[G.R. No. 168050. September 19, 2008.

]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BERNARDINO GAFFUD, JR., accused-appellant.
PUNO, C.J.:
For review before this Court is the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 31, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 00060 finding the accused-appellant Bernardino Gaffud, Jr. guilty of the complex crime of double murder and
sentencing him to death, affirming with modification the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) dated August
28, 2002 in Criminal Case No. 1125. IaTSED
The facts of this case were aptly summarized by the CA as follows:
Records show that accused-appellant Bernardino Gaffud, Jr., along with two John Does were
indicted for Double Murder for the killing of Manuel Salvador and Analyn Salvador, under the
following Information:
"The undersigned 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor accuses Bernardino Gaffud, Jr. and two (2)
JOHN DOES of the crime of DOUBLE MURDER defined and penalized under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
'That on or about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of May 10, 1994 at Sitio Biton, Barangay Wasid,
Municipality of Nagtipunan, Province of Quirino, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to kill and motivated by long standing
grudge, after conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, by means of fire, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, shot and burn Manuel Salvador and Analyn
Salvador which caused their instantaneous death.'
CONTRARY TO LAW." (p. 15, Records)
It appears that Manuel Salvador and his daughter Analyn Salvador were killed when the house they were
staying in located at Sitio Biton, Barangay Wasid, Nagtipunan, Quirino was burned down while they were
inside. An eyewitness pointed to accused-appellant Bernardino Gaffud, Jr. as one of the arsonists.
Upon preliminary investigation, where appellant Gaffud, Jr. failed to appear despite being subpoenaed to
submit his counter-affidavit, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Ferdinand Orias resolved that charges for
double murder by means of fire be filed against herein appellant and two John Does, (p. 14, Records).
When arraigned on June 6, 1995, accused-appellant Gaffud, Jr. entered a plea of Not Guilty, (p. 48, Records),
paving the way for his trial. ETIcHa
The prosecution presented six (6) witnesses against appellant Gaffud, Jr., namely Dominga Salvador,
common-law wife of Manuel Salvador and mother of Analyn Salvador, Orly Salvador, nephew of Manuel
Salvador, Potado Ballang, Barangay Captain of Wasid, Nagtipunan, Quirino, Dan Dangpal, a neighbor of the
deceased, SPO2 Dominador Tabal, the investigating police, and Dr. Teodomiro Hufana who conducted the
autopsy on the deceased Manuel Salvador.
Evidence for the prosecution tended to prove that on the night of May 10, 1994, Orly Salvador was on his way
to the house of his uncle Manuel Salvador to fetch the latter as they were going to attend a wedding at the
nearby barangay hall. He suddenly heard two gunshots. Thereafter, he saw the house of his uncle burning.
Because of the glow emanating therefrom, he saw three persons within the vicinity of the burning house. He
saw them hurriedly leaving the place towards the direction of the Cagayan river. One of the three was
holding a flashlight, whom he identified as appellant Gaffud, Jr. He could not identify the two other persons.
After the house was burned, Orly went towards the barangay hall to see if his uncle Manuel Salvador was
there, but he met Barangay Captain Potado Ballang who informed him that his uncle was not at the barangay
hall. They then proceeded to the burned house, and found the charred remains of Manuel Salvador and
Analyn Salvador. (TSN, October 10, 1995, pp. 3-8)
Barangay Captain Potado Ballang testified that he saw appellant Gaffud, Jr. on the fateful day at around 6:30
PM, along the riverbank, a few meters away from the house of Manuel Salvador. When Potado asked what he
was doing there, Gaffud, Jr. said he was looking for his boat. However, Potado knew that the appellant did
not own a boat. After a few minutes, Potado left to attend the wedding party being held at the barangay hall.
(TSN, November 4, 1996, pp. 2-5)
Dan Dangpal's testimony was dispensed with, but the defense agreed to the nature of the testimony he would
have given, which tended to show that sometime at about 8:00 PM on the fateful evening, while inside his
house, he heard successive gunshots, and when he went out of his house, he saw the deceased's house
burning about 200 meters away. He heard persons laughing and saw the light of a flashlight and persons
moving away from the burning house. He could not recognize any of them. (TSN, February 24, 1997; Exhibit
"D", p. 8, Records) aEHADT
Dominga Salvador's testimony tended to show that the appellant Gaffud, Jr. was their neighbor. In the
morning of May 10, 1994, she went to the house of the appellant to see him about her husband's share in the
construction of the barangay hall, which was contracted to the appellant. Gaffud, Jr. told her that he would go
 to her house that afternoon to introduce his in-law Balbino Bravo to her husband. Thereafter, she went home,
and left again at around 11:00 AM, leaving behind her husband Manuel Salvador and their daughter Analyn.
Later that night, she was at Natipunan, Quirino attending a seminar for "hilot", (TSN, July 4, 1995, pp. 3-15).
In her sinumpaang salaysay, offered in evidence as Exhibit "A", Dominga also related that she had earlier filed a
complaint in the barangay against the appellant and his brother for slaughtering her pig.
SPO2 Dominador Tabal was a police investigator who investigated the killing of Manuel and Analyn
Salvador. Thereat, he saw two dead bodies hanging from a Melina tree. They were put there so that they
would not be reached by the dogs. He saw that one of the victims had a fractured head, while the other had a
wound on the side. Pictures of the victims including the scene of the incident were taken by them. Among
those interviewed the appellant Gaffud, Jr. and his brother, (TSN, June 5, 1997, pp. 2-7).
Dr. Teodomiro Hufana's testimony was also dispensed with, (p. 127, Records) in view of the defense counsel's
admission of the contents of his Autopsy Report on Manuel Salvador, (Exhibit "C"), which reads in pertinent
part:
FINDINGS
— Cremated charcoaled, about 3 ft. long, stomach and intestine (Large) protruding from the abdomen.
— Presence of semi-burned rattan about 1 inch long about 1 cm. in diameter on the burned hand.
— Presence of a peculiar hole from the thoracic cavity directed downward to the body, probably gunshot wound.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
— CREMATION (Burned)
REMARKS: Cannot be identified if male or female
For the appellant's defense, the defense presented the appellant himself. His defense of
alibi was corroborated by his wife Juanita Gaffud and in-law Balbino Bravo. HEDaTA
Appellant denied the accusation leveled against him, and testified that the approximate
time of the burning of the victims' house, he was at home, entertaining his in-laws, Balbino Bravo
and Rufina Bravo, who was there for a visit. After eating dinner, he and Balbino Bravo talked. At
around 7:00 to 8:00 PM, he and Balbino Bravo saw a blaze coming from the other side of the
Cagayan River, about 50 to 80 meters away from the house of the Bravos. They did not mind the
blaze, and instead went to sleep. The next morning, they heard news about somebody being
burned, and because of this, he and Balbino Bravo hiked to the place of the incident. That's where
he found that his "pare" Manuel Salvador and his daughter were burned in their house. After
seeing the dead bodies, appellant went home. He went back later, and was even designated by
the Barangay Captain to guard the bodies of the deceased. Thereafter, he was forced to evacuate
his family from Nagtipunan, because the Ilongot tribe was forcing him to testify against someone
but he didn't want to. He was told that something might happen to his family if he didn't leave,
(TSN, June 3, 2002).
The appellant's defense was corroborated on its material points by the testimony of his
wife, Juanita Gaffud, and his in-law, Balbino Bravo, both of whom testified that on May 10, 1994,
the accused was at his residence entertaining visiting Bravo spouses and stayed there the whole
night, (TSN January 31, 2002 and March 18, 2002).
Juanita Gaffud also testified that during the pendency of the trial, she talked to Dominga
Salvador about the settlement of the case and even offered a certain amount for the said purpose,
(TSN, March 10, 2002, p. 12). 3
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision finding accused-appellant guilty of two (2) counts of murder,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds Bernardino Gaffud, Jr. GUILTY for two
(2) counts of murder and hereby sentences him as follows, to wit: DAESTI
a) Death penalty — for the death of Manuel Salvador;
b) Another death penalty — for the death of Analyn Salvador;
c) To pay the legal heirs of the victims:
c-1) SEVENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P75,000.00) for each count or a total of ONE
HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P150,000.00) as death indemnities;
c-2) FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) for each count or a total of ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) as moral damages;
c-3) TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P25,000) for each count or a total of FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages;
c-4) TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) as nominal damages; and
c-5) Costs.
 SO ORDERED. 4
As the death penalty was imposed, the case was elevated to this Court for automatic review. In his
Appellant's Brief, 5 accused-appellant argued that the RTC erred in: (i) failing to rule and resolve whether or not
conspiracy existed, as the information charged him with conspiracy with two others in the commission of the crime;
and (ii) convicting him despite the fact that conspiracy was not proven, and also despite the fact that there was no
proof whatsoever as to what overt act he committed which would constitute the crime of murder.
The case was transferred to the CA for appropriate action and disposition per Resolution 6 of this Court
dated August 24, 2004, in accordance with the ruling in People v. Mateo. 7In disposing of the assigned errors, the CA
held that the lack of discussion of conspiracy among accused-appellant and his anonymous co-accused in the decision
of the RTC was not antithetic to his conviction for the crime of murder, since the charge that he was a principal
performer in the killing of the victims was spelled out in the Information 8 filed against him. 9Moreover, in the
absence of conspiracy, each of the malefactors is liable only for the act committed by him. 10 As to the sufficiency of
the evidence presented by the prosecution, the CA held that the circumstantial evidence in this case established
accused-appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 11 Accordingly, the CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC, finding
accused-appellant guilty of the complex crime of double murder, with the following modifications: HcaDIA
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED, although the
decision of the lower court is hereby MODIFIED, in that: The accused Bernardino Gaffud, Jr. is
hereby found GUILTY of the complex crime of double murder, and is hereby sentenced to the
supreme penalty of Death. He is also ordered to pay the legal heirs of the victims: (1) P100,000.00
or P50,000.00 for each victim, as civil indemnity for the death of the victims; (2) P100,000.00 or
P50,000.00 for each victim, as moral damages; and (3) P10,000.00 as nominal damages plus costs.
SO ORDERED. 12
Pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC dated September 28,
2004, the case was elevated to this Court for review.
On the first assigned error, we concur with the CA that the failure to prove conspiracy in this case is not fatal.
The rule is that in the absence of evidence showing the direct participation of the accused in the commission
of the crime, conspiracy must be established by clear and convincing evidence in order to convict the accused. 13 In
the case at bar, however, we hold that the direct participation of accused-appellant in the killing of the victims,
Manuel Salvador and Analyn Salvador, was established beyond doubt by the evidence of the prosecution. Hence, a
finding of conspiracy in this instance is not essential for the conviction of accused-appellant.
On the second assigned error, we uphold the finding of both courts a quo that the evidence proffered by the
prosecution, although circumstantial in nature, leads to the conclusion that accused-appellant is the perpetrator of
the act resulting in the death of the victims.
It is well-settled that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction if (i) there is more than one
circumstance; (ii) the facts from which the inference is derived are proven; and (iii) the combination of all
circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 14
In this case, the following facts or circumstances were proven:
(i) Accused-appellant was near the place of the incident just a few minutes before the crime was
committed. Captain Potado Bollang testified that he saw the accused-appellant at the
riverbank, about 100 meters from the house of the victims, coming to and fro, allegedly
looking for his boat, when in fact, Captain Bollang knew that accused-appellant did not
own one. 15 EAIcCS
(ii) Accused-appellant, together with two unidentified persons, was near the house of the victims
at the time it was on fire. Accused-appellant was identified by Orly Salvador as one of the
three men he saw about 5 meters from the house of his uncle, Manuel Salvador, while it
was burning. Previously, he heard two gunshots as he was on his way towards the said
house. He also saw appellant fleeing with the other malefactors, while holding a
flashlight. 16 His testimony was corroborated by the admitted testimony of Dan Dangpal
who said that he heard two gunshots while he was at his home, which was near that of the
victims. When he went out, he also heard men laughing, and saw them fleeing from the
burning house, illumined by a flashlight. 17
(iii) Accused-appellant was in a hurry to leave the place of the incident without giving any help
to his kumpare Manuel Salvador and the latter's daughter, Analyn. Orly Salvador testified
that he saw accused-appellant holding a flashlight, in a hurry to leave the burning house of
the victim, going towards the direction of the river. 18
(iv) Accused-appellant had a motive to kill the victims because of the complaint filed by Manuel
Salvador's wife, Dominga Salvador, and the fact that he owed Manuel Salvador some
money. Dominga Salvador testified that she had filed a complaint against accused-
appellant and his brother in their barangay for their act of slaughtering her pig. Aside from
 this, in the morning of the same fateful day, she went to the house of accused-appellant
aiming to collect her husband's share in the profits for the construction of the barangay hall
they had built, but the accused-appellant only told her that he and his in-law would see her
husband later that day. 19
These circumstances, when taken together, are enough to produce the conclusion that accused-appellant
was responsible for the killing of the victims by means of burning them inside their house. CIAHaT
Moreover, we sustain the following observation of the CA that against the convincing evidence of the
prosecution, accused-appellant's defense of denial and alibi must fail:
The Court finds incredible appellant's story that after seeing the blaze across his house, he
merely slept with his in-laws without investigating. The Court finds it against human nature for
one to sleep soundly during a fire occurring just 50-80 meters from one's house, even though the
blaze is occurring across a river. Also, appellant must know, after seeing the location of the blaze,
that the house of his "pare", or close friend, was in danger, and his natural reaction at least was to
verify the object of the conflagration. Appellant's story that he only slept soundly after seeing the
blaze is therefore unbelievable, and taints the credibility of his alibi.
Another telling factor on the appellant's defense is his flight. Appellant admitted that in
his testimony that he fled Wasid, Nagtipunan, Quirino after he was investigated at the Municipal
Hall, (TSN, June 3, 2002, p. 19). Appellant said he fled because of threats from the Ilongots.
However, appellant said it never entered his mind to report the threats on him. Appellant's
explanation fails to convince. It bears stressing that appellant fled right after being investigated
and questioned by police authorities, and during the time that the preliminary investigation of
the case was ongoing. This is highly suspicious, as such time is the best time for him to defend his
innocence, if he is indeed innocent. As it is, appellant was arrested in San Vicente, Jones, Isabela, a
remote barangay by the elements of the NBI, (Id., at 23; reverse of p. 19, Records). Flight is
consistently held as and indication of guilt, (People v. Magaro, 291 SCRA 601 [1998]). There is no
showing why such conclusion should not be made in this case. 20
We now go to whether or not accused-appellant should be held liable for two (2) separate counts of
murder or for the complex crime of double murder.
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, reads:
ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies,
or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime
shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. TacSAE
In a complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually committed, they constitute only one crime
in the eyes of the law as well as in the conscience of the offender. Hence, there is only one penalty imposed for the
commission of a complex crime. 21
There are two kinds of complex crime. The first is known as compound crime, or when a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies. The second is known as complex crime proper, or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other. 22
The classic example of the first of kind is when a single bullet results in the death of two or more persons.
A different rule governs where separate and distinct acts result in a number killed. Deeply rooted is the doctrine
that when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes. 23
In the landmark case People v. Guillen, 24 the Court held that the single act of throwing a grenade at
President Roxas resulting in the death of another person and injuring four others produced the complex crime of
murder and multiple attempted murders. Under Article 248 of the RPC, murder is committed when a person is
killed by means of explosion. Applying Article 48 of the RPC, the penalty for the crime committed is death, the
maximum penalty for murder, which is the graver offense. ASEIDH
More recently, in People v. Carpo et al., 25 we held that the single act of hurling a grenade into the
bedroom of the victims causing the death of three persons and injuries to one person constituted the complex
crime of multiple murder and attempted murder. Also, in People v. Comadre, 26 we held:
The underlying philosophy of complex crimes in the Revised Penal Code, which follows
the pro reo principle, is intended to favor the accused by imposing a single penalty irrespective of
the crimes committed. The rationale being, that the accused who commits two crimes with single
criminal impulse demonstrates lesser perversity than when the crimes are committed by different
acts and several criminal resolutions.
The single act by appellant of detonating a hand grenade may quantitatively constitute a
cluster of several separate and distinct offenses, yet these component criminal offenses should be
considered only as a single crime in law on which a single penalty is imposed because the
offender was impelled by a "single criminal impulse" which shows his lesser degree of perversity.
 In light of these precedents, we hold that the single act of accused-appellant — burning the house of
Manuel Salvador, with the main objective of killing the latter and his daughter, Analyn Salvador, resulting in
their deaths — resulted in the complex crime of double murder. Under Article 248 of the RPC, murder is
committed by means of fire. Since the maximum penalty imposed for murder was death, when the case was
pending in the CA, the CA correctly imposed the penalty of death for the complex crime of double murder
instead of the two death penalties imposed by the RTC for two counts of murder. In view, however, of the
passage of Republic Act No. 9346 (otherwise known as "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the
Philippines"), we reduce the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua with no eligibility for parole. 27
Anent the award of damages, we increase the award of civil indemnity by the CA for the death of the
victims from P100,000 or P50,000 for each victim, to P150,000 or P75,000 for each victim in accordance with
prevailing jurisprudence. 28 CHDAaS
As to the deletion of exemplary damages by the CA, we reinstate the award by the RTC of exemplary
damages in the amount of P50,000, or P25,000 for each victim.
By and of itself, nighttime is not an aggravating circumstance. It becomes aggravating only when: (1) it is
especially sought by the offender; or (2) it is taken advantage of by him; or (3) it facilitates the commission of the
crime by ensuring the offender's immunity from capture. 29 In this case, the RTC correctly appreciated nighttime
as aggravating considering that nighttime was especially sought by accused-appellant to carry out his evil plan.
Evidence shows that accused-appellant waited for nighttime to consummate his plan. It should be noted that
accused-appellant was seen lurking near the house of the victims earlier in the evening. The fact that he brought
with him a flashlight clearly shows that he intended to commit the crime in darkness.
We sustain the award by the CA of moral damages in the amount of P100,000, or P50,000 for each victim,
in view of the grief and sorrow suffered by the heirs of the victims. We likewise affirm the award of nominal
damages in the amount of P10,000 for the value of the burned house as sufficiently explained by the RTC and
affirmed by the CA.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hereby AFFIRM the March 31, 2005 decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
00060 with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) the penalty of death imposed on accused-appellant is REDUCED to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole;
(2) the civil indemnity for the death of the victims is increased to P150,000, or P75,000 for each victim; and
(3) accused-appellant is ordered to pay exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000, or P25,000 for each
victim. DTEAHI
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. L-1477. January 18, 1950.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JULIO GUILLEN, defendant-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE; INSANITY AS A DEFENSE. — The accused, a man of
strong will and convictions, is not insane but suffers from a personality defect called Constitutional Psychopathic
Inferiority, characterized by a weakness of censorship specially in relation to rationalization about the
consequences of his acts.
2. CRIMINAL LAW; COMPLEX CRIME OF MURDER AND MULTIPLE ATTEMPTED MURDER;
OFFENDED PARTIES OTHER THAN INTENDED VICTIM; ACT WITH INTENTION TO KILL; CRIMINAL
LIABILITY. — In throwing a hand grenade at the President with the intention of killing him, the appellant acted
with malice. He is therefore liable for all the consequences of his wrongful act; for in accordance with article 4 of
the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended to do.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY PROPERLY CONSIDERED. — The
qualifying circumstance of treachery may properly be considered, even when the victim of the attack was not the
one whom the defendant intended to kill, if it appears from the evidence that neither of the two persons could in
any manner put up a defense against the attack, or became aware of it.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF PREMEDITATION MAY NOT PROPERLY BE
TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. — The qualifying circumstance of premeditation may not properly be taken into
account when the victim of the attack was not the one whom the defendant intended to kill.
5. ID.; ID.; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES NEED NOT BE CONSIDERED. — In meting out the
penalty for the complex crime of murder and multiple attempted murder, aggravating circumstances need not be
considered in view of article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that the prescribed penalty shall be
imposed in its maximum period.
6. ID.; ID.; DEATH PENALTY, DUTY OF THE COURT TO APPLY. — Under the facts and circumstances
proved in this case, it is the painful duty of the court to apply the law and mete out to the accused the extreme
penalty of death provided by article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
7. ID.; CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE, WHAT CONSTITUTES. — In criminal negligence, the injury caused to
another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed without malice.
This case is before us for review of, and by virtue of appeal from, the judgment rendered by the Court of
First Instance of Manila in case No. 2764, whereby Julio Guillen y Corpus, or Julio C. Guillen, is found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and multiple frustrated murder, as charged in the information,
and is sentenced to the penalty of death, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Simeon Varela (or Barrela) in the
sum f P2,000 and to pay the costs.
Upon arraignment the accused entered a plea of not guilty to the charges contained in the information.
Then the case was tried in one of the branches of the Court of First Instance of Manila presided over by
the Honorable Buenaventura Ocampo who, after the submission of the evidence of the prosecution and the
defense, rendered judgment as above stated.
In this connection it should be stated that, at the begin- ing of the trial and before arraignment, counsel de
oficio for the accused moved that the mental condition of Guillen be examined. The court, notwithstanding that it
had foundout from the answers of the accused to questions propounded to him in order to test the soundness of
his mind, that he was not suffering from any mental derangement, ordered that Julio Guillen be confined for a
period of about 8 days in the government Psychopathic Hospital, there to be examined by medical experts who
should report their findings accordingly. This was done, and, according to the report of the board of medical
experts, presided over by Dr. Fernandez of the National Psychopathic Hospital, Julio Guillen was not insane. Said
report (Exhibit L), under the heading "Formulation and Diagnosis," at pages 13 and 14, reads:
"FORMULATION AND DIAGNOSIS
"Julio C. Guillen was placed under constant observation since admissions There was not a
single moment during his whole 2 hours daily, that he was not under observation.
"The motive behind the commission of the crime is stated above. The veracity of this
motivation was determined in the Narco-synthesis That the narco-synthesis was successful was
checked up the day after the test. The narco-synthesis proved not only that Julio C. Guillen was
telling us the truth, but also did not reveal any conflict or complex that may explain a delusional or
hallucinatory motive behind the act.
"Our observation and examination failed to elicit any sign or symptom of insanity in Mr.
Julio C. Guillen. He was found to be intelligents always able to differentiate right from wrong, fully
aware of the nature of the crime he committed and is equally decided to suffer for it in any manner
or form.
"His version of the circumstances of the crime, his conduct and conversation relative
thereto, the motives, temptations and provocations that preceded the act, were all those of an
individual with a sound mind.
 "On the other hand he is a man of strong will and conviction and once arriving at a decision
he executes, irrespective of consequences and as in this case, the commission of the act at Plaza
Miranda.
"What is of some interest in the personality of Julio C. Guillen is his commission of some
overt acts. This is seen not only in the present instance, but sometime when an employee in La
Clementina Cigar Factory he engaged in a boxing bout Mr. Monzano, a Spaniard, one of the
managers of the factory because Mr. Monzano wanted to abuse the women cigar makers, and felt it
his duty to defend them. One time he ran after a policeman with a knife in hand after being
provoked to a fight several times. He even challenged Congressman Nueno to a fight sometime
before when Mr. Nueno was running for a seat in the Municipal Board of the City of Manila, after
hearing him deliver one of his apparently outspoken speeches.
"All these mean a defect in his personality characterized by a weakness of censorship
especially in relation to rationalization about the consequences of his acts "In view of the above
findings it is our considered opinion that Julio C. Guillen is not insane but is an individual with a
personality defect which in Psychiatry is termed, Constitutional Psychopathic Inferiority.
"Final Diagnosis
"Not insane: Constitutional Psychopathic Inferiority, without psychosis."
In view of the above-quoted findings of the medical board, and notwithstanding the contrary opinion of
one Dr. Alvarez, who was asked by the defense to give his opinion on the matter, the court ruled that Guillen, not
being insane, could be tried, as he was tried, for the offenses he committed on the date in question.
THE FACTS
Upon careful perusal of the evidence and the briefs submitted by counsel for the accused, the Solicitor
Genera and their respective memoranda, we find that there is no disagreement between the prosecution and the
defense, as to the essential facts which caused the filing of the present criminal case against this accused. Those
facts may be stated as follows:
On the dates mentioned in this decision, Julio Guillen y Corpus, although not affiliated with any
particular political group, had voted for the defeated candidate in the presidential elections held in 1946. Manuel
A. Roxas, the successful candidate, assumed the office of President of the Commonwealth and subsequently
President of the Philippine Republic. According to Guillen, he became disappointed in President Roxas for his
alleged failure to redeem the pledges and fulfill the promises made by him during the presidential election
campaign; and his disappointment was aggravated when, according to him, President Roxas, instead of looking
after the interest of his country, sponsored and campaigned for the approval of the so-called "parity" measure.
Hence he determined to assassinate the President.
After he had pondered for some time over the ways and means of assassinating President Roxas, the
opportunity presented itself on the night of March 10, 1947, when at a popular meeting held by the Liberal Party
at Plaza de Miranda, Quiapo, Manila, attended by a big crowd, President Roxas, accompanied by his wife and
daughter and surrounded by a number of ladies and gentlemen prominent in government and politics, stood on a
platform erected for that purpose and delivered his speech expounding and trying to convince his thousands of
listeners of the advantages to be gained by the Philippines, should the constitutional amendment granting
American citizens the same rights granted to Filipino nationals be adopted.
Guillen had first intended to use a revolver for the accomplishment of his purpose, but having lost said
firearm, which was duly licensed, he thought of two hand grenades which were given him by an American
soldier in the early days of the liberation of Manila in exchange for two bottles of whisky. He had likewise been
weighing the chances of killing President Roxas, either by going to Malacañang, or following his intended victim
in the latter's trips to the provinces, for instance, to Tayabas (now Quezon) where the President was scheduled to
speak, but having encountered many difficulties, he decided to carry out his plan at the pro-parity meeting held at
Plaza de Miranda on the night of March 10, 1947.
On the morning of that date he went to the house of Amado Hernandez whom he requested to prepare
for him a document (Exhibit B), in accordance with their previous understanding in the preceding afternoon,
when they met at the premises of the Manila Jockey Club on the occasion of an "anti-parity" meeting held there.
On account of its materiality in this case, we deem it proper to quote hereunder the contents of said document. An
English translation (Exhibit B-2) from its original in Tagalog reads:
"FOR THE SAKE OF A FREE PHILIPPINES
"I am the only one responsible for what happened. I conceived it, I planned it, and I carried it out all
by myself alone. It took me many days and nights pondering over this act, talking to my own conscience, to
my God, until I reached my conclusion. It was my duty.
"I did not expect to live long; I only had one life to spare. And had I expected to live much longer, had
I had several lives to spare, I would not have hesitated either to sacrifice it for the sake of a principle which
was the welfare of the people.
 "Thousands have died in Bataan; many more have mourned the loss of their husbands, of their sons,
and there are millions now suffering. Their deeds bore no fruits; their hopes were frustrated.
"I was told by my conscience and by my God that there was a man to be blamed for all this: he had
deceived the people, he had astounded them with too many promises with no other purpose than to entice
them; he even went to the extent of risking the heritage of our future generations. For these reasons he should
not continue any longer. His life would mean nothing as compared with the welfare of eighteen million souls.
And why should I not give up my life too if only for the good of those eighteen million soul.
"These are the reasons which impelled me to do what I did and I am willing to bear up the
consequences of my act. It matters not if others will curse me. Time and history will show, I am sure, that I
have only displayed a high degree of patriotism in the performance of my said act.
"Hurrah for a free Philippines.
"Cheers for the happiness of every Filipino home.
"May God pity on me.
"Amen.
"JULIO C. GUILLEN"
A copy (Exhibit B-1) of the original in Tagalog (Exhibit B), made at the request of Guillen by his nephew,
was handed to him only at about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of March 10, 1947, for which reason said Exhibit B-1
appears unsigned, because he was in a hurry for that meeting at Plaza de Miranda.
When he reached Plaza de Miranda, (Guillen was carrying two hand grenades concealed in a paper bag
which also contained peanuts. He buried one of the hand grenades (Exhibit D), in a plant pot located close to the
platform, and when he decided to carry out his evil purpose he stood on the chair on which he had been sitting
and, from a distance of about seven meters, he hurled the grenade at the President when the latter had just closed
his speech, was being congratulated by Ambassador Romulo and was about to leave the platform.
General Castañeda, who was on the platform, saw the smoking, hissing, grenade and, without losing his
presence of mind, kicked it away from the platform, along the stairway, and towards an open space where the
general thought the grenade was likely to do the least. harm; and, covering the President with his body, shouted
to the crowd that everybody should lie down. The grenade fell to the ground and exploded in the middle of a
group of persons who were standing close to the platform. Confusion ensued, and the crowd dispersed in a panic.
It was found that the fragments of the grenade had seriously injured Simeon Varela (or Barrela) — who died on
the following day as a result of mortal Wounds caused by the fragments of the grenade (Exhibits and F-1) —
Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang.
Guillen was arrested by members of the Police Department about two hours after the occurrence. It
appears that one Angel Garcia, who was one of the spectators at that meeting, saw how a person who was
standing next to him hurled an object at the platform and, after the explosion, ran away towards a barber shop
located near the platform at Plaza de Miranda. Suspecting that person was the thrower of the object that exploded
Garcia went after him and had almost succeeded in holding him, but Guillen offered stiff resistance, got loose
from Garcia and managed to escape. Garcia pursued him, but some detectives, mistaking the former for the real
criminal and the author of the explosion, placed him under arrest. In the meantime, while the City Mayor and
some agents of the Manila Police Department were investigating the affair, one Manuel Robles volunteered the
information that the person with whom Angel Garcia was wrestling was Julio Guillen; that he (Manuel Robles)
was acquainted with Julio Guillen for the previous ten years and had seen each other in the plaza a few moments
previous to the explosion.
The police operatives interrogated Garcia and Robles, and Julio Guillen was, within two hours after the
occurrence, found in his home at 1724 Juan Luna Street, Manila, brought to the police headquarters and identified
by Angel Garcia, as the same person who hurled towards the platform the object which exploded and whom
Garcia tried to hold when he was running away.
During the investigation conducted by the police he readily admitted his responsibility, although at the
same time he tried to justify his action in throwing the bomb at President Roxas. He also indicated to his captors
the place where he had hidden his so-called last will
quoted above and marked Exhibit B, which was then assigned by him and subsequently signed at the
police headquarters.
Re-enacting the crime (Exhibit C), he pointed out to the police where he had buried (Exhibit C-1) the other
hand grenade (Exhibit D), and, in the presence of witnesses he signed a statement which contained his answers to
questions propounded to him by Major A. Quintos of the Manila Police, who investigated him soon after his
arrest (Exhibit E). From a perusal of his voluntary statement, we are satisfied that it tallies exactly with the
declarations made by him on the witness stand during the trial of this case.
THE ISSUES
In brief submitted by counsel de oficio for this appellant, several errors are assigned allegedly committed
the trial court, namely: first, "in finding the appellant guilty of murder for the death of Simeon Varela"; second,
declaring the appellant guilty of the complex crime murder and multiple frustrated murder"; third,' in applying
sub-section 1 of article 49 of the Revised Penal Code in determining the penalty to be imposed upon the accused";
and fourth, "in considering the concurrence of the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and of contempt of
public authorities in the commission of the crime."
The evidence for the prosecution, supported by the brazen statements made by the accused, shows
beyond any shadow of doubt that, when Guillen attended that meeting, carrying with him two hand grenades, to
put into execution his preconceived plan to assassinate President Roxas, he knew fully well that, by throwing one
of those two hand grenades in his possession at President Roxas, and causing it to explode, he could not prevent
the persons who were around his main and intended victim from being killed or at least injured, due to the highly
explosive nature of the bomb employed by him to carry out his evil purpose.
Guillen, testifying in his own behalf, in answer to questions propounded by the trial judge (page 96 of
transcript) supports our conclusion. He stated that he performed the act voluntarily; that his purpose was to kill
the President, but that it did not make any difference to him if there were some people around the President when
he hurled that bomb, because the killing of those who surrounded the President was tantamount to kill ing the
President, in view of the fact that those persons, being loyal to the President, were identified with the latter. In
other words, although it was not his main intention to kill the persons surrounding the President, he felt no
compunction in killing them also in order to attain his main purpose of killing the President.
The facts do not support the contention of counsel for appellant that the latter is guilty only of homicide
through reckless imprudence in regard to the death of Simeon Varela and of less serious physical injuries in
regard to Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang, and that he should be sentenced to the
corresponding penalties for the different felonies committed, the sum total of which shall not exceed three times
the penalty to be imposed for the most serious crime in accordance with article 70 in relation to article 74 of the
Revised Penal Code.
In throwing hand grenade at the President with the intention of killing him, the appellant acted with
malice. He is therefore liable for all the consequences of his wrongful act; for in accordance with article 4 of the
Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another
should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55
Phil., 939.) In the words of Viada, "in order that an act may be qualified as imprudence it is necessary
that neither malice nor intention to cause injury should intervene; where such intention exists, the act
should be qualified by the felony it has produced even though it may not have been the intention of the actor to
cause an evil of such gravity as that produced." (Viada's Comments on the Penal Code, vol. 7, 5th ed., p. 7.) And,
as was held by this court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of
reckless imprudence. (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232.) Where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the
identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless imprudence. (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605.)
The case of People vs. Mabug-at, 51 Phil., 967, cited by counsel for appellant does not support his
contention. In that case the defendant, with intent to kill his sweetheart, fired a shot from his revolver which hit
not the intended victim but the latter's niece, who was seriously wounded. The defendant in that case contended
that he was guilty only of unlawful discharge of firearms with injuries, but this court held that the act having been
committed with intent to kill and with treachery, defendant was guilty of frustrated murder.
Squarely on the point raised by counsel is the following decision of the Supreme Court of Spain:
"Cuestion 62. Se presenta A, a las ocho de la noche, en el estanco de B a comprar tabaco, y
habiendose negado este a darselo al fiado, se retira aquel sin mediar entre ambos disputa alguna;
pero, transcurrido un cuarto de hora, hallandose el estanquero despachando a C, se oye la
detonacion de un arma de fuego disparada por A desde la calle, quedando muertos en el acto C y el
estanquero: supuesta la no intencion en A de matar a C, y si solo al estanquero, cabe calificar la
muerte de este de homicidio y la de C de imprudencia temeraria? — La Sala de lo criminal de la
Audiencia de Granada lo estimo asi, y condeno al procesado a catorce afios de reclusion por el
homicidio y a un ano de prision correccional por la imprudcncia. Aparte de que la muerte del
estanquero debio calificarse de asesinato y no de homicidio, por haberse ejecutado con alevosia, es
evidente que la muerte de C, suponiendo que no se propusiera Keiecutarla el procesado, no pudo
calificarse de imprudencia temeraria, sino que tambien debio declararsele responsable de la
misma,a tenor de lo dispuesto en este apartado ultimo del articulo; y que siendo ambas muertes
producidas por un solo hecho, o sea por un solo disparo, debio imponerse al reo la pena del delito
de asesinato en el grado maximo, a tenor de lo dispuesto en el art. 90 del Codigo, o sea la pena de
muerte. Se ve, pues, clararnente que en la antedicha sentencia, aparte de otros articulos del Codigos
se infringio por la Sala la disposicion de este apartado ultimo del articulo muy principalmente, y asi
lo declars el Tribunal Supremo en S. de 18 de junio de 1872. (Gaceta de 1.º de agosto.)" (I Viada. 5th
Ed., p. 42.)
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides as fol lows:
 "ART. 48. Penalty for Complex Crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or more grave or
less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty
for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period."
We think it is the above-quoted article and not paragraph 1 of article 49 that is applicable. The case before
us is clearly governed by the first clause of article 48 because by a single act, that of throwing a highly explosive
hand grenade at President Roxas, the accused committed two grave felonies, namely: (1) murder, of which
Simeon Varela was the victim; and (2) multiple attempted murder, of which President Roxas, Alfredo Eva, Jose
Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang were the injured parties.
The killing of Simeon Varela was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery. In the case of
People vs. Mabug-at, supra, this court held that the qualifying circumstance of treachery may be properly
considered, even when the victim of the attack was not the one whom the defendant intended to kill, if it appears
from the evidence that neither of the two persons could in any manner put up defense against the attack, or
become aware of it. In the same case it was held that the qualifying circumstance of premeditation may not be
properly taken into account when the person whom the defendant proposed to kill was different from the one
who became his victim.
There can be no question that the accused attempted to kill President Roxas by throwing a hand grenade
at him with the intention to kill him, thereby commencing the commission of a felony by overt acts, but he did not
succeed in assassinating him "by reason of some cause or accidents other than his own spontaneous desistance."
For the same reason we qualify the injuries caused on the four other persons already named as merely attempted
and not frustrated murder.
In this connection, it should be stated that, although there is abundant proof that, in violation of the
provisions of article 148 of the Revised Penal Code, the accused Guillen has committed among others the offense
of assault upon a person in authority, for in fact his efforts were directed towards the execution of his main
purpose of eliminating President Roxas for his failure to redeem his electoral campaign promises, by throwing at
him in his official capacity as the Chief Executive of the nation the hand grenade in question, yet, in view of the
failure of the prosecution to insert in the information the appropriate allegation charging Guillen with the
commission of said offense, we shall refrain from making a finding to that effect.
The complex crimes of murder and multiple attempted murder committed by the accused with the single
act of throwing a hand grenade at the President, was attended by the various aggravating circumstances alleged
in the informations without any mitigating circumstance. But ue do not deem it necessary to consider said
aggravating circumstances because in any event article 48 of the Revised Penal Code above-quoted requires that
the penalty for the most serious of said crimes be applied in its maximum period. The penalty for murder
is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. (Art. 248.) It is our painful duty to apply the law and mete
out to the accused the extreme penalty provided by it upon the facts and circumstances hereinabove narrated.
The sentence of the trial court being correct, we have no alternative but to affirm it, and we hereby do so
by a unanimous vote. The death sentence shall be executed in accordance with article 81 of the Revised Penal
Code, under authority of the Director of Prisons, on such working day as the trial court may fix within 30 days
from the date the record shall have been remanded. It is so ordered.

[G.R. Nos. L-32144-45. July 30, 1982.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NAÑO MILFLORES
SYNOPSIS: Early in the morning of November 27, 1967, an old man with black-painted face approached the house on 2233 Garrido Street,
Sta. Ana, Manila, and called out the name of one of the occupants therein, Mrs. Javier. Heeding the call, Florencia Tactay-Javier came out of
the door and met the caller. The old man handed to her a paper bag containing some vegetables and then left the place in a hurry. After
Mrs. Javier had brought the bag into the house, the said bag exploded killing one and wounding seven other occupants of the house.
Investigations thereafter conducted by various police agencies led to the arrest of accused-appellant, a magician, illusionist and marriage
counselor, who was charged separately with multiple frustrated murder and murder. On trial, appellant, who interposed the defense of
alibi, was positively identified by Mrs. Florencia Javier as the man with black-painted face who delivered the bag with the fatal bomb,
Likewise, two other witnesses testified that appellant was the man with the blackened face who ran towards them and away from the
scene of the crime soon after the explosion was heard. Evidence was also presented as to the black dyeing materials found in appellant's
jeep. Consequently, the trial court found accused-appellant guilty of two separate crimes of multiple attempted murder and murder, On
appeal, appellant, in addition to his defense of alibi, invoked double jeopardy, lack of sufficient motive and lack of positive identification.
On review, the Supreme Court held that: (a) the mere filing of two information or complaints against accused-appellant could not have
placed him in double jeopardy for the simple reason that what could have been the first jeopardy had not yet been completed or even
began; (b) appellant's alibi is destroyed by clear, positive and convincing identification of him by eyewitnesses; (c) there being positive
identification, motive for the commission of the crime loses its importance; and (d) the crime committed, being the result of a single act, is
the complex crime of murder with multiple frustrated murder qualified by the use of explosive and attended by the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation, craft and dwelling, penalized with death. The Court, however, finding that appellant is over 70
years old, reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua. Judgment modified.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; DOUBLE JEOPARDY; NOT INVOCABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — The
first information for multiple frustrated murder, Criminal Case No. 88173, does not include among the victims or offended
parties Felicidad Mique, the woman who died and is precisely named as the deceased. In the murder case, Criminal Case No.
88174. In the sense, therefore, that appellant was ever in jeopardy in that first case, it is plain to see that such was impossible or
could not have happened. Counsel is thus off tangent in invoking double jeopardy.
2. CRIMINAL LAW; COMPLEX CRIMES; MURDER WITH MULTIPLE FRUSTRATED MURDER; CASE AT BAR. —
Since the injuries suffered by the offended parties in Criminal Case No. 88173 resulted from the same act allegedly of the
accused that caused the death of Felicidad Mique, the victim in Criminal Case No. 88174, namely, the explosion of the bomb
which according to the prosecution was handed by appellant to Florencia Tactay-Javier, the crime for which appellant could be
made to answer is the virtually single complex offense of murder with frustrated murder pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code. There is in law only one offense because there is only one penalty that can be imposed notwithstanding that the
act may in fact involve a cluster of otherwise separate or distinct offenses.
3. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; MERE FILING OF TWO COMPLAINTS OR INFORMATIONS
CHARGING THE SAME OFFENSE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE DOUBLE JEOPARDY. — When appellant invoked the defense
of double jeopardy, what could have been the first jeopardy had not yet been completed or even began. It is settled
jurisprudence in this Court that the mere filing of two informations or complaints charging the same offense does not afford
the accused in those cases the occasion to complain that he is being placed in jeopardy twice for the same offense, for the
simple reason that the primary basis of the defense of double jeopardy is that the accused has already been convicted or
acquitted in the first case or that the same has been terminated without his consent.
4. ID.; EVIDENCE; MOTIVE; ABSENCE THEREOF DOES NOT PRECLUDE CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED
WHERE HIS PARTICIPATION IN THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED. — The determination
of motive becomes relevant only where there is doubt as to whether or not an accused is the one who committed the crime
charged. Withal, lack of motive does not preclude conviction of the offense when the crime and participation of the accused
are definitely proved, as in the instant cases.
5. ID.; ID.; CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE POINTS TO ACCUSED AS THE AUTHOR OF THE Crime. — As to
appellant's lament about the finding of the trial court vis-a-vis the black dyeing materials found in his jeep, it is very safe to say
that those materials constituted the strongest mute evidence of his having been indeed the black-painted man whom Florencia
and the other two eyewitnesses Juvida and Nazario saw that morning. Said materials, albeit circumstantial, pointed to him
conclusively as the culprit. There were very credible oral evidence on top of the dyeing materials.
6. ID.; ID.; ALIBI; UNAVAILING WHERE ACCUSED HAS BEEN POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED AS THE
PERPETRATOR OF THE CRIME. — "It is easily understandable why the identification of an accused as a participant in the
commission of an offense by evidence that is worthy of credence and belief negates the claim of alibi. The falsity of an assertion
that he was elsewhere and therefore could not have been guilty of the crime imputed to him becomes apparent. Where the
proof of his presence then is clear and positive, such a defense is unavailing."
7. CRIMINAL LAW; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE; USE OF EXPLOSIVE; CASE AT BAR. — The crime
committed by appellant in these cases constitutes the complex crime of murder with multiple frustrated murder, the same
being the result of a single act—that of delivering the bomb which actually exploded as he had intended causing the death of
one and grave injuries to several others. The qualifying circumstance is use of explosive.
8. ID.; PENALTY FOR THE COMPLEX CRIME OF MURDER WITH MULTIPLE FRUSTRATED MURDER; DEATH.
— Appellant's guilt having been proven beyond reasonable doubt, the Court has no alternative than to find him guilty of the
complex offense of murder with multiple frustrated murder, qualified by use of explosive and attended by the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation, craft and dwelling, which crime deserves no less than the extreme penalty of death.
9. ID.; PENALTY; DEATH PENALTY COMMUTED TO RECLUSION PERPETUA ON ACCOUNT OF
APPELLANT'S ADVANCED AGE. — It appearing from the records, however, that appellant is presently more than 70 years
old, pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, the Court has no alternative but to affirm the penalty of reclusion
perpetua imposed by the trial court, with all the concomitant accessories thereof.
BARREDO, J p:
Appeal from the decision rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch XI) in its Criminal
Cases Nos. 88173 and 88174 convicting and sentencing herein accused-appellant Naño Milflores y Laksa: to Four
(4) Years, Two (2) Months of prision correccional, as minimum, to Eight (8) Years of prision mayor, as maximum,
with the accessory penalties of the law for the crime of multiple attempted murder; and to reclusion perpetua and to
pay the heirs of the victim in the sum of P12,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, for the
crime of murder.
The incidents that gave rise to the filing of the abovementioned criminal cases against herein accused-
appellant in the court a quo may be briefly narrated as follows:
Early in the morning of November 27, 1967, about the hour of 7:45, an old man approached the house on
2233 Garrido Street, Sta. Ana, Manila, calling out the name of one of the occupants — Mrs. Javier. Heeding such
call, Florencia Tactay Javier came out of the door and met the caller. The old man handed to her a paper bag
containing some vegetables — pechay, upo and sigarillas — and then left the place. Mrs. Florencia Javier brought
the bag into the house and proceeded to empty the same of its contents. As she did so, however, something inside
the paper bag began emitting smoke and whistling sound, followed moments later by a deafening bomb
explosion which caused death of one, and multiple injuries and wounds to seven (7) other occupants of the house.
Investigations thereafter conducted by various police agencies led to the arrest of herein accused-appellant, Naño
Milflores y Laksa. Cdpr
On December 6, 1967, he was charged with multiple frustrated murder (Criminal Case No. 88173) before
the Court of First Instance of Manila, in an information reading as follows:
"That on or about the 27th of November, 1967 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with evident premeditation and
treachery, with intent to kill, attack, assault and use personal violence upon Abelardo Mique Olivar,
Romana Mique, Isabelo Lapitan, Benedicto Mique, Florencia Javier, Anaflor Javier, and Ariel Javier,
by then and there delivering a bomb inside a bag containing vegetables at the address of the latter
at 2233 Garrido, Sta. Ana, causing the same to explode when opened, thereby inflicting upon the
seen persons mentioned above mortal wounds on the different parts of their bodies, thus
performing all of the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of multiple murder as
a consequence but which nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the
will of said accused, that is, the timely medical assistance rendered to said Abelardo Mique Olivar,
Romana Mique, Isabelo Lapitan, Benedicto Mique, Florencia Javier, Anaflor Javier and Ariel Javier,
which prevented their death." (Pp. 21-22, Record)
In a separate information filed with the same court on even date, he was likewise charged for murder
(Criminal Case No. 88174). The body of said separate information reads:
"That on or about the 27th of November, 1967 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with evident premeditation and
treachery, with intent to kill, attack, assault and use personal violence upon Felicidad Mique, by
then and there delivering a bomb inside a bag containing vegetables at the address of the latter of
2233 Garrido, Sta. Ana, causing the same to explode when opened, thereby inflicting upon her
mortal wounds on the different parts of her body, which were the direct and immediate cause of
her death."
Accused-appellant was arraigned on said two informations on December 14, 1967 and January 23, 1968,
respectively, and entered pleas of "Not Guilty" to the charges. Later, he moved to quash the information for
murder but the same was denied by the trial court. Thereafter, the two cases were tried jointly, at the conclusion
of which the court a quo rendered the decision of conviction and the corresponding sentences first above
mentioned.
The factual findings of the court below, upon which it based its sentence of conviction, are not seriously
disputed by herein appellant 1 . Indeed, the record which We have carefully reviewed reveals that said findings
are supported by the evidence which His Honor summarized as follows: LLphil
"From the evidence of the prosecution it appears that Victoria Remolar Javier, a public
school teacher, married Antonio Javier on April 28, 1964 at Guiniañgan, Quezon Province. This
wedlock, however, is Antonio Javier's second since he was previously married to Florencia Tactay-
Javier, then living and with whom he had children. Sometime after the marriage of Victoria to
Antonio, she discovered this previously existing marriage to Florencia. Victoria continued her
marital relations with Antonio. This anomalous situation — i.e., a 'Love triangle' or the double
marriage of Antonio Javier — naturally resulted in animosity between the two wives. The first wife,
Florencia Tactay, filed a charge of bigamy against her husband, Antonio Javier, in Baguio City, and
an administrative charge against Victoria Remolar, Florencia, however, later desisted when Victoria
promised that she would cease to live with Antonio; and the administrative charge was dropped
upon a finding that Victoria married Antonio without prior knowledge that he was previously
married.
"Sometime in March, 1967, Victoria consulted with the accused, Naño Milflores — who
advertised his services as a palmist and fortune teller at Magsaysay Avenue, Baguio City. Victoria
wanted to know what her future would be and sought Milflores' help. She asked Milflores if she
still had a chance to live again with Antonio. Milflores told her that she had a 100% chance to live
with Antonio on condition that she pays him P375.00 as fee for the temple. He assured her that the
result would be favorable and Antonio would voluntary come back to her. Milflores told her he
would use his spiritual power in making Antonio come back to her voluntarily.
"Since March, 1967, Victoria consulted with Milflores at least once a month. She paid him
P5.00 for the initial consultation. Sometime later, she paid mm the P375.00. Milflores asked for and
Victoria gave him the address of Antonio's other wife at 2233 Garrido, Sta. Ana, Manila. Milflores
told Victoria he will work in about 7 to 9 weeks, and, within that period he assured Victoria that
Antonio will go back to her. Milflores also told Victoria to keep the arrangement between them a
secret, in order to insure its success. Victoria returned to Milflores in a couple of weeks. This time
Milflores demanded another sum of P375.00 for things he needed in the temple. Victoria gave him
the amount the following day. Then, again, Milflores asked Victoria the sums of P200.00 and
P175.00, so that by June, 1967, Victoria had given Milflores the sum of P1,130.00 in all.
"After June, 1967, Antonio Javier still did not return to Victoria. Victoria then demanded of
Milflores the return of her money. She saw Milflores at least two times in July and August and
demanded the return of the sums she had paid him. Milflores told her to be patient as Antonio
would, for sure, return to her. In September and the last week of October, 1967, Milflores got mad at
Victoria because of the latter's insistence that he (Milflores) return her (Victoria's) money (Exh. A).
"Florencia Tactay really resided at 2233 Garrido, Sta. Ana, Manila. She and her family
shared an apartment door with the Mique family — Romana, Felicidad, Isabelo Lapitan and
Abelardo Mique.
"On November 27, 1967, somebody called at the 2233 Garrido apartment door where
Florencia and the Miques resided for 'Mrs. Javier'. Florencia, who was carrying her child, peeped at
the window and saw an old man. The man called for 'Mrs. Javier' twice. Florencia then went
downstairs. The man gave her a big paper bag containing vegetables. Florencia inquired as to who
sent the same, but the man did not answer. Instead, he hurriedly went away. As Florencia received
the bag, she saw the address on it — i.e., 'Mrs. Javier; 2233 Makati'. The bag
contained pechay, upo and sigarillas. She then brought the same inside the house and placed it on a
chair in a room where Ana, Letty, Abe, Felicidad and Florencia's two children were.
"Florencia the proceeded to empty the bag of its contents. As she did so, she noticed that it
emitted smoke and heard a whistling sound. Alarmed, she withdrew away from the bag. Felicidad
Mique, however, went near the same and looked into the bag. Suddenly, a deafening explosion
ensued. The explosion caused a hole through the table and on the cement floor 7 inches wide by 4
inches deep. Fragments of utensils and furniture were thrown and scattered around and the
splattered room was in complete disarray (Exhs. II & I).
"All of the persons then in that room, where the bomb exploded, sustained injuries and
wounds as a result of the explosion. Felicidad Mique y Olivar, 21 years, student; Abelardo Mique y
Olivar, 22 years married, goldsmith, Romana Mique y Olivar, 21 years, married, housewife; Isabelo
Lapitan y Mique, 25 years, laborer; Benedicto Mique y Olivar, 15 years, student; Florencia Tactay-
Javier, wife of Antonio Javier; Anaflor Javier, 2 years, and Ariel Javier, 9 months, Florencia's
children - were brought to the St. Anne's Hospital for emergency treatment. Florencia Javier
(sic) 2 sustained 23 different, penetrating, explosive blast wounds from metallic objects and wire
coil fragments in different parts of her body — i.e., on her face or both upper right and left
extremities and both thighs. Her right anterior VIII rib was fractured and the right lobe of her liver,
right diaphragm and right lung, were pierced with metallic fragments. Two (2) coiled wire loop
metals were embedded on her right forehead and another in the anterior aspect of her right arm.
She suffered hemorrhage of about 700 cc of blood in her respiratory system, exanguination collapse
from bleeding, vena cavae, in her cardiovascular system. She died within 15 minutes of arrival at
the St. Anne's Hospital from profuse exanguinating hemorrhage, collapsing the vena cavae, and
shock due to the 23 different penetrating blast wounds. The rest of the victims were forwarded to
the Philippine General Hospital for further treatment (Exhs. B, C, D, E & F).
"Meanwhile, Alexis Nazario, a student, and Desiderio Juvida — who is known as 'Pops' in
the vicinity — were conversing at the corner of Cagayan and Mabuhay Streets, a block from
Garrido Street. They heard the explosion; they saw a person walking hurriedly from Garrido to
Mabuhay. The person's face was painted black; he was wearing a checkered polo shirt with black
pants and black shoes. Nazario - who was 8 to 10 meters only away when he saw the person
walking at a fast gait towards them (Exh. 1) — pointed to the person, at the same time calling
Juvida's attention to him, thinking that he was a thief. When the blast was heard, the person began
to run. Juvida asked Nazario to chase the person, but he (Nazario) did not overtake him (the
person) as he was running fast (mabilis). The person ran towards Tejeron Street, where he was able
to make good his escape.
"The explosion, which rocked the neighborhood that early morning, brought many persons
to the scene, mostly curious onlookers. The police chief, Gen. Ricardo Papa, also arrived at the scene
of the explosion. He took immediate steps to investigate the incident. He made requests for
homicide operatives. Sgt. B. Brown, Det. N. Bonifacio and Pat. Alejandro Yatco, MPD, responded.
"Alex Tumale y Palma, 31 years old, and a security guard of the United Equity Agency
assigned to the RCPI, alleged that he was the intended victim of the bomb explosion. He implicated
a certain Theodore Laudet (See Exhs. M & M-1), a striker of the RCPI, as the person whom he saw
carrying a paper bag with three other companions in front of his house before the explosion
occurred. Tumale informed the police that Laudet resented his escorting the manager of the RCPI.
 "Further investigation also revealed that Antonio Javier, husband of Florencia Tactay-Javier,
had contracted another marriage with one Victoria Remolar with whom he has two children; that
Victoria, who resides and teaches in Baguio City, occasionally comes to Manila to see Antonio
Javier; that Florencia and Victoria had quarreled for the sole possession of Antonio and that charges
and countercharges had been filed between them. The site of the explosion was also searched for
evidence, which were then submitted to the Criminal Investigation Division, MPD (Exhs. U & V).
"On November 28, 1967, at 4:30 a.m., Theodore Laudet y Gabriola was investigated. He was
brought before Florencia Javier, Isabelo Lapitan and Alex Tumale. The three failed to identify him.
Mrs. Javier and Lapitan averred that the suspect was older, stouter, and his face was painted black.
Laudet, on the other hand, accounted for his whereabouts the day previous. Laudet was released.
Laudet, who was subjected to a polygraph test, cleared himself (Exh. J).
"On November 30, 1967, at or about 10:00 a.m., Sgt. P. Briones, Det. Dionisia Nena Tuason
and Pat. Alejandro Yatco left for Baguio to investigate Mrs. Victoria Remolar Javier, the second wife
of Antonio Javier. They were referred to Pat. Pedro Remolar of the Baguio Police Department,
Victoria's father, from whom they learned that Victoria had left for an unknown destination. A
background investigation of Victoria revealed that she took her BSEE degree at the Baguio Colleges,
where she met Antonio Javier whom she later married in 1963. In 1966, Florencia filed an
immorality charge against Victoria. Florencia later desisted, when Antonio promised to leave
Victoria and live with her. The immorality charge was dropped, on the ground that Victoria
married Antonio in good faith.
"Meantime, in Baguio, Victoria Remolar-Javier, who was then teaching at the Ambuklao
Elementary School, heard over her transistor radio, on November 29, 1967 — a Wednesday — that
her name was being implicated in connection with the bomb explosion. She became apprehensive.
She went home to her residence at Baguio City, to seek the advice of her parents. She was shown a
newspaper account where her name was implicated, and advised to see their family lawyer, a
certain Atty. de Guzman.
"Victoria decided to see the family lawyer. The next day — November 30, a Thursday —
she was on her way to see him at about 7:00 A.M., but before she could leave the house, a phone call
was received by Victoria. The person on the other side of the line identified himself as Naño
Milflores. Milflores told Victoria to go to his office at Magsaysay Avenue and bring with her
P1,000.00 so that he could help her extricate herself from suspicion in connection with the bomb
slaying incident. She then proceeded to the office of the accused with her sister, Gertrudis.
"When she arrived there, Milflores expressed his surprise why she was accompanied by her
sister, saying, 'Why did you come with a companion?' I told you to come alone.' Victoria told
Milflores there was nothing to hide. Touching her head Milflores said, 'Loko loko ka ba? Ang hirap
hirap ng kaso mo. Now you need money so that you will not be involved in this case anymore.' He
asked Victoria and her sister to produce P1,000.00, because he knew somebody at the Manila Police
Department who could help Victoria. Victoria's sister left to secure money while Victoria was left in
the office of the accused. Gertrudis, Victoria's sister, later returned with P200.00. When Milflores
saw the amount he said, 'Bakit iyan lang? O, sigue, tama na.'
"The three then proceeded to the Dangwa Bus Station. Milflores secured two tickets
without Victoria and her sister's knowledge. Milflores then hurriedly urged Victoria to board the
bus for Manila, leaving Gertrudis behind. The two arrived at Angeles City and proceeded to the
office of Milflores there, where Victoria passed the night.
"Early the next morning — December 1, Friday — at or about 4:00 A.M., Milflores and
Victoria proceeded to Manila in his jeep. They arrived in Manila at or about 6:00 o'clock the same
morning. In Manila she was introduced to one Atty. Ben Dimaunahan, who tried to gather the facts
from Victoria about the bomb-killing. Victoria had no information to give. In the afternoon, at or
about 3:00 o'clock, Atty. Dimaunahan informed the Manila Police Department, thru Lt. A. Lim, that
he had with him Victoria Remolar-Javier, the person sought in the bomb-slaying probe, and that
they were going to the police headquarters with Milflores, a magician, illutionist, and a marriage
counselor of 423 Angeles City, Pampanga, and one Oscar Alayon, their driver. Victoria was
interviewed at the headquarters. She was allowed to go home, but was advised to return for
confrontation.
"After Victoria was interviewed, she noticed that Atty. Dimaunahan and Milflores were
nowhere around. Since she was left alone and did not know anybody in Manila, she looked for
them, until she saw Atty. Dimaunahan, who was about to leave. She requested him to look for the
accused. During the interview, Victoria told Capt. Lim that aside from the P200.00 Milflores
received from her sister in Baguio, he also received P210.00 from her in Angeles City; that Milflores
told her these amounts will be given to the lawyer who will help her with respect to her
 involvement in the case. Victoria gave these amounts to Milflores in her desire to clear her name.
Capt. Lim told her that she was swindled. From then on, Victoria began to suspect Milflores.
"After Victoria was interviewed, the suspicion of the investigating authorities focused on
Milflores. On December 2 (Saturday) — after Victoria had been interrogated extensively —
Florencia Tactay was invited to the Manila Police Department. Her husband, Antonio Javier,
accompanied her to the said office. A police line-up was conducted. Florencia requested that the
face of Milflores be painted black. Whereupon, she pointed to him as the very person who handed
to her the paper bag containing the vegetables and the fatal bomb. Florencia also stated that the
accused had the same tone of voice as the person who handed her the bag. The police line up was
conducted in the presence of police authorities and other persons, including newspaper reporters
— i.e., Tony Alba of ABS, Channel 5; Alfredo Santiago of the Evening News; Fred Cruz of the Manila
Times. Pictures were taken during the confrontation (Exh. 3, The Sunday Times, page 1).
"Alexis Nazario and Desiderio Juvida were recalled to the office. Both fingered Milflores as
the person they saw running away from the house of Mrs. Javier. Their statements were reduced
into writing.
"The accused was investigated. He denied any criminal participation in the fatal explosion
incident. He admitted he came to know Victoria Remolar-Javier sometime in June 1967, when she
came to his booth in Baguio City to seek his advice concerning her marital problems with Antonio
Javier; that he had asked Victoria to pay him some amounts for his spiritual advice and that all in
all he had received from her more or less P800.00. He stood pat on his claim of innocence and that
he had merely given her spiritual advice as a minister of the Will of Christ Chapel.
"The statement of Victoria Remolar-Javier was taken (Exh. A) on December 3, 1967
(Sunday). The investigation of Milflores proceeded. He continued to deny any participation in the
incident. At 11:00 A.M., the police authorities searched his Willy's Mitsubishi jeep, with Plate No.
1678-67 Manila, which was parked in front of the headquarters. The following articles were found
in the glove compartment: (1) one (1) piece of cotton, blackened with dye; (2) one (1) strip of cotton,
wrapped in paper; (3) one (1) plastic bottle, pitcher type; (4) one (1) pallet of black dye powder; (5) a
receipt from the Talayan, Quezon Blvd., gas station for the purchase of one liter oil, dated
November 25, 1967. A further search of the jeep yielded a small box containing (1) one brown
ladies' clutch bag; (2) one white ladies' plastic bag; (3) one forcep; (4) speculum; (5) one plastic bag
with 15 rounds of .22 cal. bullets, short; (6) 3 rounds of .22 cal. bullets, short; (7) one TVR issued by
the TRAFCON in his name; (8) one piece of candle (9) one set of keys; (10) four envelopes addressed
to him; (11) one crucifix; (12) one envelope containing 40 units of sweepstakes tickets for the
December 17, 1967 draw. Confronted with these articles, Milflores denied the presence of these
articles in his jeep and claimed the same must be that of his sons (Exh. K).
"At 12:00 o'clock, December 3 — a Sunday — 1967, Milflores was taken to the crime scene.
Witnesses Nazario and Juvida pointed to the front of House No. 2463 Cagayan Street as the place
where they saw Milflores, whose appearance attracted them, because his face was painted black.
Milflores was then placed under arrest and booked for murder and frustrated murder on 7 counts.
Charges were preferred (sic) against him with the Fiscal's Office." (Pp. 3-8, Decision, pp. 256-261,
CFI Record.)"
To reiterate, the above summation of the evidence by the trial court is fully supported by the evidence on
record. Just the same, counsel for appellant has made the following assignments of error in his brief:
"I. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS CRIMINAL CASE NO. 88174 ON GROUNDS OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
II. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CREDITING THE ALLEGED PREVIOUS
MISDEEDS OF THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT AS A BASIS FOR AN INFERENCE OF MOTIVE
IN THE DELIVERY OF EXPLOSIVE THAT CAUSED THE DEATH OF FELICIDAD MIQUE AND
THE INJURIES OF SEVEN OTHERS.
III. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT ON AN EVIDENCE THAT FAILED TO PROVE THE GUILT OF DEFENDANT
APPELLANT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT."
It is the position of appellant, under the first assigned error, that after he had pleaded to the charge of
multiple frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 88173 on December 17, 1967, the trial court gravely erred in not
hearkening to his plea of double jeopardy when he was subsequently arraigned on the separate charge of murder
in Criminal Case No. 88174 on January 23, 1968, considering that the charge in the separate information for
murder is based on facts that are the very same facts alleged in the other information for multiple frustrated
murder. Thus, appellant argues in his brief:
 "A conscientious study of the allegations in both criminal cases (shows), that in the multiple
frustrated murder case and the murder case, the elements of murder were alleged. The facts in both
cases are synonymous insofar as the following are concerned:
a) That offense charged in both cases were committed, in one single act, on
November 27, 1967;
b) That the accused delivered a bomb inside a bag containing vegetables, causing
the same to explode and which single act of the accused (herein appellant) resulted in the:
— 1 — injuries of seven persons (those named in Crim. Case No. 88173), and
— 2 — death to Felicidad Mique and independently treated in Crim. Case No. 88174.
"It is very evident that the single act of delivering a big bag containing a bomb caused the
injuries of seven persons and the death of one, but the fact of death of one must not be the reason to
make the same an object of a distinct and separate information.
"That matter of charging the accused, herein defendant-appellant, of murder in a separate
information based on facts that are the very same facts obtaining in another case of frustrated
murder, is a wanton violation of Section 2(h), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
"Sec. 2 — Motion to Quash — Grounds —
"(h) That the defendant has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being
convicted, or acquitted of the offense charged.
in relation to Section 1, paragraph 20, Article III of the Constitution which likewise provides that:
'No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an
act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.'
"It is obvious that the information charging herein appellant with the crime of MURDER in
Criminal Case No. 88174 placed him in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense treated in
Criminal Case No. 88173. Giving effect to the above-quoted provisions of our laws, our Supreme
Court, in the case of Yap vs. Lutero, G.R. No. L-1266, promulgated on April 30, 1959, resolved as
follows:
'If the two charges are based on one and the same act, conviction or acquittal under
either the law or ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other. Incidentally, such
conviction or acquittal is not indispensable to sustain the plea of double jeopardy or
punishment for the same offense. So long as jeopardy has attached under one of the
informations charging said offense, the defense may be availed of in the other case
involving the same offense, even if there has been neither conviction or acquittal in either
case." Pp. 6-8, Appellant's Brief; pp. 77-79, Record)
Before tackling counsel's pose, one important point has to be made clear. And it is that the first
information for frustrated murder, Criminal Case No. 88173, does not include among the victims or offended
parties Felicidad Mique, the woman who died and is precisely named as the deceased in the murder case,
Criminal Case No. 88174. In the sense, therefore, that appellant was ever in jeopardy in that first case, it is plain to
see that such was impossible or could not have happened. Counsel is thus off tangent in invoking double
jeopardy. prcd
To be accurate, the legal error of the prosecution here consists of having filed two separate informations
for a single offense. For there can be no doubt about the fact that since the injuries suffered by the offended parties
in Criminal Case No. 88173 resulted from the same act allegedly of the accused that caused the death of Felicidad
Mique, the victim in Criminal Case No. 88174, namely, the explosion of the bomb which according to the
prosecution was handed by appellant to Florencia Tactay-Javier, the crime for which appellant could be made to
answer is the virtually single complex offense of murder with frustrated murder pursuant to Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code which provides:
"Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the
most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period."
There is in law only one offense because there is only one penalty that can be imposed notwithstanding
that the act may in fact involve a cluster of otherwise separate or distinct offenses.
And so, the legal problem before Us is not ready whether or not the filing of Criminal Case No. 88174
placed appellant under risk of double jeopardy. What has to be resolved here is the question of whether or not the
error of the fiscal of filing two separate informations for the same offense, albeit with different offended parties in
each of them, in reversible error, having in view the peculiar milieu of the said cases.
On this point, the Solicitor General submits that:
 "We submit that Criminal Cases Nos. 88173 and 88174 were the results of appellant's single
act (pp. i and 1, Informations, rec.), and should have been incorporated in one criminal information
in accordance with the provision of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the same being a complex
crime. The reason behind the legal doctrine of discouraging the splitting of cause of action in
complex crimes was enunciated by this Honorable Supreme Court in the case of People vs.
Cano, G.R. No. L-19660, May 24, 1966; when it ruled that:
" 'From the viewpoint both of trial and practice, it is doubtful whether the
prosecution should split the action against the defendant . . . Such splitting of action would
work unnecessary inconvenience to the administration of justice in general and to the accused in
particular, for it would require the presentation of substantially the same evidence in different
courts . . .".'
Significantly, the cases at bar were filed at the same time and there was a joint hearing in both cases (pp.
12, t.s.n., Magalit, March 21, 1968). Definitely then, joint hearing conducted by the trial court in the cases at bar
cured the technical defect of splitting the cause of action, for the inconvenience sought to be prevented was
avoided. LLpr
"Moreover, the cases cited by the appellant in support for its defense of double jeopardy
cannot be applied in this case (pp. 8, 9, Appellant's Brief). Firstly, because there was only one
injured party in the cited cases, while there were several injured parties in the case at bar; secondly,
the filing of the information and the hearings on the former cases were made one after the other,
while the informations in the cases at bar were filed on the same date (pp. 1 and 1, Informations,
rec.); and then there was a joint hearing (U.S. vs. Ledesma, 29 Phil., 431; Melo vs. People, 85 Phil.
769)." (Italics Ours), (Pp. 4-5, Solicitor General's Brief)
There is, to Our mind, some degree of plausibility in such posture of the People. Indeed, it is obvious that
the technical error of the fiscal in filing two separate informations did not cause appellant any substantial
prejudice at all. In effect, as the proceedings were actually conducted, it is as if appellant had been prosecuted and
tried under a single information. It would be giving premium to technicality and sacrificing substantial justice to
yield to counsel's contention. Besides, to do so would result in duplicating what had already been done, the full-
dressed trial of the case, with both prosecution and defense presenting all their respective evidence.
But the more untenable aspect of the position of appellant is that when he invoked the defense of double
jeopardy, what could have been the first jeopardy had not yet been completed or even began. It is settled
jurisprudence in this Court that the mere filing of two informations or complaints charging the same offense does
not yet afford the accused in those cases the occasion to complain that he is being placed in jeopardy twice for the
same offense, for the simple reason that the primary basis of the defense of double jeopardy is that the accused
has already been convicted or acquitted in the first case or that the same has been terminated without his consent.
(Bulaong vs. People, L-19344, July 27, 1966, 17 SCRA 746; Silvestre vs. Military Commission No. 21, No. L-46366,
March 8, 1978; 3 Buscayno vs. Military Commissions Nos. 1, 2, 6 and 25, No. L-58284, Nov. 19, 1981, 109 SCRA
273) prLL
Accordingly, We overrule appellant's first assignment of error.
Under his second assignment of error, appellant submits that the lower court erred in giving full weight
and credit to the evidence presented by the prosecution to prove certain alleged previous misdeeds of his as basis
for an inference of motive which must have induced him to commit the crimes imputed to him in these cases. He
places reliance on Section 46 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provides in part that unless in rebuttal, the
prosecution cannot prove the bad moral character of the accused. More specifically, he bewails the finding of the
court a quo from the testimony of Victoria Remolar to the effect that appellant, having extorted the sum of
P1,130.00 from said Victoria with the promise that with his spiritual powers he would make her erstwhile
husband Antonio Javier come back to her, failing in which Victoria had demanded from him the return of her
money, appellant resorted to the nefarious scheme of delivering a bomb to said Antonio's other wife (Florencia
Tactay-Javier) to do away with her. And on this particular point, on the other hand, counsel for the People
counters that what was considered by the lower court in the determination of appellant's motive were evidence of
series of events and acts indicating his specific intent, system, scheme and plan to commit the crimes for which he
had been indicted, which kind of evidence is admissible under Section 48, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
It would appear idle, however, to discuss at length such opposing views of the parties. Suffice it to say
that what happened between Victoria Remolar and appellant as related above, furnishes a well-founded clue to
what could have been the reason for appellant's act of delivering the fatal bag of vegetables containing also a
deadly bomb, to Florencia Tactay-Javier. But even this observation seems superfluous, for the determination of
motive becomes relevant only where there is doubt as to whether or not an accused is the one who committed the
crime charged. Withal, lack of motive does not preclude conviction of the offense when the crime and
participation of the accused are definitely proved, as in these cases. (People vs. Lumantas, L-28355, July 17, 1969,
28 SCRA 764, 769, and cases therein cited; People vs. Dorico, L-31568, Nov. 29, 1973, 54 SCRA 172, 186; People vs.
Herila, L-32785, May 21, 1973, 51 SCRA 31, 38, and cases therein cited.) There is thus no merit in appellant's
second assignment of error.
 Appellant's third and last assignment of error is directed against the finding of his guilt by the trial court
beyond reasonable doubt. He complains that the testimonies of the witnesses and the circumstantial evidence
against him were excessively overweighed while the evidence on his behalf was hardly paid credit by His Honor.
Accordingly, We have taken pains to reread the transcript of the stenographic notes taken at the trial in order to
find out by Ourselves where the trial court might have erred in the appreciation of all the oral and real evidence
presented by both parties. Our conclusion after such review is that appellant's plaintiff has no merit. cdrep
1. As to what We might refer to as the prelude to the fatal events which constituted the graver offenses
committed by appellant, he more or less, admits either expressly or impliedly in his testimony and in his brief his
meetings and conversations with Victoria Remolar whom he made to believe he had spiritual powers to help her
solve her triangular — marriage affair involving her bona-fide marriage with Antonio Javier who, turned out to
have been previously legally married to Florencia Tactay. He has not denied he received money from her several
times in consideration of his promise that for sure soon enough Antonio would be Victoria's alone.
As he in truth did not possess a bit of the spiritual means he pretended to have and was in fact deceiving
Victoria to be able to fleece money from her, it is inescapable to believe that upon being finally cornered by
Victoria, he concocted the diabolical idea that he could make true his word to her by making Antonio a widower
freed from the marriage with Florencia. In a word, he must have found no other way out of his problem with
Victoria than to snap out the life of Florencia.
2. Appellant's contention that Florencia did not have sufficient basis for identifying him as the man who
delivered the bag with the fatal bomb to her that unhappy morning of November 27, 1967 is utterly untenable.
Florencia had immediately described his general build and appearance to the investigators and readily identified
him in the police lineup in the presence of pressmen after he was made to paint his face black the same way he
did that morning of the event in question. And although he did not answer her when she asked from where the
bag came and did not hear his voice then, it should be recalled that when he knocked at the door and Florencia or
Mrs. Javier looked out from the window upstairs, he said that he was looking for "Mrs. Javier". Thus, that
Florencia could identify him thru his voice cannot be surprising. LLjur
Florencia's testimony on this point reads:
"Q At 7:45 o'clock in the morning, do you remember anything unusual that happened in your
house at 2233 Garrido Street?
A Yes, sir.
COURT: (to witness)
Q What was that?
A Somebody called me, 'Mrs. Javier!
ASST. FISCAL: (to witness)
Q Upon hearing such call, what did you do?
A I peeped out of the window.
Q And what did you see after peeping out of the window?
A I saw an old man.
Q And what happened?
A He called me twice, so I went down-stairs." (t.s.n., Hearing of July 11, 1968, p. 2. Italics
supplied.)
And as to the fact that this witness first failed to identify appellant as the person who handed to her the
bag containing the bomb, the fact still remains that she later readily pointed to him after appellant's face was
painted with black dye, let alone the circumstance that black dyeing materials were also found in the glove
compartment of his jeep used by appellant in coming to the police headquarters.
As to the identification of appellant by prosecution witnesses Desiderio Juvida and Alexis Nazario, it is
not accurate to say, as suggested by appellant, that said witnesses had only a passing glimpse of the person they
saw running fast from the scene of the crime and could not have seen his face, much less recognized him. On this
point, the following is revealing:
"COURT: (To witness [Desiderio Juvida]
Q You say that the man you saw that morning is painted?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q On his face and on his hands?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q How are you certain now that this man, the accused, was the man whom you saw that
morning, because, as you said, he was painted black?
A I noticed his face when he passed by because he was only around two meters away from
me . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Q Will you please indicate on this diagram, Exhibit 1, where your position was, and where
the accused came nearest to you at the point of 2 meters?
A This is the store.
Q Where were you?
A I was at the corner of the store . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Q And where was the accused when you saw him?
A He was here already in this place — corner of Cagayan and Mabuhay Streets. I was sitting
at the corner indicated by a blue dot. Alexis, who was standing near me, facing
Cagayan Street, told me that there was a man with painted face who might be a
robber.
Q What did you do them?
A I stood up and then I looked at the man who was passing and it was then that [he] passed
in front of me.
Q And then?
A And I suspected, because he was painted, that he might be a criminal or something like
that. So I followed him with my face up to 15 meters. He was not running but he was
rushing. When we heard an explosion, and he ran, I suspected he might be connected
with the explosion, so I requested Alexis Nazario to run after him." (t.s.n., Hearing of
June 4, 1968, pp. 11, 21-23.) (Words in brackets supplied)
"COURT: [To witness Alexis Nazario]
xxx xxx xxx
Q You said as soon as you heard the explosion you saw the accused walk at a fast clip. Will
you indicate the route the accused took when you first saw him? (The witness
indicates it with an arrow.)
Q You also said you heard an explosion. From what portion of this sketch did you hear the
explosion come from?
A It came from Garrido Street - the third house from the corner.
ATTY. GENSON:
Q Was the explosion, from the place where you were standing, loud, or soft?
A It was loud.
Q How many explosions did you hear?
A Just one.
COURT:
Q You also said that the accused was walking at a fast clip and after he passed you, he ran
faster. Will you indicate the route the accused took from the place where you were?
(Witness indicating.)
ATTY. GENSON:
Q After you heard the explosion, where did you see the accused for the first time, in this
sketch?
A Here, sir.
ATTY. GENSON:
Please mark it with 'X'.
WITNESS:
The first time we saw the accused he was walking in Cagayan Street, but when we
heard the explosion he was in Mabuhay and running already." (t.s.n., Hearing of May
2, 1968, p. 9; Words in brackets supplied.
"ATTY. CABANTING: [Cross-examining witness Alexis Nazario]
 Q I suppose Milflores just passed on November 27 when you saw him that morning. Am I
right?
A Yes, sir.
Q When you saw him, he was already running fast. Is that correct?
A When he passed us, he ran fast.
Q He was already far away, when you saw him, or noticed him running. Is that correct?
A It is quite far.
COURT:
Q Will you indicate, more or less, how far?
A From this place to that place.
COURT:
Make a record that the witness indicates a distance of eight (8) to ten (10) meters.
ATTY. CABANTING:
Q That was the first time you saw him in your lifetime. Is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q You saw him in a split second that morning before giving chase. Is that correct?
A Not only seconds. He was walking towards us, facing us.
Q He was not running, but walking?
A He was walking at a fast clip." (t.s.n., Hearing of May 2, 1968, pp. 5-6; Words in brackets
supplied.)
From the above-quoted portions of the testimonies of witnesses Juvida and Nazario, it can be readily seen
that they came face to face with appellant. They saw him walking at a fast clip from Cagayan Street to Mabuhay
Street, and because they also noticed that his face was painted black, their suspicion was readily aroused that he
must be a robber or something when he passed by them at a distance of only about two (2) meters. And so, after
appellant had passed in front of them, when they heard the explosion and saw appellant start running, the old
man Juvida instructed the younger Nazario to try to catch him, albeit in such attempt Nazario failed because
appellant was able to make good his escape after Nazario lost sight of him amongst the many people passing by
Tejeron Street. It cannot be said then that said witnesses had only a glimpse of appellant at the time. Then too, it is
not at all out of the ordinary, as testified to by said witnesses, that they saw appellant first merely walking at a fast
clip after having delivered the fatal bomb to the intended victim, for the stubborn fact is, as explained by said
witnesses, appellant started to in soon after the explosion of said bomb, apparently run an attempt to get away
from the scene of the crime of which he was the author as fast as he could upon realization that the said bomb he
planted had exploded. Surely, such behavior of appellant, as described by the two witnesses referred to, is not in
conflict with the experience of common life and the ordinary instincts and promptings of human nature as
insisted by appellant. LLpr
Our review of the evidence leads Us to no other conclusion that appellant has been definitely and
indubitably identified as the man who handed the bag with the fatal bomb to Florencia Tactay-Javier.
As to appellant's lament about the finding of the trial court vis-a-vis the black dyeing materials found in
his jeep, it is very safe to say that those materials constituted the strongest mute evidence of his having been
indeed the black-painted man whom Florencia and the other two eye witnesses Juvida and Nazario saw that
morning. Said materials, albeit circumstantial, pointed to him conclusively as the culprit. There were very credible
oral evidence on top of the dyeing materials. The accurate summation by the lower court of the evidence in
support of the case for the People reads as follows:
"Having been identified; having thus been shown to have a motive for committing the
offense; and having had in his possession blackening materials — the evidence thus conclusively
point to him as the person guilty as charged in the information."
It may not be a miss to close this discussion with the following words in People vs. Gonzaga, L-34418,
May 26, 1977, 77 SCRA 140, 144-145, to dispose of his defense of alibi.
"It is easily understandable why the identification of an accused as a participant in the
commission of an offense by evidence that is worthy of credence and belief negates the claim of
alibi. The falsity of an assertion that he was elsewhere and therefore could not have been guilty of
the crime imputed to him becomes apparent. Where the proof of his presence then is clear and
positive, such a defense in unavailing. In the language of Justice Laurel in People v. Caroz (68 Phil.
621 [1939]: 'Alibis cannot stand and prevail over clear and convincing affirmation of credible
witnesses' (Ibid., 526). Such a doctrine is of respectable lineage. It was first announced by Justice
Torres in United States v. Roque (11 Phil. 422), a 1908 decision, where the accused 'was recognized
 with rare unanimity by five eye witnesses to the sequestration as being one of the four armed
individuals who in the early morning of the 23rd of June, 1904, abducted the deceased, . . . (Ibid.,
426). Since then, as pointed out by Justice Trent in United States v. Lasada (18 Phil. 90 [1910],
promulgated two years later, alibi cannot avail as against 'the positive and direct testimony' (Ibid.,
100) of the witnesses for the prosecution . . ."
Unquestionably, the crimes proven, as found above to have been committed by appellant in these cases,
constitute the complex crime of murder with multiple frustrated murder, the same being the result of a single act -
that of delivering the bomb which actually exploded as he had intended causing the death and grave injuries
already referred to earlier. The qualifying circumstance is use of explosive. Based on the facts proven, We also
find that the commission of the offense was attended by evident premeditation, craft and dwelling His guilt
having been proven beyond reasonable doubt, We have no alternative than to find him guilty of said complex
offense, with the aggravating circumstances just mentioned, and he deserves no less than the extreme penalty of
death.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appellant Naño Milflores y Laksa is hereby found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the complex offense of murder with frustrated murder with the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation, craft and dwelling and he is hereby sentenced to death. It appearing from
the records, however, that he is presently more than 70 years old, pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal
Code, We have no alternative but to affirm the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial court, with all the
concomitant accessories thereof. Costs against appellant.
Barredo (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and Escolin, JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Milflores y Laksa, G.R. Nos. L-32144-45, [July 30, 1982], 201 PHIL 154-179)

