landmark case. In this classic case of Villavicencio vs.

Lukban, the Supreme Court Liberty of abode was raised here versus the power of the executive of the
upheld the right of Filipino citizens to Freedom of Domicile. Municipality in deporting the women without their knowledge and consent in his
capacity as Mayor.

Facts:
You know what the mayor did? He got technical. The guy moved for the
Justo Lukban was then the Mayor of the City of Manila. Problem with this dude
dismissal of the case stating that those women were already out of his jurisdiction
was he ordered the deportation of 170 agogo dancers and prostitutes to Davao.
and that, it should be filed in the city of Davao instead.
Which was then not a city yet I guess. This case is dated 1919 so take note, the
President wasn't even born yet. Said women were inmates of the houses of
prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc.
The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners with the instructions to the
respondents giving them 3 options (1) Produce the bodies of the persons according
to the command of the writ. (2) Show by affidavit that on account of sickness or
The mayor's reason for doing this was to preserve the morals of the people of Manila.
infirmity those persons (170 women subject of the writ of habeas corpus) could not
safely be brought before the court, or (3) Present affidavits to show that the parties in
question or their attorney waived the right to be present.
He claimed that the prostitutes were sent to Davao, purportedly, to work for an
haciendero named Feliciano Ynigo. He had the prostitutes confined in houses (So the mayor resorted to technicalities in his defense and he was slapped by the
meaning the one in Gardenia Street before boarding them, at the dead of night, in court through technicalities as well giving him a dose of his own medicine)
two boats bound for Davao. The women were under the assumption that they were
The three respondents hence appealed to the Supreme Court.
being transported to another police station while Ynigo, the haciendero from Davao,
had no idea that the women being sent to work for him were actually prostitutes.

So the families of the prostitutes came forward to file charges against 3 people.
Lukban. Anton Hohmann, who was the Chief of Police who rounded and took
custody of the the dancers and prostitutes, and Francisco Sales, the Governor of
Davao.
They prayed for a WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS to be issued against the
respondents to compel them to bring back the 170 women who were deported to
Mindanao against their knowledge and will. During the trial, it came out that, indeed,
the women were deported without their consent. Infact there was no law or order
authorizing Lukban's deportation of the 170 prostitutes.
(So in effect, Lukban forcibly assigned them a new domicile. Obviously the guy doesn't
know anything about the law and fundamental human rights)
ISSUE: Whether we are a government of laws or a government of men? Was the act
of the mayor in deporting these women valid?
RULING: The Supreme Court said "We are clearly a government of laws". Lukban
committed grave abuse of discretion by deporting the prostitutes to a new domicile
against their will.
There is no law expressly authorizing his action. On the contrary, there is a law
punishing public officials, not expressly authorized by law or regulation, who compels
any person to change his residence.
Furthermore, the prostitutes are still, as citizens of the Philippines, entitled to
the same rights, as stipulated in the Bill of Rights, as every other citizen. Their choice
of profession should not be a cause for discrimination. It may make some, like Lukban,
quite uncomfortable but it does not authorize anyone to compel said prostitutes to
isolate themselves from the rest of the human race. These women have been
deprived of their liberty by being exiled to Davao without even being given the
opportunity to collect their belongings or, worse,without even consenting to being
transported to Mindanao. For this, Lukban et al must be severely punished.
Court reasoned further that if the chief executive of any municipality in the
Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the
boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official
action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint
and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality, then the
more the writ of habeas corpus should be enforced.
Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the
custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ
should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law,
could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must
necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila.
The Supreme Court said that the women were not chattels but Filipino citizens
who had the fundamental right not to be forced to change their place of residence.
The then mayor of Manila Justo Lukban loses this case.
Kuroda v. Jalandoni,
THE FACTS: Petitioner Shigenori Kuroda, the Commanding General of the Japanese
Imperial Forces in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation, was charged before
the Philippine Military Commission of war crimes. He questioned the constitutionality
of E.O. No. 68 that created the National War Crimes Office and prescribed rules on
the trial of accused war criminals. He contended the Philippines is not a signatory to
the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and therefore
he is charged of crimes not based on law, national and international.
II. THE ISSUES Was E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional?
III. THE RULING [The Court DENIED the petition and upheld the validity and
constitutionality of E.O. No. 68.]
YES, E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional.
Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that –
The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national
policy and adopts the generally accepted principles of international
law as part of the law of the nation.
In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of
the present day including the Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and
significant precedents of international jurisprudence established by the United Nation
all those person military or civilian who have been guilty of planning preparing or
waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses
consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the laws and customs of war, of
humanity and civilization are held accountable therefor. Consequently in the
promulgation and enforcement of Execution Order No. 68 the President of the
Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally accepted and policies of
international law which are part of the our Constitution.
Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no jurisdiction to
try petitioner for acts committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the
Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed
the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of the
Hague and Geneva conventions form, part of and are wholly based on the generally
accepted principals of international law. In facts these rules and principles were
accepted by the two belligerent nations the United State and Japan who were
signatories to the two Convention. Such rule and principles therefore form part of the
law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions
embodying them for our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in
its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule and principle of international
law as contained in treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a
signatory.
SJ vs Lantion
Facts: On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department
of Foreign Affairs of the United States requesting for the extradition of Mark Jimenez
for various crimes in violation of US laws. In compliance with the related municipal
law, specifically Presidential Decree No. 1069 “Prescribing the Procedure for
Extradition of Persons Who Have committed Crimes in a Foreign Country” and the
established “Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and the
Government of the United States of America”, the department proceeded with
proceeded with the designation of a panel of attorneys to conduct a technical
evaluation and assessment as provided for in the presidential decree and the treaty.
The respondent requested for a copy of the official extradition request as well as the
documents and papers submitted therein. The petitioner denied the request as it
alleges that such information is confidential in nature and that it is premature to
provide such document as the process is not a preliminary investigation but a mere
evaluation. Therefore, the constitutional rights of the accused are not yet available.
Issue: 1.Whether or not private respondent, Mark B. Jimenez, be granted access to
the official extradition request and documents with an opportunity to file a comment
on or opposition thereto
2.Whether or not private respondent’s entitlement to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the
Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the private respondent be furnished a copy of
the extradition request and its supporting papers and to give him a reasonable period
of time within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. In this case, there
exists a clear conflict between the obligation of the Philippine Government to comply
with the provisions of the treaty and its equally significant role of protection of its
citizens of its right of due process.
The processes outlined in the treaty and in the presidential decree already pose an
impending threat to a prospective extraditee’s liberty as early as the evaluation stage.
It is not an imagined threat to his liberty, but a very imminent one. On the other hand,
granting due process to the extradition case causes delay in the process.
The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of
international law, requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in
good faith. The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are
confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of
international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of a local state.
Efforts should be done to harmonize them. In a situation, however, where the conflict
is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and
municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the
municipal courts. The doctrine of incorporation decrees that rules of international law
are given equal standing, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments.
In this case, there is no conflict between international law and municipal law. The
United States and the Philippines share a mutual concern about the suppression and
punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions. At the same time, both States
accord common due process protection to their respective citizens. In fact, neither
the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes the rights of due process from a
prospective extradite.
Pharmaceutical vs Duque
FACTS : Named as respondents are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries, and
Assistant Secretaries of the Department of Health (DOH). For purposes of herein
petition, the DOH is deemed impleaded as a co-respondent since respondents issued
the questioned RIRR in their capacity as officials of said executive agency.1Executive
Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on October 28,
1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom
Constitution. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law
seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk
Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981.
From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that
breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be
ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk
substitutes.In 1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights
of the Child. Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties should take
appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all
segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the advantages of
breastfeeding. On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which was to
take effect on July 7, 2006.
Issue: . Whether Administrative Order or the Revised Implementing Rules and
Regulations (RIRR) issued by the Department of Health (DOH) is not constitutional;
Held: YES
Under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for
members,in the same way that conventions or agreements under Article 19 and
regulations under Article 21 come into force. Article 23 of the WHO Constitution
reads:
Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make recommendations
to Members with respect to any matter within the competence of the Organization
for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established
that such rule is being followed by states because they consider it obligatory to
comply with such rules
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of
domestic law either
By transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an
international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional
mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere
constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic
law.
Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA
Resolutions into domestic law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be
considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by executive
agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature.
ALih vs Castro
Facts:Respondents who were members of the Philippine marine and defense forces
raided the compound occupied by petitioner in search of loose firearms, ammunitions
and explosives. A shoot-out ensued after petitioners resisted the intrusion by the
respondents, killing a number of men. The following morning, the petitioners were
arrested and subjected to finger –printing, paraffin testing and photographing
despite their objection. Several kinds of rifle, grenades and ammunitions were also
confiscated.The petitioners filed an injunction suit with a prayer to have the items
illegally seized returned to them and invoked the provisions on the Bill of RightsThe
respondents admitted that the operation was done without a warrant but reasoned
that they wereacting under superior orders and that operation was necessary
because of the aggravation of the peace and order problem due to the assassination
of the city mayor.
