LAND TITLES AND DEEDS CASES and that said accretion was caused by the sea on the southward
at said accretion was caused by the sea on the southward portion of
1. G.R. No. 122269 September 30, 1999
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the SECRETARY OF
AGRICULTURE, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. VIVENCIO A. BANTUGAN, Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 55, Alaminos, Pangasinan, and
HEIRS OF ZENAIDA BUSTRIA-TIGNO, represented by CAMILO
TIGNO, respondents.
FACTS:
Sometime in 1957, one Matias Bustamante filed with the then CFI of
Pangasinan an application for registration under Act No. 496, as amended,
of a tract of land containing an area of 880,000 square meters, more or
less, situated in Barangay Malacapas, Dasol, Pangasinan.
Both the Director of Forestry and the Director of Fisheries filed oppositions
to the aforecited application, alleging among others, that "said parcel of
land, with the exception of 97,525 square meters, is a part of the Timber
Land Block "A" Land Classification Project 44, which is converted into fish
ponds." Isidro Bustria [private respondents' predecessor-in-interest] and
Julian Bustria, also opposed the said application for land registration,
alleging that they "have in the year 1943 occupied in good faith their
respective portions having a total area of fifty (50) hectares, more or
less . . . converted their respective portions into fish ponds . . . and actually
possessed and occupied their respective portions . . . exclusively against all
persons, except the Director of Forestry & Director of Fishery." After trial,
the lower court rendered a Decision in favor of applicant Bustamante.
On appeal to this Honorable Court, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 30058-R, it
was found that 783,275 square meters of the land applied for were
accretions added to applicant Bustamante's riceland of 9.7525 hectares,
said riceland. This Honorable Court then ruled:
This being so, the said accretion belongs — not to the riparian owner —
but the State. All lands thrown up by the sea and formed upon the shores,
belong to the national domain and are for public use, in accordance with
the provisions of the Law on Waters of August 3, 1866 (Insular Government
vs. Aldecoa, 19 Phil. 505) (p. 20, Decision, November 16, 1967).
Thus, modifying the judgment of the lower court, this Honorable Court
rendered a Decision on November 16, 1967, disposing:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is hereby modified
so that only 9.7525 of the land applied for is hereby adjudicated and
ordered to be registered in the name of the applicant, the remaining area
being hereby declared land of the public domain belonging to the Republic
of the Philippines, without prejudice to whatever rights oppositors Isidro
Bustria and Julian Bustria may have acquired over portions of the area thus
declared as land of the public domain, with costs against applicant.
SO ORDERED.
When brought up on certiorari to the Supreme Court, the
foregoing Judgment was affirmed in toto in the
Resolution in G.R. No. L-18605 dated February 29, 1968.
It is relevant to state at this point that the parcel of land
that is presently the subject of the dispute in the instant
case, Lot No. 7764, CAD 624-D (Portion) [Psu-155696, Lot
3 (Portion)], forms part of the above-mentioned parcel of
land declared by this Honorable Court as belonging to the
public domain, classified/zonified land available for
fishpond development, per L.C. Map No. 3175, approved
on June 24, 1984, under administrative Order No. 4-1829
(Annex "D", Petition). The subject lot contains an area of
49,999 square meters, more or less. This lot has been
leased to Mr. Porfirio Morado by the [Republic of the
1
Philippines], represented by the Secretary of Agriculture,
for a period of twenty-five (25) years, or up to December
31, 2013, under Fishpond Lease Agreement No. 5132,
dated August 17, 1989 (Annex "E", Petition).
On July 6, 1988, however, the late Zenaida Bustria
[daughter of Isidro Bustria] filed a complaint against
Porfirio Morado in the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos,
Pangasinan, Branch 55, for ownership and possession
over the lot in question [docketed as Civil Case No. A-
1759]. Herein petitioner, the Republic of the Philippines,
was not made a party to that suit.
In her complaint, Zenaida Bustria claimed absolute
ownership and quiet and peaceful possession of several
lots under PSU-155696 surveyed in the name of her
father, Isidro Bustria. She further asserted that said
Porfirio Morado maliciously applied for a fishpond permit
with the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources over
Lot 3 thereof (the subject lot), well-knowing that said lot
had always been occupied, possessed and worked by her
and her predecessors-in-interest.
Porfirio Morado denied the allegations in the complaint,
claiming that the lot in question is part of the public
domain which he developed and converted into a
fishpond. Due, however, to Porfirio Morado's and his
counsel's failure to appear at the pre-trial and
subsequent court hearings, the trial court subsequently
declared Porfirio Morado "as in default."
On January 23, 1992, Porfirio Morado filed a Petition for
Relief from Judgment which was denied on July 21, 1992
for lack of merit.
On July 8, 1992, a writ of execution was issued, and it was
implemented by Sheriffs Manuel O. de Asis and Sheriff
Cesar A. Gines. Spouses Porfirio Morado and Juliana
Morado thereafter filed with this Honorable Court a
Petition for Certiorari with Writ of Preliminary Injunction,
docketed as CA-G.R. No. 28932. In a Resolution dated
December 11, 1992, the Petition was denied for lack of
merit. The related Motion for Reconsideration was
denied in the Resolution dated February 18, 1993. (Rollo,
pp. 107-112) (emphasis omitted) 2
On April 19, 1994, petitioner, invoking §9 of B.P. Blg. 129, 3 filed with the
Court of Appeals a petition for the annulment of the trial court's decision,
dated December 17, 1991. Petitioner alleged that the land in question is
within the classified/zonified alienable and disposable lend for fishpond
development, per L.C. Map No. 3175 approved on June 24, 1984, under
Administrative Order No. 4-1829 and that since the land formed part of the
public domain, the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) has
jurisdiction over its disposition in accordance with P.D. No 704, §4.
On October 4, 1995 the, Court of Appeals rendered a decision dismissing
the petition. 4
Hence, this petition for review.
We shall deal with these questions in inverse order.
First, is the question whether petitioner has personality to bring the action
below. To begin with, an action to recover a parcel of land is in personam.
As such, it is binding only between the parties thereto, as this Court
explained in Ching v. Court of Appeals,6 viz:
An action to redeem, or to recover title to or possession
of, real property is not an action in rem or an action
against the whole world, like a land registration
proceeding or the probate of a will; it is an action in
personam, so much so that a judgment therein is binding
only upon the parties properly impleaded and duly heard
or given an opportunity to be heard. Actions in
2
 personam and actions in rem differ in that the former are
directed against specific persons and seek personal
judgments, while the latter are directed against the thing
or property or status of a person and seek judgments
with respect thereto as against the whole world. An
action to recover a parcel of land is a real action but it is
an action in personam, for it binds a particular individual
only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing.
