CASE DIGEST: ACAAC V.
AZCUNA Capayas Island, which was classified as timberland and
G.R. No. 187378 : September 30, 2013
RAMONITO O. ACAAC, PETAL FOUNDATION, INC.,
APOLINARIO M. ELORDE, HECTOR ACAAC, and ROMEO
BULAWIN,Petitioners, v. MELQUIADES D. AZCUNA, JR., in
his capacity as Mayor, and MARIETES B. BONALOS, in her
capacity as Municipal Engineer and Building Official-
Designate, both of Lopez Jaena Municipality, Misamis
Occidental, Respondents.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS:
PETAL Foundation is a non-governmental organization, which
is engaged in the protection and conservation of ecology,
tourism, and livelihood projects within Misamis
Occidental.PETAL built some cottages on Capayas Island
which it rented out to the public and became the source of
livelihood of its beneficiaries,among whom are petitioners
Hector Acaac and Romeo Bulawin.
Respondents Mayor Azcuna and Building Official Bonalos
issued Notices of Illegal Construction against PETAL for its
failure to apply for a building permit prior to the construction of
its buildings in violation of the Building Code ordering it to stop
all illegal building activities on Capayas Island. On July 8, 2002
the Sangguniang Bayan of Jaena Lopez adopted a Municipal
Ordinance which prohibited, among others : (a) the entry of
any entity, association, corporation or organization inside the
sanctuaries;and (b) the construction of any structures,
permanent or temporary, on the premises, except if authorized
by the local government.
On July 12, 2002, Azcuna approved the subject ordinance;
hence, the same was submitted to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Misamis Occidental (SP), which in turn,
conducted a joint hearing on the matter. Thereafter, notices
were posted at the designated areas, including Capayas
Island, declaring the premises as government property and
prohibiting ingress and egress thereto.
A Notice of Voluntary Demolition was served upon PETAL
directing it to remove the structures it built on Capayas Island.
Petitioners filed an action praying for the issuance of a TRO,
injunction and damagesagainst respondents alleging that they
have prior vested rights to occupy and utilize Capayas Island.
Moreover, PETAL assailed the validity of the subject ordinance
on the following grounds : (a) it was adopted without public
consultation; (b) it was not published in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province as required by the Local
Government Code (LGC); and (c) it was not approved by the
SP. Therefore, its implementation should be enjoined.
Respondents averred that petitioners have no cause of action
against them since they are not the lawful owners or lessees of
property belonging to the public domain.
The RTC declared the ordinance as invalid/void.
On appeal, the CA held that the subject ordinance was
deemed approved upon failure of the SP to declare the same
invalid within 30 days after its submission in accordance with
Section 56 of the LGC. Having enacted the subject ordinance
within its powers as a municipality and in accordance with the
procedure prescribed by law, the CA pronounced that the
subject ordinance is valid.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject ordinance is valid and
enforceable against petitioners.
HELD: The decision of the Court of Appeals is sustained.
POLITICAL LAW presumption of validity
Section 56 (d) of the LGC provides : If no action has been
taken by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan within thirty (30) days
after submission of such an ordinance or resolution, the same
shall be presumed consistent with law and therefore valid.
It is noteworthy that petitioner's own evidence reveals that a
public hearing was conducted prior to the promulgation of the
subject ordinance. Moreover, other than their bare allegations,
petitioners failed to present any evidence to show that no
publication or posting of the subject ordinance was made.
While it is true that he likewise failed to submit any other
evidence thereon, still, in accordance with the presumption of
validity in favor of an ordinance, its constitutionality or legality
should be upheld in the absence of any controverting evidence
that the procedure prescribed by law was not observed in its
enactment. Likewise, petitioners had the burden of proving
their own allegation, which they, however, failed to do.
In the similar case of Figuerres v. CA, 364 Phil. 683(1999)
citing United States v. Cristobal, 34 Phil. 825 (1916), the Court
upheld the presumptive validity of the ordinance therein
despite the lack of controverting evidence on the part of the
local government to show that public hearings were conducted
in light of : (a) the oppositors equal lack of controverting
evidence to demonstrate the local governments non-
compliance with the said public hearing; and (b) the fact that
the local governments non-compliance was a negative
allegation essential to the oppositors cause of action. Hence,
as petitioner is the party asserting it, she has the burden of
proof. Since petitioner failed to rebut the presumption of
validity in favor of the subject ordinances and to discharge the
burden of proving that no public hearings were conducted prior
to the enactment thereof, we are constrained to uphold their
constitutionality or legality.
The Petition is denied.
NMSMI vs MSS-PVAO| G.R. No. 187587| 2013
G.R. No. 187587| June 5, 2013
NMSI, Petitioner, vs. MSS - PVAO, DND, Respondent.
---and---
G.R. No. 187654| June 5, 2013
WBLOA, INC., represented by its Board of Directors, Petitioner,
vs. MSS - PVAO, DND, Respondent.
FACTS:
Acronym use:
NMSMI - NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG,
INC.
MSS - PVAO, DND - Military Shrine Services - Philippine
Veterans Affairs Office, Department of National Defense
WBLOAI - WESTERN BICUTAN LOT OWNERS
ASSOCIATION, INC.
COSLAP - Commission on Settlement of Land Problems
TFB - Task Force Bantay
SS-PVAO - Military Shrine Services – Philippine Veterans
Affairs Office
President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) issued
Proclamation No. 208, amending Proclamation No. 423, (which
reserved parcels of land in the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig,
Parañaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay City for a military
reservation. The military reservation, then known as Fort William
McKinley, was later on renamed Fort Andres Bonifacio (Fort
Bonifacio) which excluded a certain area of Fort Bonifacio and
reserved it for a national shrine. The excluded area is now
known as Libingan ng mga Bayani, which is under the
administration of herein respondent MSS-PVAO.
Again, on 7 January 1986, President Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 2476, further amending Proclamation No.
423, which excluded barangaysLower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan
and Signal Village from the operation of Proclamation No. 423
and declared it open for disposition under the provisions of
Republic Act Nos. (R.A.) 274 and 730.
At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos
made a handwritten addendum.
President Corazon C. Aquino (President Aquino) issued
Proclamation No. 172 which substantially reiterated
Proclamation No. 2476, as published, but this time excluded
Lots 1 and 2 of Western Bicutan from the operation of
Proclamation No. 423 and declared the said lots open for
disposition under the provisions of R.A. 274 and 730.
