Romero vs. Tan PDF

8/5/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 424
108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Romero vs. Tan
*
G.R. No. 147570. February 27, 2004.
SPS. NUMERIANO and CARMELITA ROMERO,

petitioners, vs. MERCEDES L. TAN, FLORENTINA L.
GONZALES, CELSO L. LUNA, MARIO LUNA and
RAMON L. GARCIA, respondents.
Agrarian Relations; Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication

Board (PARAB); Jurisdiction; Words and Phrases; The
jurisdiction of the PARAB is limited to agrarian disputes or
controversies and other matters or incidents involving the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP) under R.A. No. 6657, R.A. No. 3844 and other agrarian
laws; An agrarian dispute is defined as any controversy relating to
tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or
otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture.—On the
jurisdictional issue, we find that it was reversible error for the
PARAB to have taken cognizance of petitioners’ complaint. The
jurisdiction of the PARAB in this case is limited to agrarian
disputes or controversies and other matters or incidents involving
the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) under Rep. Act No. 6657,Rep. Act No. 3844 and
other agrarian laws. An agrarian dispute is defined as any
controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold,
tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to
agriculture, including disputes concerning farm workers
associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions
of such tenurial arrangements.
Same; Same; Same; Fishponds; Statutes; Republic Act No.
7881; Although Section 166 (1) of R.A. No. 3844 had included
fishponds in its definition of agricultural land within its coverage,
this definition must be considered modified in the light of Section
2 of R.A. No. 7881, which amended Section 10 of R.A. 6657,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL); Clearly, by virtue of the amendments to the CARL, the
operation of fishpond is no longer considered an agricultural
activity, and a parcel of land devoted to fishpond operation is not
agricultural land as therein defined.—Although Section 166 (1) of
Rep. Act No. 3844 had included fishponds in its definition of
agricultural land within its coverage, this definition must be
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016c5fbfb40293cb0575003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/21
considered modified in the light of Sec. 2 of Rep. Act No. 7881,

which amended Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 6657, otherwise known
as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). Expressly,
the amendment has excluded private lands actually, directly and
exclusively used for prawn farms and fishponds from the coverage
of the CARL. In fact, under Section 3 (c) of R.A. No. 6657, as
amended, de-
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* SECOND DIVISION.
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Romero vs. Tan
fines an agricultural land as that which is devoted to agricultural

activity and not otherwise classified as mineral, forest,
residential, commercial or industrial land. In turn, Section 3 (b)
thereof defines agricultural activity as the cultivation of the soil,
planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, including the harvesting
of such farm products, and other farm activities, and practices
performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming
operations done by persons whether natural or juridical. Clearly,
by virtue of the amendments to the CARL, the operation of a
fishpond is no longer considered an agricultural activity, and a
parcel of land devoted to fishpond operation is not agricultural
land as therein defined.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory
Construction; There is now irreconcilable inconsistency or
repugnancy between R.A. No. 3844 and R.A. No. 6657 as regards
the treatment of fishponds and prawn farms—the provisions of
R.A. No. 6657 supersede the provisions of R.A. No. 3844 insofar as
fishponds and prawn farms are concerned.—Significantly,
although there is no express repeal of Rep. Act No. 3844 as a
whole, as in fact its provisions that are not inconsistent with Rep.
Act No. 6657, may still be given suppletory effect, nonetheless,
there is now irreconcilable inconsistency or repugnancy between
the two laws as regards the treatment of fishponds and prawn
farms. Such repugnancy leads us to conclude that the provisions
of Rep. Act No. 6657 (CARL) supersede the provisions of Rep. Act
No. 3844 insofar as fishponds and prawn farms are concerned. In
any event, Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 6657 (CARL), as amended,
provides that all other laws, decrees, issuances, or parts thereof
inconsistent thereto are repealed or amended accordingly.
Same; Agrarian Tenancy; Elements; Unless the requisite

elements of tenancy concur in order to create a tenancy
relationship between the parties, the Court cannot bring the matter
within the purview of tenancy under CARL—the absence of one
element makes an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator
thereof, or a planter thereon outside the scope of CARL.—
Consequently, we rule that there is no agrarian tenancy
relationship to speak of in this case at this time, since certain
requirements set by present law on the matter have not been met.
Among these are: (1) the subject matter should be agricultural
land; (2) the purpose should be agricultural production; and (3)
there should be personal cultivation done by the tenants
themselves. Unless the requisite elements of agrarian tenancy
concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the
parties, we cannot bring the matter within the purview of tenancy
under CARL. The absence of one element makes an occupant of a
parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a planter thereon outside
the scope of CARL. Nor can such occupant, cultivator or planter
be classified as a de jure agricultural tenant for purposes of
agrarian reform law. And unless a person has established his
status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure
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Romero vs. Tan
nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government

