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1. FELICISIMO F. LAZARTE, JR., PETITIONER, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION) AND PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS. G.R. No. 180122, March 13, 2009

This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the Resolution
dated 2 March 2007 of the First Division of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 26583 entitled, "People of
the Philippines v. Robert P. Balao, et al.," which denied petitioner Felicisimo F. Lazarte, Jr.'s Motion to
Quash. The Resolution dated 18 October 2007 of said court denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration is
likewise challenged in this petition.

The antecedents follow.

In June 1990, the National Housing Authority (NHA) awarded the original contract for the infrastructure works
on the Pahanocoy Sites and Services Project, Phase 1 in Bacolod City to A.C. Cruz Construction. The project,
with a contract cost of P7, 666,507.55, was funded by the World Bank under the Project Loan Agreement
forged on 10 June 1983 between the Philippine Government and the IBRD-World Bank.

A.C. Cruz Construction commenced the infrastructure works on 1 August 1990. In April 1991, the complainant
Candido M. Fajutag, Jr.(Fajutag, Jr.) was designated Project Engineer of the project.

A Variation/Extra Work Order No. 1 was approved for the excavation of unsuitable materials and road filling
works. As a consequence, Arceo Cruz of A.C. Cruz Construction submitted the fourth billing and Report of
Physical Accomplishments on 6 May 1991. Fajutag, Jr., however, discovered certain deficiencies. As a result,
he issued Work Instruction No. 1 requiring some supporting documents, such as: (1) copy of approved
concrete pouring; (2) survey results of original ground and finished leaks; (3) volume calculation of earth fill
actually rendered on site; (4) test results as to the quality of materials and compaction; and (5) copy of work
instructions attesting to the demolished concrete structures.

The contractor failed to comply with the work instruction. Upon Fajutag, Jr.'s further verification, it was
established that there was no actual excavation and road filling works undertaken by A.C. Cruz Construction.
Fajutag, Jr.'s findings are summarized as follows:

1. No topographic map was appended, even if the same is necessary in land development works; a
discarded drawing sheet: "Spot Elevations and Existing Gradelines" of the project site was found, but
this contrasted significantly with the alleged joint-survey results in support of the Variation/Extra Work
Order No. 1;

2. No laboratory tests were conducted to ascertain unsuitability of materials, even if the same should have
been required as essential basis thereof;

3. There were no records of the excavation and disposal of unsuitable materials and of road filling works
having been made by the previous engineers, Rodolfo de los Santos and Noel Lobrido at the time said
activities were allegedly executed;

4. The excavation of unsuitable materials and road filling works were overestimated to the prejudice of the
government:
a.
b. in a 10.00 meter right-of-way (ROW) road, the entire width of 10.00 meters was used in
calculating the volume of cut of unsuitable materials when the undisturbed natural grounds on
both sides of the road was only 6.00 meters;

c. the mathematical calculation in determining the volume of cut of unsuitable materials are
contrary to the contract's technical specifications which provides for cut measurements, i.e. by
end-area method;
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d. in a 10.00 ROW road, an effective width of 8.70 meters was used in calculating the volume of
road fill when the undisturbed natural grounds on both sides of the road was only 6.00 meters
apart;

e. the mathematical calculations in determining the volume of roadfill are contrary to the contract's
technical specifications, specifically Section 3.11 thereof, i.e., by end-area method.

5. No laboratory test was made to ascertain the quality of imported road fill materials.
In a Memorandum dated 27 June 1991, the Project Office recommended the termination of the infrastructure
contract with A.C. Construction

In its Report dated 12 August 1991, the Inventory and Acceptance Committee determined the total
accomplishment of the contractor at 40.89%, representing P3,433,713.10 out of the total revised contract
amount of P8,397,225.09 inclusive of Variation Order No. 1 in the amount of P710,717.54. Thereafter, said
Committee recommended that the temporary project suspension imposed by the contractor, which incurred
delays in the project completion, be referred to the Legal Department for appropriate action.

On 19 August 1991, the Manager of the Legal Department issued a Memorandum addressed to the General
Manager of NHA endorsing approval of the Regional Projects Department's (RPD's) recommendation. The
NHA General Manager through a letter dated 29 August 1991 informed the contractor of the rescission of his
contract for the development of the said project upon his receipt thereof without prejudice to NHA's enforcing
its right under the contract in view of the contractor's unilateral and unauthorized suspension of the contract
works amounting to abandonment of the project. Despite the rescission notice issued by the NHA per letter
dated 29 August 1991, the contractor continued working intermittently with very minimal workforce until such
time as the award of remaining infrastructure works is affected by NHA to another contractor.

In March 1992, the NHA Board of Directors, per Resolution No. 2453, approved the mutual termination of the
A.C. Cruz Construction contract and awarded the remaining work to Triad Construction and Development
Corporation (Triad). The contract amount for the remaining work was P9, 554,837.32. Thereafter,
representatives from A.C. Cruz Construction, Triad and NHA-Bacolod conducted a joint measurement at the
site to determine the total accomplishment of A.C. Cruz Construction inclusive of accomplishments after NHA
inventory.

The Project Office was subsequently informed by the Central Office that the accomplishments made by A.C.
Cruz Construction after the NHA inventory would be paid directly to said contractor by Triad. As of 27 March
1992, Triad had issued checks in favor of A.C. Cruz Construction amounting to One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) which were received by Arceo M. Cruz per Official Receipt No. 3003.

In its Memorandum dated 22 June 1992, the Regional Projects Department recommended to the General
Manager that the fund settlement to A.C. Cruz Construction be effected.

Thereafter, Triad discovered that certain work items that had been in under the inventory report as
accomplished and acceptable were in fact non-existent. Fajutag, Jr. brought these irregularities to the attention
of the Commission on Audit (COA).

After its special audit investigation, the COA uncovered some anomalies, among which, are ghost activities,
specifically the excavation of unsuitable materials and road filling works and substandard, defective
workmanship. Laboratory tests confirmed the irregularities.

Further, according to the COA, while it is true that the fourth billing of A.C. Cruz Construction had not been
paid its accomplishments after the August 1991 inventory found acceptable by NHA amounting to P896,177.08
were paid directly by Triad. Effectively, A.C. Cruz Construction had been overpaid by as much as
P232,628.35, which amount is more than the net payment due per the computation of the unpaid fourth billing.

Consequently, petitioner, as manager of the Regional Projects Department and Chairman of the Inventory and
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Acceptance Committee, and other NHA officials were charged in an Information dated 5 March 2001, worded
as follows:

INFORMATION

The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor II of the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas, accuses ROBERT P.
BALAO, FELICISIMO F. LAZARTE, JR., VIRGILIO V. DACALOS, JOSEPHINE O. ANGSICO, JOSEPHINE T.
ESPINOSA, NOEL H. LOBRIDO AND ARCEO C. CRUZ for VIOLATION OF SECTION 3 (e) of REPUBLIC
ACT No. 3019, AS AMENDED (THE ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT), committed as follows:
That in or about the month of March, 1992 at Bacolod City, Province of Negros Occidental, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, ROBERT P. BALAO, JOSEPHINE C.
ANGSICO, VIRGILIO V. DACALOS, FELICISIMO F. LAZARTE, JR., JOSEPHINE T. ESPINOSA, and
NOEL H. LOBRIDO, Public Officers, being the General Manager, Team Head, Visayas Mgt. Office, Division
Manager (Visayas), Manager, RPD, Project Mgt. Officer A and Supervising Engineer, Diliman, Quezon City, in
such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office and while in the performance of their official
functions, conniving, confederating and mutually helping with each other and with accused ARCEO C. CRUZ,
a private individual and General Manager of A.C. Cruz Construction with address at 7486 Bagtikan Street,
Makati City with deliberate intent, with manifest partiality and evident bad faith, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously cause to be paid to A.C. Construction public funds in the amount of TWO
HUNDRED THIRTY TWO THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT PESOS and THIRTY FIVE
CENTAVOS (P232,628.35) PHILIPPINE CURRENCY, supposedly for the excavation and road filling works on
the Pahanocoy Sites and Services Project in Bacolod City despite the fact no such works were undertaken by
A.C. Construction as revealed by the Special Audit conducted by the Commission on Audit, thus accused
public officials in the performance of their official functions had given unwarranted benefits, advantage and
preference to accused Arceo C. Cruz and A.C. Construction and themselves to the damage and prejudice of
the government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

On 2 October 2006, petitioner filed a motion to quash the Information raising the following grounds: (1) the
facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense; (2) the information does not conform substantially
to the prescribed form; (3) the constitutional rights of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusations against them have been violated by the inadequacy of the information; and (4) the prosecution
failed to determine the individual participation of all the accused in the information in disobedience with the
Resolution dated 27 March 2005.

On 2 March 2007, the Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed resolution denying petitioner's motion to quash.
We quote the said resolution in part:

Among the accused-movants, the public officer whose participation in the alleged offense is specifically
mentioned in the May 30, 2006 Memorandum is accused Felicisimo Lazarte, Jr., the Chairman of the Inventory
and Acceptance Committee (IAC), which undertook the inventory and final quantification of the
accomplishment of A.C. Cruz Construction. The allegations of Lazarte that the IAC, due to certain constraints,
allegedly had to rely on the reports of the field engineers and/or the Project Office as to which materials were
actually installed; and that he supposedly affixed his signature to the IAC Physical Inventory Report and
Memoranda dated August 12, 1991 despite his not being able to attend the actual inspection because he
allegedly saw that all the members of the Committee had already signed are matters of defense which he can
address in the course of the trial. Hence, the quashal of the information with respect to accused Lazarte is
denied for lack of merit.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby resolves as follows:

(1) Accused Robert Balao, Josephine Angsico and Virgilio Dacalos' Motion to Admit Motion to Quash dated
October 4, 2006 is GRANTED; the Motion to Quash dated October 4, 2006 attached thereto, is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the case is hereby DISMISSED insofar as the said accused-movants are concerned.
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(2) The Motion to Quash dated October 2, 2006 of accused

Engr. Felicisimo F. Lazarte, Jr. is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Let the arraignment of the accused proceed
as scheduled on March 13, 2007.

SO ORDERED.

Subsequently, the Sandiganbayan issued the second assailed resolution denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration. Pertinently, it held:

The Motion for Reconsideration of accused Lazarte, Jr. merely reiterated the grounds and arguments which
had been duly considered and passed upon in the assailed Resolution. Nonetheless, after a careful review of
the same, the Court still finds no cogent reason to disturb the finding of probable cause of the Office of the
Ombudsman to indict accused Lazarte, Jr., Espinosa, Lobrido and Cruz of the offense charged. In its
Memorandum dated July 27, 2004 and May 30, 2006, the prosecution was able to show with sufficient
particularity the respective participation of the aforementioned accused in the commission of the offense
charged. The rest of the factual issues by accused Lazarte, Jr. would require the presentation of evidence in
the course of the trial of this case.

The Court also maintains the validity and sufficiency of the information against accused Lazarte, Jr., Espinosa,
Lobrido and Cruz. The information has particularly alleged the ultimate facts constituting the essential elements
of the offense charged which are as follows:

1. that accused Lazarte, Jr., Espinosa, and Lobrido are public officers being the Department Manager,
Project Management Officer A, and Supervising Engineer of the NHA during the time material in the
criminal information; and

2. that the said accused, in their respective official capacities and in conspiracy with accused Cruz, a
private individual and the General manager of A.C. Cruz Construction, have acted with manifest
partiality or evident bad faith and have given unwarranted benefits, preference, and advantage to Arceo
C. Cruz and A.C. Cruz Construction or have caused damage and prejudice to the government, by
"[causing] to be paid A.C. Cruz Construction public funds in the amount of Two Hundred Thirty Two
Thousand Six Hundred Twenty Eight Pesos and Thirty Five Centavos (P232,628.35) supposedly for the
excavation and road filling works on the Pahanocoy Sites and Services Project in Bacolod City despite
the fact that no such works were undertaken by A.C. Cruz Construction as revealed by the Special
Audit conducted by the Commission on Audit."

The other factual details which accused Lazarte, Jr. cited are matters of evidence best threshed out in the
course of the trial.

Hence, the instant petition which is a reiteration of petitioner's submissions. Petitioner ascribes grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to the Sandiganbayan in: (1) upholding the validity and
sufficiency of the Information despite its failure to make out an offense and conform to the prescribed form; (2)
denying his motion to quash considering that the remaining averments in the Information have been rendered
unintelligible by the dismissal of the charges against some of his co-accused; and (3) using as bases the
Prosecution's Memoranda dated 27 July 2004 and 30 May 2006 to supplement the inadequacies of the
Information. In addition, petitioner avers that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him had been violated for failure of the Information to specify his participation in the
commission of the offense. Petitioner also argues that the facts charged in the Information do not constitute an
offense as no damage or injury had been made or caused to any party or to the government. Finally, petitioner
maintains that the Sandiganbayan lost its jurisdiction over him upon the dismissal of the charges against his
co-accused as the remaining accused are public officers whose salary grade is below 27.

In its Comment dated 21 December 2007, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, counters that separate allegations of individual acts perpetrated by the conspirators are not
required in an Information and neither should they be covered by evidence submitted to establish the existence
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of probable cause. Allegations regarding the nature and extent of petitioner's participation and justification for
his acts which constitute the offense charged are evidentiary matters which are more properly addressed
during trial. The Ombudsman reiterates our ruling in Ingco v. Sandiganbayan that the fundamental test in
reflecting on the viability of a motion to quash is the sufficiency of the averments in the information that is,
whether the facts asseverated, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime
defined by law. And relying on the case of Domingo v. Sandiganbayan, the Ombudsman states that
information’s need only state the ultimate facts; the reasons therefor are to be proved during the trial. [24] The
Ombudsman moreover maintains that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over petitioner. The Ombudsman
argues that it is of no moment that petitioner's position is classified as salary grade 26 as he is a manager
within the legal contemplation of paragraph 1(g), Section 4(a) of Republic Act No. 8249.

In his Reply dated 9 October 2008, petitioner strongly asseverates that, according to the Constitution, in a
conspiracy indictment the participation of each accused in the so-called conspiracy theory should be detailed in
order to apprise the accused of the nature of the accusation against them in relation to the participation of the
other accused. A general statement that all the accused conspired with each other without stating the
participation of each runs afoul of the Constitution.[27] Petitioner adds that the ultimate facts intended by law
refer to determinate facts and circumstances which should become the basis of the cause of action; statement
of facts which would be in complete accord with the constitutional requirement of giving the accused sufficient
information about the nature and the cause of the accusation against him. Petitioner also avers that the
Ombudsman's reliance on and citation of the cases of Ingco v. Sandiganbayan and Domingo v.
Sandiganbayan is misplaced and misleading.

Petitioner's main argument is that the Information filed before the Sandiganbayan insufficiently averred the
essential elements of the crime charged as it failed to specify the individual participation of all the accused.

The Court is not persuaded. The Court affirms the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.

At the outset, it should be stressed that the denial of a motion to quash is not correctible by certiorari. Well-
established is the rule that when a motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, the remedy is not a petition for
certiorari but for petitioners to go to trial without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in their
motion to quash. Remedial measures as regards interlocutory orders, such as a motion to quash, are frowned
upon and often dismissed. The evident reason for this rule is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single court.

This general rule, however, is subject to certain exceptions. If the court, in denying the motion to dismiss or
motion to quash acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or
prohibition lies. And in the case at bar, the Court does not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed grave
abuse of discretion.

The fundamental test in reflecting on the viability of a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do
not constitute an offense is whether or not the facts asseverated, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the
essential elements of the crime defined in law. Matters aliunde will not be considered.

