.  190582,  618  SCRA  32,  April  8,  2010,  En  Banc  
[Del  Castillo])  
Article  II,  section  2
• Civilian  Supremacy
• Pursuant to the maintenance of civilian supremacy over the military, the
Constitution has allocated specific roles to the legislative and executive branches
of government in relation to military affairs. Military appropriations, as with all
other appropriations, are determined by Congress, as is the power to declare the
existence of a state of war. Congress is also empowered to revoke a proclamation
of martial law or the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.The approval of the
Commission on Appointments is also required before the President can promote
military officers from the rank of colonel or naval captain. Otherwise, on the
particulars of civilian dominance and administration over the military, the
Constitution is silent, except for the commander-­‐in-­‐chief clause which is fertile in
meaning and implication as to whatever inherent martial authority the President
may possess. (Bautista vs. Senga [2006])
Civilian  Supremacy
• Protector  of  the  people.  Military  has  no  political  role?
• Guardian  of  the  state  sovereignty.  
• Can  military  exercise  of  political  power  be  justified  as  a  last  resort?
• When  civilian  supremacy  has  lost  its  legitimacy.
Article  II,  sections  7  and  8
• Independent Foreign Policy

• Freedom  from  Nuclear  Weapons

Filipino  First  Policy
• In the grant of rights, privileges and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony, the
State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos (Sec.
10, 2nd par., Art. XII of the Constitution)
Manila  Prince  Hotel
• Manila   Prince  Hotel  v.  GSIS,  267  SCRA  408   (1997)  (Bellosillo)  
• In  this  case,   the  SC  ruled  that  this  provision  is  self-­‐executing.  It  was  also  in  
this  case   where  the  Court  clarified  that  the  rule  now  is  that  all   provisions  of  
the  Constitution  are  presumed  to  be  self-­‐executing,  rather  than  non-­‐self-­‐
executing.  Elaborating,  the  Court  explained  that  if  a   contrary  presumption  
is  adopted,  the  whole  Constitution  shall  remain  dormant  and  be  captives  of  
Congress,  which  could  have  disastrous  consequences.  
• Also,  in  this  case  the  SC  held  that  “patrimony”  simply  means  “heritage.”  
Thus,  when  we  speak  of  “national  patrimony,”  we  refer  not  only  to  the  
natural  resources  of  the  Philippines  but  as   well  as  the  cultural  heritage  of  
the  Filipino  people.  
Life  of  the  Unborn
• Article  II,  Section  12  of  the  Constitution  states:  “ The  State  recognizes  
the  sanctity  of  family  life  and  shall  protect  and  strengthen  the  family  
as  a  basic  autonomous  social  institution.  It  shall  equally  protect  the  
life  of  the  mother  and  the  life  of  the  unborn  from  conception.”
•
Imbong vs.  Ochoa  (2014)
• In  its plain  and  ordinary  meaning  (a  canon  in  statutory  construction),  the  
traditional  meaning  of  “conception”  according  to reputable  dictionaries  
cited  by  the ponente is  that  life  begins  at  fertilization.  Medical  sources  also  
support  the  view  that  conception  begins  at  fertilization.
• The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) “conception” to refer
to the moment of “fertilization” and (b) the protection of the unborn child
upon fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban all contraceptives
for being unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the fertilized
ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the union
of the male sperm and female ovum, and those that similarly take action
before fertilization should be deemed non-­‐abortive, and thus
constitutionally permissible.
Imbong vs.  Ochoa  (2014)
• The  intent  of  the  framers  of  the  Constitution  for  protecting  the  life  of  
the  unborn  child  was  to  prevent  the  Legislature  from  passing  a  
measure  prevent  abortion.  The  Court  cannot  interpret  this  otherwise.  
The  RH  Law  is  in  line  with  this  intent  and  actually  prohibits  abortion.  
By  using  the  word  “or”  in  defining  abortifacient (Section  4(a)),  the  RH  
Law prohibits  not  only  drugs  or  devices  that  prevent  implantation  but  
also  those  that  induce  abortion  and  induce  the  destruction  of  a  fetus  
inside  the  mother’s  womb.  The  RH  Law  recognizes  that  the  fertilized  
ovum  already  has  life  and  that  the  State  has  a  bounded  duty  to  
protect  it.
Article  II,  section  16
• Right to a balanced and healthful ecology
• Intergenerational  responsibility
• Linked  with  the  right  to  health
• Writ  of  Kalikasan
Precautionary  Principle
• Precautionary principle states that when human activities may lead to threats of
serious and irreversible damage to the environment that is scientifically plausible
but uncertain, actions shall be taken to avoid or diminish that threat.
• It is notable x x x that the precautionary principle shall only be relevant if there is
concurrence of three elements, namely: uncertainty, threat of environmental
damage and serious or irreversible harm. In situations where the threat is
relatively certain, or that the causal link between an action and environmental
damage can be established, or the probability of occurrence can be calculated,
only preventive, not precautionary measures, may be taken. Neither will the
precautionary principle apply if there is no indication of a threat of environmental
harm, or if the threatened harm is trivial or easily reversible.( Mosqueda, et al. v.
Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 189185,
August 16, 2016)
• In  Mosqueda,  et  al.  v.  Pilipino  Banana  Growers  &  Exporters  
Association,  Inc.,  et  al.,  (G.R.  No.  189185,  August  16,  2016,  En  Banc  
[Bersamin]),  it  was  argued  that  the  Ordinance  enacted  by  the  City  of  
Davao  prohibiting  aerial  spraying  of  pesticides  is  justified  since  it  will  
protect  the  health  of  residents  and  the  environment  against  the  risks  
posed  by  aerial  drift  of  chemicals  applying  the  precautionary  
principle.  The  Court  did  not  find  the  presence  of  the  elements  for  this  
principle  to  apply.
• We  should  not  apply  the  precautionary  approach  in  sustaining  the  
ban  against  aerial  spraying  if  little  or  nothing  is  known  of  the  exact  or  
potential  dangers  that  aerial  spraying  may  bring  to  the  health  of  the  
residents  within  and  near  the  plantations  and  to  the  integrity  and  
balance  of  the  environment.  It  is  dangerous  to  quickly  presume  that  
the  effects  of  aerial  spraying  would  be  adverse  even  in  the  absence  of  
evidence.  
Mammals  Case
• Are  these  marine  mammals  the  proper  parties  to  file  the  petition?  In  
this  case,  actually  the  SC  did  not  rule  squarely  on  this  issue.  The  Court  
ruled  instead  that  the  issue  of  whether  these  marine  mammals  have  
locus  standi to  file  the  petition  had  been  eliminated  because  of  
Section  5,  Rules  for  the  Enforcement  of  Environmental  Laws,  which  
allows  any  citizen  to  file  a  petition  for  the  enforcement  of  
environmental  laws  (Citizen‟s Suit)  and,  in  their  petition,  these  
marine  mammals  were  joined  by  human  beings  as  “stewards  of  
nature.”  
Presidential  System
• In  a  presidential  form  of  government,  there  is  the  observance  of  the  
doctrine  of  separation  of  powers;  in  a  parliamentary  government,  
instead  of  separation  of  powers,  there  is  the  union  of  the  executive  
and  legislative  branches.  In  a  presidential  form  of  government,  the  
President  is  elected  by  the  people  at  large;  in  a  parliamentary  
government,  the  Prime  Minister  is  elected  not  by  the  people  at  large  
but  by  members  of  Parliament.  
State  Immunity  from  suit
• There  are  two  conflicting  concepts  of  sovereign  immunity,  each  
widely  held  and  firmly  established.  According  to  the  classical  or  
absolute  theory, a  sovereign  cannot,  without  its  consent,  be  made  a  
respondent  in  the  courts  of  another  sovereign. According  to  the  
newer  or  restrictive  theory, the  immunity  of  the  sovereign  is  
recognized  only  with  regard  to  public  acts  or  acts jure  imperii of  a  
state,  but  not  with  regard  to  private  acts  or  acts jure  gestionis. (Holy  
See  vs.  Rosario  [1994])
• The  Philippines  adopts  the  restrictive  view.

•
State  Immunity  from  suit
• The  State  may  not  be  sued  without  its  consent.  (Section  3,  Article  XVI,  
1987  Constitution)  
Jusmag vs.  NLRC  [1994]
• The  doctrine  of  state  immunity  from  suit  has   undergone  further  
metamorphosis.  The  view  evolved  that  the  existence  of  a  contract  does  
not, per  se,   mean  that  sovereign  states  may,  at  all   times,  be  sued  in  local  
courts.  The  complexity  of  relationships  between  sovereign  states,  brought  
about  by  their  increasing  commercial  activities,  mothered  a  
more restrictive application  of  the  doctrine.
•
• xxx xxx xxx
•
• As  it  stands  now,  the  application   of  the  doctrine  of  immunity  from  suit  
has  been restricted to sovereign or governmental  activities (jure  
imperii). The  mantle  of  state  immunity cannot be  extended  to commercial,  
private  and  proprietary  acts (jure   gestionis)
• The  rule,  in  any  case,  is  not  really  absolute  for  it  does  not  say  that  the  
state  may  not  be  sued  under  any  circumstances.  On  the  contrary  x  x  x  
the  doctrine  only  conveys,  “the  state  may  not  be  sued  without  its  
consent;”  its  clear  import  then  is  that  the  State  may  at  times  be  sued.  
The  State's  consent  may  be  given  either  expressly  or  impliedly.  
Express  consent  may  be  made  through  a  general  law  (i.e.,  
Commonwealth  Act  No.  327,  as  amended  by  Presidential  Decree  No.  
1445  [Sections  49-­‐50],  which  requires  that  all  money  claims  against  
the  government  must  first  be  filed  with  the  Commission  on  Audit  
which  must  act  upon  it  within  sixty  days.  Rejection  of  the  claim  will  
authorize  the  claimant  to  elevate  the  matter  to  the  Supreme  Court  on  
certiorari  and,  in  effect,  sue  the  State  thereby)  or  a  special  law.  
• In  this  jurisdiction,  the  general  law  waiving  the  immunity  of  the  state  
from  suit  is  found  in  Act  No.  3083,  where  the  Philippine  government  
“consents  and  submits  to  be  sued  upon  any  money  claim  involving  
liability  arising  from  contract,  express  or  implied,  which  could  serve  as  
a  basis  of  civil  action  between  the  private  parties.”  Implied  consent,  
on  the  other  hand,  is  conceded  when  the  State  itself  commences  
litigation,  thus  opening  itself  to  a  counterclaim  or  when  it  enters  into  
a  contract.  In  this  situation,  the  government  is  deemed  to  have  
descended  to  the  level  of  the  other  contracting  party  and  to  have  
divested  itself  of  its  sovereign  immunity.  (Department  of  Agriculture  
v.  NLRC,  227  SCRA  693,  Nov.  11,  1993  [Vitug])  
Not  all  contracts
• This  rule  is  not  without  qualification.  Not  all  contracts  entered  into  by  
the  government  operate  as  a  waiver  of  its  non-­‐suability;  distinction  
must  still  be  made  between  one  which  is  executed  in  the  exercise  of  
its  sovereign  function  and  another  which  is  done  in  its  proprietary  
capacity.  
• The  restrictive  application  of  State  immunity  is  proper  only  when  the  
proceedings  arise  out  of  commercial  transactions   of  the  foreign  sovereign,  
its  commercial  activities  or  economic  affairs.  Stated  differently,  a  State  may  
be  said   to  have  descended  to  the  level  of  an  individual  and  can  thus  be  
deemed  to  have  tacitly  given  its  consent  to  be  sued  only  when  it  enters  
into  business  contracts.  It  does  not  apply  where  the  contracts  relate  to  the  
exercise  of  its  sovereign  functions.  In  this  case  the  projects  are  an  integral  
part  of  the  naval  base  which  is  devoted  to  the  defense  of  both  the  United  
States  and  the  Philippines,  indisputably  a  function  of  the  government  of  
the  highest  order;  they  are  not  utilized  for  nor  dedicated  to  commercial  or  
business  purposes.”  (Department  of  Agriculture  v.  NLRC,  227  SCRA  693,  
Nov.  11,  1993   [Vitug]  
Does  not  apply
• Neither  does  it  apply  where  the  public  official  is  clearly  being  sued  
not  in  his  official  capacity  but  in  his  personal  capacity,  although  the  
acts  complained  of  may  have  been  committed  while  he  occupied  a  
public  position.  (Amado  J.  Lansang v.  CA,  G.R.  No.  102667,  Feb.  23,  
2000,  2nd  Div.  [Quisumbing])  
Arigo vs.  Swift  (2014)  Tubbatataha Case
• A  petition  filed  for  the  issuance  of  a  Writ  of  Kalikasan directed  against  
the  Commander  of  the  US  Pacific  Fleet  for  the  destruction  of  our  
corrals  in  Tubbataha reef  (a  protected  area  system  under  the  NIPAS  
[National  Integrated  Protected  Areas  System]  and  a  UN  declared  
World  Heritage  Site  because  of  its  rich  marine  bio-­‐diversity)  in  the  
Sulu  Sea  caused  by  the  USS  Guardian,  an  American  naval  vessel  when  
it  ran  aground  there  in  the  course  of  its  voyage  to  Indonesia  from  its  
base  in  Okinawa,  Japan,  will  not  prosper  for  lack  of  jurisdiction  
following  the  doctrine  of  sovereign  equality  of  all  States.  In  effect,  the  
suit  is  a  suit  against  the  US  government  and,  therefore,  should  be  
dismissed.  
• The  waiver  of  immunity  from  suit  of  the  US  under  the  Visiting  Forces  
Agreement  (VFA)  applies  only  to  waiver  from  criminal  jurisdiction,  so  that  if  
an  American  soldier  commits  an  offense  in  the  Philippines,  he  shall  be  tried  
by  Philippine  courts  under  Philippine  laws.  The  waiver  did  not  include  the  
special  civil  action  for  the  issuance  of  a  Writ  of  Kalikasan.  
• Also,  the  demand  for  compensation  for  the  destruction  of  our  corrals  in  
Tubbataha reef  has  been  rendered  moot  and  academic.  After  all,   the  US  
already  signified  its  intention  to  pay  damages,   as  expressed  by  the  US  
embassy  officials  in  the  Philippines,  the  only  request  is  that  a   panel  of  
experts  composed  of  scientists  be  constituted  to  assess   the  total  damage  
caused  to  our  corrals   there,  which  request  is  not  unreasonable.  
Northrail Case  (China  Natonal Railway  vs.  
Judge  Sta.Maria (2014)
• In Holy  See, this  Court  reiterated  the  oft-­‐cited  doctrine  that  the  
determination  by  the  Executive  that  an  entity  is  entitled  to  sovereign  
or  diplomatic  immunity  is  a  political  question  conclusive  upon  the  
courts,  to  wit:
• In  Public  International  Law,  when  a  state  or  international  agency  
wishes  to  plead  sovereign  or  diplomatic  immunity  in  a  foreign  court,  
it requests  the  Foreign  Office  of  the  state  where  it  is  sued  to  convey  
to  the  court  that  said  defendant  is  entitled  to  immunity.
Immunity  from  Suit  
• The question now is whether any agency of the Executive Branch can make a
determination of immunity from suit, which may be considered as conclusive upon the
courts. This Court, in Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) v. National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC),emphasized the DFAs competence and authority to provide such
necessary determination, to wit:
• The DFAs function includes, among its other mandates, the determination of persons
and institutions covered by diplomatic immunities, a determination which, when
challenge, (sic) entitles it to seek relief from the court so as not to seriously impair the
conduct of the country's foreign relations. The DFA must be allowed to plead its case
whenever necessary or advisable to enable it to help keep the credibility of the
Philippine government before the international community. When international
agreements are concluded, the parties thereto are deemed to have likewise accepted
the responsibility of seeing to it that their agreements are duly regarded. In our
country, this task falls principally of (sic) the DFA as being the highest executive
department with the competence and authority to so act in this aspect of the
international arena.
•
• An agreement to submit any dispute to arbitration may be construed
as an implicit waiver of immunity from suit.

• In  the United  States,  the  Foreign  Sovereign  Immunities  Act  of  1976  
provides  for  a  waiver  by  implication  of  state  immunity.  In  the  said  law,  
the  agreement  to  submit  disputes  to  arbitration  in  a  foreign  country  is  
construed  as  an  implicit  waiver  of  immunity  from  suit.  Although  there  
is  no  similar  law  in  the  Philippines,  there  is  reason  to  apply  the  legal  
reasoning  behind  the  waiver  in  this  case.
Separation  of  Powers
• The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great
branches of government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in
matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere.

• Necessarily imbedded in this doctrine is the principle of non-­‐delegation of

powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim potestas delegata non delegari
potest, which means what has been delegated, cannot be delegated. This
doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such delegated power
constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate
through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the
intervening mind of another.However, this principle of non-­‐d elegation of
powers admits of numerous exceptions,[one of which is the delegation of
legislative power to various specialized administrative agencies like the
Board in this case. (Bureau of Customs Employees vs. Teves [2011])
Separation  of  Powers
• The  doctrine  of  separation  of  powers  is  not  absolute  in  its  application;  
rather,  it  should  be  applied  in  accordance  with  the  principle  of  checks  
and  balances. The  removal  from  office  of  elective  officials  must  not  be  
tainted  with  partisan  politics  and  used  to  defeat  the  will  of  the  voting  
public. Congress  itself  saw  it  fit  to  vest  that  power  in  a  more  impartial  
tribunal,  the  court. Furthermore,  the  local  government  units  are  not  
deprived  of  the  right  to  discipline  local  elective  officials;  rather,  they  
are  prevented  from  imposing  the  extreme  penalty  of  dismissal.
(Sangguniang Barangay  Mariano  Marcos  vs.  Punong Barangay  
Severino Martiniez [2007])
Delegation  of  Powers
• The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great
branches of government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters
falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere.Necessarily imbedded in
this doctrine is the principle of non-­‐delegation of powers, as expressed in the
Latin maxim potestas delegata non delegari potest, which means what has been
delegated, cannot be delegated. This doctrine is based on the ethical principle
that such delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be
performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and
not through the intervening mind of another. However, this principle of non-­‐
delegation of powers admits of numerous exceptions,[one of which is the
delegation of legislative power to various specialized administrative agencies.
(Bureau of Customs Employees vs. Teves [2011)
Three  Branches
• Legislative
• Executive
• Judiciary

• Powers  and  Limitations

• Attributes
• Exercise
Legislative  Power
• The  legislative  power  shall  be  vested  in  the  Congress  of  the  
Philippines  which  shall  consist  of  a  Senate  and  a  House  of  
Representatives,  except  to  the  extent  reserved  to  the  people  by  the  
provision  on  initiative  and  referendum.  (Section  1,  Article  VI,  1987  
Constitution)  

• Legislative  power  is  not  exclusive  to  Congress.

• Section  1  in  relation  to  Section  32  reserved  for  the  people  ordinary  
legislative  power  through  “initiative  and  referendum.”  
Bicameral  System
• The  Principle  of  Bicameralism  
• The  Bicameral  Conference  Committee  
• It  is  a  mechanism  for  compromising  differences  between  the  Senate  
and  the  House  of  Representatives.  By  the  nature  of  its  function,  a  
Bicameral  Conference  Committee  is  capable  of  producing  unexpected  
results  – results  which  sometimes  may  even  go  beyond  its  own  
mandate.  (Philippine  Judges  Association  v.  Secretary  Prado;  Tolentino  
v.  Secretary  of  Finance)  
Composition  of  the  House  of  Representatives
• 1.  District  Representatives

• 2.  Party  List  Representatives

District  Representatives
• Section  5  (1)  prescribes  that  district  representatives  shall  be  elected  
from  legislative  districts  apportioned  among  the  provinces,  cities,  and  
the  Metropolitan  Manila  area  in  accordance  with  the  number  of  their  
respective  inhabitants  and  on  the  basis  of  a  uniform  and  progressive  
ratio.

• Equality  of  representation

Constitutional  Framework  (Art.  VI,  section  5)  
On  the  Four  Rules  of  Apportionment
SECTION 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those
who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-­‐list system of registered national, regional,
and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2)  The   party-­‐list   representatives  shall  constitute  twenty  per  centum  of  the   total   number  of  
representatives  including   those  under  the   party  list.  For  three   consecutive  terms   after  the   ratification   of  
this   Constitution,   one-­‐half  of  the  seats   allocated  to  party-­‐list   representatives  shall  be  filled,  as  provided  
by  law,  by  selection   or  election  from  the  labor,  peasant,   urban  poor,  indigenous  cultural   communities,  
women,  youth,  and  such   other   sectors   as  may  be   provided  by  law,  except   the   religious  sector.
Each   legislative  district  shall  comprise,  as  far  as  practicable,  contiguous,  compact  and   adjacent  
territory. Each  city  with  a   population   of  at  least  two  hundred   fifty  thousand,   or   each  province,  shall  
have  at  least  one  representative.

(3)  Within  three  years  following  the  return  of  every  census,  the  Congress  shall  make   a  
reapportionment  of  legislative  districts  based  on   the  standards  provided  in  this  section.
The  Rule  on  Apportionment;  Aquino  vs.  
COMELEC  [2010]
• The  second  sentence  of  Section  5(3),  Article  VI  of  the  Constitution,  
succinctly  provides: Each  city  with  a  population  of  at  least  two  
hundred  fifty  thousand,  or  each  province,  shall  have  at  least  one  
representative.

• The  provision  draws  a  plain  and  clear  distinction  between  the  

entitlement  of  a  city  to  a  district  on  one  hand,  and  the  entitlement  of  
a  province  to  a  district  on  the  other. For  while  a  province  is  entitled  
to  at  least  a  representative,  with  nothing  mentioned  about  
population,  a  city  must  first  meet  a  population  minimum  of  250,000  
in  order  to  be  similarly  entitled.
Aquino  vs.  Comelec [2010]
• The  use  by  the  subject  provision  of  a  comma  to  separate  the  phrase  
each  city  with  a  population  of  at  least  two  hundred  fifty  
thousand from the  phrase  or  each  province  point  to  no  other  
conclusion  than  that  the  250,000  minimum  population  is  only  
required  for  a  city,  but  not  for  a  province.

• Plainly  read,  Section  5(3)  of  the  Constitution  requires  a 250,000  

minimum  population  only  for  a  city  to  be  entitled  to  a  
representative,  but  not  so  for  a  province.
Aquino  vs.  Comelec [2010]
• The Mariano  case limited  the  application  of  the  250,000  minimum  population  
requirement  for  cities  only  to  its initial legislative  district. In  other  words,  while  
Section  5(3),  Article  VI  of  the  Constitution  requires  a  city  to  have  a  minimum  
population  of  250,000  to  be  entitled  to  a  representative,  it  does  not  have  to  
increase  its  population  by  another  250,000  to  be  entitled  to  
an additional district.

• There  is  no  reason  why  the Mariano  case, which  involves  the  creation  of  
an additional district  within  a city,  should  not  be  applied  to additional districts  in  
provinces. Indeed,  if  an additional legislative  district  created  within  a  city  is  not  
required  to  represent  a  population  of  at  least  250,000  in  order  to  be  valid,  
neither  should  such  be  needed  for  an  additional  district  in  a  province,  
considering  moreover  that  a  province  is  entitled  to  an initial seat  by  the  mere  
fact  of  its  creation  and  regardless  of  its  population.
Difference  between  Legislative  Apportionment  
and  Reapportionment  (Bagabuyo vs.  COMELEC  
[2008]
• Legislative apportionment is  defined  by  Blacks  Law  Dictionary  as the  
determination   of  the  number  of  representatives  which  a  State,  county  
or  other  subdivision   may  send  to  a  legislative   body. It  is the  allocation  
of  seats  in  a  legislative   body  in  proportion  to  the  population;   the  
drawing  of  voting  district  lines  so  as  to  equalize  population   and  voting  
power  among  the  districts.

• Reapportionment,  on  the  other  hand,  is  the realignment   or  change  

in  legislative   districts  brought  about  by  changes  in  population   and  
mandated  by  the  constitutional   requirement  of  equality  of  
representation.
Difference  between  Legislative  Apportionment  and  
Reapportionment  (Bagabuyo vs.  COMELEC  [2008]

• Article  VI  (entitled  Legislative  Department)  of  the  1987  Constitution  lays  down  the  
rules  on  legislative  apportionment  under  its  Section  5  which  provides:
• Sec.  5(1).  (1)  The  House  of  Representatives  shall  be  composed  of  not  more  than  two  
hundred  fifty  members  unless  otherwise  fixed  by  law,  who  shall  be  elected  from  
legislative  districts  apportioned  among  the  provinces,  cities,  and  the  Metropolitan  
Manila  area  in  accordance  with  the  number  of  their  respective  inhabitants,  and  on  the  
basis  of  a  uniform  and  progressive  ratio,  and  those  who,  as  provided  by  law,  shall  be  
elected  through  a  party-­‐list  system  of  registered  national,  regional  and  sectoral parties  or  
organizations.
• x  x  x
• (3)  Each  legislative  district  shall  comprise,  as  far  as  practicable,  continuous,  compact,  and  
adjacent  territory. Each  city  with  a  population  of  at  least  two  hundred  fifty  thousand,  or  
each  province,  shall  have  at  least  one  representative.
• (4) Within  three  years  following  the  return  of  every  census,  the  Congress  shall  make  a  
reapportionment  of  legislative  districts  based  on  the  standards  provided  in  this  section.
Difference  between  Legislative  Apportionment  
and  Reapportionment  (Bagabuyo vs.  COMELEC  
[2008]
• Legislative  apportionment  does  not  mean, and  does  not  even  imply,  a  
division  of  a  local  government  unit  where  the  apportionment  takes  
place.

• Thus,  the  plebiscite  requirement  that  applies  to  the  division  of  a  
province,  city,  municipality  or barangay under  the  Local  Government  
Code  should  not  apply  to  and  be  a  requisite  for  the  validity  of  a  
legislative  apportionment  or  reapportionment
Sectoral Representations
• Three  different  groups  may  participate  in  the  party-­‐list  system:  (1)  
national  parties  or  organizations,  (2)  regional  parties  or  organizations,  
and  (3)  sectoral parties  or  organizations.  
• National  parties  or  organizations  and  regional  parties  or  organizations  
do  not  need  to  organize  along  sectoral lines  and  do  not  need  to  
represent  any  “marginalized  and  underrepresented”  sector.  
Sectoral Representation
• Political  parties  can  participate  in  party-­‐list  elections  provided  they  
register  under  the  party-­‐list  system  and  do  not  field  candidates  in  
legislative  district  elections.  A  political  party,  whether  major  or  not,  
that  fields  candidates  in  legislative  district  elections  can  participate  in  
party-­‐list  elections  through  its  sectoral wing  that  can  separately  
register  under  the  party-­‐list  system.  
Sectoral Representation
• Sectoral parties  or  organizations  may  either  be  “marginalized  and  
underrepresented”  or  lacking  in  “well-­‐defined  political  
constituencies.”  It  is  enough  that  their  principal  advocacy  pertains  to  
the  special  interest  and  concerns  of  their  sector.  The  sectors  that  are  
“marginalized  and  underrepresented”  include  labor,  peasant,  
fisherfolk,  urban  poor,  indigenous  cultural  communities,  
handicapped,  veterans,  and  overseas  workers.  The  sectors  that  lack  
“well-­‐defined  political  constituencies”  include  professionals,  the  
elderly,  women  and  the  youth.  
Sectoral Representations
• A  majority  of  the  members  of  sectoral parties  or  organizations  that  
represent  the  “marginalized  and  underrepresented”  must  belong  to  the  
“marginalized  and  underrepresented”  sector  they  represent.  
• Similarly,   a  majority  of  the  members  of  sectoral parties  or  organizations  
that  lack   “well-­‐defined  political  constituencies”  must  belong  to  the  sector  
they  represent.  The  nominees  of  sectoral parties  or  organizations  that  
represent  the  “marginalized  and  underrepresented,”  or  that  represent  
those  who  lack  “well-­‐defined  political  constituencies,”  either  must  belong  
to  their  respective  sectors,  or  must  have  a  track   record  of  advocacy  for  
their  respective  sectors.  The  nominees  of  national  and  regional  parties  or  
organizations  must  be  bona  fide  members  of  such  parties  or  organizations.  
Sectoral Representations
• National,  regional,  and  sectoral parties  or  organizations  shall  not  be  
disqualified  if  some  of  their  nominees  are  disqualified,  provided  that  
they  have  at  least  one  nominee  who  remains  qualified.  (Atong
Paglaum,  Inc.,  et  al.  v.  COMELEC,  G.R.  No.  203766,  694  SCRA  477,  
April  2,  2013,  En  Banc  [Carpio])  
Two  Questions  on  Party  List

1. How  many  votes  must  an  organization  receive  in  order  to  qualify  for  
a  seat  in  House  of  Representatives?

