CASE NAME: BENGA-ORAS VS EVANGELISTA

G.R. No: L-8558

Date: September 28, 1955
Plaintiff: Leodegario Benga-Oras
Respondent: Jose Evangelista
Crime: Abduction
Lower Court Decision: Petition to dismissed DENIED
Court of Appeals Decision: none
Supreme Court Decision: Petition for certiorari DENIED

Facts: Norma Ballos, a 14 yrs old girl was allegedly abducted against her will by the petitioner Jose Evangelista.
Because of that, her father Silvestre filed a complaint before the Justice of Peace. The petitioner in turn, filed a
motion to dismiss challenging the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that the complaint which served as the
information was not signed by the offended party, who was already in the age of discernment. The Justice of
Peace court denied the motion.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE COMPILED CASE DIGESTS

The petitioner alleges that since the offended party is already achieved the age of discernment, she should be
the one who should have filed the complaint, not her father. Since it was not the case, the court did not acquire
jurisdiction on the matter.

Issue: Whether or not the offended party has the exclusive right to file a complaint if she passed the age of
discernment

Ruling: Petition denied.

The law (Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code) does not state or does not intend to state that the right of the
offended party to file the complaint against the offender, in the cases mentioned, is hers exclusively in the sense
that when she does not file the same, her parents, grandparents, or guardian cannot file it. What it means to say
that it in fact says it, that when the offended party is a minor and she does not file a complaint, this may be done
by her parents, grandparents or guardian, in the order named.

If the offended party, who is under age, does not file or does not want to file the complaint against her offender,
her parents may do so "being under obligation to render protection to those under their power and lawful
guardianship and to represent them in the exercise of all the actions which may redound to their benefit.
CASE NAME: PEOPLE VS TANO
G.R. No: 133872
Date: May 5, 2000
Plaintiff: People of the Philippines
Respondent: ALEXANDER TAÑO y CABALLERO
Crime: Separate crimes of Robbery and Rape
Lower Court Decision: Guilty of special complex crime of robbery with rape
Court of Appeals Decision: No decision. The case was directly forwarded to Supreme Court for automatic review
since the penalty imposed to the accused is death.
Supreme Court Decision: Lower court’s assailed Decision is hereby MODIFIED

Facts:
Amy de Guzman was tending a Video Rental Shop owned by her employer and cousin, Ana Marinay. Thereupon,
accused-appellant Alexander Taño, a relative of Ana’s husband Gerry Marinay, arrived at said shop. Accused
asked Amy about the time when Gerry and Ana would be coming home, to which she replied, 10:00 p.m. (id.).
He then asked about the time when Ana

would be coming home and Amy replied that she did not know. The accused kept on going in and out of the
Video Shop, and on the last time that he went inside said shop, he jumped over the counter of the shop to
where Amy was and seized the latter by placing one of his arms around Amy’s neck, while his other hand held a
knife which he poked at her neck Amy started shouting for help but the accused increased the volume of a
karaoke. He then dragged Amy to the kitchen of the shop where he started raping her. Somebody knocked at
the door of the shop and so he instructed Amy to go upstairs to the 2nd floor to change clothes. He said he will
be taking her with him. Suddenly, he punched her in the stomach thrice causing her to lose balance. He became
violent again and banged Amy’s head on the wall causing the latter to lose consciousness. When she regained
consciousness, she found herself and the accused inside the toilet of the shop and the latter again banged her
head, this time on the toilet bowl, several times causing Amy to again lose consciousness. The accused went
upstairs and took valuables of Amy’s employer. Amy, herself lost her ring, bracelet and wristwatch during the
incident in question. Ana arrived and found the shop very disorganized. She found Amy in the toilet, bathed in
blood. Amy was brought to the hospital.

Issue
WON the lower court erred in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with
rape despite the prosecution’s insufficiency of evidence.

Ruling:
I. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
Time-tested is the guiding principle that when a victim cries rape, she says in effect all that is necessary to show
that the crime was inflicted on her; and so long as her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may
be convicted on the basis thereof. We have no reason in the instant case to deviate from this settled
jurisprudence.

Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following instances: (1) force or
intimidation is used, (2) the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, (3) she is under twelve
years of age. We find the necessary elements of rape duly established by Private Complainant Amy de Guzman.