Memorandum Order No. 119, implementing Proclamation No.
172, was issued on the same day.
Through the years, informal settlers increased and occupied
some areas of Fort Bonifacio including portions of the Libingan
ng mga Bayani. Thus, Brigadier General Fredelito Bautista
issued General Order No. 1323 creating TFB, primarily to
prevent further unauthorized occupation and to cause the
demolition of illegal structures at Fort Bonifacio.
Members of petitioner Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio
Masigasig, Inc. (NMSMI) filed a Petition with the COSLAP,
where it was docketed as COSLAP Case No. 99-434. The
Petition prayed for the following:
1. the reclassification of the areas they
occupied, covering Lot 3 of SWO-13-000-298 of
Western Bicutan, from public land to alienable and
disposable land pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476;
2. the subdivision of the subject lot by the
Director of Lands; and
3. the Land Management Bureau’s facilitation of
the distribution and sale of the subject lot to its bona
fide occupants.
Petitioner (WBLOAI) filed a Petition-in-Intervention substantially
praying for the same reliefs as those prayed for by NMSMI with
regard to the area the former then occupied.
COSLAP issued a Resolution granting the Petition and
declaring the portions of land in question alienable and
disposable, with Associate Commissioner Lina Aguilar-General
dissenting.
COSLAP ruled that the handwritten addendum of President
Marcos was an integral part of Proclamation No. 2476, and was
therefore, controlling. The intention of the President could not
be defeated by the negligence or inadvertence of others.
Further, considering that Proclamation No. 2476 was done while
the former President was exercising legislative powers, it could
not be amended, repealed or superseded, by a mere executive
enactment. Thus, Proclamation No. 172 could not have
superseded much less displaced Proclamation No. 2476, as the
latter was issued on October 16, 1987 when President Aquino’s
legislative power had ceased.
Herein respondent MSS-PVAO filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which was denied by the COSLAP in a
Resolution dated 24 January 2007.
MSS-PVAO filed a Petition with the Court of Appeals seeking to
reverse the COSLAP Resolutions dated 1 September 2006 and
24 January 2007.
Thus, on 29 April 2009, the then Court of Appeals First Division
rendered the assailed Decision granting MSS-PVAO’s Petition.
Both NMSMI and WBLOAI appealed the said Decision by filing
their respective Petitions for Review with this Court under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:
WON the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the subject lots
were not alienable and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No.
2476 on the ground that the handwritten addendum of President
Marcos was not included in the publication of the said law.
HELD:
NO.
Ruling in the case of Tanada vs Tuvera
Applying the foregoing ruling (above link in Tanada vs Tuvera)
to the instant case, this Court cannot rely on a handwritten note
that was not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as published.
Without publication, the note never had any legal force and
effect.
Furthermore, under Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the
Administrative Code, "the publication of any law, resolution or
other official documents in the Official Gazette shall be prima
facie evidence of its authority." Thus, whether or not President
Marcos intended to include Western Bicutan is not only
irrelevant but speculative. Simply put, the courts may not
speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from
the words appearing in the law.
This Court cannot rule that a word appears in the law when,
evidently, there is none. In Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v. Hon.
Trajano, we ruled that ' This does not mean, however, that
courts can create law. The courts exist for inter"under Article 8
of the Civil Code, 'judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of
the Philippines. This does not mean, however, that courts can
create law. The courts exist for interpreting the law, not for
enacting it. To allow otherwise would be violative of the principle
of separation of powers, inasmuch as the sole function of our
courts is to apply or interpret the laws, particularly where gaps
or lacunae exist or where ambiguities becloud issues, but it will
not arrogate unto itself the task of legislating." The remedy
sought in these Petitions is not judicial interpretation, but
another legislation that would amend the law ‘to include
petitioners' lots in the reclassification.
Dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petitions are
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 97925 dated 29 April 2009
is AFFIRMED in toto. Accordingly, this Court's status quo order
dated 17 June 2009 is hereby LIFTED. Likewise, all pending
motions to cite respondent in contempt is DENIED, having been
rendered moot. No costs.
CASE DIGEST: PARCERO V. PRIMETOWN PROPERTY
GROUP INC.
Published by paul on July 22, 2013 | Leave a response
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and ARTURO V.
PARCERO, petitioners,vs. PRIMETOWN PROPERTY
GROUP INC., respondent.
G.R. No. 162155. August 28,2007.
Facts:
On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, the Vice President of
Primetown (respondent), applied for refund of the income tax
which they have paid on 1997. According to Yap, the company
accrued losses amounting to P/ 71,879,228. These losses
enabled them to be exempt from paying income tax, which
respondent paid diligently. Respondent was therefore claiming
a refund. Respondents submitted requirements but the
petitioners ignored their claim. On April 14, 2000, respondents
filed a review in the Court of Tax Appeals. The said Court,
however, denied the petition stating that the petition was filed
beyond the 2-year prescriptive period for filing judicial claim for
tax refund.
According to Sec 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code,
“no suit or proceedings shall be filed after the expiration of 2-
yearsfrom the date of the payment of the tax regardless of any
supervening cause that may arise after payment. Respondents
paid the last income tax return on April 14, 1998. Article 13 of
the New Civil Code states that a year is considered 365 days;
months 30 days; days 24-hours; and night from sunset to
sunrise. Therefore, according to CTA, the date of filing a petition
fell on the 731st day, which is beyond the prescriptive period.
Issues:
Whether the two-year/730-day prescriptive period ends on April
13, 2000 or April 14, 2000 considering that the last payment of
tax was on April 14, 1998 and that year 2000 was a leap year.
Whether or not Article 13 of the New Civil Code be repealed by
EO 292 Sec 31 Chap 8 Book 1 of the Administrative Code of
1987.
Ruling:
The Court ruled that when a subsequent law impliedly repeals a
prior law, the new law shall apply. In the case at bar, Art 13 of
the New Civil Code, which states that a year shall compose 365
days, shall be repealed by EO 292 Sec 31 of the Administrative
Code of 1987, which states that a year shall be composed of 12
months regardless of the number of days in a month. Therefore,
the two-year prescriptive period ends on April 14, 2000.
Respondents filed petition on April 14, 2000 (which is the last
day prescribed to file a petition.