2. Whether  the  allocated  20%    of  the  total  membership  in  the  House  
of  Representatives  must  be  filled  up?
First  Question
• Parties,  organizations,  and  coalitions  participating  in  the  system  to  
obtain  at  least  2%  of  the  total  votes  cast  for  the  party  list  system  in  
order  to  be  entitled  to  a  party  list  seat.  Those  garnering  more  than  
this  percentage  may  have  additional  seats  in  proportion  to  their  total  
number  of  votes.

• No  winning  party,  organization  or  coalition  may  have  more  than  3  

seats  in  the  House  of  Representatives.
Barangay  Association  for  National  Advancement  and  
Transparency  (BANAT)  v.  COMELEC,  G.R.  No.  179271,  586  SCRA  
210,  July  2,  2009,  En  Banc  (Carpio)  
• “We  rule  that,  in  computing  the  allocation  of  additional  seats,  the  continued  operation  of  
the  two  percent  threshold  for  the  distribution  of  the  additional  seats  as  found  in  the  
second  clause  of  Section  11(b)  of  R.A.  No.  7941  is  unconstitutional.  This  Court  finds  that  
the  two  percent  threshold  makes  it  mathematically  impossible  to  achieve  the  maximum  
number  of  available  party  list  seats  when  the  number  of  available  party  list  seats  exceeds  
50.  The  continued  operation  of  the  two  percent  threshold  in  the  distribution  of  the  
additional  seats  frustrates  the  attainment  of  the  permissive  ceiling  that  :
• “20%  of  the  members  of  the  House  of  Representatives  shall  consist  of  party-­‐list  
representatives.  “X  x  x  
• “We  therefore  strike  down  the  two  percent  threshold  only  in  relation  to  the  distribution  
of  the  additional  seats  as  found  in  the  second  clause  of  Section  11(b)  of  R.A.  No.  7941.  
The  two  percent  threshold  presents  an  unwarranted  obstacle  to  the  full  implementation  
of  Section  5(2),  Article  VI  of  the  Constitution  and  prevents  the  attainment  of  “the  
broadest  possible  representation  of  party,  sectoral or  group  interests  in  the  House  of  
Representatives.”  
Parameters
• the  twenty  (20)  percent  allocation;  
• the  two  (2)  percent  threshold;  
• the  three  (3)  -­‐ seat  limit;  and  
• proportional  representation  
Second  Question
• Whether  the  allocated  20%    of  the  total  membership  in  the  House  of  
Representatives  must  be  filled  up?
• The    20%  prescription  of  the  Constitution  was  merely  a  maximum  
limit  to  the  number  of  party  list  representatives  but  the  maximum  
need  not  be  filled.    (Veterans  Federation  Party  vs.  COMELEC;  
reiterated  in  the  case  of  Partido vs.  COMELEC  [2000])
Qualifications  and  Privileges
• Once  elected,  both  the  district  representatives  and  the  party-­‐list  
representatives  are  treated  in  like  manner.  They  have  the  same  
deliberative  rights,  salaries,  and  emoluments.  They  can  participate  in  
the  making  of  laws  that  will  directly  benefit  their  legislative  districts  
or  sectors.  They  are  also  subject  to  the  same  term  limitation  of  three  
years  for  a  maximum  of  three  consecutive  terms.  (Daryl  Grace  J.  
Abayon v.  The  Honorable  House  of  Representatives  Electoral  Tribunal,  
et  al.,  G.R.  Nos.  189466  and  189506,  612  SCRA  375,  11  February  
2010,  En  Banc  [Abad])  
Residence  Requirement
• The  constitution  does  not  use  the  word  domicile,  but  residence.  
• Residence  means  a  place  of  abode,  whether  permanent  or  
temporary.
• Domicile  means  permanent  residence  to  which  one  when  absent,  has  
the  intention  to  return.  Residence,  in  other  words,  is  not  necessarily  
domicile;  but  domicile  necessarily  residence.
• The  enumeration  of  qualifications  in  Section  6,  Article  VI  is  exclusive.  
Congress  may  not  add  anything  to  it.
Privilege  from  Arrest
• Section  11,  Article  VI
• Limited  only  to  offenses  punishable  by  not  more  than  6  years  
imprisonment.
• The  immunity  applies  for  as  long  as  Congress  is  in  session,  whether  or  
not  the  legislator  involved  is  actually  attending  it.
• Popular  sovereignty  is  not  a  ground  to  evade  arrest.
Privilege  of  speech  and  debate
• It  is  a  guarantee  of  immunity  from  answerability  before  an  outside  
forum,  but  not  answerability  to  the  disciplinary  authority  of  Congress  
itself.
• The  speech  or  debate  must  be  one  made  in  Congress  or  in  any  
committee  thereof.
Questions  on  Officers  of  Congress
• Avelino vs.  Cuenco [1949];  Santiago  vs.  Guingona [1998]
• Question  is  political  in  nature.  In  the  absence  of  any  constitutional  or  
statutory  guidelines  or  specific  rules,  the  High  Court  is  devoid  of  any  
basis  upon  which  to  determine  the  legality  of  acts  of  the  Senate  
relative  thereto.
When  journal  conflicts  with  another  official  
act  of  Congress?
• Enrolled  Bill
• The  enrolled  bill  is  the  duly  authenticated  copy  of  a  bill  or  resolution  
bearing  the  signature  of  the  Speaker  and  the  Senate  President  and  
the  certification  of  the  secretaries  of  both  houses  that  such  bill  was  
passed.
• It  is  the  certification  of  the  officers  of  both  houses  that  gives  
probative  weight  to  an  enrolled  bill.
Electoral  Tribunals
• Nature?
• Independent  from  both  Congress  and  COMELEC.  
• It  is  for  the  HRET  to  interpret  the  meaning  of  this  particular  
qualification  of  a  nominee  – the  need  for  him  or  her  to  be  a  bona  fide  
member  or  a  representative  of  his  party-­‐list  organization  – in  the  
context  of  the  facts  that  characterize  the  nominee  respectively,  and  
the  marginalized  and  underrepresented  interests  that  they  
presumably  embody.  
Electoral  Tribunals
• Section  17,   Article  VI  of  the  Constitution  provides  that  the  HRET  shall   be  
the  sole   judge  of   all  contests  relating   to,  among  other  things,   the  
qualifications   of  the  members  of  the  House  of  Representatives.  Since  
party-­‐list   nominees   are  “elected  members”   of  the  House   of  
Representatives,  the  HRET  has  jurisdiction   to  hear  and  pass  upon  their  
qualifications.   By  analogy   with  the  cases  of  district  representatives,  once  
the  party  or  organization  of  the  party-­‐list  nominee  has  been  proclaimed  
and  the  nominee  has  taken  his  oath  and  assumed  office  as  member  of  the  
House  of  Representatives,  the  COMELEC‟s  jurisdiction  over  election  
contests  relating  to  his  qualification  ends  and  the  HRET‟s  own  jurisdiction  
begins.  (Daryl  Grace  J.  Abayon v.  The  Honorable  House  of  Representatives  
Electoral  Tribunal,  et  al.,   G.R.  Nos.  189466   and  189506,   612  SCRA  375,   11  
February  2010,   En  Banc  [Abad])  
Is  the  decision  of  HRET  or  SET  subject  to  
review?

• No.  HRET/SET  is  the  sole  judge  of  all  contests  relating  to,  among  
other  things,  the  qualifications  of  the  members  of  the  House  of  
Representatives/Senate.  

• Exception:  Grave  abuse  of  discretion,  amounting  to  lack  or  excess  of  
jurisdiction.
Can  the  ET  determine  issues  on  terrorism  and  
Fraud  in  an  election?

• Yes,  it  has  jurisdiction  to  determine  acts  of  terrorism.  

• It  can  annul  the  election  results  in    precint to  remain  faithful  to  its  
constitutional  mandate.  
Power  of  Appropriation
• No  money  shall  be  paid  out  of  the  Treasury  except  in  pursuance  of  an  
appropriations  made  by  law.  (Section  29  [1],  Article  VI,  1987  
Constitution)  

• Under  the  Constitution,  the  power  of  appropriation  is  vested  in  the  
Legislature,  subject  to  the  requirement  that  appropriations  bills  
originate  exclusively  in  the  House  of  Representatives  with  the  option  
of  the  Senate  to  propose  or  concur  with  amendments.  
Pork  Barrel  System
• The  Court  defines  the  Pork  Barrel  System  as  the  collective  body  of  
rules  and  practices  that  govern  the  manner  by  which  lump-­‐sum,  
discretionary  funds,  primarily  intended  for  local  projects,  are  utilized  
through  the  respective  participations  of  the  Legislative  and  Executive  
branches  of  government,  including  its  members.  The  Pork  Barrel  
System  involves  two  (2)  kinds  of  lump-­‐sum,  discretionary  funds:  
Two  kinds  of  lump  sum
• First,  there  is  the  Congressional  Pork  Barrel  which  is  herein  defined  
as  a  kind  of  lump-­‐sum,  discretionary  fund  wherein  legislators,  either  
individually  or  collectively  organized  into  committees,  are  able  to  
effectively  control  certain  aspects  of  the  fund‟s utilization  through  
various  post-­‐enactment  measures  and/or  practices;  and  
• Second,  there  is  the  Presidential  Pork  Barrel  which  is  herein  defined  
as  a  kind  of  lump-­‐sum,  discretionary  fund  which  allows  the  President  
to  determine  the  manner  of  its  utilization.  X  x  x  the  Court  shall  delimit  
the  use  of  such  term  to  refer  only  to  the  Malampaya Funds  and  the  
Presidential  Social  Fund.  (Belgica v.  Ochoa,  G.R.  No.  208566,  710  SCRA  
1,  105-­‐106,  Nov.  19,  2013,  En  Banc  [Perlas-­‐Bernabe])  
Question  Hour
• The  Question  Hour  (Section  22,  Article  VI,  1987  Constitution)  
• As  explained  by  the  Court  in  Senate  v.  Ermita,  this  question  hour  is  
not  really  a  regular  feature  of  a  presidential  government,  but  is  
merely  a  borrowed  concept  from  a  parliamentary  government.  
Right  to  Information
• The  right  to  information  does  not  extend  to  matters  recognized  as  
„privileged  information‟  under  the  separation  of  powers,  by  which  
the  Court  meant  Presidential  conversations,  correspondences,  and  
discussions  in  closed-­‐door  Cabinet  meetings.  
Presidential  Communications  Privilege
• Thus,  if  what  is  involved  is  the  presumptive  privilege  of  presidential  
communications  when  invoked  by  the  President  on  a  matter  clearly  
within  the  domain  of  the  Executive,  the  said  presumption  dictates  
that  the  same  be  recognized  and  be  given  preference  or  priority,  in  
the  absence  of  proof  of  a  compelling  or  critical  need  for  disclosure  
by  the  one  assailing  such  presumption. Any  construction  to  the  
contrary  will  render  meaningless  the  presumption  accorded  by  
settled  jurisprudence  in  favor  of  executive  privilege.  In  fact,  Senate  v.  
Ermita reiterates  jurisprudence  citing  “the  considerations  justifying  a  
presumptive  privilege  for  Presidential  communications.”  
Inquiries  
• Congressional  Investigations  
• There  are  two  (2)  kinds  of  congressional  investigations,  i.e.,  inquiry  in  
aid  of  legislation  (Section  21,  Article  VI,  1987  Constitution);  and  the  
question  hour  (Section  22,  Article  VI,  987  Constitution)  
Inquiry
• In  Arnault v.  Nazareno,  the  Court  held  that  intrinsic  in  the  grant  of  
legislative  power  itself  to  Congress  by  the  Constitution  is  the  power  to  
conduct  inquiries  in  aid  of  legislation,  for  Congress  may  not  be  
expected  to  enact  good  laws  if  it  will  be  denied  the  power  investigate.  

• Note  that  Arnault was  decided  in  the  1950‟s  under  the  1935  
Constitution,  and  in  that  Constitution  there  was  no  provision  similar  
to  that  which  is  expressly  provided  in  the  present  Constitution.  Yet,  as  
early  as  that  case,  the  Court  already  recognized  that  this  power  is  
intrinsic  in  the  grant  of  legislative  power  itself  to  Congress  by  the  
Constitution.  
Relevant  Questions
• In  Bengzon,  Jr.  v.  Senate  Blue  Ribbon  Committee,  two  (2)  relevant  
questions  were  raised.  
• First,  is  this  power  of  each  House  of  Congress  to  conduct  inquiries  in  
aid  of  legislation  absolute,  or  are  there  limitations?  
• Second,  is  this  power  subject  to  judicial  review,  or  is  it  a  political  
question?  
NOT  ABSOLUTE
• As  to  the  first  question,  the  Court  clarified  that  a  mere  reading  of  
Section  21,  Article  VI  of  the  Constitution  will  show  that  the  power  is  
not  really  absolute;  in  fact  there  are  three  (3)  important  limitations  
imposed  therein,  and  these  are:  
• The  inquiry  must  be  in  aid  of  legislation;  
• It  must  be  conducted  in  accordance  with  the  duly  published  rules  of  
procedure  of  a  
• House  of  Congress  conducting  such  inquiry;  and  
• The  rights  of  persons  appearing  in  or  affected  by  such  inquiry  shall  be  
respected.  
SUBJECT  TO  JUDICIAL  REVIEW
• As  to  the  second,  the  Court  held  that  since  it  had  already  been  shown  
that  the  power  is  not  really  absolute,  in  fact,  there  are  important  
limitations,  it  follows,  therefore,  that  such  is  subject  to  judicial  review  
especially  in  view  of  the  expanded  power  of  the  Court  to  determine  
whether  or  not  there  has  been  a  grave  abuse  of  discretion  
amounting  to  lack  or  excess  of  jurisdiction  on  the  part  of  any  branch  
or  instrumentality  of  the  government.  
COMMISSION  ON  APPOINTMENTS
• Section  18,  Article  VI
• Composition
• Proportional  Representation  of  all  political  parties  and  parties  and  
organizations  registered  under  the  party  list  system.
• Total  number  of  representatives  divided  by  number  of  representatives  
in  the  Commission  (complement).  The  full  complement  of  12  was  not  
mandatory.
• Independent  body;  can  promulgate  its  own  rules;  the  Supreme  Court  
cannot  pass  upon  the  correctness  of  the  interpretation  placed  by  the  
Commission  of  its  own  rules.
• CA  can  only  meet  when  Congress  is  in  session.  
• Intended  to  serve  as  check  and  balance
• Should  act  on  all  appointments  submitted  to  within  30  “session”  days  
of  Congress  from  their  submission  and  that  the  Commission  should  
rule  by  majority  vote.
Power  to  declare  war
• Who  exercises  power  and  what  kind  of  war  is  covered?
• Congress  by  a   vote  of  2/3  of  both  houses  in  joint  session  assembled,  voting  
separately  shall  have  the  sole  power  to  declare  the  existence  of  a  state  of  
war  (section  23,  article  VI)
• War   is  defined  as  armed  hostilities  between  two  states;  Emphasize  Article  
II,  section  2  renouncing  aggressive   war  as  an  instrument  of  national  policy.
• Does  not  prohibit  the  waging  of  a  defensive  war  even  in  the  absence  of  a  
declaration  of  war  or  of  a   declaration  of  the  existence  of  a   state  of  war.
• The  actual  power  to  make  war  is  an  executive  power.  It  may  make  war  even  
in  the  absence  of  a  declaration  of  war.
Delegation  of  Emergency  powers
• Section  26,  Article  VI
• War  or  other  national  emergency
• Congress  may  authorize  the  president  to  exercise  powers  necessary  
and  proper  to  carry  out  a  declared  national  policy.  A  delegation  of  
real  legislative  power.
• Subject  to  two  restrictions:  (1)  For  a  limited  period.  Unless  sooner  
withdrawn  by  resolution  of  the  congress,  such  powers  shall  cease  
upon  the  next  adjournment  thereof;  (2)  Subject  to  such  restrictions    
as  the  Congress  may  provide.
Doctrine  of  Inappropriate  Provisions
• Related  to  the  veto  power  of  the  president;
• A  provision  that  is  constitutionally  inappropriate  for  an  appropriation  
bill  may  be  singled  out  for  veto  even  if  it  is  not  an  appropriation  or  
revenue  item.
• Valid?
• An  exercise  of  presidential  judgment.
The  Executive  Power
• The  executive  power  shall  be  vested  in  the  President  of  the  Philippines.  
(Section  1,  Article  VII,  1987  Constitution)  
• Nature  of  the  Executive  Power  in  relation  to  Separation  of  Powers;Checks
and  Balances
• It  has  already  been  established  that  there  is  one  repository  of  executive  
powers,  and  that  is  the  President  of  the  Republic.  This  means  that  when  
Section  1,  Article  VII  of  the  Constitution  speaks  of  executive  power,  it  is  
granted  to  the  President  and  no  one  else.  Corollarily,  it  is  only  the  
President,  as   Chief  Executive,  who  is  authorized  to  exercise  emergency  
powers  as   provided  under  Section  23,   Article  VI,  of  the  Constitution,  as  well  
as  what  became  known  as  the  calling-­‐ out  powers  under  Section  18,  Article  
VII  thereof.  (Jamar   Kulayan v.  Gov.  Abdusakur Tan,  G.R.  No.  187298,   July  3,  
2012)
Power  of  the  Executive
• The  duty  to  protect  the  State  and  its  people  must  be  carried  out  
earnestly  and  effectively  throughout  the  whole  territory  of  the  
Philippines  in  accordance  with  constitutional  provision  on  national  
territory.  Hence,  the  President  of  the  Philippines,  as  the  sole  
repository  of  executive  power,  is  the  guardian  of  the  Philippine  
archipelago,  including  all  the  islands  and  waters  embraced  therein  
and  all  other  territories  over  which  the  Philippines  and  sovereignty  or  
jurisdiction.  X  x  x  
Power  to  call  out
• To  carry  out  this  important  duty,  the  President  is  equipped  with  
authority  over  the  Armed  Forces  of  the  Philippines  (AFP),  which  is  the  
protector  of  the  people  and  the  state.  X  x  x.  In  addition,  the  Executive  
is  constitutionally  empowered  to  maintain  peace  and  order,  protect  
life,  liberty,  and  property,  and  promote  the  general  welfare.  In  
recognition  of  these  powers,  Congress  has  specified  that  the  
President  must  oversee,  ensure,  and  reinforce  our  defensive  
capabilities  against  external  and  internal  threats  and,  in  the  same  
vein,  ensure  that  the  country  is  adequately  prepared  for  all  national  
and  local  emergencies  arising  from  natural  and  man-­‐ made  disasters.  
• To  be  sure,  this  power  is  limited  by  the  Constitution  itself.  X  x  x  (Rene  
A.V.  Saguisag,  et  al.  v.  Executive  Secretary  Paquito N.  Ochoa,  Jr.,  et  al.,  
G.R.  No.  212426,  Jan.  12,  2016,  En  Banc  [Sereno,  CJ])  
Faithful  Execution  Clause
• The  Court  has  interpreted  the  faithful  execution  clause  as  an  
obligation  imposed  on  the  President,  and  not  a  separate  grant  of  
power.  Section  17,  Article  VII  of  the  Constitution,  expresses  this  duty  
in  no  uncertain  terms  and  includes  it  in  the  provision  regarding  the  
President‟s power  of  control  over  the  executive  department  
• In  light  of  this  constitutional  duty,  it  is  the  President‟s prerogative  to  
do  whatever  is  legal  and  necessary  for  Philippine  defense  interests.  
• It  s  no  coincidence  that  the  constitutional  provision  on  the  faithful  
execution  clause  was  followed  by  that  on  the  President‟s
commander-­‐ in-­‐chief  powers,  which  are  specifically  granted  during  
extraordinary  events  of  lawless  violence,  invasion,  or  rebellion.  And  
this  duty  of  defending  the  country  is  unceasing,  even  in  times  when  
there  is  no  state  of  lawless  violence,  invasion,  or  rebellion.  At  such  
times,  the  President  has  full  powers  to  ensure  the  faithful  execution  
of  the  laws.  
• It  would  therefore  be  remiss  for  the  President  and  repugnant  to  the  
faithful-­‐execution  clause  of  the  Constitution  to  do  nothing  when  the  
call  of  the  moment  requires  increasing  the  military‟s defensive  
capabilities,  which  could  include  forging  alliances  with  states  that  
hold  a  common  interest  with  the  Philippines  or  bringing  an  
international  suit  against  an  offending  state.  
Deference  to  the  Presidential  Initiative
• This  approach  of  giving  utmost  deference  to  presidential  initiatives  in  
respect  of  foreign  affairs  is  not  novel  to  the  Court.  The  President‟s act  of  
treating  EDCA  as  an  executive  agreement  is  not  the  principal  power  being  
analyzed  x  x  x.  Rather,  the  preliminary  analysis   is  in  reference  to  the  
expansive  power  of  foreign  affairs.  We  have  long  treated  this  power  as  
something  the  Courts  must  not  unduly  restrict.  X  x  x  
• Xxx  
• Understandably,  this  Court  must  view  the  instant  case  with  the  same  
perspective  and  understanding,  knowing  full  well  the  constitutional  and  
legal  repercussions  of  any  judicial  overreach.  (Rene  A.V.  Saguisag,  et  al.  v.  
Executive  Secretary  Paquito N.  Ochoa,   Jr.,  et  al.,  G.R.  No.  212426,   Jan.  12,  
2016,   En  Banc  [Sereno,  CJ])  
Doctrine  of  Qualified  Political  Agency
• Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single
executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of
the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except
in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law
to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act
personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the
Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumably the acts of
the Chief Executive. (Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape
Tanon Strait, et al. v. Secretary Angelo Reyes, et al., GR Nos. 180771 and
181527, April 21, 2015, En Banc [Leonardo-­‐De Castro])
Appointing  Power
• Conformably,  as  consistently  interpreted  and  ruled  in  the  leading  case  of  
Sarmiento  III  v.  Mison,  and  in  the  subsequent  cases  of  Bautista  v.  Salonga,  
Quintos-­‐Deles  v.  Constitutional  Commission,  and  Calderon  v.  Carale,  under  
Section  16,   Article  VII,  of  the  Constitution,  there  are  four  groups  of  officers  
of  the  government  to  be  appointed  by  the  President:  
• First,  the  heads  of  the  executive  departments,  ambassadors,  other  public  
ministers  and  consuls,  officers  of  the  armed  forces  from  the  rank  of  colonel  
or  naval  captain,  and  other  officers  whose  appointments  are  vested  in  him  
in  this  Constitution;  
• Second,  all  other  officers  of  the  Government  whose  appointments  are  not  
otherwise  provided  for  by  law;  
• Third,  those  whom  the  President  may  be  authorized  by  law  to  
appoint;  
• Fourth,  officers  lower  in  rank  whose  appointments  the  Congress  may  
by  law  vest  in  the  President  alone.  
• It  is  well-­‐settled  that  only  presidential  appointees  belonging  to  the  
first  group  require  the  confirmation  by  the  Commission  on  
Appointments.  (Manalo  v.  Sistoza,  312  SCRA  239,  Aug.  11,  1999,  En  
Banc  [Purisima])  
Ad  Interim  Appointment;  Nature  and  
Character
• An  ad  interim  appointment  is  a  permanent  appointment  because  it  
takes  effect  immediately  and  can  no  longer  be  withdrawn  by  the  
President  once  the  appointee  has  qualified  into  office.  The  fact  that  
it  is  subject  to  confirmation  by  the  Commission  on  Appointments  
does  not  alter  its  permanent  character.  
• The  Constitution  itself  makes  an  ad  interim  appointment  permanent  
in  character  by  making  it  effective  until  disapproved  by  the  
Commission  on  Appointments  or  until  the  next  adjournment  of  
Congress.  X  x  x  Thus,  the  ad  interim  appointment  remains  effective  
until  such  disapproval  or  next  adjournment,  signifying  that  it  can  no  
longer  be  withdrawn  or  revoked  by  the  President.  
• The  Constitution  imposes  no  condition  on  the  effectivity  of  an  ad  
interim  appointment,  and  thus  an  ad  interim  appointment  takes  
effect  immediately.  The  appointee  can  at  once  assume  office  and  
exercise,  as  a  de  jure  officer,  all  the  powers  pertaining  to  the  office.  
• Thus, the term “ad interim appointment”, as used in letters of
appointment signed by the President, means a permanent
appointment made by the President in the meantime that Congress
is in recess. It does not mean a temporary appointment that can be
withdrawn or revoked at any time. The term, although not found in
the text of the Constitution, has acquired a definite legal meaning
under Philippine jurisprudence.
• An  ad  interim  appointee  who  has  qualified  and  assumed  office  becomes  at  
that  moment  a   government  employee  and  therefore  part  of  the  civil  
service.  
• He  enjoys  the  constitutional  protection  that  “[n]o  officer  or  employee  in  
the  civil  service  shall  be  removed  or  suspended  except  for  cause  provided  
by  law.”  (Section  2[3],  Article  IX-­‐B  of  the  Constitution)  Thus,  an  ad  interim  
appointment  becomes  complete  and  irrevocable  once  the  appointee  has  
qualified  into  office.  X  x  x  Once  an  appointee  has   qualified,  he  acquires  a  
legal  right  to  the  office  which  is  protected  not  only  by  statute  but  also  by  
the  Constitution.  He  can  only  be  removed  for  cause,  after  notice  and  
hearing,   consistent  with  the  requirements  of  due  process.  (Matibag v.  
Benipayo,  380   SCRA  49,  April  2,  2002,   En  Banc   [Carpio])  
Limitations  on  power  to  appoint  
• Two  months  immediately  before  the  next  presidential  elections  and  
up  to  the  end  of  his  term,  a  President  or  Acting  President  shall  not  
make  appointments,  except  temporary  appointments  to  executive  
positions  when  continued  vacancies  therein  will  prejudice  public  
service  or  endanger  public  safety.  (Section  15,  Article  VII,  1987  
Constitution)  
May  a  Solicitor  General  be  appointed  as  SOJ?
• Section  7  (2),  Article  IX-­‐B  of  the  1987  Constitution;  Section  13,  Article  
VII
• Members  of  the  Cabinet,  and  their  deputies  or  assistants  shall  not,  
unless  otherwise  provided  in  the  Constitution  hold  any  other  office  or  
employment  during  their  tenure.
• The  prohibition  against  dual  or  multiple  offices  being  held  by  one  
official  must  be  construed  as  to  apply  to  all  appointments  or  
designations,  whether  permanent  or  temporary.
Exceptions  to  Prohibition  against  Multiple  
Positions
• 1.  Those  provided  under  the  1987  Constitution  such  as  Article  VII,  
section  3  authorizing  the  Vice  President  to  become  a  member  of  the  
cabinet.