The appellate court, holding that the proceedings before the trial court
were in personam, ruled that since petitioner was not a party to Civil Case
No. A-1759, it is not a real party-in-interest and, therefore, has no
personality to bring the action for annulment of the judgment rendered in
that case. The appellate court said:
Private respondents are correct. Civil Case No. A-1759
was purely for "Ownership and Possession". The decision
sought to be annulled is solely "between the private
respondents [the Bustrias] and Porfirio Morado" (Rollo, p.
142). Petitioner Republic was not a party in the case and
is not bound by the judgment rendered therein.
It is settled, a real party-in-interest is one who stands to
be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit
(Salonga vs. Warner Barnes & Co., Ltd., 88 Phil. 128;
Petitioner Republic not being a party, and the judgment
not being in rem, it does not stand to be benefited or
injured by the judgment sought. Petitioner Republic can
on its own, and even without resorting to this petition for
annulment of judgment, institute the proper action to
assert its claim that the "subject lot is a land forming part
of the public domain'' (Rollo, p. 145). It need not seek the
annulment of the subject judgment, in Civil Case No. A-
1759 in which it was not a party and involves merely a
question of ownership; and possession between plaintiffs
Zenaida B. Bustria and defendant Porfirio Morado and
which decision is not binding on it, to be able to assert its
claim or interest in the property. It is clear for this reason
that petitioner is not a real party-in-interest (Section 2,
Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court). 7
The next question is whether the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction to
declare the land in question to belong to private respondent. The
government asserts that the lot is within the "classified/zonified alienable
and disposable land for fishpond development," hence, it is part of the
public domain; 11 that under P.D. No. 704, §4, jurisdiction over its
disposition is vested in the BFAR; that unlike agricultural land, public lands
which are declared suitable for fishpond purposes may only be disposed of
by way of license, concession, or lease; and that possession thereof, no
matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership. 12
We agree with petitioner. The State clearly stands to be adversely affected
by the trial court's disposition of in alienable public land.
The land involved in this case was classified as public land suitable for
fishpond development. 15 In controversies involving the disposition of
public land, the burden of overcoming, the presumption of state ownership
of lands of the public domain lies upon the private claimant. 16 Private
respondents have not discharged this burden.
It is settled under the Public Land Law 17 that alienable public land held by a
possessor, personally or through his predecessor-in-interest, openly,
continuously, and exclusively for 30 years is ipso jure converted to private
property by the mere lapse of time. 18 However, only public lands classified
as agricultural 19 are alienable. Lands declared for fishery purposes are not
alienable 20 and their possession, no matter how long continued, cannot
ripen into ownership.
Since the disposition of lands declared suitable for fishpond purposes fall
within the jurisdiction of the BFAR, in accordance with P.D. No 704,
§4, 21 the trial court's decision, dated December 17, 1991, is null and void.
The trial court has no jurisdiction to make a disposition of inalienable
public land. If, as claimed, Porfirio Morado secured a fishpond permit
3
through fraud and misrepresentation, private respondents' sole recourse, if
any, is to secure the annulment of the same before the BFAR and apply for
a new one in their favor, provided that they are qualified therefor. What
they did, however, was not only to bring their action in the wrong forum
but to ask to be declared owners of the land in dispute.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the Court of
Appeals, Ninth Division, in CA-G.R. SP No. 34013, dated October 4, 1995, is
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The decision of Regional Trial Court of Alaminos,
Pangasinan, Branch 55, in Civil Case No. A-1759 is hereby declared NULL
AND VOID.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
2. [ G.R. No. L-32266, February 27, 1989 ]
THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, PETITIONER, VS. RUPERTO S. VILLAREAL,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
The basic question before the Court is the legal classification of mangrove
swamps, or manglares, as they are commonly known. If they are part of
our public forest lands, they are not alienable under the Constitution. If
they are considered public agricultural lands, they may be acquired under
private ownership. The private respondent's claim to the land in question
must be judged by these criteria.
The said land consists of 178,113 square meters of mangrove swamps
located in the municipality of Sapian, Capiz. Ruperto Villareal applied for its
registration on January 25, 1949, alleging that he and his predecessors-in-
interest had been in possession of the land for more than forty years. He
was opposed by several persons, including the petitioner on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines. After trial, the application was approved by the
Court of First Instance of Capiz.[1] The decision was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.[2] The Director of Forestry then came to this Court in a petition for
review on certiorari claiming that the land in dispute was forestal in nature
and not subject to private appropriation. He asks that the registration be
reversed.
It should be stressed at the outset that both the petitioner and the private
respondent agree that the land is mangrove land. There is no dispute as to
this. The bone of contention between the parties is the legal nature of
mangrove swamps or manglares. The petitioner claims it is forestal and
therefore not disposable and the private respondent insists it is alienable
as agricultural land. The issue before us is legal, not factual.
For a proper background of this case, we have to go back to the Philippine
Bill of 1902, one of the earlier American organic acts in the country. By this
law, lands of the public domain in the Philippines Islands were classified
into three grand divisions, to wit, agricultural, mineral and timber or forest
lends. This classification was maintained in the Constitution of the
Commonwealth, promulgated in 1935, until it was superseded by the
Constitution of 1973. That new charter expanded the classification of
public lands to include industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement,
and grazing lands and even permitted the legislature to provide for other
categories.[3] This provision has been reproduced, but with substantial
modifications, in the present Constitution.[4]
Under the Commonwealth Constitution, which was one charter in force
when this case arose, only agricultural lands were allowed to be alienated.
[5]
Their disposition was provided for under C.A. No. 141. Mineral and
timber or forest lands were not subject to private ownership unless they
were first reclassified as agricultural lands and so released for alienation.
