In view of these instances, complainant requested for an
A.M. No. MTJ-04-1556. March 31, 2005
PURITA LIM, complainant, vs. JUDGE CESAR M. DUMLAO, Municipal
Trial Court, San Mateo, Isabela, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J:
In a verified letter-complaint[1] dated June 5, 2003, complainant
Purita Lim charged respondent Judge Cesar M. Dumlao of the
Municipal Trial Court of San Mateo, Isabela, with Gross Ignorance
of the Law and Grave Abuse of Authority.
Complainant averred that she filed two criminal cases for
carnapping and theft with the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City,
Isabela, Branch 35, against a certain Herman A. Medina. On May 8,
2003, Medina was apprehended and detained at the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology, Santiago City Jail, by virtue of a
Warrant of Arrest issued by then Presiding Judge Fe Albano Madrid
of Branch 35.
On May 9, 2003, respondent judge issued three separate orders for
the release of Medina on the ground that he had posted bail with
his court. Complainant alleged that respondent judge frequently
approves bail bonds for cases filed in other courts and outside the
territorial jurisdiction of his court. He also issues search warrants
for implementation outside of his court's jurisdiction which,
resultantly, are often quashed and the corresponding cases
dismissed because the articles seized were inadmissible as
evidence.
As proof, complainant attached copies of Search Warrant Nos.
2002-120,[2] 2002-173,[3] and 2002-180[4] issued by respondent judge.
Search Warrant No. 2002-120 was ordered quashed on September 2,
2002[5] by Judge Anastacio Anghad for being infirmed and fatally
defective. The crime was committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of
the MTC of San Mateo, Isabela and no 'compelling reasons' were stated in
the application to justify its filing before the MTC of San Mateo, Isabela.
What is more, it was found that respondent judge did not conduct a
thorough and extensive inquiry to the deponent and his witnesses as
required by the Rules on Criminal Procedure[6] in order to establish
probable cause and the justification for the application.
Search Warrant No. 2002-173 was also ordered[7] quashed by
Judge Anghad on December 18, 2002 as probable cause was not
actually ascertained and searching questions and answers were
not conducted. In another case, Search Warrant No. 2002-
180[8] was likewise quashed and the articles seized by virtue of
the warrant were declared inadmissible in evidence[9] because the
applicant failed to prove 'extreme and compelling circumstances'
and the warrant issued did not particularly describe the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
investigation into the activities of respondent judge. On June 30,
2003, the Court Administrator referred the complaint to
respondent judge requiring his comment thereon within ten days
from receipt,[10] but he failed to file the required comment
notwithstanding his receipt of the order on July 28, 2003 as
evidenced by the Registry Return Receipt. The Court Administrator
sent a 1st Tracer[11] dated October 28, 2003 which respondent
judge received on November 19, 2003. On June 28, 2004, this
Court resolved to require respondent judge to show cause why he
should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for his
obdurate refusal to file his comment.[12] On December 8, 2004,
with still no response from respondent judge, the Court resolved to
dispense with the comment.[13]
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), through Court
Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. and Deputy Court
Administrator Jose P. Perez, submitted to this Court a
Memorandum dated February 15, 2005. In said memorandum, the
Court was informed that respondent judge has been charged in six
(6) administrative cases, including the instant case, to wit:
1. MTJ-01-1339 (Efren Morales vs. Judge Cesar Dumlao) ' for
Abuse of Authority. Respondent was fined P5,000.00 in a decision
dated February 13, 2002.
2. MTJ-01-1350 (Lorenzo Pascual, et al. vs. Judge Cesar Dumlao) '
for Gross Negligence and Gross Ignorance. Respondent fined
P10,000.00 in a decision dated July 20, 2001.
3. MTJ-03-1519 (Reynaldo Sinaon, Sr. vs. Judge Cesar Dumlao) '
for Grave Abuse of Authority, Misconduct, Dereliction of Duty and
Ignorance of the Law. The case is pending.
4. 03-1442-MTJ (Ester Barbero vs. Judge Cesar Dumlao) ' for
Abuse of Authority. The case is pending.
5. 97-394-MTJ (Artemio Alivia vs. Judge Cesar Dumlao) ' for
Anomalous Reduction of Bailbond. Case pending.
The OCA's evaluation stated:
The respondent's failure to submit his comment as required is
further evidence of his defiance of directives issued by his
superiors. It is, furthermore, indicative of his admission of the
charges pending against him. Indeed, the practice of respondent
accepting and approving bail bonds of detained persons who are
charged of crimes in courts other than his own constitutes gross
ignorance of the law.
We believe, however, that in the determination of the penalty, we
should consider the fact that he presides over four (4) courts to
wit: MTC, San Mateo, Isabela as presiding judge; MCTC, Alfonso-
Lista-Aguinaldo as acting presiding judge; MTC, Ilagan, Isabela as
acting presiding judge, and MCTC of Tumauini-Delfin Albano also
as acting presiding judge.
Thus, the OCA recommended:
Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable
Court with the recommendations that the respondent Judge be
required to pay a fine of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) for
his obdurate refusal to file his comment on the complaint. Further,
respondent judge be required to pay a fine of TWENTY ONE
THOUSAND PESOS (P21,000.00) and warned that a repetition of
the same offense will be dealt with more drastically for approving
bail bonds for accused persons who were detained in places
outside his territorial jurisdiction.
We agree with the recommendations of the OCA, except as to the
penalty.
Section 17, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Section 17. Bail, where filed. ' (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be
filed with the court where the case is pending, or, in the absence
or unavailability of the judge thereof, with any regional trial court
judge, metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal
circuit trial judge in the province, city or municipality. If the
accused is arrested in a province, city or municipality other than
where the case is pending, bail may also be filed with any Regional
Trial Court of said place, or if no judge thereof is available, with
any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal
circuit trial judge therein.
It is not disputed that the criminal cases filed by complainant
against Herman Medina were pending before the Regional Trial
Court of Santiago City, Isabela, Branch 35. In fact, the warrant of
arrest was issued by Judge Fe Albano Madrid, presiding judge of
the said court. The order of release therefore, on account of the
posting of the bail, should have been issued by that court, or in the
absence or unavailability of Judge Madrid, by another branch of an
RTC in Santiago City. In this case, however, there is no proof that
Judge Madrid was absent or unavailable at the time of the posting
of the bail bond. In fact, complainant Lim avers that on the day
respondent judge ordered the release of Medina, Judge Madrid
and all the judges of the RTC of Santiago City, Isabela were at their
respective posts.
It is elementary that a municipal trial court judge has no authority
to grant bail to an accused arrested outside of his territorial
jurisdiction. The requirements of Section 17(a), Rule 114 as
quoted above must be complied with before a judge may grant
bail.[14] The Court recognizes that not every judicial error
bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if committed in good faith,
does not warrant administrative sanction, but only in cases within
the parameters of tolerable misjudgment.[15] Where, however,
the law is straightforward and the facts so evident, not to know it
or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of
the law.[16]
Respondent judge undeniably erred in approving the bail and
issuing the order of release. He is expected to know that certain
requirements ought to be complied with before he can approve
Medina's bail and issue an order for his release. The law involved is
rudimentary that it leaves little room for error. In the case
of Espaol and Suluen v. Mupas ,[17] we have stated:
Thus, a judge who approves applications for bail of accused whose
cases were not only pending in other courts but who were,
likewise, arrested and detained outside his territorial jurisdiction is
guilty of gross ignorance of the law and violates Rule 3.01 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct. It must be emphasized that the rules of
procedure have been formulated and promulgated by this Court to
ensure the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Failure to
abide by these rules undermines the wisdom behind them and
diminishes respect for the law. Judges should ensure strict
compliance therewith at all times in their respective
jurisdictions.[18]
It is settled that one who accepts the exalted position of a judge
owes the public and the court the ability to be proficient in the law
and the duty to maintain professional competence at all
times.[19] When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with
the rules, he erodes the confidence of the public in the courts. A
judge owes the public and the court the duty to be proficient in the
law and is expected to keep abreast of laws and prevailing
jurisprudence. Ignorance of the law by a judge can easily be the
mainspring of injustice. [20]
Respondent judge's predicament is further aggravated by his
unauthorized or irregular issuance of search warrants not once but
a number of times. 'To our mind, his violations cannot be excused
as mere lapses in judgment but blatant and conscious disregard of
basic rules of procedure.
Moreover, records show that he has been previously charged and
found guilty of similar charges. Respondent judge has been
previously fined Five Thousand Pesos for notarizing the revocation
of a Special Power of Attorney in violation of Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 1-90.[21] In another case, he was found
guilty of gross ignorance of the law and negligence in the performance of
duties for issuing a temporary restraining order and granting a party's
motion without the benefit of a proper hearing. He was fined Ten Thousand
Pesos.[22]
Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court characterizes gross
ignorance of the law and procedure as a grave offense. The
penalties prescribed for such offense are: (1) Dismissal from
service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment
to any public office, including government owned or controlled
corporations, provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits
shall in no case include accrued leave credits; (2) Suspension from
office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3)
months but not exceeding six (6) months; or (3) a fine of more
than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
In Gomos, et al. v. Adiong,[23] the respondent judge therein was
suspended from office without salary and benefits for six months
after he was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law. We took
judicial notice that previously, he was fined in the sum of
P20,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law and another P5,000.00
for gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of discretion.
In this case, respondent judge appears undeterred in disregarding
the law. He has continued to exhibit such behavior that betray an
unconcerned stance about the previous penalties he has received
and the warnings previously given that any repetition of similar
infractions shall be dealt with more severely. Thus, we are
imposing a penalty more severe than a fine. Given the
circumstances, suspension from office for six (6) months without
salary and benefits is reasonable.
We agree with the OCA that the respondent judge must be held
administratively liable for his unjustified failure to comment on an
administrative complaint. This constitutes gross misconduct and
insubordination. We held in Imbang v. Del Rosario, that:
The office of the judge requires him to obey all the lawful orders of
his superiors. It is gross misconduct, even outright disrespect for
the Court, for respondent judge to exhibit indifference to the
resolution requiring him to comment on the accusations in the
complaint thoroughly and substantially. After all, a resolution of
the Supreme Court should not be construed as a mere request, and
should be complied with promptly and completely. Such failure to
comply accordingly betrays not only a recalcitrant streak in
character, but also disrespect for the Court's lawful order and
directive. (Emphasis supplied)[24]
In that case, we fined the judge in the amount of P10,000.00 for
his failure to comply with our directives. In the present case, a fine
of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as recommended by the OCA
is reasonable penalty for respondent judge's repeated failure to
file his comment on the complaint.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Judge Cesar M.
Dumlao of the Municipal Trial Court of San Mateo, Isabela, is found
GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of
Authority and is hereby SUSPENDED from office for a period of six
(6) months without salary and other benefits with a WARNING
that a repetition of the same shall merit a more serious penalty. He
is likewise FINED the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00)
for his obstinate failure to file comment on the complaint filed
against him despite proper notice.
SO ORDERED.
[A.M. NO. MTJ-07-1673 : April 19, 2007]
[Formerly OCA-I.P.I. No. 06-1855-MTJ]
VIRGINIA B. SAVELLA, Complainant, v. JUDGE ILUMINADA M. INES,
MTC-Sinait, Ilocos Sur, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
A verified Letter-Complaint was filed by Virginia B. Savella (complainant)
1
charging Iluminada M. Ines (respondent judge), Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court of Sinait, Ilocos Sur (MTC-Sinait) with Serious Misconduct.
The Letter-Complaint stemmed from a criminal complaint for Falsification of
Public Document filed by complainant against Isabel Ibañez (accused),
docketed as Criminal Case No. 13617, before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
of Vigan, Ilocos Sur (MTCC-Vigan). A warrant of arrest was not immediately
served on the accused because she was residing in the United States of
America at that time. On 18 April 2006, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
operatives tried to serve an alias warrant of arrest on the accused, who
reportedly returned to the Philippines to visit her hometown in Sinait, Ilocos
Sur. The accused, however, was not found at her residence. Instead, her
daughter produced a copy of the Order2 dated 13 April 2006 issued by
respondent judge directing the provisional release of the accused upon posting
of a P12,000.00 bail bond.
Complainant claims that the Clerk of Court of MTC-Sinait did not forward the
bail bond papers to the court where the case was pending. This failure,
according to complainant, is tantamount to serious misconduct. He further
alleges that the order of respondent judge was highly irregular for it gave
undue favor and illegal accommodation to the accused who is known to be a
close friend of respondent judge.3
In her Comment, respondent judge narrates that on Holy Tuesday, 13 April
2006, the accused, together with her daughters, dropped by her house,
voluntarily surrendered to her, and posted bail. Respondent called her clerk to
prepare the corresponding receipt for the cash bond. However, on account of
the Holy Week celebration and the heavy workload in her court, so respondent
judge claims, she forgot to transmit the bail bond papers to MTCC-Vigan until
she was reminded by her Clerk of Court on 20 April 2006 when the latter was
"ordered"4 by Judge Francisco Ante, Jr. (Judge Ante) of MTCC-Vigan to