Corollarily, Section 6 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court states that:

SEC. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information.--A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of
the accused, the designation of the offense by the statute, the acts or omissions complained of as constituting
the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the
place wherein the offense was committed.

When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or
information.

The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged and enable the court to know the
proper judgment. The Information must allege clearly and accurately the elements of the crime charged. What
facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the
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definition and elements of the specific crimes.

The test is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms with such particularity as to appraise the
accused, with reasonable certainty, of the offense charged. The raison d'etre of the rule is to enable the
accused to suitably prepare his defense. Another purpose is to enable accused, if found guilty, to plead his
conviction in a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. The use of derivatives or synonyms or
allegations of basic facts constituting the offense charged is sufficient.

Pertinently, Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, reads:

SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.--In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall
apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or
permits or other concessions.

The essential elements for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 are as follows:

1. The accused is a public officer or private person charged in conspiracy with him;

2. Said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his official duties or in relation
to his public position;

3. He causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or private party;

4. Such undue injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such parties;
and

5. The public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.

The Court finds that the Information in this case alleges the essential elements of violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019. The Information specifically alleges that petitioner, Espinosa and Lobrido are public officers
being then the Department Manager, Project Management Officer A and Supervising Engineer of the NHA
respectively; in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to the office and while in the performance
of their official functions, connived, confederated and mutually helped each other and with accused Arceo C.
Cruz, with deliberate intent through manifest partiality and evident bad faith gave unwarranted benefits to the
latter, A.C. Cruz Construction and to themselves, to the damage and prejudice of the government. The
felonious act consisted of causing to be paid to A.C. Cruz Construction public funds in the amount of
P232,628.35 supposedly for excavation and road filling works on the Pahanocoy Sites and Services Project in
Bacolod City despite the fact that no such works were undertaken by said construction company as revealed
by the Special Audit conducted by COA.

On the contention that the Information did not detail the individual participation of the accused in the allegation
of conspiracy in the Information, the Court underscores the fact that under Philippine law, conspiracy should be
understood on two levels. Conspiracy can be a mode of committing a crime or it may be constitutive of the
crime itself. Generally, conspiracy is not a crime in our jurisdiction. It is punished as a crime only when the law
fixes a penalty for its commission such as in conspiracy to commit treason, rebellion and sedition.

When conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act of conspiring and all the elements of said crime must be set
forth in the complaint or information. But when conspiracy is not charged as a crime in itself but only as the
mode of committing the crime as in the case at bar, there is less necessity of reciting its particularities in the
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Information because conspiracy is not the gravamen of the offense charged. The conspiracy is significant only
because it changes the criminal liability of all the accused in the conspiracy and makes them answerable as
co-principals regardless of the degree of their participation in the crime. The liability of the conspirators is
collective and each participant will be equally responsible for the acts of others, for the act of one is the act of
all.

Notably, in People v. Quitlong, as pointed out by respondent, the Court ruled on how conspiracy as a mode of
committing the offense should be alleged in the Information, viz:

Where conspiracy exists and can rightly be appreciated, the individual acts done to perpetrate the felony
becomes of secondary importance, the act of one being imputable to all the others. Verily, an accused must
know from the information whether he faces a criminal responsibility not only for his acts but also for the acts of
his co-accused as well.

A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of conspiracy or allege all the details
thereof, like the part that each of the parties therein have performed, the evidence proving the common design
or the facts connecting all the accused with one another in the web of the conspiracy. Neither is it necessary
to describe conspiracy with the same degree of particularity required in describing a substantive offense. It is
enough that the indictment contains a statement of facts relied upon to be constitutive of the offense in ordinary
and concise language, with as much certainty as the nature of the case will admit, in a manner that can enable
a person of common understanding to know what is intended, and with such precision that the accused may
plead his acquittal or conviction to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts. It is said, generally, that
an indictment may be held sufficient "if it follows the words of the statute and reasonably informs the accused
of the character of the offense he is charged with conspiring to commit, or, following the language of the
statute, contains a sufficient statement of an overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy, or alleges both the
conspiracy and the contemplated crime in the language of the respective statutes defining them (15A C.J.S.
842-844).

Conspiracy arises when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it. Conspiracy comes to life at the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly,
to commit the felony and forthwith to actually pursue it. Verily, the information must state that the accused
have confederated to commit the crime or that there has been a community of design, a unity of purpose or an
agreement to commit the felony among the accused. Such an allegation, in the absence of the usual usage of
the words "conspired" or "confederated" or the phrase "acting in conspiracy," must aptly appear in the
information in the form of definitive acts constituting conspiracy. In fine, the agreement to commit the crime,
the unity of purpose or the community of design among the accused must be conveyed such as either by the
use of the term "conspire" or its derivatives and synonyms or by allegations of basic facts constituting the
conspiracy. Conspiracy must be alleged, not just inferred, in the information on which basis an accused can
aptly enter his plea, a matter that is not to be confused with or likened to the adequacy of evidence that may be
required to prove it. In establishing conspiracy when properly alleged, the evidence to support it need not
necessarily be shown by direct proof but may be inferred from shown acts and conduct of the accused.

In addition, the allegation of conspiracy in the Information should not be confused with the adequacy of
evidence that may be required to prove it. A conspiracy is proved by evidence of actual cooperation; of acts
indicative of an agreement, a common purpose or design, a concerted action or concurrence of sentiments to
commit the felony and actually pursue it. A statement of the evidence on the conspiracy is not necessary in the
Information.

The other details cited by petitioner, such as the absence of any damage or injury caused to any party or the
government, likewise are matters of evidence best raised during trial.

As to the contention that the residual averments in the Information have been rendered unintelligible by the
dismissal of the charges against some of his co-accused, the Court finds that the Information sufficiently
makes out a case against petitioner and the remaining accused.

With regard to the alleged irregular use by the Sandiganbayan of the Prosecution's Memoranda dated 27 July
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2004 and 30 May 2006 to supplement the inadequacies of the Information, the Court finds adequate its
explanation in the first assailed resolution, to wit:

It may be recalled that a reinvestigation of the case was ordered by this Court because the prosecution failed
to satisfactorily comply with an earlier directive of the former Chairperson and Members of the First Division,
after noting the inadequacy of the information, to clarify the participation of each of the accused. In ordering the
reinvestigation, the Court noted that the prosecution's July 27, 2004 Memorandum did not address the
apprehensions of the former Chairperson and Members of the First Division as to the inadequacy of the
allegations in the information.

This time, despite a reinvestigation, the prosecution's Memorandum dated May 30, 2006 still failed to specify
the participation of accused-movants Balao, Angsico and Dacalos. The most recent findings of the prosecution
still do not address the deficiency found by the Court in the information. The prosecution avers that pursuant to
Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, in determining the viability of a motion to quash based on the ground
of "facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense," the test must be whether or not the facts
asseverated, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime as defined by law.
The prosecution contends that matter aliunde should not be considered. However, in the instant case, the
Court has found the information itself to be inadequate, as it does not satisfy the requirements of particularly
alleging the acts or omissions of the said accused-movants, which served as the basis of the allegation of
conspiracy between the aforementioned accused-movants and the other accused, in the commission of the
offense charged in the information.

Finally, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction to hear the case. As correctly pointed out by the
Sandiganbayan, it is of no moment that petitioner does not occupy a position with Salary Grade 27 as he was a
department manager of the NHA, a government-owned or controlled corporation, at the time of the commission
of the offense, which position falls within the ambit of its jurisdiction. Apropos, the Court held in the case of
Geduspan v. People which involved a regional Manager/Director of Region VI of the Philippine Health
Insurance Corporation (Philhealth) with salary grade 26, to wit:

It is of no moment that the position of petitioner is merely classified as salary grade 26. While the first part of
the above-quoted provision covers only officials of the executive branch with the salary grade 27 and higher,
the second part thereof "specifically includes" other executive officials whose positions may not be of grade 27
and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court.

Hence, respondent court is vested with jurisdiction over petitioner together with Farahmand, a private individual
charged together with her.

The position of manager in a government-owned or controlled corporation, as in the case of Philhealth, is

within the jurisdiction of respondent court. It is the position that petitioner holds, not her salary grade, that
determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

This Court in Lacson v. Executive Secretary, et al. ruled:

A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur: (1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019,
as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter
II, Section 2, Title VII, book II of the Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery), (d) Executive Order Nos. 1,2, 14
and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases), or (e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed
with other crimes; (2) the offender committing the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or
employee holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph a of section 4; and (3) the offense committed
is in relation to the office.

To recapitulate, petitioner is a public officer, being a department manager of Philhealth, a government-owned

and controlled corporation. The position of manager is one of those mentioned in paragraph a, Section 4 of RA
8249 and the offense for which she was charged was committed in relation to her office as department
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manager of Philhealth. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over her person as well as the subject
matter of the case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The Resolutionsdated2 March 2007
and 18 October 2007 of the First Division of the Sandiganbayan are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED

Lazarte vs. Sandiganbayan G.R. 180122, March 13, 2009

FACTS

Sandiganbayan tried and affirmed graft charges against Felicimo Lazarte Jr., an engineer and chair of the
National Housing Authority(NHA). He allegedly used public funds amounting to P230,000 to pay a Makati-
based construction company for a ghost project(financing a project that is not part of a plan) in Bacolod City.
Further, he was accused of conspiring with fellow officers; namely, Josephine Angsico, Virgilio Dacalos, Robert
Balao, and Josephine Espinosa. They filed a motion to quash the allegation, and after a thorough investigation,
the court dismissed the charges of the alleged conspires for failure to prove participation, but it retained
Lazarte’s charge.
Issue: As department manager of the NHA (Salary Grade 26), does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over
petitioner Lazarte?

RULING

The Court sustains the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction to hear the case. As correctly pointed out by the
Sandiganbayan, it is of no moment that petitioner does not occupy a position with Salary Grade 27 as he was a
department manager of the NHA, a government-owned or controlled corporation, at the time of the commission
of the offense, which position falls within the scope of its jurisdiction. Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public
officers and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their
office as may be determined by law. NHA being part of that.
Further, the position of manager in a government-owned or controlled corporation, as in the case of Philhealth,
is within the jurisdiction of respondent court. It is the position that petitioner holds, not her salary grade, that
determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan---- that which includes the position held by Lazarte.

2. PEOPLE v. LUISITO GABORNE Y CINCO, GR No. 210710, 2016-07-27

Facts:
On 2 February 2007 at around 10:30 in the evening, Rey Perfecto De Luna and Sixto Elizan entered a videoke
bar at Barangay Mugdo, Hinabangan, Samar. Noli Abayan, appellant and Joselito Bardelas (Bardelas)
followed five minutes thereafter. While Elizan and De Luna were drinking, singing and merely having fun, four
successive gunshots were fired through the window. Because of this, Elizan and De Luna were hit from
behind. Later on, De Luna and Marialinisa Pasana saw appellant, who was then wearing a black t-shirt and a
black cap, holding a gun aimed at their location. Pasana also saw accused-appellant and Bardelas escape
after the incident. Elizan and De Luna were brought to St. Paul's Hospital at Tacloban City. Unfortunately,
Elizan was pronounced dead upon arrival. De Luna, on the other hand, survived. Appellant steadfastly denied
the accusations. According to him, he and his companions ordered for bottles of beer. However, when they
tried to order for more bottles, the waitress refused to give them their order unless they pay for their previous
orders first. While Abayan was explaining to the father of the owner of the videoke bar, appellant and Bardelas
went out to urinate, however, the waitress locked the front door. While standing outside, he heard the waitress
utter the words, "If you will not pay, I [will] have you killed, all of you, right this moment. He also consistently
contend that it was a man wearing black shirt and camouflage pants who fired shots to the videoke bar, not
him. The following day, appellant and Bardelas were arrested and underwent paraffin test.
Issues:
We find that the degree of proof required in criminal cases has been met in the case at bar. Appellant's
defenses of denial and alibi are bereft of merit.
 10

Ruling:
Elements of Murder and FrustratedMurder were establishedThis Court finds that the circumstance of treachery
should be appreciated, qualifying the crime to Murder. According to the Revised Penal Code: ARTICLE 248.
Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of
murder and shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, if committed with any of
the following attendant circumstances: With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of
armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity. In
consideration of a price, reward or promise. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck,
stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a street car or locomotive, fall of an airship, by means of
motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin. On occasion of any of the
calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive
cyclone, epidemic, or any other public calamity. With evident premeditation. With cruelty, by deliberately and
inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse. Thus, the
elements of murder are: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing
was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (4) that the
killing is not parricide or infanticide. Furthermore, there is treachery when the offender commits any of the
crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof, which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make. The requisites of treachery are:(1) The employment of means method, or manner of execution
which will ensure the safety of the malefactor from defensive or retaliating acts on the part of the victim, no
opportunity being given to the latter to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) Deliberate or conscious adoption
of such means, method, or manner of execution.[39]In this case, the hapless victims were merely drinking and
singing in-front of the videoke machine when shot by the appellant. The firing was so sudden and swift that
they had no opportunity to defend themselves or to retaliate. Furthermore, appellant's acts of using a gun and
even going out of the videoke bar evidently show that he consciously adopted means to ensure the execution
of the crime. In addition, the lower courts appropriately found appellant liable for the crime of Frustrated
Murder. A felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the
felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the
will of the perpetrator. Dr. Angel Cordero M.D. categorically said that De Luna could have died because of the
wounds if the surgery was not conducted timely. Hence, appellant performed all the acts of execution which
could have produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of
a cause independent of his will, which is, in this case, the timely and able medical attendance rendered to De
Luna.
Illegal Possession of Firearm as an aggravating circumstance in the crimes of Murder and Frustrated Murder.
The CA appropriately appreciated the use of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance in the
crimes of Murder and Frustrated Murder. Under R.A. No. 1059, use of loose firearm in the commission of a
crime, like murder, shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. In view of the amendments introduced
by R.A. No. 8294 and R.A. No. 10591, to Presidential Decree No. 1866, separate prosecutions for homicide
and illegal possession are no longer in order. Instead, illegal possession of firearm is merely to be taken as an
aggravating circumstance in the crime of murder. It is clear from the foregoing that where murder results from
the use of an unlicensed firearm, the crime is not qualified illegal possession but, murder. In such a case, the
use of the unlicensed firearm is not considered as a separate crime but shall be appreciated as a mere
aggravating circumstance. Thus, where murder was committed, the penalty for illegal possession of firearms is
no longer imposable since it becomes merely a special aggravating circumstance. The intent of Congress is to
treat the offense of illegal possession of firearm and the commission of homicide or murder with the use of
unlicensed firearm as a single offense. In the case at hand, since it was proven that accused-appellant was not
a licensed firearm holder, and that he was positively identified by the witnesses as the one who fired shots
against the victims, the use of an unlicensed firearm in the commission of the crimes of Murder and Frustrated
Murder should be considered as an aggravating circumstance thereof. The presence of such aggravating
circumstance would have merited the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of Murder. However, in view
of R.A. No. 9346, we are mandated to impose on appellant the penalty of reclusion Perpetua without eligibility
for parole.
Principles:
 11

4. CESAR P. GUY, Petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. G.R. Nos. 166794-96
March 20, 2009

These are consolidated petitions for review assailing the decision of the Sandiganbayan dated 2 September
2004 in Criminal Cases No. 26508-101 which found petitioners guilty of violating Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act No.
3019 (R.A. No. 3019).

The facts, as culled from the records, follow.