As noted earlier, the trial judge, who was able to observe firsthand the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses
while testifying, perceived Amy to be candid, straightforward, spontaneous and frank. Said witness was also
found to have been consistent and unwavering despite the rigid cross-examination of the defense counsel. We
note from the transcript of stenographic notes that the judge herself had posed additional clarificatory
questions upon Amy.Throughout her testimony, she indeed remained consistent as well as convincing.
Of long-standing is the rule that findings of trial courts, especially on the credibility of witnesses, are entitled to
great weight and accorded the highest respect by the reviewing courts, unless certain facts of substance and
value were overlooked or misappreciated such as would alter the conviction of the appellant. Trial judges are in
a better position to assess the behavior of witnesses and to detect whether they are telling the truth or not
because they could directly observe them in court. The reviewing magistrate, on the other hand, has only the
cold and impersonal records of the proceedings to rely upon.

With respect to the robbery, its elements are: (1) the subject is personal property belonging to another; (2)
there is unlawful taking of that property, (3) the taking is with the intent to gain, and (4) there is violence against
or intimidation of any person or use of force upon things. There is no question on the unlawful taking of
valuables belonging to Amy and her employer, Ana Marinay. Appellant openly admitted in court the unlawful
asportation.

II. CRIMES COMMITED

We do not, however, agree with the trial court that appellant is guilty of the special complex crime of robbery
with rape. This felony contemplates a situation where the original intent of the accused was to take, with intent
to gain, personal property belonging to another; and rape is committed on the occasion thereof or as an
accompanying crime.

Such factual circumstance does not obtain here. As related by Private Complainant Amy de Guzman, accused-
appellant suddenly jumped over the counter, strangled her, poked a knife at the left side of her neck, pulled her
towards the kitchen where he forced her to undress, and gained carnal knowledge of her against her will and
consent. Thereafter, he ordered her to proceed upstairs to get some clothes, so he could bring her out, saying
he was not leaving her alive. At this point, appellant conceived the idea of robbery because, before they could
reach the upper floor, he suddenly pulled Amy down and started mauling her until she lost consciousness; then
he freely ransacked the place. Leaving Amy for dead after repeatedly banging her head, first on the wall, then on
the toilet bowl, he took her bracelet, ring and wristwatch. He then proceeded upstairs where he took as well the
jewelry box containing other valuables belonging to his victim's employer.

Under these circumstances, appellant cannot be convicted of the special complex crime of robbery with rape.
However, since it was clearly proven beyond reasonable doubt that he raped Amy de Guzman and thereafter
robbed her and Ana Marinay of valuables totaling P16,000, he committed two separate offenses -- rape with the
use of a deadly weapon and simple robbery with force and intimidation against persons.

Appellant may well be convicted of the separate offenses of rape and robbery notwithstanding the fact that the
offense charged in the Information is only "Robbery with Rape." In a similar case, People v. Barrientos, this Court
held:

"x x x Controlling in an Information should not be the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense
charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being, by and large, mere conclusions of
law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited.
Neither is it the technical name given to the offense by the prosecutor, more than the allegations made by him,
that should predominate in determining the true character of the crime. There should also be no problem in
convicting an accused of two or more crimes erroneously charged in one information or complaint, but later
proven to be independent crimes, as if they were made the subject of separate complaints or information." In
the case at bar, we find the Information filed against appellant to have sufficiently alleged all the elements
necessary to convict him of the two separate crimes of rape and robbery. Needless to state, appellant failed,
before his arraignment, to move for the quashal of the Information which appeared to charge more than one
offense. He has thereby waived any objection and may thus be found guilty of as many offenses as those
charged in the Information and proven during the trial.[40]
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is hereby MODIFIED. Accused-Appellant Alexander Taño y Caballero is found
guilty of two separate offenses: rape and robbery. For the crime of rape, appellant is hereby SENTENCED to
reclusion perpetua and to pay Private Complainant Amy de Guzman P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto and
P30,000 as moral damages. For the crime of robbery, appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two
(2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as
maximum; and to pay De Guzman P2,487.65 as actual damages.
CRIMINAL CASE: PEOPLE V. RIGOR
violation of BP 22

Place:

Check was drawn, issued and delivered at Rural Bank of San Juan Check was dishonored at Associated Bank,
Tarlac Branch