In the leading case of Montano v. Insular Government,[6] promulgated in
4
1909, mangrove swamps or manglares were defined by the Court as:
"x x x mud flats, alternately washed and exposed by the tide, in which
grows various kindred plants which will not live except when watered by
the sea, extending their roots deep into the mud and casting their seeds,
which also germinate there. These constitute the mangrove flats of the
tropics, which exist naturally, but which are also, to some extent cultivated
by man for the sake of the combustible wood of the mangrove and like
trees as well as for the useful nipa palm propagate thereon. Although these
flats are literally tidal lands, yet we are of the opinion that they cannot be
so regarded in the sense in which that term is used in the cases cited or in
general American jurisprudence. The waters flowing over them are not
available for purpose of navigation, and they may be disposed of without
impairment of the public interest in what remains.
x x x More to the point, addressing itself directly to above-quoted Section 1820,
"Under this uncertain and somewhat unsatisfactory condition of the law,
the custom had grown of converting manglares and nipa lends into
fisheries which became a common feature of settlement along coast and at
the same time of the change of sovereignty constituted one of the most
productive industries of the Islands, the abrogation of which would destroy
vested interests and prove a public disaster."
Mangrove swamps were thus considered agricultural lends and so
susceptible of private ownership.
Subsequently, the Philippine Legislature categorically declared, despite the
above-cited case, that mangrove swamps form part of the public forests of
this country. This it did in the Administrative Code of 1917, which became
effective on October 1 of that year, thus:
"Section 1820. Words and phrase defined. For the purposes of this chapter
public forests' includes, except as otherwise specially indicated, all
unreserved public land, including nipa and mangrove swamps, and all
forest reserves of whatever character."
It is noteworthy, though, that notwithstanding this definition, the Court
maintained the doctrine in the Montano case when two years later it held
in the case of Jocson v. Director of Forestry:[7]
"x x x the words timber land are always translated in the Spanish
translation of that Act (Act of Congress) as 'terrenos forestales.' We think
there is an error in this translation and that a better translation would be
'terrenos madereros.' Timber land in English means land with trees growing
on it. The manglar plant would never be called a tree in English but a bush,
and land which has only bushes, shrubs or aquatic plants growing on it
cannot be called 'timber land.'
x x x
"The fact that there are a few trees growing in a manglare or nipa swamps
does not change the general character of the land from manglare to timber
land."
the Court declared:
"In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil. Rep., 175), this Court
said that the phrase 'agricultural lands' as used in Act No. 926 means those
public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands.
"Whatever may have been the meaning of the term 'forestry' under the
Spanish law, the Act of Congress of July 1st, 1902, classifies the public lands
in the Philippine Islands as timber, mineral or agricultural lands, and all
public lands that are not timber or mineral lands are necessarily
agricultural public lands, whether they are used as nipa
swamps, manglares, fisheries or they are used as nipa swamps, manglares,
fisheries or ordinary farm lands.
"The definition of forestry as including manglares found in the
Administrative Code of 1017 cannot affect rights which vested, prior to its
enactment.
"These lands being neither timber nor mineral lands, the trial court should
have considered them agricultural lands. If they are agricultural lands, then
the rights of appellants are fully established by Act No. 926."
5
The doctrine was reiterated still later in Garchitorena Vda de Centenera v.
Obias,[8] promulgated on March 4, 1933, more than fifteen years after the
effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1917. Justice Ostrand declared for
a unanimous Court:
"The opposition rests mainly upon the proposition that the land covered by
the application there are mangrove lands as shown in his opponent's Exh,
1, but we think this opposition of the Director of Forestry is untenable,
inasmuch as it has been definitely decided that mangrove lands are not
forest lands in the sense in which this phrase is used in the Act of
Congress."
No elaboration was made on this conclusion which was merely based on
the cases of Montano and Jocson. And in 1977, the above ruling was
reaffirmed in Tongson v. Director of Forestry,[9] with Justice Fernando
declaring that the mangrove lands in litis were agricultural in nature. The
decision even quoted with approval the statement of the trial court that:
"x x x Mangrove swamps where only trees of mangrove species grow,
where the trees are small and sparse, fit only for firewood purposes and
the trees growing are not of commercial value as lumber do not convert
the land into public land. Such lands are not forest in character. They do
not form part of the public domain."
Only last year, in Republic v. De Porkan,[10] the Court, citing Krivenko v.
Register of Deeds,[11] reiterated the ruling in the Mapa case that "all public
lands that are not timber or mineral lands are necessarily agricultural
public lands, whether they are used as nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries
or ordinary farm lands."
But the problem is not all that simple. As it happens, there is also a line of
decisions holding the contrary view.
In Yngson v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,[12] promulgated
in 1983, the Court ruled "that the Bureau of Fisheries has no Jurisdiction to
dispose of swamplands or mangrove lands forming part of the public
domain while such lands are still classified as forest lands."
Four months later, in Heirs of Amnategui v. Director of Forestry,[13] the Court
was more positive when it held, again through Justice Gutierrez:
"The Heirs of Jose Armantegui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be
classified as forest land because it is not thickly forested but is a 'mangrove
swamp.' Although considering that 'mangrove swamp' is included in the
classification of forest land in accordance with Section 1820 of the Revised
Administrative Code, the petitioners argue that no big trees classified in
Section 1821 of the said Code as first, second and third groups are found
on the land in question. Furthermore, they contend that Lot 885, even if it
is a mangrove swamp, is still subject to land registration proceedings
because the property had been in actual possession of private persons for
many years, and therefore, said land was already 'private land' better
adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and
not required by the interests to be kept under forest classification."
"The petition is without merit.
"A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose
such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it
of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be
covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other
farmers. 'Forested lands' do not have to be on mountains or in out-of-the-
way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and
other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest
land. The Classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does
not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and
until the land classified as 'forest' is released in an official proclamation to
that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of
the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect titles do not
apply."
The view was maintained in Vallarta v. Intermediate Appellate Court.
[14]
where this Court agreed with the Solicitor General's submission that the
land in dispute, which he described as "swamp mangrove" or "forestal
land," were not private properties and so not registerable. This case was
decided only twelve days after the De Porkan case.
Faced with these apparent contradictions, the Court feels there is a need
for a categorical pronouncement that should resolve once and for all the
6
question of whether mangrove swamps are agricultural lands or forest
lands.
The determination of this question is a function initially belonging to the
legislature, which has the authority to implement the constitutional
provision classifying the lands of the public domain (and is now even
permitted to provide for more categories of public lands). The legislature
having made such implementation, the executive officials may then, in the
discharge of their own role, administer our public lands pursuant to their
constitutional duty "to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed" and in
accordance with the policy prescribed. For their part, the courts will step
into the picture if the rules laid down by the legislature are challenged or,
assuming they are valid, it is claimed that they are not being correctly
observed by the executive. Thus do the three departments, coordinating
with each other, pursue and achieve the objectives of the Constitution in
the conservation and utilization of our natural resources.