immediately forward the bail bond papers of the accused. Respondent judge
asserts that her failure to immediately transmit the papers cannot be
considered such serious misconduct as to warrant administrative sanction.
Neither can the approval of the bail be construed as serious misconduct as well
because she was merely performing a judicial function.5
In its Report dated 17 October 2006, the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) found respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law and
recommended a fine of P5,000.00 with warning that a repetition of a similar
infraction in the future shall be dealt with more severely.6
In a Resolution7 dated 15 January 2007, the Court required the parties to
manifest whether or not they are willing to submit the matter for resolution on
the basis of the pleadings filed. Complainant, in her manifestation, responded
in the affirmative.8 Respondent, however, did not submit any manifestation
despite receipt of a copy of the Resolution9 on 16 February 2007. Therefore,
she is deemed to have submitted the case for resolution.
We agree with the findings of the OCA but not its recommendation.
ςηα ñrοb lεš ν ιr†υαl l αω lιb rαrÿ
As correctly pointed out by the OCA, respondent judge failed to properly apply
the rule regarding the bail bond application. Section 17, Rule 114 of the Rules
of Court explicitly provides that "(b)ail in the amount fixed may be filed with
the court where the case is pending, or, in the absence or unavailability of the
judge thereof, with any regional trial judge, metropolitan trial judge, municipal
trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge of the province or city or
municipality." The instant falsification case against accused was filed before the
MTCC-Vigan, presided by Judge Ante. There was no showing of the
unavailability of Judge Ante at that time. Following the said rule, respondent
judge clearly erred in entertaining the bail application despite knowledge of the
pendency of the falsification case before the MTCC of Vigan.
Assuming arguendo that respondent judge rightfully granted bail to accused,
her failure to transmit the order of release and other supporting papers to the
court where the case is pending constitutes another violation of the rules,
particularly Section 19 of Rule 114.10 Respondent judge should have forwarded
the records pertaining to the bail bond immediately after she received the
same.11
Judges are called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with
statutes and procedural rules. It is imperative that they be conversant with
basic legal principles and be aware of well-settled authoritative doctrines. They
should strive for excellence exceeded only by their passion for truth, to the end
that they be the personification of justice and the Rule of Law. When the law is
sufficiently basic, judges owe it to their office to simply apply it; anything less
than that would be gross ignorance of the law.12
This blatant violation of the rules exhibited by respondent judge is tantamount
to gross ignorance of law or procedure classified as a serious charge under
Section 8 of A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC,13 which merits any of the following
sanctions:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the
Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment
to any public office, including government-owned and controlled corporations.
Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include
accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three
(3) but not exceeding (6) months; or
3. A fine of not more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
Obviously, the penalty recommended by the OCA does not conform to the
prescribed sanctions. In line with our rulings in Balayon, Jr. v.
Dinopol14 and Republic v. Hidalgo,15 and considering that this is the first
administrative offense of respondent judge, we deem it proper to impose upon
her a fine of P20,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Iluminada M. Ines
administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law and accordingly imposes
on her a fine in the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS with a
stern warning that a repetition of a similar act will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. MTJ-05-1588 June 5, 2009
(Formerly No. 04-9-511-RTC)
JUDGE DIVINA LUZ P. AQUINO-SIMBULAN, Complainant,
vs.
PRESIDING JUDGE NICASIO BARTOLOME (retired), ACTING CLERK
OF COURT ROMANA C. PASCUAL, CLERK OF COURT MILAGROS
P. LEREY (retired), and DOCKET CLERK AMOR DELA CRUZ, all of
the Municipal Trial Court, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a letter-complaint1 dated April 27, 2004 filed by
complainant Judge Divina Luz P. Aquino-Simbulan with the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA), alleging that respondents Judge Nicasio V.
Bartolome, together with Romana Pascual, Milagros Lerey, and Amor
dela Cruz, Acting Clerk of Court, retired Clerk of Court and Docket Clerk,
respectively, all of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sta. Maria, Bulacan,
committed grave errors and discrepancies in processing the surety bond
for the accused Rosalina Mercado in Criminal Case No. 13360, entitled
People of the Philippines v. Rosalina Mercado, et al.
In her complaint, Judge Simbulan alleged the following:
Criminal Case No. 13360 was originally raffled to the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 41, San Fernando, Pampanga, where complainant Judge
presides. On September 18, 2003, said branch of the RTC received an
Indorsement from Warrant/Subpoena Officer PO3 Edwin Villacentino of
the Sasmuan Municipal Police Station stating that the accused Mercado
voluntarily surrendered before the MTC of Sta. Maria, Bulacan and
posted her bail bond through Summit Guaranty & Insurance Co., Inc.,
which was duly approved by respondent Judge Bartolome on August 21,
2003. This prompted complainant to issue an Order2 dated October 29,
2003, directing respondent Lerey, then Clerk of Court of the MTC, to
transmit to the RTC within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of said
Order, the bond which the former court approved.
When the Clerk of Court failed to comply, complainant Judge issued an
Order3 dated January 12, 2004 directing the former to explain in writing
within three (3) days from receipt thereof why she should not be cited in
contempt for delaying the administration of justice.
On January 29, 2004, the RTC received a letter4 from respondent
Romana Pascual, then Acting Clerk of Court of the MTC, explaining that
the bail bond in Criminal Case No. 13360 was approved by respondent
Judge during the tenure of Lerey, and that the latter had retired on
August 26, 2003.
On February 12, 2004, the RTC received a written explanation5 from
Lerey stating that she had misplaced and overlooked the subject surety
bond, which resulted in the delay of its transmission to the RTC. Attached
to Lerey’s letter were the following documents: (1) the Court Order dated
August 21, 2003 signed by respondent Judge; (2) Bond No. 46485 dated
August 21, 2003 with attachments; (3) Undertaking dated November 22,
2003; (4) Certification from the Office of the Court Administrator, dated
October 29, 2003; and (5) Certification from Summit Guaranty and
Insurance Company, Inc., dated November 22, 2003.
Upon perusal of the documents, complainant Judge discovered that the
subject surety bond bore some erasures, and its attachments were highly
anomalous. In view of these findings, the RTC issued a subpoena to
respondents Pascual and Lerey directing them to appear before it to
explain the aforementioned errors.
During the hearing held on April 26, 2004, respondents Pascual and
Lerey appeared before the RTC, Branch 41, San Fernando, Pampanga,
and the following facts were established therein:
1. That respondent Judge issued an Order of Release dated
August 21, 2003 without a Certificate of Detention and Warrant of
Arrest attached to the documents presented to him;
2. That while the Order of Release was dated August 21, 2003,
the Undertaking and Certification from the bonding company were
dated November 22, 2003 and October 29, 2003, respectively;
3. That it was Lerey who reviewed the documents before the
surety bond was referred to respondent Judge for the latter’s
approval; and
4. That the delay in the transmission of the bond and its
supporting documents was attributed to Amor dela Cruz, Docket
Clerk of the MTC of Sta. Maria, Bulacan.6
After the hearing, Public Prosecutor Otto Macabulos stated that he found
the explanation too shallow and self-serving, and that he would file an
indirect contempt case under Rule 71, Section 3 (d) of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure against Lerey and Dela Cruz. He filed said complaint7 on
June 21, 2004. The RTC, Branch 41, San Fernando, Pampanga then
directed Lerey and Dela Cruz to explain in writing within fifteen (15) days
why they should not be cited in indirect contempt of court or improper
conduct in the processing of the bail bond of accused Mercado.8
In her Manifestation/Compliance9 dated October 25, 2004, Lerey
admitted lapses and negligence in processing the subject bail bond and
was remorseful for what happened. On the other hand, Dela Cruz stated
that there was no wrongdoing on her part in the processing of the subject
bail bond and that she merely followed instructions in mailing the said bail
bond to the RTC.10
In an Order11 dated December 14, 2004, the RTC found Lerey guilty of
indirect contempt and sentenced her to pay a fine of ₱10,000.00, which
she duly paid. However, it absolved Dela Cruz from any liability as it
found her explanation meritorious.
In the meantime, in his 1st Indorsement12 dated February 26, 2004,
Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Jose P. Perez referred to the Clerk of
Court of the MTC of Sta. Maria, Bulacan the Orders issued by
complainant Judge relative to the surety bond for comment. However,
there was nothing on record to show that said Clerk of Court complied
with the directive.
DCA Perez also issued a 1st Indorsement13 dated June 22, 2004 to
respondent Judge referring to the letter dated April 27, 2004 of
complainant Judge, which discussed the errors and discrepancies
regarding the approval of the bail bond of the accused in Criminal Case
No. 13360, with the instruction to the former to submit his comment
thereto.
In compliance, respondent Judge submitted his 2nd Indorsement14 dated
July 13, 2004, wherein he denied any liability concerning his approval of
the subject surety bond. According to him, Lerey had expressly admitted
her negligence and lapses which caused the delay in transmitting the
bond to the RTC. He stressed that just like any other judge, his Clerk of
Court (Lerey) enjoys his trust and confidence on matters pertaining to the
affairs of the court, including the review and approval of bail bonds. He
added that he had no reason to doubt the official actions of Lerey as the
latter had been serving the court for around 37 years.
In a Memorandum15 dated March 1, 2005, then Court Administrator, now
Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., recommended that the letter
dated April 27, 2004 (and the Orders attached thereto) of complainant
Judge be treated as a formal administrative complaint and redocketed as
such against respondents Judge Bartolome, Pascual, Lerey, and Dela
Cruz, with the directive that the named respondents submit their
respective Comments within ten (10) days upon receipt of the Order from
the Court. Said Order16 was issued by the Court on April 13, 2005, and all
the respondents submitted their Comments on May 13, 2005.
Respondent Judge and Pascual both averred that in the case for indirect
contempt, only Lerey was found guilty of negligence in the performance
of her duties, and no other indictment was made against them.17
On the other hand, Lerey stated in her Comment18 that she has already
been found guilty of indirect contempt for failure to transmit the bail bond
within the period directed by the court, and paid the fine therefor, while
Dela Cruz clarified that she has already been exonerated from any
liability or participation in said incident.
In a Resolution19 dated June 22, 2005, the Court referred the
administrative matter to the Executive Judge of the RTC of Malolos City,
Bulacan for investigation, report and recommendation within 60 days
from receipt of the record.
On April 7, 2006, 2nd Vice-Executive Judge Candido Belmonte submitted
his Report,20 which contained the following findings:
The Investigating Court takes judicial notice that certain functions of court
which are not directly related to decision-making are delegated or
reposed to court personnel. Under this category falls the preparation and
evaluation of documents for bail, for the final approval of the judge.
However, to rely solely on the representation made by the Clerk of Court
without making even a perfunctory perusal of the records is also a mark
of neglect. As such, this court finds the explanation of the respondent
judge to be inadequate to exculpate him for the oversight he committed.
xxxx
With respect to court personnel Romana Pascual, it was established that,
at the time of the commission of the subject administrative offense, she
was not yet discharging the functions of an Officer-in-Charge. She had no
hand in the approval of the bail. As a matter of fact, she immediately
informed respondent Milagros Lerey, the former Clerk of Court, of the
Order coming from Judge Simbulan of RTC-Branch 41, Pampanga
requiring them to transmit the supporting documents for bail. However, it
was the inaction of Milagros Lerey on the matter which caused the delay
in the transmission. The Court notes that the Order of Judge Simbulan
was received at the MTC-Sta. Maria, Bulacan at a time when there was a
transition between Milagros Lerey and the present Clerk of Court. During
that interregnum, it was Romana Pascual who was the OIC. As such, the
letter-explanation of Romana Pascual, dated February 11, 2004,
addressed to Judge Simbulan is deemed sufficient explanation by this
Investigating Court. Hence, she is exonerated of the charges against her.
Regarding the charge against court personnel Amor dela Cruz, it appears
to this Court that although she was the one who finally delivered the
supporting bail documents to RTC-Branch 41, Pamapanga, she has
nothing to do with the act of delay. This seems to be the implication of the
admission of Milagros Lerey that at the time of the approval of the bail
bond the supporting documents were incomplete. She only put the
documents in order after there was an Order from RTC-Branch 41,
Pampanga to transmit the same. The delay took place during this period.
Once Milagros Lerey handed the documents to Ms. Dela Cruz, she
immediately transmitted them to RTC-Branch 41, Pampanga. These facts
borne out by her Comment submitted in the Indirect Contempt Case
before RTC-Branch 41, Pampanga dated July 19, 2004, which this
Investigating Court finds sufficient.21
Based on the foregoing, the Investigating Judge submitted the following
recommendations:
1) For respondent Judge Nicasio Bartolome, he be found to be
negligent of his duty to supervise his court employees in the
discharge of their respective functions. It is further recommended
that a fine of ₱5,000.00 be imposed on him.
2) For respondent Milagros Lerey, she be found to be grossly
negligent of the discharge of her functions as a Clerk of Court. It
is further recommended that a fine of ₱5,000.00 be imposed on
her over and above the fine of ₱10,000.00 imposed on her in the
Indirect Contempt Case.
3) For respondents Romana Pascual and Amor dela Cruz, there
was no direct documentary or testimonial evidence that shows
they have handled the bail bonds. Furthermore, they are not
responsible for the delay in the transmission of the pertinent
documents. As such, it is recommended that they be exonerated
of the charges against them.
City of Malolos, Bulacan, April 7, 2006.22
In a Resolution23 dated October 11, 2006, the Court referred the Report
of the Investigating Judge to the OCA for evaluation, report and
recommendation within thirty (30) days from receipt of records.
