RULES OF COURT

RULE 1

General Provisions

Section 1. Title of the Rules. — These Rule shall be known and cited as the Rules of Court. (1)

Section 2. In what courts applicable. — These Rules shall apply in all the courts, except as otherwise
provided by the Supreme Court. (n)

Section 3. Cases governed. — These Rules shall govern the procedure to be observed in actions, civil
or criminal and special proceedings.

(a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right,
or the prevention or redress of a wrong, (1a, R2)

A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are governed by the rules for ordinary civil
actions, subject to the specific rules prescribed for a special civil action. (n)

(b) A criminal action is one by which the State prosecutes a person for an act or omission
punishable by law. (n)

(c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact. (2a, R2)

Section 4. In what case not applicable. — These Rules shall not apply to election cases, land
registration, cadastral, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein
provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and
convenient. (R143a)

HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON, namely, ALVARO YPON, ERUDITA Y. BARON, CICERO

YPON, WILSON YPON, VICTOR YPON, and HINIDINO Y. PEÑALOSA, petitioners, vs.
GAUDIOSO PONTERAS RICAFORTE a.k.a. “GAUDIOSO E. YPON,” and THE REGISTER
OF DEEDS of TOLEDO CITY, respondents.

PERLAS-BERNABE,J.:

FACTS:

On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together with some of their cousins, 4 filed a complaint for
Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance with Damages (subject complaint) against respondent
Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte a.k.a. “Gaudioso E. Ypon” (Gaudioso), docketed as Civil Case No. T-
2246. In their complaint, they alleged that Magdaleno Ypon (Magdaleno) died intestate and childless
on June 28, 1968, leaving behind Lot Nos. 2-AA, 2-C, 2-F, and 2-J which were then covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-44 and T-77-A

Claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of Self-

Adjudication and caused the cancellation of the aforementioned certificates of title, leading to their
subsequent transfer in his name under TCT Nos. T-2637 and T-2638,7 to the prejudice of petitioners
who are Magdaleno’s collateral relatives and successors-in-interest
 Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as evidenced by: (a) his certificate of
Live Birth; (b) two (2) letters from Polytechnic School; and (c) a certified true copy of his
passport.9 Further, by way of affirmative defense, he claimed that: (a) petitioners have no cause of
action against him; (b) the complaint fails to state a cause of action; and (c) the case is not prosecuted
by the real parties-in-interest, as there is no showing that the petitioners have been judicially
declared as Magdaleno’s lawful heir.

the RTC issued the assailed July 27, 2011 Order, 11 finding that the subject complaint failed
to state a cause of action against Gaudioso. It observed that while the plaintiffs therein had
established their relationship with Magdaleno in a previous special proceeding for the issuance of
letters of administration,12this did not mean that they could already be considered as the decedent’s
compulsory heirs. Quite the contrary, Gaudioso satisfactorily established the fact that he is
Magdaleno’s son.Motion for reconsideration was denied due to counsel’s fault.

 This is a direct recourse to the Court from the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Branch 59
(RTC), through a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules ofCourt, raising
a pure question of law

ISSUE:

The core of the present controversy revolves around the issue of whether or not the RTC’s
dismissal of the case on the ground that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action was
proper.

action

RULING:

The petition has no merit.

Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. 16 It
is well-settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the
complaint.17 In this relation, a complaint is said to assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting
what appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed
for.18 Accordingly, if the allegations furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be
maintained, the same should not be dismissed, regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the
defendants.

As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs therein, alleged
that they are the lawful heirs of Magdaleno and based on the same, prayed that the Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication executed by Gaudioso be declared null and void and that the transfer certificates of title
issued in the latter’s favor be cancelled. While the foregoing allegations, if admitted to be true, would
consequently warrant the reliefs sought for in the said complaint, the rule that the determination of
a decedent’s lawful heirs should be made in the corresponding special proceeding 20 precludes the
RTC, in an ordinary action for cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the same

By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the determination of
heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had
voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already presented their evidence regarding the
issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment thereon, 23 or when a special
proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be re-
opened.24
In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to exist. Hence,
there lies the need to institute the proper special proceeding in order to determine the heirship of the
parties involved, ultimately resulting to the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246.
SYLLABUS:

Same; Civil Law; Succession; Matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be
ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of
determining such rights.―In the case of Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. CA, 581 SCRA 70 (2009), the
Court, citing several other precedents, held that the determination of who are the decedent’s lawful
heirs must be made in the proper special proceeding for such purpose, and not in an ordinary suit for
recovery of ownership and/or possession, as in this case: Jurisprudence dictates that the
determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the proper
special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and
possession of property. This must take precedence over the action for recovery of possession and
ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of
heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a
special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is
defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of
heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are
seeking the establishment of a status or right. In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera, this
Court ruled that the declaration of heirship must be made in a special proceeding, and not in an
independent civil action. This doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of Appeals x x x: In the more
recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, the Court reiterated its ruling that matters
relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate
court in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such
rights. Citing the case of Agapay v. Palang, this Court held that the status of an illegitimate child
who claimed to be an heir to a decedent’s estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action
which, as in this case, was for the recovery of property.

Same; Same;

Section 5. Commencement of action. — A civil action is commenced by the filing of the original
complaint in court. If an additional defendant is impleaded in a later pleading, the action is
commenced with regard to him on the dated of the filing of such later pleading, irrespective of whether
the motion for its admission, if necessary, is denied by the court. (6a)

ISABEL G. RAMONES, PETITIONER, V. SPOUSES TEODORICO GUIMOC, JR. AND

ELENITA GUIMOC, RESPONDENTS.

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:

 This case stemmed from an Information[5] filed (COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION) on June 30,
2006 before the Municipal Trial Court of Mariveles, Bataan (MTC), docketed as Criminal Case
No. 06-8539, charging respondents with the crime of Other Forms of Swindling under Article 316
(2) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),

 Respondents obtained money (loan) from Isabel Ramones in the amount of P663,000.00 with the
promise to sell their house and lot to the latter, and in fact, the accused executed a Deed of Sale
of Residential Bldg. and Transfer of Rights over the aforementioned house and lot which they
 acknowledged before a Notary Public, despite the accused knowing fully well that said property
was already mortgaged to a third person, to the damage and prejudice of the said Isabel
Ramones.

 MTC, in a Judgment[10] dated September 21, 2011, acquitted Teodorico but found Elenita guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Other Forms of Swindling under Article 316 (2) of the
RPC, and accordingly, sentenced her to suffer the penalty. In addition, Elenita was ordered to pay
the amount of P507,000.00, and despite his acquittal, Teodorico was also directed to pay the
amount of P60,000.00, which amounts reflect their respective civil liabilities,

 Respondents appealed[12] to the RTC, docketed as Criminal Case No. ML-4095. And alleged that
petitioner’s patyment of docket fees is insufficient pursuant to SC Circular No. 35-2004

 RTC affirmed the MTC ruling with modification, acquitting Elenita on the ground of reasonable
doubt, but still maintaining respondents' civil liabilities. ]Notably, however, the RTC did not rule
upon the issue of non-payment of correct filing fees.

 CA affirmed the RTC judgment and order.[26] It ruled, among others, that the failure to pay docket
fees did not preclude petitioner from recovering damages, considering that Section 1, Rule 111 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure does not require the payment of filing fees for actual damages\

 respondents moved for reconsideration, the CA granted respondents' motion for reconsideration
and set aside its earlier decision. CA deleted the order directing respondents to pay their
respective civil liabilities.

 Petitioner moved for reconsideration of CA ruling, but the move was denied.

ISSUE:

whether or not the CA correctly deleted the award of damages.