Petitioners Felix T. Ripalda, Concepcion C. Esperas, Eduardo R. Villamor, and Ervin C. Martinez (Ripalda, et
al.) are officers and employees of the City Engineer’s Office of the City of Tacloban. Meanwhile, petitioners
Cesar P. Guy (Guy) and Narcisa A. Grefiel (Grefiel) are the Barangay Chairman and Barangay Treasurer,
respectively, of Barangay 36, Sabang District, Tacloban City (Barangay 36). Said petitioners, together with
Edgar Amago, a private individual, owner and proprietor of Amago Construction were charged in three (3)
separate Informations with violation of Section 3 (e) of R. A. No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, in connection with the construction of three (3) infrastructure projects in Barangay 36,
namely: an elevated path walk, a basketball court and a day care center.

It appears that an audit investigation was conducted by the Commission on Audit (COA) in response to a letter-
complaint of one Alfredo Alberca regarding the three projects.5 The audit team found that the Sangguniang
Barangay of Barangay 36, acting as the Pre-Qualification, Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) accepted bid
proposals from Amago Construction and General Services (Amago Construction) without issuing the proper
plans and specifications for the basketball court and day care projects and that the work programs for the day
care center and the elevated path walk were prepared long after the construction had been completed.
Likewise, Guy and Grefiel reported the construction of the projects to the City Engineer’s Office only after they
had already been completed; thus, petitioner employees inspected the projects only after they had already
been accomplished. Petitioner employees approved the accomplishment of the projects despite the absence of
material documents, according to the audit team’s report. Finally, the audit team found material defects in the
projects and discovered that the contract cost for the basketball court and elevated path walk was overpriced.

The Ombudsman Prosecutor (Ombudsman-Visayas) filed the corresponding information for the offenses,
essentially charging petitioners with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.

Petitioner employees claimed that the participation of the City Engineer’s Office of Tacloban City in the
barangay infrastructure projects was only to provide technical assistance to implementing barangays and that it
was the barangay officials who supervised the construction of the projects. They aver that the City Engineer’s
Office was not a member of the PBAC which conducted the bidding process for the subject projects, and that
they did not personally know their co-accused Guy and Grefiel, much more did they have any association with
them prior to the approval of the three projects. It was Guy and Grefiel who requested the City Engineer’s
Office to inspect the projects, and that when the City Engineer’s Office conducted the inspection, it found the
projects already completed. Lastly, they found the three projects to be in accordance with the plans and
specifications set for them and there were no anomalies or irregularities in their construction. They add that the
residents of Barangay 36 have benefited from the three projects.7

On the other hand, Guy maintained that the three projects were authorized by resolutions duly-enacted by the
Sangguniang Barangay. He claimed that a public bidding was conducted before the construction of the
projects and that Amago Construction was the winning bidder. He added that Amago Construction constructed
the projects and was accordingly paid for the work done and the materials supplied by it.

Meanwhile, Grefiel argued that her only participation in the projects was her signing of the blank disbursement
vouchers and blank checks covering the projects, and that it was Guy who instructed her to affix her signature
on the said documents. She added that she did not participate in the supervision of the construction of the
projects nor in the disbursement of the payment of any amount for the projects to Amago Construction.

On 2 September 2004, the Sandiganbayan decided the case against petitioners.

 12

The Sandiganbayan found that Guy and Grefiel awarded the contracts to Amago Construction even if there
were no plans and specifications for the day care center and basketball court projects prior to their
construction; and that while there was a plan and specification for the elevated path walk, they tolerated
Amago Construction’s failure to abide by the said plan. Furthermore, Guy and Grefiel are also responsible for
giving Amago Construction the check payments even before requests for obligation of appropriations and
disbursement vouchers were made. The graft court also found that the construction of the projects were
reported to petitioner employees after the projects had already been completed, and that these anomalies
notwithstanding, petitioner employees certified that the projects were made in accordance with the plans and
that the same were 100% completed. Further, the Sandiganbayan found that the quality of the day care center
project was substandard, the program of work was not followed, and worse, the contract amounts for the
basketball court and the elevated path walk exceeded the allowable project costs. Finally, the Sandiganbayan
ruled that the acts of the petitioners, taken collectively, satisfactorily prove the existence of conspiracy.

Disposing of the graft cases, the Sandiganbayan ruled as follows:

Considering that all the elements of R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 3(e) were without doubt established in these cases
and the allegation of conspiracy shown, a moral certainty is achieved to find the accused liable for the acts
they committed.

WHEREFORE, accused FELIX RIPALDA, EDUARDO VILLAMOR, CONCEPCION ESPERAS, ERVIN

MARTINEZ, CESAR GUY and NARCISA GREFIEL are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having
violated R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 3(e) and are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and
one (1) month as minimum and nine (9) years as maximum for each of the three offenses, perpetual
disqualification from public office and to indemnify jointly and severally the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines in the amount of eleven thousand eight hundred ninety (₱11, 895.00).

Since the Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of accused EDGAR AMAGO, let the cases against
him be, in the meantime, archived, the same to be revived upon his arrest. Let an alias warrant of arrest be
then issued against accused EDGAR AMAGO.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioners filed their separate motions for reconsideration of the decision. However, on 25 January 2005, the
Sandiganbayan denied all their motions.

Before this Court, petitioners separately raise the following issues, thus:

In 166794-96 (Cesar P. Guy v. People of the Philippines):

1. The SANDIGANBAYAN (Fourth Division) has decided the above numbered three (3) criminal cases
in gross disregard and contrary to the applicable decision of this Honorable Court in the case of
LACSON v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et al., and thus, committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it rendered the questioned DECISION and
RESOLUTION despite the fact that it had no jurisdiction over the instant three (3) cases due to the
failure to aver "the specific factual allegations in the INFORMATIONS that would indicate the close
intimacy between the discharge of the accused’s official duties and the commission of the offense
charged, in order to qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to public office."

2. GRANTING ARGUENDO that the SANDIGANBAYAN (Fourth Division) had jurisdiction over these
three (3) criminal cases—it further committed serious errors of law and disregarded applicable
jurisprudence of this Honorable Court and thus, acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of, or in excess of jurisdiction when it rendered the assailed DECISION convicting herein petitioner and
his co-accused and issued the questioned RESOLUTION denying their MOTIONs FOR
RECONSIDERATION despite the fact that the prosecution evidently failed to prove the guilt of
 13

petitioner and his co-accused beyond reasonable doubt and further miserably failed to prove the
allegation of conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt.

In G.R. No. 167088-90 ( Narcisa M. Grefiel v. The Hon. Sandiganbayan and the People of the Philippines):

THE RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN PALPABLY DISREGARDED THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF THE

PETITIONER TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT AND, INSTEAD, REVERSED THE PRESUMPTION AND
CONVICTED THE PETITIONER OF VIOLATION OF THE ANTI-GRAFT LAW INSPITE OF THE CONCEDED
FACT THAT PETITIONER HAS NOT DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY PARTICIPATED IN THE PRE-BIDDING,
BIDDING, AWARD, PROSECUTION AND SUPERVISION OF THE PROJECTS OF THE BARANGAY, THE
CONVICTION RESTING NOT ON THE BASIS OF CONCRETE INCULPATORY EVIDENCE BUT ON THE
SWEEPING DECLARATION THAT SHE WAS ONE OF THE SIGNATORIES OF THE DISBURSEMENT
VOUCHERS AND THE CHECKS RESULTED IN A DUBIOUS FINDING THAT THE PETITIONER
CONSPIRED AND CONFEDERATED WITH HER CO-ACCUED FOR THE SUBSTANDARD
CONSTRUCTION OF THE BARANGAY PROJECTS.

In G.R. No. 166880-82 (Felix T. Ripalda, Concepcion C. Esperas, Eduardo Villamor, and Ervin C. Martinez v.
People of the Philippines):

GROUNDS FOR THE PETITION

THE COURT A QUO DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE

II

THE ASSAILED DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND APPLICABLE
DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT;

III

THE CONCLUSION OF THE COURT A QUO FRINDING THE PETITIONERS GUILTY OF THE CRIME
CHARGED IS GROUNDED ENTIRELY ON ESTIMATES, SPECULATIONS, SURMISES AND/OR
CONJECTURES

In essence, petitioners maintain that the Sandiganbayan had not acquired jurisdiction over them because the
three informations failed to state the specific actual allegations that would indicate the connection between the
discharge of their official duties and the commission of the offenses charged; or alternatively, assuming that
the Sandiganbayan had actually acquired jurisdiction, the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, as well as the existence of conspiracy.

The People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB), argues that the averments
in the Informations are "complete and wanting of the slightest vagueness as to denote another interpretation or
mislead anyone." Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court merely require the information to describe
the offense with sufficient particularity as to apprise the accused of what they are being charged with and to
enable the court to pronounce judgment, such that evidentiary matters need not be alleged in the information.
The OMB adds that if it were true that the allegations are vague or indefinite, petitioners should have filed a
motion for a bill of particulars as provided under Section 9, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court to question the
alleged insufficiency of the informations, or a motion to quash on the ground that the facts averred do not
constitute an offense.

The OMB asserts that the prosecution had satisfactorily proven the existence of the elements of the offense
under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as well as the existence of conspiracy among the accused.
 14

In addition, the OMB alleges that Grefiel’s claim that she was merely constrained to sign the disbursement
vouchers and checks relative to the subject projects is pure sophistry, since as barangay treasurer she is
mandated to disburse funds in accordance with the Local Government Code. Even Grefiel’s claim of miniscule
educational attainment should not excuse her from liability. The OMB posits that petitioners’ allegation of error
is "actually designed to lure the Court into re-opening the case on the basis of the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses which, however, on close scrutiny appear to be credible and substantiated."

The petitions have to be denied.

Petitioners were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, which states:

"SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.—In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall
apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or
permits or other concessions."

To hold a person liable under this section, the concurrence of the following elements must be established, viz:

(1) that the accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the former;

(2) that said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his or her official
duties or in relation to his or her public positions;

(3) that he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or a private party; and

(4) that the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence."

Petitioners, citing the case of Lacson v. The Executive Secretary, assert that the information’s do not contain
the specific factual allegations showing the close intimacy between the discharge of petitioners’ official duties
and the commission of the offense charged to qualify the offense as one committed in relation to public office.
In Lacson, the Court ruled that before the Sandiganbayan may acquire jurisdiction over the offense charged,
the intimate relation between the offense charged and the discharge of official duties "must be alleged in the
information."

Indeed, jurisprudence is replete with cases describing when an offense is deemed committed "in relation to
office." In Montilla and Tobia v. Hilario and Crisologo, this Court held that for an offense to be committed in
relation to the office, the relation between the crime and the office must be direct and not accidental, such that
the offense cannot exist without the office. In Adaza v. Sandiganbayan, we held that:

It does not thus suffice to merely allege in the information that the crime charged was committed by the
offender in relation to his office or that he took advantage of his position as these are conclusions of law. The
specific factual allegations in the information that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of
the offender’s official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as having
been committed in relation to public office, are controlling.

The Court finds that the Information’s sufficiently show the close intimacy between petitioners’ discharge of
official duties and the commission of the offense charged. We reproduce the accusatory portions of the
Information’s in the subject cases, thus:
 15

Criminal Case No. 26508

That in or about the year 1996, and for sometime subsequent thereto, at the City of Tacloban, Province of
Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused: FELIX T.
RIPALDA, EDUARDO R. VILLAMOR, CONCEPCION C. ESPERAS and ERVIN C. MARTINEZ, public officers,
being the City Engineer, Project Engineer, Project Inspector and ICD Representative, City Administrator’s
Office, respectively, of the City Government of Tacloban, CESAR P. GUY and NARCISA A. GREFIEL, also
public officers, being Barangay Captain and Barangay Treasurer, respectively, of Barangay 36, Sabang
District, Tacloban City, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving,
confederating together and mutually helping with each other and with EDGAR AMAGO, a private individual,
Contractor and Proprietor of Amago Construction and General Services, Inc., Tacloban City, with deliberate
intent, with manifest partiality and evident bad faith, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
construct and/or cause the construction of an elevated path walk of Barangay 36, Sabang District, Tacloban
City, with the contract cost of SIXTY-TWO THOUSAND PESOS (₱62,000.00), Philippine Currency without
following the approved program of work and drawing plan, in violation of the DILG Memorandum Circular No.
94-185, dated October 20, 1994, thereby resulting to (sic) an increase in the project cost by 17.5% or NINE
THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED SEVENTY-FOUR PESOS AND EIGHTY-FOUR CENTAVOS (₱9,274.84),
Philippine Currency, thus accused in the course of the performance of their official functions had given
unwarranted benefits to themselves and to accused Edgar Amago, to the damage and prejudice of the
government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 26509

That in or about the year 1996, and for sometime subsequent thereto, the City of Tacloban, Province of Leyte,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused: FELIX T. RIPALDA,
EDUARDO R. VILLAMOR, CONCEPCION C. ESPERAS and ERVIN C. MARTINEZ, public officers, being the
City Engineer, Project Engineer, Project Inspector and ICD Representative, City Administrator’s Office,
respectively, of the City Government of Tacloban, CESAR P. GUY and NARCISA A. GREFIEL, also public
officers, being the Barangay Captain and Barangay Treasurer, respectively, of Barangay 36, Sabang District,
Tacloban City, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving, confederating
together and mutually helping with each other and with EDGAR AMAGO, a private individual,

Contractor and Proprietor of Amago Construction and General Services, Inc., Tacloban City, with deliberate
intent, with manifest partiality and evident bad faith, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
construct and/or cause the construction of the Basketball Court of Barangay 36, Sabang District, Tacloban
City, without adhering to the approved program of work and non-preparation of the plans and specifications in
violation of DILG Memorandum Circular No. 94-185, dated October 20, 1994, thus resulting to (sic) the
increase in the contract amount to SIXTY-EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS (₱68,000.00), Philippine Currency, thus
accused in the course of the performance of their official functions had given unwarranted benefits to
themselves and to accused Edgar Amago, to the damage and prejudice of the government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 26510

That in or about the year 1996, and for some time subsequent thereto, the City of Tacloban, Province of Leyte,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused: FELIX T. RIPALDA,
EDUARDO R. VILLAMOR, CONCEPCION C. ESPERAS and ERVIN C. MARTINEZ, public officers, being the
City Engineer, Project Engineer, Project Inspector and ICD Representative, City Administrator’s Office,
respectively, of the City Government of Tacloban, CESAR P. GUY and NARCISA A. GREFIEL, also public
officers, being the Barangay Captain and Barangay Treasurer, respectively, of Barangay 36, Sabang District,
Tacloban City, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving, confederating
together and mutually helping with each other and with EDGAR AMAGO, a private individual, Contractor and
 16

Proprietor of Amago Construction and General Services, Inc., Tacloban City, with deliberate intent, with
manifest partiality and evident bad faith, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously construct and/or
cause the construction of the Day Care Center of Barangay 36, Sabang District, Tacloban City, without plans
and specifications, and not in accordance with the approved program of work, as the said center was
constructed and completed before the completion of the program of work, thereby resulting to (sic) the
increase and overpricing of construction cost, which was originally fixed at FORTY-TWO

THOUSAND PESOS (₱42,000.00), Philippine Currency, to NINETY-THREE THOUSAND PESOS

(₱93,000.00), Philippine Currency, in violation of the DILG Memorandum Circular No. 94-185, dated October
20, 1994, thus accused in the course of the performance of their official functions had given unwarranted
benefits to themselves and to accuse Edgar Amago, to the damage and prejudice of the government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The Lacson case is not applicable because in that case there was a failure to show that the charge of murder
was intimately connected with the discharge of the official functions of the accused. Specifically, the Court
observed:

While the above-quoted information states that the above-named principal accused committed the crime of
murder "in relation to their public office, there is, however, no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the
victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police
officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated
the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody.