[G.R. Nos. L-37801-05. October 23, 1978.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VEDASTO MORENO, et. al.
SYNOPSIS: In an ambuscade, Cebu mayor Samson Cerna was mortally wounded. His wife and three other companions in the
truck suffered wounds. Mrs. Cerna and the truck driver positively identified appellants Moreno, Rodrigo Baricutaro, Roberto and
Carlos Paslon, and Generalao, political rivals of the slain mayor, as among the perpetrators of the crime. In a dying declaration,
Mayor Cerna stated that he recognized the same five appellants as among their assailants. One year after the incident and after the
trial had commenced, the seven other appellants were implicated as co-conspirators by one Norteza, a known follower of the
mayor, who claimed that he was a co-conspirator in the plot to kill the mayor but that he withdrew from the same and was not
indicted. The ambush appeared to have been the aftermath of the late mayor's issuance of warrants for the arrest of four of the
appellants and the incarceration and posting of four bail bonds by appellant Moreno in connection with an incident during the
1969 elections. The original five accused interposed the defense of alibi which, however, were either weak and unconvincing, or
uncorroborated. The trial court found all twelve appellants guilty of the complex crime of murder with atentado and four frustrated
murders, although the charges were only for murder with atentado, two frustrated murders, and two attempted murders.
The Supreme Court acquitted the seven appellants implicated by Norteza holding that the veracity of his testimony is impaired not
merely by the long delay in giving it but also by the undeniable fact that he was a follower of the slain mayor which strongly
militates against his credibility. It found the conviction of the appellants for four frustrated murders glaringly erroneous, the
charges being merely for two frustrated murders and two attempted murders, and the injuries suffered by the victims not being
capable of causing death. Decision modified.
SYLLABUS
1. EVIDENCE; GUILT OF ACCUSED CANNOT BE PREDICATED ON DELAYED TESTIMONY WHICH IS
EARMARKED BY FABRICATION. — The veracity of the testimony of a witness for the prosecution implicating seven
additional accused to the conspiracy to kill the mayor on said witness' claim that he was a co-conspirator to the crime who
withdrew from the conspiracy and who was not indicted, had been impaired not only because of the long delay in giving the
testimony but because the witness was a known follower of the slaim mayor and, therefore, it was not believable that he
would have been invited by the accused to join in the conspiracy.
2. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT PROVEN BY POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION
OF ASSAILANTS BY EYEWITNESS, DYING DECLARATION OF VICTIM AND FINDING OF MOTIVE; WHEN ALIBI
CONFIRMS GUILT OF ACCUSED. — The accused's complicity in the perpetration of the ambuscade is proven beyond
 reasonable doubt by the testimonies of two eyewitnesses to the crime and the victim's dying declaration, positively identifying
them and positively establishing the motive for the killing. An accused's alibi which serves to confirm his guilt because there is
no reason for him to sleep in his sweetheart's house which is only three kilometers away from his residence; an accused's alibi
which is nullified by the testimony of the owner of the house where he claims he has played mahjong that he has not played at
that time; or an alibi that is not corroborated, may not prevail over the testimonies of eyewitnesses to the crime and the dying
declaration of the victim positively pointing to the accused as the assailants.
3. EVIDENCE; TWENTY-TWO MONTHS IN HIDING AS FUGITIVES FROM JUSTICE CONVEYS IMPRESSION OF
GUILT. — The fact that the accused were fugitive from justice for around 22 months, hiding in the mountain barrios, conveys
the impression that they had a guilty conscience.
4. CRIMINAL LAW; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE; NOCTURNITY. — Nocturnity is aggravating where the
accused took advantage of the night for the consummation of their nefarious enterprise.
5. ID.; COMPLEX CRIME OF MURDER WITH ATENTADO (ARTICLE 48, 148 and 248, REVISED PENAL CODE. —
Where a person in authority while engaged in the performance of his official duties or on occasion of such performance, has
been killed in an ambuscade which exhibited the characteristics of alevosia (Article 14 (16), Revised Penal Code), the offense
committed is the complex crime of murder with direct assault upon a person in authority.
6. ID.; ID.; PENALTY. — In the complex crime of murder with attentado, the penalty of death, the maximum penalty
for murder, the more serious offense, should be imposed. However, for lack of the requisite votes, the Supreme Court would
impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
7. ID.; ACCUSED MAY NOT BE CONVICTED OF FRUSTRATED MURDER FOR A CHARGE OF ATTEMPTED
MURDER. — Conviction of the accused of four frustrated murders where only two informations for frustrated murders and
two for attempted murders were filed is a glaring error.
8. ID.; ATTEMPTED MURDER. — Where the injuries suffered by the victims could not have caused their death, the
crime committed is attempted murder.
9. ID.; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE; BAND. — Commission of a crime be a band (cuadrilla) is aggravating.
10. ID.; ASSAILANT NOT LIABLE FOR INJURIES SUSTAINED BY VICTIMS WHO DID NOT TESTIFY AT HIS
SEPARATE TRIAL. — An assailant who had a separate trial from his co-conspirators cannot be held responsible for the
attempted murder committed against the offended parties where said offended parties and the attending physicians who
issued their corresponding medical certificates did not testify at said separate trial.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
CRIMINAL LAW; PROSECUTION OF PERJURED WITNESS. — A witness should be prosecuted as a perjured
witness where the Supreme Court rejects his uncorroborated testimony for the prosecution after showing its incredibility and
after noting that the Solicitor General agrees with the accused-appellants that it is perjured, stressing the impression that said
witness is a rehearsed witness whose testimony has been concocted in order to strengthen the prosecution's case and that his
delayed testimony exhibits earmarks of fabrication.
On the night of January 21, 1970, in an ambuscade perpetrated at Barrio Tutay, Pinamungajan, Cebu, Mayor Samson
Cerna, 51, of that town was mortally wounded. He died about two hours later. His companions, Lourdes Cerna,
Candida Comahig, Francisco Jabido and Jose de los Reyes, were also wounded.
As an aftermath of that tragic occurrence, an information for murder with atentado, two informations for frustrated
murder and two for attempted murder (five cases) were filed against thirteen persons with the Circuit Criminal Court
at Cebu City.
The lower court's judgment.—After trial, the lower court convicted (1) Vedasto Moreno, (2) Rodrigo Baricuatro, (3)
Romeo Baricuatro, (4) Carlos Paslon and (5) Emilio Generalao of murder with direct assault upon a person in
authority and sentenced each of them to death and to pay solidarily to the heirs of Mayor Cerna the sum of P50,000 as
actual and moral damages.
In the same case, (1) Crescencio F. Nemenzo, (2) Elpidio Baricuatro, (3) Elf Baricuatro, (4) Salvador Peña, (5)
Victoriano Baraga, (6) Rodulfo Umbay and (7) Robero Paslon were convicted as co-principals and were each
sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay solidarily an indemnity of P50,000 (Criminal Case No. CCC-XIV-95). cdrep
The same twelve accused were convicted of four frustrated murders, Each of them was sentenced to four
indeterminate penalties of six years and one day to eight years and one day of prision mayor and to pay solidarily an
indemnity of P8,000 to Mrs. Cerna and P2,000 each to Candida Comahig, Jabido and De los Reyes (Criminal Cases
Nos. CCC-XIV-129 to 132).
All the twelve defendants appealed. Crispin Baraga, the thirteenth accused, is at large.
Issue as to the identity of the culprits. — There is no question as to the corpus delicti or the commission of the five
offenses. The nagging question is the identity of the malefactors. The prosecution was not able to use a co-conspirator
as a State witness or to obtain an extrajudicial confession.
Sometime after the commencement of the trial, the prosecution used as a witness, Avelino Norteza, an alleged co-
conspirator, who withdrew from the conspiracy but who was not indicted and who was not present when the
ambuscade was consummated. His testimony as to the conspiracy was severely assailed by the defense and even by
the Solicitor General.
Antecedents. — Certain undisputed circumstances preceding the ambuscade may shed light on the motivation for the
assassination of Mayor Cerna and serve to explain why the appellants were implicated therein.
In 1969, Vedasto Moreno, 26, a college graduate and a businessman, residing at Barrio Tutay, was the number one
councilor of Pinamungajan affiliated with the Liberal Party. Rodrigo Baricuatro, 42, a Constabulary sergeant, was
being groomed as the Liberal Party candidate for mayor of that town in the coming 1971 elections. He would be the
opponent of mayor Cerna, a Nationalista. Moreno would be Baricuatro's running mate (1265-66 tsn November 16,
1971).
A controversial incident occurred on election day, November 11, 1969, at Barrio Tutay. According to Moreno, on that
day, he arrested Mamerto Lausa, a barrio captain, and Patrolman Filemon Diacamus because they were buying votes.
He took from them the envelopes containing money and turned them over to the Constabulary authorities, as shown
in the receipt, Exhibit 8-Moreno, signed by Sergeant Marcillano.
The prosecution has a contrary version of the incident. According to the chief of police, on that day, Moreno,
Generalao, Paslon and Romeo Baricuatro entered the house of Gabina Baron and, employing force and intimidation,
took from Lausa, the sum of P800 and grabbed from Patrolman Diacamus his service revolver. (That firearm was
allegedly turned over to Rodrigo Baricuatro. 154 tsn November 19, 1971. It was later recovered from Paslon.)
Because of that incident, the chief of police filed on November 15, 1969 in the municipal court two almost identical
complaints, both sworn to before Mayor Cerna, chargingMoreno, Romeo Baricuatro, Paslon and Generalao with
robbery in band with intimidation for having taken the money and revolver (Criminal Cases Nos. 501-RP and 502-
RP). Cdpr
On December 12, 1969 two other complaints, which were also sworn to before Mayor Cerna, were filed in the
municipal court by the chief of police. One complaint against the same four accused was for direct assault against an
agent of a person in authority, namely, Patrolman Diacamus, on the occasion mentioned above, when he was
disarmed (Criminal Case No. 505-RP).
The fourth complaint against the same four accused was for qualified trespass to dwelling for having entered
Gabina's dwelling. That complaint was also sworn to before Mayor Cerna (Criminal Case No. 506-RP). (Those four
cases were remanded to the Court of First Instance on February 23, 1970.)
Also on December 12, 1969, the chief of police filed in the municipal court a complaint (Criminal Case No. 507-RP),
sworn to before Mayor Cerna, charging Rodrigo Baricuatro, his nephew, Romeo Baricuatro (1404 tsn, November 25,
1971), and Arturo Kyamko, who were armed with a Thompson submachine gun, carbine and .45 caliber pistol, with
having committed grave threats also on election day, when they threatened to kill Lausa, the offended party in the
robbery case. Rodrigo Baricuatro was alleged to have told Lausa: Do you want to die, Merto? Killing is what we want
now. Who among you here is brave? (The municipal court dismissed that case in its order of August 28, 1970 because
of Lausa s failure to prosecute it.)
In the aforementioned four criminal cases Nos. 501, 502, 505 and 506, Mayor Cerna conducted the preliminary
examination although there was no showing that the municipal judge could not perform that duty. The mayor issued
warrant for the arrest of the four accused. Moreno was arrested and imprisoned on January 16, 1970. He posted bail,
paying P1,000 as premiums on four bail bonds. His release was ordered by the municipal judge on January 20,
1970 (Exh. 4 and 6 to 6-C-Moreno).
On the other hand, it should be noted (according to the evidence for the defense) that Sergeant Rodrigo N. Baricuatro
of the department of constabulary science and tactics of the University of the Visayas at Cebu City was given by his
commandant a pass authorizing him to be absent for seventy two hours, or from seven o'clock in the morning
of January 21to twelve o'clock midnight of January 23, 1970, for the ostensible purpose of attending to his family's
needs in Sitio Manga, Pinamungajan (Exh. 9-Rod. Bar.).
Thus, shortly before the ambuscade, considerable tension had developed between Moreno, Rodrigo Baricuatro and
their followers, on one hand, and Mayor Cerna, on the other. It may be assumed that the arrest of Moreno and the
impending arrest of Rodrigo Baricuatro, Romeo Baricuatro, Paslon and Generalao inflamed their smoldering
resentment against Mayor Cerna.
Mrs. Cerna testified that the mayor was ambushed "because Vedasto Moreno got angry with the mayor because he
was confined in jail and this Rodrigo Baricuatro is jealous of the mayor because of his ambition to become a mayor of
Pinamungajan and as long as the mayor . . . is still alive, he cannot become a mayor of our town" (155 tsn November
19, 1971).
The ambuscade. — On January 19, 1970, Governor Osmundo Rama in a telegram to Mayor Cerna requested him to
come for a conference in connection with the release of funds for his town, the detail in that place of Constabulary
soldiers, and the agenda to be taken up in the forthcoming conference of municipal mayors. (See pp. 39-43, Record of
Criminal Case No. 10-T.)
In compliance with that request, Mayor Cerna, using his cargo truck and accompanied by his wife, Lourdes Cerna,
went to Cebu City in the morning of January 21, 1970. (Note that Elpidio Baricuatro saw the mayor's truck leaving for
Cebu City and that Moreno, Rodrigo Baricuatro and Romeo Baricuatro were also in Cebu City on that fateful day,
January 21, 1970.Moreno and Rodrigo went to Pinamungajan in the afternoon of that day. The return of Mayor Cerna
to Pinamungajan in the evening of that date was known beforehand because on that day the mayor's housemaid, in
answer to a policeman's inquiry, said that the mayor would return to Pinamungajan at nighttime.)
Mayor Cerna conferred with the governor. He received a treasury warrant for P5,721 as national aid for the
maintenance and improvement of municipal roads and bridges (Exh. M).
According to Mrs. Cerna, the detail of Constabulary soldiers in Pinamungajan was necessary in order to apprehend a
band headed by Generalao, that was wanted in connection with the death of Juanito Gabonada, and because there
were rumors that Mayor Cerna's political enemies were intending to liquidate him. prcd
Late in the afternoon of that day, January 21, Mayor Cerna boarded his truck and proceeded to Barrio Tabunok,
Talisay to pick up his cargo. At about six o'clock, the truck started on its trip to Pinamungajan via Carcar. Seated in
the front seat were Jabido on the extreme left and then the driver, De los Reyes, Candida Comahig and Mrs. Cerna.
Mayor Cerna was on the extreme right, Anacleto Barrientos and two helpers were in the back of the truck.
At about eight o'clock on that moonlit night, the truck reached the five-meter-wide curve about seven meters from the
end of the wooden bridge in an isolated place at Barrio Tutay, which is about three to four kilometers away from the
poblacion of Pinamungajan. (See sketch, Exh. G, photographs, Exh H, etc. and Exh. 1-Moreno.)
After the truck had passed the bridge, its headlights revealed that a big log, about three to four arms' length, a foot
wide and six inches thick, the ends of which were connected to the sides of the road by two other pieces of wood, had
been placed across the highway as a roadblock about three meters from the curve (66 tsn November 16, 1971; 308 tsn
September 3, 1970).
Pieces of lumber piled as high as the waistline of a person or less than a meter high and about seven meters long were
stacked on the right side of the road below a cliff shaded by a balete tree. The truck's headlights were focused on the
right end of the roadblock and the pile of lumber. The truck stopped opposite the pile of lumber and was about two
arm's length from it (164 tsn November 19, 1971). One end of the roadblock rested on the pile of
lumber. Moreno's house was about 100 to 150 meters away from the bridge.
Stationed behind the pile lumber, which served as a barricade, were armed persons whom Mrs. Cerna allegedly
recognized because of the moonlight and the truck's headlights and because their bodies from the waist up were
exposed. She was instinctively afraid. She pressed the left thigh of her husband. He brushed her hand aside.
The truck stopped at the curve, which is a few meters away from the end of the bridge and which on the right side is
near the cliff and the pile of lumber. The driver did not shut off the headlights. The armed persons behind the
barricade were Romeo Baricuatro, Rodrigo Baricuatro, Carlos Paslon, Vedasto Moreno, Emilio Generalao, and three
others. The place was an ideal one for an ambuscade (67 tsn November 15, 1971).
When Mrs. Cerna saw the roadblock, she turned to the right side of the road ("stooped down in order to peep") and
she then saw "clearly" before the shooting the armed persons behind the pile of logs on the side of the road "beneath
the cliff" (32-33, 66-67, 71, 72, 74, tsn Exh. 2-Moreno). She testified that Mayor Cerna told her that Moreno and Rodrigo
Baricuatro (Bide and Dido) were among the malefactors. The veracity of that testimony and similar testimony given
by the chief of police, Anacleto Barrientos and Jose de los Reyes is vehemently contested by the appellants.
On the identity of the assailants, Mrs. Cerna testified as follows on cross-examination at the preliminary investigation:
"Q. Who were those persons with sidearms which (whom) you saw at the time of the incident? —
A. Rodrigo Baricuatro, Vedasto Moreno, Emilio Generalao, Romeo Baricuatro, Carlos Paslon, and
others whom I cannot identify because I could not see their faces.
"Q. You said also yesterday that there were persons behind the pile of logs that were placed at the
side of the road, do you know who were those persons? — A. Those are the same persons whom I
have named.
"Q. You said also it was a moonlight night and the headlight of the truck was on. Would you state
to the investigator that the persons can still be seen on that night in question? — A. It (They) can be
clearly seen.
"Q. Who were those persons whom you can clearly see? — A. Rodrigo Baricuatro, Vedasto Moreno,
Emilio Generalao, Romeo Baricuatro and Carlos Paslon.
xxx xxx xxx
"Q. Mrs. Cerna, you told this Honorable Investigator that you saw those persons you mentioned
behind the pile of logs. Now, please tell this Investigator whether you saw those persons behind the
pile of logs before the shooting or after the shooting? — A. Before the shooting.
"Q. Mrs. Cerna, since you saw those persons behind the pile of logs, and in fact you named those
persons, can you please tell this investigator what were their relative positions when you saw them
behind the pile of logs? — A. I could not tell their positions because I could only see their bodies
from their breast up.
"Q. Can you tell this Investigator if they were standing side by side or on file? — A. They were in
line, side by side.
"Q. Since you can tell this Honorable Investigator that they were in line side by side, can you please
tell us who was that person who was first from the left while looking on them? — A. Those were
fronting me from the cliff which (who) were in line side by side were: first was Rodrigo Baricuatro,
Emilio Generalao, Vedasto Moreno, Romeo Baricuatro, Carlos Paslon and those who were at the back I could
not see their faces because their faces were covered.
xxx xxx xxx
"Q. Since you said that after the shooting those persons you mentioned, disappeared, can you tell
whether they passed from the precise spot where you saw them before? — A. I do not know where
they were, but I saw that when they disappeared, they passed by the side of the truck towards the
end of the truck.
"Q. You said that you observed those persons leaving the place where you saw them before, by
passing by the side of the truck towards the end of the truck. Do you want us to understand that they
cross(ed) the bridge toward the south? — A. I did not know where they went, but I observed
that they passed by the side of the truck on the right side of the truck." (71-77 tsn Exh 2-Moreno and Exh. 5
Romeo).
At the trial, Mrs. Cerna testified:
"Q. Were you able to recognize these persons behind those (that) pile of wood? — A. Very much.
"Q. Will you name those persons to the court that you recognized behind the pile of wood? — A.
Yes, sir, Rodrigo Baricuatro, Emilio Generalao, Vedasto Moreno, Romeo Baricuatro, Carlos Paslon
and somebody behind whom I do not know because he was obstructed from my sight.
"Q. Those persons you have named to the court, how long have you known them? — A.
Vedasto Moreno and Rodrigo Baricuatro I know them since their boyhood.
"Q. How about the others you have mentioned, how long have you known them? — A. I came to
know them when they were already of age because they live in the barrio.
xxx xxx xxx
"Q. How were you able to recognize these persons you have named since it was 8:30 in the evening?
— A. Not only because of the light of the moon but they were also lighted by the beam of the light
of our truck." (62-64 tsn September 2, 1970).
xxx xxx xxx
"Q. But definitely, what you saw first, because of the beams of the lights on the front of the truck
and the moonlight, was these pile of logs across the street and not the pile of logs on the side of the
road, is that right? — A. The first that I saw because of the light of the moon, was the log blocked
across the road and when I saw I immediately turned to the side of the road and I saw the pile of
logs and behind it were some persons.
xxx xxx xxx
"Q. But the beams of the front lights of your truck was directed forward is that right? — A. It is not
towards the front all the time, because the light is scattered as adjusted.
xxx xxx xxx
"Q. How (What) do you mean by like that? — A. That the lights (of the truck are) in not straight but
it is scattered on the sides.
"Q. But you will agree with me that when you saw that pile of wood across the street, the truck was
moving? — A. Still moving and that was the time I saw clearly the persons standing by the side of
the road." (110-111, 113-114, tsn September 3, 1970).
xxx xxx xxx
"Q. But, definitely, you cannot inform the Honorable Court whether they were having sidearms
with them at that time? — A. All I saw were guns held like this (witness demonstrated a position by
holding something in her hands in a port arms position).
"Q. So, you did not see any sidearms? — A. I only saw the barrel placed on top of the wood which
they were holding" (Ibid, 126 tsn).
xxx xxx xxx
"Q. How long after the silence by the time allegedly your husband mentioned the name? — A. After
two to five minutes, more or less and I called him: 'Do', and after I called to him, he spat and then
he said: 'Dido and Bidi Day', together with the accused to be arrested.'
"Q. You are quite sure that what he said were those words 'Dido and Bidi, Day and the rest who
were the accused? — A. Dido and Bidi, Day and also the accused who are to be arrested." ( Ibid, 131
tsn).
 "Q. Did he (the chief of police) ask you whom you saw? — A. Yes, sir, I was asked.
"Q. Did he ask you whether you saw this Dido (Rodrigo Baricuatro)? — A. He asked me 'Who were
they, Day?' and I told him they were Dido Baricuatro, Bidi Moreno, Romeo Baricuatro, Emilio
Generalao, Carlos Paslon and there were some whom I did not recognize because then faces were
covered." (147-148 tsn September 3, 1970).
Mrs. Cerna further testified that the headlights (with 12 volts) of the truck were on during the shooting
and a long time thereafter and that she saw the malefactors retreating (Ibid, 95-97 tsn).
De los Reyes, the driver, gave the following testimony on the identity of the malefactors:
"Q. Upon noticing the shots, what did you do? — A. After I heard the shots, I turned my head to the
right and I saw Dido Baricuatro and Emilio Generalao like this (witness demonstrating a position as
if holding firearms in his hands).
"Q. When you saw Emilio Generalao and Dido Baricuatro, where did you see those persons? — A.
Near the end of the pile of wood at the side of the road.
"Q. What were they doing at that time when you saw them? — A. They were firing their guns
because I have seen fire flashes coming from their direction and they were carrying guns like this
(witness demonstrating right and left hand in an aiming position).
"Q. The place where you saw Emilio Generalao and Dido Baricuatro, how far were they from the
truck? — A. Maybe more than two arms' length, more or less." (229-230 tsn September 3, 1970).
xxx xxx xxx
"Q. While in that position at the right rear wheel of the truck, what did you notice? — A. At that
moment, while I was already behind the right rear wheel of the truck, I saw
Vedasto Moreno moving backwards from the truck with a gun on his hand.
"Q. After seeing this Vedasto Moreno in that position you have described, what else happened? —
A. After seeing Vedasto Moreno in that same position, Romeo Baricuatro followed him only an
interval of one arms' length, and after Romeo Baricuatro followed in the same position as
Vedasto Moreno. came Carlos Paslon.
"Q. What happened more? — A. Then, I saw Emilio Generalao followed also on the same position
and in the same manner and had an interval (distance) of only one arms' length and then was
followed by another man whom I did not know and the last one was Dido Baricuatro.
"Q. Those persons you have noted and observed, to what direction did they go? — A. They were
moving along the small path towards the upper portion of the hill." (Ibid, 232-234 tsn).
"Q. You said that when you jumped out of the truck, the headlights were on and you said that you
saw two persons. Do you know those two persons whom you saw because of the headlights? — A.
Dido Baricuatro and Emilio Generalao.
"Q. Do you know those persons personally? — A. Yes, sir, I know them.
"Q. When you said that when you were already hiding on the left rear portion of the truck, you
were able to see those persons, am I right? — A. I saw.
"Q. Who were those persons whom you saw? Name them one by one — A. The first was
Vedasto Moreno, and then Romeo Baricuatro.
"Q. Who else? — A. Carlos Paslon.
"Q. Were there other persons aside from the persons you named? — A. Emilio Generalao and next
was the person whom I do not know by name, and the next was Dido Baricuatro.
"Q. When you said Dido Baricuatro, is he the same Rodrigo Baricuatro who is accused of this case?
— A. Yes, sir.
"Q. When you said Bedi Moreno, is he the same Vedasto Moreno who is one of the accused in this
case? — A. Yes, sir." (116-118 tsn Exh. 2 Moreno and Exh. 5-Romeo).
The truck showed down and swerved to the left. Immediately after the truck had halted in front of the roadblock, or
while it was about to stop, volleys of gunfire were directed at its front and right side which was near the cliff. The
shots came from the right side of the road. The fusillade lasted only for a brief interval. Jabido and Candida Comahig
jumped out of the truck after the firing had started. Barrientos remained in the back of the truck.
De los Reyes, the driver (a resident of Barrio Tutay, whose house was about 400 meters away and who was familiar
with the place), on hearing the shots, turned his head and saw Rodrigo Baricuatro and Generalao at the end of the
roadblock. The driver jumped out of the truck and sought cover under the truck near the left rear tire which was
about four arms length from the pile of lumber. After the firing had stopped, he stationed himself behind the right
rear tire. LibLex
As testified by him from that coign of vantage, he saw and recognized Moreno, Generalao, Romeo Baricuatro,
Rodrigo Baricuatro and Carlos Paslon still holding their firearms. He was acquainted with them because they were
well-known residents of Pinamungajan. Their figures were silhouetted by the headlights of his truck which were on
during the shooting.
After the firing had ceased, Mrs. Cerna perceived that her husband was gravely wounded. She shouted for help. As
there were no houses in the vicinity, no one answered her clamor for succor.
Sometime later, the truck ("Estela") of Jose Peña (Otic) arrived. Peña's companions removed the roadblock. At that
juncture, De los Reyes showed up. He drove the mayor's truck and took him to the poblacion. (On the witness stand,
Peña, in answer to a leading question of whether he asked Mrs. Cerna and her companions who shot the mayor,
replied that "they said they did not know" [269 tsn January 5, 1972]. That answer of Peña has been capitalized upon by
the defense to counteract Mrs. Cerna's testimony that she knew the assailants of Mayor Cerna.)
The mayor was brought to Toledo City fifteen kilometers away. On arriving at that place, he was placed in another
car and taken to the Don Andres Soriano Memorial (Atlas Consolidated Mining Company) Hospital at Lutopan
where he died.
Injuries inflicted and results of the investigation at the scene of the crime. — The autopsy on the body of Mayor Cerna
disclosed six entrance gunshot wounds, located in the mandibular region, right shoulder, anterior chest wall, right
arm, and left leg, and four exit wounds, aside from abrasions and contusions (Exh. A to A-2).
A slug was recovered at the right side of the lower lip of Mayor Cerna. It was lodged between the lower lip and the
teeth of the victim or at his gums. The injuries caused by that slug involved the blood vessels, tissues and nerves of
the injured portion of the jaw. The defense argues that, because of the wound in his jaw, Mayor Cerna could not have
made a dying declaration to Mrs. Cerna and the chief of police that he was shot by Moreno and Rodrigo Baricuatro
and their companions.
Mrs. Cerna sustained fractures in the ring and middle fingers and metacarpal of her left hand. An operation was
performed on her left hand. It was permanently deformed. She spent P2,000 for her hospitalization (Ext. D-12). Jabido
had a gunshot wounded on his right cheek. He was confined in the hospital for eleven days (Exh. F).
Candida Comahig suffered contusions on her right knee and thigh which were not caused by bullets but by some
hard objects. Probably, the contusions were the consequence of her having jumped out of the truck and having fallen
on the hard ground (Exh. J).
De los Reyes had abrasions on the chin and a lacerated wound on his right arm from which a sharpnel was extracted
(Exh. E).
Recovered at the scene of the crime were a grease submachine gun caliber .45 (issued to Constabulary Sergeant
Mamerto Generalao), twenty five empty caliber .45 shells, two empty caliber .30 shells, five slugs and a magazine
with 25 rounds of ammunition, caliber .45. (Exh B, C and II-I).
On the right side of the truck, there were fifteen bullet holes from a .45 caliber submachine gun, two bullet holes on
the right side of the front and windshield from a .30 caliber rifle and twenty-six other bullet holes. And at the scene of
the ambuscade, there were bloodstains on the road and footprints on the swamp nearby. (See Exh. H-1-B and H-3-A.)
On the high ground near the curve, the investigators found empty cans, a Pepsi-Cola bottle, human waste matter, the
remains of food, and the wrappers for cooked rice known as "puso", indicating that certain persons ate their supper
there before the ambuscade. In that place, the aroma of tuba could still be smelt at seven o'clock in the morning of the
following day, January 22, 1970 (67, 70 and 72 tsn November 15, 1971).
Mrs. Cerna testified that, as a consequence of the death of her husband, who was the family's breadwinner, their ice
candy business, from which they derived a considerable daily income, was stopped. She spent P4,000 for the metal
casket, P4,000 for the twelve days during which the mayor's remains lay in state, and P7,000 for his marble tomb with
a canopy. cdll
Mayor Cerna's physical condition after the ambuscade. — The fact that Mayor Cerna was wounded in the jaw generated a
controversy as to whether he could have made the antemortem declaration, attributed to him by Mrs. Cerna, Chief of
Police Lesigues, driver De los Reyes, Anacleto Barrientos and Candida Comahig, that Moreno, Rodrigo Balicuatro
and their companions were his assailants. According to the medico-legal officer, Mayor Cerna retained his power of
speech in spite of his wounds (180 tsn June 19, 1972).
Mrs. Cerna testified that after the fusillade, Mayor Cerna bent forward, spat saliva mixed with blood and said that he
saw Moreno, Rodrigo Baricuatro and the other persons to be arrested. Mayor Cerna allegedly told her not to leave
him. She shouted for help and when nobody answered her, Mayor Cerna allowed her to leave the truck and go with
Jabido to look for help. Even after Mrs. Cerna had gone down from the truck and failed to find Jabido, the wounded
mayor allegedly told her not to leave the place. This was tearfully recounted on the witness stand by Mrs. Cerna. The
session had to be suspended at that juncture (72-73 tsn September 2, 1970).
Then, when she informed Mayor Cerna that Peña's truck had arrived, the mayor told her that Peña's truck should be
parked alongside their truck so that he could be transferred to Peña's truck. But because the road was narrow, that
maneuver could not be accomplished.
Anacleto Barrientos remained inside the mayor's truck when the ambuscade was being perpetrated. After the gunfire
had ceased and when he heard Mrs. Cerna shouting, he thought that there was a holdup. He left the truck and hid
under the bridge. After about ten minutes, he emerged from his hiding place and saw Mrs. Cerna walking to and fro
in front of the truck. He wondered why the mayor had not left the truck. He went to the right side of the front seat to
find out what had happened to the mayor.
He saw that there was blood on the mayor's white shirt. The mayor was leaning on the truck's steering wheel. The
mayor saw him and asked him who he was. He identified himself as a passenger who had boarded the truck in Cebu
City.
The mayor directed him to go after Moreno, Rodrigo Baricuatro and their companions who had fled to the elevated
portion near the scene of the ambuscade. He saw the cliff or elevated ground but he did not comply with the mayor's
directive. He went back to the bridge. While there, he heard the sound of the engine of a motor vehicle which was
ahead of the cargo truck. It seemed to him that the vehicle was in the vicinity of the barrio schoolhouse. (The same
sound was heard by Mrs. Cerna, Candida Comahig and Jabido.)
Later, Peña's truck arrived, the roadblock was removed, and De los Reyes, the driver of the mayor's truck appeared
and started it. Barrientos seated himself on the right of the wounded mayor and placed his left arm around his left
shoulder. The mayor told Barrientos to raise the mayor's right hand and to lift his left leg so that he (the mayor) could
rest. Barrientos demonstrated on the witness stand how he complied with the mayor's instruction (552-553 tsn
September 1, 1971).
On the way to the poblacion, the mayor even asked Barrientos to take out something inside the back pocket of his
pants since it caused him pain. Mrs. Cerna from time to time would call her husband "Do" and he would answer
"Day".
When the truck reached the mayor's garage in the poblacion, the chief of police, who was on the lawn of the mayor's
residence, was called by Mrs. Cerna and was informed that the mayor had been ambushed. The chief of police
approached the mayor, who was being held by Barrientos, and asked him who had shot him. The mayor replied that
he was shot by Dido Baricuatro and the other accused already known to the chief of police. The latter asked the
mayor if he was referring to Moreno, Romeo Baricuatro, Carlos Paslon and Generalao. The mayor replied in the
affirmative (10-14 tsn September 2, 1970; 241-2 tsn September 3, 1970).
According to De los Reyes, it was Mayor Cerna who suggested that the jeep of the priest be used in bringing him to
the hospital because the cargo truck, which was old, might break down. After the priest said that it might not be good
to transfer the mayor to the jeep, the mayor ordered that he be brought to the West Coast Hospital at Toledo City.
On the way to that place, Mayor Cerna asked the chief of police, who was sitting at his feet, if the place is still far. The
chief of police cautioned him not to talk much because talking was not good for a wounded person. The mayor asked
the same question of his wife when he was being brought to the hospital at Lutopan. When the mayor was being
transferred from his truck to Barba's car, he cried "Agoy". Evidently, he was suffering much pain. He sat on the left
thigh of Barrientos while he was in Barba's car. From time to time, the mayor would tell Barrientos to let him recline
and then, he would tell the latter to let him "lay flat" on his back. He was restless and, obviously, subjected to
paroxysms of pain. llcd
Possibly, the transfer of Mayor Cerna from the truck to Mayor Barba's car in Toledo City and the trip from Toledo
City to the hospital at Lutopan and the transfer to the stretcher of the hospital sapped his last reserve of resistance. He
died seven minutes after his arrival at the hospital. As long as he was in the truck, his mental faculties appeared to be
unimpaired in spite of the gunshot wounds. The mayor, a heavily built man, was endowed with a strong constitution.
He weighed 198 pounds (102 tsn September 3, 1970; 427 tsn September 1, 1970).
Appellants' contention that Mayor Cerna was already in a comatose condition after he was shot and that he could no
longer talk is unfounded.
The credibility of Avelino Norteza on the complicity of the seven appellants, Crescencio F. Nemenzo, et al. — On January 26,
1970, a Constabulary officer filed in the municipal court against (1) Moreno, (2) Generalao, (3) Rodrigo Baricuatro, (4)
Romeo Baricuatro and (6) Carlos Paslon a single complaint for murder and multiple frustrated murder. The
complaint was supported by the affidavits of Jose B. Lesigues, the chief of police, Patrolman Eulogio B. Kyamko, Jose
de los Reyes (the driver), and Placido Mondejar. Lourdes Cerna and Jose R. Kyamko also executed affidavits dated
January 28 and 30, 1970.
The municipal judge conducted a preliminary examination and, having found probable cause, he issued a warrant for
the arrest of the five accused, fixing their bail at P60,000 each in his order of January 28, 1970.
Moreno was arrested at Dumaguete City on January 28, 1970 (Exh. 3-Moreno). Rodrigo Baricuatro was arrested on
January 29, 1970 in Cebu City. Moreno and Baricuatro were released on bail on February 2, 1970. Generalao, Romeo
Baricuatro and Carlos Paslon went into hiding. The three were to be given a separate trial. On February 4, 1970 the
municipal judge elevated the record to the Court of First Instance because of the nonappearance of the accused at the
second stage of the preliminary investigation which they had presumably waived.
On February 24, 1970 the provincial fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu at Toledo City five informations
charging Moreno, Generalao, Rodrigo Baricuatro, Romeo Baricuatro, Carlos Paslon and three unknown persons with
murder with atentado and four frustrated murders (Criminal Cases Nos. 10(T) to 14(T)].
On June 22, 1970 the fiscal filed amended informations charging attempted murder only in connection with the assaults
against Candida Comahig and Jose de los Reyes [Criminal Cases Nos. 11(T) and 14(T)].
The Court of First Instance transferred the five cases to the Circuit Criminal Court at Cebu City where they were
docketed as Criminal Cases CCC-XIV-95, 129, 130, 131, and 132. In case No. 95, warrants were issued for the arrest
of Moreno and Rodrigo Baricuatro. No bail was recommended. The trial started on September 2, 1970.
About six months the trial had started, or on March 12, 1971, that is to say, after the witnesses, Jose B. Lesigues,
Lourdes Cerna and Jose de los Reyes, had testified at the trial the fiscal filed amended informations against
the five accused originally named and against eight new defendants, namely, (1) Crescencio F. Nemenzo, (2) Rodulfo
Umbay, (3) Salvador Peña, (4) Roberto Paslon, (5) Victoriano Baraga, (6) Crispin Baraga, (7) Elpidio Baricuatro and (8)
Ely Baricuatro.
The basis of the amended informations was the affidavit dated February 24, 1971 of Avelino Norteza who, as
mentioned earlier, claimed to be privy to the conspiracy to ambush Mayor Cerna (Exh. 2-Romeo). On the basis of that
affidavit, the fiscal conducted another preliminary investigation.
One important issue in this appeal is Norteza's credibility. The Solicitor General regards him as a perjured witness. At
the trial Norteza, a 37-year old mason and a high school undergraduate, testified that at about six o'clock in the
evening of January 21, 1970 Crescencio Nemenzo, Rodrigo Baricuatro, Rodulfo Umbay and Salvador Peña allegedly
went to his house at Barrio Mangoto and invited him to go to Barrio Tutay for a drinking spree. They went to the cliff
or the elevated portion in the barrio near the bridge, arriving there at about seven o'clock.
There, Norteza saw firearms (greasegun, Thompson, garand rifle) dumped under a tree. He also saw his friends,
Roberto Paslon, Carlos Paslon, Victoriano Baraga, Crispin Baraga, Emilio Generalao, Elpidio Baricuatro, Romeo
Baricuatro and Moreno. Using only one glass, they were drinking tuba mixed with Pepsi-Cola. Rodrigo Baricuatro
allegedly disclosed to him that the group would kill Mayor Cerna. Norteza was given the option to select what
firearm he would use. llcd
The plan was for Ely Baricuatro to go to his house at Sitio Mohon, Alonguinsan, and fire a shot as a signal announcing
the approach of Mayor Cerna's truck. A piece of logs on the right side of the road near the bridge would be used as a
barricade to block the truck. In accordance with that suggestion, Roberto Paslon, Carlos Paslon, Generalao, Crispin
Baraga and Victoriano Baraga blocked the road with logs. The roadblock was removed when three trucks, none of
which belonged to Mayor Cerna, passed by.
After the third truck had passed, a gunshot was heard. That meant that Mayor Cerna's truck was approaching. Some
members of the group stationed themselves behind the roadblock. Others were stationed in the upper portion near
the bridge. At that juncture, Norteza allegedly sneaked out of the place. He did not witness the ambush. On his home
through the fields, he heard the gunshots coming from the place which he had left.
The foregoing testimony was the trial court's basis for convicting appellants Elpidio Baricuatro, Ely Baricuatro,
Nemenzo, Peña, Umbay, Roberto Paslon and Victoriano Baraga. Can credence be given to Norteza's testimony? As
already stated, the Solicitor General agrees with the appellants that Norteza is a perjured witness.
Norteza explained that he kept silent about the ambuscade for more than one year because he was fearful that he
might be prosecuted and he was allegedly warned that if he squealed he and his family would be liquidated. He
changed his mind because he realized that, eventually, it would be known that he had some knowledge of the
conspiracy and because he surmised that if he disclosed what he knew about the killing of Mayor Cerna, other
persons would follow his example and disclose what they knew about the unsolved killing of his brother, Miguel, on
January 31, 1971.
We have conscientiously evaluated Norteza's uncorroborated and contradicted testimony. Our conclusion is that it
cannot be accorded any credence. Consequently, the guilt of the seven appellants implicated by him was not
established beyond reasonable doubt.
It is not merely the long delay in the giving of his testimony that impairs its veracity and engenders the notion that it
might be fabricated. What strongly militates against his credibility is the undeniable fact that he was a follower of Mayor
Cerna and, therefore, it is not believable that he would have been invited by the appellants (some of whom were
confirmed political enemies of Mayor Cerna) to join the conspiracy to kill the mayor. (1846 tsn January 11, 1972). And
because he was a follower of Mayor Cerna, it is not surprising that he was used as a prosecution witness in this case.
Norteza, as a tough guy, was well-known in the small town of Pinamungajan and its environs where, as in the case of
small communities, political affiliations are noted-secret. The appellants could not be ignorant of the fact that Norteza
and his father belonged to Mayor Cerna's faction. The mayor was one of Norteza's three bondsmen in Criminal Case
No. 472-RP of the municipal court, a 1968 case, wherein he was charged with serious physical injuries for having
assaulted Teodoro Alpas (Exh. 7 to 7-F-Moreno). Norteza voted for Mayor Cerna in the 1967 election and for Mayor
Cerna's son in the 1971 election. His father was a leader of Mayor Cerna. (147, 160 tsn November 17, 1971).
In July, 1971, or after Norteza surfaced as a prosecution witness, he was appointed a municipal caminero (1249 tsn
November 16, 1971).
Norteza's version as to the conspiracy contains improbabilities. He made it appear that although the conspirators or
the appellants had already decided on killing the mayor and had foregathered in the upper portion of Barrio Tutay to
wait for the mayor's truck, they had not yet agreed on the specific measures to be employed in accomplishing their
diabolical purpose. From Norteza's story, it appears that the conspirators had to converse aloud in his presence and
agree on the blocking of the road and the giving of the signal announcing the approach of the mayor's truck and that
they had to invite him to implement their plan.
He did not explain why his presence was still indispensable for the execution of the scheme to kill the mayor,
considering that (according to Norteza's version) there were already thirteen armed persons present who were ready
to perform their nefarious task. He did not mention any special qualifications on his part, which induced the
conspirators to invite him to join them. These facts of his story appear to be incredible. prcd
The fact that he did not join in the conversation; that he did not make any suggestions; that he was a mere listener;
that he did not even participate in placing the roadblock and in removing it when certain trucks passed, and that he
played a passive role or was a mere spectator makes it hard to believe that the conspirators would have taken him
into their confidence.
It is within the realm of possibility that the seven appellants had some participation in the ambuscade and that
someone, who had actual knowledge thereof but who was not indicted, bad informed Norteza of what had
transpired. But it is certain from the record that Norteza's uncorroborated testimony is not sufficient to prove the
complicity of the seven appellants in the assassination.
Norteza's testimony contains details that convey the impression that he was a co-conspirator. Such details as the
giving of the signal and the placing of the roadblock, and the passing of three trucks before Mayor Cerna's truck
passed, might have convinced the trial court that Norteza was present when the preparations for the ambuscade were
made.
But the record also reveals that other details were not mentioned by Norteza and that such omission casts doubt on
the veracity of his testimony. For example, Norteza did not mention that the conspirators were provided with food
which they ate while on the cliff, as shown in the telltale wrappers of "puso" rice and the empty tins of canned food
(59 tsn July 24, 1972), Norteza could not tell the kind of firearms carried by the conspirators. He merely said that
something was bulging at their waists. If he was a co-conspirator trusted by the appellants and was present on the
cliff, he could have easily ascertained the kind of weapons carried by his companions.
Norteza's explanation as to his long silence is not convincing and satisfactory. It cannot erase the impression that he
was a rehearsed witness whose testimony was concocted in order to strengthen the prosecution's case. The fact that
he did not confide to his wife and parents his knowledge of the ambuscade (1239 tsn November 16, 1971) is quite
unusual and may signify that he was not privy to the conspiracy.
In a grave case, like the instant case, the guilt of the accused cannot be predicated on delayed testimony, like that of
Norteza's, which exhibits earmarks of fabrication. It would be highly injudicious to relay on such testimony because
blanket acceptance thereof might result in the conviction of an innocent person. With the rejection of Norteza's
testimony, the seven appellants, already name, should be acquitted.
Having disposed of the appeal of the additional seven defendants, we now address ourselves to the appeal of the
original five defendants against whom criminal actions were filed in the municipal court of Pinamungajan, in four of
which cases Mayor Cerna conducted the preliminary examination and issued the warrants of arrest.

Case of appellant Moreno. — He relied on an alibi the details of which his counsel did not bother to discuss in his brief. He
testified that when the ambuscade was perpetrated, or in the evening of January 21, 1970, he was in the house of his sweetheart,
Maria Milan, at Barrio Dakit, Pinamungajan Maria Milan, Juan Dejito and Casiano Flores corroboratedMoreno's alibi. Dejito
and Flores are the brothers-in-law of appellant Nemenzo, who in turn is a first cousin of the brothers, appellants Rodrigo and
Elpidio Baricuatro.
However, Romula Gleocam, the mother of Maria Milan, who lived with her, contradicted her and testified
that Moreno called at their house at around nine o'clock in the evening of that day or after the ambuscade had been
perpetrated. Maria Portes corroborated Romula's testimony.
It may be recalled that Mrs. Cerna, Barrientos and Candida Comahig testified that, after the gunfire had ceased, they
heard the sound of the engine of a vehicle. They imagined that it was an oncoming truck. Actually, it was leaving the
scene of the crime. That sound came from that part of the highway near the schoolhouse or near Moreno's house at
Barrio Tutay (69 tsn, Exh. 2-Moreno).
At around eight-thirty of that night, as Jose Kyamko, the brother-in-law of Mrs. Cerna, was crossing the highway, a
jeep without any light passed by him. It came from Barrio Tutay and was driven to the poblacion. Kyamko
recognized it as the passenger jeepney which Leon Moreno, the father of Vedasto, had converted into a private
vehicle. When the jeep passed Kyamko, he noticed that it was driven by Moreno. Beside him was Rodrigo Baricuatro.
(See p. 37, Records of Crim. Case No. 95-Cebu.)
As already stated, according to Romula Gleocam, at around nine o'clock on that same night, Moreno, riding in a jeep,
went to the house of her daughter, Maria Milan, at barrio Dakit, which was near the poblacion (Exh. T). Romula
noticed that Moreno spoke in a quavering voice and that he looked untidy and ill-kempt. On prior occasions, he had a
well-groomed appearance. After talking with Maria for about an hour, Moreno (Vidi) departed in his jeep. llcd
Shortly thereafter, Romula heard again the drone of the jeep. Moreno called and asked Rufina Milan (Romula's sister)
that he be allowed to pass the night in her house because no one was allowed to pass Barrio Tutay. On that
night Moreno slept at Rufina's house. When Moreno was already inside the house, Romula heard a man's voice
outside callingMoreno and saying: "Boss, he is already dead". Moreno did not make any reply.
On the following morning, Moreno requested Luz, a daughter of Romula, to buy bread in the market and to listen to
the rumors being spread around. After Luz had returned, she told Moreno that some persons in the street corner were
saying that Moreno had killed Mayor Cerna. While Romula was preparing breakfast, she observed that Moreno was
always looking out of the window. After taking breakfast, he left the house together with Maria Milan.
They rode in the jeep. They passed by the store of Maria Portes where Moreno bought cigarettes. When she handed
the cigarettes to him, she noticed that he looked pale and that his hands were trembling. In fact, he dropped the
cigarettes on the ground. She asked Moreno what was wrong with him. He answered that he was being implicated in
the killing of Mayor Cerna. She said that if he had not done anything wrong, he had no reason to be afraid.
Moreno testified that after bringing Maria Milan to the high school, he went to his residence at Barrio Tutay and took
his lunch there. Then, he went to Barrio Pandacan and supervised the gathering of the coconuts, the cutting of the
bamboos and the plowing of the family lands. He went to the house of his aunt and passed the night there.
On the following day, January 23, his uncle, Francisco Gabante, arrived from San Carlos City. He went with his uncle
to Trozo, San Carlos City, arriving there by boat in the early morning of January 24, 1970. He visited his aunt, Victoria
Gabon. On the following day, January 25, he went to Bais City to visit his uncle, Felix Moreno. Then, the next day, he
went to the residence of a lawyer at Dumaguete City in order to seek legal advice.
On January 28, 1970, he was arrested in that city by three Constabulary sergeants of the Cebu City Constabulary
detachment. Moreno went to the Constabulary headquarters at Dumaguete City and slept there (Exh. 3-Moreno). He
and the Constabulary sergeants took a boat on the following day and arrived at Cebu City on January 30 (Exh. 5-
Moreno).
Maria Portes declared that after Moreno was arrested, he went to see her and requested her to testify that she saw him
at the house of Rufina Milan at six o'clock in the evening of January 21, 1970. He offered her money. She refused to
testify in his favor.
We are convinced that Moreno's complicity in the perpetration of the ambuscade was proven beyond reasonable
doubt by the testimonies of Mrs. Cerna and the driver, De los Reyes, and the declaration of Mayor Cerna to his wife,
the chief of police and Barrientos. The motive for the killing was sufficiently established. Moreno felt aggrieved by
Mayor Cerna's issuance of the warrant for his arrest and by his incarceration and posting of four bail bonds which
entailed the payment of a substantial amount as premiums.
Moreno's alibi, instead of showing his innocence, served to confirm ms guilt because, if he had no participation in the
ambuscade, there was no reason for him to sleep in his sweetheart's house, three kilometers away from his residence
in Barrio Tutay where the ambuscade was committed. His flight to San Carlos City clearly signified that he had guilty
conscience.
Case of Rodrigo Bancuatro. — This appellant was 44 years old when he testified in 1972. He was a Constabulary
sergeant connected with the reserve officers training corps (ROTC) unit of the University of the Visayas at Cebu City,
with training and experience in perpetrating ambuscades. He testified that in the afternoon of January 21, 1970, he
was given by his commandant a three day pass so that he could go to Pinamungajan and transfer to a new residence
on the lot of his parents. He arrived at Pinamungajan at past five o'clock. He and his wife took supper at six o'clock.
Then he allegedly went to the house of Tonying Batitay to play mahjong. He was accompanied by appellant Umbay,
his brother-in-law.
He stayed at Batitay's place until nine o'clock when the brothers Eleazar and Jose Peña came with the information that
Mayor Cerna had been ambushed at Barrio Tutay. Rodrigo Baricuatro, accompanied by Umbay and Loreto Quesido,
left Batitay's place, and went home.
Two days later, or on January 23, 1970; Coronel Jose Nazareno, the Constabulary zone commander who was in
Pinamungajan, took him into custody because of the suspicion that the firearms used in the ambuscade might have
come from the armory of the University of the Visayas. Rodrigo was in charge of the armory. LLjur
Upon his arrival at Cebu City, an inventory of the arms at the armory was made. He was later detained at the enlisted
men's quarters and then at the guardhouse after a criminal charge was filed against him. He denied any complicity in
the ambuscade. he refuted Norteza's statements implicating him in the assassination of Mayor Cerna.
However, and this is a decisive point, Antonio Batitay, the owner of the house where Rodrigo Baricuatro and Umbay
allegedly played mahjong from seven o'clock in the evening of January 21, 1970 (the night of the ambuscade), testified
that Rodrigo and Umbay did not play mahjong in his house at that time. They arrived in the mahjong den shortly before
nine o'clock or after the ambuscade was committed. The mahjong game was stopped after nine o'clock when news of
the ambuscade was relayed to the mahjong players (156-7, tsn March 6, 1972).
Batitay's testimony nullified Rodrigo Baricuatro's alibi and cancelled the testimonies of Eleazar Peña, Loreto Quesido,
and Beato Peña, and Sergeant Norberto Alvarado, supporting that alibi. The falsity of his alibi removes any doubt as
to his guilt.
Like Moreno, Rodrigo Baricuatro was identified by the eyewitnesses, Mrs. Cerna and De los Reyes, as being present
at the scene of the crime, and by Mayor Cerna himself in his declaration to them, to Barrientos and to the chief of
police. Rodrigo had reason to surmise to Mayor Cerna instigated the criminal action for grave threats filed against
him. Being a potential candidate of the Liberal Party for mayor in the 1971 election, he could believe that the
elimination of Mayor Cerna would insure his election.
Four prosecution witnesses, namely, Placido Mondejar, Angela Yanong, Lazaro Deroy and Sergio Perito. testified to
certain incidents which reveal that Rodrigo Baricuatro had nursed the design to kill Mayor Cerna before the 1971
elections and had recklessly made an open avowal of that intention. Rodrigo made a blanket denial of that
imputation.
It would seem that before the ambuscade Rodrigo Baricuatro and Moreno had already prepared their alibis. Rodrigo
would be in the mahjong den while Moreno would be in his girl friend's residence. What they did not foresee was
that, immediately after the ambuscade, the finger of suspicion would be pointed at them by their fellow townsmen as
individuals implicated in that iniquitous and dastardly deed.
Thus, Candida Comahig stopped her narrative about the ambuscade when she noticed that Rodrigo was among those
listening to her. And Fiscal Alfredo S. Pancho testified that on the day following the ambuscade a group of around
fifteen persons, some of whom were armed and drunked, stopped the Moreno bus at the public market of Pinamungajan
and wanted to be brought to Sitio Tubod where Rodrigo Baricuatro was residing The group harassed the bus driver and the
conductor, the employees of Vedasto Moreno's family.
That circumstance led Fiscal Pancho, a bus passenger bound for Aloguinsan, to conclude that it was dangerous
for Moreno to remain in Pinamungajan. Because of that incident, the bus could not proceed to Barrio Tutay. It had to
take a roundabout route (via Carcar) to Aloguinsan Fiscal Pancho rejected the offer that Moreno himself would drive
the bus to Aloguinsan by way of Barrio Tutay.
Case of Romeo Baricuatro. — This appellant, the nephew of Rodrigo Baricuatro, was thirty-three years old in 1970. He is
married with five children. He was a student of criminology at the University of the Visayas in Cebu City. He
declared in support of his alibi that in the afternoon of January 20, 1970 his wife came from Pinamungajan to inform
him at his boarding house in Cebu City of the warrant of arrest issued against him in the four criminal cases pending
in the municipal court. She also apprised him that Moreno had already been arrested. He testified that at around
noontime, he took his wife to the bus station for her return trip to Pinamungajan. At the station, he saw Avelino
Norteza who was working as a mason in Cebu City.
Romeo denied Norteza's testimony that he was in Barrio Tutay in the evening of January 21, 1970. Romeo's alibi is
that he was in the house of Atty. Rodolfo Acido in Cebu City at the time when the ambuscade was perpetrated.
Romeo conferred with Atty. Acido whom he had hired as his counsel in the four criminal cases. His landlord, Mario
Saromines, was with him when he conferred with Atty. Acido whom he had hired as his counsel in the four criminal
cases. His landlord, Mario Saromines, was with him when he conferred with Acido. Romeo returned to his boarding
house after nine o'clock in the evening. He was already in the boarding house when the whistle announcing the
curfew for minors was sounded at ten o'clock. LLpr
Romeo explained that Norteza testified against him because he Cerna family had helped Norteza in a certain case and
that Mrs. Cerna implicated him because she hated his uncle, Rodrigo.
Mario Saromines, a thirty-nine year old barber, corroborated Romeo's alibi. But Acido (Moreno's counsel in the
preliminary investigation), whose corroboration would be vital in establishing the truth of Romeo's alibi, did not
testify in court. Hence, Romeo's alibi cannot prevail against the testimonies of Mrs. Cerna and De los Reyes that he
was among those who ambushed Mayor Cerna.
After eluding arrest for more than twenty two months, Romeo was arrested by Sergeant Servando Tio in his house at
Sta. Cruz, Pinamungajan on November 20, 1971.
Cases of Emilio Generalao and Carlos Paslon. — Generalao, a resident of Barrio Tutay, was thirty-eight years old when he
testified in 1912. He reached the first year of high school. His alibi was that from January 6, 1970 to May 3, 1971, or for
about one year and five months, he was doing farm work in Barrio Calibasan, Toledo City which was fifteen
kilometers away from the provincial road at Matab-ang. To go to that place, one had to walk from Matab-ang. The
trip took more than six hours. Generalao stayed with his brother-in-law, Filomeno Cantutay, a resident of Calibasan.
Cantutay corroborated his alibi.
Generalao testified that in May, 1970, his wife went to Calibasan to inform him that he was implicated in the killing of
Mayor Cerna. He returned to Barrio Tutay on May 3, 1971 in order to confer with his brother and his wife regarding
his surrender. He denied that he was with Norteza in Barrio Tutay in the evening of January 21, 1970. His theory was
that Norteza was angry with him because he refused to help Norteza and his brother in gathering the coconuts of
Clemente Yanong.
He was arrested in his father's house on November 25, 1971 by certain Constabularymen named Aldaba, Nebres and
Carding and other whose names he did not know. He said that he was brought to the Constabulary station at
Pinamungajan where he was mauled by the Constabularymen and by Jesus Cerna and Jose Kyamko in the presence
of several persons. Then, he was taken to the Constabulary headquarters at Sibonga where he was again maltreated.
There, he signed an affidavit which he did not read.
The affidavit, Exhibit B-Generalao, was taken by Sergeant Benjamin Solante in the presence of Sergeants Nicanor E.
Bancog and Edmundo Panistante and sworn to before Fiscal Benicio Arzadon who prosecuted this case. Generalao,
on cross examination by Fiscal Arzadon, denied that he signed freely that affidavit.
In that affidavit, Generalao admitted that on January 2, 1970, he killed Juanito Gabonada; that, because of that killing,
he went into hiding at Sitio Calibasan and Barrio Guingkamote, Toledo City, staying with his brother-in-law
Cantutay, his friend Marcelo Tante and his mother's cousin, Felicisimo Maturam; that he returned to his father's
house at Sitio Santa Cruz, Barrio Sacsac, Pinamungajan on May 3, 1971 in order to surrender but he was not able to do
so because he feared that he might be killed, so he just laid low and talked from time to time with Carlos Paslon and
Romeo Baricuatro; that in November, 1971, in the course of an encounter with Constabulary soldiers, he threw away
ms Garand rifle and it was recovered by the Constabularymen, and that his companions in that encounter were
Carlos Paslon and Gavino Layar. (Translation.)
Carlos Paslon, married, with seven children, was thirty six years old in 1972. He finished the fifth grade. His alibi was
that from November, 1969 to February, 1970 he stayed in the house of his elder brother, Doming, in Barrio Lawaan,
Talisay, Cebu. He was working as driver at six pesos a day with the Cebu United Enterprises. Afterwards, he lived in
Duljo, Cebu City where his wife established a dress shop. He left Duljo in April, 1971 and returned to Pinamungajan.
Paslon testified that in the evening of January 21, 1970 he attended a party in the house of Eutiquio Cabuenas in
Barrio Lawaan. According to Paslon, the occasion was a "yearly devotion". According to Cabuenas, it was the
birthday of his wife. Paslon could not remember the birthdays of his children.
Cabuenas corroborated his alibi. However, on cross-examination, Cabuenas declared when he testified on August
26, 1972 that the current month was July. Cabuenas admitted that he was requested by the wife of Carlos Paslon to
testify that Carlos was in the house of Cabuenas in the evening of January 21, 1970. llcd
Carlos Paslon denied the imputation of Norteza that he was in Barrio Tutay on that date. Norteza was angry with him
because he refused to sell a pig to him.
He was arrested on November 24, 1971 in the house of Sabina Intong at Barrio Sambagon, Pinamungajan by certain
Constabularymen named Aldaba, Alpon and Carding who maltreated him. They stopped maltreating him when
Sergeant Nebres told them that according to Mrs. Cerna, Carlos Paslon would be a State witness. He was brought to
Sibonga where he signed an affidavit after having been mauled.
The alibis of Generalao and Carlos Paslon cannot be accorded any credence because they were positively identified by
Mrs. Cerna. And the fact that, like Romeo Baricuatro, they were fugitives from justice for around twenty-two months,
hiding in the mountain barrios of Pinamungajan, conveys the impression that they had a guilty conscience.
Appellants' criminal liability. — As to Mayor Cerna, the offense committed was correctly categorized as the complex
crime of murder with direct assault upon a person in authority (Arts. 48, 148 and 248, Revised Penal Code). The
killing of Mayor Cerna was indisputably treacherous. The ambuscade exhibited the characteristic features
of alevosia (Art. 14[16], Revised Penal Code). Nocturnity is aggravating because the appellants took advantage of the
night for the consummation of their nefarious enterprise.
The killing constituted a direct assault against a person in authority (Art. 152, Revised Penal Code U.S. vs. Gumban,
39 Phil. 76), as charged in the information, because the rule is that the person in authority or his agent should have
been assaulted "while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion on such performance".
At the time Mayor Cerna was ambushed, he was returning from Cebu City where he had transacted official business
with the governor. The impelling motive for the direct assault was Mayor Cerna's performance of his official duty in
conducting the preliminary examination of the four criminal cases against appellants Moreno, Generalao, Romeo
Baricuatro and Carlos Paslon and the issuance of warrants of arrest which resulted in the incarceration of Moreno and
constrained him to pay P1,000 as premiums on his bail bonds. Undoubtedly, that caused resentment. (Justo vs. Court
of Appeals, 99 Phil. 453; U.S. vs. Garcia, 20 Phil. 358).
As the crime is complex, the penalty of reclusion temporal maximum to death for murder, the more serious offense,
should be imposed in the maximum period. Hence, the death penalty should be imposed on the principals. The trial
court correctly imposed the death penalty upon Moreno and Rodrigo Baricuatro, whose guilt as co-principals in the
assassination of Mayor Cerna, was established to a moral certainty.
For lack of the requisite votes, the death penalty cannot be imposed on appellants Generalao, Carlos Paslon and
Romeo Baricuatro. They should be sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
In this connection, it may be noted that in People vs. Ubiña, 97 Phil. 515, where Aureliano Carag, the mayor of Solano,
Cagayan, was killed by eight persons led by Tomas Ubiña, his political enemy, only Ubiña was sentenced to death
because he was the one who conceived the plan and utilized his influence to perpetrate the killing. "For him justice
cannot be tempered with mercy; the law must be applied to its full force and to its full extent." His four companions,
who were indebted to him for personal favors, were sentenced only toreclusion perpetua. Three others, who were
present at the killing but did not conspire with Ubiña, were considered accomplices. (See People vs. Sakam, 61 Phil.
27; People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil. 82; People vs. Chua Huy, 87 Phil. 258, and People vs. Ging Sam, 94 Phil. 139, capital
cases, wherein not all those convicted as principals were sentenced to death.)
In the other four cases, the trial court convicted the appellant of frustrated murder. This is a glaring error. The trial
court overlooked that there were only two informations forfrustrated murder. These refer to the cases where the
victims were Lourdes Cerna and Jose de los Reyes. The other two informations charged attempted murder only in the
cases where the victims were Candida Comahig and Francisco Jabido. In these four cases, the crime committed is
attempted murder only because the injuries suffered by the victims could not have caused their death. Band (cuadrilla)
is aggravating in addition to nocturnity. LLphil
Only the five appellants originally charged should be held responsible for the attempted murders. We have already
ruled that the seven additional appellants implicated by Norteza should be acquitted.
However, Generalao, Romeo Baricuatro and Carlos Paslon cannot be held responsible for the attempted murder
committed against Jabido and De los Reyes because these two offended parties did not testify at their separate trial.
Neither did Doctors Florante Batucan and Ramon Arcenas, who examined the injuries of Jabido and De los Reyes and
issued the corresponding medical certificates (Exh. E and F), testify at the separate trial of Generalao, et al.
WHEREFORE, the trial courts decision is modified and the following judgment is rendered in these five cases:
1. In Criminal Case No. 95-Cebu, L-37801, appellants Vedasto Moreno, Rodrigo Baricuatro, Romeo Baricuatro, Carlos
Paslon and Emilio Generalao are convicted as co-principals in the crime of murder with assault upon a person in
authority.
Moreno and Rodrigo Baricuatro are each sentenced to death, while Romeo Baricuatro, Paslon and Generalao are each
sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The five appellants are ordered to pay solidarily to the heirs of Mayor Samson Cerna
an indemnity of P50,000.
2. In the other four cases, Criminal Cases Nos. 129-Cebu, L-37802; 130-Cebu, L-37803; 131-Cebu, L-37804, and 132-
Cebu, L-37805, appellants Moreno and Rodrigo Baricuatro are convicted of four attempted murders and are each
sentenced to four indeterminate penalties each consisting of four (4) years of prision correccional medium, as
minimum, to seven (7) years of prision mayor, minimum, as maximum, and to pay solidarily an indemnity of two
thousand pesos (P2,000) to each of the three victims, Candida Comahig, Francisco Jabido and Jose de los Reyes. The
same two appellants are further ordered to pay solidarily to Lourdes Cerna an indemnity of ten thousand pesos
(P10,000).
The penalty and civil liability in Criminal Cases No. 129, L-37802 and 130, L-37803, involving Candida Comahig and
Lourdes Cerna, are imposed upon appellants Generalao, Romeo Baricuatro and Carlos Paslon. These three appellants
have no liability in Criminal Cases Nos. 131 and 132, L-37804 and L-37805, involving Francisco Jabido and Jose de los
Reyes.
3. The other seven appellants, Crescencio F. Nemenzo, Elpidio Baricuatro, Ely Baricuatro, Salvador Peña, Rodulfo
Umbay, Roberto Paslon, and Victoriano Baraga, are acquitted in the five cases on the ground of reasonable doubt. The
convicted appellants will pay the costs.
SO ORDERED
[G.R. No. 125066. July 8, 1998.]
ISABELITA REODICA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
SYNOPSIS: In the evening of October 17,1987, petitioner Isabelita Reodica was driving a van along Doña Soledad Avenue, Better
Living Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro Manila hit the car of complainant Norberto Bonsol that resulted to physical injuries to the
complainant and damage to his car amounted to P8,542.00. Consequently, an information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Damage to Property with Slight Physical Injuries docketed as Criminal Case No. 33919 was filed against her. After trial, the
Regional Trial Court of Makati convicted the petitioner as charged and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of six (6) months
of arresto mayor. On Appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the said decision. Hence, this petition for review.
The court ruled that clearly, if a reckless, imprudent or negligent act results in two or more grave or less grave felonies, a complex
crime is committed. However, in Lontok v. Gorgonio, this Court declared that where one of the resulting offenses in criminal
negligence constitutes a light felony, there is no complex crime.
Hence, the trial court erred in considering the following felonies as a complex crime: the less grave felony of reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00 and the light felony of reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries.
Similarly, since offenses punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding 4 years and 2 months were within the jurisdictional ambit of
the MeTCs, MTCs and MCTCs, it follows that those penalized with censure, which is a penalty lower than arresto menor under the
graduated scale in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code and with a duration of 1 to 30 days, should also fall within the jurisdiction
of said courts. Thus, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries was cognizable by said courts.
As to the reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, the same was also under the jurisdiction
of the MeTCs, MTCs or MCTCs because the imposable penalty therefor was arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods —
the duration of which was from 1 month and 1 day to 4 months. Criminal Case No. 33919 should, therefore, be dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC of Makati.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; QUASI-OFFENSES; RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES;
PROPER PENALTY. — The penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries, a light felony, is arresto
menor in its maximum period, with a duration of 21 to 30 days. If the offense of slight physical injuries is, however, committed
deliberately or with malice, it is penalized with arresto menor under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code, with a duration of 1
day to 30 days. Plainly, the penalty then under Article 266 may be either lower than or equal to the penalty prescribed under
the first paragraph of Article 365. This being the case, the exception in the sixth paragraph of Article 365 applies. Hence, the
proper penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is public censure, this being the penalty next lower
in degree to arresto menor.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CLASSIFICATION. — As earlier stated, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is
punishable by public censure only. Article 9, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code defines light felonies as infractions of law
carrying the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200.00, or both. Since public censure is classified under Article 25
of the Code as a light penalty, and is considered under the graduated scale provided in Article 71 of the same Code as a
penalty lower than arresto menor it follows that the offense of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is a light
felony.
3. ID.; ID.; RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN DAMAGE TO PROPERTY; PROPER PENALTY; CASE AT
BAR. — As to reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, the third paragraph of Article
365, which provides for the penalty of fine, does not apply since the reckless imprudence in this case did not result in damage to
property only. What applies is the first paragraph of Article 365, which provides for arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods (1 month and 1 day to 4 months) for an act committed through reckless imprudence which, had it been intentional,
would have constituted a less grave felony. Note that if the damage to the extent of P8,542.00 were caused deliberately, the
crime would have been malicious mischief under Article 329 of the Revised Penal Code, and the penalty would then be arresto
mayor in its medium and maximum periods (2 months and 1 day to 6 months which is higher than that prescribed in the first
paragraph of Article 365). If the penalty under Article 329 were equal to or lower than that provided for in the first paragraph,
then the sixth paragraph of Article 365 would apply, i. e., the penalty next lower in degree, which is arresto menor in its
maximum period to arresto mayor in its minimum period or imprisonment from 21 days to 2 months. Accordingly, the
imposable penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property to the extent of P8,542.00 would be arresto mayor in
its minimum and medium periods, which could be anywhere from a minimum of 1 month and 1 day to a maximum of 4
 months, at the discretion of the court, since the fifth paragraph of Article 365 provides that in the imposition of the penalties
therein provided "the courts shall exercise their sound discretion without regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64."
4. ID., ID.; ID.; CLASSIFICATION. — On the other hand, reckless imprudence also resulting in damage to property is,
as earlier discussed, penalized with arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Since arresto mayor is a correctional
penalty under Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code, the quasi offense in question is a less grave felony — not a light felony as
claimed by petitioner.
5. ID.; ID.; WHERE ONE OF THE RESULTING OFFENSES IN CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE CONSTITUTES A LIGHT
FELONY, THERE IS NO COMPLEX CRIME. — Clearly, if a reckless, imprudent or negligent act results in two or more grave
or less grave felonies, a complex crime is committed. However, in Lontok v. Gorgonio this Court declared that where one of the
resulting offenses in criminal negligence constitutes a light felony, there is no complex crime.
6. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; INFORMATION; DUPLICITOUS CHARACTER THEREOF, MUST
BE RAISED BEFORE ARRAIGNMENT. — Following Lontok, the conclusion is inescapable here, that the quasi offense of
reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries should have been charged in a separate information because it is not
covered by Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. However, petitioner may no longer question, at this stage, the duplicitous
character of the information, i.e., charging two separate offenses in one information, to wit: (1) reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property; and (2) reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries This defect was deemed waived by her
failure to raise it in a motion to quash before she pleaded to the information. Under Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court,
when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information and the accused fails to object to it before trial, the
court may convict the accused of as many offenses as are charged and proved and impose on him the penalty for each of them.
7. ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION; DETERMINING FACTORS. — The jurisdiction to try a criminal action is to be
determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless the statute expressly provides, or is construed
to the effect that it is intended to operate as to actions pending before its enactment. . . . The criminal jurisdiction of the lower
courts was then determined by the duration of the imprisonment and the amount of fine prescribed by law for the offense
charged.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; OFFENSES PUNISHABLE BY CENSURE ARE COGNIZABLE BY MeTCs, MTCs AND MCTCs. —
Similarly, since offenses punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding 4 years and 2 months were within the jurisdictional
ambit of the MeTCs, MTCs and MCTCs, it follows that those penalized with censure, which is a penalty lower than arresto
menorunder the graduated scale in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code and with a duration of 1 to 30 days, should also fall
within the jurisdiction of said courts. Thus, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries was cognizable by said
courts.
9. ID.; ID.; PRESCRIPTION; THE REVISED PENAL CODE MUST PREVAIL OVER THE RULES ON SUMMARY
PROCEDURE. — It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a matter of substantive law. Pursuant to Section 5(5),
Article VIII of the Constitution, this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights. Hence, in case of conflict between the Rules on Summary Procedure promulgated by this Court and
the Revised Penal Code, the latter prevails.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — In the instant case, as the offenses involved are covered by the Revised Penal
Code, Article 91 thereof and the rulings in Francisco andCuaresma apply. Thus, the prescriptive period for the quasi offenses in
question was interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office three days after the vehicular mishap and
remained tolled pending the termination of this case. We cannot, therefore, uphold petitioner's defense of prescription of the
offense charged in the information in this case.

