Ang Tibay, represented by Toribio Teadoro, manager, and National Workers’ 

Brotherhood, ​vs.​ The Court of Industrial Relations and National Labor Union, Inc. 
 
[No. 46496. February 27, 1940] 
 
DECISION 
 
Petitioner Toribio Teodoro, the owner of Ang Tibay, a shoe factory, laid off some employees 
who were members of the National Labor Union Inc. due to a shortage of leather soles. The 
National Labor Union, Inc., respondents, then filed a case against Ang Tibay with the Court of 
Industrial Relations, arguing that Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating 
against the National Labor Union. The Court of Industrial Relations ruled in favor of the 
National Labor Union. However, the Supreme Court subsequently reversed this ruling.​ In 
response to this, the Solicitor-General, in behalf of the respondent National Labor Union, filed a 
motion for reconsideration to the said ruling.  
 
The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays that the Court abandon its 
judgment and remand the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial, arguing the 
following: 
 
1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim on September 26, 1938, that there is a shortage of leather soles 
in Ang Tibay making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the 
National Labor Union Inc., is entirely false and unsupported by the records of the Bureau 
of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather. 
 
2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was a scheme to 
prevent his bond from being forfeited despite the breach of his contract with the 
Philippine Army. 
 
3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated September 29, 1938, (re supposed 
delay of leather soles from the States) was also a scheme to prevent the his bond from 
being forfeited despite the breach of his contract with the Philippine Army. 
 
4. That the National Worker's Brotherhood of Ang Tibay is a company or employer-union 
dominated by Toribio Teodoro, its existence being illegal. (281 U.S., 548, petitioner's 
printed memorandum, p. 25.) 
 
5. That in the exercise of the laborers' rights to collective bargaining, majority rule and elective 
representation are highly essential.1 (Sections 2 and 5, Commonwealth Act No. 213.) 
 
6. That the dated provisions of the Civil Code, considering that it had been the principal source 
of dissensions and continuous civil war in Spain, cannot apply in interpreting the 

1
Commonwealth Act. No. 213 §§ 2 &5.
 practical provisions of modern labor legislation of American origin where the industrial 
peace has always been the rule. 
 
7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating 
against the National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National Workers' 
Brotherhood. 
 
8. That the said documents to be used as proof are so inaccessible to the National Labor Union, 
that the Labor Union, even with the exercise of due diligence, could not be expected offer 
such as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations. 
 
9. That the attached documents and exhibits are so essential that admitting these would result to 
the modification and possible reversal of the judgment rendered herein. 
 
Petitioner Ang Tibay has opposed this motion for reconsideration for a new trial filed by the 
National Labor Union. Ruling for Ang Tibay, this Court holds that it is not necessary to grant the 
said motion of the Solicitor-General on behalf of the National Labor Union. ​Based on the 
re-examination of the record on the proceedings by the Court of Industrial Relations, this Court 
has found no substantial evidence that the exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to their 
union affiliation.​ The transcript taken merely contains what transpired during the hearing and is 
more of a record of contradictory and conflicting statements of the opposing counsel, with a 
conclusion drawn to suit their views. It is then clear that these statements have no evidentiary 
value.  
 
As such, the Court shall dismiss the motion for a new trial of the respondent labor union. ​Before 
doing this, however, it is necessary, in setting a precedent for procedural due process, to make 
observations on the nature of the powers of the Court of Industrial Relations and emphasize 
certain guiding principles which should be observed in the succeeding administrative cases.  
 
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are stated in the 
Commonwealth Act No. 103. It is more administrative than judicial in nature. The Court of 
Industrial Relations is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a 
court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only upon its jurisdiction and deciding only 
cases that are presented to it, the function of the Court of Industrial Relations, based on organic 
law, is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial 
functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees, but its functions 
are far more comprehensive: 
 
1. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines​, to investigate and settle any question of fact 
arising from any dispute between employers and employees, and regulate the relations 
between them.2  
 

2
Id​. § 1.
 2. It shall settle any industrial or agricultural dispute which may cause a strike or lockout, 
arising from differences on wages, hours of labor, or conditions of employment, provided 
that:  
a. There are more than thirty employees involved. 
b. Any party to the controversy shall submit such dispute to the Court by the 
Secretary of Labor. 
c. The Secretary of Labor certifies that the dispute is proper for the Court of 
Industrial Relations and is for the sake of Public Interest.3  
 
3. It shall, before hearing the dispute and during the hearing, make efforts for the parties to 
settle the dispute by amicable agreement.4  
 
4. When directed by the President of the Philippines, it shall investigate all industries in a 
designated locality to determine if it is necessary to fix the minimum wage or maximum 
rental to be paid by the tenants.5 
 
In conclusion, the Court of Industrial Relations may appeal to voluntary arbitration in settlement 
of industrial disputes and organize a more effective system of investigation and arbitration to 
determine the controversies in the labor and agricultural industries. Thus, there is a mingling of 
executive and judicial functions, which is a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of 
governmental powers. 
 
In the case of ​Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al.​ , G.R. No. 46673, decided on 
September 13, 1939, we held that technical rules of procedure do not constrain the Court of 
Industrial Relations.6 The Commonwealth Act No. 103 requires it to "act according to justice and 
equity and the substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and 
shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such 
manner as it may deem just and equitable."7 The Court of Industrial Relations shall not be 
restricted to the specific relief claimed, but may include any determination deemed necessary to 
settle labor disputes in its order.8 
 
In light of the Commonwealth Act No. 103, appeals to the Court of Industrial Relations must be 
done with respect to the rights of the interested parties to accomplish the legislative purpose of 
the law. Even if the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of 
certain procedural requirements, this does not mean that it can completely ignore the essential 
requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. 
 