In the case at bar, all the elements of violation of Sec. 3(e) R.A. No. 3019 are indicated in the Informations.
The Informations allege that while in the performance of their respective functions either as city or barangay
officials, petitioners caused the construction of the subject structures, either without following the approved
program of work and drawing plan, or worse, even without any plans and specifications; and furthermore, had
given unwarranted benefits to themselves and to Edgar Amago, to the damage and prejudice of the
government.

Contrary also to petitioners’ assertions, the specific acts of the accused do not have to be described in detail in
the information, as it is enough that the offense be described with sufficient particularity to make sure the
accused fully understand what he is being charged with. The particularity must be such that a person of
ordinary intelligence immediately knows what the charge is. Moreover, reasonable certainty in the statement of
the crime suffices. It is often difficult to say what is a matter of evidence, as distinguished from facts necessary
to be stated in order to render the information sufficiently certain to identify the offense. As a general rule,
matters of evidence, as distinguished from facts essential to the description of the offense, need not be
averred. The particular acts of the accused which pertain to "matters of evidence," such as how accused city
officials prepared the inspection reports despite the absence of a project plan or how the contractor was able to
use substandard materials, do not have to be indicated in the information.

Petitioners also question the propriety of the guilty verdict handed down by the Sandiganbayan, alleging that
the prosecution failed to prove petitioners’ guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In criminal cases, an appeal throws
the whole case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors or even reverse the trial
court’s decision on grounds other than those that the parties raise as errors. We have examined the records of
the case and find no cogent reason to disturb the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan. We find that the
evidence on record amply supports the findings and conclusions of the respondent court. The elements of the
offense charged have been successfully proven by the prosecution.

First, petitioners could not have committed the offense charged were it not for their official duties or functions
as public officials. Their malfeasance or misfeasance in relation to their duties and functions underlies their
violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. Second, the undue injury caused to the government is evident from the
clear deviation from the material specifications indicated in the project plans such as in the case of the
basketball court and elevated path walk, and in the use of substandard materials in the case of the day care
 17

center. Otherwise stated, "the People did not get the full worth of their money in terms of the benefits they will
derive from the (above) sub-standard infrastructure projects." Third, unwarranted benefits were accorded to
Amago Construction when the three projects were not inspected and supervised during construction, allowing
it to cut costs and save money by using substandard materials and deviating from the specific materials and
measurements prescribed in the work programs. Moreover, Amago Construction was able to receive payments
for the projects even before the processing of the disbursement vouchers, thereby preventing the government
from refusing or deferring payment on account of discovered defects of the said projects. Fourth, it is clear that
from the very inception of the construction of the subject projects up to their completion, petitioners had
exhibited manifest partiality for Amago Construction, and acted with evident bad faith against the government
and the public which they had sworn to serve.

Neither are we inclined to vacate the Sandiganbayan’s finding of conspiracy among petitioners.

Jurisprudence teaches us that "proof of the agreement need not rest on direct evidence, as the agreement
itself may be inferred from the conduct of the parties disclosing a common understanding among them with
respect to the commission of the offense. It is not necessary to show that two or more persons met together
and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or the details by which an
illegal objective is to be carried out." Therefore, if it is proved that two or more persons aimed their acts
towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their acts, though
apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal
association and a concurrence of sentiment, then a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting
among them to concert means is proved. Conspiracy was thus properly appreciated by the Sandiganbayan
because even though there was no direct proof that petitioners agreed to cause injury to the government and
give unwarranted benefits to Amago Construction, their individual acts when taken together as a whole showed
that they were acting in concert and cooperating to achieve the same unlawful objective. The barangay
officials’ award of the contract to Amago Construction without the benefit of specific plans and specifications,
the preparation of work programs only after the constructions had been completed, the issuance and
encashment of checks in favor of Amago Construction even before any request to obligate the appropriation or
to issue a disbursement voucher was made, and the subsequent inspection and issuance of certificates of
completion by petitioner employees despite the absence of material documents were all geared towards one
purpose to cause undue injury to the government and unduly favor Amago Construction.

WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision of the
Sandiganbayan dated 2 September 2004 in Criminal Case Nos. 26508-10 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED

5. LICYAYO vs PEOPLE. GR No. 169425. March 4, 2008

FACTS: Roberto Licyayo was charged for the crime of homicide, which is the death of Rufino Guay. That on
February 16 1992, the victim together with his friends Jeffrey and Joel, attended a wedding. The petitioner and
his friends Aron, Paul and Oliver were also present at the wedding. That after the reception, the group of the
victim and the accused had a drinking session in a store, drinking bottles of gin. Later, the petition, Paul and
Oliver left the store, and the victim and his friends likewise adjourned their session and left. Rufino and his
friends dropped by another store where the group of the petitioner was also present. A brawl suddenly
occurred between Rufino and Aron. Rufino fell on the ground and Aron placed himself on top and punched
Rufino several times. Officers Danglay and Buyayo, upon hearing a call for police assistance, approached the
commotion. Upon arriving, they then saw petitioner holding a six-inch double bladed knife. They tried to pacify
the petitioner, but they were also threatened by the weapon. The petitioner then approached Rufino, who was
wrestling Paul, and stabbed Rufino several times. Roberto Licyayo was disarmed and brought to the station,
while Rufino was taken to the hospital but later on died.
The petitioner claim that there was sufficient provocation on the part of the victim as in his version of
the incident, Rufino was the one who first attacked his brother, Aron as he grabbed the latter’s collar and
punched his left cheek. The victim’s friends also punched Aron while he was lying on the ground. The
 18

petitioner fought back but he was overpowered, and can no longer recall any subsequent event that transpired.
The petitioner also said that he was intoxicated and claims the mitigating circumstance of intoxication as they
have consumed alcohol prior the incident of the crime.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation and
intoxication.

HELD: No
RATIO: The petitioner cannot invoke the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation because it was not
convincingly shown that there was alleged provocation on the part of Rufino. The court has no evidence as to
how the quarrel arose. The records do not sufficiently establish who between Rufino and Aron started the
brawl which resulted to the stabbing of Rufino by the petitioner. What is only evident is that Rufino and Aron
suddenly and unexpectedly grappled during the Incident.
The petitioner cannot also be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of intoxication because although
they have consumed alcohol prior to the commission of the crime, it was not established that the amount of
alcohol consumed was enough to impair his reason and affect his mental faculties. On the contrary, the
petitioner can even recall the details that transpired during and after his drinking session with his friends. That
is the best proof that he still knew what he was doing despite the alcohol he consumed.

6. Buebos vs People. GR 163938. 03/28/2008

FACTS
1. Adelina Borbe was in her house watching over her sick child. She heard some noise, got up and saw
the petitioners congregating in front of her hut. When she went out, she saw the roof of her hut on fire.
Instead of helping her, petitioners fled.
ISSUE
1. Whether or not petitioners are liable for simple arson or for arson of an inhabited house which merits a
penalty of up to reclusion perpetua.
RULING:

1. The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of perversity
or viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal
Code (as amended) constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous crimes for
being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest
wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common
standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society. On the
other hand, acts committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser
degree of perversity and viciousness that the law punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words,
Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political and national
security implications than destructive Arson. However, acts falling under Simple Arson may
nevertheless be converted into Destructive Arson depending on the qualifying circumstances
present.

Rescinding from the above clarification vis-à-vis the description of the crime as stated in the
accusatory portion of the Information, it is quite evident that accused-appellant was charged
with the crime of Simple Arson — for having "deliberately set fire upon the two-storey
residential house of ROBERTO SEPARA and family . . . knowing the same to be an inhabited
house and situated in a thickly populated place and as a consequence thereof a conflagration
ensued and the said building, together with some seven (7) adjoining residential houses, were
razed by fire."

Now, to the penalty. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the indeterminate
penalty should range from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. Considering that no
 19

aggravating or mitigating circumstance attended the commission of the offense, the penalty should be
imposed in its medium period [eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years. The minimum of the
indeterminate sentence is prision correctional ,which has a range of six (6) months and one (1) day to
six (6) years, to be imposed in any of its periods.

The CA sentence is in accord with law and jurisprudence. We sustain it.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The appealed judgment is AFFIRMED in full. SO ORDERED.

DANTE BUEBOS and SARMELITO BUEBOS, petitioners, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent. G.R. No. 163938. March 28, 2008

THE law on arson has always been a constant source of confusion not only among members of the bar, but
also among those of the bench. The bewilderment often centers on what law to apply and what penalty to
impose.

In this case, the Court is again tasked to determine whether petitioners are liable for simple arson or arson of
an inhabited house which merits a penalty of up to reclusion perpetua.

Before the Court is a petition to review on certiorari under Rule 45 the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA),
affirming with modification that of the Regional Trial Court in Tabaco, Albay, finding petitioners Dante Buebos
and Sarmelito Buebos guilty of arson.

The Facts

On January 1, 1994 around 3:00 o'clock in the morning, Adelina B. Borbe was in her house at Hacienda San
Miguel, Tabaco, Albay watching over her sick child. She was lying down when she heard some noise around
the house. She got up and looked through the window and saw the four accused, Rolando Buela, Sarmelito
Buebos, Dante Buebos and Antonio Cornel, Jr. congregating in front of her hut. When she went out, she saw
the roof of her nipa hut already on fire. She shouted for help. Instead of coming to her immediate succor, the
four fled.

At some distance away, Olipiano Berjuela heard Adelina scream for help. Olipiano was then drinking with
Pepito Borbe to celebrate New Year's Eve. Olipiano immediately ran to the place and saw a number of people
jumping over the fence. When he focused his flashlight on them, he was able to identify Sarmelito Buebos,
Dante Buebos and Antonio Cornel, Jr. He also saw Rolando Buela running away.

On complaint of Adelina, petitioners Dante and Sarmelito Buebos, together with Rolando Buela and Antonio
Cornel, Jr., were indicted for arson in an Information bearing the following accusations:

That on or about the 1st day of January, 1994 at 3:00 o'clock in the Barangay Hacienda,
Island of San Miguel, Municipality of Tabaco, Province of Albay, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
helping one another. With intent to cause damage, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and maliciously set on fire the nipa roof of the house of ADELINA B. BORBE, to
the latter's damage and prejudice.

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.

The prosecution evidence portraying the foregoing facts was principally supplied by private complainant
Adelina Borbe and Olipiano Berjuela.

Upon the other hand, denial and alibi were the main exculpating line of petitioners and their co-accused. The
trial court summed up the defense evidence in the following tenor:
 20

The defense contended that the accused were at different places at the time of the incident:
Rolando Buela claimed to be at sitio Tugon, Malictay, San Miguel, Tabaco, Albay as there
was a novena prayer at his parents' house on occasion of the death anniversary of his late
grandfather; Dante Buebos also claimed to have been at Romeo Calleja's having gone there
in the evening of December 30, 1993 and left the place at 12:00 o'clock noontime of January l,
1994; Sarmelito Buebos asserted that he was at his residence at sitio Malictay, Hacienda, San
Miguel, Tabaco, Albay on the day the incident happened and that he never left his house;
Antonio Cornel, Jr. likewise claimed to be at his residence at Añgas after having visited his in-
laws; that he only came to know of the accusation five (5) days after the incident happened
when he visited his parents at Malictay; witnesses were likewise presented by the accused to
corroborate their testimonies.

RTC and CA Dispositions

On April 7, 1998, the RTC found all of the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of arson. The dispositive
part of the judgment of conviction reads:

WHEREFORE, from all the foregoing, this Court finds accused ROLANDO BUELA, DANTE
BUEBOS, SARMELITO BUEBOS and ANTONIO CORNEL, JR. GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime charged; accordingly, each of the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day ofreclusion temporal as
maximum; and to pay the cost.

SO ORDERED.

Via a notice of appeal, the four accused elevated the matter to the appellate court. In their appeal, they
contended that (1) the trial court erred in finding them guilty of the crime of arson; (2) that the trial court erred in
finding conspiracy; and (3) the trial court erred in failing to give weight and credence to their defense of denial
and alibi.

On November 13, 2003, through an eight-page decision penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. de los Santos,
the CA disposed of the appeal in this wise:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Each of the accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional as
minimum to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

In downgrading the penalty, the CA opined that the accused could only be convicted of simple arson,
punishable by prision mayor, and not for burning of an inhabited house, which is punishable by imprisonment
ranging from reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua. According to the appellate court, the information failed
to allege with specificity the actual crime committed. Hence, the accused should be found liable only for arson
in its simple form.

Issues

Dissatisfied, Dante and Sarmelito Buebos have resorted to the present recourse. The following arguments are
now raised for the Court's consideration:

I. WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE

DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ON THE BASIS OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE;
 21

II. WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

CONSPIRACY EXISTED IN THE CASE AT BAR.
Our Ruling
Overview of the law on arson

The confusion surrounding arson has been confounded by the dearth of annotation on this part of our penal
law. Certainly, the law on arson is one of the least commented in this jurisdiction. For the guidance of the
bench and bar, a brief legislative history of the body of laws on arson is in order.

Previously, arson was defined and penalized under nine different articles of the Revised Penal Code: Article
320 (destructive arson), Article 321 (other forms of arson), Article 322 (cases of arson not included in the
preceding articles), Article 323 (arson of property of small value), Article 324 (crimes involving destruction),
Article 325 (burning one's own property to commit arson), Article 326 (setting fire to property exclusively owned
by the offender, Article 326-a (in cases where death resulted as a consequence of arson), and Article 326-b
( prima facie evidence of arson).

On March 7, 1979, citing certain inadequacies that impede the successful enforcement and prosecution of
arsonists, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree (P.D) No. 1613. P.D. 1613
supplanted the penal code provisions on arson. The pertinent parts of the said presidential issuance read:

SEC. 1.Arson. — Any person who burns or sets fire to the property of another shall be
punished by prision mayor.

The same penalty shall be imposed when a person sets fire to his own property under
circumstances which expose to danger the life or property of another.

SEC. 2.Destructive Arson. — The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed if the property burned is any of the following:

1.Any ammunition factory and other establishments where explosives, inflammable or

combustible materials are stored;

2.Any archive, museum, whether public or private, or any edifice devoted to culture,
education or social services;

3.Any church or place of worship or other building where people usually assemble;

4.Any train, airplane or any aircraft, vessel or watercraft, or conveyance for

transportation of persons or property;

5.Any building where evidence is kept for use in any legislative, judicial, administrative
or other official proceedings;

6.Any hospital, hotel, dormitory, lodging house, housing tenement, shopping center,
public or private market, theater or movie house or any similar place or
building;

7.Any building, whether used as a dwelling or not, situated in a populated or congested

area.

SEC. 3.Other Cases of Arson. — The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall
be imposed if the property burned is any of the following:

1. Any building used as offices of the government or any of its agencies;

 22

2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;

3. Any industrial establishment, shipyard, oil well or mine shaft, platform or tunnel;
4. Any plantation, farm, pastureland, growing crop, grain field, orchard, bamboo grove
or forest;
5. Any rice mill, sugar mill, cane mill or mill central; and
6. Any railway or bus station, airport, wharf or warehouse.
SEC. 4.Special Aggravating Circumstances in Arson. — The penalty in any case of arson
shall be imposed in its maximum period:
1. If committed with the intent to gain;
2. If committed for the benefit of another;
3. If the offender is motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner or occupant of the
property burned;
4. If committed by a syndicate. The offense is committed by a syndicate if it is planned
or carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons.

SEC. 5.Where Death Results from Arson. — If by reason of or on the occasion of arson death
results, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed.