Frivaldo vs Comelec Digest with additional info
G.R. No. 120295. June 28, 1996]
JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE, respondents.
[G.R. No. 123755. June 28, 1996]
RAUL R. LEE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.
On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed
his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of
Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. On March 23, 1995,
petitioner Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition with
the Comelec praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from
seeking or holding any public office or position by reason of not
yet being a citizen of the Philippines," and that his Certificate of
Candidacy be cancelled. On May 1, 1995, the Second Division
of the Comelec promulgated a Resolution granting the petition.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained
unacted upon until after the May 8, 1995 elections. So, his
candidacy continued and he was voted for during the elections
held on said date. On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en banc
affirmed the aforementioned Resolution of the Second
Division.
The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of
the election returns and a Certificate of Votes was issued
showing the following votes obtained by the candidates for the
position of Governor of Sorsogon:
Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060
Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440
RaulR.Lee 53,304
Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925
On June 9, 1995, Lee filed a (supplemental) petition praying
for his proclamation as the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon.
In an orderdated June 21, 1995, but promulgated according to
the petition "only on June 29, 1995," the Comelec en bane
directed "the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon to
reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming candidate Raul Lee
as the winning gubernatorial candidate in the province of
Sorsogon on June 29,1995 x x x." Accordingly, at 8:30 in the
evening of June 30,1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of
Sorsogon.
Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition praying for the
annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for
his own proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at
2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of allegiance as a
citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for repatriation
under P.D. 725 which he filed with the Special Committee on
Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted." As such,
when "the said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the Comelec) x
x x was released and received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at
5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no more legal
impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor x x
x." In the alternative, he averred that pursuant to the two cases
of Labo vs. Comelec, the Vice-Governor— not Lee — should
occupy said position of governor.
On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division
promulgated the herein assailed Resolution holding that Lee,
"not having garnered the highest number of votes," was not
legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected governor; and
that Frivaldo, "having garnered the highest number of votes,
and having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on
June 30, 1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
725 is qualified to hold the office of governor of Sorsogon".
Issues: 1. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for
lack of Filipino citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to
run for, be elected to or hold the governorship of Sorsogon –
NO!
2. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election,
valid and legal in light of existing jurisprudence? -NO!
Held:
1.)
It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No. 87193
disqualifying Frivaldo was rendered in connection with the
1988 elections while that in G.R. No. 104654 was in
connection with the 1992 elections. That he was disqualified
for such elections is final and can no longer be changed.
Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of
citizenship cannot govern a person's future status with finality.
This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for
that matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes
recognized by law for the purpose.
"Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or
indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the
corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein
as to such citizenship is generally not considered res judicata,
hence it has to be threshed out again and again, as the
occasion demands."
2.) Frivaldo assails the validity of the Lee proclamation. We
uphold him for the following reasons:
First. To paraphrase this Court in Labo vs. COMELEC, "the
fact remains that he (Lee) was not the choice of the sovereign
will," and in Aquino vs. COMELEC, Lee is "a second placer,
just that, a second placer."
"The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving
majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving
the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A
minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to
the office."
Second. As we have earlier declared Frivaldo to have
seasonably re-acquired his citizenship and inasmuch as he
obtained the highest number of votes in the 1995 elections,
he—not Lee —should be proclaimed. Hence, Lee's
proclamation was patently erroneous and should now be
corrected.
===============================================
===========
CONCLUSION OF THE COURT
In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the Local
Government Code is to be possessed by an elective official at
the latest as of the time he is proclaimed and at the start of the
term of office to which he has been elected. We further hold
P.D. No. 725 to be in full force and effect up to the present, not
having been suspended or repealed expressly nor impliedly at
any time, and Frivaldo's repatriation by virtue thereof to have
been properly granted and thus valid and effective. Moreover,
by reason of the remedial or curative nature of the law granting
him a new right to resume his political status and the legislative
intent behind it, as well as his unique situation of having been
forced to give up his citizenship and political aspiration as his
means of escaping a regime he abhorred, his repatriation is to
be given retroactive effect as of the date of his application
therefor, during the pendency of which he was stateless, he
