Persons Full Text Rep Vs CA To Sakai Vs Republic

Persons and Family Relations |1
G.R. No. 103047 September 2, 1994
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO, respondents.
Parungao, Abesamis, Eleazar & Pulgar Law Offices for private respondent.
PUNO, J.:
The case at bench originated from a petition filed by private respondent Angelina M. Castro in the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to Edwin F. Cardenas.1 As ground therefor,
Castro claims that no marriage license was ever issued to them prior to the solemnization of their marriage.
Despite notice, defendant Edwin F. Cardenas failed to file his answer. Consequently, he was declared in default. Trial
proceeded in his absence.
The controlling facts are undisputed:
On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by Judge
Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro's
parents. Defendant Cardenas personally attended to the processing of the documents required for the celebration of
the marriage, including the procurement of the marriage, license. In fact, the marriage contract itself states that
marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in the name of the contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro
Manila.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage was unknown to Castro's parents.
Thus, it was only in March 1971, when Castro discovered she was pregnant, that the couple decided to live together.
However, their cohabitation lasted only for four (4) months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways. On October 19, 1971,
Castro gave birth. The baby was adopted by Castro's brother, with the consent of Cardenas.
The baby is now in the United States. Desiring to follow her daughter, Castro wanted to put in order her marital status
before leaving for the States. She thus consulted a lawyer, Atty. Frumencio E. Pulgar, regarding the possible annulment
of her marriage. Through her lawyer's efforts, they discovered that there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas
prior to the celebration of their marriage.
As proof, Angelina Castro offered in evidence a certification from the Civil Register of Pasig, Metro Manila. It reads:
February 20, 1987
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that the names EDWIN F. CARDENAS and ANGELINA M. CASTRO who were allegedly married in the
Pasay City Court on June 21, 1970 under an alleged (s)upportive marriage license
no. 3196182 allegedly issued in the municipality on June 20, 1970 cannot be located as said license no. 3196182 does
not appear from our records.
Issued upon request of Mr. Ed Atanacio.
(Sgd) CENONA D. QUINTOS
Senior Civil Registry Officer
Castro testified that she did not go to the civil registrar of Pasig on or before June 24, 1970 in order to apply for a
license. Neither did she sign any application therefor. She affixed her signature only on the marriage contract on June
24, 1970 in Pasay City.
The trial court denied the petition. 2 It held that the above certification was inadequate to establish the alleged non-
issuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the marriage between the parties. It ruled that the "inability
of the certifying official to locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show that there was no marriage license
issued."
Unsatisfied with the decision, Castro appealed to respondent appellate court. She insisted that the certification from
the local civil registrar sufficiently established the absence of a marriage license.
As stated earlier, respondent appellate court reversed the Decision of the trial court. 3 It declared the marriage
between the contracting parties null and void and directed the Civil Registrar of Pasig to cancel the subject marriage
contract.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines urges that respondent appellate court erred when it ruled that the certification
issued by the civil registrar that marriage license no. 3196182 was not in their record adequately proved that no such
license was ever issued. Petitioner also faults the respondent court for relying on the self-serving and uncorroborated
testimony of private respondent Castro that she had no part in the procurement of the subject marriage license.
Petitioner thus insists that the certification and the uncorroborated testimony of private respondent are insufficient
to overthrow the legal presumption regarding the validity of a marriage.
Petitioner also points that in declaring the marriage between the parties as null and void, respondent appellate court
disregarded the presumption that the solemnizing officer, Judge Pablo M. Malvar, regularly performed his duties when
he attested in the marriage contract that marriage license no. 3196182 was duly presented to him before the
solemnization of the subject marriage.
The issues, being interrelated, shall be discussed jointly.
The core issue presented by the case at bench is whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence presented
by private respondent are sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior
to the celebration of the marriage of private respondent to Edwin F. Cardenas.
We affirm the impugned Decision.
At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital relations was the New
Civil Code. The law 4 provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a local
civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage
void ab initio. 5
Petitioner posits that the certification of the local civil registrar of due search and inability to find a record or entry to
the effect that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued to the parties is not adequate to prove its non-issuance.
We hold otherwise. The presentation of such certification in court is sanctioned by Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court, viz.:
Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record. — A written statement signed by an officer having custody of an official record or by
his deputy, that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office,
accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such
record or entry.
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular document
does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians
of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book
where they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date
the marriage license was issued and such other relevant data. 6
The certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he
being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a
certificate of "due search and inability to find" sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license no.
3196182 to the contracting parties.
The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in support of her petition is, in itself, not a ground
to deny her petition. The failure to offer any other witness to corroborate her testimony is mainly due to the peculiar
circumstances of the case. It will be remembered that the subject marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a judge
of a city court. The subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a "secret marriage" — a legally non-existent
phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends
of either or both of the contracting parties. The records show that the marriage between Castro and Cardenas was
initially unknown to the parents of the former.
Surely, the fact that only private respondent Castro testified during the trial cannot be held against her. Her husband,
Edwin F. Cardenas, was duly served with notice of the proceedings and a copy of the petition. Despite receipt thereof,
he chose to ignore the same. For failure to answer, he was properly declared in default. Private respondent cannot be
faulted for her husband's lack of interest to participate in the proceedings. There was absolutely no evidence on record
to show that there was collusion between private respondent and her husband Cardenas.
It is noteworthy to mention that the finding of the appellate court that the marriage between the contracting parties
is null and void for lack of a marriage license does not discount the fact that indeed, a spurious marriage license,
purporting to be issued by the civil registrar of Pasig, may have been presented by Cardenas to the solemnizing officer.
In fine, we hold that, under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by
private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED there being no showing of any reversible error committed by respondent
appellate court.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 127263. April 12, 2000
FILIPINA Y. SY, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN
FERNANDO, PAMPANGA, BRANCH XLI, and FERNANDO SY, Respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review is the decision1 dated May 21, 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 44144, which affirmed the
decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, denying the petition3 for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage of the spouses Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy.
Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on November 15, 1973 at the Church
of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City.4 Both were then 22 years old. Their union was blessed with two children,
Frederick and Farrah Sheryll who were born on July 8, 1975 and February 14, 1978,respectively.5cräläwvirtualibräry
The spouses first established their residence in Singalong, Manila, then in Apalit, Pampanga, and later at San Matias,
Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. They operated a lumber and hardware business in Sto. Tomas, Pampanga.6cräläwvirtualibräry
On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, the spouses lived separately, and their two
children were in the custody of their mother. However, their son Frederick transferred to his father's residence at
Masangkay, Tondo, Manila on May 15,1988, and from then on, lived with his father.7cräläwvirtualibräry
On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation, docketed as Civil Case No. 7900 before the Regional
Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga. Later, upon motion of petitioner, the action was later amended to a petition
for separation of property on the grounds that her husband abandoned her without just cause; that they have been
living separately for more than one year; and that they voluntarily entered into a Memorandum of Agreement dated
September 29, 1983, containing the rules that would govern the dissolution of their conjugal partnership.8 Judgment
was rendered dissolving their conjugal partnership of gains and approving a regime of separation of properties based
on the Memorandum of Agreement executed by the spouses.9 The trial court also granted custody of the children to
Filipina.10cräläwvirtualibräry
In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide against her husband, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 88-68006, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Filipina testified that in the afternoon of May 15, 1988, she
went to the dental clinic at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila, owned by her husband but operated by his mistress, to fetch
her son and bring him to San Fernando, Pampanga. While she was talking to her son, the boy ignored her and
continued playing with the family computer. Filipina got mad, took the computer away from her son, and started
spanking him. At that instance, Fernando pulled Filipina away from their son, and punched her in the different parts
of her body. Filipina also claimed that her husband started choking her when she fell on the floor, and released her
only when he thought she was dead. Filipina suffered from hematoma and contusions on different parts of her body
as a result of the blows inflicted by her husband, evidenced by a Medical Certificate issued by a certain Dr. James
Ferraren. She said it was not the first time Fernando maltreated her.11cräläwvirtualibräry
The Regional Trial Court of Manila, however, in its decision12 dated April 26, 1990, convicted Fernando only of the
lesser crime of slight physical injuries, and sentenced him to 20 days imprisonment.
Petitioner later filed a new action for legal separation against private respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 8273,on
the following grounds: (1) repeated physical violence; (2) sexual infidelity; (3) attempt by respondent against her life;
and (4) abandonment of her by her husband without justifiable cause for more than one year. The Regional Trial Court
of San Fernando, Pampanga, in its decision13 dated December 4,1991, granted the petition on the grounds of repeated
physical violence and sexual infidelity, and issued a decree of legal separation. It awarded custody of their daughter
Farrah Sheryll to petitioner, and their son Frederick to respondent.
On August 4, 1992, Filipina filed a petition14 for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando on the
ground of psychological incapacity. She points out that the final judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court in her
favor, in her petitions for separation of property and legal separation, and Fernando's infliction of physical violence on
her which ledto the conviction of her husband for slight physical injuries are symptoms of psychological incapacity.
She also cites as manifestations of her husband's psychological incapacity the following: (1) habitual alcoholism; (2)
refusal to live with her without fault on her part, choosing to live with his mistress instead; and (3) refusal to have sex
with her, performing the marital act only to satisfy himself. Moreover, Filipina alleges that such psychological
incapacity of her husband existed from the time of the celebration of their marriage and became manifest
thereafter.15cräläwvirtualibräry
The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, in its decision16 dated December 9, 1993, denied the petition
of Filipina Sy for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando. It stated that the alleged acts of the
respondent, as cited by petitioner, do not constitute psychological incapacity which may warrant the declaration of
absolute nullity of their marriage.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the trial court. In the decision17 of the
Court of Appeals dated May 21, 1996, it ruled that the testimony of petitioner concerning respondent's purported
psychological incapacity falls short of the quantum of evidence required to nullify a marriage celebrated with all the
formal and essential requisites of law. Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner failed to show that the
alleged psychological incapacity of respondent had existed at the time of the celebration of their marriage in 1973. It
reiterated the finding of the trial court that the couple's marital problems surfaced only in 1983, or almost ten years
from the date of the celebration of their marriage. And prior to their separation in 1983, they were living together
harmoniously. Thus, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court which it found to be in accordance
with law and the evidence on record.18cräläwvirtualibräry
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,19 which the Court of Appeals denied in its resolution dated November
21, 1996.20cräläwvirtualibräry
Hence, this appeal by certiorari[21] wherein petitioner now raises the following issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ON THE DATE
OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE PARTIES' MARRIAGE ON NOVEMBER 15, 1973, NOT DISPUTED BY RESPONDENT
FERNANDO, THERE WAS NO MARRIAGE LICENSE THERETO;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY STATING
THAT THE GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY APPELLANT [herein petitioner] DO NOT CONSTITUTE PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY AS WOULD JUSTIFY NULLIFICATION OF HER MARRIAGE TO APPELLEE [herein respondent];
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY STATING
THAT APPELLANT FAILED TO SHOW THAT THE ALLEGED UNDESIRABLE ACTUATIONS OF APPELLEE HAD EXISTED OR
WERE PRESENT AT THE TIME THEIR MARRIAGE WAS CELEBRATED IN 1973;
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING
THE ERRONEOUS RULING OF THE LOWER COURT THAT THERE IS A REDEEMING ATTITUDE SHOWN TO THE COURT BY
RESPONDENT FERNANDO WITH RESPECT TO HIS CHILDREN AND ALSO BELIEVES THAT RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE
PARTIES IS NOT A REMOTE POSSIBILITY WHICH IS ERRONEOUS; AND
5.WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE OF SANTOS V.COURT OF APPEALS (240 SCRA 20) IS APPLICABLE
HERETO.22cräläwvirtualibräry
In sum, two issues are to be resolved:

1. Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and privaterespondent is void from the beginning for lack of a
marriage license at the time of the ceremony; and
2. Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time of said marriage celebration to
warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity.
Petitioner, for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage being void for lack of a valid marriage license at the time
of its celebration. It appears that, according to her, the date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the date
of issuance of their marriage certificate and marriage license are different and incongruous.
Although we have repeatedly ruled that litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal, as this would
contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice,23 in a number of instances, we have relaxed observance of
procedural rules, noting that technicalities are not ends in themselves but exist to protect and promote substantive
rights of litigants. We said that certain rules ought not to be applied with severity and rigidity if by so doing, the very
reason for their existence would be defeated.24 Hence, when substantial justice plainly requires, exempting a
particular case from the operation of technicalities should not be subject to cavil.25 In our view, the case at bar
requires that we address the issue of the validity of the marriage between Fillipina and Fernando which petitioner
claims is void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license, in order to arrive at a just resolution of a deeply seated
and violent conflict between the parties. Note, however, that here the pertinent facts are not disputed; and what is
required now is a declaration of their effects according to existing law.
Petitioner states that though she did not categorically state in herpetition for annulment of marriage before the trial
court that the incongruityin the dates of the marriage license and the celebration of the marriage itself would lead to
the conclusion that her marriage to Fernando was void from the beginning, she points out that these critical dates
were contained in the documents she submitted before the court. The date of issue of the marriage license and
marriage certificate, September 17, 1974, is contained in their marriage contract which was attached as Annex "A" in
her petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and thereafter marked as Exhibit "A"
in the course of the trial.26 The date of celebration of their marriage at Our Lady of Lourdes, Sta. Teresita Parish, on
November 15, 1973, is admitted both by petitioner and private respondent, as stated in paragraph three of petitioner's
petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and private respondent's answer
admitting it.27 This fact was also affirmed by petitioner, in open court, on January 22, 1993, during her direct
examination,28 as follows:
ATTY. RAZON: In the last hearing, you said that you were married on November 15,1973?
FILIPINA SY: Yes, Sir.

November 15, 1973, also appears as the date of marriage of the parents in both their son's and daughter's birth
certificates, which are also attached as Annexes " B" and "C" in the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage before the trial court, and thereafter marked as Exhibits "B" and "C" in the course of the trial.29 These pieces
of evidence on record plainly and indubitably show that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage
license. A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. In addition, the
marriage contract shows that the marriage license, numbered 6237519, was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither
petitioner nor private respondent ever resided in Carmona.30cräläwvirtualibräry
Carefully reviewing the documents and the pleadings on record, we find that indeed petitioner did not expressly state
in her petition before the trial court that there was incongruity between the date of the actual celebration of their
marriage and the date of the issuance of their marriage license. From the documents she presented, the marriage
license was issued on September 17,1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on November 15, 1973. The
ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license. Nowhere do we find
private respondent denying these dates on record. Article 80 of the Civil Code31 is clearly applicable in this case. There
being no claim of an exceptional character, the purported marriage between petitioner and private respondent could
not be classified among those enumerated in Articles 72-7932 of the Civil Code. We thus conclude that under Article
80 of the Civil Code, the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning.
We note that their marriage certificate and marriage license are only photocopies. So are the birth certificates of their
son Frederick and daughter Farrah Sheryll. Nevertheless, these documents were marked as Exhibits during the course
of the trial below, which shows that these have been examined and admitted by the trial court, with no objections
having been made as to their authenticity and due execution. Likewise, no objection was interposed to petitioner's
testimony in open court when she affirmed that the date of the actual celebration of their marriage was on November
15, 1973. We are of the view, therefore, that having been admitted in evidence, with the adverse party failing to timely
object thereto, these documents are deemed sufficient proof of the facts contained therein.33cräläwvirtualibräry
The remaining issue on the psychological incapacity of private respondent need no longer detain us. It is mooted by
our conclusion that the marriage of petitioner to respondent is void ab initio for lack of a marriage license at the time
their marriage was solemnized.m is
WHEREFORE , the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, dated
December 9,1993 as well as the Decision promulgated on May 21, 1996 by the Court of Appeals and its Resolution
dated November 21, 1996, in CA-G.R. No. 44144 are set aside. The marriage celebrated on November 15, 1973
between petitioner Filipina Yap and private respondent Fernando Sy is hereby declared void ab initio for lack of
marriage license at the time of celebration. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

P e r s o n s a n d F a m i l y R e l a t i o n s | 10
Endnotes:
31 Art. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxx
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character;
xxx
32 ART. 72. When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal union or commits acts which tend to
bring danger, dishonor or injury to the other or to the family, the aggrieved party may apply to the court for relief.
ART. 73. Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity without the consent of
the other. The latter may object only on valid, serious, and moral grounds.
In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not:
(1) The objection is proper, and
(2) Benefit has accrued to the family prior to the objection or thereafter. If the benefit accrued prior to the objection,
the resulting obligation shall be enforced against the separate property of the spouse who has not obtained consent.
The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of creditors who acted in good faith.
ART. 74. The property relations between husband and wife shall be governed in the following order:
(1) By marriage settlements executed before the marriage;

(2) By the provisions of this Code; and
(3) By the local customs.
ART. 75. The future spouses may, in the marriage settlements, agree upon the regime of absolute community, conjugal
partnership of gains, complete separation of property, or any other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements,
or when the regime agreed upon is void, the system of absolute community of property as established in this code
shall govern.
ART. 76. In order that any modification in the marriage settlements may be valid, it must be made before the
celebration of the marriage, subject to the provisions of Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and 136.
ART. 77. The marriage settlements and any modification thereof shall be in writing, signed by the parties and executed
before the celebration of the marriage. They shall not prejudice third persons unless they are registered in the local
civil registry where the marriage contract is recorded as well as in the proper registries of property.
ART. 78. A minor who according to law may contract marriage may also enter into marriage settlements, but they shall
be valid only if the persons designated in Article 14 to give consent to the marriage are made parties to the agreement,
subject to the provisions of Title IX of this Code.
ART. 79. For the validity of any marriage settlements executed by a person upon whom a sentence of civil interdiction
has been pronounced or who is subject to any other disability, it shall be indispensable for the guardian appointed by
a competent court to be made a party thereto.
G.R. No. 167684 July 31, 2006
JAIME O.SEVILLA, petitioner,
vs.
CARMELITA N. CARDENAS, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
74416 dated 20 December 2004 which set aside the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, in Civil
Case No. 94-1285 dated 25 January 2002.
In a Complaint3 dated 28 March 1994 filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before the RTC, he claimed that on 19 May 1969, through
machinations, duress and intimidation employed upon him by Carmelita N. Cardenas and the latter's father, retired
Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed forces of the Philippines, he and Carmelita went to the City Hall of Manila and
they were introduced to a certain Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the Gospel. On the said date,
the father of Carmelita caused him and Carmelita to sign a marriage contract before the said Minister of the Gospel.
According to Jaime, he never applied for a marriage license for his supposed marriage to Carmelita and never did they
obtain any marriage license from any Civil Registry, consequently, no marriage license was presented to the
solemnizing officer.
For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of Jaime, and claims that she and Jaime were married civilly on 19
May 1969,4 and in a church ceremony thereafter on 31 May 19695 at the Most Holy Redeemer Parish in Quezon City.
Both marriages were registered with the local civil registry of Manila and the National Statistics Office. He is estopped
from invoking the lack of marriage license after having been married to her for 25 years.
The trial court made the following findings:
In support of his complaint, plaintiff [Jaime] testified that on May 19, 1969, he and defendant [Carmelita] appeared
before a certain Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales, a Minister of the Gospel, at the city hall in Manila where they executed a
Marriage Contract (Exh. "A") in civil rites. A certain Godofredo Occena who, plaintiff alleged, was an aide of defendant's
father accompanied them, and who, together with another person, stood as witness to the civil wedding. That
although marriage license no. 2770792 allegedly issued in San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969 was indicated in the
marriage contract, the same was fictitious for he never applied for any marriage license, (Ibid., p. 11). Upon
verifications made by him through his lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Abola, with the Civil Registry of San Juan, a Certification
dated March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") was issued by Rafael D. Aliscad, Jr., Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, that "no marriage
license no. 2770792 was ever issued by said office." On May 31, 1969, he and defendant were again wed, this time in
church rites, before Monsignor Juan Velasco at the Most Holy Redeemer Parish Church in Brixton Hills, Quezon City,
where they executed another marriage contract (Exh. "F") with the same marriage license no. 2770792 used and
indicated. Preparations and expenses for the church wedding and reception were jointly shared by his and defendant's
parents. After the church wedding, he and defendant resided in his house at Brixton Hills until their first son, Jose
Gabriel, was born in March 1970. As his parents continued to support him financially, he and defendant lived in Spain
for some time, for his medical studies. Eventually, their marital relationship turned bad because it became difficult for
him to be married he being a medical student at that time. They started living apart in 1976, but they underwent family
counseling before they eventually separated in 1978. It was during this time when defendant's second son was born
whose paternity plaintiff questioned. Plaintiff obtained a divorce decree against defendant in the United States in 1981
and later secured a judicial separation of their conjugal partnership in 1983.
Atty. Jose M. Abola, then counsel for the plaintiff, himself manifested that when his service was engaged by plaintiff,
and after the latter narrated to him the circumstances of his marriage, he made inquiries with the Office of Civil
Registry of San Juan where the supposed marriage license was obtained and with the Church of the Most Holy
Redeemer Parish where the religious wedding ceremony was celebrated. His request letters dated March 3, 1994 (Exh.
"J"), March 7, 1994 (Exh. "L"), March 9, 1994 (Exh. "M") and March 11, 1994 (Exh. "K") were all sent to and received
by the Civil Registrar of San Juan, who in reply thereto, issued Certifications dated March 4, 1994 (Exh. "I"), and March
11, 1994 (Exh. "E") and September 20, 1994 (Exh. "C"), that "no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by that
office." Upon his inquiry, the Holy Redeemer Parish Church issued him a certified copy of the marriage contract of
plaintiff and defendant (Exh. "F") and a Certificate of Marriage dated April 11, 1994 (Exh. "G"), wherein it noted that
it was a "purely religious ceremony, having been civilly married on May 19, 1969 at the City Hall, Manila, under
Marriage License No. 2770792 issued at San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969."
Perlita Mercader, Registration Officer III of the Local Registry of San Juan, identified the Certificates dated March 4,
1994, March 11, 1994 and September 20, 1994 issued by Rafael Aliscad, Jr., the Local Civil Registrar, and testified that
their office failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 may have been registered (TSN, 8-6-96, p.
5).
Defendant Carmelita Cardenas testified that she and plaintiff had a steady romantic relationship after they met and
were introduced to each other in October 1968. A model, she was compelled by her family to join the Mutya ng
Pilipinas beauty pageant when plaintiff who was afraid to lose her, asked her to run away with him to Baguio. Because
she loved plaintiff, she turned back on her family and decided to follow plaintiff in Baguio. When they came back to
Manila, she and plaintiff proceeded to the latter's home in Brixton Hills where plaintiff's mother, Mrs. Sevilla, told her
not to worry. Her parents were hostile when they learned of the elopement, but Mrs. Sevilla convinced them that she
will take care of everything, and promised to support plaintiff and defendant. As plaintiff was still fearful he may lose
her, he asked her to marry him in civil rites, without the knowledge of her family, more so her father (TSN, 5-28-98, p.
4) on May 19, 1969, before a minister and where she was made to sign documents. After the civil wedding, they had
lunch and later each went home separately. On May 31, 1969, they had the church wedding, which the Sevilla family
alone prepared and arranged, since defendant's mother just came from hospital. Her family did not participate in the
wedding preparations. Defendant further stated that there was no sexual consummation during their honeymoon and
that it was after two months when they finally had sex. She learned from Dr. Escudero, plaintiff's physician and one of
their wedding sponsors that plaintiff was undergoing psychiatric therapy since age 12 (TSN, 11-2-98, p. 15) for some
traumatic problem compounded by his drug habit. She found out plaintiff has unusual sexual behavior by his obsession
over her knees of which he would take endless pictures of. Moreover, plaintiff preferred to have sex with her in
between the knees which she called "intrafemural sex," while real sex between them was far and between like 8
months, hence, abnormal. During their marriage, plaintiff exhibited weird sexual behavior which defendant attributed
to plaintiff's drug addiction (TSN, 11-5-98, pp. 5-8). A compulsive liar, plaintiff has a bad temper who breaks things
when he had tantrums. Plaintiff took drugs like amphetamines, benzedrine and the like, "speed" drugs that kept him
from sleep and then would take barbiturates or downers, like "mogadon." Defendant tried very hard to keep plaintiff
away from drugs but failed as it has become a habit to him. They had no fixed home since they often moved and partly
lived in Spain for about four and a half years, and during all those times, her mother-in-law would send some financial
support on and off, while defendant worked as an English teacher. Plaintiff, who was supposed to be studying, did
nothing. Their marriage became unbearable, as plaintiff physically and verbally abused her, and this led to a break up
in their marriage. Later, she learned that plaintiff married one Angela Garcia in 1991 in the United States.
Jose Cardenas, father of defendant, testified that he was not aware of the civil wedding of his daughter with the
plaintiff; that his daughter and grandson came to stay with him after they returned home from Spain and have lived
with him and his wife ever since. His grandsons practically grew up under his care and guidance, and he has supported
his daughter's expenses for medicines and hospital confinements (Exhs. "9" and "10").
Victoria Cardenas Navarro, defendant's sister, testified and corroborated that it was plaintiff's family that attended to
all the preparations and arrangements for the church wedding of her sister with plaintiff, and that she didn't know
that the couple wed in civil rites some time prior to the church wedding. She also stated that she and her parents were
still civil with the plaintiff inspite of the marital differences between plaintiff and defendant.
As adverse witness for the defendant, plaintiff testified that because of irreconcilable differences with defendant and
in order for them to live their own lives, they agreed to divorce each other; that when he applied for and obtained a
divorce decree in the United States on June 14, 1983 (Exh. "13"), it was with the knowledge and consent of defendant
who in fact authorized a certain Atty. Quisumbing to represent her (TSN, 12-7-2000, p. 21). During his adverse
testimony, plaintiff identified a recent certification dated July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE") issued by the Local Civil Registrar of
San Juan, that the marriage license no. 2770792, the same marriage license appearing in the marriage contract (Exh.
"A"), is inexistent, thus appears to be fictitious.6
In its Decision dated 25 January 2002, declaring the nullity of the marriage of the parties, the trial court made the
following justifications:
Thus, being one of the essential requisites for the validity of the marriage, the lack or absence of a license renders the
marriage void ab initio. It was shown under the various certifications (Exhs. "I", "E", and "C") earlier issued by the office
of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of San Juan, and the more recent one issued on July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE")
that no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by that office, hence, the marriage license no. 2770792
appearing on the marriage contracts executed on May 19, 1969 (Exh. "A") and on May 31, 1969 (Exh. "F") was fictitious.
Such a certification enjoys probative value under the rules on evidence, particularly Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court, x x x.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the civil marriage between Jaime O. Sevilla and Carmelita N. Cardenas
solemnized by Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales at the Manila City Hall on May 19, 1969 as well as their contract of marriage
solemnized under religious rites by Rev. Juan B. Velasco at the Holy Redeemer Parish on May 31, 1969, NULL and VOID
for lack of the requisite marriage license. Let the marriage contract of the parties under Registry No. 601 (e-69) of the
registry book of the Local Civil Registry of Manila be cancelled.
Let copies of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property registries in accordance with Article 52 of
the Family Code. Likewise, let a copy hereof be forwarded the Office of the Solicitor General for its record and
information.7
Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 20 December 2004, the Court of Appeals
disagreed with the trial court and held:
In People v. De Guzman (G.R. No. 106025, February 9, 1994), the Supreme Court explained that: "The presumption of
regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The
presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive."
In this case, We note that a certain Perlita Mercader of the local civil registry of San Juan testified that they "failed to
locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered," for the reason that "the employee handling is
already retired." With said testimony We cannot therefore just presume that the marriage license specified in the
parties' marriage contract was not issued for in the end the failure of the office of the local civil registrar of San Juan
to produce a copy of the marriage license was attributable not to the fact that no such marriage license was issued
but rather, because it "failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered." Simply put, if the
pertinent book were available for scrutiny, there is a strong possibility that it would have contained an entry on
marriage license no. 2720792.
xxxx
Indeed, this Court is not prepared to annul the parties' marriage on the basis of a mere perception of plaintiff that his
union with defendant is defective with respect to an essential requisite of a marriage contract, a perception that
ultimately was not substantiated with facts on record.8
Jaime filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 6 January 2005 which the Court of Appeals denied in a Resolution
dated 6 April 2005.
This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by Jaime.
He raises the following issues for Resolution.
1. Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in accordance with law to the parties herein prior to the
celebration of the marriages in question;
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly applied and relied on the presumption of regularity of officials acts,
particularly the issuance of a marriage license, arising solely from the contents of the marriage contracts in question
which show on their face that a marriage license was purportedly issued by the Local Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro
Manila, and
3. Whether or not respondent could validly invoke/rely upon the presumption of validity of a marriage arising from
the admitted "fact of marriage."9
At the core of this controversy is the determination of whether or not the certifications from the Local Civil Registrar
of San Juan stating that no Marriage License No. 2770792 as appearing in the marriage contract of the parties was
issued, are sufficient to declare their marriage as null and void ab initio.
We agree with the Court of Appeals and rule in the negative.
Pertinent provisions of the Civil Code which was the law in force at the time of the marriage of the parties are Articles
53,10 5811 and 80.12
Based on the foregoing provisions, a marriage license is an essential requisite for the validity of marriage. The marriage
between Carmelita and Jaime is of no exception.
At first glance, this case can very well be easily dismissed as one involving a marriage that is null and void on the ground
of absence of a marriage license based on the certifications issued by the Local Civil Registar of San Juan. As ruled by
this Court in the case of Cariño v. Cariño13:
[A]s certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that such a certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a
marriage license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by the local civil
registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all date relative to the
issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has been sufficiently
overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and that they secured the
required marriage license. Although she was declared in default before the trial court, petitioner could have squarely
met the issue and explained the absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this
Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her
case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been
solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage
license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
The foregoing Decision giving probative value to the certifications issued by the Local Civil Registrar should be read in
line with the decision in the earlier case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,14 where it was held that:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular document
does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians
of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book
where they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date
the marriage license was issued and such other relevant data. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar must categorically state that the document does not
exist in his office or the particular entry could not be found in the register despite diligent search. Such certification
shall be sufficient proof of lack or absence of record as stated in Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – a written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an official record or
by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his
office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain
no such record or entry.
We shall now proceed to scrutinize whether the certifications by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan in connection
with Marriage License No. 2770792 complied with the foregoing requirements and deserved to be accorded probative
value.
The first Certification15 issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, was dated 11 March 1994. It
reads:
No Marriage License Number 2770792 were (sic) ever issued by this Office. With regards (sic) to Marriage License
Number 2880792,16 we exert all effort but we cannot find the said number.
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above problem.
San Juan, Metro Manila
March 11, 1994
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
Local Civil Registrar
The second certification17 was dated 20 September 1994 and provides:

This is to certify that no marriage license Number 2770792 were ever issued by this Office with regards to Marriage
License Number 2880792, we exert all effort but we cannot find the said number.
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above problem.
September 20, 1994
The third Certification,18 issued on 25 July 2000, states:
This is to certify that according to the records of this office, no Marriage License Application was filed and no Marriage
License No. 2770792 allegedly dated May 19, 1969 was issued by this Office to MR. JAIME O. SEVILLA and MS.
CARMELITA CARDENAS-SEVILLA.
This is to further certify that the said application and license do not exist in our Local Civil Registry Index and, therefore,
appear to be fictitious.
This certification is being issued upon the request of the interested party for whatever legal intent it may serve.

July 25, 2000
Note that the first two certifications bear the statement that "hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you
our full force locating the above problem." It could be easily implied from the said statement that the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar could not exert its best efforts to locate and determine the existence of Marriage License No.
2770792 due to its "loaded work." Likewise, both certifications failed to state with absolute certainty whether or not
such license was issued.
This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the representative from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San
Juan, Ms. Perlita Mercader, who stated that they cannot locate the logbook due to the fact that the person in charge
of the said logbook had already retired. Further, the testimony of the said person was not presented in evidence. It
does not appear on record that the former custodian of the logbook was deceased or missing, or that his testimony
could not be secured. This belies the claim that all efforts to locate the logbook or prove the material contents therein,
had been exerted.
As testified to by Perlita Mercader:
Q Under the subpoena duces tecum, you were required to bring to this Court among other things the register of
application of/or (sic) for marriage licenses received by the Office of the :Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Province of
Rizal, from January 19, 1969 to May 1969. Did you bring with you those records?
A I brought may 19, 1969, sir.
Q Is that the book requested of you under no. 3 of the request for subpoena?
A Meron pang January. I forgot, January . . .
Q Did you bring that with you?