• 2.  Posts  occupied  by  Executive  Officials  specified  in  Section  13,  Article  
VII  without  additional  compensation  in  ex  oficio capacities  as  
provided  by  law  and  required  by  the  primary  functions  of  the  officials’  
offices
Calling  out  power  as  Commander  in  Chief
• While  the  President  is  still  a  civilian,  Article  II,  Section  3  of  the  Constitution  
mandates  that  civilian  authority  is,  at  all  times,  supreme  over  the  military,  
making  the  civilian  president  the  nation‟s supreme  military  leader.  The  net  
effect  of  Article  II,  Section  3,   when  read  with  Article  VII,  Section  18,  is  that  a  
civilian  President  is  the  ceremonial,  legal  and  administrative  head  of  the  
armed  forces.  
• The  Constitution  does  not  require  that  the  President  must  be  possessed  of  
military  training  and  talents,  but  as  Commander-­‐in-­‐Chief,  he  has  the  power  
to  direct  military  operations  and  to  determine  military  strategy.  Normally,  
he  would  be  expected  to  delegate  the  actual  command  of  the  armed  forces  
to  military  experts,  but  the  ultimate  power  is  his.  (Jamar  Kulayan v.  Gov.  
Abdusakur Tan,  G.R.  No.  187298,   July  3,   2012,   En  Banc  [Sereno,  CJ])  
Subject  to  Judicial  Review  or  Political  
Question  ?
• When  the  President  calls  the  armed  forces  to  prevent  or  suppress  lawless  
violence,  invasion  or  rebellion,  he  necessarily  exercises  a  discretionary  
power  solely  vested  in  his  wisdom.
• This  is  clear   from  the  intent  of  the  framers  and  from  the  text  of  the  
Constitution  itself.  The  Court,  thus,  cannot  be  called  upon  to  overrule  the  
President's  wisdom  or  substitute  its  own.  However,  this  does  not  prevent  
an  examination  of  whether  such  power  was  exercised  within  permissible  
constitutional  limits  or  whether  it  was  exercised  in  a   manner  constituting  
grave  abuse  of  discretion.  In  view  of  the  constitutional  intent  to  give  the  
President  full  discretionary  power  to  determine  the  necessity  of  calling  out  
the  armed  forces,  it  is  incumbent  upon  the  petitioner  to  show  that  the  
President's  decision  is  totally  bereft  of  factual  basis..  (Integrated  Bar  of  the  
Philippines  v.  Hon.  Ronaldo  B.  Zamora,  G.R.  No.  141284,   Aug.  15,   2000,   En  
Banc  [Kapunan])  
Basis  for  the  full  discretionary  power  on  call  
out  power  by  the  President
• Full  discretionary  power  under  section  18,  Article  VII
• Call  out  such  Armed  Forces  to  prevent  or  suppress  lawless  violence,  
invasion  or  rebellion
• Reinforced  by  Article  VII,  section  18  -­‐ no  such  power  on  Congress  to  
revoke  or  review  the  President’s  action  to  call  out  the  Armed  Forces
Two  conditions  to  exercise  the  power  to  suspend  
the  privilege  of  Habeas  Corpus    or  impose  ML
• 1.  There  must  be  actual  invasion  or  rebellion;  and

• 2.  Public  safety  must  require  it.

• These  two  conditions  are  not  required  in  the  power  to  call  out  the  
AFP.  The  only  criterion  is  that  “whenever  it  becomes  necessary”.
 President’s  authority  to  declare  a  state  of   Exercise  of  Emergency  Power  (Art.VI)
Distinction  
national  emergency  (Article VII)
Section  18. The  President  shall  be  the  Commander-­‐in-­‐Chief   Section  23.
of  all  armed  forces  of  the  Philippines  and  whenever  it   The  Congress,   by  a  vote  of  two-­‐thirds  of  both   Houses  
becomes  necessary,  he  may  call  out  such  armed  forces  to   in  joint  session  assembled,   voting   separately,  shall  
prevent  or  suppress  lawless  violence,  invasion  or  rebellion.  In  
have  the  sole  power  to  declare  the  existence  of  a  state  
case  of  invasion  or  rebellion,  when  the  public  safety  requires  
it,  he  may,  for  a  period  not  exceeding  sixty  days,  suspend   the   of  war.
privilege  of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  or  place  the  Philippines   In  times  of  war  or  other   national  emergency,  the  
or  any  part  thereof  under  martial  law.  Within  forty-­‐eight   Congress  may,  by  law,  authorize  the  President,   for  a  
hours  from  the  proclamation  of  martial  law  or  the   limited  period   and  subject  to  such  restrictions  as  it  
suspension   of  the  privilege  of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus,  the   may  prescribe,   to  exercise  powers  necessary  and  
President  shall  submit  a  report  in  person  or  in  writing  to  the   proper   to  carry  out  a  declared  national  policy.  Unless  
Congress.  The  Congress,  voting  jointly,  by  a  vote  of  at  least  a   sooner   withdrawn  by  resolution   of  the  Congress,  such  
majority  of  all  its  Members  in  regular  or  special  session,  may  
powers  shall  cease  upon   the  next  adjournment  
revoke  such  proclamation  or  suspension,   which  revocation  
shall  not  be  set  aside  by  the  President.  Upon   the  initiative  of   thereof.
the  President,  the  Congress  may,  in  the  same  manner,  extend  
such  proclamation  or  suspension   for  a  period  to  be  
determined  by  the  Congress,  if  the  invasion  or  rebellion  shall  
persist  and  public  safety  requires  it.
Note  Article  XII
• Section  17. In  times  of  national  emergency,  when  the  public  interest  
so  requires,  the  State  may,  during  the  emergency  and  under  
reasonable  terms  prescribed  by  it,  temporarily  take  over  or  direct  the  
operation  of  any  privately-­‐owned  public  utility  or  business  affected  
with  public  interest.
• Requires  delegation  of  power  from  Congress
Emergency  construed
• 1.  Economic
• 2.  Natural  Disaster
• 3.  National  Security

• It  may  include  economic  crisis,  epidemic,  typhoon,  flood  or  other  

similar  catastrophe  of  nationwide  proportions  
Pardoning  Power
• Except  in  cases  of  impeachment,  or  as  otherwise  provided  in  this  
Constitution,  the  President  may  grant  reprieves,  commutations,  and  
pardons,  and  remit  fines  and  forfeitures,  after  conviction  by  final  
judgment.  
• He  shall  also  have  the  power  to  grant  amnesty  with  the  concurrence  
of  all  the  Members  of  the  Congress.  (Section  19,  1987  Constitution)  
• The  1987  Constitution  specifically  Section  19  of  Article  VII  and  Section  
5  of  Article  IX-­‐C,  provides  that  the  President  of  the  Philippines  
possesses  the  power  to  grant  pardons,  along  with  other  acts  of  
executive  clemency.  
• It  is  apparent  that  the  only  instances  in  which  the  President  may  not  
extend  pardon  remain  to  be:  (1)  impeachment  cases;  (2)  cases  that  
have  not  yet  resulted  in  a  final  conviction;  and  (3)  cases  involving  
violations  of  election  laws,  rules  and  regulations  in  which  there  was  
no  favorable  recommendation  coming  from  the  COMELEC.  Therefore,  
it  can  be  argued  that  any  act  of  Congress  by  way  of  statute  cannot  
operate  to  delimit  the  pardoning  power  of  the  President.  
• It  is  unmistakably  the  long-­‐standing  position  of  this  Court  that  the  exercise  
of  the  pardoning  power  is  discretionary  in  the  President  and  may  not  be  
interfered  with  by  Congress  or  the  Court,  except  only  when  it  exceeds  the  
limits  provided  for  by  the  Constitution.  
• This  doctrine  of  non-­‐diminution  or  non-­‐impairment  of  the  President‟s
power  of  pardon  by  acts  of  Congress,  specifically  through  legislation,  was  
strongly  adhered  to  by  an  overwhelming  majority  of  the  framers  of  the  
1987  Constitution  when  they  finally  rejected  a   proposal  to  carve  out  an  
exception  from  the  pardoning  power  of  the  President  in  the  form  of  
“offenses  involving  graft  and  corruption”  that  would  be  enumerated  and  
defined  by  Congress  through  the  enactment  of  a  law.  (Atty.  Alicia  Risos-­‐
Vidal  v.  COMELEC,  G.R.  No.  206666,   January  21,   2015,   En  Banc  [Leonardo-­‐
De  Castro])  
PARDON AMNESTY

Infraction of  laws  of  the  state  or  ordinary   Addressed to  political  offenses
offfenses
Granted to  Individuals Granted  to  a  class  or  classes  of  persons

Must  be  accepted Need  not be  accepted

No need  for  concurrence  of  Congress Requires the  concurrence  of  Congress

Looks  backward  and  relieves  pardonee Looks  forward

of  the  consequences of  the  offenses
Diplomatic  and  Treaty  Making  power
• No  treaty  or  international  agreement  shall  be  valid  and  effective  
unless  concurred  in  by  at  least  two-­‐thirds  of  all  the  Members  of  the  
Senate.  (Section  21,  Article  VII,  1987  Constitution)  
• After  the  expiration  in  1991  of  the  Agreement  between  the  Republic  
of  the  Philippines  and  the  United  States  of  America  concerning  
Military  Bases,  foreign  military  bases,  troops,  or  facilities  shall  not  be  
allowed  in  the  Philippines  except  under  a  treaty  duly  concurred  in  by  
the  Senate  and,  when  the  Congress  so  requires,  ratified  by  a  majority  
of  the  votes  cast  by  the  people  in  a  national  referendum  held  for  that  
purpose,  and  recognized  as  a  treaty  by  the  other  contracting  State.  
(Section  25,  Article  XVIII,  1987  Constitution)  
• The  President  also  carries  the  mandate  of  being  the  sole  organ  in  the  
conduct  of  foreign  relations.  Since  every  state  has  the  capacity  to  interact  
with  and  engage  in  relations  with  other  sovereign  states,  it  is  but  logical  
that  every  state  must  vest  in  an  agent  the  authority  to  represent  its  
interests  to  those  other  sovereign  states.  
• Xxx  
• The  role  of  the  President  in  foreign  affairs  is  qualified  by  the  Constitution  in  
that  the  Chief  Executive  must  give  paramount  importance  to  the  
sovereignty  of  the  nation,  the  integrity  of  its  territory,  its  interest,  and  the  
right  of  the  sovereign  Filipino  people  to  self-­‐determination.  X  x  x(Rene  A.V.  
Saguisag,  et  al.  v.  Executive  Secretary  Paquito N.  Ochoa,   Jr.,   et  al.,   G.R.  No.  
212426,   Jan.  12,   2016,   En  Banc  [Sereno,  CJ])  
Power  to  ratify  treaty
• In  our  jurisdiction,  the  power  to  ratify  is  vested  in  the  President  and  
not,  as  commonly  believed,  in  the  legislature.  The  role  of  the  Senate  
is  limited  only  to  giving  or  withholding  its  consent,  or  concurrence,  to  
the  ratification.  (BAYAN  [Bagong Alyansang Makabayan]  v.  Executive  
Secretary  Ronaldo  Zamora,  G.R.  No.  138570,  Oct.  10,  2000,  En  Banc  
[Buena])  
General  Rule
• Section  21,  Article  VII  deals  with  treaties  or  international  agreements  
in  general,  in  which  case,  the  concurrence  of  at  least  two-­‐thirds  (2/3)  
of  all  the  Members  of  the  Senate  is  required  to  make  the  subject  
treaty,  or  international  agreement,  valid  and  binding  on  the  part  of  
the  Philippines.  
• This  provision  lays  down  the  general  rule  on  treaties  or  international  
agreements  and  applies  to  any  form  of  treaty  with  a  wide  variety  of  
subject  matter,  such  as,  but  not  limited  to,  extradition  or  tax  treaties  
or  those  economic  in  nature.  All  treaties  or  international  agreements  
entered  into  by  the  Philippines,  regardless  of  subject  matter,  
coverage,  or  particular  designation  or  appellation,  requires  the  
concurrence  of  the  Senate  to  be  valid  and  effective.  
Special  Rule
• In    contrast,  Section  25,  Article  XVIII  is  a   special  provision  that  applies  to  
treaties  which  involve  the  presence  of  foreign  military  bases,   troops  or  
facilities  in  the  Philippines.  
• Under  this  provision,  the  concurrence  of  the  Senate  is  only  one  of  the  
requisites  to  render  compliance  with  the  constitutional  requirements  and  
to  consider  the  agreement  binding  on  the  Philippines.  
• Section  25,   Article  XVIII  further  requires  that  “foreign  military  bases,  
troops,  or  facilities”  may  be  allowed  in  the  Philippines  only  by  virtue  of  a  
treaty  duly  concurred  in  by  the  Senate,  ratified  by  a   majority  of  the  votes  
cast  in  a   national  referendum  held  for  that  purpose  if  so  required  by  
Congress,  and  recognized  as  such  by  the  other  contracting  State.  
• It  is  a  finely-­‐imbedded  principle  in  statutory  construction  that  a  
special  provision  or  law  prevails  over  a  general  one.  Lex  specialis
derogat generali.  (BAYAN  [Bagong Alyansang Makabayan]  v.  Executive  
Secretary  Ronaldo  Zamora,  G.R.  No.  138570  and  Companion  Cases,  
Oct.  10,  2000,  342  SCRA  449,  481-­‐492,  En  Banc  [Buena])  
EDCA  
• Despite  the  President‟s roles  as   defender  of  the  State  and  sole  authority  in  
foreign  relations,  the  1987   Constitution  expressly  limits  his  ability  in  
instances  when  it  involves  the  entry  of  foreign  military  bases,  troops  or  
facilities.  The  initial  limitation  is  found  in  Section  21  of  the  provisions  on  
the  Executive  Department  x   x  x.  The  specific  limitation  is  given  by  Section  
25  of  the  Transitory  Provisions  x  x  x.  
• It  is  quite  plain  that  the  Transitory  Provisions  of  the  1987   Constitution  
intended  to  add  to  the  basic   requirements  of  a   treaty  under  Section  21   of  
Article  VII.  This  means  that  both  provisions  must  be  read  as  additional  
limitations  to  the  President‟s overarching  executive  functions  in  matters  of  
defense  and  foreign  relations.  (Rene  A.V.  Saguisag,  et  al.  v.  Executive  
Secretary  Paquito N.  Ochoa,   Jr.,  G.R.  No.  212426,   January   12,  2016,   En  Banc  
[Sereno,  CJ])  
Power  to  enter  into  Executive  Agreements
• As  the  sole  organ  of  our  foreign  relations,  and  the  constitutionally  
assigned  chief  architect  of  our  foreign  policy,  the  President  is  vested  
with  the  exclusive  power  to  conduct  and  manage  the  country‟s
interface  with  other  states  and  governments.  Being  the  principal  
representative  of  the  Philippines,  the  Chief  Executive  speaks  and  
listens  for  the  nation;  initiates,  maintains,  and  develops  diplomatic  
relations  with  other  states  and  governments;  negotiates  and  enters  
into  international  agreements;  promotes  trade,  investments,  tourism  
and  other  economic  relations;  and  settles  international  disputes  with  
other  states.  
• As  previously  discussed,  this  constitutional  mandate  emanates  from  
the  inherent  power  of  the  President  to  enter  into  agreements  with  
other  stats,  including  the  prerogative  to  conclude  binding  executive  
agreements  that  do  not  require  further  Senate  concurrence.  The  
existence  of  this  presidential  power  is  so  well-­‐entrenched  that  Section  
5(2)(a),  Article  VIII  of  the  Constitution,  even  provides  for  a  check  on  
its  exercise  
Defined
• In  Commissioner  of  Customs  v.  Eastern  Sea  Trading  (113  Phil.  333  
[1961])  executive  agreements  are  defined  as  “international  
agreements  embodying  adjustments  of  detail  carrying  out  well-­‐
established  national  polices  and  traditions  and  those  involving  
arrangements  of  a  more  or  less  temporary  nature.”  In  Bayan  Muna v.  
Romulo,  this  Court  further  clarified  that  executive  agreements  can  
cover  a  wide  array  of  subjects  that  have  various  scopes  and  purposes.  
They  are  no  longer  limited  to  the  traditional  subjects  that  are  usually  
covered  by  executive  agreements  as  identified  in  Eastern  Sea  Trading.  
• One  of  the  distinguishing  features  of  executive  agreements  is  that  
their  validity  and  effectivity  are  not  affected  by  a  lack  of  Senate  
concurrence.  This  distinctive  feature  was  recognized  as  early  as  in  
Eastern  Sea  Trading  (1961)  x  x  x  (Rene  A.V.  Saguisag,  et  al.  v.  Executive  
Secretary  Paquito N.  Ochoa,  Jr.,  G.R.  No.  212426,  January  12,  2016,  En  
Banc  [Sereno,  CJ])  
Binding  Effect  of  Executive  Agreements
• In  international  law,  there  is  no  difference  between  treaties  and  
executive  agreements  in  their  binding  effect  upon  states  concerned,  
as  long  as  the  functionaries  have  remained  within  their  powers.  
International  law  continues  to  make  no  distinction  between  treaties  
and  executive  agreements:  they  are  equally  binding  obligations  upon  
nations.  (BAYAN  [Bagong Alyansang Makabayan]  v.  Executive  
Secretary  Ronaldo  Zamora,  G.R.  No.  138570,  Oct.  10,  2000,  En  Banc  
[Buena])  
Powers  relative  to  Appropriation
• The  President  shall  submit  to  the  Congress  within  thirty  days  from  the  
opening  of  every  regular  session,  as  the  basis  of  the  general  
appropriations  bill,  a  budget  of  expenditures  and  sources  of  financing,  
including  receipts  from  existing  and  proposed  revenue  measures.  
(Sec.  22,  Art.  VII,  1987  Constitution)  
• The  Congress  may  not  increase  the  appropriations  recommended  by  
the  President  for  the  operation  of  the  Government  as  specified  in  the  
budget.  The  form,  content,  and  manner  of  preparation  of  the  budget  
shall  be  prescribed  by  law.  (Sec.  25[1],  Art.  VI,  1987  Constitution)  
JUDICIAL  DEPARTMENT
• The  judicial  power  shall  be  vested  in  one  Supreme  Court  and  in  such  
lower  courts  as  may  be  established  by  law.  
• Judicial  power  includes  the  duty  of  the  courts  of  justice  to  settle  
actual  controversies  involving  rights  which  are  legally  demandable  
and  enforceable,  and  to  determine  whether  or  not  there  has  been  a  
grave  abuse  of  discretion  amounting  to  lack  or  excess  of  jurisdiction  
on  the  part  of  any  branch  or  instrumentality  of  the  Government.  
(Section  1,  Article  VIII,  1987  Constitution)  
• The  Constitution  states  that  judicial  power  includes  the  duty  of  the  
courts  of  justice  not  only  “to  settle  actual  controversies  involving  
rights  which  are  legally  demandable  and  enforceable”  but  also  “to  
determine  whether  or  not  there  has  been  a  grave  abuse  of  discretion  
amounting  to  lack  or  excess  of  jurisdiction  on  the  part  of  any  branch  
or  instrumentality  of  the  Government.”  It  has  thereby  expanded  the  
concept  of  judicial  power,  which  up  to  then  was  confined  to  its  
traditional  ambit  of  settling  actual  controversies  involving  rights  that  
were  legally  demandable  and  enforceable.  
JUDICIAL  POWER  and  POLITICAL  QUESTION
• n  Tanada v.  Cuenco,  we  held  that  political  questions  refer  “to  those  
questions  which,  under  the  Constitution,  are  to  be  decided  by  the  
people  in  their  sovereign  capacity,  or  in  regard  to  which  full  
discretionary  authority  has  been  delegated  to  the  legislative  or  
executive  branch  of  the  government.  It  is  concerned  with  issues  
dependent  upon  the  wisdom,  not  legality  of  a  particular  measure.”  
(Vinuya,  et  al.  v.  The  Honorable  Executive  Secretary  Alberto  G.  
Romulo,  et  al.,  G.R.  No.  162230,  April  28.  2010,  En  Banc  [Del  Castillo])  
MARCOS  BURIAL  CASE
• In  sum,  there  is  no  clear  constitutional  or  legal  basis  to  hold  that  there  was  
a  grave   abuse  of  discretion  amounting  to  lack  or  excess  of  jurisdiction  
which  would  justify  the  Court  to  interpose  its  authority  to  check  and  
override  an  act  entrusted  to  the  judgment  of  another  branch.  Truly,  the  
President‟s discretion  is  not  totally  unfettered.  X  x  x.  At  bar,  President  
Duterte x  x   x  acted  within  the  bounds  of  the  law  and  jurisprudence,  
Notwithstanding  the  call  of  human  rights  advocate,  the  Court  must  uphold  
what  is  legal  and  just.  And  that  is  not  to  deny  Marcos  of  his  rightful  place  at  
the  LNMB.  For  even  the  Framers  of  our  Constitution  intend  that  full  respect  
for  human  rights  is  available  at  any  stage  of  a  person‟s development,  from  
the  time  he  or  she  becomes  a  person  to  the  time  he  or  she  leaves  this  
earth.  
Marcos  Burial  Case
• There  are  certain  things  that  are  better  left  for  history  – not  this  Court  
– to  adjudge.  The  Court  could  only  do  so  much  in  accordance  with  
clearly  established  rules  and  principles.  Beyond  that,  it  is  ultimately  
for  the  people  themselves,  as  the  sovereign,  to  decide,  a  task  that  
may  require  the  better  perspective  that  the  passage  of  time  provides.  
• Saturnino C.  Ocampo,  et  al.  v.  Rear  Admiral  Ernesto  C.  Enriquez,  et  al.,  
G.R.  No.  225973,  November  8,  2016,  En  Banc  (Peralta)  
COMFORT  WOMEN
• The  SC  may  not  compel  the  President  to  take  up  the  cause  of  the  
petitioners  (comfort  women  during  World  War  II)  against  Japan.  That  will  
violate  the  doctrine  of  separation  of  powers  for  that  is  a  political  question  –
a  question  in  regard  to  which  full  discretionary  authority  has  been  
delegated  by  the  Constitution  to  the  President  as  the  chief  architect  of  our  
foreign  policy  and  as   the  spokesman  of  the  nation  in  matters  of  foreign  
relations.  The  most  that  the  SC  may  do  is  to  exhort  her,  to  urge  her  to  take  
up  petitioners  cause  – but  not  to  compel  her.  
• In  matters  of  foreign  policy,  the  Executive  and  the  Judiciary  must  speak  
with  just  one  voice  to  avoid  serious  embarrassments  and  strained  relations  
with  foreign  countries.  (Vinuya,  et.  al.  v.  The  Honorable  Executive  Secretary  
Alberto  G.  Romulo,  et.  al.,   G.R.  No.  162230,   April  28.  2010,   En  Banc  (Del  
Castillo)  
Requisites  to  exercise  judicial  review
• The  prevailing  rule  in  constitutional  litigation  is  that  no  question  
involving  the  constitutionality  or  validity  of  a  law  or  governmental  act  
may  be  heard  and  decided  by  the  Court  unless  there  is  compliance  
with  the  legal  requisites  for  judicial  inquiry,  namely:  (a)  there  must  be  
an  actual  case  or  controversy  calling  for  the  exercise  of  judicial  power;  
(b)  the  person  challenging  the  act  must  have  the  standing  to  question  
the  validity  of  the  subject  act  or  issuance;  (c)  the  question  of  
constitutionality  must  be  raised  at  the  earliest  opportunity;  and  (d)  
the  issue  of  constitutionality  must  be  the  very  lis mota of  the  case.  Of  
these  requisites,  case  law  states  that  the  first  two  are  the  most  
important.  (Belgica,  et  al.  v.  Exec.  Sec.  Paquito N.  Ochoa,  et  al.,  G.R.  
No.  208566,  710  SCRA  1,  89,  Nov.  19,  2013,  En  Banc  [Perlas-­‐Bernabe])  
• It  is  well-­‐settled  that  no  question  involving  the  constitutionality  or  
validity  of  a  law  or  governmental  act  may  be  heard  and  decided  by  
the  Court  unless  the  following  requisites  for  judicial  inquiry  are  
present:  (a)  there  must  be  an  actual  case  of  controversy  calling  for  the  
exercise  of  judicial  power;  (b)  the  person  challenging  the  act  must  
have  the  standing  to  question  the  validity  of  the  subject  or  issuance;  
(c)  the  question  of  constitutionality  must  be  raised  at  the  earliest  
opportunity;  and  (d)  the  issue  of  constitutionality  must  be  the  very  lis
mota of  the  case.  In  this  case,  the  absence  of  the  first  two,  which  are  
the  most  essential,  renders  the  discussion  of  the  last  two  superfluous.  
(Saturnino C.  Ocampo,  et  al.  v.  Rear  Admiral  Ernesto  C.  Enriquez,  et  
al.,  G.R.  No.  225973,  November  8,  2016,  En  Banc  [Peralta])  
Actual  Case  or  Controversy
• An  “actual  case  or  controversy”  is  one  which  involves  a  conflict  of  
legal  rights,  an  assertion  of  opposite  legal  claims,  susceptible  of  
judicial  resolution  as  distinguished  from  a  hypothetical  or  abstract  
difference  or  dispute.  There  must  be  contrariety  of  legal  rights  that  
can  be  interpreted  and  enforced  on  the  basis  of  existing  law  or  
jurisprudence.  Related  to  the  requisite  of  an  actual  case  or  
controversy  is  the  requisite  of  “ripeness,”  which  means  that  
something  hadbeen accomplished  or  performed  by  either  branch  
before  a  court  may  come  into  the  picture,  and  the  petitioner  must  
allege  the  existence  of  an  immediate  or  threatened  injury  to  itself  as  a  
result  of  the  challenged  action.  
• Moreover,  the  limitation  on  the  power  of  judicial  review  to  actual  
cases  and  controversies  carries  the  assurance  that  the  courts  will  not  
intrude  into  areas  committed  to  the  other  branches  of  the  
government.  Those  areas  pertain  to  questions  which,  under  the  
Constitution,  are  to  be  decided  by  the  people  in  their  sovereign  
capacity,  or  in  regard  to  which  full  discretionary  authority  has  been  
delegated  to  the  legislative  or  executive  branch  of  the  government.  As  
they  are  concerned  with  questions  of  policy  and  issues  dependent  
upon  the  wisdom,  not  legality  of  a  particular  measure,  political  
questions  used  to  be  beyond  the  ambit  of  judicial  review.  
• An  actual  case  or  controversy  means  an  existing  case  or  controversy  that  is  
appropriate  or  ripe  for  determination,  not  conjectural  or  anticipatory,  lest  the  
decision  of  the  court  would  amount  to  an  advisory  opinion.  (Republic  
Telecommunications  Holding,  Inc.  v.  Santiago,  556  Phil.  83,  91-­‐92  [2001])  The  rule  
is  that  courts  do  not  sit  to  adjudicate  mere  academic  questions  to  satisfy  
scholarly  interest,  however  intellectually  challenging.  The  controversy  must  be  
justiciable  – definite  and  concrete,  touching  on  the  legal  relations  of  parties  
having  adverse  legal  interests.  In  other  words,  the  pleadings  must  show  an  active  
antagonistic  assertion  of  a  legal  right,  on  the  one  hand,  and  a  denial  thereof,  on  
the  other;  that  is,  it  must  concern  a  real,  tangible  and  not  merely  a  theoretical  
question  or  issue.  There  ought  to  be  an  actual  and  substantial  controversy  
admitting  of  specific  relief  through  a  decree  conclusive  in  nature,  as  distinguished  
from  an  opinion  advising  what  the  law  would  be  upon  a  hypothetical  state  of  
facts.  (Information  Technology  Foundation  of  the  Philippines  v.  Commission  on  
Elections,  499  Phil.  281,  304-­‐305  [2005])  
• However,  the  scope  of  the  political  question  doctrine  has  been  limited  
by  Section  1  of  Article  VIII  of  the  1987  Constitution  when  it  vested  in  
the  judiciary  the  power  to  determine  whether  or  not  there  has  been  
grave  abuse  of  discretion  amounting  to  lack  or  excess  of  jurisdiction  
on  the  part  of  any  branch  or  instrumentality  of  the  Government.  
(Saturnino C.  Ocampo,  et  al.  v.  Rear  Admiral  Ernesto  C.  Enriquez,  et  
al.,  G.R.  No.  225973,  November  8,  2016,  En  Banc  [Peralta])  
Ripeness  of  Actual  Case
• Corollary  to  the  requirement  of  an  actual  case  or  controversy  is  the  
requirement  of  ripeness  (Lawyers  against  Monopoly  and  Poverty  [LAMP]  v.  
The  Secretary  of  Budget  and  Management,  GR  No.  164987,  April  24,   2012,  
670  SCRA  373,   383).  A  question  is  ripe  for  adjudication  when  the  act  being  
challenged  has  had  a  direct  adverse  effect  on  the  individual  challenging  it.  
For  a   case  to  be  considered  ripe  for  adjudication,  it  is  a  prerequisite  that  
something  has  then  been  accomplished  or  performed  by  either  branch  
before  a  court  may  come  into  the  picture,  and  the  petitioner  must  allege  
the  existence  of  an  immediate  or  threatened  injury  to  himself  as   a  result  of  
the  challenged  action.  He  must  show  that  he  has  sustained  or  is  
immediately  in  danger  of  sustaining  some  direct  injury  as   a  result  of  the  act  
complained  of  (The  Province  of  North  Cotabato v.  The  Government  of  the  
Republic  of  the  Philippines,  589  Phil.  387,   481  [2008]).  (James  M.  Imbong,  
et  al.  v.  Hon.  Paquito N.  Ochoa,  Jr.,   et  al.,   GR  No.  204819,   April  8,  2014,  
Moot  and  Academic
• An  action  is  considered  “moot”  when  it  no  longer  presents  a  justiciable  
controversy  because  the  issued  involved  have  become  academic  or  dead,  
or  when  the  matter  in  dispute  has  already  been  resolved  and  hence,  one  is  
not  entitled  to  judicial  intervention  unless  the  issue  is  likely  to  be  raised  
again  between  the  parties  (Santiago  v.  Court  of  Appeals,  348  Phil.  792,  800  
[1998]).  Time  and  again,  courts  have  refrained  from  even  expressing  an  
opinion  in  a  case  where  the  issues  have  become  moot  and  academic,  there  
being  no  more  justiciable  controversy  to  speak  of,   so  that  a  determination  
thereof  would  be  of  no  practical  use  or  value  (Barbieto v.   Court  of  Appeals,  
GR  No.  184646,  October  30,  2009,   604  SCRA  825,   840).  (International  
Service  for  the  Acquisition  of  Agri-­‐biotech  Applications,  Inc.  v.  Greenpeace  
Southeast  Asia  (Philippines),  et  al.,   GR  No.  209271,  December  8,  2015,  En  
Banc  [Villarama])  
Exceptions  to  Moot  and  Academic
• Even  on  the  assumption  of  mootness,  jurisprudence  dictates  that  
“the  „moot  and  academic‟  principle  is  not  a  magical  formula  that  can  
automatically  dissuade  the  Court  in  resolving  a  case.”  The  Court  will  
decide  cases,  otherwise  moot,  if  first,  there  is  a  grave  violation  of  the  
Constitution;  second,  the  exceptional  character  of  the  situation  and  
the  paramount  public  interest  is  involved;  third,  when  the  
constitutional  issue  raised  requires  formulation  of  controlling  
principles  to  guide  the  bench,  the  bar,  and  the  public;  and  fourth,  the  
case  is  capable  of  repetition  yet  evading  review.  (Belgica,  et  al.  v.  Exec.  
Sec.  Paquito N.  Ochoa,  et  al.,  G.R.  No.  208566,  710  SCRA  1,  93,  Nov.  
19,  2013,  En  Banc  [Perlas-­‐Bernabe])  
Legal  Standing
• Defined  as  a  right  of  appearance  in  a  court  of  justice  on  a  given  
question,  locus  standi requires  that  a  party  alleges  such  personal  
stake  in  the  outcome  of  the  controversy  as  to  assure  that  concrete  
adverseness  which  sharpens  the  presentation  of  issues  upon  which  
the  court  depends  for  illumination  of  difficult  constitutional  
questions.  Unless  a  person  has  sustained  or  is  in  imminent  danger  of  
sustaining  an  injury  as  a  result  of  an  act  complained  of,  such  party  has  
no  standing.  (Saturnino C.  Ocampo,  et  al.  v.  Rear  Admiral  Ernesto  C.  
Enriquez,  et  al.,  G.R.  No.  225973,  November  8,  2016,  En  Banc  
[Peralta])  
• Locus  standi is  “a  right  of  appearance  in  a  court  of  justice  on  a  given  question  (Bayan  
Muna v.  Romulo,  G.R.  No.  159618,  February  1,  2011,  641  SCRA  244,  254,  citing  David  v.  
Macapagal-­‐Arroyo,  522  Phil.  705,  755  [2006]).
• Specifically,  it  is  “a  party‟s personal  and  substantial  interest  in  a  case  where  he  has  
sustained  or  will  sustain  direct  injury  as  a  result”  of  the  act  being  challenged,  and  “calls  
for  more  than  just  a  generalized  grievance.”  (Id.,  citing  Jumamil v.  Café,  507  Phil.  455,  465  
[2005],  citing  Integrated  Bar  of  the  Philippines  v.  Zamora,  392  Phil.  618,  632-­‐633  [2000])  
However,  the  rule  on  standing  is  a  procedural  matter  which  this  Court  has  relaxed  for  
non-­‐traditional  plaintiffs  like  ordinary  citizens,  taxpayers  and  legislators  when  the  public  
interest  so  requires,  such  as  when  the  subject  matter  of  the  controversy  is  of  
transcendental  importance,  of  overreaching  significance  to  society,  or  of  paramount  
public  interest.  (Biraogo v.  Philippine  Truth  Commission  of  2010,  G.R.  Nos.  192935  &  
193036,  December  7,  2010,  637  SCRA  78,  151  citing  Social  Justice  Society  [SJS]  v.  
Dangerous  Drugs  Board,  et  al.,  591  Phil.  393404  [2008];  Tatad v.  Secretary  of  the  
Department  of  Energy,  346  Phil.  321  [1997]  and  De  Guia v.  COMELEC,  G.R.  No.  104712,  
May  6,  1992,  208  SCRA  420,  422.)  
Standard  on  Interest
• Lawyers  against   Monopoly  and   Poverty  vs.  Secretary  of  
Budget   and   Management,  et   al.,  G.R.  No.   164987,  April   24,  
2012
In  the  determination  of  the   degree  of   interest  essential  to  
give  the  requisite  standing  to  attack   the  constitutionality   of   a  
statute,   the  general  rule   is  that   not  only   persons  individually  
affected,  but   also   taxpayers  have  sufficient  interest  in  
preventing  the   illegal  expenditures   of   moneys   raised  by  
taxation  and   may   therefore  question  the   constitutionality   of  
statutes  requiring   expenditure   of   public  moneys.  
Mammals  Case
• had been suggested by animal rights advocates and environmentalists that
not only natural and juridical persons should be given legal standing
because of the difficulty for persons, who cannot show that they by
themselves are real parties-­‐in-­‐interests, to bring actions in representation
of these animals or inanimate objects. For this reason, many environmental
cases have been dismissed for failure of the petitioner to show that he/she
would be directly injured or affected by the outcome of the case.
• However, in our jurisdiction, locus standi in environmental cases has been
given a more liberalized approach. While developments in Philippine
legal theory and jurisprudence have not progressed as far as Justice
Douglas's paradigm of legal standing for inanimate objects, the current
trend moves towards simplification of procedures and facilitating court
access in environmental cases.
Guidelines  on  Non-­‐Traditional  Parties
• ) For  taxpayers,  there  must  be  a  claim  of  illegal  disbursement  of  
public  funds  or  that  the  tax  measure  is  unconstitutional;
• 2) For  voters,  there  must  be  a  showing  of  obvious  interest  in  the  
validity  of  the  election  law  in  question;
• 3) For  concerned  citizens,  there  must  be  a  showing  that  the  
issues  raised  are  of  transcendental  importance  which  must  be  
settled  early;  and
• 4) For  legislators,  there  must  be  a  claim  that  the  official  action  
complained  of  infringes  their  prerogatives  as  legislators.
FACIAL  CHALLENGE
• James  M.  Imbong,  et  al.  v.  Hon.  Paquito N.  Ochoa,  Jr.,   et  al.,  (GR  No.  
204819,   April  8,  2014,   En  Banc   [Mendoza])  
• In  United  States  (US)  constitutional  law,  a  facial  challenge,   also  known   as  a  
First  Amendment  Challenge, is  on  that  is  launched  to  assail   the  validity  of  
statutes  concerning  not  only  protected  speech,  but  also  all  other  rights  in  
the  First  Amendment  (See  United  States  v.  Salerno,  481   U.S.  739  [1987]).  
These  include  religious  freedom,  freedom  of  the  press,  and  the  right  of  the  
people  to  peaceably  assemble,   and  to  petition  the  Government  for  a  
redress  of  grievances.  After  all,   the  fundamental  right  to  religious  freedom,  
freedom  of  the  press  and  peaceful  assembly  are  but  component  rights  of  
the  right  to  one‟s freedom  of  expression,  as  they  are  modes  which  one‟s
thoughts  are  externalized.  
• In  this  jurisdiction,  the  application  of  doctrines  originating  from  the  U.S.  has  been  
generally  maintained,  albeit  with  some  modifications.  While  this  Court  has  
withheld  the  application  of  facial  challenges  to  strictly  penal  statutes  (Romualdez
v.  Commission  on  Elections,  576  Phil.  357  [2008];  Romualdez v.  Sandiganbayan,  
479  Phil.  265  [2004];  Estrada  v.  Sandiganbayan,  421  Phil.  290  [2001]),  
• It  has  expanded  its  scope  to  cover  statutes  not  only  regulating  free  speech,  but  
also  those  involving  religious  freedom,  and  other  fundamental  rights  (Resolution,  
Romualdez v.  Commission  on  Elections,  594  Phil.  305,  316  [2008]).  The  underlying  
reason  for  this  modification  is  simple.  For  unlike  its  counterpart  in  the  U.S.,  this  
Court,  under  its  expanded  jurisdiction,  is  mandated  by  the  Fundamental  Law  not  
only  to  settle  actual  controversies  involving  rights  which  are  legally  demandable  
and  enforceable,  but  also  to  determine  whether  or  not  there  has  been  a  grave  
abuse  of  discretion  amounting  to  lack  or  excess  of  jurisdiction  on  the  part  of  any  
branch  or  instrumentality  of  the  Government.  Verily,  the  framers  of  Our  
Constitution  envisioned  a  proactive  Judiciary,  ever  vigilant  with  its  duty  to  
maintain  the  supremacy  of  the  Constitution.  
• Jose  Jesus  M.  Disini,  Jr.,  et  al.  v.  The  Secretary  of  Justice,  et  al.,  G.R.  
No,.  203335,  Feb.  11,  2014,  En  Banc  (Abad)  
• When  a  penal  statute  encroaches  upon  the  freedom  of  speech,  a  
facial  challenge  grounded  on  the  void-­‐for-­‐vagueness  doctrine  is  
acceptable.  The  inapplicability  of  the  doctrine  must  be  carefully  
delineated.  As  Justice  Antonio  T.  Carpio explained  in  his  dissent  in  
Romualdez v.  Commission  on  Elections,  “we  must  view  these  
statements  of  the  Court  on  the  inapplicability  of  the  overbreadth and  
vagueness  doctrines  to  penal  statutes  as  appropriate  only  insofar  as  
these  doctrines  are  used  to  mount  “facial”  challenges  to  penal  
statutes  not  involving  free  speech.”  
VOID  FOR  VAGUENESS  AND  OVERBREADTH
• Southern  Hemisphere  Engagement  Network,  Inc.,  et  al.  v.  Anti-­‐Terrorism  Council,  
et  al.  (G.R.  Nos.  178552,  178581,  178890,  179157,  &  179461,  5  October  2010,  En  
Banc  (Carpio-­‐ Morales)  
• In  addition,  a  statute  or  act  suffers  from  the  defect  of  vagueness  when  it  lacks  
comprehensible  standards  that  men  of  common  intelligence  must  necessarily  
guess  at  its  meaning  and  differ  as  to  its  application.  
• The  overbreadth doctrine,  meanwhile,  decrees  that  a  governmental  purpose  to  
control  or  prevent  activities  constitutionally  subject  to  state  regulations  may  not  
be  achieved  by  means  which  sweep  unnecessarily  broadly  and  thereby  invade  
the  area  of  protected  freedoms.  Distinguished  from  an  as-­‐applied  challenge  
which  considers  only  extant  facts  affecting  real  litigants,  a  facial  invalidation  is  an  
examination  of  the  entire  law,  pinpointing  its  flaws  and  defects,  not  only  on  the  
basis  of  its  actual  operation  to  the  parties,  but  also  on  the  assumption  or  
prediction  that  its  very  existence  may  cause  others  not  before  the  court  to  refrain  
from  constitutionally  protected  speech  or  activities.  
• The  most  distinctive  feature  of  the  overbreadth technique  is  that  it  marks  an  
exception  to  some  of  the  usual  rules  of  constitutional  litigation.  Ordinarily,  a  
particular  litigant  claims  that  a  statute  is  unconstitutional  as  applied  to  him  or  her.  
Moreover,  challengers  to  a  law  are  not  permitted  to  raise  the  rights  of  third  
parties  and  can  only  assert  their  own  interests.  
• In  overbreadth analysis,  those  rules  give  way;  challenges  are  permitted  to  raise  
the  rights  of  third  parties;  and  the  court  invalidates  the  entire  statute  “on  its  fact,”  
not  merely  “as  applied  for”  so  that  the  overbreadth law  becomes  unenforceable  
until  a  properly  authorized  court  construes  it  more  narrowly.  The  factor  that  
motivates  courts  to  depart  from  the  normal  adjudicatory  rules  is  the  concern  with  
the  “chilling”  deterrent  effect  of  the  overbreadth statute  on  third  parties  not  
courageous  enough  to  bring  suit.  The  Court  assumes  that  an  overbreadth law‟s
“very  existence  may  cause  others  not  before  the  court  to  refrain  from  
constitutionally  protected  speech  or  expression.”  An  overbreadth ruling  is  
designed  to  remove  that  deterrent  effect  on  the  speech  of  those  third  parties.  
• The  rule  established  in  our  jurisdiction  is,  only  statutes  on  free  
speech,  religious  freedom,  and  other  fundamental  rights  may  be  
facially  challenged.  Under  no  case  may  ordinary  penal  statutes  be  
subjected  to  a  facial  challenge.  Criminal  statutes  have  general  in  
terrorem effect  resulting  from  their  very  existence,  and,  if  facial  
challenge  is  allowed  for  this  reason  alone,  the  State  may  well  be  
prevented  from  enacting  laws  against  socially  harmful  conduct.  In  the  
area  of  criminal  law,  the  law  cannot  take  chances  as  in  the  area  of  
free  speech.  
RULE  MAKING  POWER
• ARTICLE  VIII,  SECTION  5(5)  Promulgate  rules  concerning  the  
protection  and  enforcement  of  constitutional  rights,  pleading,  
practice,  and  procedure  in  all  courts,  the  admission  to  the  practice  of  
law,  the  integrated  bar,  and  legal  assistance  to  the  under-­‐privileged.  
Such  rules  shall  provide  a  simplified  and  inexpensive  procedure  for  
the  speedy  disposition  of  cases,  shall  be  uniform  for  all  courts  of  the  
same  grade,  and  shall  not  diminish,  increase,  or  modify  substantive  
rights. Rules  of  procedure  of  special  courts  and  quasi-­‐judicial  bodies  
shall  remain  effective  unless  disapproved  by  the  Supreme  Court.
• The  1987  Constitution  took  away  the  power  of  Congress  to  repeal,  alter  or  
supplement  rules  concerning  pleading,  practice,  and  procedure;  and  that  the  
power  to  promulgate  these  rules  is  no  longer  shared  by  the  Court  with  Congress  
and  the  Executive,  thus:

• Since  the  payment  of  legal  fees  is  a  vital  component  of  the  rules  promulgated  by  
this  Court  concerning  pleading,  practice  and  procedure,  it  cannot  be  validly  
annulled,  changed  or  modified  by  Congress. As  one  of  the  safeguards   of  this  
Courts  institutional  independence,  the  power  to  promulgate  rules  of  pleading,  
practice  and  procedure  is  now  the  Courts  exclusive  domain. That  power  is  no  
longer  shared  by  this  Court  with  Congress,  much  less  the  Executive.  (In  re:  
Exemption  of  the  National  Power  Corporation,  A.M.  no.05-­‐10-­‐2010   SC,  March  10,  
2010;reiterated   in  the  case  of    In  re:  Exemption  of  Perpetual  Health  Cooperative  
[2012])
CITIZENSHIP
• Value

• Citizenship  is  not  a  matter  of  convenience.  It  is  a  badge  of  identity  
that  comes  with  attendant  civil  and  political  rights  accorded  by  the  
State  to  its  citizens.  It  likewise  demands  the  concomitant  duty  to  
maintain  allegiance  to  one‟s flag  and  country.  (Casan Macode
Maquiling v.  COMELEC,  et  al.,  G.R.  No.  195649,  April  16,  2013,  En  
Banc  [Sereno,  CJ])  
Adherence  to  Jus  Sanquinis
• The  Philippine  law  on  citizenship  adheres  to  the  principle  of  jus  
sanguinis.  Thereunder,  a  child  follows  the  nationality  or  citizenship  of  
the  parents  regardless  of  the  place  of  his/her  birth,  as  opposed  to  the  
doctrine  of  jus  soli  which  determines  nationality  or  citizenship  on  the  
basis  of  place  of  birth.  (Valles  v.  COMELEC,  337  SCRA  543,  Aug.  9,  
2000,  En  Banc  [Purisima])  
Acquiring  Citizenship
• There  are  two  ways  of  acquiring  citizenship:  (1)  by  birth,  and  (2)  by  
naturalization.  These  ways  of  acquiring  citizenship  correspond  to  the  two  
kinds  of  citizens:  the  natural-­‐born  citizen,  and  the  naturalized  citizen.  A  
person  who  at  the  time  of  his  birth  is  a  citizen  of  a  particular  country,  is  a  
natural-­‐born  citizen  thereof.  
• As  defined  in  the  Constitution,  natural-­‐born  citizens  “are  those  citizens  of  
the  Philippines  from  birth  without  having  to  perform  any  act  to  acquire  or  
perfect  his  Philippine  citizenship.”  
• On  the  other  hand,  naturalized  citizens  are  those  who  have  become  Filipino  
citizens  through  naturalization,  generally  under  Commonwealth  Act  No.  
473,   otherwise  known  as  the  Revised  Naturalization  Law,  which  repealed  
the  former  Naturalization  Law  (Act  No.  2927),   and  by  Republic  Act  No.  530.  
(Antonio  Bengson III  v.  HRET,  G.R.  No.  142840,   May  7,  2001,   En  Banc  
[Kapunan])  
Natural  Born  Citizens
• Natural-­‐born  citizens  are  those  who  are  citizens  of  the  Philippines  
from  birth  without  having  to  perform  any  act  to  acquire  or  perfect  
their  Philippine  citizenship.  Those  who  elect  Philippine  citizenship  in  
accordance  with  paragraph  (3),  Section  1  hereof  shall  be  deemed  
natural-­‐born  citizens.  (Section  2,  Article  IV,  1987  Constitution)  
• In  general,  there  are  only  two  (2)  kinds  of  Filipino  citizens,  i.e.,  
natural-­‐born  and  naturalized.  There  is  no  third  category.  If  one  did  not  
have  to  undergo  the  cumbersome  process  of  naturalization,  it  means  
that  he  is  natural-­‐born.  (Antonio  Bengson III  v.  HRET,  G.R.  No.  142840,  
May  7,  2001,  En  Banc  [Kapunan])  
Foundling  as  a  Citizen
• To  deny  full  Filipino  citizenship  to  all  foundlings  and  render  them  
stateless  just  because  there  may  be  a  theoretical  chance  that  one  
among  the  thousands  of  these  foundlings  might  be  the  child  of  not  
just  one,  but  two,  foreigners  is  downright  discriminatory,  irrational,  
and  unjust.  It  just  doesn‟t make  any  sense.  
• Given  the  statistical  certainty  99.9%  -­‐ that  any  child  born  in  the  
Philippines  would  be  a  natural-­‐born  citizen,  a  decision  denying  
foundlings  such  status  is  effectively  a  denial  of  their  birthright.  There  
is  no  reason  why  this  Honorable  Court  should  use  an  improbable  
hypothetical  to  sacrifice  the  fundamental  political  rights  of  an  entire  
class  of  human  beings.  
• As  a  matter  of  fact,  foundlings  are  as  a  class,  natural-­‐born  citizens.  
While  the  1935  Constitution‟s enumeration  is  silent  as  to  foundlings,  
there  is  no  restrictive  language  which  would  definitely  exclude  
foundlings  either  
• Domestic  laws  on  adoption  also  support  the  principle  that  foundlings  
are  Filipinos.  These  laws  do  not  provide  that  adoption  confers  
citizenship  upon  the  adoptee.  Rather,  the  adoptee  must  be  a  Filipino  
in  the  first  place  to  be  adopted.  X  x  x  
• Foundlings  are  likewise  citizens  under  international  law.  Under  the  
1987  Constitution,  an  international  law  can  become  part  of  the  
sphere  of  domestic  law  either  by  transformation  or  incorporatio
• The  common  thread  of  the  UDHR  (Universal  Declaration  of  Human  
Rights),  UNCRC  (UN  Convention  on  the  Rights  of  the  Child)  and  ICCPR  
(International  Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political  Rights)  is  to  obligate  the  
Philippines  to  grant  nationality  from  birth  and  ensure  that  no  child  is  
stateless.
• This  grant  of  nationality  must  be  at  the  time  of  birth,  and  it  cannot  be  
accomplished  by  the  application  of  our  present  naturalization  laws,  
Commonwealth  Act  No.  473,  as  amended,  and  R.A.  No.  9139,  both  of  
which  require  the  applicant  to  be  at  least  eighteen  (18)  years  old  .
(Mary  Grace  Natividad S.  Poe-­‐Llamanzares v.  COMELEC,  G  R.  No.  
221697,  March  8,  2016,  En  Banc  [Perez])  
Loss  or  Reacquisition  of  Citizenship
• Philippine  citizenship  may  be  lost  or  reacquired  in  the  manner  
provided  by  law  (Section  3,  Article  IV,  1987  Constitution)  
• There  are  three  (3)  ways  by  which  Philippine  citizenship  may  be  
reacquired,  namely:  (1)  by  naturalization;  (2)  by  repatriation;  and  (3)  
by  direct  act  of  Congress.  
Effect  of  Marriage
• Citizens  of  the  Philippines  who  marry  aliens  shall  retain  their  
citizenship,  unless  by  their  act  or  omission  they  are  deemed,  under  
the  law,  to  have  renounced  it.  (Section  4,  Article  IV,  1987  
Constitution)  
Dual  Citizenship  vs.  Dual  Allegiance
• Dual  allegiance  of  citizens  is  inimical  to  the  national  interest  and  shall  
be  dealt  with  by  law.  (Section  5,  Article  IV,  1987  Constitution)  

• This  provision  is  not  self-­‐executing.  The  word  employed  by  Section  5  
is  “shall.”  The  law  referred  to  is  a  future  law.  
Dual  Allegiance  vs.  Citizenship
• Dual  citizenship  arises  when,  as  a  result  of  the  concurrent  application  
of  the  different  laws  of  two  or  more  states,  a  person  is  simultaneously  
considered  a  national  by  the  said  states.  For  instance,  such  a  situation  
may  arise  when  a  person  whose  parents  are  citizens  of  a  state  which  
adheres  to  the  principle  of  jus  sanguinis is  born  in  a  state  which  
follows  the  doctrine  of  jus  soli.  Such  a  person,  ipso  facto  and  without  
any  voluntary  act  on  his  part,  is  concurrently  considered  a  citizen  of  
both  states.  
• Dual  allegiance,  on  the  other  hand,  refers  to  a  situation  in  which  a  
person  simultaneously  owes,  by  some  positive  act,  loyalty  to  two  or  
more  states.  While  dual  citizenship  is  involuntary,  dual  allegiance  is  
the  result  of  an  individual‟s volition.  (Mercado  v.  Manzano,  307  SCRA  
630,  May  26,  1999,  En  Banc  [Mendoza])  
Are  persons  with  mere  dual  citizenship  disqualified  to  run  for  elective  
local  positions  under  Section  40(d)  of  the  Local  Government  Code?  