These are the primary rights which must be respected administrative proceedings: 
 

3
Id.​ § 4.
4
​Id​. § 4 ៕ 2.
5
​Id.​ § 5.
6
​Goseco v. Court of Industrial Relations et al., 68 SCRA 450 (1939).
7
Commonwealth Act No. 103, § 20.
8
Id​. § 13.
 1. The parties have a right to a hearing.  
 
This right includes the right of the party interested in presenting his own case and in submitting 
evidence in support thereof. In the language of Chief Hughes, in ​Morgan v. U.S​.,​ "the 
liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of 
fair play.”9 
 
2. The tribunal ​must consider ​such evidence presented.10 
 
Edwards vs. McCoy​ has held that ​"the right to adduce evidence, without the 
corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is 
conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust 
it aside without notice or consideration."11 
 
3. The decision must have something to support it. 
 
"While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply 
a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it 
is a nullity, a place when directly attached."12 This principle emanates from the more 
fundamental principle that the genius of constitutional government is contrary to the 
vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power. 
 
4. The evidence must be substantial. 
 
Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion13, but the 
evidence must be "substantial".14 
 
    "Substantial  evidence  is  more  than  a  mere  scintilla.  It  means  such  relevant  evidence  as  a 
reasonable  mind  might  accept  as  adequate  to  support  a  conclusion."  (Appalachian  Electric 
Power  v.  National  Labor  Relations  Board,  4  Cir.,  93  F.  2d  985,  989;  National  Labor 
Relations  Board  v.  Thompson  Products,  6  Cir.,  97  F.  2d 13, 15; Ballston-Stillwater Knitting 
Co.  v.  National  Labor  Relations  Board,  2  Cir.,  98  F.  2d  758,  760.)  *  *  *  The  statute 
provides  that  ‘the  rules  of  evidence  prevailing  in  courts  of  law  and  equity  shall  not  be 
controlling.'  The  apparent  purpose  of  this  and  similar  provisions  is  to  free  administrative 
boards  from  the  compulsion  of  technical  rules  so  that  the  mere  admission  of  matter  which 
would be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative 
order.  (Interstate  Commerce  Commission  v.  Baird,  194  U.S.  25,  44,  24  S.  Ct.  563,  568,  48 
Law.  ed.  860;  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  v.  Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 227 U.S. 
88,  93  33  S.  Ct.  185,  187,  57  Law.  ed. 431; United States v. Abilene and Southern Ry. Co. S. 
Ct.  220,  225,  74  Law.  ed.  624.)  But  this  assurance  of  desirable  flexibility  in  administrative 
procedure  does  not  go  far  as  to  justify  orders  without  a  basis  in  evidence  having  rational 

9
Morgan v. U.S., 304 U.S. 1, 58 (1938).
10
​Id.
11
Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598 (1912).
12
Id.
13
City of Manila vs. Agustin, 65 SCRA 151 (1937).
14
Washington, Virginia and Maryland Coach Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 142, 147, (1937).
 probative  force.  Mere  uncorroborated  hearsay  or  rumor  does  not  constitute  substantial 
evidence.15  (Consolidated  Edison  Co.  v.  National  Labor  Relations  Board,  59  S.  Ct.  206,  83 
Law. ed. No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)"​  
 
5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least 
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.16  
 
Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can 
these parties be protected in their right to know the case against them. This rule should 
not, however, prevent the administrative tribunal from exercising their duty actively to 
see that the law is enforced and to use the legal methods to investigate the material facts. 
However, that their report is only advisory.17 
 
The Court of Industrial Relations may refer any matter under its consideration to a local board of 
inquiry, a provincial fiscal, a justice of the peace, or any public official for investigation, 
and may delegate such functions that the Court of Industrial Relations may deem 
necessary.18 
 
6. The administrative court must act on its or his independent consideration of the law 
and facts of the controversy, and not merely accept the views of a subordinate in 
arriving at a decision.  
 
7. The administrative court should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in 
such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues 
involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered.  
 
In light of these principles, the Court observes that the record does not have the factual basis for 
a conclusion of law, except for the alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National 
Worker's Brotherhood. Nevertheless, this does not prevent the grant for a new trial prayed for by 
respondent National Labor Union, Inc. 
 
Ang Tibay contends that the evidence necessary to prove their allegations are so inaccessible to 
the respondents that even with the exercise of due diligence, they could not be expected to obtain 
such information and offer them as proof to the Court of Industrial Relations. Such 
documentation is so essential that its admission would result in the modification and possible 
reversal of the judgment. 
 
Considering Ang Tibay's arguments, we have concluded, in the interest of justice, that the 
movant has the opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and 
other relevant evidence to the main issue involved 
The legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new.  

15
​Id.
16
Interstate Commerce Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88 (1913).
17
Commonwealth Act No. 103 § 9.
18
​Id​. § 10.
The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not by the fault of the parties adversely 
affected. Accordingly, the Court grants the motion for a new trial and orders this case to be 
remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, which shall proceed according to the cardinal 
primary rights in administrative proceedings. So ordered. 
  
WHEREFORE​, motion for new trial is granted and cause is remanded with instructions. 
 
Sofia Anazea A. David 
1C - 2022 
Legal Writing - Atty. Natividad 
 
This decision was originally written by Justice Laurel.