In C.A. No. 141, the National Assembly delegated to the President of the
Philippines the function of making periodic classifications of public lands,
thus:
"Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the
lands of the public domain into:
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one
class to another, for the purposes of their administration and disposition."
"Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable
or disposable lands. the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time declare what
lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act.
With particular regard to alienable public lands, Section 9 of the same law
provides:
"For the purpose of their administration and disposition, the lands of the
public domain alienable or open to disposition shall be classified, according
to the use or purposes to which such lands are destined, as follows:
(a) Agricultural;
(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive
purposes;
(c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; and
(d) Reservations for townsites and for public and quasi-public uses.
The President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, shall from time to time make the classifications
provided for in this section, and may, at any tics and in a similar manner,
transfer lands from one class to another."
As for timber or forest lands, the Revised Administrative Code states as
follows:
"Sec. 1826. Regulation setting apart forest reserves - Revocation of same. -
Upon the recommendation of the Director of Forestry, with the approval of
the Department Head, the President of the Philippines may set apart forest
reserves from the public lands and he shall by proclamation declare the
establishment of such reserves and the boundaries thereof, and thereafter
such forest reserves shall not be entered, sold, or otherwise disposed of,
but shall remain as such for forest uses, and shall be administered in the
same manner as public forests.
"The President of the Philippines may in like manner by proclamation alter
or modify the boundaries of any forest reserve from time to time, or revoke
any such proclamation, and upon such revocation such forest reserve shall
be and become part of the public lands as though such proclamation had
never been made.
7
"Sec. 1827. Assignment of forest land for agricultural purposes. - Lands in
public forests, not including forest reserves, upon the certification of the
Director of Forestry that said lands are better adapted and more valuable
for agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by the public
interests to be kept under forest, shall be declared by the Department
Head to be agricultural lands."
With these principles in mind, we reach the following conclusion:
Mangrove swamps or manglares should be understood as comprised
within the public forests of the Philippines as defined in the aforecited
Section 1820 of the Administrative Code of 1917. The legislature having so
determined, we have no authority to ignore or modify its decision, and in
effect veto it, in the exercise of our own discretion. The statutory definition
remains unchanged to date and, no less noteworthy, is accepted and
invoked by the executive department. More importantly, the said provision
has not been challenged as arbitrary or unrealistic or unconstitutional,
assuming the requisite conditions, to justify our judicial intervention and
scrutiny. The law is thus presumed valid and so must be respected. We
repeat our statement in the Amunategui case that the classification of
mangrove swamps as forest Lands is descriptive of its legal nature or status
and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
That determination having been made and no cogent argument having
been raised to annul it, we have no duty as judges but to apply it. And so
we shall.
Our previous description of the term in question as pertaining to our
agricultural lands should be understood as covering only those lands over
which ownership had already vested before the Administrative Code of
1917 become effective. Such lands could not be retroactively legislated as
forest lands because this would be violative of a duly acquired property
right protected by the due process clause. So we ruled again only two
months ago in Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals,[15] where the
possession of the land in dispute commenced as early as 1909, before it
was much later classified as timberland.
It follows from all this that the land under contention being admittedly a
part of the mangrove swamps of Sapian, and for which a minor forest
license had in fact been issued by the Bureau of Forestry from 1920 to
1950, it must be considered forest land. It could therefore not be the
subject of the adverse possession and consequent ownership claimed by
the private respondent in support of his application for registration. To be
so, it had first to be released as forest Hand and reclassified as agricultural
land pursuant to the certification the Director of Forestry may issue under
Section 1827 of the Revised Administrative Code.
The private respondent invokes the survey plan of the mangrove swamps
approved by the Director of Lands,[16] to prove that the land is registerable.
It should be plain, however, that the mere existence of such a plan would
not have the effect of converting the mangrove swamps, as forest land, into
agricultural land. Such approval is ineffectual because it is clearly
inofficious. The Director of Lands was not authorized to act in the premises.
Under the aforecited law, it is the Director of Forestry who has the
authority to determine whether forest land is more valuable for agricultural
rather than forestry uses, as a basis for its declaration as agricultural land
and release for private ownership.
Thus we held in the Yngson case:
"It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the public
domain that until timber or forest lands are released. as disposable and
alienable neither the Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau of Fisheries has
authority to lease, grant, sell or otherwise dispose of these lands for
homesteads, sales patents, leases for grazing or other purposes, fishpond
leases and other modes of utilization.
"The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer and dispose of
swamplands or mangrove lands forming part of the public domain while
such lands are still classified as forest land or timber land and not released
for fishery or other purposes."
The same rule was echoed in the Vallarta case, thus:
"It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land
cannot be owned by private persons. It is not registerable. The adverse
possession which can be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of
imperfect title cases cannot commence until after the forest land has been
8
declared alienable and disposable. Possession of forest land, no matter
how long cannot convert it into private property."
We find in fact that even if the land in dispute were agricultural in nature,
the proof the private respondent offers of prescriptive possession thereof
3. Republic vs. CA and De La Rosa
is remarkably meager and of dubious persuasiveness. The record contains
no convincing evidence of the existence of the informacion
posesoria allegedly obtained by the original transferor of the property, let Republic of the Philippines, Benguet & Atok vs. Court of Appeals & De La
alone the fact that the conditions for acquiring title thereunder have been Rosa
satisfied. Nowhere has it been shown that the informacion posesoria has
G.R. No. L-43938, April 15, 1988
been inscribed or registered in the registry of property and that the land
has been under the actual and adverse possession of the private
respondent for twenty years as required by the Spanish Mortgage Law.
[17]
These matters are not presumed but must be established with definite
proof, which is lacking in this case. Cruz, J.:

Significantly, the tax declarations made by the private respondent were
practically the only basis used by the appellate court in sustaining his claim
of possession over the land in question. Tax declarations are, of course, not
sufficient to prove possession and much less vest ownership in favor of the
declarant, as we have held in countless cases.[18]
We hold, in sum, that the private respondent has not established his right
to the registration of the subject land in his name. Accordingly, the petition
must be granted.
It is reiterated for emphasis that, conformably to the legislative definition
embodied in Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917,
which remains unamended up to now, mangrove swamps
or manglares form part of the public forests of the Philippines. As such,
they are not alienable under the Constitution and may not be the subject
of private ownership until and unless they are first released as forest land
and classified as alienable agricultural land.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the
application for registration of title of private respondent is DISMISSED, with
cost against him. This decision is immediately executory.