SEC. 6.Prima Facie Evidence of Arson. — Any of the following circumstances shall
constitute prima facie evidence of arson:

1.If the fire started simultaneously in more than one part of the building or
establishment.

2.If substantial amount of flammable substances or materials are stored within the
building not necessary in the business of the offender nor for household use.

3.If gasoline, kerosene, petroleum or other flammable or combustible substances or

materials soaked therewith or containers thereof, or any mechanical, electrical,
chemical, or electronic contrivance designed to start a fire, or ashes or traces
of any of the foregoing are found in the ruins or premises of the burned building
or property.

4.If the building or property is insured for substantially more than its actual value at the
time of the issuance of the policy.

5.If during the lifetime of the corresponding fire insurance policy more than two fires
have occurred in the same or other premises owned or under the control of the
offender and/or insured.

6.If shortly before the fire, a substantial portion of the effects insured and stored in a
building or property had been withdrawn from the premises except in the
ordinary course of business.

7.If a demand for money or other valuable consideration was made before the fire in
exchange for the desistance of the offender or for the safety of other person or
property of the victim.

SEC. 7.Conspiracy to Commit Arson. — Conspiracy to commit arson shall be punished

by prision mayor in its minimum period.

SEC. 8.Confiscation of Object of Arson. — The building which is the object of arson including
the land on which it is situated shall be confiscated and escheated to the State, unless the
owner thereof can prove that he has no participation in nor knowledge of such arson despite
the exercise of due diligence on his part.
 23

On November 11, 1980, the law on arson was again revisited via P.D. No. 1744. The new law expanded the
definition of destructive arson by way of reinstating Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code. The amendatory
legislation also paved the way for the re imposition of the capital punishment on destructive arsonists.

When Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659 (An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes) was
passed on December 13, 1993, Article 320 again underwent a revision. As it now stands, Article 320 of the
Revised Penal Code is worded, thus:

Art. 320.Destructive Arson. — The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed
upon any person who shall burn:

1.One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of burning, or as
a result of simultaneous burnings, committed on several or different occasions.

2.Any building of public or private ownership, devoted to the public in general or where
people usually gather or congregate for a definite purpose such as, but not
limited to, official governmental function or business, private transaction,
commerce, trade, workshop, meetings and conferences, or merely incidental to
a definite purpose such as but not limited to hotels, motels, transient dwellings,
public conveyances or stops or terminals, regardless of whether the offender
had knowledge that there are persons in said building or edifice at the time it is
set on fire and regardless also of whether the building is actually inhabited or
not.

3.Any train or locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or airplane, devoted to transportation

or conveyance, or for public use, entertainment or leisure.

4.Any building, factory, warehouse installation and any appurtenances thereto, which
are devoted to the service of public utilities.

5.Any building the burning of which is for the purpose of concealing or destroying
evidence of another violation of law, or for the purpose of concealing
bankruptcy or defrauding creditors or to collect from insurance.

Irrespective of the application of the above enumerated qualifying circumstances, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death shall likewise be imposed when the arson is perpetrated or
committed by two (2) or more persons or by a group of persons, regardless of whether their
purpose is merely to burn or destroy the building or the burning merely constitutes an overt act
in the commission or another violation of law.

The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall also be imposed upon any person who shall
burn:

1.Any arsenal, shipyard, storehouse or military powder or fireworks factory, ordinance,

storehouse, archives or general museum of the Government.

2.In an inhabited place, any storehouse or factory of inflammable or explosive

materials.

If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under this Article, death
results, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed.

Of course, with the repeal of the Death Penalty Law on June 24, 2006 through R.A. No. 9346, arson is no
longer a capital offense.
 24

We proceed to the crux of the petition.

Circumstantial evidence points to petitioners' culpability

Petitioners score the CA for convicting them of arson based on circumstantial evidence. They argue that the
inference that they were responsible for the burning of private complainant's hut was not duly proven by the
People.

Circumstantial evidence is defined as that evidence that "indirectly proves a fact in issue through an inference
which the fact-finder draws from the evidence established. Resort thereto is essential when the lack of direct
testimony would result in setting a felon free."

At the outset, We may well emphasize that direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only basis
on which a court draws its finding of guilt. Established facts that form a chain of circumstances can lead the
mind intuitively or impel a conscious process of reasoning towards a conviction. Verily, resort to circumstantial
evidence is sanctioned by Rule 133, Section 5 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.

The following are the requisites for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient for a conviction: (a) there is more
than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused, to the exclusion of all others,
is the one who has committed the crime. Thus, to justify a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the
combination of circumstances must be interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the
guilt of the accused.

After a careful review of the evidence presented by both parties, We find that the circumstantial evidence
extant in the records is sufficient to identify petitioners as the authors of the burning of the hut of private
complainant Adelina Borbe:

1.Private complainant heard some noise emanating from outside her house at around 3:00 a.m.;

2.When she went out to check the disturbance, private complainant saw petitioners, together with their two
other co-accused, standing in front of the house;

3.Moments later, the roof of her house caught fire;

4.Petitioners and their cohorts absconded while private complainant desperately shouted for help.

The facts from which the cited circumstances arose have been proved through positive testimony. Evidently,
these circumstances form an unbroken chain of events leading to one fair conclusion — the culpability of
petitioners for the burning of the hut. The Court is convinced that the circumstances, taken together, leave no
doubt that petitioner perpetrated the arson.

Conspiracy evident from coordinated action of petitioners

Petitioners next contend that conspiracy was erroneously appreciated by both the trial and appellate courts.
They posit that the finding of conspiracy was premised on speculation and conjecture.

The rule is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. Proof of the agreement need not
rest on direct evidence, as the same may be inferred from the conduct of the parties indicating a common
understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense. Corollarily, it is not necessary to
show that two or more persons met together and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details of an
unlawful scheme or the details by which an illegal objective is to be carried out. The rule is that conviction is
proper upon proof that the accused acted in concert, each of them doing his part to fulfil the common design. In
 25

such a case, the act of one becomes the act of all and each of the accused will thereby be deemed equally
guilty of the crime committed.

In the case at bench, conspiracy was evident from the coordinated movements of petitioners Dante and
Sarmelito Buebos. Both of them stood outside the house of private complainant Adelina. They were part of the
group making boisterous noise in the vicinity. Petitioners also fled together while the roof of Adelina's house
was ablaze. These acts clearly show their joint purpose and design, and community of interest.

We quote with approval the CA observation along this line:

Accused-appellant's assertion that conspiracy has not been established is belied by the
accounts of the prosecution witness. The manner by which the accused-appellants behaved
after the private complainant shouted for help clearly indicated a confederacy of purpose and
concerted action on the part of the accused-appellants. Even if there is no direct evidence
showing that all of the accused had prior agreement on how to set the roof of the house on
fire, the doctrine is well settled that conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence of prior
agreement to commit the crime. Very seldom such prior agreement be demonstrable since, in
the nature of things, criminal undertakings are only rarely documented by agreements in
writing.

Crime committed and the penalty

The RTC sentenced all four accused to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years and one day
of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as maximum. On appeal, the CA reduced the sentence to six (6) years of prision correccional, as
minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum. The CA ratiocinated:

The information charges accused-appellants with "violation of P.D. 1613" without specifying
the particular provision breached. The information having failed to allege whether or not the
burnt house is inhabited, and not having been established that the house is situated in a
populated or congested area, accused-appellants should be deemed to have only been
charged with plain arson under Section 1 of the decree. Under Section 1 of the decree, the
offense of simple arson committed is punishable by prision mayor.

There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances in the case at bar accused-
appellants should be sentenced to suffer the penalty ofprision mayor in its medium period as
provided under Article 321, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, by
Presidential Decree No. 1613. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum
penalty should be anywhere within the range of prision correctional.

The legal basis of the trial court in convicting petitioners of arson is Section 3, paragraph 2 of P.D. No. 1613.
The said provision of law reads:

SEC. 3.Other Cases of Arson. — The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall
be imposed if the property burned is any of the following:

2.Any inhabited house or dwelling;

The elements of this form of arson are: (a) there is intentional burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned is
an inhabited house or dwelling. Admittedly, there is a confluence of the foregoing elements here. However, the
information failed to allege that what was intentionally burned was an inhabited house or dwelling. That is fatal.

Sections 8 and 9 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure state:

 26

Sec. 8.Designation of the offense. — The complaint or information shall state the designation
of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and
specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense,
reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.

Sec. 9.Cause of the accusation. — The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and
concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged
as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances for the court to pronounce judgment.

Under the new rules, the information or complaint must state the designation of the offense given by the statute
and specify its qualifying and generic aggravating circumstances. Otherwise stated, the accused will not be
convicted of the offense proved during the trial if it was not properly alleged in the information.

Perusing the information, there was no allegation that the house intentionally burned by petitioners and their
cohorts was inhabited. Rather, the information merely recited that "accused, conspiring, confederating and
helping one another, with intent to cause damage, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
maliciously set on fire the nipa roof of the house of ADELINA B. BORBE, to the latter's damage and
prejudice."

Although the rule took effect only on December 1, 2000, while the petitioners were convicted by the RTC on
April 7, 1998, it may be applied retroactively. It is elementary that rules of criminal procedure are given
retroactive application insofar as they benefit the accused.

In fine, petitioners can be convicted only of simple arson, under Section 1, paragraph 1 of P.D. No. 1613,
punishable by prision mayor.

This is not a case of first impression. This Court has, on a number of occasions, modified the RTC and CA
judgments for having applied the wrong law and penalty on arson. In People v. Soriano, the accused was
found guilty of destructive arson, then a capital offense. On automatic review, the Court held that he should be
held liable only for simple arson. The explanation:

However, we believe that the applicable provision of law should be Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613,
which imposes a penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua for other cases of arson
as the properties burned by accused-appellant are specifically described as houses,
contemplating inhabited houses or dwellings under the aforesaid law. The descriptions as
alleged in the second Amended Information particularly refer to the structures as houses
rather than as buildings or edifices. The applicable law should therefore be Sec. 3, par. 2, of
PD 1613, and not Art. 320, par. 1 of the Penal Code. In case of ambiguity in construction of
penal laws, it is well-settled that such laws shall be construed strictly against the government,
and literally in favor of the accused.

The elements of arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 are: (a) there is intentional burning;
and (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Incidentally, these
elements concur in the case at bar.

The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of
perversity or viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of The
Revised Penal Code constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous crimes "for
being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest
wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the
common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered
society." On the other hand, acts committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple Arson are
crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness that the law punishes with a lesser
 27

penalty. In other words, Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less significant social,
economic, political and national security implications than Destructive Arson. However, acts
falling under Simple Arson may nevertheless be converted into Destructive Arson depending
on the qualifying circumstances present.

In the present case, the act neither committed by accused-appellant neither appears to be
heinous nor represents a greater degree of perversity and viciousness as distinguished from
those acts punishable under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code. No qualifying circumstance
was established to convert the offense to Destructive Arson. The special aggravating
circumstance that accused-appellant was "motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner or
occupant of the property burned" cannot be appreciated in the present case where it appears
that he was acting more on impulse, heat of anger or risen temper rather than real spite or
hatred that impelled him to give vent to his wounded ego. Nothing can be worse than a
spurned lover or a disconsolate father under the prevailing circumstances that surrounded the
burning of the Cimagala house. Thus, accused-appellant must be held guilty of Simple Arson
penalized under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 for the act of intentionally burning an inhabited
house or dwelling.

An oversight of the same nature was addressed by this Court in the more recent case of People v.
Malngan. Said the Court in Malngan:

The ultimate query now is which kind of arson is accused-appellant guilty of?

As previously discussed, there are two (2) categories of the crime of arson: 1) destructive
arson, under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659; and
2) simple arson, under Presidential Decree No. 1613. Said classification is based on the kind,
character and location of the property burned, regardless of the value of the damage caused,
48 to wit:

Article 320 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, contemplates the malicious
burning of structures, both public and private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels,
aircraft, factories and other military, government or commercial establishments by any
person or group of persons. The classification of this type of crime is known as Destructive
Arson, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The reason for the law is self-
evident: to effectively discourage and deter the commission of this dastardly crime, to prevent
the destruction of properties and protect the lives of innocent people. Exposure to a brewing
conflagration leaves only destruction and despair in its wake; hence, the State mandates
greater retribution to authors of this heinous crime. The exceptionally severe punishment
imposed for this crime takes into consideration the extreme danger to human lives exposed by
the malicious burning of these structures; the danger to property resulting from the
conflagration; the fact that it is normally difficult to adopt precautions against its commission,
and the difficulty in pinpointing the perpetrators; and, the greater impact on the social,
economic, security and political fabric of the nation. [Emphasis supplied]

If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under Art. 320, death
should result, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed.

On the other hand, PD 1613 which repealed Arts. 321 to 326-B of The Revised Penal Code
remains the governing law for Simple Arson. This decree contemplates the malicious burning
of public and private structures, regardless of size, not included in Art. 320, as amended by
RA 7659, and classified as other cases of arson. These include houses, dwellings,
government buildings, farms, mills, plantations, railways, bus stations, airports,
wharves and other industrial establishments. Although the purpose of the law on Simple
Arson is to prevent the high incidence of fires and other crimes involving destruction, protect
the national economy and preserve the social, economic and political stability of the nation,
 28

PD 1613 tempers the penalty to be meted to offenders. This separate classification of Simple
Arson recognizes the need to lessen the severity of punishment commensurate to the act or
acts committed, depending on the particular facts and circumstances of each case.

To emphasize:

The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of
perversity or viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of the
Revised Penal Code (as amended) constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as
heinous crimes for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their
inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and
outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized
and ordered society. On the other hand, acts committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple
Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness that the law punishes with
a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less significant
social, economic, political and national security implications than Destructive Arson. However,
acts falling under Simple Arson may nevertheless be converted into Destructive Arson
depending on the qualifying circumstances present.

Rescinding from the above clarification vis-à-vis the description of the crime as stated in the
accusatory portion of the Information, it is quite evident that accused-appellant was charged
with the crime of Simple Arson — for having "deliberately set fire upon the two-storey
residential house of ROBERTO SEPARA and family . . . knowing the same to be an inhabited
house and situated in a thickly populated place and as a consequence thereof a conflagration
ensued and the said building, together with some seven (7) adjoining residential houses, were
razed by fire.

The facts of the case at bar is somewhat similar to the facts of the case of People v. Soriano.
The accused in the latter case caused the burning of a particular house. Unfortunately, the
blaze spread and gutted down five (5) neighboring houses. The RTC therein found the
accused guilty of destructive arson under paragraph 1 of Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. This Court, through Mr. Justice Bellosillo, however,
declared that:

". . . [T]he applicable provision of law should be Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613, which
imposes a penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua for other cases of arson
as the properties burned by accused-appellant are specifically described as houses,
contemplating inhabited houses or dwellings under the aforesaid law. The descriptions
as alleged in the second Amended Information particularly refer to the structures as
houses rather than as buildings or edifices. The applicable law should therefore be
Sec. 3, Par. 2, of PD 1613, and not Art. 320, par. 1 of the Penal Code. In case of
ambiguity in construction of penal laws, it is well-settled that such laws shall be
construed strictly against the government, and liberally in favor of the accused.

The elements of arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 are: (a) there is intentional
burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling.
Incidentally, these elements concur in the case at bar."

As stated in the body of the Information, accused-appellant was charged with having
intentionally burned the two-storey residential house of Robert Separa. Said conflagration
likewise spread and destroyed seven (7) adjoining houses. Consequently, if proved, as it was
proved, at the trial, she may be convicted, and sentenced accordingly, of the crime of simple
arson. Such is the case "notwithstanding the error in the designation of the offense in the
information, the information remains effective insofar as it states the facts constituting the
crime alleged therein." "What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation
 29

of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violate . . . but the
description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited."