The Information against petitioner reads:

That on or about the 16th day of November 1989 in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Rural Bank of San Juan, Inc. thru its loan officer Carlos N.
Garcia, a postdated check to apply on account or for value the check described below:

Check No.165476
Drawn against: Associated Bank, Tarlac Branch
In the Amount of: P500,000.00
Dated: February 16, 1990
Payable to: Rural Bank of San Juan

said accused well knowing that at the time of issue on 16 November 1989, he has already insufficient funds or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment in full of the face amount of such check and that as of 2 February
1990 his bank accounts were already closed and that check when presented for payment from and after the
date thereof, was subsequently dishonored for the reason “Account Closed” and despite receipt of notice of
such dishonor, the accused failed to pay said payee the face amount of said check or to make arrangement for
full payment thereof during the period of not less than five (5) banking days after receiving notice.

When arraigned, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

On July 8, 1994, the trial court rendered judgment against petitioner.

Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s decision.

Petitioner contends that the Regional Trial Court of Pasig had no jurisdiction over this case since no proof has
been offered that his check was issued, delivered, dishonored or that knowledge of insufficiency of funds
occurred in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila.

ISSUE: W/N the Regional Trial Court of Pasig has jurisdiction over the case considering that the check was
dishonored by the drawee, Associated Bank, in its Tarlac Branch.

RULING: The contention is untenable.

As regards venue of a criminal action, Section 15, paragraph (a), of Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which reflects the old rule,[28] provides:

Sec. 15. Place where action is to be instituted. –

(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or
territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred.

Violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes. In such crimes, some
acts material and essential to the crimes and requisite to their consummation occur in one municipality or
territory and some in another, in which event, the court of either has jurisdiction to try the cases, it being
understood that the first court taking cognizance of the case excludes the other. Hence, a person charged with a
transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed.

The evidence clearly shows that the undated check was issued and delivered at the Rural Bank of San Juan,
Metro Manila on November 16, 1989, and subsequently the check was dated February 16, 1990 thereat. On
May 25, 1990, the check was deposited with PS Bank, San Juan Branch, Metro Manila. Thus, the Court of
Appeals correctly ruled:

Violations of B.P. 22 are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes. A suit on the check can be filed in any of
the places where any of the elements of the offense occurred, that is, where the check is drawn, issued,
delivered or dishonored. x x x

The information at bar effectively charges San Juan as the place of drawing and issuing. The jurisdiction of courts
in criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information. Although, the check was
dishonored by the drawee, Associated Bank, in its Tarlac Branch, appellant has drawn, issued and delivered it at
RBSJ, San Juan. The place of issue and delivery was San Juan and knowledge, as an essential part of the offense,
was also overtly manifested in San Juan. There is no

question that crimes committed in November, 1989 in San Juan are triable by the RTC stationed in Pasig. In short
both allegation and proof in this case sufficiently vest jurisdiction upon the RTC in Pasig City.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR No. 18855,
is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
CRIMINAL CASE : AGBAYANI V SAYO
G.R. No: L-47880 April 30, 1979
Petitioners: Wilson Agbayani, Carmelo Bautista, Pablo Pascual and Renato Romeo Dugay
Respondent: Honorable Sofronio G. Sayo, Presiding Judge of CFI of Nueva Vizcaya and Conrado B. Mahinan
private respondent
Crime: Libel
Lower Court: Motion to Quash Denied
Supreme Court: Petition granted, trial court's order denying petitioners' motion to quash is set aside
NATURE Instant petition for certiorari and prohibition
FACTS Conrado B. Mahinan, a lawyer, was the manager of the Cagayan Valley Branch of the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) stationed at Cauayan, Isabela. Among his subordinates were Wilson Agbayani, Carmelo
N. Bautista, Pablo R.Pascual, and Renato Romeo P. Dugay. On March 8, 1976, Mahinan filed with the fiscal's
office at Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya a complaint for written defamation against Agbayani, Bautista,Pascual and
Dugay. On July 23, 1976, the provincial fiscal of Nueva Vizcaya filed in the Court of First Instance of that province
an information for libel charging Agbayani, Bautista, Pascual and Dugay with having maliciously made
defamatory imputations against Mahinan on or about February 17, 1976 in Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya.

