Brainstorm: The Next Generation | Of good conduct

BY ATTY. CAESAR EUROPA ON AUGUST 26, 2019

“And so we come to hear another tale of woe, of an infamous public figure and his minions
indicted for having raped and killed a young lady and a budding lad, of these victims who
had led short obscure lives that earned an equally ignominious end, and of a criminal
enterprise so despicable only the unthinking beasts can orchestrate. It was, indeed, a plot
seemingly hatched in hell. And let it not be said that the full protection of the law has been
deprived appellants. Even a beast cannot deny this” (People v. Sanchez, G.R. Nos.
121039-45, January 25, 1999)

With the Supreme Court saying this to describe the brutal rape-slay of Eileen Sarmenta and
Allan Gomez, then why did former Mayor Antonio Sanchez’s name even come up for
consideration to be released due to good conduct allowances?

Before shooting from the hip and just blabbering about it, I decided to review the applicable
laws to look at it from an objective and studied point of view and I decided to write this
article as it may be of help to those who are interested.

What is this “allowance for good conduct” anyway? Under article 97 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), these are deductions from the sentence of a convict or detention prisoner,
subject to certain conditions, for every month that he does not violate the jail rules and
regulations. This is NOT NEW, it has been there since the RPC took effect in 1931.
Originally, the deductions in the RPC were from 5 to 15 days per month of good conduct,
depending on the length of time served.

It bears emphasizing that the “good conduct” deductions are given on a month to month
basis. In other words, the allowances will not be granted only for the months when the
prisoner breaks prison rules and regulations. So, if he behaves for 11 months in a year but
breaks the rules on the 12th month, he still gets credit for the time that he was good.

In 2013, Congress passed R.A. 10592, increasing the deductions to 20 to 30 days per
month of detention, again depending on the length of time already served. This, per se, is
NOT a BAD LAW because it increases the incentives for inmates to behave and it was
probably one of the measures that Congress came up with to try and decongest our very
overcrowded jails.

“This is the fault of the Supreme Court” NO, IT IS NOT. All that the Supreme Court did, last
June 25, 2019, in the case of “Inmates of the New Bilibid Prison v. De Lima” (G.R. Nos.
212719 & 214637) was to declare that the benefits of R.A. 10592 MUST be given
retroactive effect and benefit prisoners who were already in jail prior to the effectivity of the
new law. This was based on the basic legal principle in criminal law that penal laws that are
beneficial to the accused must be given retroactive effect.

“Mayor Sanchez was sentenced to SEVEN (7) penalties of reclusion perpetua, so how
could he possibly be released even if deductions are made?” Well, he was actually
sentenced to NINE (9) penalties of reclusion perpetua, 7 for the rape-slay of Eileen
Sarmenta and Allan Gomez, and 2 for the murder of Nelson Peñalosa and Rickson
Peñalosa (People v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 131116, August 27, 1999)

Even if under Article 70 of the RPC, this is a total of 270 years (30 years for each count), it
DOES NOT MATTER because under the same provision, the maximum imprisonment of
prisoners with multiple penalties is three (3) times the highest penalty, a.k.a. the “Three-
Fold Rule”, NOT TO EXCEED 40 YEARS. So, under the law, the maximum imprisonment of
any person, regardless of how many penalties he has been sentenced to suffer is still
limited to FORTY (40) YEARS.

In other words, in the case of Mr. Sanchez, the good conduct allowances will be deducted
from his maximum imprisonment of 40 years.

“R.A. 10592 provides that “recidivists, habitual delinquents, escapees and persons charged
with heinous crimes are excluded from the coverage of this Act, so it should not apply to Mr.
Sanchez”. Here is where things get a little iffy because, there is a bit of a grey area as far as
this is concerned.

The mentioned exclusion is found in Section 1 of R.A. 10592 which amends Article 29 of the
RPC which, in turn, specifically covers the deduction of the period of preventive
imprisonment, i.e., the period of detention prior to final conviction, from the convict’s
sentence when he is finally convicted or declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The
exclusion does not appear anywhere else in R.A. 10592, particularly in the portions thereof
referring to allowances for good conduct.

In view of this, it can be reasonably argued that only the deduction of the “preventive
imprisonment” from the convict’s sentence is not applicable to those convicted of heinous
crimes. Moreover, considering that this exclusion is not found in Article 29 of the RPC as it
was originally written, it is also arguable that it should not affect those were convicted prior
to the effectivity of the law because that portion of R.A. 10592 is NOT beneficial, and is
even prejudicial, to the prisoner.

This vagueness in how R.A. 10592 was written will benefit Mr. Sanchez because of the
legal principle that penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused (Gilbuena y
Esgana v. People, G.R. No. 213034, August 12, 2015.)

So, after all this, should Mr. Sanchez be granted good conduct allowances? Applying the
law, he would be entitled to deductions for the periods of detention that he followed the
prison rules and regulations. However, it has been made public that he was found to have
been enjoying prohibited luxuries during his imprisonment and he was even found in
possession of “shabu”, apparently hidden inside a statue of the Virgin Mary, in jail.

Considering this, he should not be entitled to any good conduct allowances for the ENTIRE
PERIOD that he was enjoying luxuries particularly because among the violations
enumerated in the “Uniform Manual on Time Allowances” of the Department of Justice and
Bureau of Corrections is “Keeping unauthorized amount of money, jewelry, cellular phones
or other communications devices, luxurious properties and other items classified as
contraband under the rules”.

Also, the officials of the BuCor, particularly the Director of Prisons, have great leeway in
granting or denying good conduct allowances. The fact that Mr. Sanchez has been found to
have been violating, not the just prison rules, but even the Dangerous Drugs Act while being
detained, shows that, contrary to the voiced opinions of some politicians, he has NOT truly
reformed. I even read in a news article, which I hope was not fake news, that he is still
maintaining that he is innocent of the crimes for which he was convicted. So, if indeed he
has changed, it was apparently a change for the worse.

In ending, I certainly hope that while we have cause to raise issues about the application of
good conduct allowances to benefit Mr. Sanchez, considering the specifics of his case, we
should not lose sight of the fact that he is ONLY ONE of the thousands of prisoners who
can benefit from R.A. 10592, many of whom may be truly deserving of a second chance to
be contributing members of society.

So, I hope that this one very rotten apple will not give cause to throw away the bushel of a
thousand souls.
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. 117472. February 7, 1997]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO, accused-

appellant.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

On June 25, 1996, we rendered our decision in the instant case affirming the conviction of
the accused-appellant for the crime of raping his ten-year old daughter. The crime having
been committed sometime in April, 1994, during which time Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659,
commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was already in effect, accused-appellant was
inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death.

On July 9, 1996, the accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration which
focused on the sinister motive of the victim's grandmother that precipitated the filing of the
alleged false accusation of rape against the accused. We find no substantial arguments on
the said motion that can disturb our verdict.

On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense counsel, Atty. Julian R.

Vitug, and retained the services of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal
Assistance Group of the Philippines (FLAG).

On August 23, 1996, we received the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration prepared by
the FLAG on behalf of accused-appellant. The motion raises the following grounds for the
reversal of the death sentence:

"[1] Accused-appellant should not have been prosecuted since the pardon by the
offended party and her mother before the filing of the complaint acted as a bar to
his criminal prosecution.
[2] The lack of a definite allegation of the date of the commission of the offense in
the Complaint and throughout trial prevented the accused-appellant from preparing
an adequate defense.
[3] The guilt of the accused was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
[4] The Honorable Court erred in finding that the accused-appellant was the father
or stepfather of the complainant and in affirming the sentence of death against him
on this basis.
[5] The trial court denied the accused-appellant of due process and manifested bias
in the conduct of the trial.
[6] The accused-appellant was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance
of counsel and to due process, due to the incompetence of counsel.
[7] R.A. [No.] 7659, reimposing the death penalty is unconstitutional per se:
a. For crimes where no death results from the offense, the death penalty is
a severe and excessive penalty in violation of Article III, Sec. 19 ( I ) of the
1987 Constitution.
b. The death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of Article
III, Sec. 11 of the 1987 Constitution."
In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises three (3) main issues: (1)
mixed factual and legal matters relating to the trial proceedings and findings; (2) alleged
incompetence of accused-appellant's former counsel; and (3) purely legal question of the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659.

I.

It is a rudimentary principle of law that matters neither alleged in the pleadings nor raised
during the proceedings below cannot be ventilated for the first time on appeal before the
Supreme Court. Moreover, as we have stated in our Resolution in Manila Bay Club
Corporation v. Court of Appeals:1

"If well-recognized jurisprudence precludes raising an issue only for the first time on
appeal proper, with more reason should such issue be disallowed or disregarded
when initially raised only in a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the
appellate court."

It is to be remembered that during the proceedings of the rape case against the accused-
appellant before the sala of then presiding Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion, the defense
attempted to prove that:

a) the rape case was motivated by greed, hence, a mere concoction of the alleged
victim's maternal grandmother;
b) the accused is not the real father of the complainant;
c) the size of the penis of the accused cannot have possibly penetrated the alleged
victim's private part; and
d) the accused was in Paraaque during the time of the alleged rape.

In his Brief before us when the rape case was elevated for automatic review, the accused-
appellant reiterated as grounds for exculpation:

a) the ill-motive of the victim's maternal grandmother in prompting her grandchild to

file the rape case;
b) the defense of denial relative to the size of his penis which could not have
caused the healed hymenal lacerations of the victim; and
c) the defense of alibi.

Thus, a second hard look at the issues raised by the new counsel of the accused-appellant
reveals that in their messianic appeal for a reversal of our judgment of conviction, we are
asked to consider for the first time, by way of a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration,
the following matters:

a) the affidavit of desistance written by the victim which acted as a bar to the
criminal prosecution for rape against the accused-appellant;
b) the vagueness attributed to the date of the commission of the offense in the
Complaint which deprived the accused-appellant from adequately defending
himself;
c) the failure of this Court to clearly establish the qualifying circumstance that
placed the accused-appellant within the coverage of the Death Penalty Law;
d) the denial of due process and the manifest bias exhibited by the trial court during
the trial of the rape case.

Apparently, after a careful scrutiny of the foregoing points for reconsideration, the only
legitimate issue that We can tackle relates to the Affidavit of Desistance which touches on
the lack of jurisdiction of the trial court to have proceeded with the prosecution of the
accused-appellant considering that the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be
raised at any time, even during appeal.2

It must be stressed that during the trial proceedings of the rape case against the accused-
appellant, it appeared that despite the admission made by the victim herself in open court
that she had signed an Affidavit of Desistance, she, nevertheless, "strongly pointed out that
she is not withdrawing the charge against the accused because the latter might do the
same sexual assaults to other women."3 Thus, this is one occasion where an affidavit of
desistance must be regarded with disfavor inasmuch as the victim, in her tender age,
manifested in court that she was pursuing the rape charges against the accused-appellant.

We have explained in the case of People v. Gerry Ballabare,4 that:

"As pointed out in People v. Lim (24 190 SCRA 706 [1990], which is also cited by
the accused-appellant, an affidavit of desistance is merely an additional ground to
buttress the accused's defenses, not the sole consideration that can result in
acquittal. There must be other circumstances which, when coupled with the
retraction or desistance, create doubts as to the truth of the testimony given by the
witnesses at the trial and accepted by the judge."5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the case at bar, all that the accused-appellant offered as defenses mainly consisted of
denial and alibi which cannot outweigh the positive identification and convincing testimonies
given by the prosecution. Hence, the affidavit of desistance, which the victim herself
intended to disregard as earlier discussed, must have no bearing on the criminal
prosecution against the accused-appellant, particularly on the trial court's jurisdiction over
the case.

II

The settled rule is that the client is bound by the negligence or mistakes of his
counsel.6 One of the recognized exceptions to this rule is gross incompetency in a way that
the defendant is highly prejudiced and prevented, in effect, from having his day in court to
defend himself.7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the instant case, we believe that the former counsel of the accused-appellant to whom
the FLAG lawyers now impute incompetency had amply exercised the required ordinary
diligence or that reasonable decree of care and skill expected of him relative to his client's
defense. As the rape case was being tried on the merits, Atty. Vitug, from the time he was
assigned to handle the case, dutifully attended the hearings thereof. Moreover, he had
seasonably submitted the Accused-Appellant's Brief and the Motion for Reconsideration of
our June 25, 1996 Decision with extensive discussion in support of his line of defense.
There is no indication of gross incompetency that could have resulted from a failure to
present any argument or any witness to defend his client. Neither has he acted haphazardly
in the preparation of his case against the prosecution evidence. The main reason for his
failure to exculpate his client, the accused-appellant, is the overwhelming evidence of the
prosecution. The alleged errors committed by the previous counsel as enumerated by the
new counsel could not have overturned the judgment of conviction against the accused-
appellant.

III

Although its origins seem lost in obscurity, the imposition of death as punishment for
violation of law or custom, religious or secular, is an ancient practice. We do know that our
forefathers killed to avenge themselves and their kin and that initially, the criminal law was
used to compensate for a wrong done to a private party or his family, not to punish in the
name of the state.

The dawning of civilization brought with it both the increasing sensitization throughout the
later generations against past barbarity and the institutionalization of state power under the
rule of law. Today every man or woman is both an individual person with inherent human
rights recognized and protected by the state and a citizen with the duty to serve the
common weal and defend and preserve society.

One of the indispensable powers of the state is the power to secure society against
threatened and actual evil. Pursuant to this, the legislative arm of government enacts
criminal laws that define and punish illegal acts that may be committed by its own subjects,
the executive agencies enforce these laws, and the judiciary tries and sentences the
criminals in accordance with these laws.
Although penologists, throughout history, have not stopped debating on the causes of
criminal behavior and the purposes of criminal punishment, our criminal laws have been
perceived as relatively stable and functional since the enforcement of the Revised Penal
Code on January 1, 1932, this notwithstanding occasional opposition to the death penalty
provisions therein. The Revised Penal Code, as it was originally promulgated, provided for
the death penalty in specified crimes under specific circumstances. As early as 1886,
though, capital punishment had entered our legal system through the old Penal Code, which
was a modified version of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870.

The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took the form of a constitutional question of
whether or not the death penalty is a cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment in
violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel and unusual punishments. We
unchangingly answered this question in the negative in the cases of Harden v. Director of
Prison,8 People v. Limaco,9 People v. Camano,10 People v. Puda11 and People v.
Marcos,12 In Harden, we ruled:

"The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-parte Kemmler, 136
U.S., 436, the United States Supreme Court said that 'punishments are cruel when they
involve torture or a lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the
meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and
barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of
life.'"13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Consequently, we have time and again emphasized that our courts are not the fora for a
protracted debate on the morality or propriety of the death sentence where the law itself
provides therefor in specific and well-defined criminal acts. Thus we had ruled in the 1951
case of Limaco that:

"x x x there are quite a number of people who honestly believe that the supreme
penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or ineffective. However, as long as that
penalty remains in the statute books, and as long as our criminal law provides for its
imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the
law regardless of their private opinions,"14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

and this we have reiterated in the 1995 case of People v. Veneracion.15

Under the Revised Penal Code, death is the penalty for the crimes of treason,
correspondence with the enemy during times of war, qualified piracy, parricide, murder,
infanticide, kidnapping, rape with homicide or with the use of deadly weapon or by two or
more persons resulting in insanity, robbery with homicide, and arson resulting in death. The
list of capital offenses lengthened as the legislature responded to the emergencies of the
times. In 1941, Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 616 added espionage to the list. In the
1950s, at the height of the Huk rebellion, the government enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No.
1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Law, which carried the death penalty for
leaders of the rebellion. From 1971 to 1972, more capital offenses were created by more
laws, among them, the Anti-Hijacking Law, the Dangerous Drugs Act, and the Anti-
Carnapping Law. During martial law, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866 was enacted
penalizing with death, among others, crimes involving homicide committed with an
unlicensed firearm.

In the aftermath of the 1986 revolution that dismantled the Marcos regime and led to the
nullification of the 1973 Constitution, a Constitutional Commission was convened following
appointments thereto by Corazon Aquino who was catapulted to power by the people.

Tasked with formulating a charter that echoes the new found freedom of a rejuvenated
people, the Constitutional Commissioners grouped themselves into working committees
among which is the Bill of Rights Committee with Jose B. Laurel, Jr. As Chairman and
Father Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as Vice-Chairman.

On July 17, 1986, Father Bernas presented the committee draft of the proposed bill of rights
to the rest of the commission. What is now Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution
was first denominated as Section 22 and was originally worded as follows:
"Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, or the
death penalty inflicted. Death penalty already imposed shall be commuted to reclusion
perpetua."