In his Memorandum24 dated November 20, 2007, DCA Jose P. Perez
observed that:
1. In approving the surety bond of the accused, respondent Judge
violated Section 17, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.25 In the
 instant case, the accused Rosalina Mercado was not arrested.
That being the case, she should have filed her bail bond with the
court where her case was pending, i.e., the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 41, San Fernando City, Pampanga. In the absence of the
judge thereof, it could be done at another branch of the same
court within the province of Pampanga or City of San Fernando.
Instead, accused Mercado filed her bond in the Municipal Trial
Court of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, where respondent Judge presides,
who approved the same and ordered her release from custody.
2. Respondent Judge did not require the accused to submit the
supporting documents pertinent to the application for a bond. It
appears that there was no Certificate of Detention presented to
him; hence, there was no legal justification for him to issue the
Order of Release and process the bond since the accused was
not detained within his jurisdiction. Also, there was no Warrant of
Arrest attached to the documents presented to him. Moreover, all
the supporting papers were belatedly filed: (a) Undertaking was
dated 22 November 2003; (b) Certification from the Office of the
Court Administrator was dated 29 October 2003; and (c) the
Certification from Summit Guaranty & Insurance Co., Inc. was
dated 22 November 2003.
3. Respondent Judge failed to live up to the standards of a good
magistrate. Not only did he approve the bail bond of the accused
without the requisite authority to do so, his manner of doing so
showed a flagrant disregard for the applicable procedural law he
had sworn to uphold and serve. He committed gross misconduct
by blatantly disregarding the Rules and settled jurisprudence.
These findings led DCA Perez to recommend the following:
Considering that Judge Bartolome has compulsorily retired from the
service effective on 11 October 2006, we recommend that a fine in the
amount of Forty Thousand Pesos (₱40,000.00) be deducted from his
retirement benefits.
With respect to Clerk of Court Milagros Lerey, who already retired from
the service on 26 August 2003, we also find her guilty of gross
misconduct. As can be gleaned from the records, she admitted her
wrongdoing. Had she not retired, we could have meted her the extreme
penalty of dismissal. We, therefore, recommend that she be fined in the
amount of Forty Thousand Pesos (₱40,000.00).
With respect to respondents Romana Pascual and Amor dela Cruz, there
being no evidence linking them to the processing of the questioned bond,
it is recommended that the charges against them be dismissed.26
In a Resolution27 dated April 2, 2008, the Court required the parties to
manifest within ten (10) days from notice whether they were willing to
submit the case for decision on the basis of the pleadings/records
already filed and submitted. All respondents manifested their willingness
to submit the case for decision: respondents Lerey, Pascual and Dela
Cruz having complied on May 13, 2008, and Judge Bartolome on May
23, 2008. The Court submitted the administrative case for resolution on
July 25, 2008.
After a careful evaluation of the records and the Reports of the
Investigating Judge and the OCA, the Court holds that there were indeed
grave errors and discrepancies committed by respondents Judge
Bartolome and Lerey in processing the surety bond for the accused in
Criminal Case No. 13360.
The following provisions of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
apply before an accused can be released on bail:
Sec. 14. Bail, where filed. (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with
the court where the case is pending, or, in the absence or unavailability
of the judge thereof, with another branch of the same court within the
province or city. If the accused is arrested in a province, city or
municipality other than where the case is pending, bail may be filed also
with any regional trial court of said place, or, if no judge thereof is
available, with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge or
municipal circuit trial judge therein. x x x
Sec. 16. Release on bail. The accused must be discharged upon
approval of the bail by the judge with whom it was filed in accordance
with Section 14 hereof.
Whenever bail is filed with a court other than where the case is pending,
the judge accepting the bail shall forward the bail, the order of release
and other supporting papers to the court where the case is pending,
which may, for good reason, require a different one to be filed.
The OCA’s Report revealed that the accused Rosalina Mercado was not
arrested. The proper procedure, according to the above-cited rules,
would have been to file her bail bond with the RTC Branch 41, San
Fernando, Pampanga where her case was pending. Had complainant
Judge been absent or was unavailable at that time, the accused could file
for bail with another branch of the RTC in Pampanga or in San Fernando
City. However, the accused filed her surety bond with the MTC of Sta.
Maria, Bulacan, where it was approved by respondent Judge.
Not only did respondent Judge erroneously order the release of the
accused, but he also failed to require submission of the supporting
documents needed in the application for a bond. There was no Certificate
of Detention or Warrant of Arrest attached to the bond transmitted by the
MTC to the complainant Judge. Moreover, the other supporting
documents were belatedly filed. Records show that respondent Judge
approved the bail bond on August 21, 2003, but the Undertaking was
dated November 22, 2003, the Certification from the OCA was dated
October 29, 2003, and the Certification from Summit Guaranty and
Insurance Co., Inc. was dated November 22, 2003.
Respondent Judge contends that Lerey, who has been Clerk of Court for
37 years, was given the simple matter of examining the documents
attached to the application for a bail bond. For her part, Lerey admitted
her negligence when she misplaced and overlooked the surety bond
policy, resulting in the delay in the transmission of said documents to the
RTC. Notably, she also failed to give an explanation for the erasures
which complainant discovered on the surety bond. By such acts, it is
evident that Lerey did not measure up to the standards required by
Section 1, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel28 as
quoted:
Section 1. Court personnel shall at all times perform official duties
properly and with diligence. They shall commit themselves exclusively to
the business and responsibilities of their office during working hours.
In addition, a clerk of court has a vital function in the prompt and sound
administration of justice since his or her office is the hub of adjudicative
and administrative orders, processes, and concerns.29 He or she also has
the duty to ensure an orderly and efficient record management system in
the court and to supervise the personnel under her office to function
effectively. 30
However, Lerey’s admission of negligence cannot excuse respondent
Judge from liability in the irregular processing of the bail bond. Pertinent
provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct31 state that:
Rule 3.08. – A judge should diligently discharge administrative
responsibilities, maintain professional competence in court management,
and facilitate the performance of the administrative functions of other
judges and court personnel.
Rule 3.09. – A judge should organize and supervise the court personnel
to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, and require at all
times the observance of high standards of public service and finality.
In Bellena v. Judge Perello,32 wherein respondent Judge attributed the
delay in transmittal of records to her clerk of court, the former was still
found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine. The Court held that, although
the clerk of court is primarily responsible for the implementation of
respondent judge’s orders, the fact remains that respondent judge is
tasked with administrative supervision over his or her personnel. It is the
responsibility of the judge to always see to it that his/her orders are
properly and promptly enforced, and that case records are properly
stored and kept. Thus, in the present case, respondent Judge himself
should have verified that the documents for bail were complete and
correct instead of relying on the representations of his clerk of court.
With regard to respondents Pascual and Dela Cruz, the Court observes
that there is no evidence to show that they have contributed to the
irregularities or delay in transmittal of the bail bond. At the time of the
commission of the administrative offense, Pascual was not yet
discharging the functions of an Acting Clerk of Court. Dela Cruz, on the
other hand, merely delivered the supporting documents to the RTC.
Having thus established the respondents’ liabilities, what remains for the
Court’s contention are their penalties.
Under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service,33 the acts of respondent Judge and Lerey may be classified as
gross neglect of duty, which is punishable by dismissal under Rule IV,
Section 52 A(2) thereof. Neglect of duty denotes the failure of an
employee to give one’s attention to a task expected of him. Gross neglect
is such neglect which, from the gravity of the case or the frequency of
instances, becomes so serious in its character as to endanger or threaten
the public welfare.34
In Ulat-Marrero v. Torio, Jr.,35 the Court has categorized as a grave
offense of gross neglect of duty, the failure of a court process server to
serve summons which resulted in the delayed resolution of a case. As
corollarily applied to the present case, where respondents released the
accused on temporary liberty despite the absence of the required
supporting documents for bail, the former are likewise liable for gross
neglect of duty.
Were it not for the fact that both respondents, Judge Bartolome and
Lerey, have retired on October 11, 2006 and August 26, 2003,
respectively, the Court would have dismissed them from the service.
Instead, it orders respondents to pay a fine to be deducted from their
retirement benefits, in accordance with its rulings in Moncada v.
Cervantes,36 Office of the Court Administrator v. Paredes,37 and Soria v.
Oliveros.38
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds:
1. Presiding Judge Nicasio Bartolome (retired) GUILTY of gross
neglect of duty for which he is meted a fine in the amount of Forty
Thousand Pesos (₱40,000.00), to be deducted from his
retirement benefits; and
 2. Clerk of Court Milagros Lerey (retired) GUILTY of gross neglect
of duty for which she is meted a fine in the amount of Forty
Thousand Pesos (₱40,000.00), to be deducted from her
retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. MTJ-04-1558 April 7, 2010
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 04-1594-MTJ)
Re: ANONYMOUS LETTER-COMPLAINT AGAINST HON. MARILOU
RUNES-TAMANG, PRESIDING JUDGE, MeTC PATEROS, METRO
MANILA AND PRESIDING JUDGE, MeTC SAN JUAN, METRO
MANILA,
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
The administration of justice is circumscribed with a heavy burden of
responsibility. It requires that everyone involved in its dispensation ―
from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk ― live up to the strictest
standards of competence, honesty, and integrity in the public
service.1 Any impression of impropriety, misdeed, or negligence in the
performance of official functions must be avoided. The Court shall not
countenance any conduct, act, or omission on the part of those involved
in the administration of justice that violates the norm of public
accountability and diminishes the faith of the people in the
Judiciary.2 Indeed, public confidence in our courts is vital to the effective
functioning of the Judiciary.3
Bearing these tenets in mind, the Court proceeds to determine the
ultimate liabilities of a presiding judge, her branch clerk of court, and her
process server in connection with an anomaly involving the approval of
bail bonds in criminal cases.
An anonymous "Concerned Filipino Citizen" sent to then Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. a letter dated October 22, 2003 requesting the
investigation of Judge Marilou D. Runes-Tamang, Presiding Judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) in Pateros and Acting Presiding Judge of
the MeTC in San Juan, Metro Manila.4 The letter-sender complained that
Judge Tamang, through the connivance of the arresting officer and court
employees of MeTC at San Juan, had been indiscriminately approving
fake bonds for a fee of ₱1,000.00 "per count ng kaso." The letter-sender
also requested the investigation of Judge Tamang’s husband, a sheriff of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasig and an alleged drug addict.
The letter prompted the Court to treat it as an administrative complaint.
On November 4, 2003,5 Chief Justice Davide, Jr. referred the letter to
then Deputy Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock (DCA Lock) for
appropriate action.
lawph!l
Initial Investigation and Report
by the Office of the Court Administrator
The office of DCA Lock conducted a discreet investigation on the
reported impropriety. The investigation revealed that Judge Tamang had
approved bail bonds issued by Covenant Assurance Company, Inc
(Covenant), despite Covenant having been blacklisted since December
20, 2002 in the RTC in Pasig City.
It appears that the RTC, Branch 153, in Pasig City furnished to the OCA
a copy of its order dated October 22, 20036 revoking the "unethical
Orders of Release" issued by Judge Tamang in various criminal cases
assigned to that branch. The order stated that Judge Tamang had
approved the bail bonds issued by a blacklisted company without any
showing of the unavailability of all the RTC Judges in Pasig, considering
that the accused persons posting the bail bonds were charged in criminal
cases pending before the RTC in Pasig and were detained in the Pasig
City Jail.
In his memorandum dated May 12, 2004, DCA Lock recommended that
the Assistant Court Administrator in charge of the area where Judge
Tamang was stationed be directed to conduct further investigation of the
irregularities.7
On May 18, 2004, the Court approved the recommendation, and
endorsed the matter to then Assistant Court Administrator Antonio H.
Dujua (ACA Dujua), who immediately directed the conduct of the
investigation.
ACA Dujua submitted his memoranda dated June 3, 20048 and June 25,
2004.9 In turn, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) presented to
the Chief Justice its memorandum dated June 29, 2004,10 detailing the
anomalous transactions on bail bonds committed in the sala of Judge
Tamang.
The OCA memorandum reported thus:
We have limited our inquiry to the bail bonds acted upon during the
period from January 2003 to June 2004, considering that the Covenant
Assurance Company, Inc. (Covenant for brevity) – the apparent favored
bonding company of Judge Tamang – was blacklisted on 20 December
2002 only.
As previously mentioned in our first Memorandum, as of the date of our
investigation, we found no criminal cases in the RTC in Mandaluyong
City wherein the bail bonds were secured from Covenant. However, there
are three cases- Criminal Cases Nos. MC03-6841, MC03-7058, and
MC03-7156 – wherein the bail bonds were secured in San Juan and
approved by Judge Tamang, notwithstanding the presence and
availability of the Judges in the RTC of Mandaluyong City before whose
courts the cases are pending. Such approval was made in contravention
of the provisions of Section 17(a), Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. x x x
xxx
In the RTC of Pasig City, the records in a considerable number of
criminal cases hereinafter enumerated show Judge Tamang's blatant
disregard for the provisions of the Rules. These records show how she
has been indiscriminately approving bonds in violation of such provisions.
Of significance, more than a majority of the bonds she had approved had
