Airbus CRM

A.C.R.M.
SIMULATOR BRIEFING INSTRUCTOR’S GUIDE
Human resources
© Dédale 1996-2000
Ourselves
ACRM - 2000 Briefing simulator - V4
© Dédale 1996-1998
DATE: APR 2000 Page 1 SIMDEBRIEF
A.C.R.M.
The buffer zone

Mental Resources
to control
Warning Signals:
Situation
“You’re losing
Awareness
control!”
© Dédale 1996-2000
Loss of
control
In control
Mental Resources
to control
Actions
If we were talking about machines (e.g. the autopilot) , perhaps we could talk about
control as a relatively simple phenomenon - either in control or out of control.
But it is not so simple, or so dangerous, for humans.
Fortunately for us, there is a buffer zone that sends warning signals that one is starting to
lose control. This signals come from yourself, the others and the aircraft systems.
Activity in this area can alert the person to adjust the use of their mental resources so as
to regain their full control and the safety of the ‘green zone’.
In most cases, losing control can be prevented because specific signals warn us that we
are reaching the limits of the control envelope.
For example:
When we start to become overloaded, we feel it, and we manage the available resources
accordingly, usually by deciding to do fewer tasks or by sharing the workload with
another.
And conversely, when we are distracted or thinking of other things, slips and errors alert
us that we need to bring our mental resources back to the task at hand.
We will talk more about the different warning signals and what they mean as we go
through the day, especially in the module on Error Management.
© Dédale 1996-1998
A.C.R.M.
Different modes of control
Strategic
Tactical
Opportunistic
Opportunistic
© Dédale 1996-2000 Scrambled
More goals; More anticipation and planning;

Broader time and spatial horizons
(Source: Hollnagel’ Contextual Control Model)
There are different ‘modes’ of control:

u strategic control: long term planning, big picture, strategic decisions (e.g. fuel,
diversion, etc.),
u tactical control: short term anticipation, procedures, tactical decisions (e.g.
after failure decision or landing procedures; using ‘selected’ mode in the FCU
to anticipate changes from ATC)
u opportunistic control: real time, relevant reactions to unexpected events, no
anticipation, (e.g., There is a roadblock which interrupts your drive, but you see
an alternate route you were not previously aware of)
u scrambled control: real time, irrelevant reactions to events; very close to loss
of control; can reach the ‘panic’ behavior. (eg, sudden decompression -
immediate reaction is reflexive… close to loss of control depending on the
pilot’s previous experience)
Note: Clarify that ‘scrambled’ here does not have the same meaning as in the military
(immediate takeoff in 2 minutes in response to enemy alert). Such a military action
would be considered as opportunistic and tactical control in the above model.
During a flight, efficient performance implies a dynamic mix of the first 3 levels. There
will be more strategic control at some periods (e.g. pre-flight), more tactical control at
others (e.g. landing). And, efficient anticipation ensures good use of opportunistic
control when actual events deviate from the expected events.
Different modes of control are associated with a different time and spatial horizons.
The further you are thinking into the future, the more you are likely to be involved with
strategic control; conversely, the more you are trapped by the present and unexpected
events, the more likely you will be focused on opportunistic or even scrambled control.
© Dédale 1996-1998
A.C.R.M.
Listen to your errors!
What
Whathappened?
happened? Why?
Why? What
Whatdid
did you
youlearn?
learn?
Time pressure Manage time
Forgetting to ... Attention capture Prioritize tasks
© Dédale 1996-2000
Inattention Use check list
Seeing / hearing
Too much anticipation “What if not ?”
what was expected
More attention
Slip, lapse Routine errors More monitoring
“What may be different?”
Make it simple
Wrong reasoning Inadequate knowledge
Stick to SOP
Here are some broad categories of errors:

u forgetting to do something
u making a slip, a routine error (skill-based error)
u expectation bias (expecting to see something based on the wrong mental
template)
u poor reasoning (knowledge-based error).
For each of these categories there can be several reasons why they occurred, from time
pressure, to complacency or under-investment, poor knowledge.
The important thing is to learn from your errors.

