Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

DECISION

February 16, 1912

G.R. No. L-6583

RAMON FABIE, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
THE CITY OF MANILA, defendant-appellant.

Acting Attorney-General Harvey for appellant.

Sanz & Opisso for appellees.

CARSON, J.:

Ordinance No. 124 of the city of Manila, enacted September 21, 1909, is an
amendment of section 107 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of Manila, enacted
June 13, 1908 relating to the issuance of permits for the erection of buildings.
Section 107 so amended reads as follows:

SEC. 107. Issuance of permits. - When the application plans, and specifications
conform to the requirements of this title and of title eleven hereof, the engineer shall
issue a permit for the erection of the building and shall approve such plans and
specifications in writing: Provided, That the building shall about or face upon a public
street or alley or on a private street or alley which has been officially approved. One
copy of all approved plans and specifications shall be returned to the owner or his
agent and one copy shall be retained by the engineer.

The appellees are the owners in common of a large tract of land which forms a part
of the estate known as the Hacienda de Santa Ana de Sapa and which is inclosed
between Calle Herran of the District of Paco and an estero known as Tripa de Gallina,
and lying within the corporate limits of the city of Manila.

On the 26th day of November, 1909, the plaintiffs and appellees sought to obtain
from the city of Manila a building permit authorizing the construction of a small nipa
house upon the property in question. It was claimed that the purpose of the building
was to serve as a guard house in which watchmen might be stationed in order to
prevent the carrying away of zacate from the premises. The permit was denied by
the city authorities on the ground that the site of the proposed building did not
conform to the requirements of section 107 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of
Manila, as amended by Ordinance No. 124, which provides: "That the building shall
abut or face upon a public street or alley or on a private street or alley which has
been officially approved." It is the contention of the appellees herein that this
provision is unconstitutional and in violation of the fundamental rights of the
property owners of the city of Manila as guaranteed by the established laws of these
Islands and by the Constitution of the United States, in that it constitutes an invasion
of their property rights without due process of law. The lower court found in favor of
appellees and declared the ordinance null and void, at least to the extent of the
above-cited provision. From this judgment this appeal has been duly perfected. The
only question submitted for the adjudication on this appeal is the constitutionality of
the ordinance, and to this question alone was direct our attention in this opinion.

The appellant, the city of Manila, is a duly organized municipal corporation having full
power and authority to enact lawful ordinances for the protection and security of the
lives, health and property of its citizens. Counsel for appellant insists that the
ordinance in question is a valid exercise of the police power of the city, in that its
sold purpose and aim is to effect these ends by affording better sanitary regulations
as well as increased facilities for protection to property from loss by fire.

It is undoubtedly on of the fundamental duties of the city of Manila to make all

reasonable regulations looking to the preservation and security of the general health
of the community, and the protection of life and property from loss or destruction by
fire. All such regulations have their sanction in what is termed the police power.
Much difficulty has been experienced by the courts and text writers in the attempt to
define the police power of the state, and to set forth its precise limitations. In fact it
has been said to be, from its very nature incapable of any exact definition or
limitation. Mr. Thompson in his exhaustive treatise on Corporations summarizes as
follows the conclusions of the leading adjudicated cases and authorities touching this
subject. He says:

Its business is to regulate and protect the security of social order, the life and health
of the citizen, the comfort of an existence in thickly populated communities, the
enjoyment of private and social life, and the beneficial use of property AmDHc8zlM.

And again the same author says:

However courts may differ as to the extent and boundaries of this power, and
however difficult it may be of precise definition, there is a general agreement that it
extends to the protection of the lives, health and property of the citizens, and to the
preservation of good order and the public morals. In the absence of any
constitutional prohibition, a legislature may lawfully prevent all things hurtful to the
comfort, safety, and welfare of society though the prohibition invades the right of
liberty or property of an individual. (Thompson on Corporations, 2d ed., vol. 1, sec.
421.)