having given ' up his U. S. nationality.
Thus, in contemplation of law, he possessed the vital
requirement of Filipino citizenship as of the start of the term of
office of governor, and should have been proclaimed instead of
Lee. Furthermore, since his reacquisition of citizenship
retroacted to August 17, 1994, his registration as a voter of
Sorsogon is deemed to have been validated as of said date as
well. The foregoing, of course, are precisely consistent with our
holding that lack of the citizenship requirement is not a
continuing disability or disqualification to run for and hold
public office. And once again, we emphasize herein our
previous rulings recognizing the Comelec's authority and
jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for annulment of
proclamations.
This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed
the electoral laws of our country to give fullest effect to the
manifest will of our people, for in case of doubt, political laws
must be interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular
mandate freely expressed through the ballot. Otherwise stated,
legal niceties and technicalities cannot stand in the way of the
sovereign will. Consistently, we have held:
"x x x (L)aws governing election contests must be liberally
construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of
public officials may not be defeated by mere technical
objections (citations omitted)."
The law and the courts must accord Frivaldo every possible
protection, defense and refuge, in deference to the popular
will. Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance
of giving effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure the
survival of our democracy. In any action involving the
possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this
Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a
manner that would give effect to the will of the majority, for it is
merely sound public policy to cause elective offices to be filled
by those who are the choice of the majority. To successfully
challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner
must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently
antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that
overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the
apparent will of the people, would ultimately create greater
prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic
traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect
and promote. In this undertaking, Lee has miserably failed.
In Frivaldo's case, it would have been technically easy to find
fault with his cause. The Court could have refused to grant
retroactivity to the effects of his repatriation and hold him still
ineligible due to his failure to show his citizenship at the time
he registered as a voter before the 1995 elections. Or, it could
have disputed the factual findings of the Comelec that he was
stateless at the time of repatriation and thus hold his
consequent dual citizenship as a disqualification "from running
for any elective local position." But the real essence of justice
does not emanate from quibblings over patchwork legal
technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's gut consciousness of
the dynamic role of law as a brick in the ultimate development
of the social edifice. Thus, the Court struggled against and
eschewed the easy, legalistic, technical and sometimes harsh
anachronisms of the law in order to evoke substantial justice in
the larger social context consistent with Frivaldo's unique
situation approximating venerability in Philippine political life.
Concededly, he sought American citizenship only to escape
the clutches of the dictatorship. At this stage, we cannot
seriously entertain any doubt about his loyalty and dedication
to this country. At the first opportunity, he returned to this land,
and sought to serve his people once more. The people of
Sorsogon overwhelmingly voted for him three times. He took
an oath of allegiance to this Republic every time he filed his
certificate of candidacy and during his failed naturalization bid.
And let it not be overlooked, his demonstrated tenacity and
sheer determination to re-assume his nationality of birth
despite several legal set-backs speak more loudly, in spirit, in
fact and in truth than any legal technicality, of his consuming
intention and burning desire to re-embrace his native
Philippines even now at the ripe old age of 81 years. Such
loyalty to and love of country as well as nobility of purpose
cannot be lost on this Court of justice and equity. Mortals of
lesser mettle would have given up. After all, Frivaldo was
assured of a life of ease and plenty as a citizen of the most
powerful country in the world. But he opted, nay, single-
mindedly insisted on returning to and serving once more his
struggling but beloved land of birth. He therefore deserves
every liberal interpretation of the law which can be applied in
his favor. And in the final analysis, over and above Frivaldo
himself, the indomitable people of Sorsogon most certainly
deserve to be governed by a leader of their overwhelming
choice.
Bellis vs Bellis, G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased,
PEOPLE’S BANK & TRUST COMPANY,
executor, MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA
BELLIS, oppositors-appellants, VS.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET. AL., heir-appellees
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
FACTS:
Amos Bellis, born in Texas, was a citizen of the State of Texas
and of the United States. He had 5 legitimate children with his
wife, Mary Mallen, whom he had divorced, 3 legitimate children
with his 2nd wife, Violet Kennedy and finally, 3 illegitimate
children.
Prior to his death, Amos Bellis executed a will in the
Philippines in which his distributable estate should be divided
in trust in the following order and manner:
Nonetheless, if Texas has conflict rule adopting the situs
theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the
place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise,
since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines.
In the absence, however of proofs as to the conflict of law rule
of Texas, it should not be presumed different from our
appellants, position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of
renvoi.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos Bellis, was a citizen
of the State of Texas, USA and that under the Laws of Texas,
there are no forced heirs or legitimates. Accordingly, since the
intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of
successional rights has to be determined under Texas Law,
the Philippine Law on legitimates can not be applied to the
testate of Amos Bellis.