Quoted in the information were the affidavits of Pascual and Bautista signed at Cauayan, Isabela,Bautista's
undated letter asking for Mahinan's dismissal, and Agbayani's "unusual incident report" subscribed and sworn to
before a Manila notary and enclosing documentary evidence to support his charges of malversation and
falsification against Mahinan and praying for the latter's separation from the service.

According to the information, all those documents allegedly depicted Mahinan "as an incorrigible managerial
misfit, despoiler of public office,spendthrift of GSIS funds, inveterate gambler,chronic falsifier", and an
"unreformed ex-convict".
The four accused filed a motion to quash contending that the Court of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged because Mahinan was a public officer holding office at Cauayan, Isabela
when the alleged libel was committed and, under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, the offense charged
comes within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Isabela. They argued that the provincial fiscal of
Nueva Vizcaya had no authority to conduct the preliminary investigation and to file the information. It was
denied by the trial court in its order of April 25, 1977 on the ground that Mahinan was not a public officer within
the meaning of article 203 of the Revised Penal Code since the insurance business of the GSIS is not an
inherently governmental function. After petitioners' motion for the reconsideration of that order was denied,
they filed in this Court the instant petition.
ISSUE :
WON the CFI of Nueva Vizcaya was the proper venue of the criminal action for written defamation filed by
Mahinan
HELD :
NO
There is no issue as to whether Mahinan is a public officer. As GSIS branch manager, he is unquestionably a
public officer. Article 360, which lays down the rules on venue in cases of written defamation and which
specifies the officer or court that should conduct the preliminary investigation, reads as follows:

ART. 360 Persons responsible. . . ."The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as
provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance of the
province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties
actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense.

"Provided, however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of
Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the
City of Manila or of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in case such
public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of
the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous
article is printed and first published…"Preliminary investigation of criminal actions for written defamations as
provided for in the chapter shall be conducted by the provincial or city fiscal of the province or city, or by the
municipal court of the city or capital of the province where such actions may be instituted in accordance with
the provisions of this article." (As amended by Republic Act Nos. 1289 and 4363) Before article 360 was
amended, the rule was that a criminal action for libel may be instituted in any jurisdiction where the libelous
article was published or circulated, irrespective of where it was written or printed. Under that rule, the criminal
action is transitory and the injured party has a choice of venue.

-Experience had shown that under that old rule the offended party could harass the accused in a libel case by
laying the venue of the criminal action in a remote or distant place.

Republic Act No. 4363 was enacted so as to prevent the offended party in written defamation cases from
inconveniencing the accused by means of out-of-town libel suits, meaning complaints filed in remote municipal
courts
The rules on venue in article 360 may be restated thus:1. Whether the offended party is a public official ora
private person, the criminal action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the
libelous article is printed and first published. 2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action
may also be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province where he actually resided at the time of the
commission of the offense. 3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the
commission of the offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila.4. If the offended
party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of
the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense. -As a corollary, the
preliminary investigation of the criminal action for written defamation shall be conducted by the provincial or
city fiscal of the province or city, or by the municipal court of the cityor capital of the province where such action
may be instituted.
Applying the foregoing rules, the proper venue of Mahinan's criminal action for written defamation against the
petitioners is the Court of First Instance of Isabela, since as a GSIS branch manager, he was a public official
stationed at Cauayan, Isabela and the alleged libel was committed when he was (as he still)in the public service.
The preliminary investigation of the complaint should have been conducted by the provincial fiscal of Isabela, or
by the municipal judge of Ilagan, the provincial capital, or by the Court of First Instance of the same province.
The criminal action could have been filed also in the Court of First Instance of the province or in the city court of
the city where the libel was printed and first published.
The information in this case is defective or deficient because it does not show that the Court of FirstInstance of
Nueva Vizcaya, where it was filed, has jurisdiction to entertain the criminal action for written defamation
initiated by Mahinan against the petitioners and that the provincial fiscal of that province had the authority to
conduct the preliminary investigation.
Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction
Petition granted. The trial court's order denying petitioners' motion to quash is set aside. It is directed to dismiss
Criminal Case No. 509, the libel case against the petitioners, without prejudice to the filing of another criminal
action for written defamation in the Court of First Instance of Isabela within the remainder of the prescriptive
period, if warranted according to the result of a proper and duly conducted preliminary investigation. Costs
against respondent Mahinan.
CRIMINAL CASE : BALA VS MARTINEZ
Topic: venue in criminal cases is jurisdictional
G.R. No. L-67301
January 29, 1990
Venue: manila
Crime: falsification of a public document
Petitioner: MANUEL V. BALA
Respondent: HON. JUDGE ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ and PAUL AYANG-ANG Probation Officer
Ponente: SARMIENTO, J.:
RTC: petitioner Manuel Bala guilty
CA: affirmed
The petitioner by this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order seeks the reversal of the order dated

