Lorenzo v Posadas

L-43082
June 18, 1937

FACTS:

On 27 May 1922, Thomas Hanley died in Zamboanga, leaving a will and considerable
amount of real and personal properties. Hanley’s will provides the following: his money
left will be given to his nephew Matthew Hanley, as well as all the real estate owned by
him. It further provided that the property will only be given ten years after Thomas
Hanley’s death. Thus, in the testamentary proceedings, the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga appointed P.J.M. Moore as trustee of the estate. Moore took his oath of
office and gave bond on March 10, 1924, and resigned on Feb. 29, 1932. Pablo
Lorenzo was appointed in his stead. Juan Posadas, Collector of Internal Revenue,
assessed inheritance tax against the estate amounting to P2,057.74 which includes
penalty and surcharge. He filed a motion in the testamentary proceedings so that
Lorenzo will be ordered to pay the amount due. Lorenzo paid the amount in protest after
CFI granted Posadas’ motion. He claimed that the inheritance tax should have been
assessed after 10 years. He asked for a refund but Posadas declined to do so. The
latter counterclaimed for the additional amount of P1,191.27 which represents interest
due on the tax and which was not included in the original assessment. However, CFI
dismissed this counterclaim. It also denied Lorenzo’s claim for refund against Posadas.
Hence, both appealed.
ISSUE:
1) WON there has been delinquency in the payment of the inheritance tax
2) WON the provisions of Act No. 3606 favorable to the tax-payer be given
retroactive effect?
HELD:

1. Yes. The plaintiff correctly states that the liability to pay a tax may arise at a
certain time and the tax may be paid within another given time.

The defendant maintains that it was the duty of the executor to pay the
inheritance tax before the delivery of the decedent's property to the trustee.
Stated otherwise, the defendant contends that delivery to the trustee was
delivery to the cestui que trust, the beneficiary in this case, within the meaning of
the first paragraph of subsection (b) of section 1544 of the Revised
Administrative Code. This contention is well taken and is sustained.
 To constitute a valid testamentary trust there must be a concurrence of three
circumstances: (1) Sufficient words to raise a trust; (2) a definite subject; (3) a
certain or ascertain object; statutes in some jurisdictions expressly or in effect so
providing." (69 C. J., pp. 705,706.) There is no doubt that the testator intended to
create a trust. He ordered in his will that certain of his properties be kept together
undisposed during a fixed period, for a stated purpose. The probate court
certainly exercised sound judgment in appointment a trustee to carry into effect
the provisions of the will (see sec. 582, Code of Civil Procedure).

The delinquency in payment occurred on March 10, 1924, the date when Moore
became trustee. The interest due should be computed from that date and it is
error on the part of the defendant to compute it one month later. The provisions
cases are mandatory (see and cf. Lim Co Chui vs. Posadas, supra), and neither
the Collector of Internal Revenue or this court may remit or decrease such
interest, no matter how heavily it may burden the taxpayer.

2. No. "A statute should be considered as prospective in its operation, whether it

enacts, amends, or repeals an inheritance tax, unless the language of the statute
clearly demands or expresses that it shall have a retroactive effect, . . . ." (61 C.
J., P. 1602.) Though the last paragraph of section 5 of Regulations No. 65 of the
Department of Finance makes section 3 of Act No. 3606, amending section 1544
of the Revised Administrative Code, applicable to all estates the inheritance
taxes due from which have not been paid, Act No. 3606 itself contains no
provisions indicating legislative intent to give it retroactive effect. No such effect
can be given the statute by this court.