“Listen to your errors, not your ego.”
Example:
You take a 100-item test, and you get two items wrong. 3 months later, what are you
most likely to remember? The two that you got wrong!!
© Dédale 1996-1998
A.C.R.M.
Control during
Transition
Mental Resources
to control
Sit. Awareness
© Dédale 1996-2000
Mental Resources
Mental Effort to control
to stay in control on Actions
the new Aircraft
What is happening now on the new aircraft?
First you have to learn new systems knowledge and maneuvers. You have to start to
build your new skills and expectations. You need more mental resources to control
your actions.
Second you have to monitor your old habits and routines from the previous aircraft,
making sure they are appropriate or adapting them for the new context. You need more
mental resources to control Situation Awareness, because the new aircraft is not so
familiar, your mental picture and expectations are weaker.
© Dédale 1996-1998
A.C.R.M.
Becoming an expert..
again
• Identify what is
similar
• Practice your
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skills
• Identify what is different

• Resist inadequate routines
Using this graph again, the question is how to rebuild your expertise, to build up control
capacity on the new aircraft so that it is as strong as on your previous aircraft…
For now it is important to appreciate that some aspects will be the same, especially
your basic airmanship and the higher order planning, anticipating, and strategic
control.
Also that traps such as habits lie in wait for the overloaded and the underloaded
pilot.
© Dédale 1996-1998
A.C.R.M.
Template for ‘Cruise’
Descent
preparation
© Dédale 1996-2000
Briefing before
descent, Fuel check
Mode change
at TOD
Waypoints,
ATC..
Weather, Nav..
What do we mean by Mental Template? The dictionary meaning of ‘template’ is:

“a pattern, mould, or the like, used as a guide in mechanical work; to transfer a design
onto a work surface.”
A template is more than just a recipe or procedure for how to perform the relevant
actions;
u a mental template or guide includes the goal which drives the actions
(recall the role of goals in our model of control)
u also the expectations that we develop for what is about to happen, our
anticipative control.
u The template also guides our scanning of the environment for relevant cues
to test and confirm our understanding of the situation.
With learning, repetition and experience, we develop hundreds of mental templates and
store them in our brains, waiting for the appropriate situation to trigger them.
To return to our example, you have assessed your situation sufficiently to realize you are
in cruise. Can you describe some of the features of your mental template for ‘cruise’ -
your goal, expectations, actions and relevant cues?
Just as in our model of control, each of these influences the other. Mental expectations
are cross-checked against physical cues, which provide the feedback about whether the
result is matching the goal or whether the actions, or goals, need to be modified.
© Dédale 1996-1998
A.C.R.M.
To detect a loss of
situation awareness
Signals that you might be missing something:

u Unexplained discrepancies
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– Unusual timing
– Unexpected results
– Communication mismatch
u GPWS warning
u ‘‘Something seems strange, it doesn’t feel
right’’
u Healthy doubt, ...
These signals should alert you that your situation awareness is poor:
u Unexplained discrepancies
• Unusual timing
• Unexpected results
• Ambiguities in communication
u A feeling that something looks strange. You have to listen to your intuition
u Healthy doubt is being willing to be a little ‘on edge’ (anxious, cautious); to

maintain a level of skeptical inquiry, of active monitoring, of being willing to
check and cross-check
And the list is not exhaustive.
© Dédale 1996-1998
A.C.R.M.
To recover a loss of
situation awareness
u Communicate: express any doubt, ask for external

assistance
u Set time deadlines to act
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u Avoid fixation on the past problem: Debrief what
happened after the flight
u Keep It Simple Stable and Safe
– Change the question: move back to the big picture, to the last
thing you were sure of
– Change the information source: use raw data, basic information,
external inputs
– Change the automation level (or take over)
u Recognize your limits, communicate, express your doubts and listen. You
should not feel ashamed. If both crew members have a poor situation
awareness, they can ask for help from ATC, Ops, other airborne aircraft, ...
u Set a time deadline and develop contingencies, eg, X minutes to diagnose the
problem, otherwise go to Plan B.
u Avoid fixating on a past problem. Look forward. After the flight, you will have
time to debrief what happened.
u Keep or come back to a triple S situation; a Stable, Simple and Safe situation.
u Change your information sources. Use raw data to confirm inputs from the
system. Don't forget you have stand-by instruments. Also use external inputs.
u Change the question. Try to recover a ‘big picture’. Come back to the last thing
you were sure of and then rebuild the big picture from there.
u Take over, or change the automation level. This will help you to look at the
situation from a different perspective.
Note: The moment you start to detect a loss of SA, you are already on the road to
recovering or rebuilding (updating) your SA. So many of the same things that help you
detect a loss of SA are also useful for rebuilding SA.
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A.C.R.M.
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© Dédale 1996-1998
A.C.R.M.
Human resources
© Dédale 1996-2000
The crew
© Dédale 1996-1998
A.C.R.M.
Factors affecting
teamwork
u Communication: quantity & quality