April 2, 1984 of the then Court of First Instance (CFI), now Regional Trial Court (RTC), of Manila, Branch XX.

Facts:

The petitioner had been indicted for removing and substituting the picture of Maria Eloisa Criss Diazen which
had been attached to her United States of America passport, with that of Florencia Notarte, in effect falsifying a
genuine public or official document. On January 3, 1978, the trial court adjudged petitioner Manuel Bala guilty
of the crime of falsification of a public document. The petitioner seasonably appealed, but the Court of Appeals,
on April 9, 1980, affirmed in toto the lower court's decision. After the case had been remanded to the court of
origin for execution of judgment, the petitioner applied for and was granted probation by the respondent judge
in his order dated August 11, 1982. The petitioner was then placed under probation for a period of one (1) year,
subject to the terms and conditions enumerated therein. On September 23, 1982, the probationer (petitioner)
asked his supervising probation officer for permission to transfer his residence from BF Homes to Phil-Am Life
Subdivision in Las Piñas specifically 33 Jingco Street. The probation officer verbally granted the probationer's
request as he found nothing objectionable to it.

By the terms of the petitioner's probation, it should have expired on August 10, 1983, one year after the order
granting the same was issued. But, the order of final discharge could not be issued because the respondent
probation officer had not yet submitted his final report on the conduct of his charge.

Respondent People of the Philippines : Through Assistant City Fiscal Jose D. Cajucom of Manila, filed a motion
to revoke the probation of the petitioner before Branch XX of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, presided
over by the respondent judge. The motion alleged that the petitioner had violated the terms and conditions of
his probation.

Petitioner : Petitioner filed his opposition to the motion on the ground that he was no longer under probation,
his probation period having terminated on August 10, 1983, as previously adverted to. As such, no valid reason
existed to revoke the same, he contended.

Respondent Probation Officer: As if to confirm the Manila Assistant City Fiscal's motion to revoke the
petitioner's probation, the respondent probation officer filed on January 6, 1984, a motion to terminate Manuel
Bala's probation, at the same time attaching his progress report on supervision dated January 5, 1984. 6 The
same motion, however, became the subject of a "Manifestation," dated January 10, 1984, which stated that the
probation officer was not pursuing the motion to terminate dated January 6, 1984; instead, he was submitting a
supplemental report 7 which recommended the revocation of probation "in the light of new facts, information,
and evidences."
Thereafter, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and/or strike out the motion to revoke probation,
questioning the jurisdiction of the court over his case inasmuch as his probation period had already expired.

Petitioner's contention: His change of residence automatically transferred the venue of the case from the RTC
of Manila to the Executive Judge, of the RTC of Makati which latter court include under its jurisdiction the
Municipality of Las Piñas the probationer's place of residence, invoking Section 13, P.D. No. 968, which provides

Sec. 13. Control and Supervision of Probationer. ...

Whenever a probationer is permitted to reside in a place under the jurisdiction of another court, control over
him shall be transferred to the Executive Judge of the, Court of First Instance of that place, and in such a case a
copy of the probation order the investigation report and other pertinent records shall be furnished to said
Executive Judge. Thereafter. the Executive Judge to whom jurisdiction over the probationer is transferred shall
have the power with respect to him that was previously possessed by the court which granted the probation.

As stated at the outset, the respondent judge denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. Hence, this
petition.

Issue:

Whether or not his transfer of residence automatically transferred jurisdiction over his probation from the
Manila Regional Trial Court to the same court in his new address

Ruling:

No.