There is, thus, a need to modify the penalty imposed by the RTC as Sec. 5 of PD No. 1613
categorically provides that the penalty to be imposed for simple arson is:

SEC. 5.Where Death Results from Arson. — If by reason of or on the occasion of

arson death results, the penalty of reclusion perpetuato death shall be imposed.

Accordingly, there being no aggravating circumstance alleged in the Information, the

imposable penalty on accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua.

Now, to the penalty. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty
should range from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. Considering that no aggravating or
mitigating circumstance attended the commission of the offense, the penalty should be imposed in its medium
period [eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years]. The minimum of the indeterminate sentence
is prision correctional, which has a range of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years, to be imposed in
any of its periods.

The CA sentence is in accord with law and jurisprudence. We sustain it. WHEREFORE, the petition is
DENIED. The appealed judgment is AFFIRMED in full. SO ORDERED.

7. People v. Tampus GR No. 181084, June 16, 2009

FACTS:

The offended party, ABC, is the daughter of appellant Ida, and was 13 years old at the time of the
incident. Ida worked as a waitress in a beer house. At the time of the commission of the crime, Ida and ABC
was renting a room in a house owned by Tampus who was a barangay tanod. On April 1, 1995 ABC testified
that she was in the house with Ida and Tampus who were both drinking beer. They forced her to drink beer and
after consuming three and one-half glasses of beer, she became intoxicated and very sleepy. While ABC was
lying on the floor of their room, she overheard Tampus requesting her mother, Ida, that he be allowed to have
sexual intercourse with her. Appellant Ida agreed and instructed Tampus to leave as soon as he finished
having sexual intercourse with ABC. Ida then went to work, leaving Tampus alone with ABC. ABC fell asleep
and when she woke up, she noticed that the garter of her panties was loose and rolled down to her knees. She
suffered pain all over her body and her private parts and noticed that her panties and short pants were stained
with blood which was coming from her private part. When her mother arrived home from work the following
morning, she kept on crying but appellant Ida ignored her. ABC testified that on April 4, 1995, she was left
alone in the room since her mother was at work at the beer house. Tampus went inside their room and
threatened to kill her if she would report the previous sexual assault to anyone. He then forcibly removed her
panties. ABC shouted but Tampus covered her mouth and again threatened to kill her if she shouted. He
undressed himself and consummated the sexual act then he left the house. When ABC told appellant Ida
about the incident, the latter again ignored her.
Both defendants denied the allegation Tampus claiming that he went to the public market on April 1 and
that he was at the Barangay Outpost to perform his duties as barangay tanod on April 4. Ida alleged that she
always brings her daughter with her when she works.
(Dr. Costas), the Head of the Department of Psychiatry of the Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center,
issued a Medical Certification which showed that appellant Ida was treated as an outpatient at the Vicente
Sotto Memorial Medical Center Psychiatry Department from November 11, 1994 to January 12, 1995 and was
provisionally diagnosed with Schizophrenia, paranoid type.
The trial court convicter Tampus of two counts of rape and found Ida guilty as an accomplice in the first
rape case. The mitigating circumstance of illness which would diminish the exercise of will power without
depriving her of the consciousness of her acts was appreciated in favor of Ida. Both were ordered jointly, and
severally to indemnify ABC the sum of Php 50,000.00
 30

Pending resolution of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, accused Tampus died and his appeal
was dismissed. The appeal dealt only with that of appellant Ida. The appellate court gave credence to the
testimony of ABC and affirmed the trial court’s decision with modification. It appreciated the mitigating
circumstance of illness in favor of Ida, but found that Ida failed to prove that she was completely deprived of
intelligence on the basis of the medical report and the testimony of the attending physician, Ida’s schizophrenia
was determined by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals to have diminished the exercise of her will-
power though it did not deprive her of the consciousness of her acts. The appeal was dismissed, the appellate
court affirmed the trial court’s decision but modified the award of damages ordering Ida to pay moral damages
in the amount of fifty Php 50,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of Php 25,000.00

ISSUES:
Whether the mitigating circumstance must be appreciated in favor of Ida
Whether or not Ida can be considered as an accomplice.
Whether or not the trial court and appellate court was correct in their Imposition of the
indemnities that Ida has to pay

RULING:

1. The conviction of Ida as accomplice in the crime

Accomplices are persons who, not being included in Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code, cooperate in
the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts. The following requisites must be proved in order
that a person can be considered an accomplice:
(a) community of design, i.e., knowing that criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he
concurs with the latter in his purpose;
(b) he cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts; and,
(c) there must be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person
charged as accomplice
The testimony of ABC establishes that Ida cooperated in the execution of the rape by Tampus when
prior to the act of rape by Tampus, she forced ABC to drink beer and she agreed to Tampus’ request for him to
have sexual intercourse with ABC. Ida’s acts show that she had knowledge of and even gave her permission to
the plan of Tampus to have sexual intercourse with her daughter.
All the requisites concur in order to find Ida guilty as an accomplice to Tampus in the rape of ABC. The
testimony of ABC shows that there was community of design between Ida and Tampus to commit the rape of
ABC. Ida had knowledge of and assented to Tampus’ intention to have sexual intercourse with her daughter.
She forced ABC to drink beer, and when ABC was already drunk, she left ABC alone with Tampus, with the
knowledge and even with her express consent to Tampus’ plan to have sexual intercourse with her daughter.
It is settled jurisprudence that the previous acts of cooperation by the accomplice should not be
indispensable to the commission of the crime; otherwise, she would be liable as a principal by indispensable
cooperation. The evidence shows that the acts of cooperation by Ida are not indispensable to the commission
of rape by Tampus. First, because it was both Ida and Tampus who forced ABC to drink beer, and second
because Tampus already had the intention to have sexual intercourse with ABC and he could have
consummated the act even without Ida’s consent. The acts of Ida are closely related to the eventual
commission of rape by Tampus.

Circumstances affecting the liability of ida

Schizophrenia may be considered as a mitigating circumstance if it diminishes the exercise of the

willpower of the accused. The testimony shows that even though Ida was diagnosed with schizophrenia, she
was not totally deprived of intelligence but her judgment was affected. Thus, on the basis of the Medical
Certification that Ida suffered from and was treated for schizophrenia a few months prior to the incident, and on
the testimony of Dr. Costas, Ida’s schizophrenia could be considered to have diminished the exercise of her
willpower although it did not deprive her of the consciousness of her acts.
The undisputed fact that Ida is the mother of ABC—who was 13 years old at the time of the incident—
could have been considered as a special qualifying circumstance which would have increased the imposable
penalty to death. However, although the victim's minority was alleged and established, her relationship with the
 31

accused as the latter's daughter was not properly alleged in the Information, and even though this was proven
during trial and not refuted by the accused, it cannot be considered as a special qualifying circumstance that
would serve to increase the penalty of the offender. Under the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which should
be given retroactive effect following the rule that statutes governing court proceedings will be construed as
applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, every Information must state the
qualifying and the aggravating circumstances attending the commission of the crime for them to be considered
in the imposition of the penalty. Since in the case at bar, the did not state that Ida is the mother of ABC, this
circumstance could not be appreciated as a special qualifying circumstance. Ida may only be convicted as an
accomplice in the crime of simple rape, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua.

Civil indemnity imposed against the appellant

It is necessary and proper to award ABC civil indemnity of P50,000.00. Civil indemnity ex delicto is
mandatory upon finding of the fact of rape. This is distinct from moral damages awarded upon such finding
without need of further proof, because it is assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries
entitling the victim to such award. The victim in simple rape cases is entitled to an award of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity ex delicto and another P50,000.00 as moral damages. However, Tampus’ civil indemnity ex delicto
has been extinguished by reason of his death before the final judgment, in accordance with Article 89 of the
Revised Penal Code. It becomes relevant to determine the particular amount for which each accused is liable
when they have different degrees of responsibility in the commission of the crime and, consequently, differing
degrees of liability. When a crime is committed by many, each one has a distinct part in the commission of the
crime and though all the persons who took part in the commission of the crime are liable, the liability is not
equally shared among them. Hence, an accused may be liable either as principal, accomplice or accessory.
The particular liability that each accused is responsible for depends on the nature and degree of his
participation in the commission of the crime. The penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for a particular
crime is imposed upon the principal in a consummated felony. he accomplice is only given the penalty next
lower in degree than that prescribed by the law for the crime committed and an accessory is given the penalty
lower by two degrees. However, a felon is not only criminally liable, he is likewise civilly liable. Apart from the
penalty of imprisonment imposed on him, he is also ordered to indemnify the victim and to make whole the
damage caused by his act or omission through the payment of civil indemnity and damages.
Civil liability arising from the crime is shared by all the accused. Although, unlike criminal liability—in
which the Revised Penal Code specifically states the corresponding penalty imposed on the principal,
accomplice and accessory—the share of each accused in the civil liability is not specified in the Revised Penal
Code. The courts have the discretion to determine the apportionment of the civil indemnity which the principal,
accomplice and accessory are respectively liable for, without guidelines with respect to the basis of the
allotment.
Article 109 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "[i]f there are two or more persons civilly liable for
a felony, the courts shall determine the amount for which each must respond." Notwithstanding the
determination of the respective liability of the principals, accomplices and accessories within their respective
class, they shall also be subsidiarily liable for the amount of civil liability adjudged in the other classes. Article
110 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "[t]he principals, accomplices, and accessories, each within their
respective class, shall be liable severally (in solidum) among themselves for their quotas, and subsidiarily for
those of the other persons liable."
If for instance, there are four principals and only one accomplice and the total of the civil indemnity and
damages is P6,000.00, the court cannot assign two-thirds (2/3) of the indemnity and damages to the principals
and one-third (1/3) to the accomplice. Even though the principals, as a class, have a greater share in the
liability as against the accomplice-- since one-third (1/3) of P6,000.00 is P2,000.00, while two-thirds (2/3) of
P6,000.00 is P4,000.00-- when the civil liability of every person is computed, the share of the accomplice ends
up to be greater than that of each principal. This is so because the two-thirds (2/3) share of the principals—or
P4,000.00—is still divided among all the four principals, and thus every principal is liable for only P1,000.00.
In the case at bar, the trial court ruled that the accomplice is solidarily liable with the principal for the
entire amount of the civil indemnity of P50,000.00. This is an erroneous apportionment of the civil indemnity.
First, because it does not take into account the difference in the nature and degree of participation between the
principal, Tampus, versus the accomplice, Ida. Ida’s previous acts of cooperation include her acts of forcing
ABC to drink beer and permitting Tampus to have sexual intercourse with her daughter. But even without these
acts, Tampus could have still raped ABC. It was Tampus, the principal by direct participation, who should have
 32

the greater liability, not only in terms of criminal liability, but also with respect to civil liability. Second, Article
110 of the Revised Penal Code states that the apportionment should provide for a quota amount for every
class for which members of such class are solidarily liable within their respective class, and they are only
subsidiarily liable for the share of the other classes. The Revised Penal Code does not provide for solidary
liability among the different classes, as was held by the trial court in the case at bar.lTaking into consideration
the difference in participation of the principal and accomplice, the principal, Tampus, should be liable for two-
thirds (2/3) of the total amount of the civil indemnity and moral damages and appellant Ida should be ordered
to pay one-third (1/3) of the amount. Civil indemnity for simple rape was correctly set at P50,000.00 and moral
damages at P50,000.00. The total amount of damages to be divided between Tampus and Ida is P100,000.00,
where Tampus is liable for P66,666.67 (which is two-thirds [2/3] of P100,000.00) and Ida is liable for
P33,333.33 (which is one-third [1/3] of P100,000.00). This is broken down into civil indemnity of P16,666.67
and moral damages of P16,666.67. However, since the principal, Tampus, died while the case was pending in
the Court of Appeals, his liability for civil indemnity ex delicto is extinguished by reason of his death before the
final judgment. His share in the civil indemnity and damages cannot be passed over to the accomplice, Ida,
because Tampus’ share of the civil liability has been extinguished. However, since Tampus’ civil liability ex
delicto is extinguished, Ida’s subsidiary liability with respect to this amount is also eliminated, following the
principle that the accessory follows the principal.
Exemplary damages were incorrectly awarded by the Court of Appeals. In criminal cases, exemplary
damages are imposed on the offender as part of the civil liability when the crime was committed with one or
more aggravating circumstances. Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or corrective
damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrongdoings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings
and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct.
Exemplary damages may be awarded only when one or more aggravating circumstances are alleged in the
information and proved during the trial. In the case at bar, no qualifying or aggravating circumstance was
appreciated against Ida. Although, the minority of the victim coupled with the fact that the offender is the parent
of the victim could have served to qualify the crime of rape, the presence of these concurring circumstances
cannot justify the award of exemplary damages since the relationship of the offender, Ida, to the victim, ABC,
was not alleged in the Information. The minority of the rape victim and her relationship with the offender must
both be alleged in the information and proved during the trial in order to be appreciated as an
aggravating/qualifying circumstance. While the information in the instant case alleged that ABC was a minor
during the incident, there was no allegation that Ida was her parent. Since the relationship between ABC and
appellant was not duly established, the award of exemplary damages is not warranted.

Appellant Ida Montes claros guilty beyond reasonable doubt as accomplice in the crime of rape and sentencing
her to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to
twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. She is ordered to pay civil indemnity in
the amount of sixteen thousand, six hundred sixty-six pesos and sixty-seven centavos (P16,666.67), and moral
damages in the amount of sixteen thousand, six hundred sixty-six pesos and sixty-seven centavos
(P16,666.67). The award of exemplary damages is deleted.

PEOPLE vs. TAMPUS (G.R. No. 181084, June 16, 2009 “Accomplice”

FACTS:

ABC, is the daughter of appellant, Montesclaros, and was a minor at the time of the incident.
Montesclaros worked as a waitress in a beer house. Montesclaros and ABC were renting a room in a house
owned by Tampus, who was a barangay tanod. On April, 1995, ABC stated that she was in the house with
Montesclaros and Tampus who were both drinking beer. They forced her to drink beer and when she became
intoxicated she was now very sleepy then she overheard Tampus requesting her mother, Montesclaros that he
be allowed to have sexual intercourse with her. Montesclaros agreed and instructed Tampus to leave as soon
as he was finished. Montesclaros left for work essentially leaving Tampus alone with the victim. She fell asleep
and when she woke up she noticed that the garter of her panties was loose and rolled down to her knees. She
suffered pain all over her body noticed that her panties and short pants were stained with blood which was
coming from her genitals. Montesclaros arrived home from work the following morning, she kept on crying but
appellant ignored her.
 33

A similar incident ensued on April 4, 1995 around 1:00 a.m., she was left alone in the room since her
mother was at work at the beer house. Tampus went inside their room and threatened to kill her if she would
report the previous incident to anyone. Same thing happened as Monteclaros ignored her again when the
victim told her about the incident.

Without other recourse she filed two Complaints. She accused Tampus of rape she declared in her
Complaint that this was done in conspiracy with co-accused Montesclaros, her mother, who gave permission to
Tampus to rape her. The victim also stated a similar incident effectively filing two separate cases.

The trial court appreciated in Montesclaros’ favor the mitigating circumstance of illness which would
diminish the exercise of will-power without depriving her of the consciousness of her acts, pursuant to Article
13(9) of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court convicted Tampus of two counts of rape and found
Montesclaros guilty as an accomplice.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court’s decision to implicate Ida Montesclaros as an accomplice in the rape of
ABC accurate?