In the case of U. S. vs. Toribio (15 Phil. Rep., 88, 92) we had occasion to discuss at
length the police powers of the State, and in the opinion in that case will be found a
number of quotations from textbook and judicial authority, developing and
exemplifying the principles on which the exercise of the police powers of the State
have been recognized and applied. But for the purpose of this opinion the foregoing
citations from Thompson's treatise on Corporations sets forth the doctrine quite
satisfactorily, and relying on the reasoning of the opinion in the case of U. S. vs.
Toribio (15 Phil. Rep., 92), it is not necessary to enter at this time into an extended
discussion of the principles on which the doctrine rest.
In accord with the rule laid down in the case of Lawton vs. Steele (152 U. S., 132-
134), quoted at some length in the opinion in the case of U. S. vs. Toribio, to justify
the State in the exercise of it police powers on behalf of the public, it must appear:

First, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require such interference; and, second, that the means are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting
the public interest, arbitrary interfere with private business, or impose unusual and
unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other words, is determination as
to what is a proper exercise of its police powers is not conclusive, but is subject to
the supervision of the court 0UxQS1VL.

It is very clear that the ordinance, if it be held to be reasonable, prescribes a rule in

the interest of the public of the city of Manila generally, as distinguished from the
interest of individuals or of a particular class. In determining its validity, therefore,
the only questions which need be considered, are whether its provisions are or are
not reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of its purposes, and whether they
are or are not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

The purpose and object of the ordinance is avowedly and manifestly to protect and
secure the health, lives and property of the citizens of Manila against the ravages of
fire and disease. The provision that denies permits for the construction of buildings
within the city limits unless they "abut or face upon a public street or alley or on a
private street or alley which has been officially approved," is in our opinion
reasonably necessary to secure the end in view y2U7u82.

In the first place it prevents the huddling and crowding of buildings in irregular
masses on single or adjoining tracts of land, and secures an air space on at least one
side of each new residence or other building constructed in the city. The menace to
the health and safety of the residents of Manila resulting from the crowding of nipa
shakes, and even more substantial buildings upon small tracts of land is a matter of
common knowledge; and in a community, exposed as this city is to destructive
conflagrations and epidemic diseases, a legislative measures which tends to prevent
the repetition of such unfortunate conditions should not be judicially declared to be
unreasonable, in the absence of the most compelling reasons OJr1GVR.

In the second place, the provisions of the ordinance in question manifestly promote
the safety and security of the citizens of Manila and of their property against fire and
disease, especially epidemic disease, by securing the easy and unimpeded approach
to all new buildings: First, of fire engines, and other apparatus for fighting fire;
second, of ambulances, refuse wagons, and apparatus used by the sanitary
department in caring for the sanitation of the city; third, of fire and health inspectors
generally; of employees of the fire department and others engaged in fighting fire;
and of employees of the Bureau of Health engaged in their duty as guardians of the
sanitary conditions and general health of the city.

There can be no question as to the intent an purpose of the provision of the

ordinance under discussion. It is manifestly intended to subserve the public health
and safety of the citizens of Manila generally and was not conceived in favor of any
class or of particular individuals. Those charged with the public welfare and safety of
the city deemed the enactment of the ordinance necessary to secure these purposes,
and it cannot be doubted that if its enactment was reasonably necessary to that end
it was and is a due and proper exercise of the police power. We are of opinion that
the enforcement of its provisions cannot fail to redound to the public good, and that
it should be sustained on the principle that "the welfare of the people is the highest
law" (salus populi suprema est lex). Indeed having in mind the controlling public
necessity which demands the adoption of proper measures to secure the ends sought
to be attained by the enactment of this provisions of the ordinances; and the large
discretion necessarily vested in the legislative authority to determine not only what
the interests of the public require, but what measures are necessary for the
protection of such interest; we are satisfied that we would not be justified in an
attempt to restrict or control the exercise of that discretion even if the "reasonable
necessity" for its exercise in the particular form actually adopted were much less
apparent than it is in this case.