under existing agrarian reform laws.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; There is personal
cultivation if the tenant (lessee) cultivates the land himself or with
the aid of the immediate farm household, which refers to the
members of the family of the tenant (lessee) and other persons who
are dependent upon him for support and who usually help him in
the activities.—Here, we also find that petitioners failed to prove
their personal “cultivation” of the area in question. There is
personal cultivation if the tenant (lessee) cultivates the land
himself or with the aid of the immediate farm household, which
refers to the members of the family of the tenant (lessee) and
other persons who are dependent upon him for support and who
usually help him in the activities. Particularly fatal to petitioners’
cause is the joint venture agreement with Kenneth Bautista. This
agreement provides, among others, that Kenneth Bautista will
share in the operation and management of the fishpond; pay the
agreed rentals to the registered owner of the land; and that after
deducting all operational expenses, Kenneth Bautista and
petitioners shall have equal share in the net profits. Not only does
it reflect lack of personal cultivation by petitioners, but it also
shows the nature of their fishpond operation is that of a large

scale commercial venture.
Same; Same; Vested Rights; Section 2(b) of R.A. No. 7881
contains a proviso, precisely to protect vested rights of those who
have already been issued a Certificate of Land Ownership Award
(CLOA)—without such CLOA no vested rights could be claimed.—
Petitioners claim vested rights arising from the alleged existing
tenancy relations. But this cannot be done validly under the
present circumstances of this case. Section 2(b) of Rep. Act No.
7881 now contains a proviso, precisely to protect vested rights of
those who have already been issued a Certificate of Land
Ownership Award (CLOA). Without such CLOA no vested rights
could now be claimed by petitioners. In any event, petitioners
failed to substantiate their allegation that they have been in
possession of the fishpond as early as 1985. The records show that
the lease contract began on January 1, 1996, to end on December
31, 1999. Petitioners have not shown other pieces of evidence in
their favor that would show possession prior to this lease contract,
to prove their allegation of prior occupancy.
Courts; Judgments; Res Judicata; Elements.—Coming now to
the issue of res judicata, we find that the elements thereof have
been duly established in favor of respondents, to wit: (1) there is a
final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it has jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the judgment or order
is on the merits; (4) there is between the two cases identity of
parties, subject matter and causes of action. The compromise
agreement between the parties was duly approved by the MTC of
Malabon, Branch 55. Absent any evidence that mistake,
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Romero vs. Tan
fraud, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or falsity of

documents that vitiated the compromise agreement, the
agreement must be upheld.
Same; Same; Same; Attorneys; The fact alone that a party was
not assisted by counsel in entering into a compromise agreement
does not ipso facto result in a mistake under the law as to render
inutile the approval of the trial court, besides, it is presumed that a
person would take ordinary care of his concerns, such that said
party’s failure to obtain counsel at that time must be deemed with
full knowledge of the consequences thereof.—Petitioners claim that
counsel did not assist them at the time the court approved the
compromise agreement. However, this fact alone does not ipso
facto result in a mistake under the law as to render inutile the
approval of the trial court. In the absence of any evidence to
counter the presumption of regularity of the performance of

official duty, such presumption of regularity should be upheld.
Besides, it is presumed that a person would take ordinary care of
his concerns, such that petitioners’ failure to obtain counsel at
that time must be deemed with full knowledge of the
consequences thereof.
Same; Same; Same; Compromise Agreements; A judicial
compromise has the effect of res judicata and is immediately
executory and not appealable unless set aside.—Had petitioners
truly believed that the compromise agreement should have been
stricken down, the proper course to take would have been to file a
motion to set aside the agreement on grounds of nullity under
Article 2038 of the Civil Code. It is well-settled that a judicial
compromise has the effect of res judicata and is immediately
executory and not appealable unless set aside as abovestated.
Should the motion to set aside the compromise agreement be
denied, petitioners may then appeal the denial. Further, a
judgment based on a compromise agreement is a judgment on the
merits, wherein the parties have validly entered into stipulations
and the evidence was duly considered by the trial court that
approved the agreement.
Same; Same; Same; The ultimate test in ascertaining the
identity of causes of action in two suits is to look into whether or
not the same evidence fully supports and establishes both present
cause of action and the former cause of action—if in the
affirmative, the former judgment would be a bar.—It cannot be
denied also that in the actions filed by petitioners in the different
courts, as well as in the PARAB, there is identity of parties, of
subject matter and of causes of action. The ultimate test in
ascertaining the identity of causes of action in two suits is to look
into whether or not the same evidence fully supports and
establishes both the present cause of action and the former cause
of action. If in the affirmative, the former judgment would be a
bar. Petitioners in all instances sought to prove the existence of
tenancy relationship with respondents over a huge area de-
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Romero vs. Tan
voted to fishpond operations. They had to present the same

evidence in any case, and they did.
Actions; Certiorari; Appeals; A special civil action of certiorari
is an independent action, raising the question of jurisdiction where
the tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; The availability of the ordinary recourse of appeal