Father Bernas explained that the foregoing provision was the result of a consensus among
the members of the Bill of Rights Committee that the death penalty should be abolished.
Having agreed to abolish the death penalty, they proceeded to deliberate on how the
abolition was to be done -- whether the abolition should be done by the Constitution or by
the legislature -- and the majority voted for a constitutional abolition of the death penalty.
Father Bernas explained:

"x x x [T]here was a division in the Committee not on whether the death penalty
should be abolished or not, but rather on whether the abolition should be done by
the Constitution -- in which case it cannot be restored by the legislature -- or left to
the legislature. The majority voted for the constitutional abolition of the death
penalty. And the reason is that capital punishment is inhuman for the convict and
his family who are traumatized by the waiting, even if it is never carried out. There is
no evidence that the death penalty deterred deadly criminals, hence, life should not
be destroyed just in the hope that other lives might be saved. Assuming mastery
over the life of another man is just too presumptuous for any man. The fact that the
death penalty as an institution has been there from time immemorial should not
deter us from reviewing it. Human life is more valuable than an institution intended
precisely to serve human life. So, basically, this is the summary of the reasons
which were presented in support of the constitutional abolition of the death
penalty".16

The original wording of Article III, Section 19 (1), however, did not survive the debate that it
instigated. Commissioner Napoleon G. Rama first pointed out that "never in our history has
there been a higher incidence of crime" and that "criminality was at its zenith during the last
decade".17 Ultimately, the dissent defined itself to an unwillingness to absolutely excise the
death penalty from our legal system and leave society helpless in the face of a future
upsurge of crimes or other similar emergencies. As Commissioner Rustico F. de los Reyes,
Jr. suggested, "although we abolish the death penalty in the Constitution, we should afford
some amount of flexibility to future legislation,"18 and his concern was amplified by the
interpellatory remarks of Commissioner Lugum L. Commissioner and now Associate Justice
Florenz Regalado, Commissioner Crispino M. de Castro, Commissioner Ambrosio B.
Padilla, Commissioner Christian Monsod, Commissioner Francisco A. Rodrigo, and
Commissioner Ricardo Romulo. Commissioner Padilla put it succinctly in the following
exchange with Commissioner Teodoro C. Bacani:

"BISHOP BACANI. x x x At present, they explicitly make it clear that the church has
never condemned the right of the state to inflict capital punishment.
MR. PADILLA. x x x So it is granted that the state is not deprived of the right even
from a moral standpoint of imposing or prescribing capital punishment.
BISHOP BACANI. Yes. What I am saying is that from the Catholic point of view,
that right of the state is not forbidden.
MR. PADILLA. In fact x x x we have to accept that the state has the delegated
authority from the Creator to impose the death penalty under certain circumstances.
BISHOP BACANI. The state has the delegation from God for it to do what is needed
for the sake of the common good, but the issue at stake is whether or not under the
present circumstances that will be for the common good.
MR. PADILLA. But the delegated power of the state cannot be denied.
BISHOP BACANI. Yes, the state can be delegated by God at a particular stage in
history, but it is not clear whether or not that delegation is forever under all
circumstances
MR. PADILLA. So this matter should be left to the legislature to determine, under
certain specified conditions or circumstances, whether the retention of the death
penalty or its abolition would be for the common good. I do not believe this
Commission can a priori, and as was remarked within a few days or even a month,
determine a positive provision in the Constitution that would prohibit even the
 legislature to prescribe the death penalty for the most heinous crimes, the most
grievous offenses attended by many qualifying and aggravating circumstances."19

What followed, thus, were proposed amendments to the beleaguered provision. The move
to add the phrase, "unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the national
assembly provides for the death penalty," came from Commissioners Monsod, Jose E.
Suarez and de los Reyes. Commissioner Rodrigo, however, expressed reservations even
as regards the proposed amendment. He said:

"x x x [T]he issue here is whether or not we should provide this matter in the
Constitution or leave it to the discretion of our legislature. Arguments pro and con
have been given x x x. But my stand is, we should leave this to the discretion of the
legislature.
The proposed amendment is halfhearted. It is awkward because we will, in effect,
repeal by our Constitution a piece of legislation and after repealing this piece of
legislation, tell the legislature that we have repealed the law and that the legislature
can go ahead and enact it again. I think this is not worthy of a constitutional body
like ours. If we will leave the matter of the death penalty to the legislature, let us
leave it completely to the discretion of the legislature, but let us not have this half-
baked provision. We have many provisions in the Revised Penal Code imposing the
death penalty. We will now revoke or repeal these pieces of legislation by means of
the Constitution, but at the same time say that it is up to the legislature to impose
this again.
x x x The temper and condition of the times change x x x and so we, I think we
should leave this matter to the legislature to enact statutes depending on the
changing needs of the times. Let us entrust this completely to the legislature
composed of representatives elected by the people.
I do not say that we are not competent. But we have to admit the fact that we are
not elected by the people and if we are going to entrust this to the legislature, let us
not be half-baked nor half-hearted about it. Let us entrust it to the legislature 100
percent."20cräläwvirtualibräry

Nonetheless, the proposed amendment was approved with twenty-three (23)

commissioners voting in favor of the amendment and twelve (12) voting against it, followed
by more revisions, hence the present wording of Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987
Constitution in the following tenor:

"Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty
already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua."

The implications of the foregoing provision on the effectivity of the death penalty provisions
in the Revised Penal Code and certain special criminal laws and the state of the scale of
penalties thereunder, were tremendous.

The immediate problem pertained to the applicable penalty for what used to be capital
crimes. In People v. Gavarra,21 we stated that "in view of the abolition of the death penalty
under Section 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the penalty that may be imposed for
murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua"22 thereby
eliminating death as the original maximum period. The constitutional abolition of the death
penalty, it seemed, limited the penalty for murder to only the remaining periods, to wit, the
minimum and the medium, which we then, in People v. Masangkay,23 People v.
Atencio24 and People v. Intino25 divided into three new periods, to wit, the lower half
of reclusion temporal maximum as the minimum; the upper half of reclusion
temporal maximum as the medium; and reclusion perpetua as the maximum, in keeping
with the three-grade scheme under the Revised Penal Code. In People v.
Munoz,26 however, we reconsidered these aforecited cases and after extended discussion,
we concluded that the doctrine announced therein did not reflect the intention of the
framers. The crux of the issue was whether or not Article III, Section 19 (1) absolutely
abolished the death penalty, for if it did, then, the aforementioned new three-grade penalty
should replace the old one where the death penalty constituted the maximum period. But if
no total abolition can be read from said constitutional provision and the death penalty is only
suspended, it cannot as yet be negated by the institution of a new three-grade penalty
premised on the total inexistence of the death penalty in our statute books. We thus ruled
in Munoz:

"The advocates of the Masangkay ruling argue that the Constitution abolished the
death penalty and thereby limited the penalty for murder to the remaining periods,
to wit, the minimum and the medium. These should now be divided into three new
periods in keeping with the three-grade scheme intended by the legislature. Those
who disagree feel that Article III, Section 19 (1) merely prohibits the imposition of
the death penalty and has not, by reducing it to reclusion perpetua, also
correspondingly reduced the remaining penalties. These should be maintained
intact.
A reading of Section 19 (1) of Article III will readily show that there is really nothing
therein which expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty. The provision
merely says that the death penalty shall not be imposed unless for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter provides for it and, if
already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The language, while
rather awkward, is still plain enough".27chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Nothing is more defining of the true content of Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987
Constitution than the form in which the legislature took the initiative in re-imposing the death
penalty.

The Senate never doubted its power as vested in it by the constitution, to enact legislation
re-imposing the death penalty for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. Pursuant to
this constitutional mandate, the Senate proceeded to a two-step process consisting of: first,
the decision, as a matter of policy, to re-impose the death penalty or not; and second, the
vote to pass on the third reading the bill re-imposing the death penalty for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes.

On February 15, 1993, after a fierce and fiery exchange of arguments for and against
capital punishment, the Members of the Senate voted on the policy issue of death penalty.
The vote was explained, thus:

"SUSPENSION OF THE RULES

Upon motion of Senator Romulo, there being no objection, the Body suspended the
Rules of the Senate.
Thereafter, upon motion of Senator Romulo, there being no objection, the Chair
directed that a nominal voting be conducted on the policy issue of death penalty.

INQUIRY OF SENATOR TOLENTINO

Asked by Senator Tolentino on how the Members of the Senate would vote on this
policy question, Senator Romulo stated that a vote of Yes would mean a vote in
favor of death as a penalty to be reincorporated in the scale of penalties as
provided in the Revised Penal Code, and a vote of No would be a vote against the
reincorporation of death penalty in the scale of penalties in the Revised Penal
Code.

INQUIRY OF SENATOR ALVAREZ

xxx

The Chair explained that it was agreed upon that the Body would first decide the
question whether or not death penalty should be reimposed, and thereafter, a
seven-man committee would be formed to draft the compromise bill in accordance
with the result of the voting. If the Body decides in favor of the death penalty, the
Chair said that the committee would specify the crimes on which death penalty
would be imposed. It affirmed that a vote of Yes in the nominal voting would mean a
vote in favor of death penalty on at least one crime, and that certain refinements on
how the penalty would be imposed would be left to the discretion of the seven-man
committee.
 xxx

INQUIRY OF SENATOR TAADA

In reply to Senator Taada's query, the Chair affirmed that even if a senator would
vote 'yes' on the basic policy issue, he could still vote 'no' on the imposition of the
death penalty on a particular crime.

REMARKS OF SENATOR TOLENTINO

Senator Tolentino observed that the Body would be voting on the basic policy issue
of whether or not the death penalty would be included in the scale of penalties
found in Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, so that if it is voted down, the Body
would discontinue discussing Senate Bill No. 891 pursuant to the Rules, but if
approved, a special committee, as agreed upon in the caucus, is going to be
appointed and whatever course it will take will depend upon the mandate given to it
by the Body later on.

The Chair affirmed Senator Tolentino's observations.

REMARKS OF SENATOR ROCO

Senator Roco stated that the Body would vote whether or not death as a penalty will be
reincorporated in the scale of penalties provided by the Revised Penal Code. However, he
pointed out that if the Body decides in favor of death penalty, the Body would still have to
address two issues: 1) Is the crime for which the death penalty is supposed to be imposed
heinous pursuant to the constitutional mandate? 2) And, if so, is there a compelling reason
to impose the death penalty for it? The death penalty, he stressed, cannot be imposed
simply because the crime is heinous."28chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

With seventeen (17) affirmative votes and seven (7) negative votes and no abstention, the
Chair declared that the Senate has voted to re-incorporate death as a penalty in the scale of
penalties as provided in the Revised Penal Code. A nine-person committee was
subsequently created to draft the compromise bill pursuant to said vote. The mandate of the
committee was to retain the death penalty, while the main debate in the committee would be
the determination of the crimes to be considered heinous.

On March 17, 1993, Senator Arturo Tolentino, Chairman of the Special Committee on the
Death Penalty, delivered his Sponsorship Speech. He began with an explanation as to why
the Senate Bill No. 891 re-imposes the death penalty by amending the Revised Penal Code
and other special penal laws and includes provisions that do not define or punish crimes but
serve purposes allied to the reimposition of the death penalty. Senator Tolentino stated:

x x x [W]hen the Senate approved the policy of reimposing the death penalty on
heinous crimes and delegated to the Special Committee the work of drafting a bill, a
compromise bill that would be the subject for future deliberations of this Body, the
Committee had to consider that the death penalty was imposed originally in the
Revised Penal Code.
So, when the Constitution was approved in order to do away with the death penalty,
unless Congress should, for compelling reasons reimpose that penalty on heinous
crimes, it was obvious that it was the Revised Penal Code that was affected by that
provision of the Constitution. The death penalty, as provided in the Revised Penal
Code, would be considered as having been repealed -- all provisions on the death
penalty would be considered as having been repealed by the Constitution, until
Congress should, for compelling reasons, reimpose such penalty on heinous
crimes. Therefore, it was not only one article but many articles of the Revised Penal
Code that were actually affected by the Constitution.
And it is in consideration of this consequence of the constitutional provision that our
Special Committee had to consider the Revised Penal Code itself in making this
compromise bill or text of the bill. That is why, in the proposed draft now under
consideration which we are sponsoring, the specific provisions of the Revised Penal
Code are actually either reenacted or amended or both. Because by the effect of
the Constitution, some provisions were totally repealed, and they had to be
 reenacted so that the provisions could be retained. And some of them had to be
amended because the Committee thought that amendments were
proper."29chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In response to a query by Senator Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as to whether or not it would

have been better if the Senate were to enact a special law which merely defined and
imposed the death penalty for heinous crimes, Senator Tolentino explicated, thus:

"x x x [T]hat may be a way presenting the bill. But we must bear in mind that the
death penalty is imposed in the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, when the
Constitution abolished the death penalty, it actually was amending the Revised
Penal Code to such an extent that the Constitution provides that where the death
penalty has already been imposed but not yet carried out, then the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua, that is the penalty in the Revised Penal Code. So we thought
that it would be best to just amend the provisions of the Revised Penal Code,
restoring the death penalty for some crimes that may be considered as heinous.
That is why the bill is in this form amending the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code.
Of course, if some people want to present a special bill... the whole trouble is, when
a special bill is presented and we want to punish in the special bill the case of
murder, for instance, we will have to reproduce the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code on murder in order to define the crime for which the death penalty shall be
imposed. Or if we want to impose the death penalty in the case of kidnapping which
is punished in the Revised Penal Code, we will do the same -- merely reproduce.
Why will we do that? So we just followed the simpler method of keeping the
definition of the crime as the same and merely adding some aggravating
circumstances and reimposing the death penalty in these offenses originally
punished in the Revised Penal Code."30chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

From March 17, 1993, when the death penalty bill was presented for discussion until August
16, 1993, the Members of the Senate debated on its provisions.

The stiffest opposition thereto was bannered by Senator Lina who kept prodding the
sponsors of the bill to state the compelling reason for each and every crime for which the
supreme penalty of death was sought. Zeroing in on the statement in the preamble of the
death penalty bill that the same is warranted in the face of "the alarming upsurge of
[heinous] crimes", Senator Lina demanded for solid statistics showing that in the case of
each and every crime in the death penalty bill, there was a significantly higher incidence of
each crime after the suspension of the death penalty on February 2, 1987 when the 1987
Constitution was ratified by the majority of the Filipino people, than before such
ratification.31 Inasmuch as the re-impositionists could not satisfy the abolitionists with
sufficient statistical data for the latter to accept the alarming upsurge of heinous crimes as a
compelling reason justifying the reimposition of the death penalty, Senator Lina concluded
that there were, in fact, no compelling reasons therefor. In the alternative, Senator Lina
argued that the compelling reason required by the constitution was that "the State has done
everything in its command so that it can be justified to use an inhuman punishment called
death penalty".32The problem, Senator Lina emphasized, was that even the re-
impositionists admit that there were still numerous reforms in the criminal justice system
that may and must be put in place, and so clearly, the recourse to the enactment of a death
penalty bill was not in the nature of a last resort, hence, unconstitutional in the absence of
compelling reasons. As an initial reaction to Senator Lina's contentions, Senator Tolentino
explained that the statement in the preamble is a general one and refers to all the crimes
covered by the bill and not to specific crimes. He added that one crime may not have the
same degree of increase in incidence as the other crimes and that the public demand to
impose the death penalty is enough compelling reason.33

Equally fit to the task was Senator Wigberto Taada to whom the battle lines were clearly
drawn. He put to issue two things: first, the definition of "heinous crimes" as provided for in
the death penalty bill; and second, the statement of compelling reasons for each and every
capital crime. His interpellation of Senator Tolentino clearly showed his objections to the bill:

"Senator Taada. x x x But what would make crimes heinous, Mr. President? Are crimes
heinous by their nature or elements as they are described in the bill or are crimes heinous
because they are punished by death, as bribery and malversation are proposed to be
punished in the bill?

Senator Tolentino. They are heinous by their nature, Mr. President, but that is not supposed
to be the exclusive criterion. The nature of the offense is the most important element in
considering it heinous but, at the same time, we should consider the relation of the offense
to society in order to have a complete idea of the heinous nature of these offenses.

In the case of malversation or bribery, for instance, these offenses by themselves

connected with the effect upon society and the government have made them fall under the
classification of heinous crimes. The compelling reason for imposing the death penalty is
when the offenses of malversation and bribery becomes so grave and so serious as
indicated in the substitute bill itself, then there is a compelling reason for the death penalty.

Senator Taada. With respect to the compelling reasons, Mr. President, does the Gentleman
believe that these compelling reasons, which would call for the reimposition of the death
penalty, should be separately, distinctly and clearly stated for each crime so that it will be
very clear to one and all that not only are these crimes heinous but also one can see the
compelling reasons for the reimposition of the death penalty therefor?

Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, that matter was actually considered by the Committee.
But the decision of the Committee was to avoid stating the compelling reason for each and
every offense that is included in the substitute measure. That is why in the preamble,
general statements were made to show these compelling reasons. And that, we believe,
included in the bill, when converted into law, would be sufficient notice as to what were
considered compelling reasons by the Congress, in providing the death penalty for these
different offenses.

If a matter like this is questioned before the Supreme Court, I would suppose that with the
preamble already in general terms, the Supreme Court would feel that it was the sense of
Congress that this preamble would be applicable to each and every offense described or
punishable in the measure.

So we felt that it was not necessary to repeat these compelling reasons for each and every
offense.

Senator Taada. Mr. President, I am thinking about the constitutional limitations upon the
power of Congress to enact criminal legislation, especially the provisions on the Bill of
Rights, particularly the one which says that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of law.

Can we not say that under this provision, it is required that the compelling reasons be so
stated in the bill so that the bill, when it becomes a law, will clearly define the acts and the
omissions punished as crimes?

Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, I believe that in itself, as substantive law, this is sufficient.
The question of whether there is due process will more or less be a matter of procedure in
the compliance with the requirements of the Constitution with respect to due process itself
which is a separate matter from the substantive law as to the definition and penalty for
crimes.

Senator Taada. Under the Constitution, Mr. President, it appears that the reimposition of the
death penalty is subject to three conditions and these are:

1. Congress should so provide such reimposition of the death penalty;

2. There are compelling reasons; and

3. These involve heinous crimes.

Under these provision of the Constitution, paragraph 1, Section 13, does the
distinguished Gentleman not feel that Congress is bound to state clearly the
compelling reasons for the reimposition of the death penalty for each crime, as well
as the elements that make each of the crimes heinous included in the bill?
 Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, that is a matter of opinion already. I believe that
whether we state the compelling reasons or not, whether we state why a certain
offense is heinous, is not very important. If the question is raised in the Supreme
Court, it is not what we say in the bill that will be controlling but what the Supreme
Court will fell as a sufficient compelling reason or as to the heinous nature whether
the crime is heinous or not. The accused can certainly raise the matter of
constitutionality but it will not go into the matter of due process. It will go into the
very power of Congress to enact a bill imposing the death penalty. So that would be
entirely separate from the matter of due process." 34chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Senator Francisco Tatad, on his part, pointed out that the death penalty bill violated our
international commitment in support of the worldwide abolition of capital punishment, the
Philippines being a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
its Second Optional Protocol. Senator Ernesto Herrera clarified, however, that in the United
Nations, subject matters are submitted to the different committees which vote on them for
consideration in the plenary session. He stressed that unless approved in the plenary
session, a declaration would have no binding effect on signatory countries. In this respect,
the Philippines cannot be deemed irrevocably bound by said covenant and protocol
considering that these agreements have reached only the committee
level.35chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

After the protracted debate, the Members of the Senate voted on Senate Bill No. 891 on
third reading. With seventeen (17) affirmative votes, four (4) negative votes, and one
abstention, the death penalty bill was approved on third reading on August 16, 1993.

The Senate's vote to pass Senate Bill No. 891 on third reading on August 16, 1993 was a
vindication of, the House of Representatives. The House had, in the Eight Congress, earlier
approved on third reading House Bill No. 295 on the restoration of the death penalty for
certain heinous crimes. The House was in effect rebuffed by the Senate when the Senate
killed House Bill No. 295 along with other bills coming from the House. House Bill No. 295
was resurrected during the Ninth Congress in the form of House Bill No. 62 which was
introduced by twenty one (21) Members of the House of Representatives on October 27,
1992. House Bill No. 62 was a merger of House Bill Nos. 125, 187, 411, 764, 506, 781, 955,
1565, 1586, 2206, 3238, 3576 and 3632 authored by various Members of the Lower House.