been secured from the Covenant Assurance Company, Inc.,
notwithstanding the fact that such bonding company is among those
blacklisted by the Supreme Court.
xxx
There are rare cases when Judge Tamang approved bail bonds secured
from legitimate surety companies. However, even in such cases,
approval was made without compliance with the provisions of Rule 114 .
x x x In Criminal Cases Nos. 125724, 125802, 12612-D, 12648-D and
125723, where the bail bonds were secured from legitimate surety firms
(either Commonwealth or Summit Guaranty), the accused were all
detained in Pasig City where their cases were pending.11
Acting on the OCA’s recommendation, the Court en banc issued a
resolution dated July 27, 2004,12 to wit:
(a) TREAT OCA’s Memorandum dated 29 June 2004 as an
administrative complaint against Judge Marilou D. Runes-
Tamang to be docketed as A.M. No. MTJ-04-1558 (Office of the
Court Administrator vs. Judge Marilou D. Runes-Tamang,
Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Pateros, Metro Manila
and Acting Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court San Juan,
Metro Manila) and automatically converted into administrative
disciplinary proceedings against Judge Runes-Tamang as both
judge and member of the Philippine Bar.
(b) REQUIRE Judge Runes-Tamang to ANSWER the charges
against her and explain why she should not be disciplined as a
member of the Philippine Bar, within a period of ten (10) days
from notice hereof;
(c) DECLARE all the bail bonds secured from the Covenant
Assurance Company, Inc. after 20 December 2002 as NULL AND
VOID; and
(d) DIRECT the concerned judges of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City and Mandaluyong City to REQUIRE all the accused
who secured the above bail bonds from the Covenant Assurance
Company, Inc. to secure NEW bail bonds from accredited and
legitimate bonding companies or face immediate arrest.
Comment/Answer of Judge Tamang
Maintaining her innocence of the charges, Judge Tamang submitted her
answer/comment dated September 30, 2003,13 in which she related the
circumstances surrounding the approval of the bail bonds.
Sometime in August of 2003, an RTC Judge of Pasig City called her
attention to an irregular order of release she had signed as the Acting
Judge of the MeTC in San Juan, Metro Manila, involving a criminal case
pending in Pasig City. Allegedly, the order of release was signed without
the necessary supporting documents.
The discovery of the irregular order of release prompted Judge Tamang
to conduct an investigation in the MeTC of San Juan. After her initial
investigation, she issued Office Memorandum No. 001-03 dated
September 17, 2003,14 addressed to Ellen Sorio, the Branch Clerk of
Court of the MeTC in San Juan, directing her to shed light on the
anomaly. Office Memorandum No. 001-03 included a directive that no
bails bonds would be approved until after the controversy was resolved.
In her response to Office Memorandum No. 001-03, Sorio explained that
as standard office procedure, she checked all orders and documents,
including bail bonds, before Judge Tamang signed them. Sorio added
that to her recollection, all the bail bonds passing through her for
presentation to Judge Tamang had been in order, although on many
occasions, Ronnie Medrano, the MeTC’s Process Server, retained
possession of some of the documents accompanying the orders of
release.15
Sorio’s explanation prompted Judge Tamang to issue Office
Memorandum No. 002-03 dated September 21, 2003,16 requiring
Medrano to submit his comment vis-à-vis Sorio's allegations.
Through his Tugon/Salaysay dated September 26, 2003,17 Medrano
"admitted" his guilt, and begged Judge Tamang for forgiveness.
Thereafter, Judge Tamang issued Office Memorandum No. 003-03 dated
September 27, 2003,18 directing Sorio and Medrano to immediately
release all the bail bonds still in their possession, and to request the
clerks-in-charge of the various courts concerned to remind their
respective judges to immediately cause the cancellation of the bail
bonds, if warranted.
Conceding that she might have been remiss in her duties with respect to
the orders of release based on bail bonds issued by Covenant, Judge
Tamang insisted that she had been "too trusting" of some personnel of
MeTC in San Juan. In substantiation, she cited the following
circumstances:
(1) Even the previous Judge of the MeTC in San Juan had been
subjected to the modus operandi, because there were ten orders
of release that said Judge had issued involving criminal cases
pending in the RTC and MeTC in Pasig City, Quezon City, and
Mandaluyong City, and even one criminal case pending in
Angeles City;19
(2) Fourteen orders of release were issued at around 6 p.m. on
Fridays, when there were no available Judges in the other courts;
and the orders of release were served from around 7 p.m. to 8
p.m. of the same day;20
(3) Some orders of release involved accused who were detained
in San Juan, although the criminal cases were pending in the
Pasig City RTC, while other orders of release involving criminal
cases in Mandaluyong City were based on bail bonds issued by
legitimate bonding companies;21
(4) She was not able to receive copies of the orders dated August
25, 2003 and October 22, 2003 issued by Judge Ygaña of RTC
Pasig City, declaring her orders of release as null and
void,22 which reflected a manifest cover-up on the part of some
court personnel of the MeTC in San Juan;
(5) The issuance of the orders of release based on Covenant’s
bail bonds happened only in the MeTC in San Juan, not in the
MeTC in Pateros where she was the Presiding Judge;23
(6) She stayed late in her office to sign orders, to resolve pending
motions, and to pen decisions. She believed that all orders of
release involving legitimate bonding companies were signed by
her beyond office hours, when there were no available judges in
other courts; 24 and
(7) That she already rectified her mistakes as early as September
2003 by issuing Memoranda No. 001-03 and No. 003-03.
Insisting that the court personnel had taken advantage of her leniency
and kindness, Judge Tamang declared that she "has never transgressed
the Code of Judicial Conduct with malicious intention and orchestrated
plans of compromising the integrity of the judiciary."
In her supplemental answer/comment dated October 8, 2004,25 Judge
Tamang bewailed the failure to accord her due process, contending that
she should have been required to file her answer/comment upon receipt
of the anonymous letter-complaint; and that she should have been given
opportunity to explain with particularity each and every document that
became the basis of the recommendation.
Inclusion of Additional Respondents
In the resolution dated November 9, 2004,26 the Court noted Judge
Tamang’s answer and supplemental answer/comment, and referred the
matter to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation.
The OCA submitted its memorandum dated January 26,
2005,27 recommending as follows:
(1) That Ms. Eleanor A. Sorio and Mr. Ronnie Medrano, Clerk of
Court III and Process Server, respectively, of the Metropolitan
Trial Court (Branch 57) at San Juan, Metro Manila, be
INCLUDED as respondents together with Judge Marilou D.
Runes-Tamang in the instant administrative case;
(2) That both Ms. Sorio and Mr. Medrano be required to submit
their respective COMMENTS regarding their participation in the
processing/approval of the bonds irregularly issued and secured
from Covenant Assurance Company, Inc., subject of the OCA
Memorandum dated 12 May 2004 and 29 June 2004; and
(3) That the instant administrative matter be REFERRED to the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City for
investigation of (a) all the circumstances attendant to the irregular
bail bond transactions; and (b) the specific liability of Judge
Tamang, Ms. Sorio, Mr. Medrano and other court personnel who
may be involved, report and recommendation within sixty (60)
days from the receipt by the investigating judge of the comments
of Ms. Sorio and Mr. Medrano.
Acting on the OCA’s recommendations, the Court resolved on March 1,
2005 to: (1) include Eleanor Sorio and Ronnie Medrano as respondents
in the administrative case; (2) direct Sorio and Medrano to comment on
the complaint; and (3) refer the matter to the Executive Judge of the RTC
in Pasig City for investigation, report and recommendation.28
Notwithstanding their receipt of the pertinent documents and the
additional time allowed to them under the resolution dated January 24,
2006,29 Sorio and Medrano failed to file their comment/answer.
In the meantime, Judge Tamang filed a motion for earlier resolution30 and
an omnibus motion to request that the matter be already submitted for
resolution.31
Subsequently, Medrano manifested that he was waiving his right to file a
comment, and that he was submitting the administrative case for
decision.32 Due to the prior referral to the OCA, the Court resolved to
refer the manifestation of Medrano to the OCA.
Upon recommendation of the OCA,33 the Court en banc issued its
resolution dated August 28, 2007,34 to wit:
(a) REFER Administrative Matter No. MTJ-04-1558 (formerly
A.M. OCA IPI No. 04-1594) to the Office of the incumbent
Executive Judge of RTC Pasig City, Judge Amelia C. Manalastas,
for investigation, report and recommendation within sixty (60)
days from receipt of the records;
(b) DIRECT the Office of the Clerk of Court-Supreme Court to
REMAND the complete and original records of the instant
administrative matter to the OCA for their proper transmittal to the
Office of Executive Judge Manalastas;
(c) DIRECT Executive Judge Manalastas to (1) FURNISH
respondents Eleanor A. Sorio and Ronnie Medrano, Clerk of
Court III and Process Server, respectively, of the MeTC, Branch
57, San Juan, with copies of the October 22, 2003 Anonymous
Complaint and the September 30, 2004 Answer and October 8,
2004 Supplemental Answer filed by Judge Tamang relative to the
case and (2) REQUIRE said respondents to submit their
comment thereon within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days
from receipt of the corresponding order from the investigating
judge; and
(d) DIRECT Judge Edwin A. Villasor, Presiding Judge, RTC
Branch 265, Pasig City to explain, within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of this notice, his failure to act on Administrative Matter
No. MTJ-04-1558 (formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 04-1594) despite
having received copies of Court resolutions and documents
relative to the case.
Investigation, Report and Recommendation of the Executive Judge
Upon receiving the Court’s resolution dated August 28, 2007, Executive
Judge Amelia C. Manalastas35 of the RTC in Pasig City directed Sorio
and Medrano to file their respective comments, and set the hearing of the
administrative case. Judge Manalastas conducted hearings on October 8
and 16, 2007.36
In her compliance dated November 29, 2007,37 Judge Manalastas stated
that she had found no evidence to support a finding against Judge
Tamang of bad faith, dishonesty, or deliberate intent to do injustice; but
recommended that Judge Tamang be found guilty of gross negligence for
violating Canon 6 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and that her co-
respondents be found guilty of grave misconduct, viz:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Office respectfully submits the following
RECOMMENDATION for consideration by the Honorable Court:
1. That Respondent Judge Marilou D. Runes-Tamang be
admonished for her gross negligence in the performance of her
functions.
2. That respondents Eleonor Sorio and Ronnie Medrano be
suspended for their grave misconduct.
Final Report of the OCA
In its final report dated June 30, 2008,38 the OCA adopted the findings of
the Investigating Judge, but concluded that the penalties for Judge
Tamang were not commensurate with the offenses committed. Thus, the
OCA submitted as follows:
(a) That Respondent Judge Marilou Runes-Tamang be found
GUILTY of simple misconduct and be ordered to pay a FINE in
the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the
future shall be dealt with more severely.
(b) That Respondent Eleanor A. Sorio, Clerk of Court III, MeTC,
Branch 57, San Juan, Metro Manila, be found GUILTY of Gross
Neglect of Duty and ordered SUSPENDED for SIX (6) months
without pay with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar offense in the future shall be dealt with more
severely; and
(c) That Respondent Ronnie Medrano, Process Server, MeTC,
Branch 57, San Juan, Metro Manila be found GUILTY of Grave
Misconduct and ordered DISMISSED from the service with
forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and
with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality
of the government, including government owned or controlled
corporations.
Ruling
I
Liability of Judge Tamang
Judge Tamang admittedly approved not only the bail bonds issued by
Covenant, a blacklisted bonding company, but also the bail bonds in
some instances for accused persons charged in criminal cases pending
outside her territorial jurisdiction. Yet, she insisted that she did not
thereby transgress the Code of Judicial Conduct, because she had relied
on the representation of her duly authorized personnel that the bail bonds
were in order. She claimed that she approved the bail bonds for the
criminal cases pending outside her territorial jurisdiction because the
accused were detained in San Juan and Pateros, where she was the
Presiding Judge.
Judge Tamang’s explanations could not completely exonerate her.
The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires
that a magistrate be the embodiment of judicial competence.39 According
to Webster,40 competence means "the quality or state of being
functionally adequate or having sufficient knowledge, judgment, skill, or
strength." Webster also defines a competent person to be one
"possessed of or characterized by marked or sufficient aptitude, skill,
strength, or knowledge."
Did Judge Tamang competently act in approving the questioned bail
bonds?
Par. 1.3.1.5 (d.1), Section E, Chapter VI of the 2002 Revised Manual for
Clerks of Court, outlines the requirements for the approval of bail bonds
posted in the courts, to wit:
In accepting surety bond, the Clerk of Court should see to it that the
following requisites are complied with, otherwise, the bond should be
rejected:
(1) Photographs of accused
It shall be obligatory on the part of surety and bonding companies
issuing such bond to attach photographs (face, left and right
profiles), passport size, recently taken of the accused on all
copies of the corresponding personal bail bond to be issued or
posted.
(2) Affidavit of justification
The bond shall be accompanied by an affidavit of justification to
include a statement to the effect that that the company has no
pending obligation demandable and outstanding in any amount to
the Government or any of its agencies as of the last day of the
month preceding the date the bond is issued or posted.
(3) Clearance from the Supreme Court
Every bond shall be accompanied by a clearance from the
Supreme Court showing that the company concerned is qualified
to transact business which is valid only for thirty (30) days from
the date of its issuance.
(4) Certificate of compliance with the Circular from the Office of
the Insurance Commissioner
The bond shall be accompanied by a verified certification to the
effect that the bond form used has been duly registered with the
Insurance Commission; that the same has been entered and
recorded in the Bond Registry Book of the company concerned in
compliance with OIC Circular No. 66 dated September 19, 1966,
and that the said bond has not been cancelled.
(5) Authority of agent
In case the bond is issued through a branch office or through an
agent, a copy of the authority or power of attorney shall be
submitted to the Clerk of Court for filing, together with the
schedule of limits of its authority.
(6) Current certificate of authority
The bond shall be accompanied by a current certificate of
authority issued by the Insurance Commission with the financial
statement (OIC Form No. 1) showing the maximum underwriting
capacity of the company.
(7) Procedure
All applications for bail/judicial bonds, before their approval by the