does not bar a party from making use of the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari where the ordinary appeal would not be a prompt and
adequate remedy, i.e., “[a] remedy which is equally beneficial,
speedy and sufficient, not merely a remedy which at some time in
the future will bring about a revival of the judgment of the lower
court complained of in the certiorari proceeding, but a remedy
which will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects
of that judgment and the acts of the inferior court or tribunal.”—
We rule that respondents correctly filed a special civil action of
certiorari with the Court of Appeals, as provided under Section 1,
Rule 65, observing the rules on hierarchy of courts. A special civil
action of certiorari is an independent action, raising the question
of jurisdiction where the tribunal, board, or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. As already discussed, the PARAB has no
power to act on the case as the subject matter of the action was
beyond the scope of its jurisdiction under the law. Petitioners
would want respondents to appeal the PARAB ruling to the
DARAB as a logical and proper remedy, rather than go on
certiorari before the CA. Appeal in this case, however, would have
been an inadequate remedy as precisely respondents were
questioning the very jurisdiction of the PARAB to take cognizance
of the case. The availability of the ordinary recourse of appeal
does not bar a party from making use of the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari where the ordinary appeal would not be a prompt and
adequate remedy, that is, “[a] remedy which is equally beneficial,
speedy and sufficient, not merely a remedy which at some time in
the future will bring about a revival of the judgment of the lower
court complained of in the certiorari proceeding, but a remedy
which will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious
effects of that judgment and the acts of the inferior court or
tribunal.”
Agrarian Reform; The rationale behind CARL and other
agrarian reform laws is to emancipate the small farmers and farm
workers from the bondage of tilling land they do not own—our
agrarian laws have been enacted to make the small farmers more
independent, self-reliant and responsible citizens and a source of
genuine strength in our democratic society.—The rationale behind
CARL, (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, Rep. Act No.
6657) and other agrarian reform laws is to emancipate the small
farmers and farm workers from the bondage of tilling land
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Romero vs. Tan
they do not own. They aim to put into their hands the cultivation
of economically viable family-sized farms. Earlier, the Land
Reform Code (Rep. Act No. 3844) defined economic family-sized
farm as an area of farm land that permits efficient use of labor
and capital resources of the farm family, and will produce an
income sufficient to provide a modest standard of living to meet a
farm family’s need for food, clothing, shelter and education with
possible allowance for payment of yearly installments on the land,
and reasonable reserves to absorb yearly fluctuations in income.
Subsequently, Rep. Act No. 6657 was enacted declaring that it is
the policy of the state to pursue a comprehensive agrarian reform
program to the end that there be a more equitable distribution
and ownership of land to provide small farmers and farm workers
with the opportunity to enhance their dignity and improve the
quality of their lives through greater productivity of agricultural
lands. Indeed, our agrarian laws have been enacted to make the
small farmers more independent, self-reliant and responsible
citizens and a source of genuine strength in our democratic
society.
Same; It would stretch one’s imagination to consider
petitioners as lowly farm workers when evidence shows in reality
they are businessmen engaged in aquaculture, operating a huge
fishpond with an area of 1,256,433 square meters—leasing this
huge area could be better appreciated as falling properly under
civil law lease rather than agrarian reform lease-tenancy.—In this
case, however, the records do not show that petitioners are small
farmers or farm workers deserving of the beneficence and
protection afforded by our agrarian laws. It would stretch one’s
imagination to consider petitioners as lowly farm workers when
evidence shows in reality they are businessmen engaged in
aquaculture, operating a huge fishpond with an area of one
million, two hundred fifty-six thousand and four hundred thirty-
three (1,256,433) square meters. Leasing this huge area could be
better appreciated as falling properly under civil law lease rather
than agrarian reform lease-tenancy. Moreover, in this case, there
is no showing that large fishpond operators belong to the class of
beneficiaries contemplated by legislators when they envisioned a
policy of emancipation of small farmers or farm workers from
bondage of the soil through agrarian reforms. In sum, we agree
that the appellate court did not err in excluding the fishpond
subject of the present controversy from the coverage of CARL, and
holding the PARAB’s decision dated May 9, 2000 void for lack of
jurisdiction.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Almadro & Lambino Law Firm for petitioners.
114

Romero vs. Tan
Efren Dela Cruz for respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
1
Petitioners assail the decision dated January 19, 2001, of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59110, which
reversed that of 2 the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board, Region III, dated May 9, 2000. The
Board found that a tenancy relationship existed between
petitioners and respondents, entitling petitioners to retain
possession of the fishpond in dispute. The appellate court
ruled against petitioners, declaring the PARAB’s decision
void for want of jurisdiction.
Subject of this controversy is a private fishpond with an
area of one million, two hundred fifty six thousand and four
hundred thirty three (1,256,433) square meters in
Barangay San Jose, Lubao, Pampanga. The records show
that under a contract to petitioners as lessees by
respondents as lessors, the fishpond was leased for
P1,200,000.00 yearly rental. This contract is evidenced by a
“Kasunduan Sa Pamuwisan,”spanning the period January
1, 1996 until December 31, 1999.3
Petitioners allege that they have been in peaceful
possession of the fishpond as tenant-lessee since 1985.
They presented cash vouchers and4 handwritten receipts
covering the period 1987 to 1997. In September 1999,
respondents gave verbal notice to terminate petitioners’
lease. According to petitioners, respondents wanted to
terminate the contract because a third party offered to pay
higher rent. However, despite petitioners’ counter-offer to
match the increase in the rent, respondents appeared bent
on removing petitioners from the premises.
For their part, respondents aver that there is no
relationship of lease-tenancy by petitioners to speak of.
They add that the existing contract between them and
petitioners is an ordinary lease, governed by the Civil Code.
Respondents further claim that petition-
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 41-49. Penned by Associate Justice Delilah Vidallon-