That the ordinance is not "unduly oppressive upon individuals" becomes very clear
when the nature and extent of the limitations imposed by its provisions upon the use
of private property are considered with relation to the public interests, the public
health and safety, which the ordinance seeks to secure. Discussing this question in
his opinion to the Municipal Board relative to the validity and constitutionality of this
ordinance, the Attorney-General well said: "Under the ordinance before us rights in
private property are not arbitrary regulated. No person desiring to erect a building is
prohibited from doing so. He can, if necessary, lay out a private street or the city can
extend the public street system. The property may thus be substantially increased in
value rather than the reverse, In brief, the owner's right to the enjoyment of his
property is only interfered with in so far as it is necessary to protect the rights of
others."

To this we may add the following citation from the opinion in the case
of Commonwelth vs. Alger (7 Cush., 53, 84) which to our minds well states the
principle in this regard on which the validity of the of the ordinance in question must
be sustained:

We think it is a settled principle, growing out of the nature of well ordered civil
society, that every holder of property, however absolute and unqualified may be his
title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it may be so regulated that it
shall not be injurious to the rights of the community. . . . Rights of property, like all
other social and conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable limitations in
their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable
restraints and regulations established by law, as the legislature, under the governing
and controlling power vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary and
expedient.

We conclude that the proviso of the ordinance in question directing: "That the
building shall abut or face upon a public street or alley which has been officially
approved," is valid, and that the judgment of the lower court should be reversed,
without special condemnation of costs. So ordered taise.

Torres, Johnson, Moreland and Trent, JJ., concur. .

Facts: In July 17, 1940 the National Traffic Commission recommended to the Director of Public Works and
to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from
passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarinas Street from 7:30
AM to 12:30 PM and from 1:30 PM to 5:30 PM; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad
crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street from 7 AM to 11 PM; one year from the date of opening of
the Colgante Bridge to traffic.

The Director of Public Works recommended to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that
the closing of Rizal Avenue to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion extending from the
railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street during the same hours as indicated for a period of
one year from the date of opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic.

Issue: Whether CA 548 is unconstitutional because it constitutes undue delegation of legislative power and
infringes upon constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to ensure the well-being and
economic security of all people;

Whether there is unlawful interference with legitimate business or trade and abridging of the right to
personal liberty and freedom of locomotion.

Held: The writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby DENIED.

Ratio: According to Judge Ranney: "The true distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to
make the law, which necessarily involves discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done to the latter no valid objection can be made.

The Legislature cannot delegate a power to make law, but it can make a law to delegate a power to
determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes or intends to make, its action depend. To
deny this would stop the wheels of the government.

By consideration of public convenience and welfare the National Assembly enacted CA 548. Persons
may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and
prosperity of the State. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind
through education and personal discipline so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which
means peace and order and happiness for all.

The State has exercised its Police Power in this case.

June 26, 1940, this Court had occasion to observe that the principle of separation of
powers has been made to adapt itself to the complexitiesof modern governments,
giving rise to the adoption, within certainlimits, of the principle of “subordinate
legislation,” not only in theUnited States and England but in practically all modern
governments. Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life,
themultiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and theincreased
difficulty of administering the laws, the rigidity of thetheory of separation of
governmental powers has, to a large extent, been relaxed by permitting the
delegation of greater powers by thelegislative and vesting a larger amount of
discretion in administrativeand executive officials, not only in the execution of the
laws, but alsoin the promulgation of certain rules and regulations calculated
topromote public interest.
chanroblespublishingcompany
The petitioner further contends that the rules and regulationspromulgated by the
respondents pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 constitute an
unlawful interference withlegitimate business or trade and abridge the right to
personal liberty and freedom of locomotion. Commonwealth Act No. 548 was
passed by the National Assembly in the exercise of the paramount policepower of the
state.
chanroblespublishingcompany
Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations complained of were
promulgated, aims to promote safe transit upon and avoidobstructions on national
roads, in the interest and convenience of thepublic. In enacting said law, therefore,
the National Assembly wasprompted by considerations of public convenience
and welfare. It wasinspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic. which is, to
say theleast, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the
enactment of said law, and the state in order topromote the general welfare may
interfere with personal liberty, withproperty, and with business and occupations.
Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order
tosecure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state (U.S. vs. Gomez
Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To this fundamental aim of ourGovernment the rights of the
individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but
liberty should not be madeto prevail over authority because then society will fall into
anarchy.Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then