Hernandez v. Albano, 19 SCRA 95

G.R. No. L-19272
January 25, 1967

FACTS:

Isabela representative Delfin Albano filed a complaint with the Manila City Fiscal
against Finance Secretary and Central Bank Monetary Board Presiding Officer
Jaime Hernandez for violation of Article 216 of the Revised Penal Code (possession of
prohibited interest by a public officer), Commonwealth Act 626 (which provides for
the penalty for violations of Article VII, Section 11, subsection (2) of the
Constitution) or RA 265(Central Bank Act). The complaint revolves around
petitioner's alleged shareholdings in the University of the East, Bicol Electric Co., Rural
Bank of Nueva Caceres, DMG inc., and University of Nueva Caceres and the claim that
said corporations obtained dollar allocations from the Central Bank, through the
Monetary Board, during petitioner's incumbency as presiding officer thereof. In total,
there were five charges docketed in the fiscal’s office. At the joint investigation of the
foregoing charges before respondent Carlos C. Gonzales, the investigating Fiscal,
complainant Albano moved to exclude the alleged violation of Article 216 of the Revised
Penal Code as the applicability of this statute was in pending before the SC in Solidum
v Hernandez, which had since been resolved adversely against Hernandez. Fiscal
Gonzales granted the motion. Then, petitioner sought the dismissal of the remaining
charges upon the averment that (a) violation of Article VII, Section 11, subsection (2) of
the Constitution, punishable under Commonwealth Act 626, should be prosecuted at the
domicile of the private enterprises affected there by; and that (b) violation of Section 13
of Republic Act 265 is not criminal in nature. Dismissal and reconsideration denied.
Petitioner went to the Court of First Instance Manila on certiorari and prohibition praying
for preliminary injunction to restrain the fiscal’s office from continuing the investigation.
The CFI dismissed the petition.
ISSUE:

WON the prosecuting arm of the City of Manila should be restrained from proceeding
with the investigation of the charges against Hernandez
RULING:

By statute, the prosecuting officer of the City of Manila and his assistants are
empowered to investigate crimes committed within the city's territorial jurisdiction. Not a
mere privilege, it is the sworn duty of a Fiscal to conduct an investigation of a criminal
charge filed with his office. The power to investigate postulates the other obligation on
the part of the Fiscal to investigate promptly and file the case of as speedily. Agreeably
to the foregoing, a rule — now of long standing and frequent application — was
formulated that ordinarily criminal prosecution may not be blocked by court prohibition
or injunction. We are not to be understood, however, as saying that the heavy hand of a
prosecutor may not be shackled — under all circumstances. The rule is not an
invariable one. Extreme cases may, and actually do, exist where relief in equity may be
availed of to stop a purported enforcement of a criminal law where it is necessary (a) for
the orderly administration of justice; (b) to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in
an oppressive and vindictive manner; (c) to avoid multiplicity of actions; (d) to afford
adequate protection to constitutional rights; and (e) in proper cases, because the statute
relied upon is unconstitutional, or was "held invalid."

Commonwealth Act 626 provides the penal sanction for a violation of this constitutional
precept, i.e., a fine of not than P5,000 or imprisonment of not more than 2 years, or
both. The legal mandate in Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of the Court is that "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential
ingredients thereof took place." This principle is fundamental. Thus, where an offense is
wholly committed outside the territorial limits wherein the court operates, said court is
powerless to try the case. For, "the rule is that one cannot be held to answer for any
crime committed by him except in the jurisdiction where it was committed." Similarly, the
City Fiscal of Manila and his assistants — as such — may not investigate a crime
committed within the exclusive confines of, say, Camarines Norte. This proposition
offers no area for debate. Because, said prosecuting officers would then be
overreaching the territorial limits of their jurisdiction, and, in the process, step on the
shoes of those who, by statute, are empowered and obligated to perform that task. They
cannot unlawfully encroach upon powers and prerogatives of the Fiscals of the province
aforesaid. Since criminal action must be instituted and tried in the place where the crime
or an essential ingredient thereof, took place, it stands to reason to say that the Manila
under the facts obtained here, have jurisdiction to investigate the violation complained
of. The other argument pressed upon us — that a violation of Section 13 of Republic Act
265 is not criminal in nature — furnishes no better foundation.

In the light of the considerations, we vote to affirm the judgment under review. Costs
against petitioner. So ordered.