FACTS: These consolidated cases arose from the application for registration
of a parcel of land filed on February 11, 1965, by Jose de la Rosa on his own
behalf and on behalf of his three children, Victoria, Benjamin and Eduardo.
The land, situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province, was divided into 9
lots and covered by plan Psu-225009. According to the application, Lots 1-5
were sold to Jose de la Rosa and Lots 6-9 to his children by Mamaya
Balbalio and Jaime Alberto, respectively, in 1964.
The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as
to Lots 1-5, Atok Big Wedge Corporation, as to Portions of Lots 1-5 and all
of Lots 6-9, and by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Bureau of
Forestry Development, as to lots 1-9.
In support of the application, both Balbalio and Alberto testified that they
had acquired the subject land by virtue of prescription; Balbalio claimed to
have received Lots 1-5 from her father shortly after the Liberation.

SO ORDERED.

9
Benguet opposed on the ground that the “June Bug” mineral claim
covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it on September 22, 1934, by the successors-
in-interest of James Kelly, who located the claim in September 1909 and
recorded it on October 14, 1909. From the date of its purchase, Benguet
had been in actual, continuous and exclusive possession of the land in
concept of owner, as evidenced by its construction of adits, its affidavits of
annual assessment, its geological mappings, geological samplings and
trench side cuts, and its payment of taxes on the land.
For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were
covered by the Emma and Fredia mineral claims located by Harrison and
Reynolds on December 25, 1930, and recorded on January 2, 1931, in the
office of the mining recorder of Baguio. These claims were purchased from
these locators on November 2, 1931, by Atok, which has since then been in
open, continuous and exclusive possession of the said lots as evidenced by
its annual assessment work on the claims, such as the boring of tunnels,
and its payment of annual taxes thereon.
The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection, arguing
that the land sought to be registered was covered by the Central Cordillera
Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16, 1929.
Moreover, by reason of its nature, it was not subject to alienation under
the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.
The trial court denied the application, holding that the applicants had
failed to prove their claim of possession and ownership of the land sought
to be registered.
The applicants appealed to the respondent court, which reversed the trial
court and recognized the claims of the applicant, but subject to the rights
of Benguet and Atok respecting their mining claims. In other words, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the
land while at the same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet
and Atok by virtue of their mining claims. Both Benguet and Atok have
appealed to this Court, invoking their superior right of ownership.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT APPLICANTS ALL SURNAMED DELA ROSA HAVE
SUPERIOR RIGHTS OF OWNERSHIP OVER THE SURFACE RIGHTS OVER THE
LAND IN QUESTION WHILE OPPOSITORS BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC.
AND ATOK BIG WEDGE MINING COMPANY ARE RESERVED OF THEIR SUB-
SURFACE RIGHTS BY VIRTUE OF THEIR MINING CLAIM AS DECIDED BY THE
RESPONDENT COURT.
HELD: NO. Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to
the property in question by virtue of their respective mining claims which
they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the
alienation of all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands,
subject to vested rights existing at the time of its adoption. The land was
not and could not have been transferred to the private respondents by
10
virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could its use be shared
simultaneously by them and the mining companies for agricultural and
mineral purposes. It is true that the subject property was considered forest
land and included in the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, but this did not
impair the rights already vested in Benguet and Atok at that time. Such
rights were not affected either by the stricture in the Commonwealth
Constitution against the alienation of all lands of the public domain except
those agricultural in nature for this was made subject to existing rights. The
perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and
under the laws then in force removed it from the public domain. By such
act, the locators acquired exclusive rights over the land, against even the
government, without need of any further act such as the purchase of the
land or the obtention of a patent over it. As the land had become the
private property of the locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as
they did, to Benguet and Atok. The Court of Appeals justified this by saying
there is “no conflict of interest” between the owners of the surface rights
and the owners of the sub-surface rights. This is rather doctrine, for it is a
well-known principle that the owner of piece of land has rights not only
to its surface but also to everything underneath and the airspace above it
up to a reasonable height. Under the aforesaid ruling, the land is classified
as mineral underneath and agricultural on the surface, subject to separate
claims of title. This is also difficult to understand, especially in its practical
application.
The Regalian doctrine which, as its name implies, is intended for the
benefit of the State, not of private persons. The rule simply reserves to the
State all minerals that may be found in public and even private land
devoted to "agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential or (for) any
purpose other than mining." Thus, if a person is the owner of agricultural
land in which minerals are discovered, his ownership of such land does not
give him the right to extract or utilize the said minerals without the
permission of the State to which such minerals belong.
The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing that the
rights over the land could be used for both mining and non-mining
purposes simultaneously. The correct interpretation is that once minerals
are discovered in the land, whatever the use to which it is being devoted
at the time, such use may be discontinued by the State to enable it to
extract the minerals therein in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative.
The land is thus converted to mineral land and may not be used by any
private party, including the registered owner thereof, for any other purpose
that will impede the mining operations to be undertaken therein. The
Regalian doctrine then extends not only to land but also to “all natural
wealth that may be found in the bowels of the earth.”
11
4. DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 83609
OCTOBER 26, 1989
PONENTE: GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.
FACTS:
On July 20, 1976, Ibarra and Amelia Bisnar, the private
respondents, claimed to be the owners of two parcels of lands situated in
Capiz and filed a joint application for registration of title to the said lands.
On December 16, 1976, the Director of Lands and Bureau of
Forest Development opposed the application on the grounds that the
respondents were not applicants neither predecessors-in-interest to
possess sufficient title to acquire ownership and that the lands in question
are a portion of the public domain belonging to the State.
On February 24, 1977, the respondents filed an amended
application which was approved on March 14, 1977.
The CFI of Capiz held on granting the application for confirmation
and registration of the two parcels of land filed by private respondents. It
found that applicants and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
public, continuous, peaceful and adverse possession of the subject parcels
of land under bona fide claims of ownership for more than eighty (80)
years (not only 30) prior to the filing of the application for registration,
introduced improvements on the lands by planting coconuts, bamboos and
other plants, and converted a part of the land into productive fishponds.
The respondent court affirmed the decision in toto, and it held
that the classification of the lots as timberland by the Director of Forestry
cannot prevail in the absence of proof that the said lots are indeed more
valuable as forest land than as agricultural land. Thereafter, the Director of
Lands through the OSG filed a petition before this Court for the review of
the said decision.