the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve therequired balance of
liberty and authority in his mind througheducation and personal discipline, so that
there may be establishedthe resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order
andhappiness for all. The moment greater authority is conferred upon
thegovernment, logically so much is withdrawn from the residuum of liberty which
resides in the people. The paradox lies in the fact thatthe apparent curtailment of
liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preservation.
chanroblespublishingcompany
The scope of police power keeps expanding as civilization advances. As was said in
the case of Dobbins vs. Los Angeles (195 U.S. 223, 238;49 L. ed. 169), “the right to
exercise the police power is a continuingone, and a business lawful today may in the
future, because of thechanged situation, the growth of population or other causes,
becomea menace to the public health and welfare, and be required to yield tothe
public good.” And in People vs. Pomar (46 Phil., 440), it wasobserved that “advancing
civilization is bringing within the policepower of the state today things which were not
thought of as being within such power yesterday. The development of civilization,
therapidly increasing population, the growth of public opinion, with anincreasing
desire on the part of the masses and of the government tolook after and care for the
interests of the individuals of the state,have brought within the police power many
questions for regulation which formerly were not so considered.”
chanroblespublishingcompany
The petitioner finally avers that the rules and regulations complainedof infringe upon
the constitutional precept regarding the promotionof social justice to insure the well-
being and economic security of allthe people. The promotion of social justice,
however, is to be achievednot through a mistaken sympathy towards any given
group. Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism,
noranarchy,” but the humanization of laws and the equalization of socialand
economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational andobjectively secular
conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the
welfare of all the people, theadoption by the Government of measures calculated to
insureeconomic stability of all the competent elements of society, throughthe
maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in theinterrelations of the
members of the community, constitutionally,
through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through
the exercise of powers underlying theexistence of all governments on the time-
honored principle of
salus populi est suprema lex
.
chanroblespublishingcompany
Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of thenecessity of
interdependence among divers and diverse units of asociety and of the protection
that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our
social and economiclife, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of
thestate of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, andof bringing
about “the greatest good to the greatest number.”
chanroblespublishingcompan y

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING

, the Writ of Prohibition Prayedfor is hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner.
So ordered.
Avanceña,
C.J.
, Imperial, Diaz and Horrilleno,
JJ.
, concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

DECISION

September 25, 1918

G.R. No.
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VALENTIN GINER CRUZ, defendant-appellant.

Aurelio A. Torres for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Paredes for appellee.

, J.:

Section 733 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of Manila enumerates eleven
classes of individuals who shall be deemed to be vagrants. The section includes any
person who "acts as pimp or procurer." The words "pimp" and "procurer," practically
synonymous in signification, are terms of opprobrium. The commonly accepted
definition of the word "pimp" (alcahuete) is "one who provides gratification for the
lust of others; a procurer; a panderer." (6 Words and Phrases, 5379.) The clause in
question standing alone within semi-colons, it is not essential, in order to convict one
of vagarancy because a pimp or procurer, that this person have no visible means of
support, or be an agent for a keeper of a house of prostitution, etc.

A comparison of section 733 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of Manila of 1917
with the corresponding section of the preceding Revised Ordinances discloses that
the phrase "or acts as pimp or procurer" was not found in the old ordinances. Since
the legislative body of the city of Manila has taken the pains to include these words
in the new ordinances, it must have done so for a purpose, which plainly is to put a
stop to vile traffic in human flesh. Such a laudable object on the part of the Municipal
Board of the city of Manila should now be effectuated by judicial enforcement.