DAVIDE, JR., J p:
On the evening of 17 October 1987, petitioner Isabelita Reodica was driving a van along Doña Soledad Avenue,
Better Living Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro Manila. Allegedly because of her recklessness, her van hit the car of
complainant Norberto Bonsol. As a result, complainant sustained physical injuries, while the damage to his car
amounted to P8,542.00. cdphil
Three days after the incident, or on 20 October 1987, the complainant filed an Affidavit of Complaint 1 against
petitioner with the Fiscal's Office.
On 13 January 1988, an information 2 was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati (docketed as
Criminal Case No. 33919) charging petitioner with "Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with
Slight Physical Injury." The information read:
The undersigned 2nd Asst. Fiscal accuses Isabelita Reodica of the crime of Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight Physical Injury as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of October, 1987 in the Municipality of Parañaque,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovementioned accused, Isabelita Velasco Reodica, being then the driver and/or person in
charge of a Tamaraw bearing plate no. NJU-306, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously drive, manage and operate the same in a reckless, careless, negligent and
imprudent manner, without regard to traffic laws, rules and regulations and without taking
the necessary care and precaution to avoid damage to property and injuries to person,
causing by such negligence, carelessness and imprudence the said vehicle to bump/collide
with a Toyota Corolla bearing plate no. NIM-919 driven and owned by Norberto Bonsol,
 thereby causing damage amounting to P8,542.00, to the damage and prejudice of its owner,
in the aforementioned amount of P8,542.00.
That as further consequence due to the strong impact, said Norberto Bonsol
suffered bodily injuries which required medical attendance for a period of less that nine (9)
days and incapacitated him from performing his customary labor for the same period of
time.
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued.
On 31 January 1991, the RTC of Makati, Branch 145, rendered a decisions 3 convicting petitioner of the "quasi
offense of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with slight physical injuries," and sentencing her:
[t]o suffer imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor, and to pay the complainant, Norberto
Bonsol y Atienza, the sum of Thirteen Thousand Five Hundred Forty-Two (P13,542), Philippine
Currency, without subsidiary impairment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs. 4
The trial court justified imposing a 6-month prison term in this wise:
As a result of the reckless imprudence of the accused, complainant suffered slight physical
injuries (Exhs. D, H and I). In view of the resulting physical injuries, the penalty to be imposed is
not fine, but imprisonment (Gregorio, Fundamental of Criminal Law Review, Eighth Edition 1988,
p. 711). Slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence is now punished with penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period (People v. Aguiles, L-11302, October 28, 1960, cited in Gregorio's
book, p. 718). 5
As to the sum of P13,542.00, this represented the cost of the car repairs (P8,542.00) and medical expenses (P5,000.00).
Petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals, which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CR No. 14660.
After her motions for extension of time to file her brief were granted, she filed a Motion to Withdraw Appeal for
Probation Purposes, and to Suspend, Ex Abundanti Cautela, Period for Filing Appellant's Brief. However, respondent
Court of Appeals denied this motion and directed petitioner to file her brief. 6
After passing upon the errors imputed by petitioner to the trial court, respondent Court of Appeals rendered a
decision 7 on 31 January 1996 affirming the appealed decision.
Petitioner subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration 8 raising new issues, thus:
NOW THAT AN ACQUITTAL SEEMS IMPOSSIBLE, MAY WE REVISIT THE PENALTY AND
MOVE THAT IT BE REVIEWED AND SET ASIDE SINCE IT IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED TO
BE ERROR TO COMPLEX DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AND SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES, AS
BOTH ARE LIGHT OFFENSES, OVER WHICH THE RESPONDENT COURT HAD NO
JURISDICTION AND EVEN ASSUMING SUCH JURISDICTION, IT CANNOT IMPOSE A
PENALTY IN EXCESS OF WHAT IS AUTHORIZED BY LAW. 9
REVERSAL OF THE DECISION REMAINS POSSIBLE ON GROUNDS OF PRESCRIPTION OR
LACK OF JURISDICTION. 10
In its Resolution of 24 May 1996, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit, as well as her supplemental motion for reconsideration. Hence, the present petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court premised on the following grounds:
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION DATED JANUARY 31, 1996 AND MORE SO ITS
RESOLUTION DATED MAY 24, 1996, ARE CONTRARY TO LAW AND GROSSLY ERRONEOUS
IN THAT THEY IMPOSED A PENALTY IN EXCESS OF WHAT IS AUTHORIZED BY LAW FOR
THE CRIME OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES, ON
THE BASIS OF A CLERICAL ERROR IN A SECONDARY SOURCE.
A. IN THE CASE OF PEOPLE V. AGUILAR, 11 THE SAME CASE WHERE THE COURT A
QUO BASED ITS FINDING OF A PENALTY WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, WHAT WAS STATED IN THE ORIGINAL TEXT OF
SAID CASE IS THAT THE PENALTY FOR SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES THROUGH
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE IS ARRESTO MENOR AND NOT ARRESTO MAYOR. IT IS
GRAVE ERROR FOR THE RESPONDENT COURT TO PUNISH PETITIONER MORE
THAN SHE SHOULD OR COULD BE PUNISHED BECAUSE OF A CLERICAL ERROR
COPIED FROM A SECONDARY SOURCE.
B. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
WHEN IT COMPLEXED THE CRIME OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN
DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AND SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES IMPOSING A SINGLE
EXCESSIVE PENALTY IN ITS ELLIPTICAL RESOLUTION OF MAY 24, 1996.
C. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION NOTWITHSTANDING THE DEFENSE OF
PRESCRIPTION AND LACK OF JURISDICTION.
Anent the first ground, petitioner claims that the courts below misquoted not only the title, but likewise the ruling
of the case cited as authority regarding the penalty for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence.
Concretely, the title of the case was not People v. Aguiles, but People v. Aguilar; while the ruling was that the penalty
for such quasioffense was arresto menor — not arresto mayor.
As regards the second assigned error, petitioner avers that the courts below should have pronounced that there
were two separate light felonies involved, namely: (1) reckless imprudence with slight physical injuries; and (2)
reckless imprudence with damage to property, instead of considering them a complex crime. Two light felonies, she
insists, "do not . . . rate a single penalty of arresto mayor or imprisonment of six months," citing Lontok
v. Gorgonio, 12 thus:
Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less serious physical injuries,
damage to property amounting to P10,000.00 and slight physical injuries, a chief of police did not
err in filing a separate complaint for the slight physical injuries and another complaint for
the lesiones menos graves and damage to property (Arcaya vs. Teleron, L-37446, May 31, 1974, 57
SCRA 363, 365).
The case of Angeles vs. Jose, 96 Phil. 151, cited by investigating fiscal, is different from the
instant case because in that case the negligent act resulted in the offenses of lesiones menos graves and
damage to property which were both less grave felonies and which, therefore, constituted a
complex crime.
In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the offense of lesiones leves through
reckless imprudence should have been charged in a separate information.
She then suggests that "at worst, the penalties of two light offenses, both imposable in their maximum period and
computed or added together, only sum up to 60 days imprisonment and not six months as imposed by the lower
courts."
On the third assigned error, petitioner insists that the offense of slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, being punishable only by arresto menor, is a light offense; as such, it prescribes in two months. Here,
since the information was filed only on 13 January 1988, or almost three months from the date the vehicular
collision occurred, the offense had already prescribed, again citing Lontok, thus:
In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the offense of lesions leves through
reckless imprudence should have been charged in a separate information. And since, as a light
offense, it prescribes in two months, Lontok's criminal liability therefor was already extinguished
(Arts. 89[5], 90 and 91, Revised Penal Code in relation to sec. 2[e] and [f], Rule 117, Rules of Court).
The trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion in not sustaining Lontok's motion to quash
that part of the information charging him with that light offense.
Petitioner further claims that the information was filed with the wrong court, since Regional Trial Courts do not
deal with arresto menor cases. She submits that damage to property and slight physical injuries are light felonies and
thus covered by the rules on summary procedure; therefore, only the filing with the proper Metropolitan Trial
Court could have tolled the statute of limitations, this time invoking Zaldivia v. Reyes. 13
In its Comment filed on behalf of public respondents, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) agrees with
petitioner that the penalty should have been arresto menor in its maximum period, instead of arresto mayor, pursuant
to Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
As to the second assigned error, the OSG contends that conformably with Buerano v. Court of Appeals, 14 which
frowns upon splitting of crimes and prosecution, it was proper for the trial court to "complex" reckless imprudence
with slight physical injuries and damage to property because what the law seeks to penalize is the single act of
reckless imprudence, not the results thereof; hence, there was no need for two separate informations.
To refute the third assigned error, the OSG submits that although the Municipal Trial Court had jurisdiction to
impose arresto menor for slight physical injuries, the Regional Trial Court properly took cognizance of this case
because it had the jurisdiction to impose the higher penalty for the damage to property, which was a fine equal to
thrice the value of P8,542.00. On this score, the OSG, cites Cuyos v. Garcia. 15
The OSG then debunks petitioner's defense of prescription of the crime, arguing that the prescriptive period here
was tolled by the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office three days after the incident, pursuant to People
v. Cuaresma, 16 and Chico v. Isidro. 17
In her Reply to the Comment of the OSG, petitioner expressed gratitude and appreciation to the OSG in joining
cause with her as to the first assigned error. However, she considers the OSG's reliance on Buerano v. Court of
Appeals 18 as misplaced, for nothing there validates the "complexing" of the crime of reckless imprudence with
physical injuries and damage to property; besides, in that case, two separate informations were filed — one for
slight and serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence and the other for damage to property through
reckless imprudence. She then insists that in this case, following Arcaya v. Teleron 19 and Lontok v. Gorgonio, 20 two
informations should have been filed. She likewise submits that Cuyos v. Garcia 21 would only apply here on the
assumption that it was proper to "complex" damage to property through reckless imprudence with slight physical
injuries through reckless imprudence. Chico v. Isidro 22 is likewise "inapposite," for it deals with attempted
homicide, which is not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
Petitioner finally avers that People v. Cuaresma 23 should not be given retroactive effect; otherwise, it would either
unfairly prejudice her or render nugatory the en banc ruling inZaldivia 24 favorable to her.
The pleadings thus raise the following issues:
I. Whether the penalty imposed on petitioner is correct.
II. Whether the quasi offenses of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount
of P8,542.00 and reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries are light felonies.
III. Whether the rule on complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code applies to
the quasi offenses in question.
IV. Whether the duplicity of the information may be questioned for the first time on appeal.
V. Whether the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the offenses in question.
VI. Whether the quasi offenses in question have already prescribed.
I. The Proper Penalty.
We agree with both petitioner and the OSG that the penalty of six months of arresto mayor imposed by the
trial court and affirmed by respondent Court of Appeals is incorrect. However, we cannot subscribe to their
submission that the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period is the proper penalty.
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall
commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it
would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto
menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would
otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in
its minimum period shall be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to
the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to
the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than 25
pesos.
A fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by
simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have
constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the courts shall exercise their sound discretion, without
regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the
first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the courts shall impose the penalty next lower in
degree than that which should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply.
According to the first paragraph of the aforequoted Article, the penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries, a light felony, is arresto menor in its maximum period, with a duration of 21 to 30 days. If the
offense of slight physical injuries is, however, committed deliberately or with malice, it is penalized with arresto
menor under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code, with a duration of 1 day to 30 days. Plainly, the penalty then
under Article 266 may be either lower than or equal to the penalty prescribed under the first paragraph of Article
365. This being the case, the exception in the sixth paragraph of Article 365 applies. Hence, the proper penalty for
reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is public censure, this being the penalty next lower in
degree to arresto menor. 25
As to reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, the third paragraph of
Article 365, which provides for the penalty of fine, does not apply since the reckless imprudence in this case did not
result in damage to property only. What applies is the first paragraph of Article 365, which provides for arrest mayor in
its minimum and medium periods (1 month and 1 day to 4 months) for an act committed through reckless
imprudence which, had it been intentional, would have constituted a less grave felony. Note that if the damage to
the extent of P8,542.00 were caused deliberately, the crime would have been malicious mischief under Article 329 of
the Revised Penal Code, and the penalty would then be arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods (2
months and 1 day to 6 months which is higher than that prescribed in the first paragraph of Article 365). If the
penalty under Article 329 were equal to or lower than that provided for in the first paragraph, then the sixth
paragraph of Article 365 would apply, i.e., the penalty next lower in degree, which is arresto menor in its maximum
period to arresto mayor in its minimum period or imprisonment from 21 days to 2 months. Accordingly, the
imposable penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property to the extent of P8,542.00 would
be arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, which could be anywhere from a minimum of 1 month and 1
day to a maximum of 4 months, at the discretion of the court, since the fifth paragraph of Article 365 provides that
in the imposition of the penalties therein provided "the courts shall exercise their sound discretion without regard to
the rule prescribed in article 64."
II. Classification of the Quasi Offense in Question.
Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo), but likewise by means of fault (culpa). There is deceit
when the wrongful act is performed with deliberate intent; and there is fault when the wrongful act results from
imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill. 26
As earlier stated, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is punishable by public censure
only. Article 9, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code defines light felonies as infractions of law carrying the
penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200.00, or both. Since public censure is classified under Article 25 of
the Code as a light penalty, and is considered under the graduated scale provided in Article 71 of the same Code as
a penalty lower than arresto menor, it follows that the offense of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical
injuries is a light felony.
On the other hand, reckless imprudence also resulting in damage to property is, as earlier discussed, penalized
with arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Sincearresto mayor is a correctional penalty under Article 25
of the Revised Penal Code, the quasi offense in question is a less grave felony — not a light felony as claimed by
petitioner.
III. Applicability of the Rule on Complex Crimes.
Since criminal negligence may, as here, result in more than one felony, should Article 48 of the Revised Code on
complex crimes be applied? Article 48 provides as follows:
ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, or when an offense is necessary a means for committing the other, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
Clearly, if a reckless, imprudent or negligent act results in two or more grave or less grave felonies, a complex crime
is committed. However, in Lontok v. Gorgonio, 27 this Court declared that where one of the resulting offenses in
criminal negligence constitutes a light felony, there is no complex crime, thus:
Applying article 48, it follows that if one offense is light, there is no complex crime. The resulting
offenses may be treated as separate or the light felony may be absorbed by the grave felony. Thus,
the light felonies of damage to property and slight physical injuries, both resulting from a single act
of imprudence, do not constitute a complex crime. They cannot be charged in one information.
They are separate offenses subject to distinct penalties (People vs. Turla, 50 Phil. 1001; See People
vs. Estipona, 70 Phil. 513).
Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less serious physical injuries, damage to
property amounting to P10,000 and slight physical injuries, a chief of police did not err in filing a
separate complaint for the slight physical injuries and another complaint for the lesiones menos
graves and damage to property [Arcaya vs. Teleron, L-37446, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 363, 365].
Hence, the trial court erred in considering the following felonies as a complex crime: the less grave felony of reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00 and the light felony of reckless imprudence
resulting in physical injuries.
IV. The Right to Assail the Duplicity of the Information.
Following Lontok, the conclusion is inescapable here, that the quasi offense of reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries should have been charged in a separate information because it is not covered by Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code. However, petitioner may no longer question, at this stage, the duplicitous character of the
information,i.e., charging two separate offenses in one information, to wit: (1) reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property; and (2) reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries. This defect was deemed
waived by her failure to raise it in a motion to quash before she pleaded to the information. 28 Under Section 3, Rule
120 of the Rules of Court, when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information and the
accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict the accused of as many offenses as are charged and
proved and impose on him the penalty for each of them. 29
V. Which Court Has Jurisdiction Over the Quasi Offenses in Question.
The jurisdiction to try a criminal action is to be determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the
action, unless the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate as to actions
pending before its enactment. 30
At the time of the filing of the information in this case, the law in force was Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise
known as "The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980." Section 32(2)31 thereof provided that except in cases falling
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan
Trial Courts (MeTCs), Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs), and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs) had exclusive
original jurisdiction over "all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months,
or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable
accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof."
The criminal jurisdiction of the lower courts was then determined by the duration of the imprisonment and the
amount of fine prescribed by law for the offense charged. The question thus arises as to which court has jurisdiction
over offenses punishable by censure, such as reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries.
In Uy Chin Hua v. Dinglasan, 32 this Court found that a lacuna existed in the law as to which court had jurisdiction
over offenses penalized with destierro, the duration of which was from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years, which was co-
extensive with prision correccional. We then interpreted the law in this wise:
Since the legislature has placed offenses penalized with arresto mayor under the jurisdiction of
justice of the peace and municipal courts, and since by Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 217, it has placed destierro below arresto mayor as a
lower penalty than the latter, in the absence of any express provision of law to the contrary it is
logical and reasonable to infer from said provisions that its intention was to place offenses
penalized with destierro also under the jurisdiction of justice of the peace and municipal courts and
not under that of courts of first instance.
Similarly, since offenses punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding 4 years and 2 months were within the
jurisdictional ambit of the MeTCs, MTCs and MCTCs, it follows that those penalized with censure, which is a
penalty lower than arresto menor under the graduated scale in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code and with a
duration of 1 to 30 days, should also fall within the jurisdiction of said courts. Thus, reckless imprudence resulting
in slight physical injuries was cognizable by said courts.
As to the reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, the same was also under
the jurisdiction of MeTCs, MTCs or MCTCs because the imposable penalty therefor was arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods — the duration of which was from 1 month and 1 day to 4 months.
Criminal Case No. 33919 should, therefore, be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC of Makati.
VI. Prescription of the Quasi Offenses in Question.
Pursuant to Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries, being a
light felony, prescribes in two months. On the other hand, reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in
the amount of P8,542.00 being a less grave felony whose penalty is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods, prescribes in five years.
To resolve the issue of whether these quasi offenses have already prescribed, it is necessary to determine whether
the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office three days after the incident in question tolled the running of the
prescriptive period.
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. — The period of prescription shall commence
to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their
agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run
again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are
unjustifiably stopped by any reason not imputable to him. (emphasis supplied)
Notably, the aforequoted article, in declaring that the prescriptive period "shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information," does not distinguish whether the complaint is filed for preliminary examination or
investigation only or for an action on the merits. 33 Thus, in Francisco v. Court of Appeals 34 and People
v. Cuaresma, 35 this Court held that the filing of the complaint even with the fiscal's office suspends the running of
the statute of limitations.
We cannot apply Section 9 36 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, which provides that in cases covered thereby,
such as offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 6 months, as in the instant case, "the prosecution
commences by the filing of a complaint or information directly with the MeTC, RTC or MCTC without need of a
prior preliminary examination or investigation; provided that in Metropolitan Manila and Chartered Cities, said
cases may be commenced only by information." However, this Section cannot be taken to mean that the prescriptive
period is interrupted only by the filing of a complaint or information directly with said courts.
It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a matter of substantive law. Pursuant to Section 5(5), Article
VIII of the Constitution, this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights. 37 Hence, in case of conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure promulgated by
this Court and the Revised Penal Code, the latter prevails.
Neither does Zaldivia control in this instance. It must be recalled that what was involved therein was a violation of a
municipal ordinance; thus, the applicable law was not Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, but Act. No. 3326, as
amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and
Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run." Under, Section 2 thereof, the period of
prescription is suspended only when judicial proceedings are instituted against the guilty party. Accordingly, this
Court held that the prescriptive period was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor, as such did not constitute a judicial proceeding; what could have tolled the prescriptive
period there was only the filing of the information in the proper court.
In the instant case, as the offenses involved are covered by the Revised Penal Code, Article 91 thereof and the
rulings in Francisco and Cuaresma apply. Thus, the prescriptive period for the quasi offenses in question was
interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office three days after the vehicular mishap and remained
tolled pending the termination of this case. We cannot, therefore, uphold petitioner's defense of prescription of the
offenses charged in the information in this case.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 14660 is SET ASIDE as the Regional Trial Court, whose decision was affirmed therein, had no
jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 33919.
Criminal Case No. 33919 is ordered DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 172716. November 17, 2010.]

JASON IVLER vs. HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO and EVANGELINE PONCE
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
The petition seeks the review 1 of the Orders 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City affirming sub-silencio a
lower court's ruling finding inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar a second prosecution for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property. This, despite the accused's previous conviction for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries arising from the same incident grounding the second
prosecution.
The Facts
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L.
Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal
Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponce's husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce's
vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.
On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted out the
penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No.
82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence. SICDAa
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases. 3
After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC
the suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking
S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioner's motion, the MeTC proceeded with the
arraignment and, because of petitioner's absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest. 4Seven days later, the
MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioner's motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment
until after his arrest. 5 Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained
unresolved.
Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803
for petitioner's loss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner contested the motion.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly grounding its ruling on
petitioner's forfeiture of standing to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the MeTC's order to arrest petitioner for
his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366. Thus, without reaching the merits of S.C.A. No.
2803, the RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner sought reconsideration but this proved
unavailing. 6 HITEaS
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his petition in S.C.A. No. 2803 constrained him to forego
participation in the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner distinguishes his case from the line of
jurisprudence sanctioning dismissal of appeals for absconding appellants because his appeal before the RTC was a
special civil action seeking a pre-trial relief, not a post-trial appeal of a judgment of conviction. 7
Petitioner laments the RTC's failure to reach the merits of his petition in S.C.A. 2803. Invoking jurisprudence,
petitioner argues that his constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense
bars his prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366, having been previously convicted in Criminal Case No. 82367 for
the same offense of reckless imprudence charged in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner submits that the multiple
consequences of such crime are material only to determine his penalty. CSTcEI
Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTC's decision forfeiting petitioner's standing to
maintain his petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent Ponce calls the Court's attention to jurisprudence
holding that light offenses (e.g., slight physical injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code with grave or less grave felonies (e.g., homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged to separate the charge in
Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the homicide and damage
to property.
In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the Office of the Solicitor General's motion not to file a comment to the
petition as the public respondent judge is merely a nominal party and private respondent is represented by counsel.
The Issues
Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803
when the MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366;
and (2) if in the negative, whether petitioner's constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
The Ruling of the Court
We hold that (1) petitioner's non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did not divest him of
personality to maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803; and (2) the protection afforded by the Constitution shielding
petitioner from prosecutions placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense bars further
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366. ADETca
Petitioner's Non-appearance at the Arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing to
Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803
Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellant's escape from custody or violation of the terms of his bail bond are
governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124, 8in relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion of the appellee or motu
proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign
country during the pendency of the appeal." The "appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to
review judgments of convictions.
The RTC's dismissal of petitioner's special civil action for certiorari to review a pre-arraignment ancillary question on
the applicability of the Due Process Clause to bar proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 finds no basis under
procedural rules and jurisprudence. The RTC's reliance on People v. Esparas 9 undercuts the cogency of its ruling
because Esparasstands for a proposition contrary to the RTC's ruling. There, the Court granted review to an appeal
by an accused who was sentenced to death for importing prohibited drugs even though she jumped bail pending trial
and was thus tried and convicted in absentia. The Court in Esparas treated the mandatory review of death sentences
under Republic Act No. 7659as an exception to Section 8 of Rule 124. 10
The mischief in the RTC's treatment of petitioner's non-appearance at his arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 as
proof of his loss of standing becomes more evident when one considers the Rules of Court's treatment of a
defendant who absents himself from post-arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule 114 11 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, the defendant's absence merely renders his bondsman potentially liable on its bond (subject
to cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce the accused within 30 days); the defendant retains his standing
and, should he fail to surrender, will be tried in absentia and could be convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day
period granted to the bondsman to produce the accused underscores the fact that mere non-appearance does
not ipso facto convert the accused's status to that of a fugitive without standing. EScAHT
Further, the RTC's observation that petitioner provided "no explanation why he failed to attend the scheduled
proceeding" 12 at the MeTC is belied by the records. Days before the arraignment, petitioner sought the suspension
of the MeTC's proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 in light of his petition with the RTC in S.C.A. No. 2803.
Following the MeTC's refusal to defer arraignment (the order for which was released days after the MeTC ordered
petitioner's arrest), petitioner sought reconsideration. His motion remained unresolved as of the filing of this
petition.
Petitioner's Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366
The accused's negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense" 13 protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior
verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information. 14 It is not disputed that petitioner's
conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus,
the case turns on the question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the "same
offense." Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same offense of reckless
imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an
entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter]
requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not." 15
We find for petitioner. ITSCED
Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,
its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. The text of the
provision reads:
Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it
been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correctional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the
penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted
a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
 Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise
constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it
would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be
imposed. cdrep
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of
another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said
damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than twenty-five pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple
imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a
light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the
rules prescribed in Article sixty-four.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable: ISDCaT
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first two
paragraphs of this article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that
which should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, to death of a person shall
be caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by prision correctional in its medium and
maximum periods.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which
material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or
failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence,
physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage
impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest. ASTDCH
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the offender
who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this hand to give.
Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub-groupings relating to (1) the penalties attached to the
quasi-offenses of "imprudence" and "negligence" (paragraphs 1-2); (2) a modified penalty scheme for either or both
quasi-offenses (paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9); (3) a generic rule for trial courts in imposing penalties (paragraph 5); and (4)
the definition of "reckless imprudence" and "simple imprudence" (paragraphs 7-8). Conceptually, quasi-offenses
penalize "the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight,
the imprudencia punible," 16 unlike willful offenses which punish the intentional criminal act. These structural and
conceptual features of quasi-offenses set them apart from the mass of intentional crimes under the first 13 Titles of
Book II of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined
and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As early as the middle of the last century, we
already sought to bring clarity to this field by rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the proposition that
"reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it . . ." 17 on three points of analysis: (1)
the object of punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the legislative intent to treat quasi-
crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming them under the mitigating circumstance of minimal intent) and;
(3) the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and intentional crimes:
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence" is not a crime
in itself but simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability is too
broad to deserve unqualified assent. There are crimes that by their structure cannot be committed through
imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in our Revised
Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a
mere question of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or
imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous
recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. . . . ACHEaI
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the penalty therefor,
then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a
wrong as the one actually committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the corresponding penalty
should be fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed for each crime when committed willfully. For each
penalty for the willfull offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But
instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto
mayor maximum, to prision correccional [medium], if the willful act would constitute a grave felony,
notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all the way from prision mayor to death,
 according to the case. It can be seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the
individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series of crimes. 18 (Emphasis supplied)
This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to state that their commission results in
damage, either to person or property. 19
Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in Quizon without jurisdiction to hear a case for "Damage to Property
through Reckless Imprudence," its jurisdiction being limited to trying charges for Malicious Mischief, an intentional
crime conceptually incompatible with the element of imprudence obtaining in quasi-crimes.
Quizon, rooted in Spanish law 20 (the normative ancestry of our present day penal code) and since repeatedly
reiterated, 21 stands on solid conceptual foundation. The contrary doctrinal pronouncement in People v. Faller 22 that
"[r]eckless impudence is not a crime in itself . . . [but] simply a way of committing it . . . ," 23 has long been abandoned
when the Court en banc promulgated Quizon in 1955 nearly two decades after the Court decided Faller in
1939. Quizon rejected Faller's conceptualization of quasi-crimes by holding that quasi-crimes under Article 365 are
distinct species of crimes and not merely methods of committing crimes. Faller found expression in post-
Quizon jurisprudence 24 only by dint of lingering doctrinal confusion arising from an indiscriminate fusion of
criminal law rules defining Article 365 crimes and the complexing of intentional crimes under Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Codewhich, as will be shown shortly, rests on erroneous conception of quasi-crimes. Indeed,
the Quizonian conception of quasi-crimes undergirded a related branch of jurisprudence applying the Double
Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses, barring second prosecutions for a quasi-offense alleging one resulting act after a
prior conviction or acquittal of a quasi-offense alleging another resulting act but arising from the same reckless act or
omission upon which the second prosecution was based. caADSE
Prior Conviction or Acquittal of
Reckless Imprudence Bars
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to
commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same
quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Court's unbroken chain of jurisprudence on
double jeopardy as applied to Article 365 starting with People v. Diaz, 25 decided in 1954. There, a full Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Montemayor, ordered the dismissal of a case for "damage to property thru reckless imprudence"
because a prior case against the same accused for "reckless driving," arising from the same act upon which the first
prosecution was based, had been dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the same legal question was brought before
the Court, that is, whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the
same quasi-offense, regardless of the consequences alleged for both charges, the Court unfailingly and consistently
answered in the affirmative in People v. Belga 26 (promulgated in 1957 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.), Yap v.
Lutero 27 (promulgated in 1959, unreported, per Concepcion, J.), People v. Narvas 28(promulgated in 1960 by the
Court en banc, per Bengzon J.), People v. Silva 29 (promulgated in 1962 by the Court en banc, per Paredes, J.), People v.
Macabuhay 30 (promulgated in 1966 by the Court en banc, per Makalintal, J.), People v. Buan 31 (promulgated in 1968 by
the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.B.L., acting C.J.), Buerano v. Court of Appeals 32 (promulgated in 1982 by the Court en
banc, per Relova, J.), and People v. City Court of Manila 33 (promulgated in 1983 by the First Division, per Relova, J.).
These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the Double Jeopardy
Clause.
The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection under the Double Jeopardy Clause to
quasi-offenses was best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan, where, in barring a subsequent prosecution for
"serious physical injuries and damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because of the accused's prior acquittal
of "slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," with both charges grounded on the same act, the Court
explained: 34
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless
imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi
offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an
imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes
thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into
account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is
single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal
negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions. 35 . . .
Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy merely extended to its logical conclusion the reasoning
of Quizon.
There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this unbroken line of authority. Preceding Diaz by
more than a decade, El Pueblo de Filipinas v. Estipona, 36decided by the pre-war colonial Court in November 1940,
allowed the subsequent prosecution of an accused for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property despite
his previous conviction for multiple physical injuries arising from the same reckless operation of a motor vehicle
upon which the second prosecution was based. Estipona's inconsistency with the post-war Diaz chain of
jurisprudence suffices to impliedly overrule it. At any rate, all doubts on this matter were laid to rest in 1982
in Buerano. 37 There, we reviewed the Court of Appeals' conviction of an accused for "damage to property for
reckless imprudence" despite his prior conviction for "slight and less serious physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence," arising from the same act upon which the second charge was based. The Court of Appeals had relied
on Estipona. We reversed on the strength of Buan: 38
Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the ruling of this Court in the pre-war case of
People vs. Estipona decided on November 14, 1940. However, in the case of People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA
1383 (March 29, 1968), this Court, speaking thru Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held that —
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific
act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For
the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done,
would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not
the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine
the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is
single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense
(criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes
and prosecutions. acEHSI
xxx xxx xxx
. . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the Peace (now
Municipal) Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both charges
are derived from the consequences of one and the same vehicular accident, because the
second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same
offense. 39 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had effectively overruled Estipona.
It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano, in a reversal of his earlier stance in Silva, joined causes with the
accused, a fact which did not escape the Court's attention:
Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in his MANIFESTATION dated
December 12, 1969 (page 82 of the Rollo) admits that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining
petitioner's plea of double jeopardy and submits that "its affirmatory decision dated January 28, 1969, in
Criminal Case No. 05123-CR finding petitioner guilty of damage to property through reckless imprudence
should be set aside, without costs." He stressed that "if double jeopardy exists where the reckless act resulted
into homicide and physical injuries, then the same consequence must perforce follow where the same reckless
act caused merely damage to property-not death-and physical injuries. Verily, the value of a human life
lost as a result of a vehicular collision cannot be equated with any amount of damages caused to a
motors vehicle arising from the same mishap." 40 (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, we find merit in petitioner's submission that the lower courts erred in refusing to extend in his favor the
mantle of protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. A more fitting jurisprudence could not be tailored to
petitioner's case than People v. Silva, 41 a Diaz progeny. There, the accused, who was also involved in a vehicular
collision, was charged in two separate Informations with "Slight Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence" and
"Homicide with Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence." Following his acquittal of the former, the
accused sought the quashal of the latter, invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause. The trial court initially denied relief,
but, on reconsideration, found merit in the accused's claim and dismissed the second case. In affirming the trial
court, we quoted with approval its analysis of the issue following Diaz and its progeny People v. Belga: 42
On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order of May 2, 1959 and dismissed the
case, holding: —
[T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely within the doctrine of double
jeopardy enunciated in People v. Belga, . . . In the case cited, Ciriaco Belga and Jose Belga
were charged in the Justice of the Peace Court of Malilipot, Albay, with the crime of
physical injuries through reckless imprudence arising from a collision between the two
automobiles driven by them (Crim. Case No. 88). Without the aforesaid complaint having
been dismissed or otherwise disposed of, two other criminal complaints were filed in the
same justice of the peace court, in connection with the same collision one for damage to
property through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 95) signed by the owner of one of
the vehicles involved in the collision, and another for multiple physical injuries through
reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 96) signed by the passengers injured in the accident.
Both of these two complaints were filed against Jose Belga only. After trial, both defendants
 were acquitted of the charge against them in Crim. Case No. 88. Following his acquittal,
Jose Belga moved to quash the complaint for multiple physical injuries through reckless
imprudence filed against him by the injured passengers, contending that the case was just a
duplication of the one filed by the Chief of Police wherein he had just been acquitted. The
motion to quash was denied and after trial Jose Belga was convicted, whereupon he
appealed to the Court of First Instance of Albay. In the meantime, the case for damage to
property through reckless imprudence filed by one of the owners of the vehicles involved
in the collision had been remanded to the Court of First Instance of Albay after Jose Belga
had waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. After such remand, the
Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance two informations against Jose Belga, one
for physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and another for damage to property
through reckless imprudence. Both cases were dismissed by the Court of First Instance,
upon motion of the defendant Jose Belga who alleged double jeopardy in a motion to
quash. On appeal by the Prov. Fiscal, the order of dismissal was affirmed by the Supreme
Court in the following language:
The question for determination is whether the acquittal of Jose Belga in the
case filed by the chief of police constitutes a bar to his subsequent prosecution for
multiple physical injuries and damage to property through reckless imprudence.
In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G.R. No. L-6518, prom. March 30, 1954, the accused
was charged in the municipal court of Pasay City with reckless driving under sec. 52 of the
Revised Motor Vehicle Law, for having driven an automobile in a 'fast and reckless manner
. . . thereby causing an accident.' After the accused had pleaded not guilty the case was
dismissed in that court 'for failure of the Government to prosecute'. But some time
thereafter the city attorney filed an information in the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
charging the same accused with damage to property thru reckless imprudence. The amount
of the damage was alleged to be P249.50. Pleading double jeopardy, the accused filed a
motion, and on appeal by the Government we affirmed the ruling. Among other things we
there said through Mr. Justice Montemayor — THADEI
The next question to determine is the relation between the first offense of
violation of the Motor Vehicle Law prosecuted before the Pasay City Municipal
Court and the offense of damage to property thru reckless imprudence charged in
the Rizal Court of First Instance. One of the tests of double jeopardy is whether or
not the second offense charged necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the former complaint or information (Rule 113, Sec. 9). Another
test is whether the evidence which proves one would prove the other that is to say
whether the facts alleged in the first charge if proven, would have been sufficient to
support the second charge and vice versa; or whether one crime is an ingredient of
the other. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also disposes of the contention of the
prosecuting attorney that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence could not have been joined with the charge for homicide with serious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence in this case, in view of the provisions of Art. 48 of
theRevised Penal Code, as amended. The prosecution's contention might be true. But
neither was the prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for slight physical
injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious charge of homicide
with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the
defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan,
which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in
this case the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the
defendant have been previously cleared by the inferior court. 43
Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us in Silva to reexamine Belga (and hence, Diaz) "for the
purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application." 44 We declined the invitation, thus:
The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in dismissing the case, on the
ground of double jeopardy, upon the basis of the acquittal of the accused in the JP court for Slight
Physical Injuries, thru Reckless Imprudence. In the same breath said State, thru the Solicitor
General, admits that the facts of the case at bar, fall squarely on the ruling of the Belga case . . .,
upon which the order of dismissal of the lower court was anchored. The Solicitor General, however,
urges a re-examination of said ruling, upon certain considerations for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying
its application. We find, nevertheless, that further elucidation or disquisition on the ruling in the Belga case,
 the facts of which are analogous or similar to those in the present case, will yield no practical advantage to the
government. On one hand, there is nothing which would warrant a delimitation or clarification of the
applicability of the Belga case. It was clear. On the other, this Court has reiterated the views expressed
in the Belga case, in the identical case of Yap v. Hon. Lutero, etc., L-12669, April 30,
1959. 45 (Emphasis supplied) DIHETS
Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC succumbed, stems from
persistent but awkward attempts to harmonize conceptually incompatible substantive and procedural rules in
criminal law, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses and Article 48 on complexing of crimes,
both under theRevised Penal Code. Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple
felonies falling under either of two categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies (thus excluding from its operation light felonies); 46 and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other. The legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving
multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the penalty for the most serious crime.
In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but "the mental
attitude . . . behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight . . .," 47 a single mental attitude
regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or
more consequences.
Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article 48 works to combine in a single
prosecution multiple intentional crimes falling under Titles 1-13, Book II of theRevised Penal Code, when proper;
Article 365 governs the prosecution of imprudent acts and their consequences. However, the complexities of
human interaction can produce a hybrid quasi-offense not falling under either models — that of a single criminal
negligence resulting in multiple non-crime damages to persons and property with varying penalties corresponding
to light, less grave or grave offenses. The ensuing prosecutorial dilemma is obvious: how should such a quasi-
crime be prosecuted? Should Article 48's framework apply to "complex" the single quasi-offense with its multiple
(non-criminal) consequences (excluding those amounting to light offenses which will be tried separately)? Or
should the prosecution proceed under a single charge, collectively alleging all the consequences of the single
quasi-crime, to be penalized separately following the scheme of penalties under Article 365? IDTSaC
Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none of which involved the issue of double
jeopardy) applied Article 48 by "complexing" one quasi-crime with its multiple consequences 48 unless one
consequence amounts to a light felony, in which case charges were split by grouping, on the one hand, resulting
acts amounting to grave or less grave felonies and filing the charge with the second level courts and, on the other
hand, resulting acts amounting to light felonies and filing the charge with the first level courts. 49Expectedly, this
is the approach the MeTC impliedly sanctioned (and respondent Ponce invokes), even though under Republic Act
No. 7691, 50 the MeTC has now exclusive original jurisdiction to impose the most serious penalty under Article
365 which is prision correctional in its medium period.
Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the "complexing" of acts penalized
under Article 365 involves only resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave felonies because there will be a
single prosecution of all the resulting acts. The issue of double jeopardy arises if one of the resulting acts is
penalized as a light offense and the other acts are penalized as grave or less grave offenses, in which case Article
48 is not deemed to apply and the act penalized as a light offense is tried separately from the resulting acts
penalized as grave or less grave offenses.
The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single prosecution of all the effects of the
quasi-crime collectively alleged in one charge, regardless of their number or severity, 51 penalizing each
consequence separately. Thus, in Angeles v. Jose, 52 we interpreted paragraph three of Article 365, in relation to a
charge alleging "reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and less serious physical injuries," as
follows:
[T]he third paragraph of said article, . . . reads as follows: SCADIT
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in
damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from
an amount equal to the value of said damage to three times such value, but which shall in
no case be less than 25 pesos.
The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is only damage to property the
amount fixed therein shall be imposed, but if there are also physical injuries there should be an additional
penalty for the latter. The information cannot be split into two; one for the physical injuries, and another for
the damage to property, . . . . 53 (Emphasis supplied)
By "additional penalty," the Court meant, logically, the penalty scheme under Article 365.
 Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable. Coherence in this field demands choosing
one framework over the other. Either (1) we allow the "complexing" of a single quasi-crime by breaking its
resulting acts into separate offenses (except for light felonies), thus re-conceptualize a quasi-crime, abandon its
present framing under Article 365, discard its conception under the Quizon and Diaz lines of cases, and treat the
multiple consequences of a quasi-crime as separate intentional felonies defined under Titles 1-13, Book II under
the penal code; or (2) we forbid the application of Article 48 in the prosecution and sentencing of quasi-crimes,
require single prosecution of all the resulting acts regardless of their number and severity, separately penalize
each as provided in Article 365, and thus maintain the distinct concept of quasi-crimes as crafted under Article
365, articulated in Quizonand applied to double jeopardy adjudication in the Diaz line of cases. TaCIDS
A becoming regard of this Court's place in our scheme of government denying it the power to make laws
constrains us to keep inviolate the conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and intentional felonies under
our penal code. Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually
impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies; or (2)
an offense which is a necessary means for committing another. This is why, way back in 1968 in Buan, we rejected
the Solicitor General's argument that double jeopardy does not bar a second prosecution for slight physical
injuries through reckless imprudence allegedly because the charge for that offense could not be joined with the
other charge for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence following Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code:
The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence could not be joined with the accusation for serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence, because Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code allows only the complexing of
grave or less grave felonies. This same argument was considered and rejectedby this Court in the
case of People vs. [Silva] . . .:
[T]he prosecution's contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution
obliged to first prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence before pressing the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense
in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the
prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the more serious charge of
homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same
alleged reckless imprudence of which the defendant has been previously cleared by the inferior court.
[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant . . . by the Justice of the
Peace . . . of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being
prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance
of the province, where both charges are derived from the consequences of one and the same
vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the
same offense. 54 (Emphasis supplied) CDTHSI
Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the splitting of charges under Article 365,
irrespective of the number and severity of the resulting acts, rampant occasions of constitutionally impermissible
second prosecutions are avoided, not to mention that scarce state resources are conserved and diverted to proper
use.
Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the
number or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties
under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under
Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first level court. 55
Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler protection of
their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of
the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated
by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more
serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to
quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a
single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep
intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365,
befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling. CaDSHE
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February 2006 and 2 May 2006
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366
against petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the
ground of double jeopardy.
Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives.
 SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. L-32205. August 31, 1979.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. (1) EMERITO ABELLA alias Kulot, et. al.
AQUINO, J p:
This case is about the massacre of certain prisoners in the Davao Penal Colony. It was a reprise of a similar riot which
occurred in the national penitentiary at Muntinlupa, Rizal on Sunday morning, February 16, 1958 (People vs. De los
Santos, L-19067-68, July 30, 1965, 14 SCRA 702). cdphil
The record reveals that in the morning of Sunday, June 27, 1965 Numeriano Reynon, a prisoner-trustee, was
performing guard duty at the jailhouse of the penal colony in Panabo, Davao del Norte.
The jailhouse (bartolina) was a two-story building whose second floor was divided by a corridor or passageway one
and half meters wide. On one side was a single cell about ten meters long and eight meters wide. On the opposite side
were three small cells.
Around seventy (seventy-five, according to defendant Cabcaban) prisoners were incarcerated in the big cell. It was
indubitably congested. The prisoners used a drum to dispose of their waste matter. Confined in the three small cells
were seventeen prisoners who had committed grave misconduct and who were known as "close-confined" prisoners
to distinguish them from the prisoners in the big cell who were just undergoing punishment.
The prisoners belonged to two gangs: the Oxo gang, whose members were Visayans with an Oxo mark tattooed on
their bodies, and the Sigue-Sigue gang whose members hailed from Luzon. The name Sigue-Sigue was tattooed on
their thighs or buttocks. The existence of these gangs in the New Bilibid Prison was traced by Judge (now Justice)
Andres Reyes in the De los Santos case, supra. See People vs. Peralta, 25 SCRA 759. cdll
Shortly before noontime of that Sunday, June 27, 1965, or after the inmates of the big cell had taken their lunch,
Reynon locked that cell. The seventeen inmates of the three small cells, all members of the Oxo gang, had also taken
their lunch but Reynon did not lock their cells because he was waiting for the prisoner-janitor to bring out from those
cells the cans used as urinals.
At that juncture, Leocadio Gavilaguin, a prisoner from the small cell, approached Reynon and asked permission to
pawn his pillow to Rodolfo Carballo, an inmate of the big cell. Reynon told Gavilaguin that Carballo would not
accept his pillow because it was very dirty. As it turned out, Gavilaguin was simply employing a ruse to inveigle
Reynon into opening the door to the big cell.
When Reynon refused to open the door, Gavilaguin grabbed him from behind. Then, as if on cue, "the close-confined"
prisoners from the small cells surrounded Reynon and assaulted him. One prisoner stabbed Reynon while the others
hit him on the chest and right temple with fistic blows. Reynon lost consciousness and collapsed on the floor.
A prisoner took the bunch of keys which were in Reynon's custody and opened the door of the big cell. (According to
some extrajudicial confessions, Reynon himself opened the door.) Led by Kulot (Emerito Abella), Tisoy (Agustin
Villaflor) and Cadio (Gavilaguin), the other thirteen prisoners from the small cells rushed into the big cell. They were
(1) Gorgonio Añover, (2) Rustico Cidro, (3) Absalon Enrigan, (4) Sindolfo Galanto, (5) Felix Hernandez, (6) Benedicto
Loraña alias Payat, (7) Eleuterio Maldecir alias Aswang, (8) Ciriaco Opsiar alias Simaron, (9) Vicente Quijano, (10)
Juanito Rebutaso, (11) Eleuterio Taboy, (12) Jose Villarama and (13) Sofronio Villegas. They were armed with
improvised weapons. So, there were around eighty-six prisoners in the eighty-square-meter big cell when the
massacre occurred. LibLex
The seventeenth closely confined prisoner, Perfecto Bilbar alias Proping, stayed in the small cell. He locked its door
and closed the padlock of the big cell (Page 9, Record, Report of Jose T. Castro).
Inside the big cell, Villaflor (Tisoy) shouted: "Tumabi ang Bisaya!" ("Visayans go to the sides"). Guillermo Ignacio alias
Pilay, an inmate of the big cell, placed pieces of wood and a blanket on the door to keep it closed (16 tsn July 25, 1967).
According to the eyewitnesses, Arsenio Guevarra,, Juan del Rosario (a victim), and Roberto Rodrigo, all prisoners, the
inmates from the big cell, who joined the sixteen raiders from the three cells in assaulting the victims, were (1)
Rodolfo Apolinario, (2) Maximo Apolinias alias Max, (3) Domingo Astrologia alias Blackie, (4) Jose Barbajo alias Joe,
(5) Catalino Cabcaban alias Inday, (6) Rodolfo Carballo alias Rudy, (7) Crescencio Cuizon alias Sianong Kulot, (8)
Francisco Dionisio (he pleaded guilty), (9) Elino Duran, (10) Jose Francisco alias Karate, (11) Guillermo Ignacio alias
Pilay, (12) Roberto Pangilinan alias Pagong, (13) Rolando Pangilinan, (14) Eugenio Provido, Jr. alias Junior, (15)
Romeo Ricafort alias Romy, (16) Marcelo Sardenia and (17) Angel Tagana.
Some of these seventeen prisoners destroyed the floor of the big cell, removed the wood therefrom and used the
pieces of wood in clubbing to death some of the victims.
The assaulted prisoners, who were unarmed, did not resist the attack. Many of them were lying flat on the floor with
raised hands or clinging to the walls made of steel-matting. The affray lasted for about an hour. Although three
whistles were sounded at the start of the massacre and prison officials rushed to the corridor near the big cell, they
could not do anything because the door was locked and the key was held by one of the raiders. No one among the
assailants was injured.
The offenders at first did not surrender to prison officials who had arrived at the scene after the alarm was sounded.
It was only after they were assured that they would not be maltreated that Abella advised his companions to
surrender.
Villaflor gathered all the weapons used by his group. He gave them and the bunch of keys to Geronimo Jorge, the
overseer of the penal colony, through the holes of the steel-matting. Those weapons consisted of five sharp-pointed
wooden daggers, seven sharp-pointed aluminum daggers, three wire ice picks, two bamboo ice picks, two Gillete
blades with wooden handles, a stone wrapped with cloth (caburata), a wooden club (Reynon's balila) and twenty-two
pieces of wood.
Ten victims, identified as (1) Romeo Bulatao, (2) Manalo Castillo, (3) Jose Castro, (4) Gualberto Fuentes, (5) Jose
Magpantay, (6) Severino Pacon, (7) Carlito Padilla, (8) Generoso Palino, (9) Jacinto Refugia and (10) Delfin San
Miguel, were pronounced dead on arrival at the penal colony hospital. Salvador Abique, Demetrio Camo, Manuel
Cayetano and Armando Sanchez died in that hospital. The fourteen victims died of shock, cerebral hemorrhage and
severe external and internal hemorrhage. Cdpr
Three other victims survived. Reynon sustained a lacerated wound on his eyebrow and a stab wound on the left
shoulder. He was confined in the hospital for nineteen days.
Juan del Rosario, a prisoner in the big cell, suffered a lacerated wound in the head and six incised wounds on the
right cheek, mid-anterior side of the neck, right side of the neck and the left arm.
Bartolome de Guzman had a lacerated wound on the head, two incised wounds at the nape and at the left
hypochondriac region, a stab wound on the neck which penetrated the larynx and two superficial punctured wounds
on the left and right sides of the chest.
The examining physician testified that Reynon, Del Rosario and De Guzman would have died had there been no
timely medical attendance.
In July, 1965 the statements of several jail inmates were taken by the prison investigator. They were sworn to before
the municipal judge of Panabo.
On September 24, 1965 Vicente B. Afurong, supervising prison guard and senior investigator of the Davao Penal
Colony, filed in the municipal court of Panabo a complaint for multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder
against thirty-seven prisoners of the penal colony who allegedly took part in the assault (Criminal Case No. 1773).
The accused waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. On October 22, 1965, a special counsel of the
provincial fiscal's office filed an information in the Court of First Instance of Davao, Davao City Branch II, charging
the thirty-seven accused with multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder (Criminal Case No. 9405).
As specified in the information, at the time the massacre occurred the thirty-seven accused were quasi-recidivists
because they were serving sentences for different crimes after having been convicted by final judgment, as indicated
below:
(1) Abella — qualified theft, murder and frustrated murder; (2) Añover — murder,
theft of large cattle and evasion of service of sentence; (3) Apolinario — qualified theft; (4)
Apolinias — homicide; (5) Astrologia — robbery, homicide, frustrated homicide and
qualified theft; (6) Barbajo — robbery with habitual delinquency; (7) Bilbar — homicide; (8)
Cabcaban — theft;
(9) Carballo — homicide; (10) Cidro — frustrated murder and evasion of service of
sentence; (11) Cuizon — murder and robbery; (12) Dionisio — murder, robbery in an
inhabited house, six counts, and theft, four counts; (13) Duran - homicide; (14) Enrigan —
homicide; (15) Francisco — robbery; (16) Galanto — homicide; (17) Gavilaguin — murder,
homicide and evasion of service of sentence; (18) Gaylan — murder; (19) Gelle — murder;
(20) Hernandez — homicide;
(21) Ignacio — murder, arson, evasion of service of sentence and frustrated murder;
(22) Lagarto — murder; (23) Loraña — murder, frustrated murder, attempted robbery with
homicide and robbery with serious physical injuries; (24) Maldecir — murder, frustrated
murder, double homicide and evasion of service of sentence; (25) Opsiar — murder,
frustrated murder and qualified theft; (26) Roberto Pangilinan - murder and theft, two
counts, (27) Rolando Pangilinan — murder; (28) Provido, Jr. — theft, two counts and
violation of articles 157 and 178 of the Revised Penal Code;
(29) Quijano — murder; (30) Rebutaso — robbery; (31) Ricafort — homicide and
attempted homicide; (32) Sardenia — robbery, four counts; (33) Taboy — murder; (34)
Tagana — robbery with physical injuries, malicious mischief, slander by deed, slander with
slight physical injuries and violations of Manila ordinances; (35) Villaflor — robbery,
frustrated homicide and evasion of service of sentence; (36) Villarama — frustrated homicide
and evasion of service of sentence, and (37) Villegas — murder and evasion of service of
sentence.
At the arraignment on March 5, 1966, the accused were represented by two lawyers de oficio. The information was
read and explained to them in the Tagalog dialect.
The nineteen accused who pleaded guilty were (1) Abella, (2) Añover, (3) Cidro, (4) Dionisio, (5) Enrigan, (6) Galanto,
(7) Gavilaguin, (8) Hernandez, (9) Loraña, (10) Maldecir, (11) Opsiar, (12) Rolando Pangilinan, (13) Quijano, (14)
Rebutaso, (15) Ricafort, (16) Taboy, (17) Villaflor, (18) Villarama and (19) Villegas.
Of the nineteen who pleaded guilty, sixteen were "close-confined" prisoners from the three small cells while three
(Dionisio, Pangilinan and Ricafort) were from the big cell. LibLex
The seventeen accused who pleaded not guilty were (1) Apolinario, (2) Apolonias, (3) Astrologia, (4) Barbajo, (5)
Bilbar, (6) Cabcaban, (7) Carballo, (8) Cuizon, (9) Duran, (10) Francisco, (11) Gaylan, (12) Gelle, (13) Lagarto, (14)
Roberto Pangilinan, (15) Provido, Jr., (16) Sardenia and (17) Tagana.
The thirty-seventh accused, Guillermo Ignacio, at first pleaded guilty but when he repudiated his extrajudicial
confession, a plea of not guilty was substituted for his plea of guilty.
After the pleas were entered, the trial court required the fiscal to present evidence as to those who had pleaded guilty.
The fiscal submitted as exhibits the extrajudicial confessions of the nineteen accused which were sworn to before the
municipal judge.
At the fiscal's behest, the trial court ordered the interpreter to ask individually the nineteen accused whether they
confirmed their confessions. In open court, all of them ratified their confessions.
Typical of the confessions of the accused was Villaflor's statement taken by Ramon C. Alicarte, an investigator, on
July 14, 1965 at the so-called "reading center" of the penal colony. Villaflor said:
"13. Q. — Will you please narrate to me what you know about that unusual incident
(in the morning of June 27, 1965)?
"A. — On that particular time and date, the inmates of the big cell opposite our cell
were already inside their cell after they have eaten their noon meal and after they were
locked in the big cell, we inmates in the close-confinement cells were also sent out to have our
noon meal.
"But before we went out from our cells, we had already agreed that we are going to
get inside the big cell and we also made an agreement that one of us from the close-
confinement cells by the name of Cadio (Gavilaguin) would find a way so that we can get
inside the big cell.
"After Cadio had finished eating, he went to his cell and got a pillow which was to be
sold to our contact inside the big cell. When Cadio was already at the aisle between the big
cell and the close-confinement cells, our contact in the big cell by the name of Ruding Pakpak
(Arsenio Guevarra) (should be Rodolfo Carballo) came near the door of their cell and asked
Cadio if the pillow he (Cadio) was holding is made of cotton.
"Cadio then called the trusty police on duty, prisoner Numeriano Reynon, and
requested him (Reynon) that he (Cadio) is going to pledge the said pillow to Ruding Pakpak
(Carballo) but the said trusty was hesitant at first. When Cadio's request was seconded by
Emerito Abella by saying: 'Sigi na pare, dahil sa wala kaming pangbili ng cigarilyo', Reynon
opened the door of the big cell and Ruding Pakpak said: 'Abi, Abi tingnan ko ang unan kung
bulak ang laman.'
"Then, I saw that Reynon was grappled by some of my co-inmates from the close
confinement cell and then my companions began entering the big cell. When I also went
inside the big cell, Ruding Pakpak met me and said to me: 'Saan ang sa akin?' I pulled from
my waist his weapon and gave it to him.
"I then began looking for the inmate who had incriminated me in the previous
incident in the prison compound which caused my being jailed in the close-confinement cells.
I then asked Pakpak as to where is Jimmy (Refugia) and he pointed Refugia to me who was
then at the ceiling.
"When I saw Refugia, I also climbed and pulled him down. When he fell down the
floor, I stabbed him and after that I left Jimmy (Jacinto) who was already fatally wounded.
Then, I began looking for another of our enemies. I then saw Manuel Cayetano who was
already wounded. I took the club from Emerito Abella and began beating Cayetano with it
until I stopped beating him when I saw that he was no longer moving. I gave the club to
Kulot (Emerito Abella) and rested for a while.
"I then saw Pakpak grappling with Bundat and Pakpak called for me to help him. I
went near them and I stabbed Bundat once. And Bundat lessened his grip from Pakpak then
began stabbing Bundat (sic) and when he saw that Bundat is (was) dead, he mixed with the
rest.
"Then, he asked me: 'Ano ba ito Cusa (Agustin), aamin rin ba ako?' Then, I told him:
'siempre tapos na rin iyon' and he kept quiet. I then continued my rest until at (sic) the
employees and guards arrived at the jail. While the rest of my companions continued
stabbing and beating our victims, I rested." (Exh. B, pp. 63-64, Record)
Gavilaguin's narrative of the massacre is as follows:
"15. Q. — Will you narrate to me the story of said incident?
"A. — At about 11:55 a. m., June 27, 1965, we were sent out of the cell for our lunch.
After the lunch I called the jailer (trusty police) the person of Reynon and told him: 'Pare, we
finished our meal. Please come and I'll tell you something.' Then, he approached and said:
'What?' 'I have a pillow to be given to Rudy Pakpak for sale. You may inspect it if you wish.'
"After (he) inspected, he called Rudy Pakpak and said: 'Will you buy this pillow?"
and Rudy said: 'Open the door so that I can see it.' Reynon opened the door and when it was
 opened, Sofronio Villegas (prisoner) held him (Reynon) tightly, and I grabbed the key from
the hand of Reynon. When I got (it), I pushed him away and opened the door. When I got
inside the cell, I said: 'Visaya at Ilocano ay tumabi.'
"My companions followed me inside in the big cell and I told them to watch on the
door. I saw trusty police Budoy and (he) closed the door and said: 'Mamatay kayong lahat
diyan.'
"When I went to the middle part of the big cell, I met Abiki having Sigi-sigi tatoo. I
stabbed him and he was able to stab the weapon (sharp-pointed stakes) taken from me. When
he held my hand, he told me: 'Kalugar (sic), Pilay, you help me. Tulongan mo ako. Malaki
masyado ito.'
"Pilay approached us and I gave him the blade and he used the same to cut off the
neck of Abiki. Abiki released me and I continued stabbing for several others (sic). When I saw
him down, I left him and went to the other. I saw some Sigi-sigi members. I also stabbed
them after which I told Rudy Pakpak: 'Hilahin mo dito and mga patay.'
"I saw some who were still alive and I told him: Beat them on the head with the
wooden clubs.' Afterwards, the employees arrived and shouted: 'You surrender' and we
called Mr. Jorge for whom we made the surrender by giving to him our weapons such as
sharpened stakes and others.
"Then, we were ordered to go down naked with hands tied and thereafter, we were
instructed to go to the place near the toilet until the Judge arrived. The dead ones were
brought down . . ." (Exh, E, pp. 76-77 or 55-56, Record)
The trial court forthwith rendered a partial decision convicting the nineteen accused, who pleaded guilty, of the
complex crime of multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder, qualified by treachery and premeditation (alleged
in the information) and with the special aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism which was not offset by their
plea of guilty.
In addition, recidivism, which was alleged in the information, was appreciated against Abella, Añover, Cidro,
Dionisio, Enrigan, Galanto, Gavilaguin, Hernandez, Loraña, Maldecir, Opsiar, Rolando Pangilinan, Quijano, Ricafort,
Taboy, Villaflor and Villegas.
Reiteration, which was also alleged in the information, was appreciated against Abella, Gavilaguin, Maldecir,
Villaflor, Villarama and Dionisio.
Eighteen accused who pleaded guilty were sentenced to death. Rebutaso the nineteenth accused who also pleaded
guilty, was sentenced to cadena perpetua (should bereclusion perpetua). All of them were ordered to pay solidarily an
indemnity of six thousand pesos to the heirs of each of the fourteen victims (Decision of March 5, 1966, p.
238,Expediente of Criminal Case No. 9405).
Those who were convicted were sent to the national penitentiary. The eighteen accused (including Ignacio) who
pleaded not guilty were tried. Upon motion of the fiscal, on the ground of lack of evidence, the trial court dismissed
the case as to Perfecto Bilbar (page 299, Expediente).
After trial, the lower court in its decision of September 14, 1969 convicted twelve of the said eighteen defendants,
namely (1) Apolonias, (2) Astrologia, (3) Barbajo, (4) Cabcaban, (5) Carballo (6) Cuizon, (7) Duran, (8) Francisco, (9)
Ignacio, (10) Pangilinan, (11) Provido, Jr. and (12) Tagana, of the complex crime of multiple murder and multiple
frustrated murder with the aggravating circumstances of premeditation and quasi-recidivism (treachery was not
mentioned).
The trial court sentenced to death each of the said twelve accused (in addition to the eighteen "close-confined"
prisoners who pleaded guilty and were already sentenced to death in the trial court's 1966 partial decision) and
ordered them to pay solidarily an indemnity of six thousand pesos to the heirs of each of the fourteen victims,
namely, Abique, Bulatao, Camo, Castillo, Castro, Cayetano, Fuentes, Magpantay, Pacon, Padilla, Palino, Refugia,
Sanchez and San Miguel. The twelve defendants were further ordered to pay solidarily an indemnity of three
thousand pesos to each of the frustrated murder victims, Numeriano Reynon, Juan del Rosario and Bartolome de
Guzman.
For lack of evidence, a verdict of acquittal was rendered for six accused, namely, Apolinario, Bilbar, Gaylan, Gelle,
Lagarto and Sardenia (Decision of September 14, 1969, page 400, Expediente).
So, thirty of the thirty-seven accused were sentenced to death. The case of Rebutaso, who was sentenced to cadena
perpetua and who did not appeal, is not under review. cdrep
The death sentence imposed upon Astrologia is likewise not under review because it was not promulgated. After the
trial, he was returned to the national penitentiary for security reasons. On October 10, 1969 he was erroneously
paroled because the Board of Pardons and Parole was not informed that he was sentenced to death in the Davao
court's decision of September 14, 1969 (Pages 413-4 of Expediente and pages 1, 152 and 159, Rollo)
After the rendition of that decision or during the pendency of this case, death ended the agonies of ten of the twenty-
nine accused who were sentenced to death. The ten dead defendants were Añover, Cidro, Cuizon, Galanto, Maldecir,
Opsiar, Roberto Pangilinan, Rolando Pangilinan, Ricafort and Villaflor (Pages 98, 125, 171, 176, 181, 212, 336-B, 662,
717 and 750, Volumes I and II of the Rollo)
The death penalty imposed on the remaining nineteen accused named in the title of this case (Including Abella, Apolonias
and Villegas who escaped from confinement, page 158, Rollo), is the one under automatic review "as law and justice
shall dictate"
Review of death sentence on those who pleaded guilty. — It may be recapitulated that of the nineteen accused in the death
row, ten, namely (1) Abella, an escapee, (2) Dionisio, (3) Enrigan, (4) Gavilaguin, (5) Hernandez, (6) Loraña, (7)
Quijano, (8) Taboy, (9) Villarama (he allegedly killed on February 12, 1976 a fellow prisoner in the national
penitentiary, page 712, Volume II of Rollo), and (10) Villegas, an escapee, pleaded guilty upon arraignment and in
open court ratified their extrajudicial confessions which were sworn to before the municipal judge. They were
sentenced to death in the trial court's 1966 partial decision.
Nine of the ten were among the sixteen "close-confined" prisoners in the three small cells who invaded the big cell.
The tenth, Dionisio, was confined in the big cell.
After a perusal of their confessions, we find that their admission of guilt therein is corroborated by evidence of
the corpus delicti or the fact that the massacre described therein actually took place.
The requirements of section 20, Article IV of the Constitution with respect to extrajudicial confessions are not
applicable to the confessions herein because they were taken before the effectivity of the Constitution or before
January 17, 1973 Magtoto vs. Manguera, L-37201-02, Simeon vs. Villaluz, L-37424 and People vs. Isnani, L-38929, all
decided on March 3, 1975, 63 SCRA 4).
Counsel de oficio contends that the accused made an improvident plea of guilty because the lower court did not
apprise them of the meaning and consequences of their plea. Reliance is placed on the dictum that in capital cases "it
is advisable for the court to call witnesses for the purpose of establishing the guilt and the degree of culpability of the
defendant" (U.S. vs. Talbanos, 6 Phil. 541, 543)
Also cited is the admonition that "judges are duty-bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused
pleads guilty he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction" (People vs.
Apduhan, Jr., L-19491, August 30, 1968, 24 SCRA 798, 817)
And the long settled rule is that in case a plea of guilty is made in capital cases "the proper and prudent course to
follow is to take such evidence as are available and necessary in support of the material allegations of the information,
including the aggravating circumstances therein enumerated, not only to satisfy the trial judge himself but also to aid
the Supreme Court in determining whether the accused really and truly understood and comprehended the meaning,
full significance and consequences of his plea" (People vs. Bulalake, 106 Phil. 767, 770. See People vs. Baluyot, L-
32752-3, January 31, 1977, 75 SCRA 148) LibLex
As already indicated in our recital of the proceedings below, the trial court, in order to comply with the procedure in
capital cases when a plea of guilty is entered, required the fiscal to present evidence. The latter presented the
confessions of those who pleaded guilty.
It is true that the trial judge did not adhere to the ritualistic formula of explaining to the accused the meaning and
consequences of their plea of guilty and the nature of the aggravating circumstances.
Presumably, the trial court did not do so, not only because the judicial confessions of the accused (pleas of guilty)
were reinforced by their extrajudicial confessions, but also because it was cognizant of the fact that all the accused
were quasi-recidivists who had already acquired experience in criminal proceedings and had, therefore, some
comprehension of what a plea of guilty signifies.
We hold that in this case the accused did not make an improvident plea of guilty. As held in U.S. vs. Jamad, 37 Phil.
305, 318, it lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge whether he is satisfied that a plea of guilty has been
entered by the accused with full knowledge of the meaning and consequences thereof.
People vs. Yamson and Romero, 109 Phil. 793, is a case similar to the instant case. In the Yamson case two prisoners in
the New Bilibid Prison killed their fellow convict. At their arraignment for murder, they pleaded guilty with the
assistance of a counsel de oficio. They were forthwith convicted by the trial court and sentenced to death, being quasi-
recidivists.
The accused appealed. This Court, in resolving the contention of the counsel de oficio that the accused had made an
improvident plea, held that the trial judge must have been fully satisfied that the accused entered the plea of guilty
with full knowledge of the meaning and consequences thereof. That observation may be applied to the instant case.
(Same holding in People vs. Perete, 111 Phil. 943 and People vs. Yamson, 111 Phil. 406.)
Review of the death sentence on those who pleaded not guilty. — As to the other nine accused, who pleaded not guilty and
were tried and sentenced to death, namely, Apolonias, Barbajo, Cabcaban, Carballo, Duran, Francisco, Ignacio,
Provido. Jr. and Tagana, it is necessary to make a painstaking examination of the evidence in order to ascertain
whether their guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt.
Those nine accused were in the big cell (bartolina). The prosecution's theory is that they conspired with the sixteen
raiders from the three small cells to kill the fourteen victims and inflict injuries on the three other victims.
1. Maximo Apolonias alias Max. — He was born in Barrio Anas, Dimasalang, Masbate. He finished grade four. He was
convicted of homicide by the Court of First Instance of Masbate and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six
months and one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum. He
was imprisoned in the national penitentiary on December 26, 1964. He arrived in the Davao Penal Colony on May 8,
1965. He was twenty-four years old when he testified on March 13, 1968.
He testified that when the massacre occurred he climbed the wall of steel-matting. He allegedly did not know what
transpired when the sixteen "close-confined" raiders entered the big cell. In his statement of August 9, 1965, he denied
having joined the sixteen raiders. He repeatedly declared that he could not have been involved in the massacre
because he was a new arrival in the penal colony. The massacre took place fifty days after his arrival.
Witness Guevarra said that he did not see Apolonias assaulting the victims (109 tsn November 16, 1966). Witnesses
Del Rosario and Rodrigo implicated Apolonias but did not state definitely the acts perpetrated by the latter during
the assault.
We find that the prosecution's evidence does not establish beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of Apolonias. As to him,
it is not sufficient to justify the judgment of conviction.
2. Jose Barbajo alias Joe. — He is a native of Mabolo, Cebu City. He finished grade three. He was eighteen years old
when he was convicted of robbery. The Court of First Instance of Cebu imposed upon him a penalty of six years and
eight months of prision mayor (as a habitual delinquent he was not entitled to an indeterminate sentence) plus three
years, six months and twenty-one days for habitual delinquency. He was received in the national penitentiary on July
9, 1964. He arrived in the Davao Penal Colony on September 13, 1964.
He was twenty-five years old when he testified on March 12, 1968. He declared that he was sick when the massacre
occurred. He climbed the wall of steel matting. He said that he was not a member of any prison gang.
Witness Guevarra identified Barbajo as a member of the Oxo gang and as having beaten with a piece of wood one
"Bandes" (108, 115 and 127 tsn November 17 and 18, 1966). Witness Del Rosario implicated Barbajo and witness
Rodrigo definitely testified that Barbajo supplied to his companions the pieces of wood which they used in beating
the victims (10 tsn July 25, 1967).
3. Catalino Cabcaban alias Inday. — He was born in Barrio Asagna, Tanjay, Negros Oriental. He finished the fourth
grade. He was convicted of theft and evasion of service of sentence. He was confined in the national penitentiary
starting August 29, 1962. He arrived in the Davao Penal Colony on May 15, 1964. He was twenty-six years old on
October 20, 1967 when he testified.
In his statement (Exh. DD), he admitted that he was a member of the Oxo gang but he denied that he helped the
sixteen raiders in assaulting the victims. He testified that at the time the massacre was being perpetrated he was
clinging to the wall made of steel-matting. His body was examined while he was on the witness stand. It was tattooed
but not with the letters "OXO".
Witnesses Guevarra and Del Rosario, the companions of Cabcaban in the big cell, testified that Cabcaban was a
member of the Oxo gang and that he helped Abella's group in attacking the members of the Sigue-Sigue gang in the
big cell. Witness Rodrigo, a prisoner acting as a special policeman, pointed to Cabcaban as the person who beat Cabile
with a piece of wood (4 tsn July 25, 1967). There is no victim surnamed Cabile, as reported in the transcript, but
Rodrigo was probably referring to the victim named Salvador Abique who was also identified by a witness as
Tabique. The name "Cabile" might be an error in transcription. cdll
4. Rodolfo Carballo alias Ruding Pakpak. — He was born in Villadolid, Negros Occidental. He resided at 958 Antipolo
Street, Tondo, Manila. He finished grade six. He was convicted of homicide by the Court of First Instance of Manila
and sentenced to six years and one day of prision mayor to twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal.
He was brought to the New Bilibid Prison on December 8, 1962. He arrived in the Davao Penal Colony on June 20,
1964. He escaped from the penal colony on August 12, 1964 and was recaptured on May 15, 1965. He was twenty-
seven years old when he testified on January 8, 1968.
He admitted in his statement to the investigator that he was a member of the Oxo gang and had the Oxo tattoo mark.
He testified that during the massacre he climbed the wall of steel-matting but someone pulled his feet and he fell
down on the floor.
Witness Guevarra testified that Gavilaguin, a closely-confined prisoner, wanted to sell his pillow to Carballo (who is
identified in the confessions as Ruding Pakpak), a prisoner in the big cell. It was that ruse which started the
commotion (95-98 tsn November 16, 1966). Guevarra identified Carballo as one of those who helped the sixteen
raiders (107 tsn November 17, 1966). That testimony was corroborated by witnesses Del Rosario and Rodrigo.
5. Elino Duran. — He was born in Catbalogan, Samar. He finished grade five. He was convicted of homicide by the
Court of First Instance of Samar and sentenced to six years and one day of prision mayor to fourteen years and eight
months of reclusion temporal. He was brought to the national penitentiary on December 18, 1962. He arrived in the
Davao Penal Colony on March 5, 1963. He was twenty-nine years old when he testified on March 12, 1968.
In his statement and testimony, he denied any participation in the massacre. He said that during the riot he climbed
the wall of steel-matting. He said that he was not a member of the Oxo gang but he believed that he was counted as
an Oxo sympathizer because he is a Visayan.
He admitted that he executed a statement and that the contents thereof were true (Exh. EE). On the witness stand, he
pointed to Ignacio alias Pilay, Tagana, Astrologia, Cabcaban and Carballo alias Rudy as among those who took part
in the massacre.
In his statement, he identified Cuizon, Roberto Pangilinan, Rolando Pangilinan, Cabcaban, Lagarto, Apolonias,
Astrologia, Ricafort, Carballo, Ignacio, Tagana and Dionisio as having taken part in the killings (See No. 12, Exh. EE)
Prosecution eyewitnesses Guevarra, Del Rosario and Rodrigo identified Duran as having collaborated with the
sixteen raiders in perpetrating the massacre.
6. Jose Francisco alias Karate. — He was born in Pila, Laguna and resided at San Andres Extension, Manila. He finished
the first year of high school. He used to be a judo instructor. In 1964, he was convicted of robbery by the Court of First
Instance of Manila and sentenced to imprisonment for two years and four months of prision correccional, as minimum,
to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum (Exh. J-5). He was confined in the national penitentiary on
February 15, 1964. He was received in the Davao Penal Colony on May 15, 1964 and confined in the big cell on June
25, 1965, or two days before the riot, because he was suspected of having smuggled deadly weapons into the prison
compound (pp. 93 or 115, Record). He was twenty-five years old when he testified on January 8, 1968.
He declared that when the raiders entered the big cell he stepped aside, climbed the wall of steel-matting and prayed.
However, witness Guevarra identified Francisco as a member of the Oxo gang who helped the raiders and who,
armed with a wooden club, beat the victim, Gualberto Fuentes, who died (108, 114-115 and 127 tsn November 17 and
18, 1966). Witness Del Rosario included Francisco in his wholesale identification of twelve assailants who helped the
raiders from the small cells. cdrep
Counsel de oficio, who filed a brief for Francisco only, contended that the trial court erred in holding that Francisco
was a co-conspirator. Said counsel alleged that Francisco was convicted of robbery (snatching) because he was framed
up by a certain Patrolman Liwanag of the Manila police. According to counsel, Francisco and one Roberto Gonzales
(an actor) had charged Liwanag with extorting money from the Karate-Club, of which Francisco was a member, and,
in revenge, Liwanag fabricated a complaint for robbery against Francisco who was convicted and sent to the Davao
Penal Colony. No evidence was presented in the lower court by Francisco to prove that he was convicted on a
trumped-up charge of robbery.
7. Guillermo Ignacio alias Pilay. — He was born in La Carlota, Negros Occidental. He finished grade five. He was
convicted of murder, frustrated murder, arson and evasion of service of sentence. He was received in the national
penitentiary on July 27, 1953. He arrived in the Davao Penal Colony on September 22, 1961. He escaped three times
from prison (Exh. J-12). He was thirty-eight years old when he testified on March 12, 1968.
He declared that when the massacre began, he stood beside the steel-matting. He saw his fellow prisoner, Arsenio
Guevarra (the prosecution witness), carrying a pillow. After the riot, he was investigated. He said that he did not read
his statement but he was just made to sign it and he signed it so that he would not be maltreated. In his statement, he
admitted he was a member of the Oxo gang.
Guevarra said that he did not see Ignacio helping the group (108 tsn November 17, 1966).
Witness Rodrigo, a prisoner acting as a special policeman, identified Ignacio as a member of the Oxo gang and as the
prisoner who, during the riot, covered the door of the big cell with a blanket and pieces of wood and who, armed
with a wooden club, took part in beating the victims (15-16 tsn July 25, 1967)
Witness Del Rosario, in his wholesale identification of the twelve prisoners who took part in the assault, included
Ignacio (222 tsn February 10, 1967)
8. Eugenio Provido, Jr. — He was born in Sta. Barbara, Iloilo. He finished the sixth grade. He was convicted of theft and
violations of articles 157 and 178 of the Revised Penal Code. He was received in the national penitentiary on
December 3, 1959. He arrived in the Davao Penal Colony on February 29, 1964 (Exh. J-17). He was twenty-six years
old when he testified on July 10, 1968.
He declared that when the sixteen raiders entered the big cell he was driven to a corner and was shielded by the other
prisoners and in that situation he heard the shouts of the rioters. He said that he did not know what actually
happened because he was solicitous about his own personal safety. He did not climb the steel-matting. He said that
during the investigation of the case, he was told that he would be utilized as a State witness. He denied that he was a
member of the Oxo gang.
Witness Guevarra testified that he did not know Provido (90 tsn November 16, 1966). However, when he was asked
to point to his (Guevarra's) companions in the big cell who helped Abella's group, Guevarra fingered Provido and
identified him as a member of the Oxo gang and as having beaten the victims with a piece of wood (ibid, 108 and 115;
127 tsn Nov. 18, 1966).
Witness Rodrigo identified Provido as having beaten the deceased Jose Magpantay with a piece of wood (10-11 tsn
July 25, 1967). Witness Del Rosario included Provido as among those who participated in the assault (222 tsn
February 10, 1967)
9. Angel Tagana. — He was born in Dulag, Leyte. He finished grade two. He resided in Pandacan, Manila. He had six
convictions for robbery with physical injuries, malicious mischief and slander by deed and violations of city
ordinances. He was received in the national penitentiary on June 15, 1963. He arrived in the Davao Penal Colony on
May 8, 1965 (Exh. J-9). He was twenty-six years old when he testified on January 9, 1968.
He declared that when the sixteen raiders entered the big cell and started stabbing his companions he ran to the side
of the cell. He was not assaulted by anyone.
In his statement, he admitted that he was a member of the Oxo gang (p. 119 or 143, Record). Witness Guevarra
identified him as a member of that group and as having used a piece of wood in beating one victim (115 and 127 tsn
November 17, 1966). Witnesses Del Rosario and Rodrigo also pointed to Tagana as one of those who helped Abella's
group (222 tsn February 10, 1967 and 14-15 tsn July 25, 1967).
Counsels de oficio contend that the trial court erred in holding that there was a conspiracy among the accused. That
contention has no basis in the evidence. The record supports the trial court's finding that "conspiracy can logically be
inferred from the simultaneous and concerted acts of (the) sixteen raiders who, after putting down the guard and
entering the big cell, joined and combined forces with their friends and associates-inmates of the big cell who were
waiting for the go-signal to commence the attack in pursuance of their criminal objective"
The trial court added that the acts and conduct of the accused from the start of their aggression until the riot was
suppressed were characterized "by a swift, united and concerted movement that could easily indicate a community of
purpose, closeness of association and concurrence of wills", as shown particularly by the order of the two "close-
confined" prisoners, Abella and Villaflor, that the Visayans in the big cell should stay on one side so that it could be
ascertained that they were the allies of the sixteen raiders. LLpr
The conspiracy among the accused was manifest and indubitable. The massacre had been planned by the sixteen
"close-confined" prisoners in collaboration with the other members of the Oxo gang in the big cell.
Counsel de oficio assails the credibility of witnesses Guevarra and Del Rosario. These two witnesses were prisoners in
the big cell. They had sufficient opportunity to observe what took place during the hour-long riot. Del Rosario was
himself a victim.
Counsel de oficio contends that reiteration is not aggravating because there is no evidence that the said accused had
been previously punished for an offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater penalty or for two or more
crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty. On the contrary, according to counsel, the said accused were still serving
sentence for their prior convictions.
Counsel's contention is correct as to Abella. Dionisio, Gavilaguin, Maldecir, Villaflor and Villarama against whom
reiteration was considered aggravating. They were still serving sentence for their previous crimes at the time the riot
occurred. In order that the aggravating circumstance of reiteration may be taken into account, it should be shown that
the offender against whom it is appreciated had already served out his sentences for the prior offenses (People vs.
Layson, L-25177, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 92, 97).
But since the accused are quasi-recidivists, the fact that reiteration cannot be appreciated against them and that their
plea of guilty is mitigating will not affect the imposition of the death penalty for the murders and frustrated murders
which they had committed.
The other contention of counsel de oficio that all the accused should be given the benefit of the extenuating
circumstance of voluntary surrender to the authorities is not correct. The accused did not surrender voluntarily and
unconditionally. They rejected the initial requests for their surrender. They surrendered after prison officials armed
with guns demanded their surrender. They chose the person to whom they would surrender, namely, Jorge, the
overseer.
Defense counsel's contention that treachery and evident premeditation are not aggravating in this case is untenable.
The accused, who were all armed, unexpectedly attacked the unarmed and defenseless Sigue-Sigue inmates in the big
cell who had no means of escaping from that cell and who could not avoid their assaults. The victims did not offer
any resistance.
The accused had deliberately planned the attack as shown by the manner in which they executed the massacre. They
provided themselves with improvised weapons. No one among the accused sustained any injuries or was exposed to
any risk arising from any defense that the victims might have made. The victims were not able to make any
retaliation. Moreover, there was abuse of superiority which absorbed cuadrilla.
In People vs. Layson, L-25177, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 92, the four accused, also inmates of the Davao Penal
Colony, who were armed with bladed weapons, entered on January 17, 1964 the cell of their fellow prisoners, locked
the door thereof and stabbed him to death. It was held that the crime was murder aggravated by treachery, evident
premeditation and quasi-recidivism.
The Layson case is similar to the instant case. The difference between the two cases is that in the instant case, more
prisoners were involved and there were seventeen victims.
Motion for new trial. — On October 30, 1973 or after the Solicitor General had filed his brief, twenty of the thirty
accused, who were sentenced to death, filed, personally or without the assistance of counsel, a motion for new trial.
Those twenty movants are Añover alias Abarca (who died on June 18, 1976), Barbajo, Cabcaban, Carballo, Cuizon
(who died on November 6, 1977), Dionisio, Duran, Enrigan, Francisco, Gavilaguin, Hernandez, Ignacio, Loraña,
Opsiar (who died on April 2, 1974), Provido, Quijano, Tagana, Taboy, Villarama and Villegas.
Of those twenty, ten accused, namely, Dionisio, Enrigan, Gavilaguin, Hernandez, Loraña, Opsiar, Quijano, Taboy,
Villarama and Villegas had pleaded guilty. Nine of the ten were "close-confined" prisoners in the three cells. The
tenth, Dionisio, was in the big cell. The other ten of the twenty accused were from the big cell. They pleaded not
guilty and they were tried.
The twenty movants alleged in their motion for new trial that those who pleaded guilty did so due to "the coercion,
harassment and intimidation applied by the prison authorities" or due to "third degree" and other brutalities. They
further alleged that one of the "fabricated (prosecution) witnesses" was Guillermo Ignacio who made a retraction and
that another witness, Elino Duran, was forced to sign his affidavit. cdll
The Solicitor General commented that the grounds relied upon by the movants are not the grounds for a new trial
under sections 2 and 3, Rule 121 and section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court. He correctly observed that Ignacio and
Duran were not utilized as prosecution witnesses.
Action on the motion for new trial was deferred until the case is decided on the merits. After an evaluation of the said
motion, we find that it is devoid of merit and is not in order.
The record does not show that Ignacio retracted his statement. Duran never claimed that he was intimidated into
making his statement. Those movants who pleaded guilty were convicted on the basis of their confessions which they
ratified during the trial. On the other hand, those who pleaded not guilty were given a fair trial. They testified and
they had the opportunity to prove their innocence. Their testimonies (except Apolonias' testimony) did not generate
any reasonable doubt as to their guilt.
Propriety of the imposition of the death penalty on the eighteen accused. — As to the fourteen deceased victims, the crime is
murder qualified by treachery which absorbs abuse of superiority and cuadrilla. As to those who pleaded guilty, that
mitigating circumstance is offset by evident premeditation. Recidivism is aggravating as to some accused. As to all
the eighteen accused, quasi-recidivism is a special aggravating circumstance which justifies the imposition of the
penalty for murder (reclusion temporal maximum to death) in its maximum period or death.
The fiscal and the trial court treated the fourteen killings and the injuries inflicted on the three victims as a complex
crime of multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder. The trial court imposed a single death penalty.
However, the Solicitor General submits that the accused should be convicted of fourteen separate murders and three
separate frustrated murders and punished, respectively, by fourteen death penalties and three penalties for the
frustrated murders because the killings and injuries were effected by distinct acts.
It is argued that article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable to this case. Cited in support of that stand is the
ruling in U.S. vs. Ferrer, 1 Phil. 56 that "where the defendant has fired two shots, killing one party and wounding
another, the acts constitute two distinct crimes, each of which must be tried separately"
We hold that the Solicitor General's submission is not well-taken. In the De los Santos case, supra, which involved two
riots on two successive days in the national penitentiary wherein nine prisoners were killed (five on the first day and
four on the second day), the fourteen members of the Sigue-Sigue gang who took part in the killing were convicted of
multiple murder (a complex crime) and not of nine separate murders. Only one death penalty was imposed. It was
commuted to reclusion perpetua for lack of necessary votes.
There is no compelling reason for not deciding this case in the same way as the De los Santos case. The two cases are
very similar.
The ruling in the De los Santos case is predicated on the theory that "when, for the attainment of a single purpose
which constitutes an offense, various acts are executed, such acts must be considered only as one offense", a complex
one (People vs. Peñas, 66 Phil. 682, 687. See People vs. Cu Unjieng, 61 Phil. 236, 302 and 906, where the falsification of
one hundred twenty-eight warehouse receipts during the period from November 1930 to July 6, 1931, which enabled
the accused to swindle the bank in the sum of one million four hundred thousand pesos was treated as only one
complex crime of estafa through multiple falsification of mercantile documents and only one penalty was
imposed). cdrep