ISSUE:
Whether the lots in question may be registered under Section
48(b) of CA 141
HELD:
No. The lots cannot be registered under Section 48(b) of CA 141.
A positive act of the government is needed to declassify land which is
classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes. A parcel of forest land is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and
jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System
5. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS, digested
(GR # 57667, May 28, 1990) (Law on Natural Resources, Tax Declaration
and Receipts)
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari where petitioner San
Miguel Corporation who purchased Lot 684 from Silverio Perez, seeks the
reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals denying its application for
registration of the said land in view of its failure to show entitlement
thereto.
The Solicitor General opposed and appealed the application contending
that the land in question is part of public domain and that petitioner being
a private corporation is disqualified from holding alienable lands of the
public domain. In this case, petitioner claims that its predecessor-in-
interest had open, exclusive and undisputed possession of the land in
question based on documentary evidence of tax declarations and receipts,
and testimonial evidence of vendor Silverio Perez.
12
ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence presented by the petitioner is
sufficient to warrant a ruling that petitioner and/or its predecessor-in-
interest has a registrable right over Lot 684.
HELD: No, documentary evidence of tax declarations and receipts are not
conclusive evidence of ownership or right of possession over a piece of
land but mere indicia of a claim of ownership. They only become strong
evidence of ownership of land acquired by prescription when accompanied
by proof of actual possession. Also, the testimony of vendor Silverio Perez
as proof of actual possession is weak and was not corroborated by other
witnesses.
6. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF
LUCENA, represented by Msgr. Jose T. Sanchez, and REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH LIII, LUCENA CITY, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Gilbert D. Camaligan for private respondent.
G.R. No. 75042 November 29, 1988
FACTS: “On February 2, 1979, the ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP of Lucena,
represented by Msgr. Jose T. Sanchez, filed an application for confirmation
of title to four (4) parcels of land. Three of said parcels, denominated as
Lots 1, 2 and 3, respectively, of plan PSU-65686 are situated in Barrio
Masin, Municipality of Candelaria, Quezon Province. The fourth parcels
under plan PSU-112592 is located in Barrio Bucal (Taguan), same
municipality and province. As basis for the application, the applicant
claimed title to the various properties through either purchase or donation
dating as far back as 1928.The court ordered the registration of the four
parcels together with the improvements thereon „in the name of the
ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF LUCENA, INC., a religious corporation sole
duly registered and existing under the laws of the Republic of the
Philippines.”
ISSUES: Whether or not the Roman Catholic Bishop of Lucena, as a
corporation sole is qualified to apply for confirmation of its title to the four
(4) parcels of land subject of this case.
RULING: There is no doubt that a corporation sole by the nature of its
incorporation is vested with the right to purchase and hold real estate and
personal property. It need not therefore be treated as an ordinary private
corporation because whether or not it is so treated as such, the
Constitutional provision involved will, nevertheless, be not applicable. The
lands subjects of this petition were already private property at the time the
application for confirmation of title was filed in 1979. There is therefore no
cogent reason to disturb the findings of the appellate court. WHEREFORE,
the petition is dismissed for lack of merit and the appealed decision and
Resolution of the Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby AFFIRMED.
7. [G.R. No. 54276. August 16, 1991.]
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, Petitioner, v. IGLESIA NI KRISTO and HON.
DOMINGO D. PANIS, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of
Zambales and Olongapo, Br. III, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
NARVASA, J.:
Application of the doctrine laid down in 1986 in Director of Lands v. I.A.C . 1
is all that is necessary to resolve the issue presented in the appeal at bar.
13
The petitioner takes no issue with the factual findings of the Registration
Court. In its petition, 2 it makes the following recitation of the relevant
facts, viz.:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Respondent Iglesia ni Kristo filed an application for the registration and
confirmation of title over a parcel of land, with an area of 280 sq. meters,
situated at Barrio Consuelo Sur, Municipality of San Marcelino, Province of
Zambales. The application . . . was docketed in the Court of First Instance of
Zambales & Olongapo, Branch III (presided by respondent Judge) as LRC
No. N-187-O.
Petitioner (Republic) opposed the application on the Found that the . . .
Iglesia ni Kristo is a private corporation, and that under Art. XIV, sec. 11, of
the Constitution, private corporations cannot acquire lands of the public
domain but can only hold them by lease in an area not exceeding 1,000
hectares. . . . It appears that the applicant acquired the property in
question from Gregorio Rolls and Romualdo Rolls (both of San Marcelino,
Zambales) on May 23, 1946, as shown by the Deed of Sale (Exhibit ‘I’).
After acquiring the land, applicant had it declared for taxation
purposes. . . . The latest tax declaration of this same parcel of land starts
with the year 1974 as per Tax Dec. No. 4763 . . . . The land is exempt from
payment of Realty Tax, being devoted primarily for religious purposes
(Exhibit N).
Without passing upon the Government’s contention that respondent
Iglesia ni Kristo was disqualified from acquiring the land in question, the
trial court rendered judgment on June 2, 1980 decreeing the registration of
the land in the name of the respondent (Iglesia). The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered registering and confirming the
title of the applicant, Iglesia ni Kristo with its Executive Minister Eraño G.
Manalo as corporation sole with office and postal address at corner of
Central and Don Mariano Marcos Avenues, Diliman, Quezon City, over the
parcel of land situated at Barrio Consuelo Sur, Municipality of San
Marcelino, Province of Zambales, with an area of 280 sq. m. covered by
Plan PSU-03-000947. (Exhibit `F’).
SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library
(N.B. The decision also makes the finding that since acquiring the land, the
Iglesia in Kristo "has been in open, public, adverse, peaceful and
continuous possession in the concept of an owner thereof to the present
time," having in fact "put up a chapel made of concrete materials and
galvanized iron for its roofing;" and that the "land is not also within any
military or naval reservation.")
It is this decision of June 2, 1980 that is subject of the Government’s
petition for review on certiorari at bar.
The petition will have to be denied, in accordance with the judgment of
this Court en banc in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court
handed down on December 29, 1986, 3 involving substantially similar facts.