u Briefings: timing, content and style
u Leadership & followership styles
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u Workload & time pressure
u Stress, illness, fatigue
u Physical factors: Noise, heat, cold
u Differences in crew position, experience, age
u Mixed-culture crews: country, company
u Disagreements
The quantity and quality of communication can certainly affect teamwork.

Stress and interpersonal conflicts can also affect synergy, as it will be more difficult to
have a friendly atmosphere in the cockpit.
Difference in crew hierarchy can affect synergy in a cockpit. A very young copilot
flying with the airline's chief pilot may find it difficult to express his doubts about a
decision. This will also be true on an instruction flight or a check flight.
The same will happen in a cockpit when the captain is highly experienced as compared
to the FO. But it could also prove difficult for a young captain to implement his
leadership when faced with an experienced FO.
Flying with pilots from a different country or company may be different to what you
are accustomed. In a multicultural cockpit, your fellow crew member may not react as
you would. You may have trouble understanding him. This is all the more true when
mother tongues are different, causing a reduction in communication.
The extent to which the crew are engaging in shared mental models and shared,
constantly updated situation awareness will affect the smoothness and effectiveness of
the teamwork.
© Dédale 1996-1998
A.C.R.M.
Manage time
First
fix a decision
deadline !
u
© Dédale 1996-2000
Stabilize the situation
u Assess time factors
u Prioritize tasks
u Keep everyone in the loop
– moderate time pressure: involve everyone
– extreme time pressure: act and inform everyone
Time pressure is very important in aeronautics, and it especially affects decision

making. Time pressure reduces the time available for situation assessment and proper
evaluation of different options. So if at all possible, buy some time.
Here are some tips.
u First of all, fix a decision deadline. E.g.: “We need to come up with a decision
within 15 minutes. At that time, we must accept the information we have and
decide!”.
u Stabilize the situation. If the time available allows it, ask for a holding pattern or
radar assistance for example.
u Assess time factors: a holding pattern is OK if you have enough fuel. You should
be aware of the time you can spend.
u Prioritize: start with the emergency, then you can work back to the abnormal and
secondary importance items.
u Manage workload: use your team, delegate. E.g., the flight attendant can go and
check for evidence of smoke at the rear of the cabin.
u If you want everybody to follow the decision process and understand the objectives
given, you must let everybody follow you:
- if the time allows it, keep everyone involved in the decision making process
(in other words, adapt the decision process speed to the “slowest” crew
member);
- under extreme time pressure, there is no time for discussion! The Captain
decides, acts and then informs the other(s) about the decision made.
© Dédale 1996-1998
A.C.R.M.
Error Management:
The Crew
u Communication
u Read-backs (ATC)
i
u Call outs
u Cross checking
© Dédale 1996-2000
u Briefings
u Check-lists
u Procedures
However competent the aircraft systems capabilities are, the main error management tool
is the crew.
You are intelligent, the computers are not. Computers have been called ‘dumb and
dutiful’ - they will only do what you tell them. You understand the situation, the
computers do not. You know what you intend to do, the computers do not. Therefore you
need to communicate between crew members, to read back all ATC messages. Making
the call-out, cross-checking and carrying out briefings are error management tools at the
disposal of the crew.
Check-lists and procedures are also tools the crew can use to detect and correct error.
Let’s have a look at these two items now.
© Dédale 1996-1998
A.C.R.M.
Using the crew as a

resource
Mental Resources
to control
Sit. Awareness
© Dédale 1996-2000
Mental Resources
to control
Actions
Recall our control model.

