Diaz vs.

De Leon
[No. 17714. May 31, 1922]
ROMUALDEZ, J.:

Facts:
The testator, shortly after the execution of his first will, asked that the same be
returned to him. The instrument was returned to the testator who ordered his servant to
tear the document. This was done in his presence and before a nurse who testified to
this effect. After some time, the testator, being asked by Dr. Cornelio Mapa about the
will, said that it had been destroyed. Further, witnesses, Canto and the Mother Superior
of the Hospital where the deceased was confined, testified that the testator personally
stated that he was anxious to withdraw or change the provisions he had made in his first
will.
The petitioner denies such revocation, while the contestant affirms the same by
alleging that the testator revoked his will by destroying it, and by executing another will
expressly revoking the former. It was found that the second will executed by the
deceased is not clothed with all the necessary requisites to constitute a sufficient
revocation.

Issue:
WoN the will executed by Jesus de Leon was revoked by him?

Ruling:
Yes, the will executed by Jesus de Leon was revoked by him.
According to the statute governing the subject in this jurisdiction the destruction
animo revocandi of a will constitutes, in itself, a sufficient revocation. (Sec. 623, Code of
Civil Procedure.) The original will herein presented for probate having been destroyed
animo revocandi, cannot be declared the will and last testament of the testator.
The intention of revoking the will is manifest from the established fact that the
testator was anxious to withdraw or change the provisions he had made in his first will.
This fact is disclosed by the testator's own statements to the witnesses Canto and the
Mother Superior of the Hospital where he was confined. The original will herein
presented for probate having been destroyed with animo revocandi, cannot now be
probated as the will and last testament of Jesus de Leon.
Judgment is affirmed with costs against the petitioner.
 Jimenez vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. 75773. April 17, 1990.*
FERNAN, C.J.:

Facts:
The marriage of Lino Jimenez and Consolacion Ungson produced four children,
namely: Alberto, Leonardo, Sr., Alejandra and Angeles. During the existence of the
marriage, Lino acquired 5 parcels of land. After the death of Consolacion, Lino married
Genoveva with whom he begot 7 children: Tomas, Visitacion, Digno, Antonio, Amadeo,
Modesto and Virginia. Lino died on August 11, 1951 while Genoveva Caolboy died on
November 21, 1978.
Thereafter, in April 1979, Virginia filed a petition before the CFI of Pangasinan,
praying to be appointed as administratrix of the properties of the deceased spouses
Lino and Genoveva. Enumerated in her petition were the supposed heirs of the
deceased spouses and the four children of Lino and Consolacion.
In October, 1979, Leonardo Jr., son of Leonardo Jimenez, Sr., filed a motion for
the exclusion of his father’s name and the latter’s siblings from the petition, as they are
children of Lino and Consolacion and because they have already received their
inheritance consisting of the 5 parcels of land.
On March 23, 1981, Virginia was appointed administrator of the Intestate Estate
of Lino and Genoveva. She filed an inventory of the estate of the spouses Lino and
Genoveva wherein she included the 5 parcels of land. As a consequence, Leonardo, Jr.
moved for the exclusion of these properties from the inventory on the ground that these
had already been adjudicated to Leonardo Sr., et al. Subsequently, the probate court
ordered the exclusion of 5 parcels of land from the inventory. MR was denied.
On a petition for certiorari and prohibition, CA dismissed the petition because
Genoveva, had admitted that the subject parcels of land had been adjudicated to the
children of the previous nuptial; the subject properties could not have been acquired
during the marriage of Lino to Genoveva because they were already titled in the name
of Lino even prior to 1921; the claim of Virginia was barred by prescription because it
was only in 1981 when they questioned the adjudication of the subject properties, and
Virginia was guilty of laches. This decision became final and executory.
Two years after, Virginia, et al filed an amended complaint dated before the RTC
of Pangasinan, to recover possession/ownership of the subject 5 parcels of land as part
of the estate of Lino and Genoveva and to order Leonardo Sr., et al to render an
accounting of the produce therefrom. Leonardo Sr., et al moved for the dismissal of the
complaint on the grounds that the action was barred by prior judgment and by
prescription and laches. However, petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss contending
that the action was not barred by prior judgment because the probate court had no
jurisdiction to determine with finality the question of ownership of the lots which must be
ventilated in a separate action; and the action instituted in 1981 was not barred by
prescription or laches because the forcible acquisition of the subject properties occurred
only after the death of Genoveva in 1978. TC resolved to dismiss the complaint on the
ground of res judicata. MR was denied. Petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by
Virginia et al before the appellate court was likewise denied due course and dismissed.
Hence, this recourse.
Issue:
WoN in a settlement proceeding (testate or intestate) the lower court has
jurisdiction to settle questions of ownership and whether res judicata exists as to bar
petitioners’ present action for the recovery of possession and ownership of the five (5)
parcels of land?