Issue:Whether or not the seizing of the items and the taking of the fingerprints and
photographs of the petitioners and subjecting them to paraffin testing are violative of
the bill of Rights and are inadmissible as evidence against them.
Held:The court held that superior orders nor the suspicion that the respondents had
against petitioners did not excuse the former from observing the guaranty provided
for by the constitution against unreasonable searches and seizure. The petitioners
were entitled to due process and should be protected from the arbitrary actions of
those tasked to execute the law. Furthermore, there was no showing that the
operation was urgent nor was there any showing of the petitioners as criminals or
fugitives of justice to merit approval by virtue of Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of
Court.The items seized, having been the “fruits of the poisonous tree” were held
inadmissible as evidence in any proceedings against the petitioners. The operation by
the respondents was done without a warrant and so the items seized during said
operation should not be acknowledged in court as evidence. But said evidence should
remain in the custody of the law (custodia egis).However, as to the issue on
finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-testing as violative of the provision
against self-incrimination, the court held that the prohibition against
self-incrimination applies to testimonial compulsion only. As Justice Holmes put it in
People v. Lagman and Sosa, 66 Phil. 13, July 13, 1938Avanceña, C.J.
Facts: The appellants Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de Sosa are charged with a
violation of Sec. 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the National Defense Law
for being Filipinos having been reached the age 20 years in 1936, willfully and
unlawfully refused to register in the military service between the 1st and 7th of
April of the said year, notwithstanding the fact that they had been required to do so.
The Court of First Instance of Bataan sentenced each of the appellants one month and
one day of imprisonment with the cost.
Aglipay vs Ruiz

Issue: Whether or not the National Defense Law is unconstitutional.

Facts of the Case: The Director of Posts announced on May 1936 in Manila
newspapers that he would order the issuance of postage stamps for the
Ruling: The Constitutionality of said law was upheld.The appellants do not deny the
commemoration of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress celebration in the City
facts, but they alleged in defense that they have not registered in the military service
of Manila. The said event was organized by the Roman Catholic Church. Monsignor
because Primitivo de Sosa is fatherless and has a mother and a brother to support and
Gregorio Aglipay, the petitioner, is the Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent
Tranquilino Lagman also has a father to support, has no military leanings, and does
Church, requested Vicente Sotto who is a member of the Philippine Bar to raise the
not wish to kill or be killed.
matter to the President. The said stamps in consideration were actually issued already
Under Sec. 2 of Article II of the Philippine Constitution, “The defense of the State and sold though the greater part thereof remained unsold. The further sale of the
is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be stamps was sought to be prevented by the petitioner.
required by law to render personal military or civil service.” The
National Defense Law, insofar as it establishes compulsory military
service, does not go against the constitution, but in the contrary, in faithful Issue: Whether or not the respondent violated the Constitution in issuing and
compliance therewith. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic
performed except through an army, and to leave the organization of an army to the Congress
will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government excusable should
there would be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein.
Held: No, the respondent did not violate the Constitution by issuing and selling
It was also held by the court that the right of the Government to require
the commemorative postage stamps. Ruiz acted under the provision of Act No. 4052,
compulsory military service is a consequence of its duty to defend the State and is
which contemplates no religious purpose in view, giving the Director of Posts the
reciprocal with its duty to defend the life, liberty, and property of the citizen.Citing
discretion to determine when the issuance of new postage stamps would be
the case of Jacobson vs. Massachusetts, the court said
“advantageous to the Government.” Of course, the phrase “advantageous to the
that, without violating the Constitution, a person may be
Government” does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. In the case at bar,
compelled by force, if need be, against his will, against his pecuniary
the issuance of the postage stamps was not intended by Ruiz to favor a particular
interests, and even against his religious or political convictions, to take place in the
church or denomination. The stamps did not benefit the Roman Catholic Church, nor
ranks of the army of his country, and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense.
were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. The purpose of
In US vs. Olson, it was also said that this is not deprivation of property without due
issuing of the stamps was to actually take advantage of an international event
process of the law since in its just sense, there is no right of property to an office or
considered to be a great opportunity to give publicity to the Philippines and as a
employment. These justify that compulsory military service is the defense of the
result attract more tourists to the country. In evaluating the design made for the
State, whether actual or whether in preparation to make it more effective, in case of
stamp, it showed the map of the Philippines instead of showing a Catholic chalice. The
need.
focus was on the location of the City of Manila, and it also bore the inscription that
The circumstance that the appellants have dependent families to support does reads “Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937.” In considering
not excuse them from their duty to present themselves before these, it is evident that there is no violation of the Constitution therefore the act of
the Acceptance Board because, if such circumstance exists, they can the issuing of the stamps is constitutional.
ask for deferment in complying with their duty and, at all events,they can obtain the
proper pecuniary allowance to attend to these family responsibilities.