In his Sponsorship Speech, Representative Manuel R. Sanchez of Rizal ably essayed the
constitutional vesting in Congress of the power to re-impose the death penalty for
compelling reasons invoking heinous crimes as well as the nature of this constitutional pre-
requisite to the exercise of such power.

"Mr. Speaker, in Article III, Section 19(1) of Constitution reads, a I quote:

'Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons

involving heinous crimes, the Congress shall thereafter provide for it...'

The phrase 'unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress shall
thereafter provide for it was introduced as an amendment by then Comm. Christian
Monsod.

The import of this amendment is unmistakable. By this amendment, the death penalty was
not completely abolished by the 1987 Constitution. Rather, it merely suspended the death
penalty and gave Congress the discretion to review it at the propitious time.

Arguing for the inclusion of said amendment in the fine provision, Comm. Ricardo Romulo
said, and I quote:

"'The people should have the final say on the subject, because, at some future time,
the people might want to restore death penalty through initiative and referendum.

Commissioner Monsod further argued, and I quote:

We cannot presume to have the wisdom of the ages. Therefore, it is entirely

possible in the future that circumstances may arise which we should not preclude
today.
 xxx xxx xxx

I believe that [there] are enough compelling reasons that merit the reimposition of the
capital punishment. The violent manner and the viciousness in which crimes are now
committed with alarming regularity, show very clearly a patent disregard of the law and a
mockery of public peace and order.

In the public gallery section today are the relatives of the victims of heinous crimes the
Hultmans, the Maguans, the Vizcondes, the Castanoses, and many more, and they are all
crying for justice. We ought to listen to them because their lives, their hopes, their dreams,
their future have fallen asunder by the cruel and vicious criminality of a few who put their
selfish interest above that of society.

Heinous crime is an act or series of acts which, by the flagrantly violent manner in which the
same was committed or by the reason of its inherent viciousness, shows a patent disregard
and mockery of the law, public peace and order, or public morals. It is an offense whose
essential and inherent viciousness and atrocity are repugnant and outrageous to a civilized
society and hence, shock the moral self of a people.

Of late, we are witness to such kind of barbaric crimes.

The Vizconde massacre that took the lives of a mother and her two lovely daughters, will
stand in the people's memory for many long years as the epitome of viciousness and
atrocity that are repugnant to civilized society.

The senseless murder of Eldon Maguan, and up-and-coming young business executive,
was and still is an outrage that shocks the moral self of our people.

The mind-boggling death of Maureen Hultmann, a comely 16 year-old high school student
who dreamt of becoming a commercial model someday, at the hands of a crazed man was
so repulsive, so brutal that it offends the sensibilities of Christians and non-Christians alike

The cold-blooded double murder of Cochise Bernabe and Beebom Castanos, the lovely and
promising couple from the University of the Philippines, is eternally lodged in the recesses
of our minds and still makes our stomach turn in utter disgust.

xxx xxx xxx

The seriousness of the situation is such that if no radical action is taken by this body in
restoring death penalty as a positive response to the overwhelming clamor of the people,
then, as Professor Esteban Bautista of the Philippine Law Center said, and I quote:

'When people begin to believe that organized society is unwilling or unable to impose upon
criminal offenders the punishment they deserve, there are sown the seeds of anarchy of
self-help, of vigilante justice and lynch law. The people will take the law upon their hands
and exact vengeance in the nature of personal vendetta.'

It is for this reason, Mr. Speaker, that I stand here and support House Bill No. 62.

As duly elected Representatives of our people, collectively, we ought to listen to our

constituents and heed their plea a plea for life, liberty and pursuit of their happiness under a
regime of justice and democracy, and without threat that their loves ones will be kidnapped,
raped or butchered.

But if such a misfortune befalls them, there is the law they could rely on for justice. A law
that will exact retribution for the victims. A law that will deter future animalistic behavior of
the criminal who take their selfish interest over and above that of society. A law that will deal
a deathblow upon all heinous crimes.

Mr. Speaker, my distinguished colleagues, for the preservation of all that we hold
dear and sacred, let us restore the death penalty."36chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

A studious comparison of the legislative proceedings in the Senate and in the House of
Representatives reveals that, while both Chambers were not wanting of oppositors to the
death penalty, the Lower House seemed less quarrelsome about the form of the death
penalty bill as a special law specifying certain heinous crimes without regard to the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code and more unified in the perception of what crimes are
heinous and that the fact of their very heinousness involves the compulsion and the
imperative to suppress, if not completely eradicate, their occurrence. Be it the foregoing
general statement of Representative Sanchez or the following details of the nature of the
heinous crimes enumerated in House Bill No. 62 by Representative Miguel L. Romero of
Negros Oriental, there was clearly, among the hundred or so re-impositionists in the Lower
House, no doubt as to their cause:

"My friends, this bill provides for the imposition of the death penalty not only for the
importation, manufacture and sale of dangerous drugs, but also for other heinous crimes
such as reason; parricide; murder; kidnapping; robbery; rape as defined by the Revised
Penal Code with or without additionally defined circumstances; plunder, as defined in R.A.
7080; piracy, as defined under Section 2 of PD 532; carnapping, as defined in Section 2 of
RA 6539, when the owner, driver or occupant is killed; hijacking, as defined in xxx RA 6235;
and arson resulting in the death of any occupants.

All these crimes have a common denominator which qualifies them to the level of heinous
crimes. A heinous crime is one which, by reason of its inherent or manifest wickedness,
viciousness, atrocity or perversity, is repugnant and outrageous to the common standards of
decency and morality in a just and civilized society.

For instance, the crime of treason is defined as a breach of allegiance to a government,

committed by a person who owes allegiance to it (U.S. v. Abad 1 Phil. 437). By the
'allegiance' is meant the obligation of fidelity and obedience which individuals owe to the
government under which they live or to their sovereign in return for the protection which
they receive (52 Am Jur 797).

In kidnapping, the though alone of one's loved one being held against his or her own will in
some unidentified xxx house by a group of scoundrels who are strangers is enough terrify
and send shivers of fear through the spine of any person, even scoundrels themselves.

In robbery accompanied by rape, intentional mutilation or arson, what is being punished by

death is the fact that the perpetrator, at the time of the commission of the crime, thinks
nothing of the other crime he commits and sees it merely as a form of self-amusement.
When a homicide is committed by reason of the robbery, the culprits are perceived as
willing to take human life in exchange for money or other personal property.

In the crime of rape, not only do we speak of the pain and agony of the parents over the
personal shock and suffering of their child but the stigma of the traumatic and degrading
incident which has shattered the victim's life and permanently destroyed her reputation, not
to mention the ordeal of having to undergo the shameful experience of police interrogation
and court hearings.

Piracy, which is merely a higher form of robbery, is punished for the universal hostility of the
perpetrators against their victims who are passengers and complement of the vessel, and
because of the fact that, in the high seas, no one may be expected to be able to come to
the rescue of the helpless victims. For the same reason, Mr. Speaker, the crime of air piracy
is punished due to the evil motive of the hijackers in making unreasonable demands upon
the sovereignty of an entire nation or nations, coupled with the attendant circumstance of
subjecting the passengers to terrorism." 37chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The debate on House Bill No. 62 lasted from October 27, 1992 to February 11, 1993. On
February 11, 1993, the Members of the House of Representatives overwhelmingly
approved the death penalty bill on second reading.

On February 23, 1993, after explaining their votes, the Members of the House of
Representatives cast their vote on House Bill No. 62 when it was up for consideration on
third reading. 38 The results were 123 votes in favor, 26 votes against, and 2 abstentions

After the approval on third reading of House Bill No. 62 on February 23, 1993 and of Senate
Bill No. 891 on August 16, 1993, the Bicameral Conference Committee convened to
incorporate and consolidate them.
On December 31, 1993, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, entitled, "An Act to Impose the
Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal
Code, as Amended, Other Special Penal Laws, and for Other Purposes," took
effect.39chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Between December 31, 1993, when R.A. No. 7659 took effect, and the present time,
criminal offenders have been prosecuted under said law, and one of them, herein accused-
appellant, has been, pursuant to said law, meted out the supreme penalty of death for
raping his ten-year old daughter. Upon his conviction, his case was elevated to us on
automatic review. On June 25, 1996, we affirmed his conviction and the death sentence.

Now, accused-appellant comes to us in the heels of this court's affirmation of his death
sentence and raises for the first time the issue of the constitutionality of R.A. 7659. His
thesis is two-fold: (1) that the death penalty law is unconstitutional per se for having been
enacted in the absence of compelling reasons therefor; and (2) that the death penalty for
rape is a cruel, excessive and inhuman punishment in violation of the constitutional
proscription against punishment of such nature.

We reject accused-appellant's proposition.

Three justices interposed their dissent hereto, agreeing with accused-appellant's view that
Congress enacted R.A. No. 7659 without complying with the twin requirements of
compelling reasons and heinous crimes.

At this juncture, the detailed events leading to the enactment of R.A. No. 7659 as unfurled
in the beginning of this disquisition, necessarily provide the context for the following
analysis.

Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution plainly vests in Congress the power to re-
impose the death penalty "for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes". This power is
not subsumed in the plenary legislative power of Congress, for it is subject to a clear
showing of "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes."

The constitutional exercise of this limited power to re-impose the death penalty entails (1)
that Congress define or describe what is meant by heinous crimes; (2) that Congress
specify and penalize by death, only crimes that qualify as heinous in accordance with the
definition or description set in the death penalty bill and/or designate crimes punishable by
reclusion perpetua to death in which latter case, death can only be imposed upon the
attendance of circumstances duly proven in court that characterize the crime to be heinous
in accordance with the definition or description set in the death penalty bill; and (3) that
Congress, in enacting this death penalty bill be singularly motivated by "compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes."

In the second whereas clause of the preamble of R.A. No. 7659, we find the definition or
description of heinous crimes. Said clause provides that

"x x x the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for being
grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or
manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and
outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just,
civilized and ordered society."

Justice Santiago Kapunan, in his dissenting opinion in People v. Alicando, 40 traced the
etymological root of the word "heinous" to the Early Spartans' word, "haineus", meaning,
hateful and abominable, which, in turn, was from the Greek prefix "haton", denoting acts so
hatefully or shockingly evil.

We find the foregoing definition or description to be a sufficient criterion of what is to be

considered a heinous crime. This criterion is deliberately undetailed as to the circumstances
of the victim, the accused, place, time, the manner of commission of crime, its proximate
consequences and effects on the victim as well as on society, to afford the sentencing
authority sufficient leeway to exercise his discretion in imposing the appropriate penalty in
cases where R.A. No. 7659 imposes not a mandatory penalty of death but the more flexible
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
During the debates on the proposed death penalty bill, Senators Lina and Taada grilled the
sponsors of the bill as regards what they perceived as a mere enumeration of capital crimes
without a specification of the elements that make them heinous. They were oblivious to the
fact that there were two types of crimes in the death penalty bill: first, there were crimes
penalized by reclusion perpetua to death; and second, there were crimes penalized by
mandatory capital punishment upon the attendance of certain specified qualifying
circumstances.

Under R.A. No. 7659, the following crimes are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death:

(1) Treason (Sec. 2);

(2) Qualified piracy (Sec. 3);

(3) Parricide (Sec. 5);

(4) Murder (Sec. 6);

(5) Infanticide (Sec. 7);

(6) Kidnapping and serious illegal detention if attended by any of the following four
circumstances: (a) the victim was detained for more than three days; (b) it was committed
simulating public authority; (c) serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats
to kill him were made; and (d) if the victim is a minor, except when the accused is any of the
parents, female or a public officer (Sec. 8);

(7) Robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation (Sec. 9);

(8) Destructive arson if what is burned is (a) one or more buildings or edifice; (b) a building
where people usually gather; (c) a train, ship or airplane for public use; (d) a building or
factory in the service of public utilities; (e) a building for the purpose of concealing or
destroying evidence Or a crime; (f) an arsenal, fireworks factory, or government museum;
and (g) a storehouse or factory of explosive materials located in an inhabited place; or
regardless of what is burned, if the arson is perpetrated by two or more persons (Sec. 10);

(9) Rape attended by any of the following circumstances: (a) the rape is committed with a
deadly weapon; (b) the rape is committed by two or more persons; and (c) the rape is
attempted or frustrated and committed with homicide (Sec. 11);

(10) Plunder involving at least P50 million (Sec. 12);

(11) Importation of prohibited drugs (Sec. 13);

(12) Sale, administration, delivery, distribution, and transportation of prohibited drugs (id.);

(13) Maintenance of den, dive or resort for users of prohibited drugs (id.);

(14) Manufacture of prohibited drugs (id.);

(15) Possession or use of prohibited drugs in certain specified amounts (id.);

(16) Cultivation of plants which are sources of prohibited drugs (id.)

(17) Importation of regulated drugs (Sec. 14);

(18) Manufacture of regulated drugs (id.);

(19) Sale, administration, dispensation, delivery, transportation, and distribution of regulated

drugs (id.);

(20) Maintenance of den, dive, or resort for users of regulated drugs (Sec. 15);

(21) Possession or use of regulated drugs in specified amounts (Sec. 16);

(22) Misappropriation, misapplication or failure to account dangerous drugs confiscated by
the arresting officer (Sec. 17);

(23) Planting evidence of dangerous drugs in person or immediate vicinity of another to

implicate the latter (Sec. 19); and

(24) Carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is
killed or raped (Sec. 20).

All the foregoing crimes are not capital crimes per se, the uniform penalty for all of them
being not mandatory death but the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. In other
words, it is premature to demand for a specification of the heinous elements in each of
foregoing crimes because they are not anyway mandatorily penalized with death. The
elements that call for the imposition of the supreme penalty of death in these crimes, would
only be relevant when the trial court, given the prerogative to impose reclusion perpetua,
instead actually imposes the death penalty because it has, in appreciating the evidence
proffered before it, found the attendance of certain circumstances in the manner by which
the crime was committed, or in the person of the accused on his own or in relation to the
victim, or in any other matter of significance to the commission of the crime or its effects on
the victim or on society, which circumstances characterize the criminal acts as grievous,
odious, or hateful, or inherently or manifestly wicked, vicious, atrocious or perverse as to be
repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in
a just, civilized and ordered society.

On the other hand, under R.A. No. 7659, the mandatory penalty of death is imposed in the
following crimes:

(1) Qualified bribery

"If any public officer is entrusted with law enforcement and he refrains from arresting or
prosecuting an offender who has committed a crime punishable by reclusion
perpetua and/or death in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present, he shall suffer
the penalty for the offense which was not prosecuted.

If it is the public officer who asks or demands such gift or present, he shall suffer the penalty
of death." (Sec. 4)

(2) Kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim or
the victim is raped, tortured or subjected to dehumanizing acts

"The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the
purpose of ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances
above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subject
to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty [of death] shall be imposed." (Sec. 8)

(3) Destructive arson resulting in death

"If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under this Article,
death results, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed." (Sec. 10)

(4) Rape with the victim becoming insane, rape with homicide and qualified

"When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty
shall be death.

xxx xxx xxx

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall
be death.

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent or the victim.

2. when the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.

3. when the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or
other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity.

4. when the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old

5. when the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS) disease.

6. when committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Philippine
National Police or any law enforcement agency.

7. when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent
physical mutilation." (Sec. 11 )

(5) Sale, administration, delivery, distribution and transportation of prohibited drugs where
the victim is a minor or the victim dies

"Notwithstanding the provision of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the victim of the
offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense under this Section be
the proximate cause of the death of victim thereof, the maximum penalty [of death] herein
provided shall be imposed." (Sec. 13)

(6) Maintenance of den, dive, or resort for users of prohibited drugs where the victim is a
minor or the victim dies

"Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, the maximum of
the penalty [of death] shall be imposed in every case where a prohibited drug is
administered, delivered or sold to a minor who is allowed to use the same in such place.

Should a prohibited drug be the proximate case of the death of a person using the same in
such den, dive or resort, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed on the
maintainer notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary." (Sec.
13)

(7) Sale, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and transportation of regulated

drugs where the victim is a minor or the victim dies

"Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the victim of the
offense is a minor, or should a regulated drug involved in any offense under this Section be
the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty [of death] herein
provided shall be imposed." (Sec. 14)

(8) Maintenance of den, dive, or resort for users of regulated drugs where the victim is a
minor or the victim dies

"Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, the maximum
penalty [of death] herein provided shall be imposed in every case where a regulated drug is
administered, delivered or sold to a minor who is allowed to use the same in such place.

Should a regulated drug be the proximate cause of death of a person using the same in
such den, dive or resort, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed on the
maintainer notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary." (Sec.
15)

(9) Drug offenses if convicted are government officials, employees or officers including
members of police agencies and armed forces
"The maximum penalties [of death] provided for in Section 3, 4 (1), 5(1), 6, 7, 8, 9, 11,12
and 13 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 14(1), 15A (1), 16, and 19 of Article III [of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972] shall be imposed, if those found guilty or any of the same
offenses are government officials, employees or officers including members of police
agencies and the armed forces." (Sec. 19)

(10) Planting of dangerous drugs as evidence in drug offenses with the mandatory death
penalty if convicted are government officials, employees or officers

"Any such above government official, employee or officer who is found guilty of 'planting'
any dangerous drugs punished in Section s 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 and 13 of Article II and Sections 14,
14-A, 15, and 16 of Article III (of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) in the person or in the
immediate vicinity of another as evidence to implicate the latter, shall suffer the same
penalty as therein provided." (Sec. 19)

(11) In all the crimes in RA. No. 7659 in their qualified form

"When in the commission of the crime, advantage was taken by the offender of his public
position, the penalty to be imposed shall be in its maximum [of death] regardless of
mitigating circumstances.

The maximum penalty [of death] shall be imposed if the offense was committed by any
person who belongs to an organized/syndicated crime group.

An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two or more persons collaborating,

confederating or mutually helping one another for purposes of gain in the commission of
any crime." (Sec. 23)

It is specifically against the foregoing capital crimes that the test of heinousness must be
squarely applied.

The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature,
despicable, either because life was callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal
and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as
a human being. The right of a person is not only to live but to live a quality life, and this
means that the rest of society is obligated to respect his or her individual personality, the
integrity and the sanctity of his or her own physical body, and the value he or she puts in his
or her own spiritual, psychological, material and social preferences and needs. Seen in this
light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in
the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts;
destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the
death of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide,
infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention where the victim is detained for more
than three days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him
were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation,
destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped
vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly
heinous by their very nature.