The defendant, a cochero, having solicited an American soldier to go with him in his
rig to find a woman of loose moral and having secured a Deliah for the soldier, is "a
pimp or procurer," guilty of the offense punished by section 733 of the Revised
Ordinances of the city of Manila. Although this fact was only shown by the testimony
of one to support a judgment of conviction if, as in this instance, it satisfies beyond a
reasonable doubt. (U.S. vs. Olais [1917], 36 Phil. 828.)

For this offense, the defendant was sentenced in the Municipal Court and again in the
Court of First Instance of the city of Manila to three months' imprisonment and the
costs. Although both of these judges apparently took into consideration in fixing the
penalty that the defendant was as recidivist, and although we are unable to find any
demonstration of this fact in the record, nevertheless, as the penalty is within the
limitations permitted by the Ordinances, and as the offense of the defendant merits
no judicial sympathy, it results that the judgment appealed from should be affirmed
with costs against the appellant.

So ordered.

Torres, Araullo, Street, Avanceña and Fisher, JJ., concur. .

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-24153 February 14, 1983

TOMAS VELASCO, LOURDES RAMIREZ, SY PIN, EDMUNDO UNSON, APOLONIA RAMIREZ

and LOURDES LOMIBAO, as component members of the STA. CRUZ BARBERSHOP
ASSOCIATION, in their own behalf and in representation of the other owners of
barbershops in the City of Manila, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, City Mayor of Manila, HON. HERMINIO A. ASTORGA, Vice-
Mayor and Presiding Officer of the Municipal Board in relation to Republic Act 4065, THE
MUNICIPAL BOARD OF THE CITY OF MANILA and EDUARDO QUINTOS SR., Chief of
Police of the City of Manila, respondents-appellees.

Leonardo L. Arguelles for respondent-appellant.

FERNANDO, C.J.:

This is an appeal from an order of the lower court dismissing a suit for declaratory relief
challenging the constitutionality based on Ordinance No. 4964 of the City of Manila, the
contention being that it amounts to a deprivation of property of petitioners-appellants of their
means of livelihood without due process of law. The assailed ordinance is worded thus: "It shall
be prohibited for any operator of any barber shop to conduct the business of massaging
customers or other persons in any adjacent room or rooms of said barber shop, or in any room or
rooms within the same building where the barber shop is located as long as the operator of the
barber shop and the room where massaging is conducted is the same person." 1 As noted in the
appealed order, petitioners-appellants admitted that criminal cases for the violation of this
ordinance had been previously filed and decided. The lower court, therefore, held that a petition
for declaratory relief did not lie, its availability being dependent on there being as yet no case
involving such issue having been filed. 2

Even if such were not the case, the attack against the validity cannot succeed. As pointed out in
the brief of respondents-appellees, it is a police power measure. The objectives behind its
enactment are: "(1) To be able to impose payment of the license fee for engaging in the business
of massage clinic under Ordinance No. 3659 as amended by Ordinance 4767, an entirely
different measure than the ordinance regulating the business of barbershops and, (2) in order to
forestall possible immorality which might grow out of the construction of separate rooms for
massage of customers." 3 This Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the
general welfare clause. As far back as U.S. v. Salaveria, 4 a 1918 decision, this Court through
Justice Malcolm made clear the significance and scope of such a clause, which "delegates in
statutory form the police power to a municipality. As above stated, this clause has been given
wide application by municipal authorities and has in its relation to the particular circumstances of
the case been liberally construed by the courts. Such, it is well to really is the progressive view of
Philippine jurisprudence." 5 As it was then, so it has continued to be. 6 There is no showing,
therefore, of the unconstitutionality of such ordinance.

WHEREFORE, the appealed order of the lower court is affirmed. No costs.

Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, Melencio- Herrera, Plana, Escolin,
Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., reserves his vote.