RULING:

NO, Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure states that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in these
Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual damages."[35]
Among these exceptions, Section 21, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-
SC[36] - which guidelines were reflected in SC Circular No. 35-2004 and was already in effect at the time
the Information was filed - states that the payment of filing fees is required in estafa cases under the
following conditions:
SEC. 21. Other fees. -The following fees shall also be collected by the clerks of court of the regional trial
courts or courts of the first level, as the case may be:
(a) In estafa cases where the offended party fails to manifest within fifteen (15) days following the
filing of the information that the civil liability arising from the crime has been or would be
separately prosecuted, or in violations of BP No. 22 if the amount involved is:xxx

In the 1987 case of Manchester Development Corporation v. CA (Manchester),[37] the Court laid down the
general rule that "[a court] acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed
docket fee."[38] In Manchester, the Court upheld the CA's dismissal of the case filed therein, based on the
following circumstances:
The Court of Appeals therefore, aptly ruled in the present case that the basis of assessment of the
docket fee should be the amount of damages sought in the original complaint and not in the
amended complaint.The Court cannot close this case without making the observation that it frowns at
the practice of counsel who filed the original complaint in this case of omitting any specification of the
amount of damages in the prayer although the amount of over P78 million is alleged in the body of the
complaint. This is clearly intended for no other purpose than to evade the payment of the correct
filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk in the assessment of the filing fee. \

To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar
pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the
pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the
filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not be accepted nor
admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.

The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee.
An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court,
much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading.
x x x.[39] (Emphasis supplied)

Accordingly, subsequent decisions now uniformly hold that "when insufficient filing fees are
initially paid by the plaintiffs and there is no intention to defraud the government,
the Manchester rule does not apply

In line with this legal paradigm, prevailing case law demonstrates that "[t]he non-payment of the
prescribed filing fees at the time of the filing of the complaint or other initiatory pleading fails to vest
jurisdiction over the case in the trial court. Yet, where the plaintiff has paid the amount of filing
fees assessed by the clerk of court, and the amount paid turns out to be deficient, the trial court still
acquires jurisdiction over the case, subject to the payment by the plaintiff of the deficiency
assessment."[46] "The reason is that to penalize the party for the omission of the clerk of court is not fair if
the party has acted in good faith.

In this case, it is undisputed that the amount of P500.00 paid by petitioner was insufficient to cover the
required filing fees for her estafa case under the premises of Section 21, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court,
as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC. Nonetheless, it is equally undisputed that she paid the full amount
of docket fees as assessed by the Clerk of Court of the MTC, which is evidenced by a certification
dated April 11, 2016 issued therefor. In addition, petitioner consistently manifested her willingness to pay
additional docket fees when required. In her petition, she claims that she is "very much willing to pay the
correct docket fees which is the reason why she immediately went to the clerks of court[,] and records
show that she paid the [MTC] of the amount assessed from her."[53] Indeed, the foregoing actuations
negate any bad faith on petitioner's part, much more belie any intent to defraud the government. As such,
applying the principles above-discussed, the Court holds that the court a quo properly acquired
jurisdiction over the case. However, petitioner should pay the deficiency that shall be considered as a lien
on the monetary awards in her favor pursuant to Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court

Besides, the Court observes that if respondents believed that the assessment of filing fees was incorrect,
then it was incumbent upon them to have raised the same before the MTC. Instead, contrary to the CA's
assertion,[54]records show that respondents actively participated in the proceedings before the MTC and
belatedly questioned the alleged underpayment of docket fees only for the first time on appeal [55] before
the RTC, or five (5) years later after the institution of the instant case. The Court is aware that lack of
jurisdiction, as a ground to dismiss a complaint, may, as a general rule, be raised at any stage of the
proceedings. However, in United Overseas Bank, the Court has observed that the same is subject to the
doctrine of estoppel by laches, which squarely applies here

. By way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question of whether or not the court had
jurisdiction either over the subject matter of the action or the parties is not important in such cases
because the party is barred from such conduct, not because the judgment or the order of the court is valid
and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice cannot be tolerated by reason
of public policy

ince the Manila RTC ruled that the petitioner is now estopped by laches from questioning its jurisdiction
and considering that its Order denying petitioner's Motion to Dismiss is not tainted with grave abuse of
discretion but wholly substantiated by the evidence on the record, this Court would no longer disturb said
order.[56]

Accordingly, the Court sets aside the assailed CA rulings. A new one is entered ordering Elenita and
Teodorico to pay petitioner the amounts of P507,000.00 and P60,000.00, respectively, both with legal
interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum, reckoned not from December 13, 2006 as ruled by
the MTC, but from the time the Information was filed on June 30, 2006, consistent with existing
jurisprudence on estafa cases,[57] and six percent (6%) per annum, from July 1, 2013 until full
satisfaction.[58] Further, the MTC is directed to determine the amount of deficient docket fees, which shall
constitute a lien on the aforementioned monetary awards.