a. $240,000 to his 1st wife Mary Mallen;

b. P120,000 to his 3 illegitimate children at P40,000 each;
c. The remainder shall go to his surviving children by his 1st
and 2nd wives, in equal shares.

Subsequently, Amos Bellis died a resident of San Antonio,

Texas, USA. His will was admitted to probate in the
Philippines. The People’s Bank and Trust Company, an
executor of the will, paid the entire bequest therein.

Preparatory to closing its administration, the executor

submitted and filed its “Executor’s Final Account, Report of
Administration and Project of Partition” where it reported, inter
alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary Mallen by the shares
of stock amounting to $240,000 delivered to her, and the
legacies of the 3 illegitimate children in the amount of P40,000
each or a total of P120,000. In the project partition, the
executor divided the residuary estate into 7 equal portions
for the benefit of the testator’s 7 legitimate children by his 1st
and 2nd marriages.

Among the 3 illegitimate children, Mari Cristina and Miriam

Palma Bellis filed their respective opposition to the project
partition on the ground that they were deprived of their
legitimates as illegitimate children.

The lower court denied their respective motions for

reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether Texan Law of Philippine Law must apply.

RULING:
It is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of
Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death. So that
even assuming Texan has a conflict of law rule providing that
the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to
Philippine Law, but would still refer to Texas Law.
KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA and NIPPON ENGINEERING
CONSULTANTS CO., LTD.,
vs
MINORU KITAMURA
G.R. No. 149177
November 23, 2007
FACTS:
Nippon Engineering Consultants (Nippon), a jurisdiction and the choice of the lex foriwill often coincide, the
Japaneseconsultancy firm providing technical and management
support in the infrastructure projects national permanently
residing in the Philippines. The agreement provides that
Kitamaru was to extend professional services to Nippon for a
year. Nippon assigned Kitamaru to work as the project manager
of the Southern TagalogAccess Road (STAR) project. When the
STAR project was near completion, DPWH engaged
the consultancy services of Nippon, this time for the detailed
engineering & construction supervision of the Bongabon-Baler
Road Improvement (BBRI) Project. Kitamaru was named as the
project manger in the contract.
Hasegawa, Nippon’s general manager for its International
Division, informed Kitamaru that the company had no more
intention of automatically renewing his ICA. His services would
be engaged by the company only up to the substantial
completion of the STAR Project.
Kitamaru demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI project.
Nippon insisted that Kitamaru’s contract was for a fixed term that
had expired. Kitamaru then filed for specific performance &
damages w/ the RTC of Lipa City. Nippon filed a MTD.
Nippon’s contention: The ICA had been perfected in Japan &
executed by & between Japanese nationals. Thus, the RTC of
Lipa City has no jurisdiction. The claim for improper pre-
termination of Kitamaru’s ICA could only be heard & ventilated
in the proper courts of Japan following the principles of lex loci
celebrationis & lex contractus.
The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. The CA ruled hat the
principle of lex loci celebrationis was not applicable to the case,
because nowhere in the pleadings was the validity of the written
agreement put in issue. It held that the RTC was correct in
applying the principle of lex loci solutionis.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine
courts in civil cases for specific performance & damages
involving contracts executed outside the country by foreign
nationals may be assailed on the principles of lex loci
celebrationis, lex contractus, “the state of the most significant
relationship rule,” or forum non conveniens.
HELD:
NO. In the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, 3
consecutive phases are involved: jurisdiction, choice of law, and
recognition and enforcement of judgments. Jurisdiction & choice
of law are 2 distinct concepts.Jurisdiction considers whether it is
fair to cause adefendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks
the further question whether the application of a substantive law
w/c will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties.
The power to exercise jurisdiction does not automatically give a
state constitutional authority to applyforum law. While
“minimum contacts” for one do not always provide the
necessary “significant contacts” for the other. The question of
whether the law of a state can be applied to a transaction is
different from the question of whether the courts of that state
have jurisdiction to enter a judgment.
In this case, only the 1st phase is at issue—jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction, however, has various aspects. For a court to validly
exercise its power to adjudicate a controversy, it must have
jurisdiction over the plaintiff/petitioner, over
the defendant/respondent, over the subject matter, over the
issues of the case and, in cases involving property, over
the res or the thing w/c is the subject of the litigation. In assailing
the trial court's jurisdiction herein, Nippon is actually referring to
subject matter jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is
conferred by the sovereign authority w/c establishes and
organizes the court. It is given only by law and in the manner
prescribed by law. It is further determined by the allegations of
the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all
or some of the claims asserted therein. To succeed in its motion
for the dismissal of an action for lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the claim, the movant must show that the court
or tribunal cannot act on the matter submitted to it because no
law grants it the power to adjudicate the claims.
In the instant case, Nippon, in its MTD, does not claim that the
RTC is not properly vested by law w/ jurisdiction to hear the
subject controversy for a civil case for specific performance &
damages is one not capable of pecuniary estimation & is
properly cognizable by the RTC of Lipa City. What they rather
raise as grounds to question subject matter jurisdiction are the
principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus, and the
“state of the most significant relationship rule.” The Court finds
the invocation of these grounds unsound.
Lex loci celebrationis relates to the “law of the place of the
ceremony” or the law of the place where a contract is made. The
doctrine of lex contractus or lex loci contractus means the “law
of the place where a contract is executed or to be performed.” It
controls the nature, construction, and validity of the contract and
it may pertain to the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties
or the law intended by them either expressly or implicitly.Under
the “state of the most significant relationship rule,” to ascertain
what state law to apply to a dispute, the court should determine
which state has the most substantial connection to the
occurrence and the parties. In a case involving a contract, the
court should consider where the contract was made, was
negotiated, was to be performed, and the domicile, place of
business, or place of incorporation of the parties. This rule takes
into account several contacts and evaluates them according to
their relative importance with respect to the particular issue to
be resolved.
Since these 3 principles in conflict of laws make reference to the
law applicable to a dispute, they are rules proper for the
2nd phase, the choice of law. They determine which state's law
is to be applied in resolving the substantive issues of a conflicts
problem. Necessarily, as the only issue in this case is that of
jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules are not only inapplicable but also
not yet called for.
Further, Nippon’s premature invocation of choice-of-law rules is
exposed by the fact that they have not yet pointed out any
conflict between the laws of Japan and ours. Before determining
which law should apply, 1st there should exist a conflict of laws
situation requiring theapplication of the conflict of laws
rules. Also, when the law of a foreign country is invoked to
provide the proper rules for the solution of a case, the existence
of such law must be pleaded and proved.
It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a
foreign element, is brought before a court or administrative
agency, there are 3 alternatives open to the latter in disposing
of it: (1) dismiss the case, either because of lack of jurisdiction