There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance and
implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and
economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for
its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that
bankrupted the government and impoverished the population, the Philippine Government
must muster the political will to dismantle the culture of corruption, dishonesty, greed and
syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of society and
psyche of the populace. Terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic services
to its people, any form of misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates
to an actual threat to the very existence of government, and in turn, the very survival of the
people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the effects and
repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug
offenses involving government officials, employees or officers, that their perpetrators must
not be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to society.
We have no doubt, therefore, that insofar as the element of heinousness is concerned, R.A.
No. 7659 has correctly identified crimes warranting the mandatory penalty of death. As to
the other crimes in R.A. No. 7659 punished by reclusion perpetua to death, they are
admittingly no less abominable than those mandatorily penalized by death. The proper time
to determine their heinousness in contemplation of law, is when on automatic review, we
are called to pass on a death sentence involving crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death under R.A. No. 7659, with the trial court meting out the death sentence in exercise of
judicial discretion. This is not to say, however, that the aggravating circumstances under the
Revised Penal Code need be additionally alleged as establishing the heinousness of the
crime for the trial court to validly impose the death penalty in the crimes under R.A. No.
7659 which are punished with the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.

In the first place, the 1987 Constitution did not amend or repeal the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code relating to aggravating circumstances. Secondly, R.A. No. 7659, while
it specifies circumstances that generally qualify a crime provided therein to be punished by
the maximum penalty of death, neither amends nor repeals the aggravating circumstances
under the Revised Penal Code. Thus, construing R.A. No. 7659 in parimateria with the
Revised Penal Code, death may be imposed when (1) aggravating circumstances attend
the commission of the crime as to make operative the provision of the Revised Penal Code
regarding the imposition of the maximum penalty; and (2) other circumstances attend the
commission of the crime which indubitably characterize the same as heinous in
contemplation of R.A. No. 7659 that justify the imposition of the death, albeit the imposable
penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. Without difficulty, we understand the rationale for the
guided discretion granted in the trial court to cognize circumstances that characterize the
commission of the crime as heinous. Certainly there is an infinity of circumstances that may
attend the commission of a crime to the same extent that there is no telling the evil that man
is capable of. The legislature cannot and need not foresee and inscribe in law each and
every loathsome act man is capable of. It is sufficient thus that R.A. 7659 provides the test
and yardstick for the determination of the legal situation warranting the imposition of the
supreme penalty of death. Needless to say, we are not unaware of the ever existing danger
of abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in meting out the death sentence.
Precisely to reduce to nil the possibility of executing an innocent man or one criminal but not
heinously criminal, R.A. 7659 is replete with both procedural and substantive safeguards
that ensure only the correct application of the mandate of R.A. No. 7659.

In the course of the congressional debates on the constitutional requirement that the death
penalty be re-imposed for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, we note that the
main objection to the death penalty bill revolved around the persistent demand of the
abolitionists for a statement of the reason in each and every heinous crime and statistical
proof the such compelling reason actually exists.

We believe, however, that the elements of heinousness and compulsion are inseparable
and are, in fact, interspersed with each other. Because the subject crimes are either so
revolting and debasing as to violate the most minimum of the human standards of decency
or its effects, repercussions, implications and consequences so destructive, destabilizing,
debilitating, or aggravating in the context of our socio-political and economic agenda as a
developing nation, these crimes must be frustrated, curtailed and altogether eradicated.
There can be no ifs or buts in the face of evil, and we cannot afford to wait until we rub
elbows with it before grasping it by the ears and thrashing it to its demission.

The abolitionists in congress insisted that all criminal reforms first be pursued and
implemented before the death penalty be re-imposed in case such reforms prove
unsuccessful. They claimed that the only compelling reason contemplated of by the
constitution is that nothing else but the death penalty is left for the government to resort to
that could check the chaos and the destruction that is being caused by unbridled criminality.
Three of our colleagues, are of the opinion that the compelling reason required by the
constitution is that there occurred a dramatic and significant change in the socio-cultural
milieu after the suspension of the death penalty on February 2, 1987 such as an
unprecedented rise in the incidence of criminality. Such are, however, interpretations only of
the phrase "compelling reasons" but not of the conjunctive phrase "compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes". The imposition of the requirement that there be a rise in the
incidence of criminality because of the suspension of the death penalty, moreover, is an
unfair and misplaced demand, for what it amounts to, in fact, is a requirement that the death
penalty first proves itself to be a truly deterrent factor in criminal behavior. If there was a
dramatically higher incidence of criminality during the time that the death penalty was
suspended, that would have proven that the death penalty was indeed a deterrent during
the years before its suspension. Suffice it to say that the constitution in the first place did not
require that the death penalty be first proven to be a deterrent; what it requires is that there
be compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.

Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states that congress, for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, may re-impose the death penalty. Nothing in the said
provision imposes a requirement that for a death penalty bill to be valid, a positive
manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of crime should first be perceived and
statistically proven following the suspension of the death penalty. Neither does the said
provision require that the death penalty be resorted to as a last recourse when all other
criminal reforms have failed to abate criminality in society. It is immaterial and irrelevant that
R.A. No. 7659 cites that there has been an "alarming upsurge of such crimes", for the same
was never intended by said law to be the yardstick to determine the existence of compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes. Fittingly, thus, what R.A. No. 7659 states is that "the
Congress, in the interest of justice, public order and rule of law, and the need to rationalize
and harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons to impose
the death penalty for said crimes."

We now proceed to answer accused-appellant's other ground for attacking the

constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659, i.e., that the death penalty imposed in rape is violative of
the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.

Accused-appellant first claims that the death penalty is per se a cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment as ruled by the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court in Furman v.
Georgia.41 To state, however, that the U.S. Supreme Court, in Furman, categorically ruled
that the death penalty is a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, is misleading and
inaccurate.

The issue in Furman was not so much death penalty itself but the arbitrariness pervading
the procedures by which the death penalty was imposed on the accused by the sentencing
jury. Thus, the defense theory in Furman centered not so much on the nature of the death
penalty as a criminal sanction but on the discrimination against the black accused who is
meted out the death penalty by a white jury that is given the unconditional discretion to
determine whether or not to impose the death penalty. In fact, the long road of the American
abolitionist movement leading to the landmark case of Furman was trekked by American
civil rights advocates zealously fighting against racial discrimination. Thus, the U.S.
Supreme Court stated in Furman:

"We cannot say from facts disclosed in these records that these defendants were
sentenced to death because they were black. Yet our task is not restricted to an effort to
divine what motives impelled these death penalties. Rather, we deal with a system of law
and of justice that leaves to the uncontrolled discretion of judges or juries the determination
whether defendants committing these crimes should die x x x.

xxx

In a Nation committed to equal protection of the laws there is no permissible 'caste' aspect
of law enforcement. Yet we know that the discretion of judges and juries in imposing the
death penalty enables the penalty to be selectively applied, feeding prejudices against the
accused if he is poor and despised x x x.

xxx

Thus, these discretionary statutes are unconstitutional in their operation. They are pregnant
with discrimination and discrimination is an ingredient not compatible with the idea of equal
protection of the laws that is implicit in the ban on 'cruel and unusual' punishments."

Furman, thus, did not outlaw the death penalty because it was cruel and unusual per se.
While the U.S. Supreme Court nullified all discretionary death penalty statutes in Furman, it
did so because the discretion which these statutes vested in the trial judges and sentencing
juries was uncontrolled and without any parameters, guidelines, or standards intended to
lessen, if not altogether eliminate, the intervention of personal biases, prejudices and
discriminatory acts on the part of the trial judges and sentencing juries.
Consequently, in the aftermath of Furman, when most of the states re-enacted their death
penalty statutes now bearing the procedural checks that were required by the U.S. Supreme
Court, said court affirmed the constitutionality of the new death penalty statutes in the cases
of Gregg v. Georgia,42 Jurek v. Texas,43 and Profitt v. Florida.44

Next, accused-appellant asseverates that the death penalty is a cruel, inhuman or

degrading punishment for the crime of rape mainly because the latter, unlike murder, does
not involve the taking of life. In support of his contention, accused-appellant largely relies on
the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in Coker v. Georgia.45chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In Coker, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled as follows:

"x x x It is now settled that the death penalty is not invariably cruel and unusual punishment
within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment; it is not inherently barbaric or an
unacceptable mode of punishment for crime; neither is it always disproportionate to the
crime for which it is imposed. It is also established that imposing capital punishment, at
least for murder, in accordance with the procedures provided under the Georgia statutes
saves the sentence from the infirmities which led the Court to invalidate the prior Georgia
capital punishment statute in Furman v. Georgia x x x.

xxx

In Gregg [v. Georgia] x x x the Court's judgment was that the death penalty for deliberate
murder was neither the purposeless imposition of severe punishment nor a punishment
grossly disproportionate to the crime. But the Court reserved the question of the
constitutionality of the death penalty when imposed for other crimes. x x x

That question, with respect to rape of an adult woman, is now before us.

xxx

x x x [T]he public judgment with respect to rape, as reflected in the statutes providing the
punishment for that crime, has been dramatically different. In reviving death penalty laws to
satisfy Furman's mandate, none of the States that had not previously authorized death for
rape chose to include rape among capital felonies. Of the 16 States in which rape had been
a capital offense, only three provided the death penalty for rape of an adult woman in their
revised statutes -- Georgia, North Carolina. and Louisiana. In the latter two States, the
death penalty was mandatory for those found guilty, and those laws were invalidated by
Woodson and Roberts. When Louisiana and North Carolina, respondent to those decisions,
again revised their capital punishment laws, they reenacted the death penalty for murder
but not for rape; none of the seven other legislatures that to our knowledge have amended
or replaced their death penalty statutes since July 2, 1976, including four States (in addition
to Louisiana and North Carolina) that had authorized the death sentence for rape prior to
1972 and had reacted to Furman with mandatory statutes, included rape among the crimes
for which death was an authorized punishment.

xxx

It should be noted that Florida, Mississippi, and Tennessee also authorized the death
penalty in some rape cases, but only where the victim was a child, and the rapist an adult,
the Tennessee statute has since been invalidated because the death sentence was
mandatory. x x x The upshot is that Georgia is the sole jurisdiction in the United States at
the present time that authorizes a sentence of death when the rape victim is an adult
woman, and only two other jurisdictions provide capital punishment when the victim is a
child

The current judgment with respect to the death penalty for rape is not wholly unanimous
among state legislatures, but it obviously weighs very heavily on the side of rejecting capital
punishment as a suitable penalty for raping an adult woman.

x x x [T]he legislative rejection of capital punishment for rape strongly confirms our own
judgment, which is that death is indeed a disproportionate penalty for the crime of raping an
adult woman.
We do not discount the seriousness of rape as a crime. It is highly reprehensible, both in a
moral sense and in its almost total contempt for the personal integrity and autonomy of the
female victim and for the latter's privilege of choosing those with whom intimate
relationships are to be established. Short of homicide, it is the 'ultimate violation of self.' It is
also a violent crime because it normally involves force, or the threat of force or intimidation,
to over come the will and the capacity of the victim to resist. Rape is very often
accompanied by physical injury to the female and can also inflict mental and psychological
damage. Because it undermines the community's sense of security, there is public injury as
well.

Rape is without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in terms of moral depravity and
of the injury to the person and to the public, it does not compare with murder, which does
involve the unjustified taking of human life. Although it may be accompanied by another
crime, rape by definition does not include the death of or even the serious injury to another
person. The murderer kills; the rapist, if no more than that, does not. Life is over for the
victim of the murderer; for the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it was, but it is
not over and normally is not beyond repair. We have the abiding conviction that the death
penalty, which 'is unique in its severity and irrevocability' x x x is an excessive penalty for
the rapist who, as such, does not take human life."

The U.S. Supreme Court based its foregoing ruling on two grounds: first, that the public has
manifested its rejection of the death penalty as a proper punishment for the crime of rape
through the willful omission by the state legislatures to include rape in their new death
penalty statutes in the aftermath of Furman; and second, that rape, while concededly a
dastardly contemptuous violation of a woman's spiritual integrity, physical privacy, and
psychological balance, does not involve the taking of life.

Anent the first ground, we fail to see how this could have any bearing on the Philippine
experience and in the context of our own culture.

Anent the second ground, we disagree with the court's predicate that the gauge of whether
or not a crime warrants the death penalty or not, is the attendance of the circumstance of
death on the part of the victim. Such a premise is in fact an ennobling of the biblical notion
of retributive justice of "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth". We have already
demonstrated earlier in our discussion of heinous crimes that the forfeiture of life simply
because life was taken, never was a defining essence of the death penalty in the context of
our legal history and cultural experience; rather, the death penalty is imposed in heinous
crimes because the perpetrators thereof have committed unforgivably execrable acts that
have so deeply dehumanized a person or criminal acts with severely destructive effects on
the national efforts to lift the masses from abject poverty through organized governmental
strategies based on a disciplined and honest citizenry, and because they have so caused
irreparable and substantial injury to both their victim and the society and a repetition of their
acts would pose actual threat to the safety of individuals and the survival of government,
they must be permanently prevented from doing so. At any rate, this court has no doubts as
to the innate heinousness of the crime of rape, as we have held in the case of People v.
Cristobal: 46

"Rape is the forcible violation of the sexual intimacy of another person. It does injury to
justice and charity. Rape deeply wounds the respect, freedom, and physical and moral
integrity to which every person has a right. It causes grave damage that can mark the victim
for life. It is always an intrinsically evil act xxx an outrage upon decency and dignity that
hurts not only the victim but the society itself."

We are not unaware that for all the legal posturings we have so essayed here, at the heart
of the issue of capital punishment is the wistful, sentimental life-and-death question to which
all of us, without thinking, would answer, "life, of course, over death". But dealing with the
fundamental question of death provides a context for struggling with even more basic
questions, for to grapple with the meaning of death is, in an indirect way, to ask the
meaning of life. Otherwise put, to ask what the rights are of the dying is to ask what the
rights are of the living.

"Capital punishment ought not to be abolished solely because it is substantially repulsive, if

infinitely less repulsive than the acts which invoke it. Yet the mounting zeal for its abolition
seems to arise from a sentimentalized hyperfastidiousness that seeks to expunge from the
society all that appears harsh and suppressive. If we are to preserve the humane society
we will have to retain sufficient strength of character and will to do the unpleasant in order
that tranquillity and civility may rule comprehensively. It seems very likely that capital
punishment is a x x x necessary, if limited factor in that maintenance of social tranquillity
and ought to be retained on this ground. To do otherwise is to indulge in the luxury of
permitting a sense of false delicacy to reign over the necessity of social
survival." 47chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration and the
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration are hereby DENIED48 for LACK OF MERIT.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 117472 June 25, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO, accused-appellant.

PER CURIAM:p

Amidst the endless debates on whether or not the reimposition of the death penalty is
indeed a deterrent as far as the commission of heinous crimes is concerned and while the
attendant details pertaining to the execution of a death sentence remain as yet another
burning issue, we are tasked with providing a clear-cut resolution of whether or not the
herein accused-appellant deserves to forfeit his place in human society for the infliction of
the primitive and bestial act of incestuous lust on his own blood.

Before us for automatic review is the judgment of conviction, dated September 7, 1994, for
the crime of Rape, rendered after marathon hearing by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 104, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused LEO

ECHEGARAY Y PILO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE
as charged in the complaint, aggravated by the fact that the same was
commited by the accused who is the father/stepfather of the complainant, he
is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH, as provided for under
RA. No. 7659, to pay the complainant Rodessa Echegaray the sum
of P50,000.00 as damages, plus all the accessory penalties provided by law,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. 1

We note, however, that the charge had been formulated in this manner:

COMPLAINT

The undersigned accuses LEO ECHEGARAY Y PILO of the crime of RAPE,

committed as follows:

That on or about the month of April 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned
complainant, his daughter, a minor, 10 years of age, all against her will and
without her consent, to her damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW 2

Upon being arraigned on August 1, 1994, the accused-appellant, assisted by his counsel de
oficio, entered the plea of "not guilty."

These are the pertinent facts of the case as summarized by the Solicitor-General in his
brief:

This is a case of rape by the father of his ten-year old daughter.

Complainant RODESSA ECHEGARAY is a ten-year old girl and a fifth-

grader, born on September 11, 1983. Rodessa is the eldest of five siblings.
She has three brothers aged 6, 5 and 2, respectively, and a 3-month old baby
 sister. Her parents are Rosalie and Leo Echegaray, the latter being the
accused-appellant himself. The victim lives with her family in a small house
located at No. 199 Fernandez St., Barangay San Antonio, San Francisco Del
Monte, Quezon City (pp. 5-9, Aug. 9, 1994, TSN).

Sometime in the afternoon of April 1994, while Rodessa was looking after her
three brothers in their house as her mother attended a gambling session in
another place, she heard her father, the accused-appellant in this case, order
her brothers to go out of the house (pp. 10-11, ibid). As soon as her brothers
left, accused-appellant Leo Echegaray approached Rodessa and suddenly
dragged her inside the room (p. 12, ibid). Before she could question the
appellant, the latter immediately, removed her panty and made her lie on the
floor (p. 13, ibid). Thereafter, appellant likewise removed his underwear and
immediately placed himself on top of Rodessa. Subsequently, appellant
forcefully inserted his penis into Rodessa's organ causing her to suffer
intense pain (pp. 14-15, ibid). While appellant was pumping on her, he even
uttered. "Masarap ba, masarap ba?" and to which Rodessa answered: "Tama
na Papa, masakit" (p. 16, ibid). Rodessa's plea proved futile as appellant
continued with his act. After satisfying his bestial instinct, appellant
threatened to kill her mother if she would divulge what had happened. Scared
that her mother would be killed by appellant, Rodessa kept to herself the
ordeal she suffered. She was very afraid of appellant because the latter, most
of the time, was high on drugs (pp. 17-18, ibid.). The same sexual assault
happened up to the fifth time and this usually took place when her mother
was out of the house (p. 19, ibid.). However, after the fifth time, Rodessa
decided to inform her grandmother, Asuncion Rivera, who in turn told Rosalie,
Radessa's mother. Rodessa and her mother proceeded to the Barangay
Captain where Rodessa confided the sexual assaults she suffered.
Thereafter, Rodessa was brought to the precinct where she executed an
affidavit (p. 21, ibid.). From there, she was accompanied to the Philippine
National Police Crime Laboratory for medical examination (p. 22, ibid.).