Magtolis, with Associate Justices Teodoro P. Regino, and Josefina
Guevara-Salonga concurring.
2 CA Rollo, pp. 84-92.
3Id., at p. 21-A.
4Id.,at p. 36.
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VOL. 424, FEBRUARY 27, 2004 115

Romero vs. Tan
ers failed to pay the agreed rental covering the period

January 1, 1997 to December 31, 1997. Accordingly,
respondents were constrained to file an ejectment case
against petitioners before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MTC) of Malabon, Branch 55, conformably 5
with the
provision on venue in the lease contract.
On July 21, 1997, the MTC issued a judgment based on
a compromise agreement wherein the parties agreed, inter
alia, that petitioners would vacate
6
the leased premises not
later than December 31, 1999.
Both parties admit that the aforestated compromise
agreement bore the imprimatur of the trial court. Equally
admitted is the fact that petitioners were not represented
by counsel when they entered into said compromise
agreement.
On November 10, 1999, petitioners filed a complaint for
maintenance of peaceful possession and issuance of
mandatory preliminary injunction with the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, Region III (PARAB).
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss it, alleging lack of
jurisdiction, improper venue and litis pendentia, and/or res
judicata. The PARAB in an order dated January 19, 2000
denied the motion to dismiss.
On January 7
6, 2000, Kenneth Bautista filed a motion for
intervention. He alleged that 8
he had entered into a one
year-joint venture agreement dated November 30, 1998, to
expire on December 30, 1999, with the petitioners to
augment their harvest and enhance their fishpond
technology. Intervenor claims that he has the right of
possession over the subject fishpond as respondents
(defendants in the PARAB complaint) executed a lease
contract extending 9from January 1, 2000 to December 31,
2003 in his favor. He claims that petitioners’ right as
lessees of the fishpond already lapsed with the expiration
of their contract on December 31, 1999.
On January 28, 2000, petitioners amended their
complaint to include intervenor Kenneth Bautista as one of
the defendants.
_______________
5Id.,at p. 22.
6Id.,at pp. 32-33.
7 Rollo, pp. 31-32.
8 CA Rollo, pp. 56-57.
9Id.,at pp. 88-89.
116

Romero vs. Tan
After the parties submitted their evidence and position

papers, the PARAB rendered judgment in favor of herein
petitioners. It found that petitioners have proved the
existence of all the elements necessary to establish a
tenancy relationship. Dated May 9, 2000, the judgment
reads:
“Wherefore, in view of the foregoing judgment is hereby rendered:
“1) Maintaining plaintiff-spouses Numeriano and Carmelita

Romero as tenants over the subject fishpond;
“2) Ordering the issuance of a Writ of Permanent Mandatory
Injunction restoring plaintiffs in their peaceful possession
of the fishpond in question and directing defendants and
intervenor to cease and desist from doing any act which
would deprive herein plaintiffs of their possession and
cultivation of the subject fishpond;
“3) Ordering plaintiffs herein to post bond in the amount of
1.2 million pesos in favor of intervenor herein to answer
for the damages which the latter might suffer if it should
be found later on that the former is not entitled to the
relief prayed for;
“4) Ordering the defendants and intervenor to respect the
peaceful possession and cultivation by the plaintiffs of the
subject fishpond;
“5) Declaring the lease contract 10
between intervenor and
defendants as null and void.”
In the meantime, while the complaint before the PARAB

was pending, herein petitioners on December 10, 1999, (21
days before the expiration of the lease contract and the
date to relinquish possession of the fishpond pursuant to
the compromise agreement), filed with the RTC of
Malabon, Branch 74, a petition for annulment11 of the MTC
judgment, order, and compromise agreement. Petitioners
raised issues concerning the tenancy relationship, lack of
assistance by counsel in arriving at the compromise
agreement, as well as lack of jurisdiction by the MTC
Malabon because the subject property is located in Lubao,
Pampanga. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss premised
on culpability of petitioners for forum shopping, including
lack of cause of action to file the petition. On March 7,
2001, the RTC dismissed the 12 petition for lack of cause of
action and failure to prosecute.
_______________
10Id.,at pp. 91-92.
11Id.,at pp. 58-65.

12 Rollo, p. 70.
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Romero vs. Tan
As it turned out, even before the RTC’s Order of dismissal

came out in their favor, respondents had already elevated
the controversy to the appellate court. To be precise, on
June 8, 2000, respondents filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari assailing the May 9, 2000 decision of
the PARAB. Finding in favor of respondents, the Court of
Appeals, in a decision dated January 19, 2001, set aside the
PARAB decision, decreeing thus:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is

hereby GRANTED and GIVEN DUE COURSE. The assailed
Order of January 19, 2000 and the questioned Decision dated May
9, 2000 are declared NULL and VOID for want of jurisdiction.
“Let the final and executory judgment of the MTC of Malabon
in Civil Case No. 1694-97
13
be executed immediately.
“SO ORDERED.”
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the said decision

was denied by the CA in a resolution dated March 19, 2001.
Heedless of this development, petitioners filed on April 4,
2001, a petition with the RTC of Malabon, Branch 170, for
certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of
preliminary injunction/restraining order. This petition
questioned the order of execution dated February 26, 2001
issued by the MTC of Malabon, Branch 55, which ordered
the execution
14
of its judgment based on the compromise
agreement.
Then on April 11, 2001 petitioners filed before this Court
an appeal via a petition praying for reversal of the
abovestated CA decision, which ruled that the PARAB had
no jurisdiction to hear and decide the complaint filed by
petitioners, and thus ordered the immediate execution of
MTC judgment.
Petitioners now assign the following as errors:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT

DECLARED THAT THE PROVINCIAL
ADJUDICATOR ERASMO SP. CRUZ HAS NO
JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER
OF THE CASE BASED ON THE CASE OF ATLAS
FERTILIZER CORP. VS. SECRETARY OF
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, 274
SCRA 30, WHERE THE SUPREME COURT
RULED THAT THE PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 7881 EXPRESSLY STATED THAT

FISHPONDS AND PRAWN
_______________
13Id.,at pp. 48-49.