A No, sir.
Q Why not?
A I cannot locate the book. This is the only book.
Q Will you please state if this is the register of marriage of marriage applications that your office maintains as required
by the manual of the office of the Local Civil Registrar?
COURT
May I see that book and the portion marked by the witness.
xxxx
COURT
Why don't you ask her direct question whether marriage license 2880792 is the number issued by their office while
with respect to license no. 2770792 the office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan is very definite about it it was
never issued. Then ask him how about no. 2880792 if the same was ever issued by their office. Did you ask this
2887092, but you could not find the record? But for the moment you cannot locate the books? Which is which now,
was this issued or not?
A The employee handling it is already retired, sir.19
Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost efforts were not exerted to locate the
logbook where Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been entered, the presumption of regularity of performance
of official function by the Local Civil Registrar in issuing the certifications, is effectively rebutted.
According to Section 3(m),20 Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed is among the disputable presumptions.
In one case, it was held:
A disputable presumption has been defined as a species of evidence that may be accepted and acted on where there
is no other evidence to uphold the contention for which it stands, or one which may be overcome by other evidence.
One such disputable/rebuttable presumption is that an official act or duty has been regularly performed. x x x.21
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to
perform a duty.22
The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty is disputable and can be overcome by other evidence as
in the case at bar where the presumption has been effectively defeated by the tenor of the first and second
certifications.
Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage License No. 2770792. It can
also mean, as we believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook just cannot be found. In the absence of showing of
diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, we cannot easily accept that absence of the same also means non-
existence or falsity of entries therein.
Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage, the
indissolubility of the marriage bonds.23 The courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly
repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.24
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the validity of the marriage.25
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and lived together for several years producing two
offsprings,26 now adults themselves. It took Jaime several years before he filed the petition for declaration of nullity.
Admittedly, he married another individual sometime in 1991.27 We are not ready to reward petitioner by declaring
the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and in the process allow him to profit from his own deceit and
perfidy.28
Our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution. Our family law is
based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested.
The State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break-up of families weakens our
social and moral fabric; hence, their preservation is not the concern of the family members alone.29
"The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is x x x marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a
civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact
married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption
established by our Code of Civil Procedure is `that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.' Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio – Always presume marriage."30
This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.31
By our failure to come to the succor of Jaime, we are not trifling with his emotion or deepest sentiments. As we have
said in Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco,32 regrettably, there are situations like this one, where neither law nor society
can provide the specific answers to every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 20
December 2004 and the Resolution dated 6 April 2005 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., J.J., concur.
Footnotes:
10 ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) a marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
11 ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those under Article
75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality
where either contracting party habitually resides.
12 ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxxx
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional charater.
G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and female. (Genesis 5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming from inside the bamboo. "Oh
North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. She pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a sudden,
the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came two human beings; one was a male and the other was a female. Amihan
named the man "Malakas" (Strong) and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize the changes made by a
physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a person’s sex? May a person successfully petition for a
change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and
sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-
105207, impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and
Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate
of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and
that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood.1 Feeling trapped in a man’s body, he consulted several
doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation.
His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment
surgery2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and
reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact
undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in
his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People’s Journal Tonight, a newspaper of general
circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks.3 Copies of the order were sent to the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to the petition was
made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American fiancé, Richard P.
Edel, as witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions read:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful
motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in consonance with the principles of
justice and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a woman,
now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing
and should not be in any way taken against him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community in
granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of
the petitioner and her [fiancé] and the realization of their dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present petition despite due notice and
publication thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any [o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the Civil Registrar of Manila to change
the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner, specifically for petitioner’s first name from "Rommel
Jacinto" to MELY and petitioner’s gender from "Male" to FEMALE. 5
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court
of Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex
alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the Republic. It ruled that the trial court’s
decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the
ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the Republic’s petition, set aside the
decision of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration
but it was denied.9 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407
to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.10
The petition lacks merit.
A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and sex. As found by the
trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful
motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became entitled to the civil registry
changes sought. We disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification.11 A change of
name is a privilege, not a right.12 Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes.13 In this connection, Article
376 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. – No entry in
a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and
change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar
or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for change
of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction
over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers.
The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of
Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an
administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied.15 It likewise lays down the
corresponding venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first
name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for change of first name or nickname may
be allowed in any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to
write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been
publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to make his first
name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change of name
does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status.18 RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground
of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may
only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling
reason justifying such change.19 In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official
name.20 In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true
and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name was not within that
court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it
could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided
under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name
does not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner’s petition in so
far as the change of his first name was concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the
statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical
errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings
and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
the correction of such errors.22 Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil
register.23
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing,
copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name
or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be
corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction
must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error.
It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those
provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:24
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring
marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation;
(15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur after
birth.25 However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction
on the ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to change means "to replace
something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute."26 The birth certificate
of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all
correct. No correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as legitimations,
acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births, marriages, naturalization and
deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages,
adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and
changes of name). These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal
capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex
reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned
by any law, expressly or impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and incapacities)
of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership.27
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not
ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. The
comprehensive term status… include such matters as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have
rights in general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation,
marriage, divorce, and sometimes even succession.28 (emphasis supplied)
A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal capacity and civil
status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioner’s
cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. – The declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth
or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a
birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local
civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by
either parent of the newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex
and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mother
alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; and (f) such other data as may be required in the
regulations to be issued.
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth.29
Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by
examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the
determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error,30 is immutable.31
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in the absence of
a contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil Register Law and laws
concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be understood in their common and ordinary
usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities
of structure and function that distinguish a male from a female"32 or "the distinction between male and female."33
Female is "the sex that produces ova or bears young"34 and male is "the sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa
for fertilizing ova."35 Thus, the words "male" and "female" in everyday understanding do not include persons who
have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-
known meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary."36 Since
the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be
argued that the term "sex" as used then is something alterable through surgery or something that allows a post-
operative male-to-female transsexual to be included in the category "female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the intervention
of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is
no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the Ground of Equity
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. It
believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences. First, even
the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first step towards his eventual marriage to his male
fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between
a man and a woman.37 One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a
male and a female.38 To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the
laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex
reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly
to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women,39 certain felonies under the Revised
Penal Code40 and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,41 among
others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if
petitioner’s petition were to be granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason
of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial
legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what guidelines should
govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly
important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based.
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or change of entries
in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented and what
procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment
the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down
the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be recognized as having
successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else.
The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch
of government, Congress.
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and [the] realization of
their dreams." No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation
do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is
indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by
the legislature, not by the courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna, Garcia, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
14 Under Section 2 (6) of RA 9048, "first name" refers to a name or nickname given to a person which may consist of
one or more names in addition to the middle names and last names. Thus, the term "first name" will be used here to
refer both to first name and nickname.
15 The last paragraph of Section 7 of RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 7. Duties and Powers of the Civil Registrar General. – xxx xxx xxx
Where the petition is denied by the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general, the petitioner may either
appeal the decision to the civil registrar general or file the appropriate petition with the proper court.
16 SECTION 3. Who May File the Petition and Where. – Any person having direct and personal interest in the correction
of a clerical or typographical error in an entry and/or change of first name or nickname in the civil register may file, in
person, a verified petition with the local civil registry office of the city or municipality where the record being sought
to be corrected or changed is kept.
In case the petitioner has already migrated to another place in the country and it would not be practical for such party,
in terms of transportation expenses, time and effort to appear in person before the local civil registrar keeping the
documents to be corrected or changed, the petition may be filed, in person, with the local civil registrar of the place
where the interested party is presently residing or domiciled. The two (2) local civil registrars concerned will then
communicate to facilitate the processing of the petition.
Citizens of the Philippines who are presently residing or domiciled in foreign countries may file their petition, in person,
with the nearest Philippine Consulates.
The petitions filed with the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general shall be processed in accordance with
this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
All petitions for the clerical or typographical errors and/or change of first names or nicknames may be availed of only
once.
17 SECTION 5. Form and Contents of the Petition. – The petition shall be in the form of an affidavit, subscribed and
sworn to before any person authorized by the law to administer oaths. The affidavit shall set forth facts necessary to
establish the merits of the petition and shall show affirmatively that the petitioner is competent to testify to the
matters stated. The petitioner shall state the particular erroneous entry or entries, which are sought to be corrected
and/or the change sought to be made.
The petition shall be supported with the following documents:
(1) A certified true machine copy of the certificate or of the page of the registry book containing the entry or entries
sought to be corrected or changed;
(2) At least two (2) public or private documents showing the correct entry or entries upon which the correction or
change shall be based; and
(3) Other documents which the petitioner or the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general may consider
relevant and necessary for the approval of the petition.
In case of change of first name or nickname, the petition shall likewise be supported with the documents mentioned
in the immediately preceding paragraph. In addition, the petition shall be published at least once a week for two (2)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. Furthermore, the petitioner shall submit a certification from
the appropriate law enforcement agencies that he has no pending case or no criminal record.
29 This, of course, should be taken in conjunction with Articles 407 and 412 of the Civil Code which authorizes the
recording of acts, events and judicial decrees or the correction or change of errors including those that occur after
birth. Nonetheless, in such cases, the entries in the certificates of birth are not be corrected or changed. The decision
of the court granting the petition shall be annotated in the certificates of birth and shall form part of the civil register
in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar. (Co v. Civil Register of Manila, supra note 24)
30 The error pertains to one where the birth attendant writes "male" or "female" but the genitals of the child are that
of the opposite sex.
31 Moreover, petitioner’s female anatomy is all man-made. The body that he inhabits is a male body in all aspects
other than what the physicians have supplied.
38 Article 2(1), Id.
39 These are Articles 130 to 138 of the Labor Code which include nightwork prohibition, facilities for women,
prohibition on discrimination and stipulation against marriage, among others.
40 These include Article 333 on adultery, Articles 337 to 339 on qualified seduction, simple seduction and acts of
lasciviousness with the consent of the offended party and Articles 342 and 343 on forcible and consented abduction,
among others.
A.M. No. MTJ-92-721 September 30, 1994
JUVY N. COSCA, EDMUNDO B. PERALTA, RAMON C. SAMBO, and APOLLO A. VILLAMORA, complainants,
vs.
HON. LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR., Presiding Judge, and NELIA B. ESMERALDA-BAROY, Clerk of Court II, both of the
Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, respondents.
Esteban R. Abonal for complainants.
Haide B. Vista-Gumba for respondents.
PER CURIAM, J.:
Complainants Juvy N. Cosca, Edmundo B. Peralta, Ramon C. Sambo, and Apollo Villamora, are Stenographer I,
Interpreter I, Clerk II, and Process Server, respectively, of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
Respondents Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr. and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy are respectively the Presiding Judge and
Clerk of Court II of the same court.
In an administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on October 5, 1992, herein respondents
were charged with the following offenses, to wit: (1) illegal solemnization of marriage; (2) falsification of the monthly
reports of cases; (3) bribery in consideration of an appointment in the court; (4) non-issuance of receipt for cash bond
received; (5) infidelity in the custody of detained prisoners; and (6) requiring payment of filing fees from exempted
entities. 1
Pursuant to a resolution issued by this Court respondents filed their respective Comments. 2 A Reply to Answers of
Respondents was filed by complainants. 3 The case was thereafter referred to Executive Judge David C. Naval of the
Regional Trial Court, Naga City, for investigation report and recommendation. The case was however transferred to
First Assistant Executive Judge Antonio N. Gerona when Judge Naval inhibited himself for the reason that his wife is a
cousin of respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. 4
The contending versions of the parties regarding the factual antecedents of this administrative matter, as culled from
the records thereof, are set out under each particular charge against respondents.
1. Illegal solemnization of marriage
Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the requisite marriage license. Thus,
the following couples were able to get married by the simple expedient of paying the marriage fees to respondent
Baroy, despite the absence of a marriage license, viz.: Alano P. Abellano and Nelly Edralin, Francisco Selpo and Julieta
Carrido, Eddie Terrobias and Maria Gacer, Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga, Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario,
and Sammy Bocaya and Gina Bismonte. As a consequence, their marriage contracts (Exhibits B, C, D, F, G, and A,
respectively) did not reflect any marriage license number. In addition, respondent judge did not sign their marriage
contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the reason being that he allegedly had to wait for the
marriage license to be submitted by the parties which was usually several days after the ceremony. Indubitably, the
marriage contracts were not filed with the local civil registrar. Complainant Ramon Sambo, who prepares the marriage
contracts, called the attention of respondents to the lack of marriage licenses and its effect on the marriages involved,
but the latter opted to proceed with the celebration of said marriages.
Respondent Nelia Baroy claims that when she was appointed Clerk of Court II, the employees of the court were already
hostile to her, especially complainant Ramon Sambo who told her that he was filing a protest against her appointment.
She avers that it was only lately when she discovered that the court had a marriage Register which is in the custody of
Sambo; that it was Sambo who failed to furnish the parties copies of the marriage contract and to register these with
the local civil registrar; and that apparently Sambo kept these marriage contracts in preparation for this administrative
case. Complainant Sambo, however, claims that all file copies of the marriage contracts were kept by respondent
Baroy, but the latter insists that she had instructed Sambo to follow up the submission by the contracting parties of
their marriage licenses as part of his duties but he failed to do so.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. contends that the marriage between Alano P. Abellano and Nelly Edralin falls under
Article 34 of the Civil Code, hence it is exempt from the marriage license requirement; that he gave strict instructions
to complainant Sambo to furnish the couple a copy of the marriage contract and to file the same with the civil registrar,
but the latter failed to do so; that in order to solve the problem, the spouses subsequently formalized their marriage
by securing a marriage license and executing their marriage contract, a copy of which was filed with the civil registrar;
that the other five marriages alluded to in the administrative complaint were not illegally solemnized because the
marriage contracts were not signed by him and they did not contain the date and place of marriage; that copies of
these marriage contracts are in the custody of complainant Sambo; that the alleged marriage of Francisco Selpo and
Julieta Carrido, Eddie Terrobias and Maria Emma Gaor, Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga, and of Arsenio Sabater and
Margarita Nacario were not celebrated by him since he refused to solemnize them in the absence of a marriage license;
that the marriage of Samy Bocaya and Gina Bismonte was celebrated even without the requisite license due to the
insistence of the parties in order to avoid embarrassment to their guests but that, at any rate, he did not sign their
marriage contract which remains unsigned up to the present.
2. Falsification of monthly report for July, 1991 regarding the number of marriages solemnized and the number
of documents notarized.
It is alleged that respondent judge made it appear that he solemnized seven (7) marriages in the month of July, 1992,
when in truth he did not do so or at most those marriages were null and void; that respondents likewise made it appear
that they have notarized only six (6) documents for July, 1992, but the Notarial Register will show that there were one
hundred thirteen (113) documents which were notarized during that month; and that respondents reported a notarial
fee of only P18.50 for each document, although in fact they collected P20.00 therefor and failed to account for the
difference.
Respondent Baroy contends, however, that the marriage registry where all marriages celebrated by respondent judge
are entered is under the exclusive control and custody of complainant Ramon Sambo, hence he is the only one who
should be held responsible for the entries made therein; that the reported marriages are merely based on the
payments made as solemnization fees which are in the custody of respondent Baroy. She further avers that it is Sambo
who is likewise the custodian of the Notarial Register; that she cannot be held accountable for whatever alleged
difference there is in the notarial fees because she is liable only for those payments tendered to her by Sambo himself;
that the notarial fees she collects are duly covered by receipts; that of the P20.00 charged, P18.50 is remitted directly
to the Supreme Court as part of the Judiciary Development Fund and P150 goes to the general fund of the Supreme
Court which is paid to the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Respondent theorizes that the
discrepancies in the monthly report were manipulated by complainant Sambo considering that he is the one in charge
of the preparation of the monthly report.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon avers that the erroneous number of marriages celebrated was intentionally placed by
complainant Sambo; that the number of marriages solemnized should not be based on solemnization fees paid for
that month since not all the marriages paid for are solemnized in the same month. He claims that there were actually
only six (6) documents notarized in the month of July, 1992 which tallied with the official receipts issued by the clerk
of court; that it is Sambo who should be held accountable for any unreceipted payment for notarial fees because he
is the one in charge of the Notarial Register; and that this case filed by complainant Sambo is merely in retaliation for
his failure to be appointed as the clerk of court. Furthermore, respondent judge contends that he is not the one
supervising or preparing the monthly report, and that he merely has the ministerial duty to sign the same.
3. Bribery in consideration of an appointment in the court
Complainants allege that because of the retirement of the clerk of court, respondent judge forwarded to the Supreme
Court the applications of Rodel Abogado, Ramon Sambo, and Jessell Abiog. However, they were surprised when
respondent Baroy reported for duty as clerk of court on October 21, 1991. They later found out that respondent Baroy
was the one appointed because she gave a brand-new air-conditioning unit to respondent judge.
Respondent Baroy claims that when she was still in Naga City she purchased an air-conditioning unit but when she was
appointed clerk of court she had to transfer to Tinambac and, since she no longer needed the air conditioner, she
decided to sell the same to respondent judge. The installation and use thereof by the latter in his office was with the
consent of the Mayor of Tinambac.
Respondent judge contends that he endorsed all the applications for the position of clerk of court to the Supreme
Court which has the sole authority over such appointments and that he had no hand in the appointment of respondent
Baroy. He contends that the air-conditioning unit was bought from his
co-respondent on installment basis on May 29, 1992, eight (8) months after Baroy had been appointed clerk of court.
He claims that he would not be that naive to exhibit to the public as item which could not be defended as a matter of
honor and prestige.
4. Cash bond issued without a receipt
It is alleged that in Criminal Case No. 5438, entitled "People vs. Mendeza, et al., "bondswoman Januaria Dacara was
allowed by respondent judge to change her property bond to cash bond; that she paid the amount of P1,000.00 but
was never issued a receipt therefor nor was it made to appear in the records that the bond has been paid; that despite
the lapse of two years, the money was never returned to the bondswoman; and that it has not been shown that the
money was turned over to the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac.
Respondent Baroy counters that the cash bond was deposited with the former clerk of court, then turned over to the
acting clerk of court and, later, given to her under a corresponding receipt; that the cash bond is deposited with the
bank; and that should the bondswoman desire to withdraw the same, she should follow the proper procedure
therefor.
Respondent judge contends that Criminal Case No. 5438 was archieved for failure of the bondsman to deliver the body
of the accused in court despite notice; and that he has nothing to do with the payment of the cash bond as this is the
duty of the clerk of court.
5. Infidelity in the custody of prisoners
Complainants contend that respondent judge usually got detention prisoners to work in his house, one of whom was
Alex Alano, who is accused in Criminal Case No. 5647 for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act; that while Alano was
in the custody of respondent judge, the former escaped and was never recaptured; that in order to conceal this fact,
the case was archived pursuant to an order issued by respondent judge dated April 6, 1992.
Respondent judge denied the accusation and claims that he never employed detention prisoners and that he has
adequate household help; and that he had to order the case archived because it had been pending for more than six
(6) months and the accused therein remained at large.
6. Unlawful collection of docket fees
Finally, respondents are charged with collecting docket fees from the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Inc.
although such entity is exempt by law from the payment of said fees, and that while the corresponding receipt was
issued, respondent Baroy failed to remit the amount to the Supreme Court and, instead, she deposited the same in
her personal account.
Respondents Baroy contends that it was Judge-Designate Felimon Montenegro (because respondent judge was on sick
leave) who instructed her to demand payment of docket fees from said rural bank; that the bank issued a check for
P800.00; that she was not allowed by the Philippine National Bank to encash the check and, instead, was instructed to
deposit the same in any bank account for clearing; that respondent deposited the same in her account; and that after
the check was cleared, she remitted P400.00 to the Supreme Court and the other P400.00 was paid to the Municipal
Treasurer of Tinambac.
On the basis of the foregoing contentions, First Vice-Executive Judge Antonio N. Gerona prepared and submitted to us
his Report and Recommendations dated May 20, 1994, together with the administrative matter. We have
perspicaciously reviewed the same and we are favorably impressed by the thorough and exhaustive presentation and
analysis of the facts and evidence in said report. We commend the investigating judge for his industry and perspicacity
reflected by his findings in said report which, being amply substantiated by the evidence and supported by logical
illations, we hereby approve and hereunder reproduce at length the material portions thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
The first charge against the respondents is illegal solemnization of marriage. Judge Palaypayon is charged with having
solemnized without a marriage license the marriage of Sammy Bocaya and Gina Besmonte (Exh. A). Alano Abellano
and Nelly Edralin (Exh. B), Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido (Exh. C), Eddie Terrobias and Maria Emma Gaor (Exh. D),
Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga (Exh. F) and Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario (Exh. G).
In all these aforementioned marriages, the blank space in the marriage contracts to show the number of the marriage
was solemnized as required by Article 22 of the Family Code were not filled up. While the contracting parties and their
witnesses signed their marriage contracts, Judge Palaypayon did not affix his signature in the marriage contracts,
except that of Abellano and Edralin when Judge Palaypayon signed their marriage certificate as he claims that he
solemnized this marriage under Article 34 of the Family Code of the Philippines. In said marriages the contracting
parties were not furnished a copy of their marriage contract and the Local Civil Registrar was not sent either a copy of
the marriage certificate as required by Article 23 of the Family Code.
The marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte is shown to have been solemnized by Judge Palaypayon without a marriage
license. The testimonies of Bocay himself and Pompeo Ariola, one of the witnesses of the marriage of Bocaya and
Besmonte, and the photographs taken when Judge Palaypayon solemnized their marriage (Exhs. K-3 to K-9) sufficiently
show that Judge Palaypayon really solemnized their marriage. Bocaya declared that they were advised by Judge
Palaypayon to return after ten (10) days after their marriage was solemnized and bring with them their marriage
license. In the meantime, they already started living together as husband and wife believing that the formal requisites
of marriage were complied with.
Judge Palaypayon denied that he solemnized the marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte because the parties allegedly did
not have a marriage license. He declared that in fact he did not sign the marriage certificate, there was no date stated
on it and both the parties and the Local Civil Registrar did not have a copy of the marriage certificate.
With respect to the photographs which show that he solemnized the marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte, Judge
Palaypayon explains that they merely show as if he was solemnizing the marriage. It was actually a simulated
solemnization of marriage and not a real one. This happened because of the pleading of the mother of one of the
contracting parties that he consent to be photographed to show that as if he was solemnizing the marriage as he was
told that the food for the wedding reception was already prepared, visitors were already invited and the place of the
parties where the reception would be held was more than twenty (20) kilometers away from the poblacion of
Tinambac.
The denial made by Judge Palaypayon is difficult to believe. The fact alone that he did not sign the marriage certificate
or contract, the same did not bear a date and the parties and the Local Civil Registrar were not furnished a copy of the
marriage certificate, do not by themselves show that he did not solemnize the marriage. His uncorroborated testimony
cannot prevail over the testimony of Bocaya and Ariola who also declared, among others, that Bocaya and his bride
were advised by Judge Palaypayon to return after ten (10) days with their marriage license and whose credibility had
not been impeached.
The pictures taken also from the start of the wedding ceremony up to the signing of the marriage certificate in front
of Judge Palaypayon and on his table (Exhs. K-3, K-3-a, K-3-b, K-3-c, K-4, K-4-a, K-4-b, K-4-c,
K-4-d, K-5, K-5-a, K-5-b, K-6, K-7, K-8, K-8-a and K-9), cannot possibly be just to show a simulated solemnization of
marriage. One or two pictures may convince a person of the explanation of Judge Palaypayon, but not all those
pictures.
Besides, as a judge it is very difficult to believe that Judge Palaypayon would allows himself to be photographed as if
he was solemnizing a marriage on a mere pleading of a person whom he did not even know for the alleged reasons
given. It would be highly improper and unbecoming of him to allow himself to be used as an instrument of deceit by
making it appear that Bocaya and Besmonte were married by him when in truth and in fact he did not solemnize their
marriage.
With respect to the marriage of Abellano and Edralin (Exh. B), Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized their
marriage, but he claims that it was under Article 34 of the Family Code, so a marriage license was not required. The
contracting parties here executed a joint affidavit that they have been living together as husband and wife for almost
six (6) years already (Exh. 12; Exh. AA).
In their marriage contract which did not bear any date either when it was solemnized, it was stated that Abellano was
only eighteen (18) years, two (2) months and seven (7) days old. If he and Edralin had been living together as husband
and wife for almost six (6) years already before they got married as they stated in their joint affidavit, Abellano must
ha(ve) been less than thirteen (13) years old when he started living with Edralin as his wife and this is hard to believe.
Judge Palaypayon should ha(ve) been aware of this when he solemnized their marriage as it was his duty to ascertain
the qualification of the contracting parties who might ha(ve) executed a false joint affidavit in order to have an instant
marriage by avoiding the marriage license requirement.
On May 23, 1992, however, after this case was already filed, Judge Palaypayon married again Abellano and Edralin,
this time with a marriage license (Exh. BB). The explanation given by Judge Palaypayon why he solemnized the marriage
of the same couple for the second time is that he did not consider the first marriage he solemnized under Article 34
of the Family Code as (a) marriage at all because complainant Ramon Sambo did not follow his instruction that the
date should be placed in the marriage certificate to show when he solemnized the marriage and that the contracting
parties were not furnished a copy of their marriage certificate.
This act of Judge Palaypayon of solemnizing the marriage of Abellano and Edralin for the second time with a marriage
license already only gave rise to the suspicion that the first time he solemnized the marriage it was only made to
appear that it was solemnized under exceptional character as there was not marriage license and Judge Palaypayon
had already signed the marriage certificate. If it was true that he solemnized the first marriage under exceptional
character where a marriage license was not required, why did he already require the parties to have a marriage license
when he solemnized their marriage for the second time?
The explanation of Judge Palaypayon that the first marriage of Abellano and Edralin was not a marriage at all as the
marriage certificate did not state the date when the marriage was solemnized and that the contracting parties were
not furnished a copy of their marriage certificate, is not well taken as they are not any of those grounds under Article(s)
35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code which declare a marriage void from the beginning. Even if no one, however,
received a copy of the marriage certificate, the marriage is still valid (Jones vs. H(o)rtiguela, 64 Phil. 179). Judge
Palaypayon cannot just absolve himself from responsibility by blaming his personnel. They are not the guardian(s) of
his official function and under Article 23 of the Family Code it is his duty to furnish the contracting parties (a) copy of
their marriage contract.
With respect to the marriage of Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido (Exh. C), and Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario
(Exh. G), Selpo and Carrido and Sabater and Nacarcio executed joint affidavits that Judge Palaypayon did not solemnize
their marriage (Exh. 13-A and Exh. 1). Both Carrido and Nacario testified for the respondents that actually Judge
Palaypayon did not solemnize their marriage as they did not have a marriage license. On cross-examination, however,
both admitted that they did not know who prepared their affidavits. They were just told, Carrido by a certain Charito
Palaypayon, and Nacario by a certain Kagawad Encinas, to just go to the Municipal building and sign their joint
affidavits there which were already prepared before the Municipal Mayor of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
With respect to the marriage of Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga (Exh. f), their marriage contract was signed by them
and by their two (2) witnesses, Atty. Elmer Brioso and respondent Baroy (Exhs. F-1 and F-2). Like the other
aforementioned marriages, the solemnization fee was also paid as shown by a receipt dated June 7, 1992 and signed
by respondent Baroy (Exh. F-4).
Judge Palaypayon also denied having solemnized the marriage of Gamay and Belga allegedly because there was no
marriage license. On her part, respondent Baroy at first denied that the marriage was solemnized. When she was
asked, however, why did she sign the marriage contract as a witness she answered that she thought the marriage was
already solemnized (TSN, p. 14; 10-28-93).
Respondent Baroy was, and is, the clerk of court of Judge Palaypayon. She signed the marriage contract of Gamay and
Belga as one of the two principal sponsors. Yet, she wanted to give the impression that she did not even know that
the marriage was solemnized by Judge Palaypayon. This is found very difficult to believe.
Judge Palaypayon made the same denial of having solemnized also the marriage of Terrobias and Gaor (Exh. D). The
contracting parties and their witnesses also signed the marriage contract and paid the solemnization fee, but Judge
Palaypayon allegedly did not solemnize their marriage due to lack of marriage license. Judge Palaypayon submitted
the affidavit of William Medina, Vice-Mayor of Tinambac, to corroborate his testimony (Exh. 14). Medina, however,
did not testify in this case and so his affidavit has no probative value.
Judge Palaypayon testified that his procedure and practice have been that before the contracting parties and their
witnesses enter his chamber in order to get married, he already required complainant Ramon Sambo to whom he
assigned the task of preparing the marriage contract, to already let the parties and their witnesses sign their marriage
contracts, as what happened to Gamay and Belga, and Terrobias and Gaor, among others. His purpose was to save his
precious time as he has been solemnizing marriages at the rate of three (3) to four (4) times everyday (TSN, p. 12;
2-1-94).
This alleged practice and procedure, if true, is highly improper and irregular, if not illegal, because the contracting
parties are supposed to be first asked by the solemnizing officer and declare that they take each other as husband and
wife before the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two (2) witnesses before they are supposed to sign their
marriage contracts (Art. 6, Family Code).
The uncorroborated testimony, however, of Judge Palaypayon as to his alleged practice and procedure before
solemnizing a marriage, is not true as shown by the picture taken during the wedding of Bocaya and Besmonte (Exhs.
K-3 to K-9) and by the testimony of respondent Baroy herself who declared that the practice of Judge Palaypayon ha(s)
been to let the contracting parties and their witnesses sign the marriage contract only after Judge Palaypayon has
solemnized their marriage (TSN, p. 53;
10-28-93).
Judge Palaypayon did not present any evidence to show also that he was really solemnizing three (3) to four (4)
marriages everyday. On the contrary his monthly report of cases for July, 1992 shows that his court had only twenty-
seven (27) pending cases and he solemnized only seven (7) marriages for the whole month (Exh. E). His monthly report
of cases for September, 1992 shows also that he solemnized only four (4) marriages during the whole month (Exh. 7).
In this first charge of having illegally solemnized marriages, respondent Judge Palaypayon has presented and marked
in evidence several marriage contracts of other persons, affidavits of persons and certification issued by the Local Civil
Registrar (Exhs. 12-B to 12-H). These persons who executed affidavits, however, did not testify in this case. Besides,
the marriage contracts and certification mentioned are immaterial as Judge Palaypayon is not charged of having
solemnized these marriages illegally also. He is not charged that the marriages he solemnized were all illegal.
The second charge against herein respondents, that of having falsified the monthly report of cases submitted to the
Supreme Court and not stating in the monthly report the actual number of documents notarized and issuing the
corresponding receipts of the notarial fees, have been sufficiently proven by the complainants insofar as the monthly
report of cases for July and September, 1992 are concerned.
The monthly report of cases of the MTC of Tinambac, Camarines Sur for July, 1992 both signed by the respondents,
show that for said month there were six (6) documents notarized by Judge Palaypayon in his capacity as Ex-Officio
Notary Public (Exhs. H to H-1-b). The notarial register of the MTC of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, however, shows that
there were actually one hundred thirteen (113) documents notarized by Judge Palaypayon for the said month (Exhs.
Q to Q-45).
Judge Palaypayon claims that there was no falsification of the monthly report of cases for July, 1992 because there
were only six (6) notarized documents that were paid (for) as shown by official receipts. He did not, however, present
evidence of the alleged official receipts showing that the notarial fee for the six (6) documetns were paid. Besides, the
monthly report of cases with respect to the number of documents notarized should not be based on how many
notarized documents were paid of the notarial fees, but the number of documents placed or recorded in the notarial
register.
Judge Palaypayon admitted that he was not personally verifying and checking anymore the correctness of the monthly
reports because he relies on his co-respondent who is the Clerk of Court and whom he has assumed to have checked
and verified the records. He merely signs the monthly report when it is already signed by respondent Baroy.
The explanation of Judge Palaypayon is not well taken because he is required to have close supervision in the
preparation of the monthly report of cases of which he certifies as to their correctness. As a judge he is personally
responsible for the proper discharge of his functions (The Phil. Trial Lawyer's Asso. Inc. vs. Agana, Sr., 102 SCRA 517).
In Nidera vs. Lazaro, 174 SCRA 581, it was held that "A judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or
mismanagement of his court personnel."
On the part of respondent Baroy, she puts the blame of the falsification of the monthly report of cases on complainant
Sambo whom she allegedly assigned to prepare not only the monthly report of cases, but the preparation and custody
of marriage contracts, notarized documents and the notarial register. By her own admission she has assigned to
complainant Sambo duties she was supposed to perform, yet according to her she never bother(ed) to check the
notarial register of the court to find out the number of documents notarized in a month (TSN, p. 30; 11-23-93).
Assuming that respondent Baroy assigned the preparation of the monthly report of cases to Sambo, which was denied
by the latter as he claims that he only typed the monthly report based on the data given to him by her, still it is her
duty to verify and check whether the report is correct.
The explanation of respondent Baroy that Sambo was the one in custody of marriage contracts, notarized documents
and notarial register, among other things, is not acceptable not only because as clerk of court she was supposed to be
in custody, control and supervision of all court records including documents and other properties of the court (p. 32,
Manual for Clerks of Court), but she herself admitted that from January, 1992 she was already in full control of all the
records of the court including receipts (TSN, p. 11; 11-23-93).
The evidence adduced in this cases in connection with the charge of falsification, however, also shows that respondent
Baroy did not account for what happened to the notarial fees received for those documents notarized during the
month of July and September, 1992. The evidence adduced in this case also sufficiently show that she received cash
bond deposits and she did not deposit them to a bank or to the Municipal Treasurer; and that she only issued
temporary receipts for said cash bond deposits.
For July, 1992 there were only six (6) documents reported to have been notarized by Judge Palaypayon although the
documents notarized for said month were actually one hundred thirteen (113) as recorded in the notarial register. For
September, 1992, there were only five (5) documents reported as notarized for that month, though the notarial
register show(s) that there were fifty-six (56) documents actually notarized. The fee for each document notarized as
appearing in the notarial register was P18.50. Respondent Baroy and Sambo declared that what was actually being
charged was P20.00. Respondent Baroy declared that P18.50 went to the Supreme Court and P1.50 was being turned
over to the Municipal Treasurer.
Baroy, however, did not present any evidence to show that she really sent to the Supreme Court the notarial fees of
P18.50 for each document notarized and to the Municipal Treasurer the additional notarial fee of P1.50. This should
be fully accounted for considering that Baroy herself declared that some notarial fees were allowed by her at her own
discretion to be paid later. Similarly, the solemnization fees have not been accounted for by Baroy considering that
she admitted that even (i)n those instances where the marriages were not solemnized due to lack of marriage license
the solemnization fees were not returned anymore, unless the contracting parties made a demand for their return.
Judge Palaypayon declared that he did not know of any instance when solemnization fee was returned when the
marriage was not solemnized due to lack of marriage license.
Respondent Baroy also claims that Ramon Sambo did not turn over to her some of the notarial fees. This is difficult to
believe. It was not only because Sambo vehemently denied it, but the minutes of the conference of the personnel of
the MTC of Tinambac dated January 20, 1992 shows that on that date Baroy informed the personnel of the court that
she was taking over the functions she assigned to Sambo, particularly the collection of legal fees (Exh. 7). The notarial
fees she claims that Sambo did not turn over to her were for those documents notarized (i)n July and September, 1992