Having a crew rather than just one person in the cockpit, really adds potential to the
control envelope. It is as if we can increase the size of the envelope.
But as we have seen in the Towers exercise, a crew has to be working well together
before they can really expand their control envelope.
So let’s a talk a little about the factors which affect teamwork.
© Dédale 1996-1998
A.C.R.M.
Communication
Summary
u Use briefings, call-outs and procedures with
discipline
u Prepare your message: use simple, standard
language, be clear & unambiguous
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u Manage interruptions: respect the receiver’s task,
protect your own task
u Listen actively : Check that you understand and that
you have been understood
u Communication is not only verbal: Gestures,
attitudes, even silences can send a ‘mixed message’
© Dédale 1996-1998
A.C.R.M.
Decisions based on
Situation Assessment
Situation A Situation B
© Dédale 1996-2000
Action 1 Action 2
If Situation A, do Action 1 If Situation B, do Action 2
We will talk about two types of decisions. The first focuses on situation assessment, the
second focuses on evaluating different options.
Example:
Imagine there is smoke in the cockpit. If it is due to an electrical problem, then the
procedure is straightforward. If the smoke is due to a pneumatic problem, the procedure
is very different, but it is also very straightforward. In each case, the ECAM status page
is a solid support. As soon as you can diagnose the situation, the correct course of action
will be apparent.
The situation assessment is the problem, not the action to take: you know what to do in
each case.. So you need to put your energy into gathering the information that will
verify your diagnosis.
© Dédale 1996-1998
A.C.R.M.
Traps and tips
Wrong situation Can it be

awareness something else?
© Dédale 1996-2000
Relevant cues Are we
missed missing something?
Here are some traps and tips concerning these “situation assessment dependent
decisions”.
Traps are boxed in red (left side):
u Your situation awareness can be poor or inaccurate such that you fail to
diagnose very clearly
u The poor SA in turn leads you to miss relevant cues. Alternately, you may not
have the proper knowledge (lack of expertise).
u As a consequence, you can hesitate between wrong options: the situation is
perhaps neither Situation A nor Situation B, but something else
Tips are boxed in green (right side):

Try to broaden your set of interpretations, i.e. try to think about the situation in another
way, from another point of view, using other cues:
u Can it be something else?
u Are we missing something?
u Is there any other option?
Note: You are supposing here there is no strong time pressure: you have plenty of time to
think and improve the decision process.
© Dédale 1996-1998
A.C.R.M.
Decisions based on
Mental Simulation
Unusual
Situation
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Will option A work?
Will option B work?
Will option X work?
Let’s now consider another type of decision. Here the situation is unusual or non-
standard, and your job is to decide the best possible course of action. There is little
doubt as to what has happened. But the problem lies in the solution.
Example:
You have a passenger medical emergency about half-way through your flight, and there
is no professional medical help available (you can not reach the company’s medical
advice service, and there are no medical professionals in the passenger list). You need to
decide if it is best to return to your original airport, to continue as planned, to divert, …?
Here you really need to consider each option and its feasibility. Are there any problems
further along to be considered. Eg., is there suitable medical help where you want to
land? Is there accommodation for the other passengers if needed? Is there a company
fueling station?
You go through the options in your mind (mental simulation) to discover if anything
important could go wrong. If problems are foreseen, then the option might be modified
or rejected altogether, and another typical action plan is explored.
Note: the process is simplified under severe time pressure: fewer options are considered
(as few as one in case of strong pressure) and the option evaluation is simplified.
Another example:
You have lost one engine and all associated hydraulic and electrical systems.
There is no doubt as to what has happened. But the problem lies in the solution.
What should you do?
u go back to the departure airport? go on to destination? divert? Trouble-shoot
and try to restore systems?
Mental simulation will allow you to choose one option by evaluating consequences:
What fuel? What weather? What about the passengers? What about maintenance? etc.
© Dédale 1996-1998
A.C.R.M.
Traps and tips
Wrong option Is this a good solution?

considered Is there another option?
Choosing a solution Can I make it?