In criminal cases, venue is an element of jurisdiction. Such being the case, the Manila RTC would not be deprived
of its ,jurisdiction over the probation case. To uphold the petitioner's contention would mean a depreciation of
the Manila court's power to grant probation in the first place. It is to be remembered that when the
petitioneraccused applied for probation in the then CFI of Manila, he was a resident of Las Piñas as he is up to
now, although in a different subdivision. As pointed out earlier, he merely moved from BF Homes to Philam Life
Subdivision 33 Jingco Street, also in Las Piñas. On the other hand, pursuing the petitioner's argument on this
score to the limits of it logic would mean that his probation was null and void in the place, because then the
Manila CFI was without jurisdiction to grant him probation as he was a resident of Las Piñas.

It is therefore incorrect to assume that the petitioner's change of abode compels change of venue, and
necessarily, control over the petitioner, to the Executive Judge of the RTC of his new residence. Thus, in the
apportionment of the regional trial courts under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, Las Piñas is one among the municipalities included in the National Capital Judicial
Region (Metro Manila) with a seat at Makati. 18 Needless to say, the Regional Trial Court in Makati, like the
Manila Regional Trial Court, forms part of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region. Accordingly,
the various branches of the regional trial courts of Makati or Manila under the National Capital Region, are
coordinate and co-equal courts, the totality of which is only one Regional Trial Court. Jurisdiction is vested in the
court, not in the judges. In other words, the case does not attach to the branch or judge. 20 Therefore, in this
case, RTC Branch XX of Manila, which granted the probation, has not lost control and supervision over the
probation of the petitioner.

The petitioner also claims that he had verbally obtained permission to transfer residence from his probation
officer. This would not suffice the law is very explicit in its requirement of a prior court approval in writing.
Section 10 of PD 968 categorically decrees that the probationer must

xxx
(j) reside at premises approved by it (court) and not to change his residence without its prior written approval;

xxx

Further, such written approval is required by the 21 probation order of August 11, 1982 as one of the conditions
of probation, to wit:

(3) To reside in BF Homes, Las Piñas and not to change said address nor leave the territorial jurisdiction of
Metro Manila for more than twenty-four (24) hours without first securing prior written approval of his Probation
Officer.

In the light of all the foregoing and in the interest of the expeditious administration of justice, we revoke the
probation of the petitioner for violations of the conditions of his probation, instead of remanding the case to the
trial court and having the parties start all over again in needless protracted proceedings.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED and the probation of the petitioner is hereby REVOKED.
Criminal Case: Cudiavs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No:110315
Date:January16,1998
Petitioner: Renato Cudia Respondent: Court of Appeals, Hon.CarlosD.Rustia
Crime: Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition.
Place: Angeles City, Pampanga
Ponente: Romero
Facts : Renato Cudia was arrested on June 28,1989 in Mabalacat, Pampanga for the crime of Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Ammunition. He was brought to Sto.Domingo, Angeles City which a preliminary investigation was
conducted and as a result the City Prosecutor filed an information against him. The case
againsthimwasraffledtoBranch60 of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City. Upon his arraignment, the court
called theattentionofthepartiesandcontrarytotheinformation,RenatioCudia had committed the offense in
Mabalacat and not in Angeles City. Thus the judge ordered that the case should be assigned to a court involving
crimes committed outside Angeles City consequently it was assigned to Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC.
However, the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga filed an information charging Renato Cudio with the same
crime and it was likewise assigned to Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC which resulted in to two Information
filed with the same crime. This prompted the City Prosecutor to file a Motion to Dismiss/ Withdraw the
Information which the trial court granted. Renato filed a Motion to Quash the criminal case filed by the
Provincial Prosecutor on the ground that his continued prosecution for the offense of illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition—for which he had been arraigned in the first criminal case, and which had been
dismissed despite his opposition—would violate his right not to be put twice in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense. The trial court denied the motion to quash; hence, petitioner raised the issue to the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court, stating that there was no double jeopardy, dismissed the same on the ground that
the petition could not have been convicted under the first information as the same was defective. Petitioner's
motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, this appeal.
Issue:Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it found that the City Prosecutor of Angeles City did not
have the authority to file the first information.
Ruling: No.
It is plainly apparent that the City Prosecutor of Angeles City had no authority to file the first information, the
offense having been committed in the Municipality of Mabalacat, which is beyond his jurisdiction. Presidential
Decree No. 1275, in relation to Section 9 of the Administrative Code of1987,pertinentlyprovidesthat:
Sec.11. The provincial or the city fiscal shall:
b)Investigate and/o rcause to be investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors and violations of all penal
laws and ordinances within their respective jurisdictions and have the necessary information or complaint
prepared or made against the persons accused. In the conduct of such investigations he or his assistants shall
receive the sworn statements or take oral evidence of witnesses summoned by subpoena for the purpose.
It is thus the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, not the City Prosecutor, who should prepare information for
offenses committed within Pampanga but outside of Angeles City. An information, when required to be filed by
a public prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by another. It must be exhibited or presented by the prosecuting
attorney or someone authorized by law. If not, the court does not acquire jurisdiction.
In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or information in the former prosecution. As the
fiscal had no authority to file the information, the dismissal of the first information would not be a bar to
petitioner’s subsequent prosecution. As the first information was fatally defective for lack of authority of the
officer filing it, the instant petition must fail for failure to comply with all the requisites necessary to invoke
double jeopardy.