already. Besides there never was any demand she made for Sambo to turn over some notarial fees supposedly in his
possession. Neither was there any memorandum she issued on this matter, in spite of the fact that she has been
holding meetings and issuing memoranda to the personnel of the court (Exhs. V, W, FF, FF-1, FF-2, FF-3; Exhs. 4-A
(supplement(s), 5-8, 6-S, 7-S and 8-S).
It is admitted by respondent Baroy that on October 29, 1991 a cash bond deposit of a certain Dacara in the amount of
One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos was turned over to her after she assumed office and for this cash bond she issued
only a temporary receipt (Exh. Y). She did not deposit this cash bond in any bank or to the Municipal Treasurer. She
just kept it in her own cash box on the alleged ground that the parties in that case where the cash bond was deposited
informed her that they would settle the case amicably.
Respondent Baroy declared that she finally deposited the aforementioned cash bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00)
Pesos with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) in February, 1993, after this administrative case was already filed
(TSN, pp. 27-28; 12-22-93). The Pass Book, however, shows that actually Baroy opened an account with the LBP, Naga
Branch, only on March 26, 1993 when she deposited an amount of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos (Exhs. 8 to 8-1-
a). She claims that One Thousand (P1,000.000) Pesos of the initial deposit was the cash bond of Dacara. If it were true,
it was only after keeping to herself the cash bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for around one year and five
months when she finally deposited it because of the filing of this case.
On April 29, 1993, or only one month and two days after she finally deposited the One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos
cash bond of Dacara, she withdrew it from the bank without any authority or order from the court. It was only on July
23, 1993, or after almost three (3) months after she withdrew it, when she redeposited said cash bond (TSN, p. 6; 1-4-
94).
The evidence presented in this case also show that on February 28, 1993 respondent Baroy received also a cash bond
of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos from a certain Alfredo Seprones in Crim. Case No. 5180. For this cash bond
deposit, respondent Baroy issued only an annumbered temporary receipt (Exh. X and X-1). Again Baroy just kept this
Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos cash bond to herself. She did not deposit it either (in) a bank or (with) the Municipal
Treasurer. Her explanation was that the parties in Crim. Case No. 5180 informed her that they would settle the case
amicably. It was on April 26, 1993, or almost two months later when Judge Palaypayon issued an order for the release
of said cash bond (Exh. 7).
Respondent Baroy also admitted that since she assumed office on October 21, 1991 she used to issue temporary
receipt only for cash bond deposits and other payments and collections she received. She further admitted that some
of these temporary receipts she issued she failed to place the number of the receipts such as that receipt marked
Exhibit X (TSN, p. 35; 11-23-93). Baroy claims that she did not know that she had to use the official receipts of the
Supreme Court. It was only from February, 1993, after this case was already filed, when she only started issuing official
receipts.
The next charge against the respondents is that in order to be appointed Clerk of Court, Baroy gave Judge Palaypayon
an air conditioner as a gift. The evidence adduced with respect to this charge, show that on August 24, 1991 Baroy
bought an air conditioner for the sum of Seventeen Thousand Six Hundred (P17,600.00) Pesos (Exhs. I and I-1). The
same was paid partly in cash and in check (Exhs. I-2 and I-3). When the air conditioner was brought to court in order
to be installed in the chamber of Judge Palaypayon, it was still placed in the same box when it was bought and was
not used yet.
The respondents claim that Baroy sold it to Judge Palaypayon for Twenty Thousand (P20,00.00) Pesos on installment
basis with a down payment of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos and as proof thereof the respondents presented a
typewritten receipt dated May 29, 1993 (Exh. 22). The receipt was signed by both respondents and by the Municipal
Mayor of Tinambac, Camarines Sur and another person as witness.
The alleged sale between respondents is not beyond suspicion. It was bought by Baroy at a time when she was applying
for the vacant position of Clerk of Court (to) which she was eventually appointed in October, 1991. From the time she
bought the air conditioner on August 24, 1991 until it was installed in the office of Judge Palaypayon it was not used
yet. The sale to Judge Palaypayon was only evidenced by a mere typewritten receipt dated May 29, 1992 when this
case was already filed. The receipt could have been easily prepared. The Municipal Mayor of Tinambac who signed in
the receipt as a witness did not testify in this case. The sale is between the Clerk of Court and the Judge of the same
court. All these circumstances give rise to suspicion of at least impropriety. Judges should avoid such action as would
subject (them) to suspicion and (their) conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety (Jaagueta vs.
Boncasos, 60 SCRA 27).
With respect to the charge that Judge Palaypayon received a cash bond deposit of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos
from Januaria Dacara without issuing a receipt, Dacara executed an affidavit regarding this charge that Judge
Palaypayon did not give her a receipt for the P1,000.00 cash bond she deposited (Exh. N). Her affidavit, however, has
no probative value as she did not show that this cash bond of P1,000.00 found its way into the hands of respondent
Baroy who issued only a temporary receipt for it and this has been discussed earlier.
Another charge against Judge Palaypayon is the getting of detention prisoners to work in his house and one of them
escaped while in his custody and was never found again. To hide this fact, the case against said accused was ordered
archived by Judge Palaypayon. The evidence adduced with respect to this particular charge, show that in Crim. Case
No. 5647 entitled People vs. Stephen Kalaw, Alex Alano and Allan Adupe, accused Alex Alano and Allan Adupe were
arrested on April 12, 1991 and placed in the municipal jail of Tinambac, Camarines Sur (Exhs. 0, 0-1, 0-2 and 0-3; Exh.
25). The evidence presented that Alex Alano was taken by Judge Palaypayon from the municipal jail where said accused
was confined and that he escaped while in custody of Judge Palaypayon is solely testimonial, particularly that of David
Ortiz, a former utility worker of the MTC of Tinambac.
Herein investigator finds said evidence not sufficient. The complainants should have presented records from the police
of Tinambac to show that Judge Palaypayon took out from the municipal jail Alex Alano where he was under detention
and said accused escaped while in the custody of Judge Palaypayon.
The order, however, of Judge Palaypayon dated April 6, 1992 in Crim. Case No. 5047 archiving said case appears to be
without basis. The order states: "this case was filed on April 12, 1991 and the records show that the warrant of arrest
(was) issued against the accused, but up to this moment there is no return of service for the warrant of arrest issued
against said accused" (Exh. 0-4). The records of said case, however, show that in fact there was a return of the service
of the warrant of arrest dated April 12, 1991 showing that Alano and Adupe were arrested (Exh. 0-3).
Judge Palaypayon explained that his order dated April 6, 1992 archiving Crim. Case No. 5047 referred only to one of
the accused who remained at large. The explanation cannot be accepted because the two other accused, Alano and
Adupe, were arrested. Judge Palaypayon should have issued an order for the arrest of Adupe who allegedly jumped
bail, but Alano was supposed to be confined in the municipal jail if his claim is true that he did not take custody of
Alano.
The explanation also of Judge Palaypayon why he ordered the case archived was because he heard from the police
that Alano escaped. This explanation is not acceptable either. He should ha(ve) set the case and if the police failed to
bring to court Alano, the former should have been required to explain in writing why Alano was not brought to court.
If the explanation was that Alano escaped from jail, he should have issued an order for his arrest. It is only later on
when he could not be arrested when the case should have been ordered archived. The order archiving this case for
the reason that he only heard that Alano escaped is another circumstance which gave rise to a suspicion that Alano
might have really escaped while in his custody only that the complainants could not present records or other
documentary evidence to prove the same.
The last charge against the respondents is that they collected filing fees on collection cases filed by the Rural Bank of
Tinambac, Camarines Sur which was supposed to be exempted in paying filing fees under existing laws and that the
filing fees received was deposited by respondent Baroy in her personal account in the bank. The evidence presented
show that on February 4, 1992 the Rural Bank of Tinambac filed ten (10) civil cases for collection against farmers and
it paid the total amount of Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos representing filing fees. The complainants cited Section 14
of Republic Act 720, as amended, which exempts Rural Banks (from) the payment of filing fees on collection of sums
of money cases filed against farmers on loans they obtained.
Judge Palaypayon, however, had nothing to do with the payment of the filing fees of the Rural Bank of Tinambac as it
was respondent Baroy who received them and besides, on February 4, 1992, he was on sick leave. On her part Baroy
claims that the bank paid voluntarily the filing fees. The records, however, shows that respondent Baroy sent a letter
to the manager of the bank dated January 28, 1992 to the effect that if the bank would not pay she would submit all
Rural Bank cases for dismissal (Annex 6, comment by respondent Baroy).
Respondent Baroy should have checked whether the Rural Bank of Tinambac was really exempt from the payment of
filing fees pursuant to Republic Act 720, as amended, instead of threatening the bank to have its cases be submitted
to the court in order to have them dismissed. Here the payment of the filing fees was made on February 4, 1992, but
the Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos was only turned over to the Municipal Treasurer on March 12, 1992. Here, there is
an undue delay again in complying with her obligation as accountable officer.
In view of the foregoing findings that the evidence presented by the complainants sufficiently show that respondent
Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr. had solemnized marriages, particularly that of Sammy Bocaya and Gina Besmonte,
without a marriage license, and that it having been shown that he did not comply with his duty in closely supervising
his clerk of court in the preparation of the monthly report of cases being submitted to the Supreme Court, particularly
for the months of July and September, 1992 where it has been proven that the reports for said two (2) months were
falsified with respect to the number of documents notarized, it is respectfully recommended that he be imposed a fine
of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS with a warning that the same or similar offenses will be more severely dealt
with.
The fact that Judge Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts or certificates of those marriages he solemnized
without a marriage license, there were no dates placed in the marriage contracts to show when they were solemnized,
the contracting parties were not furnished their marriage contracts and the Local Civil Registrar was not being sent
any copy of the marriage contract, will not absolve him from liability. By solemnizing alone a marriage without a
marriage license he as the solemnizing officer is the one responsible for the irregularity in not complying (with) the
formal requ(i)sites of marriage and under Article 4(3) of the Family Code of the Philippines, he shall be civilly, criminally
and administratively liable.
Judge Palaypayon is likewise liable for his negligence or failure to comply with his duty of closely supervising his clerk
of court in the performance of the latter's duties and functions, particularly the preparation of the monthly report of
cases (Bendesula vs. Laya, 58 SCRA 16). His explanation that he only signed the monthly report of cases only when his
clerk of court already signed the same, cannot be accepted. It is his duty to closely supervise her, to check and verify
the records if the monthly reports prepared by his clerk of court do not contain false statements. It was held that "A
judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or incompetence of court personnel (Nidua vs. Lazaro, 174 SCRA 158).
In view also of the foregoing finding that respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy, the clerk of court of the Municipal Trial
Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, has been found to have falsified the monthly report of cases for the months of July
and September, 1992 with respect to the number of documents notarized, for having failed to account (for) the
notarial fees she received for said two (2) months period; for having failed to account (for) the solemnization fees of
those marriages allegedly not solemnized, but the solemnization fees were not returned; for unauthorized issuance of
temporary receipts, some of which were issued unnumbered; for receiving the cash bond of Dacara on October 29,
1991 in the amount of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for which she issued only a temporary receipt (Exh. Y) and for
depositing it with the Land Bank of the Philippines only on March 26, 1993, or after one year and five months in her
possession and after this case was already filed; for withdrawing said cash bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos
on April 29, 1993 without any court order or authority and redepositing it only on July 23, 1993; for receiving a cash
bond of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos from Alfredo Seprones in Crim. Case No. 5180, MTC, Tinambac, Camarines
Sur, for which she issued only an unnumbered temporary receipt (Exhs. X and X-1) and for not depositing it with a
bank or with the Municipal Treasurer until it was ordered released; and for requiring the Rural Bank of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur to pay filing fees on February 4, 1992 for collection cases filed against farmers in the amount of Four
Hundred (P400.00) Pesos, but turning over said amount to the Municipal Treasurer only on March 12, 1992, it is
respectfully recommended that said respondent clerk of court Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy be dismissed from the service.
It is provided that "Withdrawal of court deposits shall be by the clerk of court who shall issue official receipt to the
provincial, city or municipal treasurer for the amount withdrawn. Court deposits cannot be withdrawn except by order
of the court, . . . ." (Revised Manual of Instructions for Treasurers, Sec. 183, 184 and 626; p. 127, Manual for Clerks of
Court). A circular also provides that the Clerks of Court shall immediately issue an official receipt upon receipt of
deposits from party litigants and thereafter deposit intact the collection with the municipal, city or provincial treasurer
and their deposits, can only be withdrawn upon proper receipt and order of the Court (DOJ Circular No. 52, 26 April
1968; p. 136, Manual for Clerks of Court). Supreme Court Memorandum Circular No. 5, 25 November 1982, also
provides that "all collections of funds of fiduciary character including rental deposits, shall be deposited immediately
by the clerk of court concerned upon receipt thereof with City, Municipal or Provincial Treasurer where his court is
located" and that "no withdrawal of any of such deposits shall be made except upon lawful order of the court
exercising jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Respondent Baroy had either failed to comply with the foregoing circulars, or deliberately disregarded, or even
intentionally violated them. By her conduct, she demonstrated her callous unconcern for the obligations and
responsibility of her duties and functions as a clerk of court and accountable officer. The gross neglect of her duties
shown by her constitute(s) a serious misconduct which warrant(s) her removal from office. In the case of Belen P.
Ferriola vs. Norma Hiam, Clerk of Court, MTCC, Branch I, Batangas City; A.M. No. P-90-414; August 9, 1993, it was held
that "The clerk of court is not authorized to keep funds in his/her custody; monies received by him/her shall be
deposited immediately upon receipt thereof with the City, Municipal or Provincial Treasurer. Supreme Court Circular
Nos. 5 dated November 25, 1982 and 5-A dated December 3, 1982. Respondent Hiam's failure to remit the cash bail
bonds and fine she collected constitutes serious misconduct and her misappropriation of said funds constitutes
dishonesty. "Respondent Norma Hiam was found guilty of dishonesty and serious misconduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service and (the Court) ordered her immediate dismissal (from) the service.
xxx xxx xxx
We here emphasize once again our adjuration that the conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office
charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with
the heavy burden of responsibility. His conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum
but, above all else, must be beyond suspicion. Every employee should be an example of integrity, uprightness and
honesty. 5 Integrity in a judicial office is more than a virtue, it is a necessity. 6 It applies, without qualification as to
rank or position, from the judge to the least of its personnel, they being standard-bearers of the exacting norms of
ethics and morality imposed upon a Court of justice.
On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code pertinently provides that the formal requisites of marriage
are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for therein. 7 Complementarily, it declares that the
absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab initio and that, while
an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for
the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. 8
The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected by the illegal marriages, and what we are
providing for herein pertains to the administrative liability of respondents, all without prejudice to their criminal
responsibility. The Revised Penal Code provides that "(p)riests or ministers of any religious denomination or sect, or
civil authorities who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance with
the provisions of the Marriage Law."9 This is of course, within the province of the prosecutorial agencies of the
Government.
The recommendation with respect to the administrative sanction to be imposed on respondent judge should,
therefore, be modified. For one, with respect to the charge of illegal solemnization of marriages, it does appear that
he had not taken to heart, but actually trifled with, the law's concern for the institution of marriage and the legal
effects flowing from civil status. This, and his undeniable participation in the other offenses charged as hereinbefore
narrated in detail, approximate such serious degree of misconduct and of gross negligence in the performance of
judicial duties as to ineludibly require a higher penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby imposes a FINE of P20,000.00 on respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon. Jr., with a
stern warning that any repetition of the same or similar offenses in the future will definitely be severely dealt with.
Respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits
and with prejudice to employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the Government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations.
Let copies of this decision be spread on their records and furnished to the Office of the Ombudsman for appropriate
action.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390 April 11, 2002
(Formerly IPI No. 01-1049-MTJ)
MERCEDITA MATA ARAÑES, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO, respondent.
PUNO, J.:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Arañes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law via a sworn Letter-
Complaint dated 23 May 2001. Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines
Sur. Petitioner alleges that on 17 February 2000, respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her late groom
Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his
territorial jurisdiction.
They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her husband passed away. However,
since the marriage was a nullity, petitioner's right to inherit the "vast properties" left by Orobia was not recognized.
She was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine
Navy.1âwphi1.nêt
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his illegal acts and unethical
misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much hardships, embarrassment and sufferings.
On 28 May 2001, the case was referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to then Acting Court Administrator Zenaida
N. Elepaño for appropriate action. On 8 June 2001, the Office of the Court Administrator required respondent judge
to comment.
In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge averred that he was requested by a certain Juan Arroyo on 15
February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17 February 2000. Having been assured that all the
documents to the marriage were complete, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala at the Municipal Trial Court
of Balatan, Camarines Sur. However, on 17 February 2000, Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a difficulty walking
and could not stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan which is located almost 25 kilometers from his residence in
Nabua. Arroyo then requested if respondent judge could solemnize the marriage in Nabua, to which request he
acceded.
Respondent judge further avers that before he started the ceremony, he carefully examined the documents submitted
to him by petitioner. When he discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage license, he refused
to solemnize the marriage and suggested its resetting to another date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the
parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage
out of human compassion. He also feared that if he reset the wedding, it might aggravate the physical condition of
Orobia who just suffered from a stroke. After the solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the marriage license
and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured
respondent judge that they would give the license to him in the afternoon of that same day. When they failed to
comply, respondent judge followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same reassurance that the
marriage license would be delivered to his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the contracting parties that their marriage is valid despite the absence
of a marriage license. He attributes the hardships and embarrassment suffered by the petitioner as due to her own
fault and negligence.
On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28 August 2001 with the Office of the Court
Administrator. She attested that respondent judge initially refused to solemnize her marriage due to the want of a
duly issued marriage license and that it was because of her prodding and reassurances that he eventually solemnized
the same. She confessed that she filed this administrative case out of rage. However, after reading the Comment filed
by respondent judge, she realized her own shortcomings and is now bothered by her conscience.
Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that petitioner and Orobia filed their Application for Marriage License on
5 January 2000. It was stamped in this Application that the marriage license shall be issued on 17 January 2000.
However, neither petitioner nor Orobia claimed it.
It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar General issued a Certification that it has no record of such marriage
that allegedly took place on 17 February 2000. Likewise, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur
issued another Certification dated 7 May 2001 that it cannot issue a true copy of the Marriage Contract of the parties
since it has no record of their marriage.
On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent judge so the latter could communicate with the Office
of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur for the issuance of her marriage license. Respondent judge wrote
the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur. In a letter dated 9 May 2001, a Clerk of said office, Grace T. Escobal,
informed respondent judge that their office cannot issue the marriage license due to the failure of Orobia to submit
the Death Certificate of his previous spouse.
The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report and Recommendation dated 15 November 2000, found the
respondent judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued marriage license and for doing so outside his
territorial jurisdiction. A fine of P5,000.00 was recommended to be imposed on respondent judge.
We agree.
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P. 129, the authority of the regional trial court judges and judges
of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme
Court.1âwphi1.nêt
The case at bar is not without precedent. In Navarro vs. Domagtoy,1 respondent judge held office and had jurisdiction
in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. However, he solemnized a wedding at his
residence in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte which did not fall within the jurisdictional area of the
municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos. We held that:
"A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to marry the faithful is authorized to do so only
within the area or diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has
jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the
law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only
within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a
resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the
marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability."2 (Emphasis supplied.)
In said case, we suspended respondent judge for six (6) months on the ground that his act of solemnizing a marriage
outside his jurisdiction constitutes gross ignorance of the law. We further held that:
"The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law they are sworn to
apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law.
It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in the instant case. x x x While
magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited
ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons."3
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines
Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law
and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly
solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on
marriage.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license. In People
vs. Lara,4 we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent
issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided
by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent
judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge
acted in gross ignorance of the law.1âwphi1.nêt
Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by petitioner. This Court has
consistently held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal of the complaint does not necessarily have the legal effect
of exonerating respondent from disciplinary action. Otherwise, the prompt and fair administration of justice, as well
as the discipline of court personnel, would be undermined.5 Disciplinary actions of this nature do not involve purely
private or personal matters. They can not be made to depend upon the will of every complainant who may, for one
reason or another, condone a detestable act. We cannot be bound by the unilateral act of a complainant in a matter
which involves the Court's constitutional power to discipline judges. Otherwise, that power may be put to naught,
undermine the trust character of a public office and impair the integrity and dignity of this Court as a disciplining
authority.6
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the
future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 145226 February 06, 2004
LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision1 dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed the judgment2 dated August 5, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol,
Branch 4, in Criminal Case No. 8688. The trial court found herein petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of bigamy and sentenced him to a prison term of seven (7) months of prision correccional as
minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. Also assailed in this petition is the resolution3
of the appellate court, dated September 25, 2000, denying Morigo’s motion for reconsideration.
The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as follows:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province
of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978).
After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other.
In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former replied and after
an exchange of letters, they became sweethearts.
In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they maintained
constant communication.
In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to
get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.
On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for divorce against appellant which
was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992.
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago4 at the Virgen sa Barangay Parish,
Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial
Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The complaint seek (sic) among others, the declaration of nullity of
accused’s marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.
On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information5 filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran
[City], with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.6
The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for judicial nullification of
his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion was granted, but subsequently
denied upon motion for reconsideration by the prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case, which was docketed
as Criminal Case No. 8688, herein petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued.
On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in Criminal Case No. 8688, as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Bigamy and sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from Seven (7) Months
of Prision Correccional as minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor as maximum.
SO ORDERED.7
In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioner’s claim that his first marriage to Lucia was null and
void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals,8 the trial court ruled that want of a valid marriage ceremony is
not a defense in a charge of bigamy. The parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is
void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can
be allowed to marry again.
Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez v. Gmur,9 which held that the court of a
country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and in which one or both spouses may resort merely for the
purpose of obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial status of the parties. As such, a
divorce granted by said court is not entitled to recognition anywhere. Debunking Lucio’s defense of good faith in
contracting the second marriage, the trial court stressed that following People v. Bitdu,10 everyone is presumed to
know the law, and the fact that one does not know that his act constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him
from the consequences thereof.
Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 20700.
Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before the appellate court, the trial
court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since
no marriage ceremony actually took place. No appeal was taken from this decision, which then became final and
executory.
On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.11
In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that the subsequent declaration of nullity
of Lucio’s marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could not acquit Lucio. The reason is that what is sought to be
punished by Article 34912 of the Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a second marriage before the first
marriage had been dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact that the first marriage was void from the beginning is not a
valid defense in a bigamy case.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from the Canadian court could not be
accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 1513 of the Civil Code and given the fact that it is contrary to
public policy in this jurisdiction. Under Article 1714 of the Civil Code, a declaration of public policy cannot be rendered
ineffectual by a judgment promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision, contending that the doctrine in Mendiola v.
People,15 allows mistake upon a difficult question of law (such as the effect of a foreign divorce decree) to be a basis
for good faith.
On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of merit.16 However, the denial was by a split
vote. The ponente of the appellate court’s original decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined
in the opinion prepared by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis. The dissent observed that as the first marriage was validly
declared void ab initio, then there was no first marriage to speak of. Since the date of the nullity retroacts to the date
of the first marriage and since herein petitioner was, in the eyes of the law, never married, he cannot be convicted
beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.
The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT IN CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER
THE REVISED PENAL CODE, CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE. COROLLARILY, WHETHER OR NOT THE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE [THE] PETITIONER’S LACK OF CRIMINAL INTENT WHEN HE
CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58 PHIL. 817)
IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT EACH AND EVERY
CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING THE INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.17
To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether his
defense of good faith is valid.
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the divorce decree of the Ontario
court. He highlights the fact that he contracted the second marriage openly and publicly, which a person intent upon
bigamy would not be doing. The petitioner further argues that his lack of criminal intent is material to a conviction or
acquittal in the instant case. The crime of bigamy, just like other felonies punished under the Revised Penal Code, is
mala in se, and hence, good faith and lack of criminal intent are allowed as a complete defense. He stresses that there
is a difference between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not
necessarily follow that his intention to contract a second marriage is tantamount to an intent to commit bigamy.
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good faith in the instant case is a convenient
but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies upon our ruling in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,18 which held that bigamy
can be successfully prosecuted provided all the elements concur, stressing that under Article 4019 of the Family Code,
a judicial declaration of nullity is a must before a party may re-marry. Whether or not the petitioner was aware of said
Article 40 is of no account as everyone is presumed to know the law. The OSG counters that petitioner’s contention
that he was in good faith because he relied on the divorce decree of the Ontario court is negated by his act of filing
Civil Case No. 6020, seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lucia.
Before we delve into petitioner’s defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent, we must first determine whether
all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,20 we laid down the elements of bigamy
thus:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not
been judicially declared presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first.
Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendency of CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, the RTC of
Bohol Branch 1, handed down the following decision in Civil Case No. 6020, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the annulment of the marriage entered
into by petitioner Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol and further directing the Local
Civil Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to effect the cancellation of the marriage contract.
SO ORDERED.21
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing
officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a
solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 322 and
423 of the Family Code. As the dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, "This simply means that
there was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In
other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab
initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married."24
The records show that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the
decision had long become final and executory.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this case,
legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under
the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from the
beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for
legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The
existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that
a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must,
perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.
The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan.25 In the latter case, the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtained after the second marriage was already celebrated.
We held therein that:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted.
One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This
principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes as "void."26
It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized not just once, but twice: first
before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued and then again six months later before a priest in religious
rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to have transpired, although later declared void ab initio.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer.
Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage
contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone,
without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable
for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in favor of an accused and
weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the
circumstances of the present case, we held that petitioner has not committed bigamy. Further, we also find that we
need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and
academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of the appellate court dated September 25, 2000, denying herein
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is
ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on the ground that his guilt has not been proven with moral certainty.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
5 The accusatory portion of the charge sheet found in Records, p. 1, reads:
"That, on or about the 4th day of October, 1992, in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being previously united in lawful marriage with Lucia Barrete on
August 23, 1990 and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously contract a second marriage with Maria Jececha Limbago to the damage and prejudice of Lucia Barrete
in the amount to be proved during trial.
"Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code."
12 ART. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
13 Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
14 Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws
of the country in which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in
a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public
policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations
or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
18 G.R. No. 138509, 31 July 2000, 336 SCRA 747, 752-753.
19 Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely
of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
22 Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing
officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than
two witnesses of legal age.
23 Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as
stated in Article 35 (2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible
for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
G.R. No. 167746 August 28, 2007
RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA, Petitioner,
vs.
ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Restituto Alcantara assailing the Decision1 of
the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66724 denying petitioner’s appeal and affirming the
decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 143, in Civil Case No. 97-1325 dated 14 February
2000, dismissing his petition for annulment of marriage.
The antecedent facts are:
A petition for annulment of marriage3 was filed by petitioner against respondent Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that on
8 December 1982 he and respondent, without securing the required marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for
the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged
their wedding before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel.4 They got
married on the same day, 8 December 1982. Petitioner and respondent went through another marriage ceremony at
the San Jose de Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise celebrated without
the parties securing a marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the
marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply
for a license with the local civil registrar of the said place. On 14 October 1985, respondent gave birth to their child
Rose Ann Alcantara. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing,
judgment be issued declaring their marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage
contract5 and its entry on file.6
Answering petitioner’s petition for annulment of marriage, respondent asserts the validity of their marriage and
maintains that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry
of Carmona, Cavite. Contrary to petitioner’s representation, respondent gave birth to their first child named Rose Ann
Alcantara on 14 October 1985 and to another daughter named Rachel Ann Alcantara on 27 October 1992.7 Petitioner
has a mistress with whom he has three children.8 Petitioner only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade
prosecution for concubinage.9 Respondent, in fact, has filed a case for concubinage against petitioner before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 60.10 Respondent prays that the petition for annulment of
marriage be denied for lack of merit.
On 14 February 2000, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143, rendered its Decision disposing as follows:
The foregoing considered, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit;
2. Petitioner is ordered to pay respondent the sum of twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) per month as support for
their two (2) children on the first five (5) days of each month; and
3. To pay the costs.11
As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the petitioner’s appeal. His Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied in a resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 6 April 2005.12
The Court of Appeals held that the marriage license of the parties is presumed to be regularly issued and petitioner
had not presented any evidence to overcome the presumption. Moreover, the parties’ marriage contract being a
public document is a prima facie proof of the questioned marriage under Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.13
In his Petition before this Court, petitioner raises the following issues for resolution:
a. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it ruled that the Petition for Annulment has no
legal and factual basis despite the evidence on record that there was no marriage license at the precise moment of
the solemnization of the marriage.
b. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it gave weight to the Marriage License No.
7054133 despite the fact that the same was not identified and offered as evidence during the trial, and was not the
Marriage license number appearing on the face of the marriage contract.
c. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to apply the ruling laid down by this
Honorable Court in the case of Sy vs. Court of Appeals. (G.R. No. 127263, 12 April 2000 [330 SCRA 550]).
d. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to relax the observance of procedural
rules to protect and promote the substantial rights of the party litigants.14
We deny the petition.
Petitioner submits that at the precise time that his marriage with the respondent was celebrated, there was no
marriage license because he and respondent just went to the Manila City Hall and dealt with a "fixer" who arranged
everything for them.15 The wedding took place at the stairs in Manila City Hall and not in CDCC BR Chapel where Rev.
Aquilino Navarro who solemnized the marriage belongs.16 He and respondent did not go to Carmona, Cavite, to apply
for a marriage license. Assuming a marriage license from Carmona, Cavite, was issued to them, neither he nor the
respondent was a resident of the place. The certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, cannot
be given weight because the certification states that "Marriage License number 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr.
Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario"17 but their marriage contract bears the number 7054033 for their
marriage license number.
The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 8 December 1982, or prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code, the applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its
celebration.
A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the
marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)18 in relation to Article 58 of the same Code.19
Article 53 of the Civil Code20 which was the law applicable at the time of the marriage of the parties states:
Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State’s demonstration of its involvement and participation
in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested.21
Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his marriage. The cases where
the court considered the absence of a marriage license as a ground for considering the marriage void are clear-cut.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,22 the Local Civil Registrar issued a certification of due search and
inability to find a record or entry to the effect that Marriage License No. 3196182 was issued to the parties. The Court
held that the certification of "due search and inability to find" a record or entry as to the purported marriage license,
issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a
record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Based on said certification, the Court held that there
is absence of a marriage license that would render the marriage void ab initio.
In Cariño v. Cariño,23 the Court considered the marriage of therein petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased Santiago
S. Carino as void ab initio. The records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no
marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no
record of such marriage license. The court held that the certification issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to
prove the non-issuance of the marriage license. Their marriage having been solemnized without the necessary
marriage license and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, the marriage of
the petitioner and the deceased is undoubtedly void ab initio.
In Sy v. Court of Appeals,24 the marriage license was issued on 17 September 1974, almost one year after the
ceremony took place on 15 November 1973. The Court held that the ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was
indeed contracted without a marriage license.
In all these cases, there was clearly an absence of a marriage license which rendered the marriage void.
Clearly, from these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license,
the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very
least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties.
In this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. A
certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite.25 The certification moreover
is precise in that it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto
Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein.
The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz of Carmona, Cavite, reads:
This is to certify that as per the registry Records of Marriage filed in this office, Marriage License No. 7054133 was
issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario on December 8, 1982.
This Certification is being issued upon the request of Mrs. Rosita A. Alcantara for whatever legal purpose or intents it
may serve.26
This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the issuance of the
marriage license was done in the regular conduct of official business.27 The presumption of regularity of official acts
may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. However, the presumption prevails
until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is
rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption and, in
case of doubt as to an officer’s act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness.28
Significantly, apart from these, petitioner, by counsel, admitted that a marriage license was, indeed, issued in
Carmona, Cavite.29
Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims that neither he nor
respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is no sufficient basis to annul petitioner
and respondent’s marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the
contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion
of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage.30
An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible
for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable.31
Again, petitioner harps on the discrepancy between the marriage license number in the certification of the Municipal
Civil Registrar, which states that the marriage license issued to the parties is No. 7054133, while the marriage contract
states that the marriage license number of the parties is number 7054033. Once more, this argument fails to sway us.
It is not impossible to assume that the same is a mere a typographical error, as a closer scrutiny of the marriage
contract reveals the overlapping of the numbers 0 and 1, such that the marriage license may read either as 7054133
or 7054033. It therefore does not detract from our conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of said marriage
license to the parties.
Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean hands,32 petitioner cannot pretend that he
was not responsible or a party to the marriage celebration which he now insists took place without the requisite
marriage license. Petitioner admitted that the civil marriage took place because he "initiated it."33 Petitioner is an
educated person. He is a mechanical engineer by profession. He knowingly and voluntarily went to the Manila City Hall
and likewise, knowingly and voluntarily, went through a marriage ceremony. He cannot benefit from his action and be
allowed to extricate himself from the marriage bond at his mere say-so when the situation is no longer palatable to
his taste or suited to his lifestyle. We cannot countenance such effrontery. His attempt to make a mockery of the
institution of marriage betrays his bad faith.34
Petitioner and respondent went through a marriage ceremony twice in a span of less than one year utilizing the same
marriage license. There is no claim that he went through the second wedding ceremony in church under duress or
with a gun to his head. Everything was executed without nary a whimper on the part of the petitioner.lavvphi1
In fact, for the second wedding of petitioner and respondent, they presented to the San Jose de Manuguit Church the
marriage contract executed during the previous wedding ceremony before the Manila City Hall. This is confirmed in
petitioner’s testimony as follows—
WITNESS
As I remember your honor, they asked us to get the necessary document prior to the wedding.
COURT
What particular document did the church asked you to produce? I am referring to the San Jose de Manuguit church.
WITNESS
I don’t remember your honor.