That holding in the De los Santos case is buttressed by some precedents. Thus, in People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil. 64 and
82, 102-103, where seventy-seven Constabularymen murdered six policemen (including the assistant chief of police)
and two private citizens and gravely wounded three civilians, they were convicted of multiple murder with grave
injuries, a complex crime. The eleven sergeants and corporals were sentenced to death while the sixty-six privates
were sentenced to reclusion perpetua. (See People vs. Umali, 96 Phil. 185, re sedition and multiple murder.)
In People vs. Sakam, 61 Phil. 27, nineteen Moros, forming part of a band of one hundred, massacred fourteen
Constabularymen. They were charged and convicted of multiple murder, a complex crime. Their ring leader was
sentenced to death. The other eighteen accused were sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
In People vs. Lawas, 97 Phil. 975, where on a single occasion around fifty Maranaos were killed by a group of home
guards (formerly Constabulary soldiers), the killing was held to be only one complex offense of multiple homicide
because it "resulted from a single criminal impulse" and it was not possible to determine how many victims were
killed by each of the accused. (See U.S. vs. Fresnido, 4 Phil. 522 where the killing of three Constabulary soldiers on a
single occasion was punished as a single homicide.)
In People vs. Manantan, 94 Phil. 831, around eighty persons stationed on both sides of the highway in Sitio Salabusab,
Bongabong, Nueva Ecija, fired at the group of Aurora Vda. de Quezon riding in five cars which were proceeding to
Baler, Quezon Province. The group was going to attend the inauguration of a monument in honor of President
ManuelL. Quezon.
Killed as a result of the ambuscade were eleven persons, namely, Mrs. Quezon, Baby Quezon, Felipe Buencamino III,
Mayor Ponciano Bernardo of Quezon City, Primitivo San Agustin, Antonio San Agustin, Pedro Payumo, two
Constabulary lieutenants, one corporal and a soldier. LLphil
Five persons were charged with multiple murder, a complex crime, for complicity in the ambuscade. The trial court
sentenced them to death. They appealed. The case as to three of the accused was dismissed on the ground that their
confessions were taken after they had been tortured.
Two other accused, Pedro Manantan and Raymundo Viray, executed extrajudicial confessions. At the trial, they relied
on alibis, which were not given credence.
This Court imposed upon Manantan and Viray only one death penalty for the multiple murder but for lack of
necessary votes, the penalty was reduced to reclusion perpetua.
As persuasive authority, it may be noted that the Court of Appeals rendered the same ruling when it held that where
a conspiracy animates several persons with a single purpose "their individual acts in pursuance of that purpose are
looked upon as a single act — the act of execution — giving rise to a complex offense. The felonious agreement
produces a sole and solidary liability: each confederate forms but a part of a single being" (People vs. Leaño, 1 ACR
447, 461 perAlbert, J., with Justices Pedro Concepcion, Moran, Sison and Paras concurring)
In the Leaño case, a group of twenty-five persons armed with bolos, knives, sticks and other weapons, after shouting
to one another "Remember the agreement! Don't be afraid!", attacked a group of excursionists coming from the Vintar
Dam in Ilocos Norte, who were riding in a Ford coupe and omnibus.
As a result of the attack, one excursionist was killed, three suffered lesiones menos graves and four suffered light
injuries. The trial court convicted the assailants of homicide only. The Solicitor General recommended that they be
convicted of lesiones menos graves and lesiones leves in addition to homicide. The Court of Appeals held that the
appellants were guilty of the complex crime of homicide with lesiones menos graves.
The holding that there is a complex crime in cases like the instant case is similar to the rule in robbery with homicide,
a special complex crime, where the number of persons killed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery does not
change the nature of the crime.
We have already stated that the conviction for multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder, as a complex crime,
qualified by treachery (absorbing abuse of superiority and cuadrilla) and aggravated by quasi-recidivism and evident
premeditation (offset by plea of guilty) and recidivism, as to some accused, as shown in the record, should be
affirmed.
The death penalty was properly imposed in conformity with articles 48, 160 and 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The
indemnity of six thousand pesos should be increased to twelve thousand pesos for each set of heirs of the fourteen
victims. Cdpr
However, justice should be tempered with mercy. Considering the circumstances which drove the accused to
massacre their fellow prisoners, they deserve clemency. The death penalty should be commuted to reclusion perpetua.
The following observations of this Court in the De los Santos case have some relevancy to this case:
"But the members of the Court cannot in conscience concur in the death penalty imposed, because they find it
impossible to ignore the contributory role played by the inhuman conditions then reigning in the penitentiary, vividly
described by the trial judge in his decision.
"It is evident that the incredible overcrowding of the prison cells, that taxed facilities beyond measure and the starvation
allowance of ten centavos per meal for each prisoner, must have rubbed raw the nerves and dispositions of the
unfortunate inmates, and predisposed them to all sorts of violence to seize from their owners the meager supplies
from outside in order to eke out their miserable existence.
"All this led inevitably to the formation of gangs that preyed like wolf packs on the weak, and ultimately to pitiless
gang rivalry for the control of the prisoners, abetted by the inability of the out-numbered guards to enforce discipline,
and which culminated in violent riots. The government cannot evade responsibility for keeping prisoners under such
sub-human and Dentesque conditions.
"Society must not close its eyes to the fact that if it has the right to exclude from its midst those who attack it, it has no
right at all to confine them under circumstances that strangle all sense of decency, reduce convicts to the level of
animals, and convert a prison term into prolonged torture and slow death." (See People vs. Dahil, L-30271, June 15,
1979.)
Justice Barredo believes that in a case like the instant case, where, since the commission of the multiple murder and
multiple frustrated murder in 1965 or more than fourteen years ago, the accused have been in confinement and in fact
they have been in confinement for other offenses even prior to 1965, the death penalty should be commuted
to reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, following the precedent established in the aforecited De los Santos case, the death penalty imposed by
the lower court is reduced to reclusion perpetua. The indemnity of six thousand pesos is increased to twelve thousand
pesos. The indemnities for the frustrated murders are affirmed. Defendant Maximo Apolonias is acquitted on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED. Cdpr

[G.R. No. L-40995. June 25, 1980.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EULALIO BOHOS, ET AL.
This is a review on appeal of the decision dated December 18, 1974, of the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte,
Branch IV, Iligan City, in Criminal Case No. 1440 convicting Eulalio Bohos of the complex crime of Forcible
Abduction with Rape and sentencing him to die for each of the thirteen (13) separate acts of rape committed on the
person of the complainant, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Eulalio Bohos GUILTY as principal and beyond
reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape under Articles 335 and 342
of the Revised Penal Code with the attending aggravating circumstances of nighttime and taking
advantage of superior strength and number with no attending mitigating circumstance and hereby
sentences the said accused to suffer the supreme penalty of death for each of the thirteen (13)
separate acts of rape committed on the person of Myrna de la Vega.
"Further, the accused is sentenced to indemnify Myrna de la Vega in the amount of 500.00
for actual damages representing her expenses in coming to testify in this case in Iligan City from
San Carlos City, P12,000.00 for moral damages and P6,000.00 for exemplary damages.
"Finally he is sentenced to pay the costs of this proceedings."
On September 17, 1966, a Saturday, Myrna de la Vega, then 16 years old and a student of the Immaculate Concepcion
College in Ozamis City left the residential home at Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte, at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon to see
a movie in barrio Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte, accompanied by a small child who tagged along when Myrna
went to the child's house in Maranding. At about 4:00 o'clock the child got thirsty so Myrna took her home but
returned alone to view the rest of the film.
It was already 8:00 o'clock in the evening when she finally left the movie house to go home. In going to Maranding
Myrna walked a kilometer via the highway and she had to take the same route in going home to Kapatagan. By that
time the highway way already deserted and although there were houses along the way the occupants had already
gone to bed. After walking for sometime she noticed several persons approaching and as they came nearer they
turned out to be four men. Then she heard one of the men say, "Bay, Bay, mayron babae." She tried to run away from
them but her efforts proved futile for she was no match to the four men who immediately caught up with her. One
man held her right arm, another held her left arm and the other two covered her mouth. A passing cargo truck bound
for Iligan City was stopped and she was dragged aboard it. The four men rode with her at the rear of the truck. Two
men continued to hold her arms. A handkerchief was then placed inside her mouth, her panty was removed and right
there on the truck one of the men abused her sexually. The cargo truck was made to stop at Magpatao, another barrio
of Lala where she was forced to alight and taken to a small house along the highway, belonging to Teodoro Engio.
That night, Myrna was ravished thirteen times, once in the truck and twelve times in the house of Teodoro Engio
where the four men took turns in ravishing her three times each. Everytime she was abused one man held her right
hand, another held her left hand and another held her legs wide apart. After that night's ordeal, Myrna's hands and
feet were tied. The following morning, September 18, 1966, her abductors untied Myrna and each one again took
turns in having carnal knowledge of her while the others held her hands and her legs apart. After they were through
they tied her up again. All in all Myrna was violated seventeen times.
Myrna was rescued at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of September 18, 1966 by then Kapatagan Mayor Bernardo
Nietes together with some of his policemen led by Desk Sergeant Apolonio Pangilinan in coordination with
Philippine Army soldiers, in response to a report of Florencio Morilla a neighbor of the De la Vegas. They found
Myrna in the house of Teodoro Engio fast asleep wearing only a "sando" while a small towel was wrapped around
her waist to cover her private parts. Beside her, also sleeping was Agustin Nodado, one of the accused, who was in
his underwear. Both were interrogated right in the house and Agustin Nodado gave the names of his companions as
Teotimo Babanto, Felix Palcis and Eulalio Bohos. Myrna looked weak and pale; she could not talk very well and was
trembling during the interrogation. However, she was able to tell Mayor Nietes and Sgt. Pangilinan that she was
kidnapped and abused by four men including Nodado. That same afternoon, Teotimo Babanto, Felix Palcis and
Eulalio Bohos were also arrested. Eulalio Bohos was arrested right along the highway of Maranding where the
raiding team passed him on their way back to the Police Station of Katagan after the rescue of Myrna while Teotimo
Babanto and Felix Palcis were picked up in Baroy where they were apprehended for pickpocketing. Immediately after
the arrest of the three, Myrna identified them as the companions of Nodado who kidnapped her and took turns in
raping her. Teodoro Engio was also apprehended for questioning but he explained that he allowed the four who were
his friends just to pass the night at his house. At the time of the trial Teodoro had already died.
On November 25, 1967, Felix Palcis, Teotimo Babanto and Eulalio Bohos escaped from the provincial jail while
Agustin Nodado escaped on September 26, 1968, after he had stabbed to death the guard on duty (Report of the
Provincial Warden, Exhibit "A"). Only Eulalio Bohos had been rearrested as of arraignment date on March 18, 1974.
He pleaded not guilty to the offense charged, was tried and convicted as aforesaid. The three others are still at large.
The verified complaint filed by Myrna de la Vega with the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte on January 18,
1968, against Agustin Nodado, Teotimo Babanto, alias Toting, alias Ernesto Ybañez, Felix Palcis and Eulalio Bohos
alleges:
"That on or about the 17th day of September 1966 in the barrio of Maranding, Municipality
of Kapatagan, Province of Lanao del Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused Agustin Nodado, in company with Teotimo Babanto, Felix Palcis and
Eulalio Bohos, who have escaped from confinement in the Provincial Jail last November 25, 1967, as
detained prisoners in Crim. Case No. 1311 together with Agustin Nodado, and who are still at
large, armed with a deadly weapon, and with the use thereof, conspiring together, confederating
and mutually helping with one another and with lewd designs, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take and carry away the undersigned by force and violence or
intimidation in a cargo truck which happened to pass by bound for Iligan City and while in the said
truck, the said accused abused her and upon reaching the barrio of Magpatao, Lala, this province,
the said accused stopped the truck and forced her to alight thereon, dragged her to a certain house
at Magpatao where she was detained, the said accused alternately and successively had sexual
intercourse with her against her will, to the damage and prejudice of the offended party."
At the time of the trial in 1974, Myrna had transferred her residence to San Carlos City (Pangasinan) which explains
the award of P500.00 for her expenses in going to Iligan City in order to testify. Mayor Nietes had abandoned
politics and moved to Quezon, Bukidnon, as a farmer, And Dr. Pablito P. Abragan, Municipal Health Officer of
Kapatagan who performed the examination on Myrna was killed in 1971 during an ambuscade so that his findings
(Exh. "B") had to be interpreted by Dr. Ramon Abragan, Jr., Provincial Health Officer who gave the opinion that
force was used on the person of Myrna when she was sexually used.
Appellant's counsel de oficio, Mary Concepcion-Bautista, who is a very capable lawyer, states in her brief:
"At the outset, we must confess to an inner conflict as to whether we should proceed as counsel de oficio for
the appellant after we found ourselves compelled to accept that indeed the crime of forcible abduction with
rape had been committed, and that appellant had guilty participation in its commission.
"As this Honorable Court had aptly observed in its previous decisions, no country lass would allow herself
to be so humiliated publicly unless she had really suffered and been so victimized.
 "Furthermore, the half-nakedness of the victim at the time of her rescue was an indication of what she had
gone through and one can surmise that she fell asleep out of sheer physical weakness and exhaustion. In
addition, there was no reason to question her identification of the appellant when he was apprehended on
September 18, 1966 and in the courtroom. Neither could we ignore the circumstance that appellant escaped,
instead of insisting on an early trial which an innocent man would have done."
Nonetheless, appellant's counsel has raised certained points in an effort to mitigate ins criminal liability. Thus she
argues that there was no conspiracy among the four accused, hence the appellant should not be held liable for the acts
of his co-accused.
It is true that there is no evidence in the record of a previous plan among the accused to abduct Myrna in order to
rape her. No witness testified to having seen or heard the accused conspire or confabulate. The whole incident
happened because the four accused met a woman walking alone at a deserted place at night. But for collective
responsibility to be established, it is not necessary that conspiracy be proved by direct evidence of a prior agreement
to commit the crime. It is sufficient that at the time of the commission of the offense all the accused acted in concert
showing that they had the same purpose or common design and were united in its execution. (People vs. Cutura, etc.)
The degree of participation by each of them is immaterial (People vs. Verzo). The simultaneous acts of the four
accused — two of them holding Myrna's hands and the other two covering her mouth as they accosted her on the
highway; the four of them dragging Myrna aboard the truck which they stopped and where she was violated by one
of them with the assistance and encouragement of the three others; the four of them alternately and successively
ravishing her inside the house of Teodoro Engio three times each on the night of September 17, 1966, and one each the
following morning while one held complainant's right arm, another held her left arm and another stretched her legs
wide apart - together with other circumstances, make evident a community to design, an indicia of a conspiracy to
abduct complainant forcibly for the satisfaction of their carnal desire against her will.
We are satisfied that there was conspiracy among the four accused to abduct and rape Myrna so that the act of any
one was also the act of the others.
Appellant's other point is: "Even if we may assume purely for the sake of argument that the complaining witness was
forcibly abducted and then raped thirteen times, we submit that there was only one forcible abduction, with rape and
that was the one allegedly committed on the truck or jeep. Any subsequent acts of intercourse in the house against her
will would be only separate acts of rape and can no longer be considered separate complex crimes of forcible
abduction with rape."
This point is well taken. There was only one forcible abduction with rape which was the one committed in the truck.
Thus in People vs. Jose, et al., G.R. No. L-28232, Feb. 6, 1971, 37 SCRA 450, where the four accused forcibly abducted
Maggie de la Riva and each of them raped her, this Court held "that even while the first act of rape was being
performed, the crime of forcible abduction had already been consummated, so that each of the three succeeding
crimes of the same nature can not legally be considered as still connected with the abduction - in other words, they
should be detached from, and considered independently of, that of forcible abduction and, therefore, the former can
no longer be complexed with the latter." (At p. 475.)
We have examined the record to ascertain if there was indeed forcible abduction with rape and other rapes in order to
set our minds at ease. And the evidence is overwhelming so as to satisfy even the most skeptical reviewer that the
crimes were in fact committed.
We have Myrna's testimony that she was forcibly abducted and then raped seventeen (17) times. Corroborating her
were Bernardo Nietes, former Municipal Mayor of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte, and Apolonio Pangilinan, former
Desk Sergeant in the Kapatagan Police Force, concerning their rescue of Myrna in the afternoon of September 18,
1966, at Magpatao, Lala, Lanao del Sur, where she was brought by her abductors, and their investigation of the case
immediately after the rescue which lead to the arrest of appellant Eulalio Bohos and his companions Agustin
Nodado, Teotimo Babanto and Felix Palcis. Both Nietes and Pangilinan testified that in that investigation, Agustin
Nodado identified his three companions as Teotimo Babanto, Eulalio Bohos and Felix Palcis. Pangilinan further
testified that Teodoro Engio who was also apprehended on the same date for questioning, identified the four accused
as his friends who asked his permission to pass the night in his house. And then we have the testimony of Dr. Ramon
Abragan, Sr. to the effect that Myrna was abused when she was sexually used according to Exhibit "B" which reads as
follows:
"REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
FIELD OPERATIONS
REGIONAL HEALTH OFFICE NO. 7
RURAL HEALTH UNIT
KAPATAGAN, LANAO DEL NORTE
September 19, 1966
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that I personally performed the examination of MYRNA DE LA VEGA, 16 years old,
single of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte. Findings:
Ocular inspection of the vulva revealed:
(1) Fresh blood along the external os.
 (2) Peri-vulvar hyperomia, moderate, more prominent along both sides of the clitoris.
Internal examination revealed:
(1) One finger can be admitted with slight pain, but can admit 2 fingers with difficulty on the part of
the examiner and severe pain on the part of the patient.
(2) Tenderness upon tactation of the cervix.
(3) Hymen incomplete with slight laceration at 8:30 o'clock.
(4) Laceration of the cervix slight at 6:00 o'clock with slight bleeding from the laceration.
(SGD) PABLITO P. ABRAGAN, M.D.
Municipal Health Officer"
The defense of the appellant is alibi. He claims that on September 17 and 18, 1966, he was in the house of
Vicente Pangilinan at Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte. We reject this defense. The defense of alibi, which can be easily
concocted, cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witness as the author
of the crime (People v. Caoile, G.R. No. L-31104, Nov. 15, 1974, 61 SCRA 73). For alibi to prosper it is not enough
to prove that the accused was somewhere when the crime was committed but that he must likewise demonstrate
that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime during its commission (People v.
Cortez, G.R. No. L-31106, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 308).
The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength was correctly appreciated by the trial court
but it erred when it also added nocturnity for there is no evidence to show that nighttime was purposely chosen
to facilitate the commission of the crime.
The aggravating circumstance of use of a motor vehicle should also be appreciated.
The crimes thus proved to have been committed are forcible abduction with rape and sixteen (16) separate
rapes attended by the aggravating circumstances of superiority and use of a motor vehicle without any mitigating
circumstance.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is modified in that Eulalio Bohos is sentenced to suffer not
thirteen (13) but seventeen (17) death penalties; it is affirmed in all other respects. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
|||

[G.R. No. L-28232. February 6, 1971.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JAIME JOSE , ET AL.
The amended complaint filed in this case in the court below, reads as follows:
"The undersigned complainant accuses JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, BASILIO PINEDA, JR. alias "BOY,"
EDUARDO AQUINO Y PAYUMO alias "EDDIE" and ROGELIO CAÑAL Y SEVILLA alias
"ROGER," as principals, WONG LAY PUENG, SILVERIO GUANZON Y ROMERO and JESSIE
GUION Y ENVOLTARIO as accomplices, of the crime of Forcible Abduction with rape, committed
as follows:
"That on or about the 26th day of June, 1967, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named principal accused, conspiring together, confederating
with and mutually helping one another, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with lewd design, forcibly abduct the undersigned complainant against her will, and did, then and
there take her, pursuant to their common criminal design, to the Swanky Hotel in Pasay City, where
each of the four (4) accused, by means of force and intimidation, and with the use of a deadly
weapon, have carnal knowledge of the undersigned complainant against her will, to her damage and
prejudice in such amount as may be awarded to her under the provisions of the civil code.
"That WONG LAY PUENG, SILVERIO GUANZON y ROMERO, and JESSIE GUION y
ENVOLTARIO, without taking a direct part in the execution of the offense either by forcing,
inducing the principal accused to execute, or cooperating in its execution by an indispensable act,
did, then and there cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts, that
is, by cooperating, aiding, abetting and permitting the principal accused in sequestering the
undersigned complainant in one of the rooms of the Swanky Hotel then under the control of the
accused Wong Lay Pueng, Silverio Guanzon y Romero and Jessie Guion y Envoltario, thus
supplying material and moral aid in the consummation of the offense.
"That the aforestated offense has been attended by the following aggravating circumstances:
1. Use of a motor vehicle.
2. Night time sought purposely to facilitate the commission of the crime and to make its discovery
difficult;
3. Abuse of superior strength;
 4. That means were employed or circumstances brought about which added ignominy to the natural
effects of the act; and
5. That the wrong done in the commission of the crime be deliberately augmented by causing other
wrong not necessary for the commission.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."
Upon arraignment, Basilio Pineda, Jr. pleaded guilty to the charge imputed in the above-quoted amended
complaint; however, in an order dated July 11, 1967, the court reserved judgment "until such time as the prosecution
shall have concluded presenting all of its evidence to prove the aggravating circumstances listed in the complaint."
Upon the other hand, the rest of the defendants went to trial on their respective pleas of not guilty. After hearing on
the merits, the court below rendered its decision on October 2, 1967, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Jaime Jose, Rogelio Cañal, Eduardo Aquino
and Basilio Pineda, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of forcible abduction with rape
as described under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as emended, and hereby sentences each of
them to the death penalty to be executed at a date to be set and in the manner provided for by law;
and each to indemnify the complainant in the amount of ten thousand pesos. On the ground that
the prosecution has failed to establish a prima facie case against the accomplices Wong Lay Pueng,
Silverio Guanzon y Romero, and Jessie Guion y Envoltario, the Motion to Dismiss filed for and in
their behalf is hereby granted, and the case dismissed against the aforementioned accused.
"Insofar as the car used in the abduction of the victim which Jaime Jose identified by
pointing to it from the window of the courtroom and pictures of which were submitted and marked
as Exhibits "M" and "M-1," and which Jaime Jose in his testimony admitted belonged to him,
pursuant to Art. 45 of the Revised Penal Code, which requires the confiscation and forfeiture of the
proceeds or instruments of the crime, the Court hereby orders its confiscation."
This case is now before us by virtue of the appeal interposed by Basilio Pineda, Jr., Edgardo Aquino, and Jaime Jose,
and for automatic review as regards Rogelio Cañal. However, for practical purposes all of them shall hereafter be
referred to as appellants.
The complainant, Magdalena "Maggie" de la Riva, was, at the time of the incident, 25 years old and single; she
graduated from high school in 1958 at Maryknoll College and finished the secretarial course in 1960 at St. Theresa's
College. Movie actress by profession, she was receiving P8,000.00 per picture. It was part of her work to perform in
radio broadcasts and television shows, where she was paid P800.00 per month in permanent shows, P300.00 per
month in live promotional shows, and from P100.00 to P200.00 per appearance as guest in other shows.
So it was that at about 4:30 o'clock in the morning of June 26, 1967, Miss De la Riva, homeward bound from the ABS
Studio on Roxas Blvd., Pasay City, was driving her bantam car accompanied by her maid Helen Calderon, who was
also at the front seat. Her house was at No. 48, 12th Street, New Manila, Quezon City. She was already near her
destination when a Pontiac two-door convertible car with four men aboard (later identified as the four appellants)
came abreast of her car and tried to bump it. She stepped on her brakes to avoid a collision, and then pressed on the
gas and swerved her car to the left, at which moment she was already in front of her house gate; but because the
driver of the other car (Basilio Pineda, Jr.) also accelerated his speed, the two cars almost collided for the second time.
This prompted Miss De la Riva, who was justifiably annoyed, to ask: "Ano ba?" Forthwith, Pineda stopped the car
which he was driving, jumped out of it and rushed towards her.
The girl became so frightened at this turn of events that she tooted the horn of her car continuously. Undaunted,
Pineda opened the door of Miss De la Riva's car and grabbed the lady's left arm. The girl held on tenaciously to her
car's steering wheel and, together with her maid, started to scream. Her strength, however, proved no match to that of
Pineda, who succeeded in pulling her out of her car. Seeing her mistress' predicament, the maid jumped out of the car
and took hold of Miss De la Riva's right arm in an effort to free her from Pineda's grip. The latter, however, was able
to drag Miss De la Riva toward the Pontiac convertible car, whose motor was all the while running.
When Miss De la Riva, who was being pulled by Pineda, was very near the Pontiac car, the three men inside started
to assist their friend: one of them held her by the neck, while the two others held her arms and legs. All three were
now pulling Miss De la Riva inside the car. Before she was completely in, appellant Pineda jumped unto the driver's
seat and sped away in the direction of Broadway Street. The maid was left behind.
The complainant was made to sit between Jaime Jose and Edgardo Aquino at the back seat; Basilio Pineda, Jr. was at
the wheel, while Rogelio Cañal was seated beside him. Miss De la Riva entreated the appellants to release her; but all
she got in response were jeers, abusive and impolite language, and threats that the appellants would finish her with
their Thompson and throw acid at her face if she did not keep quiet. In the meantime, the two men seated on each
side of Miss De la Riva started to get busy with her body: Jose put one arm around the complainant and forced his
lips upon hers, while Aquino placed his arms on her thighs and lifted her skirt. The girl tried to resist them. She
continuously implored her captors to release her, telling them that she was the only breadwinner in the family and
that her mother was alone at home and needed her company because her father was already dead. Upon learning of
the demise of Miss De la Riva's father, Aquino remarked that the situation was much better than he thought since no
one could take revenge against them. By now Miss De la Riva was beginning to realize the futility of her pleas. She
made the sign of the cross and started to pray. The appellants became angry and cursed her. Every now and then
Aquino would stand up and talk in whispers with Pineda, after which the two would exchange knowing glances with
Cañal and Jose.
The car reached a dead-end street. Pineda turned the car around and headed towards Victoria Street. Then the car
proceeded to Araneta Avenue, Sta. Mesa Street, Shaw Boulevard, thence to Epifanio de los Santos Avenue. When the
car reached Makati, Aquino took a handkerchief from his pocket and, with the help of Jose, blindfolded Miss De la
Riva. The latter was told not to shout or else she would be stabbed or shot with a Thompson. Not long after, the car
came to a stop at the Swanky Hotel in Pasay City. The blindfolded lady was led out of the car to one of the rooms on
the second floor of the hotel.
Inside the room Miss De la Riva was made to sit on bed. Her blindfold was removed. She saw Pineda and Aquino
standing in front of her, and Jose and Cañal sitting beside her, all of them smiling meaningfully. Pineda told the
complainant: "Magburlesque ka para sa amin." The other three expressed their approval and ordered Miss De la Riva
to disrobe. The complainant ignored the command. One of the appellants suggested putting off the light so that the
complainant would not be ashamed. The idea, however, was rejected by the others, who said that it would be more
pleasurable for them if the light was on. Miss De la Riva was told to remove her stockings, in order, according to
them, to make the proceedings more exciting. Reluctantly, she did as directed, but so slowly did she proceed with the
assigned task that the appellants cursed her and threatened her again with the Thompson and the acid. They started
pushing Miss De la Riva around. One of them pulled down the zipper of her dress; another unhooked her brassiere.
She held on tightly to her dress to prevent it from being pulled down, but her efforts were in vain: her dress, together
with her brassiere, fell on the floor.

The complainant was now completely naked before the four men, who were kneeling in front of her and feasting their
eyes on her private parts. This ordeal lasted for about ten minutes, during which the complainant, in all her
nakedness, was asked twice or thrice to turn around. Then Pineda picked up her clothes and left the room with his
other companions. The complainant tried to look for a blanket with which to cover herself, but she could not find one.
Very soon, Jose reentered the room and began undressing himself. Miss De la Riva, who was sitting on the bed trying
to cover her bareness with her hands, implored him to ask his friends to release her. Instead of answering her, he
pushed her backward and pinned her down on the bed. Miss De la Riva and Jose struggled against each other; and
because the complainant was putting up stiff resistance, Jose cursed her and hit her several times on the stomach and
other parts of the body. The complainant crossed her legs tightly, but her attacker was able to force them
open. Jose succeeded in having carnal knowledge of the complainant. He then left the room.
The other three took their turns. Aquino entered the room next. A struggle ensued between him and Miss De la Riva,
during which he hit her on different parts of the body. LikeJose, Aquino succeeded in abusing the complainant. The
girl was now in a state of shock. Aquino called the others into the room. They poured water on her face and slapped
her to revive her. Afterwards, three or the accused left the room, leaving Pineda and the complainant. After some
struggle during which Pineda hit her, the former succeeded in forcing his carnal desire on the latter. When the
complainant went into a state of shock for the second time, the three other men went into the room, again poured
water on the complainant's face and slapped her several times. The complainant heard them say that they had to
revive her so she would know what was happening. Jose, Aquino and Pineda then left the room. It was now
appellant Cañal's turn. There was a struggle between him and Miss De la Riva. Like the other three appellants before
him, he hit the complainant on different parts of the body and succeeded in forcing his carnal lust on her.
Mention must be made of the fact that while each of the four appellants was struggling with the complainant, the
other three were outside the room, just behind the door, threatening the complainant with acid and telling her to give
in because she could not, after all, escape, what with their presence.
After the appellants had been through with the sexual carnage, they gave Miss De la Riva her clothes, told her to get
dressed and put on her stockings, and to wash her face and comb her hair, to give the impression that nothing had
happened to her. They told her to tell her mother that she was mistaken by a group of men for a hostess, and that
when the group found out that she was a movie actress, she was released without being harmed. She was warned not
to inform the police; for if she did and they were apprehended, they would simply post bail and later hunt her up and
disfigure her face with acid. The appellant then blindfolded Miss De la Riva again and led her down from the hotel
room. Because she was stumbling, she had to be carried into the car. Inside the car, appellant Jose held her head down
on his lap, and kept it in that position during the trip, to prevent her from being seen by others.
Meanwhile, the four appellants were discussing the question of where to drop Miss De la Riva. They finally decided
on a spot in front of the Free Press Building not far from Epifanio de los Santos Avenue near Channel 5 to make it
appear, according to them, that the complainant had just come from the studio. Pineda asked Jose to alight and call a
taxicab, but to choose one which did not come from a well-known company. Jose did as requested, letting several
taxicabs pass by before flagging a UBL taxicab. After they warned again Miss De la Riva not to inform anyone of what
had happened to her, appellant Cañal accompanied her to the taxicab. The time was a little past 6:00 o'clock. When
Miss De la Riva was already inside the cab and alone with the driver, Miguel F. Campos, she broke down and cried.
She kept asking the driver if a car was following them; and each time the driver answered her in the negative.
It was 6:30 o'clock — or some two hours after the abduction — when Miss De la Riva reached home. Her mother, her
brother-in-law Ben Suba, as well as several PC officers, policemen and reporters, were at the house. Upon seeing her
mother, the complainant ran toward her and said, "Mommy, Mommy, I have been raped. All four of them raped me."
The mother brought her daughter upstairs. Upon her mother's instruction, the complainant immediately took a bath
and a douche. The older woman also instructed her daughter to douche herself two or three times daily with a strong
solution to prevent infection and pregnancy. The family doctor, who was afterwards summoned, treated the
complainant for external physical injuries. The doctor was not, however, told about the sexual assaults. Neither was
Pat. Pablo Pascual, the police officer who had been sent by the desk officer, Sgt. Dimla, to the De la Riva residence
when the latter received from a mobile patrol a report of the snatching. When Miss De la Riva arrived home from her
harrowing experience, Pat. Pascual attempted to question her, but Ben Suba requested him to postpone the
interrogation until she could be ready for it. At that time, mother and daughter were still undecided on what to do.
On the afternoon of June 28, 1967, the complainant's family gathered to discuss what steps, if any, should be taken.
After some agonizing moments, a decision was reached: the authorities had to be informed. Thus, early on the
morning of June 29, 1967, or on the fourth day after the incident, Miss De la Riva, accompanied by her lawyer, Atty.
Regina O. Benitez, and by some members of the family, went to the Quezon City Police Department Headquarters,
filed a complaint and executed a statement (Exh. "B") wherein she narrated the incident and gave descriptions of the
four men who abused her. In the afternoon of the same day, the complainant submitted herself to a medico-internal
examination by Dr. Ernesto Brion, NBI Chief Medico-Legal Officer.
During the physical examination of the complainant by Dr. Brion on June 29, 1967, Pat. Pascual was also at the NBI
office. There he received a telephone call from the police headquarters to the effect that one of the suspects had been
apprehended. That evening, the complainant and Pat. Pascual proceeded to the headquarters where Miss De la Riva
identified appellant Jaime Jose from among a group of persons inside the Office of the Chief of Police of Quezon City
as one of the four men who abducted and raped her. She executed another statement (Exh. "B-1") wherein she made a
formal identification of Jose and related the role played by him.
At about 9:00 o'clock of the same evening, appellant Jose executed a statement (Exh. "I") before Pat. Marcos G. Viñas.
In his statement, which was duly sworn, Jose admitted that he knew about, and was involved in, the June 26 incident.
He named the other three appellants as his companions. Jose stated, among other things, that upon the initiative of
Pineda, he and the other three waited for Miss De la Riva to come out of the ABS Studio; that his group gave chase to
the complainant's car; that it was Pineda who blindfolded her; and that on]y Pineda and Aquino criminally assaulted
the complainant.
After Exh. "I" was executed by Jose, an informant furnished Pat. Viñas with a picture of appellant Edgardo Aquino.
The picture was shown to Miss De la Riva, who declared in her sworn statement (Exh. "B-3") that the man in the
picture was one of her abductors and rapists. The same picture was shown to Jose, who, in another sworn statement
(Exh. "I-1"), identified the man in the picture as appellant Aquino.
After the apprehension of Jose, the other three soon fell into the hands of the authorities: Pineda and Cañal on July 1,
1967, in Lipa City, and Aquino on July 5, 1967, in the province of Batangas. On the evening of July 1, 1967, Miss De la
Riva pointed to Pineda and Cañal as among the four persons who abducted and raped her. She picked them out from
among several persons in the Office of the Chief of Police of Quezon City. Later in the same evening, Miss De la Riva
executed a sworn statement (Exh. "B-2") wherein she made the same identification of the two appellants from among
a group of persons in the Office of the Chief of the Detective Bureau, adding that appellant Cañal had tatoo marks on
his right hip. After the identification, one of the policemen took appellant Cañal downstairs and undressed him, and
he saw, imprinted on the said appellant's right hip, the words "Bahala na Gang."
Appellant Cañal and Pineda executed and swore to separate statements on the day of their arrest. In his statement
(Exh. "G"), appellant Cañal confirmed the information previously given by Jose that the four of them waited for Miss
De la Riva to come down from the ABS Studio, and that they had planned to abduct and rape her. Appellant Cañal
admitted that all four of them participated in the commission of the crime, but he would make it appear that insofar
as he was concerned the complainant yielded her body to him on condition that he would release her. Pineda
executed a statement (Exh. "J") stating that he and his other three companions went to the ABS Studio, and that, on
learning that Miss De la Riva was there, they made plans to wait for her and to follow her. He admitted that his group
followed her car and snatched her and took her to the Swanky Hotel. He would make it appear, however, that the
complainant voluntarily acceded to having sexual intercourse with him.
In his medical report (Exh. "K"), Dr. Brion noted the presence of multiple contusions and bruises on different parts of
the complainant's body, as well as of genital injuries. On the witness stand the doctor was shown several photographs
of the complainant taken in his presence and under his supervision. With the aid of the photographs and the medical
reports, the doctor explained to the court that he found contusions or bruises on the complainant's chest, shoulders,
arms and fore-arms, right arm index finger, thighs, right knee and legs. He also declared that when he was examining
her, Miss De la Riva complained of slight tenderness around the neck, on the abdominal wall and at the sides of the
extragenital physical injuries, and that on pressing the said injuries, he elicited a sigh of pain or tenderness on the part
of the subject. The injuries, according to Dr. Brion, could have been caused by blows administered by a closed fist or
by the palm of the hand, and could have been inflicted on the subject while she was being raped. It was the doctor's
opinion that they could have been sustained on or about June 26, 1967. In connection with the genital examination,
the doctor declared that he found injuries on the subject's genitalia which court have been produced by sexual
intercourse committed on June 26, 1967. He said that he failed to find spermatozoa. He explained. however, that
spermatozoa are not usually found in the vagina after the lapse of three days from the last intercourse, not to mention
the possibility that the subject might have douched herself.
The three appellants who pleaded not guilty (Jose, Aquino and Cañal) took the witness stand. We quote hereunder
the portions of the decision under review relative to the theory of the defense:
"Their story is that they and their co-accused Pineda had gone to the Ulog Cocktail Lounge
somewhere in Mabini street in Manila, and there killed time from 9:30 in the evening of June 25 until
closing time, which was about 3:30 in the early morning of the next day. At the cocktail lounge they had
listened to the music while enjoying some drinks. Between them they had consumed a whole bottle of
whisky, so much so that at least Aquino became drunk, according to his own testimony. They had been
joined at their table by a certain Frankie whom they met only that night. Come time to go home, their new
acquaintance asked to be dropped at his home in Cubao. The five men piled into the red-bodied, black
topped two-door convertible Plymouth (Pontiac) car of Jaime Jose, and with Pineda at the wheel repaired to
Cubao. After dislodging their new friend, Pineda steered the car to España Extension to bring Aquino to his
home in Mayon Street. But somewhere in España Extension before the Rotonda a small car whizzed past
them almost hitting them. They saw that the driver was a woman. Pineda gave chase and coming abreast of
the small car he shouted, 'Putang ina mo, kamuntik na kaming mamatay.' The woman continued on her
way. Now Pineda saying, 'let us teach her a lesson,' sped after her and when she swerved ostensibly to
enter a gate, Pineda stopped his car behind hers, hurriedly got down, striding to the small car, opened the
door and started dragging the girl out. Both Jose and Aquino confirm the presence of another woman
inside the girl's car, who helped the girl struggle to get free from Pineda's grip; and that the struggle lasted
about ten minutes before Pineda finally succeeded in pushing the girl into the red convertible. All the three
accused insist they did nothing to aid Pineda; but they also admit that they did nothing to stop him.
"Now the defense contends that Pineda cruised around and around the area just to scare the girl
who was in truth so scared that she begged them to let her be and return her to her home. She turned
to Jose in appeal, but this one told her he could not do anything as the 'boss' was Pineda. Aquino heard her
plead with Jose 'do you not have a sister yourself?' but did not hear the other plea 'do you not have a
mother?' Then Pineda stopped at the corner of the street where he had forcibly snatched the girl
presumably to return her, but then suddenly changing his mind he said, 'why don't you do a strip tease for
us. I'll pay you P1,000.00' and the girl taunted, 'are you kidding?'; that after a little while she consented to
do the performance as long as it would not last too long and provided the spectators were limited to the
four of them.
"Pineda sped the car until they got to Swanky Hotel where he and Maggie alighted first, but not
before Maggie had borrowed a handkerchief from one of them to cover her face as she went up the Hotel.
The three followed, and when they saw the pair enter a room, they quickly caught up. All the three accused
testify that as soon as they got into the room, Maggie de la Riva asked the boys to close the windows before
she undressed in front of them. They themselves also removed their clothing. Two of them removed their
pants retaining their briefs, while Boy Pineda and Cañal stripped to the skin 'because it was hot.' The three
accused declared that they saw Boy Pineda hand P100.00 to Maggie and they heard him promise her that he
would pay the balance of P900.00 later. Whereupon, the show which lasted about 10 minutes began with
the naked girl walking back and forth the room about 4 to 5 times. This accomplished all of them dressed
up once more and the three accused (Jaime Jose, Eduardo Aquino and Rogelio Cañal) left the room to wait
in the car for Boy Pineda and Maggie de la Riva who were apparently still discussing the mode of payment
of the balance. Three minutes later Maggie de la Riva and Boy Pineda joined them. Now, the question of
how and where to drop Maggie came up and it is testified to by the accused that it was Maggie's idea that
they should drop her near the ABS Studio so that it would appear as if she had just come from her work.
"Jaime Jose was picked by the police on the morning of June 29 along Buendia Avenue. Aquino
testifies how, on June 29 Pineda went to him with a problem. He did not have the P900.00 with which to
pay Maggie the balance of her 'show' and he was afraid that if he did not pay, Maggie would have her
goons after him. He wanted Aquino to go with him to Lipa City where he had relatives and where he could
help raise the money. Aquino readily obliged, and to make the company complete they invited Cañal to
join them. They used another car of Jaime Jose, different from the one they had used the day before. At
Lipa, Aquino detached himself from his companions and proceeded alone to the barrio allegedly to visit his
relatives. In the meantime his two companions had remained in the City and had, according to Cañal, gone
to live in a house very close to the municipal hall building. They later moved to another house where the
PC and Quezon City police posse found and arrested them. Aquino was the last to be apprehended, when
having read in the newspapers that he was wanted, he surrendered on July 5 to Mrs. Aurelia Leviste, wife
of the governor of Batangas."
The striptease-act-for-a-fee story on which the defense theory is anchored, defies one's credulity and reason, and
had failed utterly to counteract the evidence for the prosecution, particularly the complainant's testimony and Dr.
Brion's medical report and testimony. We quote with approval the able dissertation of the trial judge on this point:
"As main defense in the charge of rape, the three accused advance the proposition that nothing
happened in Swanky Hotel except a strip-tease exhibition which the complainant agreed to do for them for
a fee of P1,000.00, P100.00 down and the balance to be paid 'later.' The flaw in this contention lies in its utter
inverisimilitude. The Court cannot believe that any woman exists, even one habitually engaged in this kind
of entertainment (which Maggie de la Riva has not been proven to be) who would consent (and as easily
and promptly as defense claims) to do a performance, not even for all money in the world after the rough
handling she experienced from these wolves in men's clothing who now hungered for a show. There is no
fury to match a woman stirred to indignation. A woman's pride is far stronger than her yen for money, and
her revenge much more keen. The Court cannot believe that after the rudeness and meanness of these men
to her, Maggie would in so short an internal of time forget her indignation and so readily consent to satisfy
their immoral curiosity about her. The woman in her would urge her to turn the men's hankering as a
weapon of revenge by denying them their pleasure.
"Besides, the manner of payment offered for the performance is again something beyond even the
wildest expectations. Assuming that the woman whom the accused had abducted was in this kind of trade
and assuming that the price offered was to her satisfaction, what woman would be willing to perform first
and be paid later? It is simply preposterous to believe that Maggie de la Riva should have consented to do a
strip-tease act for a measly down-payment of P100.00 and the balance to be paid God knows when. Since
when are expositions of the flesh paid on installment basis? By the very precarious nature of their pitiful
calling, women who sell their attractions are usually very shrewd and it is to be expected that they would
demand full payment before curtain call. How was Maggie to collect later when she did not even know who
these men were, where they lived, whether they could be trusted with a promise to pay later (!) whether
she would ever find them again? If there is anything that has struck the Court about the complainant, it is
her courage, her intelligence and her alertness. Only a stupid woman, and a most stupid one at that, could
have been persuaded to do what the defense wants this Court to believe Maggie de la Riva consented to do.
"Finally, it is odd that not one of these men should have mentioned this circumstance during their
interviews with anyone, either the press, their police interrogator, the persons who negotiated their
surrender (as in the case of Aquino) or even their counsel. One cannot escape the very strong suspicion that
this story is a last ditch, desperate attempt to save the day for the accused. It truly underscores the
hopelessness of their stand and projects all the more clearly their guilt.
"Then there is the incident of the men's stripping themselves. Why was there need for this? The
Court realizes that in its desperate need of an explanation for Maggie's positive identification of Cañal as
the man with a tatoo mark on his right buttock, the defense concocted the sickeningly indecent story that
the four men removed their underclothing in the presence of a woman simply 'because it was hot.' What
kind of men were these who were so devoid of any sense of decency that they thought nothing of adding
insult to injury by not only inducing a woman to strip before them, but of forcing her to perform before
a naked audience? And then they have the gall to argue that 'nothing' happened. For males of cold and
phlegmatic blood and disposition it could be credible, but not for men of the torrid regions like ours where
quick passions and hot tempers are the rule rather than the exception!.
"All of these considerations set aside, notwithstanding, it is quite obvious that the version of the
defense has not been able to explain away a very vital piece of evidence of the prosecution which, if
unexplained, cannot but reduce any defense unavailing. The result of the physical (external and internal)
examination conducted on the person of Maggie de la Riva in the afternoon of June 29, the pertinent
findings of which are quoted earlier in this decision, establish beyond doubt that at the time that Maggie de
la Riva was examined she bore on her body traces of physical and sexual assault.
"The only attempt to an explanation made by the defense is either one of the following: (1) the
insinuation that when Maggie de la Riva and Boy Pineda were left behind in the hotel room the bruises and
the sexual attack could have taken place then. But then, the defense itself says that these two persons
rejoined the other three after three or four minutes! It is physically impossible, in such a short time, for Boy
Pineda to have attacked the girl and inflicted on her all of these injuries; (2) it was suggested by the defense
that Maggie de Riva could have inflicted all of those injuries upon herself just to make out a case against the
accused. The examining physician rules out this preposterous proposition, verily it does not take much
stretch of the imagination to see how utterly impossible this would be, and for what purpose? Was P900.00
which she had failed to collect worth that much self-torture? And what about all the shame, embarrassment
and publicity she would (as she eventually did) expose herself to? If she really had not been raped would
she have gone thru all of these tribulations?
"A woman does not easily trump up rape charges for she has much more to lose in the notoriety the
case will reap for her, her honor and that of her family, than in the redress she demands (Canastre, 82-480;
Medina, C.A. 1943 O.G. 151; Medina y Puno, CA O. G. 338; CA 55 O. G. 7666; Galamiton, L-6302, August
 25, 1954); (3) it could also be argued that the contusions and bruises could have been inflicted on Maggie
during her struggle with Pineda when the latter pulled and pushed her into the red convertible car. The
telltale injuries, however, discount this possibility, for the location in which many of the bruises and
traumas were located (particularly on the inner portion of her thighs) could not have been caused by any
struggle save by those of a woman trying to resist the brutal and bestial attack on her honor.
"In their Memorandum the accused contend that Maggie's sole and uncorroborated testimony
should not be rated any credence at all as against the concerted declaration of the three accused. In the first
place, it is not correct to say that Maggie's declaration was uncorroborated — she has for corroboration
nothing less than the written extra-judicial statements ofJose and Cañal. But even assuming that Maggie
stood alone in her statements, the cases cited by the accused in their Memorandum notwithstanding which
the Court does not consider in point anyway, jurisprudence has confirmed the ruling that numbers is the
least vital element in gauging the weight of evidence. What is more important is which of the declarations
is the more credible, the more logical, the more reasonable, the more prone to be biased or polluted. (Ricarte
44 OG 2234; Damian CA-GR No. 25523, April 24, 1959). Besides, it should be borne in mind that in the most
detestable crime of rape in which a man is at his worst the testimony of the offended party most often is the
only one available to prove directly its commission and that corroboration by other eyewitnesses would in
certain cases place a serious doubt as to the probability of its commission, so that courts of justice are most
often placed in a position of having to accept such uncorroborated testimony if the same is in other regards
conclusive, logical and probable (Landicho, VIII ACE 530)."
We shall now consider the points raised by the appellants in their briefs.
1. Appellants Jose, Aquino and Cañal deny having had anything to do with the abduction of Miss De la Riva. They
point to Pineda (who entered a plea of guilty) as the sole author thereof, but they generously contend that even as to
him the act was purged of any taint of criminality by the complainant's subsequent consent to perform a striptease
show for a fee, a circumstance which, it is claimed, negated the existence of the element of lewd design. This line of
defense has evidently no leg to stand on. The evidence is clear and overwhelming that all the appellants participated
in the forcible abduction. Miss De la Riva declared on the witness stand, as well as in her sworn statements, that they
helped one another in dragging her into the car against her will; that she did not know them personally; that while
inside the car, Jose and Aquino, between whom she was seated, toyed with her body, the farmer forcing his lips on
hers, and the latter touching her thighs and raising her skirt; that meaningful and knowing glances were in the
meanwhile being exchanged among the four; and that all of them later took turns in ravishing her at the Swanky
Hotel. This testimony, whose evidentiary weight has not in the least been overthrown by the defense, more than
suffices to establish the crimes charged in the amended complaint. In the light thereof, appellants' protestation that
they were not motivated by lewd designs must be rejected as absolutely without factual basis.
2. The commission of rape by each of the appellants has, as held by the court below, likewise been clearly
established Jose, Aquino and Cañal contend that the absence of semen in the complainant's vagina disproves the fact
of rape. The contention is untenable. Dr. Brion of the NBI, who testified as an expert, declared that semen is not
usually found in the vagina after three days from the last intercourse, especially if the subject has douched herself
within that period. In the present case, the examination was conducted on the fourth day after the incident, and the
complainant had douched herself to avoid infection and pregnancy. Furthermore, the absence of spermatozoa does
not disprove the consummation of rape, the important consideration being, not the emission of semen, but
penetration (People vs. Hernandez, 49 Phil., 980). Aquino's suggestion that the abrasions on the cervix were caused by
the tough tip of a noozle deliberately used by the complainant to strengthen her alleged fabricated tale of rape, is
absurd, if not cruel. It is difficult to imagine that any sane woman, who is single and earning as much as Miss De la
Riva did, would inflict injuries on her genital organ by puncturing the same with a sharply-pointed instrument in
order to strike back at four strangers who allegedly would not pay her the sum of P900.00 due her for a strip-tease act.
Besides, Dr. Brion testified that the insertion of such an instrument in the genital organ would not result in the kind of
injuries he found in the mucosa of the cervix.
3. Other evidence and considerations exist which indubitably establish the commission of successive rapes by the four
appellants. Upon Miss De la Riva's arrival at her house in the morning of June 26, 1967, she immediately told her
mother, "Mommy, Mommy, I have been raped. All four of them raped me." This utterance, which is part of the res
gestae, commands strong probative value, considering that it was made by the complainant to her mother who, in
cases of this nature, was the most logical person in whom a daughter would confide the truth. Aquino and Cañal
would make capital of the fact that Miss De la Riva stated to the reporters on the morning of June 26, that she was not
abused. Her statement to the press is understandable. At that time the complainant, who had not yet consulted her
family on a matter which concerned her reputation as well as that of her family, and her career, was not then in a
position to reveal publicly what had happened to her. This is one reason why the complainant did not immediately
inform the authorities of the tragedy that befell her. Another reason is that she was threatened with disfiguration.
And there were, of course, the traumas found by Dr. Brion on different parts of the complainant's body. Could they,
too, have been self-inflicted? Or, as suggested, could they possibly have been inflicted by appellant Pineda alone,
when the story given by the other three is that Pineda and the complainant were left in the hotel room for only three
or four minutes, and that they came out to join them in what they would picture to be a cordial atmosphere, the
complainant even allegedly suggesting that she be dropped on a spot where people would reasonably presume her to
have come from a studio? Equally important is the complainant's public disclosure of her tragedy, which led to an
examination of her private parts and lay her open to risks of future public ridicule and diminution of popularity and
earnings as a movie actress.
4. Jose and Cañal seek the exclusion of their extra-judicial statements from the mass of evidence on the grounds that
they were secured from them by force and intimidation, and that the incriminating details therein were supplied by
the police investigators. We are not convinced that the statements were involuntarily given, or that the details recited
therein were concocted by the authorities. The statements were given in the presence of several people and
subscribed and sworn to before the City Fiscal of Quezon City, to whom neither of the aforesaid appellants intimated
the use of inordinate methods by the police. They are replete with details which could hardly be known to the police;
and although it is suggested that the authorities could have secured such details from their various informers, no
evidence at all was presented to establish the truth of such allegation. While in their statementsJose and Cañal
admitted having waited — together with the two other appellants — for Miss De la Riva at the ABS Studio, each of
them attempted in the same statements to exculpate himself: appellant Jose stated that only Pineda and Aquino
criminally abused the complainant; while appellant Cañal would make it appear that the complainant willingly
allowed him to have sexual intercourse with her. Had the statements been prepared by the authorities, they would
hardly have contained matters which were apparently designed to exculpate the affiants. It is significant, too, that the
said two appellants did not see it fit to inform any of their friends or relatives of the alleged use of force and
intimidation by the police. Dr. Mariano Nario of the Quezon City Police Department, who examined appellant Cañal
after the latter made his statement, found no trace of injury on any part of the said appellant's body in spite of the
claims that he was boxed on the stomach and that one of his arms was burned with a cigarette lighter. In the
circumstances, and considering, further, that the police officers who took down their statements categorically denied
on the witness stand that the two appellants were tortured, or that any detail in the statements was supplied by them
or by anyone other than the affiants themselves, We see no reason to depart from the trial court's well-considered
conclusion that the statements were voluntarily given. However, even disregarding the in-custody statements
of Jose and Cañal, We find that the mass of evidence for the prosecution on record will suffice to secure the conviction
of the two.
The admissibility of his extrajudicial statements is likewise being questioned by Jose on the other ground that he was
not assisted by counsel during the custodial interrogations. He cites the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States in Messiah vs. U.S. (377 U.S. 201), Escobedo vs. Illinois (378 U.S. 478) and Miranda vs. Arizona (384 U.S. 436).
The provision of the Constitution of the Philippines in point is Article III (Bill of Rights), Section 1, par. 17 of which
provides: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall . . . enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel . . ."
While the said provision is identical to that in the Constitution of the United States, in this jurisdiction the
term criminal prosecutionswas interpreted by this Court, in U.S. vs. Beecham, 23 Phil., 258 (1912), in connection with a
similar provision in the Philippine Bill of Rights (Section 5 of Act of Congress of July 1, 1902) to mean proceedings
before the trial court from arraignment to rendition of the judgment. Implementing the said constitutional provision,
We have provided in Section 1, Rule 115 of the Rules of Court that "In all criminal prosecutions the defendant shall be
entitled . . . (b) to be present and defend in person and by attorney at every stage of the proceedings, that is, from the
arraignment to the promulgation of the judgment." The only instances where an accused is entitled to counsel before
arraignment, if he so requests, are during the second stage of the preliminary investigation (Rule 112, Section 11) and
after the arrest (Rule 113, Section 18). The rule in the United States need not be unquestioningly adhered to in this
jurisdiction, not only because it has no binding effect here, but also because in interpreting a provision of the
Constitution the meaning attached thereto at the time of the adoption thereof should be considered. And even there
the said rule is not yet quite settled, as can be deduced from the absence of unanimity in the voting by the members of
the United States Supreme Court in all the three above-cited cases.
5. Appellant Pineda claims that insofar as he is concerned there was a mistrial resulting in gross miscarriage of justice.
He contends that because the charge against him and his co-appellants is a capital offense and the amended
complaint cited aggravating circumstances, which, if proved, would raise the penalty to death, it was the duty of the
court to insist on his presence during all stages of the trial. The contention is untenable. While a plea of guilty is
mitigating, at the same time it constitutes an admission of all the material facts alleged in the information, including
the aggravating circumstances, and it matters not that the offense is capital, for the admission (plea of guilty) covers
both the crime and its attendant circumstances qualifying and/or aggravating the crime (People vs. Boyles, et al., L-
15308, May 29, 1964, citing People vs. Ama, 1-14783, April 29, 1961, and People vs. Parete, L-15515, April 29, 1961).
Because of the aforesaid legal effect of Pineda's plea of guilty, it was not incumbent upon the trial court to receive his
evidence, much less to require his presence in court. It would be different had appellant Pineda requested the court to
allure him to prove mitigating circumstances, for then it would be the better part of discretion on the part of the trial
court to grant his request. (Cf. People, vs. Arconado, L-16175, February 28, 1962.) The case of U.S. vs. Agcaoili (31
Phil., 91), cited by Pineda, is not in point, for there this Court ordered a new trial because it found for a fact that the
accused, who had pleaded guilty, "did not intend to admit that he committed the offense with the aggravating
circumstances" mentioned in the information. We are not in a position to make a similar finding here. The transcript
of the proceedings during the arraignment shows that Pineda's counsel, Atty. Lota, prefaced his client's plea of guilty
with the statement that
 "I have advised him (Pineda) about the technicalities in plain simple language of the
contents of aggravating circumstances and apprised him of the penalty he would get, and we have
given said accused time to think. After a while I consulted him — for three times — and his
decision was still the same."
Three days after the arraignment, the same counsel stated in court that he had always been averse to Pineda's idea of
pleading guilty, because "I know the circumstances called for the imposition of the maximum penalty considering the
aggravating circumstances," but that he acceded to his client's wish only after the fiscal had stated that he would
recommend to the court the imposition of life imprisonment on his client. To be sure, any such recommendation does
not bind the Court. The situation here, therefore, is far different from that obtaining in U.S. vs. Agcaoili, supra.
6. Two of the appellants — Jose and Cañal — bewail the enormous publicity that attended the case from the start of
investigation to the trial. In spite of the said publicity, however, it appears that the court a quo was able to give the
appellants a fair hearing. For one thing, three of the seven (7) original accused were acquitted. For another
thing, Josehimself admits in his brief that the Trial Judge "had not been influenced by adverse and unfair comments of
the press, unmindful of the rights of the accused to a presumption of innocence and to fair trial."
We are convinced that the herein four appellants have conspired together to commit the crimes imputed to them in
the amended information quoted at the beginning of this decision. There is no doubt at all that the forcible abduction
of the complainant from in front of her house in Quezon City, was a necessary if not indispensable means which
enabled them to commit the various and successive acts of rape upon her person. It bears noting, however, that even
while the first act of rape was being performed, the crime of forcible abduction had already been consummated, so
that each of the three succeeding crimes of the same nature can not legally be considered as still connected with the
abduction — in other words, they should be detached from, and considered independently of, that of forcible
abduction and, therefore, the former can no longer be complexed with the latter.
What kind of rape was committed? Undoubtedly, it is that which is punishable by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death, under paragraph 3, Article 335, as amended byRepublic Act No. 4111 which took effect on June 20, 1964, and
which provides as follows:
"ART. 335. When and how rape committed. — Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances:
"1. By using force or intimidation;
"2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
"3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances mentioned
in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.
"The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
"Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons,
the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
"When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be death.
"When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion
thereof, the penalty shall be likewise death.
"When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death."
As regards, therefore, the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, the first of the crimes committed, the latter
is definitely the more serious; hence, pursuant to the provision of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty
prescribed shall be imposed in its maximum period. Consequently, the appellants should suffer the extreme penalty
of death. In this regard, there is hardly any necessity to consider the attendance of aggravating circumstances, for
the same would not alter the nature of the penalty to be imposed.
Nevertheless, to put matters in their proper perspective and for the purpose of determining the proper penalty to be
imposed in each of the other three crimes of simple rape, it behooves Us to make a definite finding in this
connection to the effect that the commission of said crimes was attended with the following aggravating
circumstances: (a) nighttime, appellants having purposely sought such circumstance to facilitate the commission of
these crimes; (b) abuse of superior strength, the crime having been committed by the four appellants in conspiracy
with one another (Cf. People vs. De Guzman, et al., 51 Phil., 105, 113); (c) ignominy, since the appellants in ordering
the complainant to exhibit to them her complete nakedness for about ten minutes, before raping her, brought about
a circumstance which tended to make the effects of the crime more humiliating; and (d) use of a motor vehicle. With
respect to appellants Jose, Aquino and Cañal, none of these aggravating circumstances has been offset by any
mitigating circumstance. Appellant Pineda should, however, be credited with the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary plea of guilty, a factor which does not in the least affect the nature of the proper penalties to be imposed,
for the reason that there would still be three aggravating circumstances remaining. As a result, appellants should
likewise be made to suffer the extreme, penalty of death in each of these three simple crimes of rape. Art. 63(2) RPC
In refusing to impose as many death penalties as there are offenses committed, the trial court applied by analogy
Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that "the maximum duration of all the penalties therein
imposed upon the appellant shall not be more than three-fold the length of time corresponding to the most severe of
the penalties imposed upon the appellant, which should not exceed forty years." The said court is of the opinion that
since a man has only one life to pay for a wrong, the ends of justice would be served, and society and the victim
would be vindicated just as well, if only one death penalty were imposed on each of the appellants.
We cannot agree with the trial court. Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code can only be taken into account in
connection with the service of the sentence imposed, not in the imposition of the penalty (People vs. Escares, 55 Off.
Gaz., 623). In holding that only one death penalty should be imposed because man has only one life, the trial court
ignored the principle enunciated in the very case it cited, namely, U.S. vs. Balaba, 37 Phil., 260, where this Court, in
affirming the judgment of the trial court, found the accused guilty of two murders and one homicide and imposed
upon him two death sentences for the murders and a prison term for the homicide. In not applying the said
principle, the court a quo said that the case of Balaba is different from the present case, for while in the former case
the accused was found to have committed three distinct offenses, here only one offense is charged, even if complex.
As We have explained earlier herein, four crimes were committed, charged and proved. There is, therefore, no
substantial difference between the two cases insofar as the basic philosophy involved is concerned, for the fact
remains that in the case of Balaba this Court did not hesitate to affirm the two death sentences imposed on the
accused by the trial court. In People vs. Peralta, et al., L-19060, October 29, 1968, in which this Court imposed on
each of the six accused three death penalties for three distinct and separate crimes of murder, We said that "since it
is the settled rule that once conspiracy is established, the act of one conspirator is attributable to all, then each
conspirator must be held liable for each of the felonious acts committed as a result of the conspiracy, regardless of
the nature and severity of the appropriate penalties prescribed by law." In the said case (which was promulgated
after the decision of the court a quo had been handed down) We had occasion to discuss at length the legality and
practicality of imposing multiple death penalties, thus:
"The imposition of multiple death penalties is decried by some as a useless formality, an exercise in futility. It is
contended, undeniably enough, that a death convict, like all mortals, has only one life to forfeit. And because of
this physiological and biological attribute of man, it is reasoned that the imposition of multiple death penalties
is impractical and futile because after the service of one capital penalty, the execution of the rest of the death
penalties will naturally be rendered impossible. The foregoing opposition to the multiple imposition of death
penalties suffers from four basic flaws: (1) it fails to consider the legality of imposing multiple capital penalties;
(2) it fails to distinguish between imposition of penalty and service of sentence; (3) it ignores the fact that
multiple death sentences could be served simultaneously; and (4) it overlooks the practical merits of imposing
multiple death penalties.
"The imposition of a penalty and the service of a sentence are two distinct, though related, concepts. The imposition
of the proper penalty or penalties is determined by the nature, gravity and number of offenses charged and
proved, whereas service of sentence is determined by the severity and character of the penalty or penalties
imposed. In the imposition of the proper penalty or penalties, the court does not concern itself with the
possibility or practicality of the service of the sentence, since actual service is a contingency subject to varied
factors like the successful escape of the convict, grant of executive clemency or natural death of the prisoner. All
that go into the imposition of the proper penalty or penalties, to reiterate, are the nature, gravity and number of
the offenses charged and proved and the corresponding penalties prescribed by law.
"Multiple death penalties are not impossible to serve because they will have to be executed simultaneously. A
cursory reading of article 70 will show that there are only two moves of serving two or more (multiple)
penalties: simultaneously or successively. The first rule is that two or more penalties shall be served
simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so permit. In the case of multiple capital penalties, the nature
of said penal sanctions does not only permit but actually necessitates simultaneous service.
"The imposition of multiple death penalties, far from being a useless formality, has practical importance. The
sentencing of an accused to several capital penalties is an indelible badge of his extreme criminal perversity,
which may not be accurately projected by the imposition of only one death sentence irrespective of the number
of capital felonies for which he is liable. Showing thus the reprehensible character of the convict in its real
dimensions, the possibility of a grant of executive clemency is justifiably reduced in no small measure. Hence,
the imposition of multiple death penalties could effectively serve as a deterrent to an improvident grant of
pardon or commutation. Faced with the utter delinquency of such a convict, the proper penitentiary authorities
would exercise judicious restraint in recommending clemency or leniency in his behalf.
"Granting, however, that the Chief Executive, in the exercise of his constitutional power to pardon (one of the
presidential prerogatives which is almost absolute) deems it proper to commute the multiple death penalties to
multiple life imprisonments, then the practical effect is that the convict has to serve the maximum forty (40)
years of multiple life sentences. If only one death penalty is imposed, and then is commuted to life
imprisonment, the convict will have to serve a maximum of only thirty years corresponding to a single life
sentence."
We are, therefore, of the opinion that in view of the existence of conspiracy among them and of our finding as regards
the nature and number of the crimes committed, as well as of the presence of aggravating circumstances, four death
penalties should be imposed in the premises.
xxx xxx xxx
Before Us is a petition for intervention filed by Filipinas Investment & Finance Corporation asking for reversal of that
portion of the judgment of the court below ordering the confiscation of the car used by the appellants in abducting the
complainant. The aforesaid car is a 1965 two-door Pontiac sedan with Motor No. WT-222410, Serial No.
2376752110777, Plate No. H-33284, File No. 11584171, alleged by the intervenor to be in the custody of Major Ernesto
San Diego of the Quezon City Police Department. The car is registered in the name of Mrs. Dolores Gomez.
On April 4, 1967, Mrs. Dolores Gomez, mother of appellant Jaime G. Jose, bought the car from the Malayan Motors
Corporation and simultaneously executed a chattel mortgage thereon to secure payment of the purchase price of
P13,200, which was stipulated to be payable in 24 monthly installments of P550 beginning May 4, 1967 up to April 4,
1969. The mortgage was duly registered with the Land Transportation Commission and inscribed in the Chattel
Mortgage Registry. The mortgage lien was annotated on the motor registration certificate. On April 17, 1967, for value
received and with notice to Mrs. Gomez, the Malayan Motors Corporation assigned its credit against Mrs. Gomez, as
well as the chattel mortgage, to the intervenor. The assignment was duly registered with the Land Transportation
Commission and annotated on the registration certificate.
Mrs. Gomez failed to pay any of the installments due, in view of which the intervenor filed on July 5, 1967, an action
for replevin against her (Civil Case No. 69993, Court of First Instance of Manila) as a preliminary step to foreclosure
of the chattel mortgage. On July 7, 1967, the court issued an order for the seizure of the car. The sheriff, however,
could not enforce the writ of replevin because the car was not in Mrs. Gomez' possession, the same having been used
by her son, appellant Jaime G. Jose, together with the other appellants in this case, in the abduction of Miss De la Riva,
as a result of which the car was seized by the Quezon City police and placed in the custody of Major San Diego, who
refused to surrender it to the sheriff on the ground that it would be used as evidence in the trial of the criminal case.
During the pendency of that criminal case in the court below, or on July 26, 1967, the intervenor filed with the said
court a petition for intervention. The said petition was not, however, acted upon. On October 2, 1967, the trial court
rendered its judgment in the present case ordering the car's confiscation as an instrument of the crime. Although not
notified of the said decision, the intervenor filed, on October 17, 1967, a motion for reconsideration of the order of
confiscation; but the same was denied on October 31, 1967, on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over
the case in view of the automatic elevation thereof to this Court. The intervenor then filed a petition for relief from
judgment, but the same was also denied.
On February 5, 1968, judgment was rendered in the replevin case ordering Mrs. Gomez to deliver the car to the
intervenor so that the chattel mortgage thereon could be foreclosed, or, in the alternative, to pay the intervenor the
sum of P13,200 with interest thereon at 12% per annum from July 5, 1968, the premium bond, attorney's fees, and the
costs of suit. The judgment became final and executory. Attempts to execute the judgment against the properties of
Mrs. Gomez were unavailing; the writ of execution was returned by the sheriff unsatisfied. On July 26, 1968, the
present petition for intervention was filed with this Court, which allowed the intervenor to file a brief. In his brief the
Solicitor General contends, among others, that the court a quo having found that appellant Jose is the owner of the car,
the order of confiscation is correct.
Considering that the car in question is registered in the name of Mrs. Dolores Gomez, who, in the absence of strong
evidence to the contrary, must be considered as the lawful owner thereof; that the only basis of the court a quo in
concluding that the said car belongs to appellant Jose were the latter's statements during the trial of the criminal case
to that effect; that the said statements were not, however, intended to be, nor could constitute, a claim of ownership
over the car adverse to his mother, but were made simply in answer to questions propounded in court for the sole
purpose of establishing the identity of the defendant who furnished the car used by the appellants in the commission
of the crime; that the chattel mortgage on the car and its assignment in favor of the intervenor were made several
months before the date of the commission of the crimes charged, which circumstance forecloses the possibility of
collusion to prevent the State from confiscating the car; that the final judgment in the replevin case can only be
executed by delivering the possession of the car to the intervenor for foreclosure of the chattel mortgage; and that
Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code bars the confiscation and forfeiture of an instrument or tool used in the
commission of the crime if such "be the property of a third person not liable for the offense," it is the sense of this
Court that the order of the court below for the confiscation of the car in question should be set, aside and that the said
car should be ordered delivered to the intervenor for foreclosure as decreed in the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Manila in the replevin case, Civil Case No. 69993. xxx xxx xxx
Before the actual promulgation of this decision, this Court received a formal manifestation on the part of the Solicitor
General to the effect that Rogelio Cañal, one of the herein appellants, died in prison on December 28, 1970. As a result
of this development, this case is hereby dismissed as to him alone, and only insofar as his criminal liability is
concerned, with one-fourth (1/4) of the costs declared de oficio.
WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby modified as follows: appellants Jaime G. Jose, Basilio Pineda, Jr.,
and Edgardo P. Aquino are pronounced guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, and each and
every one of them is likewise convicted of three (3) other crimes of rape. As a consequence thereof, each of them is
hereby sentenced to four (4) death penalties; all of them shall, jointly and severally, indemnify the complainant in the
sum of P10,000.00 in each of the four crimes, or a total of P40,000; and each shall pay one-fourth (1/4) of the costs.
Insofar as the car used in the commission of the crime is concerned, the order of the court a quo for its confiscation is
hereby set aside; and whoever is in custody thereof is hereby ordered to deliver its possession to intervenor Filipinas
Investment & Finance Corporation in accordance with the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil
Case No. 69993 thereof.