Aquino J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
 EN BANC

G.R. No. 118127 April 12, 2005

CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor of the City of Manila, HON.
JOSELITO L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila and Presiding
Officer of the City Council of Manila, HON. ERNESTO A. NIEVA, HON. GONZALO P.
GONZALES, HON. AVELINO S. CAILIAN, HON. ROBERTO C. OCAMPO, HON. ALBERTO
DOMINGO, HON. HONORIO U. LOPEZ, HON. FRANCISCO G. VARONA, JR., HON.
ROMUALDO S. MARANAN, HON. NESTOR C. PONCE, JR., HON. HUMBERTO B. BASCO,
HON. FLAVIANO F. CONCEPCION, JR., HON. ROMEO G. RIVERA, HON. MANUEL M.
ZARCAL, HON. PEDRO S. DE JESUS, HON. BERNARDITO C. ANG, HON. MANUEL L. QUIN,
HON. JHOSEP Y. LOPEZ, HON. CHIKA G. GO, HON. VICTORIANO A. MELENDEZ, HON.
ERNESTO V.P. MACEDA, JR., HON. ROLANDO P. NIETO, HON. DANILO V. ROLEDA, HON.
GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., HON. MA. PAZ E. HERRERA, HON. JOEY D. HIZON, HON.
FELIXBERTO D. ESPIRITU, HON. KARLO Q. BUTIONG, HON. ROGELIO P. DELA PAZ, HON.
BERNARDO D. RAGAZA, HON. MA. CORAZON R. CABALLES, HON. CASIMIRO C. SISON,
HON. BIENVINIDO M. ABANTE, JR., HON. MA. LOURDES M. ISIP, HON. ALEXANDER S.
RICAFORT, HON. ERNESTO F. RIVERA, HON. LEONARDO L. ANGAT, and HON. JOCELYN
B. DAWIS, in their capacity as councilors of the City of Manila, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., as Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila and MALATE
TOURIST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

I know only that what is moral is what you feel good after and what is immoral is what you
feel bad after.

Ernest Hermingway
Death in the Afternoon, Ch. 1

It is a moral and political axiom that any dishonorable act, if performed by oneself, is less
immoral than if performed by someone else, who would be well-intentioned in his
dishonesty.

J. Christopher Gerald
Bonaparte in Egypt, Ch. I

The Court's commitment to the protection of morals is secondary to its fealty to the fundamental
law of the land. It is foremost a guardian of the Constitution but not the conscience of individuals.
And if it need be, the Court will not hesitate to "make the hammer fall, and heavily" in the words of
Justice Laurel, and uphold the constitutional guarantees when faced with laws that, though not
lacking in zeal to promote morality, nevertheless fail to pass the test of constitutionality.

The pivotal issue in this Petition1 under Rule 45 (then Rule 42) of the Revised Rules on Civil
Procedure seeking the reversal of the Decision2 in Civil Case No. 93-66511 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 18 (lower court),3 is the validity of Ordinance No. 7783
(the Ordinance) of the City of Manila.4

The antecedents are as follows:

Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in
the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. 5 It built and opened Victoria
Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the Department of
Tourism as a hotel.6 On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for
a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order 7 (RTC Petition) with the lower
court impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon.
Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the City Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed
that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments,
be declared invalid and unconstitutional.8

Enacted by the City Council9 on 9 March 1993 and approved by petitioner City Mayor on 30
March 1993, the saidOrdinance is entitled–

AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF

BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT,
SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING
PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. 10

The Ordinance is reproduced in full, hereunder:

SECTION 1. Any provision of existing laws and ordinances to the contrary

notwithstanding, no person, partnership, corporation or entity shall, in the Ermita-
Malate area bounded by Teodoro M. Kalaw Sr. Street in the North, Taft Avenue in the
East, Vito Cruz Street in the South and Roxas Boulevard in the West, pursuant to P.D.
499 be allowed or authorized to contract and engage in, any business providing
certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where women
are used as tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the community, annoy
the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the
community, such as but not limited to:

1. Sauna Parlors

2. Massage Parlors

3. Karaoke Bars

4. Beerhouses

5. Night Clubs

6. Day Clubs

7. Super Clubs

8. Discotheques

9. Cabarets

10. Dance Halls

11. Motels
 12. Inns

SEC. 2 The City Mayor, the City Treasurer or any person acting in behalf of the said
officials are prohibited from issuing permits, temporary or otherwise, or from
granting licenses and accepting payments for the operation of business
enumerated in the preceding section.