COURT
Were you asked by the church to present a Marriage License?
WITNESS
I think they asked us for documents and I said we have already a Marriage Contract and I don’t know if it is good
enough for the marriage and they accepted it your honor.
COURT
In other words, you represented to the San Jose de Manuguit church that you have with you already a Marriage
Contract?
WITNESS
Yes your honor.
COURT
That is why the San Jose de Manuguit church copied the same marriage License in the Marriage Contract issued which
Marriage License is Number 7054033.
WITNESS
Yes your honor.35

The logical conclusion is that petitioner was amenable and a willing participant to all that took place at that time.
Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage, thereby cleansing whatever irregularity or
defect attended the civil wedding.36
Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner -- that they appeared before a "fixer" who arranged everything for them and
who facilitated the ceremony before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC Br Chapel -
- will not strengthen his posture. The authority of the officer or clergyman shown to have performed a marriage
ceremony will be presumed in the absence of any showing to the contrary.37 Moreover, the solemnizing officer is not
duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil
registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has been issued by the competent official, and
it may be presumed from the issuance of the license that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the
contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law.38
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the validity of the marriage.39 Every
intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this presumption
with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.
Wherefore, premises considered, the instant Petition is Denied for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 30 September 2004 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 143 of Makati City, dated 14
February 2000, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
13 Sec. 44. Entries in official records. – Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer
of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of
the facts therein stated.
18 (3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character.
19 Art. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those under article
75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality
where either contracting party habitually resides.
20 Now Article 3 of the Family Code.
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated
in Article 35.
25 Article 70 of the Civil Code, now Article 25 Family Code, provides:
The local civil registrar concerned shall enter all applications for marriage licenses filed with him in a register book
strictly in the order in which the same shall be received. He shall enter in said register the names of the applicants, the
dates on which the marriage license was issued, and such other data as may be necessary.
G.R. No. 191425 September 7, 2011
ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
G.R. No. 191425 is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 promulgated on 30 September 2009 as well as the
Resolution3 promulgated on 23 February 2010 by the Court of Appeals (appellate court) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31538. The
appellate court affirmed the 19 November 2007 Decision4 of Branch 215 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
(trial court) in Criminal Case No. Q-04-129031.
The trial court found accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. (Nollora) guilty of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment. Co-accused Rowena Geraldino (Geraldino) was acquitted for the
prosecution’s failure to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Facts
The appellate court recited the facts as follows:
On August 24, 2004, Assistant City Prosecutor Raymond Jonathan B. Lledo filed an Information against Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr. ("Nollora") and Rowena P. Geraldino ("Geraldino") for the crime of Bigamy. The accusatory portion of the
Information reads:
"That on or about the 8th day of December 2001 in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused ATILANO O.
NOLLORA, JR., being then legally married to one JESUSA PINAT NOLLORA, and as said marriage has not been legally
dissolved and still subsisting, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a subsequent or second
marriage with her [sic] co-accused ROWENA P. GERALDINO, who knowingly consented and agreed to be married to
her co-accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR. knowing him to be a married man, to the damage and prejudice of the said
offended party JESUSA PINAT NOLLORA."
Upon his arraignment on April 18, 2005, accused Nollora assisted by counsel, refused to enter his plea. Hence, a plea
of not guilty was entered by the Court for him. Accused Geraldino, on the other hand, entered a plea of not guilty
when arraigned on June 14, 2005. On even date, pre-trial conference was held and both the prosecution and defense
entered the following stipulation of facts:
"1. the validity of the first marriage between Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. and Jesusa Pinat Nollora solemnized on April 6,
1999 at Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte;
2. that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted the second marriage with Rowena P. Geraldino on December 8, 2001 in
Quezon City;
3. that in the Counter-Affidavit of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., he admitted that he contracted the second marriage to
Rowena P. Geraldino;
4. that Rowena P. Geraldino attached to her Counter-Affidavit the Certificate of Marriage with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
dated December 8, 2001;
5. the fact of marriage of Rowena P. Geraldino with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. as admitted in her Counter-Affidavit."
The only issue thus proffered by the prosecution for the RTC’s resolution is whether or not the second marriage is
bigamous. Afterwards, pre-trial conference was terminated and the case was set for initial hearing. Thereafter, trial
ensued.
Evidence for the Prosecution
As culled from the herein assailed Decision, the respective testimonies of prosecution witnesses were as follows:
"xxx (W)itness Jesusa Pinat Nollora xxx testified that she and accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. met in Saudi Arabia while
she was working there as a Staff Midwife in King Abdulah Naval Base Hospital. Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. courted her and
on April 6, 1999, they got married at the [IE]MELIF Chruch [sic] in Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan (Exhibit
‘A’). While working in said hospital, she heard rumors that her husband has another wife and because of anxiety and
emotional stress, she left Saudi Arabia and returned to the Philippines (TSN, October 4, 2005, page 10). Upon arrival
in the Philippines, the private complainant learned that indeed, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted a second marriage
with co-accused Rowena P. Geraldino on December 8, 2001 (Exhibit ‘B’) when she secured a certification as to the civil
status of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. (Exhibit ‘C’) from the National Statistics Office (NSO) sometime in November 2003.
Upon learning this information, the private complainant confronted Rowena P. Geraldino at the latter’s workplace in
CBW, FTI, Taguig and asked her if she knew of the first marriage between complainant and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. to
which Rowena P. Geraldino allegedly affirmed and despite this knowledge, she allegedly still married Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr. because she loves him so much and because they were neighbors and childhood friends. Private
complainant also knew that Rowena P. Geraldino knew of her marriage with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., because when she
(private complainant) was brought by Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. at the latter’s residence in Taguig, Metro Manila and
introduced her to Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.’s parents, Rowena P. Geraldino was there in the house together with a friend
and she heard everything that they were talking about.
Because of this case, private complainant was not able to return to Saudi Arabia to work as a Staff Midwife thereby
losing income opportunity in the amount of ₱34,000.00 a month, more or less. When asked about the moral damages
she suffered, she declared that what happened to her was a tragedy and she had entertained [thoughts] of committing
suicide. She added that because of what happened to her, her mother died and she almost got raped when Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr. left her alone in their residence in Saudi Arabia. However, she declared that money is not enough to assuage
her sufferings. Instead, she just asked for the return of her money in the amount of ₱50,000.00 (TSN, July 26, 2005,
pages 4-14).
Prosecution witness Ruth Santos testified that she knew of the marriage between the private complainant and Atilano
O. Nollora, Jr., because she was one of the sponsors in said wedding. Sometime in November 2003, she was asked by
the private complainant to accompany the latter to the workplace of Rowena P. Geraldino in FTI, Taguig, Metro Manila.
She declared that the private complainant and Rowena P. Geraldino had a confrontation and she heard that Rowena
P. Geraldino admitted that she (Rowena) knew of the first marriage of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. and the private
complainant but she still went on to marry Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. because she loves him very much (TSN, October 24,
2005, pages 3-5).
Evidence for the Defense
The defense’s version of facts, as summarized in the herein assailed Decision, is as follows:
"Accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. admitted having contracted two (2) marriages, the first with private complainant
Jesusa Pinat and the second with Rowena P. Geraldino. He, however, claimed that he was a Muslim convert way back
on January 10, 1992, even before he contracted the first marriage with the private complainant. As a [M]uslim convert,
he is allegedly entitled to marry four (4) wives as allowed under the Muslim or Islam belief.
To prove that he is a Muslim convert even prior to his marriage to the private complainant, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
presented a Certificate of Conversion dated August 2, 2004 issued by one Hadji Abdul Kajar Madueño and approved
by one Khad Ibrahim A. Alyamin wherein it is stated that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. allegedly converted as a Muslim since
January 19, 1992 (Exhibit ‘2,’ ‘3’ and ‘4’). Aside from said certificate, he also presented a Pledge of Conversion dated
January 10, 1992 issued by the same Hadji Abdul Kajar Madueño and approved by one Khad Ibrahim A. Alyamin (Exhibit
‘7’).
He claimed that the private complaint knew that he was a Muslim convert prior to their marriage because she [sic]
told this fact when he was courting her in Saudi Arabia and the reason why said private complainant filed the instant
case was due to hatred having learned of his second marriage with Rowena P. Geraldino. She [sic] further testified
that Rowena P. Geraldino was not aware of his first marriage with the private complainant and he did not tell her this
fact because Rowena P. Geraldino is a Catholic and he does not want to lose her if she learns of his first marriage.
He explained that in his Marriage Contract with Jesusa Pinat, it is indicated that he was a ‘Catholic Pentecostal’ but
that he was not aware why it was placed as such on said contract. In his Marriage Contract with Rowena P. Geraldino,
the religion ‘Catholic’ was also indicated because he was keeping as a secret his being a Muslim since the society does
not approve of marrying a Muslim. He also indicated that he was ‘single’ despite his first marriage to keep said first
marriage a secret (TSN, January 30, 2006, pages 2-13).
Defense witness Hadji Abdul Qasar Madueño testified that he is the founder and president of Balik Islam Tableegh
Foundation of the Philippines and as such president, he has the power and authority to convert any applicant to the
Muslim religion. He alleged that sometime in 1992, he met accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. in Mabini (Manila) who was
then going abroad. Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. applied to become a Muslim (Exhibit ‘14’) and after receiving the application,
said accused was indoctrinated regarding his obligations as a Muslim. On January 10, 1992, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
embraced the Muslim faith. He was then directed to report every Sunday to monitor his development.
In the year 2004, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. visited him and asked for a certification because of the filing of the instant case.
On October 2, 2004, he issued a Certificate of Conversion wherein it is stated that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. is a Muslim
convert since January 10, 1992. Apart from the above-mentioned document, their ‘Imam’ also issued a Pledge of
Conversion (Exhibit ‘7’). He declared that a Muslim convert could marry more than one according to the Holy Koran.
However, before marrying his second, third and fourth wives, it is required that the consent of the first Muslim wife
be secured. Thus, if the first wife is not a Muslim, there is no necessity to secure her consent (TSN, October 9, 2006,
pages 2-12).
During his cross-examinations, he declared that if a Muslim convert gets married not in accordance with the Muslim
faith, the same is contrary to the teachings of the Muslim faith. A Muslim also can marry up to four times but he should
be able to treat them equally. He claimed that he was not aware of the first marriage but was aware of the second.
Since his second marriage with Rowena P. Geraldino was not in accordance with the Muslim faith, he advised Atilano
O. Nollora, Jr. to re-marry Rowena P. Geraldino in accordance with Muslim marriage celebration, otherwise, he will
not be considered as a true Muslim (TSN, June 25, 2007, pages 3-7).
Accused Rowena P. Geraldino alleged that she was only a victim in this incident of bigamous marriage. She claimed
that she does not know the private complainant Jesusa Pinat Nollora and only came to know her when this case was
filed. She insists that she is the one lawfully married to Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., having been married to the latter since
December 8, 2001. Upon learning that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted a first marriage with the private complainant,
she confronted the former who admitted the said marriage. Prior to their marriage, she asked Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. if
he was single and the latter responded that he was single. She also knew that her husband was a Catholic prior to their
marriage but after she learned of the first marriage of her husband, she learned that he is a Muslim convert. She also
claimed that after learning that her husband was a Muslim convert, she and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., also got married in
accordance with the Muslim rites. She also belied the allegations of the private complainant that she was sought by
the private complainant and that they had a confrontation where she admitted that she knew that Atilano O. Nollora,
Jr. was married to the private complainant and despite this knowledge, she went on to marry him because she loved
him very much. She insisted that she only came to know the private complainant when she (private complainant) filed
this case (TSN, August 14, 2007, pages 2-8)."5
The Trial Court’s Ruling
In its Decision6 dated 19 November 2007, the trial court convicted Nollora and acquitted Geraldino.
The trial court stated that there are only two exceptions to prosecution for bigamy: Article 417 of the Family Code, or
Executive Order No. 209, and Article 1808 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, or Presidential
Decree No. 1083. The trial court also cited Article 27 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, which
provides the qualifications for allowing Muslim men to have more than one wife: "[N]o Muslim male can have more
than one wife unless he can deal with them in equal companionship and just treatment as enjoined by Islamic Law and
only in exceptional cases."
In convicting Nollora, the trial court’s Decision further stated thus:
The principle in Islam is that monogamy is the general rule and polygamy is allowed only to meet urgent needs. Only
with the permission of the court can a Muslim be permitted to have a second wife subject to certain requirements.
This is because having plurality of wives is merely tolerated, not encouraged, under certain circumstances (Muslim
Law on Personal Status in the Philippines by Amer M. Bara-acal and Abdulmajid J. Astir, 1998 First Edition, Pages 64-
65). Arbitration is necessary. Any Muslim husband desiring to contract subsequent marriages, before so doing, shall
notify the Shari’a Circuit Court of the place where his family resides. The clerk of court shall serve a copy thereof to
the wife or wives. Should any of them objects [sic]; an Agama Arbitration Council shall be constituted. If said council
fails to secure the wife’s consent to the proposed marriage, the Court shall, subject to Article 27, decide whether on
[sic] not to sustain her objection (Art. 162, Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines).
Accused Atilano Nollora, Jr., in marrying his second wife, co-accused Rowena P. Geraldino, did not comply with the
above-mentioned provision of the law. In fact, he did not even declare that he was a Muslim convert in both marriages,
indicating his criminal intent. In his converting to the Muslim faith, said accused entertained the mistaken belief that
he can just marry anybody again after marrying the private complainant. What is clear, therefore, is [that] a Muslim is
not given an unbridled right to just marry anybody the second, third or fourth time. There are requirements that the
Shari’a law imposes, that is, he should have notified the Shari’a Court where his family resides so that copy of said
notice should be furnished to the first wife. The argument that notice to the first wife is not required since she is not
a Muslim is of no moment. This obligation to notify the said court rests upon accused Atilano Nollora, Jr. It is not for
him to interpret the Shari’a law. It is the Shari’a Court that has this authority.
In an apparent attempt to escape criminal liability, the accused recelebrated their marriage in accordance with the
Muslim rites. However, this can no longer cure the criminal liability that has already been violated.
The Court, however, finds criminal liability on the person of accused Atilano Nollora, Jr., only. There is no sufficient
evidence that would pin accused Rowena P. Geraldino down. The evidence presented by the prosecution against her
is the allegation that she knew of the first marriage between private complainant and Atilano Nollora, Jr., is
insufficient[,] being open to several interpretations. Private complainant alleged that when she was brought by Atilano
Nollora, Jr., to the latter’s house in Taguig, Metro Manila, Rowena P. Geraldino was there standing near the door and
heard their conversation. From this incident, private complainant concluded that said Rowena P. Geraldino was aware
that she and Atilano Nollora, Jr., were married. This conclusion is obviously misplaced since it could not be reasonably
presumed that Rowena P. Geraldino understands what was going on between her and Atilano Nollora, Jr. It is axiomatic
that "(E)very circumstance favoring accused’s innocence must be taken into account, proof against him must survive
the test of reason and the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment" (People vs. Austria, 195 SCRA
700). This Court, therefore, has to acquit Rowena P. Geraldino for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:
a) Finding accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy punishable under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. This court hereby renders judgment imposing upon him a prison term of two
(2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum of his indeterminate sentence, to eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, plus accessory penalties provided by law.
b) Acquitting accused ROWENA P. GERALDINO of the crime of Bigamy for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
Costs against accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
SO ORDERED.9
Nollora filed a notice of appeal and moved for the allowance of his temporary liberty under the same bail bond pending
appeal. The trial court granted Nollora’s motion.
Nollora filed a brief with the appellate court and assigned only one error of the trial court:
The trial court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged despite the prosecution’s
failure to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.10
The Appellate Court’s Ruling
On 30 September 2009, the appellate court dismissed Nollora’s appeal and affirmed the trial court’s decision.11
The appellate court rejected Nollora’s defense that his second marriage to Geraldino was in lawful exercise of his
Islamic religion and was allowed by the Qur’an. The appellate court denied Nollora’s invocation of his religious beliefs
and practices to the prejudice of the non-Muslim women who married him pursuant to Philippine civil laws.1avvphi1
Nollora’s two marriages were not conducted in accordance with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, hence the Family
Code of the Philippines should apply. Nollora’s claim of religious freedom will not immobilize the State and render it
impotent in protecting the general welfare.
In a Resolution12 dated 23 February 2010, the appellate court denied Nollora’s motion for reconsideration. The
allegations in the motion for reconsideration were a mere rehash of Nollora’s earlier arguments, and there was no
reason for the appellate court to modify its 30 September 2009 Decision.
Nollora filed the present petition for review before this Court on 6 April 2010.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Nollora is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy.
The Court’s Ruling
Nollora’s petition has no merit. We affirm the rulings of the appellate court and of the trial court.
Elements of Bigamy
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 349. Bigamy. ‒ The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are:
1. That the offender has been legally married.
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not
yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code.
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage.
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.13
The circumstances in the present case satisfy all the elements of bigamy. (1) Nollora is legally married to Pinat;14 (2)
Nollora and Pinat’s marriage has not been legally dissolved prior to the date of the second marriage; (3) Nollora
admitted the existence of his second marriage to Geraldino;15 and (4) Nollora and Geraldino’s marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity except for the lack of capacity of Nollora due to his prior marriage.16
The marriage certificate17 of Nollora and Pinat’s marriage states that Nollora and Pinat were married at Sapang Palay
IEMELIF Church, Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan on 6 April 1999. Rev. Jonathan De Mesa, Minister of the
IEMELIF Church officiated the ceremony. The marriage certificate18 of Nollora and Geraldino’s marriage states that
Nollora and Geraldino were married at Max’s Restaurant, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, Metro Manila on 8 December
2001. Rev. Honorato D. Santos officiated the ceremony.
A certification dated 4 November 2003 from the Office of the Civil Registrar General reads:
We certify that ATILANO JR O. NOLLORA who is alleged to have been born on February 22, 1968 from ATILANO M.
NOLLORA SR and FLAVIANA OCLARIT, appears in our National Indices of Marriage for Groom for the years 1973 to
2002 with the following information:
Date of Marriage Place of Marriage
a) April 06, 1999 b) SAN JOSE DEL MONTE, BULACAN
a) December 08, 2001 b) QUEZON CITY, METRO MANILA (2nd District)19
Before the trial and appellate courts, Nollora put up his Muslim religion as his sole defense. He alleged that his religion
allows him to marry more than once. Granting arguendo that Nollora is indeed of Muslim faith at the time of
celebration of both marriages,20 Nollora cannot deny that both marriage ceremonies were not conducted in
accordance with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, or Presidential Decree No. 1083. The applicable Articles in the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws read:
Art. 14. Nature. - Marriage is not only a civil contract but a civil institution. Its nature, consequences and incidents are
governed by this Code and the Shari’a and not subject to stipulation, except that the marriage settlements to a certain
extent fix the property relations of the spouses.
Art. 15. Essential Requisites. - No marriage contract shall be perfected unless the following essential requisites are
complied with:
(a) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(b) Mutual consent of the parties freely given;
(c) Offer (ijab) and acceptance (qabul) duly witnessed by at least two competent persons after the proper guardian in
marriage (wali) has given his consent; and
(d) Stipulation of the customary dower (mahr) duly witnessed by two competent persons.
Art. 16. Capacity to contract marriage. - (1) Any Muslim male at least fifteen years of age and any Muslim female of
the age of puberty or upwards and not suffering from any impediment under the provisions of this Code may contract
marriage. A female is presumed to have attained puberty upon reaching the age of fifteen.
x x x.
Art. 17. Marriage Ceremony. - No particular form of marriage ceremony is required but the ijab and the qabul in
marriage shall be declared publicly in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and the two competent
witnesses. The declaration shall be set forth in an instrument in triplicate, signed or marked by the contracting parties
and said witnesses, and attested by the person solemnizing the marriage. One copy shall be given to the contracting
parties and another sent to the Circuit Registrar by the solemnizing officer who shall keep the third.
Art. 18. Authority to solemnize marriage. - Marriage maybe solemnized:
(a) By the proper wali by the woman to be wedded;
(b) Upon the authority of the proper wali, by any person who is competent under Muslim law to solemnize marriage;
or
(c) By the judge of the Shari’a District Court or Shari’a Circuit Court or any person designated by the judge, should the
proper wali refuse without justifiable reason, to authorize the solemnization.
Art. 19. Place of solemnization. - Marriage shall be solemnized publicly in any mosque, office of the Shari’a judge, office
of the Circuit Registrar, residence of the bride or her wali, or at any other suitable place agreed upon by the parties.
Art. 20. Specification of dower. - The amount or value of dower may be fixed by the contracting parties (mahr-
musamma) before, during or after the celebration of marriage. If the amount or the value thereof has not been so
fixed, a proper dower (mahr-mithl) shall, upon petition of the wife, be determined by the court according to the social
standing of the parties.
Indeed, Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that "[i]n case of a marriage between a Muslim and
a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the [Family Code of the Philippines, or
Executive Order No. 209, in lieu of the Civil Code of the Philippines] shall apply." Nollora’s religious affiliation is not an
issue here. Neither is the claim that Nollora’s marriages were solemnized according to Muslim law. Thus, regardless
of his professed religion, Nollora cannot claim exemption from liability for the crime of bigamy.21
Nollora asserted in his marriage certificate with Geraldino that his civil status is "single." Moreover, both of Nollora’s
marriage contracts do not state that he is a Muslim. Although the truth or falsehood of the declaration of one’s religion
in the marriage certificate is not an essential requirement for marriage, such omissions are sufficient proofs of
Nollora’s liability for bigamy. Nollora’s false declaration about his civil status is thus further compounded by these
omissions.
[ATTY. CALDINO:]
Q: In your marriage contract, Mr. Witness, with Jesusa Pinat, you indicated here as your religion, Catholic Pentecostal,
and you were saying that since January 10, 1992, you are already a [M]uslim convert. . . you said, Mr. Witness, that
you are already a [M]uslim convert since January 10, 1992. However, in your marriage contract with Jesusa Pinat, there
is no indication here that you have indicated your religion. Will you please go over your marriage contract?
[NOLLORA:]
A: When we got married, they just placed there Catholic but I didn’t know why they did not place any Catholic there.
xxx
Q: Now, Mr. Witness, I would like to call your attention with respect to your marriage contract with your co-accused
in this case, Rowena Geraldino, x x x will you please tell us, Mr. Witness, considering that you said that you are already
a [M]uslim convert on January 10, 1992, why in the marriage contract with Rowena Geraldino, you indicated there
your religion as Catholic, Mr. Witness?
A: Since I was a former Catholic and since I was then keeping, I was keeping it as a secret my being my Balik-Islam,
that’s why I placed there Catholic since I know that the society doesn’t approve a Catholic to marry another, that’s
why I placed there Catholic as my religion, sir.
Q: How about under the column, "civil status," why did you indicate there that you’re single, Mr. Witness?
A: I also kept it as a secret that I was married, earlier married.22 (Emphasis supplied)
xxx
[PROSECUTOR TAYLOR:]
Q: Would you die for your new religion, Mr. Nollora?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: If you would die for your new religion, why did you allow that your faith be indicated as Catholic when in fact you
were already as you alleged [M]uslim to be put in your marriage contract?
xxx
[A:] I don’t think there is anything wrong with it, I just signed it so we can get married under the Catholic rights [sic]
because after that we even got married under the [M]uslim rights [sic], your Honor.
xxx
Q: Under your Muslim faith, if you marry a second wife, are you required under your faith to secure the permission of
your first wife to get married?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: Did you secure that permission from your first wife, Jesusa Nollora?
A: I was not able to ask any permission from her because she was very mad at me, at the start, she was always very
mad, ma’am.23
In his petition before this Court, Nollora casts doubt on the validity of his marriage to Geraldino.1avvphi1 Nollora may
not impugn his marriage to Geraldino in order to extricate himself from criminal liability; otherwise, we would be
opening the doors to allowing the solemnization of multiple flawed marriage ceremonies. As we stated in Tenebro v.
Court of Appeals:24
There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still
produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold
otherwise would render the State’s penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately
ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting
multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31538 promulgated on 30
September 2009 and the Resolution promulgated on 23 February 2010 are AFFIRMED. Petitioner Atilano O. Nollora,
Jr. is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Bigamy in Criminal Case No. Q-04-129031 and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment with a term of two years, four months and one day of prision correccional as minimum to
eight years and one day of prision mayor as maximum of his indeterminate sentence, as well as the accessory penalties
provided by law.
Costs against petitioner Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
7 Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void,
unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years
and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance
where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules t of Court assailing the September 29, 2011
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which affirmed the April 25, 2008Decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC). declaring the marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer) and respondent Liberty
Albios (A/bios) as void from the beginning.
The facts
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage with Register
No. 2004-1588.3
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity 4 of her marriage with Fringer. She
alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never
really had any intention of entering into a married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations.
She described their marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio .
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed a motion to set
case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an
investigation and determine the existence of a collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor complied and
reported that she could not make a determination for failure of both parties to appear at the scheduled investigation.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the hearing despite being
duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits ensued.
Ruling of the RTC
In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of Liberty Albios and Daniel
Lee Fringer as void from the very beginning. As a necessary consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner shall cease
using the surname of respondent as she never acquired any right over it and so as to avoid a misimpression that she
remains the wife of respondent.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.6
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only. Giving credence to the testimony
of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship;
that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went
their separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United States and never again communicated with her; and that, in
turn, she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled
that when marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such
was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for
reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated February 5, 2009, denying the motion for want of merit. It
explained that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage
as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means to acquire American citizenship in
consideration of $2,000.00.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the essential
requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence
of getting married and that their case was similar to a marriage in jest. It further explained that the parties never
intended to enter into the marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family. It
concluded that their purpose was primarily for personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and for
Fringer, the consideration of $2,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
Assignment of Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT HELD THAT A MARRIAGE CONTRACTED FOR
THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS DONEIN JEST, HENCE, LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT
OFCONSENT.8
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship and for Fringer to be paid
$2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to the marriage, as they knowingly and willingly entered into that
marriage and knew the benefits and consequences of being bound by it. According to the OSG, consent should be
distinguished from motive, the latter being inconsequential to the validity of marriage.
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest. The parties here
intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire
American citizenship would be rendered futile.
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the petition, reiterating her stand that her marriage was similar
to a marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void from the beginning.
On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating its arguments in its petition for review on certiorari.
Ruling of the Court