ThusMotionforReconsiderationisDENIED.
Case Name: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. OLIVIA ALETH GARCIA CRISTOBAL
G.R. No: G.R. No. 159450
Date: March 30, 2011
Plaintiff: People of the Philippines
Respondent: Olivia Aleth Garcia Cristobal
Crime: Qualified Theft
Lower Court Decision: Guilty
Court of Appeals Decision: Affirmed Lower Court (modified only the penalty)
Supreme Court Decision: Affirmed CA decision
FACTS:
The accused, Olivia Aleth Garcia Cristobal, is one of the tellers of Prudential Bank in its branch in Angeles City.
She was charged of the crime of qualified theft “…with grave abuse of trust and confidence reposed upon her by
her employer, with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away cash money amounting to $10,000.00,
belonging to the Prudential Bank…”
Among the six tellers of Prudential Bank in the said branch, she was the only teller assigned to handle dollar
deposits and withdrawals. Virgilio Frias, Prudential Bank’s

Senior audit examiner, inventoried the cash accountabilities of the said bank by manually counting the money in
each of the teller’s cash boxes. The books of the branch showed that appellant, Olivia, had a cash accountability
of $15,040.52, the money in her cash box was only $5,040.52. When asked about the shortage, appellant
explained that there was a withdrawal of $10,000.00 on December 29, 1995 after the cut-off time which would
be treated as a withdrawal on January 2, 1996 and showed to Frias a withdrawal memo dated January 2, 1996.
The next day, Frias checked the account ledger of FX-836, and found a "hold jacket" indicating that no
withdrawal from the said account should be allowed to reduce its balance below $35,000.00; he also found in
the ledger that a deposit of $10,000.00 was made on January 2, 1956. He found the deposit memo on file.
Thereafter, Frias compared the signature on the withdrawal memo with the specimen signatures of the
depositors in their signature card. Finding a "big difference" in the signatures, he referred the matter to the
branch manager, Edgardo Panlilio.

Asked by Panlilio to explain, appellant reiterated that the withdrawal was made after the cut-off time on
December 29, 1995. Doubting her explanation, Frias conducted another cash count. At that time, appellant’s
accountability based on the books of the bank was $21,778.86, but the money in her cash box was only
$11,778.86, thus, short of US$10,000.00. When Panlilio again asked appellant to explain, the latter started to cry
and said she would explain to the bank president.

The next day, January 4, 1996, appellant told Panlilio that she gave the $10,000.00 to a person on December 29,
1995 because her family was being threatened.

In her letter to the bank president dated January 4, 1996, appellant apologized and explained her shortage of
$10,000.00 and another shortage of P2.2 Million which the audit team had also discovered, stating the same
reason that she and her family was threatened.

Upon the State resting its case against the accused, her counsel filed a Demurrer to Evidence and Motion to
Defer Defense Evidence, praying for the dismissal of the charge on the ground that the evidence of the State did
not suffice to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. However, the RTC denied the Demurrer to Evidence
and Motion to Defer Defense Evidence and deemed the case submitted for decision on the basis that her filing
her demurrer to evidence without express leave of court as required by Section 15, Rule 119, of the Rules of
Court had waived her right to present evidence. The Court of Appeals, affirmed the RTC’s decision.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the information filed against the accused was fatally defective 2. Whether or not the RTC
correctly found that the accused had waived her right to present evidence in her defense 3. Whether or not the
extrajudicial admission of taking the amount involved contained in the letter of the accused to the president of
Prudential Bank was admissible under the rules and jurisprudence.