Judge concerned, shall be coursed thru the Clerk of Court or his
duly authorized personnel who shall see to it that the bond is in
order and the signature of the bonding officer authentic before
affixing his signature thereto. He shall also indicate therein the
outstanding liability of the bonding company, if any, for the
information and guidance of the Court. For this particular
purpose, the Clerk of Court shall keep a file of specimen
signature of authorized bonding officers, to prevent the
submission of "fake bail bonds."41
Judge Tamang approved bail bonds issued by Covenant although they
manifestly lacked the required clearance from the Supreme Court
indicating that Covenant was qualified to transact business with the
courts. As earlier stated, Covenant was a blacklisted company at the time
of issuance of the bail bonds. She was thereby guilty of a neglect of duty,
for, according to Judicial Audit and Physical Inventory of Confiscated
Cash, Surety and Property Bonds at RTC, Tarlac City, Brs. 63, 64 &
65,42 the judge is still bound to review the supporting documents before
approving the bail bonds, even if it is the Clerk of Court who has the duty
to ascertain that the bail bonds are in order, and that all requisites for
approval have been complied with. The Court concurred with the OCA’s
following observation submitted in said case, to wit:
Although the duty to ensure compliance with the requisites of the bail
bond application rests mainly with the Clerk of Court or his duly
authorized personnel and the task of the Judge is only to approve the
same, said task has an accompanying responsibility on the part of the
approving Judge to review or determine its validity. Understandably, he
should be employing the minimum standard the rules require the clerks of
court to observe. Considering the seriousness of the purpose in the
posting of bail bond, approval thereof should pass through strict scrutiny
and with utmost caution on the part of both the Clerk of Court (or his duly
authorized personnel) and the approving Judge.43
Indeed, in Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 4, Dolores, Eastern Samar44 and Padilla v.
Silerio,45 the Court expressly enjoins a judge to carefully pore over all
documents before signing the documents and giving them
official imprimatur. The judge’s signing of orders must not be taken lightly,
or be regarded as the usual paper work that passes through the judge’s
hands for signature.46 Also, according to Suroza v. Honrado,47 a judge is
inexcusably negligent if he fails to observe in the performance of his
duties that diligence, prudence and circumspection that the law requires
in the rendition of any public service.
Judge Tamang’s excuse of simply relying on the representation of the
court personnel who unfortunately took advantage of her leniency and
kindness betrayed a deficiency in that requisite degree of circumspection
demanded of all those who don the judicial robe. She cannot now thereby
exculpate herself, or take refuge behind that excuse, for, in fact, such
reliance was actually her admission of being neglectful and of lacking the
diligent care in paying attention to the judicial matters brought to her for
signature. A carelessness of that kind and degree ran contrary to the
competence expected of her as a dispenser of justice and as a visible
representation of the law.
Section 17 (a), Rule 114 of the Rules of Court governs the approval of
bail bonds for criminal cases pending outside the judge’s territorial
jurisdiction, viz:
Section 17. Bail, where filed.— (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed
with the court where the case is pending, or in the absence or
unavailability of the judge thereof, with any regional trial judge,
metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial
judge in the province, city, or municipality. If the accused is arrested in a
province, city, or municipality other than where the case is pending, bail
may also be filed with any Regional Trial Court of said place, or if no
judge thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial
judge, or municipal circuit trial judge therein.
xxx
Under the provision, the bail bond may be filed either with the court
where the case is pending, or with any RTC of the place of arrest, or if no
RTC Judge is available, with any MeTC or MTC of the place of arrest.
The list of approved bail bonds contained in the OCA memorandum
dated June 29, 200448 shows 34 involved accused detained in Pasig
City,49 seven in Taguig City,50 six in San Juan,51 and one in Pateros.52 The
remaining three cases involved accused who voluntarily surrendered to
Judge Tamang in the San Juan MeTC.53 However, all of the criminal
cases were pending in the Pasig RTC.
Judge Tamang contends that under Section 17(a), Rule 114, supra, the
accused who were detained and who voluntarily surrendered in San Juan
could file their applications for bail in San Juan; that the accused
detained in Pateros could do the same; and that the bail applications of
those detained in Taguig City were legally approved, because she was
then the Pairing Judge of the MeTC in Taguig City (Branch 74).54
As a judge then on detail in San Juan, Judge Tamang was correct in
approving the applications for bail of the accused who had voluntarily
surrendered and been detained in San Juan, Pateros, and Taguig City,
because Section 7(a), Rule 114, supra, granted her the authority to
approve applications for bail of accused detained within her territorial
jurisdiction, in the event of the unavailability of any RTC Judge in the
area. It is worth noting that at the time of the subject bail applications,
there was still no RTC Judge stationed in San Juan and Pateros.55
However, Judge Tamang did not substantiate her explanation that she
had approved the bail applications of the accused detained in Pasig City
and had issued the corresponding release orders after office hours on
Fridays because no RTC Judges had been available in Pasig City. Aside
from the affidavits attesting that she had stayed and worked in her office
until 9 p.m. and that the orders of release had been immediately served
on the jail warden concerned, she offered no proof to justify her approval
of the questioned bonds. Thus, her explanation did not exculpate her, for,
truly, her approvals of the bail bonds constituted an irregularity arising
from her lack of the authority to do so.
The OCA classified Judge Tamang’s acts as simple misconduct, and
recommended a fine of ₱10,000.00 to be imposed on her.
Although her approval of the bail bonds and her issuance of the orders of
release manifested a degree of incompetence on her part, we should not
find Judge Tamang guilty of simple misconduct, a less serious charge
under Section 9, Rule 140, Rules of Court. Instead, we find her guilty of
simple neglect of duty, a light charge under Section 10, Rule 140, Rules
of Court, for we are all too aware of the pitfalls that a judge like her
frequently stumbles into when detailed in another station. She became an
unwitting victim of the continuing illegal activities of Medrano, who took
advantage of her being too busy with her judicial and administrative
duties and tasks to have noticed and prevented his illegal activities.
Nonetheless, several circumstances properly mitigated her administrative
liability.56
First: Medrano admitted his liability and totally exonerated Judge Tamang
of any participation in or knowledge of the anomalous scheme of
submitting blacklisted bonds for approval. In his Tugon/Salaysay,57 he
confessed:
Tungkol po sa bond na inyong napirmahan, akin pong inaamin na
marami dito ang ipinadaan sa akin. Ngunit nananangan po ako na ang
karamihan dito ay ligal at walang problema nang ito ay dinadala sa inyo
para sa inyong aprubal. Ngunit inaamin ko rin na nitong nakaraang mga
buwan ay may mga bonds na hindi ko pinadala kay Ate Ellen. Ito yung
mga pagkakataong may mga taong lumalapit sa akin at nakiusap at dahil
na rin sa hindi ko matanggihan bunsod ng pakikisama. Ang mga bonds
na sinsabi ko ay isinasabay ko na lamang sa mga papeles na dinadala
sa inyong lamesa para mapirmahan kapag kayo ay dumarating na galing
sa inyong Korte sa Pateros.
Medrano stated that some of the bail applications had incomplete
supporting papers; that he had requested the staff to tell Judge Tamang,
should she ask, that the bail applications were complete; and that he had
thereby taken advantage of the judge’s voluminous workload. He also
declared:
Inaamin ko din po na ang iba dito ay kulang sa papeles at kung
pagkaminsan ay kumpleto nga ngunit mga xerox copies lamang ang mga
dokumento naka –attach. Sa ganitong mga pagkakataong ay pinasasabi
ko na lamang sa mga staff na sabihin sa inyo kapag kayo ay
nagtatanong na kumpleto ang lahat at walang prublema at ikakabit ko na
lamang sa bond kinabukasan o kapag ito ay dadalhin na sa korte.
Maari pong sabihin na akin nga pong naabuso at nasamantala ang
kabaitan at pagtitiwala ninyo sa amin, dahil naipalusot ko ang mga
nasabing bonds, nang hindi ko sinsabi sa inyo ang katotohanan. Maari
ding sabihing sinamantala ko ang sobrang dami ng inyong ginagawa na
pagkaminsan ay tinityempo ko ang pagpasok ng mga bonds kasama ng
napakaraming papeles na inyong pipirmahan kapag kayo ay
nagmamadali nang umalis pauwi. xxx
Undoubtedly, Medrano unconditionally assumed sole responsibility for
the anomalous bail bonds, even if he admitted having committed the
anomaly at the behest of several unnamed persons, viz:
Kung mayroon man dapat managot sa lahat ng gusot na ito ay AKO
lamang po at wala nang iba pa. xxx Hindi ko po talaga alam na aabot sa
ganito ang lahat. Gusto ko lamang pong malaman ninyo na ako ay
biktima lamang ng mga taong nakiusap sa akin na dahil sa tiwala at
kumpyansa sa kanila, kapag sinabi nila sa akin na ayos ang lahat ng
papeles at ang mga nasabing bonds at alam na ng kinauukulang
husgado, akin po itong tinatanggap at pinadadala sa inyong lamesa para
mapirmahan.
Second: It is undisputed that upon learning about the anomaly in August
2003 Judge Tamang immediately took steps to frontally deal with it by
conducting an investigation, and directing Sorio at first and Medrano later
to explain their participations in the uncovered anomaly.58 Her measures
were sincerely taken a few months before the Court received the
denunciatory anonymous letter in November 2003. The taking of such
measures were probably what convinced Executive Judge Manalastas as
Investigating Judge to observe in her report on the investigation that
there appeared "no evidence to support a finding of bad faith, fraud,
dishonesty or deliberate intent to do injustice."59
Third: The offense is Judge Tamang’s first administrative charge as a
judge. According to Concerned Boholanos for Law and Order v. Calibo,
Jr.,60 the fact that a judge is being charged administratively for the first
time is a mitigating circumstance.
Such mitigating circumstances, coupled with Judge Tamang’s good
performance record,61 rendered it is just and warranted to impose the
penalty of reprimand pursuant to Section 11, C, Rule 140, Rules of Court,
viz
Section 11. Sanctions. – xxx
xxx
C. If the respondent is guilty of a light charge, any of the following
sanctions shall be imposed:
1. A fine of not less than ₱1,000.00 but not exceeding ₱10,000.00
and/or
2. Censure;
3. Reprimand;
 4. Admonition with warning.
II
Liability of Ellen Sorio
The OCA recommended that Sorio be found guilty of gross negligence,
which Subsection A(2), Section 52, Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules
on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service punishes with dismissal from
the service.
The 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court requires that all
applications for bail and judicial bonds shall be coursed, before their
approval by the Judge concerned, through the Clerk of Court or his duly
authorized personnel, who shall see to it that the bonds are in order. In
accepting surety bonds, the Clerk of Court should see to it that all the
requisites are complied with; otherwise, the bonds should be rejected.
Every bond shall be accompanied by a clearance from the Supreme
Court showing that the issuing company is qualified to transact business,
which clearance is valid only for 30 days from the date of its issuance.
In response to Judge Tamang’s Memorandum Order No 001-03, Sorio
categorically averred that she had personally scrutinized the documents
before these were brought to the judge’s table for her
signature.62 Insisting that there was no single defective or anomalous
bond from among the documents that had passed through her, Sorio
stated:
It’s true that all orders and other documents including bail bonds pass
through the undersigned before they are presented to you for signature.
The idea was for me to check whether the documents to be signed by
you are in order. To my recollection, all bail bonds which passed through
undersigned for scrutiny/examination were all in order before they were
presented to you for your signature. After your signature on bail bonds,
corresponding endorsement letters were made to the court where the
accused may have pending case and we have these transmittal on
record.63
Sorio’s insistence notwithstanding, there were still spurious bail bonds
that had reached the hands of Judge Tamang, and that the latter
ultimately signed. Thus, although Sorio denied any knowledge of or
participation in such anomalous bail bonds, we find her liable.
As the Branch Clerk of Court of the MeTC in San Juan, Sorio was the
administrative officer of the branch who had the control and supervision
of all court records, exhibits, documents, properties and supplies. With
her responsibilities as such, Sorio should have ensured that all bail bonds
and their supporting documents were in order before endorsing them to
Judge Tamang for approval. Sorio should have rejected the bail bonds of
Covenant due to the latter’s blacklisting and its lack of clearance from the
Supreme Court to issue such bail bonds. She cannot now simply feign
ignorance and escape liability upon the implausible pretext that some bail
bonds did not pass through her.
Likewise, Sorio did not explain the non-transmittal of some approved bail
bonds and their supporting documents to the courts, before which the
criminal cases of the accused concerned had been filed and pending.
Based on the record, Judge Tamang had given instructions to Sorio and
Medrano to immediately release the bail bonds upon her approval of
them. However, during the hearing before the Investigating Judge, Sorio
admitted her failure to see to their immediate release, although such was
her primary responsibility as the Branch Clerk of Court, to wit:
COURT: No, first explain to me why these documents were not
transmitted… (interrupted)
MS. SORIO: Upon approval yon ni Judge Tamang, after approval
I gave everything to the one in-charge in transmitting the bonds.
COURT: Who is the one in-charge?
MS. SORIO: The interpreter, Your Honor, then I presumed that
everything will be transmitted by her.
COURT: You have administrative responsibility over the
personnel of the Court.
MS. SORIO: Yes, Your Honor, alam ko po yon kaya naman po
pag nagpa ano na ho sya hindi ko na po alam kung alin-alin po
yong kanyang mga pinadala at hindi niya pinadala. And then
ngayon, silang dalawa (2) nalang ho ni Ronnie and nag-uusap ho
kung ano pa pong kulang.
COURT: Eh pano yan di command responsibility din sayo yan
because these documents were never transmitted by your
subordinate.
MS. SORIO: Basta binigyan ko po sila ng instruction lagi talaga
na itransmit nyo kaagad yan.
COURT: But they were never transmitted, the fact is, they were
never transmitted.
MS. SORIO: I don’t know… (interrupted)
COURT: So who should be responsible?
MS. SORIO: Hindi ko po talaga alam kung natransmit ho nila
lahat yon ma’am.
xxx
 COURT: So why they were not transmitted and why did you not
find out until this investigation?
MS. SORIO: I do believe, Your Honor, that they will follow my
instructions.
COURT: And you never follow it up? You never ask them?
MS. SORIO: I am always following up, Your Honor, the instruction
to them.
COURT: That’s not enough apparently, you’re the clerk of court
eh kasi lalo na yon it’s a vacant Court walang judge you should