14Id., at pp. 90-91.
118

Romero vs. Tan
FARMS ARE EXCLUDED FROM THE

COVERAGE OF THE COMPREHENSIVE
AGRARIAN REFORM LAW [CARL];
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
DECLARED THAT IT IS LIKEWISE
DISMISSIBLE CONSIDERING THAT THERE
WAS A COMPROMISE AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE PETITIONER AND THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS WHICH HAS THE FORCE OF
RES JUDICATA BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND
SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED EXCEPT FOR
VICES OF CONSENT OR FORGERY;
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
GAVE DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION FILED
BY THE RESPONDENTS CONSIDERING THAT
THE PROPER REMEDY IS TO APPEAL THE
DECISION OF THE 15
PROVINCIAL
ADJUDICATOR TO THE DARAB.
Principally, the issues for our resolution are (1) whether or

not the PARAB had jurisdiction to hear and decide the
complaint for maintenance of peaceful possession and
issuance of mandatory preliminary injunction; (2) whether
or not the compromise agreement duly approved by the
MTC of Malabon, Branch 55, had the force and effect of res
judicata; and (3) whether or not the PARAB decision
should have been appealed to the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), and not the subject
of a special civil action of certiorari filed with the Court of
Appeals. These issues depend, in turn, on whether the
fishpond, which is the subject of the controversy, is
governed by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL).
Noteworthy, respondents counter that petitioners are
guilty of forum shopping in filing different complaints
based on the same facts with different judicial and quasi-
judicial bodies. Considering the circumstances of this case,
however, we shall first tackle the substantial issues on the

merits before the technical matter raised by respondents.
Petitioners aver that the PARAB had jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case as it involves a tenancy
relationship. They further claim that this tenancy
relationship has long been in existence since 1985 such
that any amendment to the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL) to the effect that fishponds are
excluded from the coverage of the latter cannot be given
retroactive
_______________
15Id.,at pp. 7-8.
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Romero vs. Tan
effect, hence, will not operate to divest the PARAB of its

jurisdiction over the complaint.
The Court of Appeals in ruling that the PARAB has no
jurisdiction relies on our ruling in the case of Atlas16
Fertilizer Corp. v.Sec-retary, Dept. of Agrarian Reform
where we held that Rep. Act No. 7881 expressly provides
that fishponds and prawn farms are excluded from the
coverage of CARL. In reversing the PARAB’s findings, the
appellate court stated:
. . . [T]hat the provincial adjudicator’s jurisdiction is only to hear,

determine and adjudicate all AGRARIAN CASES, AND
DISPUTES AND INCIDENTS IN CONNECTION THEREWITH
(DARAB New Rules of Procedure, Rule 2, Section 2), and
considering further that lands devoted to fishing are not
agricultural lands because the use of the land is only incidental to
and not the principal factor in productivity, as implied by this
Court in the Atlas case, it follows17
that the PARAB has no
jurisdiction over the instant case.
On the jurisdictional issue, we find that it was reversible

error for the PARAB to have taken cognizance of
petitioners’ complaint. The jurisdiction of the PARAB in
this case is limited to agrarian disputes or controversies
and other matters or incidents involving the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) under Rep. Act 18
No. 6657,Rep. Act No.
3844 and other agrarian laws. An agrarian dispute is
defined as any controversy relating to tenurial
arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or
otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including
disputes concerning farm workers associations or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,

maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange
19
terms or
conditions of such tenurial arrangements.
Although Section 166 (1) of Rep. Act No. 3844 had
included fishponds in its definition of agricultural land
within its coverage, this definition must be considered
modified in the light of Sec. 2 of Rep. Act No. 7881, which
amended Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 6657,
_______________
16 G.R. Nos. 93100 & 97855, 19 June 1997, 274 SCRA 30, 36.
17 Rollo, pp. 47-48.
18 Rule II, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Procedure Governing Proceedings
Before the DAR Adjudication Board and Different Regional and Provincial
Adjudicators.
19 Section 3 (d), Rep. Act No. 6657, as amended.
120