• The  phrase  “dual  citizenship”  in  R.A.  No.  7160,  Section  40(d)  (Local  
Government  Code)  must  be  understood  as  referring  to  “dual  
allegiance.”  Consequently,  persons  with  mere  dual  citizenship  do  not  
fall  under  this  disqualification.  Unlike  those  with  dual  allegiance,  who  
must  be  subject  to  strict  process  with  respect  to  the  termination  of  
their  status,  for  candidates  with  dual  citizenship,  it  should  suffice  if,  
upon  the  filing  of  their  certificate  of  candidacy,  they  elect  Philippine  
citizenship  to  terminate  their  status  as  persons  with  dual  citizenship  
considering  that  their  condition  is  the  unavoidable  consequence  of  
conflicting  laws  of  different  states.  
• By  electing  Philippine  citizenship,  such  candidates  at  the  same  time  
forswear  allegiance  to  the  other  country  of  which  they  are  also  
citizens  and  thereby  terminate  their  status  as  dual  citizens.  It  may  be  
that,  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  foreign  state  and  of  its  laws,  such  
an  individual  has  not  effectively  renounced  his  foreign  citizenship.  
That  is  of  no  moment.  (Mercado  v.  Manzano,  G.R.  No.  135083,  307  
SCRA  630,  May  26,  1999  [Mendoza])  
Instances  when  a  citizen  of  the  Philippines  may  possess  dual  citizenship  
considering  the  citizenship  clause  (Article  IV)  of  the  Constitution.  
• 1)   Those  born  of  Filipino  fathers  and/or  mothers  in  foreign  countries  
which  follow  the  principle  of  jus  soli;  
• 2)   Those  born  in  the  Philippines  of  Filipino  mothers  and  alien  fathers  
if  by  the  laws  of  their  father‟s country  such  children  are  citizens  of  
that  country;  
• 3)   Those  who  marry  aliens  if  by  the  laws  of  the  latter‟s country  the  
former  are  considered  citizens,  unless  by  their  act  or  omission  they  
are  deemed  to  have  renounced  Philippine  citizenship.  (Mercado  v.  
Manzano,  G.R.  No.  135083,  307  SCRA  630,  May  26,  1999  [Mendoza])  
Dual  Citizenship  Law  (RA  9225)
• The  law  applies  to:  (1)  former  natural-­‐born  citizens  of  the  Philippines  
who  have  already  become  citizens  of  a  foreign  country  through  
naturalization;  and  (2)  natural-­‐born  citizens  of  the  Philippines  who  
may  wish  to  become  a  citizen  of  a  foreign  country  through  
naturalization  after  the  effectivity  of  this  Act.  
• In  both  cases,  they  are  given  the  opportunity  to  either  reacquire  
(reacquisition)  or  retain  (retention)  their  Philippine  citizenship.  Thus,  
in  effect,  they  will  possess  dual  citizenship.  
• Casan Macode Maquiling v.  COMELEC,  et  al.,  G.R.  No.  195649,  April  
16,  2013,  En  Banc  (Sereno,  CJ)  
• FACTS:  When  after  renouncing  his  American  citizenship  upon  his  filing  
of  certificate  of  candidacy  for  mayor,  it  was  established  that  he  
travelled  several  times  to  the  US  using  his  American  passport,  that  
was  an  effective  recantation  of  his  renunciation  of  his  foreign  
citizenship.  Thus,  he  reverted  to  his  prior  status  as  a  person  having  
dual  citizenship  and,  therefore,  disqualified  to  run  for  mayor  pursuant  
to  Sec.  40  (d)  of  the  Local  Government  Code  (R.A.  No.  7061).  
• Section  5(2)  of  The  Citizenship  Retention  and  Re-­‐acquisition  Act  of  2003  
provides:  
• Those  who  retain  or  re-­‐acquire  Philippine  citizenship  under  this  Act  shall  
Enjoy  full  civil  and  political  rights  and  be  subject  to  all  attendant  liabilities  
and  responsibilities  under  existing  laws  of  the  Philippines  and  the  following  
conditions:  xxxx
• (2)  Those  seeking  elective  public  office  in  the  Philippines  shall  meet  the  
qualifications  for  holding  such  public  office  as  required  by  the  Constitution  
and  existing  laws  and,  at  the  time  of  the  filing  of  the  certificate  of  
candidacy,  make  a  personal  and  sworn  renunciation  of  any  and  all  foreign  
citizenship  before  any  public  officer  authorized  to  administer  an  oath.  
• We  agree  with  the  pronouncement  of  the  COMELEC  
First  Division  that  “Arnado‟s act  of  continuously  using  
his  US  passport  effectively  negated  his  Affidavit  of  
Renunciation.”  This  does  not  mean  that  he  failed  to  
comply  with  the  twin  requirements  under  R.A.  No.  
9225,  for  he  in  fact  did.  It  was  after  complying  with  
the  requirements  that  he  performed  positive  acts  
which  effectively  disqualified  him  from  running  for  an  
elective  public  office  pursuant  to  Section  40(d)  of  the  
Local  Government  Code  of  1991.  
• Besides,  Arnado‟s subsequent  use  of  his  Philippine  passport  does  not  
correct  the  fact  that  after  he  renounced  his  foreign  citizenship  and  prior  to  
filing  his  certificate  of  candidacy,  he  used  his  US  passport.  In  the  same  way  
that  the  use  of  his  foreign  passport  does  not  undo  his  Oath  of  
Renunciation,  his  subsequent  use  of  his  Philippine  passport  does  not  undo  
his  earlier  use  of  his  US  passport.  

• We  therefore  hold  that  Arnado,  by  using   his  US  passport   after  renouncing  
his  American  citizenship,  has  recanted  the  same  Oath  of  Renunciation  he  
took.  Section   40(d)  of  the  Local  Government  Code  applies   to  his   situation.  
He  is   disqualified  not  only   from  holding   the  public  office  but  even  from  
becoming  a  candidate  in  the  May  2011  elections.  
Naturalization
• Naturalization  signifies  the  act  of  formally  adopting  a  foreigner  into  
the  political  body  of  a  nation  by  clothing  him  or  her  with  the  
privileges  of  a  citizen.  (Edison  So  v.  Republic  of  the  Philippines,  G.R.  
No.  170603,  January  29,  2007,  3rd  Div.,  [Callejo,  Sr.])  
Ways  to  become  a  PH  citizen  
• Under  current  and  existing  laws,  there  are  three  ways  by  which  an  
alien  may  become  a  citizen  by  naturalization:  
• (a)  administrative  naturalization  pursuant  to  R.A.  No.  9139;
• (b)  judicial  naturalization  pursuant  to  C.A.  No.  473,  as  amended;  and  
• (c)  legislative  naturalization  in  the  form  of  a  law  enacted  by  Congress  
bestowing  Philippine  citizenship  to  an  alien.  (Edison  So  v.  Republic  of  
the  Philippines,  G.R.  No.  170603,  January  29,  2007,  3rd  Div.,  [Callejo,  
Sr.])  
• R.A.  No.  9139  may  be  availed  of  only  by  native-­‐born  aliens  who  lived  here  
in  the  Philippines  all   their  lives,  who  never  saw  any  other  country  and  all  
along  thought  that  they  were  Filipinos;  who  have  demonstrated  love  and  
loyalty  to  the  Philippines  and  affinity  to  the  customs  and  traditions  of  the  
Filipino  people.  
• To  reiterate,  the  intention  of  the  legislature  in  enacting  R.A.  No.  9139  was  
to  make  the  process  of  acquiring  Philippine  citizenship  less  tedious,  less  
technical  and  more  encouraging  which  is  administrative  rather  than  judicial  
in  nature.  What  the  legislature  had  in  mind  was  merely  to  prescribe  
another  mode  of  acquiring  Philippine  citizenship  which  may  be  availed  of  
by  native  born  aliens.  The  only  implication  is  that,  a  native  born  alien  has  
the  choice  to  apply  for  judicial  or  administrative  naturalization,  subject  to  
the  prescribed  qualifications  and  disqualifications.  (Edison  So  v.  Republic  of  
the  Philippines,  G.R.  No.  170603,   January   29,  2007,   3rd  Div.,  [Callejo,  Sr.]  
Constitutional  Commissions
• Legal  Framework  :  Article  IX-­‐ A,  1987  Constitution
• Civil  Service  Commission
• Commission  on  Audit
• Commission  on  Elections
• Declared  as  “independent  by  the  constitution”
Inhibitions
• 1.  Cannot  hold  any  other  office  or  employment
• 2.  Cannot  engage  in  the  practice  of  any  profession
• 3.  Cannot  take  part  in  the  active  management  or  control  of  any  
business  which  are  affected  by  the  functions  of  their  office
• 4.  Shall  not  be  financially  interested  directly  or  indirectly,  in  any  
contract  with,  or  in  any  franchise  or  privilege  granted  by  the  
Government,  any  of  its  subdivisions,  agencies  or  instrumentalities  
including  GOCCs.
Evidence  of  Independence  Principle
• 1.  Salaries  of  their  Commissioners  are  fixed  by  law  and  shall  not  be  
decreased  during  their  tenure  (section  3,  Article  IX-­‐A)
• 2.  Enjoy  Fiscal  Autonomy  (section  5)
• 3.  Commissioners  can  be  removed  by  impeachment  only  (Art.  XI,  
section  2)
• 4.  President  cannot  designate  an  Acting  Chairman,  like  the  Chairman  
of  the  Comelec (Brillantes vs.  Yorac [1990])
Fiscal  Autonomy
• The  agencies  which  the  Constitution  has  vested  with  fiscal  autonomy  
should  be  given  priority  in  the  release  of  their  approved  
appropriations  against  all  other  agencies  not  similarly  vested  when  
there  is  a  revenue  shortfall.  (CSC  vs.  DBM  [2005])

• Mandamus  may  be  availed  of  to  enforce  fiscal  autonomy.

Promotional  Appointment
• There  is  nothing  in  section  1  [2],  Article  IX-­‐D  that  explicitly  precludes  a  
promotional  appointment  from  Commissioner  to  Chairman,  provided  
it  is  made  under  the  condition  – as  long  as  the  commissioner  has  not  
served  a  full  term  of  7  years,  and  that  the  appointment  to  any  
vacancy  shall  be  only  for  the  unexpired  portion  of  the  term  of  the  
predecessor.  In  addition,  the  aggregate  service  of  the  Commissioner  
in  said  position  and  the  term  to  which  he  shall  be  appointed  to  the  
position  of  Chairman  must  not  exceed  7  years  so  as  not  to  disrupt  the  
rotational  system  in  the  Commission.
Civil  Service  Commission
• The  civil  service  embraces  all  branches,  subdivisions,  intrumentalities,  
and  agencies  of  the  Government  including  Government  Owned  and  
Controlled  Corporations  with  original  charters.  

• Appointments  in  the  civil  service  shall  be  made  only  according  to  
merit  and  fitness  to  be  determined  as  far  as  practicable,  by  
competitive  examination.  (section  2[2],  Article  IX-­‐B)

• Exempt  from  competitive  examination  – Positions  which  are  policy  

determining,  primarily  confidential  and  highly  technical.  
Limitations/Restrictions
• An  officer  or  employee  of  the  civil  service  may  be  removed  or  
suspended  only  for  cause  provided  by  law.  (section  2  [3],  Article  IX-­‐B)

• No  officer  or  employee  in  the  civil  service  shall  engage  directly  or  
indirectly  in  any  electioneering  or  partisan  political  campaign.  (section  
2  [4],  Article  IX-­‐B)

• Not  allowed  to  engaged  in  strike,  but  entitled  to  right  to  self-­‐
organization
Limitations/Restrictions
• No  candidate  who  has  lost  in  any  election  shall,  within  one  year  after  such  election  be  
appointed  to  any  office  in  the  Government,  or  in  any  GOCC,  or  any  of  its  subsidiaries.  
(Article  IX-­‐B,  section  6)

• No  elective  official  shall  be  eligible  for  appointment  or  designation  in  any  capacity  to  any  
public  office  or  position  during  his  tenure.  (section  7,  Article  IX-­‐B)

• No  elective  or  appointive  officer  or  employee  shall  receive  additional,  double  or  indirect  
compensation  unless  specifically  authorized  by  law.  (section  8,  Article  IX-­‐B)

• No  elective  or  appointive  public  officer  or  employee  shall  accept  without  the  consent  of  
the  Congress,  any  present,  emolument  or  title  of  any  kind  from  any  foreign  government.  
(section  8,  Article  IX-­‐B)
What  is  the  only  act  that  a  civil  service  employee  
may  do  which  is  not  partisan  political  activity?
• Vote

• Section  79  (B)  of  the  Omnibus  Election  Code  – any  act  that  is  
designed  to  elect  or  promote  the  election  of  a  candidate  is  an  
electioneering  or  partisan  political  activity.
The  BILL  OF  RIGHTS
• Contextual  Framework  before  details

• Principles

• Discussion  of  Rights

• Relation  to  International  Law

Context
• Constitutional Law is the study of the fundamental powers of the
State, namely, the police power, the power of eminent domain and
the power of taxation, and the liberties or rights enshrined in the Bill
of Rights of the Constitution, as well as the proper equilibrium
between the three inherent powers of the State on the one hand and
the liberties as secured by the Bill of Rights, on the other hand. The
Bill of Rights marks the line beyond which power exceeds or rights
abused, and the judiciary which construes the law decides whether
one or the other has crossed the line, so as to maintain the proper
balance which ordered society requires. (Agpalo, 2006)
Civil  Rights  and  Natural  Rights
• “With  the   establishment  of  civil  government  and   a   constitution,   there  arises  
a  conceptual   distinction   between   natural   rights  and   civil  rights,  difficult  
though  to  define   their   scope  and   delineation.  It  has   been  proposed  that  
natural  rights  are  those  rights  that  "appertain  to  man  in  right  of  his    
existence." These   were  fundamental   rights   endowed   by  God   upon   human  
beings,  "all   those   rights  of  acting  as   an  individual  for  his   own  comfort  and  
happiness,   which  are   not  injurious  to  the   natural   rights  of  others."   On  the  
other   hand,  civil   rights  are  those  that  "appertain  to  man  in  right  of  his  
being  a  member  of  society."  These  rights,   however,   are  derived   from  the  
natural   rights  of  individuals  ….  
• (CJ  Puno  in  his  dissenting  opinion  in  Republic  vs.  Sandiganbayan [2003])
Classification  of  Rights
• Rights  have  been  classified  in  various  manners.  One  classification  
made  a  distinction  between  classical and  social  rights.    The  other  and  
more  common  classification  are  those  referred  to  in  international  law  
as  civil,  political,  economic,  cultural  and  social  rights .
• Foremost  of  the  rights  that  can  be  found  in  our  Constitution  are  
those  which  are  collectively  known  as  “civil  and  political  rights”  
which  serves  to  protect  the  individual  from  excesses  of  the  state.  
These  rights  in  our  Constitution  are  similar  to  those  enshrined  in  the  
Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights,  of  which  the  Philippines  is  a  
state  party.
Guaranty  Liberty
• These  broad  guaranty  are  classified  under  two  headings  as  
enunciated  before  by  former  Chief  Justice  Enrique  Fernando  under  
the  broad  guaranty  of  liberty:

1. Freedom  of  Belief,  whether  secular  or  religious,  freedom  of  

expressing  such  beliefs,  and  freedom  to  associate  with  others  of  like  
persuasion;  and
2. Personal  Freedom,  which  includes  the  constitutionally  guaranteed  
freedom  of  an  accused  against  excessive  state  action.
Classification  of  Rights
• The  economic,  social  and  cultural  rights  are  enshrined  in  the  
International  Covenant  of  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural  Rights  which  
entered  into  force  in  1976.

• The  Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights,  the  International  

Covenant  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural  Rights  and  the  
International  Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political  Rights  and  its  Optional  
Protocol  all  belong  to  what  we  refer  to  as  the  International  Bill  of  
Human  Rights.
Historical  Context  of  the  PH  Bill  of  Rights
• Pre-­‐Spanish
• Spanish  Period
• Malolos Constitution  -­‐ Title  IV  – The  Filipinos  and  their  National  and  
Individual  Rights
• Commonwealth  – 1935   Constitution
• The  War   Constitution  – 1943  Constitution  – Article  VII  – Duties  and  Rights  
of  Every  Citizen
• 1973  Constitution
• The  1986  Freedom  Constitution
• 1987  Constitution
Right  to  Liberty  and  Property:  State’s  Power  
to  Restrict  
• Universal   Declaration  of  Human  Rights,  Article  3
Everyone   has   the  right  to  life,  liberty  and   the  security  of  person.

• Universal   Declaration  of  Human  Rights,  Article  17

Everyone   has   the  right  to  own  property  alone  as  well  as  in   association   with  
others.
• No  one   shall   be  arbitrarily  deprived  of  his  property.

• 1987  Constitution,  Article  IV,  Section  1.

No  person   shall   be   deprived   of  life,  liberty,   or  property   without  due   process   of  
law,   nor  shall   any  person   be   denied  the  equal   protection   of  the   laws
Right  to  Liberty  and  Property  under  PH  
• The  Philippine  is  a  state  party  to  about  23  international  human  rights  
instruments.

• Whilst, the rights to liberty and property are provided for by the
international law instruments, the Philippines through its national
constitution has provided for the adequate and substantial
recognition of these rights.
Juridical  Concept  of  Liberty
• The  right  to  Liberty  guaranteed  by  the  Constitution  includes  the  right  
to  exist  and  the  right  to  be  free  from  arbitrary  personal  restraint  or  
servitude.
• Liberty  includes  the  right  of  the  citizens  to  be  free  to  use  his  faculties  
in  all  lawful  ways;  to  live  an  work  where  he  will;  to  earn  his  livelihood  
by  an  lawful  calling;  to  pursue  any  avocations,  an  for  that  purpose.  to  
enter  into  all  contracts  which  may  be  proper,  necessary,  and  essential  
to  his  carrying  out  these  purposes  to  a  successful  conclusion.  The  chief  
elements  of  the  guaranty  are  the  right  to  contract,  the  right  to  choose  
one's  employment,  the  right  to  labor,  and  the  right  of  locomotion.
• Rubi  vs.  Provincial  Board    [1919]
Restriction
• The  rights  to  liberty  and  property  are  subject  to  three  restrictions  or  
limitations  – police  power,  eminent  domain  and  taxation.  

• These  three  are  referred  to  as  the  great  and  inherent  powers  of  
sovereignty.  They  constitute  the  totality  of  sovereign  power.  

• Agan vs.  International  Air  Terminals,  420  SCRA  575  (2004)

Police  Power  of  the  State
• Rooted  on  the  Latin  maxims,  salus populi suprema est lex (the  welfare  
of  the  people  is  the  supreme  law)  and  sic  utere tuo ut alienum non  
laedas (so  use  your  property  as  not  to  injure  the  property  of  others),  
• A  similar  sentiment  was  echoed  by  our  own  Justice  Laurel  in  Calalang
v.  Williams  who  defined  police  power  as  the  "state  authority  to  enact  
legislation   that  may  interfere  with  personal  liberty  or  property  in  
order  to  promote  the  general  welfare.  
Police  Power  
• Police  power,  as  an  inherent  attribute  of  sovereignty,  is  the  power  to  
prescribe  regulations  to  promote  the  health,  morals,   peace,  education,  
good  order,  or  safety,  and  the  general  welfare  of  the  people.  
• To  determine  the  validity  of  a  police  measure,  two  questions   must  be  
asked:   (1)  Does   the  interest  of  the  public   in  general,   as  distinguished  from  
those  of   a  particular   class,   require  the  exercise   of  police  power?   and  (2)  
Are  the  means  employed   reasonably   necessary   for  the  accomplishment  
of  the  purpose   and  not  unduly  oppressive   upon  individuals?  
(FRANCISCO  I.  CHAVEZ,  petitioner,  vs.  COMMISSION  ON  ELECTIONS,  
represented  by  its  Chairman,  BENJAMIN  S.  ABALOS,   ESMERALDA  AMORA-­‐
LADRA,   in  her  capacity  as   Acting  Director  IV,  National  Capital  Judicial  Region,  
Commission  on  Elections,  and  the  SOLICITOR  GENERAL,  respondents.,  G.R.  
No.  162777.    August  31,  2004)
Defined
• Police  power  has  also  been  defined  as  the  "state  authority  to  enact  legislation  
that  may  interfere  with  personal  liberty  or  property  in  order  to  promote  the  
general  welfare."  It  consists  of  two  essential  elements.  First,  it  is  an  imposition  
of  restraint  upon  liberty  or  property.  Second,  the  power  is  exercised  for  the  
benefit  of  the  common  good.  Its  definition  in  elastic  terms  underscores  its  all-­‐
encompassing  and  comprehensive  embrace. It  is  and  still  is  the  "most  essential,  
insistent,  and  illimitable"  of  the  State's  powers.  It  is  familiar  knowledge  that  
unlike  the  power  of  eminent  domain,  police  power  is  exercised  without  provision  
for  just  compensation  for  its  paramount  consideration  is  public  welfare.
(DEMOSTHENES  P.  AGAN,  JR.,  vs.  PHILIPPINE  INTERNATIONAL  AIR  TERMINALS  CO.,  
INC.,  MANILA  INTERNATIONAL  AIRPORT  AUTHORITY,  DEPARTMENT  OF  
TRANSPORTATION  AND  COMMUNICATIONS  and  SECRETARY  LEANDRO  M.  
MENDOZA,  in  his  capacity  as  Head  of  the  Department  of  Transportation  and  
Communications,  respondents.,  G.R.  No.  155001.    January  21,  2004.)
• Police  power  is  essentially  regulatory  in  nature  and  the  power  to  issue  
licenses  or  grant   business  permits,  if  exercised  for  a   regulatory  and  not  
revenue-­‐raising  purpose,  is  within  the  ambit  of  this  power.  
• By  virtue  of  a  valid  delegation  of  legislative  power,  it  may  also  be  exercised  
by  the  President  and  administrative  boards,  as   well  as   the  lawmaking  
bodies  on  all   municipal  levels,  including  the  barangay.  Delegation  of  
legislative  powers  to  the  President  is  permitted  in  Sections  23(2)  and  28(2)  
of  Article  VI  of  the  Constitution.
• ARTICLE  VI,  SECTION  23.  (2) In  times  of  war  or  other  national  
emergency,  the  Congress  may,  by  law,  authorize  the  President,  for  a  limited  
period  and  subject  to  such  restrictions  as  it  may  prescribe,  to  exercise  
powers  necessary  and  proper  to  carry  out  a  declared  national  policy.  
Unless  sooner  withdrawn  by  resolution  of  the  Congress,  such  powers  shall  
cease  upon  the  next  adjournment  thereof.
• ARTICLE  VI,  SECTION  28  (2) The  Congress  may,  by  law,  authorize  the  
President  to  fix  within  specified  limits,  and  subject  to  such  limitations  
and  restrictions  as  it  may  impose,  tariff  rates,  import  and  export  
quotas,  tonnage  and  wharfage dues,  and  other  duties  or  imposts  
within  the  framework  of  the  national  development  program  of  the  
Government.
(CAMARINES  NORTE  ELECTRIC  COOPERATIVE,  INC.  (CANORECO)  vs.  
HON.  RUBEN  D.  TORRES,  in  his  capacity  as  Executive  Secretary;  REX  
TANTIONGCO;  HONESTO  DE  JESUS;  ANDRES  IBASCO;  TEODULO  M.  
MEA;  and  VICENTE  LUKBAN,  respondents.,  G.R.  no.127249,  February  
27,  1998)
Requisites  for  valid  delegation  of  Police  Power
• Such  delegation  confers  upon  the  President  quasi-­‐legislative  power  
which  may  be  defined  as  the  authority  delegated  by  the  law-­‐making  
body  to  the  administrative  body  to  adopt  rules  and  regulations  
intended  to  carry  out  the  provisions  of  the  law  and  implement  
legislative  policy.  To  be  valid,  an  administrative  issuance,  such  as  an  
executive  order,  must  comply  with  the  following  requisites:
• (1) Its  promulgation  must  be  authorized  by  the  legislature;      

• (2) It  must  be  promulgated  in  accordance  with  the  prescribed  

procedure;
• (3)  It  must  be  within  the  scope  of  the  authority  given  by  the  
legislature;  and

• (4) It  must  be  reasonable.

(HON.  EXECUTIVE  SECRETARY,,  vs.  SOUTHWING  HEAVY  INDUSTRIES,  
INC.,  represented  by  its  President  JOSE  T.  DIZON,  UNITED  
AUCTIONEERS,  INC.,  represented  by  its  President  DOMINIC  SYTIN,  and  
MICROVAN,  INC.,  represented  by  its  President  MARIANO  C.  SONON,  
respondents.,  G.R.no.164171,  February  20,  2006)
• Police  power  is  inherent  in  the  state  but  not  in  municipal  corporations  
(Balacuit v.  CFI  of  Agusan del  Norte,  163  SCRA  182).  
• Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a
valid delegation of such power by the legislature which is the repository of
the inherent powers of the State. A valid delegation of police power may
arise from express delegation, or be inferred from the mere fact of the
creation of the municipal corporation; and as a general rule, municipal
corporations may exercise police powers within the fair intent and purpose
of their creation which are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers
expressly granted, and statutes conferring powers on public corporations
have been construed as empowering them to do the things essential to the
enjoyment of life and desirable for the safety of the people.
Local  Government  Code
• Our  Congress  delegated  police  power  to  the  local  government  units  in  the  Local  
Government  Code  of  1991.  
• This delegation is found in Section 16 of the same Code, known as the general
welfare clause, viz: "Sec. 16. General Welfare. — Every local government unit
shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom,
as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and
effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the
general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government
units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and
enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people
to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate
and self-­‐reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals,
enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among
their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and
convenience of their inhabitants."
Undue  delegation
• The  case  of  Review  Center  Association  vs.  Executive  Secretary is  a  case  
in  point.  In  this  case,  Executive  Order  no.  566  issued  by  President  
Arroyo  in  2006  which  authorized  the  Commission  on  Higher  
Education  (CHED)  to  supervise  the  establishment  and  operation  of  all  
review  centers  and  similar  entities  in  the  Philippines  was  in  issue.  The  
Review  Center  Association  of  the  Philippines  asserted  that,  the  said  
executive  order  is  a  usurpation  of  the  legislative  power.  The  CHED  
however  argues  that  the  same  is  a  valid  delegation  of  the  State’s  
police  power  to  regulate  review  centers,  and  an  exercise  of  the  
executive’s  residual  powers.
• G.R.  No.  180046.    April  2,  2009
Eminent  Domain
• The  power  of   eminent  domain  is  the  inherent  right   of  the  state  (and  of  
those  entities   to  which   the  power  has  been  lawfully  delegated)  to  
condemn  private  property  to  public  use   upon  payment  of  just  
compensation.  On  the  other  hand,  police  power  is  the  power  of  the  state  
to  promote  public  welfare  by  restraining  and  regulating  the  use  of  liberty  
and  property.  Although  both  police  power  and  the  power  of  eminent  
domain  have  the  general   welfare  for  their  object,  and  recent  trends  show  a  
mingling  of  the  two  with  the  latter  being  used  as  an  implement  of  the  
former,  there  are  still  traditional  distinctions  between  the  two.

(G.R.  No.  157882.    March  30,  2006.,   DIDIPIO  EARTH-­‐SAVERS'  MULTI-­‐PURPOSE  

ASSOCIATION,  INCORPORATED  (DESAMA),  et.al.,  petitioners,  vs.  ELISEA  
GOZUN,  
Distinction  between  Police  Power  and  
Eminent  Domain
• Police power must be distinguished from the power of eminent
domain. In the exercise of police power, there is a restriction of
property interest to promote public welfare or interest which involves
no compensable taking.
• When the power of eminent domain, however, is exercised, property
interest is appropriated and applied to some public purpose,
necessitating compensation therefor.
Police  Power  and  Power  of  Taxation
• Police power and the power of taxation are inherent powers of the State.
These powers are distinct and have different tests for validity. Police power
is the power of the State to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare, while
the power of taxation is the power to levy taxes to be used for public
purpose. The main purpose of police power is the regulation of a
behavior or conduct, while taxation is revenue generation. The "lawful
subjects" and "lawful means" tests are used to determine the validity of
a law enacted under the police power. The power of taxation, on the
other hand, is circumscribed by inherent and constitutional limitations.