[G.R. No. L-1536. July 31, 1947.]

RICARDO PARULAN vs. SOTERO RODAS (CFI-Manila Judge), and LUIS REYES (Assistant City Fiscal)
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION; COMPLEX CRIME HOW DETERMINED. — In order to
determine whether two offenses constitute a complex crime, the court should not find out whether, in accordance with their
definition by law, one of them is an essential element of the other, such as physical injuries which cause the death of the victim, or
stealing of personal property without the consent of the owner through force or violence, for in such cases there would be only one
single offense of homicide in the first and robbery in the second case. But it should take into consideration the facts alleged in a
complaint or information and determine whether one of the two separate and different offenses charged therein v as committed as
a necessary means to commit the other offense; if it were the two offenses constitute one complex crime; otherwise the complaint or
information charges two crimes or offenses independent from one another. Examples are given in the resolution.
2. COURTS; JURISDICTION; COMPLEX CRIME. — The crime charged being a complex crime of kidnapping and murder, the
court of first instance of any province in which any one of the essential elements of said complex offense has been committed, has
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offense; and, therefore, the Court of First Instance of Manila from where the victim was
kidnapped has jurisdiction over the offense, for the crime of kidnapping is a continuous offense committed in Manila and
continued all the way to the place where the victim was taken and murdered.
FERIA, J p:
This is a motion for reconsideration of our resolution dated July 11, 1947, which reads as follows:
"Passing upon the petition for certiorari in G. R. No. L-1536, Ricardo Parulan vs. Sotero
Rodas, etc. et al., praying for relief from the order of the respondent Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, dated July 8, 1947, denying petitioner's motion to quash the information filed in
criminal case No. 3649 of said respondent Court as well as petitioner's motion for reconsideration
and praying, further, for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the respondent
Judge from arraigning the petitioner on July 12, 1947: the Court resolved to dismiss said petition of
the ground that the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction over the complex offence of
kidnapping with murder, the one charged in the information. . .
Section 48 of the Penal Code, providing for penalties for complex crime, says that "when an offense is a
necessary means to commit the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be
applied in its maximum period." Therefore, the question for determination in the present case is whether the
offense charged in the information is a complex crime of kidnapping and murder, the former as a necessary
means for committing the latter.
In order to determine whether two offenses constitute a complex crime, we should not find out whether,
in accordance with their definition by law, one of them is as essential element of the other, such as physical
injuries which cause the death of the victim, or stealing of personal property without the consent of the owner
through force or violence, for in such cases there would be only one single offense of homicide in the first and
robbery in the second case. But we should take into consideration the facts alleged in a complaint or information
and determine whether one of the two separate and different offenses charged therein was committed as a
necessary means to commit the other offense; if it were the two offenses constitute one complex crime; otherwise
the complaint or information charges two crimes or offenses independent from one another.
For example, the crime of falsification of a private document is not in general, an essential element of the
crime of estafa, because this offense may be committed through many and varied means; but if a defendant is
charged in a complaint or information with having committed falsification of a private document as a means for
committing estafa, the offense charged would be a complex offense of estafa through falsification. Also, abduction
is, in general, not an essential element of rape because rape may be committed anywhere without necessity of
forcibly abducting or taking the victim to another place for that purpose; but if the offense charged is that the
defendant abducted or carried by force the victim from one place to another wherein the latter was raped by the
former, the crime charged would be a complex crime of rape through abduction, the abduction being in such a
case a necessary means to commit the rape. And although homicide or murder may be committed wherever the
victim may be found, yet if the charge in a complaint or information is that the victim was kidnapped and taken
to another distant place in order to demand ransom for his release and kill him if ransom is not paid, the offense
charged would evidently be a complex crime of murder through kidnapping, the latter being a necessary means
to commit the former.
The pertinent part of the information reads as follows:
"That on or about the 10th day of June, 1947, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, being then private individuals, conspiring and confederating together and all helping one
another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and for the purpose of extorting
ransom from one Arthur Lee or of killing him if the desired amount of money could not be given,
kidnap, carry away in as automobile, detain, and later, after having taken him to an uninhabited
place be means of a motor boat, with treachery, to wit: while the said Arthur Lee was deprived of
his liberty and was very weak as a result of the physical injuries which had been previously
inflicted upon him by the said accused, fire upon him with a .45 caliber pistol several shots thru the
chest and head, fracturing the right 5th and 6th ribs and the skull and lacerating the brain, thereby
inflicting upon him physical injuries which directly caused the death of the said Arthur Lee almost
instantaneously."
From a cursory examination of the foregoing it clearly appears that the crime charged is kidnapping and
murder and the former was committed by the defendants as a necessary means "for the purpose of extorting
ransom from the victim or killing him if the desired amount of money could not be given," that is, that the
defendants had to kidnap or carry the victim to a faraway and secluded place in order to better secure the consent
of the victim through fear to pay the ransom, and kill him with certain sense of impunity and certainty that no
other person may witness the commission of the offense by the defendants if the victim refuses to accede to their
demand and that in fact he was killed by the defendants because of his refusal to pay the ransom.
The crime charged being a complex crime of kidnapping and murder, the court of first instance of any
province in which any one of the essential elements of said complex offense has been committed, has jurisdiction
to take cognizance of the offense, and, therefore, the Court of First Instance of Manila from where the victim was
kidnapped has jurisdiction over the offense, for the crime of kidnapping is a continuous offense committed in
Manila and continued all the way to the place where the victim was taken and murdered.
The motion for reconsideration is therefore denied.
[G.R. Nos. 113692-93. April 4, 1997.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDWIN JULIAN, et. al.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES IN REVIEWING RAPE CASES. — In deciding this
appeal, the Court is guided by certain well-established principles in reviewing rape cases, to wit: "(a) an accusation of rape can be
made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (b) due to the
nature of the crime of rape where usually only two persons are involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized
with extreme caution; and (c) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense." Furthermore, as in other rape cases, "the credibility of the offended
party's testimony is determinative of the outcome" of the case because "when an alleged victim of rape says that she was violated,
she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been inflicted on her and so long as her testimony meets the test of
credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof."
2. ID.; ID.; NO LAW REQUIRES A MEDICAL EXAMINATION FOR THE SUCCESSFUL PROSECUTION OF RAPE. — No law
requires a medical examination for the successful prosecution of rape. Thus, it has been held: ". . . lack of lacerated wounds does
not negate sexual intercourse. Moreover, the fact that hymenal lacerations were found to be 'healed round edge' and no
spermatozoa was found does not necessarily negate rape. A freshly broken hymen is not an essential element of rape. For that
matter, in crimes against chastity, the medical examination of the victim is not an indispensable element for the successful prosecution of the
crime, as her testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the accused thereof ."
3. ID.; EVIDENCE; TESTIMONY; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; THE TRIAL COURT'S EVALUATION IS VIEWED AS CORRECT
AND IS ENTITLED TO THE HIGHEST RESPECT. — In assessing the credibility of witnesses, the long-held doctrine is that "that
trial court's evaluation as to the credibility of witnesses is viewed as correct and entitled to the highest respect because it is more
competent to so conclude, having had the opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor and deportment on the stand, and the
manner in which they gave their testimonies. The trial judge therefore can better determine if such witnesses were telling the truth,
being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies. Therefore, unless the trial judge plainly overlooked certain facts of
substance and value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, his assessment on credibility must be respect."
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT AFFECTED BY THE DELAY IN FILING THE COMPLAINT; CASE AT BAR. — Delay in prosecuting the
offense is not an indication of a fabricated charge. Many victims of rape never complain or file criminal charges against the rapists.
They prefer to bear the ignominy and pain, rather than reveal their shame to the world or risk the offenders' making good their
threats to kill or hurt their victims." This is "understandable as Filipino women are known to be affectedly shy and coy. Rape
stigmatizes the victim, not the perpetrator. It is sad reality that a non-virgin who has been deflowered against her will is
nonetheless treated with scorn by society." In the final analysis, what is important is that both Nelia Agtarap and Angeles Alonzo
revealed they had been raped when they filed their sworn complaint with the Laoag Police. Consequently, Nelia's delay in filing
the complaint does not in any way affect her credibility.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; DOCTRINE OF "FALSUS IN UNO, FALSUS IN OMNIBUS"; NOT AN INFLEXIBLE RULE OF UNIVERSAL
APPLICATION; CASE AT BAR. — The doctrine of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus "deals only with the weight of evidence and is not
a positive rule of law, and the same is not an inflexible one of universal application. The modern trend of jurisprudence is that the
testimony of a witness may be believed in part and disbelieved in part, depending upon the corroborative evidence and the
probabilities and improbabilities of the case. That is the present rule in the Philippines, and appellant cannot . . . discredit such
portions of her testimony as are otherwise credible." Hence, the mere fact that Angeles and Nelia had mistakenly implicated
Obrero in their complaint does not belie their charges against the other accused including the accused-appellant Edwin Julian
when, from the evidence on record, such charges are overwhelmingly credible and probable.
6. ID.; ID.; ALIBI; INHERENTLY WEAK AND UNRELIABLE, AND MAY EASILY BE FABRICATED. — Courts have always
looked upon the defense of alibi with suspicion and have always received it with caution not only because it is inherently weak
and unreliable but because it is easily fabricated. For alibi to serve as basis for acquittal, it must be established with clear and
convincing evidence. The requisites of time and place must be strictly met. Appellant must convincingly demonstrate that it was
physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.
PANGANIBAN, J p:
Rape is chilling, naked sadism. It is marked by the savagery and brutality of the assault on the helpless victim's
person and privacy. Thus, a severe penalty is meted out by the State, as parens patriae, for this abhorrent crime,
revealing the clear legislative intent to "protect women against the unbridled bestiality of persons who cannot control
their libidinous proclivities." 1
This is an appeal from the Decision 2 dated September 15, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region,
Branch 15 3 stationed in Laoag City, in Criminal Case No. 2822-15 finding Accused-appellant Edwin Julian guilty of
forcible abduction with rape plus three counts of rape. Incidentally, the city prosecutor committed the unfortunate
mistake of not including Edwin Julian as an accused in Criminal Case No. 2823-15 resulting in the dropping of the
latter from that related case. cdta
In the amended Criminal Complaint 4 in Criminal Case No. 2822-15, Accused-appellant Edwin Julian and Accused
Alberto Bumanglag, Mario Alonzo alias Marcos Obrero, Ernesto Macalipis and Pedro Duldulao were charged with
forcible abduction with rape. The crime was committed as follows:
"That on or about the 19th day of November, 1984, in the City of Laoag, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, together,
confederating with and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully
and feloniously, with lewd design, forcibly abduct (sic) the undersigned complainant against her
will, and did then and there take her, pursuant to their common criminal design, to an uninhabited
place in Barangay 15, San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, where each of the accused Edwin Julian, Alberto
Bumanglag, Mario Alonzo alias Marcos Obrero, and Pedro Duldulao by means of force and
intimidation, and with the use of a deadly weapon, have carnal knowledge of the undersigned
complainant, against her will, to her damage and prejudice in such amount as maybe (sic) awarded
to her under the provisions of the New Civil Code of the Philippines.
That the aforestated offense has been attended by the following aggravating circumstances:
1. Use of motor vehicle;
2. Nighttime, sought purposely to facilitate the commission of the crime and to make its
discovery difficult; and
3. Abuse of superior strength.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
The foregoing amended complaint, filed with the certification of Assistant City Fiscal Constante C. Caridad
after the latter had found a prima facie case against the accused, was treated as the Information. When
arraigned, all the accused, except Ernesto Macalipis who was not arrested and remained at large, pleaded not
guilty to the charge. Subsequently, Bumanglag jumped bail but the trial court correctly ordered his trial in
absentia. In an order dated November 21, 1986, the court a quo dropped Mario Alonzo alias Marcos Obrero
from the information after the complainants had cleared him of participation in the crime charged. After trial,
the trial court rendered a judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, Judgment is hereby rendered
declaring EDWIN JULIAN, ALBERTO BUMANGLAG, and PEDRO DULDULAO guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape and three (3) separate Crimes of
Rape in Criminal Case No. 2822, and are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of FOUR (4) TERMS
of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify, jointly and severally, complainant Nelia Agtarap in the
amount of P150,000.00. In Criminal Case No. 2823, the Court finds ALBERTO BUMANGLAG and
PEDRO DULDULAO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape
and two (2) separate crimes of Rape, and are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of THREE
TERMS of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify, jointly and severally, complainant Angeles Alonzo
in the amount of P150.000.00.
Accused ALBERTO BUMANGLAG is sentenced in absentia having escaped from detention
during the trial. With respect to accused ERNESTO MACALIPIS who was not arrested and has
remained at large, the two (2) cases are hereby ordered ARCHIVED insofar as he is concerned, to be
automatically revived upon his arrest.
Pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 2-92 of the Supreme Court dated January 20, 1992,
the bailbond given for the provisional liberty of EDWIN JULIAN and PEDRO DULDULAO are
hereby CANCELLED and they are hereby ordered committed to prison immediately.
SO ORDERED." 5
The Bureau of Corrections informed this Court in a letter dated July 7, 1994 that Accused-appellant Edwin
Julian "was received in the New Bilibid Prison on October 14, 1993," but that there was "no record of
confinement of ALBERTO BUMANGLAG and PEDRO DULDULAO," 6 who are thus deemed at large.
The Facts: Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution's version, as gleaned by the trial court from the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Angeles
Alonzo (the complainant in Criminal Case No. 2823-15 and witness in Criminal Case No. 2822-15) and Nelia
Agtarap (the complainant in Criminal Case No. 2822-15 and witness in Criminal Case No. 2823-15) is as follows:
"Angeles and Nelia, 35 and 33 years old, respectively, and both residents of Laoag City,
worked as beauticians at Ceasar's Beauty Parlor located in the Laoag City supermarket. In the
evening of November 19, 1984 between 7:00 to 8:00 o'clock they left the beauty parlor in the
company of two male customers who had invited them to go out for snacks. They rode in the 2-
door Gemini car of Roy Valdez, a vacationing 'balikbayan', together with Jun Alcon, Roy's friend.
They first went to the residence of Angeles in Nangalisan where she asked permission to go out
with her friends.
 They returned to the poblacion to buy their snacks after which they proceeded to the Laoag
City (Marcos) Bridge. They stopped at the southern end of the bridge and parked their car on the
eastern lane facing north, near a streetlight. Angeles, Roy and Jun got off while Nelia remained
inside the car seated at the right front seat. The door was open and she was facing her three
companions who were only one meter away from the car.
While they were thus enjoying the breeze and taking their snacks, four (4) men later
identified as the accused approached from the western side of the bridge and surrounded them.
Julian opened the car's left door and sat on the driver's seat. Bumanglag pointed a gun at them and
ordered them to get inside the car. When they hesitated, one of the accused pushed them inside the
car. Once inside the car, the accused put on masks. Julian backed up the car and drove towards
Gabu and then turned left towards Suba. All this time, the accused were threatening the
complainants to keep quiet and forced them to stop everytime a vehicle approached. On the road to
Suba, Duldulao and Macalipis tore the seat cover of the car and used it to blindfold Angeles and
Nelia. Duldulao also tied the hands and feet of Roy Valdez and Jun Alcon. Julian then stopped the
car at a narrow road in what turned out to be a forested area and all of them were told to get out.
Bumanglag removed the blindfold of Angeles and led her to an open field about 10 to 12
meters away from the car. He pointed a gun at her hand and told her to follow and do as told. At
the same time Julian and Duldulao led Nelia, also with blindfold removed, to another place about 6
meters away from the place where Bumanglag led Angeles.
Poking his gun at various parts of Angeles' body, Bumanglag ordered her to remove her
pants and panty. Angeles first pleaded with Bumanglag to spare her and when she resisted
Bumanglag kicked and boxed her thighs. After her pants and panty were removed, Bumanglag
ordered Angeles to lie down and when she refused he pushed her to the ground. He lay on top of
her, kissing and embracing her. Angeles fought and resisted by pressing her legs together but
Bumanglag was stronger. He forced her legs apart with his own legs and succeeded in raping her.
After Bumanglag was through with her she put back her panty and pants but Duldulao
came along and forced her to undress again, threatening her if she refused. She felt so weak and
had no more energy to fight and resist and so Duldulao also succeeded in raping her, even adding
insult to injury by asking if she was enjoying it. cdll
After Angeles had dressed up, Duldulao took her back to the car but on the way they met
Macalipis who grabbed her from Duldulao. She cried out for help and shouted, 'Nelia, where are
you?' Nelia shouted back, 'I'm here' and Nelia was also crying. Macalipis also forced Angeles to
undress and succeeded in raping her. She felt very tried (sic) and had no more strength to resist.
She managed to dress up but after walking about 2 meters toward the car she felt so exhausted that
she sat on the ground. Macalipis told her that they did what they did because they had just come
down from the mountains and that they were deprived of sex for a long time. It was then that Nelia
approached them, accompanied by Julian, Bumanglag and Duldulao. They came from the direction
where, minutes before, she heard Nelia crying.
As previously stated, when Bumanglag led Angeles to the place where he raped her, Nelia
was also taken to a secluded place by Julian and Duldulao. While Nelia's hands were held together
by Duldulao, Julian forcibly undressed her and when she resisted Julian slapped her and
threatened her with a gun. After Julian succeeded in removing her clothes, Nelia was raped first by
Julian, followed by Bumanglag and by Julian again for the second time. Duldulao did not rape
Nelia but he held her while she was being raped by Julian but Nelia does not know who held her
when she was raped by Bumanglag because she was by then hysterical. When Julian raped Nelia
the second time, Bumanglag was present. During all the time Nelia and Angeles were being raped,
they cried out to each other for help.
Later, when they had re-grouped, Julian threatened Nelia and Angeles not to report to the
police and to consider what happened to them as just a bad dream and that henceforth they should
call him 'brod'. Julian also told Nelia, Angeles and their two male companions to retrieve the car
from (sic) Solsona because they will bring it there.
They all re-boarded the car and with Julian at the wheel they drove eastward until they
reached a place near the highway in San Nicolas where Nelia and Angeles were told to alight.
About ninety (90) meters further to the south, their two male companions were also allowed to
alight. Nelia and Angeles ran towards their two companions and helped them remove their
blindfolds and untie their hands. From there they walked to the house of Angeles in Nangalisan. By
then it was near dawn.
Early the following morning, Nelia left Angeles' house and went home to Barangay
Caaoacan. (sic) Roy Valdez and Jun Alcon had earlier left without bidding good-bye to either
Angeles and Nelia.
 Angeles reported for work at the beauty parlor. About 9:00 A.M. she was called to the
telephone. She recognized the voice as that of Julian when he said he is their 'brod'. He also told
Angeles to tell their two male companions not to look for the car in Solsona because they left the car
west of the provincial capitol building. Julian repeated his threats and because of such threats
Angeles and Nelia did not report the incident to the police and did not submit to a medical
examination." 7
The prosecution also presented Policeman Rodrigo Ventura, Chief Investigator of the Laoag City Police, who
gave the following testimony:
"On February 6, 1985 at the Laoag City Police headquarters, Ventura was investigating
Alberto Bumanglag and Ernesto Macalipis in connection with several carnapping incidents in
Laoag City, particularly the complaint of one Alfredo Alcon, Jr. that carnappers forcibly took his
Gemini car on November 19, 1984. The two suspects had been earlier arrested by the Batac police
for carnapping and Ventura had requested for their custody. While he was interrogating the
suspects, Angeles Alonzo and Nelia Agtarap arrived at the police station. They told Ventura that
they heard over the radio about carnapping suspects being investigated by the police. They also
told him that on November 19, 1984 the car they were riding in was carnapped and that they were
sexually abused by the carnappers. Upon seeing Alberto Bumanglag and Ernesto Macalipis,
Angeles and Nelia immediately identified them as two of the men who sexually abused them on
the night of November 19, 1984. The two suspects admitted their participation in the rape and
carnapping incident and identified their companions as Edwin Julian and Mario Obrero and others.
Later, when Edwin Julian was arrested, the complainants identified him as one of those who
abducted them and who raped Nelia Agtarap. The identification was made in the Office of then
City Mayor Rodolfo C. Fariñas where Julian admitted the accusation against him and named Pedro
Duldulao as one of his companions." 8
Laoag City Police Investigator Alden Rosacio testified that
"On April 17, 1986 Pedro Duldulao was brought to the Laoag City Police Station by his
relative, Pat. Samuel Barit, also of the Laoag City Police, for investigation in connection with
carnapping and rape cases in Laoag City. Among these cases was the complaint of Roy Valdez that
his car was stolen on November 19, 1984 and that his two lady companions were raped. Duldulao
told the police what he knew about the cases being investigated and asked for a lawyer to assist
him in making a confession. Whereupon, Rosacia accompanied Duldulao to the Citizens Legal
Assistance Office (CLAO), now the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), where Duldulao's extra-judicial
confession was taken. Duldulao was assisted by CLAO lawyer Maria Calija. Before giving his extra-
judicial confession, Duldulao was duly apprised of his constitutional rights by both Pat. Rosacia
and lawyer Calija. Duldulao voluntarily confessed that on November 19, 1984 at about 9:00 P.M.,
Edwin Julian, Alberto Bumanglag, Ernesto Macalipis and Mario Obrero sexually abused two
women whom he (Duldulao) and his four-named companions abducted from the Marcos Bridge in
the victims' car, together with two male companions." 9
Meanwhile, Maria Calija, CLAO lawyer, testified that "Duldulao asked her for legal assistance and corroborated the
testimony of Rosacia with respect to her participation in the preparation of Duldulao's extra-judicial confession." 10
Version of the Defense
The defense posits denial and alibi as follows:
"The accused Edwin Julian denied the charges against him and put up the defense of alibi.
He testified that in the early days of October 1984 he went to Alcala, Pangasinan and was employed
by one Ruben Mendoza as the latter's personal representative and spokesman in his construction
firm. Mendoza was at that time the vice president of the Association of Barangay Captains of
Pangasinan. Julian's brother, a member of the military, was assigned as security man of Mr.
Mendoza together with a certain Maj. Pedrino. Edwin Julian didn't return to Laoag until March
1986. His parents and his wife visited him in Pangasinan and his father showed him the affidavits
of the complainants and that was the first time he learned of the charges filed against him. They
then negotiated for his surrender to the police. He told police investigators that he was in
Pangasinan when the alleged abduction and multiple rape took place but he didn't execute a
written statement. llcd
Rosemarie Julian corroborated the testimony of her husband that from October 1984 to
March 1986 Edwin was in Alcala, Pangasinan. She testified that during all this time she and her
children were living in Barangay Navotas, Laoag City but visited her husband about five times and
stayed in the house of Mr. Ruben Mendoza. She first learned of the case against her husband in
March 1986. That was the time she reported for work as an employee of the then PC-INP in Camp
Juan, Laoag City. When her co-employees informed her about the cases against her husband, she
 went to Alcala to inform him. When her husband arrived in Laoag in April 1986 he was
immediately detained at the provincial jail." 11
Error Assigned
The defense cites a single error:
"The trial court erred in giving credence to the prosecution's evidence relative to the
identity of accused-appellant Edwin Julian and his involvement in the commission of the crime of
forcible abduction with rape described in Nelia Agtarap's amended complaint in the face of the
inconclusiveness and unreliability of the entire prosecution's evidence of the identities of the
malefactors and consequently, erred in rejecting his defenses of denial and alibi unrebutted by the
prosecution." 12
Ultimately, the issue boils down to the credibility of the witnesses.
This Court's Ruling
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Credibility of Witnesses
The defense questions whether "the entire evidence of the prosecution relative to the identities of the malefactors are
conclusive and reliable to warrant the inference that the identity and involvement of accused-appellant in the crime
described in Agtarap's amended complaint had been established beyond reasonable doubt." 13 Appellant answers
this question in the negative, based on the following: (1) the statement of Roy Valdez, one of private complainant's
male companions that fateful night, given at the Laoag City police station the next day, that "four unidentified men
were the culprits"; (2) Private Complainant Angeles Alonzo's testimony that "she was not able to recognize her and
her companions' abductors"; (3) the lapse of "almost three months" before the two private complainants reported to
the police that they had been raped; (4) their failure to undergo medical examination; (5) Angeles' sworn statement
that Marcos Obrero had no participation in the crime charged, thereby contradicting her earlier sworn complaint
against five suspects including Obrero; and (6) the two private complainants' subsequent execution of an affidavit of
desistance in favor of Accused Pedro Duldulao. 14
In deciding this appeal, the Court is guided by certain well-established principles in reviewing rape cases, to wit: "(a)
an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused,
though innocent, to disprove; (b) due to the nature of the crime of rape where usually only two persons are involved,
the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) the evidence for the prosecution
must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
defense." 15 Furthermore, as in other rape cases, "the credibility of the offended party's testimony is determinative of
the outcome" 16 of the case because "when an alleged victim of rape says that she was violated, she says in effect all
that is necessary to show that rape has been inflicted on her and so long as her testimony meets the test of credibility,
the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof." 17
In assessing the credibility of witnesses, the long-held doctrine is that "the trial court's evaluation as to the credibility
of witnesses is viewed as correct and entitled to the highest respect because it is more competent to so conclude,
having had the opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor and deportment on the stand, and the manner in
which they gave their testimonies. The trial judge therefore can better determine if such witnesses were telling the
truth, being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies. Therefore, unless the trial judge plainly overlooked
certain facts of substance and value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, his assessment on
credibility must be respected." 18
After a thorough review of the entire record of this case, we find that the trial court did not overlook any such
material fact nor did it commit any palpable error in its assessment of the testimonies of the prosecution and defense
witnesses. The record shows the unequivocal and unswerving testimonies of Nelia Agtarap and Angeles Alonzo
faithfully recounting their harrowing experience that fateful night of November 19, 1984 and sufficiently identifying
Appellant Julian as one of their abductors who raped them. In fact, Nelia steadfastly charged Appellant Julian of
raping her not only once but twice. Their accounts of the circumstances antecedent to, during and after their forcible
abduction and rape are replete with significant details that jibe on material points. Their version is significantly
backed by the complaint filed by one of their male companions in their disastrous double date, Alfredo Alcon Jr. (Jun
Alcon), that his Gemini car was forcibly taken from him that same evening of November 19, 1994. Hence, we find no
cogent reason to disturb the findings and assessment of the trial court as to the credibility of witnesses. As astutely
and correctly observed by the trial court:
"The details of the abduction and multiple rape were clearly and graphically described by
the complainant, two fairly good-looking ladies in their late twenties and early thirties at the time of
the commission of the crime. They testified in a straightforward, forthright and convincing manner,
positively identifying the accused as their attacker (tsn, September 10, 1986, pp. 27-33; tsn,
November 19, 1986, pp. 13-16; tsn, October 23, 1989, pp. 26-33). No evidence was presented to show
that the complainants had ulterior motives to falsely charge the accused."19
Identification of Appellant
 The defense contends that the identification of Accused-appellant Edwin Julian by Private Complainant Nelia
Agtarap was made doubtful by Roy Valdez's report that his Gemini car had been taken by four "unidentified" men.
We find this contention puerile. The only import of the statement of Roy, a nonresident balikbayan, was that he did not
recognize the four who had taken his car but this did not mean he would not be able to recognize and identify them if
he saw them again. Furthermore, to support their argument, the defense points to Angeles Alonzo's testimony that
she did not recognize the perpetrators of the crime committed against them. Their argument is of no moment,
however, since they cited Alonzo's statement out of context. As aptly stated by the Solicitor General:
"The claim misleads.
A reading of the purported testimony readily shows that Angeles Alonzo did not readily
recognize the malefactors only at the time when they suddenly approached her and her
companions. Thus:
'q Do you know the accused Pedro Duldulao? cdpr
a No, sir. When the incident happened, I was not able to recognize their faces.
q What is that incident you are referring to?
a It was when they took us from the Marcos Bridge.' (p. 4, TSN, September 10, 1986)" 20
The trial court elucidated the matter stating that "from a reading of the transcript of her entire testimony, it is
clear that what she meant was that she did not know their names (tsn, December 16, 1986, p. 13). Angeles testified in
Ilocano and based upon the experience of undersigned presiding judge, the original meaning must have gotten lost in
the process of translation." 21
Contrary to the defense's assertion, the findings of the court a quo clearly and indubitably show that the
private complainants had the opportunity, and indeed were able, to identify Appellant Julian, viz.:
"The evidence shows that the southern end of the Laoag bridge where the complainants
parked their car on the night of November 19, 1984 was well-lighted (tsn, September 10, 1986, p. 9).
The faces of the accused were therefore visible to the complainants as the accused approached from
the western lane of the bridge, surrounded the complainants and forced them inside the car. At this
point the accused put on their masks. On the way to Suba, the complainants were blindfolded,
obviously to avoid close-proximity recognition during the time it took to reach Suba. But once in
the forested area their blindfolds were removed and that sometime during the rape episode the
accused also removed their masks, perhaps confident that they had so intimidated their victims that
even if they were recognized, the victims would not report to the police. It was probably this
confidence that led to Edwin Julian's audacity to stare at the victim's faces and say 'may I look at
your faces' (tsn, November 19, 1986, p. 24). It was a moonlight (sic) night (tsn, September 10, 1986,
p. 23) and the faces of the accused were visible to the complainants. By the time they drove back to
San Nicolas, the accused had become bold enough to dispense with their masks. All these
circumstances show that the complainants had ample opportunity to look at and remember the
faces of the accused.
Admittedly, the complainants did not know the names of the accused at the time of the
incident although they recognized their faces (tsn, December 16, 1986, p. 13). In fact, in the case of
Edwin Julian and Pedro Duldulao, Angeles Alonzo testified that Julian had patronized their beauty
parlor once or twice (tsn, supra, p. 7) while Nelia Agtarap testified that Duldulao's face was familiar
because because he had passed by the beauty parlor a number of times (tsn, November 27, 1989, p.
23). Duldulao himself testified that he knew Angeles Alonzo when he was still a passenger jeepney
conductor (tsn, January 14, 1993, p. 3)." 22
Delay in Reporting the Forcible Abduction and Rape
The mere fact that almost three months had passed before Nelia and Angeles decided to report to the police
authorities the crime committed against them does not negate the veracity of their charge. The Court reiterates that
"(t)he failure of complainant to disclose her defilement without loss of time to persons close to her or to report the
matter to the authorities does not perforce warrant the conclusion that she was not sexually molested and that her
charges against the accused are all baseless, untrue and fabricated. Delay in prosecuting the offense is not an
indication of a fabricated charge. Many victims of rape never complain or file criminal charges against the rapists.
They prefer to bear the ignominy and pain, rather than reveal their shame to the world or risk the offenders' making
good their threats to kill or hurt their victims." 23 This is "understandable as Filipino women are known to be
affectedly shy and coy. Rape stigmatizes the victim, not the perpetrator. It is a sad reality that a non-virgin who has
been deflowered against her will is nonetheless treated with scorn by society." 24 In the final analysis, what is
important is that both Nelia Agtarap and Angeles Alonzo revealed they had been raped when they filed their sworn
complaint with the Laoag Police. Consequently, Nelia's delay in filing the complaint does not in any way affect her
credibility. In one case, a complaint was filed three months after the incident, and this Court held that "three months is
not too long a period to file a complaint for rape." 25
Medical Examination Not Indispensable to Prosecution of Rape
 The defense points to the failure of the private complainants to submit themselves to medical examination
prior to their filing a sworn complaint charging the accused of raping them. The defense argues that this was a fatal
defect in the prosecution of the instant case. We disagree. No law requires a medical examination for the successful
prosecution of rape. Thus, it has been held:
". . . lack of lacerated wounds does not negate sexual intercourse. Moreover, the fact that
hymenal lacerations were found to be 'healed round edge' and no spermatozoa was found does not
necessarily negate rape. A freshly broken hymen is not an essential element of rape. For that matter,
in crimes against chastity, the medical examination of the victim is not an indispensable element for the
successful prosecution of the crime, as her testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the accused
thereof ." 26 (Emphasis supplied.)
Falsus in Uno, Falsus in Omnibus?
The defense further argues that since Private Complainant Angeles Alonzo had made a false accusation
against Marcos Obrero, a mistake she herself later corrected resulting in Obrero's being dropped from the case, the
testimonies of the private complainants Angeles Alonzo and Nelia Agtarap, who had both falsely charged Obrero,
should be discredited in whole. We are not persuaded. The doctrine of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus "deals only with
the weight of evidence and is not a positive rule of law, and the same is not an inflexible one of universal application.
The modern trend of jurisprudence is that the testimony of a witness may be believed in part and disbelieved in part,
depending upon the corroborative evidence and the probabilities and improbabilities of the case. That is the present
rule in the Philippines, and appellant cannot . . . discredit such portions of her testimony as are otherwise
credible." 27 Hence, the mere fact that Angeles and Nelia had mistakenly implicated Obrero in their complaint does
not belie their charges against the other accused including the accused-appellant Edwin Julian when, from the
evidence on record, such charges are overwhelmingly credible and probable.
The fact that both private complainants each executed an affidavit of desistance in favor of Accused Duldulao
does not destroy their credibility since each has satisfactorily explained her execution of the document. As insightfully
put by the trial court:
"As to the affidavits of desistance, the complainants explained that they were virtually
tricked into signing them by Duldulao's former counsel. It appears that there was an attempt to
'settle' the case insofar as Duldulao was concerned, apparently with the blessings of then presiding
judge who suspended proceedings for six (6) months to give the parties a chance 'to arrive at a final
satisfactory settlement' (Order dated November 12, 1987, p. 214, Record of Crim. Case No. 2822).
And obviously, the attempt failed because the complainants later repudiated the affidavits (tsn,
September 4, 1990, pp. 16-17). The Court takes note that the affidavits were signed on February 20,
1987 but the jurat is dated February 19, 1987 or the day before it was signed, evidencing haste in its
preparation and giving credence to complainant's claim they were forced and virtually tricked into
signing the affidavits. cdtai
In his confession, Duldulao admitted he was with all the other accused when they forcibly abducted the
complainants, but impliedly denied having raped them, pointing to the others as the ones who did. However, since
conspiracy is alleged and duly proven, such disclaimer is for naught since the act of one is the act of all." 28
Appellant's Defense of Alibi Debunked
"Courts have always looked upon the defense of alibi with suspicion and have always received it with caution
not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable but because it is easily fabricated. For alibi to serve as basis for
acquittal, it must be established with clear and convincing evidence. The requisites of time and place must be strictly
met. Appellant must convincingly demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of
the crime at the time of its commission." 29 Appellant Edwin Julian did not substantiate his claim of alibi with clear
and convincing evidence. This was evident from the finding of the trial court that:
"In the case of Edwin Julian, the Court is not convinced that he was in Alcala, Pangasinan
when the crime was committed. Not only did he fail to present the testimonies of his supposed
employer and that of his brother who allegedly recommended him to that employer, he also failed
to present any documentary proof of his supposed employment in the construction firm of Mr.
Ruben Mendoza at the time of the incident. From Julian's demeanor on the witness stand, it
appeared obvious to the Court that he was acting out a concocted story. True, his wife testified in
Court but her testimony must be regarded as naturally biased. Furthermore, Julian testified that he
learned of the charges against him when his father showed him the affidavits of the complainants.
On the other hand, his wife testified that her co-employees in the PNP told her about the charges
and it was she who informed her husband. The Court believes that what happened is that when
Julian learned of the arrest of Bumanglag and Macalipis, he fled to Pangasinan and hid there for
more than a year. In fact, a warrant for his arrest was issued on May 2, 1985 (p. 8, Record of Crim.
Case No. 2822)." 30
Since, as previously discussed, Appellant Julian "was positively identified by the victim of rape herself who
harbored no ill motive against the accused, the defense of alibi must fail."31
 In the light of the foregoing, this Court's conscience rests easy on the moral certainty that Accused-appellant
Edwin Julian has been proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. However, we differ with the trial
court's ruling in Criminal Case No. 2822-15 declaring co-conspirators Edwin Julian, Alberto Bumanglag and Pedro
Duldulao guilty of forcible abduction with rape plus three more counts of rape. For when the first act of rape was
committed by Edwin Julian against Nelia Agtarap, the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape was then
consummated. Hence, there were only two separate acts of rape remaining, directly and successively committed by
Bumanglag and, for the second time, by Julian against Nelia Agtarap, for which they may be further held liable. 32 In
other words, Julian, Bumanglag and Duldulao are each guilty of one count of forcible abduction with rape and two
counts of rape. This modification of the trial court's judgment will benefit only Edwin Julian, as the two remaining
accused (Bumanglag and Duldulao) are at large. Furthermore, this Decision is without prejudice to the filing of
another information against Edwin Julian for his participation in the forcible abduction and rape of Angeles Alonzo
for which he has not yet been prosecuted, as he had not been included in the amended complaint treated as the
information in Criminal Case No. 2823-15.
On the other hand, Appellant Julian and the other accused cannot be held liable for three counts of forcible
abduction with rape. This is based on the pronouncement of the Court inPeople vs. Bohos 33 which was reiterated
in People vs. Bacalso 34 that:
"Appellant's other point is: 'Even if we may assume purely for the sake of argument that the
complaining witness was forcibly abducted and then raped thirteen times, we submit that there was
only one forcible abduction with rape and that was the one allegedly committed on the truck or
jeep. Any subsequent acts of intercourse in the house against her will would be only separate acts of
rape and can no longer be considered separate complex crimes of forcible abduction with
rape.' cdtech
This point is well taken. There was only one forcible abduction with rape which was the
one committed in the truck. Thus, in People vs. Jose, et al., G.R. No. L-28322, February 6, 1971, 37
SCRA 450, where the four accused abducted Maggie de la Riva and each of them raped her, this
Court held, 'that even while the first act of rape was being performed, the crime of forcible abduction had
already been consummated, so that each of the three succeeding crimes of the same nature cannot legally be
considered as still connected with the abduction — in other words they should be detached from, and
considered independently of, that of forcible abduction and, therefore, the former can no longer be complexed
with the latter." (Emphasis supplied.)
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court dated September 15, 1995 in regard to Appellant is hereby
MODIFIED. Appellant Edwin Julian is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of forcible abduction with rape in
Criminal Case No. 2822, but he is guilty of only two separate additional crimes of rape therein. Three terms
of reclusion perpetua are hereby imposed on him. The indemnity due to the victim Nelia Agtarap in the amount of
P150,000.00 stands. The trial court's decision in regard to Accused Alberto Bumanglag and Ernesto Macalipis, who are
at large, remains unmodified. cda
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. Nos. 138874-75. February 3, 2004.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESvs.FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAÑAGA alias "PACO";JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN
ADLAWAN alias "WESLEY";ALBERTO CAÑO alias "ALLAN PAHAK";ARIEL BALANSAG; DAVIDSON
VALIENTE RUSIA alias "TISOY TAGALOG";JAMES ANTHONY UY alias "WANGWANG";and JAMES
ANDREW UY alias "MM”
 For most of the Cebuanos, the proceedings in these cases will always be remembered as the "trial of the
century." A reading of the voluminous records readily explains why the unraveling of the facts during the hearing
before the court below proved transfixing and horrifying and why it resulted in unusual media coverage.
These cases involve the kidnapping and illegal detention of a college beauty queen along with her comely and
courageous sister. An intriguing tale of ribaldry and gang-rape was followed by the murder of the beauty queen. She
was thrown off a cliff into a deep forested ravine where she was left to die. Her sister was subjected to heartless
indignities before she was also gang-raped. In the aftermath of the kidnapping and rape, the sister was made to
disappear. Where she is and what further crimes were inflicted upon her remain unknown and unsolved up to the
present.
Before us in an appeal from the Decision 1 dated May 5, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Cebu City
in Criminal Cases Nos. CBU 45303-45304, finding Rowen Adlawan alias "Wesley," Josman Aznar, Ariel Balansag,
Alberto Caño alias "Allan Pahak," Francisco Juan Larrañaga alias "Paco," James Andrew Uy alias "MM," and James
Anthony Uy alias "Wang Wang," appellants herein, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalties of "two (2) reclusiones perpetua" and to
indemnify the heirs of the victims, sisters Marijoy and Jacqueline Chiong, jointly and severally, the amount of
P200,000.00 as actual damages and P5,000,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages.
The Fourth Amended Informations 2 for kidnapping and illegal detention dated May 12, 1998 filed against
appellants and Davidson Rusia alias "Tisoy Tagalog," the discharged state witness, read as follows:
1) For Criminal Case No. CBU-45303: 3
"That on the 16th day of July, 1997, at about 10:00 o'clock more or less in the evening, in the
City of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, all
private individuals, conniving, confederating and mutually helping with one another, with
deliberate intent, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap or deprive one
Marijoy Chiong, of her liberty and on the occasion thereof, and in connection, accused, with
deliberate intent, did then and there have carnal knowledge of said Marijoy against her will with
the use of force and intimidation and subsequent thereto and on the occasion thereof, accused with
intent to kill, did then and there inflict physical injuries on said Marijoy Chiong throwing her into a
deep ravine and as a consequence of which, Marijoy Chiong died.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."
2) For Criminal Case CBU-45304: 4
"That on the 16th day of July, 1997, at about 10:00 o'clock more or less in the evening, in the
City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, all
private individuals, conniving, confederating and mutually helping with one another, with
deliberate intent, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap or deprive
one Jacqueline Chiong of her liberty, thereby detaining her until the present.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."
On separate arraignments, state witness Davidson Rusia and appellants Rowen Adlawan, Josman Aznar,
Ariel Balansag, Alberto Caño, James Andrew and James Anthony Uy pleaded not guilty. 5 Appellant Francisco Juan
Larrañaga refused to plead, hence, the trial court entered for him the plea of "not guilty." 6 Thereafter, trial on the
merits ensued.
In the main, the prosecution evidence centered on the testimony of Rusia. 7 Twenty-one
witnesses 8 corroborated his testimony on major points. For the defense, appellants James Anthony Uy and Alberto
Caño took the witness stand. Appellant Francisco Juan Larrañaga was supposed to testify on his defense of alibi but
the prosecution and the defense, through a stipulation approved by the trial court, dispensed with his testimony.
Nineteen witnesses testified for the appellants, corroborating their respective defenses of alibi.
The version of the prosecution is narrated as follows:
On the night of July 16, 1997, sisters Marijoy and Jacqueline Chiong, who lived in Cebu City, failed to come
home on the expected time. It was raining hard and Mrs. Thelma Chiong thought her daughters were simply having
difficulty getting a ride. Thus, she instructed her sons, Bruce and Dennis, to fetch their sisters. They returned home
without Marijoy and Jacqueline. Mrs. Chiong was not able to sleep that night. Immediately, at 5:00 o'clock in the
morning, her entire family started the search for her daughters, but there was no trace of them. Thus, the family
sought the assistance of the police who continued the search. But still, they could not find Marijoy and Jacqueline. 9
Meanwhile, in the morning of July 18, 1997, a certain Rudy Lasaga reported to the police that a young woman
was found dead at the foot of a cliff in Tan-awan, Carcar, Cebu. 10Officer-in-Charge Arturo Unabia and three other
policemen proceeded to Tan-awan and there, they found a dead woman lying on the ground. Attached to her left
wrist was a handcuff. 11Her pants were torn, her orange t-shirt was raised up to her breast and her bra was pulled
down. Her face and neck were covered with masking tape. 12
 On July 19, 1996, upon hearing the news about the dead woman, Mrs. Chiong's son Dennis and other relatives
proceeded to the Tupaz Funeral Parlor at Carcar, Cebu to see the body. It was Marijoy dressed in the same orange
shirt and maong pants she wore when she left home on July 16, 1997. Upon learning of the tragic reality, Mrs. Chiong
became frantic and hysterical. She could not accept that her daughter would meet such a gruesome fate. 13
On May 8, 1998, or after almost ten months, the mystery that engulfed the disappearance of Marijoy and
Jacqueline was resolved. Rusia, bothered by his conscience and recurrent nightmares, 14 admitted before the police
having participated in the abduction of the sisters. 15 He agreed to re-enact the commission of the crimes. 16
On August 12, 1998, Rusia testified before the trial court how the crimes were committed and identified all the
appellants as the perpetrators. He declared that his conduit to Francisco Juan Larrañaga was Rowen Adlawan whom
he met together with brothers James Anthony and James Andrew Uy five months before the commission of the crimes
charged. 17 He has known Josman Aznar since 1991. He met Alberto Caño and Ariel Balansag only in the evening of
July 16, 1997. IDCHTE
On July 15, 1997, while Rusia was loafing around at the Cebu Plaza Hotel, Cebu City, Rowen approached him
and arranged that they meet the following day at around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon. 18 When they saw each other
the next day, Rowen told him to stay put at the Ayala Mall because they would have a "big happening" in the evening.
All the while, he thought that Rowen's "big happening" meant group partying or scrounging. He thus lingered at the
Ayala Mall until the appointed time came. 19
At 10:30 in the evening, Rowen returned with Josman. They met Rusia at the back exit of the Ayala Mall and told him to
ride with them in a white car.Rusia noticed that a red car was following them. Upon reaching Archbishop Reyes
Avenue, same city, he saw two women standing at the waiting shed. 20 Rusia did not know yet that their names were
Marijoy and Jacqueline.
Josman stopped the white car in front of the waiting shed and he and Rowen approached and invited Marijoy
and Jacqueline to join them. 21 But the sisters declined. Irked by the rejection, Rowen grabbed Marijoy while Josman
held Jacqueline and forced both girls to ride in the car. 22 Marijoy was the first one to get inside, followed by Rowen.
Meanwhile, Josman pushed Jacqueline inside and immediately drove the white car. Rusia sat on the front seat beside
Josman.
Fourteen (14) meters from the waiting shed, Jacqueline managed to get out of the car. Josman chased her and
brought her back into the car. Not taking anymore chances, Rowen elbowed Jacqueline on the chest and punched
Marijoy on the stomach, causing both girls to faint. 23 Rowen asked Rusia for the packaging tape under the latter's
seat and placed it on the girls' mouths. Rowen also handcuffed them jointly. The white and red cars then proceeded to
Fuente Osmeña, Cebu City.
At Fuente Osmeña, Josman parked the car near a Mercury Drug Store and urged Rusia to inquire if a van that
was parked nearby was for hire. A man who was around replied "no" so the group immediately left. The two cars
stopped again near Park Place Hotel where Rusia negotiated to hire a van. But no van was available. Thus, the cars
sped to a house in Guadalupe, Cebu City known as the safehouse of the "Jozman Aznar Group." Thereupon, Larrañaga,
James Anthony and James Andrew got out of the red car.
Larrañaga, James Anthony and Rowen brought Marijoy to one of the rooms, while Rusia and Josman led
Jacqueline to another room. Josman then told Rusia to step out so Rusia stayed at the living room with James Andrew.
They remained in the house for fifteen (15) to twenty (20) minutes. At that time, Rusia could hear Larrañaga, James
Anthony, and Rowen giggling inside the room.
Thereafter, the group brought Marijoy and Jacqueline back to the white car. Then the two cars headed to the
South Bus Terminal where they were able to hire a white van driven by Alberto. Ariel was the conductor. James
Andrew drove the white car, while the rest of the group boarded the van. They traveled towards south of Cebu City,
leaving the red car at the South Bus Terminal.
Inside the van, Marijoy and Jacqueline were slowly gaining strength. James Anthony taped their mouths
anew and Rowen handcuffed them together. Along the way, the van and the white car stopped by a barbeque store.
Rowen got off the van and bought barbeque and Tanduay rhum. They proceeded to Tan-awan. 24 Then they parked
their vehicles near a precipice25 where they drank and had a pot session. Later, they pulled Jacqueline out of the van
and told her to dance as they encircled her. She was pushed from one end of the circle to the other, ripping her clothes
in the process. Meanwhile, Josman told Larrañaga to start raping Marijoy who was left inside the van. The latter did
as told and after fifteen minutes emerged from the van saying, "who wants next?" Rowen went in, followed by James
Anthony, Alberto, the driver, and Ariel, the conductor. Each spent a few minutes inside the van and afterwards came
out smiling. 26
Then they carried Marijoy out of the van, after which Josman brought Jacqueline inside the vehicle. Josman
came out from the van after ten minutes, saying, "whoever wants next go ahead and hurry up." Rusia went inside the van
and raped Jacqueline, followed by James Andrew. At this instance, Marijoy was to breathe her last for upon Josman's
instruction, Rowen and Ariel led her to the cliff and mercilessly pushed her into the ravine 27 which was almost 150
meters deep. 28
 As for Jacqueline, she was pulled out of the van and thrown to the ground. Able to gather a bit of strength,
she tried to run towards the road. The group boarded the van, followed her and made fun of her by screaming, "run
some more." There was a tricycle passing by. The group brought Jacqueline inside the van. Rowen beat her until she
passed out. The group then headed back to Cebu City with James Andrew driving the white car. Rusia got off from
the van somewhere near the Ayala Center. 29
There were other people who saw snippets of what Rusia had witnessed. Sheila Singson, 30 Analie
Konahap 31 and Williard Redobles 32 testified that Marijoy and Jacqueline were talking to Larrañaga and Josman
before they were abducted. Roland Dacillo 33 saw Jacqueline alighting and running away from a white car and that
Josman went after her and grabbed her back to the car. Alfredo Duarte 34 testified that he was at the barbeque stand
when Rowen bought barbeque; that Rowen asked where he could buy Tanduay; that he saw a white van and he heard
therefrom voices of a male and female who seemed to be quarreling; that he also heard a cry of a woman which he
could not understand because "it was as if the voice was being controlled;" and that after Rowen got his order, he boarded
the white van which he recognized to be previously driven by Alberto Caño. Meanwhile, Mario Miñoza, 35 a tricycle
driver plying the route of Carcar-Mantalongon, saw Jacqueline running towards Mantalongon. Her blouse was torn
and her hair was disheveled. Trailing her was a white van where a very loud rock music could be heard. Manuel
Camingao 36 recounted that on July 17, 1997, at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning, he saw a white van near a cliff at
Tan-awan. Thinking that the passenger of the white van was throwing garbage at the cliff, he wrote its plate number
(GGC-491) on the side of his tricycle. 37
Still, there were other witnesses 38 presented by the prosecution who gave details which, when pieced
together, corroborated well Rusia's testimony on what transpired at the Ayala Center all the way to Carcar.
Against the foregoing facts and circumstances, the appellants raised the defense of alibi,thus:
Larrañaga, through his witnesses, sought to establish that on July 16, 1997, he was in Quezon City taking his
mid-term examinations at the Center for Culinary Arts. In the evening of that day until 3:00 o'clock in the morning of
July 17, 1997, he was with his friends at the R & R Bar and Restaurant, same city. Fifteen witnesses testified that they
were either with Larrañaga or saw him in Quezon City at the time the crimes were committed. His friends, Lourdes
Montalvan, 39 Charmaine Flores, 40 Richard Antonio, 41 Jheanessa Fonacier, 42 Maharlika Shulze, 43 Sebastian
Seno, 44 Francisco Jarque, 45 Raymond Garcia, 46 Cristina Del Gallego, 47 Mona Lisa Del Gallego, 48 Paolo
Celso 49 and Paolo Manguerra 50 testified that they were with him at the R & R Bar on the night of July 16, 1997. The
celebration was a "despedida" for him as he was leaving the next day for Cebu and a "bienvenida" for another friend.
Larrañaga's classmate Carmina Esguerra 51 testified that he was in school on July 16, 1997 taking his mid-term
examinations. His teacher Rowena Bautista, 52 on the other hand, testified that he attended her lecture in Applied
Mathematics. Also, some of his neighbors at the Loyola Heights Condominium, Quezon City, including the security
guard, Salvador Boton, testified that he was in his condo unit in the evening of July 16, 1997. Representatives of the
four airline companies plying the route of Manila-Cebu-Manila presented proofs showing that the name Francisco
Juan Larrañaga does not appear in the list of preflight and post-flight manifests from July 15, 1997 to about noontime
of July 17, 1997.
Meanwhile, James Anthony Uy testified that on July 16, 1997, he and his brother James Andrew were at home
in Cebu City because it was their father's 50th birthday and they were celebrating the occasion with a small party
which ended at 11:30 in the evening. 53 He only left his house the next day, July 17, 1997 at about 7:00 o'clock in the
morning to go to school. 54The boys' mother, Marlyn Uy, corroborated his testimony and declared that when she
woke up at 2:00 o'clock in the morning to check on her sons, she found them sleeping in their bedrooms. They went to
school the next day at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning. 55
Clotilde Soterol testified for Alberto and Ariel. She narrated that on July 16, 1997, at around 7:00 o'clock in the
evening, Alberto brought the white Toyota van with Plate No. GGC-491 to her shop to have its aircon repaired.
Alberto was accompanied by his wife Gina Caño, co-appellant Ariel, and spouses Catalina and Simplicio Paghinayan,
owners of the vehicle. Since her (Clotildes') husband was not yet around, Alberto just left the vehicle and promised to
return the next morning. Her husband arrived at 8:30 in the evening and started to repair the aircon at 9:00 o'clock of
the same evening. He finished the work at 10:00 o'clock the following morning. At 11:00 o'clock, Alberto and his wife
Gina, Ariel and Catalina returned to the shop to retrieve the vehicle. 56 Alberto, 57 Gina 58 and
Catalina 59 corroborated Clotilde's testimony.
To lend support to Josman's alibi,Michael Dizon recounted that on July 16, 1997, at about 8:00 o'clock in the
evening, he and several friends were at Josman's house in Cebu. They ate their dinner there and afterwards drank
"Blue Label." They stayed at Josman's house until 11:00 o'clock in the evening. Thereafter, they proceeded to BAI Disco
where they drank beer and socialized with old friends. They stayed there until 1:30 in the morning of July 17, 1997.
Thereafter, they transferred to DTM Bar. They went home together at about 3:00 o'clock in the morning. Their friend,
Jonas Dy Pico, dropped Josman at his house. 60
Concerning state witness Rusia, on August 7, 1998, when the prosecution moved that he be discharged as an
accused for the purpose of utilizing him as a state witness, 61 Larrañaga and brothers James Anthony and James
Andrew opposed the motion on the ground that he does not qualify as a state witness under Section 9, Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure. 62 On August 12, 1998, the trial court allowed the prosecution to
present Rusia as its witness but deferred resolving its motion to discharge until it has completely presented its
evidence. 63 On the same date, the prosecution finished conducting Rusia's direct examination. 64 The defense
lawyers cross-examined him on August 13, 17, and 20, 1998. 65On the last date, Judge Ocampo provisionally
terminated the cross-examination due to the report that there was an attempt to bribe him and because of his
deteriorating health. 66
Resenting the trial court's termination of Rusia's cross-examination, the defense lawyers moved for the
inhibition of Judge Ocampo. 67 When he informed the defense lawyers that he would not inhibit himself since he
found no "just and valid reasons" therefor, the defense lawyers withdrew en masse as counsel for the appellants
declaring that they would no longer attend the trial. Judge Ocampo held them guilty of direct contempt of court.
Thus, defense lawyers Raymundo Armovit, Edgar Gica, Fidel Gonzales, Ramon Teleron, Alfonso de la Cerna and
Lorenzo Paylado were ordered jailed.
In the Order dated August 25, 1998, the trial court denied the motion for inhibition of the defense lawyers and
ordered them to continue representing their respective clients so that the cases may undergo the mandatory
continuous trial. The trial court likewise denied their motion to withdraw as appellants' counsel because of their
failure to secure a prior written consent from their clients. On August 26, 1998, appellants filed their written consent to
the withdrawal of their counsel. ASHICc
Thereafter, Larrañaga, Josman and brothers James Anthony and James Andrew moved for the postponement
of the hearing for several weeks to enable them to hire the services of new counsel. 68 On August 31, 1998, the trial
court denied appellants' motions on the ground that it could no longer delay the hearing of the cases. On September 2,
1998, the trial court directed the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) to act as counsel de oficio for all the appellants. 69
Trial resumed on September 3, 1998 with a team of PAO lawyers assisting appellants. Larrañaga objected to
the continuation of the direct examination of the prosecution witnesses as he was not represented by his counsel de
parte.The trial court overruled his objection. The prosecution witnesses testified continuously from September 3, 1998
to September 24, 1998. Meanwhile, the cross-examination of said witnesses was deferred until the appellants were
able to secure counsel of their choice. On the same date, September 24, 1998, Atty. Eric C. Villarmia entered his
appearance as counsel for Larrañaga, while Atty. Eric S. Carin appeared as counsel for brothers James Anthony and
James Andrew.
Thereafter, or on October 1, 1998, the defense lawyers started cross-examining Rusia. The cross-examination
continued on October 5, 6, 12 and 13, 1998.
Eventually, acting on the prosecution's motion to discharge Rusia to be a state witness, the trial court required
the opposing parties to submit their respective memoranda. On November 12, 1998, the trial court issued an omnibus
order granting the prosecution's motion discharging Rusia as an accused and according him the status of a state witness.
On May 5, 1999, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, all the accused Francisco Juan Larrañaga, Josman Aznar, James Andrew
Uy, James Anthony Uy, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Caño, and Ariel Balansag are hereby
foundGuilty beyond reasonable doubt of two crimes of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention
and are hereby sentenced to imprisonment of Two (2) Reclusiones Perpetua each — which penalties,
however, may be served by them simultaneously (Article 70, Revised Penal Code).Further, said
accused are hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of the two (2) victims in these cases, jointly and
severally, in the amount of P200,000.00 in actual damages and P5,000,000.00 by way of moral and
exemplary damages.
"SO ORDERED."
Hence, the instant separate appeals. Appellants Rowen, Alberto and Ariel ascribe to the trial court the following
errors:
"I. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE UNTRUSTWORTHY,
INCONSISTENT, CONTRADICTORY AND INCREDULOUS TESTIMONY OF (DAVIDSON)
VALIENTE RUSIA.
''II. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION
WITNESSES, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE DEFENDANTS WERE NOT DULY
REPRESENTED BY COUNSELS OF THEIR OWN CHOICE DURING THE TIME THESE
WITNESSES WERE PRESENTED.
"III. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY IN THE CASE
AT BAR.
"IV. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE
PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
"V. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DISPLAYING MANIFEST ANIMOSITY TOWARDS THE
DEFENSE'S WITNESSES WHICH CLEARLY SHOWED ITS PREJUDICE AND BIAS IN DECIDING
THE CASE.
 "VI. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING SOME DEFENSE WITNESSES TO
TESTIFY.
"VII. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONSIDERING ROWEN ADLAWAN TO HAVE WAIVED
PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE IN HIS BEHALF."
For his part, Josman raises the following assignments of error:
"I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISCHARGING DAVID VALIENTE RUSIA AS
STATE WITNESS IN GROSS AND BLATANT DISREGARD OF THE RULES ON DISCHARGE OF
STATE WITNESS.
"II. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO RUSIA'S TESTIMONY
DESPITE CLEAR SHOWING THAT HIS CRIMINAL RECORD — AS AN EX-CONVICT, DRUG
ADDICT AND GANGSTER — AND HIS SUICIDAL TENDENCIES — SERIOUSLY IMPAIR HIS
CREDIBILITY AND INNATE CAPACITY FOR TRUTH, HONESTY AND INTEGRITY.
"III. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN LENDING CREDENCE TO RUSIA'S TESTIMONY
REPLETE AS IT WAS WITH INCONSISTENCIES, FALSEHOODS AND LIES.
"IV. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN LENDING CREDENCE TO THE
CORROBORATIVE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
"V. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT AZNAR HIS RIGHT TO
DUE PROCESS AND IN DEPRIVING HIM OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF AN
ACCUSED.
"VI. THE TRIAL JUDGE VIOLATED AZNAR'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS WHEN THE TRIAL
JUDGE REFUSED TO INHIBIT HIMSELF AND PROCEEDED WITH THE TRIAL DESPITE
GLARING BADGES OF HIS PARTIALITY AND BIAS FOR THE PROSECUTION.
"VII. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISCREDITING AND DISREGARDING THE
DEFENSE OF APPELLANT AZNAR.
"VIII. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT AZNAR ON THE
BASIS OF PROSECUTING EVIDENCE MAINLY ANCHORED ON RUSIA'S TESTIMONY WHICH
FAILED TO EVINCE PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF APPELLANT AZNAR'S
CRIMINAL LIABILITY."
In his 145-page appellant's brief, Larrañaga alleges that the trial court committed the following errors:
"6.1 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IGNORING AND VIOLATING DUE PROCESS
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED.
6.2 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE DISCHARGE OF ACCUSED
DAVIDSON RUSIA.
6.3 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING PARTIAL CREDIBILITY TO THE
TESTIMONY OF DAVIDSON RUSIA.
6.4 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE TESTIMONIES OF THE OTHER
WITNESSES.
6.5 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF
OTHER WITNESSES.
6.6 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION HAS
OVERCOME THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE.
6.7 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING AND REJECTING, EVEN AT
DIRECT TESTIMONY STAGE, THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S DEFENSE OF ALIBI." EHCaDS
For their part, brothers James Anthony and James Andrew, in their 147-page appellants' brief, bid for an
acquittal on the following grounds:
"A) THE TRIAL COURT BELOW GRIEVOUSLY FAILED TO OBSERVE, AND THUS
DENIED ACCUSED JAMES ANTHONY S. UY AND JAMES ANDREW S. UY THEIR
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW, TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT, TO
HAVE COUNSEL OF THEIR OWN CHOICE, TO HAVE AN IMPARTIAL JUDGE, TO MEET
WITNESSES FACE TO FACE, AND TO PRODUCE EVIDENCE ON THEIR BEHALF;
B) THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE HAS ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO SUPPORT THE
CONVICTION OF ACCUSED JAMES ANTHONY S. UY AND JAMES ANDREW S. UY IN THESE
CASES THUS THE TRIAL COURT BELOW SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT
RENDERED THE 5 MAY 1999 JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AGAINST THEM." 70
 Appellants' assignments of error converge on four points, thus: (1) violation of their right to due process; (2)
the improper discharge of Rusia as an accused to be a state witness; (3) the insufficiency of the evidence of the
prosecution; and (4) the trial court's disregard and rejection of the evidence for the defense.
The appeal is bereft of merit.
I. Violation of Appellants' Right to Due Process
Due process of law is the primary and indispensable foundation of individual freedoms; it is the basic and
essential term in the social compact which defines the rights of the individual and delimits the powers which the State
may exercise. 71 In evaluating a due process claim, the court must determine whether life, liberty or property interest
exists, and if so, what procedures are constitutionally required to protect that right. 72 Otherwise stated, the due
process clause calls for two separate inquiries in evaluating an alleged violation: did the plaintiff lose something that fits
into one of the three protected categories of life, liberty, or property?;and, if so, did the plaintiff receive the minimum measure of
procedural protection warranted under the circumstances? 73
For our determination, therefore, is whether the minimum requirements of due process were accorded to
appellants during the trial of these cases.
Section 14, Article III of our Constitution catalogues the essentials of due process in a criminal prosecution, thus:
"SEC. 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved,
and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel,to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial,and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face,and
to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his
behalf. However,after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused
provided that he has been notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable."
Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure casts the foregoing provision in a more detailed manner, thus:
"SECTION 1. Rights of accused at the trial.— In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled
to the following rights:
(a) To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt.
(b) To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
(c) To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to
promulgation of the judgment.The accused may, however, waive his presence at the trial pursuant to
the stipulations set forth in his bail, unless his presence is specifically ordered by the court for
purposes of identification. The absence of the accused without justifiable cause at the trial of which
he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present thereat. When an accused under
custody escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived his right to be present on all subsequent trial
dates until custody over him is regained. Upon motion, the accused may be allowed to defend
himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly protect his rights
without the assistance of counsel.
(d) To testify as a witness in his own behalf but subject to cross-examination on matters covered by
direct examination. His silence shall not in any manner prejudice him.
(e) To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against himself.
(f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either party may utilize as part of its
evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased, out of or cannot with due diligence be found in the
Philippines, unavailable, or otherwise unable to testify, given in another case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, the adverse party having the opportunity to
cross-examine him.
(g) To have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of witnesses and production of
other evidence in his behalf.
(h) To have speedy, impartial and public trial.
(i) To appeal in all cases allowed and in the manner prescribed by law."
Of the foregoing rights, what appellants obviously claim as having been trampled upon by the trial court are their: (a)
right to be assisted by counsel at every stage of the proceedings; (b) right to confront and cross-examine the
prosecution witnesses; (c) right to produce evidence on their behalf; and (d) right to an impartial trial.
A. Right to Counsel
Anent the right to counsel, appellants fault the trial court: first,for appointing counsel de oficio despite their
insistence to be assisted by counsel of their own choice; and second,for refusing to suspend trial until they shall have
secured the services of new counsel.
Appellants cannot feign denial of their right to counsel. We have held that there is no denial of the right to counsel
where a counsel de oficio was appointed during the absence of the accused's counsel de parte,pursuant to the court's
desire to finish the case as early as practicable under the continuous trial system. 74
Indisputably, it was the strategic machinations of appellants and their counsel de parte which prompted the trial court
to appoint counsel de oficio.The unceremonious withdrawal of appellants' counsel de parte during the proceedings of
August 24, 1998, as well as their stubborn refusal to return to the court for trial undermines the continuity of the
proceedings. Considering that the case had already been dragging on a lethargic course, it behooved the trial court to
prevent any further dilatory maneuvers on the part of the defense counsel. Accordingly, it was proper for the trial
court to appoint counsel de oficio to represent appellants during the remaining phases of the proceedings.
At any rate, the appointment of counsel de oficio under such circumstances is not proscribed by the Constitution. An
examination of its provisions concerning the right to counsel shows that the "preference in the choice of counsel"
pertains more aptly and specifically to a person under investigation 75 rather than an accused in a criminal
prosecution. 76 And even if we are to extend the application of the concept of "preference in the choice of counsel" to
an accused in a criminal prosecution, such preferential discretion is not absolute as would enable him to choose a
particular counsel to the exclusion of others equally capable. We stated the reason for this ruling in an earlier case:
"Withal, the word 'preferably' under Section 12 (1), Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution does not
convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to
preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling his defense. If the rule
were otherwise, then, the tempo of a custodial investigation, will be solely in the hands of the accused who can
impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer, who for one reason or
another, is not available to protect his interest. This absurd scenario could not have been contemplated by the
framers of the charter." 77
In the same breath, the choice of counsel by the accused in a criminal prosecution is not a plenary one. If the chosen
counsel deliberately makes himself scarce, the court is not precluded from appointing a de oficio counsel whom it considers
competent and independent to enable the trial to proceed until the counsel of choice enters his appearance.Otherwise, the pace of
a criminal prosecution will be entirely dictated by the accused to the detriment of the eventual resolution of the case.
Neither is there a violation of appellants' right to counsel just because the trial court did not grant their
request for suspension of the hearing pending their search for new counsel. An application for a continuance in order
to secure the services of counsel is ordinarily addressed to the discretion of the court, and the denial thereof is not
ordinarily an infringement of the accused's right to counsel. The right of the accused to select his own counsel must be
exercised in a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner.
In the present case, appellants requested either one (1) month or three (3) weeks to look for new counsel. Such periods
are unreasonable. Appellants could have hired new lawyers at a shorter time had they wanted to. They should have
been diligent in procuring new counsel. 81 Constitutional guaranty of right to representation by counsel does not mean that
accused may avoid trial by neglecting or refusing to secure assistance of counsel and by refusing to participate in his trial. 82 It
has been held that where the accused declined the court's offer to appoint counsel and elected to defend himself, the
denial of his motion made toward the end of the trial for a continuance so that he could obtain counsel of his own
choice was not an infringement of his constitutional rights. 83 While the accused has the right to discharge or change
his counsel at any time, this right is to some extent subject to supervision by the trial court, particularly after the trial
has commenced. The court may deny accused's application to discharge his counsel where it appears that such application is not
made in good faith but is made for purposes of delay. 84
Significantly, parallel to the hearing at the trial court were also petitions and motions involving several incidents in
these cases filed with the Court of Appeals and this Court. The appellants, particularly Larrañaga, were represented
there by the same counsel de parte. 85 Certainly, it is wrong for these lawyers to abandon appellants in the proceeding before
the trial court and unceasingly represent them in the appellate courts. Indeed, in doing so, they made a mockery of judicial process
and certainly delayed the hearing before the court below.InLacambra vs. Ramos, 86 we ruled:
"The Court cannot help but note the series of legal maneuvers resorted to and repeated
importunings of the accused or his counsel, which resulted in the protracted trial of the case, thus
making a mockery of the judicial process, not to mention the injustice caused by the delay to the
victim's family." aSADIC
Furthermore, appellants' counsel de parte ought to know that until their withdrawal shall have been approved by the
appellants, they still remain the counsel of record and as such, they must do what is expected of them, that is, to
protect their interests. They cannot walk out from a case simply because they do not agree with the ruling of the
judge. Being officers of the court whose duty is to assist in administering justice, they may not withdraw or be
permitted to withdraw as counsel in a case if such withdrawal will work injustice to a client or frustrate the ends of
justice.
B. Right to Confront and Cross-Examine
the Prosecution Witnesses.
Appellants also fault the trial court for depriving them of the right to cross-examine Rusia and the other prosecution
witnesses. Appellants' assertion has no factual and legal anchorage. For one, it is not true that they were not given
 had a fair share of time in
sufficient opportunity to cross-examine Rusia. All of appellants' counsel de parte
grilling Rusia concerning his background to the kidnapping of Marijoy and
Jacqueline. The records reveal the following dates of his cross-examination:
Lawyers Dates of Cross-examination