RULING:

Whether or not the information filed against the accused was fatally defective

The petitioner submits that the information charged her with qualified theft that allegedly transpired on
December 29, 1995, but the evidence at trial could not be the basis of her conviction because it actually proved
that the taking had transpired on January 2, 1996; and that the discrepancy would unduly prejudice her rights as
an accused to be informed of the charges as to enable her to prepare for her defense. But the petitioner’s
submission is untenable.

The sufficiency of the allegation of the time or date of the commission of the offense, Section 6 and Section 11,
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, the rules applicable, provide: Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or
information. – A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the
offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense; and the place wherein the offense was
committed. When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the
complaint or information.

Section 11. Time of the commission of the offense. – It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information
the precise time at which the offense was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense,
but the act may be alleged to have been committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense
was committed as the information or complaint will permit.

Conformably with these rules, the information was sufficient because it stated the approximate time of the
commission of the offense through the words "on or about the 2nd of January, 1996," and the accused could
reasonably deduce the nature of the criminal act with which she was charged from a reading of its contents as
well as gather by such reading whatever she needed to know about the charge to enable her to prepare her
defense.

The information herein did not have to state the precise date when the offense was committed, considering that
the date was not a material ingredient of the offense. As such, the offense of qualified theft could be alleged to
be committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission.

Whether or not the RTC correctly found that the accused had waived her right to present evidence in her
defense

Under the rule, the RTC properly declared the accused to have waived her right to present evidence because she
did not obtain the express leave of court for her demurrer to evidence, thereby reflecting her voluntary and
knowing waiver of her right to present evidence. The RTC did not need to inquire into the voluntariness and
intelligence of the waiver, for her opting to file her demurrer to evidence without first obtaining express leave of
court effectively waived her right to present her evidence.

The rule in point is Section 15, Rule 119, of the Revised Rules of Court, viz: Section 15. Demurrer to evidence. –
After the prosecution has rested its case, the court may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence: (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution an opportunity to be heard; or (2) on motion of
the accused filed with prior leave of court.

If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense.
When the accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave of court, he waives the right to present
evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution.

Whether or not the extrajudicial admission of taking the amount involved contained in the letter of the accused
to the president of Prudential Bank was admissible under the rules and jurisprudence.

The letter was not an extrajudicial confession whose validity depended on its being executed with the assistance
of counsel and its being under oath, but a voluntary party admission under Section 26,23 Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court that was admissible against her. An admission, if voluntary, is admissible against the admitter for the
reason that it is fair to presume that the admission corresponds with the truth, and it is the admitter’s fault if
the admission does not. By virtue of its being made by the party himself, an admission is competent primary
evidence against the admitter. Worth pointing out is that the letter was not a confession due to its not expressly
acknowledging the guilt of the accused for qualified theft. Under Section 30,26 Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, a
confession is a declaration of an accused acknowledging guilt for the offense charged, or for any offense
necessarily included therein. Nonetheless, there was no need for a counsel to have assisted the accused when
she wrote the letter because she spontaneously made it while not under custodial investigation. Her insistence
on the assistance of a counsel might be valid and better appreciated had she made the letter while under arrest,
or during custodial investigation, or under coercion by the investigating authorities of the Government. The
distinction of her situation from that of a person arrested or detained and under custodial investigation for the
commission of an offense derived from the clear intent of insulating the latter from police coercion or
intimidation underlying Section 12 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution, which provides: Section
12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of
his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any
other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. (3) Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. (4) The law shall provide for
penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of
torture or similar practices, and their families. To reiterate, the rights under Section 12, supra, are available to
"any person under investigation for the commission of an offense." The phrase does not cover all kinds of
investigations, but contemplates only a situation wherein "a person is already in custody as a suspect, or if the
person is the suspect, even if he is not yet deprived in any significant way of his liberty."27 The situation of the
accused was not similar to that of a person already in custody as a suspect, or if the person is the suspect, even
if she is not yet deprived in any significant way of his liberty.