That judgment reconsidered and declared "no longer . . . binding
precedent," Manila Electric Company v. Castro-Bartolome, Et Al.,
promulgated on June 29, 1982, 4 and instead adopted the dissenting
opinion therein 5 (based on a line of cases beginning with Cariño v. Insular
Government in 1909 6 thru Susi v. Razon in 1925 7 down to Herico v. Dar in
1980. 8
In that case, Director of Lands v. I.A.C., a private corporation, Acme
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. purchased a tract of land in 1962 from Mariano
Infiel and Acer Infiel, two members of the Dumagat tribe, but applied with
the Court for registration of its title over the land under the Torrens Act
only in July, 1981, long after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution —
which inter alia prohibits private corporations from holding alienable lands
of the public domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares (a
prohibition not found in the 1935 Constitution, in force in 1962 when Acme
purchased the land in question). There being no question that Acme and its
predecessors-in-interest had possessed and occupied the land for more
than the required 30-year period prescribed in Section 48 of the Public
Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended), 9 the question
presented to the Court en banc was whether or not the title that Acme had
acquired in 1962 could be confirmed in its favor in proceedings instituted
by it in 1981 when the 1973 Constitution was already in effect, having in
mind the prohibition therein against private corporations holdings lands of
14
the public domain. That question the Court en banc answered in this
wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . (The weight of authority is) that open, exclusive and undisputed
possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates
the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period
ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be
public land and becomes private property. . . .
"x x x
Herico (supra), in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
‘. . . Secondly, under the provisions of :Republic Act No. 1942, which the
respondent Court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner’s case, with the
latter’s proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since
1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the lands
has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from the mass of
public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act
as by free patent. . . .
‘As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the
foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have
acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant,
without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land,
therefore, ceased to be of the public domain and beyond the authority of
the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is a
mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the
title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued
upon the strength of said patent.
"Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of
considering possession of public land which is of the character and
duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express grant from
the State than the dictum of the statute itself (Section 48 (b) of C.A. No.
141) that the possession(s) ‘. . . shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title . . ..’No proof being admissible to overcome
a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth, be
little more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the
possession claimed is of the required character and length of time; and
registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title
already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the land from
public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already effected
by operation of law from the moment the required period of possession
became complete. As was so well put in Cariño, ‘. . . (T)here are indications
that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that,
for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the
proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as
already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law.’
"x x x
". . . The purely accidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings
were brought under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which forbids
corporations from owning lands of the public domain cannot defeat a right
already vested before that law came into effect or invalidate transactions
then perfectly valid and proper. This Court has already held in analogous
circumstances that the Constitution cannot impair vested rights."cralaw
virtua1aw library
The substantial identity of the facts and issues between the case at bar and
Director of Lands v. I.A.C. being undeniable, and being cited to no
persuasive reason to decline to apply the doctrine in the latter to the
former, the Court, as aforesaid, has no alternative except to rule adversely
to the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the judgment of the respondent
Court dated June 2, 1980 in LRC No. N-187-0 entitled, "Iglesia ni Kristo, etc.
v. Director of Lands, Et Al.," is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
15
8. [ GR No. 85322, Apr 30, 1991 ]
ALFREDO M. ALMEDA v. CA
GRINO-AQUINO, J.:
This petition for review assails the Court of Appeals' decision dated May 9,
1988 in CA-G.R. No. 09309-CV reversing the judgment dated January 6,
1986 of the Regional Trial Court in LRC Case No. N-10771 entitled, "Alfredo
M. Almeda, Leonardo M. Almeda and Ernesto M. Almeda, Applicants
versus Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands,
Oppositor."
The case involves a parcel of land with an area of 1,208 square meters
located in Barrio Pampangin, Pateros, Rizal, and described in Survey Plan
Psu-128539. It was originally owned and possessed by Emiliano Almeda,
father of the petitioners, by virtue of an "Escritura de Particion
Extrajudicial" (Exh. G) executed on June 15, 1935, between him and his
brother Adriano, wherein they attested the fact that the land in question
was inherited from their parents, Vedasto Almeda and Josefa C.
Concepcion, who had inherited the same from their own parents (great-
grandparents of herein petitioners).
After Emiliano's death on May 1, 1948 at the age of 67, his wife, Ana
Menguito, and their children received the produce of the land and rented
out to third persons portions of the property where Emiliano had three
houses built. Upon Ana's death on April 3, 1950, her children with
Emiliano inherited the property and the lessees moved out. On June 9,
1980, the brothers Alfredo, Leonardo and Ernesto executed an extrajudicial
partition adjudicating the land to themselves (Exh. J).
On September 12, 1984, the Almeda brothers applied for the registration
of the land in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch CLVI, where the case
was docketed as LRC Case No. N-10771, LRC Record No. N-58761 entitled,
"Alfredo M. Almeda, Leonardo M. Almeda and Ernesto M. Almeda,
Applicants." Their application was set for hearing on December 20, 1984.
The notice of hearing dated October 10, 1984 was duly published in the
Official Gazette and posted by the deputy sheriff.
On the date of the hearing, no one appeared to oppose the application
except the Director of Lands, through the Solicitor General, who had earlier
filed a formal opposition. An order of general default was issued against
the whole world, except the aforementioned oppositor, and the case was
set for hearing.
The report of the Bureau of Lands stated that the land is not included in
any military area or naval reservation nor is it covered by any land patent
or public land application. The Land Registration Commission Report also
stated that Plan Psu-128539, when plotted in the Municipal Index map,
does not overlap with any previously-plotted titled properties under Act
496 as amended by PD 1525, and that the survey books do not show that
the subject lot had been applied for except in this case.
The Director of Lands, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
presented Corazon Calamno, senior forester of the Bureau of Forest
Development, who stated that she prepared the inspection report on
November 26, 1984; that the land falls within the alienable and disposable
land under Project No. 29 of Pateros, Metro Manila, as per BFD Map LC
2623, certified and declared as such on January 23, 1968.
The Court found that the applicants' possession of the parcel of land
sought to be registered, together with that of their predecessors-in-
interest, has been public, peaceful, continuous, adverse to the whole world
and in the concept of an owner for a period of more than thirty (30) years,
and, that the land is not located within any forest reservation nor
mortgaged or encumbered in favor of any person or lending institution.
In a decision dated January 18, 1986, the trial court affirmed the order of
general default and confirmed the title of the applicants to the parcel of
land covered by the plan, Psu-128539, and ordered its registration in the
names of Alfredo, Leonardo and Ernesto Almeda pro-indiviso (pp. 42-
45, Rollo).