Liong v. Lee,
G.R. No. 181658,
August 7, 2013

FACTS:

Petitioner Paul Lee is the President of Centillion Holding, Inc. (CHI), affiliated with
Clothman Knitting Corporation (CKC Group). Respondent Chin Lee is the elected
treasurer of CHI. Paul lee filed a verified petition for the issuance of an Owner‘s
Duplicate Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT), covering a property owned by CHI.
He claims he originally had in his possession an owner‘s duplicate copy of the TCT but
subsequently lost it. In a Complaint -Affidavit, respondent Chin Lee alleges that as
treasurer of CHI, she was tasked with the duty of keeping all vital financial documents
including the said TCT. She claims that Paul Lee knew of this fact and made a willful
and deliberate assertion of falsehood in his verified petition, thereby accusing him of
perjury. Paul Lee‘s counsel then moved in open court that respondent Chin Lee and her
counsel should be excluded from participating in the case, since perjury is a public
offense, and there is no private person injured by the crime.
ISSUE:

WON the Honorable Court of Appeals committed a grave error when it upheld the
resolution of the Metropolitan Trial Court that there is a private offended party in the
crime of perjury, a crime against public interest.
RULING:

The petition has no merit.

Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate of
our law that "[e]very person criminally liable x x x is also civilly liable." Underlying this
legal principle is the traditional theory that when a person commits a crime, he offends
two entities, namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity, called the
State, whose law he has violated; and (2) the individual member of that society whose
person, right, honor, chastity or property was actually or directly injured or damaged by
the same punishable act or omission.

Even assuming that no civil liability was alleged or proved in the perjury case being tried
in the MeTC, this Court declared in the early case of Lim Tek Goan v. Yatco, cited by
both MeTC and CA, that whether public or private crimes are involved, it is erroneous
for the trial court to consider the intervention of the offended party by counsel as merely
a matter of tolerance. Thus, where the private prosecution has asserted its right to
intervene in the proceedings, that right must be respected. The right reserved by the
Rules to the offended party is that of intervening for the sole purpose of enforcing the
civil liability born of the criminal act and not of demanding punishment of the accused.
Such intervention, moreover, is always subject to the direction and control of the public
prosecutor. Accordingly, if there is no waiver or reservation of civil liability, evidence
should be allowed to establish the extent of injuries suffered.

In the case before us, there was neither a waiver nor a reservation made; nor did the
offended party institute a separate civil action. It follows that evidence should be allowed
in the criminal proceedings to establish the civil liability arising from the offense
committed, and the private offended party has the right to intervene through the private
prosecutors.
Rimando v. Comelec, et al.
G.R. No. 176364,
September 18, 2009

FACTS:

On July 13, 2001, herein private respondent lodged a Complaint with the COMELEC,
Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor, Santa Cruz Laguna, accusing Jacinto
Carag, Jonry Enaya and herein petitioner Juanito R. Rimando of violating Section 2,
paragraph (e) and Section 3, paragraph (d) of COMELEC Resolution No. 3328 in
relation to Section 261, paragraph (s) of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 32 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7166.

Petitioner denied the allegation in his counter-affidavit. In a Resolution dated October 8,

2001, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Santa Cruz, Laguna, dismissed private
respondent’s complaint against petitioner, private respondent then appealed to
COMELEC. On May 6, 2002, the COMELEC En Banc rendered a Resolution affirming
the dismissal of the complaint against security guards but directing its Law Department
to file the proper information against petitioner Juanito Rimando for violation of Article
XXII, Section 261, paragraph (s) of the Omnibus Election Code.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was granted by COMELEC En Banc
in its Resolution dated January 30, 2004. Private Respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration for the aforementioned resolution which was granted by the COMELEC
on October 11, 2005. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the October 11, 2005
Resolution but was denied by COMELEC.

Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to reverse
and set 1) Resolution promulgated on October 11, 2005 and 2) Resolution promulgated
on January 5, 2007.