The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of
acquiring American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?
The Court resolves in the negative.
Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon of marriage fraud for the purposes of
immigration.
Marriage Fraud in Immigration
The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the development of marriage fraud for
the sole purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the United States, marriages where a couple marries only to
achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific benefits, have been referred to as "limited purpose" marriages.11 A
common limited purpose marriage is one entered into solely for the legitimization of a child.12 Another, which is the
subject of the present case, is for immigration purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned with the intention of
the couple at the time of their marriage,13 and it attempts to filter out those who use marriage solely to achieve
immigration status.14
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,15 established the principal test for
determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a "marriage is a sham if the bride and
groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time they were married. "This standard was modified with the
passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead
demonstrate that the marriage was not "entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United
States." The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to establish a life together, to determining the
intention of evading immigration laws.16 It must be noted, however, that this standard is used purely for immigration
purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the legal validity or existence of a marriage.
The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent for the limited purpose of
immigration is also legally void and in existent. The early cases on limited purpose marriages in the United States made
no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable case of
United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien to stay in the country, the parties
had agreed to marry but not to live together and to obtain a divorce within six months. The Court, through Judge
Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert temporary into permanent permission to stay in the country was not
a marriage, there being no consent, to wit:
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent is necessary to every contract; and
no matter what forms or ceremonies the parties may go through indicating the contrary, they do not contract if they
do not in fact assent, which may always be proved. x x x Marriage is no exception to this rule: a marriage in jest is not
a marriage at all. x x x It is quite true that a marriage without subsequent consummation will be valid; but if the spouses
agree to a marriage only for the sake of representing it as such to the outside world and with the understanding that
they will put an end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive, they have never really agreed to be married
at all. They must assent to enter into the relation as it is ordinarily understood, and it is not ordinarily understood as
merely a pretence, or cover, to deceive others.18
(Italics supplied)
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines,19 which declared as valid a marriage
entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to the United States, stating that a valid marriage could not be
avoided "merely because the marriage was entered into for a limited purpose."20 The 1980 immigration case of
Matter of McKee,21 further recognized that a fraudulent or sham marriage was intrinsically different from a non
subsisting one.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been recognized as problematic. The
problem being that in order to obtain an immigration benefit, a legal marriage is first necessary.22 At present, United
States courts have generally denied annulments involving" limited purpose" marriages where a couple married only
to achieve a particular purpose, and have upheld such marriages as valid.23
The Court now turns to the case at hand.
Respondent’s marriage not void
In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered into for a purpose other
than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception.
In its resolution denying the OSG’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the marriage was
declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be
legally bound by it and used it only as a means for the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Agreeing with the
RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held that the parties clearly did not understand
the nature and consequence of getting married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to
a marriage in jest considering that the parties only entered into the marriage for the acquisition of American citizenship
in exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a marriage contract and never intended to live as husband
and wife or build a family.
The CA’s assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties’ supposed lack of consent. Under Article 2 of the
Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same Code provides that the absence of any
essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing
officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage.
Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under
Articles45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence.24 Consent must also be
conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the
beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act.25 Their understanding should not be affected by insanity,
intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.26
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it
was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as
they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired
their ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring
American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the
marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements
of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created
between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to a marriage by way of
jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with no real intention of
entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear understanding that the parties would not be bound. The
ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation.27 It is a pretended
marriage not intended to be real and with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any
genuine consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a
complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent because the parties have absolutely no intention of being
bound in any way or for any purpose.
The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest.1âwphi1 Albios and Fringer had an undeniable
intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the respondent to acquire American
citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would allow them to further their objective, considering that only a
valid marriage can properly support an application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into
the actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore,
clearly present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish a conjugal and family
life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real intention to establish a life together is, however,
insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the
nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may,
thus, only be declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a marriage
void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of
foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is
not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.28
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictate on the kind of life
that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy
and would raise serious constitutional questions.29 The right to marital privacy allows married couples to structure
their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love
one another or not, and so on.30 Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as
convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites,31 are
equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage.
Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.
Although the Court views with disdain the respondent’s attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest purposes, It cannot
declare the marriage void. Hence, though the respondent’s marriage may be considered a sham or fraudulent for the
purposes of immigration, it is not void ab initio and continues to be valid and subsisting.
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of the Family Code. Only
the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code may constitute fraud, namely, (1) non- disclosure of a
previous conv1ctwn involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3)
concealment of a sexually transmitted disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality.
No other misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a marriage. Entering
into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not qualify under any of the listed
circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent
party. In the present case, there is no injured party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham
marriage.
Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage with Fringer to be
declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court cannot declare such a marriage void in
the event the parties fail to qualify for immigration benefits, after they have availed of its benefits, or simply have no
further use for it. These unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent
schemes. Albios already misused a judicial institution to enter into a marriage of convenience; she should not be
allowed to again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient situation.
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the foundation of the family
and shall be protected by the State.32 It must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the
contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the
needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer needed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013
SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, questioning the Decision1
of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760, which reversed the Decision2 in Civil Case
No. 03-0382-CFM dated October 5, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109, Pasay City, and the CA
Resolution dated July 24, 2008, denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision.
The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay City, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM, and raffled
to RTC Branch 109. Syed alleged the absence of a marriage license, as provided for in Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of
Executive Order No. 269, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, as a ground for the annulment of his
marriage to Gloria.
In the Marriage Contract3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage License No. 9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite
on January 8, 1993, was presented to the solemnizing officer. It is this information that is crucial to the resolution of
this case.
At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and they
were married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan.4 He arrived in the Philippines in December of 1992.
On January 9, 1993, at around 5 o’clock in the afternoon, he was at his mother-in-law’s residence, located at 2676 F.
Muñoz St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law arrived with two men. He testified that he was told that he was
going to undergo some ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the
nature of said ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he did not know
that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite
to apply for a marriage license, and that he had never resided in that area. In July of 2003, he went to the Office of the
Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of their marriage
contract wherein the marriage license number could be found.5 The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C.
Encarnacion, issued a certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license number appearing in the
marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967, was the number of another marriage license issued
to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.6 Said certification reads as follows:
11 July 2003
This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in this office, Marriage License No. 9969967 was
issued in favor of MR. ARLINDO GETALADO and MISS MYRA MABILANGAN on January 19, 1993.
No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS and MISS GLORIA F. GOO on January
8, 1993.
This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for whatever legal purpose or intents it may serve.7
On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him in 2001 and 2002, and that he had
gone to the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to get certification on whether or not there was a marriage
license on advice of his counsel.8
Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite.
Bagsic appeared under a letter of authority from the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, and brought
documents pertaining to Marriage License No. 9969967, which was issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan
on January 20, 1993.9
Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage licenses and that the numbers are issued
chronologically.10 He testified that the certification dated July 11, 2003, was issued and signed by Leodivina
Encarnacion, Registrar of the Municipality of Carmona, Cavite, certifying that Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued
for Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 19, 1993, and that their office had not issued any other license
of the same serial number, namely 9969967, to any other person.11
For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas
Goo and May Ann Ceriola.
Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of the Gospel and a barangay captain, and that he is
authorized to solemnize marriages within the Philippines.12 He testified that he solemnized the marriage of Syed
Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo at the residence of the bride on January 9, 1993.13 He stated that the witnesses were
Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and Mary Ann Ceriola.14 He testified that he had been solemnizing marriages
since 1982, and that he is familiar with the requirements.15 Rev. Dauz further testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him
the marriage license the day before the actual wedding, and that the marriage contract was prepared by his
secretary.16 After the solemnization of the marriage, it was registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and
Rev. Dauz submitted the marriage contract and copy of the marriage license with that office.17
Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the wedding of Syed Abbas and Gloria Goo by the mother
of the bride, Felicitas Goo.18 He testified that he requested a certain Qualin to secure the marriage license for the
couple, and that this Qualin secured the license and gave the same to him on January 8, 1993.19 He further testified
that he did not know where the marriage license was obtained.20 He attended the wedding ceremony on January 9,
1993, signed the marriage contract as sponsor, and witnessed the signing of the marriage contract by the couple, the
solemnizing officer and the other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola.21
Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar Abbas is her son-in-law, and that she was present
at the wedding ceremony held on January 9, 1993 at her house.22 She testified that she sought the help of Atty.
Sanchez at the Manila City Hall in securing the marriage license, and that a week before the marriage was to take
place, a male person went to their house with the application for marriage license.23 Three days later, the same person
went back to their house, showed her the marriage license before returning it to Atty. Sanchez who then gave it to
Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer.24 She further testified that she did not read all of the contents of the marriage
license, and that she was told that the marriage license was obtained from Carmona.25 She also testified that a bigamy
case had been filed by Gloria against Syed at the Regional Trial Court of Manila, evidenced by an information for
Bigamy dated January 10, 2003, pending before Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.26
As to Mary Ann Ceriola’s testimony, the counsels for both parties stipulated that: (a) she is one of the sponsors at the
wedding of Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas on January 9, 1993; (b) she was seen in the wedding photos and she could
identify all the persons depicted in said photos; and (c) her testimony corroborates that of Felicitas Goo and Atty.
Sanchez.
The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented the marriage contract bearing their
signatures as proof.27 She and her mother sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in securing a marriage license, and asked
him to be one of the sponsors. A certain Qualin went to their house and said that he will get the marriage license for
them, and after several days returned with an application for marriage license for them to sign, which she and Syed
did. After Qualin returned with the marriage license, they gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz,
the solemnizing officer. Gloria testified that she and Syed were married on January 9, 1993 at their residence.28
Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June 15, 1993.29
Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura
during the existence of the previous marriage, and that the case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 02A-03408, with
the RTC of Manila.30
Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August 9, 1992 in Taiwan, but that she did not know if
said marriage had been celebrated under Muslim rites, because the one who celebrated their marriage was Chinese,
and those around them at the time were Chinese.31
The Ruling of the RTC
In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage license was issued by the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License No. 9969967 had been issued to Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan, and the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified that no marriage
license had been issued for Gloria and Syed.32 It also took into account the fact that neither party was a resident of
Carmona, Cavite, the place where Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued, in violation of Article 9 of the Family
Code.33 As the marriage was not one of those exempt from the license requirement, and that the lack of a valid
marriage license is an absence of a formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on January 9, 1993 was void ab
initio.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, and against the respondent declaring as follows:
1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas is hereby
annulled;
2. Terminating the community of property relations between the petitioner and the respondent even if no property
was acquired during their cohabitation by reason of the nullity of the marriage of the parties.
3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar General, National Statistics Office, are hereby ordered to
cancel from their respective civil registries the marriage contracted by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent
Gloria Goo-Abbas on January 9, 1993 in Manila.
SO ORDERED.34
Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, but the RTC denied the same, prompting her to
appeal the questioned decision to the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the CA
In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment of errors:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT AS NULL AND
VOID DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE DESPITE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT THERE WAS ONE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A REQUISITE OF A VALID MARRIAGE, THE OVERWHELMING
EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE CEREMONY TOOK PLACE WITH THE APPEARANCE OF THE CONTRACTING
PARTIES BEFORE THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT THEY TOOK EACH OTHER AS
HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE PRESENCE OF NOT LESS THAN TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL BY LACHES ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER,
AN ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN THE COURT BELOW.35
The CA gave credence to Gloria’s arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that the certification of the Municipal
Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was
conducted, and thus held that said certification could not be accorded probative value.36 The CA ruled that there was
sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly married and that there was
compliance with all the requisites laid down by law.37
It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the marriage contract. The CA also considered that
the parties had comported themselves as husband and wife, and that Syed only instituted his petition after Gloria had
filed a case against him for bigamy.38
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 05 October 2005 and Order dated 27
January 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is DISMISSED. The marriage between Shed [sic] Azhar
Abbas and Gloria Goo Abbas contracted on 09 January 1993 remains valid and subsisting. No costs.
SO ORDERED.39
Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 200840 but the same was denied by the CA in a Resolution
dated July 24, 2008.41
Hence, this petition.
Grounds in Support of Petition
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN CITING REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF
APPEALS AS THE SAME IS DIAMETRICALLY INCONSISTENT AND CONTRARY TO THE COURT’S OWN FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE, WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL
AND LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.42
The Ruling of this Court
The petition is meritorious.
As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive Order No. 209, or the Family Code
of the Philippines, is the applicable law. The pertinent provisions that would apply to this particular case are Articles
3, 4 and 35(3), which read as follows:
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated
in Article 35(2).
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible
for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxxx
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter.
There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the Family Code, nor with the formal requisites of the
authority of the solemnizing officer and the conduct of the marriage ceremony. Nor is the marriage one that is exempt
from the requirement of a valid marriage license under Chapter 2, Title I of the Family Code. The resolution of this
case, thus, hinges on whether or not a valid marriage license had been issued for the couple. The RTC held that no
valid marriage license had been issued. The CA held that there was a valid marriage license.
We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.
Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on the marriage contract
as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license. To prove that no such license was
issued, Syed turned to the office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said
license. It was there that he requested certification that no such license was issued. In the case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals43 such certification was allowed, as permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – A written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an official record or
by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his
office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain
no such record or entry.
In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar of Pasig to prove the non-issuance of a
marriage license, the Court held:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular
document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register.
As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining
a register book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the
applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant data.44
The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed probative value, as his duty was
to maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was allegedly issued,
issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage license for Gloria and Syed was issued, and that the serial
number of the marriage license pertained to another couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified
machine copy of Marriage License No. 9969967 was presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the
names of Gloria and Syed do not appear in the document.
In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the certification, stating that it did not comply with Section 28,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite diligent search" in the certification, and since the
certification used stated that no marriage license appears to have been issued, no diligent search had been conducted
and thus the certification could not be given probative value.
To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals.45 It is worth noting that in that
particular case, the Court, in sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage license was lacking, relied on the
Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, which merely stated that the alleged marriage license could not be
located as the same did not appear in their records. Nowhere in the Certification was it categorically stated that the
officer involved conducted a diligent search, nor is a categorical declaration absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court to apply.
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official duty has been regularly
performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, "The presumption of regularity of official
acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty."46 No such affirmative
evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty of checking the records of their
office, thus the presumption must stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search having been conducted, as
Marriage License No. 996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court. The fact that the names in said license
do not correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not overturn the presumption that the registrar conducted a
diligent search of the records of her office.
It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. She failed to explain why
the marriage license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where, admittedly, neither party resided. She took no
pains to apply for the license, so she is not the best witness to testify to the validity and existence of said license.
Neither could the other witnesses she presented prove the existence of the marriage license, as none of them applied
for the license in Carmona, Cavite. Her mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of the license,
having admitted to not reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo
approached for assistance in securing the license, admitted not knowing where the license came from. The task of
applying for the license was delegated to a certain Qualin, who could have testified as to how the license was secured
and thus impeached the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the testimony of her representative. As
Gloria failed to present this Qualin, the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value.
It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract and a copy of the marriage license were
submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of the marriage license could have simply been secured
from that office and submitted to the court. However, Gloria inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening her claim
that there was a valid marriage license issued for her and Syed.
In the case of Cariño v. Cariño,47 following the case of Republic,48 it was held that the certification of the Local Civil
Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license.
The case of Cariño further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that
it became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required
marriage license had been secured.49 Gloria has failed to discharge that burden, and the only conclusion that can be
reached is that no valid marriage license was issued. It cannot be said that there was a simple irregularity in the
marriage license that would not affect the validity of the marriage, as no license was presented by the respondent. No
marriage license was proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the certification of the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Gloria’s failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license.
To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its conclusion that Gloria and Syed were validly married.
To quote the CA:
Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and documentary, that appellant and appellee have been
validly married and there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law. Both parties are legally capacitated
to marry. A certificate of legal capacity was even issued by the Embassy of Pakistan in favor of appellee. The parties
herein gave their consent freely. Appellee admitted that the signature above his name in the marriage contract was
his. Several pictures were presented showing appellant and appellee, before the solemnizing officer, the witnesses
and other members of appellant’s family, taken during the marriage ceremony, as well as in the restaurant where the
lunch was held after the marriage ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit "5-C" which shows appellee signing the
Marriage Contract.
xxxx
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and has [sic] one offspring, Aliea Fatima Goo Abbas, who
was born on 15 June 1993. It took appellee more than ten (10) years before he filed on 01 August 2003 his Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 4 of the Family Code. We take serious note that said Petition appears
to have been instituted by him only after an Information for Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated 10 January 2003 was filed
against him for contracting a second or subsequent marriage with one Ma. Corazon (Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We
are not ready to reward (appellee) by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and in the process
allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy.50
All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract was signed
does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says,
"The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in
Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from
the beginning, except those exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the
same Code.51 Again, this marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and thus, having been
solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab initio.1âwphi1
As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his motives are less than pure,
that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does not make up for the failure of the respondent
to prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a
valid marriage license cannot be attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The law must
be applied. As the marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab
initio.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated March 11, 2008
and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City dated October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No. 03-
0382-CFM annulling the marriage of petitioner with respondent on January 9, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED.
Footnotes
33 Article 9. A Marriage License shall be issued by the Local Civil Registrar of the city or municipality where either
contracting party habitually resides, except in marriages where no license is required in accordance with Chapter 2 of
this Title.
51 Art. 27. In case either or both of the contracting parties are at the point of death, the marriage may be solemnized
without necessity of a marriage license and shall remain valid even if the ailing party subsequently survives.
Art. 28. If the residence of either party is so located that there is no means of transportation to enable such party to
appear personally before the local civil registrar, the marriage may be solemnized without necessity of a marriage
license.
Art. 29. In the cases provided for in the two preceding articles, the solemnizing officer shall state in an affidavit
executed before the local civil registrar or any other person legally authorized to administer oaths that the marriage
was performed in articulo mortis or that the residence of either party, specifying the barrio or barangay, is so located
that there is no means of transportation to enable such party to appear personally before the local civil registrar and
that the officer took the necessary steps to ascertain the ages and relationship of the contracting parties and the
absence of legal impediment to the marriage.
Art. 30. The original of the affidavit required in the last preceding article, together with a legible copy of the marriage
contract, shall be sent by the person solemnizing the marriage to the local civil registrar of the municipality where it
was performed within the period of thirty days after the performance of the marriage.
Art. 31. A marriage in articulo mortis between passengers or crew members may also be solemnized by a ship captain
or by an airplane pilot not only while the ship is at sea or the plane is in flight, but also during stopovers at ports of
call.
Art. 32. A military commander of a unit, who is a commissioned officer, shall likewise have authority to solemnize
marriages in articulo mortis between persons within the zone of military operation, whether members of the armed
forces or civilians.
Art. 33. Marriage among Muslims or among members of the ethnic cultural communities may be performed validly
without the necessity of marriage licenses, provided they arc solemnized in accordance with their customs, rites or
practices.
Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state
the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer
shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
G.R. No. 201061 July 3, 2013
SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner,
vs.
BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 17 August 2011 Decision2 and the 14 March 2012 Resolution3
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.
The Antecedent Facts
On 15 March 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin) filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or
declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43 (trial court). The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 04109401. Benjamin alleged that on 10 September 1973, he married Azucena Alegre
(Azucena) in Caloocan City. They had three children, namely, Rizalyn, Emmamylin, and Benjamin III.
In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally GoBangayan (Sally) who was a customer in the auto
parts and supplies business owned by Benjamin’s family. In December 1981, Azucena left for the United States of
America. In February 1982, Benjamin and Sally lived together as husband and wife. Sally’s father was against the
relationship. On 7 March 1982, in order to appease her father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig
City where they signed a purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamin’s marital status, assured him that the
marriage contract would not be registered.
Benjamin and Sally’s cohabitation produced two children, Bernice and Bentley. During the period of their cohabitation,
they acquired the following real properties:
(1) property under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 61722 registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as
spouses;
(2) properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin, married to Sally;
(3) properties under Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) Nos. 8782 and 8783 registered in the name of Sally,
married to Benjamin; and
(4) properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 registered in the name of Sally as a single individual.
The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for Canada, bringing Bernice and Bentley with
her. She then filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public documents against Benjamin, using their
simulated marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage
and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court on the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous
and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court for the partition of the
properties he acquired with Sally in accordance with Article 148 of the Family Code, for his appointment as
administrator of the properties during the pendency of the case, and for the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as
illegitimate children. A total of 44 registered properties became the subject of the partition before the trial court.
Aside from the seven properties enumerated by Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37 properties in her answer.
After Benjamin presented his evidence, Sally filed a demurrer to evidence which the trial court denied. Sally filed a
motion for reconsideration which the trial court also denied. Sally filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals and asked for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or injunction which the Court of Appeals
never issued. Sally then refused to present any evidence before the trial court citing the pendency of her petition
before the Court of Appeals. The trial court gave Sally several opportunities to present her evidence on 28 February
2008, 10 July 2008, 4 September 2008, 11 September 2008, 2 October 2008, 23 October 2008, and 28 November 2008.
Despite repeated warnings from the trial court, Sally still refused to present her evidence, prompting the trial court to
consider the case submitted for decision.
The Decision of the Trial Court
In a Decision4 dated 26 March 2009, the trial court ruled in favor ofBenjamin. The trial court gave weight to the
certification dated 21 July 2004 from the Pasig Local Civil Registrar, which was confirmed during trial, that only
Marriage License Series Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of February 1982 and the purported
Marriage License No. N-07568 was not issued to Benjamin and Sally.5 The trial court ruled that the marriage was not
recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office because it could not be registered due to
Benjamin’s subsisting marriage with Azucena.
The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not bigamous. The trial court ruled that the
second marriage was void not because of the existence of the first marriage but because of other causes, particularly,
the lack of a marriage license. Hence, bigamy was not committed in this case. The trial court did not rule on the issue
of the legitimacy status of Bernice and Bentley because they were not parties to the case. The trial court denied Sally’s
claim for spousal support because she was not married to Benjamin. The trial court likewise denied support for Bernice
and Bentley who were both of legal age and did not ask for support.
On the issue of partition, the trial court ruled that Sally could not claim the 37 properties she named in her answer as
part of her conjugal properties with Benjamin. The trial court ruled that Sally was not legally married to Benjamin.
Further, the 37 properties that Sally was claiming were owned by Benjamin’s parents who gave the properties to their
children, including Benjamin, as advance inheritance. The 37 titles were in the names of Benjamin and his brothers
and the phrase "married to Sally Go" was merely descriptive of Benjamin’s civil status in the title. As regards the two
lots under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860, the trial court found that they were bought by Benjamin using his own money
and that Sally failed to prove any actual contribution of money, property or industry in their purchase. The trial court
found that Sally was a registered co-owner of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 61722, N-193656, and 253681 as well as
the two condominium units under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783. However, the trial court ruled that the lot under TCT No.
61722 and the two condominium units were purchased from the earnings of Benjamin alone. The trial court ruled that
the properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720, and 190860 and CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were part of the conjugal
partnership of Benjamin and Azucena, without prejudice to Benjamin’s right to dispute his conjugal state with Azucena
in a separate proceeding.
The trial court further ruled that Sally acted in bad faith because she knew that Benjamin was married to Azucena.
Applying Article 148 of the Family Code, the trial court forfeited Sally’s share in the properties covered under TCT Nos.
N-193656 and 253681 in favor of Bernice and Bentley while Benjamin’s share reverted to his conjugal ownership with
Azucena.
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the marriage of BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR. and SALLY S. GO on March 7, 1982 at Santolan, Pasig, Metro
Manila is hereby declared NULL and VOID AB INITIO. It is further declared NONEXISTENT.
Respondent’s claim as co-owner or conjugal owner of the thirtyseven (37) properties under TCT Nos. 17722, 17723,
17724, 17725, 126397, RT-73480, and RT-86821; in Manila, TCT Nos. 188949, 188950, 188951, 193035, 194620,
194621, 194622, 194623, 194624, 194625, 194626, 194627, 194628, 194629, 194630, 194631, 194632, 194633,
194634, 194635, 194636, 194637, 194638, 194639, 198651, 206209, 206210, 206211, 206213 and 206215 is
DISMISSED for lack of merit. The registered owners, namely: Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr., Roberto E. Bangayan, Ricardo
B. Bangayan and Rodrigo B. Bangayan are the owners to the exclusion of "Sally Go" Consequently, the Registry of
Deeds for Quezon City and Manila are directed to delete the words "married to Sally Go" from these thirty-seven (37)
titles.
Properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720 and 190860, CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 are properties acquired from
petitioner’s money without contribution from respondent, hence, these are properties of the petitioner and his lawful
wife. Consequently, petitioner is appointed the administrator of these five (5) properties. Respondent is ordered to
submit an accounting of her collections of income from these five (5) properties within thirty (30) days from notice
hereof. Except for lot under TCT No. 61722, respondent is further directed within thirty (30) days from notice hereof
to turn over and surrender control and possession of these properties including the documents of title to the
petitioner.
On the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and N-253681, these properties are under co-ownership of the parties
shared by them equally. However, the share of respondent is declared FORFEITED in favor of Bernice Go Bangayan
and Bentley Go Bangayan. The share of the petitioner shall belong to his conjugal ownership with Azucena Alegre. The
liquidation, partition and distribution of these two (2) properties shall be further processed pursuant to Section 21 of
A.M. No. 02-11-10 of March 15, 2003.
Other properties shall be adjudicated in a later proceeding pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10.
Respondent’s claim of spousal support, children support and counterclaims are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Further,
no declaration of the status of the parties’ children.
No other relief granted.
Furnish copy of this decision to the parties, their counsels, the Trial Prosecutor, the Solicitor General and the Registry
of Deeds in Manila, Quezon City and Caloocan.
SO ORDERED.6
Sally filed a Verified and Vigorous Motion for Inhibition with Motion for Reconsideration. In its Order dated 27 August
2009,7 the trial court denied the motion. Sally appealed the trial court’s decision before the Court of Appeals.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 17 August 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals partly granted the appeal. The Court of Appeals ruled that the
trial court did not err in submitting the case for decision. The Court of Appeals noted that there were six resettings of
the case, all made at the instance of Sally, for the initial reception of evidence, and Sally was duly warned to present
her evidence on the next hearing or the case would be deemed submitted for decision. However, despite the warning,
Sally still failed to present her evidence. She insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not around and was not
subpoenaed despite the presence of her other witnesses.
The Court of Appeals rejected Sally’s allegation that Benjamin failed to prove his action for declaration of nullity of
marriage. The Court of Appeals ruled that Benjamin’s action was based on his prior marriage to Azucena and there
was no evidence that the marriage was annulled or dissolved before Benjamin contracted the second marriage with
Sally. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court committed no error in declaring Benjamin’s marriage to Sally null
and void.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally was governed by Article 148 of the Family
Code. The Court of Appeals ruled that only the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contribution. The Court of Appeals ruled that the 37 properties being claimed by Sally rightfully belong to Benjamin
and his siblings.
As regards the seven properties claimed by both parties, the Court of Appeals ruled that only the properties under TCT
Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin belong to him exclusively because he was able to establish
that they were acquired by him solely. The Court of
Appeals found that the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 and under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were
exclusive properties of Sally in the absence of proof of Benjamin’s actual contribution in their purchase. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the property under TCT No. 61722 registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally shall be owned
by them in common, to be shared equally. However, the share of Benjamin shall accrue to the conjugal partnership
under his existing marriage with Azucena while Sally’s share shall accrue to her in the absence of a clear and convincing
proof of bad faith.
Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that Sally failed to present clear and convincing evidence that would show bias and
prejudice on the part of the trial judge that would justify his inhibition from the case.
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Order dated
March 26, 2009 and August 27, 2009, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43, in Civil Case No.
04-109401 are hereby AFFIRMED with modification declaring TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 to be exclusively owned by
the petitioner-appellee while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 as well as CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783
shall be solely owned by the respondent-appellant. On the other hand, TCT No. 61722 shall be owned by them and
common and to be shared equally but the share of the petitioner-appellee shall accrue to the conjugal partnership
under his first marriage while the share of respondent-appellant shall accrue to her. The rest of the decision stands.
SO ORDERED.8
Sally moved for the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ decision. In its 14 March 2012 Resolution, the Court of
Appeals denied her motion.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issues
Sally raised the following issues before this Court:
(1) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial court’s ruling that Sally had waived
her right to present evidence;
(2) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial court’s decision declaring the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and non-existent; and
(3) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming with modification the trial court’s decision
regarding the property relations of Benjamin and Sally.
The Ruling of this Court

The petition has no merit.
Waiver of Right to Present Evidence
Sally alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s ruling that she waived her right to present
her evidence. Sally alleges that in not allowing her to present evidence that she and Benjamin were married, the trial
court abandoned its duty to protect marriage as an inviolable institution.
It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right but is addressed to
the discretion of the trial court.9 In this case, Sally’s presentation of evidence was scheduled on28 February 2008.
Thereafter, there were six resettings of the case: on 10 July 2008, 4 and 11 September 2008, 2 and 28 October 2008,
and 28 November 2008. They were all made at Sally’s instance. Before the scheduled hearing of 28 November 2008,
the trial court warned Sally that in case she still failed to present her evidence, the case would be submitted for
decision. On the date of the scheduled hearing, despite the presence of other available witnesses, Sally insisted on
presenting Benjamin who was not even subpoenaed on that day. Sally’s counsel insisted that the trial court could not
dictate on the priority of witnesses to be presented, disregarding the trial court’s prior warning due to the numerous
resettings of the case. Sally could not complain that she had been deprived of her right to present her evidence because
all the postponements were at her instance and she was warned by the trial court that it would submit the case for
decision should she still fail to present her evidence on 28 November 2008.
We agree with the trial court that by her continued refusal to present her evidence, she was deemed to have waived
her right to present them. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, Sally’s continued failure to present her evidence
despite the opportunities given by the trial court showed her lack of interest to proceed with the case. Further, it was
clear that Sally was delaying the case because she was waiting for the decision of the Court of Appeals on her petition
questioning the trial court’s denial of her demurrer to evidence, despite the fact that the Court of Appeals did not
issue any temporary restraining order as Sally prayed for. Sally could not accuse the trial court of failing to protect
marriage as an inviolable institution because the trial court also has the duty to ensure that trial proceeds despite the
deliberate delay and refusal to proceed by one of the parties.10
Validity of the Marriage between Benjamin and Sally
Sally alleges that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals recognized her marriage to Benjamin because a marriage
could not be nonexistent and, at the same time, null and void ab initio. Sally further alleges that if she were allowed
to present her evidence, she would have proven her marriage to Benjamin. To prove her marriage to Benjamin, Sally
asked this Court to consider that in acquiring real properties, Benjamin listed her as his wife by declaring he was
"married to" her; that Benjamin was the informant in their children’s birth certificates where he stated that he was
their father; and that Benjamin introduced her to his family and friends as his wife. In contrast, Sally claims that there
was no real property registered in the names of Benjamin and Azucena. Sally further alleges that Benjamin was not
the informant in the birth certificates of his children with Azucena.
First, Benjamin’s marriage to Azucena on 10 September 1973 was duly established before the trial court, evidenced
by a certified true copy of their marriage contract. At the time Benjamin and Sally entered into a purported marriage
on 7 March 1982, the marriage between Benjamin and Azucena was valid and subsisting.
On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, Teresita Oliveros (Oliveros), Registration Officer II of the Local Civil
Registrar of Pasig City, testified that there was no valid marriage license issued to Benjamin and Sally. Oliveros
confirmed that only Marriage Licence Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of February 1982. Marriage
License No. N-07568 did not match the series issued for the month. Oliveros further testified that the local civil
registrar of Pasig City did not issue Marriage License No. N-07568 to Benjamin and Sally. The certification from the
local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license and absent any suspicious circumstance,
the certification enjoys probative value, being issued by the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data
relative to the issuance of a marriage license.11 Clearly, if indeed Benjamin and Sally entered into a marriage contract,
the marriage was void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license.12
It was also established before the trial court that the purported marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not
recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. The lack of record was certified by Julieta B.
Javier, Registration Officer IV of the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Pasig;13 Teresita R. Ignacio,
Chief of the Archives Division of the Records Management and Archives Office, National Commission for Culture and
the Arts;14 and Lourdes J. Hufana, Director III, Civil Registration Department of the National Statistics Office.15 The
documentary and testimonial evidence proved that there was no marriage between Benjamin and Sally. As pointed
out by the trial court, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally "was made only in jest"16 and "a simulated marriage,
at the instance of Sally, intended to cover her up from expected social humiliation coming from relatives, friends and
the society especially from her parents seen as Chinese conservatives."17 In short, it was a fictitious marriage.
The fact that Benjamin was the informant in the birth certificates of Bernice and Bentley was not a proof of the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally. This Court notes that Benjamin was the informant in Bernice’s birth certificate
which stated that Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March 198218 while Sally was the informant in Bentley’s birth
certificate which also stated that Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March 1982.19 Benjamin and Sally were
supposedly married on 7 March 1982 which did not match the dates reflected on the birth certificates.
We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and, at the same
time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license, except those covered
by Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall be void from the beginning." In this case, the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a license. It was duly established that no marriage license was issued to
them and that Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil
registrar of Pasig City for the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 3520 which made
their marriage void ab initio. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the general
rules on void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated or
fictitious are "inexistent and void from the beginning."21 Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial
court’s ruling that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio and non-existent.
Except for the modification in the distribution of properties, the Court of Appeals affirmed in all aspects the trial court’s
decision and ruled that "the rest of the decision stands."22 While the Court of Appeals did notdiscuss bigamous
marriages, it can be gleaned from the dispositive portion of the decision declaring that "the rest of the decision stands"
that the Court of Appeals adopted the trial court’s discussion that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally is not
bigamous.1âwphi1 The trial court stated:
On whether or not the parties’ marriage is bigamous under the concept of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the
marriage is not bigamous. It is required that the first or former marriage shall not be null and void. The marriage of
the petitioner to Azucena shall be assumed as the one that is valid, there being no evidence to the contrary and there
is no trace of invalidity or irregularity on the face of their marriage contract. However, if the second marriage was void
not because of the existence of the first marriage but for other causes such as lack of license, the crime of bigamy was
not committed. In People v. De Lara [CA, 51 O.G., 4079], it was held that what was committed was contracting marriage
against the provisions of laws not under Article 349 but Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code. Concluding, the marriage
of the parties is therefore not bigamous because there was no marriage license. The daring and repeated stand of
respondent that she is legally married to petitioner cannot, in any instance, be sustained. Assuming that her marriage
to petitioner has the marriage license, yet the same would be bigamous, civilly or criminally as it would be invalidated
by a prior existing valid marriage of petitioner and Azucena.23
For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity except for
the existence of a prior marriage.24 In this case, there was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just
signed a purported marriage contract without a marriage license. The supposed marriage was not recorded with the
local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. In short, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist.
They lived together and represented themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
Property Relations Between Benjamin and Sally
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed by Article 148 of the
Family Code which states:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and
corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money
and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute
community of conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding
Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by them through
their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
their respective contributions. Thus, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly excluded the 37 properties
being claimed by Sally which were given by Benjamin’s father to his children as advance inheritance. Sally’s Answer to
the petition before the trial court even admitted that "Benjamin’s late father himself conveyed a number of properties
to his children and their respective spouses which included Sally x x x."25
As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the Court of Appeals is more in accord with
the evidence on record. Only the property covered by TCT No. 61722 was registered in the names of Benjamin and
Sally as spouses.26 The properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 were in the name of Benjamin27 with the
descriptive title "married to Sally." The property covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were registered in the name of
Sally28 with the descriptive title "married to Benjamin" while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681
were registered in the name of Sally as a single individual. We have ruled that the words "married to" preceding the
name of a spouse are merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner.29 Such words do not prove co-
ownership. Without proof of actual contribution from either or both spouses, there can be no co-ownership under
Article 148 of the Family Code.30
Inhibition of the Trial Judge
Sally questions the refusal of Judge Roy G. Gironella (Judge Gironella) to inhibit himself from hearing the case. She
cited the failure of Judge Gironella to accommodate her in presenting her evidence. She further alleged that Judge
Gironella practically labeled her as an opportunist in his decision, showing his partiality against her and in favor of
Benjamin.
We have ruled that the issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the
part of the judge.31 To justify the call for inhibition, there must be extrinsic evidence to establish bias, bad faith,
malice, or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or order itself.32 In
this case, we have sufficiently explained that Judge Gironella did not err in submitting the case for decision because of
Sally’s continued refusal to present her evidence.
We reviewed the decision of the trial court and while Judge Gironella may have used uncomplimentary words in
writing the decision, they are not enough to prove his prejudice against Sally or show that he acted in bad faith in
deciding the case that would justify the call for his voluntary inhibition.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August 2011 Decision and the 14 March 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 187462, June 01, 2016
RAQUEL G. KHO, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND VERONICA B. KHO, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Challenged in the present petition for review on certiorari are the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA), Cebu City dated March 30, 2006 and January 14, 2009, respectively, in CA-GR. CV No. 69218. The assailed CA
Decision reversed and set aside the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2,
in Civil Case No. 464, which ruled in petitioner's favor in an action he filed for declaration of nullity of his marriage with
private respondent, while the CA Resolution denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The present petition arose from a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage filed by herein petitioner with the RTC
of Oras, Eastern Samar. Pertinent portions of the Petition allege as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx
3. Sometime in the afternoon of May 31, 1972, petitioner's parents summoned one Eusebio Colongon, now deceased,
then clerk in the office of the municipal treasurer, instructing said clerk to arrange and prepare whatever necessary
papers were required for the intended marriage between petitioner and respondent supposedly to take place at
around midnight of June 1, 1972 so as to exclude the public from witnessing the marriage ceremony;
4. Petitioner and Respondent thereafter exchanged marital vows in a marriage ceremony which actually took place at
around 3:00 o'clock before dawn of June 1, 1972, on account that there was a public dance held in the town plaza
which is just situated adjacent to the church whereas the venue of the wedding, and the dance only finished at around
2:00 o'clock of same early morning of June 1, 1972;
5. Petitioner has never gone to the office of the Local Civil Registrar to apply for marriage license and had not seen
much less signed any papers or documents in connection with the procurement of a marriage license;
6. Considering the shortness of period from the time the aforenamed clerk of the treasurer's office was told to obtain
the pertinent papers in the afternoon of May 31, 1972 so required for the purpose of the forthcoming marriage up to
the moment the actual marriage was celebrated before dawn of June 1, 1972, no marriage license therefore could
have been validly issued, thereby rendering the marriage solemnized on even date null and void for want of the most
essential requisite;
7. For all intents and purposes, thus, Petitioner's and Respondent's marriage aforestated was solemnized sans the
required marriage license, hence, null and void from the beginning and neither was it performed under circumstances
exempting the requirement of such marriage license;
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that after due notice and
hearing, judgment be rendered:
1. Declaring the contract of marriage between petitioner and respondent held on June 1, 1972, at Arteche, Eastern
Samar, null and void ab initio and of no legal effect;
x x x x4ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Among the pieces of evidence presented by petitioner is a Certification5 issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Arteche, Eastern Samar which attested to the fact that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar has neither record nor
copy of a marriage license issued to petitioner and respondent with respect to their marriage celebrated on June 1,
1972.
Respondent filed her Answer6 praying that the petition be outrightly dismissed for lack of cause of action because
there is no evidence to prove petitioner's allegation that their marriage was celebrated without the requisite marriage
license and that, on the contrary, both petitioner and respondent personally appeared before the local civil registrar
and secured a marriage license which they presented before their marriage was solemnized.
Upon petitioner's request, the venue of the action was subsequently transferred to the RTC of Borongan, Eastern
Samar, Branch 2, where the parties submitted their respective pleadings as well as affidavits of witnesses.
On September 25, 2000, the RTC rendered its Decision granting the petition. The dispositive portion of the said
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby declares the marriage contracted between Raquel G. Kho and
Veronica Borata on June 1, 1972 null and void ab initio, pursuant to Article 80 of the Civil Code and Articles 4 and 5 of
the Family Code. The foregoing is without prejudice to the application of Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar for proper registration
of this decree of nullity of marriage.
SO ORDERED.7ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The RTC found that petitioner's evidence sufficiently established the absence of the requisite marriage license when
the marriage between petitioner and respondent was celebrated. As such, the RTC ruled that based on Articles 53(4),
58 and 80(3) of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the absence of the said marriage license rendered the marriage
between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio.
Respondent then filed an appeal with the CA in Cebu City. On March 30, 2006, the CA promulgated its assailed Decision,
disposing thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated 25 September 2000 of Branch 2 of the Regional Trial Court
of Borongan, Eastern Samar, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage between the petitioner-appellee Raquel Kho
and Veronica Kho is declared valid and subsisting for all intents and purposes.
SO ORDERED.8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The CA held that since a marriage was, in fact, solemnized between the contending parties, there is a presumption
that a marriage license was issued for that purpose and that petitioner failed to overcome such presumption. The CA
also ruled that the absence of any indication in the marriage certificate that a marriage license was issued is a mere
defect in the formal requisites of the law which does not invalidate the parties' marriage.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,9 but the CA denied it in its Resolution dated January 14, 2009.
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues, to wit:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ASCRIBING A SO-CALLED "ETHICAL DIMENSION"
TO PETITIONER'S CAUSE, ALLUDING TO AN ALLEGED LIAISON WITH ANOTHER WOMAN AS A FACTOR IN REVERSING
THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT WHICH VOIDED HIS MARRIAGE IN QUESTION WITH RESPONDENT;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPRECIATING AGAINST PETITIONER THE FACT
THAT DESPITE THE LAPSE OF 25 YEARS HE DID NOTHING TO ATTACK, EVEN COLLATERALLY, HIS APPARENTLY VOID
MARRIAGE WITH RESPONDENT;
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ALTOGETHER DISREGARDING PETITIONER'S
OBVIOUSLY OVERWHELMING DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCES OF LACK OF MARRIAGE LICENSE AND GIVING WEIGHT
INSTEAD TO UNSUPPORTED PRESUMPTIONS IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT, IN ITS ASSAILED DECISION; and
4 WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SETTING ASIDE OR REVERSING THE LOWER
COURT'S JUDGMENT DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT A NULLITY FOR ABSENCE
OF THE REQUISITE MARRIAGE LICENSE.10ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Petitioner's basic contention in the present petition centers on the alleged failure of the CA to give due credence to
petitioner's evidence which established the absence or lack of marriage license at the time that petitioner and
respondent's marriage was solemnized. Petitioner argues that the CA erred in deciding the case not on the basis of
law and evidence but rather on the ground of what the appellate court calls as ethical considerations as well as on the
perceived motive of petitioner in seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage with respondent.
The Court finds for the petitioner.
At the outset, the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), raises a procedural question by arguing that
the issues presented by petitioner in the present petition are factual in nature and it is not proper for this Court to
delve into these issues in a petition for review on certiorari.
The Court does not agree.
The issues in the instant petition involve a determination and application of existing law and prevailing jurisprudence.
However, intertwined with these issues is the question of the existence of the subject marriage license, which is a
question of fact and one which is not appropriate for a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. This rule, nonetheless, is not without exceptions, viz.:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures;
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to
the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(7) When the findings arc contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.11ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In the present case, the findings of the RTC and the CA, on whether or not there was indeed a marriage license obtained
by petitioner and respondent, are conflicting. Hence, it is but proper for this Court to review these findings.
The marriage of petitioner and respondent was celebrated on June 1, 1972, prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code.12 Hence, the Civil Code governs their union. Accordingly, Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential
requisites of marriage as a contract, to wit:
ART 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.13ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Article 58 of the Civil Code makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by
the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an
exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article 75.14 Under the Civil Code, marriages
of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title 111, comprising Articles 72 to 79. These marriages are: (1)
marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or war; (2) marriages in remote places; (3) consular
marriages; (4) ratification of marital cohabitation; (5) religious ratification of a civil marriage; (6) Mohammedan or
pagan marriages; and (7) mixed marriages. Petitioner's and respondent's marriage does not fall under any of these
exceptions.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code also makes it clear that a marriage performed without the corresponding marriage
license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the
essence of the marriage contract.15 The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil
Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper government official has
inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.16 Stated differently, the requirement and issuance of a marriage
license is the State's demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of
which the general public is interested.17
In the instant case, respondent claims that she and petitioner were able to secure a marriage license which they
presented to the solemnizing officer before the marriage was performed.
The OSG, on its part, contends that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage and that any doubt
should be resolved to sustain such validity. Indeed, this Court is mindful of this principle as well as of the Constitutional
policy which protects and strengthens the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family.
On the other hand, petitioner insists that the Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar,
coupled with the testimony of the former Civil Registrar, is sufficient evidence to prove the absence of the subject
marriage license.
The Court agrees with petitioner and finds no doubt to be resolved as the evidence is clearly in his favor.
Apropos is the case of Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño.18 There, it was held that the certification of the Local Civil Registrar,
that their office had no record of a marriage license, was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license.19 It was
further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it became the
burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage
license had been secured.20
As stated above, petitioner was able to present a Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche,
Eastern Samar attesting that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar "has no record nor copy of any marriage license ever
issued in favor of Raquel G. Kho [petitioner] and Veronica M. Borata [respondent] whose marriage was celebrated on
June 1, 1972."21 Thus, on the basis of such Certification, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and
respondent has been overcome and it becomes the burden of respondent to prove that their marriage is valid as it is
she who alleges such validity. As found by the RTC, respondent was not able to discharge that burden.
It is telling that respondent failed to present their alleged marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. In addition,
the Certificate of Marriage22 issued by the officiating priest does not contain any entry regarding the said marriage
license. Respondent could have obtained a copy of their marriage contract from the National Archives and Records
Section, where information regarding the marriage license, i.e., date of issuance and license number, could be
obtained. However, she also failed to do so. The Court also notes, with approval, the RTC's agreement with petitioner's
observation that the statements of the witnesses for respondent, as well as respondent herself, all attest to the fact
that a marriage ceremony was conducted but neither one of them testified that a marriage license was issued in favor
of petitioner and respondent. Indeed, despite respondent's categorical claim that she and petitioner were able to
obtain a marriage license, she failed to present evidence to prove such allegation. It is a settled rule that one who
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.23
Based on the Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar, coupled with respondent's
failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license or of any evidence to show that such license was ever issued,
the only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage license was, in fact, issued. Contrary to the ruling of
the CA, it cannot be said that there was a simple defect, not a total absence, in the requirements of the law which
would not affect the validity of the marriage. The fact remains that respondent failed to prove that the subject
marriage license was issued and the law is clear that a marriage which is performed without the corresponding
marriage license is null and void.
As to the sufficiency of petitioner's evidence, the OSG further argues that, on the basis of this Court's ruling in Sevilla
v. Cardenas,24 the certification issued by the local civil registrar, which attests to the absence in its records of a
marriage license, must categorically state that the document does not exist in the said office despite diligent search.
However, in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,25 this Court considered the certification issued by the
Local Civil Registrar as a certification of due search and inability to find the record or entry sought by the parties despite
the absence of a categorical statement that "such document does not exist in their records despite diligent search."
The Court, citing Section 28,26 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, held that the certification of due search and inability to
find a record or entry as to the purported marriage license, issued by the civil registrar, enjoys probative value, he
being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Based
on said certification, the Court held that there is absence of a marriage license that would render the marriage void
ab initio.
Moreover, as discussed in the abovestated case of Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño,27 this Court considered the marriage
of the petitioner and her deceased husband as void ab initio as the records reveal that the marriage contract of
petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the local civil registrar, their office
has no record of such marriage license. The court held that the certification issued by the local civil registrar is adequate
to prove the non-issuance of the marriage license. Their marriage having been solemnized without the necessary
marriage license and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, the marriage of
the petitioner and the deceased is undoubtedly void ab initio. This ruling was reiterated in the more recent case of
Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan, Jr.28
Furthermore, in the fairly recent case of Abbas v. Abbas,29 this Court echoed the ruling in Republic v. CA30 that, in
sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage license was lacking, this Court relied on the Certification issued
by the local civil registrar, which stated that the alleged marriage license could not be located as the same did not
appear in their records. Contrary to petitioner's asseveration, nowhere in the Certification was it categorically stated
that the officer involved conducted a diligent search. In this respect, this Court held that Section 28, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court does not require a categorical statement to this effect. Moreover, in the said case, this Court ruled that:
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official duty has been regularly
performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, "The presumption of regularity of official
acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty." No such affirmative evidence
was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty of checking the records of their office,
thus the presumption must stand. x x x31ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In all the abovementioned cases, there was clear and unequivocal finding of the absence of the subject marriage
license which rendered the marriage void.
From these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the
law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least,
supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties.32
Indeed, all the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract
was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license.33 As cited above, Article 80(3) of the Civil
Code clearly provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except marriages of
exceptional character under Articles 72 to 79 of the same Code. As earlier stated, petitioner's and respondent's
marriage cannot be characterized as among the exceptions.
As to the motive of petitioner in seeking to annul his marriage to respondent, it may well be that his motives are less
than pure - that he seeks a way out of his marriage to legitimize his alleged illicit affair with another woman. Be that
as it may, the same does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license,
given the weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The law must be applied. As the marriage license, an essential
requisite under the Civil Code, is clearly absent, the marriage of petitioner and respondent is void ab
initio.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, Cebu City, dated
March 30, 2006 and January 14, 2009, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 69218, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2, dated September 25, 2000, in Civil Case No.
464 is REINSTATED.
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390 April 11, 2002