or refusal to assume jurisdiction over the case; (2) assume
jurisdiction over the case and apply the internal law of the forum;
or (3) assume jurisdiction over the case and take into account
orapply the law of some other State or States. The court’s power
to hear cases and controversies is derived from the Constitution
and the laws. While it may choose to recognize laws of foreign
nations, the court is not limited by foreign sovereign law short of
treaties or other formal agreements, even in matters regarding
rights provided by foreign sovereigns.
Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniens, be
used to deprive the RTC of its jurisdiction. 1st, it is not a proper
basis for a motion to dismiss because Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the
Rules of Court does not include it as a ground. 2nd, whether a
suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of the said
doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the particular case
and is addressed to the sound discretion of the RTC. In this
case, the RTC decided to assume jurisdiction. 3rd, the propriety
of dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual
determination; hence, this conflicts principle is more properly
considered a matter of defense.
RAYTHEON INTERNATIONAL v. STOCKTON W. ROUZIE,
GR No. 162894, 2008-02-26
Facts:
Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of the State of
Connecticut, United States of America, and respondent
Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen, entered into a
contract whereby BMSI hired... respondent as its
representative to negotiate the sale of services in several
government projects in the Philippines for an agreed
remuneration of 10% of the gross receipts.
respondent secured a service contract with the Republic of the
Philippines on behalf of
BMSI for the dredging of rivers affected by the Mt. Pinatubo
eruption and mudflows.
respondent filed before the Arbitration Branch of
(NLRC) a suit against BMSI and Rust International, Inc.
(RUST), Rodney C. Gilbert and Walter G. Browning for alleged
nonpayment of commissions, illegal termination and... breach
of employment contract.
Labor Arbiter Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr. rendered judgment ordering
BMSI and RUST to pay respondent's money claims.
Upon appeal by BMSI, the NLRC reversed the decision of the
Labor
Arbiter and dismissed respondent's complaint on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction.
Respondent elevated the case to this Court but was
dismissed... respondent, then a resident of La Union, instituted
an action for damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Bauang, La Union.
defendants herein petitioner Raytheon
International, Inc. as well as BMSI and RUST, the two
corporations impleaded in the earlier labor case
BMSI verbally employed respondent to negotiate the sale of
services in government projects and that... respondent was not
paid the commissions due him from the Pinatubo dredging
project which he secured on behalf of BMSI.
In its Answer,[8] petitioner alleged that contrary to respondent's
claim, it was a foreign corporation duly licensed to do business
in the Philippines and denied entering into any arrangement
with respondent or paying the latter any sum of money.
Petitioner also referred to the NLRC decision which disclosed
that per the written agreement between respondent and BMSI
and RUST,... denominated as "Special Sales Representative
Agreement," the rights and obligations of the parties shall be
governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut.[10]
Petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint on grounds of
failure to state a cause of... action and forum non conveniens
and prayed for damages by way of compulsory counterclaim.[
RTC denied petitioner's omnibus motion. The trial court held
that the factual allegations in the complaint, assuming the
same to be admitted, were sufficient for the trial court to render
a valid judgment... thereon. It also ruled that the principle of
forum non conveniens was inapplicable because the trial court
could enforce judgment on petitioner, it being a foreign
corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines.
Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision[21] denying
the petition for certiorari for lack of merit.
the appellate court deferred to the discretion of the trial court
when... the latter decided not to desist from assuming
jurisdiction on the ground of the inapplicability of the principle
of forum non conveniens.
Issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
REFUSING TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT ON THE
GROUND OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS.
Petitioner mainly asserts that the written contract between
respondent and BMSI included a valid choice of law clause,
that is, that the contract shall be governed by the laws of the
State of Connecticut. It also mentions the presence of foreign
elements in the dispute namely,... the parties and witnesses
involved are American corporations and citizens and the
evidence to be presented is located outside the Philippines
that renders our local courts inconvenient forums.
Petitioner theorizes that the foreign elements of the dispute
necessitate the... immediate application of the doctrine of
forum non conveniens.
Ruling:
The instant petition lacks merit.
Civil Case No. 1192-BG is an action for damages arising from
an alleged breach of contract. Undoubtedly, the nature of the
action and the amount of damages prayed are within the
jurisdiction of the RTC.
As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the trial court acquired
jurisdiction over herein respondent (as party plaintiff) upon the
filing of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the
person of petitioner (as party defendant) was acquired by its
voluntary... appearance in court.
That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same
shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut does
not suggest that the Philippine courts, or any other foreign
tribunal for that matter, are precluded from hearing the civil
action.
Petitioner's averments of the foreign elements in the instant
case are not sufficient to oust the trial court of its jurisdiction
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is
DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 67001 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
Principles:
Hasegawa v. Kitamura,[26] the Court outlined three
consecutive phases involved in judicial resolution of conflicts-
of-laws problems, namely: jurisdiction, choice of law, and
recognition and enforcement of judgments.
foreign element
(1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may
conveniently resort
(2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an
intelligent decision as to the law and the facts
(3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have the power
to enforce its decision
On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem
where the case is filed in a Philippine court and where the
court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties and
the res, it may or can proceed to try the case even if the rules
of conflict-of-laws... or the convenience of the parties point to a
foreign forum. This is an exercise of sovereign prerogative of
the country where the case is filed.
Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is
conferred by the Constitution and the law[30] and by the
material allegations in the complaint, irrespective of whether or
not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims
or... reliefs sought therein
Jurisdiction and... choice of law are two distinct concepts.
Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to
travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question
whether the application of a substantive law which will
determine the merits of the case is fair to both... parties.
The choice of law stipulation will become relevant only when
the substantive issues of the instant case develop, that is, after
hearing on the merits proceeds before the trial court.
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in
conflicts-of-laws cases, may refuse impositions on its
jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient" or available
forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies
elsewhere.
Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the
principle of forum non conveniens requires a factual
determination; hence, it is more properly considered as a
matter of defense. While it is within the discretion of the trial
court to abstain from assuming... jurisdiction on this ground, it
should do so only after vital facts are established, to determine
whether special circumstances require the court's desistance.