PLANTERS  PRODUCTS,  INC.,  petitioner,  vs.  FERTIPHIL  CORPORATION,  

respondent.,  G.R.no.166006,  March  14,   2008
Coconut  Levy  
• The coconut levy funds are also deemed as an exercise of the State’s police
and taxing power. Coconut levy funds partake of the nature of taxes which,
in general, are enforced proportional contributions from persons and
properties, exacted by the State by virtue of its sovereignty for the support
of government and for all public needs. Based on this definition, a tax has
three elements, namely: a) it is an enforced proportional contribution from
persons and properties; b) it is imposed by the State by virtue of its
sovereignty; and c) it is levied for the support of the government. The
coconut levy funds fall squarely into these elements.
(REPUBLIC  OF  THE  PHILIPPINES,  represented  by  the  PRESIDENTIAL  
COMMISSION  ON  GOOD  GOVERNMENT  (PCGG),  petitioner,  vs.  COCOFED  et  
al.  and  BALLARES  et  al.,  1  EDUARDO  M.  COJUANGCO  JR.  and  the  
SANDIGANBAYAN  (First  Division)  respondents.,  G.R.no.147062-­‐64,  December  
14,   2001)
Not  absolute
• The  rule  on  taxation  as  an  implement  of  the  State’s  police  power  is  
however  not  absolute.  In  Philippine   Airlines,  Inc.  v.  Edu,  it  was  held  
that  the  imposition  of  a  vehicle  registration  fee  is  not  an  exercise  by  
the  State  of  its  police  power,  but  of  its  taxation  power.  (G.R.  No.  L-­‐
41383,  August  15,  1988,  164  SCRA  32)
Cannot  be  diminished
• Police  power  cannot  be  diminished,  let  alone  defeated  by  any  contract  for  its  
paramount  consideration  is  public  welfare  and  interest.
• The  welfare  of  the  people  is  the  supreme  law.  Thus,  no  franchise  or  right  can  be  
availed  of  to  defeat  the  proper  exercise  of  police  power  (Surigao Electric  Co.,  Inc.  
vs.  Municipality  of  Surigao,  24  SCRA  898,  Aug.  30,  1968).  The  State  has  inherent  
power  enabling  it  to  prohibit  all  things  hurtful  to  comfort,  safety,  and  welfare  of  
society  (Edu  vs.  Ericta,  35  SCRA  481,  Oct.  24,  1970).
• (Taxicabs  of  Metro  Manila,  Inc.,  et  al.  v.  Board  of  Transportation,  et  al.,  G.R.  No.  L-­‐
59234,  September  30,  1982,  202  Phil.  925;  Ynot v.  Intermediate  Appellate  Court,  
G.R.  No.  74457,  March  20,  1987;  Presidential  Commission  on  Good  Government  
v.  Pena,  G.R.  No.  L-­‐77663,  April  12,  1988;  WENCESLAO  VINZONS  TAN,  petitioner-­‐
appellant,  vs.  THE  DIRECTOR  OF  FORESTRY,  APOLONIO  RIVERA,  THE  SECRETARY  
OF  AGRICULTURE  AND  NATURAL  RESOURCES  JOSE  Y.  FELICIANO,  respondents-­‐
appellees,  RAVAGO  COMMERCIAL  CO.,  JORGE  LAO  HAPPICK  and  ATANACIO  
MALLARI,  intervenors.,  G.R.no.  L-­‐24548,  October  27,  1983)
• No  franchise  or  right  can  be  availed  of  to  defeat  the  proper  exercise  of  
police  power  — the  authority  "to  enact  rules  and  regulations  for  the  
promotion  of  the  general  welfare."  So  it  is,  that  by  the  exercise  of  the  
police  power,  which  is  a  continuing  one,  "a  business  lawful  today  may  
in  the  future,  because  of  the  changed  situation,  the  growth  of  
population  or  other  causes,  become  a  menace  to  the  public  health  
and  welfare,  and  be  required  to  yield  to  the  public  good.”
• Public  welfare,  we  have  said,  lies  at  the  bottom  of  any  regulatory  
measure  designed  "to  relieve  congestion  of  traffic,  which  is,  to  say  the  
least,  a  menace  to  public  safety."  
• A  reasonable  relation  must  exist  between  the  purposes  of  the  police  
measure  and  the  means  employed  for  its  accomplishment,  for  even  
under  the  guise  of  protecting  the  public  interest,  personal  rights  and  
those  pertaining  to  private  property  will  not  be  permitted  to  be  
arbitrarily  invaded.  Lacking  a  concurrence  of  these  two  requisites,  the  
police  measure  shall  be  struck  down  as  an  arbitrary  intrusion  into  
private  rights    — a  violation  of  the  due  process  clause.    
• CITY  OF  MANILA,  HON.  ALFREDO  S.  LIM  as  the  Mayor  of  the  City  of  
Manila  HON.  JOSELITO  L.  ATIENZA,  in  his  capacity  as  Vice-­‐Mayor  of  
the  City  of  Manila  and  Presiding  Officer  of  the  City  Council  of  Manila.  
G.R.  No.  118127.    April  12,  2005.
• In the case of PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC., for and in behalf of
139 members, represented by its President Amado P. Macasaet and
its Executive Director Ermin F. Garcia, Jr., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, respondent., the Supreme Court on the question of
compelling print media companies to donate so-­‐called “COMELEC”
space ruled against it as an invalid exercise of police power.

(G.R.  No.  119694.    May  22,  1995)

Lawful  Subject  and  Lawful  Method
• The  proper  exercise  of  the  police  power  requires  the  concurrence  of  a  
lawful  subject  and  a  lawful  method.  The  subject  of  the  challenged  
regulation  is  certainly  within  the  ambit  of  the  police  power.  
(DEPARTMENT  OF  EDUCATION,  CULTURE  AND  SPORTS  (DECS)  and  
DIRECTOR  OF  CENTER  FOR  EDUCATIONAL  MEASUREMENT,  petitioners,  
vs.  ROBERTO  REY  C.  SAN  DIEGO  and  JUDGE  TERESITA  DIZON-­‐
CAPULONG,  in  her  capacity  as  Presiding  Judge  of  the  Regional  Trial  
Court  of  Valenzuela,  Metro  Manila,  Branch  172,  respondents.,  
G.R.no.89572,  December  21,  1989)
Emergency  Laws  as  Police  Power

• Emergency  laws  are  police  power  legislations  designed  to  meet  

certain  declared  emergencies.  To  be  valid,  the  law  must  be  for  a  
limited  and  definite  period  of  time,  and  the  period  must  be  
reasonable  in  relation  to  the  nature  and  duration  of  the  crisis  it  seeks  
to  overcome  or  surmount.
• Ruben  Agpalo,  “Philippine  Constitutional  Law,”  Rex  Book  Store,  2006,  
p.  55
Subject  to  judicial  inquiry
• Police  power,  however,  is  subject  to  judicial  inquiry.  It  may  not  be  
exercised  arbitrarily  or  unreasonably  and  could  be  set  aside  if  it  is  
either  capricious,  discriminatory,  whimsical,  arbitrary,  unjust,  or  is  
tantamount  to  a  denial  of  due  process  and  equal  protection  clauses  
of  the  Constitution.
(Banco  Filipino  Savings  and  Mortgage  Bank  v.  Monetary  Board,  Central  
Bank  of  the  Philippines,  G.R.  Nos.  70054,  68878,  77255-­‐58,  78766,  
78767,  78894,  81303,  81304,  90473,  December  11,  1991,  204  SCRA  
767,  798.)
• Where  such  exercise  of  police  power  may  be  considered  as  either  
capricious,  whimsical,  unjust  or  unreasonable,  a  denial  of  due  process  
or  a  violation  of  any  other  applicable  constitutional  guaranty  may  call  
for  correction  by  the  courts.
• ERMITA-­‐MALATE  HOTEL  AND  MOTEL  OPERATORS  ASSOCIATION,  INC.,  
HOTEL  DEL  MAR,  INC.  and  GO  CHIU,  petitioners-­‐appellees,  vs.  THE  
HONORABLE  CITY  MAYOR  OF  MANILA,  respondent-­‐appellant,  VICTOR  
ALABANZA,  intervenor-­‐appellee.,  G.R.no.  L-­‐24693,  July  31,  1967
Power  of  Eminent  Domain
• Eminent domain is defined as "the power of the nation or a sovereign
state to take, or to authorize the taking of, private property for a public
use without the owner's consent, conditioned upon payment of just
compensation." It is acknowledged as "an inherent political right,
founded on a common necessity and interest of appropriating the
property of individual members of the community to the great
necessities of the whole community."

BARANGAY  SINDALAN,  SAN  FERNANDO,  PAMPANGA,  rep.  by  BARANGAY  

CAPTAIN  ISMAEL  GUTIERREZ,  petitioner,  vs.  COURT  OF  APPEALS,  JOSE  
MATOTO   III,  and  PATRICIA  SINDAYAN,  respondents.,  G.R.no.150640,  March  
22,   2007
Inseparable  from  sovereignty
• Eminent  domain  is  a  fundamental  State  power  that  is  inseparable  
from  sovereignty.  It  is  the  Government's  right  to  appropriate,  in  the  
nature  of  a  compulsory  sale  to  the  State,  private  property  for  public  
use  or  purpose.  However,  the  Government  must  pay  the  owner  
thereof  just  compensation  as  consideration  therefore.  

THE  CITY  OF  CEBU,  petitioner,  vs.  SPOUSES  APOLONIO  and  BLASA  
DEDAMO,  respondents.  G.R.  No.  142971.    May  7,  2002.
The  power  of  eminent  domain  is  lodged  in  the  legislative  branch  of  the  
government.  It  delegates  the  exercise  thereof  to  local  government  
units,  other  public  entities  and  public  utility  corporations,  subject  only  
to  Constitutional  limitations.

LOURDES  DE  LA  PAZ  MASIKIP,  petitioner,  vs.  THE  CITY  OF  PASIG,  HON.  
MARIETTA  A.  LEGASPI,  in  her  capacity  as  Presiding  Judge  of  the  
Regional  Trial  Court  of  Pasig  City,  Branch  165  and  THE  COURT  OF  
APPEALS,  respondents.,  [G.R.  No.  136349.    January  23,  2006.
Not  Limitless
• However, the power of eminent domain is not limitless. Any arm of
the State that exercises the delegated power of eminent domain must
wield that power with circumspection and utmost regard for
procedural requirements. A government instrumentality that fails to
observe the constitutional guarantees of just compensation and due
process abuses the authority delegated to it, and is liable to the
property owner for damages.
• THE  REPUBLIC  OF  THE  PHILIPPINES  REPRESENTED  BY  THE  NATIONAL  
IRRIGATION  ADMINISTRATION,  petitioner,  vs.  THE  HONORABLE  
COURT  OF  APPEALS  and  FRANCISCO  DIAZ,  IN  HIS  CAPACITY  AS  
ADMINISTRATOR  OF  THE  INTESTATE  ESTATE  OF  THE  LATE  MANUEL  
DIAZ,  respondents.,  G.R.no.147245,  March  31,  2005
Requisites
• Over  the  years  and  in  a  plethora  of  cases,  this  Court  has  recognized  
the  following  requisites  for  the  valid  exercise  of  the  power  of  eminent  
domain:  (1)  the  property  taken  must  be  private  property;  (2)  there  
must  be  genuine  necessity  to  take  the  private  property;  (3)  the  taking  
must  be  for  public  use;  (4)  there  must  be  payment  of  just  
compensation;  and  (5)  the  taking  must  comply  with  due  process  of  
law.
• FERMIN  MANAPAT,  petitioner,  vs.  COURT  OF  APPEALS  and  NATIONAL  
HOUSING  AUTHORITY,  respondents.,  G.R.no.110478,  October  15,  
2007
Two  stages
• Expropriation  proceedings  consists  of  two  stages:  
• first,  condemnation  of  the  property  after  it  is  determined  that  its  
acquisition  will  be  for  a  public  purpose  or  public  use  and
• second,  the  determination  of  just  compensation  to  be  paid  for  the  
taking  of  private  property  to  be  made  by  the  court  with  the  
assistance  of  not  more  than  three  commissioners.  
How  exercised
• The power of eminent domain is exercised by the filing of a complaint
which shall join as defendants all persons owning or claiming to own,
or occupying, any part of the expropriated land or interest therein. If
a known owner is not joined as defendant, he is entitled to intervene
in the proceeding; or if he is joined but not served with process and
the proceeding is already closed before he came to know of the
condemnation, he may maintain an independent suit for damages.
The defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the owners
of the property condemned. They include all other persons owning,
occupying or claiming to own the property.
Elements  of  Taking
• The  Supreme  Court  has   defined  the  elements  of  "taking"  as   the  main  
ingredient  in  the  exercise  of  power  of  eminent  domain,  in  the  following  
words:  "A  number  of  circumstances  must  be  present  in  the  'taking'  of  
property  for  purposes  of  eminent  domain:  (1)  the  expropriator  must  enter  
a  private  property;  (2)  the  entrance  into  private  property  must  be  for  more  
than  a   momentary  period;  (3)  the  entry  into  the  property  should  be  under  
warrant  or  color  of  legal  authority;  (4)  the  property  must  be  devoted  to  a  
public  use  or  otherwise  informally  appropriated  or  injuriously  affected;  and  
(5)  the  utilization  of  the  property  for  public  use  must  be  in  such  a  way  to  
oust  the  owner  and  deprive  him  of  all  beneficial  enjoyment  of  the  
property."  
• NATIONAL  POWER  CORPORATION,  petitioner,  vs.  COURT  OF  APPEALS  and  
MACAPANTON  MANGONDATO,   respondents.  G.R.  No.  113194.  March  11,  
1996.
Neither  acquisition  of  title  nor  destruction
• It  is  a  settled  rule  that  neither  acquisition  of  title  nor  total  destruction  of  value  is  
essential  to  taking.  It  is  usually  in  cases  where  title  remains  with  the  private  
owner  that  inquiry  should  be  made  to  determine  whether  the  impairment  of  a  
property  is  merely  regulated  or  amounts  to  a  compensable  taking.  A  regulation  
that  deprives  any  person  of  the  profitable  use  of  his  property  constitutes  a  taking  
and  entitles  him  to  compensation,  unless  the  invasion  of  rights  is  so  slight  as  to  
permit  the  regulation  to  be  justified  under  the  police  power.  Similarly,  a  police  
regulation  that  unreasonably  restricts  the  right  to  use  business  property  for  
business  purposes  amounts  to  a  taking  of  private  property,  and  the  owner  may  
recover  therefor.
• THE  OFFICE  OF  THE  SOLICITOR  GENERAL,  petitioner,  vs.  AYALA  LAND  
INCORPORATED,  ROBINSON'S  LAND  CORPORATION,  SHANGRI-­‐LA  PLAZA  
CORPORATION  and  SM  PRIME  HOLDINGS,  INC.,  respondents.,  G.R.no.  177056,  
September  18,  2009
Public  Use
• There is no precise meaning of "public use" and the term is susceptible of
myriad meanings depending on diverse situations.
• The limited meaning attached to "public use" is "use by the public" or
"public employment," that "a duty must devolve on the person or
corporation holding property appropriated by right of eminent domain to
furnish the public with the use intended, and that there must be a right on
the part of the public, or some portion of it, or some public or quasi-­‐public
agency on behalf of the public, to use the property after it is condemned."
• The term "public use" has now been held to be synonymous with "public
interest," "public benefit," "public welfare," and "public convenience."
Public  Use  =  Public  Benefit
• The  more  generally  accepted  view  sees  "public  use"  as  "public  advantage,  
convenience,  or  benefit,  and  that  anything  which  tends  to  enlarge  the  
resources,  increase  the  industrial  energies,  and  promote  the  productive  
power  of  any  considerable  number  of  the  inhabitants  of  a  section  of  the  
state,  or  which  leads  to  the  growth  of  towns  and  the  creation  of  new  
resources  for  the  employment  of  capital  and  labor,  [which]  contributes  to  
the  general   welfare  and  the  prosperity  of  the  whole  community."  In  this  
jurisdiction,  "public  use"  is  defined  as   "whatever  is  beneficially  employed  
for  the  community."  
• BARANGAY  SINDALAN,  SAN  FERNANDO,  PAMPANGA,  rep.  by  BARANGAY  
CAPTAIN  ISMAEL  GUTIERREZ,  petitioner,  vs.  COURT  OF  APPEALS,  JOSE  
MATOTO   III,  and  PATRICIA  SINDAYAN,  respondents.  G.R.  No.  150640.    
March  22,   2007.
Public  Use
• The  use  of  land  by  the  Government  for  military  and  aviation  purposes  
is  a  public  use  within  the  meaning  of  the  provisions  of  law  authorizing  
the  Government  of  the  Philippine  Islands  to  acquire  real  estate  for  
public  uses  by  the  exercise  of  the  right  of  eminent  domain.
• VISAYAN  REFINING  COMPANY,  DEAN  C.  WORCESTER,  and  FRED  A.  
LEAS,  petitioners,  vs.  HON.  MANUEL  CAMUS,  Judge  of  the  Court  of  
First  Instance  of  the  Province  of  Rizal  and  HON.  QUINTIN  PAREDES,  
Attorney-­‐General  of  the  Philippine  Islands,  respondents.  G.R.  No.  
15870.    December  3,  1919.
Just  Compensation
• Just compensation refers to the sum equivalent to the market value of the
property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open
market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition, or
the fair value of the property as between one who receives and one who
desires to sell. It is fixed at the time of the actual taking by the State. Thus,
if property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with
the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must
include interests on its just value, to be computed from the time the
property is taken up to the time when compensation is actually paid or
deposited with the court.

APO   FRUITS  CORPORATION  and  HIJO  PLANTATION,  INC.,  petitioners,  vs.  THE  
HON.  COURT  OF  APPEALS  and  LAND  BANK  OF  THE  PHILIPPINES,  respondents.  
G.R.  No.  164195.    December  4,  2009.
Just  Compensation
• The  general  rule  in  determining  "just  compensation"  in  eminent  domain  is  
the  value  of  the  property  as   of  the  date  of  the  filing  of  the  complaint.  
Normally,  the  time  of  the  taking  coincides  with  the  filing  of  the  complaint  
for  expropriation.  Hence,  many  rulings  of  this  Court  have  equated  just  
compensation  with  the  value  of  the  property  as  of  the  time  of  filing  of  the  
complaint  consistent  with  the  above  provision  of  Section  4,   Rule  67   of  the  
Revised  Rules  of  Court.  So  too,  where  the  institution  of  the  action  precedes  
entry  into  the  property,  the  just  compensation  is  to  be  ascertained  as  of  
the  time  of  the  filing  of  the  complaint.  
• NATIONAL  POWER  CORPORATION,  petitioner,  vs.  COURT  OF  APPEALS  and  
MACAPANTON  MANGONDATO,   respondents.  G.R.  No.  113194.  March  11,  
1996.]
Judicial  Function
• The  determination  of  'just  compensation  is  a  judicial  function.  Well-­‐settled  is  the  
rule  that  the  determination  of  "just  compensationn'  in  eminent  domain  cases  is  
"  in  eminent  domain  cases  is  a  judicial  function.  In  Export  Processing  Zone  
Authority  v.  Dulay,  the  Court  held  that  any  valuation  for  just  compensation  laid  
down  in  the  statutes  may  serve  only  as  guiding  principle  or  one  of  the  factors  in  
determining  just  compensation  but  it  may  not  substitute  the  court's  own  
judgment  as  to  what  amount  should  be  awarded  and  how  to  arrive  at  such  
amount.  The  executive  department  or  the  legislature  may  make  the  initial  
determinations  but  when  a  party  claims  a  violation  of  the  guarantee  in  the  Bill  of  
Rights  that  private  property  may  not  be  taken  for  public  use  without  just  
compensation,  no  statute,  decree,  or  executive  order  can  mandate  that  its  own  
determination  shall  prevail  over  the  court's  findings.  
• NATIONAL  POWER  CORPORATION,  petitioner,  vs.  PUREFOODS  CORPORATION,  
SOLID  DEVELOPMENT  CORPORATION,  J.  G.R.  No.  160725.    September  12,  2008.
Local  Government
• Local  government  units  have  no  inherent  power  of  eminent  domain  and  
can  exercise  it  only  when  expressly  authorized  by  the  legislature.  By  virtue  
of  RA  7160,  Congress  conferred  upon  local  government  units  the  power  to  
expropriate.  
SEC.  19. Eminent  Domain.  — A  local   government  unit   may,  through   its  
chief  executive  and   acting   pursuant   to  an  ordinance,   exercise  the  power   of  
eminent   domain   for  public  use,  or  purpose,   or  welfare  for  the  benefit   of  the  
poor   and   the  landless,  upon  payment  of  just  compensation,  pursuant  to  the  
provisions   of  the   Constitution  and   pertinent   laws  .  .  ..  (italics  supplied).

DIOSDADO  LAGCAO,  DOROTEO  LAGCAO  and  URSULA  LAGCAO,   petitioners,  

vs.  JUDGE  GENEROSA  G.  LABRA,  Branch  23,  Regional  Trial  Court,  Cebu,  and  
the  CITY  OF  CEBU,  respondent.  G.R.  No.  155746.    October  13,   2004.
Requisite  for  Local  Government
• Before  a  local  government  unit  may  enter  into  the  possession  of  the  
property  sought  to  be  expropriated,  it  must  (1)  file  a  complaint  for  
expropriation  sufficient  in  form  and  substance  in  the  proper  court  and  
(2)  deposit  with  the  said  court  at  least  15%  of  the  property's  fair  
market  value  based  on  its  current  tax  declaration.  The  law  does  not  
make  the  determination  of  a  public  purpose  a  condition  precedent  to  
the  issuance  of  a  writ  of  possession.
• AMOS  P.  FRANCIA,  JR.,  CECILIA  P.  FRANCIA,  AND  HEIRS  OF  BENJAMIN  
P.  FRANCIA,  petitioners,  vs.  MUNICIPALITY  OF  MEYCAUAYAN,  
respondent.  G.R.  No.  170432.    March  24,  2008.
•
Local  Government  Exercise
• It  is  clear  therefore  that  several  requisites  must  concur  before  an  LGU  can  exercise  the  
power  of  eminent  domain,  to  wit:
• 1.An  ordinance  is  enacted  by  the  local  legislative  council  authorizing  the  local  chief  
executive,  in  behalf  of  the  local  government  unit,  to  exercise  the  power  of  eminent  
domain  or  pursue  expropriation  proceedings  over  a  particular  private  property.
• 2.The  power  of  eminent  domain  is  exercised  for  public  use,  purpose  or  welfare,  or  for  the  
benefit  of  the  poor  and  the  landless.
• 3.There  is  payment  of  just  compensation,  as  required  under  Section  9,  Article  III  of  the  
Constitution,  and  other  pertinent  laws.
• 4.A  valid  and  definite  offer  has  been  previously  made  to  the  owner  of  the  property  
sought  to  be  expropriated,  but  said  offer  was  not  accepted.

Antonio  v.  Geronimo,  G.R.  No.  124779,  November  29,  2005,  476  SCRA  340,  350.
Will  a  resolution  suffice?
• The  Court  in  no  uncertain  terms  have  pronounced  that  a  local  
government  unit  cannot  authorize  an  expropriation  of  private  
property  through  a  mere  resolution  of  its  lawmaking  body.  R.A.  No.  
7160  otherwise  known  as  the  Local  Government  Code  expressly  
requires  an  ordinance  for  the  purpose  and  a  resolution  that  merely  
expresses  the  sentiment  of  the  municipal  council  will  not  suffice.  
• Municipality  of  Parañaque v.  V.M.  Realty  Corporation,  supra  at  687;  
Heirs  of  Suguitan v.  City  of  Mandaluyong,  supra;  Antonio  v.  Geronimo,  
supra  at  352.
Necessity  of  an  Offer
• A  valid  and  definite  offer  is  a  mandatory  requirement.  It  is  the  Local  
Government  Unit  who  bears  the  burden  of  proving  compliance  with  
this  mandatory  requirement.  It  is  incumbent  upon  the  condemnor to  
exhaust  all  reasonable  efforts  to  obtain  the  land  it  desires  by  
agreement.  Failure  to  prove  compliance  with  the  mandatory  
requirement  will  result  in  the  dismissal  of  the  complaint.  

Pequonnock Yacht  Club,  Inc.  v.  City  of  Bridgeport,  259  Conn.  592,  790  
A.2d  1178  (2002).
•
Necessity  of  an  Offer
• The purpose of the requirement of a valid and definite offer to be first
made to the owner is to encourage settlements and voluntary
acquisition of property needed for public purposes in order to avoid
the expense and delay of a court action. The law is designed to give to
the owner the opportunity to sell his land without the expense and
inconvenience of a protracted and expensive litigation. This is a
substantial right which should be protected in every instance.
Res  Judicata  not  a  bar
• The  Supreme  Court  has  held  that  the  principle  of  res  judicata,  which  
finds  application  in  generally  all  cases  and  proceedings,    cannot  bar  
the  right  of  the  State  or  its  agent  to  expropriate  private  property.  The  
very  nature  of  eminent  domain,  as  an  inherent  power  of  the  State,  
dictates  that  the  right  to  exercise  the  power  be  absolute  and  
unfettered  even  by  a  prior  judgment  or  res  judicata.  The  scope  of  
eminent  domain  is  plenary  and,  like  police  power,  can  "reach  every  
form  of  property  which  the  State  might  need  for  public  use."  