(Formerly IPI No. 01-1049-MTJ)
MERCEDITA MATA ARAÑES, petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO, respondent.
PUNO, J.:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Arañes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law via a sworn Letter-Complaint
dated 23 May 2001. Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Petitioner
alleges that on 17 February 2000, respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia
without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.
They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her husband passed away. However, since
the marriage was a nullity, petitioner's right to inherit the "vast properties" left by Orobia was not recognized. She was
likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy. 1âwphi1.nêt
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his illegal acts and unethical misrepresentations
which allegedly caused her so much hardships, embarrassment and sufferings.
On 28 May 2001, the case was referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to then Acting Court Administrator Zenaida N.
Elepaño for appropriate action. On 8 June 2001, the Office of the Court Administrator required respondent judge to
comment.
In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge averred that he was requested by a certain Juan Arroyo on 15 February
2000 to solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17 February 2000. Having been assured that all the documents to the
marriage were complete, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines
Sur. However, on 17 February 2000, Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors
of travelling to Balatan which is located almost 25 kilometers from his residence in Nabua. Arroyo then requested if
respondent judge could solemnize the marriage in Nabua, to which request he acceded.
Respondent judge further avers that before he started the ceremony, he carefully examined the documents submitted to
him by petitioner. When he discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage license, he refused to
solemnize the marriage and suggested its resetting to another date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the
influx of visitors, and the delivery of provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human
compassion. He also feared that if he reset the wedding, it might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just
suffered from a stroke. After the solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the marriage license and admonished the
parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured respondent judge that
they would give the license to him in the afternoon of that same day. When they failed to comply, respondent judge followed
it up with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same reassurance that the marriage license would be delivered to his sala
at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the contracting parties that their marriage is valid despite the absence of
a marriage license. He attributes the hardships and embarrassment suffered by the petitioner as due to her own fault and
negligence.
On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28 August 2001 with the Office of the Court
Administrator. She attested that respondent judge initially refused to solemnize her marriage due to the want of a duly
issued marriage license and that it was because of her prodding and reassurances that he eventually solemnized the same.
She confessed that she filed this administrative case out of rage. However, after reading the Comment filed by respondent
judge, she realized her own shortcomings and is now bothered by her conscience.
Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that petitioner and Orobia filed their Application for Marriage License on 5
January 2000. It was stamped in this Application that the marriage license shall be issued on 17 January 2000. However,
neither petitioner nor Orobia claimed it.
It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar General issued a Certification that it has no record of such marriage that
allegedly took place on 17 February 2000. Likewise, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur issued
another Certification dated 7 May 2001 that it cannot issue a true copy of the Marriage Contract of the parties since it has
no record of their marriage.
On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent judge so the latter could communicate with the Office of
the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur for the issuance of her marriage license. Respondent judge wrote the Local
Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur. In a letter dated 9 May 2001, a Clerk of said office, Grace T. Escobal, informed
respondent judge that their office cannot issue the marriage license due to the failure of Orobia to submit the Death
Certificate of his previous spouse.
The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report and Recommendation dated 15 November 2000, found the respondent
judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued marriage license and for doing so outside his territorial
jurisdiction. A fine of P5,000.00 was recommended to be imposed on respondent judge.
We agree.
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P. 129, the authority of the regional trial court judges and judges of
inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court. 1âwphi1.nêt
The case at bar is not without precedent. In Navarro vs. Domagtoy,1 respondent judge held office and had jurisdiction in the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. However, he solemnized a wedding at his residence
in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte which did not fall within the jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta.
Monica and Burgos. We held that:
"A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to marry the faithful is authorized to do so only
within the area or diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has
jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of
the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings
only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction,
there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the
validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability."2 (Emphasis supplied.)
In said case, we suspended respondent judge for six (6) months on the ground that his act of solemnizing a marriage outside
his jurisdiction constitutes gross ignorance of the law. We further held that:
"The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law they are sworn
to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the
law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in the instant case. x
x x While magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent
judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of
married persons."3
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and
subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized
the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license. In People vs.
Lara,4 we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance
of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the
marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess
such authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance
of the law. 1âwphi1.nêt
Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by petitioner. This Court has consistently
held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal of the complaint does not necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating
respondent from disciplinary action. Otherwise, the prompt and fair administration of justice, as well as the discipline of
court personnel, would be undermined.5 Disciplinary actions of this nature do not involve purely private or personal matters.
They can not be made to depend upon the will of every complainant who may, for one reason or another, condone a
detestable act. We cannot be bound by the unilateral act of a complainant in a matter which involves the Court's
constitutional power to discipline judges. Otherwise, that power may be put to naught, undermine the trust character of a
public office and impair the integrity and dignity of this Court as a disciplining authority.6
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines
Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future will be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
July 12, 2017
G.R. No. 214529
JERRYSUS L. TILAR, Petitioner

vs.
ELIZABETH A. TILAR and the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a direct recourse from the Decision1 dated June 3, 2014 and the Order2 dated August 19, 2014, both issued by
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Baybay City, (RTC)in Special Proceeding (SP) No. B-10-11-39 dismissing the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, and denying reconsideration
thereof, respectively.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
On November 4, 2010, petitioner filed with the RTC a petition3 for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of private
respondent's (respondent) psychological incapacity based on Article 36 of the Family Code. He alleged that he and
respondent were married on June 29, 1996 in a Catholic Church in Poro, Poro Camotes, Cebu with Rev. Fr. Vicente Igot as
the solemnizing officer; that a son was born of their marriage; that their marriage went well in the first few months but
respondent later became an extremely jealous, violent person which resulted to frequent quarrels and petitioner being
threatened and physically harmed; that she is a happy-golucky and extravagant type of person and a gambler; that they
eventually separated in 2002; and, that respondent is now living with another man in Cebu City. Petitioner consulted a
clinical psychologist and respondent was said to be suffering from "aggressive personality disorder as well as histrionic
personality disorder" which made her psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations.
Respondent failed to file her Answer despite being served with summons. The RTC then required the Public Prosecutor to
conduct an investigation whether collusion existed. In his Manifestation and Compliance, the Public Prosecutor certified as
to the absence of collusion between the parties.4 Trial, thereafter, ensued with petitioner and his witness testifying.
On June 3, 2014, the RTC issued its assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this case is ORDERED DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.5
In so ruling, the RTC ratiocinated in this wise:
x x x the lingering issue that confronts this Court, whether it can validly [pass] upon the validity of church marriage in the
light of the separation of the Church and the State as enunciated in Section 6 of Art. (sic) of the 1987 Constitution. Withal,
marriage is a sacrament according to the teaching of the Catholic Church. Being a sacrament, the same is purely religious.
Declaration of nullity, which is commonly called an annulment in the Catholic Church, is a judgment rendered by an
ecclesiastical tribunal determining that the sacrament of marriage was invalidly contracted. The procedure is governed by
the Church's Canon Law not by the civil law observed by the State in nullity cases involving civil marriages. Ergo, the principle
of separation of Church and State finds application in this case. x x x
xxxx
Clearly, the State cannot encroach into the domain of the Church, thus, resolving the validity of the church marriage is
outside the province of its authority. Although the Family Code did not categorize the marriage subject of the petition for
nullity or annulment, the Constitution as the fundamental law of the State laid down the principle of separation, ergo, it is
beyond cavil that nullity of a church marriage cannot be taken out of the church jurisdiction. The court being an entity of
the State is bereft of any jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case.
As the second issue hinges on the affirmative resolution on the jurisdiction of this Court, the same becomes moot due to
the non-affirmance of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.6
Petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied in an Order dated August 19, 2014. 1âwphi1
In denying the motion for reconsideration, the RTC said:
Marriages solemnized and celebrated by the Church are [per se] governed by its Canon Law. Although the Family Code
provides for some regulations, the same does not follow that the State is authorized to inquire to its validity, The
Constitution is supreme to the Family Code. Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the Constitution is written in
all laws, acts and transactions, hence, the same must be upheld.7
Petitioner filed the instant petition for review on the sole ground that:
The Regional Trial Court erred in dismissing the case on the ground that the validity of church marriage is outside of the
province of its authority.8
Petitioner contends that the RTC had rendered judgment principally on the ground that the validity of church marriage is
outside the province of its authority, however, it is the civil law, particularly the Family Code, which principally governs the
marriage of the contracting parties.
The Solicitor General filed a Manifestation in Lieu of Comment on the petition for review arguing that the courts have
jurisdiction to rule on the validity of marriage pursuant to the provision of the Family Code, and that the RTC has exclusive
jurisdiction over cases involving contracts of marriage and marital relations.
We find merit in this petition.
Section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution provides:
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
Our Constitution clearly gives value to the sanctity of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but
it is a new relation, an institution the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.9 Thus, the State is mandated to
protect marriage, being the foundation of the family, which in turn is the foundation of the nation.10 The State has
surrounded marriage with safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity and permanence. The security and stability of the
State are largely dependent upon it. It is the interest of each and every member of the community to prevent the bringing
about of a condition that would shake its foundation and ultimately lead to its destruction.11
Our law on marriage, particularly the Family Code, restates the constitutional provision to protect the inviolability of
marriage and the family relations. In one of the whereas clauses of the Family Code, it is stated:
Whereas, there is a need to implement policies embodied in the New Constitution that strengthen marriage and the family
as a basic social institution and ensure equality between men and women.
Accordingly, Article 1 of the Family Code pertinently provides:
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law
for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose
nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements
may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
As marriage is a special contract, their terms and conditions are not merely subject to the stipulations of the contracting
parties but are governed by law. The Family Code provides for the essential12 as well as formal13requisites for the validity of
marriage. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated
in Article 35 (2). A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.14 No prescribed form or religious rite for
the solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear personally
before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each
other as husband and wife. This declaration shall be contained in the marriage certificate which shall be signed by the
contracting parties and their witnesses and attested by the solemnizing officer. A marriage license shall be issued by the
local civil registrar of the city or municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, except in marriages where
no license is required.15 The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license is that it is the authority granted by
the State to the contracting parties, after the proper government official has inquired into their capacity to contract
marriage.16
The Family Code also provides on who may solemnize and how marriage may be solemnized, thus:
Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
xxxx
(2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious sect duly authorized by his church or religious sect and
registered with the civil registrar general, acting within the limits of the written authority granted by his church or religious
sect and provided that at least one of the contracting parties belongs to the solemnizing officer's church or religious sect;
xxxx
Article. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or
temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases
of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both
of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place
designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.
Thus, the contract of marriage is entered into by complying with the requirements and formalities prescribed by law. The
marriage of petitioner and respondent which was solemnized by a Catholic priest and was held in a church was in accordance
with the above-quoted provisions. Although, marriage is considered a sacrament in the Catholic church, it has civil and legal
consequences which are governed by the Family Code. As petitioner correctly pointed out, the instant petition only seeks
to nullify the marriage contract between the parties as postulated in the Family Code of the Philippines; and the declaration
of nullity of the parties' marriage in the religious and ecclesiastical aspect is another matter.17 Notably, the proceedings for
church annulment which is in accordance with the norms of Canon Law is not binding upon the State as the couple is still
considered married to each other in the eyes of the civil law. Thus, the principle of separation of the church and state finds
no application in this case.
As marriage is a lifetime commitment which the parties cannot just dissolve at whim, the Family Code has provided for the
grounds18 for the termination of marriage. These grounds may be invoked and proved in a petition for annulment of voidable
marriage or in a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, which can be decided upon only by the court exercising
jurisdiction over the matter. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980 provides:
Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
xxxx
(15) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;
Hence, a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, which petitioner filed before the RTC of Baybay City, falls within its
exclusive jurisdiction; thus, the RTC erred in dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certjorari is GRANTED. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Baybay City, Leyte
is ORDERED to PROCEED with the resolution of the case based on the sufficiency of the evidence presented.
SO ORDERED.
Section 1, Arr. XV, Constitution, thus:
Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
solidarity and actively promote its total development.
12 Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are present:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female; and
(2) Consent freely given in the presence of a solemnizing officer.
13 Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer
and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age.
17 Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents or guardians;
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages were
contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority
to do so;
(3) Those solemnized without license, except those covered the preceding Chapter;
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under Article 41;
(5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other; and
(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization. (As amended by Executive Order 227)
Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether relationship between the
parties be legitimate or illegitimate:
(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.
Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy:
(1) Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;
(2) Between step-parents and step-children;
(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;

(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;
(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
(8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other person's spouse, or his or
her own spouse.
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there
is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only
two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute
a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age or over but
below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents, guardian or person
having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one,
such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife;
(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the
other as husband and wife;
(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of
the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same
having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such incapacity
continues and appears to be incurable; or
(6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and appears to be
incurable.
G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner,

vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the
national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who
obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment; hence, like any
other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on
evidence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the January 7, 1999 Decision 1 and
the March 24, 1999 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026-AF. The assailed
Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio solemnized on
January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can now remarry under existing and applicable
laws to any and/or both parties."3
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.
The Facts
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987.4 They
lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989,5 a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage,
was issued by an Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of Australian Citizenship" issued by
the Australian government.6 Petitioner – a Filipina – and respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of
Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City.7 In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as "single"
and "Filipino."8
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage.
While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory
Declarations secured in Australia.9
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage10 in the court a quo, on the ground of
bigamy – respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed
that she learned of respondent's marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and its
subsequent dissolution.11 He contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce
decree obtained in Australian in 1989;12 thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. 1âwphi1.nêt
On July 7, 1998 – or about five years after the couple's wedding and while the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending
– respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the "marriage ha[d]
irretrievably broken down."13
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complained be dismissed on the ground that it stated no cause of action.14 The
Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent.15 The court marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both
parties.16 After they submitted their respective memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution.17
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized
in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essential element of the marriage;
that is, respondent's alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained
by respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more martial union to nullify or annual.
Hence, this Petition.18
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
"I
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by the respondent ipso
facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him to contract a second marriage with
the petitioner.
"2
The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a certificate of legal capacity to
marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding the petitioner' marriage to the respondent.
"3
The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case.
"4
The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of the Family Code
as the applicable provisions in this case.
"5
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce decree
obtained by the respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to remarry, without first securing a
recognition of the judgment granting the divorce decree before our courts."19
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on two pivotal ones: (1) whether the
divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and (2) whether respondent was proven to be legally
capacitated to marry petitioner. Because of our ruling on these two, there is no more necessity to take up the rest.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson
Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong
Seng Gee,20 petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this
jurisdiction only upon proof of the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce
decree itself. She adds that respondent miserably failed to establish these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages solemnized abroad are
governed by the law of the place where they were celebrated (the lex loci celebrationist). In effect, the Code requires the
presentation of the foreign law to show the conformity of the marriage in question to the legal requirements of the place
where the marriage was performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our discussion. Philippine law does not
provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.21 A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even
by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 1522 and 1723 of the Civil Code.24 In mixed marriages involving a Filipino
and a foreigner, Article 2625 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is
"validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry."26 A divorce obtained abroad by a couple,
who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.27
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo
Jr. decrees that "aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law."28 Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.29 Presentation
solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first comply with the registration
requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. These articles read as follows:
"ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file separately a sworn
application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall specify the following:
xxx xxx xxx
"(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or annulled;
xxx xxx xxx
"ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall be required to
furnish, instead of the birth of baptismal certificate required in the last preceding article, the death certificate of
the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage. x
x x.
"ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the
appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons."
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document – a written official act of an
Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document
must first be presented and admitted in evidence.30 A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed
the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself.31 The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an
officially body or tribunal of a foreign country.32
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record
of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested33 by the officer having legal custody of
the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.34
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family
court.35 However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforemetioned rules on evidence must be
demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for
petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of
Cabanatuan City.36 The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification.37Hence, it was admitted
in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree
admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.38
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound
by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.39 Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an
alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen.40 Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective
cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his
allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because she is the party
challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce
decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long
time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts: thus, judges may take judicial notice of
foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the
prosecution or defense of an action."41 In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the
complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in
their answer when they introduce new matters.42 Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of
proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.43 Like any other facts, they
must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by
reason of their judicial function.44 The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt
upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.
Second Issue:
Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was legally incapacitated to marry her
in 1994.
Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in evidence, adequately established his
legal capacity to marry under Australian law.
Respondent's contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a
cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo
matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends
it and leaves the bond in full force.45 There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by
respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree – a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is in
effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the
prescribed period during which no reconciliation is effected.46
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and practices, still restrict remarriage.
Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted
on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from remarrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of
good behavior.47
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has died)
commits the offence of bigamy."48
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been restricted. It did not
absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the
trial court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent's capacity to remarry
despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or presumptive evidence as
to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 3949 of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no proof has been presented
on the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code was not submitted together
with the application for a marriage license. According to her, its absence is proof that respondent did not have legal capacity
to remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party concerned. The
certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of
respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal
capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.50
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner. A review of
the records before this Court shows that only the following exhibits were presented before the lower court: (1) for
petitioner: (a) Exhibit "A" – Complaint;51 (b) Exhibit "B" – Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recto (Filipino-
Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija; 52 (c) Exhibit "C" – Certificate
of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro
Manila;53 (d) Exhibit "D" – Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification that no information of annulment
between Rederick A. Recto and Editha D. Samson was in its records;54 and (e) Exhibit "E" – Certificate of Australian
Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto;55 (2) for respondent: (Exhibit "1" – Amended Answer;56 (b) Exhibit "S" – Family Law Act 1975
Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia;57 (c) Exhibit "3" – Certificate of Australian Citizenship
of Rederick A. Recto;58 (d) Exhibit "4" – Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia
Certificate;59 and Exhibit "5" – Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recto and Grace J. Garcia
Recio since October 22, 1995.60
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally
capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with petitioner's contention that the court a quo erred in
finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to
adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal
capacity to contract the second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy. After
all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce
decree. Hence, we believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any,
which show petitioner's legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the
parties' marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were
both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City
dated January 12, 1994.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we REMAND the case to the court a quofor the
purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that,
of declaring the parties' marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 152577 September 21, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
CRASUS L. IYOY, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, prays for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001,1 affirming the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil
Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998,2 declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada
Rosal-Iyoy null and void on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a Complaint3 for declaration of nullity of marriage by
respondent Crasus on 25 March 1997. According to the said Complaint, respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December
1961 at Bradford Memorial Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their union, they had five children – Crasus, Jr.,
Daphne, Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos – who are now all of legal ages. After the celebration of their marriage, respondent
Crasus discovered that Fely was "hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant." In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United
States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children, the youngest then being only six years old, to the care of
respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from her requesting that
he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said request. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned,
through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually had a
child. In 1987, Fely came back to the Philippines with her American family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City.
Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because he was afraid he might not be able to bear the sorrow and the
pain she had caused him. Fely returned to the Philippines several times more: in 1990, for the wedding of their eldest child,
Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain operation of their fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons. Fely continued
to live with her American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly using the surname of her American husband in
the Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations made in which she was named
as "Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus." At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned
respondent Crasus, and there was no more possibility of reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus finally alleged in
his Complaint that Fely’s acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological
incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes a
ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the
Philippines.
Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim4 with the RTC on 05 June 1997. She asserted therein that she was already an
American citizen since 1988 and was now married to Stephen Micklus. While she admitted being previously married to
respondent Crasus and having five children with him, Fely refuted the other allegations made by respondent Crasus in his
Complaint. She explained that she was no more hot-tempered than any normal person, and she may had been indignant at
respondent Crasus on certain occasions but it was because of the latter’s drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of sincere
effort to find employment and to contribute to the maintenance of their household. She could not have been extravagant
since the family hardly had enough money for basic needs. Indeed, Fely left for abroad for financial reasons as respondent
Crasus had no job and what she was then earning as the sole breadwinner in the Philippines was insufficient to support their
family. Although she left all of her children with respondent Crasus, she continued to provide financial support to them, as
well as, to respondent Crasus. Subsequently, Fely was able to bring her children to the U.S.A., except for one, Calvert, who
had to stay behind for medical reasons. While she did file for divorce from respondent Crasus, she denied having herself
sent a letter to respondent Crasus requesting him to sign the enclosed divorce papers. After securing a divorce from
respondent Crasus, Fely married her American husband and acquired American citizenship. She argued that her marriage
to her American husband was legal because now being an American citizen, her status shall be governed by the law of her
present nationality. Fely also pointed out that respondent Crasus himself was presently living with another woman who
bore him a child. She also accused respondent Crasus of misusing the amount of ₱90,000.00 which she advanced to him to
finance the brain operation of their son, Calvert. On the basis of the foregoing, Fely also prayed that the RTC declare her
marriage to respondent Crasus null and void; and that respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely the ₱90,000.00 she
advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses.
After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their respective Pre-Trial Briefs,5 the RTC afforded both parties the opportunity
to present their evidence. Petitioner Republic participated in the trial through the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.6
Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of evidence in support of his Complaint: (1) his own testimony on 08
September 1997, in which he essentially reiterated the allegations in his Complaint;7 (2) the Certification, dated 13 April
1989, by the Health Department of Cebu City, on the recording of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and
Fely in the Register of Deeds, such marriage celebration taking place on 16 December 1961;8 and (3) the invitation to the
wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, wherein Fely openly used her American husband’s surname, Micklus.9
Fely’s counsel filed a Notice,10 and, later on, a Motion,11 to take the deposition of witnesses, namely, Fely and her children,
Crasus, Jr. and Daphne, upon written interrogatories, before the consular officers of the Philippines in New York and
California, U.S.A, where the said witnesses reside. Despite the Orders12 and Commissions13 issued by the RTC to the
Philippine Consuls of New York and California, U.S.A., to take the depositions of the witnesses upon written interrogatories,
not a single deposition was ever submitted to the RTC. Taking into account that it had been over a year since respondent
Crasus had presented his evidence and that Fely failed to exert effort to have the case progress, the RTC issued an Order,
dated 05 October 1998,14 considering Fely to have waived her right to present her evidence. The case was thus deemed
submitted for decision.
Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment declaring the marriage of respondent Crasus and
Fely null and void ab initio, on the basis of the following findings –
The ground bearing defendant’s psychological incapacity deserves a reasonable consideration. As observed, plaintiff’s
testimony is decidedly credible. The Court finds that defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of psychological
incapacity to comply with her marital duties such as striving for family unity, observing fidelity, mutual love, respect, help
and support. From the evidence presented, plaintiff adequately established that the defendant practically abandoned him.
She obtained a divorce decree in the United States of America and married another man and has establish [sic] another
family of her own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation, wherein he is married to a wife who is already married to another
man in another country.
Defendant’s intolerable traits may not have been apparent or manifest before the marriage, the FAMILY CODE nonetheless
allows the annulment of the marriage provided that these were eventually manifested after the wedding. It appears to be
the case in this instance.
Certainly defendant’s posture being an irresponsible wife erringly reveals her very low regard for that sacred and inviolable
institution of marriage which is the foundation of human society throughout the civilized world. It is quite evident that the
defendant is bereft of the mind, will and heart to comply with her marital obligations, such incapacity was already there at
the time of the marriage in question is shown by defendant’s own attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff.
In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is defendant’s psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital
obligations which already existed at the time of the marriage in question has been satisfactorily proven. The evidence in
herein case establishes the irresponsibility of defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy, firmly.
Going over plaintiff’s testimony which is decidedly credible, the Court finds that the defendant had indeed exhibited
unmistakable signs of such psychological incapacity to comply with her marital obligations. These are her excessive
disposition to material things over and above the marital stability. That such incapacity was already there at the time of the
marriage in question is shown by defendant’s own attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff. And for these reasons there is
a legal ground to declare the marriage of plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy and defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy null and void ab initio.15
Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of the RTC was contrary to law and evidence, filed an appeal
with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, though, in its Decision, dated 30 July 2001, affirmed the appealed Judgment
of the RTC, finding no reversible error therein. It even offered additional ratiocination for declaring the marriage between
respondent Crasus and Fely null and void, to wit –
Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appellee abroad, has remarried, and is now permanently residing in the United
States. Plaintiff-appellee categorically stated this as one of his reasons for seeking the declaration of nullity of their
marriage…
Article 26 of the Family Code provides:
"Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1),
(4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
"WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS
THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE ALIEN SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO REMARRY, THE FILIPINO
SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW."
The rationale behind the second paragraph of the above-quoted provision is to avoid the absurd and unjust situation of a
Filipino citizen still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse
because he or she has obtained a divorce abroad. In the case at bench, the defendant has undoubtedly acquired her
American husband’s citizenship and thus has become an alien as well. This Court cannot see why the benefits of Art. 26
aforequoted can not be extended to a Filipino citizen whose spouse eventually embraces another citizenship and thus
becomes herself an alien.
It would be the height of unfairness if, under these circumstances, plaintiff would still be considered as married to
defendant, given her total incapacity to honor her marital covenants to the former. To condemn plaintiff to remain shackled
in a marriage that in truth and in fact does not exist and to remain married to a spouse who is incapacitated to discharge
essential marital covenants, is verily to condemn him to a perpetual disadvantage which this Court finds abhorrent and will
not countenance. Justice dictates that plaintiff be given relief by affirming the trial court’s declaration of the nullity of the
marriage of the parties.16
After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08 March 2002,17 denied its Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner
Republic filed the instant Petition before this Court, based on the following arguments/grounds –
I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondent’s wife do not per se constitute psychological incapacity.
II. The Court of Appeals has decided questions of substance not in accord with law and jurisprudence considering that the
Court of Appeals committed serious errors of law in ruling that Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code is inapplicable to
the case at bar.18
In his Comment19 to the Petition, respondent Crasus maintained that Fely’s psychological incapacity was clearly established
after a full-blown trial, and that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines was indeed applicable to the
marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely, because the latter had already become an American citizen. He further questioned
the personality of petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, to institute the instant Petition,
because Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines authorizes the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the trial
court, not the Solicitor General, to intervene on behalf of the State, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity
of marriages.
After having reviewed the records of this case and the applicable laws and jurisprudence, this Court finds the instant Petition
to be meritorious.
I
The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the finding of psychological incapacity of Fely.
Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial provisions of the Family Code of the Philippines, reads –
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
its solemnization.
Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes psychological incapacity. In a series of cases, this Court laid down
guidelines for determining its existence.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,20 the term psychological incapacity was defined, thus –
". . . [P]sychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative
of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist
at the time the marriage is celebrated…21
The psychological incapacity must be characterized by –
(a) Gravity – It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required
in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence – It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
(c) Incurability – It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.22
More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines were
handed down by this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,23 which, although quite lengthy, by its significance,
deserves to be reproduced below –
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an
entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable,"
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the
state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability
and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job…
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less
ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts…
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General,
along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the
case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the
defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.24
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,25 further clarified that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse
should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of
marriage based on psychological incapacity. Such psychological incapacity, however, must be established by the totality of
the evidence presented during the trial.
Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned jurisprudence, this Court finds that the totality of evidence
presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore,
there is no basis for declaring their marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before the RTC was his testimony, which can be easily put
into question for being self-serving, in the absence of any other corroborating evidence. He submitted only two other pieces
of evidence: (1) the Certification on the recording with the Register of Deeds of the Marriage Contract between respondent
Crasus and Fely, such marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr.,
their eldest son, in which Fely used her American husband’s surname. Even considering the admissions made by Fely herself
in her Answer to respondent Crasus’s Complaint filed with the RTC, the evidence is not enough to convince this Court that
Fely had such a grave mental illness that prevented her from assuming the essential obligations of marriage.
It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines contemplates downright incapacity or inability
to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will,
on the part of the errant spouse.26 Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also
do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article.27
As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases, Article 36 "is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts
the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting
a party even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness
of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume."28
The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt and embarrassed respondent Crasus and the rest of the
family. Her hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment of respondent Crasus; her marriage to an American;
and even her flaunting of her American family and her American surname, may indeed be manifestations of her alleged
incapacity to comply with her marital obligations; nonetheless, the root cause for such was not identified. If the root cause
of the incapacity was not identified, then it cannot be satisfactorily established as a psychological or mental defect that is
serious or grave; neither could it be proven to be in existence at the time of celebration of the marriage; nor that it is
incurable. While the personal examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer mandatory for the declaration
of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, by virtue of this Court’s ruling in Marcos
v. Marcos,29 respondent Crasus must still have complied with the requirement laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals
and Molina30 that the root cause of the incapacity be identified as a psychological illness and that its incapacitating nature
be fully explained.
In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.31 No less than the Constitution of 1987 sets
the policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.32
II
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not applicable to the case at bar.
According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines –
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law.
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple getting married is a Filipino
citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said
provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce,
she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before
the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after
which she married her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen
since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties,
status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do
not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from
respondent Crasus.
III
The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the Republic, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of
nullity of marriages.
Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines, respondent Crasus argued that only the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal assigned to the RTC may intervene on behalf of the State in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriages; hence, the Office of the Solicitor General had no personality to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State.
Article 48 provides –
ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and
to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does not bar him or his Office from intervening in
proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages. Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987, appoints the Solicitor General as the principal law officer and legal defender of the
Government.33 His Office is tasked to represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and
its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. The Office of
the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring the
services of lawyers.34
The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to ensure that the interest of the State is represented and
protected in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing collusion between the parties,
or the fabrication or suppression of evidence; and, bearing in mind that the Solicitor General is the principal law officer and
legal defender of the land, then his intervention in such proceedings could only serve and contribute to the realization of
such intent, rather than thwart it.
Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor General is authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the
People or the Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before this Court or the Court of Appeals.35 While it is
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal who actively participates, on behalf of the State, in a proceeding for annulment or
declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General takes over when the case is elevated to
the Court of Appeals or this Court. Since it shall be eventually responsible for taking the case to the appellate courts when
circumstances demand, then it is only reasonable and practical that even while the proceeding is still being held before the
RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General can already exercise supervision and control over the conduct of the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal therein to better guarantee the protection of the interests of the State.
In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed the role of the Solicitor General in several cases for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages that were appealed before it, summarized as follows in the case of Ancheta v. Ancheta36
–
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268 SCRA 198 (1997)], this Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation
and application of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which concerns the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General,
along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the
case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the
defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. [Id., at 213]
This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin [355 SCRA 285 (2001)] reiterated its pronouncement in Republic v. Court of
Appeals [Supra.] regarding the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the State…37
Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages,38 which became effective on 15 March 2003, should dispel any other doubts of respondent Crasus as to the
authority of the Solicitor General to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State. The Rule recognizes the authority of the
Solicitor General to intervene and take part in the proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages before
the RTC and on appeal to higher courts. The pertinent provisions of the said Rule are reproduced below –
Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition. –
(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and
the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its filing and submit to the court proof of
such service within the same period.
Sec. 18. Memoranda. – The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of the
Solicitor General, to file their respective memoranda in support of their claims within fifteen days from the date the trial is
terminated. It may require the Office of the Solicitor General to file its own memorandum if the case is of significant interest
to the State. No other pleadings or papers may be submitted without leave of court. After the lapse of the period herein
provided, the case will be considered submitted for decision, with or without the memoranda.
Sec. 19. Decision. –
…
(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor, shall be served with copies of the decision
personally or by registered mail. If the respondent summoned by publication failed to appear in the action, the dispositive
part of the decision shall be published once in a newspaper of general circulation.
(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from notice to the parties. Entry of judgment shall be
made if no motion for reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is filed by any of the parties, the public prosecutor, or the
Solicitor General.
Sec. 20. Appeal. –
(2) Notice of Appeal. – An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal from the decision by filing a Notice of Appeal
within fifteen days from notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial. The appellant shall serve a copy of
the notice of appeal on the adverse parties.
Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion contrary to those of the RTC and the Court of Appeals, and sustains
the validity and existence of the marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely. At most, Fely’s abandonment, sexual
infidelity, and bigamy, give respondent Crasus grounds to file for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code of the
Philippines, but not for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the same Code. While this Court commiserates
with respondent Crasus for being continuously shackled to what is now a hopeless and loveless marriage, this is one of those
situations where neither law nor society can provide the specific answer to every individual problem.39
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30
July 2001, affirming the Judgment of the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and subsisting.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and
obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under
Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling on this apparently novel
question, presented as a pure question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision1 dated May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court
of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution2 dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for
reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry.
The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code and by reason of the
divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the
Philippine Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.3
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V.
Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano
discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a
certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel,
California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic,
herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE4
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case because it
only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper
remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation.5 Furthermore, the OSG argues
there is no law that governs respondent’s situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial
determination.6
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists that when his naturalized
alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law
pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.7
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually constituted a
petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or
whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or other governmental regulation
may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any
question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy
must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the
controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.8
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino citizens where one
later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the
parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage
while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief,
has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when
respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply to the case of
respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come about in the first place, and what was the
intent of the legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the
"Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37,
and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed
into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so
amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles
35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by the case at hand. It seems
to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino
citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting
her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings9 on the Family Code, the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the
Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are Filipinos who divorce them abroad.
These spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them
abroad can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino citizens. For those whose foreign
spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be considered to be validly divorced here and can re-marry. We propose
that this be deleted and made into law only after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26,
according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to
the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.10 The Van Dorn
case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly
obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry
under Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals.11 In Quita, the parties were, as in
this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained
a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized
foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage
were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree.
The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the
interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene
the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as
necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its
terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.12
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant
case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid
divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are
both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is to file either a petition
for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this particular
case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of validity. On the
other hand, legal separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally
separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by respondent concerning the
divorce decree and the naturalization of respondent’s wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden
of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.13
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an
American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it
must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.14 Such foreign law
must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be
alleged and proved.15 Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to
remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is
capacitated to enter into another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as
amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who
had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present petition
there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondent’s bare
allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried
an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon
respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002,
and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby
SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11,
elevated via a petition for review on certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization
on November 29, 2000.3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig
City.4 Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned
to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having
an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The
Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert’s petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The
divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.5
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his
new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian
divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of
the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under
Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent
Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.6
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as
dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted
instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerbert’s petition and, in fact,
alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus,
requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert’s.
In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the
proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian
citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code,8 in order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law.9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where
35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity
to remarry under Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III;10 the provision was enacted
to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse."11
THE PETITION
From the RTC’s ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition.13
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he,
thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
Taking into account the rationale behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that the
provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine
in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse – an interpretation he claims to be
contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He considers himself as a proper
party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility that he might be prosecuted
for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiancée in the Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be
on file with the Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective Comments,14
both support Gerbert’s position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to
aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
THE COURT’S RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive
right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages – void15 and voidable16 marriages. In both cases,
the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of
the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the
marriage.17 Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.18
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C.
Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution,19 enacted Executive Order No. (EO)
227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its present wording, as follows:
35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into the law this
Court’s holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.20 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.21 In both cases, the Court refused to
acknowledge the alien spouse’s assertion of marital rights after a foreign court’s divorce decree between the alien and
the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond between the
spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still married to [the alien spouse] and
still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her
heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends
of justice are to be served.22
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse."23 The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling
the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided
the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved,
capacitating him or her to remarry.24 Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial
recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a
related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize
divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond;25 Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute
divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph
in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the
dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the recognition
of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts
can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction,
however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree),
whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law.26
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In
other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien
spouse can claim no right under this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal interest to petition for
its recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights
in favor of aliens – with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s
petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to
aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce
decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law have been
duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant
to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign
country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title of
the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right
as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the
requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce
situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national law.27
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give
effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country."28 This means that the foreign
judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable
national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.29 The recognition may be made in an
action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an
integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity
to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes
into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal
custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required certificates
proving its authenticity,30 but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce.31 Under this situation, we can,
at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate
to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests that will be served and
the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other
interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner’s presumptive evidence of a right by
proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to
state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign
judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata32 between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court.33
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments
between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending
judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will
not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code provides.
Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree
As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already recorded the
divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate based on the mere presentation of the decree.34 We
consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to what
had been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall
be recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal
consequences touching upon a person’s legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting "all his personal qualities and
relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
illegitimate, or his being married or not."35
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a person’s legal capacity and status that
must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the registration of
divorce decrees in the civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. – A civil register is established for recording the civil status of persons, in which shall be entered:
(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. — The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their offices the following books, in which
they shall, respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil status of persons:
(1) Birth and death register;