Rodessa testified that the said sexual assaults happened only during the time
when her mother was pregnant. Rodessa added that at first, her mother was
on her side. However, when appellant was detained, her mother kept on
telling her. "Kawawa naman ang Tatay mo, nakakulong" (pp. 39-40, ibid.).

When Rodessa was examined by the medico-legal officer in the person of

Dra. Ma. Cristina B. Preyna,3the complainant was described as physically on
a non-virgin state, as evidenced by the presence of laceration of the hymen of
said complainant (TSN, Aug. 22, 1995, pp. 8-9).4

On the other hand, the accused-appellant's brief presents a different story:

. . . the defense presented its first witness, Rosalie Echegaray. She asserted
that the RAPE charge against the accused was only the figment of her
mothers dirty mind. That her daughter's complaint was forced upon her by her
grandma and the answers in the sworn statement of Rodessa were coached.
That the accusation of RAPE was motivated by Rodessa's grandmother's
greed over the lot situated at the Madrigal Estate-NHA Project, Barangay San
Antonio, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, which her grandmother's
paramour, Conrado Alfonso gave to the accused in order to persuade the
latter to admit that Rodessa executed an affidavit of desistance after it turned
out that her complaint of attempted homicide was substituted with the crime
of RAPE at the instance of her mother. That when her mother came to know
about the affidavit of desistance, she placed her granddaughter under the
custody of the Barangay Captain. That her mother was never a real mother to
her.

She stated that her complaint against accused was for attempted homicide as
her husband poured alcohol on her body and attempted to burn her. She
identified the certification issued by the NHA and Tag No. 87-0393 (Exh. 2).
That the Certification based on the Masterlist (Exh. 3) indicates that the
property is co-owned by accused and Conrado Alfonso. That Rodessa is her
 daughter sired by Conrado Alfonso, the latter being the paramour of her
mother. That Conrado Alfonso waived his right and participation over the lot
in favor of the accused in consideration of the latter's accepting the fact that
he is the father of Rodessa to simulate the love triangle and to conceal the
nauseating sex orgies from Conrado Alfonso's real wife.

Accused testified in his behalf and stated that the grandmother of the
complainant has a very strong motive in implicating him to the crime of RAPE
since she was interested to become the sole owner of a property awarded to
her live-in partner by the Madrigal Estate-NHA Project. That he could not
have committed the imputed crime because he considers Rodessa as his
own daughter. That he is a painter-contractor and on the date of the alleged
commission of the crime, he was painting the house of one Divina Ang of
Barangay Vitalis, Parañaque, Metro Manila (Exh. 4). The travel time between
his work place to his residence is three (3) hours considering the condition of
traffic. That the painting contract is evidenced by a document denominated
"Contract of Services" duly accomplished (see submarkings of Exh. 4). He
asserted that he has a big sexual organ which when used to a girl 11 years
old like Rodessa, the said female organ will be "mawawarak." That it is
abnormal to report the imputed commission of the crime to the grandmother
of the victim.

Accused further stated that her (sic) mother-in-law trumped-up a charge of

drug pushing earlier and he pleaded guilty to a lesser offense of using drugs.
The decretal portion of the judgment of conviction ordering the accused to be
confined at the Bicutan Rehabilitation Center irked the grandmother of
Rodessa because it was her wish that accused should be meted the death
penalty.

Accused remain steadfast in his testimony perorating the strong motive of

Rodessa's grandmother in implicating him in this heinous crime because of
her greed to become the sole owner of that piece of property at the National
Housing Authority-Madrigal Project, situated at San Francisco del Monte,
Quezon City, notwithstanding rigid cross-examination. He asserted that the
imputed offense is far from his mind considering that he treated Rodessa as
his own daughter. He categorically testified that he was in his painting job site
on the date and time of the alleged commission of the crime.

Mrs. Punzalan was presented as third defense witness. She said that she is
the laundry woman and part time baby sitter of the family of accused. That at
one time, she saw Rodessa reading sex books and the Bulgar newspaper.
That while hanging washed clothes on the vacant lot, she saw Rodessa
masturbating by tinkering her private parts. The masturbation took sometime.

This sexual fling of Rodessa were corroborated by Silvestra Echegaray, the

fourth and last witness for the defense. She stated that she tried hard to
correct the flirting tendency of Rodessa and that she scolded her when she
saw Rodessa viewing an X-rated tape. Rodessa according to her was fond of
going with friends of ill-repute. That (sic) she corroborated the testimony of
Mrs. Punzalan by stating that she herself saw Rodessa masturbating inside
the room of her house.5

In finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, the
lower court dismissed the defense of alibi and lent credence to the straightforward
testimony of the ten-year old victim to whom no ill motive to testify falsely against accused-
appellant can be attributed. The lower court likewise regarded as inconsequential the
defense of the accused-appellant that the extraordinary size of his penis could not have
insinuated itself into the victim's vagina and that the accused is not the real father of the
said victim.

The accused-appellant now reiterates his position in his attempt to seek a reversal of the
lower court's verdict through the following assignment of errors:
 1. THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE
SINISTER MOTIVE OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT'S
GRANDMOTHER? THAT PRECIPITATED THE FILING OF
THE CHARGE OF RAPE, HENCE IT ERRED IN HOLDING
ACCUSED GUILTY AS CHARGED.

2. THE COURT BELOW OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT

THE HEALED LACERATIONS AT 3 AND 7 O'CLOCK COULD
NOT HAVE BEEN DUE TO THE PUMPING OF THE PENIS
OF ACCUSED TO THE VAGINA OF PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT, HENCE IT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
ACCUSED COMMITTED THE CRIME CHARGED,
NOTWITHSTANDING VEHEMENT DENIAL.

3. THE COURT A QUO WHIMSICALLY IGNORED THE

DEFENSE OF ALIBI THAT ACCUSED WAS IN PARAÑAQUE
ON THE DATE AND TIME OF THE IMPUTED CRIME HENCE,
IT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ALIBI IS NOT SUSTAINABLE
IN THE CASE AT BAR.6

Considering that a rape charge, in the light of the reimposition of the death penalty, requires
a thorough and judicious examination of the circumstances relating thereto, this Court
remains guided by the following principles in evaluating evidence in cases of this nature: (a)
An accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for
the accused though innocent to disprove; (b) In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of
rape where only two persons are involved, the testimony of the complainant must be
scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) The evidence for the prosecution must stand and
fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
evidence for the defense. 7

Anent the first assigned error, no amount of persuasion can convince this Court to tilt the
scales of justice in favor of the accused-appellant notwithstanding that he cries foul insisting
that the rape charge was merely concocted and strongly motivated by greed over a certain
lot situated at the NHA-Madrigal Estate Housing Project, Barangay San Antonio, San
Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. The accused-appellant theorizes that prosecution
witness Asuncion Rivera, the maternal grandmother of the victim Rodessa, concocted the
charge of rape so that, in the event that the accused-appellant shall be meted out a death
sentence, title to the lot will be consolidated in her favor. Indeed, the lot in question is co-
owned by the accused-appellant and Conrado Alfonso, the live-in partner of Asuncion
Rivera, according to the records of the National Housing Authority (Exh. "3"). The accused-
appellant would want us to believe that the rape charge was fabricated by Asuncion Rivera
in order to eliminate the accused-appellant from being a co-owner. So, the live-in partners
would have the property for their own.8

We believe, as did the Solicitor-General, that no grandmother would be so callous as to

instigate her 10-year old granddaughter to file a rape case against her own father simply on
account of her alleged interest over the disputed lot.9

It is a well-entrenched jurisprudential rule that the testimony of a rape victim is credible

where she has no motive to testify against the accused. 10

We find no flaws material enough to discredit the testimony of the ten-year old Rodessa
which the trial court found convincing enough and unrebutted by the defense. The trial court
not surprisingly noted that Rodessa's narration in detail of her father's monstrous acts had
made her cry.11 Once again, we rule that:

. . . The testimony of the victim who was only 12 years old at the time of the
rape as to the circumstances of the rape must be given weight, for testimony
of young and immature rape victims are credible (People v. Guibao, 217
SCRA 64 [1993]). No woman especially one of tender age, practically only a
girl, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private
parts and thereafter expose herself to a public trial, if she were not motivated
solely by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished (People v.
Guibao, supra). 12
The accused-appellant points out certain inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses in his attempt to bolster his claim that the rape accusation against
him is malicious and baseless. Firstly, Rodessa's testimony that the accused-appellant was
already naked when he dragged her inside the room is inconsistent with her subsequent
testimony that the said accused-appellant was still wearing short pants when she was
dragged inside the room. Secondly, Rodessa's sworn statement before the police
investigator which indicated that, while the accused was executing pumping acts, he uttered
the words "Masarap ba?", differ from her testimony in court wherein she related that, when
the accused took out his penis from her vagina, the accused said "Masarap, tapos na."
Thirdly, the victim's grandmother, Asuncion Rivera, recounted in her sworn statement that it
was the accused who went to see her to apprise her of the rape committed on her
granddaughter. However, in her testimony in court , Asuncion Rivera claimed that she was
the one who invited the accused-appellant to see her in her house so as to tell her a
secret.13 These alleged discrepancies merely pertain to minor details which in no way pose
serious doubt as to the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. Whether or not the accused
was naked when he dragged Rodessa inside the room where he sexually assaulted her
bears no significant effect on Rodessa's testimony that she was actually raped by the
accused-appellant. Moreover, a conflicting account of whatever words were uttered by the
accused-appellant after he forcefully inserted his penis into Rodessa's private organ against
her will cannot impair the prosecution's evidence as a whole. A determination of which
version earmarks the truth as to how the victim's grandmother learned about the rape is
inconsequential to the judgment of conviction.

As we have pronounced in the case of People v. Jaymalin: 14

This Court has stated time and again that minor inconsistencies in the
narration of the witness do not detract from its essential credibility as long as
it is on the whole coherent and intrinsically believable. Inaccuracies may in
fact suggest that the witness is telling the truth and has not been rehearsed
as it is not to he expected that he will be able to remember every single detail
of an incident with perfect or total recall.

After due deliberation, this Court finds that the trial judge's assessment of the credibility of
the prosecution witnesses deserves our utmost respect in the absence of arbitrariness.

With respect to the second assigned error, the records of the instant case are bereft of clear
and concrete proof of the accused-appellant's claim as to the size of his penis and that if
that be the fact, it could not have merely caused shallow healed lacerations at 3:00 and
7:00 o'clock. 15 In his testimony, the accused-appellant stated that he could not have raped
Rodessa because of
the size of his penis which could have ruptured her vagina had he actually done so. 16 This
Court gives no probative value on the accused-appellant's self-serving statement in the light
of our ruling in the case of People v. Melivo, supra,17 that:

The vaginal wall and the hymenal membrane are elastic organs capable of
varying degrees of distensibility. The degree of distensibility of the female
reproductive organ is normally limited only by the character and size of the
pelvic inlet, other factors being minor. The female reprodructive canal being
capable of allowing passage of a regular fetus, there ought to be no difficulty
allowing the entry of objects of much lesser size, including the male
reproductive organ, which even in its largest dimensions, would still be
considerably smaller than the full-term fetus.

xxx xxx xxx

In the case at bench, the presence of healed lacerations in various parts of he

vaginal wall, though not as extensive as appellant might have expected them
to be, indicate traumatic injury to the area within the period when the
incidents were supposed to have occurred. (At pp. 13-14, emphasis supplied)

In rape cases, a broken hymen is not an essential element thereof. 18 A mere knocking at
the doors of the pudenda, so to speak, by the accused's penis suffices to constitute the
crime of rape as full entry into the victim's vagina is not required to sustain a conviction. 19 In
the case, Dr. Freyra, the medico-legal examiner, categorically testified that the healed
lacerations of Rodessa on her vagina were consistent with the date of the commission of
the rape as narrated by the victim to have taken place in April, 1994. 20

Lastly, the third assigned error deserves scant consideration. The accused-appellant
erroneously argues that the Contract of Services (Exhibit 4) offered as evidence in support
of the accused-appellant's defense of alibi need not be corroborated because there is no
law expressly requiring so. 21 In view of our finding that the prosecution witnesses have no
motive to falsely testify against the accused-appellant, the defense of alibi, in this case,
uncorroborated by other witnesses, should be completely disregarded. 22 More importantly,
the defense of alibi which is inherently weak becomes even weaker in the face of positive
identification of the accused-appellant as perpetrator of the crime of rape by his victim,
Rodessa. 23

The Contract of Services whereby the accused-appellant obligated himself to do some

painting job at the house of one Divina Ang in Parañaque, Metro Manila, within 25 days
from April 4, 1994, is not proof of the whereabouts of the accused-appellant at the time of
the commission of the offense.

The accused-appellant in this case is charged with Statutory Rape on the basis of the
complaint, dated July 14, 1994. The gravamen of the said offense, as stated in paragraph 3,
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, is the carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve
years old. 24 Rodessa positively identified his father accused-appellant, as the culprit of
Statutory Rape. Her account of how the accused-appellant succeeded in consummating his
grievous and odious sexual assault on her is free from any substantial self-contradiction. It
is highly inconceivable that it is rehearsed and fabricated upon instructions from Rodessa's
maternal grandmother Asuncion Rivera as asserted by the accused-appellant. The words of
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, speaking for the Court, more than two decades ago, are
relevant and worth reiterating, thus:

. . . it is manifest in the decisions of this Court that where the offended parties
are young and immature girls like the victim in this case, (Cited cases
omitted) there is marked receptivity on its, part to tend credence to their
version of what transpired. It is not to be wondered at. The state, as parens
patria, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those, who,
because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves fully.
Those of tender years deserve its utmost protection. Moreover, the injury in
cases of rape is not inflicted on the unfortunate victim alone. The
consternation it causes her family must also be taken into account It may
reflect a failure to abide by the announced concern in the fundamental law for
such institution There is all the more reason then for the rigorous application
of the penal law with its severe penalty for this offense, whenever warranted.
It has been aptly remarked that with the advance in civilization, the disruption
in public peace and order it represents defies explanation, much more so in
view of what currently appears to be a tendency for sexual permissiveness.
Where the prospects of relationship based on consent are hardly minimal,
self-restraint should even be more marked. 25

Under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 often referred to as the Death Penalty Law, Art.
335 of the Revised Penal Code was amended, to wit:

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with
any of the following attendant circumstances:

1. When the victim is under eigthteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the
victim.

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied)

Apparently, as a last glimpse of hope, the accused-appellant questions the penalty imposed
by the trial court by declaring that he is neither a father, stepfather or grandfather of
Rodessa although he was a confirmed lover of Rodessa's mother. 26 On direct examination,
he admitted that before the charge of rape was riled against him, he had treated Rodessa
as his real daughter and had provided for her food, clothing, shelter and education. 27 The
Court notes that Rodessa uses the surname of the accused-appellant, not Rivera (her
mother's maiden name) nor Alfonso (her grandmother's live-in partner). Moreover,
Rodessa's mother stated during the cross-examination that she, the accused-appellant, and
her five children, including Rodessa, had been residing in one house only. 28 At any rate,
even if he were not the father, stepfather or grandfather of Rodessa, this disclaimer cannot
save him from the abyss where perpetrators of heinous crimes ought to be, as mandated by
law. Considering that the accused-appellant is a confirmed lover of Rodessa's mother, 29 he
falls squarely within the aforequoted portion of the Death Penalty Law under the term
"common-law spouse of the parent of the victim."

The fact that the ten-year old Rodessa referred to the accused-appellant as "Papa" is
reason enough to conclude that accused-appellant is either the father or stepfather of
Rodessa. Thus, the act of sexual assault perpetrated by the accused on his young victim
has become all the more repulsive and perverse. The victim's tender age and the accused-
appellant's moral ascendancy and influence over her are factors which forced Rodessa to
succumb to the accused's selfish and bestial craving. The law has made it inevitable under
the circumstances of this case that the accused-appellant face the supreme penalty of
death. WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 104.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
 EN BANC

G.R. No. 129054 September 29, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ALEX BARTOLOME, Accused-

Appellant.

PER CURIAM:

This is an automatic review of the decision rendered by Branch 19 of the Regional Trial
Court of Cagayan de Oro City in Criminal Case No. 95-118 imposing upon accused-
appellant Alex Bartolome the supreme penalty of death for raping his daughter. 1

Herein appellant Alex Bartolome was charged with the crime of rape on the basis of a
complaint filed by Elena Gorra Bartolome, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about March 9, 1995, at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening, more or less, at
Zone 2, Patag, Cagayan de Oro City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, who is my (sic) own father, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have carnal knowledge with complaint victim, ELENA BARTOLOME y
GORRA, accused forcing himself sexually on the latter, a 16 year old minor against her will.

Contrary to and in Violation of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.

City of Cagayan de Oro, March 13, 1995. 2

Appellant entered a plea of not guilty at his arraignment on April 5, 1995 3 and trial on the
merits thereafter proceeded.

The inculpatory facts, as borne out by the record and documented by page references to
the transcripts of stenographic notes taken at the trial, were synthesized by the Office of the
Solicitor General in this wise:

Private complainant Elena Gorra Bartolome is the daughter of appellant Alex Bartolome and
Alma Gorra. She was born on July 31, 1978 in Patag, Cagayan de Oro City and is the fourth
child of the spouses Bartolome. Elena lived in Patag until she was ten (10) years old when
the whole family left for Sto, Tomas, Davao del Norte where complainant's mother, Alma
Gorra, worked as a cook for a Cuban national. While they were in Davao, appellant left his
family and returned to Cagayan de Oro. Later, appellant returned to them in Davao and
reconciled with her mother. However, after her mother became pregnant, appellant again
left them and went back to Cagayan de Oro. Soon he developed the habit of travelling to
and from Davao and Cagayan de Oro every now and then (TSN, Nov. 15, 1995, pp. 5-9, E.
Bartolome).

On October 30, 1993, when Elena was fourteen (14) years old, appellant went back to
Davao. At that time, Elena was six (6) months pregnant with her child (by) her boyfriend,
Jockery Polo. Thence, her mother suggested to Elena that she had better go with appellant
to Cagayan de Oro City where she could give birth and at the same time visit her
grandmother (appellant's mother). Appellant being her father, Elena agreed to her mother's
proposition (Id., pp. 9-10, 22).