Bernas,  Joaquin  G.,  The  1987  Constitution  of  the  Republic  of  the  
Philippines:  A  Commentary,  1996  ed.,  p.  348.
• While  the  principle  of  res  judicata does  not  denigrate  the  right  of  the  
State  to  exercise  eminent  domain,  it  does  apply  to  specific  issues  
decided  in  a  previous  case.  
• For  example,  a  final  judgment  dismissing  an  expropriation  suit  on  the  
ground  that  there  was  no  prior  offer  precludes  another  suit  raising  
the  same  issue;  it  cannot,  however,  bar  the  State  or  its  agent  from  
thereafter  complying  with  this  requirement,  as  prescribed  by  law,  and  
subsequently  exercising  its  power  of  eminent  domain  over  the  same  
property.  
The  Power  of  Taxation
• Taxes  are  the  lifeblood  of  the  government,  for  without  taxes,  the  
government  can  neither  exist  nor  endure.  A  principal  attribute  of  
sovereignty,  the  exercise  of  taxing  power  derives  its  source  from  the  
very  existence  of  the  state  whose  social  contract  with  its  citizens  
obliges  it  to  promote  public  interest  and  common  good.  The  theory  
behind  the  exercise  of  the  power  to  tax  emanates  from  necessity;  
without  taxes,  government  cannot  fulfill  its  mandate  of  promoting  the  
general  welfare  and  well-­‐being  of  the  people.
• NATIONAL  POWER  CORPORATION,  petitioner,  vs.  CITY  OF  
CABANATUAN,  respondent.,  G.R.  no.149110,  April  9,  2003
Attribute  of  sovereignty
• Taxation  is  an  attribute  of  sovereignty.  The  power  to  tax  is  the  
strongest  of  all  the  powers  of  government.  If  approximate  equality  in  
taxation  is  to  be  attained,  all  property  subject  to  a  tax  must  respond,  
or  there  is  resultant  inequality.  To  prevent  such  a  lamentable  
situation,  the  law  ordains  that  the  claim  of  the  State  upon  the  
property  of  the  tax  debtor  shall  be  superior  to  that  of  any  other  
creditor  
Power  to  destroy
• The  power  of  taxation  is  sometimes  called  also  the  power  to  destroy.  
It  should,  therefore,  be  exercised  with  caution  to  minimize  injury  to  
the  proprietary  rights  of  a  taxpayer.  It  must  be  exercised  fairly,  equally  
and  uniformly,  lest  the  tax  collector  kill  the  "hen  that  lays  the  golden  
egg".
• ANTONIO  ROXAS,  EDUARDO  ROXAS  and  ROXAS  Y  CIA.,  in  their  own  
respective  behalfs and  as  judicial  co-­‐guardians  of  JOSE  ROXAS,  
petitioners,  vs.  COURT  OF  TAX  APPEALS  and  COMMISSIONER  OF  
INTERNAL  REVENUE,  respondents.,  G.R.  no.L-­‐25043,  April  26,  1968
Free  to  select  subjects
• It  is  inherent  in  the  power  to  tax  that  the  State  be  free  to  select  the  
subjects  of  taxation,  and  it  has  been  repeatedly  held  that  "inequalities  
which  result  from  a  singling  out  of  one  particular  class  for  taxation,  or  
exemption,  infringe  no  constitutional  limitation.
• COMMISSIONER  OF  INTERNAL  REVENUE  and  COMMISSIONER  OF  
CUSTOMS,  petitioners,  vs.  HON.  APOLINARIO  B.  SANTOS,  in  his  
capacity  as  Presiding  Judge  of  the  Regional  Trial  Court,  Branch  67,  
Pasig  City;  ANTONIO  M.  MARCO;  JEWELRY  BY  MARCO  &  CO.,  INC.,  
and  GUILD  OF  PHILIPPINE  JEWELERS,  INC.,  respondents.  G.R.  No.  
119252.    August  18,  1997.
Freedom  to  classify  
• This  power  has  aptly  been  described  as  "of  wide  range  and  flexibility."  Indeed,  it  
is  said  that  in  the  field  of  taxation,  more  than  in  other  areas,  the  legislature  
possesses  the  greatest  freedom  in  classification.  The  reason  for  this  is  that,  
classification  has  been  a  device  for  fitting  tax  programs  to  local  needs  and  usages  
in  order  to  achieve  an  equitable  distribution  of  the  tax  burden.  The  classification  
is  likewise  based  on  considerations  of  administrative  convenience.  For  it  is  now  a  
settled  principle  of  law  that  "considerations  of  practical  administrative  
convenience  and  cost  in  the  administration  of  tax  laws  afford  adequate  grounds  
for  imposing  a  tax  on  a  well  recognized  and  defined  class."
• BENJAMIN  P.  GOMEZ,  petitioner-­‐appellee,  vs.  ENRICO  PALOMAR,  in  his  capacity  
as  Postmaster  General;  HON.  BRIGIDO  R.  VALENCIA,  in  his  capacity  as  Secretary  of  
Public  Works  and  Communications  and  DOMINGO  GOPEZ,  in  his  capacity  as  
Acting  Postmaster  of  San  Fernando,  Pampanga,  respondents-­‐appellants.  ,  G.R.  
No.  L-­‐23645.    October  29,  1968.
Rights  and  Liberties
• Right  and  Liberty  to  Property

• Intellectual  Liberties

• Physical  Liberties
Intellectual  Liberties
• Section  4,  Article  III,  1987  Constitution
• No  law  shall  be  passed   abridging  the  freedom   of  speech,   of  expression,   or  the  
press,  or  the  right  of  the  people  peaceably  to  assembly  and  petition  the  
government   for  redress   of  grievances.
• Section  5,    Article  III,  1987  Constitution
• No  law  shall  be  made  respecting   an  establishment  of  religion,  or  prohibiting  the  
free  exercise  thereof.   The  free  exercise  and  enjoyment  of  religious  profession   and  
worship  without  discrimination  or  preference   shall  forever  be  allowed.  No  
religious  test  shall  be  required  for  the  exercise  of  civil  or  political  rights.
• Section  8,  Article  IIII,  1987  Constitution
• The  right  of  the  people  including  those  employed    in  the  public  and  private  
sectors,  to  form  unions,  associations   or  societies,  to  form  unions,  associations   for  
purposes   not  contrary  to  law  shall  not  be  abridged.
Religious  Freedom
• Freedom of religion has been accorded a preferred status by the
framers of our fundamental laws, past and present. We have affirmed
this preferred status well aware that it is "designed to protect the
broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to
believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as
he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others
and with the common good.”
• IGLESIA  NI  CRISTO  (INC),  petitioner,  vs.  THE   HONORABLE   COURT  OF  APPEALS,  BOARD  OF  REVIEW   FOR  
MOVING  PICTURES  AND   TELEVISION  and  HONORABLE   HENRIETTA   S.  MENDEZ,  respondents,   G.R.   no.  
119673,  July  26,  1996;  ISLAMIC  DA'WAH  COUNCIL  OF  THE  PHILIPPINES,  INC.,  herein   represented   by  
PROF.  ABDULRAFIH  H.  SAYEDY,  petitioner,  vs.  OFFICE  OF  THE   EXECUTIVE   SECRETARY   of  the   Office  of  the  
President   of  the  Philippines,  herein   represented   by  HON.  ALBERTO   G.  ROMULO,  Executive  Secretary,  
and  the  OFFICE  ON  MUSLIM   AFFAIRS,  herein   represented   by  its   Executive  Director,  HABIB   MUJAHAB  
HASHIM,  respondents,   G.R.  No.  153888.    July  9,  2003
• What  is  guaranteed  by  our  Constitution  is  religious  liberty,  not  mere  
religious  toleration.  Religious  freedom,  however,  as  a  constitutional  
mandate  is  not  inhibition  of  profound  reverence  for  religion  and  is  not  
a  denial  of  its  influence  in  human  affairs.  Religion  as  a  profession  of  
faith  to  an  active  power  that  binds  and  elevates  man  to  his  Creator  is  
recognized.  And,  in  so  far  as  it  instills  into  the  minds  the  purest  
principles  of  morality,  its  influence  is  deeply  felt  and  highly  
appreciated.
• GREGORIO  AGLIPAY,  petitioner,  vs.  JUAN  RUIZ,  respondent,  G.R.  No.  
45459.    March  13,  1937
• While  it  is  beyond  debate  that  every  citizen  has  the  undeniable  and  
inviolable  right  to  religious  freedom,  the  exercise  thereof,  and  of  all  
fundamental  rights  for  that  matter,  must  be  done  in  good  faith.  As  
Article  19  of  the  Civil  Code  admonishes:  "Every  person  must  in  the  
exercise  of  his  rights  and  in  the  performance  of  his  duties  .  .  .  observe  
honesty  and  good  faith."
• RELI  GERMAN,  RAMON  PEDROSA,  TIRSO  SANTILLAN,  JR.,  et.al.,  
petitioners,  vs.  GEN.  SANTIAGO  BARANGAN  and  MAJOR  ISABELO  
LARIOSA,  respondents,  G.R.  No.  68828.    March  27,  1985.
•
• Freedom  to  Believe

• Freedom  to  Act

• Subject  to  limitations

Benevolent  Neutrality  Accomodation
• In  the  leading  case  of  ALEJANDRO  ESTRADA,  complainant,  vs.  
SOLEDAD  S.  ESCRITOR,  the  Supreme  Court  ruled  on  the  extent  of  the  
State’s  interference  on  religious  freedom  and  the  application  of  the  
so-­‐called  “Benevolent-­‐Neutrality   Accomodation”

• A.M.  No.  P-­‐02-­‐1651.    August  4,  2003

• Benevolent neutrality recognizes the religious nature of the Filipino
people and the elevating influence of religion in society; at the same
time, it acknowledges that government must pursue its. secular goals.
In pursuing these goals, however, government might adopt laws or
actions of general applicability which inadvertently burden religious
exercise. Benevolent neutrality gives room for accommodation of
these religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. It
allows these breaches in the wall of separation to uphold religious
liberty, which after all is the integral purpose of the religion clauses.
• The case at bar involves this first type of accommodation where an
exemption is sought from a law of general applicability that inadvertently
burdens religious exercise. Although our constitutional history and
interpretation mandate benevolent neutrality, benevolent neutrality does
not mean that the Court ought to grant exemptions every time a free
exercise claim comes before it. But it does mean that the Court will not
look with hostility or act indifferently towards religious beliefs and
practices and that it will strive to accommodate them when it can within
flexible constitutional limits; it does mean that the Court will not simply
dismiss a claim under the Free Exercise Clause because the conduct in
question offends a law or the orthodox view for this precisely is the
protection afforded by the religion clauses of the Constitution, i.e., that in
the absence of legislation granting exemption from a law of general
applicability, the Court can carve out an exception when the religion
clauses justify it.
• We here lay down the doctrine that in Philippine jurisdiction, we adopt the
benevolent neutrality approach not only because of its merits as discussed
above, but more importantly, because our constitutional history and
interpretation indubitably show that benevolent neutrality is the launching
pad from which the Court should take off in interpreting religion clause
cases. The ideal towards which this approach is directed is the protection
of religious liberty "not only for a minority, however small — not only for a
majority, however large — but for each of us" to the greatest extent
possible within flexible constitutional limits. Benevolent neutrality is
manifest not only in the Constitution but has also been recognized in
Philippine jurisprudence, albeit not expressly called "benevolent neutrality"
or "accommodation".
Compelling  State  Interest
• We cannot therefore simply take a passing look at respondent's claim
of religious freedom, but must instead apply the "compelling state
interest" test. The government must be heard on the issue as it has
not been given an opportunity to discharge its burden of
demonstrating the state's compelling interest which can override
respondent's religious belief and practice. To repeat, this is a case of
first impression where we are applying the "compelling state interest"
test in a case involving purely religious conduct. The careful
application of the test is indispensable as how we will decide the case
will make a decisive difference in the life of the respondent who
stands not only before the Court but before her Jehovah God.
Free  Speech  and  Free  Press
• Restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either or
a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine
which permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been
established between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated;
(b) the balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to
balance conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a
conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests
observable in a given situation of type of situation; and (c) the clear and
present danger rule which rests on the premise that speech may be
restrained because there is substantial danger that the speech will likely
lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule requires
that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive,
"extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high."
• As articulated in our jurisprudence, we have applied either
the dangerous tendency doctrine or clear and present
danger test to resolve free speech challenges. More recently,
we have generally adhered to the clear and present danger
test.
• Philippine jurisprudence, even as early as the period
under the 1935 Constitution, has recognized four
aspects of freedom of the press. These are (1)
freedom from prior restraint; (2) freedom from
punishment subsequent to publication (3) freedom of
access to information; and (4) freedom of circulation.
• Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press
or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or
dissemination.

• Freedom from prior restraint is largely freedom from government

censorship of publications, whatever the form of censorship, and
regardless of whether it is wielded by the executive, legislative or
judicial branch of the government.
• Thus, it precludes governmental acts that required approval of a
proposal to publish; licensing or permits as prerequisites to
publication including the payment of license taxes for the privilege to
publish; and even injunctions against publication. Even the closure of
the business and printing offices of certain newspapers, resulting in
the discontinuation of their printing and publication, are deemed as
previous restraint or censorship. Any law or official that requires
some form of permission to be had before publication can be made,
commits an infringement of the constitutional right, and remedy can
be had at the courts.
• it is not enough to determine whether the challenged act constitutes
some form of restraint on freedom of speech. A distinction has to be
made whether the restraint is (1) a content-­‐neutral regulation, i.e.,
merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that
merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well defined
standards; or (2) a content-­‐based restraint or censorship, i.e., the
restriction is based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech.
The cast of the restriction determines the test by which the
challenged act is assayed with.
• When the prior restraint partakes of a content-­‐neutral
regulation, it is subjected to an intermediate review. A
content-­‐based regulation, however, bears a heavy
presumption of invalidity and is measured against the clear
and present danger rule. The latter will pass constitutional
muster only if justified by a compelling reason, and the
restrictions imposed are neither overbroad nor vague.
Freedom  of  Expression
• The  right  to  free  expression  has  two  aspects  (1)  freedom  from  
previous  restraint  or  censorship  and  (2)  freedom  from  subsequent  
punishment.    The  first  aspect  is  embodied  in  Section  4  of  Article  III  of  
the  1987  Philippine  Constitution,  which  states:
•
• “No  law  shall  be  passed  abridging  the  freedom  of  speech,  of  
expression,  or  of  the  press,  or  the  right  of  the  people  to  peaceably  
assemble  and  petition  the  Government  for  redress  of  grievances.”  
• The  second  aspect  is  contained  in  Section  18  of  the  same  Article,  
which  reads  as  follows:
•
• “No  person  shall  be  detained  solely  by  reason  of  his  political  beliefs  
and  aspirations.”
• Freedom of expression, traditionally understood, includes
several other rights involved in effective communications like
the freedoms of speech, of the press, of assembly, of
petition, of religion, of association and of access to public
information. It even encompasses the right to be silent, the
right to listen and the right not to listen.
Five  cognate  rights
• The  constitutional  provisions  enumerates  5  cognate  rights,  
namely:
• ·∙  Freedom  of  Speech;
• ·∙  Freedom  of  Expression;
• ·∙  Freedom  of  the  Press;
• ·∙  Right  of  peaceful  assembly;  and
• ·∙  Right  to  Petition.
Tests
• There  are  different  tests  employed  in  resolving  any  challenge  to  laws  
restricting  freedom  of  expression.  These  tests  include  the  following:
• Dangerous  Tendency  Rule
• Clear  and  Present  Danger  Rule
• Balancing  of  Interests
Clear  and  Present  Danger
• Clear  and  present  danger  rule  by  saying  that  the  issue  to  be  resolved  
is  “whether  the  words  used  are  used  in  such  circumstances  and  are  of  
such  a  nature  as  to  create  a  clear  and  present  danger  that  they  will  
bring  about  the  substantive  evils  that  the  State  has  a  right  to  
prevent.”  
• Under  this  test,  any  act  that  restrains  speech  or  other  forms  of  
expression  should  be  greeted  with  furrowed  brows.    The  Supreme  
Court  has  invariably  ruled  in  favor  of  freedom  of  expression,  and  any  
restriction  is  treated  as  an  exception.  The  power  to  exercise  prior  
restraint  is  not  to  be  presumed;  rather,  the  presumption  is  against  the  
validity  of  prior  censorship.  
Dangerous  Tendency  Rule
• If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the State has
a right to prevent, then such words are punishable.
• It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force,
violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts
be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language
used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force,
violence or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and
probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive
evil, which the legislative body seeks to prevent.”
• The present Supreme Court adheres to the more liberal “clear and
present danger rule.” In passing upon the legality of exit polls, the
Court said that they created no obvious or imminent risk to society
that could not be prevented by assiduous and circumspect
governance.
Balancing  of  Interests
• Rests  on  the  theory  that  it  is  the  court’s  function  in  a  case  before  it  when  it  
finds  public  interests  served  by  legislation,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  free  
expression  clause  affected  by  it,  on  the  other,  to  balance  one  against  the  
other  and  arrive  at  a  judgment  where  the  greater  weight  shall  be  
placed. If,  on  balance,   it  appears  that  the  public  interest  served  by  
restrictive  legislation  is  of  such  nature  that  it  outweighs  the  abridgment  of  
freedom,  then  the  court  will  find  the  legislation  valid. In  short,  the  
balance-­‐of-­‐interests  theory  rests  on  the  basis  that  constitutional  freedoms  
are  not  absolute,  not  even  those  stated  in  the  free  speech  and  expression  
clause,   and  that  they  may  be  abridged  to  some  extent  to  serve  appropriate  
and  important  interests. To  the  mind  of  the  Court,  the  balancing  of  interest  
doctrine  is  the  more  appropriate  test  to  follow.
• Eliseo  Soriano  vs.  Ma.  Consoliza Laguardia,   G.R.  No.  164785,    April  29,   2009
Freedom  of  Assembly  and  Petition
• There  is  no  question  as  to  the  people’s  rights  to  peaceful  assembly  to  
petition  the  government  for  a  redress  of  grievances  and,  for  that  
matter,  to  organize  or  form  associations  for  purposes  not  contrary  to  
law,  as  well  as  to  engage  in  peaceful  concerted  activities.  These  rights  
are  guaranteed  by  no  less  than  the  Constitution,  particularly  Sections  
4  and  8  of  the  Bill  of  Rights,  Section  2(5)  of  Article  IX,  and  Section  3  of  
Article  XIII.  Jurisprudence  abounds  with  hallowed  pronouncements  
defending  and  promoting  the  people’s  exercise  of  these  rights.
Not  absolute
• The  right  to  freedom  of  speech,  and  to  peacefully  assemble  and  
petition  the  government  for  redress  of  grievances,  are  fundamental  
personal  rights  of  the  people  recognized  and  guaranteed  by  the  
constitutions  of  democratic  countries.  But  it  is  a  settled  principle  
growing  out  of  the  nature  of  well-­‐ordered  civil  societies  that  the  
exercise  of  those  rights  is  not  absolute  for  it  may  be  so  regulated  that  
it  shall  not  be  injurious  to  the  equal  enjoyment  of  others  having  equal  
rights,  nor  injurious  to  the  rights  of  the  community  or  society
Freedom  of  Association
• The right of individuals to form an association as guaranteed by the
fundamental law includes the freedom to associate or refrain from
association. No man is compelled by law to become a member of a
political party; or after having become such, to remain a member. He
may join such a party for whatever reason seems good to him, and
may quit the party for any cause, good, bad, or indifferent, or without
cause. The decision of a candidate on whether to run as an
independent candidate or to join a political party, group or
aggrupation is left entirely to his discretion.
• EMMANUEL  SINACA,  petitioner,  vs.  MIGUEL  MULA  and  COMMISSION  
ON  ELECTIONS,  respondents,  G.R.  No.  135691. September  27,  1999
Physical  Liberty
• 1987  Philippine  Constitution,  Article  IV
• Section  2.  The  right  of  the  people  to  be  secure   in  their  persons,   houses,   papers,  
and  effects  against  unreasonable   searches   and  seizures  of  whatever  nature   and  
for  any  purpose   shall  be  inviolable,  and  no  search  warrant  or  warrant  of  arrest  
shall  issue  except  upon  probable  cause  to  be  determined  personally  by  the  judge  
after  examination  under  oath  or  affirmation  of  the  complainant  and  the  
witnesses   he  may  produce,   and  particularly  describing  the  place  to  be  searched  
and  the  persons   or  things  to  be  seized.  
• Section  3.  (1)  The  privacy  of  communication  and  correspondence   shall  be  
inviolable  except  upon  lawful  order  of  the  court,  or  when  public  safety  or  order  
requires   otherwise,  as  prescribed   by  law.  
• Any  evidence  obtained  in  violation  of  this  or  the  preceding  section  shall  be  
inadmissible  for  any  purpose   in  any  proceeding.  
• Section  6.  The  liberty  of  abode  and  of  changing  the  same  within  the  
limits  prescribed  by  law  shall  not  be  impaired  except  upon  lawful  
order  of  the  court.  Neither  shall  the  right  to  travel  be  impaired  except  
in  the  interest  of  national   security,  public  safety,  or  public  health,  as  
may  be  provided  by  law.
• Section  11.  Free  access  to  the  courts  and  quasi-­‐judicial  bodies  and  
adequate  legal  assistance  shall  not  be  denied  to  any  person  by  reason  
of  poverty.  
• Section  12.  (1)  Any  person  under  investigation  for  the  commission  of  an  offense  shall  have  the  
right  to  be  informed  of  his  right  to  remain  silent  and  to  have  competent  and  independent  counsel  
preferably  of  his  own  choice.  If  the  person  cannot  afford  the  services  of  counsel,  he  must  be  
provided  with  one.  These  rights  cannot  be  waived  except  in  writing  and  in  the  presence  of  counsel.  
• (2)  No  torture,  force,  violence,  threat,  intimidation,  or  any  other  means  which  vitiate  the  free  will  
shall  be  used  against  him.  Secret  detention  places,  solitary,  incommunicado,  or  other  similar  forms  
of  detention  are  prohibited.  
• (3)  Any  confession  or  admission  obtained  in  violation  of  this  or  Section  17  hereof  shall  be  
inadmissible  in  evidence  against  him.  
• (4)  The  law  shall  provide  for  penal  and  civil  sanctions  for  violations  of  this  section  as  well  as  
compensation  to  the  rehabilitation  of  victims  of  torture  or  similar  practices,  and  their  families.  
• Section  13.  All  persons,  except  those  charged  with  offenses  punishable  by  reclusion  perpetua when  
evidence  of  guilt  is  strong,  shall,  before  conviction,  be  bailable by  sufficient  sureties,  or  be  released  
on  recognizance  as  may  be  provided  by  law.  The  right  to  bail  shall  not  be  impaired  even  when  the  
privilege  of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  is  suspended.  Excessive  bail  shall  not  be  required.  
• Section  14.  (1)  No  person  shall  be  held  to  answer  for  a  criminal  offense  without  due  
process  of  law.  
• (2)  In  all  criminal  prosecutions,  the  accused  shall  be  presumed  innocent  until  the  contrary  
is  proved,  and  shall  enjoy  the  right  to  be  heard  by  himself  and  counsel,  to  be  informed  of  
the  nature  and  cause  of  the  accusation  against  him,  to  have  a  speedy,  impartial,  and  
public  trial,  to  meet  the  witnesses  face  to  face,  and  to  have  compulsory  process  to  secure  
the  attendance  of  witnesses  and  the  production  of  evidence  in  his  behalf.  However,  after  
arraignment,  trial  may  proceed  notwithstanding  the  absence  of  the  accused:  Provided,  
that  he  has  been  duly  notified  and  his  failure  to  appear  is  unjustifiable.  
• Section  15.  The  privilege  of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  shall  not  be  suspended  except  in  
cases  of  invasion  or  rebellion,  when  the  public  safety  requires  it.  
• Section  16.  All  persons  shall  have  the  right  to  a  speedy  disposition  of  their  cases  before  all  
judicial,  quasi-­‐judicial,  or  administrative  bodies.  
• Section  17.  No  person  shall  be  compelled  to  be  a  witness  against  himself.  
• Section  18.  (1)  No  person   shall  be  detained  solely  by  reason   of  his  political  beliefs  
and  aspirations.  
• (2)  No  involuntary  servitude   in  any  form  shall  exist  except  as  a  punishment  for  a  
crime  whereof   the  party  shall  have  been  duly  convicted.  
• Section  19.  (1)  Excessive  fines  shall  not  be  imposed,  nor  cruel,  degrading   or  
inhuman  punishment  inflicted.  Neither  shall  death  penalty  be  imposed,  unless,  for  
compelling  reasons   involving  heinous  crimes,  the  Congress  hereafter   provides  for  
it.  Any  death  penalty  already  imposed  shall  be  reduced   to  reclusion  perpetua.  
• (2)  The  employment  of  physical,  psychological,  or  degrading   punishment  against  
any  prisoner   or  detainee  or  the  use  of  substandard   or  inadequate   penal  facilities  
under  subhuman   conditions  shall  be  dealt  with  by  law.  
• Section  21.  No  person   shall  be  twice  put  in  jeopardy  of  punishment   for  the  same  
offense.   If  an  act  is  punished  by  a  law  and  an  ordinance,  conviction  or  acquittal  
under  either  shall  constitute  a  bar  to  another   prosecution   for  the  same  act.
Rights  and  Freedoms
• Writ  of  Habeas  Corpus
• Freedom  of    Persons,  Home  and  Possessions  Including  
Communication  Except  when  Reasonable  Search  and  Seizure  is  
conducted
• Rights  of  an  Accused
• Right  to  Bail
• Right  against  self-­‐incrimnation
• Right  against  Double  Jeopardy
• Freedom  of  Movment
Writ  of  Habeas  Corpus
• In  general,  the  purpose  of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  is  to  determine  whether  or  
not  a  particular  person  is  legally  held.  A  prime  specification  of  an  application  for  a  
writ  of  habeas  corpus,  in  fact,  is  an  actual  and  effective,  and  not  merely  nominal  
or  moral,  illegal  restraint  of  liberty.  "The  writ  of  habeas  corpus  was  devised  and  
exists  as  a  speedy  and  effectual  remedy  to  relieve  persons  from  unlawful  
restraint,  and  as  the  best  and  only  sufficient  defense  of  personal  freedom.  A  
prime  specification  of  an  application  for  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus  is  restraint  of  
liberty.  The  essential  object  and  purpose  of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  is  to  inquire  
into  all  manner  of  involuntary  restraint  as  distinguished  from  voluntary,  and  to  
relieve  a  person  therefrom  if  such  restraint  is  illegal.  Any  restraint  which  will  
preclude  freedom  of  action  is  sufficient.”
• JOHANNA  SOMBONG,  petitioner,  vs.  COURT  OF  APPEALS  and  MARIETTA  NERI  
ALVIAR,  LILIBETH  NERI  and  all  persons  holding  the  subject  child  ARABELA  
SOMBONG  in  their  custody,  respondents.  G.R.  No.  111876.  January  31,  1996.
• A  petition  for  the  issuance  of  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus  is  a  special  proceeding  
governed  by  Rule  102  of  the  Rules  of  Court,  as  amended.  In  Ex  Parte  Billings,  it  
was  held  that  habeas  corpus  is  that  of  a  civil  proceeding  in  character.  It  seeks  the  
enforcement  of  civil  rights.  Resorting  to  the  writ  is  not  to  inquire  into  the  criminal  
act  of  which  the  complaint  is  made,  but  into  the  right  of  liberty,  notwithstanding  
the  act  and  the  immediate  purpose  to  be  served  is  relief  from  illegal  restraint.  
The  rule  applies  even  when  instituted  to  arrest  a  criminal  prosecution  and  secure  
freedom.  When  a  prisoner  petitions  for  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus,  he  thereby  
commences  a  suit  and  prosecutes  a  case  in  that  court.
• GLENN  CABALLES  y  CHUA,  petitioner,  vs.  COURT  OF  APPEALS,  HON.  EMMANUEL  
D.  LAUREA,  HON.  BENJAMIN  T.  ANTONIO,  and  PEOPLE  OF  THE  PHILIPPINES,  
respondents.,  G.R.  No.  163108.    February  23,  2005
•
•
• Habeas  corpus  is  a  summary  remedy.  It  is  analogous  to  a  proceeding  
in  rem  when  instituted  for  the  sole  purpose  of  having  the  person  of  
restraint  presented  before  the  judge  in  order  that  the  cause  of  his  
detention  may  be  inquired  into  and  his  statements  final.  The  writ  of  
habeas  corpus  does  not  act  upon  the  prisoner  who  seeks  relief,  but  
upon  the  person  who  holds  him  in  what  is  alleged  to  be  the  unlawful  
authority.  Hence,  the  only  parties  before  the  court  are  the  petitioner  
(prisoner)  and  the  person  holding  the  petitioner  in  custody,  and  the  
only  question  to  be  resolved  is  whether  the  custodian  has  authority  
to  deprive  the  petitioner  of  his  liberty.  
• In  passing  upon  a  petition  for  habeas  corpus,  a  court  or  judge  must  
first  inquire  into  whether  the  petitioner  is  being  restrained  of  his  
liberty.  If  he  is  not,  the  writ  will  be  refused.  Inquiry  into  the  cause  of  
detention  will  proceed  only  where  such  restraint  exists.  If  the  alleged  
cause  is  thereafter  found  to  be  unlawful,  then  the  writ  should  be  
granted  and  the  petitioner  discharged.  Needless  to  state,  if  otherwise,  
again  the  writ  will  be  refused.  
• NURHIDA  JUHURI  AMPATUAN,  petitioner,  vs.  JUDGE  VIRGILIO  V.  
MACARAIG,  REGIONAL  TRIAL  COURT,  MANILA,  BRANCH  37,  DIRECTOR  
GENERAL  AVELINO  RAZON,  JR.,  DIRECTOR  GEARY  BARIAS,  PSSUPT.  CO  
YEE  M.  CO,  JR.  and  POLICE  CHIEF  INSPECTOR  AGAPITO  QUIMSON,  
respondents,  G.R.  No.  182497.    June  29,  2010.
• Section  4,  Rule  102  of  the  Rules  of  Court,  as  amended,  provides  that  
the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  is  not  allowed  if  the  person  alleged  to  be  
restrained  of  his  liberty  is  in  the  custody  of  an  officer  under  process  
issued  by  a  court  or  judge  or  by  virtue  of  a  judgment  or  order  of  a  
court  of  record.  
Freedom  of    Persons,  Home  and  Possessions  Including  
Communication  Except  when  Reasonable  Search  and  Seizure  is  
conducted

• Enshrined  in  the  Constitution  is  the  inviolable  right  to  privacy  of  home  
and  person.  It  explicitly  ordains  that  people  have  the  right  to  be  
secure  in  their  persons,  houses,  papers,  and  effects  against  
unreasonable  searches  and  seizures  of  whatever  nature  and  for  any  
purpose.  Inseparable,  and  not  merely  corollary  or  incidental  to  said  
right  and  equally  hallowed  in  and  by  the  Constitution,  is  the  
exclusionary  principle  which  decrees  that  any  evidence  obtained  in  
violation  of  said  right  is  inadmissible  for  any  purpose  in  any  
proceeding.  
• Verily, the rule is, the Constitution bars State intrusions to a person's
body, personal effects or residence except if conducted by virtue of a
valid search warrant issued in compliance with the procedure
outlined in the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court;
"otherwise such search and seizure become 'unreasonable' within the
meaning of the aforementioned constitutional provision."
• Such  warrantless  searches  and  seizures  have  long  been  deemed  permissible  by  
jurisprudence  in  instances  of  (1)  search  of  moving  vehicles,  (2)  seizure  in  plain  
view,  (3)  customs  searches,  (4)  waiver  or  consent  searches,  (5)  stop  and  frisk  
situations  (Terry  search),  and  (6)  search  incidental  to  a  lawful  arrest.  The  last  
includes  a  valid  warrantless  search  and  seizure  pursuant  to  an  equally  valid  
warrantless  arrest,  for,  while  as  a  rule,  an  arrest  is  considered  legitimate  if  
effected  with  a  valid  warrant  of  arrest,  the  Rules  of  Court  recognize  permissible  
warrantless  arrests,  to  wit:  (1)  arrest  in  flagrante  delicto,  (2)  arrests  effected  in  
hot  pursuit,  and  (3)  arrests  of  escaped  prisoners.