be responsible. Ano bang ginagawa ninyo pag walang judge
dyan? You know command responsibility you’re the highest
official in that Court.
MS. SORIO: Yes, Your Honor, I’m doing my best, Your Honor,
lahat po iniuutos ko sa kanila, lahat ng dapat nilang gawin
pinagagawa ko but unfortunately (interrupted)
COURT: Oo it is not enough na iuutos mo tapos hindi naman
gagawin di ba
MS. SORIO: Tsinetsek ko naman po sa kanila eh.64
Sorio’s passing on the blame to her subordinates, as the
foregoing excerpt of her testimony indicates, did not justify her
failure to ensure that the approved bail bonds be forthwith
transmitted to the courts concerned. Her obligation did not end
with the initial verification and signing of the documents, but
extended until the bail bonds and their supporting documents
were transmitted to the courts concerned for appropriate action.
Thus, we cannot exonerate Sorio. As the Branch Clerk of Court, she was
an essential and ranking officer of the judicial system who performed
delicate administrative functions vital to the prompt and proper
administration of justice.65 Her responsibility went beyond a perfunctory
and superficial supervision of her subordinates. As the Court pointed out
in Office of the Court Administrator v. Saa:66
xxx Clerks of Court are required to be persons of competence, honesty,
and probity since they are specifically imbued with the mandate of
safeguarding the integrity of the court and its proceedings, to earn and
preserve respect therefor, to maintain loyalty thereto and to the judge as
a superior officer, to maintain the authenticity and correctness of court
records and to uphold the confidence of the public in the administration of
justice. xxx
The degree of diligence expected of Sorio as the Branch Clerk was high.
According to Escobar Vda. de Lopez v. Luna,67 the Clerks of Court:
xxx [a]re the hubs of adjudicative and administrative orders, processes
and like concerns. Their responsibilities are vital to the prompt and sound
administration of justice. They cannot be allowed to slacken on their
work. They should be officers of competence; they should safeguard the
integrity of the court and its proceedings; they should uphold the
confidence of the public in the administration of justice; and they should
help ensure that the cause of justice is done without delay.
Sorio was remiss in the performance of her duties. Aside from taking her
responsibilities as the Branch Clerk of Court for granted, she also fell
short of the task of effective supervision of the court staff. The
recommendation of the OCA that Sorio be administratively sanctioned for
gross negligence of duty was, therefore, proper, considering that, as the
OCA aptly put it:
Respondent Sorio was grossly negligent in her duties as clerk of court as
shown by her insistence, during the hearing conducted by the
investigating judge that she knew nothing of what was happening in the
Court. Being the Branch Clerk of Court, she cannot just feign ignorance,
considering that she is the administrative assistant of the presiding judge
with the duty to assist in the management of all matters not involving the
exercise of discretion or judgment of the judge.68
The OCA observed, however, that it found no evidence of bad faith,
fraud, dishonesty or deliberate intent to do injustice on the part of Sorio.
Although her participation in the anomaly was sufficiently established, we
give due consideration to the fact that this offense was her first
administrative liability in the 35 years she worked in the Judiciary by
appreciating this fact as a mitigating circumstance in her favor.69 We
impose suspension from the service for two months without pay.
III
Liability of Ronnie Medrano
We cannot be as compassionate towards Medrano, who categorically
admitted his offense, giving the simple explanation of having thereby
accommodated ill-intentioned people. His anomalies for a consideration
appeared to be not isolated, but repeated many times. He thereby
converted his employment in the court into an income-generating activity.
We find him guilty of grave misconduct,70 because he fell short of his
accountability to the people as a public employee. The Court explains
in Imperial v. Santiago, Jr.,71 viz:
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the
public officer. To warrant dismissal from the service, the misconduct
must be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous and not
trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a
mere error of judgment. The misconduct must also have a direct
relation to and be connected with the performance of his official duties
amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect or
failure to discharge the duties of the office. There must also be reliable
evidence showing that the judicial acts complained of were corrupt or
inspired by an intention to violate the law.
In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the
elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant
disregard of established rule must be manifest.72 Corruption as an
element of grave misconduct consists in the act of an official or employee
who unlawfully or wrongfully uses his station or character to procure
some benefit for himself or for another, contrary to the rights of others.73
Medrano knowingly and corruptly submitted spurious or irregular bail
bonds for the approval of the judge. His grave misconduct was, therefore,
a grave offense that deserved the penalty of dismissal for the first offense
pursuant to Sec. 52-A of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service.74 Accordingly, he is meted the ultimate penalty of
dismissal.
WHEREFORE, the Court declares and finds:
1. JUDGE MARILOU D. RUNES-TAMANG of the Metropolitan
Trial Court in Pateros, Metro Manila guilty of simple neglect of
duty, with mitigating circumstances as stated in this decision, and,
accordingly, she is reprimanded, with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same offense, or the commission of a similar
offense, shall be dealt with more severely;
2. ELEANOR A. SORIO, Clerk of Court III, Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 57, in San Juan, Metro Manila guilty of gross
neglect of duty, with a mitigating circumstance as stated in this
decision, and, accordingly, she is suspended from the service for
two months without pay, with a stern warning that a repetition of
the same offense, or the commission of a similar offense, shall be
dealt with more severely; and
3. RONNIE MEDRANO, Process Server, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 57, in San Juan, Metro Manila guilty of grave misconduct,
and, accordingly, he is dismissed from the service with forfeiture
of retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with
prejudice to his re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of
the Government, including government-owned and government-
controlled corporations.
Let a copy of this decision be attached to the personnel records of the
respondents in the Office of the Court Administrator.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-11-2262 February 9, 2011
[Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-3056-RTJ]
GAUDENCIO B. PANTILO III, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE VICTOR A. CANOY, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This administrative complaint against Judge Victor A. Canoy (Judge
Canoy) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 29 in Surigao City
stems from a complaint filed by Gaudencio Pantilo III (Pantilo), charging
Judge Canoy with several counts of gross ignorance of the law and/or
procedures, grave abuse of authority, and appearance of impropriety
(Canon 2, Code of Judicial Conduct). Pantilo prays for Judge Canoy’s
disbarment in relation to Criminal Case No. 8072 for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide entitled People of the Philippines v.
Leonardo Luzon Melgazo.
The facts of the case, as gathered from the records, are as follows:
The complainant, Pantilo, the brother of the homicide victim in the above-
mentioned criminal case, recounts in his letter-complaint that, on
September 3, 2008, at around 5 o’clock in the afternoon, he, along with
police officers Ronald C. Perocho (Perocho) and Santiago B. Lamanilao,
Jr. (Lamanilao), acting as escorts of Leonardo Luzon Melgazo (Melgazo),
the accused in Criminal Case No. 8072, went to the City Prosecutor’s
Office, Surigao City, to attend the inquest proceedings.1 Later, at around
8 o’clock in the evening, Pantilo was informed by Perocho that Melgazo
had been released from detention.2
The following day, September 4, 2008, Pantilo went to the Surigao City
Police Station to verify the information. Upon arriving there, Custodial
Officer Anecito T. Undangan told him that Melgazo had indeed been
released at around 6:30 p.m. on September 3, 2008, as shown in the
Police Logbook of Detention Prisoners and as authorized by Chief of
Police Supt. Ramer Perlito P. Perlas.3 Further, the logbook showed that
Melgazo was temporarily released upon the order of Judge Canoy after
he posted bail in the amount of thirty thousand pesos (PhP 30,000), as
evidenced by O.R. No. 0291794 dated September 3, 2008.4
Pantilo proceeded to the Office of the Clerk of Court to request a copy of
the Information, only to find out that none had yet been filed by the
Surigao City Prosecutor’s Office.5 Puzzled, he inquired from the City
Prosecutor’s Office the details surrounding the release of Melgazo. He
learned that no Information had yet been filed in Court that would serve
as the basis for the approval of the bail. Likewise, he also learned from
the City Police Station that no written Order of Release had been issued
but only a verbal order directing the police officers to release Melgazo
from his detention cell.6 One of the police officers even said that Judge
Canoy assured him that a written Order of Release would be available
the following day or on September 4, 2008 after the Information is filed in
Court.
On September 5, 2008, Melgazo filed a Motion for the Release of his
impounded vehicle as physical evidence pending the trial of the
case.7 The motion was received by the Office of the Clerk of Court at 8:30
a.m. that day and was subsequently raffled in the afternoon. In the Notice
of Hearing of the said motion, Melgazo prayed that it be heard on
September 5, 2008 at 8:30 a.m. According to Pantilo, this clearly violated
the rules which require that the other party must be served a copy of the
motion at least three (3) days before the hearing.
Nevertheless, Judge Canoy issued an Order dated September 5, 2008,
directing Assistant City Prosecutor Robert Gonzaga (Prosecutor
Gonzaga), the prosecutor-in-charge of the case, to give his comment on
the said motion within three (3) days upon receipt of the Order. Three (3)
days later, Prosecutor Gonzaga submitted his comment. And despite his
opposition, Judge Canoy granted Melgazo’s motion.8
Subsequently, Pantilo filed a motion for inhibition of Judge Canoy which
was later denied.
Aggrieved, Pantilo filed a letter-complaint dated November 3, 2008
before the Office of the Court Administrator charging Judge Canoy with
(1) gross ignorance of the law and procedures; (2) grave abuse of
authority; and (3) appearance of impropriety (Canon 2, Code of Judicial
Conduct). Pantilo also prays for Judge Canoy’s disbarment.
On January 5, 2009, the Court Administrator required respondent judge
to comment on the complaint within ten (10) days from receipt.
Accordingly, on February 5, 2009, Judge Canoy filed his comment,
arguing that the facts in this case were exceptional. In his comment, he
admitted that the inquest proceedings of Melgazo before Prosecutor
Gonzaga concluded around 5:00 p.m. on September 3, 2008, after
which, Melgazo, with his counsel, Atty. Cacel Azarcon, went to his office
to post bail for Melgazo’s provisional liberty.9 He noted that because of
the time, most of the clerks in his office and the Office of the Clerk of
Court had already gone home. Thus, it was no longer possible to process
the posting of bail and all the necessary papers needed for the release of
Melgazo.
Bearing in mind the constitutional right of the accused to bail and coupled
with the insistence of Melgazo’s counsel, Judge Canoy summoned
Prosecutor Gonzaga and inquired about the result of the inquest
proceedings. Thereupon, Prosecutor Gonzaga relayed to him that the
charge against Melgazo was for Reckless Imprudence with Homicide and
the recommended bail bond was thirty thousand pesos (PhP 30,000).
However, since it was already past 5:00 p.m., Prosecutor Gonzaga
claimed that he could no longer file the Information and that it would have
to be filed the next day.10
Despite all this, Judge Canoy informed Prosecutor Gonzaga that he
would allow Melgazo to post bail in the amount recommended. He then
called Mrs. Ruth O. Suriaga (Suriaga), Clerk IV, Office of the Clerk of
Court, RTC, Surigao City, to accept as deposit for bail the thirty thousand
pesos (PhP 30,000) from Melgazo.11 Likewise, he instructed Suriaga to
earmark an official receipt which would have to be dated the following
day or September 4, 2008.
Accordingly, he summoned the escorting police officers, Perocho and
Lamanilao, and verbally ordered them to release Melgazo from detention.
He also said that the written order would be issued the following day.12
In his defense, Judge Canoy invokes the constitutional right of the
accused to bail and Section 17(c), Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which does not require that a person be charged in
court before he or she may apply for bail.13 To his mind, there was
already "a constructive bail given that only the papers were needed to
formalize it."14 It would be unreasonable and unjustifiable to further delay
the release of the accused. Nevertheless, he submits that if he would be
"faulted for such act, he does humbly concede but he merely acted in
accordance with what he deemed best for the moment x x x."15
As to his Order dated September 8, 2008 directing the release of the
vehicle subject of the case, he contends that there was no deliberate
intent to disregard rules and procedure. In fact, he points out that the
prosecution was given three (3) days within which to file its comment on
the motion of the accused. The grounds raised by both parties were well
taken into consideration, but he found the grounds raised by Melgazo to
be more reasonable and practical and, hence, he granted the motion.
Similarly, he denied the motion for inhibition filed by Pantilo owing to the
absence of an express imprimatur of the prosecutor handling the case.
On February 9, 2009, Pantilo filed his Reply to the Comment arguing that
there is no such thing as constructive bail under the rules. He adds that,
while he does not dispute the accused’s right to post bail, the granting of
such should be in harmony with the rules, i.e., an application or motion to
that effect and a corresponding order from the court granting the motion.
On October 18, 2010, Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez issued
his evaluation and recommendation on the case. In his evaluation, the
Court Administrator found that respondent judge failed to comply with the
documents required by the rules to discharge an accused on bail.
Further, the Court Administrator noted that Judge Canoy also has
another pending case (but filed on a later date, September 3, 2009):
OCA-IPI No. 09-3254-RTJ, entitled Cristita Conjurado Vda. de Tolibas v.
Judge Victor A. Canoy for Gross Ignorance of the Law and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of Service.
Consequently, he recommended the following: (1) the instant complaint
be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter; and (2) Judge Canoy
be fined forty thousand pesos (PhP 40,000) with a stern warning that a
commission of similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
The Court’s Ruling
We find the evaluation and recommendations of the Court Administrator
well-founded.
It is settled that an accused in a criminal case has the constitutional right
to bail,16 more so in this case when the charge against Melgazo,
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide, is a non-capital offense.
However, the letter-complaint focuses on the manner of Melgazo’s