CORPORATE LAW CASE DIGEST: TAYAG V. BENGUET
(1968)
G.R. No. L-23145 November 29, 1968
Lessons Applicable: Theory of Concession (Corporate Law)
FACTS:
 March 27, 1960: Idonah Slade Perkins died in New York
City
 August 12, 1960: Prospero Sanidad instituted ancillary
administration proceedings appointing ancillary
administrator Lazaro A. Marquez later on substituted
by Renato D. Tayag
 On January 27, 1964: CFI ordered domiciliary
administrator County Trust Company of New York to
surrender to the ancillary administrator in the
Philippines 33,002 shares of stock certificates owned by
her in a Philippine corporation, Benguet Consolidated,
Inc., to satisfy the legitimate claims of local creditors
 When County Trust Company of New York refused the
court ordered Benguet Consolidated, Inc. to declare the
stocks lost and required it to issue new certificates in lieu
thereof
 Appeal was taken by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. alleging
the failure to comply with its by-laws setting forth
the procedure to be followed in case of a lost, stolen or
destroyed so it cannot issue new stock certs.
ISSUE: W/N Benguet Consolidated, Inc. can ignore a court
order because of its by-laws
HELD: NO. CFI Affirmed
 Fear of contigent liability - obedience to a lawful order =
valid defense
 Benguet Consolidated, Inc. is a Philippine corporation
owing full allegiance and subject to the unrestricted
jurisdiction of local courts
 Assuming that a contrariety exists between the above by-
law and the command of a court decree, the latter is to be
followed.
 corporation is an artificial being created by operation of
law...."It owes its life to the state, its birth being purely
dependent on its will. Cannot ignore the source of its very
existence
Labels: 1968, Case Digest, Corporate Law, Corporate Law
Case Digest, G.R. No. L-23145 November 29, Juris
Doctor, Tayag v. Benguet, Theory of Concession
CASE DIGEST: TUNA PROCESSING V. PHILIPPINE
KINGFORD
G.R. No. 185582 : February 29, 2012
TUNA PROCESSING, INC., Petitioner, v. PHILIPPINE
KINGFORD, INC., Respondent.
PEREZ, J.:
FACTS:
Philippine Kingford, Inc. (Kingford) is a corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines while
Tuna Processing, Inc. (TPI) is a foreign corporation not
licensed to do business in the Philippines. Due to
circumstances not mentioned in the case, Kingford withdrew
from petitioner TPI and correspondingly, reneged on their
obligations. Petitioner submitted the dispute for arbitration
before the International Centre for Dispute Resolution in the
State of California, United States and won the case against
respondent. To enforce the award, petitioner TPI filed a
Petition for Confirmation, Recognition, and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Award before the RTC of Makati City. The
RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that the petitioner
lacked legal capacity to sue in the Philippines.
ISSUE: Can a foreign corporation not licensed to do business
in the Philippines, but which collects royalties from entities in
the Philippines, sue here to enforce a foreign arbitral award?
HELD: RTCs decision is reversed.
POLITICAL LAW: special vs. general law
The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 shall apply in
this case as the Act, as its title - An Act to Institutionalize the
Use of an Alternative Dispute Resolution System in the
Philippines and to Establish the Office for Alternative Dispute
Resolution, and for Other Purposes - would suggest, is a law
especially enacted to actively promote party autonomy in the
resolution of disputes or the freedom of the party to make their
own arrangements to resolve their disputes. It specifically
provides exclusive grounds available to the party opposing an
application for recognition and enforcement of the arbitral
award. The Corporation Code is the general law providing for
the formation, organization and regulation of private
corporations. As between a general and special law, the latter
shall prevail generalia specialibus non derogant.
The Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute Resolution
provides that any party to a foreign arbitration may petition the
court to recognize and enforce a foreign arbitral award.Indeed,
it is in the best interest of justice that in the enforcement of a
foreign arbitral award, the losing party can not avail of the rule
that bars foreign corporations not licensed to do business in
the Philippines from maintaining a suit in our courts. When a
party enters into a contract containing a foreign arbitration
clause and, as in this case, in fact submits itself to arbitration, it
becomes bound by the contract, by the arbitration and by the
result of arbitration, conceding thereby the capacity of the
other party to enter into the contract, participate in the
arbitration and cause the implementation of the result.
GRANTED.
ZAMORANOS V. PEOPLE (G.R. NO. 193902; JUNE 1, 2011)
CASE DIGEST: ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS,
Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SAMSON
R. PACASUM, SR., Respondents.
FACTS: Zamoranos wed Jesus de Guzman, a Muslim convert,
in Islamic rites. Prior thereto, Zamoranos was a Roman
Catholic who had converted to Islam. Subsequently, the two
wed again, this time, in civil rites before Judge Perfecto Laguio
(Laguio) of the RTC, Quezon City.
A little after a year, Zamoranos and De Guzman obtained a
divorce by talaq. The dissolution of their marriage was
confirmedy theShari'aCircuitDistrictCourt,which issued a
Decree of Divorce.
Now it came to pass that Zamoranos married anew. As she
had previously done in her first nuptial to De Guzman,
Zamoranos wed Samson Pacasum, Sr. (Pacasum), her
subordinate at the Bureau of Customs where she worked,
under Islamic rites in Balo-i, Lanao del Norte. Thereafter, in
order to strengthen the ties of their marriage, Zamoranos and
Pacasum renewed their marriage vows in a civil ceremony
before Judge Valerio Salazar of the RTC, Iligan City. However,
unlike in Zamoranos' first marriage to De Guzman, the union
between her and Pacasum was blessed with progeny, namely:
Samson, Sr., Sam Jean, and Sam Joon.
Despite their three children, the relationship between
Zamoranos and Pacasum turned sour and the two were de
facto separated. The volatile relationship of Zamoranos and
Pacasum escalated into a bitter battle for custody of their
minor children. Eventually, Zamoranos and Pacasum arrived at
a compromise agreement which vested primary custody of the
children in the former, with the latter retaining visitorial rights
thereto.
As it turned out, the agreement rankled on Pacasum. He filed a
flurry of cases against Zamoranos including a petition for
annulment, a criminal complaint for bigamy and dismissal and
disbarment from the civil service.
Meanwhile, on the criminal litigation front, the Office of the City
Prosecutor, through Prosecutor Leonor Quiones, issued a
resolution, finding prima facie evidence to hold Zamoranos
liable for Bigamy. Consequently, an Information for Bigamy
was filed against Zamoranos before the RTC.
On the other civil litigation front on the Declaration of a Void
Marriage, the RTC, rendered a decision in favor of Zamoranos,
dismissing the petition of Pacasum for lack of jurisdiction. The
RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, found that Zamoranos and De
Guzman are Muslims, and were such at the time of their
marriage, whose marital relationship was governed by
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1083, otherwise known as the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Was the marriage of Zamoranos to Pacasum bigamous?
HELD: First, we dispose of the peripheral issue raised by
Zamoranos on the conclusiveness of judgment made by the
RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, which heard the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage filed by Pacasum on the
ground that his marriage to Zamoranos was a bigamous
marriage. In that case, the decision of which is already final
and executory, the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, dismissed the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter by the regular civil courts.
The RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, declared that it was the Shari'a
Circuit Court which had jurisdiction over the subject matter
thereof.
Nonetheless, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, which heard the
case for Bigamy, should have taken cognizance of the
categorical declaration of the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, that
Zamoranos is a Muslim, whose first marriage to another
Muslim, De Guzman, was valid and recognized under Islamic
law. In fact, the same court further declared that Zamoranos'
divorce from De Guzman validly severed their marriage ties.