Romero vs. Tan
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform

Law (CARL). Expressly, the amendment has excluded
private lands actually, directly and exclusively used for
prawn farms and fishponds from the coverage of the CARL.
In fact, under Section 3 (c) of R.A. No. 6657, as amended,
defines an agricultural land as that which is devoted to
agricultural activity and not otherwise classified as
mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.
In turn, Section 3 (b) thereof defines agricultural activity as
the cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit
trees, including the harvesting of such farm products, and
other farm activities, and practices performed by a farmer
in conjunction with such farming operations done by
persons whether natural or juridical. Clearly, by virtue of
the amendments to the CARL, the operation of a fishpond
is no longer considered an agricultural activity, and a
parcel of land devoted to fishpond operation is not
agricultural land as therein defined.
Significantly, although there is no express repeal of Rep.
Act No. 3844 as a whole, as in fact its provisions that are
not inconsistent with Rep. Act No. 6657, may still be given
suppletory effect, nonetheless, there is now irreconcilable
inconsistency or repugnancy between the two laws as
regards the treatment of fishponds and prawn farms. Such
repugnancy leads us to conclude that the provisions of Rep.
Act No. 6657 (CARL) supersede the provisions of Rep. Act
No. 3844 insofar as fishponds and prawn farms are
concerned. In any event, Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 6657
(CARL), as amended, provides that all other laws, decrees,

issuances, or parts thereof inconsistent
20
thereto are
repealed or amended accordingly.
Consequently, we rule that there is no agrarian tenancy
relationship to speak of in this case at this time, since
certain requirements set by present law on the matter have
not been met. Among these are: (1) the subject matter
should be agricultural land; (2) the
_______________
20 SEC. 76. Repealing Clause.—Section 35 of Republic Act No. 3844,

Presidential Decree No. 316, the last two paragraphs of Section 12 of
Presidential Decree No. 946, Presidential Decree No. 1038, and all other
laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, issuances or parts
thereof inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or amended
accordingly. (RA 6657, as amended)
121
VOL. 424, FEBRUARY 27, 2004 121

Romero vs. Tan
purpose should be agricultural production; and (3) there

should be 21personal cultivation done by the tenants
themselves.
Unless the requisite elements of agrarian tenancy
concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between
the parties, we cannot bring the matter within the purview
of tenancy under CARL. The absence of one element makes
an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a
planter thereon outside the scope of CARL. Nor can such
occupant, cultivator or planter be classified as a de
jureagricultural tenant for purposes of agrarian reform
law. And unless a person has established his status as a de
jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he
covered by the Land Reform Program 22
of the Government
under existing agrarian reform laws.
Here, we also find that petitioners failed to prove their
personal “cultivation” of the area in question. There is
personal cultivation if the tenant (lessee) cultivates the
land himself or with the aid of the immediate farm
household, which refers to the members of the family of the
tenant (lessee) and other persons who are dependent upon
him for 23support and who usually help him in the
activities. Particularly fatal to petitioners’ cause is the
joint venture agreement with Kenneth Bautista. This
agreement provides, among others, that Kenneth Bautista
will share in the operation and management of the
fishpond; pay the agreed rentals to the registered owner of
the land; and that after deducting all operational expenses,
Kenneth Bautista24
and petitioners shall have equal share in
the net profits. Not only does it reflect lack of personal
cultivation by petitioners, but it also shows the nature of
their fishpond operation is that of a large scale commercial
venture.
_______________
21SeeSection 166 (2), (3), RA 3844; Note that Section 4 of RA 3844, as

amended, states that agricultural share tenancy throughout the country is
declared contrary to public policy and shall be automatically converted to
agricultural leasehold upon the effectivity of the said section.
22 Caballes v. Department of Agrarian Reform, No. L-78214, 5
December 1988, 168 SCRA 247, 254, citing Tiongson v. Court of Appeals,
No. L- 62626, 18 July 1984, 130 SCRA 482, 488.
23 Handbook for CARP Implementors, p. 106, (2nd Ed.), Bureau of
Agrarian Reform Information and Education, Department of Agrarian
Reform.
24 CA Rollo, p. 56.
122

Romero vs. Tan
Petitioners claim vested rights arising from the alleged

existing tenancy relations. But this cannot be done validly 25
under the present circumstances of this case. Section 2(b)
of Rep. Act No. 7881 now contains a proviso, precisely to
protect vested rights of those who have already been issued
a Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA). Without
such CLOA no vested rights could now be claimed by
petitioners. In any event, petitioners failed to substantiate
their allegation that they have been in possession of the
fishpond as early as 1985. The records show that the lease
contract began on January 1, 1996, to end on December 31,
1999. Petitioners have not shown other pieces of evidence
in their favor that would show possession prior to this lease
contract, to prove their allegation of prior occupancy.
Coming now to the issue of res judicata, we find that the
elements thereof have been duly established in favor of
respondents, to wit: (1) there is a final judgment or order;
(2) the court rendering it has jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; (3) the judgment or order is on the
merits; (4) there is between the two cases identity 26
of
parties, subject matter and causes of action. The
compromise agreement between the parties was duly
approved by the MTC of Malabon, Branch 55. Absent any
evidence that mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, undue
influence, or falsity of documents that vitiated the
compromise agreement, the agreement must be upheld.
Petitioners claim that counsel did not assist them at the

time the court approved the compromise agreement.
However, this fact alone does not ipso facto result in a
mistake under the law as to render inutile the approval of
the trial court. In the absence of any evidence to counter
the presumption of regularity of the performance of official
27
duty, such presumption of regularity should be upheld.
Besides, it is presumed that a person would
_______________
25 Sec. 2(b), R.A. 7881 (Amends Sec. 10, R.A. No. 6657)—“. . . private
lands actually, directly and exclusively used for prawn farms and
fishponds shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act: Provided that
said prawn farms and fishponds have not been distributed and Certificate
of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) issued to agrarian reform beneficiaries
under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.”
26 Linzag v. Court of Appeals, 353 Phil. 506, 522; 291 SCRA 304 (1998).
27 Revised Rules of Court, Section 3 (m), Rule 131.
123
VOL. 424, FEBRUARY 27, 2004 123