1. Armovit (for Larrañaga) August 13 and 17, 1998

2. Gonzales (for Larrañaga) August 20, 1998

3. Gica (for Josman) August 20, 1998

4. Paylado (for James Anthony and James Andrew) August 20, 1998

5. De la Cerna (for Rowen, Alberto and Ariel) August 20, 1998

6. Villarmia (for Larrañaga) October 1, 1998

7. Andales (for Josman) October 5 and 6, 1998

8. Carin (for James Andrew and James Anthony) October 5, 1998

9. Debalucos (for Rowen, Caño and Balansag) October 12, 1998

10. De Jesus (for Rowen, Alberto and Ariel) October 12, 1998

11. Ypil (for Rowen, Alberto and Ariel) October 12, 1998 89

That the trial court imposed limitation on the length of time counsel for appellants may cross-examine Rusia cannot
be labeled as a violation of the latter's constitutional right. Considering that appellants had several lawyers, it was just
imperative for the trial court to impose a time limit on their cross-examination so as not to waste its time on repetitive
and prolix questioning.
Indeed, it is the right and duty of the trial court to control the cross-examination of witnesses, both for the purpose of
conserving its time and protecting the witnesses from prolonged and needless examination. 90 Where several accused
are being tried jointly for the same offense, the order in which counsel for the several defendants shall cross-examine
the state's witnesses may be regulated by the court 91 and one of them may even be denied the right to cross-examine
separately where he had arranged with the others that counsel of one of them should cross-examine for
all. 92 In People vs. Gorospe, 93 we ruled:
"While cross-examination is a right available to the adverse party, it is not absolute in the
sense that a cross-examiner could determine for himself the length and scope of his cross-
examination of a witness. The court has always the discretion to limit the cross-examination and to
consider it terminated if it would serve the ends of justice."
The transcript of stenographic notes covering Rusia's cross-examination shows that appellants' counsel had
ample chance to test his credibility.
Records show that the failure of the PAO lawyers to cross-examine some of the prosecution witnesses was
due to appellants' obstinate refusal. In its Order 94 dated September 8, 1998, the trial court deferred the cross-
examination in view of appellants' insistence that their new counsel de parte will conduct the cross-examination. So as
not to unduly delay the hearing, the trial court warned the appellants that if by September 24, 1998, they are not yet
represented by their new counsel de parte,then it will order their counsel de oficio to conduct the cross-examination.
Lamentably, on September 24, 1998, appellants' counsel de parte entered their appearances merely to seek another
postponement of the trial. Thus, in exasperation, Judge Ocampo remarked:
"Every time a defense counsel decides to withdraw, must an accused be granted one (1) month suspension of
trial to look for such new counsel to study the records and transcripts? Shall the pace of the trial of these cases be thus
left to the will or dictation of the accused — whose defense counsels would just suddenly withdraw and cause
such long suspensions of the trial while accused allegedly shop around for new counsels and upon hiring new counsels
ask for another one month trial suspension for their new lawyers to study the records? While all the time such defense
counsels (who allegedly have already withdrawn) openly continue to 'advise' their accused-clients and even file
'Manifestations' before this Court and Petitions for Certiorari, Injunction and Inhibition on behalf of accused before
the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court?
"What inanity is this that the accused and their lawyers are foisting upon this Court? In
open defiance of the provisions of SC A.O. No. 104-96 that these heinous crimes cases shall undergo
'mandatory continuous trial and shall be terminated within sixty (60) days'?"
Still, in its Order dated October 8, 1998, the trial court gave appellants' new counsel de parte a period until
October 12, 1998 to manifest whether they are refusing to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses concerned; if so,
then the court shall consider them to have waived their right to cross-examine those witnesses. During the hearing on
October 12, 1998, Larrañaga's new counsel de parte,Atty. Villarmia, manifested that he would not cross-examine the
prosecution witnesses who testified on direct examination when Larrañaga was assisted by counsel de oficio only. The
next day, the counsel de parte of Josman, and brothers James Anthony and James Andrew adopted Atty. Villarmia's
manifestation. Counsel for Rowen, Alberto and Ariel likewise refused to cross-examine the same witnesses. Thus, in
its Order dated October 14, 1998, the trial court deemed appellants to have waived their right to cross-examine the
prosecution witnesses.
It appears, therefore, that if some of the prosecution witnesses were not subjected to cross-examination, it was
not because appellants were not given the opportunity to do so. The fact remains that their new counsel de
parte refused to cross-examine them. Thus, appellants waived their right "to confront and cross examine the witnesses"
against them.
C. Right to Impartial Trial
Appellants imputes bias and partiality to Judge Ocampo when he asked questions and made comments when
the defense witnesses were testifying.
Canon 14 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics states that a judge may properly intervene during trial to promote
expeditious proceeding, prevent unnecessary waste of time and dilly-dallying of counsel or clear up obscurities. The
test is whether the intervention of the judge tends to prevent the proper presentation of a cause or the ascertainment of the truth
in the matter where he interposes his questions or comments.
Records show that the intervention by way of comment of Judge Ocampo during the hearing was not only
appropriate but was necessary. One good illustration is his explanation onalibi.Seeing that the appellants' counsel
were about to present additional witnesses whose testimonies would not establish the impossibility of appellants'
presence in the scene of the crime, Judge Ocampo intervened and reminded appellants' counsel of the requisites
of alibi,thus:
"Well, I'm not saying that there is positive identification. I'm only saying that in proving your
alibi you must stick by what the Supreme Court said that it was impossible if they are telling the truth, di ba?
Now with these other witnesses na hindi naman ganoon to that effect it does not prove that it was impossible,
e, what is the relevance on that? What is the materiality? Iyon ang point ko. We are wasting our time with
that testimony. Ilang witnesses and epe-present to that effect. Wala rin namang epekto. It will not prove that
it was not impossible for him to go to Cebu at 10:30 P.M.,of July 16, e, papano yan? We are being criticized
by the public already for taking so long a time of the trial of these cases which is supposed to be
finished within 60 days. Now from August, September, October, November, December and
January, magse-six months na, wala pa and you want to present so many immaterial witnesses."
Surely, we cannot fault Judge Ocampo for exhaustively reminding appellants' counsel of the parameters
of alibi to ensure that there will be an orderly and expeditious presentation of defense witnesses and that there will be
no time wasted by dispensing with the testimonies of witnesses which are not relevant. Remarks which merely manifest
a desire to confine the proceedings to the real point in issue and to expedite the trial do not constitute a rebuke of counsel. 95
Appellants also decry the supposed harshness of Judge Ocampo towards the witnesses for the defense,
namely: Lourdes Montalvan, Michael Dizon, Rebecca Seno, Clotilde Soterol, Salvador Boton, Catalina Paghinayan and
Paolo Celso.
With respect to Lourdes Montalvan, Judge Ocampo expressed surprise on "how a 17-year-old girl could go to
a man's apartment all alone." He said that such conduct "does not seem to be a reasonable or a proper behavior for a
17-year-old girl to do." These statements do not really indicate bias or prejudice against the defense witnesses. The
transcript of stenographic notes reveals that Judge Ocampo uttered them, not to cast doubt on the moral character of
Lourdes Montalvan, but merely to determine the credibility of her story, thus:
"...But what I wanted to point out is the question of credibility. That is what we are here
for. We want to determine if it is credible for a 17-year-old college student of the Ateneo who belongs to a
good family, whose father is a lawyer and who could afford to live by herself in a Condominium Unit in
Quezon City and that she would go to the Condominium Unit of a man whom he just met the previous
month, all alone by herself at night and specifically on the very night July 16, 1997 ...That is the question that
I would like you to consider ... I assure you I have no doubts at all about her moral character and I have the
highest respect for Miss Montalvan ..."
Strong indication of Judge Ocampo's lack of predilection was his acquiescence for Lourdes Montalvan to
clarify during redirect examination why she found nothing wrong with being alone at Larrañaga's unit. We quote the
proceedings of November 19, 1998, thus:
ATTY. VILLARMIA:
Q When you went up you said you were alone. What was your feeling of going up to that room
alone or that unit alone?
PROS. GALANIDA
We object, not proper for re-direct. That was not touched during the cross. That should have been
asked during the direct-examination of this witness, Your Honor.
ATTY. VILLARMIA:
We want to clarify why she went there alone.
 COURT:
Precisely, I made that observation that does not affect or may affect the credibility of witness the fact that she
went there alone. And so, it is proper to ask her, di ba?
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
What was your purpose? Ask her now — what was your purpose?
/to the witness:
Q Will you answer the question of the Court/What was your purpose or intention in going in
Paco's room that night alone?
WITNESS:
A My purpose for going there was to meet Richard, sir, and to follow-up whether we will go out
later that night or not. The purpose as to going there alone, sir, I felt, I trusted Paco.
PROS. DUYONGCO:
May we ask the witness not to elaborate, Your Honor.
ATTY. VILLARMIA:
That is her feeling.
COURT:
That was her purpose. It is proper." 96
Appellants consider as violation of their right to due process Judge Ocampo's remarks labeling Rebecca Seno's
and Catalina Paghinayan's testimony as "incredible;" 97 Clotilde Soterol as a "totally confused person who appears to be
mentally imbalanced;" 98 and Salvador Boton and Paulo Celso as "liars." 99
Suffice it to state that after going over the pertinent transcript of stenographic notes, we are convinced that
Judge Ocampo's comments were just honest observations intended to warn the witnesses to be candid to the court. He
made it clear that he merely wanted to ascertain the veracity of their testimonies in order to determine the truth of the
matter in controversy. 100 That such was his purpose is evident from his probing questions which gave them the
chance to correct or clarify their contradictory statements. Even appellants' counselde parte acknowledged that Judge
Ocampo's statements were mere "honest observations." 101 If Judge Ocampo uttered harsh words against those defense
witnesses, it was because they made a mockery of the court's proceedings by their deliberate lies. The frequency with
which they changed their answers to Judge Ocampo's clarificatory questions was indeed a challenge to his patience.
A trial judge is not a wallflower during trial. It is proper for him to caution and admonish witnesses when necessary
and he may rebuke a witness for levity or for other improper conduct. 102 This is because he is called upon to ascertain the
truth of the controversy before him. 103
It bears stressing at this point that the perceived harshness and impatience exhibited by Judge Ocampo did
not at all prevent the defense from presenting adequately its side of the cases. IcHAaS
D. Right to Produce Evidence
Appellants assail the trial court's exclusion of the testimonies of four (4) airlines personnel 104 which were
intended to prove that Larrañaga did not travel to Cebu from Manila or from Cebu to Manila on July 16, 1997. The
trial court's exclusion of the testimonies is justified. By an alibi,Larrañaga attempted to prove that he was at a place
(Quezon City) so distant that his participation in the crime was impossible. To prove that he was not in the pre-flight
and post-flight of the four (4) major airlines flying the route of Cebu to Manila and Manila to Cebu on July 15 and 16,
1997 would not prove the legal requirement of "physical impossibility" because he could have taken the flight from
Manila to Cebu prior to that date, such as July 14, 1997. According to Judge Ocampo, it was imperative for appellants'
counsel to prove that Larrañaga did not take a flight to Cebu before July 16, 1997.
In the same way, we cannot fault the trial court for not allowing the defense to continue with the tedious process of
presenting additional witnesses to prove Larrañaga's enrollment at the Center for Culinary Arts, located at Quezon
City, from June 18, 1997 to July 30, 1997 considering that it would not also prove that he was not in Cebu on July 16 to
17, 1997. It is a known practice of students who are temporarily residing in Metro Manila to return to their provinces
once in a while to spend time with their families. To prove that Larrañaga was enrolled during a certain period of time
does not negate the possibility that he went home to Cebu City sometime in July 1997 and stayed there for a while.
Due process of law is not denied by the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or incompetent evidence, or testimony of an
incompetent witness. 105 It is not error to refuse evidence which although admissible for certain purposes, is not
admissible for the purpose which counsel states as the ground for offering it. 106
To repeat, due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their
respective sides of the controversy. 107 In the present case, there is no showing of violation of due process which
justifies the reversal or setting aside of the trial court's findings.
 II. The Improper Discharge of Rusia as an Accused
to be a State Witness
Appellants argue that Rusia is not qualified to be a state witness under paragraphs (d) and (e) of Section 9, Rule
119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which reads:
"Sec. 9. Discharge of the accused to be state witness.— When two or more persons are jointly charged
with the commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the
court may direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may be
witness for the state when after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn
statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the court is
satisfied that:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) Said accused does not appear to be most guilty;
(e) Said accused has not at anytime been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
xxx xxx xxx"
Appellants claim that Rusia was the "most guilty of both the charges of rape and kidnapping" having admitted in
open court that he raped Jacqueline. Furthermore, Rusia admitted having been previously convicted in the United
States of third degree burglary.
It bears stressing that appellants were charged with kidnapping and illegal detention. Thus, Rusia's admission that
he raped Jacqueline does not make him the "most guilty" of the crimes charged. Moreover, far from being the
mastermind, his participation, as shown by the chronology of events, was limited to that of an oblivious follower who
simply "joined the ride" as the commission of the crimes progressed. It may be recalled that he joined the group upon
Rowen's promise that there would be a "big happening" on the night of July 16, 1997. All along, he thought the "big
happening" was just another "group partying or scrounging." In other words, he had no inkling then of appellants'
plan to kidnap and detain the Chiong sisters. Rusia retained his passive stance as Rowen and Josman grabbed Marijoy
and Jacqueline at the waiting shed of Ayala Center. He just remained seated beside the driver's seat, not aiding Rowen
and Josman in abducting the Chiong sisters. When Jacqueline attempted to escape 14 meters away from the waiting
shed, it was Josman who chased her and not Rusia. Inside the car, it was Rowen who punched and handcuffed the
Chiong sisters. At the safehouse of the "Josman Aznar Group," Rusia stayed at the living room while Larrañaga, James
Anthony, Rowen, and Josman molested Marijoy and Jacqueline on separate rooms. At Tan-awan, it was Josman who
ordered Rowen and Ariel to pushed Marijoy into the deep ravine. And Rusia did not even know what ultimately
happened to Jacqueline as he was the first to leave the group. Clearly, the extent of Rusia's participation in the crimes
charged does not make him the "most guilty."
The fact that Rusia was convicted of third degree burglary in Minnesota does not render his testimony
inadmissible. 108 In People vs. De Guzman, 109 we held that although the trial court may have erred in discharging the
accused, such error would not affect the competency and the quality of the testimony of the defendant. In Mangubat
vs. Sandiganbayan, 110 we ruled:
"Anent the contention that Delia Preagido should not have been discharged as a state witness because of a
'previous final conviction' of crimes involving moral turpitude, suffice it to say that 'this Court has time and
again declared that even if the discharged state witness should lack some of the qualifications enumerated by
Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, his testimony will not, for that reason alone, be discarded or
disregarded.In the discharge of a co-defendant, the court may reasonably be expected to err; but such
error in discharging an accused has been held not to be a reversible one. This is upon the principle
that such error of the court does not affect the competency and the quality of the testimony of the discharged
defendant."
Furthermore, it may be recalled that Rusia was extremely bothered by his conscience and was having nightmares
about the Chiong sisters, hence, he decided to come out in the open. 111 Such fact alone is a badge of truth of his
testimony.
But, more importantly, what makes Rusia's testimony worthy of belief is the marked compatibility between such
testimony and the physical evidence. Physical evidence is an evidence of the highest order. It speaks eloquently than a
hundred witnesses. 112 The presence of Marijoy's ravished body in a deep ravine at Tan-awan, Carcar with tape on
her mouth and handcuffs on her wrists certainly bolstered Rusia's testimony on what actually took place from Ayala
Center to Tan-awan. Indeed, the details he supplied to the trial court were of such nature and quality that only a
witness who actually saw the commission of the crimes could furnish. What is more, his testimony was corroborated
by several other witnesses who saw incidents of what he narrated, thus: (1) Rolando Dacillo and Mario Minoza saw
Jacqueline's two failed attempts to escape from appellants; (2) Alfredo Duarte saw Rowen when he bought barbeque
and Tanduay at Nene's Store while the white van, driven by Alfredo Caño, was waiting on the side of the road and he
heard voices of "quarreling male and female" emanating from the van; (3) Manuel Camingao testified on the presence
of Larrañaga and Josman at Tan-awan, Carcar at dawn of July 17, 1997; and lastly, (4) Benjamin Molina and Miguel
Vergara recognized Rowen as the person who inquired from them where he could find a vehicle for hire, on the
evening of July 16, 1997. All these bits and pieces of story form part of Rusia's narration. With such strong anchorage
on the testimonies of disinterested witnesses, how can we brush aside Rusia's testimony?
Rusia's discharge has the effect of an acquittal. 113 We are not inclined to recall such discharge lest he will be placed
in double jeopardy. Parenthetically, the order for his discharge may only be recalled in one instance, which is when he
subsequently failed to testify against his co-accused. The fact that not all the requisites for his discharge are present is
not a ground to recall the discharge order. Unless and until it is shown that he failed or refused to testify against his co-
accused, subsequent proof showing that any or all of the conditions listed in Sec. 9 of Rule were not fulfilled would not wipe away
the resulting acquittal. 114
III. Appreciation of the Evidence for the
Prosecution and the Defense
Settled is the rule that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is left largely to the trial court because of its
opportunity, not available to the appellate court, to see the witnesses on the stand and determine by their demeanor
whether they are testifying truthfully or lying through their teeth. Its evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is well-
nigh conclusive on this Court, barring arbitrariness in arriving at his conclusions. 115
We reviewed the records exhaustively and found no compelling reason why we should deviate from the findings of
fact and conclusion of law of the trial court. Rusia's detailed narration of the circumstances leading to the horrible
death and disappearance of Jacqueline has all the earmarks of truth. Despite the rigid cross-examination conducted by
the defense counsel, Rusia remained steadfast in his testimony. The other witnesses presented by the prosecution
corroborated his narration as to its material points which reinforced its veracity.
Appellants proffered the defense of denial and alibi.As between their mere denial and the positive identification and
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, we are convinced that the trial court did not err in according weight to the
latter. For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must show that he was in another place at such a period of time
that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the place where the crime was committed at the time of its
commission. 116 These requirements of time and place must be strictly met. 117 A thorough examination of the evidence
for the defense shows that the appellants failed to meet these settled requirements. They failed to establish by clear
and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for them to be at the Ayala Center, Cebu City when the
Chiong sisters were abducted. What is clear from the evidence is that Rowen, Josman, Ariel, Alberto. James Anthony
and James Andrew were all within the vicinity, of Cebu City on July 16, 1997.
Not even Larrañaga who claimed to be in Quezon City satisfied the required proof of physical impossibility. During
the hearing, it was established that it takes only one (1) hour to travel by plane from Manila to Cebu and that there are four
(4) airline companies plying the route.One of the defense witnesses admitted that there are several flights from Manila to
Cebu each morning, afternoon and evening. Taking into account the mode and speed of transportation, it is therefore
within the realm of possibility for Larrañaga to be in Cebu City prior to or exactly on July 16, 1997. Larrañaga's
mother, Margarita Gonzales-Larrañaga, testified that his son was scheduled to take a flight from Manila to Cebu on
July 17, 1997 at 7:00 o'clock in the evening, but he was able to take an earlier flight at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon.
Margarita therefore claimed that his son was in Cebu City at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening of July 17, 1997 or the
day after the commission of the crime. However, while Larrañaga endeavored to prove that he went home to Cebu
City from Manila only in the afternoon of July 17, 1997, he did not produce any evidence to show the last time he went to
Manila from Cebu prior to such crucial date.If he has a ticket of his flight to Cebu City on July 17, 1997, certainly, he
should also have a ticket of his last flight to Manila prior thereto. If it was lost, evidence to that effect should have
been presented before the trial court.
Indeed, Larrañaga's presence in Cebu City on July 16, 1997 proved to be not only a possibility but a reality. No less
than four (4) witnesses for the prosecution identified him as one of the two men talking to Marijoy and Jacqueline on
the night of July 16, 1997. Shiela Singson testified that on July 16, 1997, at around 7:20 in the evening, she saw Larrañaga
approach Marijoy and Jacqueline at the West Entry of Ayala Center.The incident reminded her of Jacqueline's prior story
that he was Marijoy's admirer. She (Shiela) confirmed that she knows Larrañaga since she had seen him on five (5)
occasions. Analie Konahap also testified that on the same evening of July 16, 1997, at about 8:00 o'clock, she saw Marijoy and
Jacqueline talking to two (2) men at the West Entry of Ayala Center.She recognized them as Larrañaga and Josman, having
seen them several times at Glicos, a game zone, located across her office at the third level of Ayala Center. Williard
Redobles,the security guard then assigned at Ayala Center, corroborated the foregoing testimonies of Shiela and
Analie. In addition, Rosendo Rio,a businessman from Cogon, Carcar, declared that he saw Larrañaga at Tan-awan at
about 3:30 in the morning of July 17, 1997. The latter was leaning against the hood of a white van. 118
Taking the individual testimonies of the above witnesses and that of Rusia, it is reasonable to conclude that Larrañaga
was indeed in Cebu City at the time of the commission of the crimes and was one of the principal perpetrators.
Of course, we have also weighed the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by appellants in support of
their respective alibi.However, they proved to be wanting and incredible.
Salvador Boton,the security guard assigned at the lobby of Loyola Heights Condominium, testified on the entry of
Larrañaga's name in the Condominium's logbook to prove that he was in Quezon City on the night of July 16, 1997.
However, a cursory glance of the entry readily shows that it was written at the uppermost portion of the logbook and
was not following the chronological order of the entries. Larrañaga's 10:15 entry was written before the 10:05 entry
which, in turn, was followed by a 10:25 entry. Not only that, the last entry at the prior page was 10:05. This renders the
authenticity of the entries doubtful. It gives rise to the possibility that the 10:15 entry was written on a later date when
all the spaces in the logbook were already filled up and thus, the only remaining spot was the uppermost portion.
Surprisingly, the alleged arrival of Larrañaga and his friend Richard Antonio at the Loyola Heights Condominium in
the early evening of July 16, 1997 was not recorded in the logbook.
Rowena Bautista, a teacher at the Center for Culinary Arts, Quezon City, testified that Larrañaga attended her lecture
on Applied Mathematics on July 16, 1997 from 8:00 o'clock to 11:30 in the morning. 119 This runs counter to
Larrañaga's affidavit 120 stating that on the said date, he took his mid-term examinations in the subject Fundamentals
of Cookery from 8:00 o'clock in the morning to 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon.
With respect to Larrañaga's friends, the contradictions in their testimonies, painstakingly outlined by the Solicitor
General in the appellee's brief, reveal their unreliability. To our mind, while it may be possible that Larrañaga took the
mid-term examinations in Fundamentals of Cookery and that he and his friends attended a party at the R and R Bar
and Restaurant, also in Quezon City, however it could be that those events occurred on a date other than July 16, 1997.
Clotilde Soterol,in defense of Ariel and Alberto (the driver and the conductor of the van) attempted to discredit Rusia's
testimony by testifying that the white van with plate no. GGC-491 could not have been used in the commission of the
crimes on the night of July 16, 1997 because it was parked in her shop from 7:00 o'clock in the evening of the same
date until 11:00 o'clock in the morning of July 17, 1997. What makes Soterol's testimony doubtful is her contradicting
affidavits. In the first affidavit dated July 28, 1997, or twelve (12) days from the occurrence of the crime, she stated
that Alberto took the van from her shop at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 16, 1997 and returned it for repair only on July
22, 1997. 121 But in her second affidavit dated October 1, 1997, she declared that Alberto left the van in her shop at
7:00 o'clock in the evening of July 16, 1997 until 11:00 o'clock in the morning of July 17, 1997. 122Surely, we cannot
simply brush aside the discrepancy and accept the second affidavit as gospel truth.
Appellants attempted to establish their defense of alibi through the testimonies of relatives and friends who obviously
wanted them exculpated of the crimes charged. Naturally, we cannot but cast an eye of suspicion on their testimonies.
In People vs. Ching, 123 we ruled that it is but natural, although morally unfair, for a close relative to give weight to
blood ties and close relationship in times of dire needs especially when a criminal case is involved.
Rusia positively identified the appellants. The settled rule is that positive identification of an accused by credible
witnesses as the perpetrator of the crime demolishes alibi,the much abused sanctuary of felons. 124 Rusia's testimony
was corroborated by several disinterested witnesses who also identified the appellants. Most of them are neither
friends, relatives nor acquaintances of the victims' family. As we reviewed closely the transcript of stenographic notes,
we could not discern any motive on their part why they should testify falsely against the appellants. In the same vein,
it is improbable that the prosecution would tirelessly go through the rigors of litigation just to destroy innocent lives.
Meanwhile, appellants argue that the prosecution failed to prove that the body found at the foot of a deep ravine in
Tan-awan, Carcar was that of Marijoy. We are not convinced. Rusia testified that Josman instructed Rowen "to get rid"
of Marijoy and that following such instruction, Rowen and Ariel pushed her into the deep ravine. Furthermore,
Inspector Edgardo Lenizo, 125 a fingerprint expert, testified that the fingerprints of the corpse matched those of
Marijoy. 126 The packaging tape and the handcuff found on the dead body were the same items placed on Marijoy
and Jacqueline while they were being detained. 127 The body had the same clothes worn by Marijoy on the day she
was abducted. 128 The members of the Chiong family personally identified the corpse to be that of Marijoy 129 which
they eventually buried. They erected commemorative markers at the ravine, cemetery and every place which
mattered to Marijoy. Indeed, there is overwhelming and convincing evidence that it was the body of Marijoy that was
found in the ravine.
Appellants were charged with the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention in two (2) Informations and were
convicted thereof. Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 8 of R.A. 7659, reads:
"Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention.— Any private individual who shall kidnap or
detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death;
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of
the parents, female or a public officer.
"The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the
purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances
above mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
"When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected
to torture or dehumanizing acts,the maximum penalty shall be imposed."
The elements of the crime defined in Art. 267 above are: (a) the accused is a private individual; (b) he kidnaps or
detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping must be
illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense, any of the four (4) circumstances mentioned above is present. 130
There is clear and overwhelming evidence that appellants, who are private individuals, forcibly dragged Marijoy and
Jacqueline into the white car, beat them so they would not be able to resist, and held them captive against their will. In
fact, Jacqueline attempted to free herself twice from the clutches of appellants — the first was near the Ayala Center
and the second was in Tan-awan, Carcar — but both attempts failed. Marijoy was thrown to a deep ravine, resulting
to her death. Jacqueline, on the other hand, has remained missing until now.
Article 267 states that if the victim is killed or died as a consequence of the detention, or is raped or subjected to
torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. In People vs. Ramos, 131 citing Parulan vs.
Rodas, 132 and People vs. Mercado, 133 we held that this provision given rise to a special complex crime, thus:
"Prior to 31 December 1993, the date of effectivity of RA No. 7659, the rule was that where
the kidnapped victim was subsequently killed by his abductor, the crime committed would either
be a complex crime of kidnapping with murder under Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, or two (2)
separate crimes of kidnapping and murder. Thus, where the accused kidnapped the victim for the
purpose of killing him, and he was in fact killed by his abductor, the crime committed was the
complex crime of kidnapping with murder under Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as the
kidnapping of the victim was a necessary means of committing the murder. On the other hand,
where the victim was kidnapped not for the purpose of killing him but was subsequently slain as
an afterthought, two (2) separate crimes of kidnapping and murder were committed.
However, RA No. 7659 amended Art. 267 of The Revised Penal Code by adding thereto a last
paragraph which provides —
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped or is subjected to
torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes the concept of 'special complex crime' of
kidnapping with murder or homicide. It effectively eliminated the distinction drawn by the courts
between those cases where the killing of the kidnapped victim was purposely sought by the
accused, and those where the killing of the victim was not deliberately resorted to but was merely
an afterthought. Consequently, the rule now is: Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the
detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the
kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as separate
crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last paragraph of Art. 267, as amended
by RA No. 7659."
The prosecution was able to prove that Marijoy was pushed to a ravine and died. Both girls were raped by the gang.
In committing the crimes, appellants subjected them to dehumanizing acts. Dehumanization means deprivation of
human qualities, such as compassion. 134 From our review of the evidence presented, we found the following
dehumanizing acts committed by appellants: (1) Marijoy and Jacqueline were handcuffed and their mouths
mercilessly taped; (2) they were beaten to severe weakness during their detention; (3) Jacqueline was made to dance
amidst the rough manners and lewd suggestions of the appellants; (4) she was taunted to run and forcibly dragged to
the van; and (5) until now, Jacqueline remains missing which aggravates the Chiong family's pain. All told,
considering that the victims were raped, that Marijoy was killed and that both victims were subjected to
dehumanizing acts, the imposition of the death penalty on the appellants is in order.
Thus, we hold that all the appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping
and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape in Criminal Case No. CBU-45303 wherein Marijoy is the victim;
and simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention in Criminal Case No. CBU-45304 wherein Jacqueline is the
victim.
A discussion on the nature of special complex crime is imperative. Where the law provides a single penalty for two or
more component offenses, the resulting crime is called a special complex crime. Some of the special complex crimes
under the Revised Penal Code are (1) robbery with homicide, 135 (2) robbery with rape, 136 (3) kidnapping with
serious physical injuries, 137 (4) kidnapping with murder or homicide, 138 and (5) rape with homicide. 139 In a special
complex crime, the prosecution must necessarily prove each of the component offenses with the same precision that would be
necessary if they were made the subject of separate complaints.As earlier mentioned, R.A. No. 7659 amended Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code by adding thereto this provision: "When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the
detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed;and that this
provision gives rise to a special complex crime. In the cases at bar, particularly Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, the
Information specifically alleges that the victim Marijoy was raped "on the occasion and in connection" with her detention
and was killed "subsequent thereto and on the occasion thereof." Considering that the prosecution was able to prove each
of the component offenses, appellants should be convicted of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention with homicide and rape. It appearing from the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution that there
is a "direct relation, and intimate connection" 140 between the kidnapping, killing and raping of Marijoy, rape cannot be
considered merely as an aggravating circumstance but as a component offense forming part of the herein special
complex crime. It bears reiterating that in People vs. Ramos,141 and People vs. Mercado, 142 interpreting Article 267, we
ruled that "where the person killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or
was merely an afterthought,the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Article 48, nor
be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last paragraph of Article 267." The
same principle applies here. The kidnapping and serious illegal detention can no longer be complexed under Article 48, nor be
treated as separate crime but shall be punished as a special complex crime. At any rate, the technical designation of the crime is of
no consequence in the imposition of the penalty considering that kidnapping and serious illegal detention if complexed with either
homicide or rape, still, the maximum penalty of death shall be imposed.
Anent Criminal Case No. CBU-45304 wherein Jacqueline is the victim, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon appellants considering that the above-mentioned component offenses were not alleged in the
Information as required under Sections 8 and 9, 143 Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Consistent
with appellants' right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him,these attendant circumstances or
component offenses must be specifically pleaded or alleged with certainty in the information and proven during the
trial. Otherwise, they cannot give rise to a special complex crime, as in this case. Hence, the crime committed is only
simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention.
From the evidence of the prosecution, there is no doubt that all the appellants conspired in the commission of the
crimes charged. Their concerted actions point to their joint purpose and community of intent. Well settled is the rule
that in conspiracy, direct proof of a previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. It may be deduced from
the mode and manner by which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when
such point to a joint design and community of interest. 144 Otherwise stated, it may be shown by the conduct of the
accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime. 145 Appellants' actions showed that they have the
same objective to kidnap and detain the Chiong sisters. Rowen and Josman grabbed Marijoy and Jacqueline from the
vicinity of Ayala Center. Larrañaga, James Andrew and James Anthony who were riding a red car served as back-up
of Rowen and Josman. Together in a convoy, they proceeded to Fuente Osmeña to hire a van, and thereafter, to the
safehouse of the "Jozman Aznar Group" in Guadalupe, Cebu where they initially molested Marijoy and Jacqueline.
They headed to the South Bus Terminal where they hired the white van driven by Alberto, with Ariel as the
conductor. Except for James Andrew who drove the white car, all appellants boarded the white van where they held
Marijoy and Jacqueline captive. In the van, James Anthony taped their mouths and Rowen handcuffed them together.
They drank and had a pot session at Tan-awan. They encircled Jacqueline and ordered her to dance, pushing her and
ripping her clothes in the process. Meanwhile, Larrañaga raped Marijoy, followed by Rowen, James Anthony,
Alberto, and Ariel. On other hand, Josman and James Andrew raped Jacqueline. Upon Josman's order, Rowen and
Ariel led Marijoy to the cliff and pushed her. After leaving Tan-awan, they taunted Jacqueline to run for her life. And
when Rusia got off from the van near Ayala Center, the appellants jointly headed back to Cebu City.
Clearly, the argument of Rowen, Ariel and Alberto that they were not part of the "conspiracy" as they were merely
present during the perpetration of the crimes charged but not participants therein, is bereft of merit. To hold an
accused guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance
or furtherance of the complicity. 146 There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the
furtherance of the common design and purpose. 147 Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the
accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and
growing out of the purpose intended. 148 As shown by the evidence for the prosecution, Rowen, Ariel and Alberto
were not merely present at the scene of the crime.
Indeed, all appellants, except James Anthony who was 16 years old when the crimes charged were committed, share
the same degree of responsibility for their criminal acts.Under Article 68 149 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable
penalty on James Anthony, by reason of his minority, is one degree lower than the statutory penalty. This means that
he stands to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case No. CBU-45303 and twelve (12) years of prision
mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as
maximum, in Criminal Case No. CBU-45304. The penalty for the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention with homicide and rape, being death, one degree lower therefrom is reclusion perpetua. 150 On the
other hand, the penalty for simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention is reclusion perpetua to death. One degree
lower from the said penalty is reclusion temporal. 151 There being no aggravating and mitigating circumstance, the
penalty to be imposed on James Anthony is reclusion temporal in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, he should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum
period, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum. 152
As for the rest of the appellants, the foregoing established facts call for the imposition on them of the death
penalty in Criminal Case No. CBU-45303 and reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case No. CBU-45304. It is therefore clear
that the trial court erred in merely imposing "two (2) Reclusiones Perpetua," rationalizing that justice must be tempered
with mercy. We must be reminded that justice is not ours to give according to our sentiments or emotions. It is in the
law which we must faithfully implement.
At times we may show compassion and mercy but not at the expense of the broader interest of fair play and
justice. While we also find it difficult to mete out the penalty of death especially on young men who could have led
productive and promising lives if only they were given enough guidance, however, we can never go against what is
laid down in our statute books and established jurisprudence.
In keeping with the current jurisprudence, the heirs of Marijoy and Jacqueline are entitled to the amount of
P100,000.00 in each case by way of civil indemnity ex delicto. 153 As regards the actual damages, it appears that the
award of P200,000.00 is not supported by evidence. To be entitled to actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual
amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence
obtainable to the injured party. 154 Thus, in light of the recent case of People vs. Abrazaldo, 155 we grant the award of
P25,000.00 as temperate damages in each case, in lieu of actual damages. There being proofs that the victims' heirs
suffered wounded feelings, mental anguish, anxiety and similar injury, we award an equitable amount of P150,000.00
as moral damages, also in each case. Exemplary damages is pegged at P100,000.00 in each case156 to serve as a
deterrent to serious wrongdoings and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of the
victims and as punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Cebu City in Criminal Cases Nos. CBU-
45303 and 45304 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellants FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAÑAGA alias "PACO;" JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN
ADLAWAN alias "WESLEY;" ALBERTO CAÑO alias "ALLAN PAHAK;" ARIEL BALANSAG; and JAMES ANDREW UY alias
"MM," are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with
homicide and rape and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH by lethal injection;
(2) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, appellants FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAÑAGA alias "PACO;" JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN
ADLAWAN alias "WESLEY;" ALBERTO CAÑO alias "ALLAN PAHAK;" ARIEL BALANSAG; and JAMES ANDREW UY alias
"MM," are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention and are sentenced to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA;
(3) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellant JAMES ANTHONY UY, who was a minor at the time the crime was committed, is
likewise found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with
homicide and rape and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA; in Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, he
is declared guilty of simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years
of prision mayor in its maximum period, as MINIMUM, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as
MAXIMUM.
(4) Appellants are ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Marijoy and Jacqueline, in each case, the amounts of (a)
P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, (b) P25,000.00 as temperate damages, (c) P150,000.00 as moral damages, and (d) P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
Three (3) Justices of the Court maintain their position that RA 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes
the death penalty; nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional and the death
penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
In accordance with Article 83 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of RA No. 7659, upon the
finality of this Decision let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for the
possible exercise of Her Excellency's pardoning power, SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 107799. April 15, 1998.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PABLITO NANG "alias Batutto", (at large) SUMINA GAMO and
LUMUNSOG GABASAN alias "Dodong”
SYNOPSIS: Pablito Nang and accused-appellants Sumina Gamo and Lumonsog Gabasan were charged with robbery with
homicide. Of the three accused, only Gamo and Gabasan were apprehended, while Pablito Nang remains at large to this day. Upon
arraignment, both accused-appellants entered a plea of not guilty. They interposed the defense of denial and alibi. The trial court
found Gamo and Gabasan guilty of the crime charged. Hence, this appeal. Appellants insist on their innocence. THCASc
The appeal is devoid of merit. The core issue raised is factual and involves the credibility of the testimonies of witnesses. This
Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in passing upon the credibility of witnesses, unless there appears in the
record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been
misapprehended or misinterpreted. While this Court agrees that the trial court may have committed some errors, these lapses are
not so grave as to reverse the verdict of conviction against accused-appellants who were positively identified by eyewitnesses as
the perpetrators of the crime being imputed to them.
There is no serious incongruence in the prosecution eyewitnesses' sworn declarations and their testimonies. What is material is that
their testimonies agree on the essential fact that the three accused were present and they participated in the commission of the
crime. As between sworn statements taken ex parte and testimonies given in open court, the latter are generally held to be
superior. AHDaET

SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; AS A GENERAL RULE, THIS COURT WILL NOT
INTERFERE WITH THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT IN PASSING UPON THE CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES. — The
appeal is devoid of merit. The core issue raised is factual and involves the credibility of the testimonies of witnesses. This Court
will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in passing upon the credibility of witness, unless there appears in the record
some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been
misapprehended or misinterpreted. While this Court agrees that the trial court may have committed some errors, these lapses are
not so grave as to reverse the verdict of conviction against accused-appellants who were positively identified by eyewitnesses as
the perpetrators of the crime being imputed to them.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CHILD'S COMPETENCE AS A WITNESS; REQUIREMENTS. — The requirements of a child's competence
as a witness are: (a) capacity of observation (b) capacity of recollection and (c) capacity of communication. The determination of
whether a child is of sufficient intelligence according to the foregoing requirements is addressed to the sound judgment of the trial
court. In the instant case, this Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the trial court's assessment regarding Elizabeth's credibility
as a witness. TAHCEc
3. CRIMINAL LAW; PENALTIES FOR RECLUSION PERPETUA AND LIFE IMPRISONMENT, DISTINGUISHED. — The
special complex crime of robbery with homicide carries the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death under Article 294 (1) of the
Revised Penal Code. In the case at bar, the proper imposable penalty upon accused-appellants is reclusion perpetua in the absence of
proven mitigating or aggravating circumstances. However, the trial court erroneously imposed on accused-appellants the penalty
of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.Reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment are not synonymous penalties — these are
distinct in nature, in duration and in accessory penalties. This Court has distinguished between the two penalties in previous
decisions, going as far back as People v. Mobe [81 Phil. 58 (1948)] and, recently, in People v. Antonio Magana, G.R. No. 105673, July 26,
1996.
ROMERO, J p:
Pablito Nang alias "Batutto" (Batuto) and accused-appellants Sumina 1 Gamo and Lumonsog 2 Gabasan alias
"Dodong" were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide before the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City,
Branch 19. The information reads: Cdrep
"That on the 16th day of May, 1990 at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening at Sitio San Pedro,
Barangay Lubusan, Municipality of Lapuyan, Province of Zamboanga del Sur, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, the two of said accused being armed
with a pistol and a knife respectively, with intent to gain and by means of violence did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and rob (sic) the spouses Mr. and Mrs. Nicanor
Gonzales of the sum of Five Hundred (P500.00) Pesos and pursuant to said conspiracy and by
reason and on the occasion thereof, the abovenamed accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously stab and inflict injuries upon Nicanor Gonzales which caused the
latter's death immediately thereafter.
Act contrary to Article (sic) 293 and 294 of the Revised Penal Code." 3
Of the three accused, only herein accused-appellants Gamo and Gabasan, were apprehended, while Pablito Nang
remains at large to this day. Upon arraignment, both accused-appellants entered a plea of "not guilty."
The prosecution's version of the crime, as testified to by the deceased victim's wife, Epifania Gonzales, and daughter,
Elizabeth, is as follows:
At around 7:00 o'clock p.m. on May 16, 1990, farmer Nicanor Gonzales, his wife Epifania and six of their eleven
children, namely: Monina, Celso, Elizabeth, Basilio, Ambrosio and Ronnie were in their house at Sitio San Pedro,
Lubosan, Lapuyan, Zamboanga del Sur. Feeling the urge to relieve himself before going to bed, Nicanor proceeded
downstairs to the comfort room adjacent to the house. Since it was already dark, Epifania placed a lighted gas lamp
on the windowsill overlooking the toilet to illuminate the place. 4 After a while, Nicanor called for his daughter
Elizabeth to take her turn in using the toilet. Forthwith, Elizabeth went downstairs and walked towards the direction
of the toilet. 5
To her surprise, she saw her father being attacked by three masked men. As Nicanor struggled with the assailants,
their T-shirt masks dropped, enabling Elizabeth to recognize them with the aid of the light emanating from the gas
lamp on the window overlooking the toilet and the scene of the crime. She recognized the two culprits who held her
father's hands accused-appellants Sumiba Gamo and Lumonsog Gabasan, and the third who stabbed her father, as
accused Pablito Nang. Elizabeth positively identified the three assailants because she was familiar with their faces
since they used to pass by their place. 6
After stabbing Nicanor, the three malefactors rushed inside the house. Out of fear, Elizabeth followed them, only to be
hit on the head by Gabasan who then stood as lookout beside the stairs. 7 Having subsequently eluded Gabasan,
Elizabeth managed to reach the upper floor of the house where she saw her mother Epifania struggling against
Pablito Nang and Sumiba Gamo. 8
Earlier Epifania Gonzales, having heard the commotion coming from the direction of the comfort room, decided to
investigate. Before she could even step out of the door, two masked men she met immediately grabbed her by the
hands and poked knives at her. In the ensuing scuffle, she was able to pry loose their masks. Aided by the light
coming from the gas lamp on the window, Epifania recognized the two who gripped her hands as Pablito Nang and
Sumiba Gamo, both of whom were then armed with hunting knives. She also saw Lumonsog Gabasan standing by the
stairs. The three intruders were familiar to her as Lumonsog Gabasan used to sell copra to them and buy on credit
from her store. Nang was known as "bugoy," being notorious in the community. 9
Gabasan demanded money from Epifania who replied that they had no money. She pleaded with them to spare her
life. The two men warned her, instead, to keep quiet. But as Epifania continued to struggle with the two, she sustained
wounds on her left wrist and neck. While Pablito Nang was restraining her, Sumiba Gamo searched their trunk, took
the money in it, and told Nang about it. 10 As the three intruders fled, one of them shouted threateningly that they
would come back. After the three had left, Epifania immediately shouted for help crying out, "Tabang mo kay gitulis
me!" (Help us, we were robbed!)
There being no immediate response to her cries for assistance, Epifania, hurriedly scampered downstairs. As she left
the house, she saw her husband Nicanor seriously wounded beside the mango tree. When she asked him to identify
his assailants, he named Pablito Nang and Sumiba Gamo and could make no more utterance as he was choking in his
own blood due to his grave condition. 11 When the neighbors arrived, they placed the wounded Nicanor on a bench
which they carried towards the road to bring him to a doctor. Unfortunately, however, Nicanor expired after only a
few minutes. 12
When Epifania inspected the family trunk that was ransacked by the intruders, she found out that the money
consisting of paper bills and coins totalling some P500.00 were taken by the three men. 13
The following day, Patrolman Alfren Humpa and Pfc. Ansaling Lingating conducted an investigation and drew a
sketch of the crime scene 14 which indicated the window of the Gonzales house overlooking the toilet, the one meter
distance of the toilet from the house, the four-meter distance of the toilet from the mango tree where the bloodstains
were found and the distance of the house from the road where the victim died.
The post mortem examination prepared by Rural Sanitation Inspector George Bayamban revealed that Nicanor
Gonzales sustained the following injuries:
1. One stab wound at the middle of the chest measuring 1 3/4 inch in length and 1 inch wide and 4 inches
deep;
2. One stab wound at the middle of his back measuring 1 3/4 inch in length and ½ inch wide and 4 inches
deep. 15
Hemorrhage due to stab wounds at middle back and chest was the cause of Nicanor's death. 16
The defense had an altogether different version of the occurrence. Accused-appellants Sumiba Gamo and
Lumonsog Gabasan interposed the defense of denial and alibi. In the morning of May 16, 1990, they were hired by
Lamberto Lingating Lusay to make copra at Guili-an, Lapuyan, Zamboanga del Sur. They started making copra after
breakfast at about 7:00 o'clock a.m. After they had finished their work at about 4:00 o'clock p.m., they decided to go to
the house of Lumonsog Gabasan in order to rest. While there, Ernie Gandamon arrived and summoned Temie
Gabasan, the brother of accused-appellant Lumonsog Gabasan, to discuss the impending marriage between Temie
and Ernie's cousin Myrna. The father of Lumonsog Gabasan agreed to go to the house of Myrna in Sitio Guili-an,
Poblacion, Lapuyan. He was accompanied by accused-appellants Lumonsog Gabasan and Sumiba Gamo, Dugang,
Temie and Mamerto Masulog. The group brought two chickens to symbolize the plighted troth between Temie and
Myrna.
Upon arrival at their destination, accused-appellants cooked and prepared the chickens for supper, after
which a wedding covenant was forged between the father of the prospective groom and Mamerto Masulog, the
guardian of the bride-to-be. While having dinner, they heard gunshots coming from the neighboring barangay,
thereby prompting the father of accused-appellant Lumonsog and his younger brother to go home at once out of
concern for the rest of the family. Accused-appellants Lumonsog Gabasan and Sumiba Gamo, together with Temie,
stayed behind and slept at the house of Ernie that evening. Upon waking up at 7:00 o'clock a.m., they then returned to
their place of work. 17 The defense presented Ernie Gandamon, Mamerto Masulog and Pendatun Bandatun to
corroborate accused-appellants' alibi. 18
On February 21, 1992, the trial court 19 rendered its judgment of conviction, disposing thus:
"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds "GUILTY" beyond reasonable doubt accused
SUMINA GAMO and LUMONSOG GABASAN of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and
sentences them to RECLUSION PERPETUA or LIFE IMPRISONMENT, with all the accessory
penalties prescribed by law and to return the sum of FIVE HUNDRED (P500.00) PESOS to the heirs
of victim Nicanor Gonzales which is the amount taken by them and to pay FIFTY THOUSAND
(P50,000.00) PESOS as to compensation for the death of the victim Nicanor Gonzales to the latter's
heirs without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Both accused Sumina Gamo and
Lumonsog Gabasan having been in prison since June 5, 1990, are hereby credited FOUR-FIFTH
(4/5) of such preventive imprisonment in the service of their sentence herein imposed.
SO ORDERED." 20
Hence, this appeal. Appellants insist on their innocence and contend that the trial court erred:
"I . . . WHEN IT IGNORED MATERIAL INCONSISTENCIES IN THE TESTIMONIES OF THE
WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION AND MADE FINDINGS OF FACT THAT ARE
UNSUPPORTED BY THE RECORDS AND THE EVIDENCE; Cdrep
 II . . . WHEN IT GAVE CREDENCE AND FULL WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE WIFE
AND THE DAUGHTER OF THE DECEASED VICTIM NICANOR GONZALES;
III . . . WHEN IT HELD THAT THE ACCUSED APPELLANTS WERE GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE." 21
The appeal is devoid of merit.
Clearly, the core issue raised is factual and involves the credibility of the testimonies of witnesses. It is doctrinal that
this Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in passing upon the credibility of witnesses, unless
there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the
significance of which has been misapprehended or misinterpreted. The reason for this is that the trial court is in a
better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying during the trial. 22 There is no cogent reason for the Court to depart from this well-settled rule.
Accused-appellants point to certain errors committed by the trial court in its "findings of fact . . . that are not
supported by the records . . . (and thus) . . . greatly prejudiced their constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial."
They, therefore, submit that this case comes within the exception to the rule that the findings of the trial court with
regard to the credibility of the witnesses and the findings as to facts are not to be disturbed on appeal. 23 These
supposed errors are: (1) that the daughter of the deceased victim, Elizabeth, was hit on the head with a gun by one of
the three assailants, 24 but the records show that she only testified that she was hit on the head without mentioning a
gun; 25 (2) that Pablito Nang was identified by Epifania because he removed his mask while ransacking the family
trunk, 26 but witness Epifania said that she was able to remove the masks of the culprits while she was struggling
with them; (3) that Epifania was grabbed by two masked men and a third masked person followed and entered the
house and then ransacked the trunk, 27 but in the testimony of Epifania, only two persons entered their house and it
was appellant Gamo who opened the trunk, while the third, appellant Gabasan, was waiting by the stairs; 28 (4) that
the victim's wife, Epifania, did not identify Lumonsog Gabasan while the victim's daughter Elizabeth did not identify
Sumina Gamo, because they did not know them, hence the two told the truth, 29 but in their respective testimonies,
wife and daughter categorically identified all three accused as the ones who killed Nicanor, attacked them and robbed
them of their money. 30 Accused-appellants, therefore, conclude that because of these errors in its factual findings and
appreciation of the evidence, the lower court failed in its duty to conduct a real examination as to the credibility of the
testimony of the two key witnesses for the prosecution.
Upon careful examination of the assailed decision and the evidence on record, this Court agrees with accused-
appellants' observation that the trial court may indeed have committed some errors, but these lapses are not so grave
as to suffice to reverse the verdict of conviction against accused-appellants, who, as the records show, were
categorically and positively identified by eyewitnesses as the perpetrators of the crime being imputed to them.
More important, all the elements of the crime of robbery with homicide are shown to exist. The crime of robbery with
homicide is primarily classified as an offense against property and not against persons. It is therefore incumbent upon
the prosecution to establish that: (a) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a
person; (b) the property thus taken belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus
lucrandi and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide, which is therein used in a
generic sense, was committed. 31 This Court is satisfied that all the elements of the crime attributed to accused-
appellants had been adequately established.
Accused-appellants attempt to discredit the testimonies of prosecution witnesses by pointing out certain alleged
inconsistencies and contradictions between their affidavits or sworn statements given to the police investigators vis-a-
vis their testimonies in open court. They allege that in Epifania's affidavit, nothing was mentioned about her being
stabbed by her attackers. What she stated was that Sumiba Gamo pointed a knife at her while Pablito Nang ransacked
the trunk. In court, however, she testified that Nang stabbed her and that Gamo was the one who opened the trunk,
and that she recognized them as she was able to snatch their masks. As regards the affidavit of Elizabeth, accused-
appellants point out that what was stated therein was that Lumonsog Gabasan whipped her with a pistol but she
made no mention about the gun in her court testimony, only her allegation that she was whipped by Lumonsog
Gabasan.
Contrary to what accused-appellants assert, there is no serious incongruence in the prosecution eyewitnesses' sworn
declarations and their testimonies. What is material is that their testimonies agree on the essential fact that the three
accused were present and they participated in the commission of the crime. It bears stressing that ex parte affidavits
are generally incomplete. Hence, inconsistencies between the declaration of the affiants in their sworn statements and
those in court do not necessarily discredit them. The infirmity of affidavits as evidence is a matter of judicial
experience. 32
In People v. Miranda, this Court observed thus:
". . . Predictably, testimonies given during trials are much more exact and elaborate than those stated in
sworn statements. Ex parte affidavits are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate for varied reasons,
at times because of partial and innocent suggestions or for want of specific inquiries. Witnesses cannot be
expected everytime, except when told, to distinguish between what may be inconsequential and what may
be mere insignificant details."
In the same vein, this Court noted in People v. Reyes, 34 viz.:
". . . Differences in the narration of an incident between the sworn statements and the testimony of a
witness are not unknown. The infirmity of an extrajudicial statement is a matter of judicial experience. An
extrajudicial statement or affidavit is generally not prepared by the affiant himself but by another who uses
his own language in writing the affiant's statement; hence, omissions and misunderstandings by the writer
are not infrequent."
Thus, as between sworn statements taken ex parte and testimonies given in open court, the latter are generally held to
be superior. The rationale is that affidavits are oftentimes executed when an affiant's mental faculties are not in such a
state as to afford him a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident that has transpired. 35 Affidavits are not
complete reproductions of what the declarant has in mind because the administering officer generally prepares them
and the affiant simply signs them after the same have been read to him. 36
In the case at bar, the alleged inconsistencies between the affidavits and testimonies of witnesses are minor and do not
affect their credibility as witnesses. They merely show that their affidavits are incomplete with respect to certain
details that do not in any way detract from the overall veracity of their testimonies. Minor inconsistencies serve
instead to strengthen their credibility as they are badges of truth rather than indicia of falsehood. The most candid
witnesses oftentimes make mistakes and fall into confused and inconsistent statements but such honest lapses do not
necessarily affect their credibility. Far from eroding the effectiveness of the testimonies of the two witnesses, such
trivial differences in fact constitute signs of veracity. What is clear is that their affidavits and testimonies concur on all
material points and establish the presence of accused-appellants at the scene of the crime and the manner in which
they executed the same.
Accused-appellants also assail the trial court's utmost reliance on the testimony of 11-year-old Elizabeth considering
her tender age and alleged low level of understanding, intelligence and common sense. On this score, it is well-
established that any child regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he can perceive, and perceiving, can make
known his perception to others and that he is capable of relating truthfully facts for which he is examined. 39
The requirements of a child's competence as a witness are: (a) capacity of observation (b) capacity of recollection and
(c) capacity of communication. The determination of whether a child is of sufficient intelligence according to the
foregoing requirements is addressed to the sound judgment of the trial court. In the instant case, this Court finds no
cogent reason to disturb the trial court's assessment regarding Elizabeth's credibility as a witness.
Accused-appellants' defense of alibi is, as repeatedly pronounced, one of the weakest defenses an accused can
invoke. 40 Accordingly, courts have invariably looked upon it with caution, if not suspicion, not only because it is
inherently unreliable but because it is rather easy to fabricate. Alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of
the accused by the prosecution's witness who has no motive to testify falsely against them. For alibi to be believed,
credible and tangible proof of physical impossibility for the accused to be at the scene of the crime is indispensable.
The accused must show that he was at such other place for such a period of time that it was physically impossible for
him to have been at the place where the crime was committed at the time of its commission.
Evidence of physical impossibility had not been adduced in the case at bar. Barangay Guili-an where Lumonsog
Gabasan and Sumiba Gamo claimed to be at the time of the commission of the crime is not far from Sitio San Pedro,
Brgy. Lubosan where the crime was committed. According to defense witness Ernie Gandamon, the distance between
Guili-an and San Pedro Lubosan, Lapuyan, can be negotiated in 20 minutes by riding a carabao or by hiking.
Moreover, accused-appellants' alibi cannot prevail in light of the positive identification of prosecution eyewitnesses
Epifania and Elizabeth Gonzales who have not been proved to harbor any ill-motives in testifying against the
accused-appellants.
Challenge is also made as to the credibility of the key witnesses being the wife and child of the deceased victim.
Relationship per se, without more, does not affect the credibility of witnesses. Indeed, it would be unnatural for the
relatives of the victims who seek justice to commit another injustice by imputing the crime on innocent persons and
not on those who were actually responsible therefor.
Moreover, the delay of witnesses in revealing to the authorities the identities of the accused may be attributable to
trauma, confusion, and grief. It is quite understandable when the witnesses do not immediately report the identity of
the offender after a startling occurrence more specifically when they are related to victim as they just had a traumatic
experience.
The trial court correctly found accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with
homicide as defined in Article 294(I) of the Revised Penal Code. The prosecution has established with moral certainty
through the eyewitness testimonies of Epifania and Elizabeth that accused-appellants used violence and intimidation
against the members of the Gonzales family in carrying out their intention to rob them. They stabbed to death Nicanor
Gonzales to facilitate the commission of the robbery and attacked his wife Epifania and 11-year-old child Elizabeth
causing them injuries, in carrying out their intention to rob them of their money. It was likewise amply shown
through eyewitness testimony that accused-appellants took away some P500.00 from the Gonzales family trunk.
There being proof of asportation, animus lucrandi is presumed. 49
In the crime of robbery with homicide, the homicide may precede robbery or may occur after robbery. What is
essential is that there is a nexus, an intimate connection between robbery and the killing whether the latter be prior or
subsequent to the former or whether both crimes be committed at the same time.
Likewise, the rule is well-established that whenever homicide has been committed as a consequence of or on the
occasion of the robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as principals of the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide although they did not actually take part in the homicide, unless it
clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the homicide. Such exception does not apply in the instant case. By
their concerted action, accused-appellants and Pablito Nang obviously conspired to rob the Gonzales family, on which
occasion they killed Nicanor to facilitate their criminal intent. It is immaterial, therefore, that accused-appellants
merely held the arms of Nicanor Gonzales while Pablito Nang stabbed him. In view of the presence of conspiracy, all
the perpetrators of the crime shall bear equal responsibility.
The special complex crime of robbery with homicide carries the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death under Article
294(1) of the Revised Penal Code. In the case at bar, the proper imposable penalty upon accused-appellants is reclusion
perpetua in the absence of proven mitigating or aggravating circumstances. However, the trial court erroneously
imposed on accused-appellants the penalty of "reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment." Reclusion perpetua and life
imprisonment are not synonymous penalties — there are distinct in nature, in duration and in accessory penalties.
This Court has distinguished between the two penalties in previous decisions, going as far back as People v. Mobe and,
recently, in People v.Antonio Magana, thus:
"The Code (Revised Penal Code) does not prescribe the penalty of 'life imprisonment' for any of the felonies
therein defined, that penalty being invariably imposed for serious offenses penalized not by the . . . Code
but by the special law. Reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at least (30) years, after which the
convict becomes eligible for pardon. It also carries with it accessory penalties, namely: perpetual special
disqualification, etc. It is not the same as 'life imprisonment' which, for one thing, does not carry with it any
accessory penalty, and for another, does not appear to have any definite extent or duration."
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from convicting accused-appellants Sumina Gamo and Lumunsog Gabasan of
the crime of Robbery with Homicide is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the phrase "or life imprisonment"
in the dispositive portion thereof is DELETED. Cdrep
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Philippine National Police and the National Bureau of Investigation which
shall effect with dispatch the arrest of Pablito Nang in order that he may be put on trial for the crime charged and
duly proved here. SO ORDERED.
[G.R. Nos. 147678-87. July 7, 2004.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.EFREN MATEO
VITUG, J p:
On 30 October 1996, ten (10) informations, one for each count of rape, allegedly committed on ten different dates — 07
October 1995, 14 December 1995, 05 January 1996, 12 January 1996, 29 February 1996, 08 May 1996, 02 July 1996, 18
July 1996, 16 August 1996 and 28 August 1996 — were filed against appellant EFREN MATEO. Except for the variance
in dates, the ten informations, later docketed Criminal Cases No. 9351 to No. 9360, inclusive, in the Regional Trial
Court of Tarlac, uniformly read —
"The undersigned OIC Provincial Prosecutor upon preliminary investigation conducted by
the MTC, Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch 1, accuses Efren Mateo of Brgy. Buenavista, Tarlac, Tarlac of the
crime of Rape, committed as follows:
"That on or about January 12, 1996, in the Municipality of Tarlac, Province of Tarlac,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Efren Mateo y
Garcia, who is the guardian of the complaining witness, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously and by means of force and intimidation have carnal knowledge with said Imelda C.
Mateo in their house against her consent." 1
The trial ensued following a plea of "not guilty" entered by appellant to all the charges.
According to Imelda Mateo, she was born on 11 September 1980 to the spouses Dan Icban and Rosemarie Capulong.
Rosemarie Capulong and appellant started to live together without the benefit of marriage when private complainant
was only two years old. Imelda stayed with her mother and appellant in a house in Buenavista, Tarlac, and adopted
the surname of appellant when she started schooling.
Imelda recalled that each time the ten rape incidents occurred her mother, Rosemarie, was not at home. On 07 October
1995, the date of the first rape, Rosemarie went to Bamban and returned home only the next day. The second rape was
said to have occurred on 14 December 1995, while her mother was attending a seminar for day-care workers. Imelda
recalled the third rape to have been committed on 05 January 1996, the same day her mother resigned from her job
and left for Manila. The fourth rape, she said, happened a week later, on 12 January 1996, when Rosemarie Capulong
was attending yet another seminar for day-care workers. The fifth incident was on 29 February 1996, when Rosemarie
left for Manila to follow-up her application for an overseas job. The sixth rape took place on 08 May 1996 when
Rosemarie was once again in Manila to attend to her application papers. On 01 July 1996, Rosemarie and appellant left
for Manila as Rosemarie was scheduled to depart for Jeddah. Appellant returned home in the evening of the next day,
02 July 1996, the same day the job recruiter relayed the news that Rosemarie Capulong could not yet leave for Jeddah.
During the night, appellant again molested Imelda. With Rosemarie finally away, appellant frequented his nocturnal
visits. On the night of 18 July 1996, appellant went into her room and abused her while her siblings were sleeping in
the sala.The same incident was repeated on the night of 16 August 1996 when appellant, already naked, entered the
room and sexually assaulted Imelda. The last rape was committed on 28 August 1996. According to private
complainant, she never reported any of the ten incidents to anybody because the accused had threatened to kill her
and her mother if she were to disclose the matter to anyone.
Imelda stated that each of the ten rape incidents were committed in invariably the same fashion. All were perpetrated
inside the house in Buenavista, Tarlac, during the night and, each time, she would try to ward off his advances by
kicking him but that he proved to be too strong for her. These incidents occurred in the presence of her three sleeping
siblings who failed to wake up despite the struggles she exerted to fend off the advances. She recalled that in all ten
instances, appellant had covered her mouth with a handkerchief to prevent her from shouting. Subsequently,
however, she changed her statement to say that on two occasions, particularly the alleged sexual assaults on 02 July
1996 and 18 July 1996, appellant had only covered her mouth with his hands. Still much later, Imelda testified that he
had not covered her mouth at all.
The predictable pattern of the rape incidents testified to by Imelda prompted the defense to ask her whether she had,
at any one time, taken any protective measure in anticipation of the rape incidents. She replied that once she had
requested her brothers and sister to keep her company in the bedroom at night but appellant had scolded them. On
the night of the fourth rape, she narrated that she armed herself with a knife but, when appellant entered her room
that night, she was not able to retrieve the bladed weapon from under the bed as appellant was sitting right on top of
it. CcTHaD
Dr. Rosario Fider, the second witness for the prosecution, stated that she had physically examined private
complainant on 14 October 1996 and found superficially healed lacerations at 3:00, 6:00 and 9:00 positions on her
private organ that could have been caused by an insertion of an instrument or by sexual intercourse. According to Dr.
Fider, the lacerations pointed to possibly one or two, and at most three, incidents of rape, which had happened not
earlier than two weeks before the date of the physical examination.
Appellant denied each of the charges. On 07 October 1995, the date of the first rape, he claimed that he was
in Barangay Talaga, Capas, to pick up newly hatched ducklings, numbering about a thousand, which had to be
properly fed, kept warm and constantly cared for that required him to be around the entire day and night for two
weeks. The fowls had then to be brought into an open field located one and a half kilometers away which could be
traversed by foot. He continued to tend to the animals from 20 October 1995 until sometime in February 1996. During
the period, he was able to go home only once a week or three times a month.
On 14 December 1995, the supposed date of the second rape, appellant admitted that he had temporarily left the care
of his ducks to go caroling with his wife, their daughter Imelda and some friends. He immediately returned to care for
his ducks, located some 500 meters from their residence, that kept him busy and away from home when the third,
fourth and fifth rape incidents were said to have taken place on the 5th and 12th of January and 29th of February of
1996. While he admitted to leaving occasionally the animals in order to go home, these visits, however, were said to be
brief and mainly for getting some food and fresh clothes. Appellant could not recall when exactly he sold the ducks
but it was definitely prior to 08 May 1996, the day he was accepted and reported for work at the LA Construction of
Hacienda Luisita, Tarlac, located some three kilometers away. On 08 May 1996, the date of the sixth rape, he was at
work from seven o'clock in the morning until the following day to finish a rush job.
On 01 July 1996, he accompanied his wife, Rosemarie, to Manila who was scheduled to leave for Jeddah the following
day. Upon being advised that her flight was postponed, the couple stayed in the house of one Luding Sevilla in
Caloocan. On 03 July, he returned to Tarlac. From 15 July to September, 1996, he was given the nightshift at the LA
Construction. Appellant asserted that it was impossible for him to have raped private complainant on 28 August 1996
because at six o'clock that evening, his friends Boy Botio, Boy Pineda, Marvin Dalangin and Nelson Castro had picked
him up at his house to attend the fiesta at BarangayMurcia, Concepcion, Tarlac, where they spent the night.
Appellant dismissed the charges against him as being the malicious "retribution" of a vengeful stepdaughter.
Allegedly, on 11 October 1996, he took private complainant to task after his son, Marlon Mateo, who had reported
seeing her engaged in sexual intercourse with one Pikong Navarro inside the room of their house. Earlier, on 05
August 1996, he also learned that Sharon Flores, a neighbor and a friend of private complainant, had caught his
stepdaughter and Navarro in a very compromising position. In anger, he hit Imelda twice with a piece of bamboo. He
then forbade her from going out at night and leaving her siblings alone in the house. HTcADC
Rosemarie Capulong, the mother of private complainant, rose to testify in defense of her common-law husband.
Capulong asserted that she had not at any time, prior to her departure for Jeddah, spent any night outside their house.
Rosemarie said that she was a day-care teacher from June 1990 until June 1996. On 07 October 1995, the date of the
supposed first rape, she was at home and did not go to Bamban as so claimed by private complainant. Capulong
disputed the claim of private complainant that she attended a seminar for day-care workers on 12 January 1996 since
her job did not require her to attend seminars except for regular meetings held on the last Friday of every month, with
each meeting lasting for only half a day. The last seminar she had attended was in June of 1990 in Tarlac. On 29
February 1996, Rosemarie was also certain that she spent the night at home as she had to report for work the
following day. She started obtaining documents for her planned employment abroad only on 12 February 1996, when
she secured her birth certificate in Bamban as so attested by the date appearing on the certification from the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Bamban. On 08 May 1996, she admitted being away from home while attending a general assembly
of day-care workers in Zambales. On that day, appellant was likewise not at home due to his overtime work up until
about three or four o'clock in the early morning. Imelda herself, Capulong testified, had attended on that day the San
Miguel fiesta.Contrary to the allegation of private complainant, the witness was not in Manila on the 5th and 12th of
January 1996 because, at that time, she had yet no plans of working overseas. She denied the assertions of private
complainant that Capulong had resigned from her day-care work on 05 January 1996, saying it was actually months
later, or in June of 1996, when she quit her job. It was on 13 February 1996 when she went to Manila for the first time
to attend to her application for a possible overseas work. She made subsequent trips to the city, that is, on the 3rd, 5th,
8th and 24th of the month of June, to follow-up her employment papers and to submit herself to a medical check-up.
All these visits only took a day, and she would always be home in Buenavista at nightfall. On 01 July 1996, appellant
accompanied her to Manila but, upon learning that her flight was postponed, they spent the night in Caloocan. The
couple stayed together in Manila until 03 July 1996, when appellant decided to return to Tarlac. Rosemarie worked in
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, until 11 November 1996 when she decided to return home.
Rosemarie Capulong corroborated the testimony of appellant regarding his whereabouts from October 1995, when
the ducks were first brought to the field, until 15 December 1995, when appellant had joined her and their friends
caroling. Capulong believed that the charges may have been fabricated by her relatives who were "jealous" of
appellant because it was he, not they, who had been receiving the remittances of her earnings from Saudi Arabia.
Sharon Flores, a neighbor, testified that, about noontime on 05 August 1996, she repaired to the house of private
complainant to investigate rumors regarding a man seen entering the Capulong residence. When she went in, she saw
private complainant and Pikong Navarro lying on the bed, embracing each other under a blanket.
Anselmo Botio, a friend of appellant, and Marlon Mateo, a brother of private complainant, corroborated
appellant's alibi.Botio said that on 28 August 1996, at six o'clock in the evening, he, together with appellant and some
friends, went to attend the fiesta in Barangay Murcia upon the invitation of one Ruben Santos. The group arrived in
Murcia at seven o'clock that evening and promptly had dinner and a drinking spree which lasted until the morning of
the next day.
Marlon Mateo testified that one day in October 1996, while his mother was working overseas, he arrived home from
school, and saw Pikong Navarro and private complainant, both naked, on the bed. Navarro was on top of private
complainant and was making thrusting motions. Marlon Mateo hurriedly left to report the incident to his father.
At the conclusion of the trial, the court a quo issued its decision, dated 23 January 2001, finding appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of ten (10) counts of rape —
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of ten (10) counts of rape and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape and to indemnify the complainant the sum
of P50,000.00 as actual damages and P50,000.00 as moral damages for each count of rape." 2
More often than not, the Court has deemed it sufficient to convict an accused for rape solely on the basis of the
testimony of the victim. 3 The heavy reliance normally given by the Court on the narration of the victim finds
justification on the fact that, generally, she would be the sole witness to the incident and the shy and demure character
of the typical Filipina would preclude her from fabricating that crime. It is imperative, nonetheless, that the testimony
must be convincing and straightforward in order to avoid any serious doubt from being cast on the veracity of the
account given.
Relative to the first supposed rape incident, private complainant categorically stated that she had slept in the lone
bedroom of the house while her siblings and her stepfather slept in the sala —
"Q. How did (sic) he able to remove your t-shirt and shorts?
"A. He brought me to the sala and in that place when he undressed me, sir.
"xxx xxx xxx
"Q. How did (sic) he able to take you out from the room? In what way?
"A. She (sic) lifted me and still my mouth was covered, my hands were stocked and I cannot move, sir.
"Q. She (sic) lifted you by his two hands, is that right? AaITCH
"A. Yes, sir." 4
"Q. You testified on direct examination that there is only one room in your house, is that right?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. And you were then sleeping inside your house in that one room, is that right?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. While your brothers as well as your stepfather were then sleeping outside your room, you [were]
also sleeping, is that right?
 "A. Yes, sir." 5
In the next breath, however, she testified that all her three siblings were sleeping with her on the night of 07
October 1995 —
"Q. How did (sic) he able to remove your t-shirt and shorts?
"A. He brought me to the sala and in that place when he undressed me, sir.
"Q. Do you want to tell this Honorable Court that he brought you to the sala where your brothers Ryan and
Marlon and your sister Iris were then sleeping?
"A. My brothers and sister were sleeping in the room, sir.
"Q. Is it not a fact that there was only one room in your house?
"A. But they slept there on that night, sir.
"Q. In other words, Madam Witness, you were sleeping together with Ryan, Marlon, and Iris by that time in one
room together in one bed?
"A. Yes, sir." 6
Still, later, Imelda changed her testimony and said that her brothers were in the sala and that it was only her sister
Iris who was with her in the bedroom when the rape incidents were committed —
"Q. How about your brother Ryan where did he sleep on October 7, 1995?
"A. At the sala, sir.
"Q. Who was with him in the sala?
"A. He [was] sleeping with my stepfather and my brother Marlon, sir.
"Q. How about Iris, where was she sleeping? aCTcDH
"A. She was with me, sir.
"Q. You mean to imply to the Court that according to you the accused abused you on October 7, 1995, Iris [was]
with you in the room?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Are you sure of that?
"A. Yes, sir.
"xxx xxx xxx
"Q. You stated in your direct testimony that on October 7, 1995 your father entered your room where you were
sleeping, covering your mouth and forced you to go to the sala, do you recall that statement?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. Do you not remember that you have testified that he was able to take you to the sala?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. And then when you reached the sala, you stated that the accused criminally abused you? IaSAHC
"A. No, sir.
"Q. Do you not remember having been asked by the prosecutor examining you, and now I cite to you your
statement; 'Q — Public Prosecutor Llobrera, 'Now, let us make it clear. You said you were brought to the
sala and your answer, 'Yes, sir.''' Do you not remember having made that statement?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. And another question, 'When you reached the sala what were the first things he did to you and your answer,
'He kissed me, sir." Do you remember that?
"A. No, sir. The first time he abused me was in the room, sir." 7
The Solicitor General would posit that the claim of private complainant that she had the sole privilege of sleeping in
the lone bedroom of their house while the rest of the family, namely both her parents and her three siblings, had to
squeeze themselves in the sala strained credulity, and that the testimony of her mother, Rosemarie Capulong, to the
effect that the couple were the occupants of the single bedroom while their children stayed in the sala where the
television was located, made more sense. EADCHS
Imelda testified that her three siblings — Marlon, Ryan and Iris — were sleeping inside the house every time the rape
incidents were committed. The identical testimony of everyone else in the Mateo household, including her mother
Rosemarie Capulong and brother Marlon Mateo, exposed such assertions to be a blatant lie and categorically stated
that Ryan himself had never stayed in the Mateo residence because he was living with his grandparents since
childhood.
Private complainant testified that during the rape incidents she was gagged with a handkerchief which rendered her
unable to shout for help. Later on, however, she gave different versions on whether appellant covered her mouth with
his hand or with a handkerchief during the rape incidents occurring on 07 October 1995, 05 January 1996, 12 January
1996, 18 July 1996, 16 August 1996 and 28 August 1996. Eventually, she repudiated her earlier testimony by stating
that appellant had never covered her mouth, either with a handkerchief or with his hand —
"Q. Both the incidents of July 2 and July 18, according to you, he only covered your mouth on both occasions?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. He did not tie your mouth with anything?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. Miss Witness, in your statement also on August 20, 1997, you stated that the accused covered your mouth
and tied your mouth with a handkerchief on both occasions. Do you remember having given that
statement?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. So, you do not remember having made that statement?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. Recalling your testimony you gave on August 20, 1997, for the July 2 occasion and the testimony that you
gave as appearing on page 18 of the transcript of stenographic notes. These questions and answers were
given and answered by you. 'Q. While he was doing all these things to you, did you call for help? A. I
cannot shout because my mouth was covered with a handkerchief, sir. Q. Was he holding that
handkerchief? A. It was tied, sir.' On July 17, 1997, you said that the accused tied your mouth on July 2,
1996, and you said that you cannot shout because your mouth was tied with a handkerchief. Do you
remember having stated that?
"A. No, sir.
"xxx xxx xxx
"Q. On the July 18 occasion, you also stated in your direct testimony on August 29, 1997, when asked these
following questions appearing on page 21 of the transcript of stenographic notes. 'Q. Tell the Court how
did he rape you on that night? A. On that night while I was sleeping in my room, he tied a handkerchief
in my mouth so I could not shout, sir.' Do you remember having stated that?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. And also you were asked this question: 'Q. After tying this handkerchief to your mouth, what did he do to
you?' You said that he raped you. Do you remember having given this statement?
"A. No, sir." 8
Also quite telling were some discrepancies in the testimony of private complainant regarding the whereabouts of her
mother Rosemarie Capulong on the dates of the incidents. According to private complainant, it was when her mother
Rosemarie was not at home when appellant would commit the dastardly crimes. Not only did the account of Imelda
contradict that of Rosemarie but that Imelda herself would appear to have made irreconcilable statements. According
to her, on 07 October 1995, the date of the first rape, Rosemarie had gone to Bamban to visit her mother. Subsequently,
however, she said that Rosemarie went to Bamban because she worked there, only to later say that, at that time,
Rosemarie had already resigned from work. Imelda would further change her story by stating that Rosemarie
Capulong did not report for work that day; then, in a quick turnaround, she remarked that her mother did go to
Bamban not to work but to get her birth certificate. Interestingly, Imelda said that 07 October 1995 was a working day,
and that she had gone to school the following day. Judicial notice could be taken of the fact, however, that 07 October
1995 was a Saturday and that the following day, a Sunday, could not have been a school day. With respect to the rape
committed on 12 January 1996, Imelda testified that Rosemarie was attending a seminar; yet, when cross-examined,
she told the trial court that on that day Rosemarie went to Manila to borrow money from her cousin.
The subsequent conduct of a victim could also either confirm or negate her claim of rape. 9 The human nature,
characterized by an instinct for self-preservation and an aversion to humiliation, would dictate that a typical victim of
rape could display changes in behavior, erratic mood swings and an alteration in her daily routine. No such changes
were observed in the case of private complainant. She testified that on the day after the first incident on 07 October
1995, she woke up at six o'clock in the morning, washed her face, and went to school. There was no apparent attempt
on her part to run away from home despite every chance to escape from her tormentor or to exercise every means
available to ensure that the incidents would not be repeated. At fifteen years old, already old enough to think of her
safety and well-being, Imelda Mateo went about her usual business as if nothing unusual had occurred. She
continued to sleep in the same bedroom with nary any precaution against the bestiality she was sure would come
everytime her mother was away.
While it may be argued that appellant's moral ascendancy over Imelda was enough to intimidate her to suffer in
silence; still, it could well be improbable for a victim who had been raped no less than ten times not to make a simple
outcry against her unarmed rapist when she had every opportunity to do so.
The Solicitor General assails the factual findings of the trial court and recommends an acquittal of appellant.
The records would disclose that the first half of the trial, from 17 July 1997 until 15 October 1997, was conducted by
Judge Lino L. Diamsay. Judge Edgardo F. Sundiam conducted the trial from 14 January 1999 until 24 February 1999.
From 11 May 1999 until the day of the last hearing, it was Judge Arsenio P. Adriano who heard the case. While this
change of the presiding judges would not invalidate the proceedings, it did deny to the deciding magistrate the
opportunity to observe in entirety the demeanor of the witnesses which could well be vital to the decision-making
process, particularly where credibility would, by and large, constitute the singular issue.
The law demands that only proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt can justify a verdict of guilt.
Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed the direct appellate review over all criminal cases in which the penalty
imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment (or lower but involving offenses committed on the same
occasion or arising out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed). The practice finds justification in the 1987 Constitution —
Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
"(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari,as the law or the Rules
of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
"xxx xxx xxx
"(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher."
The same constitutional article has evidently been a thesis for Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659, 10 as well as procedural rules contained in Section 3 of Rule
122, 11 Section 10 of Rule 122, 12 Section 13 of Rule 124 13 and Section 3 of Rule 125 14 of the Rules of Court. It
must be stressed, however, that the constitutional provision is not preclusive in character, and it does not
necessarily prevent the Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, from adding an intermediate appeal or
review in favor of the accused.
In passing, during the deliberations among the members of the Court, there has been a marked absence of
unanimity on the crucial point of guilt or innocence of herein appellant. Some are convinced that the evidence would
appear to be sufficient to convict; some would accept the recommendation of acquittal from the Solicitor General on
the ground of inadequate proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the occasion best demonstrates the typical
dilemma, i.e.,the determination and appreciation of primarily factual matters, which the Supreme Court has had to
face with in automatic review cases; yet, it is the Court of Appeals that has aptly been given the direct mandate to
review factual issues.
While the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review by the Supreme Court of cases where the penalty
imposed is reclusion perpetua,life imprisonment, or death, nowhere, however, has it proscribed an intermediate review.
If only to ensure utmost circumspection before the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed,
the Court now deems it wise and compelling to provide in these cases a review by the Court of Appeals before the
case is elevated to the Supreme Court. Where life and liberty are at stake, all possible avenues to determine his guilt or
innocence must be accorded an accused, and no care in the evaluation of the facts can ever be overdone. A prior
determination by the Court of Appeals on, particularly, the factual issues, would minimize the possibility of an error
of judgment. If the Court of Appeals should affirm the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, it
could then render judgment imposing the corresponding penalty as the circumstances so warrant, refrain from
entering judgment and elevate the entire records of the case to the Supreme Court for its final disposition. 15
Statistics would disclose that within the eleven-year period since the re-imposition of the death penalty law in
1993 until June 2004, the trial courts have imposed capital punishment in approximately 1,493, 16 out of which 907
cases 17 have been passed upon in review by the Court. In the Supreme Court, where these staggering numbers find
their way on automatic review, the penalty has been affirmed in only 230 cases comprising but 25.36% of the total
number. Significantly, in more than half or 64.61% of the cases, the judgment has been modified through an order of
remand for further proceedings, by the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law or by a reduction of the
sentence. Indeed, the reduction by the Court of the death penalty to reclusion perpetua has been made in no less than
483 cases or 53.25% of the total number. The Court has also rendered a judgment of acquittal in sixty-five (65) cases. In
sum, the cases where the judgment of death has either been modified or vacated consist of an astounding 71.77% of
the total of death penalty cases directly elevated before the Court on automatic review that translates to a total of six
hundred fifty-one (651) out of nine hundred seven (907) appellants saved from lethal injection.
Under the Constitution, the power to amend rules of procedure is constitutionally vested in the Supreme
Court —
Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
"(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts."
Procedural matters, first and foremost, fall more squarely within the rule-making prerogative of the Supreme
Court than the law-making power of Congress. The rule here announced additionally allowing an intermediate
review by the Court of Appeals, a subordinate appellate court, before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court on
automatic review, is such a procedural matter.
 Pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, more particularly Section 3 and Section 10
of Rule 122, Section 13 of Rule 124, Section 3 of Rule 125, and any other rule insofar as they provide for direct appeals
from the Regional Trial Courts to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, as well as the resolution of the Supreme Court en banc,dated 19 September 1995, in "Internal Rules
of the Supreme Court" in cases similarly involving the death penalty, are to be deemed modified accordingly.
WHEREFORE, the instant case is REMANDED, and all pertinent records thereof ordered to be
FORWARDED, to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition, consistent with the discussions
hereinabove set forth. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 118806. July 10, 1998.]