On November 1, 1993, Elena and appellant took a bus and left Davao. They stayed
overnight and slept in San Francisco, Agusan del Norte. The following day, they proceeded
to Cagayan de Oro, arriving there about 7:00 A.M. Elena immediately visited the graves of
her grandmother, her sister and cousin (Id., pp. 10-11).
On the night of November 2, 1993, Elena asked her grandmother where she could sleep.
Her grandmother answered that she would sleep with her in her room together with Elena's
cousins. But appellant protested and told Elena to sleep instead with him since she was
pregnant and her cousins might hit her belly. Besides, appellant added, he was alone in his
room. Elena's grandmother prodded her to just sleep with appellant, lest the latter would go
wild. Since appellant was her father, Elena slept beside him in the latter's room. It was then
nine o'clock in the evening, more or less.

Later, while Elena was lying down, the right side of her body facing the wall, she noticed
that a hand was placed on top of her breast then slipped down towards her vagina. Knowing
that it was appellant's hand, Elena then tried to ward off appellant's hand and kept on
kicking her feet but appellant punched her on the left side of her hip. After which, appellant
took off his briefs and removed Elena's underwear and ordered Elena to move closer to
him. Appellant thereupon placed himself at the back of Elena, inserted his penis into her
vagina and had sexual intercourse with her. After the sexual intercourse, appellant wiped
his penis with the towel placed around his neck and went downstairs to drink water. Elena
was left in the room crying. From that time on, appellant raped his daughter every week with
an interval of two (2) days for each rape. The same continued until 15 or 16 days before
Elena delivered her child on January 23, 1994. Despite the foregoing, however, Elena did
not tell her grandmother of her ordeal because of appellant's threat to kill her and kick her
belly (Id., pp. 11-25).

Subsequently, about a week after Elena had given birth to her child, appellant again raped
his daughter. Elena was then inside her grandmother's room lying down on bed with only a
napkin on her vagina because her organ was still bleeding because of the delivery.
Appellant removed the napkin and went on top of Elena and had sexual intercourse with
her. On this occasion, Elena asked appellant why he was doing it to her when she was his
daughter. He replied to just shut up since he was missing her mother. Elena at that time
suffered tremendous pain as she had just given birth to her child (Id., pp. 25-28).

On March 9, 1995, between 9:00 to 10:00 in the evening, appellant again wanted to have
sex with Elena while they were inside his room. As a pretext, appellant pushed Elena's
child, as a result of which her elbow hit the child who then cried. Elena then hit the lock of
the trunk (cavan) waking up her grandmother who asked what was happening. Appellant
pretended to wake Elena up and scolded her for not attending to her child. Appellant then
went down and got a pipe and hit Elena at her left hip. Afterwards, appellant got a piece of
cloth, lowered his brief down to his knees and removed Elena's underwear. He then
stretched Elena's legs, bent his body and licked her vagina for about three or four times.
Appellant then rode on top of Elena, inserted his penis into her vagina, and made push and
pull movements as he panted. When appellant noticed that he was about to have an
orgasm, he pulled out his organ and discharged his seminal fluid on the base of Elena's
vagina. After that, appellant got the piece of cloth and wiped Elena's vagina as well as his
organ. Appellant then gave the cloth to Elena and instructed her to wipe her vagina with it
so that she would not get pregnant (Id., pp. 28-32).

After the above-mentioned incident, Elena thought of going back to Davao and so she went
to see her aunt from Iligan City, Annie Mangandato, who was in Patag to ask (for) money
for her fare. Her aunt, who was not aware of her predicament, told appellant about Elena's
plan. Appellant then confronted Elena why she was angry with him when appellant was not
the first one to deflower her. Further, appellant threatened Elena that he would beat and
hang her when her aunt got back to Iligan.

Finally, in the morning of March 10, 1995, Elena finally decided to tell her aunt who was
about to go home to Iligan that she was being raped by her own father. As suggested by her
aunt, Elena went to the barangay captain of Patag and reported that appellant sexually
molested her. Later, Elena went to the police station in Carmen, Cagayan de Oro City and
also reported the rape. She was then advised by the attending policewoman to proceed to
the provincial hospital for medical examination
(Id., pp. 40-48). 4

On the part of the defense, appellant admitted having had sexual intercourse with his own
daughter. However, he claims that they were living together as husband and wife and that
their sexual encounters are all consensual.
On January 16, 1997, the trial court rendered its decision convicting appellant of the crime
charged, with the following disposition:

WHEREFORE, the court pronounces accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of rape of his own daughter, Elena Bartolome, and so hereby imposes upon him the
supreme penalty of death. He is also ordered to pay the costs and to indemnify Elena the
sum of P50,000.00.

Pursuant to law, the court hereby orders the City Warden of Cagayan de Oro to ship the
accused without delay to the National Penitentiary.

SO ORDERED. 5

The conviction of herein appellant is now being assailed on the sole ground that the lower
court erred in holding that Elena Bartolome was raped by appellant. It is the principal
contention of appellant that the sexual intercourse between them is an act of two consenting
adults notwithstanding the minority of the alleged offended party.

In support of appellant's proposition, he claims that he did not force or intimidate his
daughter into having sexual relations with him and, in fact, there was no struggle or outcry
from the victim during the alleged rape on March 9, 1995 which is the subject of the present
case. He also seeks to capitalize on the failure of the victim to immediately report the sexual
abuses committed against her despite countless opportunities to do so. Such failure,
appellant contends, renders doubtful the truth of her accusation.

Appellant's arguments are not at all persuasive and, much less, credible. Contrary to his
claim, the prosecution sufficiently and convincingly established that appellant did have
carnal knowledge of the victim through force and intimidation. The victim testified that:

A. On March 9, 1995 he wanted to have sex with me again and then he pushed the child
and when he pushed the child my elbow hit the child and the child cried and I hit the lock of
the trunk (cavan) and it made my grandmother to (sic) wake up and said, "what's that Alex"
and my father told me, "wake up Elena, you have a baby and you don't know how to take
care of him. Look at that now. And he went down and g(o)t a pipe and hit me with that
pipe. 6

Furthermore, even if there was absence of force, the apparent submission of herein victim
does not indicate consent. She had been repeatedly abused by her father for more than a
hundred times. On the occasion of all those rapes, appellant inflicted upon her bodily
injuries and continously threatened to kill her. Considering the strength and the moral
ascendancy of her father, the victim obviously knew that any opposition or resistance on her
part would be futile. It must be emphasized that in this type of incestuous rape, the degree
of force or intimidation need not be the same as in other cases of rape where the parties
involved have no relationship at all with each other, because the father exercises strong
moral and physical control over his daughter. 7

Also, the fact that the victim did not resist appellant by struggling or shouting for help does
not rule out force and intimidation. 8 The threat alone coming from her father, a person who
wielded such moral ascendancy, was enough to render her incapable of resisting or asking
for help. 9

Physical resistance need not be established in rape when threats and intimidation are
employed and the victim submits herself to the embrace of her rapist because of fear. 10 As
we have ruled inPeople vs. Bayani, 11

[I]t must be emphasized that force as an element of rape need not be irresistible; it need but
be present, and so long as it brings about the desired results, all considerations of whether
it was more or less irresistible is beside the point. So must it likewise be for intimidation
which is addressed to the mind of the victim and is therefore subjective. Intimidation must
be viewed in the light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the commission
of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule. It is therefore enough that it produces fear -
fear that if the victim did not yield to the bestial demands of the accused, something would
happen to her at that moment or even thereafter as when she is threatened with death if
she reports the incident. Intimidation includes the moral kind as the fear caused by
threatening the girl with a knife or pistol. And when such intimidation exists and the victim is
cowed into submission as a result thereof, thereby rendering resistance futile, it would be
extremely unreasonable, to say the least, to expect the victim to resist with all her might and
strength. If resistance would nevertheless be futile because of continuing intimidation, then
offering none at all would not mean consent to the assault so as to make the victim's
participation in the sexual act voluntary.

Furthermore, even assuming that force or intimidation had not been actually employed, the
crime of rape was nevertheless committed. The absence of violence or offer of resistance
would not be significant because of the overpowering and overbearing moral influence of
the father over the daughter which takes the place of violence and offer of resistance
required in rape cases committed by an accused having no blood relationship with the
victim. 12

In a rape committed by a father against his own daughter, the former's moral ascendancy
and influence over the latter substitutes for violence or intimidation. That ascendancy or
influence necessarily flows from the father's parental authority, which the Constitution and
the laws recognize, support and enhance, as well as from the children's duty to obey and
observe reverence and respect towards their parents. Such reverence and respect are
deeply ingrained in the minds of Filipino children and are recognized by law. Abuse of both
by a father can subjugate his daughter's will, thereby forcing her to do whatever he wants. 13

Appellant's theory that he and his daughter are living together as husband and wife is
obviously incredible. Said contention, as ruled in the case of People v. Matrimonio, 14 "is an
affront to Filipino values and an assault on the intelligence; it offends sensibilities. The story
could only be concocted by a morally corrupt and mentally depraved sex maniac."

It is hard to believe that a daughter would simply give in to her father's lascivious designs
had not her resistance been overpowered. 15 No daughter in her right mind would voluntarily
submit herself to her own father unless there was force or intimidation, as a sexual act
between a father and a daughter is extremely revolting. 16

Even the failure of the victim to immediately report to the authorities the repeated assault on
her virtue by her father cannot be taken against her. Such delay does not necessarily
detract from her credibility nor negate the commission of the rape. The delay and initial
reluctance of a rape victim to make public the assault on her virtue is neither unknown nor
uncommon. It is not an unexpected reaction of a woman to keep secret, at least
momentarily, the dishonor brought to bear on her and to suffer alone in her misfortune
rather than be the subject of embarrassment, public scrutiny, pity or ridicule. More so is this
true in the case at bar where the rapist is the victim's own father. 17

Herein victim is living under the same roof with his father, and she and her son are
dependent upon him for support. From the time she was initially raped, herein appellant
continuously threatened to kill her. These conditions are valid and more than sufficient
reasons for a 16-year old victim to simply suffer in silence.

That fear of the victim is not unfounded for herein appellant is a violent man, as can be
deduced from the victim's testimony thus:

Q You mentioned about your auntie (being) afraid of your father. Can you describe the
temperament of your father?

A When I arrived here from Davao all our neighbors told me that everytime my father got
angry he will break something and hit something and sometimes he will tell my Lola, "when
will you die old woman" (Kanus-a pa ka mamatay tigulanga ka)

COURT:

Make it of record that the witness is crying louder.

ASST. FISCAL DAMASING: ( To the witness cont'ng.)

Q When you arrived at Patag on November 2, 1993 to March 9, 1995, can you tell the
Honorable Court whether you have observed your father in time of anger?
A When he is mad, he goes wild and even sometimes when he is eating and if he heard
some words he will turn upside down the table and he used to tell us also, that, "just a little
mistake" and then he will get a little saliva from his mouth and make a cross with his finger
on the ground.

Q From November 2, 1993 to March 9, 1995, how many times did you observe that your
father did this?

A There are times when he cannot rape me he will be mad and he goes wild and he
demonstrate(s) with his close fist and telling me, "be careful." And there was a time that he
was not able to rape me that his lower bailey (sic) was painful.

Q Back to the question. How many times did you observe your father did (sic) this kind of
temper?

A Almost permanent. 18

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. DELA ROSA: (To the witness cont'ng.)

Q You were living in that house at Patag for one year. You must be familiar with the people
living in that house. Is that right?

A Yes, I am familiar with them but I cannot confide to tell them because I was not allowed to
go out by my father.

COURT: (To the witness).

Q From the last week of October, 1993 up to March 12, 1995 how many times if you did, did
you complain to your Lola about your father's molestation with you?

A Only once, Your Honor. It was in March 9, 1995.

Q Why did you not during all these 100 days before that, complain to your Lola?

A Because my father told me that he would beat me and treated me to kill (sic).

Q But that is only the words of your father. He did not beat you?

A He actually physically hit me Your Honor. In fact, there are times when he smashed me
(o)n the wall. In fact, he pushed my head against the wall and my mouth hit in the wall (sic).

Q You have your uncle and your Auntie. Did it not occur to your mind from October 1993 up
to March 10, 1995 to run to any of them for help?

A When my auntie from Iligan City came to the house of my Lola, my father got angry why
she stays there, especially if my auntie will stay there long. 19

xxx xxx xxx

It was also the same fear for her life that impelled herein victim to finally make public the
outrage repeatedly committed on her by her father. It was only when her father told her that
he would beat and hang her after her aunt went home to Iligan, that she immediately told
her aunt about the whole incident and asked for her help. 20

It is an entrenched decisional rule that delay in reporting a carnal violation committed by a

father against his daughter due to threats is justified. In the numerous cases of rape that
have reached this Court, we find that it is not uncommon for young girls to conceal, for
some time, the assaults on their honor because of the rapist's threat on their lives. In many
instances, rape victims simply suffer in silence. With more reason would a girl ravished by
her own father keep quiet about what befell her. Furthermore, it is unfair to judge the action
of children who have undergone traumatic experiences by the norms of behavior expected
of mature individuals under the same circumstances. 21
It is also worth noting that appellant admitted that he asked for the victim's
forgiveness. 22 We have interpreted the significance of such gesture as an admission of
guilt. A plea for forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an attempt to compromise.
In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses involving criminal negligence or
those allowed by law to be compromised, such offer of compromise by the accused may be
received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. No one would ask for forgiveness
unless he had committed some wrong, for to forgive means to absolve, to pardon, to cease
to feel resentment against on account of wrong committed; give up claim to requital from or
retribution upon (an offender). 23

A father who can readily admit with ease the fact that he had sexual intercourse with his
minor daughter for more than 100 times is no longer a man and is not even fit to be called a
beast. As we have ruled in People vs.
Melivo, 24 "The man who violates his own progeny commits an act which runs against
known biologic, legal and moral laws. Even some of the most primitive beasts protect their
offspring with a fierceness which costs their own lives. By inflicting the primitive, bestial act
of incestuous lust on his own blood, appellant deserves to forfeit his place in human society.

We now come to the imposable penalty for the crime committed. Under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the death penalty shall be
imposed if the crime of rape is committed where "the victim is under eighteen (18) years of
age and the offender is a parent ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity
or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the
victim." 25 In the case at bar, it is an undisputed fact that the victim was 16 years old at the
time of the commission of the offense on March 9, 1995 and the offender is her own father.
Thus, the trial court did not err in imposing upon the appellant the capital punishment.

Further, in line with the new policy adopted by the Court the award of the trial court in the
civil aspect of the case must be modified. Under this policy, the indemnification for the
victim shall be in the increased amount of P75,000.000 if the crime of rape is committed or
effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized
by the applicable amendatory laws. 26 In addition, the Court also resolved that in crimes of
rape the amount of P50,00000 as moral damages must be awarded to the victim without the
need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof. 27

Four members of this Court maintain their position that Republic Act No. 7659 insofar as it
prescribes the death penalty is unconstitutional; but they nevertheless submit to the ruling of
the majority that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty should be imposed in
the case at bar.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that
appellant Alex Bartolome is ordered to indemnify the offended party in the increased
amount of P75,000.00 as civil liability ex delicto and to pay the additional amount of
P50,000.00 as moral damages.

Upon finality of this decision, let certified true copies thereof, as well as the records of this
case, be forwarded without delay to the Office of the President for possible exercise of
executive clemency pursuant to Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 25 of R.A. 7659.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Panganiban,
Martinez, Quisumbing and Purisima, JJ., concur.

Narvasa, C.J. and Mendoza, J., are on leave.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 99287 June 23, 1992

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR., AND JAIME MANUEL, respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.:

This petition for certiorari seeks to reverse the decision and the order of the Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Region at Pasig, Metro Manila dated February 25 and March 13,
1991, respectively in Criminal Case No. 1345-D entitled "People of the Philippines v. Jaime
Manuel y Ohide" for violation of Section 16, Article 111, RA 6425, as amended.

Briefly, the antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

On August 24, 1990, Jaime Manuel y Ohide was charged with violation of Section 16,
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. The penalty prescribed in the said section
is imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to twelve years and a fine ranging from
six thousand to twelve thousand pesos. The information against him reads:

That on or about the 21st day of August, 1990, in the Municipality of San
Juan, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, without the corresponding license or
prescription did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession, custody and control 0.08 grams of Methamphetamin
Hydrocloride (Shabu) wrapped with an aluminum foil, which is a regulated
drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 15, Rollo)

During the arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued.
On November 21, 1990, the prosecution rested its case. On January 9, 1991, counsel for
private respondent verbally manifested in open court that private respondent was willing to
change his former plea of "not guilty" to that of "guilty" to the lesser offense of violation of
Section 17, R.A. No. 6425, as amended. The said section provides a penalty
of imprisonment ranging from six months and one day to four years and a fine ranging from
six hundred to four thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any pharmacist, physician,
dentist, veterinarian, manufacturer, wholesaler who violates or fails to keep the records
required under Section 25 of the Act; if the violation or failure involves a regulated drug.
That same day, the respondent Judge issued an order (Annex "B," p. 17, Rollo) directing
private respondent to secure the consent of the prosecutor to the change of plea, and set
the promulgation of decision on January 30, 1991. On January 30, 1991, respondent Judge
postponed the promulgation of the decision to February 18, 1991 to give private respondent
another opportunity to secure the consent of the prosecutor. Also, on the said date, the
private respondent filed his Request to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense. On February 18,
1991, respondent Judge issued another order (Annex "D," p. 19, Rollo) postponing the
promulgation of decision to February 25, 1991 to give private respondent further opportunity
to secure the consent of the prosecutor. On February 20, 1991, the prosecutor filed his
Opposition to the Request to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense (annex "E," p. 20, Rollo) on
the grounds that: (1) the prosecution already rested its case on November 21, 1990; (2) the
possibility of conviction of private respondent of the crime originally charged was high
because of the strong evidence of the prosecution; and (3) the valuable time which the court
and the prosecutor had expended would be put to waste. On February 21, 1991, private
respondent filed his Reply to Opposition with Leave of Court to Plead Guilty to a Lesser
Offense (annex F, p. 21, Rollo), alleging therein, among other matters, that the Rules on
Criminal Procedure does not fix a specific period within which an accused is allowed to
plead guilty to a lesser offense. Subsequently, on February 25, 1991, respondent Judge
rendered a decision granting the accused's motion, to wit:

It may well be appropriate at this time to state that the accused is not availing
of the "voluntary plea of guilt" as a mitigating circumstance envisioned under
Article 13, paragraph 7 of the Revised Penal Code. The accused simply
wants to avail of Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules. As pointed out by Atty.
Fernando Fernandez of the PAO, there is nothing in the said provision which
requires that the same be availed of prior to the presentation of the evidence
for the prosecution. It is conceded though, as pointed out by the prosecution,
that such is a waste of time on the part of the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor and of the Court, nonetheless, this Court, having in mind Section
2 of Rule 1 which provides that the rules shall be liberally construed in order
to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding and also for
humanitarian considerations, hereby APPROVES and GRANTS the Motion at
bar.