Romero vs. Tan
28
take ordinary care of his concerns, such that petitioners’
failure to obtain counsel at that time must be deemed with
full knowledge of the consequences thereof. Had petitioners
truly believed that the compromise agreement should have
been stricken down, the proper course to take would have
been to file a motion to set aside the agreement on grounds
of nullity under Article 2038 of the Civil Code. It is well
settled that a judicial compromise has the effect of res
judicata and is immediately executory
29
and not appealable
unless set aside as abovestated. Should the motion to set
aside the compromise agreement be denied, petitioners
may then appeal the denial. Further, a judgment based on
a compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits,
wherein the parties have validly entered into stipulations
and the evidence was duly considered by the trial court
that approved the agreement.
That the MTC of Malabon, Branch 55, had jurisdiction
over the case for ejectment, to begin with, is in our view
beyond dispute. It is a basic tenet of law that courts acquire
jurisdiction over the subject matter based on the
allegations of the complaint. The assertions in the answer
by the defendant cannot divest the court of said
jurisdiction. The original complaint filed by respondents
clearly alleged that it was a suit for ejectment, the
jurisdiction of which is lodged with the proper MTC.
It cannot be denied also that in the actions filed by

petitioners in the different courts, as well as in the PARAB,
there is identity of parties, of subject matter and of causes
of action. The ultimate test in ascertaining the identity of
causes of action in two suits is to look into whether or not
the same evidence fully supports and establishes both the
present cause of action and the former cause of action. If in30
the affirmative, the former judgment would be a bar.
Petitioners in all instances sought to prove the existence of
tenancy relationship with respondents over a huge area
devoted to fishpond operations. They had to present the
same evidence in any case, and they did. On this score, we
note that petitioners’ counsel failed to apprise this Court of
all the actions tending to raise the same cause of action,
filed in different judicial and quasi-judicial
_______________
28Ibid.,Sec. 3 (d).
29 Salvador v. Ortoll, G.R. No. 140942, 18 October 2000, 343 SCRA 658,
668.
30 Bachrach Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 357 Phil. 483, 492; 296
SCRA 487 (1998).
124

Romero vs. Tan
bodies, in contravention of the undertaking specified in the

certification on non-forum shopping. Petitioners and their
counsel made no mention of the petition for annulment of
judgment/compromise agreement filed with the RTC of
Malabon, Branch 74, nor of the petition for certiorari with
injunction filed with RTC of Malabon, Branch 170, on April
4, 2001 assailing the February 26, 2001 order of execution
of the municipal trial court. Petitioners through counsel
showed a lack of candor in coming to this Court without
full disclosure of prior actions taken successively or
simultaneously. Respondents claim that petitioners
engaged in forum shopping as shown by the records in this
controversy. However, the Court deems it necessary to
decide now this case on the merits, rather than merely
relying on a technicality, for the sake of substantive justice
due the concerned parties.
Finally, we rule that respondents correctly filed a special
civil action of certiorari with the Court of Appeals, as
provided under Section 1, Rule 65, observing the rules on
hierarchy of courts. A special civil action of certiorari is an
independent action, raising the question of jurisdiction
where the tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of

jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
31
of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. As already discussed, the
PARAB has no power to act on the case as the subject
matter of the action was beyond the scope of its jurisdiction
under the law. Petitioners would want respondents to
appeal the PARAB ruling to the DARAB as a logical and
proper remedy, rather than go on certiorari before the CA.
Appeal in this case, however, would have been an
inadequate remedy as precisely respondents were
questioning the very jurisdiction of the PARAB to take
cognizance of the case.
The availability of the ordinary recourse of appeal does
not bar a party from making use of the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari where the ordinary appeal 32
would not
be a prompt and adequate remedy, that is, “[a] remedy
which is equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient, not
merely a remedy which at some time in the future will
bring about a revival of the judgment of the lower court
complained of in the certiorari proceeding, but a remedy
which will
_______________
31 Revised Rules of Court, Section 1, Rule 65.

32See J. Feria, Civil Procedure Annotated, pp. 465-466, citing Silvestre
v. Torres, 57 Phil. 885, 893 (1933).
125
VOL. 424, FEBRUARY 27, 2004 125