SANTIAGO ARGONCILLO, RICHARDO BALBONA and POLICARPIO UMITEN vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
SYNOPSIS: This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC of
Roxas City finding the petitioners guilty of illegal fishing with the use of an explosive (dynamite) punishable under Section 33 in
relation to Section 38 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 704, as amended by P.D. 1058, and sentenced them to suffer the straight
penalty of 20 years of imprisonment.
The Supreme Court finds the challenged decision correct and proper. Under P.D. 704, as amended, the last paragraph of Section 33
thereof, creates a presumption that illegal fishing has been committed when fish caught or killed with the use of explosives,
obnoxious or poisonous substances or by electricity are found in a fishing boat. In this case, the Court finds that the prosecution has
clearly established the presumption that the crime of illegal fishing was committed and herein petitioners utterly failed to
overcome such presumption. Particularly, it cannot be denied that the fishes found in petitioners' possession were caught or killed
with the use of explosives. This fact was duly attested by the prosecution witnesses, Joey Dela Cruz and Rolando Amoroso, both
employees of the Bureau of Fisheries. In view thereof, petitioners having failed to discharge the burden of disproving that they
have committed illegal fishing. the Court is left with no alternative but to affirm petitioners' conviction.

SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; THERE IS NO ESTABLISHED DOCTRINE THAT NON-FLIGHT IS AN INDICATION OF
INNOCENCE; CASE AT BAR. — Petitioners likewise aver that they did not flee when the law enforcers arrived, and even
voluntarily reported to the Ivisan Police Station the following morning. They submit that their alleged non-flight should strengthen
their claim of innocence. We disagree. There is no established doctrine to the effect that, in every instance, non-flight is an
indication of innocence. Moreover, even if they wanted to, petitioners could not have possibly eluded the law enforcers who were
in two pump boats. Attempts to flee would also have been useless since petitioners were already identified by the barrio captain.
2. ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; ASSESSMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT REGARDING THE CREDIBILITY OF
PROSECUTION IS ACCORDED GREAT RESPECT BY APPELLATE TRIBUNALS; CASE AT BAR. — In fine, we find no reason to
disturb the assessment of the trial court regarding the credibility of prosecution witnesses Joey de la Cruz and Rolando Amoroso.
Its findings are accorded great respect by appellate tribunals since trial courts have the advantage of examining the witnesses'
testimonies and observing their demeanor first hand.
3. CRIMINAL LAW; PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 704; ILLEGAL FISHING HAS BEEN COMMITTED WHEN FISH CAUGHT OR
KILLED WITH THE USE OF EXPLOSIVES, OBNOXIOUS OR POISONOUS SUBSTANCE OR BY ELECTRICITY ARE FOUND IN
THE FISHING BOAT; CASE AT BAR. — In Hizon vs. Court of Appeals (265 SCRA 517 [1996]), this Court held that the law, as
contained in the last paragraph of Section 33, creates a presumption that illegal fishing has been committed when fish caught or
killed with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substances or by electricity are found in a fishing boat. In this case, it
cannot be denied that the fishes found in petitioners' banca were caught or killed by the use of explosives.
4. ID.; ID.; PENALTIES; INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW; THE TRIAL COURT ERRED FOR FAILURE TO APPLY AND
IMPOSE AN INDETERMINATE SENTENCE WITH A DEFINITE MINIMUM AND MAXIMUM TERM; CASE AT BAR. — The
penalty imposed by law for illegal fishing if explosive is actually used is imprisonment ranging from twenty (20) years to life
imprisonment. The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that if, as in this case, the offense is punished by a law other than the
Revised Penal Code, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not
exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same. The
trial court therefore erred when it sentenced petitioners to "suffer a straight penalty of twenty (20) years imprisonment." In Spouses
Jose and Trinidad Bacar vs. Judge Salvador P. de Guzman, Jr. (271 SCRA 328 [1997]), we held that it was erroneous to impose a straight
penalty of six (6) years imprisonment on the accused for homicide. . . . Accordingly, the proper penalty to be imposed upon the
accused should be an indeterminate penalty which is hereby set at twenty (20) years as minimum to twenty-five (25) years
asmaximum.
KAPUNAN, J p:
This is a petition to review the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Roxas City, Branch 15, 2 finding petitioners herein guilty of "illegal fishing with the use of an
explosive," the dispositive portion of which reads: LexLib
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, Policarpio Umiten, Santiago Argoncillo and Richard Balbona,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of illegal fishing with the use of an explosive punishable
under Section 33 in relation to Section 38 of Presidential Decree No. 704 dated May 16, 1975 as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1058 dated December 1, 1976and each shall suffer a straight penalty of
twenty (20) years imprisonment.
However, accused, Johnson Sucgang, Elvis Villar and Efren Alvaro, are acquitted for failure of the
prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The fish sample is forfeited in favor of the government.
Considering the penalty imposed upon the accused, Policarpio Umiten, Santiago Argoncillo and Richard
Balbona, the bail bond for their provisional liberty is increased to Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos each
effective immediately upon promulgation. They shall not be released from detention until they put up an
appropriate bail bond for their provisional liberty.
The property bond of accused, Johnson Sucgang, Elvis Villar and Efren Alvaro, are deemed cancelled.
Costs against the convicted accused.
SO ORDERED. 3
On August 1, 1990, an Information was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Capiz charging Johnson Sucgang, Policarpio
Umiten, Elvis Villar, Santiago Argoncillo, Richardo Balbona and Efren Alvaro with illegal fishing (with the use of
dynamite), as follows: cdtai
That at or about 6:30 o'clock [sic] in the evening of May 7, 1990, in the sea water of Barangay Basiao,
Ivisan, Capiz, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
catch, take, gather and have in their possession and control different species of fish with the use of
explosives. 4
Upon arraignment on September 11, 1990, the accused, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded "not guilty" to the
offense charged. Trial ensued thereafter.
The lower court synthesized the evidence presented by the prosecution as follows: 5
Due to reports of rampant illegal fishing at Barangay Basiao, Ivisan, Capiz, personnel from the
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources specifically from the Bureau of Fisheries as well as the
Barangay Captain of said place assisted by the local policemen created a team to conduct surveillance within the
Ivisan Bay. Thus, around 5:30 in the afternoon of May 7, 1990, a team riding in two (2) pumpboats from the
Barangay Basiao wharf proceeded along the waters of Ivisan Bay. Riding in one pumpboat were Persinefles U.
Oabe, the Barangay Captain of said place; Rolando Amoroso, an employee of the Bureau of Fisheries; Pat. Rafael
Tupaz, a member of the local Integrated National Police and Remegio Unasin, a barangay councilman who acted
as the pilot. In the other pumpboat were Joey de la Cruz, a co-employee of Rolando Amoroso; Pat. Reggie Uadan
and Enido Baldesimo. Now and then, the team had to stop and listen for possible occurrences of illegal fishing
within their vicinity. Around 6:30 of the same evening while standing by with their engines off, in a place facing
Barangay Culasi, they heard an explosion. Sensing it was caused by dynamite, they proceeded to the area around
five hundred meters (500 m.) away from them.
After ten minutes of navigation, the team arrived at the scene in question which was near an islet. They
surrounded the area. At a distance of around ten meters, Joey de la Cruz, an employee of the Bureau of Fisheries
and Aquatic Resources, saw three persons diving into the water. Thereafter, they would surface and throw their
catch of fish to the unmotorized banca around four meters long nearby. In the seashore of said islet, around three
to four meters away from these three persons float in the water, were three other persons standing in the rocky
portions around three meters apart. These six persons tried to escape but Rolando Amoroso, the co-employee of
Joey de la Cruz, advised them not to do so and introduced themselves as law enforcers. The team found out that
the fishes they caught were deep sea fish of four kinds locally known as "vulgan," "bulawis," "pacol," and "bag-
angan." Joey de la Cruz gathered seven fish samples from their banca while Rolando Amoroso went down from
the pumpboat and proceeded to the islet. However, upon inspection, he failed to find any explosive (dynamite)
either on the seashore or on the banca. No paraphernalia used in dynamite fishing were found. Both Joey de la
Cruz and Rolando Amoroso recognized the six persons as the herein accused by their faces.
 Persinefles U. Oabe, barangay captain of Barangay Basiao, who was with the team riding in a pumpboat
with Rolando Amoroso identified the three persons retrieving fish from the water as Policarpio Umiten, Santiago
Argoncillo and Richard Balbona while the other three persons standing on the rocky portions of the islet as
Johnson Sucgang, Elvis Umiten and Efren Alvaro.
The team apprehended the six accused and brought them to the fish cage of the barangay captain located
within the same barangay. While on their way, Joey de la Cruz externally examined the fish samples.
Upon their arrival at the fish cage, another external examination was conducted by Joey de la Cruz and
Rolando Amoroso. In both external examinations, the two found out that the fishes were caught with the use of
explosives because blood was oozing from their operculums and their eyes were protruding.
An on-the-spot investigation was conducted but the accused denied any culpability. They were then
released on the strength of their promise to report to the local police the following day.
The fish samples were then placed in a plastic bag filled with ice at the house of Barangay Captain
Persinefles U. Oabe that evening. In the morning, Joey de la Cruz and Rolando Amoroso brought the fish samples
to their office in Roxas City where they conducted an internal examination. The examination revealed that the fish
samples were caught with the use of explosives because their air bladders were raptured and deeply stained with
blood; the vertebral columns were broken but with bloodstains; their ribs were broken; and there were blood clots
in their abdomens. Joey de la Cruz and Rolando Amoroso rendered a written report of their internal examination
to the Provincial Agricultural Officer.
The testimonies of Joey de la Cruz, Rolando Amoroso, and Persinefles U. Oabe above were corroborated
by Pat. Rafael Tupaz, one of the police escorts of the team.
Sgt. Sergio Ordales, a member of the local police of the municipality of Ivisan testified that while on duty
in the morning of May 8, 1990, herein six accused arrived at their station. He asked why they were there and they
answered that they were told to report to the police station. He learned from them that they were arrested for
illegal fishing with the use of explosives.
On the other hand, the lower court portrayed the evidence presented by the version of the defense, thus:
All the accused denied the imputation of the prosecution.
Policarpio Umiten, Santiago Argoncillo, Richard O. Balbona were uniform in alleging that around 4:00 in
the afternoon of May 7, 1990, they dropped a fishnet about two hundred (200) 'armslength' and one (1) meter in
width at the scene where they were apprehended. This method they locally call "patuloy" requires that the fishnet
be retrieved every hour to collect its catch. The trio went back to the place near the islet in question around 6:30 in
the evening for the purpose of collecting their catch from the fishnet. They had not been able to collect all their
catch from the net when the team of law enforcers, prosecution witnesses herein, arrived. They were asked
whether they heard an explosion. After they denied having heard any, Barangay Captain Persinefles U. Oabe, told
the accused to go with them. The team got seven pieces of fish samples. The accused left around one and one-half
kilos of fish they had gathered at the time the team of law enforcers arrived. They were then brought to the fish
cage owned by Persinefles U. Oabe at Barangay Basiao.
Above three accused would like the Court to believe that the seven pieces of fish samples taken by the
team of fishing law enforcers were the catch of their fishnet they locally called "patuloy."
On the other hand, Elvis Villar testified that he and Efren Alvaro were together in going to the islet in
question, riding in an unmotorized banca to gather shells locally called "suso" and "butlogan" for viand. Both
started gathering shells under the stones in the islet around 5:30 in the afternoon. While they were preparing to go
home at around 6:30 in the evening, the team of law enforcers riding in motorized pumpboats arrived. The
barangay captain and the personnel from the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources asked them whether they
heard an explosion. After they denied having heard any, they were told by the barangay captain to board their
pumpboats. They obliged, leaving the shells they had gathered. They were then brought to the fish cage of the
barangay captain.
Although accused Johnson Sucgang admitted his presence in the islet in question, he offered a different
explanation. He testified that he went to said place to look for "Pulutan" requested by his customer, Wilfredo
Arcangeles. Being an operator and manager of Virgen Beach Resort located at Sitio Manangkalan, he obliged.
Thus, between 5:00 to 5:30 in the afternoon of May 7, 1990, he left his resort riding in a banca. He paddled his way
towards the islet where he saw two persons at the bank while the other three were on the water. He went ashore.
Later, the barangay captain and his companions riding in two pumpboats arrived. Like his co-accused, he was
asked if he heard an explosion. After he denied hearing any, the barangay captain told him to go with them. They
were all brought to the fish cage of the barangay captain for questioning.
Wilfredo Arcangeles corroborated the claim of Johnson Sucgang. He confirmed that he requested the
latter to look for "pulutan" since he had visitors from Bacolod City prompting Johnson Sucgang to look for some.
He saw the accused leave in a banca and affirmed that he had no dynamite with him. 6
On September 30, 1991, the trial court rendered its decision which, as stated at the beginning, was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
 Hence, this petition.
Petitioners point out that the fact that neither explosives nor related paraphernalia were found in their
possession is an indication of their innocence.
We do not agree. First, it is quite probable that petitioners dumped these materials into the sea while the
raiding party was approaching. Moreover, Section 33, Presidential Decree No. 704, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1058, provides:
Sec. 33. Illegal fishing; . . . — It shall be unlawful for any person to catch, take or gather, or
cause to be caught, taken or gathered fish or fishery/aquatic products in Philippine waters with the
use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance, or by the use of electricity as defined in
paragraphs (l), 7 (m) 8 and (d), 9 respectively, of Sec. 3 hereof . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The discovery of dynamite, other explosives and chemical compounds containing
combustible elements, or obnoxious or poisonous substance, or equipment or device for electric
fishing in any fishing boat or in the possession of a fisherman shall constitute a presumption that
the same were used for fishing in violation of this Decree, the discovery in any fishing boat of fish
caught or killed by the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance or by electricity shall
constitute a presumption that the owner, operator or fisherman were fishing with the use of
explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance or electricity. LexLib
In Hizon vs. Court of Appeals, 10 this Court held that the law, as contained in the last paragraph of Section
33, creates a presumption that illegal fishing has been committed when fish caught or killed with the use of
explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substances or by electricity are found in a fishing boat. In this case, it cannot
be denied that the fishes found in petitioners' banca were caught or killed by the use of explosives.
The Report 11 of Bureau of Fisheries employees Joey de la Cruz and Rolando Amoroso states:
Republic of the Philippines
Department of Agriculture
Roxas City
1990-05-08
The Provincial Agricultural Officer
Department of Agriculture
Roxas City
Sir:
I have the honor to submit to this office the result of the scientific fish examination conducted on the
fish samples taken from the possession of Mr. Johnson Umiten Sucgang, 38 years old, married and resident of
Barangay Basiao, Ivisan, Capiz and company on May 7, 1990, 6:30 PM by combined elements of the
Department of Agriculture, PC/INP Unit of Ivisan, Capiz and Barangay officials, of Basiao, Ivisan, Capiz
conducting sea borne patrol on illegal fishing.
Source of fish samples Sea water of Brgy., Basiao,
Ivisan, Capiz
Fish samples taken from Johnson U. Sucgang, 38 years old,
married, of Brgy., Basiao, Ivisan,
Capiz, et. al.
Date fish samples taken May 7, 1990 at 6:30 PM
Date fish samples examined May 7, 1990 at 7:00 PM
Name of fish samples taken Number Weight Value

Local Name

Bulawis 2 pcs. 300 gms P8.00

Bulgan 2 pcs. 200 gms 10.00
Pakol 1 pc. 100 gms 2.00
Bag-angan 1 pc. 150 gms 3.00
Bukod 1 pc. 150 gms 3.00
Characteristics noted on the fish examined:
1. External Manifestation
a. Blood, oozing on the operculum.
2. Internal Manifestation
a. Air bladder raptured deeply stained with blood;
b. Vertebral column broken with blood stain.
Conclusion:
 The fish samples manifested signs that said fish were caught or killed by the use of explosives.
Examined by:
(Sgd.)
JOEY I. DE LA CRUZ
(Sgd.)
ROLANDO E. AMOROSO
Fish Examiners
Joey de la Cruz affirmed the above findings in his testimony before the trial court. 12 Said testimony was
corroborated by Rolando Amoroso, a co-employee of De la Cruz in the Bureau of Fisheries. The latter further
stated that the fish were killed specifically by dynamite:
ATTY. LUMAWAG:
Q Can you identify whether it was through dynamite or any other means of explosive the fish was caught?
A Yes, sir. Because you know when we saw, when we conducted the external manifestation of the fish not
only blood oozing from the ears but also from the eyes that were protruding.
Q Is it not possible that it be caused also through fishing by means of electricity?
A No.
O Other kinds of explosives?
A Yes, explosives.
Q For example, what other aside from dynamite?
A What explosives aside from dynamite, no other. 13
The trial court correctly gave credence to these testimonies, thus:
Above three (3) accused would like the Court to believe that the seven (7) pieces of fish
samples taken by the team of fishing law enforcers were the catch of their fish net they locally called
[sic] "patuloy."

xxx xxx xxx

With the external and internal examination by Joey de la Cruz and Rolando Amoroso
showing that these fishes were caught with the use of explosive, bare denial of above three (3)
accused that they caught them by means of a fishing net they locally call "patuloy" is insufficient to
disprove such finding. It is simply a superiority of weight of object evidence over testimonies of the
accused.
Joey de la Cruz is an agricultural technologist of their office and a graduate of Bachelor of
Science in Fishery. Joey de la Cruz and Rolando Amoroso had undergone training course in fishery
laws and implementing regulations as well as actual demonstrations in sea to practice what they
had learned in theory. [As] . . . technical personnel of the Bureau of Fishery and Aquatic Resources,
their finding after an internal and external examination of fish samples to prove they were caught
with the use of explosives should be presented to show that these prosecution witnesses fabricated
their story. There is no ulterior motive which implied them to testify as they did. Furthermore, no
evidence was introduced by the defense to impeach their credibility nor evidence to discredit their
persons. Credibility of the testimonies having remained unimpeached, it shall be given great weight
in the determination of the guilt of the accused. Besides, being public officers to enforce fishing
laws, in the absence of ill-motive on their part, to impute to the accused a serious offense of illegal
fishing with the use of explosive, the presumption is that there was regular performance of public
duty on their part. 14
The presumption that the crime of illegal fishing was committed has, therefore, been clearly established.
Such presumption, however, is merely prima facie, and may be rebutted by the accused. 15
Petitioners attempt to overcome said presumption by disputing the findings of prosecution witnesses
Joey de la Cruz and Rolando Amoroso. They claim that since not all their catch were examined, there can be no
conclusive proof that the fish were killed with the use of explosives. 16
They also question the credibility of these witnesses, thus:
. . . If it is true that prosecution witness Joey de la Cruz, allegedly a technical personnel [sic]
of the Bureau of Fisheries and competent to determine if a fish is killed by dynamite blast, found
the 7 fishes to have been killed by a dynamite blast, it was unnatural for the team not to arrest the
petitioners on the spot. . . . 17
Petitioners' arguments have no merit.
It is ridiculous to have expected that all the fish found in the accused's fishing boat would be subjected to
an examination. It is sufficient that, as in the case at bar, a random sample of the accused's catch was examined
and found to have been killed with the use of explosives. A patent impracticality would result if the law required
otherwise.
The fact that the patrol team did not immediately deliver the accused to the municipal jail does not
diminish the credibility of the above witnesses. Persinefles U. Oabe, the barangay captain of Basiao, gave a
plausible explanation for the accused's release:
A We released those six persons because if we bring them to the municipality of Ivisan we have no
available transportation because they were only riding in a single motor vehicle. 18
The want of available transportation is not surprising. The dearth in law enforcement facilities; especially
in the provinces, is not lost on this Court and is a matter of judicial notice.
In fine, we find no reason to disturb the assessment of the trial court regarding the credibility of
prosecution witnesses Joey de la Cruz and Rolando Amoroso. Its findings are accorded great respect by appellate
tribunals since trial courts have the advantage of examining the witnesses' testimonies and observing their
demeanor first hand. 19
Petitioners also argue that they could not have been caught fishing with the use of dynamite in shallow
waters because the fishes used as evidence were described by the prosecution witnesses as "deep sea fishes."
According to petitioners:
The seven (7) fishes that the prosecution used as evidence were described by prosecution
witnesses as 'deep sea fishes'. But it has been shown in the testimony of petitioner Santiago
Argoncillo that he and the other petitioners were fishing in shallow waters about 1½ meters deep
(TSN, March 13, 1991, p. 7) and using fishnet 200 armslength long and 1 meter wide (TSN, March
13, 1991, p. 4). This testimony was not rebutted by the prosecution. In fact, the 3 accused who were
acquitted by the trial court were found by the prosecution witnesses standing on the seashore near
where the petitioners were fishing (TSN, January 23, 1991, pp. 5 to 6). That petitioners would
engage in dynamite fishing in shallow waters and near the seashore would be unnatural. The
allegation that the petitioners were fishing with the use of explosive is therefore not credible. 20
We are not persuaded.
The fishes caught by petitioners were not actually "deep sea fishes" in the sense that they came from the
deep portions of the sea as distinguished from shallow waters or waters near or along the shores. The fishes
caught were locally known as "vulgan," "bulawis," "pacol," and "bag-angan." They are generally described as "isda
sa bato" or "bottom feeders." The following excerpt from the testimony of fish examiner Joey de la Cruz shows
that the term "deep sea fishes" arose from the trial court's erroneous translation of "isda sa bato' or "bottom
feeders" which were the terms actually employed by said witness to describe the subject fishes:
ATTY. LUMAWAG:
Q What were the species of the fishes that you recovered from that banca?
A Bottom feeders.
COURT:
'Isda sa bato,' in English?
A Bottom feeders.
COURT:
Deep sea fishes. 21
Petitioners next contend that if it is true that they were engaged in illegal fishing, it would be "unnatural"
for them to use a boat which would make it difficult for them to escape from the law enforcers riding motorized
boats. 22
Petitioners' contention is too ludicrous to warrant serious consideration. The law punishing illegal fishing
does not require the use of motorized banca or boat for the crime to be committed. Concededly, a motorized
banca can better serve those engaged in illegal fishing for purposes of eluding law enforces. However, not
everyone can financially afford to fit a motor in his banca. Indeed, petitioner Argoncillo admitted that the banca
that they were using was leased from a certain Dikoy Odrunia. 23
Petitioners likewise aver that they did not flee when the law enforcers arrived, and even voluntarily
reported to the Ivisan Police Station the following morning. They submit that their alleged non-flight should
strengthen their claim of innocence. 24
We disagree. There is no established doctrine to the effect that, in every instance, non-flight is an
indication of innocence. 25 Moreover, even if they wanted to, petitioners could not have possibly eluded the law
enforcers who were in two pump boats. Attempts to flee would also have been useless since petitioners were
already identified by the barrio captain.cdasia
 Lastly, the fact that the accused were asked by the patrol team whether or not they heard an explosion is
not in any way reflective of petitioners' innocence. We deem such inquiry as nothing more than a part of the
investigative process. It is quite common, and in most cases, necessary, for law enforcers to ask questions to help
them ascertain whether or not there exists probable cause to arrest persons suspected of committing a crime.
Having failed to discharge themselves of the burden of disproving that they have committed illegal
fishing, the Court is left with no alternative but to affirm petitioners' conviction.
The penalty imposed by law 26 for illegal fishing if explosive is actually used is imprisonment ranging
from twenty (20) years to life imprisonment. The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that if, as in this case, the
offense is punished by a law other than the Revised Penal Code, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the
minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same. 27 The trial court therefore erred
when it sentenced petitioners to "suffer a straight penalty of twenty (20) years imprisonment. 28 In Spouses Jose and
Trinidad Bacar vs. Judge Salvador P. de Guzman, Jr., 29 we held that it was erroneous to impose a straight penalty of
six (6) years imprisonment on the accused for homicide. We explained:
. . . It is basic law that . . . the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is mandatory
where imprisonment exceeds one (1) year, except only in the following cases:
a. Offenses punished by death or life imprisonment.
b. Those convicted of treason (Art. 114), conspiracy or proposal to commit
treason (Art. 115).
c. Those convicted of misprision of
treason (Art. 116), rebellion (Art. 134), sedition (Art. 139), or espionage (Art. 117).
d. Those convicted of piracy (Art. 122).
e. Habitual delinquents (Art. 62, par. 5).
Recidivists are entitled to an indeterminate sentence. (People v. Jaramilla, L-28547, Feb. 22,
1974). Offender is not disqualified to avail of the benefits of the law even if the crime is
committed while he is on parole. (People v. Calreon, CA 78 O.G. 6701, Nov. 19, 1982).
f. Those who escaped from confinement or those who evaded sentence.
g. Those granted conditional pardon and who violated the terms of the same (Art. 159).
(People v. Corral, 74 Phil. 359).
h. Those whose maximum period of imprisonment does not exceed one year.
Where the penalty actually imposed does not exceed one year, the accused cannot avail
himself of the benefits of the law, the application of which is based upon the penalty
actually imposed in accordance with law and not upon that which may be imposed in the
discretion of the Court. (People v. Hidalgo, [CA] G.R. No. 00452-CR, Jan. 22, 1962).
i. Those who are already, serving final judgment upon the approval of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law.
The need for specifying the minimum and maximum periods of the indeterminate sentence
is to prevent the unnecessary and excessive deprivation of liberty and to enhance the economic
usefulness of the accused, since he may be exempted from serving the entire sentence, depending
upon his behavior and his physical, mental, and moral record. The requirement of imposing an
indeterminate sentence in all criminal offenses whether punishable by the n or by special laws, with definite
minimum and maximum terms, as the Court deems proper within he legal range of the penalty specified by
the law must, therefore, be deemed mandatory. 30
Accordingly, the proper penalty to be imposed upon the accused should be an indeterminate penalty which is
hereby set at twenty (20) years as minimum to twenty-five (25) years asmaximum.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED
with the modification that petitioners are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
ranging from twenty (20) years as minimum to twenty-five (25) years as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
[A.M. No. RTJ-96-1349. April 18, 1997.]
SPOUSES JOSE and TRINIDAD BACAR, complainants, vs. JUDGE SALVADOR P. DE GUZMAN, JR.
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PUBLIC OFFICERS; JUDGES; SHALL NOT BE LIABLE FOR EVERY ERROR OR
MISTAKE IN HIS PERFORMANCE, OF DUTY. — Not every, error or mistake of a judge in the performance of his duties
makes him liable therefor. To hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders,
assuming that he has erred, would be nothing short of harassment and would make his position unbearable. For no one
called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN LIABLE FOR RENDERING UNJUST JUDGMENT AND IGNORANCE OF THE LAW;
MANIFESTATIONS; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. — Under the law, a judgment of conviction may, upon motion of
the accused, be modified or set aside by the court rendering it before the judgment has become final or appeal has been
perfected. The fact that respondent judge's appreciation of the evidence differed from that of petitioners which could be
biased, does not warrant the conclusion that said judge has rendered an unjust judgment nor that he is ignorant of the law.
In the absence of any indication 1) that the trial court's conclusion is based entirely on speculations; 2) that there is grave
abuse of discretion; 3) that the court, in making its findings went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to
the admissions of both appellant and appellee, or; that the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts, or; that the
presiding judge is blatantly biased, the general rule that the trial court's findings of fact should be given great weight still
stands. However, respondent judge is liable for gross ignorance of the law for imposing a straight penalty of six (6) years
imprisonment on the accused in his modified judgment in the case for homicide. Since respondent judge imposed the
straight penalty of six (6) years which is erroneous, he is therefore liable for gross ignorance of the law. This Court has held
that when the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it, constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
Likewise, that unawareness of and unfamiliarity with the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law and duration and
graduation of penalties merit disciplinary action, from reprimand to removal.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; OWES IT TO THE PUBLIC AND TO THE LEGAL PROFESSION TO KNOW THE LAW HE IS
SUPPOSED TO APPLY. — A judge should have moral and intellectual courage and independence of mind in the discharge of
his duties for only in that way can he merit his judicial position and the support and confidence of the people in him.
Respondent judge owes it to the public and to the legal profession to know the law he is supposed to apply to a given
controversy. He is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. Party
litigants will have great faith in the administration of justice if judges cannot justly be accused of apparent deficiency in their
grasp of the legal principles.
4. CRIMINAL LAW; INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW; WHEN MANDATORY; EXCEPTIONS. — It is basic
law that the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is mandatory where imprisonment exceeds one (1) year, except
only in the following cases: "a. Offenses punished by death or life imprisonment. b. Those convicted of treason (Art. 114),
conspiracy or proposal to commit treason (Art. 115). c. Those convicted of misprision of treason (Art. 116), rebellion
(Art. 134), sedition (Art. 139), or espionage (Art. 117). d. Those convicted of piracy (Art.122), e. Habitual delinquents (Art. 62,
par. 5). Recidivists are entitled to an indeterminate sentence. (People vs. Jaramilla, L-28547, Feb. 22, 1974). Offender is not
disqualified to avail of the benefits of the law even if the crime is committed while he is on parole. (People vs. Clareon, CA
78 O.G. 6701, Nov. 19, 1982). f. Those who escaped from confinement or those who evaded sentence. g. Those granted
conditional pardon and who violated the terms of the same (Art. 159). (People vs. Corral, 74 Phil. 359). h. Those whose
maximum period of imprisonment does not exceed one year. Where the penalty actually imposed does not exceed one year,
the accused cannot avail himself of the benefits of the law, the application of which may be imposed in the discretion of the
Court (People vs. Hidalgo, [CA] G.R. No. 00452-CR, Jan. 22, 1962). i. Those who are already serving final judgment upon the
approval of the Indeterminate Sentence Law."
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; MINIMUM AND MAXIMUM PERIODS; RATIONALE FOR SPECIFYING THEREOF. — The need
for specifying the minimum and maximum periods of the indeterminate sentence is to prevent the unnecessary and
excessive deprivation of liberty and to enhance the economic usefulness of the accused, since he may be exempted from
serving the entire sentence, depending upon his behavior and his physical, mental, and moral record. The requirement of
imposing an indeterminate sentence in all criminal offenses whether punishable by the RPC or by special laws, with definite
minimum and maximum terms, as the Court deems proper within the legal range of the penalty specified by the law must,
therefore, be deemed mandatory.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DETERMINATION THEREOF; APPLICABLE RULES AND PROVISIONS. — In crimes
punishable under the Revised Penal Code, the maximum term of the indeterminate penalty is determined in accordance
with the rules and provisions of the Code exactly as if the Indeterminate Sentence Law had never been enacted. The rules
and provisions which must be applied to determine the maximum term of the indeterminate penalty are those provided in
Articles 46, 48, 50 to 57, 61, 62 (except paragraph 5), 64, 65, 68, 69, and 71. However, the aforesaid rules and provisions in
those articles, particularly Arts. 50 to 57, 62, 64 and 65, are not applicable in fixing the minimum term of the indeterminate
penalty. The Court has unqualified discretion to fix the term of the minimum. The only limitation is that it is within the
range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense committed, without regard to its three (3)
periods.
PADILLA, J p:
In this petition by way of complaint, dated 11 April 1994, petitioner-spouses Jose and Trinidad Bacar pray for the
dismissal from the service of respondent Judge Salvador P. deGuzman, Jr., presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati, Branch 142, on the grounds of: 1) gross ignorance of the law, and; 2) rendering an unjust judgment in
Criminal Cases Nos. 89-1360 and 89-2878 for homicide and attempted homicide respectively, both entitled "People of
the Philippines v. Gerardo Fortaleza Marcial". cdt
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On 30 March 1989, an information for homicide (for the death of one Maximo Bacar, son of herein petitioner-spouses)
was filed by 2nd Assistant Fiscal Domingo A. Israel against Gerardo Fortaleza Marcial before the Regional Trial Court
of Makati, Branch 142, docketed as Criminal Case No. 89-1360.
On 7 June 1989, another information (this time for attempted homicide committed against one Edgar Mabuyo) was
filed by the aforesaid Fiscal Israel against the same Gerardo Fortaleza Marcial before the same court, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 89-2878.
On 13 May 1992, after trial on the merits, a Joint Judgment in Criminal Cases Nos. 89-1360 and 89-2878 was rendered
by respondent judge, finding the accused Gerardo Marcial guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. The
dispositive part of the decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Gerardo Marcial
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide in Criminal Case No. 89-1360 and of the
offense of Slight Physical Injuries in Criminal Case No. 89-2878. No modifying circumstances
having attended the commission of said crimes, the accused is hereby sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to fourteen (14) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal with respect to Criminal Case No. 89-1360 and
to suffer imprisonment of thirty (30) days of arresto menor as regards Criminal Case No. 89-2878.
The accused is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim Maximo Bacar in the
amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the amount of P33,572.00 as actual damages and
costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Makati, Metro Manila, May 13, 1992."
On 13 August 1992, the accused, Gerardo Marcial, filed a motion for reconsideration of the joint judgment, alleging
among others, that the court erred in imposing the penalties without considering at least two (2) mitigating
circumstances, namely: sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party which immediately preceded
the act, and; that the accused had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed.
On 28 October 1992, herein petitioners filed an opposition to said motion. However, on 13 November 1992, the lower
court granted the motion for reconsideration filed by the accused. After reassessing the facts of the case on the basis of
said motion, respondent judge took into account the mitigating circumstances of want of intent to commit so grave a
wrong and sufficient provocation which immediately preceded the act and accordingly, reduced the penalty in Criminal
Case No. 89-1360 to six (6) years of prision mayor, while retaining the penalty in Criminal Case No. 89-2878, i.e., imprisonment
of thirty (30) days of arresto menor.
The lower court justified its order thus:
"It appearing upon a re-examination of the evidence on record that the encounter between
the group of the accused Gerardo Marcial and that of the victims Maximo Bacar and Edgar Mabuyo
precipitated a 'free for all fight', that in such a melee, confusion broke loose and was expected to
ensue as a matter of course; that the participation in the melee of each of the members of the
respective groups of the victims and the accused was unexpected and unpremeditated; that the
victim Edgar Mabuyo admitted that prior to the incident, there was heckling which came from him
directed to the group of the accused Gerardo Marcial and that it was he who started it out, that
accused Gerardo Marcial confined himself to giving a single thrust with an icepick on the right arm
of Edgar Mabuyo and at the back of Maximo Bacar from which it can be safely inferred that the
accused had no intention to commit so grave a wrong, for otherwise, he would have persisted in
attacking the victims to the point of finishing them off; the Court resolves to accord the accused
Gerardo Marcial the benefit of the mitigating circumstances of want of intent to commit so grave a
wrong and sufficient provocation which immediately preceded the act in accordance with Article
13, paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby reconsiders the Decision dated May
13, 1992 in the foregoing respect." 1
On 14 December 1992 and 16 April 1993, respectively, the prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration and an
addendum to said motion. On 25 May 1993, the accused filed his comment and/or opposition to the prosecution's
motion for reconsideration. On 9 December 1993, respondent judge issued an order denying the prosecution' s motion
for reconsideration for lack of merit. On 4 January 1994, the prosecution filed another motion for reconsideration and
clarification which respondent judge denied anew on 21 January 1994.
On 11 April 1994, the spouses Jose and Trinidad Bacar, parents of the deceased — victim Maximo Bacar in Criminal
Case No. 89-1360, filed the present petition praying for the dismissal of respondent judge Salvador P. de Guzman, Jr.,
presiding judge of the RTC of Makati, Branch 142, for gross ignorance of the law and for rendering an unjust
judgment in said consolidated cases. cdtech
On the first issue, petitioners allege that respondent judge committed gross ignorance of the law when he accorded
the accused the mitigating circumstances of want of intent to commit so grave a wrong and sufficient provocation
which immediately preceded the act in accordance with Art. 13, pars. 3 and 4 of the Revised Penal Code because these
cited provisions are not applicable in either or both criminal cases. They contend that lack of intent to commit so grave
a wrong cannot apply in Criminal Case No. 89-2878 where the accused was found guilty of slight physical injuries
because lack of intention to kill is not mitigating in crimes against persons, citing the case of People v. Dalacgac where it
was held that in crimes against persons who do not die as a result of the assault, the absence of the intent to kill
reduces the felony to mere physical injuries, but it does not constitute a mitigating circumstance under Art. 13, par. 3.
Additionally, said mitigating circumstances cannot apply to Criminal Case No. 89-1360 (for Homicide) for when the
accused stabbed the unarmed and defenseless Maximo Bacar at his back with an icepick, it is crystal clear, so
petitioners contend, that the intention of the accused Gerardo Marcial at that particular moment when he executed or
committed the stabbing was to kill and finish off Maximo Bacar and not to harm him only. 4 Petitioners cite the case
of People v. Boyles, et al., 5 to wit:
"Article 13, par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code addresses itself to the intention of the offender
at the particular moment when he executes or commits the criminal act; not to his intention during
the planning stage. Therefore, when, as in the case under review, the original plan was only to rob,
but which plan, on account of the resistance offered by the victim, was compounded into the more
serious crime of robbery with homicide, the plea of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong
cannot be rightly granted. The unforgettable fact remains that when they ganged up on their victim,
they employed deadly weapons and inflicted on him, mortal wounds in his neck. At that precise
moment, they did intend to kill their victim, and that was the moment to which Art. 13, par. 3
refers." 6
As for the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation, petitioners contend that this is not applicable to Criminal
Case No. 89-1360 (for Homicide) for while Edgardo Mabuyo, the victim in Criminal Case No. 89-2878, admitted that
prior to the incident, there was heckling which came from him directed at the group of the accused Gerardo Marcial
and that he was the one who started the heckling, and that the heckling triggered the "free for all fight", there was
however, no iota of evidence that the deceased Maximo Bacar made any provocation. It is further argued by
petitioners that under said Article 13, par. 4, RPC, the provocation to be considered mitigating must originate from the
offended party. Therefore, said mitigating circumstance cannot be appreciated in the case involving the deceased
Maximo Bacar as it is undisputed that he himself never gave or caused any provocation.
Petitioners contend that instead of according the accused Gerardo Marcial the aforesaid mitigating circumstances,
respondent judge should have considered the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength under Art. 14,
par. 15, of the Revised Penal Code and treachery under Art. 14, par. 16, of the same Code. 7
On rendering an unjust judgment, petitioners allege that in imposing a straight penalty of six (6) years imprisonment
for homicide, after taking into consideration the aforesaid mitigating circumstances, respondent judge has rendered
an unjust judgment in Criminal Case No. 89-1360. It is contended that under the graduation and application of
penalties, the penalty that should be imposed can in no case be justified to only six (6) years "flat". 8
The present complaint was referred to respondent judge for comment by then Deputy Court Administrator Juanito A.
Bernad in his First (1st) Indorsement dated 27 May 1994. In reply thereto, respondent judge filed a motion, dated 3
June 1994, requesting for an extension of 20 days within which to file his comment for the reason that he needed to
borrow the records of said Criminal Cases Nos. 89-1360 and 89-2878 from the Makati Regional Trial Court so that he
may be able to file an intelligible comment. He also explained that per his recollection, when accused Marcial filed his
motion for reconsideration of the joint judgment, respondent judge, to be sure that he would not commit an error,
sought a second opinion from one Judge Nemesio Felix who allegedly opined that the said accused should have been
given the benefit of homicide in a "tumultuous affray" with no intent to commit the crime, and of self-defense, and
suggested a reduced straight penalty of anywhere from two (2) years to six (6) years. Respondent's request for
extension was granted by then Deputy Court Administrator Juanito A. Bernad per his letter dated 20 June 1994.
However, as his comment was not forthcoming, tracer letters, dated 8 November 1994 and 10 October 1995, were sent
to respondent judge by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA, for brevity), reiterating the directive for him to
file his comment on the complaint against him.
Meanwhile, complainants filed a letter with the OCA dated 20 October 1995 reiterating the charges against
respondent judge and particularly assailing his order of 13 November 1992 imposing a straight penalty of six (6) years
so as to enable the accused to avail of the benefits of probation and prayed that judgment be imposed by this Court on
the accused to vindicate the death of their son. They also took exception to the statement of respondent judge in the
assailed order that their motion for reconsideration dated 10 December 1992 was filed out of time. 9
Since respondent judge continually failed to file his comment, this Court issued a Resolution, dated 1 July 1996,
requiring respondent judge to 1) show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for
failure to comment on the complaint, and; 2) file the required comment on the complaint. In the same Resolution, the
complainants were advised that their prayer to impose the correct penalty in the criminal charges cannot be granted
since the present proceedings involve only the administrative liability, if any, of respondent judge. cdasia
On 6 August 1996, respondent judge finally filed his comment. He explained therein why he took into consideration
the aforesaid mitigating circumstances and contends that in doing so, he merely exercised his discretion and
judgment. As to why he should not be disciplinary dealt with or held in contempt for failure to file comment,
respondent judge set forth the following reasons:
"1. In the belief that the complaint for ignorance of the law (for appreciating the two (2) mitigating
circumstances) was unquestionably, obviously and completely baseless because they were acts of
judicial discretion in the appreciation of evidence, respondent did not give the matter the priority
that it deserved.
2. The Bacar spouses assured respondent during a visit to him in the Pasay City RTC that they were
going to withdraw their complaint.
3. Respondent had been under severe stress since the first week of November 1995 to the present
when he discovered that Judge Salvador Abad Santos, executive judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati, . . . initiated an administrative complaint against him . . ." 10
On 14 August 1996, respondent judge filed an urgent ex-parte motion for second (2nd) extension of time to file his
explanation, and; on 28 August 1996, respondent finally filed his explanation on why he should not be disciplinarily
dealt with or held in contempt of court for his failure to file a comment.
After evaluating the foregoing facts, the Office of the Court Administrator made the following findings:
1. Respondent cannot be held liable for rendering an unjust judgment by considering in favor of the accused
the two (2) mitigating circumstances. Under the Rules of Court, a judgment of conviction may, upon motion
of the accused, be modified or set aside by the court rendering it before the judgment has become final or
appeal has been perfected. Moreover, errors in the application of the law and the appreciation of the evidence
are judicial in nature. The remedy therefore of the complainants should likewise be judicial.
2. However, respondent may be held liable for gross ignorance of the law for imposing a straight penalty of
six (6) years of imprisonment on the accused in his modified judgment in the case for homicide. The
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is mandatory where imprisonment would exceed one (1)
year. 11 And in applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law for offenses penalized under the Revised Penal
Code, the indeterminate sentence should have a fixed minimum and maximum. 12 In this case, what was
imposed was a straight penalty which is erroneous. 13
We agree with aforesaid findings of the Office of the Court Administrator on both points.
Not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of his duties makes him liable therefor. To hold a judge
administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming that he has erred, would be
nothing short of harassment and would make his position unbearable. For no one called upon to try the facts or
interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. 14
In the case at bar, respondent judge cannot be faulted for modifying his decision after considering the two (2)
mitigating circumstances of want of intent to commit so grave a wrong and sufficient provocation which immediately
preceded the act, set forth in the motion for reconsideration filed by the accused. Under the law, a judgment of
conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside by the court rendering it before the judgment
has become final or appeal has been perfected.
The fact that respondent judge' s appreciation of the evidence differed from that of petitioners which could be biased,
does not warrant the conclusion that said judge has rendered an unjust judgment nor that he is ignorant of the law. In
the absence of any indication 1) that the trial court's conclusion is based entirely on speculations; 2) that there is grave
abuse of discretion; 3) that the court, in making its findings went beyond the issues of the case and the same are
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee, or; that the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts, or; that the presiding judge is blatantly biased, the general rule that the trial court' s findings of fact should be
given great weight still stands.
However, respondent judge is liable for gross ignorance of the law for imposing a straight penalty of six (6) years
imprisonment on the accused in his modified judgment in the case for homicide. It is basic law that, as stated above,
the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is mandatory where imprisonment exceeds one (1) year, 15 except
only in the following cases:
 "a. Offenses punished by death or life imprisonment.
b. Those convicted of treason (Art. 114), conspiracy or proposal to commit treason (Art. 115).
c. Those convicted of misprision of treason (Art. 116), rebellion (Art. 134), sedition (Art. 139), or espionage
(Art. 117). casia
d. Those convicted of piracy (Art. 122).
e. Habitual delinquents (Art. 62, par. 5).
Recidivists are entitled to an indeterminate sentence. (People v. Jaramilla, L-28547, Feb. 22, 1974). Offender is
not disqualified to avail of the benefits of the law even if the crime is committed while he is on parole.
(People v. Clareon, CA 78 O.G. 6701, Nov. 19, 1982).
f. Those who escaped from confinement or those who evaded sentence.
g. Those granted conditional pardon and who violated the terms of the same (Art. 159). (People v. Corral, 74
Phil. 359).
h. Those whose maximum period of imprisonment does not exceed one year.
Where the penalty actually imposed does not exceed one year, the accused cannot avail himself of the
benefits of the law, the application of which is based upon the penalty actually imposed in accordance with
law and not upon that which may be imposed in the discretion of the Court. (People v. Hidalgo, [CA] G.R.
No. 00452-CR, Jan. 22, 1962).
i. Those who are already serving final judgment upon the approval of the Indeterminate Sentence Law." 16
The need for specifying the minimum and maximum periods of the indeterminate sentence is to prevent the
unnecessary and excessive deprivation of liberty and to enhance the economic usefulness of the accused, since he may
be exempted from serving the entire sentence, depending upon his behavior and his physical, mental, and moral
record. The requirement of imposing an indeterminate sentence in all criminal offenses whether punishable by the
RPC or by special laws, with definite minimum and maximum terms, as the Court deems proper within the legal
range of the penalty specified by the law must, therefore, be deemed mandatory. 17
In crimes punishable under the Revised Penal Code, the maximum term of the indeterminate penalty is determined in
accordance with the rules and provisions of the Code exactly as if the Indeterminate Sentence Law had never been
enacted. 18
The rules and provisions which must be applied to determine the maximum term of the indeterminate penalty are
those provided in Articles 46, 48, 50 to 57, 61, 62 (except paragraph 5), 64, 65, 68, 69, and 71. 19
However, the aforesaid rules and provisions in those articles, particularly Arts. 50 to 57, 62, 64 and 65, are not
applicable in fixing the minimum term of the indeterminate penalty. The Court has unqualified discretion to fix the
term of the minimum. 20 The only limitation is that it is within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed
by the Code for the offense committed, without regard to its three (3) periods. 21
Take the present case, for example, of homicide in which two (2) mitigating circumstances attended its commission.
The penalty for homicide prescribed by Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. Since two (2)
mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the offense, said penalty shall
be lowered by one degree pursuant to Article 64 paragraph 5 of the same Code, which in this case is prision mayor.
This penalty shall be imposed in its medium period considering that no other modifying circumstance attended the
commission of the offense, the two (2) mitigating circumstances having been already taken into account in reducing
the penalty by one (1) degree lower (Basanv. People, L-39483, 29 November 1974, 61 SCRA 275). Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the penalty shall be within the range of the penalty next lower in
degree which is prision correccional and the maximum of which shall be within the range of the medium period
of prision mayor. 22
Since respondent judge imposed the straight penalty of six (6) years which is erroneous, he is therefore liable for gross
ignorance of the law. This Court has held that when the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not
know it, constitutes gross ignorance of the law. 23 Likewise, that unawareness of and unfamiliarity with the
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law and duration and graduation of penalties merit disciplinary action,
from reprimand to removal. 24
Respondent judge cannot shirk responsibility for imposing said erroneous penalty by saying, as he did in his motion
for extension dated 3 June 1994, 25 that he in fact sought and adopted the opinion of one Judge Nemesio Felix. A
judge should have moral and intellectual courage and independence of mind in the discharge of his duties for only in
that way can he merit his judicial position and the support and confidence of the people in him. 26
Respondent judge owes it to the public and to the legal profession to know the law he is supposed to apply to a given
controversy. He is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules.
Party litigants will have great faith in the administration of justice if judges cannot justly be accused of apparent
deficiency in their grasp of the legal principles. 27
Finally, this Court takes notice of the fact that respondent judge filed his comment on this present petition more than
two (2) years from the time the Office of the Court Administrator through then Deputy Court Administrator Juanito
Bernad, issued a directive for him to do so. As a judge, respondent ought to know that all directives coming from the
Office of the Court Administrator and his deputies are issued in the exercise of administrative supervision of courts
and their personnel, hence, they should be respected. His excuses that the complaint was unquestionably, obviously,
and completely baseless; that complainants were going to withdraw their complaint, and; that he was under severe
stress are not enough for him to ignore said Office's directives. It took a resolution of the Court itself for respondent
judge to finally file his comment. Even then, respondent judge had to ask for several extensions before complying
with this Court's orders. 28
WHEREFORE, the Court, resolving to hold respondent Judge Salvador P. de Guzman, Jr. administratively liable for
gross ignorance of the law, imposes on him a FINE of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) WITH A STERN WARNING
that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. Additionally, he is hereby ADMONISHED
for failure to file promptly his comment as directed by the Office of the Court Administrator. cdtai
SO ORDERED.
[A.M. No. MTJ-95-1063. February 9, 1996.]
ALFONSO C. CHOA vs. JUDGE ROBERTO S. CHIONGSON
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; JUDGES; CHARGE OF GRAVE MISCONDUCT, GROSS BIAS AND PARTIALITY, AND
HAVING KNOWINGLY RENDERED AN UNJUST JUDGMENT, DEVOID OF MERIT. — Respondent is charged with grave
misconduct, gross bias and partiality, and having knowingly rendered an unjust judgment in a Criminal Case for Perjury initiated
by the complainant's wife. This complaint arose from the alleged untruthful statements in the complainant's Petition for
Naturalization. Respondent Judge found the complainant herein guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of perjury. The
complainant moved for a reconsideration of the judgment but respondent Judge denied said motion. Hence, the complainant filed
the instant complaint. The allegations in the complaint are utterly devoid of merit. Good faith and good motive did not seem to have
inspired the filing of the complaint. As correctly pointed out by the respondent, if the complainant and his counsel honestly
believed that the allegations in the Information in the perjury case did not constitute an offense, they should have filed a motion to
quash. Under Section 3(a), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, the accused may move to quash the complaint or information on this
ground. The complainant never did; he was arraigned and entered into trial. Although his failure to do so did not operate as a
waiver of the said ground pursuant to Section 8 of the same Rule, it showed, nevertheless, his admission of the weakness of the
ground. If he had perceived it to be strong, he would not have wasted an opportunity to put an early end to the ordeal of a
prolonged litigation. Besides, this ground had not at all been invoked by him. The withdrawal of the Petition for Naturalization did
not and cannot amount to a recall of the questioned untruthful statements. Neither could it extinguish any offense which may have
been committed by reason of such untruthful statements. As to the respondent Judge's being a next-door neighbor of the
complainant's wife — the complainant in the perjury case — it must be stressed that that alone is not a ground for either a
mandatory disqualification under the first paragraph or for a voluntary disqualification under the second paragraph of Section 1,
Rule 137 of the Rules of Court. In any event, the complainant has failed to disclose in his complaint that he had raised this matter at
any time before the rendition of the judgment. In fact, the summary of the grounds of his motion for reconsideration in the
respondent's order denying the said motion does not include this matter. If indeed the complainant honestly believed in the
justness of the grievance, he would have raised it in an appropriate pleading before the trial court. Finally, the nature and character
of the complainant's grievances relative to the respondent's judgment finding the former guilty of perjury may only be properly
ventilated in an appropriate judicial proceeding, such as an appeal from the judgment. This kind of recourse, whether made in
addition to a regular appeal from the judgment, or in lieu thereof, if none had been made, is clearly without any basis and cannot
be tolerated for it robs Judges of precious time which they could otherwise devote to the cases in their courts or to the unclogging
of their dockets. CDta
2. LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; DUTIES AS MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE BAR. — Atty. Raymundo A. Quiroz,
counsel for the complainant, must have been aware of the utter lack of merit of the charges against the respondent. As a Member of
the Philippine Bar he is bound: (1) by his oath, not to, wittingly or willingly, promote or sue any groundless, false, or unlawful suit
nor give aid nor consent to the same; (2) by Section 20 (c), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to counsel or maintain such action or
proceedings only as appear to him to be just; and (3) to uphold the Code of Professional Responsibility. It was incumbent upon him
to give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results of the complainant's case with the end in view of promoting
respect for the law and legal processes. He should, therefore, be required to show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken
against him for his apparent failure to observe the foregoing duties and responsibilities.
DAVIDE, JR., J p:
The uncomplicated issues in this administrative complaint have been properly joined with the filing of the
respondent's comment as required in the 1st Indorsement of 18 August 1995 of Hon. Bernardo P. Abesamis, Deputy
Court Administrator. No further pleadings need be required from the parties.
In the complaint signed by Atty. Raymundo A. Quiroz as counsel for the complainant and verified by the
latter, the respondent is charged with grave misconduct, gross bias and partiality, and having knowingly rendered an
unjust judgment in Criminal Case No. 50322 entitled, "People of the Philippines vs. Alfonso C. Choa."
Criminal Case No. 50322 was for Perjury and initiated by the complainant's wife, Leni L. Ong-Choa, through
the filing of a letter-complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Bacolod City. This complaint arose from the
alleged untruthful statements or falsehoods in the complainant's Petition for Naturalization dated 30 March 1989
which was docketed as Case No. 5395, of Branch 41 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City.
In due course, an Information was filed, in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MCTC) of Bacolod City by the
Office of the Prosecutor, charging the complainant herein with perjury allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 30th day of March, 1989, in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused, did, then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly made untruthful statements of [sic] falsehoods upon
material matters required by the Revised Naturalization Law (C.A. No. 473) in his verified "Petition
for Naturalization" dated April 13, 1989, subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public Felomino B.
Tan, Jr., who is authorized to administer oath[s], which petition bears Doc. No. 140; Page No. 29;
Book No. XXIII; and Series of 1989, in the Notarial Register of said Notary Public, by stating therein
the following, to wit:
5. I am married to a Filipino. My wife's name is Leni
Ong Choa and now resides at 46 Malaspina Street, Bacolod City.
 I have two (2) children, whose names, dates and places of birth,
and residences are as follows:
NAME DATE PLACE RESIDENCE
OF BIRTH OF BIRTH

ALBRYAN July 19, Bacolod 46 Malaspina St.,

ONG CHOA 1981 City Bacolod City

CHERYL LYNNE May 5, Bacolod 46 Malaspina St.,

ONG CHOA 1983 City Bacolod City
xxx xxx xxx
10. I am of good moral character, I believe in the principles underlying the
Philippine Constitution. I have conducted myself in a proper and irreproachable manner
during the entire period of my residence in the Philippines in my relations with the
constituted government as well as with the community in which I am living.
xxx xxx xxx
When in truth and in fact said accused knew that his wife Leni Ong Choa and their two (2)
children were not then residing at the said address at No. 46 Malaspina Street, Villamonte, Bacolod
City, having left the aforesaid residence in 1984, or about five (5) years earlier and were then
residing at Hervias Subdivision, Bacolod City, that contrary to his aforesaid allegations in his
verified Petition for Naturalization, accused while residing at 211, 106 Street, Greenplains
Subdivision, Bacolod City, has been carrying on an immoral and illicit relationship with one Stella
Flores Saludar, a woman not his wife since 1984, and begotting [sic] two (2) children with her as a
consequence, as he and his wife, the private offended party herein, have long been separated from
bed and boards [sic] since 1984; which falsehoods and/or immoral and improper conduct are
grounds for disqualifications [sic] of [sic] becoming a citizen of the Philippines.
Act contrary to law.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 50322 and was assigned to Branch III thereof where the
respondent is the presiding Judge.
After trial, the respondent Judge rendered judgment on 21 February 1995 and found the complainant herein
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of perjury. The respondent Judge accordingly sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of six months and one day of prision correccional and to pay the costs.
The complainant moved for a reconsideration of the judgment alleging that: (1) there is no basis for the
conviction since his petition for naturalization had been withdrawn and therefore had become functus officio; (2) the
petition for naturalization is a pleading, hence its allegations are privileged; and (3) his prosecution violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. The last ground is founded on an admission made by a representative of the
Office of the Solicitor General of her lack of knowledge of any perjury case filed based on a withdrawn or dismissed
petition for naturalization. CDTInc
The respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit in an order dated 31 March
1995.
The complainant filed the instant complaint on 14 July 1995 and prayed for the removal of the respondent
Judge from office. As grounds therefor, he alleges that:
(1) The respondent Judge is guilty of Grave Misconduct, Gross Bias and Partiality, and Knowingly
Rendering An Unjust Judgment when he intentionally failed to divulge the next-door-
neighbor relationship between him and the family of Leni Ong Choa and to disqualify
himself from sitting in the criminal case on such ground as part of the grand design and
preconceived intention to unjustly convict the complainant of the crime charged without
due process.
(2) The allegations in the Information do not constitute the offense of perjury.
(3) The petition having been withdrawn with finality, it has become functus officio and it is as if the
Petition was not filed at all so that whatever false statements were contained therein were
no longer required by law and had ceased to be on a material matter.
(4) The respondent Judge admitted for prosecution Exhibit "P" (handwritten list of properties) even
if this was self-serving as it was undated and unsigned; and — Exhibit "Q" (letter of Leni
 Ong Choa's counsel to the complainant) even if it was also self-serving as there was no
showing that he received the letter.
(5) The respondent Judge has sentenced the complainant to suffer a penalty higher than that
provided by law, without applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
The respondent Judge refutes the charge in his Comment dated 12 September 1995, thus:
He denies being the next-door-neighbor of Leni Ong Choa there being a house, belonging
to the Sia family, separating his house and that of Leni Choa; he and the rest of the members of his
family are not acquainted with Leni Choa or any member of her family and had not exchanged
greetings nor is he even a nodding acquaintance of Leni Choa or any member of her family.
He asserts that if the allegations in the Information do not constitute an offense, the
complainant should have filed a Motion to Quash but he did not. Just the same, when the
complainant stated in the Petition that he together with his wife and children lived at 46 Malaspina
St., Bacolod City, he committed a falsehood under oath because the truth is two (2) years before the
filing of the Petition, his wife and two (2) children were not living with him anymore, making him
liable for perjury.
Respondent also avers that the complainant is not of good moral character contrary to what
he stated in the Petition for Naturalization since he is conducting an extra-marital relationship with
Stella Flores Saludar, his former employee, with whom he has begotten two (2) children. As a
matter of fact, a case for concubinage against complainant was filed and is now pending in Court.
According to the respondent, a reading of the Order granting the Motion to Withdraw the
Petition will show that the Prosecutor representing the Office of the Solicitor General opposed the
Motion to Withdraw the Petition for the reason that the complainant had abandoned his wife and
two (2) children, is not giving them support and is now living with his paramour.
On the claim of the complainant that his petition for naturalization has became functus
officio in view of its withdrawal, hence no longer existent, the respondent Judge maintains that the
withdrawal reduced the petition to functus officio only for the purpose of the Special Proceedings
but not when it is used as evidence in other cases.
On the issue of the admissibility of the Exhibits P, Q and R, the respondent Judge contends
that Exhibits P, Q and R were duly identified by Leni Ong Choa and her testimonies on these were
found to be credible by the Court.
Finally, respondent Judge asserts that the Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable in
the perjury case as the penalty imposed by the court did not exceed one (1) year.
The respondent Judge then prays for the dismissal of the complaint for being patently without merit and for
the censure and reprimand of the complainant's counsel with a warning to refrain from filing similar harassment
suits.
In the Evaluation contained in a Memorandum dated 17 November 1995 and duly approved by the Court
Administrator, Hon. Zenaida N. Elepaño, Deputy Court Administrator, makes the following findings and
conclusions:
EVALUATION: A careful study of the records shows that the allegations of the complainant are devoid of
any merit.
The charge that respondent Judge and Leni Choa are neighbors [sic] appears to be petty
under the circumstances. Granting that they are indeed next-door neighbors does not necessarily
mean that respondent Judge has violated Rule 137 of the Rules of Court for Disqualification of
Judges. Nowhere in said Rule is it ordained that being the neighbor of a party litigant is reason
enough for the Judge to disqualify himself from hearing the former's case.
With respect to the complainant's claim that the allegations in the information do not
constitute the offense of perjury, an administrative proceeding is not the forum to decide whether
the judge has erred or not, especially as complainant has appealed his conviction.
Even if the matter can be examined, we do not find any error in the Court's decision.
The elements of perjury as enumerated in the case of People of the Philippines vs.
Bautista (C.A., 40 O.G. 2491) are as follows:
(a) Statement in the affidavit upon material matter made under oath;
(b) The affiant swears to the truthfulness of the statements is his affidavit before a
competent officer authorized to administer oath;
(c) There is a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood; and
(d) Sworn statement containing the falsity is required by law.
 It cannot be denied that the petition for naturalization filed by Alfonso C. Choa was made
under oath and before a competent officer authorized to administer oath as shown by the records
(p. 4, APPENDIX "A"). This petition for naturalization is required by law as a condition precedent
for the grant of Philippine citizenship (Section 7, Com. Act No. 473).
The question now boils down to whether there is a willful and deliberate assertion of
falsehood.
As shown by the records (p. 1, APPENDIX "A"), Alfonso C. Choa declared in his petition
dated 30 March 1989 that his wife Leni Ong Choa resides at 46 Malaspina St., Bacolod City while in
the administrative complaint he filed against respondent Judge, he stated that his wife Leni
Ong Choa left their family residence (46 Malaspina St., Bacolod City) in the latter part of 1984 (p. 6,
par. 2 of Adm. Complaint). This simply means that when he filed his petition for naturalization,
Leni Ong Choa was not residing at the abovementioned address anymore.
It was also proven that Alfonso C. Choa had a child with a woman not his wife and he
himself signed the birth certificate as the father of that child (p. 4, APPENDIX "E"). This is contrary
to what he declared in his petition that he is of good moral character which is required under
the Naturalization Law (par. 3, Sec. 2, Com. Act No. 473).
There was therefore a deliberate assertion of falsehood by Alfonso C. Choa to warrant
conviction for perjury as found by Judge Chiongson.
As to the complainant's claim that the withdrawal of the petition makes it functus officio, we
sustain the respondent Judge's view that the Petition can be used as evidence in another case. In the
case of People of the Philippines vs. Cainglet (16 SCRA 748) the Court held that "every interest of
public policy demands that perjury be not shielded by artificial refinements and narrow
technicalities. For perjury strikes at the very administration of the laws (Jay vs. State, [1916] 15 Ala.
App. 255, 43 So. 137). It is the policy of the law that judicial proceedings and judgment shall be fair
and free from fraud, and that litigants and parties be encouraged to tell the truth and that they be
punished if they do not (People vs. Niles, 300 Ill., 458, 133 N.E. 252, 37 A.R.L. 1284, 1289)."
On whether the judge erred in not applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law to the case, we
cite Section 2 of R.A. No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law) which provides in part that "This Act
shall not apply to . . . those whose maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year, . . ."
Since the penalty for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code isarresto mayor in its
maximum period which is one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months to prision correccional in
its minimum period which is six (6) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months,
the respondent Judge was correct in not applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
As earlier stated, the foregoing discussion is in no way the final appreciation of the Court's
decision which is on appeal, but is made only to illustrate the utter lack of merit of this charge.
Counsel for the complainant must be reprimanded for assisting in the filing of this complaint.
Deputy Court Administrator Elepaño then recommends:
Premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that this complaint against Judge
Roberto S. Chiongson be DISMISSED for lack of merit. It is further recommended that Atty.
Raymundo A. Quiroz be REPRIMANDED for assisting in the filing of a patently unmeritorious
complaint.
We fully agree with Deputy Court Administrator Elepaño that the allegations in the complaint are
utterly devoid of merit. Good faith and good motive did not seem to have inspired the filing of the complaint.
Indeed, as correctly pointed out by the respondent, if the complainant and his counsel honestly believed that
the allegations in the Information in the perjury case did not constitute an offense, they should have filed a motion to
quash. Under Section 3(a), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, the accused may move to quash the complaint or information
on this ground. The complainant never did; he was arraigned and entered into trial. Although his failure to do so did
not operate as a waiver of the said ground pursuant to Section 8 of the same Rule, it showed, nevertheless, his
admission of the weakness of the ground. If he had perceived it to be strong, he would not have wasted an
opportunity to put an early end to the ordeal of a prolonged litigation. Besides, this ground had not at all been
invoked by him, as shown in the order of 31 March 1995 denying the complainant's motion for the reconsideration.
The withdrawal of the Petition for Naturalization did not and cannot amount to a recall of the questioned
untruthful statements. Neither could it extinguish any offense which may have been committed by reason of such
untruthful statements.
As to the respondent Judge's being a next-door neighbor of the complainant's wife — the complainant in the
perjury case — it must be stressed that that alone is not a ground for either a mandatory disqualification under the
first paragraph or for a voluntary disqualification under the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of
Court. In any event, the complainant has failed to disclose in his complaint that he had raised this matter at any time
before the rendition of the judgment. In fact, the summary of the grounds of his motion for reconsideration in the
respondent's order denying the said motion does not include this matter. If indeed the complainant honestly believed
in the justness of this grievance, he would have raised it in an appropriate pleading before the trial court.
Finally, the nature and character of the complainant's grievances relative to the respondent's judgment
finding the former guilty of perjury may only be properly ventilated in an appropriate judicial proceeding, such as an
appeal from the judgment.
This kind of recourse, whether made in addition to a regular appeal from the judgment, or in lieu thereof, if
none had been made, is clearly without any basis and cannot be tolerated for it robs Judges of precious time which
they could otherwise devote to the cases in their courts or to the unclogging of their dockets.
Atty. Raymundo A. Quiroz, counsel for the complainant, must have been aware of the utter lack of merit of
the charges against the respondent. As a Member of the Philippine Bar he is bound: (1) by his oath, not to, wittingly or
willingly, promote or sue any groundless, false, or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; (2) by Section
20(c), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to counsel or maintain such action or proceedings only as appear to him to be
just; and (3) to uphold the Code of Professional Responsibility. It was incumbent upon him to give a candid and
honest opinion on the merits and probable results of the complainant's case (Rule 15.05, Canon 15, Code of
Professional Responsibility) with the end in view of promoting respect for the law and legal processes (Canon 1, Id.).
He should, therefore, be required to show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for his
apparent failure to observe the foregoing duties and responsibilities.
WHEREFORE, for want of merit, the instant complaint is DISMISSED.
For the reasons above stated, Atty. Raymundo A. Quiroz is hereby directed to SHOW CAUSE, within fifteen
(15) days from notice hereof, why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for his apparent failure to comply with his
duties and responsibilities above stated. Llibris
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 123991. December 6, 1996.]