Moreover, such an admission of guilt by the accused indicates his submission

to the law and a moral disposition on his part to reform. (Vide: People vs.
Coronel, G.R. No. L-19091, June 30, 1966)

Let it be made of record however that the Court is not putting a premium on
the change of heart of the accused in mid-stream.

WHEREFORE, finding the accused JAIME MANUEL Y CHIDE @ Manny

guilty beyond reasonable-doubt of the crime of violation of Section 17, Article
III, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, he is hereby sentenced to a straight
prison term of two (2) years and one (1) day of prision correccional, to pay a
fine of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to pay the costs.

In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be credited in full with the
period of his preventive imprisonment.

Pursuant to Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, let
the 0.08 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) subject matter of
this case be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government and be
turned over to the Dangerous Drugs Board Custodian, NBI, to be disposed of
according to law.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 24-25)

Forthwith, the prosecutor filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforestated decision but
the same was denied in the order of March 13, 1991, which states:

It is the considered view of this Court that Section 2, Rule 116 of

the Rules should not be interpreted to the letter in "victimless crimes" such as
this case, possession of regulated drugs, which is more of a "social disease"
case so to speak and in the light of (the) provision itself that "with the consent
of the offended party and the fiscal." Is the fiscal the offended party?

Moreover as the records show, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal has not
been very consistent on this "lesser offense plea" thing. It would perhaps be
in consonance with justice that a guideline be laid down by the said Office, if
only to apprise the public, the Court and the accused on when said consent is
to be given by the fiscal as a matter of course and when it will be withheld.
For to leave the same undefined is in the mind of this Court, not conducive to
a "just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding.
 SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 41-42)

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

I. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN GRANTING

PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S REQUEST TO PLEAD GUILTY TO A LESSER
OFFENSE BECAUSE THE REQUEST WAS FILED OUT OF TIME AND THE
CONSENT THERETO OF THE PROSECUTOR AND THE OFFENDED
PARTY WAS NOT OBTAINED.

II. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN CONVICTING

PRIVATE RESPONDENT OF THE LESSER OFFENSE OF VIOLATION OF
SECTION 17, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425, AS AMENDED, INSTEAD OF THE
OFFENSE ORIGINALLY CHARGED OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 16 OF
THE SAME LAW, IN VIEW OF THE ABSENCE OF A VALID CHANGE OF
PLEA. (Rollo, pp. 74-75)

In the resolution of January 20, 1992, We issued a temporary restraining order to enjoin the
respondent Judge from enforcing the questioned judgment in the aforesaid criminal case
(Rollo, p. 86).

The petition is meritorious.

Plea bargaining in criminal cases, is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution
work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval (see Black
Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., 1979, p. 1037). It usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty to
a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for
a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge (ibid). Ordinarily, plea-bargaining is made
during the pre-trial stage of the criminal proceedings. However, the law still permits the
accused sufficient opportunity to change his plea thereafter. Thus, Rule 116 of the Rules of
Court, Section 2 thereof, provides:

Sec. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — The accused, with the consent of
the offended party and the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial court to plead
guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it is necessarily
included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction
than the trial court. No amendment of the complaint or information is
necessary.

A conviction under this plea, shall be equivalent to a conviction of the offense

charged for purposes of double jeopardy.

However, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense under the
aforequoted rule is not demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter that
is addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court (Manuel v. Velasco, et al.,
G.R. No. 94732, February 26, 1991, En Banc Resolution).

In the case at bar, the private respondent (accused) moved to plead guilty to a lesser
offense after the prosecution had already rested its case. In such situation, jurisprudence
has provided the trial court and the Office of the Prosecutor with yardstick within which their
discretion may be properly exercised. Thus, in People v. Kayanan (L-39355, May 31, 1978,
83 SCRA 437, 450), We held that the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution
does not have sufficient evidence to establish guilt of the crime charged. In his concurring
opinion in People v. Parohinog (G.R. No. L-47462, February 28, 1980, 96 SCRA 373, 377),
then Justice Antonio Barredo explained clearly and tersely the rationale of the law:

. . . (A)fter the prosecution had already rested, the only basis on which the
fiscal and the court could rightfully act in allowing the appellant to charge his
former plea of not guilty to murder to guilty to the lesser crime of homicide
could be nothing more nothing less than the evidence already in the record.
The reason for this being that Section 4 of Rule 118 (now Section 2, Rule
116) under which a plea for a lesser offense is allowed was not and could not
have been intended as a procedure for compromise, much less bargaining.
As evident from the foregoing, the trial court need not wait for a guideline from the Office of
the Prosecutor before it could act on the accused's motion to change plea. As soon as the
fiscal has submitted his comment whether for or against the said motion, it behooves the
trial court to assiduously study the prosecution's evidence as well as all the circumstances
upon which the accused made his change of plea to the end that the interests of justice and
of the public will be served. A reading of the disputed rulings in this case failed to disclose
the strength or weakness of the prosecution's evidence. Apparently, the judgment under
review dwelt solely on only one of the three objections (i.e.waste of valuable time already
spent by the court and prosecution) interposed by the Fiscal which was the least
persuasive. It must be recalled that the other two grounds of objection were that the
prosecution had already rested its case and that the possibility of conviction of the private
respondent of the crime originally charged was high because of the strong evidence of the
prosecution. Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence in hand, the respondent
judge's acceptance of the private respondent's change of plea is improper and irregular.

The counsel for the private respondent argues that only the consent of the fiscal is needed
in crimes involving, violation of RA 6425 as amended because there is no offended party to
speak Of and that even the latter's consent is not an absolute requirement before the trial
court could allow the accused to change his plea.

We do not agree. The provision of Section 2, Rule 116 is clear. The consent of both the
Fiscal and the offended party is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser
offense (see Manuel v. Velasco, et al., supra, p. 6). The reason for this is obvious. The
Fiscal has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions (Cinco, et al. v. Sandiganbayan,
et al., G.R. Nos. 92362-67, October 15, 1991). Consequently, it is his duty to always
prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, when the evidence in his hands
can only sustain the former (seePeople v. Parohinog, supra, concurring opinion of then
Justice Barredo, p. 377; also Vda. de Bagatua, et al. v. Revilla, et al., 104 Phil. 393, 395-
396).

It would not also be correct to state that there is no offended party in crimes under RA 6425
as amended. While the acts constituting the crimes are not wrong in themselves, they are
made so by law because they infringe upon the rights of others. The threat posed by drugs
against human dignity and the integrity of society is malevolent and incessant (People v.
Ale, G.R. No. 70998, October 14, 1986, 145 SCRA 50, 58). Such pernicious effect is felt not
only by the addicts themselves but also by their families. As a result, society's survival is
endangered because its basic unit, the family, is the ultimate victim of the drug menace.
The state is, therefore, the offended party in this case. As guardian of the rights of the
people, the government files the criminal action in the name of the People of the
Philippines. The Fiscal who represents the government is duty bound to defend the public
interests, threatened by crime, to the point that it is as though he were the person directly
injured by the offense (see United States v. Samio, 3 Phil. 691, 696). Viewed in this light,
the consent of the offended party, i.e. the state, will have to be secured from the Fiscal who
acts in behalf of the government.

Lastly, the counsel for the private respondent maintains that the private respondent's
change of plea and his conviction to the lesser offense of violation of Section 17, RA No.
6425 as amended is no longer open to review otherwise his constitutional right against
double jeopardy will be violated.

Such supposition has no basis. The right against double jeopardy given to the accused in
Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court applies in cases where both the fiscal and the
offended party consent to the private respondent's change of plea. Since this is not the
situation here, the private respondent cannot claim this privilege. Instead, the more
pertinent and applicable provision is that found in Section 7, Rule 117 which states:

Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. —

xxx xxx xxx

However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another

prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in
the former complaint or information under any of the following instances:
 (a) . . . ;

(b) . . . ;

(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of
the Fiscal and of the offended party;

xxx xxx xxx

Under this rule, the private respondent could still be prosecuted under the original charge of
violation of Section 16 of RA 6425 as amended because of the lack of consent of the Fiscal
who also represents the offended party, i.e., the state. More importantly, the trial court's
approval of his change of plea was irregular and improper.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The judgment and order of the Regional
Trial Court, National Capital Region at Pasig, Branch 156 dated February 25 and March 13,
1991, respectively in Criminal Case No. 1345-D (People v. Manuel y Ohide) are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said criminal case is hereby remanded to the trial court
for continuation of trial on the original charge of violation of Section 16 of Republic Act No.
6425 as amended. The temporary restraining order issued in this case is made permanent.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

 Fifteenth Congress
Third Regular Session

Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-third day of July, two thousand
twelve.

REPUBLIC ACT No. 10592

AN ACT AMENDING ARTICLES 29, 94, 97, 98 AND 99 OF ACT NO. 3815, AS AMENDED,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED PENAL CODE

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled:

Section 1. Article 29 of Act No. 3815, as amended, otherwise known as the Revised Penal
Code, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

"ART. 29. Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from term of imprisonment. –

Offenders or accused who have undergone preventive imprisonment shall be
credited in the service of their sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the
full time during which they have undergone preventive imprisonment if the detention
prisoner agrees voluntarily in writing after being informed of the effects thereof and
with the assistance of counsel to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon
convicted prisoners, except in the following cases:

"1. When they are recidivists, or have been convicted previously twice or
more times of any crime; and

"2. When upon being summoned for the execution of their sentence they
have failed to surrender voluntarily.

"If the detention prisoner does not agree to abide by the same disciplinary rules
imposed upon convicted prisoners, he shall do so in writing with the assistance of a
counsel and shall be credited in the service of his sentence with four-fifths of the
time during which he has undergone preventive imprisonment.

"Credit for preventive imprisonment for the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
deducted from thirty (30) years.1âwphi1

"Whenever an accused has undergone preventive imprisonment for a period equal

to the possible maximum imprisonment of the offense charged to which he may be
sentenced and his case is not yet terminated, he shall be released immediately
without prejudice to the continuation of the trial thereof or the proceeding on appeal,
if the same is under review. Computation of preventive imprisonment for purposes of
immediate release under this paragraph shall be the actual period of detention with
good conduct time allowance: Provided, however, That if the accused is absent
without justifiable cause at any stage of the trial, the court may motu proprio order
the rearrest of the accused: Provided, finally, That recidivists, habitual delinquents,
escapees and persons charged with heinous crimes are excluded from the coverage
of this Act. In case the maximum penalty to which the accused may be sentenced
is lestierro, he shall be released after thirty (30) days of preventive imprisonment."

Section 2. Article 94 of the same Act is hereby further amended to read as follows:
 "ART. 94. Partial extinction of criminal liability. – Criminal liability is extinguished
partially:

"1. By conditional pardon;

"2. By commutation of the sentence; and

"3. For good conduct allowances which the culprit may earn while he is
undergoing preventive imprisonment or serving his sentence."

Section 3. Article 97 of the same Act is hereby further amended to read as follows:

"ART. 97. Allowance for good conduct. – The good conduct of any offender qualified
for credit for preventive imprisonment pursuant to Article 29 of this Code, or of any
convicted prisoner in any penal institution, rehabilitation or detention center or any
other local jail shall entitle him to the following deductions from the period of his
sentence:

"1. During the first two years of imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction
of twenty days for each month of good behavior during detention;

"2. During the third to the fifth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be
allowed a reduction of twenty-three days for each month of good behavior
during detention;

"3. During the following years until the tenth year, inclusive, of his
imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of twenty-five days for each
month of good behavior during detention;

"4. During the eleventh and successive years of his imprisonment, he shall be
allowed a deduction of thirty days for each month of good behavior during
detention; and

"5. At any time during the period of imprisonment, he shall be allowed another
deduction of fifteen days, in addition to numbers one to four hereof, for each
month of study, teaching or mentoring service time rendered.

"An appeal by the accused shall not deprive him of entitlement to the above
allowances for good conduct."

Section 4. Article 98 of the same Act is hereby further amended to read as follows:

"ART. 98. Special time allowance for loyalty. – A deduction of one fifth of the period
of his sentence shall be granted to any prisoner who, having evaded his preventive
imprisonment or the service of his sentence under the circumstances mentioned in
Article 158 of this Code, gives himself up to the authorities within 48 hours following
the issuance of a proclamation announcing the passing away of the calamity or
catastrophe referred to in said article. A deduction of two-fifths of the period of his
sentence shall be granted in case said prisoner chose to stay in the place of his
confinement notwithstanding the existence of a calamity or catastrophe enumerated
in Article 158 of this Code.

"This Article shall apply to any prisoner whether undergoing preventive imprisonment
or serving sentence."

Section 5. Article 99 of the same Act is hereby further amended to read as follows:"

"ART. 99. Who grants time allowances. – Whenever lawfully justified, the Director of
the Bureau of Corrections, the Chief of the Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology and/or the Warden of a provincial, district, municipal or city jail shall grant
allowances for good conduct. Such allowances once granted shall not be revoked."

Section 6. Penal Clause. – Faithful compliance with the provisions of this Act is hereby
mandated. As such, the penalty of one (1) year imprisonment, a fine of One hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00) and perpetual disqualification to hold office shall be imposed
against any public officer or employee who violates the provisions of this Act.

Section 7. Implementing Rules and Regulations. – The Secretary of the Department of

Justice (DOJ) and the Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government
(DILG) shall within sixty (60) days from the approval of this Act, promulgate rules and
regulations on the classification system for good conduct and time allowances, as may be
necessary, to implement the provisions of this Act.

Section 8. Separability Clause. – If any part hereof is held invalid or unconstitutional, the
remainder of the provisions not otherwise affected shall remain valid and subsisting.

Section 9. Repealing Clause. – Any law, presidential decree or issuance, executive order,
letter of instruction, administrative order, rule or regulation contrary to or inconsistent with
the provisions of this Act is hereby repealed, modified or amended accordingly.

Section 10. Effectivity Clause. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days from its
publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) new papers of general circulation.

Approved,

(Sgd.) JUAN PONCE ENRILE (Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.

President of the Senate Speaker of the House of
Representatives

This Act which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 3064 and House Bill No. 417 was finally
passed by the Senate and the House of Representatives on November 5, 2012 and
January 28, 2013, respectively.

(Sgd.) EDWIN B. BELLEN (Sgd.) MARILYN B. BARUA-YAP

Acting Senate Secretary Secretary General
House of Representatives

Approved: MAY 29 2013

(Sgd.) BENIGNO S. AQUINO III

President of the Philippines
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659

AN ACT TO IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY ON CERTAIN HEINOUS CRIMES,

AMENDING FOR THAT PURPOSE THE REVISED PENAL LAWS, AS AMENDED, OTHER
SPECIAL PENAL LAWS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

WHEREAS, the Constitution, specifically Article III, Section 19 paragraph (1) thereof, states
"Excessive fines shall not be imposed nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted.
Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. . .";

WHEREAS, the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for being grievous,
odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness,
viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common
standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society;

WHEREAS, due to the alarming upsurge of such crimes which has resulted not only in the
loss of human lives and wanton destruction of property but also affected the nation's efforts
towards sustainable economic development and prosperity while at the same time has
undermined the people's faith in the Government and the latter's ability to maintain peace
and order in the country;

WHEREAS, the Congress, in the justice, public order and the rule of law, and the need to
rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons
to impose the death penalty for said crimes;

Now, therefore,

Section 1. Declaration of Policy. - It is hereby declared the policy of the State to foster and
ensure not only obedience to its authority, but also to adopt such measures as would
effectively promote the maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty and
property, and the promotion of the general welfare which are essential for the enjoyment by
all the people of the blessings of democracy in a just and humane society;

Section 2. Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is hereby amended to read
as follows:

"Art. 114. Treason. - Any Filipino citizen who levies war against the Philippines or
adheres to her enemies giving them aid or comfort within the Philippines or
elsewhere, shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death and shall pay a fine not
to exceed 100,000 pesos."

No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses at

least to the same overt act or on confession of the accused in open court.

Likewise, an alien, residing in the Philippines, who commits acts of treason as

defined in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be punished by reclusion temporal to
death and shall pay a fine not to exceed 100,000 pesos."

Section 3. Section Three, Chapter One, Title One of Book Two of the same Code is hereby
amended to read as follows:

"Section Three. - Piracy and mutiny on the high seas or in the Philippine waters

Art. 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine waters. - The
penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be inflicted upon any person who, on the high
seas, or in Philippine waters, shall attack or seize a vessel or, not being a member of
its complement nor a passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the cargo of said
vessel, its equipment or passengers.
 The same penalty shall be inflicted in case of mutiny on the high seas or in
Philippine waters."

Art. 123. Qualified piracy. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be
imposed upon those who commit any of the crimes referred to in the preceding
article, under any of the following circumstances:

1. Whenever they have seized a vessel by boarding or firing upon the same;

2. Whenever the pirates have abandoned their victims without means of

saving themselves or;

3. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, physical injuries

or rape."

Section 4. There shall be incorporated after Article 211 of the same Code a new article to
read as follows:

"Art. 211-A. Qualified Bribery. - If any public officer is entrusted with law enforcement
and he refrains from arresting or prosecuting an offender who has committed a crime
punishable by reclusion perpetua and/or death in consideration of any offer, promise,
gift or present, he shall suffer the penalty for the offense which was not prosecuted.

If it is the public officer who asks or demands such gift or present, he shall suffer the
penalty of death."

Section 5. The penalty of death for parricide under Article 246 of the same Code is hereby
restored, so that it shall read as follows:

"Art. 246. Parricide. - Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate of illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse,
shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua
to death."

Section 6. Article 248 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246
shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of

armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or
persons to insure or afford impunity.

2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.

3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a

vessel, derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of
motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and
ruin.

4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding

paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone,
epidemic or other public calamity.

5. With evident premeditation.

6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the

victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse."

Section 7. Article 255 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:
 "Art. 255. Infanticide. - The penalty provided for parricide in Article 246 and for
murder in Article 248 shall be imposed upon any person who shall kill any child less
than three days of age.