 The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of prohibition, without
pronouncement as to costs.
American Bible Society vs City of Manila
Facts: Plaintiff-appellant is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious, missionary
corporation duly registered and doing business in the Philippines through its
Philippine agency established in Manila in November, 1898. The defendant appellee is
a municipal corporation with powers that are to be exercised in conformity with the
provisions of Republic Act No. 409, known as the Revised Charter of the City of
Manila.
During the course of its ministry, plaintiff sold bibles and other religious
materials at a very minimal profit.
On May 29 1953, the acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila informed
plaintiff that it was conducting the business of general merchandise since November,
1945, without providing itself with the necessary Mayor's permit and municipal
license, in violation of Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Ordinances Nos. 2529,
3028 and 3364, and required plaintiff to secure, within three days, the corresponding
permit and license fees, together with compromise covering the period from the 4th
quarter of 1945 to the 2nd quarter of 1953, in the total sum of P5,821.45 (Annex A).
Plaintiff now questions the imposition of such fees.
Issue: Whether or not the said ordinances are constitutional and valid
(contention: it restrains the free exercise and enjoyment of the religious profession
and worship of appellant).
Held: Section 1, subsection (7) of Article III of the Constitution, provides that:
(7) No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof, and the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No
religion test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. The provision
aforequoted is a constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, which carries with it the right to disseminate
religious information.
It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked for the bibles and other
religious pamphlets was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of
the same but this cannot mean that appellant was engaged in the business or
occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit. For this reason. The Court believe
that the provisions of City of Manila Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, cannot be
applied to appellant, for in doing so it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of
its religious profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious
beliefs.
With respect to Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, the Court do not find that it
imposes any charge upon the enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution, nor
tax the exercise of religious practices.
It seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered
unconstitutional, however inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the
plaintiff. As to Ordinance No. 2529 of the City of Manila, as amended, is also not
applicable, so defendant is powerless to license or tax the business of plaintiff Society.
Estrada vs. Escritor
FACTS: Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas
City. Alejandro Estrada, the complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding
judge of Branch 253, RTC of Las Pinas City, requesting for an investigation of rumors
that Escritor has been living with Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man not her husband, and
had eventually begotten a son. Escritor’s husband, who had lived with another
woman, died a year before she entered into the judiciary. On the other hand,
Quilapio is still legally married to another woman. Estrada is not related to either
Escritor or Quilapio and is not a resident of Las Pinas but of Bacoor,
Cavite. According to the complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain
employed in the judiciary for it will appear as if the court allows such act.
Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the
Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society where her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio is
in conformity with their religious beliefs. After ten years of living together, she
executed on July 28, 1991 a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” which was
approved by the congregation. Such declaration is effective when legal impediments
render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union. Gregorio, Salazar, a member
of the Jehovah’s Witnesses since 1985 and has been a presiding minister since 1991,
testified and explained the import of and procedures for executing the declaration
which was completely executed by Escritor and Quilapio’s in Atimonan, Quezon and
was signed by three witnesses and recorded in Watch Tower Central Office.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative
charge of “gross and immoral conduct” and be penalized by the State for such
conjugal arrangement.
HELD: A distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should
be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular
morality.
The Court states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach
that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free
Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of
morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.
The state’s interest is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by maintaining
among its ranks a high standard of morality and decency. “There is nothing in the
OCA’s (Office of the Court Administrator) memorandum to the Court that
demonstrates how this interest is so compelling that it should override respondent’s
plea of religious freedom. Indeed, it is inappropriate for the complainant, a private
person, to present evidence on the compelling interest of the state. The burden of
evidence should be discharged by the proper agency of the government which is the
Office of the Solicitor General”.
In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential that the government be given
an opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in
opposing the respondent’s position that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and
punishable as it is within the scope of free exercise protection. The Court could not
prohibit and punish her conduct where the Free Exercise Clause protects it, since this
would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious
freedom. Furthermore, the court cannot simply take a passing look at respondent’s
claim of religious freedom but must also apply the “compelling state interest” test.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the Office of the Court Administrator.
The Solicitor General is ordered to intervene in the case where it will be given the
opportunity (a) to examine the sincerity and centrality of respondent's claimed
religious belief and practice; (b) to present evidence on the state's "compelling
interest" to override respondent's religious belief and practice; and (c) to show that
the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to
respondent's religious freedom. The rehearing should be concluded thirty (30) days
from the Office of the Court Administrator's receipt of this Decision.