• PEOPLE  OF  THE  PHILIPPINES,  plaintiff-­‐appellee,  vs.  CHUA  HO  SAN  @  TSAY  HO  
SAN,  accused-­‐appellant,  G.R.  No.  128222.    June  17,  1999
•
• In  cases  of  in  flagrante  delicto  arrests,  a  peace  officer  or  a  private  
person  may  without  a  warrant,  arrest  a  person,  when,  in  his  presence,  
the  person  to  be  arrested  has  committed,  is  actually  committing,  or  is  
attempting  to  commit  an  offense.  The  arresting  officer,  therefore,  
must  have  personal  knowledge  of  such  fact  or  as  recent  case  law  
adverts  to  personal  knowledge  of  facts  or  circumstances  convincingly  
indicative  or  constitutive  of  probable  cause.  The  term  probable  cause  
had  been  understood  to  mean  a  reasonable  ground  of  suspicion  
supported  by  circumstances  sufficiently  strong  in  themselves  to  
warrant  a  cautious  man's  belief  that  the  person  accused  is  guilty  of  
the  offense  with  which  he  is  charged.  
• with  respect  to  arrests,  it  is  such  facts  and  circumstances  which  would  
lead  a  reasonably  discreet  and  prudent  man  to  believe  that  an  
offense  has  been  committed  by  the  person  sought  to  be  arrested.  (1  
BERNAS  87)  As  applied  to  searches,  probable  cause  refers  to  the  
existence  of  facts  and  circumstances  which  could  lead  a  reasonably  
discreet  and  prudent  man  to  believe  that  an  offense  has  been  
committed  and  that  the  items,  articles  or  objects  sought  in  
connection  with  said  offense  or  subject  to  seizure  and  destruction  by  
law  is  in  the  place  to  be  searched  
• The  Constitution  lays  down  the  general  rule  that  a  search  and  seizure  
must  be  carried  on  the  strength  of  a  judicial  warrant.  Otherwise,  the  
search  and  seizure  is  deemed  "unreasonable."  Evidence  procured  on  
the  occasion  of  an  unreasonable  search  and  seizure  is  deemed  
tainted  for  being  the  proverbial  fruit  of  a  poisonous  tree  and  should  
be  excluded.  Such  evidence  shall  be  inadmissible  in  evidence  for  any  
purpose  in  any  proceeding  
Rights  of  an  Accused
• The  rights  of  the  accused  during  custodial  investigation  are  enshrined  
in  Article  III,  Section  12  (1)  of  the  1987  Constitution  which  provides  
that:  "Sec.  12.  (1)  Any  person  under  investigation  for  the  commission  
of  an  offense  shall  have  the  right  to  be  informed  of  his  right  to  remain  
silent  and  to  have  competent  and  independent  counsel  preferably  of  
his  own  choice.  If  the  person  cannot  afford  the  services  of  counsel,  he  
must  be  provided  with  one.  These  rights  cannot  be  waived  except  in  
writing  and  in  the  presence  of  counsel."  
• The  rights  to  remain  silent  and  to  counsel  may  be  waived  by  the  accused  
provided  that  the  constitutional  requirements  are  complied  with.  It  must  appear  
clear  that  the  accused  was  initially  accorded  his  right  to  be  informed  of  his  right  
to  remain  silent  and  to  have  a  competent  and  independent  counsel  preferably  of  
his  own  choice.  In  addition,  the  waiver  must  be  in  writing  and  in  the  presence  of  
counsel.  If  the  waiver  complies  with  the  constitutional  requirements,  then  the  
extrajudicial  confession  will  be  tested  for  voluntariness,  i.e.,  if  it  was  given  freely  
— without  coercion,  intimidation,  inducement,  or  false  promises;  and  credibility,  
i.e.,  if  it  was  consistent  with  the  normal  experience  of  mankind.  PEOPLE  OF  THE  
PHILIPPINES,  plaintiff-­‐appellee,  vs.  DONATO  B.  CONTINENTE  and  JUANITO  T.  
ITAAS,  JOHN  DOE,  PETER  DOE,  JAMES  DOE,  PAUL  DOE  and  SEVERAL  OTHER  DOES  
(at  large),  accused,  DONATO  B.  CONTINENTE  and  JUANITO  T.  ITAAS,  accused-­‐
appellants,  G.R.  Nos.  100801-­‐02.    August  25,  2000
•
•
• Sec.  12   (1)  Art.  III  of  the  Constitution  may  be  invoked  only  during  a  
custodial  investigation:  "The  criminal  process  includes  the  investigation  
prior  to  the  filing  of  charges,  the  preliminary  examination  and  investigation  
after  charges  are  filed,  and  the  period  of  trial.  The  Miranda  rights  or  the  
Section  12  (1)  rights  were  conceived  for  the  first  of  these  three  phases,  that  
is,   when  the  enquiry  is  under  the  control  of  police  officers.  It  is  in  this  
situation  that  the  psychological  if  not  physical  atmosphere  of  custodial  
investigations,  in  the  absence  of  proper  safeguards,   is  inherently  coercive.  
Outside  of  this  situation,  Section  12  (1)  no  longer  applies."      
• PEOPLE  OF  THE  PHILIPPINES,  appellee,  vs.  SILVENO  ESTADO  y  AMISTOSO  
JR.,  a.k.a.  "NONO,"  appellant,  G.R.  No.  150867.    February  5,  2004
• The  right  to  be  informed  requires  "the  transmission  of  meaningful  
information  rather  than  just  the  ceremonial  and  perfunctory  
recitation  of  an  abstract  constitutional  principle."  It  should  allow  the  
suspect  to  consider  the  effects  and  consequences  of  any  waiver  he  
might  make  of  these  rights.
• PEOPLE  OF  THE  PHILIPPINES,  appellee,  vs.  BENJAMIN  SAYABOC  y  
SEGUBA,  PATRICIO  ESCORPISO  y  VALDEZ,  MARLON  BUENVIAJE  y  
PINEDA,  and  MIGUEL  BUENVIAJE  y  FLORES,  appellants,  G.R.  No.  
147201.    January  15,  2004.
• Any  information  or  admission  given  by  a  person  while  in  custody  
which  may  appear  harmless  or  innocuous  at  the  time  without  the  
competent  assistance  of  an  independent  counsel  must  be  struck  
down  as  inadmissible.  Even  if  the  confession  contains  a  grain  of  truth  
or  even  if  it  had  been  voluntarily  given,  if  it  was  made  without  the  
assistance  of  counsel,  it  is  inadmissible.
• PEOPLE  OF  THE  PHILIPPINES,  appellee,  vs.  REY  SUNGA,  RAMIL  
LANSANG,  INOCENCIO  PASCUA,  LITO  OCTAC  and  LOCIL  CUI  @  
GINALYN  CUYOS,  accused,  G.R.  No.  126029.    March  27,  2003
• The  interdiction  against  warrantless  searches  and  seizures  is  not  
absolute.  The  recognized  exceptions  established  by  jurisprudence  are  
(1)  search  of  moving  vehicles;  (2)  seizure  in  plain  view;  (3)  customs  
searches;  (4)  waiver  or  consented  searches;  (5)  stop  and  frisk  
situations  (Terry  search);  and  (6)  search  incidental  to  a  lawful  arrest.
• The  Terry  search  or  the  "stop  and  frisk"  situation  refers  to  a  case  
where  a  police  officer  approaches  a  person  who  is  acting  suspiciously,  
for  purposes  of  investigating  possibly  criminal  behavior  in  line  with  
the  general  interest  of  effective  crime  prevention  and  detection.  To  
assure  himself  that  the  person  with  whom  he  is  dealing  is  not  armed  
with  a  weapon  that  could  unexpectedly  and  fatally  be  used  against  
him,  he  could  validly  conduct  a  carefully  limited  search  of  the  outer  
clothing  of  such  person  to  discover  weapons  which  might  be  used  to  
assault  him.
• A  custodial  investigation  is  understood  to  mean  as  "any  questioning  
initiated  by  law  enforcement  authorities  after  a  person  is  taken  into  
custody  or  otherwise  deprived  of  his  freedom  of  action  in  any  
significant  manner."  It  begins  when  there  is  no  longer  a  general  
inquiry  into  an  unsolved  crime  but  starts  to  focus  on  a  particular  
person  as  a  suspect,  i.e.,  when  the  police  investigator  starts  
interrogating  or  exacting  a  confession  from  the  suspect  in  connection  
with  an  alleged  offense.  A  person  under  custodial  investigation  is  
guaranteed  certain  rights,  which  attach  upon  the  commencement  
thereof.  
• Jurisprudence  provides  that  extrajudicial  confessions  are  presumed  to  be  
voluntary.  The  condition  for  this  presumption,  however,  is  that  the  
prosecution  is  able  to  show  that  the  constitutional  requirements  
safeguarding  an  accused's  rights  during  custodial  investigation  have  been  
strictly  complied  with,  especially  when  the  extrajudicial  confession  has  
been  denounced.  The  rationale  for  this  requirement  is  to  allay  any  fear  that  
the  person  being  investigated  would  succumb  to  coercion  while  in  the  
unfamiliar  or  intimidating  environment  that  is  inherent  in  custodial  
investigations.  Therefore,  even  if  the  confession  may  appear  to  have  been  
given  voluntarily  since  the  confessant  did  not  file  charges  against  his  
alleged  intimidators  for  maltreatment,  the  failure  to  properly  inform  a  
suspect  of  his  rights  during  a  custodial  investigation  renders  the  confession  
valueless  and  inadmissible.      
• The  right  to  a  competent  and  independent  counsel  means  that  the  
counsel  should  satisfy  himself,  during  the  conduct  of  the  
investigation,  that  the  suspect  understands  the  import  and  
consequences  of  answering  the  questions  propounded.
• Ibid
Right  to  Bail
• Section  13,  Article  III  of  the  Constitution  provides  that  the  right  to  bail  
shall  not  be  impaired,  thus:
• Sec.  13. All  persons,  except  those  charged  with  offenses  punishable  
by  reclusion  perpetua when  evidence  of  guilt  is  strong,  shall,  before  
conviction,  be  bailable by  sufficient  sureties,  or  be  released  on  
recognizance  as  may  be  provided  by  law.  The  right  to  bail  shall  not  be  
impaired  even  when  the  privilege  of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  is  
suspended.  Excessive  bail  shall  not  be  required.
• The  decision  of  the  SC  in  Government  of  the  USA  v.  Judge  Purganan
which  says  that  “no  bail  rule  applies  in  extradition  since  bail  is  
available  only  to  one  who  had  arrested  and  detained  for  violation  of  
Philippine  criminal  laws”  was  re-­‐examined  and,  after  re-­‐examination,  
the  rule  now  is  that  an  extraditee may  be  allowed  to  post  bail  during  
the  pendency  of  an  extradition  proceeding.  However,  for  him  to  be  
allowed  to  post  bail,  still  he  must  prove  that  (1)  once  granted  bail  he  
will  not  be  a  flight  risk  or  a  danger  to  the  community;  and  (2)  that  
there  exists  special,  humanitarian  and  compelling  circumstances  that  
will  justify  the  grant  of  bail  to  him,  by  a  clear  and  convincing  
evidence.  
Enrile vs.  Sandiganbayan (2015)
• In  this  case,  former  Senator  Enrile was  shown  not  to  be  a  flight  risk  or  
a  danger  to  the  community  (his  voluntary  surrender  to  the  authorities  
and  his  record  of  respect  for  court  processes  in  earlier  cases),  and  
that  there  exist  special,  humanitarian  and  compelling  circumstances  
(his  advanced  age,  fragile  state  of  health  and  medical  predicament  
that  will  require  the  services  of  doctors  of  his  choice)  that  will  justify  
the  grant  of  bail  to  him.  After  all,  the  main  purpose  of  bail  is  to  assure  
the  presence  of  an  accused  during  the  trial  of  the  case  as  required  by  
the  cour
• Bail  for  the  provisional  liberty  to  the  accused,  regardless  of  the  crime  
charged,  should  be  allowed  independently  of  the  merits  of  the  
charge,  provided  his  continued  incarceration  is  clearly  shown  to  be  
injurious  to  his  health  or  to  endanger  his  life.  Indeed,  denying  him  bail  
despite  imperiling  hid  health  and  life  would  not  serve  the  true  
objective  of  preventive  incarceration  during  the  trial.  
• “Granting  bail  to  Enrile on  the  foregoing  reasons  is  not  
unprecedented.  
Right  against  self-­‐incrimination
• The taking of pictures of an accused even without the assistance of
counsel, being a purely mechanical act, is not a violation of his
constitutional right against self-­‐incrimination. The constitutional right
of an accused against self-­‐incrimination proscribes the use of physical
or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and
not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material.
Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the
accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and
guiding hand of counsel is not required. The essence of the right
against self-­‐incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving
of evidence against himself through a testimonial act.
• In  Pascual v.  Board  of  Medical  Examiners  (28  SCRA  344  [1969]),  we  
held  that  the  right  against  self-­‐incrimination  under  Section  17,  Article  
III  of  the  1987  Constitution  which  is  ordinarily  available  only  in  
criminal  prosecutions,  extends  to  administrative  proceedings  which  
possess  a  criminal  or  penal  aspect,  such  as  an  administrative  
investigation  of  a  licensed  physician  who  is  charged  with  immorality,  
which  could  result  in  his  loss  of  the  privilege  to  practice  medicine  if  
found  guilty.  The  Court,  citing  the  earlier  case  of  Cabal  v.  Kapunan (6  
SCRA  1059  [1962]),  pointed  out  that  the  revocation  of  one‟s license  
as  a  medical  practitioner,  is  an  even  greater  deprivation  than  
forfeiture  of  property.  (Secretary  of  Justice  v.  Lantion,  322  SCRA  160,  
184,  Jan.  18,  2000,  En  Banc  [Melo])  
• [I]t  has  been  held  that  “a  congressional  committee‟s right  to  inquire  
is  „subject  to  all  relevant  limitations  placed  by  the  Constitution  on  
governmental  action,‟  including  „the  relevant  limitations  of  the  Bill  of  
Rights‟.”  
• One  of  the  basic  rights  guaranteed  by  the  Constitution  to  an  
individual  is  the  right  against  self-­‐incrimination.  (Bengzon,  Jr.  v.  Senate  
Blue  Ribbon  Committee,  203  SCRA  767,  Nov.  20,  1991,  En  Banc  
[Padilla])  
• Section  17,  Article  3  of  the  1987  Constitution  provides  that  "no  person  
shall  be  compelled  to  be  a  witness  against  himself."  Petitioner   asserts  
that  obtaining  samples  from  him  for  DNA  testing  violates  his  right  
against  self-­‐incrimination.  Petitioner   ignores  our  earlier  
pronouncements  that  the  privilege  is  applicable  only  to  testimonial  
evidence
Right  against  Double  Jeopardy
• The  Supreme  Court  ruled  that  the  three  requisites  before  double  jeopardy  
can  be  invoked  are:  (1)  the  first  jeopardy  must  have  attached  prior  to  the  
second;  (2)  the  first  jeopardy  must  have  been  validly  terminated;  and  (3)  
the  second  jeopardy  must  be  for  the  same  offense  as   that  in  the  first,  or  
the  second  offense  includes  or  is  necessarily  included  in  the  offense  
charged  in  the  first  information,  or  is  an  attempt  to  commit  the  same  or  is  
a  frustration  thereof.  In  the  Court's  view,  it  is  clear  that  no  double  jeopardy  
has  attached  in  this  case.  The  dismissal   order  made  by  the  trial   court  was  
not  valid  and  cannot  be  used  as   basis  for  a   claim  of  double  jeopardy.  The  
said  right  cannot  be  grounded  on  an  error  of  law.  
• PEOPLE  OF  THE  PHILIPPINES,  plaintiff-­‐appellee,  vs.  LUCIO  ALBERTO  y  
DANAO,  accused-­‐appellant,  G.R.  No.  132374.    August  22,   2002
• The  exception  to  the  double  jeopardy  rule  attaches  only  when  the  trial  
court  commits  grave  abuse  of  discretion  due  to  a   violation  of  due  process,  
i.e.,  that  the  prosecution  was  denied  the  opportunity  to  present  its  case  or  
that  the  trial   was  a   sham.  Conversely,  there  cannot  be  a  grave  abuse  of  
discretion  where  the  trial  court  gave  both  parties  the  opportunity  to  
present  their  case  and  even  required  them  to  submit  memoranda  from  
which  its  decision  is  based,   as  in  this  case.  In  other  words,  if  there  is  no  
denial  of  due  process,  there  can  be  no  grave  abuse  of  discretion  that  would  
merit  the  application  of  the  exception  to  the  double  jeopardy  rule.
METROPOLITAN  BANK  AND  TRUST  COMPANY,   petitioner,  vs.  HON.  REGINO  
T.  VERIDIANO  II,  Presiding  Judge,  RTC-­‐Manila,   Branch  31,   and  DOMINADOR  
ONG,   respondents.,  
•
•
• Our  Bill  of  Rights  deals  with  two  (2)  kinds  of  double  jeopardy.  The  first  
sentence  of  Clause  20,  Section  1(now  Sec.  21),  Article  III  of  the  
Constitution  ordains  that  “no  person  shall  be  twice  put  in  jeopardy  of  
punishment  for  the  same  offense.”  The  second  sentence  of  said  
clause  provides  that  “if  an  act  is  punishable  by  a  law  and  an  
ordinance,  conviction  or  acquittal  under  either  shall  constitute  a  bar  
to  another  prosecution  for  the  same  act.”  Thus,  the  first  sentence  
prohibits  double  jeopardy  of  punishment  for  the  same  offense  
whereas,  the  second  contemplates  double  jeopardy  of  punishment  
for  the  same  act.  
• Elsewhere  stated,  where  the  offense  charged  are  penalized  either  by  
different  sections  of  the  same  statute  or  by  different  statutes,  the  
important  inquiry  relates  to  the  identity  of  offenses  charged.  The  
constitutional  protection  against  double  jeopardy  is  available  only  
where  an  identity  is  shown  to  exist  between  the  earlier  and  the  
subsequent  offenses  charged.  The  question  of  identity  or  lack  of  
identity  of  offenses  is  addressed  by  examining  the  essential  elements  
of  each  of  the  two  offenses  charged,  as  such  elements  are  set  out  in  
the  respective  legislative  definitions  of  the  offenses  involved.  (People  
v.  Quijada,  259  SCRA  191,  July  24,  1996)  
• Legal  jeopardy  attaches  only:  (1)  upon  a  valid  indictment;  (b)  before  a  
competent  court;  (c)  after  arraignment;  (d)  when  a  valid  plea  has  
been  entered;  and  (e)  the  case  was  dismissed  or  otherwise  
terminated  without  the  express  consent  of  the  accused.  (Cuison v.  CA,  
289  SCRA  159,  April  15,  1998  [Panganiban])  
Freedom  of  Movement
• Article  III,  Section  6  of  the  1987  Constitution  should  be  interpreted  to  mean  
that  while  the  liberty  of  travel  may  be  impaired  even  without  Court  Order,  
the  appropriate  executive  officers  or  administrative  authorities  are  not  
armed  with  arbitrary  discretion  to  impose  limitations.  They  can  impose  
limits  only  on  the  basis  of  "national  security,  public  safety,  or  public  health"  
and  "as   may  be  provided  by  law,"  a  limitive phrase  which  did  not  appear  in  
the  1973   text  (The  Constitution,  Bernas,   Joaquin  G.,  S.J.,  Vol.  I,  First  Edition,  
1987,   p.  263).
• RICARDO  C.  SILVERIO,  petitioner,  vs.  THE  COURT  OF  APPEALS,  HON.  
BENIGNO  G.  GAVIOLA,  as  Judge  of  the  Regional  Trial   Court  of  Cebu  City,  
Branch  IX,   and  PEOPLE  OF  THE  PHILIPPINES,  respondents,  G.R.  No.  94284.    
April  8,  1991
•
• Article  III,  Section  6  of  the  1987  Constitution  should  by  no  means  be  
construed  as  delimiting  the  inherent  power  of  the  Courts  to  use  all  
means  necessary  to  carry  their  orders  into  effect  in  criminal  cases  
pending  before  them.  When  by  law  jurisdiction  is  conferred  on  a  
Court  or  judicial  officer,  all  auxiliary  writs,  process  and  other  means  
necessary  to  carry  it  into  effect  may  be  employed  by  such  Court  or  
officer  (Rule  135,  Section  6,  Rules  of  Court).
Right  to  return
• The  right  to  return  to  one's  country  is  not  among  the  rights  specifically  
guaranteed  in  the  Bill  of  Rights,  which  treats  only  of  the  liberty  of  
abode  and  the  right  to  travel.
• It  is  the  court's  well-­‐considered  view  that  the  right  to  return  may  be  
considered,  as  a  generally  accepted  principle  of  international   law  and  
under  our  Constitution,   is  part  of  the  law  of  the  land  [Art.  II  Sec.  2  of  
the  Constitution.] It  is  distinct  and  separate  from  the  right  to  travel  
and  enjoys  a  different  protection  under  the  International  Covenant  of  
Civil  and  Political   Rights,  i.e.,  against  being  "arbitrarily  deprived"  
thereof  [Art.  12  (4).]
Right  to  Privacy
• The  essence  of  privacy  is  the  “right  to  be  let  alone.”  In  the  1965  case  of  Griswold  
v.  Connecticut  (381  U.S.  479,  14  L.  ed.  2D  510  [1965]),  the  United  States  Supreme  
Court  gave  more  substance  to  the  right  of  privacy  when  it  ruled  that  the  right  has  
a  constitutional  foundation.  It  held  that  there  is  a  right  of  privacy  which  can  be  
found  within  the  penumbras  of  the  First,  Third,  Fourth,  Fifth  and  Ninth  
Amendments  x  x  x.  In  the  1968  case  of  Morfe v.  Mutuc (22  SCRA  424,  444-­‐445),  
we  adopted  the  Griswold  ruling  that  there  is  a  constitutional  right  to  privacy  x  x  x.  
• Indeed,  if  we  extend  our  judicial  gaze  we  will  find  that  the  right  of  privacy  is  
recognized  and  enshrined  in  several  provisions  of  our  Constitution.  (Morfe v.  
Mutuc,  22  SCRA  424,  444  [1968];  Cortes,  The  Constitutional  Foundations  of  
Privacy,  p.  18  [1970]).  It  is  expressly  recognized  in  Section  3(1)  of  the  Bill  of  Rights  
x  x  x.  Other  facets  of  the  right  to  privacy  are  protected  in  various  provisions  of  the  
Bill  of  Rights  (viz:  Secs.  1,  2,  6,  8,  and  17.  (Ople v.  Torres,  G.R.  No.  127685,  July  23,  
1998  [Puno])  
• The  Civil  Code  provides  that  “[e]very  person  shall  respect  the  dignity,  
personality,  privacy  and  peace  of  mind  of  his  neighbors  and  other  persons”  
and  punishes  as  actionable  torts  several  acts  by  a  person  of  meddling  and  
prying  into  the  privacy  of  another.  It  also  holds  a  public  officer  or  employee  
or  any  private  individual  liable  for  damages  for  any  violation  of  the  rights  
and  liberties  of  another  person,  and  recognizes  the  privacy  of  letters  and  
other  private  communications.  The  Revised  Penal   Code  makes  a   crime  the  
violation  of  secrets  by  an  officer,  the  revelation  of  trade  and  industrial  
secrets,  and  trespass  to  dwelling.  Invasion  of  privacy  is  an  offense  in  special  
laws  like  the  Anti-­‐Wiretapping  Law  (R.A.  4200),  the  Secrecy  of  Bank  
Deposits  (R.A.  1405)  and  the  Intellectual  Property  Code  (R.A.  8293).  The  
Rules  of  Court  on  privileged  communication  likewise  recognize  the  privacy  
of  certain  information  (Section  24,  Rule  130[c],  Revised  Rules  on  Evidence).  
(Ople v.  Torres,  G.R.  No.  127685,  July  23,  1998  [Puno])  
• Two  constitutional  guarantees  create  these  zones  of  privacy:  (a)  the  
right  against  unreasonable  searches  and  seizures,  which  is  the  basis  of  
the  right  to  be  let  alone,  and  (b)  the  right  to  privacy  of  
communication  and  correspondence.  
• In  assessing  the  challenge  that  the  State  has  impermissibly  intruded  
into  these  zones  of  privacy,  a  court  must  determine  whether  a  person  
has  exhibited  a  reasonable  expectation  of  privacy  and,  if  so,  whether  
that  expectation  has  been  violated  by  unreasonable  government  
intrusion.