(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages solemnized but also divorces and dissolved
marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization register.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the submission of the decree
by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree’s registration. The law should be read in relation with the
requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context
of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil
Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree
on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court recognition, as it cited NSO
Circular No. 4, series of 1982,36 and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 198237 – both of which required
a final order from a competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in
the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration
of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal
effect.1avvphi1
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce
decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a
foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries
in the civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial
order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial
proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment,
authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that
the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located;38
that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the proceedings;39 and
that the time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general circulation.40 As these basic
jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with
the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate proceedings for
the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry – one for recognition of the foreign decree and another
specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce
decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding41 by which the applicability of the foreign judgment
can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case
to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished
the Civil Registrar General. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,
vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE
ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City, through a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of law. The petition assails the Order1
dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment
(or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru
Fujiki, to file the petition.
The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in
the Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not
bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved,
Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan.
However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.3
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay
obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on
the ground of bigamy.4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be
recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles
35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon
City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara
and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics
Office (NSO).6
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the petition and withdrawing
the case from its active civil docket.7 The RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –
(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband
or the wife.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the
respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in the case of a non-resident
respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. x x x
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of the above provisions. The trial
court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of
the preceding requirements may be a ground for immediate dismissal of the petition."8 Apparently, the RTC took the
view that only "the husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their
marriage void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated ordinary civil actions
for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for
recognition of foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact,"9
and not a civil action which is "for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong."10
In other words, the petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay
as husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family Court judgment declaring the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment
was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines11 on bigamy and was therefore entitled to
recognition by Philippine courts.12
In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void marriages under Article 36 of the
Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be filed solely by the husband or the wife." To apply
Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd because only the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the words of
Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult to realize that the party interested in having a bigamous marriage declared a
nullity would be the husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage."14 Fujiki had material interest and therefore the
personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court is applicable.
Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No. 3753)15 in relation to Article 413 of the
Civil Code.16 The Civil Register Law imposes a duty on the "successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage
to send a copy of the final decree of the court to the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled
marriage was solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages,"
"judgments of annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning" are subject to
cancellation or correction.18 The petition in the RTC sought (among others) to annotate the judgment of the Japanese
Family Court on the certificate of marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely erred" when, on its own, it
dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be confusing the concept of venue
with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki
cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court19 which held that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant’s
prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case."20 Moreover,
petitioner alleged that the trial court should not have "immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC because he substantially complied with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC stated
that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity of marriage.21
The trial court reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper venue under
Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person"22 in the proceeding because
he "is not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially
recognized, x x x."23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It only said that
"[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal of this case[,] it should be taken together with
the other ground cited by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."24
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of
Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental.25 The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a special proceeding for correction of entry
under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to
nullify marriages x x x."26 Braza emphasized that the "validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be
questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral attack such as [a]
petition [for correction of entry] x x x."27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage between Marinay and Maekara. The
trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the petition.28 Moreover, the verification and
certification against forum shopping of the petition was not authenticated as required under Section 529 of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also warranted the "immediate dismissal" of the petition under the same provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Letters of Marinay and Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition for review.30 The public
respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO,
participated through the Office of the Solicitor General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a
Manifestation and Motion.31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTC’s "pronouncement that the petitioner failed to
comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be reinstated in the trial court for further
proceedings.32 The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can
sue to declare the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v.
Republic33 which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave,
this Court explained:
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered during the connubial
period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a
subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an action to
declare the marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is
the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only
threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional
burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the
disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by the Constitution.34
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment may be made in a
Rule 108 proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce
the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact."37 While Corpuz concerned
a foreign divorce decree, in the present case the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of the
parties, especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record "[a]cts, events and judicial
decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other
words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a
person’s legal capacity and status x x x."38 The Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a
Filipino citizen and should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void marriage under Rule
108, citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Niñal v. Bayadog40 which declared that "[t]he validity of a void marriage may
be collaterally attacked."41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for them to comment on the
petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact that she was previously married to Fujiki.43
Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she
had no reason to oppose the petition.45 She would like to maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might
cause misunderstanding between her and Fujiki.46
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction
of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court

We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of
the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does
not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy."48
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court.
To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132,
Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese
Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has
custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be
made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the
seal of office.50
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would mean that the trial
court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and contents of the petition,51 the service of
summons,52 the investigation of the public prosecutor,53 the setting of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of
the trial court.56 This is absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign
judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues."57 The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount
to relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Rañada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign
court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering
immaterial the previously concluded litigation."59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its parties.
However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and
other mandatory laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad."
This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the
Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal
jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a Philippine
court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume
to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on
the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus,
Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order against a person creates a
"presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title."
Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that "the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine
courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign
judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds
external to its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law
or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the protection of party expectations,61 as
well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states.62
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce decrees between a
Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of evidence.64 Divorce involves the
dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure
under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine
courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the
Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared
void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132,
Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a
status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded by
the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death
or marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas
this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself,
as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status
or right of a party or a particular fact."67
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of
persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of
any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is
located. (Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to
Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage
between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage
he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation
of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The
interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances68) his
most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he
contracts marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in keeping with the
financial capacity of the family"70 and preserving the property regime of the marriage.71
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution,72 but a spouse’s right in a marriage
extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of
the Family Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse
to maintain the integrity of his marriage.74 In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive
right by limiting the personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union recognized by law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a
subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife"75—it refers to the
husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void
from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The
husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for declaration
of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate
prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes.77 If anyone
can file a criminal action which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage,78 there is more reason to
confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in
the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely civil aspect of
protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party and is therefore
interested in the judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as the
bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most
of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse."80 Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled
to sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the
Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in
the civil registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held that a "trial court has no
jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x can be questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the
marriage.82 The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack
on the marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to
invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural
safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards
are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage,83 support pendente lite of the
spouses and children,84 the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses,85 and the
investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion.86 A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment
of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts
Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be
filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding civil registry is located."87 In other words, a Filipino citizen
cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the recognition
of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction
of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an
action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was
already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign
country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree
to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner
is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this Court
recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd situation where
the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse"89 under the laws of his or her country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only
authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not
allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that results from a marriage
between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly
consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of
his or her country. The correction is made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree,
which is already effective in the country where it was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
is based on this Court’s decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that the Filipino spouse "should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served."91
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains
a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to
declare the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry
under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse
will be discriminated—the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered to correct a situation
where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover,
notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a
foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public
policy. A critical difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as
expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the
option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but
this is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case
was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and
legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the
question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect
to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an
overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to
repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine
courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a right between the parties."
Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the
correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and fact92 that needs to be reflected in the civil
registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment
and the public records in the Philippines.1âwphi1
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for
bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.93 The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code.
Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not
run when the offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago."
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address the questions on venue and
the contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional
Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 215723
DOREEN GRACE PARILLA MEDINA, a.k.a. "DOREEN GRACE MEDINA KOIKE," Petitioner
vs.
MICHIYUKI KOIKE, THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, METRO MANILA, and THE ADMINISTRATOR AND
CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, Respondents
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1are the Decision2 dated July 31, 2014 and the Resolution3 dated
November 28, 2014, of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 106 (RTC), in Sp. Proc. No. Q-13-72692, denying
petitioner's petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to
Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Facts
Petitioner Doreen Grace Parilla (Doreen), a Filipino citizen, and respondent Michiyuki Koike (Michiyuki), a Japanese
national, were married on June 14, 2005 in Quezon City, Philippines.4 Their union bore two children, Masato Koike,
who was born on January 23, 2006, and Fuka Koike who was born on April 4, 2007.5
On June 14, 2012, Doreen and Michiyuki, pursuant to the laws of Japan, filed for divorce6 before the Mayor of
Ichinomiya City, Aichi Prefecture, Japan. They were divorced on even date as appearing in the Divorce Certificate7 and
the same was duly recorded in the Official Family Register ofMichiyuki Koike.8
Seeking to have the said Divorce Certificate annotated on her Certificate of Marriage9 on file with the Local Civil
Registrar of Quezon City, Doreen filed on February 7, 2013 a petition10 for judicial recognition of ioreign divorce and
declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code11 before the
RTC, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-13-72692.
At the hearing, no one appeared to oppose the petition.12 On the other hand, Doreen presented several foreign
documents, namely, "Certificate of Receiving/ Certificate of Acceptance of Divorce"13 and "Family Register of
Michiyuki Koike"14 both issued by the Mayor of Ichinomiya City and duly authenticated by the Consul of the Republic
of the Philippines for Osaka, Japan. She also presented a certified machine copy of a document entitled "Divorce
Certificate" issued by the Consul for the Ambassador of Japan in Manila that was authenticated by the Department of
the Foreign Affairs, as well as a Certification15 issued by the City Civil Registry Office in Manila that the original of said
divorce certificate was filed and recorded in the said Office. In addition, photocopies of the Civil Code of Japan and
their corresponding English translation, as well as two (2) books entitled "The Civil Code of Japan 2000" 16 and "The
Civil Code of Japan 2009"17 were likewise submitted as proof of the existence of Japan's law on divorce.18
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision19 dated July 31, 2014, the RTC denied Doreen's petition, ruling that in an action for recognition of foreign
divorce decree pursuant to Article 26 of the Family Code, the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce must be proven in accordance with Sections 2420 and 2521 of Rule
132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. The RTC ruled that while the divorce documents presented by Doreen were
successfully proven to be public or official records of Japan, she nonetheless fell short of proving the national law of
her husband, particularly the existence of the law on divorce. The RTC observed that the "The Civil Code of Japan 2000"
and "The Civil Code of Japan 2009," presented were not duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul in Japan as
required by Sections 24 and 25 of the said Rules, adding too that the testimony of Doreen relative to the applicable
provisions found therein and its effect on the matrimonial relations was insufficient since she was not presented as a
qualified expert witness nor was shown to have, at the very least, a working knowledge of the laws of Japan,
particularly those on family relations and divorce. It likewise did not consider the said books as learned treatises
pursuant to Section 46,22 Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, since no expert witness on the subject matter
was presented and considering further that Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreignjudgments and
law.23
Doreen's motion for reconsideration24 was denied in a Resolution25 dated November 28, 2014; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the RTC erred in denying the petition for judicial recognition
of foreign divorce.1âwphi1
The Court's Ruling

At the outset, it bears stressing that Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot
grant it. However, Article 26 of the Family Code - which addresses foreign marriages or mixed marriages involving a
Filipino and a foreigner - allows a Filipino spouse to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly
obtained abroad by an alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The provision reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where
35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the above-highlighted paragraph, the law confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a
foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the
marriage.26
In Corpuz v. Sta. Tomas,27the Court had the occasion to rule that:
judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws.1âwphi1 Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound
to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." This means that the foreign
judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien's applicable
national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an
integral aspect of his claim or defense.28 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citation omitted)
Thus, in Garcia v. Recio,29 it was pointed out that in order for a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse to be
recognized in our jurisdiction, it must be shown that the divorce decree is valid according to the national law of the
foreigner. Both the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must
be proven.30 Since our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires
that both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven like any other fact.31
Considering that the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen and Michiyuki, as well as the existence of pertinent
laws of Japan on the matter are essentially factual that calls for a re-evaluation of the evidence presented before the
RTC, the issue raised in the instant appeal is obviously a question of fact that is beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition
for review.
Well entrenched is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. The resolution of factual issues is the function of the
lower courts, whose findings on these matters are received with respect and are in fact binding subject to certain
exceptions.32 In this regard, it is settled that appeals taken from judgments or final orders rendered by RTC in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction raising questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law should be brought to the
Court of Appeals (CA) in accordance with Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.33
Nonetheless, despite the procedural restrictions on Rule 45 appeals as above-adverted, the Court may refer the case
to the CA under paragraph 2, Section 6 of Rule 56 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 6. Disposition of improper appeal. -x x x
An appeal by certiorari taken to the Supreme Court from the Regional Trial Court submitting issues of fact may be
referred to the Court of Appeals for decision or appropriate action. The determination of the Supreme Court on
whether or not issues of fact are involved shall be final.
This, notwithstanding the express provision under Section 5 (f) thereof that an appeal likewise "may" be dismissed
when there is error irr the choice or mode of appeal.34
Since the said Rules denote discretion on the part of the Court to either dismiss the appeal or refer the case to the CA,
the question of fact involved in the instant appeal and substantial ends of justice warrant that the case be referred to
the CA for further appropriate proceedings. It bears to stress that procedural rules were intended to ensure proper
administration of law and justice. The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for
they are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice. A deviation from its rigid enforcement may thus be
allowed to attain its prime objective, for after all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of the
courts.35
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, the case is hereby REFERRED to the Court of
Appeals for appropriate action including the reception of evidence to DETERMINE and RESOLVE the pertinent factual
issues in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 221029
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner
vs
MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Respondent
RESOLUTION
peralta, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks to reverse and set aside the
September 18, 2014 Decision1 and October 12, 2015 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
100076. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 15 October 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of
Dagupan City, First Judicial Region, Branch 43, in SPEC. PROC. NO. 2012-0005 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila.
SO ORDERED.3
The facts are undisputed.
On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for cancellation of
Entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan , Metro Manila, by virtueof a judgment of divorce Japanese court.
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, Branch 43 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan
City set the case for initial hearing on April 25, 2012. The petition and the notice of initial hearing were published once
a week for three consecutive weeks in newspaper of general circulation. During the initial hearing, counsel for Manalo
marked the documentary evidence (consisting of the trial courts Order dated January 25, 2012, affidavit of publication,
and issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012)
for purposes of compliance with the jurisdictional requirements.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for petitioner Republic of the Philippines authorizing
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dagupan to appear on its behalf. Likewise, a Manifestation and Motion was filed
questioning the title and/or caption of the petition considering that based on the allegations therein, the proper action
should be a petition for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment.
As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which the court granted. The Amended Petition, which
captioned that if it is also a petition for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment alleged:
2. That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national named YOSHINO MINORO as shown
by their Marriage Contract xxx;
3. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein [petitioner] in Japan and after die proceedings, a divorce decree
dated December 6, 2011 was rendered by the Japanese Court x x x;
4. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree, petitioner and her divorce Japanese husband are no longer
living together and in fact, petitioner and her daughter are living separately from said Japanese former husband;
5. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of marriage in Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila cancelled,
where the petitioner and the former Japanese husband's marriage was previously registered, in order that it would
not appear anymore that petitioner is still married to the said Japanese national who is no longer her husband or is no
longer married to her, she shall not be bothered and disturbed by aid entry of marriage;
6. That this petition is filed principally for the purpose of causing the cancellation of entry of the marriage between
the petitioner and the said Japanese national, pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, which marriage was
already dissolved by virtue of the aforesaid divorce decree; [and]
7. That petitioner prays, among others, that together with the cancellation of the said entry of her marriage, that she
be allowed to return and use her maiden surname, MANALO.4
Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was scheduled to leave for Japan for her employment. Among the
documents that were offered and admitted were:
1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the petition and its attachments to be sufficient in form and in
substance;
2. Affidavit of Publication;
3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012;
4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese husband;
5. Divorce Decree of Japanese court;
6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the Notification of Divorce;
and
7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce.5
The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the allegations of Manalo.
On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce obtained by Manalo
in Japan should not be recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law "does
not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce whether they are in the country or living abroad, if they are married
to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another country" and that
unless Filipinos "are naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have control over issues related
to Filipinos' family rights and duties, together with the determination of their condition and legal capacity to enter
into contracts and civil relations, inclusing marriages."6
On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family
Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree may
obtained makes the latter no longer married to the former, capacitating him to remarry. Conformably with Navarro,
et al. V. Exec. Secretary Ermita, et al.7 ruling that the meaning of the law should be based on the intent of the
lawmakers and in view of the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be height of injustice to consider Manalo as
still married to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married to her. For the appellate court, the fact that
it was Manalo who filed the divorce case is inconsequential. Cited as similar to this case was Van Dorn v. Judge Romilo,
Jr.8 where the mariage between a foreigner an a Filipino was dissolved filed abroad by the latter.
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence, this petition.
We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision.
Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after the marriage, are of two types: (1) absolute
divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which
suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.9 In this jurisdiction, the following rules exist:
1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.10
2. Consistent with Articles 1511 and 1712 of the New Civil Code, the marital bond between two Filipinos cannot be
dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained abroad.13
3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
it is consistent with their respective national laws.14
4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a subsequent marriage in
case the absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.15
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as
the Family Code of the Philippines, which took effect on August 3, 1988.16 Shortly thereafter , E.O. No. 227 was issued
on July 17, 1987.17 Aside from amending Articles 36 and 39 of the Family Code, a second paragraph was added to
Article 26.18 This provision was originally deleted by the Civil Code Revision Committee (Committee),but it was
presented and approved at a Cabinet meeting after Pres. Aquino signed E.O. No. 209.19 As modified, Article 26 now
states:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the where country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him her to remarry under Philippine law.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a
Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.20 It authorizes
our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce.21
Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case.22 Under the
principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by the spouse of foreign nationality, but the
legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the children or property relations of the spouses, must still
be determined by our courts.23
According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Committee, the idea of the amendment is to avoid the absurd
situation of a Filipino as still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the
former because he or she had obtained a divorce abroad that is recognized by his or national law.24 The aim was that
it would solved the problem of many Filipino women who, under the New Civil Code, are still considered married to
their alien husbands even after the latter have already validly divorced them under their (the husbands') national laws
and perhaps have already married again.25
In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to a case where, at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them acquired foreign citizenship by naturalization,
initiated a divorce proceeding, and obtained a favorable decree. We held in Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III:26
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals. In Quita, the parties were, as in
this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became naturalized American citizen n 1954 and obtained
a divorce in the same year. The court therein hinted, by the way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his
naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage
were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as foreign citizen and obtains divorce decree.
The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. x x x
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant
case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of marriage, but their citizenship
at the time valid divorced obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry
under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or
her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry. Specifically, Manalo pleads for the recognition of enforcement of the
divorced decree rendered by the Japanese court and for the cancellation of the entry of marriage in the local civil
registry " in order that it would not appear anymore that she is still married to the said Japanese national who is no
longer her husband or is no longer married to her; [and], in the event that [she] decides to be remarried, she shall not
be bothered and disturbed by said entry of marriage," and to use her maiden surname.
We rule in the affirmative.
Both Dacasin v. Dacasin28 and Van Dorn29 already recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained
by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, respectively.
In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an Agreement for the joint custody of their minor daughter.
Later on, the husband who is a US citizen, sued his Filipino wife enforce the Agreement, alleging that it was only the
latter who exercised sole custody of their child. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, on the
ground, among others, that the divorce decree is binding following the "nationality rule" prevailing in this jurisdiction.
The husband moved to reconsider, arguing that the divorce decree obtained by his former wife is void, but it was
denied. In ruling that the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit bu not to enforce the Agreement, which is
void, this Court said:
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged invalidity - not because the Illinois court lacked jurisdiction or
that the divorced decree violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was obtained by his Filipino spouse - to support
the Agreement's enforceability . The argument that foreigners in this jurisdiction are not bound by foreign divorce
decrees is hardly novel. Van Dron v. Romillo settled the matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound
by a divorce decree obtained abroad. There, we dismissed the alien divorcee's Philippine suit for accounting of alleged
post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his submission that the foreign divorce (obtained by the Filipino spouse)
is not valid in this jurisdiction x x x.30
Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into effect. There, a complaint was filed by the ex-husband , who
is a US citizen, against his Filipino wife to render an accounting of a business that was alleged to be a conjugal property
and to be declared with right to manage the same. Van Dorn moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause
of action was barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings that she initiated, but the trial court denied the
motion. On his part, her ex-husband averred that the divorce decree issued by the Nevada court could not prevail over
the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign court
cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters
within its jurisdiction . In dismissing the case filed by the alien spouse, the Court discussed the effect of the foreign
divorce on the parties and their conjugal property in the Philippines. Thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree
is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her
husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in
this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.
Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated
by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794,799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction are
to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The
marriage tie, when thus severed as stone party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a
husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides in the nature of penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry
again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely feed from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is
estopped by his own representation before said court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private
respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner
should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent.
The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.31
In addition, the fact that a validity obtained foreign divorce initiated by the Filipino spouse can be recognized and given
legal effects in the Philippines is implied from Our rulings in Fujiki v. Marinay, et al.32 and Medina v. Koike.33
In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her husband, who is a Japanese national, was able to obtain a judgment
from Japan's family court. Which declared the marriage between her and her second husband, who is a Japanese
national, void on the ground of bigamy. In resolving the issue of whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file
a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his her spouse and a foreign
citizen on the ground of bigamy, We ruled:
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to
Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage
between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage
he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation
of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The
interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his
most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he
contracts marriage. These property interests in marriage included the right to be supported "in keeping with the
financial capacity of the family" and preserving the property regime of the marriage.
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, but a spouse's right in a marriage extends
further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the
Family Code. x x x34
On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and her Japanese husband jointly filed for divorce, which was
granted.1âwphi1 Subsequently, she filed a petition before the RTC for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and
declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Article 26. The RTC denied the petition on the ground
that the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse recognizing his capacity to obtain a divorce
must be proven in accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. This Court agreed
and ruled that, consistent with Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et al.35 and Garcia v. Recio,36 the divorce decree and the national
law of the alien spouse must be proven. Instead of dismissing the case, We referred it to the CA for appropriate action
including the reception of evidence to determine and resolve the pertinent factual issues.
There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned rulings. When this Court recognized a foreign
divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of
child custody and property relation, it should not stop short in a likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and
necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the right to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to
live together and observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the civil status and the
domestic relation of the former spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital bond.
The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality principle, Manalo's personal status is subject to Philippine law,
which prohibits absolute divorce. Hence, the divorce decree which she obtained under Japanese law cannot be given
effect, as she is, without dispute, a national not of Japan, bit of the Philippines. It is said that that a contrary ruling will
subvert not only the intention of the framers of the law, but also that of the Filipino peopl, as expressed in the
Constitution. The Court is, therefore, bound to respect the prohibition until the legislature deems it fit to lift the same.
We beg to differ.
Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 speaksof "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained
abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding
wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the
respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute; neither can We put
words in the mouth of lawmakers.37 The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words to have used
words advisely and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non
est recedendum, or from the words if a statute there should be departure."38
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean that the divorce
proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter of the statute when
to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with
the general purpose of the act.39 Law have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but
to carry out such ends and purposes.40 As held in League of Cities of the Phils. et al. v. COMELEC et. al.:41
The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the resulting law is couched. Thus,
applying a verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render it meaningless and lead to inconvience,
an absurd situation or injustice. To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the principle that the intent or the
spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be to the rule that the spirit of the law control its letter.
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered,
is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure is free to marry under the laws of his
or her countr.42 Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree
dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino
spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the
same place and in like circumstances as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding.
Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize
the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on a Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by
operations of their alien spouses are severed by operation on the latter's national law.
Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle, found under Article 15 of the City Code, is
not an absolute and unbending rule. In fact, the mer e existence of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a testament that the
State may provide for an exception thereto. Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality principle must be disallowed
if it would cause unjust discrimination and oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally
protected by law. The courts have the duty to enforce the laws of divorce as written by the Legislature only if they are
constitutional.43
While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification and that its decision is accorded
recognition and respect by the court of justice, such classification may be subjected to judicial review.44 The deference
stops where the classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special protection by the
Constitution.45 When these violations arise, this Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of
constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations.46 If a
legislative classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar
disadvantage of a suspect class strict judicial scrutiny is required since it is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden
is upon the government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it
is the least restrictive means to protect such interest.47
"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause are those basic
liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution.48 It includes the right to free speech, political
expression, press, assembly, and forth, the right to travel, and the right to vote.49 On the other hand, what constitutes
compelling state interest is measured by the scale rights and powers arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by
history.50 It is akin to the paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give way, such as
the promotion of public interest, public safety or the general welfare.51 It essentially involves a public right or interest
that, because of its primacy, overrides individual rights, and allows the former to take precedence over the latter.52
Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress, the same principle applies with respect to the acts of the
President which have the force and effect of law unless declared otherwise by the court. In this case, We find that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates one of the essential requisites53 of the equal protection clause.54 Particularly, the
limitation of the provision only to a foreign divorce decree initiated by the alien spouse is unreasonable as it is based
on superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification.
A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino who is married to a foreign citizen.
There are real, material and substantial differences between them. Ergo, they should not be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and liabilities imposed. Without a doubt, there are political, economic cultural, and religious
dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems and procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is married
to an alien spouse has to contend with. More importantly, while a divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino against
another Filipino is null and void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien against his her Filipino spouse is recognized if
made in accordance with the national law of the foreigner.55
On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce
proceedings a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien spouse . In the eyes of the
Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in a alien land.
The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their
foreigner spouses who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them based merely
on the superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the
treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.
Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 Article 26 is arbitrary. There is inequality in treatment because a foreign
divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by a Filipino citizen against his or her alien spouse would not be
recognized even if based on grounds similar to Articles 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code.56 In filing for divorce
based on these grounds, the Filipino spouse cannot be accused of invoking foreign law at whim, tantamount to insisting
that he or she should be governed with whatever law he or she chooses. The dissent's comment that Manalo should
be "reminded that all is not lost, for she may still pray for the severance of her martial ties before the RTC in accordance
with the mechanism now existing under the Family Code" is anything but comforting. For the guidance of the bench
and the bar, it would have been better if the dissent discussed in detail what these "mechanism" are and how they
specifically apply in Manalo's case as well as those who are similarly situated. If the dissent refers to a petition for
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage, the reality is that there is no assurance that our courts will
automatically grant the same. Besides, such proceeding is duplicitous, costly, and protracted. All to the prejudice of
our kababayan.
It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 encourages Filipinos to marry foreigners,
opening the floodgate to the indiscriminate practice of Filipinos marrying foreign nationals or initiating divorce
proceedings against their alien spouses.
The supposition is speculative and unfounded.
First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as no data whatsoever was sworn to support what he intends to
prove. Second, We adhere to the presumption of good faith in this jurisdiction. Under the rules on evidence, it is
disputable presumed (i.e., satisfactory if uncontradicted and overcome by other evidence) that a person is innocent
of crime or wrong,57 that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns,59 that acquiescence resulted from a belief
that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the law and fact, 60 that a man and woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage,61 and that the law has been obeyed.62 It is
whimsical to easily attribute any illegal, irregular or immoral conduct on the part of a Filipino just because he or she
opted to marry a foreigner instead of a fellow Filipino. It is presumed that interracial unions are entered into out of
genuine love and affection, rather than prompted by pure lust or profit. Third, We take judicial notice of the fact that
Filipinos are relatively more forbearing and conservative in nature and that they are more often the victims or losing
end of mixed marriages. And Fourth, it is not for Us to prejudge the motive behind Filipino's decision to marry an alien
national. In one case, it was said:
Motive for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictated on the kind of life
that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy
and would raise serious constitutional questions. The right marital privacy allows married couples to structure their
marriages in almost any way they see it fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one
another or not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience,
companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites, are equally valid. Love,
though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations,
not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.63
The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State.64 Nevertheless, it was not meant to be a general prohibition on divorce because
Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon, in response to a question by Father Joaquin G. Bernas during the
deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, was categorical about this point.65 Their exchange reveal as
follows:
MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask that Commissioner Bernas be recognized.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco). Commissioner Bernas is recognized.
FR. BERNAS. Just one question, and I am not sure if it has been categorically answered. I refer specifically to the
proposal of Commissioner Gascon. Is this be understood as a prohibition of a general law on divorce? His intention is
to make this a prohibition so that the legislature cannot pass a divorce law.
MR. GASCON. Mr. Presding Officer, that was not primarily my intention. My intention was primarily to encourage the
social institution of marriage, but not necessarily discourage divorce. But now that the mentioned the issue of divorce,
my personal opinion is to discourage it. Mr. Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS. No my question is more categorical. Does this carry the meaning of prohibiting a divorce law?
MR. GASCON. No Mr. Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS. Thank you.66
Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our country. Effectivity March 11, 1917, Philippine courts could grant
an absolute divorce in the grounds of adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband by
virtue of Act No. 2710 of the Philippine Legislature.67 On March 25, 1943, pursuant to the authority conferred upon
him by the Commander-in-Chief fo the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines and with the approval of the latter,
the Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission promulgated an E.O. No. 141 ("New Divorce Law"), which
repealed Act No. 2710 and provided eleven ground for absolute divorce, such as intentional or unjustified desertion
continuously for at least one year prior to the filing of the action, slander by deed or gross insult by one spouse against
the other to such an extent as to make further living together impracticable, and a spouse's incurable insanity.68 When
the Philippines was liberated and the Commonwealth Government was restored, it ceased to have force and effect
and Act No. 2710 again prevailed.69 From August 30, 1950, upon the effectivity of Republic Act No. 836 or the New
Civil Code, an absolute divorce obatined by Filipino citizens, whether here or abroad, is no longer recognized.70
Through the years, there has been constant clamor from various sectors of the Philippine society to re-institute
absolute divorce. As a matte of fcat, in the currnet 17th Congress, House Bill (H.B.) Nos. 11671 106272 238073 and
602774 were filed in the House of representatives. In substitution of these bills, H.B. No. 7303 entitled "An Act
Instituting Absolute Divorce and Dissolution of Marriage in the Philippines" or the Absolute Divorce Act of 2018 was
submitted by the House Committee on Population
And Family Relations of February 8, 2018. It was approved on March 19, 2018 on Third Reading - with 134 in favor, 57
against, and 2 absentations. Under the bill, the grounds for a judicial decree of absolute divorce are as follows:
1. The grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code, modified or amended, as follows:
a. Physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the
petitioner;
b. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political affiliation;
c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of a petitioner, to engage in
prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
d. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six (6) years, even if pardoned;
e. Drug addiction or habitual alchoholism ro chronic gambling of respondent;
f. Homosexuality of the respondent;
g. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines or abroad;
h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having a child with another person other than one's spouse during the marriage,
except when upon the mutual agreement of the spouses, a child is born to them by in vitro or a similar procedure or
when the wife bears a child after being a victim of rape;
i. attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner, a common child or a child of a petitioner; and
j. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one (1) year.
When the spouses are legally separated by judicial decree for more thath two (2) years, either or both spouses can
petition the proper court for an absolute divorce based on said judicial decree of legal separation.
1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under Article 45 of the Family Code restated as follows:
a. The party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen (18) years of age or over but
below twety-one (21), and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents guradian or personl having
substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one (21) such party
freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife;
b. either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as
husband and wife;
c. The consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards with full knowledge of the facts
constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other husband and wife;
d. consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having disappeared
or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
e. Either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other and such incapacity continues
or appears to be incurable; and
f. Either part was afflicted with the sexually transmissible infection found to be serious or appears to be incurable.
Provided, That the ground mentioned in b, e and f existed either at the time of the marriage or supervening after the
marriage.
1. When the spouses have been separated in fact for at least five (5) years at the time the petition for absolute divorce
is filed, and the reconciliation is highly improbable;
2. Psychological incapacity of either spouse as provided for in Article 36 of the Family Code, whether or not the
incapacity was present at the time of the celebration of the marriage or later;
3. When one of the spouses undergoes a gender reassignment surgery or transition from one sex to another, the other
spouse is entitled to petition for absolute divorce with the transgender or transsexual as respondent, or vice-versa;
4. Irreconcilable marital differences and conflicts which have resulted in the total breakdown of the marriage beyond
repair, despite earnest and repeated efforts at reconciliation.
To be sure, a good number of Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic Church react adversely to any attempt to enact a
law on absolute divorce, viewing it as contrary to our customs, morals, and traditions that has looked upon marriage
and family as an institution and their nature of permanence,
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it also limits
what religious sects can or cannot do. They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as
policy for everyone, nor can they cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would
cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus establish a state religion.76
The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry
nor can it demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it is sincerely believes that they are good for country.77
While marriage is considered a sacrament, it has civil and legal consequences which are governed by the Family
Code.78 It is in this aspect, bereft of any ecclesiastical overtone, that the State has a legitimate right and interest to
regulate.
The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is a foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State, should not be read in total isolation but must be harmonized with other constitutional
provision. Aside from strengthening the solidarity of the Filipino family, the State is equally mandated to actively
promote its total development.79 It is also obligated to defend, among others, the right of children to special
protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development.80 To Our mind, the State cannot effectively enforce these obligation s if We limit the application of
Paragraph 2 or Article 26 only those foreign divorce initiated by the alien spouse. It is not amiss to point that the
women and children are almost always the helpless victims of all forms of domestic abuse and violence. In fact, among
the notable legislation passed in order to minimize, if not eradicate, the menace are R.A. No. 9262 ("Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004") R.A. No. 9710 ("The Magna Carta of Women"), R.A. No 10354 ("The
Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012") and R.A. No 9208 ("Anti-Trafficking in Person Act of
2003"), as amended by R.A. No. 10364 ("ExpandedAnti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012"). Moreover, in protecting
and strengthening the Filipino family as a basic autonomous social institution, the Court must not lose sight of the
constitutional mandate to value the dignity of every human person, guarantee full respect for human rights, and
ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.81
A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If We disallow a Filipino citizen who
initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the coverage of Paragraph 2 Article 26 and still require him or her to first
avail of the existing "mechanisms" under the Family Code, any subsequent relationship that he or she would enter in
the meantime shall be considered as illicit in the eyes of the Philippine law. Worse, any child born out such "extra-
marital" affair has to suffer the stigma of being branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a few of the adverse
consequences, not only to the parent but also to the child, if We are to hold a restrictive interpretation of the subject
provision. The irony is that the principle of inviolability of marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution is
meant to be tilted in favor of marriage and against unions not formalized by marriage, but without denying State
protection and assistance to live-in arrangements or to families formed according to indigenous customs.82
This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time. With the advancement of communication
and information technology, as well as the improvement of the transportation system that almost instantly connect
people from all over the world, mixed marriages have become not too uncommon. Likewise, it is recognized that not
all marriages are made in heaven and that imperfect humans more often than not create imperfect unions.83 Living
in a flawed world, the unfortunate reality for some is that the attainment of the individual's full human potential and
self fulfillment is not found and achieved in the context of a marriage. Thus it is hypocritical to safeguard the quantity
of existing marriages and, at the same time, brush aside the truth that some of them are rotten quality.
Going back, we hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be
productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other remains
bound to it.84 In reiterating that the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his or her own country if
the ends of justice are to be served, San Luis v. San Luis85 quoted:
x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate Applellate Court, the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results: and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a
cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its
provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause
injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the
good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are
inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary
when applied in a particular case because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish
obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance between the sord and the will, that justice may be
done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it worded, yielding like robots
to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to
the words of law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes agaian, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond
them."
xxxx
More that twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to render every one of
his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in ever case brought to it
for decisions. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrant, we interpret the
law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention if the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law
be dispensed with justice.86
Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results
or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason,
disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law.87 A statute may therefore, be extended to cases not within the
literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.88
The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write finis to this controversy by granting Manalo's petition to recognize
and enforce the divorce decree rendered by the Japanese court and to cancel the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry
of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Jurisprudence has set guidelines before the Philippine courts recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of foreign country. Presentation solely of the divorce decree will not
suffice.89 The fact of divorce must still first be proven.90 Before a a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our
courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing
it.91
x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and
admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. The decree purports to be
written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official
record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate
issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b)authenticated by the seal of his office.92
In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:
In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court a quo the 1) Decision of the Japanese Court allowing the
divorce; 2) the Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippines Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the Decree
of Divorce; and 3) Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce byu the Petitioner and the Japanese national. Under Rule 132,
Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court, these documents sufficiently prove the
subject Divorce Decree as a fact. Thus, We are constrained to recognize the Japanese Court's judgment decreeing the
divorce.93
If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce decree is rendered admissible a a written act
of the foreign court.94 As it appears, the existence of the divorce decree was not denied by the OSG; neither was the
jurisdiction of the divorce court impeached nor the validity of its proceedings challenged on the ground of collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit an opportunity to do so.95
Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.
x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution
or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material defendants have the burden
of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. x x x
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they
must alleged and proved. x x x The power of judicial notice must be exercise d with caution, and every reasonable
doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.96
Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent Japanese law validating it, as well as her
former husband's capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her. Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not
among those matters that Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The September 18, 2014 Decision and October 12, 2015
Resolution if the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV. No. 100076, are AFFIRMED IN PART. The case is REMANDED to the
court of origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 212860, March 14, 2018
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. FLORIE GRACE M. COTE, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision1
dated January 21, 2014 and Resolution2 dated June 11, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 122313.
The Facts
As culled from the records, the antecedent facts are as follows:
On July 31, 1995, Rhomel Gagarin Cote (Rhomel) and respondent Florie Grace Manongdo-Cote (Florie) were married
in Quezon City. At the time of their marriage, the spouses were both Filipinos and were already blessed with a son,
Christian Gabriel Manongdo who was born in Honolulu, Hawaii, United States of America (USA).3
On August 23, 2002, Rhomel filed a Petition for Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit of Hawaii on the
ground that their marriage was irretrievably broken. This was granted on August 23, 2002 by the issuance of a decree
that states among others:
A decree of absolute divorce is hereby granted to [Rhomel], the bonds of matrimony between [Rhomel] and [Florie]
are hereby dissolved and the parties hereto are restored to the status of single persons, and either party is permitted
to marry from and after the effective date of this decree.4
Seven years later, Florie commenced a petition for recognition of foreign judgment granting the divorce before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC). Florie also prayed for the cancellation of her marriage contract, hence, she also impleaded
the Civil Registry of Quezon City and the National Statistics Office (NSO). The Office of the Solicitor General,
representing Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), deputized the Office of the City Prosecutor to appear on behalf
of the State during the trial.5
On April 7, 2011, the RTC granted the petition and declared Florie to be capacitated to remarry after the RTC's decision
attained finality and a decree of absolute nullity has been issued. The RTC ruled, inter alia, that Rhomel was already
an American citizen when he obtained the divorce decree,6viz.:
[Florie] has sufficiently established that she is a Filipino citizen and married to an American citizen. Her husband
obtained a Divorce Decree on 22 August 2002 and was authenticated and registered by the Consulate General to the
Philippines in Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S.A. [Florie] being a Filipino citizen and is governed by Philippine laws, she is placed
in an absurd, if not awkward situation where she is married to somebody who is no longer married to her. This is
precisely the circumstances contemplated under Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code which provides a remedy
for Filipino spouses like [Florie].
Under the above-cited provision, [Florie] is allowed to contract a subsequent marriage since the divorce had been
validly obtained abroad by her American husband, capacitating her to remarry. In this line, the court holds that this
petition be, as it is, hereby GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered declaring [Florie] capacitated to remarry pursuant
to Article 26 paragraph 2 of the Family Code, in view of the Divorce Decree which had been validly obtained abroad
by her American spouse, dissolving their marriage solemnized on 31 July 1995 in Quezon City, Philippines.7
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on May 17, 2011. However, the RTC, believing that the petition was covered by A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, applied Section 20 of said Rule and denied the appeal because the notice was not preceded by a motion
for reconsideration.8
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA claiming that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion.
In a Decision9 dated January 21, 2014, the CA denied the petition. The pertinent portions read as follows:
The fact that even the Solicitor General and private respondent were confused as to the true nature of the petition
and the procedure that must be followed only shows that We cannot attribute a whimsical and capricious exercise of
judgment to the RTC.
xxxx
Besides, petitioner's omission, by itself, is a ground for dismissing the petition. The last paragraph of Section 3, Rule
46 of the Rules of Court allows the dismissal of a petition for certiorari if the material parts of the records were not
attached to the petition. "Certiorari, being an extraordinary remedy, the party seeking it must strictly observe the
requirements for its issuance." Although it has been ruled that the better policy is for petitioner to be accorded, in the
interest of substantial justice, "a chance to submit the same instead of dismissing the petition" We cannot allow
petitioner to benefit from this rule because the need to submit the transcript of stenographic notes and all other
pieces of evidence is quite obvious for petitioner which is questioning the sufficiency of the evidence presented.
Hence, it would be bending the rules too far if We still allow petitioner to be excused from this lapse.10
Hence, this present petition.