RULING:

Yes, Montesclaros is accountable as an accomplice in the rape of her daughter, ABC. Accomplices are
persons who, not being included in Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code, cooperate in the execution of the
offense by previous or simultaneous acts.

The requisites that are needed are fulfilled to find Montes claros guilty as an accomplice to Tampus in
the rape of ABC. The testimony of ABC shows that there was community of design between Montes claros and
Tampus to commit the rape of ABC. Montes claros had knowledge of and agreed to Tampus' intention to have
sexual intercourse with her daughter. She forced ABC to drink beer, and when ABC was already drunk, she left
ABC alone with Tampus, with the knowledge and even with her express consent to Tampus' plan to have
sexual intercourse with her daughter. It is settled jurisprudence that the previous acts of cooperation by the
accomplice should not be indispensable to the commission of the crime; otherwise, she would be liable as a
principal by indispensable cooperation.

8. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RENE ROSAS, Accused-Appellant. G.R. NO.

177825 : October 24, 2008

Facts:

Assailed before this Court is the decision dated November 29, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
HC No. 00301 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kabacan, Cotabato, Branch 22,
in Criminal Case No. 98-105, finding accused-appellant Rene Rosas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

In the court of origin, accused-appellant was charged with the crime of Murder in an Information dated October
13, 1998. The crime was alleged to have been committed, as follows:

That on September 15, 1995, in the Municipality of Kabakan, Province of Cotabato, Philippines, the said
accused, armed with a gun, with intent to kill did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and with
treachery, attack, assault and shot NESTOR ESTACIO, thereby hitting and inflicting upon the latter multiple
gunshot wounds on the different parts of his body, which caused his instantaneous death.
 34

CONTRARY TO LAW.

When arraigned on January 5, 1999, accused-appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued, in the course of which the prosecution presented the
testimonies of Dr. Crisostomo Necessario, Jr., Municipal Health Officer of Kabacan, Cotabato; Wilfredo
Bataga, mayor of Kabacan, Cotabato; Antonio Palomar Bataga, Jr.; and Arceli Estacio, widow of the victim.

For its part, the defense presented accused-appellant himself and his girlfriend, Karen Nayona.

The prosecution's version of the incident is succinctly summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General in its
Appellee's Brief, to wit:

On September 15, 1995, around eleven o'clock in the morning, Antonio Palomar Bataga, Jr. was outside the
billiard hall along Aglipay Street near the public terminal and market of Kabacan, Poblacion, Kabacan,
Cotabato. Around 15 meters away, he saw appellant Rene Rosas standing beside the post near a store across
the street. Palomar knew appellant long before, as they were both into gambling. Thereafter, the victim, Nestor
Estacio, arrived alone on board his motorcycle. He stopped in front of the Salcedo Newsstand to buy a
newspaper without switching off his motorcycle's engine. Before he could drive off, a Weena bus, which was
leaving the Bus Terminal about that time, blocked his way. Then, appellant, who was coming from the left side
behind the victim, shot the latter with a pistol at close range. After the victim fell on the ground, more gunshots
were heard, which gunshots were fired at him to make sure that he was dead. After the shooting, appellant
jumped into a motorcycle and escaped.

Meanwhile, around that same time and fifteen (15) meters away, in a carinderia located at the Bus Terminal in
Poblacion, Kabacan, Cotabato, several gunshots were heard. Wilfredo Bataga, who was the owner of the said
carinderia and also the commanding officer of the 39th Infantry Batallion assigned in Kabacan, Cotabato,
immediately proceeded to where the gunshots came from. He saw appellant about to run and a dead body
being carried by four persons into a tricycle. Wilfredo upon seeing that appellant was armed with a 45-caliber
pistol, ran after the latter but lost him in the crowd.

On October 27, 1995, Wilfredo was handed with a cartographic sketch of the suspect made by the National
Bureau of Investigation. He indorsed the cartographic sketch to the police of the Poblacion and reported the
incident.

On August 5, 1998, around 5:30 in the afternoon, appellant was spotted a meter away in front of Wilfredo's
house. Wilfredo upon seeing appellant took out his copy of the cartographic sketch and confronted appellant
that it was his picture. Appellant answered "Siguro ako nga." Appellant was then immediately arrested.

The post-mortem examination conducted by Dr. Crisostomo Necessario, Municipal Health Officer of Kabacan,
Cotabato revealed that the victim sustained multiple gunshot wounds in the lumbar region (lower back area), a
gunshot wound in the epigastric area (upper mid-portion of the abdomen near the chest) and the mid-left
portion of the hypogastric area (left abdomen). Thereafter, Dr. Necessario issued a Medical Report attributing
the victim's death to hypovolemic shock caused by gunshot wounds.

On the other hand, accused-appellant's version is hinged mainly on denial and alibi. He testified that in the
morning of September 15, 1995, he was at his boarding house located along USM Avenue, Kabacan,
Cotabato. The following day, he went home to Mintal Relocation in Davao City and came back to Kabacan,
Cotabato on August 5, 1998. On that day, while accused-appellant was in a public market, a certain Dodong
Rivera approached and informed him that he should talk to Mayor Wilfredo Bataga because a group of men
 35

was out to kill him. So, accused-appellant proceeded to the house of Mayor Bataga who showed him a
cartographic sketch. When accused-appellant was asked if it was him on the sketch, he replied, "Siguro, ako
nga." He was then taken to the Kabacan Police Station where he was detained.

Karen Nayona, accused-appellant's girlfriend, merely corroborated his testimony that he was in the boarding
house at USM Avenue, Kabacan, Cotabato in the morning of September 15, 1995. Then, at around 11 o'clock
in the morning, they met and went to a fastfood restaurant located along USM Avenue. There, she told
accused-appellant that she was two months pregnant with his baby.

In a decision 4 dated February 1, 2001, the trial court rendered its decision convicting accused-appellant of the
crime of murder, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing and finding the accused Rene Rosas alias Boy Rosal guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder qualified by treachery, judgment is hereby rendered sentencing the
accused with penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the heirs of Nestor Estacio the sum of P50,000.00 for
his death, P40,000.00 for funeral and burial expenses and P50,000.00 for moral damages.

SO ORDERED.

Pursuant to Section 3(c) of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, accused-appellant appealed
his conviction to the Supreme Court via a notice of appeal.

On February 4, 2002, this Court accepted the appeal and docketed the same as G.R. No. 148879.

On September 22, 2004, conformably with our pronouncement in People v. Mateo which modified the
provisions of the Rules of Court insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the RTC to this Court in cases
where the penalty imposed by the trial court is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, this Court
resolved to refer the case to the Court of Appeals, whereat it was docketed as CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00301, for
appropriate action and disposition.

In its decision dated November 29, 2006, the Court of Appeals upheld the conviction of accused-appellant. The
decretal portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with modification that the award for actual
damages is DELETED for reasons already discussed; in lieu thereof, an award of temperate damages in the
amount of Twenty Five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos is hereby GRANTED.

SO ORDERED.

From the Court of Appeals, the case was then elevated to this Court upon filing by accused-appellant of a
notice of appeal on January 2, 2007. In its Resolution of July 23, 2007, the Court resolved to require both
parties to submit their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desire. The parties, however, opted not to file
supplemental briefs and manifested that they were merely adopting their briefs filed before the appellate court.

In this appeal, accused-appellant assigns the following errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF MURDER WHEN THE
LATTER'S GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
 36

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WITH MURDER WHEN THE
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY WAS NOT ALLEGED WITH SPECIFICITY IN THE
INFROMATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 8, RULE 110 OF THE REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE.

Accused-appellant insists that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He assails the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses whose testimonies he pictured as inconsistent and fabricated. He also
avers that the prosecution failed to establish his identity as the perpetrator of the crime as nobody actually saw
him shoot the victim.

After a careful consideration of the evidence of this case, we find no reason to reverse the decision of the
Court of Appeals which affirmed the RTC decision in Criminal Case No. 98-105.

Accused-appellant cites an inconsistency in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Wilfredo Bataga and
Antonio Palomar Bataga, Jr. While Wilfredo testified that he saw accused-appellant about to run from the crime
scene after the shooting, Antonio, on the other hand, testified that accused-appellant jumped into a motorcycle
and escaped after the incident. According to accused-appellant, their contradicting testimonies should not be
accorded any weight and credence.

To our mind, the alleged inconsistency in the testimonies of the aforesaid prosecution witnesses is not
sufficient to adversely affect the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. It merely pertains to accused-
appellant's mode of escape, which cannot overcome the categorical and positive identification of accused-
appellant by both witnesses as the person who shot the victim. It is perfectly natural for different witnesses
testifying on the occurrence of a crime to give varying details as there may be some details which one witness
may notice while the other may not observe or remember. In fact, jurisprudence even warns against a perfect
dovetailing of narration by different witnesses as it could mean that their testimonies were fabricated and
rehearsed.13 In the instant case, while prosecution witnesses Antonio and Wilfredo differ in their narration of
minor details, they identified without equivocation the accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime.
Antonio declared on the witness stand:

PROS. DIZON, JR.

Q. By the way, do you know the accused in this case?

A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know Rene Rosas?
A Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know the other name of Rene Rosas?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Tell the Court what is the other name or the alias of Rene Rosas?
A. Boy Rosal, sir.
Q. Now, prior to 1995 have you known Rene Rosas?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. For how long did you know Rene Rosas prior to 1995?
A. Long time ago, sir.
Q. How come you know him?
A. Because of our gambling activities.
Q. By the way, do you gamble?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, how about the victim here, Mr. Estacio, do you know him?
 37

A. Yes, sir.
Q. How come you know him?
A. Because he was an employee of the Municipal Hall, sir.
Q. You said you were outside the Billiard Hall at 11:00 o'clock in the morning, now while you were there on
September 15, 1995, was there any unusual incident that happened?
A. Yes, there was, sir.
Q. Tell the Court, what was that unusual incident that happened?
A. The killing of Nestor Estacio, sir.
Q. Now, did you see the killing of Nestor Estacio?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, you said you saw the killing of Nestor Estacio, what was the weapon used in the killing of Mr. Estacio?
A. Pistol, sir.
Q. How long was that?
A. Just a short pistol, sir.
Q. Now, you said that Nestor Estacio was killed, did you see who killed Nestor Estacio?
ATTY. BALAGOT:
Your Honor please, leading, Your Honor.
PROS. DIZON, JR.:
He testified already, Your Honor please, that he saw.
COURT:
Yes, he may answer.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Please name him.
A. Rene Rosas, sir.
Antonio Bataga, Jr. could not have made a mistake with respect to accused-appellant's identity considering
that he knew accused-appellant long before he witnessed the shooting incident in 1995. Antonio who was in
the vicinity of the crime scene would thus be able to unmistakably recognize accused-appellant when the
incident happened at around 11 o'clock in the morning.
Antonio's testimony corroborated that of Wilfredo Bataga, thus:

PROS. DIZON, JR.:

Q. Why were you there, was there any incident of happening that occurred?
A. When I heard several gunbursts, I immediately proceeded to the scene of the crime and I saw the suspect
including the lying victim Nestor Estacio which was brought along by four (4) persons in loading a tricycle in
going to a hospital, sir
Q. Now, you said you saw Rene Rosas, what was he doing when you saw him?
A. When I saw him, he was already running together with innocent civilians towards the market, sir.
Q. Now, you said you also saw the dead body of a person, what is the name of that person who you said is
dead?
A. Nestor Estacio, sir.
Q. Now, what did you do upon seeing the dead body?
A. He was carried upon by four persons inside the tricycle for immediate medication, sir.
Q. Now, you said you saw the accused Rene Rosas, what did you do when you saw him?
A. I chased him, sir. I was not able to arrest him due to the thickness of the civilians running together with him,
sir.

ATTY. BALAGOT:

Q. You said that on September 15, 1995, at around 11:00 o'clock you were at your carinderia, is that
right?cralawred
A. Yes, sir.
 38

Q. Now, your carinderia was located that time at the old bus terminal building, is that right?cralawred
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you said while you were there you heard gunshots?cralawred
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you went to the site from where the gunshots were heard?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How far was your carinderia from the site where you heard those gunshots?
A. That was more or less 15 meters, sir.
Q Fifteen (15) if you will pass through the terminal going to that site?
A In the middle of the terminal, sir.
Q Now, at that time, Mr. Witness, is it not right that you passed through Jacinto Street particularly at the back
of the old terminal building?
A I intended to conduct a hamper; a block in front of Ku Kuan so that I could arrest the suspect and I personally
found out and identified the running person to be Rene Rosas @ Boy Rosas running together with scampered
civilians, sir.
B But you passed through Jacinto Street, Mr. Witness, is it right?
A Yes, sir, and I saw him personally.
Q And if you will pass through Jacinto Street, first the walking distance would be around 15 meters, is that
right?
A I saw him personally this way but I crossed the block, sir.
Q Now, because at that juncture while you were walking through that Street, you met this Rene Rosas, is that
right?
A I was not able to see him but when I arrived at the scene of the crime I saw him personally and I chased him
but could not arrest him due to the thickness of the civilians running together with him.
Q Now, you claimed that you saw Rene Rosas the accused personally, he was running at the time when you
saw him, is that right?
A. About to run when I reached the scene of the crime, sir.
Q Also there were other persons who were about to run at that time, is that right?
A Yes, sir, when I reached the scene to chase him he ran already.
Q That you choose Rene Rosas because that time he was the bodyguard of Mr. Karutin, is that right?
A. I was able to identify him when the cartographic sketch of the suspect coming from the NBI expert and Dr.
Sevilla was given to me, sir.
Q Mr. Witness, on September 15, 1995, why did you chase Rene Rosas?
A Because I saw in his arm a pistol caliber 45, sir.

Clearly, Wilfredo positively identified appellant as the person running away from the crime scene towards the
public market after shooting the victim. Just like Antonio, Wilfredo could also not have been mistaken as to
accused-appellant's identity considering that he was just 15 meters away from the crime scene and the crime
was committed in broad daylight.

Verily, the testimonies of Wilfredo and Antonio on material details are coherent, unequivocal and consistent
with each other. Antonio, who was standing just a few meters away, saw accused-appellant shoot the victim
from behind, then board a motorcycle. On the other hand, Wilfredo saw accused-appellant immediately after
the shooting fleeing from the scene of the crime carrying a 45-caliber pistol. Clearly, both witnesses personally
saw accused-appellant at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. Contrary to accused-appellant's
assertion, the declarations and testimonies of Antonio and Wilfredo established beyond reasonable doubt his
identity as the author of the crime.

The trial court gave full faith and credence to the testimonies of Wilfredo and Antonio. The time-tested doctrine
is that a trial court's assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight, and is even conclusive
and binding on this Court. The reason is obvious. The trial court has the unique opportunity to observe at
firsthand the witnesses, particularly their demeanor, conduct and attitude in the course of the trial.16
 39

Accused-appellant has not shown any evidence of improper motive on the part of Wilfredo and Antonio that
would have driven them to falsely testify against him. Where there is nothing to indicate that the witnesses for
the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, their positive and categorical declarations on the witness
stand under the solemnity of an oath deserve full faith and credence.

There being no fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would otherwise warrant a different
conclusion, the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses must be sustained.

Accused-appellant relies on his alibi that he was in his boarding house located along USM Avenue, Kabacan,
Cotabato the whole morning of September 15, 1995. For alibi to prosper, however, the accused must establish
by clear and convincing evidence (a) his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the
offense and (b) the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime. Where there is even the
least chance for the accused to be present at the crime scene, the defense of alibi will not hold water.