Romero vs. Tan
promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of

that judgment
33
and the acts of the inferior court or
tribunal.”
The rationale behind CARL, (the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law, Rep. Act No. 6657) and other
agrarian reform laws is to emancipate the small farmers
and farm workers from the bondage of tilling land they do
not own. They aim to put into their
34
hands the cultivation of
economically viable family-sized farms. Earlier, the Land
Reform Code (Rep. Act No. 3844) defined economic family-
sized farm as an area of farm land that permits efficient
use of labor and capital resources of the farm family, and
will produce an income sufficient to provide a modest
standard of living to meet a farm family’s need for food,
clothing, shelter and education with possible allowance for
payment of yearly installments on the land, and reasonable 35
reserves to absorb yearly fluctuations in income.
Subsequently, Rep. Act No. 6657 was enacted declaring
that it is the policy of the state to pursue a comprehensive

agrarian reform program to the end that there be a more
equitable distribution and ownership of land to provide
small farmers and farm workers with the opportunity to
enhance their dignity and improve the quality of their
36
lives
through greater productivity of agricultural lands. Indeed,
our agrarian laws have been enacted to make the small
farmers more independent, self-reliant and responsible
citizens37and a source of genuine strength in our democratic
society.
In this case, however, the records do not show that
petitioners are small farmers or farm workers deserving of
the beneficence and protection afforded by our agrarian
laws. It would stretch one’s imagination to consider
petitioners as lowly farm workers when evidence shows in
reality they are businessmen engaged in aquaculture,
operating a huge fishpond with an area of one million, two
hundred fifty-six thousand and four hundred thirty-three
(1,256,433) square meters. Leasing this huge area could be
better appreciated as falling properly under civil law lease
rather than agrarian reform lease-tenancy. Moreover, in
this case, there is no
_______________
33 Silvestre v. Torres and Oben,supra.

34 Rep. Act No. 3844, Section 2 (1).
35 Handbook for CARP Implementors, pp. 111-112 (2nd Ed.), Bureau of
Agrarian Reform Information and Education, Department of Agrarian
Reform.
36 Rep. Act No. 6657, SEC. 2. Declaration of Principles and Policy.
37 Rep. Act No. 3844, SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.
126

Romero vs. Tan
showing that large fishpond operators belong to the class of

beneficiaries contemplated by legislators when they
envisioned a policy of emancipation of small farmers or
farm workers from bondage of the soil through agrarian
reforms. In sum, we agree that the appellate court did not
err in excluding the fishpond subject of the present
controversy from the coverage of CARL, and holding the
PARAB’s decision dated May 9, 2000 void for lack of
jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack
of merit. The assailed decision dated January 19, 2001 of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Tinga, JJ.,

concur.
Puno (Chairman), J., On leave.
Petition denied, assailed decision affirmed.
Notes.—The policy of social justice is not intended to

countenance wrongdoing simply because it is committed by
the under-privileged—“Compassion for the poor is an
imperative of every humane society but only when the
recipient is not a rascal claiming an undeserved privilege.”
(Cecilleville Realty and Service Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, 278 SCRA 819 [1997])
The courts can not award possession to the very same
party whose license has been cancelled by the executive or
administrative officer tasked to exercise licensing power as
regards the development of fishpond areas, and which
cancellation has been sustained by the Office of the
President. (Sañado vs. Court of Appeals, 356 SCRA 546
[2001])
——o0o——
127
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8/5/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 424

108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

SPS. NUMERIANO and CARMELITA ROMERO,

Agrarian Relations; Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication

considered modified in the light of Sec. 2 of Rep. Act No. 7881,

VOL. 424, FEBRUARY 27, 2004 109

Romero vs. Tan

fines an agricultural land as that which is devoted to agricultural

Same; Agrarian Tenancy; Elements; Unless the requisite

110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Romero vs. Tan

nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government

shows the nature of their fishpond operation is that of a large

VOL. 424, FEBRUARY 27, 2004 111

Romero vs. Tan

fraud, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or falsity of

counter the presumption of regularity of the performance of

112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Romero vs. Tan

voted to fishpond operations. They had to present the same

jurisdiction; The availability of the ordinary recourse of appeal

VOL. 424, FEBRUARY 27, 2004 113

Romero vs. Tan

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Efren Dela Cruz for respondents.

1 Rollo, pp. 41-49. Penned by Associate Justice Delilah Vidallon-

VOL. 424, FEBRUARY 27, 2004 115

ers failed to pay the agreed rental covering the period

116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

After the parties submitted their evidence and position

“Wherefore, in view of the foregoing judgment is hereby rendered:

“1) Maintaining plaintiff-spouses Numeriano and Carmelita

In the meantime, while the complaint before the PARAB

10Id.,at pp. 91-92.

11Id.,at pp. 58-65.

VOL. 424, FEBRUARY 27, 2004 117

As it turned out, even before the RTC’s Order of dismissal

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the said decision

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT

ACT NO. 7881 EXPRESSLY STATED THAT

13Id.,at pp. 48-49.

118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

FARMS ARE EXCLUDED FROM THE

Principally, the issues for our resolution are (1) whether or

however, we shall first tackle the substantial issues on the

15Id.,at pp. 7-8.

VOL. 424, FEBRUARY 27, 2004 119

effect, hence, will not operate to divest the PARAB of its

. . . [T]hat the provincial adjudicator’s jurisdiction is only to hear,

On the jurisdictional issue, we find that it was reversible

representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,

120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform

(CARL), as amended, provides that all other laws, decrees,

20 SEC. 76. Repealing Clause.—Section 35 of Republic Act No. 3844,

VOL. 424, FEBRUARY 27, 2004 121

purpose should be agricultural production; and (3) there

21SeeSection 166 (2), (3), RA 3844; Note that Section 4 of RA 3844, as

122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Petitioners claim vested rights arising from the alleged