ISSUE:
WON respondent Public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or without
or in excess of jurisdiction in disregarding the time-honored doctrine of “nullum crimen,
nulla poena sine lege.”

RULING:

Yes. To begin with, under Section 261(s) of the Omnibus Election Code, the offender is,
among others, a member of a privately owned or operated security, investigative,
protective or intelligence agency, who either (a) wears his uniform or uses his insignia,
decorations or regalia, or (b) bears arms outside the immediate vicinity of his place of
work during the election period, except under certain circumstances or when authorized
by the COMELEC to do so. Ineluctably, such circumstances can only apply to security
guards Enaya and Carag but not to petitioner. Petitioner should not be made
responsible for the acts of another, more so, when the law does not make him expressly
so responsible. A penal law, as defined by this Court, is an act of the legislature that
prohibits certain acts and establishes penalties for its violation. It also defines crime,
treats of its nature and provides for its punishment.

To reiterate, under Section 261 (s) of the Omnibus Election Code, the punishable act is
the bearing of arms outside the immediate vicinity of one’s place of work during the
election period and not the failure of the head or responsible officer of the security
agency to obtain prior written COMELEC approval.

In any event, there is likewise nothing in R.A. 7166 that expressly penalizes the mere
failure to secure written authority from the COMELEC as required in Section 32 thereof.
Such failure to secure an authorization must still be accompanied by other operative
acts, such as the bearing, carrying or transporting of firearms in public places during the
election period. All told, petitioner should be absolved of any criminal liability, consistent
with the doctrine of nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege - there is no crime when there
is no law punishing it. Thus, the Court finds that respondent COMELEC acted with
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned Resolutions. Wherefore, The
Resolutions of the COMELEC En Banc issued on October 11, 2005 and January 5,
2007 in Election Case No. 01-130 are hereby reversed and set aside.

Lozano v. Martinez
G.R. No. L-63419
December 18, 1986

FACTS:
The constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short), popularly known
as the Bouncing Check Law, which was approved on April 3, 1979, is the sole issue
presented by these petitions for decision. The question is definitely one of first
impression in our jurisdiction. These petitions arose from cases involving prosecution of
offenses under the statute. The defendants in those cases moved seasonably to quash
the informations on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an offense, the
statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the respondent trial courts,
except in one case, which is the subject of G. R. No. 75789, wherein the trial court
declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The parties adversely
affected thus appealed.

In view of the importance of the issue involved here, there is no doubt in our mind that
the instant petitions should be entertained and the constitutional challenge to BP 22
resolved promptly, one way or the other, in order to put to rest the doubts and
uncertainty that exist in legal and judicial circles and the general public which have
unnecessarily caused a delay in the disposition of cases involving the enforcement of
the statute.

ISSUE:

1. W/N BP 22 violates the constitutional provision on non-imprisonment due to debt

2. W/N BP 22 impairs freedom of contract
3. W/N it contravenes the equal protection clause

RULING:

1. No. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and
issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for
payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The
law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of
the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless
checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the
public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not
as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.

The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of

public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public
nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests
of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the
 community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or
holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless
commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very wen pollute
the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually
hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.

2. No. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to

enter into "lawful" contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are not
lawful. Besides, we must bear in mind that checks can not be categorized as
mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modem day and age,
has become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking
system and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state.
3. No. Neither do we find substance in the claim that the statute in question denies
equal protection of the laws or is discriminatory, since it penalizes the drawer of
the check, but not the payee. It is contended that the payee is just as responsible
for the crime as the drawer of the check, since without the indispensable
participation of the payee by his acceptance of the check there would be no
crime. This argument is tantamount to saying that, to give equal protection, the
law should punish both the swindler and the swindled. The petitioners' posture
ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause "equal protection of the laws."
The clause does not preclude classification of individuals, who may be accorded
different treatment under the law as long as the classification is no unreasonable
or arbitrary.