From the foregoing declarations of all three persons in

authority, two of whom are officers of the court, it is evident
that Zamoranos is a Muslim who married another Muslim, De
Guzman, under Islamic rites. Accordingly, the nature,
consequences, and incidents of such marriage are governed
by P.D. No. 1083.

Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that even in criminal

cases, the trial court must have jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the offense. In this case, the charge of Bigamy
hinges on Pacasum's claim that Zamoranos is not a Muslim,
and her marriage to De Guzman was governed by civil law.
This is obviously far from the truth, and the fact of Zamoranos'
Muslim status should have been apparent to both lower courts,
the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, and the CA.

The subject matter of the offense of Bigamy dwells on the

accused contracting a second marriage while a prior valid one
still subsists and has yet to be dissolved. At the very least, the
RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, should
haveuspendedtheproceedings until Pacasum had litigated the
validity of Zamoranos and De Guzman's marriage before the
Shari'a Circuit Court and had successfully shown that it had
not been dissolved despite the divorce by talaq entered into by
Zamoranos and De Guzman.

In a pluralist society such as that which exists in the

Philippines, P.D. No. 1083, or the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws, was enacted to "promote the advancement and effective
participation of the National Cultural Communities x x x, [and]
the State shall consider their customs, traditions, beliefs and
interests in the formulation and implementation of its policies."

Trying Zamoranos for Bigamy simply because the regular

criminal courts have jurisdiction over the offense defeats the
purpose for the enactment of the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws and the equal recognition bestowed by the State on
Muslim Filipinos.

Moreover, the two experts, in the same book, unequivocally

state that one of the effects of irrevocable talaq, as well as
other kinds of divorce, refers to severance of matrimonial
bond, entitling one to remarry.

It stands to reason therefore that Zamoranos' divorce from De

Guzman, as confirmed by an Ustadz and Judge Jainul of the
Shari'a Circuit Court, and attested to by Judge Usman, was
valid, and, thus, entitled her to remarry Pacasum in 1989.
Consequently, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, is without
jurisdiction to try Zamoranos for the crime of Bigamy.