Ruling:
Yes, the present action for recovery of possession and ownership is
appropriately filed.
The Court held that as a general rule, a probate court can only pass upon
questions of title provisionally. The provisional character of the inclusion in the inventory
of a contested property is reiterated in a number of cases in the Court. It has also been
held that in a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the question of ownership is
an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality. Res judicata
does not exist because of the difference in the causes of actions.
Since the probate court’s findings are not conclusive, being prima facie, a
separate proceeding is necessary to establish the ownership of the five (5) parcels of
land. The patent reason is the probate court’s limited jurisdiction and the principle that
questions of title or ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory
of the property, can only be settled in a separate action.
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the respondent appellate court is
hereby REVERSED. Civil Case No. 16111 is reinstated and the Regional Trial Court of
Pangasinan, Branch XXXVII is directed to proceed in said case with dispatch.
 Aranas vs. Mercado
G.R. No. 156407. January 15, 2014.*
BERSAMIN, J.:

Facts:
Emigdio died intestate on January 12, 1991, survived by his second wife,
Teresita and their five children, namely: Allan, Felimon, Carmencita, Richard, and
Maria; and his two children by his first marriage, Franklin and Thelma. Emigdio inherited
and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He owned corporate shares in Mervir
Realty and Cebu Emerson. He assigned his real properties in exchange for corporate
stocks of Mervir Realty, and sold his real property to Mervir Realty.
On June 3, 1991, Thelma filed in the RTC in Cebu City a petition for the
appointment of Teresita as the administrator of Emigdio’s estate which was granted
considering that there was no opposition.
As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of Emigdio
wherein she indicated that at the time of his death, Emigdio had “left no real properties
but only personal properties” worth P6,675,435.25 in all. Claiming that Emigdio had
owned other properties that were excluded from the inventory, Thelma moved that the
RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory, and to be examined regarding it, which was
granted.
On January 21, 1993, Teresita filed a compliance supporting her inventory with
copies of three certificates of stocks covering the Mervir Realty shares of stock; the
deed of assignment executed by Emigdio on January 10, 1991 involving real properties
with the market value of P4,440,651.10 in exchange for the Mervir Realty shares and
the certificate of stock issued on January 30, 1979 for shares of stock of Cebu
Emerson worth P30,000.00.
Thelma again moved to require Teresita to be examined under oath on the
inventory, and that she (Thelma) be allowed 30 days within which to file a formal
opposition to or comment on the inventory and the supporting documents Teresita had
submitted.
After a series of hearings that ran for almost eight years, the RTC issued an
order finding and holding that the inventory submitted by Teresita had excluded
properties that should be included, hence she was ordered to re-do the inventory of
properties which are supposed to constitute as the estate of the late Emigdio.
On March 29, 2001, Teresita, et al timely sought the reconsideration of the order
on the ground that one of the real properties affected, had already been sold to Mervir
Realty, and that the parcels of land covered by the deed of assignment had already
come into the possession of and registered in the name of Mervir Realty. Thelma
opposed the motion. RTC denied the MR.
CA partly granted the petition for certiorari, reversing and setting aside the
inclusion of various parcels of land. The CA opined that the sale by Emigdio and
Teresita had transferred the ownership of the parcels of land to Mervir Realty by virtue
of the deed of absolute sale. Hence, this petition.
Thelma contends that the resort to the special civil action for certiorari to assail
the orders of the RTC by Teresita and her co-respondents was not proper.
Issue:
WoN approval of the inventory and the concomitant determination of the
ownership as basis for inclusion or exclusion from the inventory are final?

Ruling:
No, approval of the inventory and the concomitant determination of the
ownership as basis for inclusion or exclusion from the inventory were provisional and
subject to revision at anytime during the course of the administration proceedings.
The Court held that the prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining
whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory, the probate
court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is
subject to the final decision in a separate action regarding ownership which may be
instituted by the parties.
Under Section 6(a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters of administration
may be granted at the discretion of the court to the surviving spouse, who is competent
and willing to serve when the person dies intestate. Upon issuing the letters of
administration to the surviving spouse, the RTC becomes duty-bound to direct the
preparation and submission of the true inventory and appraisal of all the real and
personal estate of the deceased which has come into his possession or
knowledge, and the surviving spouse, as the administrator, has the duty and
responsibility to submit the inventory within three months from the issuance of letters of
administration pursuant to Rule 83 of the Rules of Court.
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate court
or an intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will
and/or settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to the
determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent
rationale for this rule is that such court merely exercises special and limited jurisdiction.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and
convenience.
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a
testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory
of a piece of property without prejudice to final determination of ownership in a
separate action.
Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is
one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of
jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired,
then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on ownership.
Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement
and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and
whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the
deceased spouse.
The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and appraisal of the
estate of the decedent is “to aid the court in revising the accounts and determining the
liabilities of the executor or the administrator, and in making a final and equitable
distribution (partition) of the estate and otherwise to facilitate the administration of the
estate.
 The limited jurisdiction of the RTC as an intestate court might have constricted
the determination of the rights to the properties arising from that deed, but it does not
prevent the RTC as intestate court from ordering the inclusion in the inventory of the
properties subject of that deed. This is because the RTC as intestate court, albeit
vested only with special and limited jurisdiction, was still “deemed to have all the
necessary powers to exercise such jurisdiction to make it effective.”
Lastly, the inventory of the estate of Emigdio must be prepared and submitted for
the important purpose of resolving the difficult issues of collation and advancement to
the heirs. Article 1061 of the Civil Code required every compulsory heir and the
surviving spouse, herein Teresita herself, to “bring into the mass of the estate any
property or right which he (or she) may have received from the decedent, during the
lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may
be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the
partition.”
The determination of which properties should be excluded from or included in the
inventory of estate properties was well within the authority and discretion of the RTC as
an intestate court. In making its determination, the RTC acted with circumspection, and
proceeded under the guiding policy that it was best to include all properties in the
possession of the administrator or were known to the administrator to belong to Emigdio
rather than to exclude properties that could turn out in the end to be actually part of the
estate.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari;
REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on May 15, 2002;
REINSTATES the orders issued on March 14, 2001 and May 18, 2001 by the Regional
Trial Court in Cebu; DIRECTS the Regional Trial Court in Cebu to proceed with dispatch
in Special Proceedings No. 3094-CEB entitled Intestate Estate of the late Emigdio
Mercado, Thelma Aranas, petitioner, and to resolve the case; and ORDERS the
respondents to pay the costs of suit.