If any crime penalized in this Article be committed by the mother of the child for the
purpose of concealing her dishonor, she shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in
its medium and maximum periods, and if said crime be committed for the same
purpose by the maternal grandparents or either of them, the penalty shall be
reclusion temporal."

Section 8. Article 267 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private individual who shall
kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.

2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.

4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the

accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer.

The penalty shall be death penalty where the kidnapping or detention was committed
for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none
of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the
offense.

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is

subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed."

Section 9. Article 294 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons - Penalties. - Any
person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person
shall suffer:

1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion

of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the
robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or
arson.

2. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion

perpetua, when or if by reason or on occasion of such robbery, any of the
physical injuries penalized in subdivision I of Article 263 shall have been
inflicted.

3. The penalty of reclusion temporal, when by reason or on occasion of the

robbery, any of the physical injuries penalized in subdivision 2 of the article
mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, shall have been inflicted.

4. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in

its medium period, if the violence or intimidation employed in the commission
of the robbery shall have been carried to a degree clearly unnecessary for the
commission of the crime, or when in the course of its execution, the offender
shall have inflicted upon any person not responsible for its commission any of
the physical injuries covered by subdivisions 3 and 4 of said Article 263.

5. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor

in its medium period in other cases."
Section 10. Article 320 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 320. Destructive Arson. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be
imposed upon any person who shall burn:

1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of

burning, or as a result of simultaneous burnings, committed on several or
different occasions.

2. Any building of public or private ownership, devoted to the public in general

or where people usually gather or congregate for a definite purpose such as,
but not limited to, official governmental function or business, private
transaction, commerce, trade, workshop, meetings and conferences, or
merely incidental to a definite purpose such as but not limited to hotels,
motels, transient dwellings, public conveyances or stops or terminals,
regardless of whether the offender had knowledge that there are persons in
said building or edifice at the time it is set on fire and regardless also of
whether the building is actually inhabited or not.

3. Any train or locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or airplane, devoted to

transportation or conveyance, or for public use, entertainment or leisure.

4. Any building, factory, warehouse installation and any appurtenances

thereto, which are devoted to the service of public utilities.

5. Any building the burning of which is for the purpose of concealing or

destroying evidence of another violation of law, or for the purpose of
concealing bankruptcy or defrauding creditors or to collect from insurance.

Irrespective of the application of the above enumerated qualifying circumstances, the

penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall likewise be imposed when the arson is
perpetrated or committed by two (2) or more persons or by a group of persons,
regardless of whether their purpose is merely to burn or destroy the building or the
burning merely constitutes an overt act in the commission or another violation of law.

The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall also be imposed upon any person
who shall burn:

1. Any arsenal, shipyard, storehouse or military powder or fireworks factory,

ordnance, storehouse, archives or general museum of the Government.

2. In an inhabited place, any storehouse or factory of inflammable or

explosive materials.

If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under this

Article, death results, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed."

Section 11. Article 335 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two
or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
 When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the
penalty shall be death.

When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or

on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty
shall be death.

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of
the following attendant circumstances:

1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree, or the common-law-spouse of the parent of the
victim.

2. when the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.

3. when the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the
children or other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity.

4. when the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old.

5. when the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune

Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease.

6. when committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or

the Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency.

7. when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered
permanent physical mutilation."

Section 12. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime
of Plunder) is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. - Any public officer who, by
himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses,
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt
criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total
value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of
plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who
participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing
to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition
of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be
considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and
their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of
stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State."

Section 13. Sections 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9, of Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act 1972, are hereby amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 3. Importation of Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death

and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall import or bring into
the Philippines any prohibited drug.

"Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited

Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine from five hundred
thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute,
 dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of
such transactions.

Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the victim
of the offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense under
this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum
penalty herein provided shall be imposed.

"Sec. 5. Maintenance of a Den, Dive or Resort for Prohibited Drug Users. - The
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand
pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person or group of persons
who shall maintain a den, dive or resort where any prohibited drug is used in any
form or where such prohibited drugs in quantities specified in Section 20, Paragraph
1 of this Act are found.

Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, the

maximum of the penalty shall be imposed in every case where a prohibited drug is
administered, delivered or sold to a minor who is allowed to use the same in such
place.

Should a prohibited drug be the proximate cause of the death of a person using the
same in such den, dive or resort, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be
imposed on the maintainer notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to
the contrary.

"Sec. 7. Manufacture of Prohibited Drug. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death

and fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall engage in the
manufacture of any prohibited drug.

"Sec. 8. Possession or Use of Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua

to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos
shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall possess or
use any prohibited drug subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.

"Sec. 9. Cultivation of Plants which are Sources of Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to
ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall plant, cultivate or
culture any medium Indian hemp, opium poppy (papaver somniferum), or any other
plant which is or may hereafter be classified as dangerous drug or from which any
dangerous drug may be manufactured or derived.

The land or portions hereof, and/or greenhouses on which any of said plants is
cultivated or cultured shall be confiscated and escheated to the State, unless the
owner thereof can prove that he did not know such cultivation or culture despite the
exercise of due diligence on his part.

If the land involved in is part of the public domain, the maximum of the penalties
herein provided shall be imposed upon the offender."

Section 14. Sections 14, 14-A, and 15 of Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, are hereby amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 14. Importation of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to

death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall
be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall import or bring
any regulated drug in the Philippines.

"Sec. 14-A. Manufacture of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to

death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall
be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall engage in the
manufacture of any regulated drug.
 "Sec. 15. Sale, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Transportation and
Distribution of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a
fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed
upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, dispense, deliver,
transport or distribute any regulated drug.

Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the victim
of the offense is a minor, or should a regulated drug involved in any offense under
this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum
penalty herein provided shall be imposed."

Section 15. There shall be incorporated after Section 15 of Article III of Republic Act No.
6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drug Act of 1972, a new section to read as
follows:

"Sec. 15-a. Maintenance of a den, dive or resort for regulated drug users. - The
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand
pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person or group of persons
who shall maintain a den, dive or resort where any regulated drugs is used in any
form, or where such regulated drugs in quantities specified in Section 20, paragraph
1 of this Act are found.

Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, the

maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed in every case where a regulated
drug is administered, delivered or sold to a minor who is allowed to use the same in
such place.

Should a regulated drug be the proximate cause of the death of a person using the
same in such den, dive or resort, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be
imposed on the maintainer notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to
the contrary."

Section 16. Section 16 of Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua
to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos
shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess or use any regulated drug
without the corresponding license or prescription, subject to the provisions of Section
20 hereof."

Section 17. Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is hereby amended to read as follows:

Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or

Instruments of the Crime. - The penalties for offenses under Section 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9
of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied
if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following quantities :

1. 40 grams or more of opium;

2. 40 grams or more of morphine;

3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride;

4. 40 grams or more of heroin;

5. 750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana;

6. 50 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;

7. 40 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride; or

 8. In the case of other dangerous drugs, the quantity of which is far beyond
therapeutic requirements, as determined and promulgated by the Dangerous
Drugs Board, after public consultations/hearings conducted for the purpose.

Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalty
shall range from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the
quantity.

Every penalty imposed for the unlawful importation, sale, administration, delivery,
transportation or manufacture of dangerous drugs, the cultivation of plants which are
sources of dangerous drugs and the possession of any opium pipe and other
paraphernalia for dangerous drugs shall carry with it the confiscation and forfeiture,
in favor of the Government, of all the proceeds of the crime including but not limited
to money and other obtained thereby and the instruments or tools with which it was
committed, unless they are the property of a third person not liable for the offense,
but those which are not of lawful commerce shall be ordered destroyed without
delay. Dangerous drugs and plant sources of such drugs as well as the proceeds or
instruments of the crime so confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government
shall be turned over to the Board for proper disposal without delay.

Any apprehending or arresting officer who misappropriates or misapplies or fails to

account for seized or confiscated dangerous drugs or plant-sources of dangerous
drugs or proceeds or instruments of the crime as are herein defined shall after
conviction be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos."

Section 18. There shall be incorporated after Section 20 of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, a new section to read as follows:

"Sec. 20-A. Plea-bargaining Provisions. - Any person charged under any provision of
this Act where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death shall not be
allowed to avail of the provision on plea bargaining."

Section 19. Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, is hereby amended to read as follows :

"Sec. 24. Penalties for Government Official and Employees and Officers and
Members of Police Agencies and the Armed Forces, 'Planting' of Evidence. - The
maximum penalties provided for Section 3, 4(1), 5(1), 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12 and 13 of
Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15(1), 16 and 19 of Article III shall be imposed, if
those found guilty of any of the said offenses are government officials, employees or
officers, including members of police agencies and the armed forces.

Any such above government official, employee or officer who is found guilty of
"planting" any dangerous drugs punished in Sections 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 and 13 of Article II
and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act in the person or in the
immediate vicinity of another as evidence to implicate the latter, shall suffer the
same penalty as therein provided."

Section 20. Sec. 14 of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended, known as the Anti-Carnapping
Act of 1972, is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. - Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as
this term is defined in Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of
motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years
and eight months and not more than seventeen years and four months, when the
carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon
things; and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and
not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of violence
against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of
the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the
carnapping or on the occasion thereof."
Section 21. Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is hereby amended to read
as follows:

"Art. 27. Reclusion perpetua. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be from
twenty years and one day to forty years.

Reclusion temporal. - The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be from twelve years
and one day to twenty years.

Prision mayor and temporary disqualification. - The duration of the penalties of

prision mayor and temporary disqualification shall be from six years and one day to
twelve years, except when the penalty of disqualification is imposed as an accessory
penalty, in which case, it shall be that of the principal penalty.

Prision correccional, suspension, and destierro. - The duration of the penalties of

prision correccional, suspension, and destierro shall be from six months and one day
to six years, except when the suspension is imposed as an accessory penalty, in
which case, its duration shall be that of the principal penalty.

Arresto mayor. - The duration of the penalty of arresto mayor shall be from one
month and one day to six months.

Arresto menor. - The duration of the penalty of arresto menor shall be from one day
to thirty days.

Bond to keep the peace. - The bond to keep the peace shall be required to cover
such period of time as the court may determine."

Section 22. Article 47 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:

Art. 47. In what cases the death penalty shall not be imposed; Automatic review of
the Death Penalty Cases. - The death penalty shall be imposed in all cases in which
it must be imposed under existing laws, except when the guilty person is below
eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the crime or is more than
seventy years of age or when upon appeal or automatic review of the case by the
Supreme Court, the required majority vote is not obtained for the imposition of the
death penalty, in which cases the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua.

In all cases where the death penalty is imposed by the trial court, the records shall
be forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review and judgment by the Court
en banc, within twenty (20) days but not earlier than fifteen (15) days after
promulgation of the judgment or notice of denial of any motion for new trial or
reconsideration. The transcript shall also be forwarded within ten (10) days from the
filing thereof by the stenographic reporter."

Section 23. Article 62 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby amended to read as
follows :

"Art. 62. Effects of the attendance of mitigating or aggravating circumstances and of

habitual delinquency. - Mitigating or aggravating circumstances and habitual
delinquency shall be taken into account for the purpose of diminishing or increasing
the penalty in conformity with the following rules:

1. Aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime specially

punishable by law or which are included by the law in defining a crime and
prescribing the penalty therefor shall not be taken into account for the purpose of
increasing the penalty.

1(a). When in the commission of the crime, advantage was taken by the offender of
his public position, the penalty to be imposed shall be in its maximum regardless of
mitigating circumstances.

The maximum penalty shall be imposed if the offense was committed by any group
who belongs to an organized/syndicated crime group.
 An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two or more persons
collaborating, confederating or mutually helping one another for purposes of gain in
the commission of any crime.

2. The same rule shall apply with respect to any aggravating circumstances inherent
in the crime to such a degree that it must of necessity accompany the commission
thereof.

3. Aggravating or mitigating circumstances which arise from the moral attributes of

the offender, or from his private relations with the offended party, or from any other
personal cause, shall only serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability of the principals,
accomplices and accessories as to whom such circumstances are attendant.

4. The circumstances which consist in the material execution of the act, or in the
means employed to accomplish it, shall serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability of
those persons only who had knowledge of them at the time of the execution of the
act or their cooperation therein.

5. Habitual delinquency shall have the following effects :

(a) Upon a third conviction the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty
provided by law for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the
additional penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods;

(b) Upon a fourth conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty
provided for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional
penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods; and

(c) Upon a fifth or additional conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the
penalty provided for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the
additional penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion
temporal in its minimum period.

Notwithstanding the provisions of this article, the total of the two penalties to
be imposed upon the offender, in conformity herewith, shall in no case
exceed 30 years.

For purposes of this article, a person shall be deemed to be a habitual

delinquent, if within a period of ten years from the date of his release or last
conviction of the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robo,
hurto, estafa or falsification, he is found guilty of any of said crimes a third
time or oftener.

Section 24. Article 81 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby amended to read as
follows :

"Art. 81. When and how the death penalty is to be executed. - The death sentence
shall be executed with preference to any other and shall consist in putting the person
under sentence to death by electrocution. The death sentence shall be executed
under the authority of the Director of Prisons, endeavoring so far as possible to
mitigate the sufferings of the person under the sentence during electrocution as well
as during the proceedings prior to the execution.

If the person under sentence so desires, he shall be anaesthetized at the moment of

the execution.

As soon as facilities are provided by the Bureau of Prisons, the method of carrying
out the sentence shall be changed to gas poisoning.

The death sentence shall be carried out not later than one (1) year after the
judgment has become final."

Section 25. Article 83 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:
 "Art. 83. Suspension of the execution of the death sentence. - The death sentence
shall not be inflicted upon a woman while she is pregnant or within one (1) year after
delivery, nor upon any person over seventy years of age. In this last case, the death
sentence shall be commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory
penalties provided in Article 40.

In all cases where the death sentence has become final, the records of the case
shall be forwarded immediately by the Supreme Court to the Office of the President
for possible exercise of the pardoning power."

Section 26.<="" p="">

Section 27. If, for any reason or reasons, any part of the provision of this Act shall be held to
be unconstitutional or invalid, other parts or provisions hereof which are not affected thereby
shall continue to be in full force and effect.

Section 28. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in two (2) national
newspapers of general circulation. The publication shall not be later than seven (7) days
after the approval hereof.

Approved: December 13, 1993

 REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8353

AN ACT EXPANDING THE DEFINITION OF THE CRIME OF RAPE, RECLASSIFYING

THE SAME AS A CRIME AGAINST PERSONS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ACT
NO. 3815, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled:

Section 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known as "The Anti-Rape Law of 1997."

Sec. 2. Rape as a Crime Against Persons. - The crime of rape shall hereafter be classified
as a Crime Against Persons under Title Eight of Act No. 3815, as amended, otherwise
known as the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, there shall be incorporated into Title Eight
of the same Code a new chapter to be known as Chapter Three on Rape, to read as
follows:
"Chapter Three
"Rape
"Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed:

"1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
"a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

"b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

"c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

"d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
"2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof,
shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or
anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.

"Article 266-B. Penalty. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua.

"Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

"When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty
shall become reclusion perpetua to death.

"When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion
thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

"When by reason or on the occasion ofthe rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be
death.

"The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

"l) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim;

"2) When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities or any law
enforcement or penal institution;
"3) When the rape is committed in full view of the spouse, parent, any of the children or
other relatives within the third civil degree of consanguinity;

"4) When the victim is a religious engaged in legitimate religious vocation or calling and is
personally known to be such by the offender before or at the time of the commission of the
crime;

"5) When the victim is a child below seven (7) years old;

"6) When the offender knows that he is afflicted with the Human Immuno-Deficiency Virus
(HIV)/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) or any other sexually transmissible
disease and the virus or disease is transmitted to the victim;

"7) When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or para-military
units thereof or the Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency or penal
institution, when the offender took advantage of his position to facilitate the commission of
the crime;

"8) When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent
physical mutilation or disability;

"9) When the offender knew of the pregnancy of the offended party at the time of the
commission of the crime; and

"10) When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical
handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime.

"Rape under paragraph 2 of the next preceding article shall be punished by prision mayor.

"Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be prision mayor to reclusion temporal.

"When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty
shall be reclusion temporal.

"When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion
thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua.

"When by reason or on the occasion ofthe rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be
reclusion perpetua.

"Reclusion temporal shall be imposed if the rape is committed with any of the ten
aggravating/ qualifying circumstances mentioned in this article.

"Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon. - The subsequent valid marriage between the offended
party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty imposed.

"In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the wife
as the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty: Provided, That the
crime shall not be extinguished or the penalty shall not be abated if the marriage is voidab
initio.

"Article 266-D. Presumptions. - Any physical overt act manifesting resistance against the
act of rape in any degree from the offended party, or where the offended party is so situated
as to render her/him incapable of giving valid consent, may be accepted as evidence in the
prosecution of the acts punished under Article 266-A."

Sec. 3. Separability Clause. - If any part, Sec., or provision of this Act is declared invalid or
unconstitutional, the other parts thereof not affected thereby shall remain valid.

Sec. 4. Repealing Clause. - Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, and all laws, acts,
presidential decrees, executive orders, administrative orders, rules and regulations
inconsistent with or contrary to the provisions of this Act are deemed amended, modified or
repealed accordingly.

Sec. 5. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after completion of its
publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

Approved: September 30, 1997.

 REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9346]

AN ACT PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY IN THE PHILIPPINES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of Philippines in Congress

assembled:

SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly,

Republic Act No. Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise
known as the Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection is hereby repealed, Republic Act
No. Seven Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659), otherwise known as the
Death Penalty Law, and all other laws, executive orders and decrees, insofar as they
impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.

SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:

(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature
of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or

(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the
nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.

SEC. 3. Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose

sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible
for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as
amended.

SEC. 4. The Board of Pardons and Parole shall cause the publication at least once a week
for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation of the names of persons
convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment by reason of
this Act who are being considered or recommended for commutation or pardon: Provided,
however; That nothing herein shall limit the power of the President to grant executive
clemency under Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution.

SEC. 5. This Act shall take effect immediately after its publication in two national
newspapers of general circulation.

(Sgd.) JOSE DE VENECIA JR. (Sgd.) FRANKLIN M. DRILON

Speaker of the House President of the Senate
of Representatives
Approved,

This Act which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2254 and House Bill No. 4826 was
finally passed by the Senate and the House of Representatives on June 7, 2006.

(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO (Sgd.) OSCAR G. YABES

Secretary General Secretary of the Senate
House of Representatives

Approved: JUN 24 2006

(Sgd.) GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

President of the Philippines