The Issues
THE CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
APPLYING THE PROCEDURAL RULES FOR NULLITY OF MARRIAGE PROCEEDINGS UNDER A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC IN A
PROCEEDING FOR RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN DECREE OF DIVORCE;
THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE STATE HAS NO PERSONALITY TO INTERVENE IN PROCEEDINGS FOR
RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN DECREE OF DIVORCE;
THE CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE FAILURE OF THE PETITIONER TO APPEND COPIES OF THE TRANSCRIPT OF
STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF FLORIE'S DIRECT EXAMINATION AND HER JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT IS FATAL,
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE VERY SAME DOCUMENTS WERE INCORPORATED AND QUOTED BY FLORIE IN HER
COMMENT; and
THE CA ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION DATED APRIL 7, 2011 GRANTING FLORIE'S PETITION FOR
RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN DECREE OF DIVORCE DESPITE LACK OF SHOWING THAT HER FORMER FILIPINO HUSBAND
WAS ALREADY AN AMERICAN CITIZEN AT THE TIME HE PROCURED THE DECREE OF DIVORCE.11
Ruling of the Court
The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC12 applies in a case
involving recognition of a foreign decree of divorce.
It bears stressing that as of present, our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino husbands and
wives. Such fact, however, do not prevent our family courts from recognizing divorce decrees procured abroad by an
alien spouse who is married to a Filipino citizen.
Article 26 of the Family Code states:
35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
The wordings of the second paragraph of Article 26 initially spawned confusion as to whether or not it covers even
those marriages wherein both of the spouses were Filipinos at the time of marriage and then one of them eventually
becomes a naturalized citizen of another country.
In the landmark case of Republic v. Orbecido III,13 the Court ruled that the reckoning point is not the citizenship of the
parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.14
Although the Court has already laid down the rule regarding foreign divorce involving Filipino citizens, the Filipino
spouse who likewise benefits from the effects of the divorce cannot automatically remarry. Before the divorced
Filipino spouse can remarry, he or she must file a petition for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce.
judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give
effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." This means that the foreign
judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien's applicable
national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an
integral aspect of his claim or defense.15
To clarify, respondent filed with the RTC a petition to recognize the foreign divorce decree procured by her naturalized
(originally Filipino) husband in Hawaii, USA. By impleading the Civil Registry of Quezon City and the NSO, the end
sought to be achieved was the cancellation and or correction of entries involving her marriage status.
In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et al.,16 the Court briefly explained the nature of recognition proceedings vis-a-vis
cancellation of entries under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial
order. The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial
proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment,
authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that
the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located; that
the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the proceedings; and that
the time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general circulation. x x x.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate proceedings for
the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry one for recognition of the foreign decree and another
specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce
the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding by which the applicability of the foreign judgment
can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.17
The RTC, in its Decision18 dated January 21, 2014 ruled that Florie had sufficiently established that she is married to
an American citizen and having proven compliance with the legal requirements, is declared capacitated to remarry.
The confusion arose when the RTC denied petitioner's appeal on the ground that no prior motion for reconsideration
was filed as required under Section 20 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Petitioner posits that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC do not
cover cases involving recognition of foreign divorce because the wording of Section 1 thereof clearly states that it shall
only apply to petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages, viz.:
Section 1. Scope - This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment
of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines. [Underscoring Ours]
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court applies; Motion for Reconsideration not a condition precedent to the filing of an appeal
The CA is correct when it ruled that the trial court misapplied Section 20 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
A decree of absolute divorce procured abroad is different from annulment as defined by our family laws. A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC only covers void19and voidable20marriages that are specifically cited and enumerated in the Family Code of
the Philippines. Void and voidable mmTiages contemplate a situation wherein the basis for the judicial declaration of
absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. It treats the marriage as if
it never existed. Divorce, on the other hand, ends a legally valid marriage and is usually due to circumstances arising
after the marriage.
It was error for the RTC to use as basis for denial of petitioner's appeal Section 20 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Since Florie
followed the procedure for cancellation of entry in the civil registry, a special proceeding governed by Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court, an appeal from the RTC decision should be governed by Section 321 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court
and not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
As culled from the records, petitioner received a copy of the RTC Decision on May 5, 2011. It filed a Notice of Appeal22
on May 17, 2011, thus complying with the 15-day reglementary period for filing an appeal.
An appeal is a statutory right that must be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.
Having satisfactorily shown that they have complied with the rules on appeal, petitioners are entitled to the proper
and just disposition of their cause.23
This now brings the Court to the issue whether or not the RTC's denial of petitioner's appeal is tantamount to grave
abuse of discretion. The Court rules in the negative.
No grave abuse of discretion
Although the Court agrees with petitioner that the RTC erroneously misapplied A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, such error does
not automatically equate to grave abuse of discretion. The Court has ruled time and again that not all errors attributed
to a lower court or tribunal fall under the scope of a Rule 65 petition for certiorari.
Jurisprudence has defined grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in this wise:
Grave abuse of discretion is defined as capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.24
After a careful consideration of the evidence presented and Florie having sufficiently complied with the jurisdictional
requirements, judgment was rendered by the lower court recognizing the decree of foreign divorce. It likewise
declared Florie legally capacitated to remarry citing the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Thus, the
CA is correct in denying the Rule 65 petition for certiorari, notwithstanding the RTC's dismissal of petitioner's appeaL
The dismissal, albeit erroneous, is not tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
The Court finds no indication from the records that the RTC acted arbitrarily, capriciously and whimsically in arriving
at its decision. A petition for certiorari will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and proved to exist. The
burden is on the part of the petitioner to prove not merely reversible error on the part of private respondent, but
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated January 21, 2014 and Resolution
dated June 11, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 122313 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
LUZVIMINDA DELA CRUZ MORISONO, PETITIONER, VS. RYOJI* MORISONO AND LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON
CITY, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is a direct recourse to the Court from the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 105 (RTC), through a petition
for review on certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] dated July 18, 2016 of the RTC in SP. PROC. NO. Q-12-71830 which
denied petitioner Luzviminda Dela Cruz Morisono's (Luzviminda) petition before it.
The Facts
Luzviminda was married to private respondent Ryoji Morisono (Ryoji) in Quezon City on December 8, 2009.[3]
Thereafter, they lived together in Japan for one (1) year and three (3) months but were not blessed with a child. During
their married life, they would constantly quarrel mainly due to Ryoji's philandering ways, in addition to the fact that
he was much older than Luzviminda.[4] As such, she and Ryoji submitted a "Divorce by Agreement" before the City
Hall of Mizuho-Ku, Nagoya City, Japan, which was eventually approved on January 17, 2012 and duly recorded with
the Head of Mizuho-Ku, Nagoya City, Japan on July 1, 2012.[5] In view of the foregoing, she filed a petition for
recognition of the foreign divorce decree obtained by her and Ryoji[6] before the RTC so that she could cancel the
surname of her former husband in her passport and for her to be able to marry again.[7]
After complying with the jurisdictional requirements, the RTC set the case for hearing. Since nobody appeared to
oppose her petition except the government, Luzviminda was allowed to present her evidence ex-parte. After the
presentation and absent any objection from the Public Prosecutor, Luzviminda's formal offer of evidence was admitted
as proof of compliance with the jurisdictional requirements, and as part of the testimony of the witnesses.[8]
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision[9] dated July 18, 2016, the RTC denied Luzviminda's petition. It held that while a divorce obtained abroad
by an alien spouse may be recognized in the Philippines – provided that such decree is valid according to the national
law of the alien – the same does not find application when it was the Filipino spouse, i.e., petitioner, who procured
the same. Invoking the nationality principle provided under Article 15 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article 26 (2) of
the Family Code, the RTC opined that since petitioner is a Filipino citizen whose national laws do not allow divorce,
the foreign divorce decree she herself obtained in Japan is not binding in the Philippines;[10] hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the RTC correctly denied Luzviminda's petition for recognition of
the foreign divorce decree she procured with Ryoji.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
The rules on divorce prevailing in this jurisdiction can be summed up as follows: first, Philippine laws do not provide
for absolute divorce, and hence, the courts cannot grant the same; second, consistent with Articles 15[11] and 17[12]
of the Civil Code, the marital bond between two (2) Filipino citizens cannot be dissolved even by an absolute divorce
obtained abroad; third, an absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws; and fourth, in mixed marriages involving
a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a subsequent marriage in case the absolute divorce is
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.[13]
The fourth rule, which has been invoked by Luzviminda in this case, is encapsulated in Article 26 (2) of the Family Code
which reads:
Article 26. x x x
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise. have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
This provision confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino
spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. It authorizes our courts
to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine
courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case. Under the principles of
comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality, but the legal effects
thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the children or property relations of the spouses, must still be
determined by our courts. The rationale for this rule is to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married
to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the former because he or she had obtained a
divorce abroad that is recognized by his or her national law.[14] In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas,[15] the Court held:
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse."
The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts
created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino
spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or
her to remarry. Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign
decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another
proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of
severing the marital bond; Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be
subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the
Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage
between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the recognition
of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts
can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction,
however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree),
whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law.[16] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
According to Republic v. Orbecido III,[17] the following elements must concur in order for Article 26 (2) to apply,
namely: (a) that there is a valid marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and (b) that a valid
divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.[18] In the same case, the Court also
initially clarified that Article 26 (2) applies not only to cases where a foreigner was the one who procured a divorce of
his/her marriage to a Filipino spouse, but also to instances where, at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the
parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them acquired foreign citizenship by naturalization, initiated a
divorce proceeding, and obtained a favorable decree.[19]
However, in the recent case of Republic v. Manalo (Manalo),[20] the Court En Banc extended the application of Article
26 (2) of the Family Code to further cover mixed marriages where it was the Filipino citizen who divorced his/her
foreign spouse. Pertinent portions of the ruling read:
Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry
under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or
her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry. x x x.
We rule in the affirmative.
xxxx
When this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and
extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, it should not stop short in likewise
acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the right to remarry. Indeed,
there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together and observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and
ceased to exist, the civil status and the domestic relation of the former spouses change as both of them are freed from
the marital bond.
xxxx
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained
abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding
wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the
respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute; neither can We put
words in the mouths of the lawmakers. "The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used
words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non
est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure."
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean that the divorce
proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter of the statute when
to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with
the general purpose of the act. Laws have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but
to carry out such ends and purposes. x x x.
xxxx
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered,
is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly where the
Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country.
Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage
bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively
be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like
circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision
should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign
divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operation of the latter's national
law.
xxxx
A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino who is married to a foreign citizen.
There are real, material and substantial differences between them. Ergo, they should not be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and liabilities imposed. Without a doubt, there are political, economic, cultural, and religious
dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems and procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is married
to an alien spouse has to contend with. More importantly, while a divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino against
another Filipino is null and void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien against his or her Filipino spouse is recognized
if made in accordance with the national law of the foreigner.
On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce
proceedings and a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien spouse. In the eyes of
the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in an alien
land. The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to
their foreigner spouses who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them based
merely on the superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed,
the treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.
xxxx
The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State, should not be read in total isolation but must be harmonized with other constitutional
provisions. Aside from strengthening the solidarity of the Filipino family, the State is equally mandated to actively
promote its total development. It is also obligated to defend, among others, the right of children to special protection
from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development. To our
mind, the State cannot effectively enforce these obligations if We limit the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26
only to those foreign divorce initiated by the alien spouse. x x x.
A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If We disallow a Filipino citizen who
initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the coverage of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 and still require him or her to
first avail of the existing "mechanisms" under the Family Code, any subsequent relationship that he or she would enter
in the meantime shall be considered as illicit in the eyes of the Philippine law. Worse, any child born out of such "extra-
marital" affair has to suffer the stigma of being branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a few of the adverse
consequences, not only to the parent but also to the child, if We are to hold a restrictive interpretation of the subject
provision. The irony is that the principle of inviolability of marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution is
meant to be tilted in favor of marriage and. against unions not formalized by marriage, but without denying State
protection and assistance to live-in arrangements or to families formed according to indigenous customs.
This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time. With the advancement of communication
and information technology, as well as the improvement of the transportation system that almost instantly connect
people from all over the world, mixed marriages have become not too uncommon. Likewise, it is recognized that not
all marriages are made in heaven and that imperfect humans more often than not create imperfect unions. Living in a
flawed world, the unfortunate reality for some is that the attainment of the individual's full human potential and self-
fulfillment is not found and achieved in the context of a marriage. Thus, it is hypocritical to safeguard the quantity of
existing marriages and, at the same time, brush aside the truth that some of them are of rotten quality.
Going back, We hold that marriage, being mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be
productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other remains
bound to it. x x x.[21] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Thus, pursuant to Manalo, foreign divorce decrees obtained to nullify marriages between a Filipino and an alien citizen
may already be recognized in this jurisdiction, regardless of who between the spouses initiated the divorce; provided,
of course, that the party petitioning for the recognition of such foreign divorce decree – presumably the Filipino citizen
– must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.[22]
In this case, a plain reading of the RTC ruling shows that the denial of Luzviminda's petition to have her foreign divorce
decree recognized in this jurisdiction was anchored on the sole ground that she admittedly initiated the divorce
proceedings which she, as a Filipino citizen, was not allowed to do. In light of the doctrine laid down in Manalo, such
ground relied upon by the RTC had been rendered nugatory. However, the Court cannot just order the grant of
Luzviminda's petition for recognition of the foreign divorce decree, as Luzviminda has yet to prove the fact of her.
"Divorce by Agreement" obtained, in Nagoya City, Japan and its conformity with prevailing Japanese laws on divorce.
Notably, the RTC did not rule on such issues. Since these are questions which require an examination of various factual
matters, a remand to the court a quo is warranted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated July 18, 2016 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 105 in SP. PROC. NO. Q-12-71830 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the instant case is
REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings, as directed in this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
STEPHEN I. JUEGO-SAKAI, PETITIONER, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set
aside the Amended Decision[1] dated March 3, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 104253 that set
aside its former Decision dated November 25, 2015, which in turn, affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 40, Daet, Camarines Norte, granting petitioner's Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Stephen I. Juego-Sakai and Toshiharu Sakai got married on August 11, 2000 in Japan pursuant to the wedding
rites therein. After two (2) years, the parties, by agreement, obtained a divorce decree in said country dissolving their
marriage.[2] Thereafter, on April 5, 2013, petitioner filed a Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40, Camarines Norte. In its Decision dated October 9, 2014, the RTC granted the
petition and recognized the divorce between the parties as valid and effective under Philippine Laws.[3] On November
25, 2015, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
In an Amended Decision[4] dated March 3, 2016, however, the CA revisited its findings and recalled and set aside its
previous decision. According to the appellate court, the second of the following requisites under Article 26 of the
Family Code is missing: (a) there is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner;
and (b) a divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.[5] This is because the
divorce herein was consensual in nature, obtained by agreement of the parties, and not by Sakai alone. Thus, since
petitioner, a Filipino citizen, also obtained the divorce herein, said divorce cannot be recognized in the Philippines. In
addition, the CA ruled that petitioner's failure to present authenticated copies of the Civil Code of Japan was fatal to
her cause.[6]
On May 2, 2016, petitioner filed the instant petition invoking the following arguments:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE [COURT OF APPEALS] GRAVELY ERRED UNDER LAW WHEN IT HELD THAT THE
SECOND REQUISITE FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE IS NOT
PRESENT BECAUSE THE PETITIONER GAVE CONSENT TO THE DIVORCE OBTAINED BY HER JAPANESE HUSBAND.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE [COURT OF APPEALS] GRAVELY ERRED UNDER LAW WHEN IT HELD THAT THERE
IS NO SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH REQUIREMENT ON THE SUBMISSION OF AUTHENTICATED COPIES OF [THE]
CIVIL CODE OF JAPAN RELATIVE TO DIVORCE AS REQUIRED BY THE RULES.[7]
Petitioner posits that the divorce she obtained with her husband, designated as Divorce by Agreement in Japan, as
opposed to Judicial Divorce, is the more practical and common type of divorce in Japan. She insists that it is to her
great disadvantage if said divorce is not recognized and instead, Judicial Divorce is required in order for her to avail of
the benefit under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, since their divorce had already been granted
abroad.[8] Moreover, petitioner asserts that the mere fact that she consented to the divorce does not prevent the
application of Article 26 for said provision does not state that where the consent of the Filipino spouse was obtained
in the divorce, the same no longer finds application. In support of her contentions, petitioner cites the ruling in
Republic of the Philippines v. Orbecido III wherein the Court held that a Filipino spouse is allowed to remarry in the
event that he or she is divorced by a Filipino spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship.[9] As to the issue of evidence
presented, petitioner explains that the reason why she was unable to present authenticated copies of the provisions
of the Civil Code of Japan relative to divorce is because she was unable to go to Japan due to the fact that she was
pregnant. Also, none of her friends could obtain a copy of the same for her. Instead, she went to the library of the
Japanese Embassy to photocopy the Civil Code. There, she was issued a document which states that diplomatic
missions of Japan overseas do not issue certified true copies of Japanese Law nor process translation certificates of
Japanese Law due to the potential problem in the legal interpretation thereof. Thus, petitioner maintains that this
constitutes substantial compliance with the Rules on Evidence.[10]
We grant the petition.
The issue before Us has already been resolved in the landmark ruling of Republic v. Manalo,[11] the facts of which fall
squarely on point with the facts herein. In Manalo, respondent Marelyn Manalo, a Filipino, was married to a Japanese
national named Yoshino Minoro. She, however, filed a case for divorce before a Japanese Court, which granted the
same and consequently issued a divorce decree dissolving their marriage. Thereafter, she sought to have said decree
recognized in the Philippines and to have the entry of her marriage to Minoro in the Civil Registry in San Juan, Metro
Manila, cancelled, so that said entry shall not become a hindrance if and when she decides to remarry. The trial court,
however, denied Manalo's petition and ruled that Philippine law does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce,
whether they are in the country or abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their
marriage in the Philippines or in another country.
On appeal, however, the Court therein rejected the trial court's view and affirmed, instead, the ruling of the CA. There,
the Court held that the fact that it was the Filipino spouse who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree
was granted should not affect the application nor remove him from the coverage of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code which states that "where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." We observed that to interpret the word "obtained" to
mean that the divorce proceeding must actually be initiated by the alien spouse would depart from the true intent of
the legislature and would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article
26, which is, specifically, to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse. The subject provision, therefore, should not make a distinction for a Filipino who initiated a foreign
divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien
initiated proceeding.[12]
Applying the foregoing pronouncement to the case at hand, the Court similarly rules that despite the fact that
petitioner participated in the divorce proceedings in Japan, and even if it is assumed that she initiated the same, she
must still be allowed to benefit from the exception provided under Paragraph 2 of Article 26. Consequently, since her
marriage to Toshiharu Sakai had already been dissolved by virtue of the divorce decree they obtained in Japan, thereby
capacitating Toshiharu to remarry, petitioner shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Nevertheless, as similarly held in Manalo, We cannot yet grant petitioner's Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Judgment for she has yet to comply with certain guidelines before our courts may recognize the subject divorce decree
and the effects thereof. Time and again, the Court has held that the starting point in any recognition of a foreign
divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws.[13]
This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence,
together with the alien's applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.[14]
Since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a
divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24[15] of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court applies.[16]
Thus, what is required is proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal
custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.[17]
In the instant case, the Office of the Solicitor General does not dispute the existence of the divorce decree, rendering
the same admissible. What remains to be proven, therefore, is the pertinent Japanese Law on divorce considering that
Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not among those matters that Filipino judges are supposed to know
by reason of their judicial function.[18]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Amended Decision dated March 3,
2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 104253 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the
court of origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.
SO ORDERED.

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Persons and Family Relations |1

G.R. No. 103047 September 2, 1994

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO, respondents.

The controlling facts are undisputed:

February 20, 1987

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

Issued upon request of Mr. Ed Atanacio.

(Sgd) CENONA D. QUINTOS

Senior Civil Registry Officer

Hence this petition for review on certiorari.

The issues, being interrelated, shall be discussed jointly.

We affirm the impugned Decision.

G.R. No. 127263. April 12, 2000

In sum, two issues are to be resolved:

FILIPINA SY: Yes, Sir.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not:

(1) The objection is proper, and

(1) By marriage settlements executed before the marriage;

(2) By the provisions of this Code; and

(3) By the local customs.

G.R. No. 167684 July 31, 2006

JAIME O.SEVILLA, petitioner,

CARMELITA N. CARDENAS, respondent.

The trial court made the following findings:

This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by Jaime.

He raises the following issues for Resolution.

We agree with the Court of Appeals and rule in the negative.

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

San Juan, Metro Manila

March 11, 1994

(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.

Local Civil Registrar

The second certification17 was dated 20 September 1994 and provides:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

San Juan, Metro Manila

September 20, 1994

(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.

Local Civil Registrar

The third Certification,18 issued on 25 July 2000, states:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

San Juan, Metro Manila

July 25, 2000

(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.

Local Civil Registrar

As testified to by Perlita Mercader:

A I brought may 19, 1969, sir.

A Meron pang January. I forgot, January . . .

Q Did you bring that with you?

A I cannot locate the book. This is the only book.

A The employee handling it is already retired, sir.19

In one case, it was held:

Panganiban, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., J.J., concur.

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) a marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.

The petition lacks merit.