Here, the evidence shows that USM Avenue, Kabacan, Cotabato where accused-appellant allegedly was on
September 15, 1995 is only 1.5 kilometers away from the public market and terminal in Poblacion, Kabacan,
Cotabato where the crime was committed. According to the trial court, this distance between the crime scene
and the whereabouts of accused-appellant can easily be negotiated by foot within 10 to 15 minutes. In short,
accused-appellant failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence the physical impossibility of his
presence at the scene of the crime on the date and time of its commission. Moreover, the defense of alibi
crumbles in the face of the positive identification of accused-appellant by the aforesaid prosecution witnesses
as the perpetrator of the crime.

In his last-ditch effort to relieve him of liability for the crime charged, accused-appellant argues that he cannot
be convicted of murder because the Information failed to state that treachery was a qualifying circumstance.

Accused-appellant's argument deserves scant consideration. The recent case of People v. Sayaboc reiterated
the pronouncement in People v. Aquino that even after the recent amendments to the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, qualifying circumstances need not be preceded by descriptive words such as "qualifying" or
"qualified by" to properly qualify an offense. Section 8 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure does not require the
use of such words to refer to the circumstances which raise the category of an offense. It is not the use of the
words "qualifying" or "qualified by" that raises a crime to a higher category, but the specific allegation of an
attendant circumstance which adds the essential element raising the crime to a higher category. It is sufficient
that the qualifying circumstances be specified in the Information to appraise the accused of the charges
against him to enable him to prepare fully for his defense, thus precluding surprises during trial.

The Information in this case sufficiently alleged the qualifying circumstance of treachery, thus:

accused armed with a gun, with intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and with
treachery, attack, assault and shot Nestor Esatcio,

Not only was treachery sufficiently alleged, it was likewise proven beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence on
record. It is a well-entrenched rule that treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially
to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and unexpected
attack, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape.
 40

In the instant case, Nestor Estacio was attacked from behind and assaulted without warning and provocation.
Even when the already wounded Nestor fell on the ground, accused-appellant mercilessly fired several more
shots at him. He obviously wanted to ensure the execution of the killing, without risk to himself, and deprive
Nestor of any opportunity to retaliate or defend himself. The fact that accused-appellant brought a gun with him
indicated that he made a deliberate and conscious adoption of the means to kill Nestor. Further, the autopsy
conducted by Dr. Necessario revealed multiple gunshot wounds at the lower back area of the lumbar region of
Nestor. This autopsy indubitably indicates that the shots were fired from behind on the unsuspecting victim.
Clearly then, treachery or alevosia has been sufficiently established.

We, thus, sustain the conviction of Rene Rosas for the crime of murder as well as the penalty imposed upon
him. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the crime of murder is reclusion perpetua to
death. Accused-appellant was correctly sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua, the lower of the two indivisible
penalties, since there was no other aggravating circumstance attending the commission of the crime.

We now come to the award of damages.

Conformably with existing jurisprudence, the heirs of Rene Rosas are entitled to civil indemnity in the amount
of P50,000.00, which is mandatory and is granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the
commission of the crime. Likewise, moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 shall be awarded in favor of
the heirs of the victim. Moral damages are awarded despite the absence of proof of mental and emotional
suffering of the victim's heirs. As borne out by human nature and experience, a violent death invariably and
necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victim's family. Accused-appellant is
also liable to pay exemplary damages in the sum of P25,000.00 in view of the presence of the qualifying
aggravating circumstance of treachery.

With respect to actual damages, the victim's widow, Arceli Estacio, testified that she spent a total of
P40,000.00 as burial and funeral expenses but she failed to present receipts to substantiate her claim. In
People v. Abrazaldo, we laid down the doctrine that where the amount of actual damages for funeral expenses
cannot be determined because of the absence of receipts to prove them, temperate damages may be awarded
in the amount of P25,000.00. Thus, in lieu of actual damages, temperate damages in the amount of
P25,000.00 must be awarded to the heirs of Rene Rosas because although the exact amount was not proved
with certainty, it was reasonable to expect that they incurred expenses for the coffin and burial of the victim.

WHEREFORE, the decision dated November 29, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00301
is hereby AFFIRMED. Accused-appellant Rene Rosas is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Murder and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is hereby ordered to indemnify the
heirs of Nestor Estacio the following: (a) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) P50,000.00 as moral damages, (c)
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (d) P25,000.00 as temperate damages.

SO ORDERED
 41

10. Matrido vs People GR No 179061 | July 13, 2009

Facts:

Private respondent, Empire East Land Holdings Inc. filed a case against Matrido for estafa in the Makati
Prosecutor’s Office for failing to remit payments received from its clients. By resolution, the prosecution office
dismissed the complaint for estafa for insufficiency of evidence but found probable cause to indict petitioner for
qualified theft.

RTC convicted the Matrido of qualified theft and was affirmed by the CA. Petitioner challenges the
conviction by contending that despite the indictment for qualified theft, the prosecution was trying to prove
estafa during trial, thus violating her right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner’s contention is tenable.

Held:

No.

It is settled that it is the allegations in the Information that determine the nature of the offense, not the
technical name given by the prosecutor in the preamble of the Information. From a legal point of view, it is of
no concern to the accused what is the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. It is in no way
aids him in a defense on the merits. That to which his attention should be directed, above all things else, are
the facts alleged. The real question is not did he commit a crime given in the law some technical and specific
name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in the manner therein set forth.

The recital of facts and circumstances in the Information sufficiently constitutes the crime of qualified
theft. As defined, theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain, but without violence against, or
intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take the personal property of another without the latter’s
consent. If committed with grave abuse of confidence, the crime of theft becomes qualified.

SHEALA P. MATRIDO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT. G.R. No.
179061, July 13, 2009

Sheala Matrido (petitioner) assails the May 31, 2007 Decision and August 1, 2007 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the trial court's Decision of December 13, 2004 convicting her of qualified theft.

As a credit and collection assistant of private complainant Empire East Land Holdings, Inc., petitioner was
tasked to collect payments from buyers of real estate properties such as Laguna Bel-Air developed by private
complainant, issue receipts therefor, and remit the payments to private complainant in Makati City.

On June 10, 1999, petitioner received amortization payment from one Amante dela Torre in the amount of
P22,470.66 as evidenced by the owner's copy of Official Receipt No. 36547, but petitioner remitted only
P4,470.66 to private complainant as reflected in the treasury department's copy of Official Receipt No. 36547
submitted to private complainant, both copies of which bear the signature of petitioner and reflect a difference
of P18,000.

On private complainant's investigation, petitioner was found to have failed to remit payments received from its
clients, prompting it to file various complaints, one of which is a Complaint-Affidavit of September 21, 2000 for
estafa, docketed as I.S. No. 2000-I-32381 in the Makati Prosecutor's Office.
 42

In the meantime or in October 2000, petitioner paid private complainant the total amount of P162,000, drawing
private complainant to desist from pursuing some related complaints. A few other cases including I.S. No.
2000-I-32381 pushed through, however, since the amount did not sufficiently cover petitioner's admitted
liability of P400,000.

By Resolution of November 15, 2000, the City Prosecution Office of Makati dismissed the Complaint for estafa
for insufficiency of evidence but found probable cause to indict petitioner for qualified theft under an
Information which reads:

That on or about the 10th day of June 1999, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then a Credit and Collection Assistant employed by
complainant, EMPIRE EAST LAND HOLDINGS, INC., herein represented by Leilani N. Cabuloy, and as such
had access to the payments made by complainant's clients, with grave abuse of confidence, intent of gain and
without the knowledge and consent of the said complainant company, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously take, steal and carry away the amount of P18,000.00 received from Amante Dela Torre, a
buyer of a house and lot being marketed by complainant company, to the damage and prejudice of the said
complainant in the aforementioned amount of P18,000.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
On arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty." After trial, Branch 56 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Makati, by Decision of December 13, 2004 which was promulgated on April 28, 2005, convicted petitioner of
qualified theft, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, accused SHEALA P. MATRIDO is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten
(10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years[,] five (5) months and ten (10) days.

Accused is further ordered to pay complainant EMPIRE EAST LAND HOLDINGS, INC., the amount of
P18,000.00.

SO ORDERED.
By the challenged Decision of May 31, 2007, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, hence, the
present petition which raises the sole issue of whether the appellate court "gravely erred in affirming the
decision of the trial [court] convicting the petitioner of the crime of qualified theft despite the fact that the
prosecution tried to prove during the trial the crime of estafa thus denying the petitioner the right to be informed
of the nature and cause of accusation against her"

Petitioner posits that despite her indictment for qualified theft, the prosecution was trying to prove estafa during
trial, thus violating her right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her.

The petition fails.

In Andaya v. People, the Court expounded on the constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against the accused.

As early as the 1904 case of U.S. v. Karelsen, the rationale of this fundamental right of the accused was
already explained in this wise:

The object of this written accusation was - First. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge
against him as will enable him to make his defense; and second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal
 43

for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and third, to inform the court of the facts
alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had. In
order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is made
up of certain acts and intent; these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularity of time,
place, names (plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific
allegation of every fact and circumstances necessary to constitute the crime charged.

It is fundamental that every element constituting the offense must be alleged in the information. The main
purpose of requiring the various elements of a crime to be set out in the information is to enable the accused to
suitably prepare his defense because he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that
constitute the offense. The allegations of facts constituting the offense charged are substantial matters and an
accused's right to question his conviction based on facts not alleged in the information cannot be waived. No
matter how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be, an accused cannot be convicted of any
offense unless it is charged in the information on which he is tried or is necessarily included therein. To convict
him of a ground not alleged while he is concentrating his defense against the ground alleged would plainly be
unfair and underhanded. The rule is that a variance between the allegation in the information and proof
adduced during trial shall be fatal to the criminal case if it is material and prejudicial to the accused so much so
that it affects his substantial rights.

It is settled that it is the allegations in the Information that determine the nature of the offense, not the technical
name given by the public prosecutor in the preamble of the Information. From a legal point of view, and in a
very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is the technical name of the crime of which he stands
charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the merits. That to which his attention should be directed, and in
which he, above all things else, should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is not did he
commit a crime given in the law some technical and specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the
body of the information in the manner therein set forth.

Gauging such standard against the wording of the Information in this case, the Court finds no violation of
petitioner's rights. The recital of facts and circumstances in the Information sufficiently constitutes the crime of
qualified theft.

As alleged in the Information, petitioner took, intending to gain therefrom and without the use of force upon
things or violence against or intimidation of persons, a personal property consisting of money in the amount
P18,000 belonging to private complainant, without its knowledge and consent, thereby gravely abusing the
confidence reposed on her as credit and collection assistant who had access to payments from private
complainant's clients, specifically from one Amante Dela Torre.

As defined, theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain, but without violence against, or
intimidation of neither persons nor force upon things, shall take the personal property of another without the
latter's consent. If committed with grave abuse of confidence, the crime of theft becomes qualified.

In précis, the elements of qualified theft punishable under Article 310 in relation to Articles 308 and 309 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) are as follows:

1. There was a taking of personal property.

2. The said property belongs to another.
3. The taking was done without the consent of the owner.
4. The taking was done with intent to gain.
5. The taking was accomplished without violence or intimidation against person, or force upon things.
6. The taking was done under any of the circumstances enumerated in Article 310 of the RPC, i.e., with
grave abuse of confidence.
 44

In the present case, both the trial court and the appellate court noted petitioner's testimonial admission
of unlawfully taking the fund belonging to private complainant and of paying a certain sum to exculpate
herself from liability. That the money, taken by petitioner without authority and consent, belongs to
private complainant, and that the taking was accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation
against persons, nor force upon things, there is no issue.

Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act that is presumed from the unlawful taking by the
offender of the thing subject of asportation. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is
the intent to gain.

The taking was also clearly done with grave abuse of confidence. As a credit and collection assistant of
private complainant, petitioner made use of her position to obtain the amount due to private
complainant. As gathered from the nature of her functions, her position entailed a high degree of
confidence reposed by private complainant as she had been granted access to funds collectible from
clients. Such relation of trust and confidence was amply established to have been gravely abused when
she failed to remit the entrusted amount of collection to private complainant.

The Court finds no rhyme or reason in petitioner's contention that what the prosecution tried to prove
during trial was estafa through misappropriation under Article 315(1)(b) of the RPC.
The principal distinction between the two crimes is that in theft the thing is taken while in estafa the accused
receives the property and converts it to his own use or benefit. However, there may be theft even if the
accused has possession of the property. If he was entrusted only with the material or physical (natural) or de
facto possession of the thing, his misappropriation of the same constitutes theft, but if he has the juridical
possession of the thing, his conversion of the same constitutes embezzlement or estafa.

The appellate court correctly explained that conversion of personal property in the case of an employee having
material possession of the said property constitutes theft, whereas in the case of an agent to whom both
material and juridical possession have been transferred, misappropriation of the same property constitutes
estafa. Notably, petitioner's belated argument that she was not an employee but an agent of private
complainant grants her no respite in view of her stipulation during pre-trial and her admission at the witness
stand of the fact of employment. Petitioner's reliance on estafa cases involving factual antecedents of agency
transactions is thus misplaced.

That petitioner did not have juridical possession over the amount or, in other words, she did not have a right
over the thing which she may set up even against private complainant is clear. In fact, petitioner never
asserted any such right, hence, juridical possession was lodged with private complainant and, therefore, estafa
was not committed.

Petitioner's view that there could be no element of taking since private complainant had no actual possession
of the money fails. The argument proceeds from the flawed premise that there could be no theft if the accused
has possession of the property. The taking away of the thing physically from the offended party is not
elemental, as qualified theft may be committed when the personal property is in the lawful possession of the
accused prior to the commission of the alleged felony.

A sum of money received by an employee in behalf of an employer is considered to be only in the material
possession of the employee. The material possession of an employee is adjunct, by reason of his employment,
to recognition of the juridical possession of the employer. So long as the juridical possession of the thing
appropriated did not pass to the employee-perpetrator, the offense committed remains to be theft, qualified or
otherwise.
 45

When the money, goods, or any other personal property is received by the offender from the offended party (1)
in trust or (2) on commission or (3) for administration, the offender acquires both material or physical
possession and juridical possession of the thing received. Juridical possession means a possession which
gives the transferee a right over the thing which the transferee may set up even against the owner. In this
case, petitioner was a cash custodian who was primarily responsible for the cash-in-vault. Her possession of
the cash belonging to the bank is akin to that of a bank teller, both being mere bank employees. (Italics in the
original omitted; underscoring and emphasis supplied)

That the transaction occurred outside the company premises of private complainant is of no moment, given
that not all business deals are transacted by employees within the confines of an office, and that field
operations do not define an agency. What is of consequence is the nature of possession by petitioner over the
property subject of the unlawful taking.

On the penalty imposed by the trial court, which was affirmed by the appellate court â"€ indeterminate penalty
of 10 years and 1 day to 12 years, 5 months and 10 days:

The penalty for qualified theft is two degrees higher than the applicable penalty for simple theft. The amount
stolen in this case was P18,000.00. In cases of theft, if the value of the personal property stolen is more than
P12,000.00 but does not exceed P22,000.00, the penalty shall be prision mayor in its minimum and medium
periods. Two degrees higher than this penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods or 14
years, 8 months and 1 day to 20 years.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum shall be prision mayor in its maximum period to
reclusion temporal in its minimum period or within the range of 10 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months.
The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender being present, the maximum penalty shall be the minimum
period of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods or within the range of 14 years, 8 months and
1 day to 16 years, 5 months and 20 days.

The Court thus affirms the minimum penalty, but modifies the maximum penalty imposed.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of May 31, 2007 and Resolution of August 1, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 29593 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the imposed penalty, such that petitioner, Sheala
P. Matrido, is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. SO ORDERED.