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you can’t implement Can we make it as a crew?
Looking for Is there negative

confirming cues only evidence?
How does the situation

No decision follow up
evolve after the decision?
What are the traps and tips specific to decisions based on mental simulation?
Traps are boxed in red (left side):
u You can choose an option that is poor or ignore one that might be more
effective.
u You can decide the “the best” solution and then realize you can’t implement it.
Novice pilots (or new on type) are particularly likely to be trapped this way
because they don’t yet have a good knowledge of what they can do with the
aircraft
u Humans have the tendency to look for confirming cues or supporting evidence
only. In other words, we tend to look for data (instrument values, events, etc.)
that confirm our initial decision, and rarely look for evidence that would show
us we are wrong. Because to this so-called “confirmation bias”, it is very
difficult to change the initial decision.
u No decision-follow up is another trap, as the situation may evolve differently
from what we expected at the time we were assessing the different options.
Example: Because the weather is foggy at destination, a crew decides to embark 20
additional T of fuel. The extra fuel makes them very confident. Shortly before arrival, the
destination airport closes. The crew decides to stay airborne to burn fuel without
questioning the situation (no situation re-assessment). But diversion n° 1 airport closes
and then diversion n° 2 airport too! The crew has then to invent a new solution, for which
it was not prepared: they finally decide to land in the nearest available airport, but far
below the fuel minimum!
Tips are boxed in green (right side):
u Try to widen the range of options.
u Ask yourself if you can make it, individually and as a crew. Choose a solution
that is realistic and well within your capabilities; One that you can
implement even if it is not “the best one” (risk assessment)
u Look for negative evidence:”Is there anything telling us we are wrong?”;
u Follow up your decisions: watch how the situation evolves and be ready to
adapt your decision or strategy accordingly.
Note: We again suppose here there is no strong time pressure. Under pressure, the first
acceptable solution is often taken. There is no time to search for a better or best solution.
Just a safe solution.
© Dédale 1996-1998
A.C.R.M.
Decision support:
The Captain’s role
Listen, this is
what we are going to do ...
The Captain will:
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u Ask for F/O inputs
u Assess the different options
u Make the decision
u Brief the F/O and all interested
parties (e.g. Cabin Crew)
about the decision made
Good crew work also supports decision making.

We will review the different roles to be played by the two crew members. Let's start with
the Captain.
Ask the trainees: What do you think are the roles that the Captain should play in decision
making? In other words, what is his or her contribution?
What are the Captain’s roles?
u The Captain should invite the First Officer, as well as all other interested parties
(e.g. Cabin crew, ATC, Maintenance, ground personnel, etc.), to contribute.
The Captain sets the tone: it is easier to have the other members contribute if
the Captain invites them to do so.
u The Captain has to assess or evaluate the different options.
u The Captain makes the final decision and is responsible for it.
u He then briefs all interested parties about the decision made, so that everyone
know what to do next. Crew members can not support a decision if they are not
informed.
Note: it is important that these roles be performed respecting your cultural rules and
style (power distance, communication style, etc.).
© Dédale 1996-1998
A.C.R.M.
Decision support:
The First Officer’s role
But the thunderstorm
is still over the airport!
The First Officer will:
u Provide information to
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the Captain
u State his point of view
firmly enough: Assertiveness
u Explain his ideas and suggestions: Advocacy
u Ask questions : Inquiry
u Support the Captain’s decision when it is made
What about the First Officer?

u The First Officer has to provide the Captain with all the relevant information he has. If
time allows it, this will feed the crew decision making process.
u The First Officer should state his point of view firmly enough for the Captain to take it
into account. The style will of course vary according to the culture: in some cultures,
the F/O is allowed to speak up while in others he only can contribute in an indirect
way. No matter what the communication code is, what is important here is the capacity
to feed the decision process. In particular, the First Officer should not let the Captain
be trapped by a wrong decision, especially if safety is endangered (ex. decision to
land in case of an unstabilized approach in bad weather conditions).
u The First Officer should advocate for the option he prefers and justify it in a rational
way.
u The First Officer should ask questions when he or she doesn’t understand, or in case of
doubt.
u As soon as the Captain has made a decision, the First Officer should support the
selected option, even if he was in favor of another one. In case of disagreement and
unless safety is endangered, do not try to prove you were right at all cost! Support the
Captain and implement the decision as a crew!
Some definitions:
Assertiveness: assertiveness is affirming, stating and defending what you consider to be right and
appropriate in the context.
Advocacy: to speak in favour of own position, supporting and defending personal point of view
by means of argument. Providing explanation or rationale about preferred option can improve
decision making because everyone has to think about the other's proposal. This increases the
chances to reject seductive but actually wrong options. Discussing alternatives can also favour
insight (the discovery of a bright new solution).
Inquiry: an investigation attitude which seeks information by asking questions.
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A.C.R.M.
Technical resources
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The aircraft
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A.C.R.M.
Decision support:
Procedures
u Read the procedure,
do not trust
your memory
u Monitor
the result
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FLY!
u Think: assess
the situation,
u Act, call out confirm as a
and cross check crew
Procedures support decision making because they provide:

u elements of diagnosis;
u actions to perform;
u and control elements (cautions, what to do under different conditions, what to
check, etc.).
How to implement a procedure? Here is a sequence for a good implementation. Respect

it especially in case of a procedure you only occasionally perform.
u First, you must read the procedure. Do not try to apply it by heart.
u Think, evaluate the situation, and confirm as a crew. Make sure you are
applying the right procedure, and that you understand it properly.
u Act, call-out and cross-check. Working as a crew facilitates in particular error
detection.
u Finally, always monitor the results of your actions, and assess the global
situation using ECAM status pages.
Warning: never forget to fly the aircraft: Take care of the trajectory!
While you are executing the procedure, the aircraft does not stop!
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A.C.R.M.
Decision support:
Aircraft systems
u In abnormal situations,
decisions are supported
and guided by the
ECAM DO-LIST and
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ECAM STATUS PAGE
u But! The ECAM is a tool,

not a substitute for decision
making!
Aircraft systems also support decision making.

In abnormal situations, the ECAM will usually provide you with the check-lists and
status of the aircraft. This is a very efficient decision aid and will greatly assist your
situation assessment.
The System can also assist when evaluating different options, e.g., fuel calculations for
alternates. The color coding also helps, eg, a red ‘LAND ASAP’ suggests greater
urgency than an amber ‘LAND ASAP’ when trying to evaluate options.
But remember, you are the decision maker, not the ECAM! Even if a do-list shows up
on the ECAM, the decision maker is still the Captain!
Tips:
u Always validate your actions before acting. You must understand why you are
doing what you are doing. Never accept something you don't understand!
u If you encounter if conditions, make sure they are satisfied before
implementing the then action.
u Good judgment and “airmanship” are needed to make good decisions. Don’t
lose the big picture!
Examples where the ECAM is limited in its advice :
In the air, when a door opens or there is a hole, then the Cabin Pressure Controller will
give up (can not cope) and the ECAM will order (blue is do) Cabin Control to be
switched to manual. This action is obviously useless because AUTO or MAN, there is no
control over the cabin pressure.
If you lose one engine, the associated HYD SYS might be lost. If there is a leak in the
2nd HYD SYS, and an OVHT on the remaining, the ECAM will ask to switch OFF the
pumps, but nobody in their right mind would do it (otherwise the A/C will be lost)
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Example of automation
benefit: ECAM
u Need-to-see Concept
u Provide the crew with
timely information about:
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– nature of the failure
– critical actions to be taken
– resulting status of the systems
– non critical clean-up actions
(to be completed when time permits)
ECAM is a good example of automation benefit.

Seeking to limit the effects of failures, ECAM provides the crew with timely
information about:
u the nature of the failure
u critical actions to be taken,
u resulting status of the systems
u non critical ‘clean-up’ actions to be completed when time permits.
Note: The ECAM philosophy relies on the need-to-see concept. By that we mean there
are preset sequences that you can view which will provide you with the relevant
information for the phase of flight you are in.
But, beware, if you watch only this page, you may be out of the loop, and your situation
awareness may be downgraded.
This is the reason why you should periodically review the ECAM system display pages.
© Dédale 1996-1998
A.C.R.M.
Flight modes
1.Because of mental templates, we tend to see

what we expect to see and hardly see the rest!
2.With a wrong flight mode understanding,
the whole mental template will be wrong
© Dédale 1996-2000
u Know and understand your FMA at all times!

u Call out all commanded or unexpected FMA changes!
There are basically two problems here:

u 1. Mental templates set expectations and tell us what to look at.
consequently, we tend to see what we expect to see and hardly see the rest!
This is the main reason why certain information (ex. mode reversion) can
be missed.
u 2. When misunderstanding a flight mode (this is called mode error), the
whole mental template is wrong and all expectations will be wrong.
Situation awareness then starts to deviate from what is really going on (the
actual aircraft behavior).
Safety is seriously endangered!
Some protections:
u You should be aware of the current status of the FMA at all time and
understand the flight mode implication (ex. how does the aircraft behave with
the current mode?)
u Every time a mode changes, be it commanded or unexpected, you should call it
out.
Accident examples
The Bangalore accident, or the Sainte Odile accident are examples of what can happen
when the crew misunderstands the flight mode.
But this is not specific to glass-cockpit aircraft. In 1979, a DC10-30 flying from
Frankfurt to Moscow lost 11000 feet in less than one and a half minutes after it had
stalled while unwittingly climbing in Vertical Speed mode. It took almost one minute for
the crew to realize they were stalling.
© Dédale 1996-1998
A.C.R.M.
Levels of automation
Aircraft reaction time
Managed
Selected
© Dédale 1996-2000
“HEAD DOWN”
LONG INTERACTION
LONG TERM ACTION
“HEAD UP”
SHORT INTERACTION
SHORT TERM ACTION
Basic Interaction time
According to the time you have, you can either go on basic flight, or selected or
managed navigation.
Basic flight will reduce almost to zero your interaction time with the aircraft. But your
workload will be high.
On the contrary, if you use the managed level of automation, the interaction time will be
higher, and so will the aircraft reaction time.
But your workload will be lower.
Select the proper interface:

u If you want short term interaction and short term action, use the heads up, that
is to say the FCU. You will be in selected mode.
u For a long term interaction and a long term action, it is better to use the head
down, that is to say the MCDU.
u It is also a function of confidence. Do not operate a level of automation beyond
your skills and knowledge.
Example:
u MANAGED: You plan to turn on next way point. For this, you enter the next
way point on the MCDU Flight Plan Page.
u SELECTED: ATC asks you to turn heading 220 for Radar Vectoring to ILS.
For this you use the FCU Heading knob
u BASIC: ATC requests you to immediately turn left for safety reasons. For this
you disconnect AP and turn manually to decrease reaction time.
© Dédale 1996-1998

Airbus CRM

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A.C.R.M.

SIMULATOR BRIEFING INSTRUCTOR’S GUIDE

ACRM - 2000 Briefing simulator - V4

The buffer zone

Different modes of control

© Dédale 1996-2000 Scrambled

More goals; More anticipation and planning;

ACRM - 2000 Briefing simulator - V4

(Source: Hollnagel’ Contextual Control Model)

There are different ‘modes’ of control:

Listen to your errors!

ACRM - 2000 Briefing simulator - V4

Here are some broad categories of errors:

The important thing is to learn from your errors.

What is happening now on the new aircraft?

• Identify what is different

ACRM - 2000 Briefing simulator - V4

Template for ‘Cruise’

ACRM - 2000 Briefing simulator - V4

What do we mean by Mental Template? The dictionary meaning of ‘template’ is:

Signals that you might be missing something:

u Healthy doubt is being willing to be a little ‘on edge’ (anxious, cautious); to

u Communicate: express any doubt, ask for external

ACRM - 2000 Briefing simulator - V4

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ACRM - 2000 Briefing simulator - V4

u Communication: quantity & quality

ACRM - 2000 Briefing simulator - V4

The quantity and quality of communication can certainly affect teamwork.

ACRM - 2000 Briefing simulator - V4

Time pressure is very important in aeronautics, and it especially affects decision

Here are some tips.

Using the crew as a

Recall our control model.

ACRM - 2000 Briefing simulator - V4

If Situation A, do Action 1 If Situation B, do Action 2

ACRM - 2000 Briefing simulator - V4

Traps and tips

Wrong situation Can it be

ACRM - 2000 Briefing simulator - V4

Tips are boxed in green (right side):

Will option B work?

Will option X work?

ACRM - 2000 Briefing simulator - V4

Traps and tips

Wrong option Is this a good solution?

Choosing a solution Can I make it?

Looking for Is there negative

How does the situation

ACRM - 2000 Briefing simulator - V4

The Captain will:

Good crew work also supports decision making.

What about the First Officer?

ACRM - 2000 Briefing simulator - V4

ACRM - 2000 Briefing simulator - V4

Procedures support decision making because they provide:

How to implement a procedure? Here is a sequence for a good implementation. Respect

u But! The ECAM is a tool,

ACRM - 2000 Briefing simulator - V4

Aircraft systems also support decision making.

ACRM - 2000 Briefing simulator - V4

ECAM is a good example of automation benefit.

1.Because of mental templates, we tend to see

u Know and understand your FMA at all times!