FELIX LADINO vs. HON. ALFONSO S. GARCIA and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA; PLEA OF GUILTY TO A LESSER
OFFENSE; THE DOWNGRADED OFFENSE AND ITS LOWER PENALTY SHALL CONTROL THE ADJUDGMENT OF
AND ANY FURTHER PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COURT A QUO. — The fact that the lesser offense, and its necessarily
lower penalty, resulted from a plea bargaining agreement is of no moment as far as the penalty to be imposed is concerned.
Plea bargaining is authorized by the present Rules and is in fact required to be considered by the trial court at the pre-trial
conference. The felony of homicide which must constitute the basis for the penalty to be imposed having been agreed upon
among the requisite parties and approved by the trial court itself, that downgraded offense and its lower penalty shall
control the adjudgment of and any further proceedings before the court a quo.
2. ID.; ID.; APPEAL; RULE IN CASE ONE OR MORE OF SEVERAL ACCUSED OBTAINED A FAVORABLE
JUDGMENT; APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — The present rule is that an appeal taken by one or more of several accused
shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to
the latter. Our pronouncements here with respect to petitioner Felix Ladino, his co-accused, are definitely favorable and
applicable to accused Restituto Amistad. He should not therefore be treated as the odd man out, but should also benefit
from the more beneficial indeterminate sentence that we shall impose. In fact, under similar conditions and on the same
ratiocination, the aforecited Rule has justified the extension of our judgment of acquittal to the co-accused who failed to
appeal from the judgment of the trial court which we subsequently reversed. IDCHTE
3. CRIMINAL LAW; PENALTIES; INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW; TO DETERMINE WHETHER AN
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE AND NOT A STRAIGHT PENALTY IS PROPER, WHAT IS CONSIDERED IS THE
PENALTY ACTUALLY IMPOSED BY THE TRIAL COURT, AFTER CONSIDERING THE ATTENDANT
CIRCUMSTANCES, AND NOT THE IMPOSABLE PENALTY. — It should be kept in mind that to determine whether an
indeterminate sentence and not a straight penalty is proper, what is considered is the penalty actually imposed by the trial
court, after considering the attendant circumstances, and not the imposable penalty. Corollarily, it would be an unduly
strained postulate that a sentence arrived at by a court after a valid plea bargaining should constitute an exception to the
Indeterminate Sentence Law in addition to those enumerated in Section 2 thereof. CSIcHA
REGALADO, J p:
A little more circumspection could have avoided this appellate recourse, as well as the routinary referral to
the Solicitor General since this is a criminal case on appeal, and rendered unnecessary this opinion reiterating settled
and elementary rules of criminal law.
The facts are not in dispute. Petitioner and one Restituto Amistad were charged with the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide in Criminal Case No. TG-2450-95 filed in Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court in
Tagaytay City, presided by respondent judge. Both accused pleaded not guilty when arraigned.
At the hearing of the case on February 5, 1996, both accused offered to plead guilty to the lesser offense of
simple homicide. In open court, the widow of the deceased victim, as private complainant, and the assistant
provincial prosecutor representing the People in the case, expressed their conformity thereto. That agreement was
unqualifiedly approved by respondent judge.
Pursuant to the plea of guilty to the crime of homicide, the trial court rendered an "Order" on February 19,
1996, reciting the aforestated antecedents, declaring both accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide, and sentencing each of them to a prison term of 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years, 4 months and
1 day of reclusion temporal, 1 and to severally pay the civil liability.
Accused having questioned the penalty imposed on them in light of the provisions of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, 2 and the court below having refused to reconsider the same, the case is now before us via a
petition for review on certiorari filed by one of the accused on the lone question of law as to whether or not the
indeterminate sentence meted by the trial court is correct. We shall, therefore, go back to basics.
Preliminary, it will be noted that the indeterminate sentence in question has a range of 14 years, 8 months
and 1 day, as minimum, to 17 years 4 months and 1 day, as maximum. In fine, the minimum is within the range
of reclusion temporal in its medium period, while the maximum is reclusion temporal in its maximum period. This
latter part, by itself, is erroneous.
As a simple matter of law, the penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code
is reclusion temporal in its entire extent and, in the absence of modifying circumstances, the penalty should be
imposed in its medium period. 3 This has a duration of 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months,
and shall be the basis of "an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of
the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code." 4 The lower court
accordingly, overshot the permissible maximum of the penalty, by only one day to be sure but constitutive of
error just the same.
More importantly, it disregarded the further prescription that the minimum of the sentence "shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense." 5 This would, therefore,
be prision mayor in any of its periods as the court, in the exercise of sound discretion and the circumstances of the
case, may consider commensurate and proper. Parenthetically, there is no claim that the accused are excepted
from the coverage of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
It would appear, therefore, that the lower court may have been bothered or influenced by the fact that the
crime originally charged was robbery with homicide with a decidedly higher penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death, 6 whereas the accused had been allowed to plead guilty to homicide punishable by reclusion temporal, and
 yet they would further ask for a still lower minimum of prision mayor. Elsewise stated, the trial court must have
also proceeded on the hypothesis that where a lesser penalty has been imposed for an offense lighter than that in
the original indictment, because of the agreement among the accused, the prosecutor and the offended party for
such reduced liability, the Indeterminate Sentence Law should not apply in toto.
The position taken by the lower court is, therefore, perplexing in view of the fact that it did impose what
purports to be an indeterminate sentence, albeit incorrect. Also, it overlooked the fact that it expressly found the
accused "GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide." Necessarily, it has to impose the penalty
for that felony as prescribed in Article 249, without regard to what would have been the penalty for the original
offense charged under Article 294(1), and to comply with the legal consequences flowing therefrom.
The fact that the lesser offense, and its necessarily lower penalty, resulted from a plea bargaining
agreement is of no moment as far as the penalty to be imposed is concerned.Plea bargaining is authorized by the
present Rules and is in fact required to be considered by the trial court at the pre-trial conference. 7 The felony of
homicide which must constitute the basis for the penalty to be imposed having been agreed upon among the
requisite parties and approved by the trial court itself, that downgraded offense and its lower penalty shall
control the adjudgment of and any further proceedings before the court a quo.
From that undisputable and obvious premise, it follows that the aforecited provisions of Act No. 4103, as
amended, shall necessarily apply. Also on that score, it should be kept in mind that to determine whether an
indeterminate sentence and not a straight penalty is proper, what is considered is the penalty actually imposed by
the trial court, after considering the attendant circumstances, and not the imposable penalty. 8 Corollarily, it
would be an unduly strained postulate that a sentence arrived at by a court after a valid plea bargaining should
constitute an exception to the Indeterminate Sentence Law in addition to those enumerated in Section 2 thereof.
We note one other aspect of this case which understandably has not been mentioned by the parties and
their legal representations in this appeal. The other accused, Restituto Amistad, who is identically circumstanced
and was sentenced to serve the same penalty which has been demonstrated to be mistakenly excessive, does not
appear to have perfected an appeal from that judgment. The record does not show the reason therefor.
Be that as it may, the present rule is that an appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect
those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the
latter. 9 Our pronouncements here with respect to petitioner Felix Ladino, his co-accused, are definitely favorable
and applicable to accused Restituto Amistad. He should not therefore be treated as the odd man out, but should
also benefit from the more beneficial indeterminate sentence that we shall impose. In fact, under similar
conditions and on the same ratiocination, the aforecited Rule has justified the extension of our judgment of
acquittal to the co-accused who failed to appeal from the judgment of the trial court which we subsequently
reversed. 10
ACCORDINGLY, the impugned disposition of respondent judge is MODIFIED and herein petitioner Felix
Ladino and accused Restituto Amistad are hereby SENTENCED to each serve an indeterminate penalty of ten (10)
years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum,
but with the judgment of the court a quo being AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 182748. December 13, 2011.]

ARNEL COLINARES, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
ABAD, J p:
This case is about a) the need, when invoking self-defense, to prove all that it takes; b) what distinguishes
frustrated homicide from attempted homicide; and c) when an accused who appeals may still apply for probation
on remand of the case to the trial court.
The Facts and the Case
 The public prosecutor of Camarines Sur charged the accused Arnel Colinares (Arnel) with frustrated
homicide before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose, Camarines Sur, in Criminal Case T-2213. 1
Complainant Rufino P. Buena (Rufino) testified that at around 7:00 in the evening on June 25, 2000, he and
Jesus Paulite (Jesus) went out to buy cigarettes at a nearby store. On their way, Jesus took a leak by the roadside
with Rufino waiting nearby. From nowhere, Arnel sneaked behind and struck Rufino twice on the head with a
huge stone, about 15 1/2 inches in diameter. Rufino fell unconscious as Jesus fled.
Ananias Jallores (Ananias) testified that he was walking home when he saw Rufino lying by the roadside.
Ananias tried to help but someone struck him with something hard on the right temple, knocking him out. He
later learned that Arnel had hit him. aHICDc
Paciano Alano (Paciano) testified that he saw the whole incident since he happened to be smoking outside
his house. He sought the help of a barangay tanod and they brought Rufino to the hospital.
Dr. Albert Belleza issued a Medico-Legal Certificate 2 showing that Rufino suffered two lacerated
wounds on the forehead, along the hairline area. The doctor testified that these injuries were serious and
potentially fatal but Rufino chose to go home after initial treatment.
The defense presented Arnel and Diomedes Paulite (Diomedes). Arnel claimed self-defense. He testified
that he was on his way home that evening when he met Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias who were all quite drunk.
Arnel asked Rufino where he supposed the Mayor of Tigaon was but, rather than reply, Rufino pushed him,
causing his fall. Jesus and Ananias then boxed Arnel several times on the back. Rufino tried to stab Arnel but
missed. The latter picked up a stone and, defending himself, struck Rufino on the head with it. When Ananias
saw this, he charged towards Arnel and tried to stab him with a gaff. Arnel was able to avoid the attack and hit
Ananias with the same stone. Arnel then fled and hid in his sister's house. On September 4, 2000, he voluntarily
surrendered at the Tigaon Municipal Police Station.
Diomedes testified that he, Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias attended a pre-wedding party on the night of the
incident. His three companions were all drunk. On his way home, Diomedes saw the three engaged in heated
argument with Arnel.
On July 1, 2005 the RTC rendered judgment, finding Arnel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated
homicide and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment from two years and four months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to six years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum. Since the maximum probationable
imprisonment under the law was only up to six years, Arnel did not qualify for probation.
Arnel appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), invoking self-defense and, alternatively, seeking conviction
for the lesser crime of attempted homicide with the consequent reduction of the penalty imposed on him. The CA
entirely affirmed the RTC decision but deleted the award for lost income in the absence of evidence to support
it. 3 Not satisfied, Arnel comes to this Court on petition for review. TEAICc
In the course of its deliberation on the case, the Court required Arnel and the Solicitor General to submit
their respective positions on whether or not, assuming Arnel committed only the lesser crime of attempted
homicide with its imposable penalty of imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years
and four months of prision correccional, as maximum, he could still apply for probation upon remand of the case to
the trial court.
Both complied with Arnel taking the position that he should be entitled to apply for probation in case the
Court metes out a new penalty on him that makes his offense probationable. The language and spirit of
the probation law warrants such a stand. The Solicitor General, on the other hand, argues that under
the Probation Law no application for probation can be entertained once the accused has perfected his appeal from
the judgment of conviction.
The Issues Presented
The case essentially presents three issues:
1. Whether or not Arnel acted in self-defense when he struck Rufino on the head with a stone;
2. Assuming he did not act in self-defense, whether or not Arnel is guilty of frustrated homicide; and
3. Given a finding that Arnel is entitled to conviction for a lower offense and a reduced probationable penalty,
whether or not he may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial court.
The Court's Rulings
One. Arnel claims that Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias attacked him first and that he merely acted in self-
defense when he hit Rufino back with a stone.
When the accused invokes self-defense, he bears the burden of showing that he was legally justified in
killing the victim or inflicting injury to him. The accused must establish the elements of self-defense by clear and
convincing evidence. When successful, the otherwise felonious deed would be excused, mainly predicated on the
lack of criminal intent of the accused. 4 ADCETI
 In homicide, whether consummated, frustrated, or attempted, self-defense requires (1) that the person
whom the offender killed or injured committed unlawful aggression; (2) that the offender employed means that is
reasonably necessary to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) that the person defending himself did
not act with sufficient provocation. 5
If the victim did not commit unlawful aggression against the accused, the latter has nothing to prevent or
repel and the other two requisites of self-defense would have no basis for being appreciated. Unlawful aggression
contemplates an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack or an imminent danger of such attack. A mere threatening
or intimidating attitude is not enough. The victim must attack the accused with actual physical force or with a
weapon. 6
Here, the lower courts found that Arnel failed to prove the element of unlawful aggression. He alone
testified that Jesus and Ananias rained fist blows on him and that Rufino and Ananias tried to stab him. No one
corroborated Arnel's testimony that it was Rufino who started it. Arnel's only other witness, Diomedes, merely
testified that he saw those involved having a heated argument in the middle of the street. Arnel did not submit
any medical certificate to prove his point that he suffered injuries in the hands of Rufino and his companions. 7
In contrast, the three witnesses — Jesus, Paciano, and Ananias — testified that Arnel was the aggressor.
Although their versions were mottled with inconsistencies, these do not detract from their core story. The
witnesses were one in what Arnel did and when and how he did it. Compared to Arnel's testimony, the
prosecution's version is more believable and consistent with reality, hence deserving credence. 8
Two. But given that Arnel, the accused, was indeed the aggressor, would he be liable for frustrated
homicide when the wounds he inflicted on Rufino, his victim, were not fatal and could not have resulted in death
as in fact it did not?
The main element of attempted or frustrated homicide is the accused's intent to take his victim's life. The
prosecution has to prove this clearly and convincingly to exclude every possible doubt regarding homicidal
intent. 9 And the intent to kill is often inferred from, among other things, the means the offender used and the
nature, location, and number of wounds he inflicted on his victim. 10 cEaCAH
Here, Arnel struck Rufino on the head with a huge stone. The blow was so forceful that it knocked Rufino
out. Considering the great size of his weapon, the impact it produced, and the location of the wounds that Arnel
inflicted on his victim, the Court is convinced that he intended to kill him.
The Court is inclined, however, to hold Arnel guilty only of attempted, not frustrated, homicide.
In Palaganas v. People, 11 we ruled that when the accused intended to kill his victim, as shown by his use of a
deadly weapon and the wounds he inflicted, but the victim did not die because of timely medical assistance, the
crime is frustrated murder or frustrated homicide. If the victim's wounds are not fatal, the crime is only attempted
murder or attempted homicide.
Thus, the prosecution must establish with certainty the nature, extent, depth, and severity of the victim's
wounds. While Dr. Belleza testified that "head injuries are always very serious," 12 he could not categorically say
that Rufino's wounds in this case were "fatal." Thus:
Q: Doctor, all the injuries in the head are fatal?
A: No, all traumatic injuries are potentially treated.
Q: But in the case of the victim when you treated him the wounds actually are not fatal on that
very day?
A: I could not say, with the treatment we did, prevent from becoming fatal. But on that case the
patient preferred to go home at that time.
Q: The findings also indicated in the medical certificate only refers to the length of the wound
not the depth of the wound?
A: When you say lacerated wound, the entire length of the layer of scalp.
Q: So you could not find out any abrasion?
A: It is different laceration and abrasion so once the skin is broken up the label of the frontal
lo[b]e, we always call it lacerated wound, but in that kind of wound, we did not measure
the depth. 13 ADCTac
Indeed, Rufino had two lacerations on his forehead but there was no indication that his skull incurred fracture
or that he bled internally as a result of the pounding of his head. The wounds were not so deep, they merely required
suturing, and were estimated to heal in seven or eight days. Dr. Belleza further testified:
Q: So, in the medical certificate the wounds will not require surgery?
A: Yes, Madam.
Q: The injuries are slight?
 A: 7 to 8 days long, what we are looking is not much, we give antibiotics and antit[e]tanus — the
problem the contusion that occurred in the brain.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What medical intervention that you undertake?
A: We give antibiotics, Your Honor, antit[e]tanus and suturing the wounds.
Q: For how many days did he stay in the hospital?
A: Head injury at least be observed within 24 hours, but some of them would rather go home and
then come back.
Q: So the patient did not stay 24 hours in the hospital?
A: No, Your Honor.
Q: Did he come back to you after 24 hours?
A: I am not sure when he came back for follow-up. 14
Taken in its entirety, there is a dearth of medical evidence on record to support the prosecution's claim
that Rufino would have died without timely medical intervention. Thus, the Court finds Arnel liable only for
attempted homicide and entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Three. Ordinarily, Arnel would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he having appealed from the
judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated homicide. ESaITA
But, the Court finds Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted homicide and holds that the
maximum of the penalty imposed on him should be lowered to imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum. With this new penalty, it would be
but fair to allow him the right to apply for probation upon remand of the case to the RTC.
Some in the Court disagrees. They contend that probation is a mere privilege granted by the state only to
qualified convicted offenders. Section 4 of the probation law (PD 968) provides: "That no application for probation
shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of
conviction." 15 Since Arnel appealed his conviction for frustrated homicide, he should be deemed permanently
disqualified from applying for probation.
But, firstly, while it is true that probation is a mere privilege, the point is not that Arnel has the right to
such privilege; he certainly does not have. What he has is the right to apply for that privilege. The Court finds that
his maximum jail term should only be 2 years and 4 months. If the Court allows him to apply for probation
because of the lowered penalty, it is still up to the trial judge to decide whether or not to grant him the privilege of
probation, taking into account the full circumstances of his case.
Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals "from the judgment of
conviction" is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of probation. But, as it happens, two judgments of
conviction have been meted out to Arnel: one, a conviction for frustrated homicide by the regional trial court, now
set aside; and, two, a conviction for attempted homicide by the Supreme Court.
If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinion's hard position, it will apply the probation law on
Arnel based on the trial court's annulled judgment against him. He will not be entitled to probation because of the
severe penalty that such judgment imposed on him. More, the Supreme Court's judgment of conviction for a
lesser offense and a lighter penalty will also have to bend over to the trial court's judgment — even if this has been
found in error. And, worse, Arnel will now also be made to pay for the trial court's erroneous judgment with the
forfeiture of his right to apply for probation. Ang kabayo ang nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa kalabaw (the horse errs, the
carabao gets the whip). Where is justice there? AEDCHc
The dissenting opinion also expresses apprehension that allowing Arnel to apply for probation would
dilute the ruling of this Court in Francisco v. Court of Appeals 16 that theprobation law requires that an accused
must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail himself of probation. But there is a huge difference
between Francisco and this case.
In Francisco, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati found the accused guilty of grave oral
defamation and sentenced him to a prison term of one year and one day to one year and eight months of prision
correccional, a clearly probationable penalty. Probation was his to ask! Still, he chose to appeal, seeking an
acquittal, hence clearly waiving his right to apply for probation. When the acquittal did not come, he wanted
probation. The Court would not of course let him. It served him right that he wanted to save his cake and eat it
too. He certainly could not have both appeal and probation.
The Probation Law, said the Court in Francisco, requires that an accused must not have appealed his
conviction before he can avail himself of probation. This requirement "outlaws the element of speculation on the
part of the accused — to wager on the result of his appeal — that when his conviction is finally affirmed on
appeal, the moment of truth well-nigh at hand, and the service of his sentence inevitable, he now applies for
probation as an 'escape hatch' thus rendering nugatory the appellate court's affirmance of his conviction." 17
 Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him to apply for
probation. He did not have a choice between appeal and probation. He was not in a position to say, "By taking
this appeal, I choose not to apply for probation." The stiff penalty that the trial court imposed on him denied him
that choice. Thus, a ruling that would allow Arnel to now seek probation under this Court's greatly diminished
penalty will not dilute the sound ruling in Francisco. It remains that those who will appeal from judgments of
conviction, when they have the option to try for probation, forfeit their right to apply for that privilege.
Besides, in appealing his case, Arnel raised the issue of correctness of the penalty imposed on him. He
claimed that the evidence at best warranted his conviction only for attempted, not frustrated, homicide, which
crime called for a probationable penalty. In a way, therefore, Arnel sought from the beginning to bring down the
penalty to the level where the law would allow him to apply for probation.
In a real sense, the Court's finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but only of attempted
homicide, is an original conviction that for the first time imposes on him a probationable penalty. Had the RTC
done him right from the start, it would have found him guilty of the correct offense and imposed on him the right
penalty of two years and four months maximum. This would have afforded Arnel the right to apply for
probation. aTEADI
The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation through no fault of his. The
underlying philosophy of probation is one of liberality towards the accused. Such philosophy is not served by a
harsh and stringent interpretation of the statutory provisions. 18 As Justice Vicente V. Mendoza said in his dissent
in Francisco, the Probation Law must not be regarded as a mere privilege to be given to the accused only where it
clearly appears he comes within its letter; to do so would be to disregard the teaching in many cases that
the Probation Law should be applied in favor of the accused not because it is a criminal law but to achieve its
beneficent purpose. 19
One of those who dissent from this decision points out that allowing Arnel to apply for probation after he
appealed from the trial court's judgment of conviction would not be consistent with the provision of Section 2 that
the probation law should be interpreted to "provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender."
An accused like Arnel who appeals from a judgment convicting him, it is claimed, shows no penitence.
This may be true if the trial court meted out to Arnel a correct judgment of conviction. Here, however, it
convicted Arnel of the wrong crime, frustrated homicide, that carried a penalty in excess of 6 years. How can the
Court expect him to feel penitent over a crime, which as the Court now finds, he did not commit? He only
committed attempted homicide with its maximum penalty of 2 years and 4 months.
Ironically, if the Court denies Arnel the right to apply for probation under the reduced penalty, it would
be sending him straight behind bars. It would be robbing him of the chance to instead undergo reformation as a
penitent offender, defeating the very purpose of the probation law.
At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was right and imposed on Arnel the correct
penalty of two years and four months maximum, he would have had the right to apply for probation. No one
could say with certainty that he would have availed himself of the right had the RTC done right by him. The idea
may not even have crossed his mind precisely since the penalty he got was not probationable.
The question in this case is ultimately one of fairness. Is it fair to deny Arnel the right to apply for
probation when the new penalty that the Court imposes on him is, unlike the one erroneously imposed by the
trial court, subject to probation?
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition, MODIFIES the Decision dated July 31,
2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 29639, FINDS petitioner Arnel Colinares GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of attempted homicide, and SENTENCES him to suffer an indeterminate penalty from four months
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum, and to pay Rufino
P. Buena the amount of P20,000.00 as moral damages, without prejudice to petitioner applying for probation
within 15 days from notice that the record of the case has been remanded for execution to the Regional Trial Court
of San Jose, Camarines Sur, in Criminal Case T-2213. HSEcTC SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 108747. April 6, 1995.]
PABLO C. FRANCISCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE HONORABLE MAXIMO C. CONTRERAS.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; PROBATION; A MERE PRIVILEGE AND GRANTING THEREOF RESTS SOLELY UPON THE
DISCRETION OF THE COURT. — Probation is a mere privilege, not a right. Its benefits cannot extend to those not expressly
included. Probation is not a right of an accused, but rather an act of grace and clemency or immunity conferred by the state which
may be granted by the court to a seemingly deserving defendant who thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by
law for the offense of which he stands convicted. It is a special prerogative granted by law to a person or group of persons not
enjoyed by others or by all. Accordingly, the grant of probation rests solely upon the discretion of the court which is to be exercised
primarily for the benefit of organized society, and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused. The probation law should not
therefore be permitted to divest the state or its government of any of the latter's prerogatives, rights or remedies, unless the
intention of the legislature to this end is clearly expressed, and no person should benefit from the terms of the law who is not
clearly within them.
 2. ID.; ID.; NOT AVAILABLE WHERE DEFENDANT HAS PERFECTED AN APPEAL; APPEAL TO REDUCE PENALTY,
IMMATERIAL. — Neither Sec. 4 of the Probation Law, as amended, which clearly mandates that "no application for probation
shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction," nor Llamado v.Court of
Appeals which interprets the quoted provision, offers any ambiguity or qualification. As such, the application of the law should not
be subjected to any to suit the case of petitioner. While the proposition that an appeal should not bar the accused from applying for
probation if the appeal is solely to reduce the penalty to within the probationable limit may be equitable, we are not yet prepared to
accept this interpretation under existing law and jurisprudence.
3. ID.; ID.; ACCUSED SENTENCED TO MORE THAN SIX (6) YEARS OF IMPRISONMENT, DISQUALIFIED; REASON.
— Fixing the cut-off point at a maximum term of six (6) years imprisonment for probation is based on the assumption that those
sentenced to higher penalties pose too great a risk to society, not just because of their demonstrated capability for serious
wrongdoing but because of the gravity and serious consequences of the offense they might further commit. The Probation Law, as
amended, disqualifies only those who have been convicted of grave felonies as defined in Art. 9 in relation to Art. 25 of The
Revised Penal Code, and not necessarily those who have been convicted of multiple offenses in a single proceeding who are
deemed to be less perverse. Hence, the basis of the disqualification is principally the gravity of the offense committed and the
concomitant degree of penalty imposed. Those sentenced to a maximum term not exceeding six (6) years are not generally
considered callous, hard core criminals, and thus may avail of probation.
4. ID.; ID.; FILING OF APPLICATION AFTER RECEIPT OF DECISION AND AFTER WARRANT OF ARREST WAS
ISSUED; CASE AT BENCH. — The application for probation was filed way beyond the period allowed by law. This is vital and
crucial. From the records it is clear that the application for probation was filed "only after a warrant for the arrest of petitioner had
been issued . . . (and) almost two months after (his) receipt of the Decision" of the RTC. This is a significant fact which militates
against the instant petition. Our minds cannot simply rest easy on the proposition that an application for probation may yet be
granted even if it was filed only after judgment has become final, the conviction already set for execution and a warrant of arrest
issued for service of sentence. The argument that petitioner had to await the remand of the case to the MeTC, which necessarily
must be after the decision of the RTC had become final, for him to file the application for probation with the trial court, is to stretch
the law beyond comprehension. The law, simply, does not allow probation after an appeal has been perfected. Accordingly,
considering that prevailing jurisprudence treats appeal and probation as mutually exclusive remedies, and petitioner appealed
from his conviction by the MeTC although the imposed penalties were already probationable, and in his appeal, he asserted only
his innocence and did not even raise the issue of the propriety of the penalties imposed on him, and finally, he filed an application
for probation outside the period for perfecting an appeal granting he was otherwise eligible for probation, the instant petition for
review should be as it is hereby DENIED.
5. ID.; PENALTIES; MULTIPLE PRISON TERMS IN ONE DECISION SHOULD NOT BE ADDED; SEPARATE
PENALTIES IMPOSED, BASIS OF PROBATION; CASE AT BENCH. — At the outset, the penalties imposed by the MeTC were
already probationable. Hence, there was no need to appeal if only to reduce the penalties to within the probationable period.
Multiple prison terms imposed against an accused found guilty of several offenses in one decision are not, and should not be,
added up. And, the sum of the multiple prison terms imposed against an applicant should not be determinative of his eligibility
for, nay his disqualification from, probation. The multiple prison terms are distinct from each other, and if none of the terms
exceeds the limit set out in the Probation Law, i.e., not more than six (6) years, then he is entitled to probation, unless he is
otherwise specifically disqualified. The number of offenses is immaterial as long as all the penalties imposed, taken separately, are
within the probationable period. For, Sec. 9, par. (a), P.D. 968, as amended, uses the word maximum, not total, when it says that
"[t]he benefits of this Decree shall not be extended to those . . . sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than
six years." Evidently, the law does not intend to sum up the penalties imposed but to take each penalty separately and distinctly
with the others. Consequently, even if petitioner was supposed to have served his prison term of one (1) year and one (1) day to
one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional sixteen (16) times as he was sentenced to serve the prison term for "each
crime committed on each date of each case, as alleged in the information(s)," and in each of the four (4) informations, he was
charged with having defamed the four (4) private complainants on four (4) different, separate days, he was still eligible for
probation, as each prison term imposed on petitioner was probationable.
6. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; WHERE THE LAW DOES NOT DISTINGUISH, THE COURTS SHOULD NOT
DISTINGUISH; PROVISION ON PROBATION LAW DISQUALIFYING ACCUSED WHO HAS PERFECTED APPEAL, CLEAR
AND UNAMBIGUOUS; CASE AT BENCH. — That an appeal should not bar the accused from applying for probation if the appeal
is taken solely to reduce the penalty is simply contrary to the clear and express mandate of Sec. 4 of the Probation Law, as
amended, which opens with a negative clause, "no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has
perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction." And where the law does not distinguish; the courts should not distinguish;
where the law does not make exception the court should not except.
7. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; MOTION TO QUASH; FAILURE TO MOVE TO QUASH OTHER
INFORMATIONS, DEEMED A WAIVER THEREOF. — Perhaps it should be mentioned that at the outset, petitioner, in accordance
with Sec. 3, par. (e), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, should have moved to quash as each of the four (4) Informations filed against
him charged four (4) separate crimes of grave oral defamation, committed on four (4) separate days. His failure to do so however
may now be deemed a waiver under Sec. 8 of the same Rule and he can be validly convicted, as in the instant case, of as many
crimes charged in the Information.
MENDOZA, J., dissenting opinion:
1. CRIMINAL LAW; PROBATION; MAY BE AVAILED OF WHERE ACCUSED APPEALED HIS CASE AND SENTENCE
REDUCED TO IMPRISONMENT OF NOT MORE THAN SIX (6) YEARS. — Nothing in PD 1990 to suggest that in limiting the
accused to the choice of either appealing from the decision of the trial court or applying for probation, the purpose is to deny him
the right to probation in cases like the one at bar where he becomes eligible for probation only because on appeal his sentence is
reduced. The purpose of the amendment, it bears repeating, is simply to prevent speculation or opportunism on the part of an
accused who, although eligible for probation, does not at once apply for probation, doing so only after failing in his appeal.
 2. ID.; ID.; SHOULD NOT BE REGARDED PRIMARILY AS A PRIVILEGE BUT SHOULD BE APPLIED IN FAVOR OF
THE ACCUSED TO HELP HIM DEVELOP INTO A LAW-ABIDING AND SELF-RESPECTING INDIVIDUAL. — To regard
probation, however, as a mere privilege, to be given to the accused only where it clearly appears he comes within its letter is to
disregard the teaching in many cases that the Probation Law should be applied in favor of the accused not because it is a criminal
law — it is not — but to achieve its beneficent purpose. (Santos To v. Paño, 120 SCRA 8, 14 [1983]). The niggardly application of the
law would defeat its purpose to "help the probationer develop into a law-abiding and self-respecting individual" (Baclayon v. Mutia,
129 SCRA 148, 149 [1984], per Teehankee, J.) or "afford [him] a chance to reform and rehabilitate himself without the stigma of a
prison record, to save government funds that may otherwise be spent for his food and maintenance while incarcerated, and to
decongest the jails of the country." (Del Rosario v. Rosero, 126 SCRA 228, 232 (1983), per Makasiar, J.)
3. ID.; ID.; ACCUSED TO BE QUALIFIED MUST NOT HAVE PERFECTED AN APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF
CONVICTION; EXCEPTION; CASE AT BAR. — It is argued that there is a difference because an accused who pleads "not guilty"
in the beginning, later acknowledges his guilt and shows contrition after he is found guilty. So does an accused who appeals a
sentence because under it he is not qualified for probation, but after the penalty is reduced, instead of appealing further, accepts
the new sentence and applies for probation. This case is thus distinguishable from Llamado v. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 566 (1989),
in which it was held that because the petitioner had appealed his sentence, he could not subsequently apply for probation. For,
unlike petitioner in the case at bar, the accused in that case could have applied for probation as his original sentence of one year
of prision correccional did not disqualify him for probation. That case fell squarely within the ambit of the prohibition in Sec. 4 that
one who applies for probation must not "have perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction."
4. ID.; ID.; PENALTIES IMPOSED ON ACCUSED SHOULD BE TAKEN IN THEIR TOTALITY IN APPLYING FOR
PROBATION. — It is contended that petitioner did not have to appeal because under the original sentence meted out to him he
was not disqualified for probation. The issue here is whether the multiple prison terms imposed on petitioner are to be considered
singly or in their totality for the purpose of Sec. 9(a) which disqualifies from probation those "sentenced to serve a maximum term
of imprisonment of more than six years." I submit that they should be taken in their totality. As the sentence originally imposed on
petitioner was for "one (1) year and one (1) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional in each crime committed
on each date of each case" and as there are four offenses of grave oral defamation against petitioner in each of the four cases, the
total prison term which he would have to serve was 26 years and 8 months. This is clearly beyond the probationable maximum
allowed by law. It is said, however, that even if the totality of the prison terms is the test, the modified sentence imposed by the
RTC would not qualify the petitioner for probation because he has to suffer imprisonment of eight months sixteen times. That is
not so. The RTC only "sentence[d] the said accused in each case to a STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS imprisonment."
This means eight (8) months times four (4), since there are four cases, or 32 months or 2 years and 8 months. That the duration of a
convict's sentence is determined by considering the totality of several penalties for different offenses committed is also implicit in
the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on the accumulation of penalties.
5. ID.; ID.; APPLICATION SHALL BE FILED WITH THE TRIAL COURT; ACCUSED HAS TO AWAIT THE REMAND
OF CASE TO THE TRIAL COURT AFTER SENTENCE IS MODIFIED TO APPLY FOR PROBATION. — It is said that there is a
more fundamental reason for denying probation in this case and that is that petitioner applied for probation only after his case had
been remanded to the MeTC for the execution of its decision as modified. But that is because Sec. 4 provides that "an application for
probation shall be filed with the trial court." In the circumstances of this case, petitioner had to await the remand of the case to the
MeTC, which necessarily must be after the decision of the RTC had become final.
6. ID.; PENALTIES; TOTALITIES THEREOF TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION IN APPLYING FOR PROBATION. — In
the case at bar, it can not be said that in appealing the decision of the MeTC petitioner was principally motivated by a desire to be
acquitted. While acquittal might have been an alluring prospect for him, what is clear is that he had a reason for appealing because
under the sentence given to him he was disqualified to apply for probation. The MeTC had originally sentenced him to 1 year and
1 day to 1 year and 8 months of prision correccional for "each crime committed on each date of each case, as alleged in the
information[s]." This meant, as the majority opinion points out, that petitioner had to suffer the prison term of 1 year and 1 day to 1
year and 8 months sixteen times, since he was found guilty of four crimes of grave oral defamation in each of four cases. The totality
of the penalties imposed on petitioner (26 years and 8 months) thus exceeded the limit of six (6) years of imprisonment allowed by
9(a) and disqualified him for probation. It was only after this penalty was reduced on appeal to a straight penalty of eight months
imprisonment in each case or to a total term of 2 years and 8 months in the four cases that petitioner became eligible for probation.
Then he did not appeal further although he could have done so.
VITUG, J., separate opinion:
1. CRIMINAL LAW; PROBATION; ACCUSED NOT ORIGINALLY QUALIFIED FOR PROBATION SHOULD NOT BE
DENIED THEREOF WHERE HIS APPEAL REDUCED HIS IMPRISONMENT WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED LIMIT. — An accused,
who originally is not qualified for probation because the penalty imposed on him by a court a quo exceeds six (6) years, should not
be denied that benefit of probation if on appeal the sentence is ultimately reduced to within the prescribed limit.
2. ID.; ID.; NUMBER OF PENALTIES IMPOSED ON ACCUSED CHARGED AND SENTENCED TO SERVE MULTIPLE
PRISON TERMS, TAKEN SEPARATELY IN DETERMINING QUALIFICATION FOR PROBATION. — In determining the
eligibility or disqualification of an applicant for probation charged with, and sentenced to serve multiple prison terms for, several
offenses, "the number of offenses is immaterial as long as all the penalties imposed, taken separately, are within the probationable
period." The use of the word maximum instead of the word total in Section 9, paragraph (a) of P.D. 968, as amended, should be
enough to reveal that such has been the legislative intent.
BELLOSILLO, J p:
Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to a penitent qualified offender. It essentially rejects
appeals and encourages an otherwise eligible convict to immediately admit his liability and save the state of time,
effort and expenses to jettison an appeal. The law expressly requires that an accused must not have appealed his
conviction before he can avail of probation. This outlaws the element of speculation on the part of the accused —
to wager on the result of his appeal — that when his conviction is finally affirmed on appeal, the moment of truth
well-nigh at hand, and the service of his sentence inevitable, he now applies for probation as an "escape hatch"
thus rendering nugatory the appellate court's affirmance of his conviction. Consequently, probation should be
availed of at the first opportunity by convicts who are willing to be reformed and rehabilitated, who manifest
spontaneity, contrition and remorse.
As conceptualized, is petitioner entitled to probation within the purview of P.D. 968, as amended by P.D.
1257 and P.D. 1990?
Petitioner's woes started when as President and General Manager of ASPAC Trans. Company he failed to
control his outburst and blurted —
You employees in this office are all tanga, son of a bitches (sic), bullshit. Puro kayo walang
utak . . . . Mga anak ng puta . . . . Magkano ba kayo . . . God damn you all.
Thus for humiliating his employees he was accused of multiple grave oral defamation in five (5) separate
Informations instituted by five (5) of his employees, each Information charging him with gravely maligning them
on four different days, i.e., from 9 to 12 April 1980.
On 2 January 1990, after nearly ten (10) years, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Br. 61, found
petitioner guilty of grave oral defamation in four (4) of the five (5) cases filed against him, i.e., Crim. Cases Nos.
105206, 105207, 105209 and 105210, sentenced him to a prison term of one (1) year and one (1) day to one (1) year
and eight (8) months of prision correccional "in each crime committed on each date of each case as alleged in the
information(s)," ordered him to indemnify each of the offended parties, Victoria Gatchalian, Rowena Ruiz, Linda
Marie Ayala Pigar and Marie Solis, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, plus costs
of suit. 2 He was however acquitted in Crim. Case No. 105208 for persistent failure of the offended party, Edgar
Colindres, to appear and testify.
Not satisfied with the Decision of the MeTC, and insisting on his innocence, petitioner elevated his case to
the Regional Trial Court. Cdpr
On 5 August 1991 the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Br. 59, affirmed his conviction but appreciated in
his favor a mitigating circumstance analogous to passion or obfuscation. Thus —
. . . (he) was angry and shouting when he uttered the defamatory words complained of . . .
he must have been angry and worried 'about some missing documents . . . as well as the letter of the
Department of Tourism advising ASPAC about its delinquent tax of P1.2 million . . .' the said
defamatory words must have been uttered in the heat of anger which is a mitigating circumstance
analogous to passion or obfuscation. 3
Accordingly, petitioner was sentenced "in each case to a STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS
imprisonment . . ." 4 After he failed to interpose an appeal therefrom the decision of the RTC became final. The
case was then set for execution of judgment by the MeTC which, as a consequence, issued a warrant of arrest. But
before he could be arrested petitioner filed an application for probation which the MeTC denied "in the light of
the ruling of the Supreme Court in Llamado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84850, 29 June 1989, 174 SCRA 566 . . ." 5
Forthwith he went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari which on 2 July 1992 dismissed his petition on the
following grounds —
Initially, the Court notes that the petitioner has failed to comply with the provisions of
Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 of September 4, 1991. Violation of the circular is sufficient cause
for dismissal of the petition. prcd
Secondly, the petitioner does not allege anywhere in the petition that he had asked the
respondent court to reconsider its above order; in fact, he had failed to give the court an
opportunity to correct itself if it had, in fact, committed any error on the matter. He is, however,
required to move for reconsideration of the questioned order before filing a petition forcertiorari (Sy
It v. Tiangco, 4 SCRA 436). This failure is fatal to his cause. It is a ground for dismissal of his petition
(Santos v. Vda. de Cerdenola, 5 SCRA 823; Acquiao v. Estenso, 14 SCRA 18;Del Pilar Transit, Inc. v.
Public Service Commission, 31 SCRA 372).
Thirdly, it is obvious that respondent court did not commit any capricious, arbitrary,
despotic or whimsical exercise of power in denying the petitioner's application for probation . . .
Fourthly, the petition for probation was filed by the petitioner out of time . . .
Fifthly, the Court notes that Section 4 of PD 968 allows the trial court to grant probation
after conviction, upon an application by the defendant within the period of appeal, upon terms and
conditions and period appropriate to each case, but expressly rules out probation where an appeal
has been taken . . . 6
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
In the present recourse, petitioner squirms out of each ground and seeks this Court's compassion in
dispensing with the minor technicalities which may militate against his petition as he now argues before us that
he has not yet lost his right to avail of probation notwithstanding his appeal from the MeTC to the RTC since
"[t]he reason for his appeal was precisely to enable him to avail himself of the benefits of the Probation
Law because the original Decision of the (Metropolitan) Trial Court was such that he would not then be entitled to
probation." 7 He contends that "he appealed from the judgment of the trial court precisely for the purpose of
reducing the penalties imposed upon him by the said court to enable him to qualify for probation." 8
The central issue therefore is whether petitioner is still qualified to avail of probation even after appealing
his conviction to the RTC which affirmed the MeTC except with regard to the duration of the penalties imposed.
Petitioner is no longer eligible for probation.
First. Probation is a mere privilege, not a right. 9 Its benefits cannot extend to those not expressly included.
Probation is not a right of an accused, but rather an act of grace and clemency or immunity conferred by the state
which may be granted by the court to a seemingly deserving defendant who thereby escapes the extreme rigors of
the penalty imposed by law for the offense of which he stands convicted. 10 It is a special prerogative granted by
law to a person or group of persons not enjoyed by others or by all. Accordingly, the grant of probation rests
solely upon the discretion of the court which is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society, and
only incidentally for the benefit of the accused. 11 TheProbation Law should not therefore be permitted to divest
the state or its government of any of the latter's prerogatives, rights or remedies, unless the intention of the
legislature to this end is clearly expressed, and no person should benefit from the terms of the law who is not
clearly within them. LexLib
Neither Sec. 4 of the Probation Law, as amended, which clearly mandates that "no application for
probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of
conviction," nor Llamado v. Court of Appeals 12 which interprets the quoted provision, offers any ambiguity or
qualification. As such, the application of the law should not be subjected to any to suit the case of petitioner.
While the proposition that an appeal should not bar the accused from applying for probation if the appeal is
solely to reduce the penalty to within the probationable limit may be equitable, we are not yet prepared to accept
this interpretation under existing law and jurisprudence. Accordingly, we quote Mr. Justice Feliciano speaking for
the Court en banc in Llamado v. Court of Appeals —
. . . we note at the outset that Probation Law is not a penal statute. We, however,
understand petitioner's argument to be really that any statutory language that appears to favor the
accused in a criminal case should be given a 'liberal interpretation.' Courts . . . have no authority to
invoke 'liberal interpretation' or 'the spirit of the law' where the words of the statute themselves,
and as illuminated by the history of that statute, leave no room for doubt or interpretation. We do
not believe that 'the spirit of the law' may legitimately be invoked to set at naught words which
have a clear and definite meaning imparted to them by our procedural law. The 'true legislative
intent' must obviously be given effect by judges and all others who are charged with the application
and implementation of a statute. It is absolutely essential to bear in mind, however, that the spirit of
the law and the intent that is to be given effect are derived from the words actually used by the law-
maker, and not from some external, mystical or metajuridical source independent of and
transcending the words of the legislature.
The Court is not here to be understood as giving a 'strict interpretation' rather than a
'liberal' one to Section 4 of the Probation Law of 1976 as amended by P.D. No. 1990. 'Strict' and
'liberal' are adjectives which too frequently impede a disciplined and principled search for the
meaning which the law-making authority projected when it promulgated the language which we
must apply. That meaning is clearly visible in the text of Section 4, as plain and unmistakable as the
nose on a man's face. The Court is simply reading Section 4 as it is in fact written. There is no need
for the involved process of construction that petitioner invites us to engage in, a process made
necessary only because petitioner rejects the conclusion or meaning which shines through the
words of the statute. The first duty of the judge is to take and apply a statute as he finds it, not as he
would like it to be. Otherwise, as this Court in Yangco v. Court of First Instance warned, confusion
and uncertainty will surely follow, making, we might add, stability and continuity in the law much
more difficult to achieve:
'. . . [w]here language is plain, subtle refinements which tinge words as to give
them the color of a particular judicial theory are not only unnecessary but decidedly
harmful. That which has caused so much confusion in the law, which has made is so
difficult for the public to understand and know what the law is with respect to a given
matter, is in considerable measure the unwarranted interference by judicial tribunals with
the English language as found in statutes and contracts, cutting the words here and
inserting them there, making them fit personal ideas of what the legislature ought to have
done or what parties should have agreed upon, giving them meanings which they do not
ordinarily have cutting, trimming, fitting, changing and coloring until lawyers themselves
are unable to advise their clients as to the meaning of a given statute or contract until it has
been submitted to some court for its interpretation and construction.'
 The point in this warning may be expected to become sharper as our people's grasp of
English is steadily attenuated. 13
Therefore, that an appeal should not bar the accused from applying for probation if the appeal is taken
solely to reduce the penalty is simply contrary to the clear and express mandate of Sec. 4 of the Probation Law, as
amended, which opens with a negative clause, "no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the
defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction." In Bersabal v. Salvador, 14 we said —
By its very language, the Rule is mandatory. Under the rule of statutory construction,
negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are
merely directory . . . the use of the term 'shall' further emphasizes its mandatory character and
means that it is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced.
And where the law does not distinguish the courts should not distinguish; where the law does not make
exception the court should not except.
Second. At the outset, the penalties imposed by the MeTC were already probationable. Hence, there was no need to
appeal if only to reduce the penalties to within the probationable period. Multiple prison terms imposed against an
accused found guilty of several offenses in one decision are not, and should not be, added up. And, the sum of the
multiple prison terms imposed against an applicant should not be determinative of his eligibility for, nay his
disqualification from, probation. The multiple prison terms are distinct from each other, and if none of the terms
exceeds the limit set out in the Probation Law, i.e., not more than six (6) years, then he is entitled to probation,
unless he is otherwise specifically disqualified. The number of offenses is immaterial as long as all the penalties
imposed, taken separately, are within the probationable period. For, Sec. 9, par. (a), P.D. 968, as amended, uses the
word maximum, not total, when it says that "[t]he benefits of this Decree shall not be extended to those . . .
sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years." Evidently, the law does not intend to
sum up the penalties imposed but to take each penalty, separately and distinctly with the others. Consequently,
even if petitioner was supposed to have served his prison term of one (1) year and one (1) day to one (1) year and
eight (8) months of prision correccional sixteen (16) times as he was sentenced to serve the prison term for "each
crime committed on each date of each case, as alleged in the information(s)," and in each of the four (4)
informations, he was charged with having defamed the four (4) private complainants on four (4) different,
separate days, he was still eligible for probation, as each prison term imposed on petitioner was
probationable. LLphil

Fixing the cut-off point at a maximum term of six (6) years imprisonment for probation is based on the
assumption that those sentenced to higher penalties pose too great a risk to society, not just because of their
demonstrated capability for serious wrongdoing but because of the gravity and serious consequences of the
offense they might further commit. 15The Probation Law, as amended, disqualifies only those who have been
convicted of grave felonies as defined in Art. 9 in relation to Art. 25 of The Revised Penal Code, 16 and not
necessarily those who have been convicted of multiple offenses in a single proceeding who are deemed to be less
perverse. Hence, the basis of the disqualification is principally the gravity of the offense committed and the
concomitant degree of penalty imposed. Those sentenced to a maximum term not exceeding six (6) years are not
generally considered callous, hard core criminals, and thus may avail of probation.
To demonstrate the point, let us take for instance one who is convicted in a single decision of, say, thirteen
(13) counts of grave oral defamation (for having defamed thirteen [13] individuals in one outburst) and sentenced
to a total prison term of thirteen (13) years, and another who has been found guilty of mutilation and sentenced to
six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor minimum as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal minimum as maximum. Obviously, the latter offender is more perverse and is disqualified
from availing of probation.
Petitioner thus proceeds on an erroneous assumption that under the MeTC Decision he could not have
availed of the benefits of probation. Since he could have, although he did not, his appeal now precludes him from
applying for probation.
And, even if we go along with the premise of petitioner, however erroneous it may be, that the penalties
imposed against him should be summed up, still he would not have qualified under the Decision rendered by the
RTC since if the "STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS imprisonment" imposed by the RTC is
multiplied sixteen (16) times, the total imposable penalty, would be ten (10) years and eight (8) months, which is
still way beyond the limit of not more than six (6) years provided for in the Probation Law, as amended. To
illustrate: 8 months multiplied by 16 cases = 128 months; 128 months divided by 12 months (in a year) = 10 years
and 8 months, hence, following his argument, petitioner cannot still be eligible for probation as the total of his
penalties exceeds six (6) years.
The assertion that the Decision of the RTC should be multiplied only four (4) times since there are only
four (4) Informations thereby allowing petitioner to qualify for probation, instead of sixteen (16) times, is quite
difficult to understand. The penalties imposed by the MeTC cannot be any clearer — "one (1) year and one (1) day
to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional, in each crime committed on each date of each case, as alleged
in the information(s)." Hence, petitioner should suffer the imposed penalties sixteen (16) times. On the other hand,
the RTC affirmed the judgment of conviction and merely reduced the duration of each penalty imposed by the
MeTC "in each case to a STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS imprisonment" on account of a mitigating
circumstance for each case, count or incident of grave oral defamation. There is no valid reason therefore why the
penalties imposed by the RTC should be multiplied only four (4) times, and not sixteen (16) times, considering
that the RTC merely affirmed the MeTC as regards the culpability of petitioner in each of the sixteen (16) cases
and reducing only the duration of the penalties imposed therein. Thus —
Premises considered, the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court is AFFIRMED
with modification, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused Pablo C. Francisco GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt in each of the above entitled cases and appreciating in his favor the mitigating
circumstance which is analogous to passion or obfuscation, the Court hereby sentences the said
accused in each case to a straight penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS imprisonment, with the accessory
penalties prescribed by law; and to pay the costs. 17
Nowhere in the RTC Decision is it stated or even hinted at that the accused was acquitted or absolved in
any of the four (4) counts under each of the four (4) Informations, or that any part of the judgment of conviction
was reversed, or that any of the cases, counts or incidents was dismissed. Otherwise, we will have to account for
the twelve (12) other penalties imposed by the MeTC. Can we? What is clear is that the judgment of conviction
rendered by the MeTC was affirmed with the sole modification on the duration of the penalties. cdll
In fine, considering that the multiple prison terms should not be summed up but taken separately as the
totality of all the penalties is not the test, petitioner should have immediately filed an application for probation as
he was already qualified after being convicted by the MeTC, if indeed thereafter he felt humbled was ready to
unconditionally accept the verdict of the court and admit his liability. Consequently, in appealing the Decision of
the MeTC to the RTC, petitioner lost his right to probation. For, plainly, the law considers appeal and probation
mutually exclusive remedies. 18
Third. Petitioner appealed to the RTC not to reduce or even correct the penalties imposed by the MeTC, but to assert
his innocence. Nothing more. The cold fact is that petitioner appealed his conviction to the RTC not for the sole
purpose of reducing his penalties to make him eligible for probation — since he was already qualified under the
MeTC Decision — but rather to insist on his innocence. The appeal record is wanting of any other purpose. Thus,
in his Memorandum before the RTC, he raised only three (3) statements of error purportedly committed by the
MeTC all aimed at his acquittal: (a) in finding that the guilt of the accused has been established because of his
positive identification by the witness for the prosecution; (b) in giving full faith and credence to the bare
statements of the private complainants despite the absence of corroborating testimonies; and, (c) in not acquitting
him in all the cases, 19 Consequently, petitioner insisted that the trial court committed an error in relying on his
positive identification considering that private complainants could not have missed identifying him who was
their President and General Manager with whom they worked for a good number of years. Petitioner further
argued that although the alleged defamatory words were uttered in the presence of other persons, mostly private
complainants' co-employees and clients, not one of them was presented as a witness. Hence, according to
petitioner, the trial court could not have convicted him on the basis of the uncorroborative testimony of private
complainants. 20
Certainly, the protestations of petitioner connote profession of guiltlessness, if not complete innocence,
and do not simply put in issue the propriety of the penalties imposed. For sure, the accused never manifested that he
was appealing only for the purpose of correcting a wrong penalty — to reduce it to within the probationable range. Hence,
upon interposing an appeal more so after asserting his innocence therein, petitioner should be precluded from
seeking probation. By perfecting his appeal, petitioner ipso facto relinquished his alternative remedy of availing of
the Probation Law the purpose of which is simply to prevent speculation or opportunism on the part of an
accused who although already eligible does not at once apply for probation, but doing so only after failing in his
appeal.
The fact that petitioner did not elevate the affirmance of his conviction by the RTC to the Court of
Appeals does not necessarily mean that his appeal to the RTC was solely to reduce his penalties. Conversely, he
was afraid that the Court of Appeals would increase his penalties, which could be worse for him. Besides, the
RTC Decision had already become final and executory because of the negligence, according to him, of his former
counsel who failed to seek possible remedies within the period allowed by law.
Perhaps it should be mentioned that at the outset petitioner, in accordance with Sec 3, par. (e), Rule 117 of
the Rules of Court, 21 should have moved to quash as each of the four (4) Informations filed against him charged
four (4) separate crimes of grave oral defamation, committed on four (4) separate days. His failure to do so
however may now be deemed a waiver under Sec. 8 of the same Rule 22 and he can be validly convicted, as in the
instant case, of as many crimes charged in the Information. cdrep
Fourth. The application for probation was filed way beyond the period allowed by law. This is vital and crucial.
From the records it is clear that the application for probation was filed "only after a warrant for the arrest of
 petitioner had been issued . . . (and) almost two months after (his) receipt of the Decision" 23 of the RTC. This is a
significant fact which militates against the instant petition. We quote with affirmance the well-written, albeit
assailed, ponencia of now Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals Nathanael P. De Pano, Jr., on the specific issue
—
. . . the petition for probation was filed by the petitioner out of time. The law in point,
Section 4 of P.D. 968, as amended, provides thus:
'SECTION 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial
court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by
said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal . . . place the defendant on
probation . . .'
Going to the extreme, and assuming that an application for probation from one who had
appealed the trial court's judgment is allowed by law, the petitioner's plea for probation was filed
out of time. In the petition is a clear statement that the petitioner was up for execution of
judgment before he filed his application for probation. P.D. No. 968 says that the application for
probation must be filed "within the period for perfecting an appeal;" but in this case, such period for
appeal had passed, meaning to say that the Regional Trial Court's decision had attained finality,
and no appeal therefrom was possible under the law. Even granting that an appeal from
the appellate court's judgment is contemplated by P.D. 968, in addition to the judgment rendered by
the trial court, that appellate judgment had become final and was, in fact, up for actual execution
before the application for probation was attempted by the petitioner. The petitioner did not file his
application for probation before the finality of the said judgment; therefore, the petitioner's attempt
at probation was filed too late.
Our minds cannot simply rest easy on the proposition that an application for probation may yet be
granted even if it was filed only after judgment has become final, the conviction already set for execution and a
warrant of arrest issued for service of sentence.
The argument that petitioner had to await the remand of the case to the MeTC, which necessarily must be
after the decision of the RTC had become final, for him to file the application for probation with the trial court, is
to stretch the law beyond comprehension. The law, simply, does not allow probation after an appeal has been
perfected.
Accordingly, considering that prevailing jurisprudence treats appeal and probation as mutually exclusive
remedies, and petitioner appealed from his conviction by the MeTC although the imposed penalties were already
probationable and in his appeal, he asserted only his innocence and did not even raise the issue of the propriety of
the penalties imposed on him, and finally, he filed an application for probation outside the period for perfecting
an appeal granting he was otherwise eligible for probation, the instant petition for review should be as it is hereby
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 152044. July 3, 2003.]
DOMINGO LAGROSA and OSIAS BAGUIN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF
APPEALS
SYNOPSIS
Record showed that petitioners were found guilty of violation of the Revised Forestry Code. Petitioners appealed to the
CA which affirmed their conviction, but reduced the penalty imposed. Subsequently, petitioners applied for probation with the
trial court, but was denied. The CA affirmed the trial court's denial of their application for probation because PD 968expressly
prohibits the grant of probation to those who have appealed their convictions.
On appeal, petitioners asked not to apply the letter of the law because they appealed for the purpose of reducing an
incorrect penalty.
In denying their petition, the Supreme Court held that petitioners were clearly precluded from the benefits of probation
because they have appealed from the judgment of the trial court and have applied for probation only after the CA had affirmed
their conviction. The fact that they put the merits of their conviction in issue on appeal belied their claim that they simply assailed
the propriety of the penalties imposed.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; P.D. NO. 968 (PROBATION LAW); GRANT OF PROBATION IS PROHIBITED TO AN ACCUSED
WHO HAS APPEALED HIS CONVICTION; CASE AT BAR. — The law that is at the heart of this controversy is Presidential
Decree No. 968, also known as the Probation Law. . . Under Section 9 (a) of the Probation Law, offenders who are sentenced to
serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years are disqualified from seeking probation. It should also be noted
that P.D. 968 expressly prohibits the grant of probation to those who have appealed their convictions. In this case, there is no
question that petitioners appealed from the decision of the trial court. This fact alone merits the denial of petitioners' Application
for Probation. Having appealed from the judgment of the trial court and having applied for probation only after the Court of
Appeals had affirmed their conviction, petitioners were clearly precluded from the benefits of probation. TEcCHD
 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACCUSED NOT BARRED FROM APPLYING FOR PROBATION IF APPEAL WAS SOLELY RAISED TO
REDUCE THE PENALTY TO WITHIN THE PROBATIONABLE LIMIT; CASE AT BAR. — The fact that petitioners put the merits
of their conviction in issue on appeal belies their claim that their appeal was prompted by what was admittedly an incorrect
penalty. Certainly, the protestations of petitioners connote a profession of guiltlessness, if not complete innocence, and do not
simply assail the propriety of the penalties imposed. For sure, petitioners never manifested that they were appealing only for the
purpose of correcting a wrong penalty — to reduce it to within probationable range. Hence, upon interposing an appeal, more so
after asserting their innocence therein, petitioners should be precluded from seeking probation. By perfecting their appeal,
petitioners ipso facto relinquished the alternative remedy of availing of the Probation Law, the purpose of which is simply to
prevent speculation or opportunism on the part of an accused who, although already eligible, does not at once apply for probation,
but did so only after failing in his appeal.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 67308, 1 which affirmed
the Resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City, Branch 2, denying petitioners' Application for
Probation, and its Order denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. 2
The undisputed facts are as follows.
On October 29, 1996, the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City, Branch 2, rendered a decision in Criminal
Case No. 8243, 3 finding petitioners Domingo Lagrosa and Osias Baguin guilty of violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705,
as amended (The Revised Forestry Code), for having in their possession forest products without the requisite permits.
The trial court sentenced them to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum.
Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the decision 4 was denied by the trial court on November 21, 1996. 5
Petitioners appealed their conviction to the Court of Appeals, where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No.
20632. 6 On March 14, 2000, the appellate court affirmed the conviction of the petitioners, with the modification as to
the penalty imposed, which was reduced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional, as minimum, to one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty one (21) days of prision correccional, as
maximum. 7 The decision became final and executory on April 12, 2000.
On August 29, 2001, petitioners filed an Application for Probation with the trial court, 8 which, as mentioned
at the outset, was denied. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the trial court. Hence,
petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 67308. 9 On
January 11, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision affirming the questioned resolutions of the trial
court.
Hence this petition, raising the following arguments:
1) That Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended by PD No. 1990, is very absurd and
illogical considering that petitioners were not given the opportunity to apply for probation
when they were convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, Branch 2, because the
penalty imposed by said court is more than six (6) years and therefore non-probationable.
That the first opportunity for herein petitioners to apply for probation was when the Court of
Appeals modified the sentence imposed by the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, Branch 2, from two
(2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years
of prision mayor, as maximum, to six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year, eight (8) months
and twenty one (21) days as maximum which is clearly probationable.
2) That the ruling of this Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Pablo Francisco versus Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 108747, is not applicable to the instant case because in the
said Francisco case the accused therein can apply for probation because the penalty imposed
by the lower court was already probationable but the accused instead appealed the decision
but in the case of herein petitioners they cannot apply for probation when they were
convicted because the penalty imposed by the lower court was more than six (6) years and
therefore non-probationable.
3) That the decision of the Court of Appeals herein sought to be reviewed is clearly contrary to the
purpose of the Probation Law. 10
The law that is at the heart of this controversy is Presidential Decree No. 968, also known as the Probation
Law, as amended by P.D. 1990, the pertinent provision of which reads:
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may,
after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant
within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the
defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem
best; Provided, That no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has
perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction. (italics ours)
 Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine
only. An application for probation shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of the application
shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.
Under Section 9 (a) of the Probation Law, offenders who are sentenced to serve a maximum term of
imprisonment of more than six years are disqualified from seeking probation.
It should be noted that before P.D. 968 was amended by P.D. 1990, the accused was allowed to apply for
probation even after he had already filed an appeal, as long as he had not yet begun to serve his sentence. 11
Petitioners contend that they should be allowed to apply for probation even if they had already appealed the
decision of the trial court. They argue that their case should be considered an exception to the general rule which
excludes an accused who has appealed his conviction from the benefits of probation. In the case at bar, the trial court
sentenced petitioners to a maximum term of eight years, which was beyond the coverage of the Probation Law. They
only became eligible for probation after the Court of Appeals modified the judgment of the trial court and reduced the
maximum term of the penalty imposed on them to one year, eight months and twenty-one days. 12 They submit that
the ruling in the case ofFrancisco v. CA 13 is not applicable because in that case, the accused appealed their conviction
notwithstanding the fact that the maximum term of the prison sentence imposed on them by the trial court was less
than six years. 14
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General reiterates the express provision of P.D. 968 prohibiting the
grant of probation to those who have appealed their convictions. 15 It argues that, even if the petitioners have
appealed for the purpose of reducing an incorrect penalty, this fact does not serve to remove them from the
prohibition in Section 4 of P.D. 968for the law makes no such distinction. 16
There is no question that petitioners appealed from the decision of the trial court. This fact alone merits the
denial of petitioners' Application for Probation. Having appealed from the judgment of the trial court and having
applied for probation only after the Court of Appeals had affirmed their conviction, petitioners were clearly
precluded from the benefits of probation. 17
However, petitioners now ask us not to apply the letter of the law, claiming that their situation should be
considered an exception to the rule. Their petition is without merit.
Petitioners repeatedly assert that their application for probation was made at the "first opportunity,"
undoubtedly invoking the fourth "whereas" clause of P.D. 1990, which reads:
WHEREAS, probation was not intended as an escape hatch and should not be used to
obstruct and delay the administration of justice, but should be availed of at the first opportunity by
offenders who are willing to be reformed and rehabilitated; . . . .
To bolster this assertion, petitioners claim that what prompted them to appeal the decision of the trial court
was the erroneous penalty imposed by the trial court. 18
Petitioners are not being very candid. In their appellant's brief filed in CA-G.R. CR No. 20632, they raised the
following assignment of errors:
I.
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING BOTH ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED
BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE AGAINST THEM LACKS MORAL CERTAINTY.
II.
IF EVER ACCUSED ARE GUILTY, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE PROPER PENALTY AS
PROVIDED BY LAW.
The fact that petitioners put the merits of their conviction in issue on appeal belies their claim that their
appeal was prompted by what was admittedly an incorrect penalty. Certainly, the protestations of petitioners connote
a profession of guiltlessness, if not complete innocence, and do not simply assail the propriety of the penalties
imposed. For sure, petitioners never manifested that they were appealing only for the purpose of correcting a wrong
penalty — to reduce it to within probationable range. Hence, upon interposing an appeal, more so after asserting their
innocence therein, petitioners should be precluded from seeking probation. By perfecting their appeal, petitioners ipso
facto relinquished the alternative remedy of availing of the Probation Law, the purpose of which is simply to prevent
speculation or opportunism on the part of an accused who, although already eligible, does not at once apply for
probation, but did so only after failing in his appeal. 19
Although it has been suggested that an appeal should not bar the accused from applying for probation if the
appeal is solely to reduce the penalty to within the probationable limit may be equitable, 20 we are not yet prepared to
accept this proposition, specially given the factual circumstances of this case. Had the petitioners' appeal from the
decision of the trial court raised the impropriety of the penalty imposed upon them as the sole issue, perhaps this
Court would have been more sympathetic to their plight. Unfortunately, their misrepresentation has led to their own
undoing.
 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
January 11, 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 67308, which affirmed the Resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City,
Branch 2, denying petitioners' Application for Probation, and its Order denying petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration, is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.