EDUARDO D. MONSANTO, DECOROSO D. MONSANTO, SR., and REV.

FR. PASCUAL D. MONSANTO, JR., petitioners, vs. LEONCIO LIM and
LORENZO DE GUZMAN, respondents.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
FACTS:
In a letter dated February 18, 2004, Flordelis B. Menzon, Regional
6

Director of the Home Development Mutual Fund (Pag-IBIG),

requested the intervention of Executive Judge Sinforiano A.
Monsanto (Executive Judge Monsanto) of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Catbalogan, Samar on the alleged anomalous auction sale
conducted by Sheriff IV Lorenzo De Guzman (De Guzman). According
to Pag-IBIG, De Guzman previously acceded to its request to move
the date of the auction sale to January 20, 2004; however, to its
surprise, the sale proceeded as originally scheduled on January 15,
2004. Pag-IBIG also claimed that the winning bid of Leoncio Lim
(Leoncio) in the amount of P500,000.00 was grossly disadvantageous
to the government considering that the outstanding loan obligations
of the mortgagor, Eduardo Mon santo (Eduardo), was more than the
bid amount.
ISSUE:
RULING:
SYLLABI:
Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the
prescribed docket fees vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the
subject matter.”1
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Pleadings and Practice; Section 1, Rule 6 of the Rules
of Court defines pleadings as “written statements of the respective claims and defenses of the
parties submitted to the court for appropriate judgment.”—In this case, records show that no
formal complaint or petition was filed in court. The case was supposedly “commenced”
through a letter of Pag-IBIG asking the intervention of Executive Judge Monsanto on the
alleged anomalous foreclosure sale conducted by De Guzman. However, said letter could not
in any way be considered as a pleading. Section 1, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court defines
pleadings as “written statements of the respective claims and defenses of the parties
submitted to the court for appropriate judgment.” To stress, Pag-IBIG’s letter could not be
considered as a formal complaint or petition. First, the parties to the case were not
identified pursuant to Section 1, Rule 3 and Section 1, Rule 7. Second, the so-called claim or
cause of action was not properly mentioned or specified. Third, the letter miserably failed to
comply with the requirements of Rule 7, Rules of Court. The properly identified; the
allegations were not properly set forth; no particular relief is sought; in fact, only the
intervention of Executive Judge Monsanto is requested; it was not signed by a counsel; and
most of all, there is no verification or certification against forum shopping.

Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Docket Fees; It is hornbook law that courts acquire
jurisdiction over a case only upon payment of the prescribed docket fee.—We have also noted
that no docket fees were paid before the trial court. Section 1, Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court mandates that “[u]pon the filing of the pleading or other application which initiates
an action or proceeding, the fees prescribed therefor shall be paid in full.” “It is hornbook
law that courts acquire jurisdiction over a case only upon payment of the prescribed docket
fee.”
Same; Same; Same; It is settled jurisprudence that “any decision rendered without
jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time, even on appeal before this
Court.”—In fine, since no docket or filing fees were paid, then the RTC-Branch 28 did not
acquire jurisdiction over the matter/case. It therefore erred in taking cognizance of the
same. Consequently, all the proceedings undertaken by the trial court are null and void,
and without force and effect. In, particular, the July 1, 2005 and August 30, 2005 Orders of
the RTC are null and void. It is settled jurisprudence that “[a]ny decision rendered without
jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time, even on appeal before
this Court.” Prescinding from the foregoing, we hold that the RTC-Branch 28 did not
acquire jurisdiction over the instant matter/case there being no formal initiatory pleading
filed as well as nonpayment of docket fees. Consequently, all proceedings had before the
RTC-Branch 28 were null and void for lack of jurisdiction.

Section 6. Construction. — These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of
securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. (2a)