release from detention.
Sec. 17, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure allows
that any person in custody who is not yet charged in court "may apply for
bail with any court in the province, city or municipality where he is held."
In the case at bar, Melgazo did not file any application or petition for the
grant of bail with the Surigao City RTC, Branch 29. Despite the absence
of any written application, respondent judge verbally granted bail to
Melgazo. This is a clear deviation from the procedure laid down in Sec.
17 of Rule 114. 1avv phil
In addition to a written application for bail, Rule 114 of the Rules
prescribes other requirements for the release of the accused:
SEC. 14. Deposit of cash as bail.¾The accused or any person acting in
his behalf may deposit in cash with the nearest collector of internal
revenue or provincial, city, or municipal treasurer the amount of bail fixed
by the court, or recommended by the prosecutor who investigated or filed
the case. Upon submission of a proper certificate of deposit and a written
undertaking showing compliance with the requirements of section 2 of
this Rule, the accused shall be discharged from custody. The money
deposited shall be considered as bail and applied to the payment of fine
and costs while the excess, if any, shall be returned to the accused or to
whoever made the deposit.
SEC. 2. Conditions of the bail; requirements.¾All kinds of bail are subject
to the following conditions:
(a) The undertaking shall be effective upon approval, and unless
cancelled, shall remain in form at all stages of the case until
promulgation of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court,
irrespective of whether the case was originally filed in or appealed
to it;
(b) The accused shall appear before the proper court whenever
required by the court or these Rules;
(c) The failure of the accused to appear at the trial without
justification and despite due notice shall be deemed a waiver of
his right to be present thereat. In such case, the trial may proceed
in absentia; and
(d) The bondsman shall surrender the accused to the court for
execution of the final execution.
The original papers shall state the full name and address of the accused,
the amount of the undertaking and the conditions required by this section.
Photographs (passport size) taken within the last six (6) months showing
the face, left and right profiles of the accused must be attached to the
bail.
In the case at bar, Melgazo or any person acting in his behalf did not
deposit the amount of bail recommended by Prosecutor Gonzaga with
the nearest collector of internal revenue or provincial, city or municipal
treasurer. In clear departure from Sec. 14 of Rule 114, Judge Canoy
instead verbally ordered Clerk IV Suriaga of the Surigao City RTC, Office
of the Clerk of Court, to accept the cash deposit as bail, to earmark an
official receipt for the cash deposit, and to date it the following day.
Worse, respondent judge did not require Melgazo to sign a written
undertaking containing the conditions of the bail under Sec. 2, Rule 114
to be complied with by Melgazo. Immediately upon receipt by Suriaga of
the cash deposit of PhP 30,000 from Melgazo, Judge Canoy ordered the
police escorts to release Melgazo without any written order of release. In
sum, there was no written application for bail, no certificate of deposit
from the BIR collector or provincial, city or municipal treasurer, no written
undertaking signed by Melgazo, and no written release order.
As regards the insistence of Judge Canoy that such may be considered
as "constructive bail," there is no such species of bail under the Rules.
Despite the noblest of reasons, the Rules of Court may not be ignored at
will and at random to the prejudice of the rights of another.
In BPI v. Court of Appeals, We underscored that "procedural rules have
their own wholesome rationale in the orderly administration of justice.
Justice has to be administered according to the Rules in order to obviate
arbitrariness, caprice, or whimsicality."17 In other words, "[r]ules of
procedure are intended to ensure the orderly administration of justice and
the protection of substantive rights in judicial and extrajudicial
proceedings."18 In this case, the reason of Judge Canoy is hardly
persuasive enough to disregard the Rules.19
From the foregoing, the Court finds Judge Canoy guilty of a less serious
charge of violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars under
Sec. 9, Rule 140 for which a fine of more than PhP 10,000 but not
exceeding PhP 20,000 is the imposable penalty under Sec. 11(b), Rule
140 of the Rules of Court. A fine of PhP 11,000 would be the appropriate
penalty under the circumstances of the case.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Victor A. Canoy is found GUILTY of
violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars. He is meted
the penalty of a FINE of eleven thousand pesos (PhP 11,000). He is
STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of similar or analogous infractions
in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-13-2366 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 11-3740-RTJ], February
04, 2015
JILL M. TORMIS, Complainant, v. JUDGE MEINRADO P.
PAREDES, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
For consideration is the Report and Recommendation1 of Justice Maria Elisa
Sempio Diy (Justice Diy), Court of Appeals, Cebu City, submitted to this Court
pursuant to its January 14, 2013 Resolution,2 referring the complaint filed by
Jill M. Tormis (Jill) against respondent Judge Meinrado P. Paredes (Judge
Paredes), Presiding Judge, Branch 13, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cebu City,
for investigation, report and recommendation.
The Facts
In her Affidavit/Complaint,3 dated September 5, 2011, Jill charged Judge
Paredes with grave misconduct. Jill was a student of Judge Paredes in Political
Law Review during the first semester of school year 2010-2011 at the
Southwestern University, Cebu City. She averred that sometime in August
2010, in his class discussions, Judge Paredes named her mother, Judge
Rosabella Tormis (Judge Tormis), then Presiding Judge of Branch 4, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cebu City, as one of the judges involved in the
marriage scams in Cebu City. Judge Paredes also mentioned in his class that
Judge Tormis was abusive of her position as a judge, corrupt, and ignorant of
the law.
Jill added that Judge Paredes included Judge Tormis in his discussions not only
once but several times. In one session, Judge Paredes was even said to have
included in his discussion Francis Mondragon Tormis (Francis), son of Judge
Tormis, stating that he was a “court-noted addict.”4 She was absent from class
at that time, but one of her classmates who was present, Rhoda L.
Litang (Rhoda), informed her about the inclusion of her brother. To avoid
humiliation in school, Jill decided to drop the class under Judge Paredes and
transfer to another law school in Tacloban City.
Jill also disclosed that in the case entitled “Trinidad O. Lachica v. Judge
Tormis”5(Lachica v. Tormis), her mother was suspended from the service for
six (6) months for allegedly receiving payment of a cash bail bond for the
temporary release of an accused for the warrant she had issued in a case then
pending before her sala. Judge Paredes was the one who reviewed the findings
conducted therein and he recommended that the penalty be reduced to severe
reprimand.
Jill, however, claimed that Judge Paredes committed an offense worse than
that committed by her mother. She averred that on March 13, 2011, Judge
Paredes accepted a cash bail bond in the amount of Six Thousand Pesos
(P6,000.00) for the temporary release of one Lita Guioguio in a case entitled,
“People of the Philippines v. Lita Guioguio,” docketed as Criminal Case No.
148434-R,6 then pending before Branch 8, MTCC, Cebu City (Guioguio case).
Thus, she prayed that Judge Paredes be administratively sanctioned for his
actuations.
Comment of Judge Paredes
In his Comment,7 dated October 28, 2011, Judge Paredes denied the
accusations of Jill. He stated that Judge Tormis had several administrative
cases, some of which he had investigated; that as a result of the
investigations, he recommended sanctions against Judge Tormis; that Judge
Tormis used Jill, her daughter, to get back at him; that he discussed in his
class the case of Lachica v. Tormis, but never Judge Tormis’ involvement in the
marriage scams nor her sanctions as a result of the investigation conducted by
the Court; that he never personally attacked Judge Tormis’ dignity and
credibility; that the marriage scams in Cebu City constituted a negative
experience for all the judges and should be discussed so that other judges,
court employees and aspiring lawyers would not emulate such misdeeds; that
the marriage scams were also discussed during meetings of RTC judges and in
schools where remedial law and legal ethics were taught; that he talked about
past and resolved cases, but not the negative tendencies of Judge Tormis; that
there was nothing wrong in discussing the administrative cases involving Judge
Tormis because these cases were known to the legal community and some
were even published in the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and
other legal publications; and that when he was the executive judge tasked to
investigate Judge Tormis, he told her to mend her ways, but she resented his
advice.
Judge Paredes further stated that when Jill was still his student, she did not
complain about or dispute his discussions in class regarding the administrative
liabilities of her mother; that the matter was not also brought to the attention
of the Dean of Southwestern University or of the local authorities; that he
admitted saying that Judge Tormis had a son named Francis who was a drug
addict and that drug dependents had no place in the judiciary; and that he
suggested that Francis should be removed from the judiciary.
He denied, however, having stated that Francis was appointed as court
employee as a result of the influence of Judge Tormis. She is not an influential
person and it is the Supreme Court who determines the persons to be
appointed as court employees. Judge Tormis, however, allowed her drug
dependent son to apply for a position in the judiciary.
Regarding the specific act being complained of, Judge Paredes admitted that he
personally accepted a cash bail bond of P6,000.00 for the temporary release of
Lita Guioguio on March 13, 2011. He claimed though that the approval of the
bail bond was in accordance with Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-8-62-
SC which allowed executive judges to act on petitions for bail and other urgent
matters on weekends, official holidays and special days. Judge Paredes
explained that he merely followed the procedure. As Executive Judge, he
issued a temporary receipt and on the following business day, a Monday, he
instructed the Branch Clerk of Court to remit the cash bond to the Clerk of
Court. The Clerk of Court acknowledged the receipt of the cash bond and
issued an official receipt. It was not his fault that the Clerk of Court
acknowledged the receipt of the cash bond only in the afternoon of March 21,
2011.
Lastly, Judge Paredes averred that the discussions relative to the
administrative cases of Judge Tormis could not be the subject of an
administrative complaint because it was not done in the performance of his
judicial duties.
Reply of the Complainant
In her Verified-Reply,8 dated November 23, 2011, Jill countered that her
mother had nothing to do with the filing of the present complaint; that she was
forced to leave her family in Cebu City to continue her law studies elsewhere
because she could no longer bear the discriminating and judgmental eyes of
her classmates brought about by Judge Paredes’ frequent discussions in class
of her mother’s administrative cases; that her mother was indeed one of the
judges implicated in the marriage scams, but when Judge Paredes discussed
the matter in his classes, the case of her mother was not yet resolved by the
Court and, thus, in 2010, it was still premature; and that Judge Paredes was
aware that administrative cases were confidential in nature.
Jill claimed that the intention to humiliate her family was evident when Judge
Paredes branded her brother, Francis, as a “drug addict.”
Rejoinder of Judge Paredes
In his Rejoinder,9 dated December 2, 2011, Judge Paredes asserted that it was
not premature to discuss the marriage scams in class because the scandal was
already disclosed by Atty. Rullyn Garcia and was also written in many legal
publications, and that the drug addiction of Francis was known in the Palace of
Justice of Cebu City.
In its Report,10 dated September 12, 2012, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) stated that the conflicting allegations by the parties
presented factual issues that could not be resolved based on the evidence on
record then. Considering the gravity and the sensitive nature of the charges, a
full-blown investigation should be conducted by the CA.
On January 14, 2013, pursuant to the recommendation of the OCA, the Court
referred the administrative complaint to the Executive Justice of the CA, Cebu
Station, for investigation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days
from receipt of the records.11chanRoble svirtual Lawli bra ry
On March 26, 2013, the case was raffled to, and the records were received by,
Justice Diy. Thereafter, the appropriate notices were issued and the
confidential hearings were conducted. Afterwards, Justice Diy received the
respective memoranda of the parties.
In her memorandum,12 Jill contended that Judge Paredes’ act of discussing
Judge Tormis’ cases in class where she was present was an open display of
insensitivity, impropriety and lack of delicadeza bordering on oppressive and
abusive conduct, which fell short of the exacting standards of behavior
demanded of magistrates. She asserted that the defense of Judge Paredes
that he could not be made administratively liable as the act was not made in
the performance of his official duties did not hold water because a judge should
be the embodiment of what was just and fair not only in the performance of his
official duties but also in his everyday life.
Jill also averred that Judge Paredes violated the subjudice rule when he
discussed the marriage scam involving Judge Tormis in 2010 because at that
time, the case was still being investigated; that the administrative case relative
to the marriage scam was decided only on April 2, 2013; that Judge Paredes
was not the Executive Judge of the MTCC when he received the cash bail bond
in the Guiguio case; that he could not prove that the executive judge of the
MTCC was unavailable before accepting the cash bail bond; and that the
assertion of Judge Paredes of his being an anti-corruption judge and a lone
nominee of the IBP Cebu City Chapter to the Foundation of Judicial Excellence
did not exculpate him from committing the acts complained of.
In his Reply-Memorandum,13 Judge Paredes reiterated the allegations
contained in his previous pleadings. He added that the marriage scams
scandalized the Judiciary and became public knowledge when Atty. Rullyn
Garcia of the OCA held a press conference on the matter; that, hence, every
citizen, including him, may comment thereon; that in the hierarchy of rights,
freedom of speech and expression ranked high; that Judge Tormis never
intervened in the present case; that if he indeed made derogatory remarks
against Judge Tormis, she should have filed a criminal action for oral
defamation; and that calling for the ouster of drug addicts could not be
considered an abuse, but was meant for the protection of the Judiciary.14
chanRob lesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry
(3) Reprimand; and (4) Admonition with warning.
Inasmuch as this is Judge Paredes’ first offense and considering the factual
milieu and the peculiar circumstances attendant thereto, it is respectfully
recommended that Judge Paredes be meted out with the penalty
of REPRIMAND with a warning that a repetition of the same or a similar
offense will be dealt with more severely.18