From that decision, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
16
Solicitor General, appealed to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
09309, alleging that the applicants-appellees have not met the statutory
requirements on possession under Section 48(b) of CA 141, mainly because
the land applied for was inalienable forest land before its release as
alienable and disposable land on January 3, 1968. The applicants'
possession thereof prior to January 3, 1968 was invalid for purposes of a
grant under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
The Court of Appeals, in a decision dated May 9, 1988, reversed the lower
court and denied the application for registration. It held that private
respondents had not qualified for a grant under Section 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act 141 which requires public, peaceful, continuous,
adverse possession by the applicants in the concept of an owner, for a
period of at least 30 years. They have to their credit only seventeen (17)
years possession and occupation of the land, counted from January 23,
1968, when it was declared alienable and disposable, up to September 12,
1984, when their application for registration was filed.
After their motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals,
the applicants filed this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
Petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals erred:
1. in not holding that the land classification made by the Director of
Forestry (Bureau of Forest Development) could not affect the vested rights
of the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest who had continuously
occupied and profited from the land since 1918 or very much earlier, as in
this case; and
2. in denying the motion for reconsideration despite the ruling in "The
Director of Lands vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals and Iglesia ni Cristo,"
158 SCRA 568 promulgated on March 14, 1988, which allowed registration
even when the land applied for was within the proposed alienable or
disposable block of a proposed LC project.
There is no merit in the petition.
The court of Appeals correctly ruled that the private respondents had not
qualified for a grant under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act because
their possession of the land while it was still inalienable forest land, or
before it was declared alienable and disposable land of the public domain
on January 3, 1968, could not ripen into private ownership, and should be
excluded from the computation of the 30-year open and continuous
possession in concept of owner required under Section 48(b) of Com. Act
141. It accords with our ruling in Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals,
Ibarra Bisnar, et al., 178 SCRA 708, that:
"Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of
imperfect title do not apply (Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry, 126 SCRA
69; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689; Director of Lands
vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 701; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 148
SCRA 480; Vallarta vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 679).
"Thus, possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership (Vano vs. Government, 41 Phil. 161 [1920]; Adorable vs. Director
of Forestry, 107 Phil. 401 [1960]). A parcel of forest land is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and
jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System
(Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648; Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA
210 [1983]; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 680 [1984])."
The petitioners have erroneously cited our decisions in Director of Forestry
vs. Villareal, 170 SCRA 598 and Republic vs. Court of Appeals, Miguel
Marcelo, et al., 168 SCRA 77, in support of their position in this case. In
those cases, the applicants' possession of the land antedated its
classification as forest land. We held that such lands could not be
retroactively legislated or classified as forest lands because it would violate
previously acquired property rights protected by the due process clause of
the Constitution.
The situation of the land in this case is the reverse of the Villareal and
Marcelo cases. The land here was already forest land when occupied by
the petitioners but it was later released on January 23, 1968 from its forest
classification. In other words, the petitioners here occupied forest land
17
before it was released as alienable and disposable, while the applicants in
Whether or not the stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to
the Villareal and Marcelo cases possessed parcels of land long before they
were reserved as forest land. The subsequent reservation did not prejudice AMARI of lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution
their vested rights therein.

Petitioner's recourse to the decision of this Court in Director of Lands vs.

Court of Appeals and Iqlesia Ni Cristo, 158 SCRA 568, is inappropriate. That RULING: YES!
case did not involve forest land, but agricultural land of the public domain
within the proposed alienable or disposable block.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is denied for lack of merit. Costs
against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
9. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ v. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY, GR No. 133250,
2002-07-09
FACTS:
From the time of Marcos until Estrada, portions of Manila Bay were being
reclaimed. A law was passed creating the Public Estate Authority which was
granted with the power to transfer reclaimed lands. Now in this case, PEA
entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with AMARI, a private corporation.
Under the Joint Venture Agreement between AMARI and PEA, several
hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands and several
portions of submerged areas of Manila Bay were going to be transferred to
AMARI .
ISSUE:
Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended), reclaimed lands are
classified as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain Section 3
of the Constitution: Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to
agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such
alienable lands of the public domain except by lease The 157.84 hectares
of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by
certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public
domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell
or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only
sell these lands to Philippine
citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and
existing laws. Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code,
contracts whose “object or purpose is contrary to law,” or whose “object is
outside the commerce of men,” are “inexistent and void from the
beginning.” The Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the
Constitution, and therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab
initio.

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11. LAUSAN AYOG, ET.AL., vs. JUDGE VICENTE N. CUSI RULING:
G.R. No. L-46729
November 19, 1982 NO; The Constitutional prohibition has no retroactive application
to the sales application of Binan Development Co., Inc. because it had
FACTS: already acquired a vested right to the land applied at the time the 1973
Constitution took effect. Moreover, the corporation’s compliance with the
On January 21, 1953, the Director of Lands, after bidding, awarded requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of a patent had the
to Biñan Development Co., Inc. a parcel of land with an area of about two effect of segregating the said land from the public domain.
hundred fifty hectares. The occupants of said land, herein petitioners, were
ordered to vacate the same. Upon the refusal of the occupants of the said,
the corporation filed an ejectment suit. After an investigation, the Director
of Lands found out that the occupants entered the land only after it was
awarded to the corporation. Thus, they could not be regarded as bona fide 12. Cruz vs Secretary of DENR
occupants. On July 18, 1961, the corporation fully paid the purchase price
for the land. More than thirteen years later, the Sales Patent was issued to GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000
the corporation with a reduced area of 175.3 hectares.
FACTS:
The petitioners contested that the adoption of the Constitution
which took effect on January 17, 1973, was a supervening fact which Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and
render it legally impossible to execute the trial court’s judgment of
mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of
awarding the land in question to the corporation. They invoked the
constitutional prohibition, already mentioned, that "no private corporation certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the
or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules
lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area."
and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA
The Director of Lands pointed out that the corporation had
complied with the said requirements long before the effectivity of the and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of
Constitution and that the applicant had acquired a vested right to its the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals
issuance. and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
ISSUE:

Whether the 1973 Constitution is an obstacle to the

implementation of the trial court’s 1964 judgment ejecting the petitioners. ISSUE:

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Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?

HELD:

No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining

the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership
over the natural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over
the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and
the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in
their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the
land on which the resources are found, the right to the small scale
utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large
scale development and exploitation.

Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the
lands of the public domain. They are private lands and belong to the
ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title that existed
irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of
ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a
limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the
same.

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