In her Report and Recommendation, Justice Diy found Judge Paredes guilty of
The Court’s Ruling
conduct unbecoming of a judge. She opined that his use of intemperate
language during class discussions was inappropriate. His statements in class,
The Court adopts the findings and recommendations of Justice Diy except as to
tending to project Judge Tormis as corrupt and ignorant of the laws and
the penalty.
procedure, were obviously and clearly insensitive and inexcusable.
Misconduct is defined as a transgression of some established and definite rule
Justice Diy disregarded the defense of Judge Paredes that his discussions of
of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public
the administrative case of Judge Tormis in class was an exercise of his right to
officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of
freedom of expression. She cited the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules,
Philippine Judiciary15 which urged members of the Judiciary to be models of
which must be established by substantial evidence. As distinguished from
propriety at all times. She quoted with emphasis Section 6 which stated that
simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law,
“Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief,
or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in a charge of grave
association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always
misconduct. Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the act
conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial
of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station
office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary.”16
or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person,
chanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

contrary to duty and the rights of others.19

Justice Diy likewise rejected Judge Paredes’ position that he could not be held
chanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

administratively liable for his comments against Judge Tormis and Francis as
To constitute misconduct, the act or acts must have a direct relation to and be
these were uttered while he was not in the exercise of his judicial
connected with the performance of his official duties.20 Considering that the
functions. Jurisprudence,17 as well as the New Code of Judicial Conduct,
acts complained of, the remarks against Judge Tormis and Francis, were made
required that he conduct himself beyond reproach, not only in the discharge of
by Judge Paredes in his class discussions, they cannot be considered as
his judicial functions, but also in his other professional endeavors and everyday
“misconduct.” They are simply not related to the discharge of his official
activities.
functions as a judge. Thus, Judge Paredes cannot be held liable for
misconduct, much less for grave misconduct.
Justice Diy found merit in Jill’s allegation that Judge Paredes violated
the subjudice rule when the latter discussed the marriage scams involving
Discussion of a subjudice matter, however, is another thing.
Judge Tormis in 2010 when the said issue was still being investigated. She
cited, as basis for Judge Paredes’ liability, Section 4, Canon 3 of the New Code
On subjudice matters, Section 4, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
of Judicial Conduct.
provides: c han roblesv irt uallawl ibra ry

As regards Judge Paredes’ receipt of the cash bail bond in relation to

the Guioguio case, Justice Diy absolved him of any liability as the charge of CANON 3
grave misconduct was not supported by sufficient evidence. She accepted
Judge Paredes’ explanation that he merely followed the procedure laid down in IMPARTIALITY
Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC when he approved the bail bond.
SEC. 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before or could come
Based on these findings, Justice Diy came up with the following before them, make any comment that might reasonably be expected to affect
recommendations, thus: the outcome of such proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of the
process. Nor shall judges make any comment in public or otherwise
chanroble svirtuallaw lib rary

that might affect the fair trial of any person or issue. (Emphasis
The undersigned Investigating Justice finds that indeed Judge Paredes is guilty
supplied)
of conduct unbecoming of a judge. Conduct unbecoming of a judge is
classified as a light offense under Section 10, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of
Court, penalized under Section 11 (c) thereof by any of the following: (1) a The subjudice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial
Fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00; (2) Censure; proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or
obstructing the administration of justice.21 The rationale for the rule was
spelled out in Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. Sanchez,22 where it was stated that it
is a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries,
in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every
extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence produced in
court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias,
prejudice or sympathies.23 chanRoble svi rtual Lawlibra ry
Notably, when Judge Paredes discussed the marriage scams involving Judge
Tormis in 2010, the investigation relative to the said case had not yet been
concluded. In fact, the decision on the case was promulgated by the Court
only on April 2, 2013.24 In 2010, he still could not make comments on the
administrative case to prevent any undue influence in its
resolution. Commenting on the marriage scams, where Judge Tormis was one
of the judges involved, was in contravention of the subjudice rule. Justice Diy
was, therefore, correct in finding that Judge Paredes violated Section 4, Canon
3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
The Court shares the view of Justice Diy that although the reasons of Judge
Paredes for discussing the marriage scams in his classes seemed noble, his
objectives were carried out insensitively and in bad taste. The pendency of the
administrative case of Judge Tormis and the publicity of the marriage scams
did not give Judge Paredes unrestrained license to criticize Judge Tormis in his
class discussions. The publicity given to the investigation of the said scams
and the fact that it was widely discussed in legal circles let people expressed
critical opinions on the issue. There was no need for Judge Paredes to “rub salt
to the wound,”25 as Justice Diy put it.
Judge Paredes in using intemperate language and unnecessary comments
tending to project Judge Tormis as a corrupt and ignorant judge in his class
discussions, was correctly found guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge by
Justice Dy.
Indeed, the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires
judges to exemplify propriety at all times. Canon 4 instructs: chanrob lesvi rtua llawli bra ry
CANON 4
PROPRIETY
SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in
all of their activities.
xxx
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal
restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and
should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves
in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the
dignity, independence and respect for himself, the Court and the Judiciary as a
whole. He must exhibit the hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety
and self-restraint. He should choose his words and exercise more caution and
control in expressing himself. In other words, a judge should possess the
virtue of gravitas. Furthermore, a magistrate should not descend to the level
of a sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant by uttering harsh words, snide
remarks and sarcastic comments. He is required to always be temperate,
patient and courteous, both in conduct and in language.26 chanRoble svirtual Lawli bra ry
In this case, records show that Judge Paredes failed to observe the propriety
required by the Code and to use temperate and courteous language befitting a
magistrate. Indeed, Judge Paredes demonstrated conduct unbecoming of a
judge.
When Judge Paredes failed to restrain himself and included Francis, whose
condition and personal circumstances, as properly observed by Justice Diy, had
no relevance to the topic that was then being discussed in class, it strongly
indicated his intention to taint their reputations.
The inclusion of Judge Tormis and Francis in his class discussions was never
denied by Judge Paredes who merely justified his action by invoking his right to
freedom of expression. Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct recognizes that judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom
of expression. Such right, however, is not without limitation. Section 6, Canon
4 of the Code also imposes a correlative restriction on judges: in the exercise
of their freedom of expression, they should always conduct themselves in a
manner that preserves the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and
independence of the Judiciary. In the exercise of his right to freedom of
expression, Judge Paredes should uphold the good image of the Judiciary of
which he is a part. He should have avoided unnecessary and uncalled for
remarks in his discussions and should have been more circumspect in his
language. Being a judge, he is expected to act with greater circumspection
and to speak with self-restraint. Verily, Judge Paredes fell short of this
standard.
The Court cannot sustain the assertion of Judge Paredes that he cannot be held
administratively liable for his negative portrayal of Judge Tormis and Francis in
his class discussions. Judge Paredes should be reminded of the ethical conduct
expected of him as a judge not only in the performance of his judicial duties,
but in his professional and private activities as well. Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2
of the Code mandates: chanroble svi rtual lawlib rary
CANON 2
INTEGRITY
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial
office but also to the personal demeanor of judges.
SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above
reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable
observer.

SECTION 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s
faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but
must also be seen to be done.
(Emphases supplied)
Any impropriety on the part of Judge Paredes, whether committed in or out of
the court, should not be tolerated for he is not a judge only occasionally. It
should be emphasized that the Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the
conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect
to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside
his sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality, a public
official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in
order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. A judge’s official life cannot
simply be detached or separated from his personal existence. Thus, being a
subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept
restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary
citizen. He should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public
service. The personal behavior of a judge, both in the performance of official
exercising powers incidental to his functions as an Executive Judge since he
was the only judge available when Lita Guioguio posted bail. Notably, Lita
Guioguio’s payment for cash bail bond was made on a Sunday. In addition,
the judge assigned to the court where the Guioguio case was then pending and
the executive judge of the MTCC, Cebu City were not available to receive the
bail bond. Judge Paredes was the only judge available since the practice was
for one judge to be present on Saturdays. However, there was no judge
assigned for duty during Sundays.
Relative to the matter above-discussed, the insinuation made by complainant
Jill of any irregularity reflected in the issuance of the two (2) orders of release
of different dates is not backed up by sufficient evidence.28
Conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under Section
10, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court and penalized under Section 11(C) thereof
by any of the following: (1) A fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding
P10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand; and (4) Admonition with warning.
Considering that this is the first offense of Judge Paredes, the appropriate
penalty under the circumstances is admonition. chanrob leslaw

duties and in private life should be above suspicion.27cha nRoblesvi rt ualLaw lib rary

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Meinrado P. Paredes, Presiding Judge of

Regarding the act of receiving the cash bail bond in the Guioguio case, Justice Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, administratively liable for
Diy correctly found that it cannot be regarded as grave misconduct. The Court conduct unbecoming of a judge and ADMONISHES him therefor.
finds merit in the position of Judge Paredes that the approval, as well as the
receipt, of the cash bail bond, was in accordance with the rules. Thus: chanrob lesvi rtua llawlib ra ry SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibra ry

Finally, the Investigating Officer disagrees with Jill’s allegation that Judge
Paredes committed grave misconduct when he personally received cash bail
bond in relation to the Guioguio case. Judge Paredes justified his action by
stating that he was merely following the procedure set forth in Section 14,
Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-02-SC, which authorizes executive judges to act on
petitions for bail on Saturdays after 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon, Sundays,
official holidays, and special days. Said rule also provides that should the
accused deposit cash bail, the executive judge shall acknowledge receipt of the
cash bail bond in writing and issue a temporary receipt therefor. Considering
that Judge Paredes merely followed said procedure, he cannot be held
administratively liable for his act of receiving the cash bail bond in the Guioguio
case.

Moreover, respondent judge is authorized to receive the cash bail bond under
Section 17 (a), Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Under
said provision, the bail bond may be filed either with the court where the case
is pending, or with any Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the place of arrest, or with
any judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court or the Municipal Trial Court of the
place of arrest.

Lastly, Section 1 (h), Chapter 4 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC provides that

executive judges are authorized to exercise other powers and prerogatives
which are necessary or incidental to the performance of their functions in
relation to court administration. In the instant case, Judge Paredes was merely