SEC. 3. Owners and/or operator of establishments engaged in, or devoted to, the
businesses enumerated in Section 1 hereof are hereby given three (3) months from the
date of approval of this ordinance within which to wind up business operations or
to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or convert said
businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area, such as but not
limited to:

1. Curio or antique shop

2. Souvenir Shops

3. Handicrafts display centers

4. Art galleries

5. Records and music shops

6. Restaurants

7. Coffee shops

8. Flower shops

9. Music lounge and sing-along restaurants, with well-defined activities for

wholesome family entertainment that cater to both local and foreign clientele.

10. Theaters engaged in the exhibition, not only of motion pictures but also of
cultural shows, stage and theatrical plays, art exhibitions, concerts and the like.

11. Businesses allowable within the law and medium intensity districts as
provided for in the zoning ordinances for Metropolitan Manila, except new
warehouse or open-storage depot, dock or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline
service station, light industry with any machinery, or funeral establishments.

SEC. 4. Any person violating any provisions of this ordinance, shall upon
conviction, be punished by imprisonment of one (1) year or fine of FIVE
THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS, or both, at the discretion of the Court, PROVIDED,
that in case of juridical person, the President, the General Manager, or person-in-charge
of operation shall be liable thereof; PROVIDED FURTHER, that in case of subsequent
violation and conviction, the premises of the erring establishment shall be closed
and padlocked permanently.

SEC. 5. This ordinance shall take effect upon approval.

Enacted by the City Council of Manila at its regular session today, March 9, 1993.
 Approved by His Honor, the Mayor on March 30, 1993. (Emphasis supplied)

In the RTC Petition, MTDC argued that the Ordinance erroneously and improperly included in its
enumeration of prohibited establishments, motels and inns such as MTDC's Victoria Court
considering that these were not establishments for "amusement" or "entertainment" and they
were not "services or facilities for entertainment," nor did they use women as "tools for
entertainment," and neither did they "disturb the community," "annoy the inhabitants" or
"adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community." 11

MTDC further advanced that the Ordinance was invalid and unconstitutional for the following
reasons: (1) The City Council has no power to prohibit the operation of motels as Section 458 (a)
4 (iv)12 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (the Code) grants to the City Council only the
power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of hotels, motels, inns, pension
houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments; (2) The Ordinance is void as it is
violative of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 49913 which specifically declared portions of the Ermita-
Malate area as a commercial zone with certain restrictions; (3) The Ordinance does not constitute
a proper exercise of police power as the compulsory closure of the motel business has no
reasonable relation to the legitimate municipal interests sought to be protected; (4)
The Ordinance constitutes an ex post facto law by punishing the operation of Victoria Court which
was a legitimate business prior to its enactment; (5) The Ordinanceviolates MTDC's constitutional
rights in that: (a) it is confiscatory and constitutes an invasion of plaintiff's property rights; (b) the
City Council has no power to find as a fact that a particular thing is a nuisance per se nor does it
have the power to extrajudicially destroy it; and (6) The Ordinance constitutes a denial of equal
protection under the law as no reasonable basis exists for prohibiting the operation of motels and
inns, but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments, and for
prohibiting said business in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. 14

In their Answer15 dated 23 July 1993, petitioners City of Manila and Lim maintained that the City
Council had the power to "prohibit certain forms of entertainment in order to protect the social and
moral welfare of the community" as provided for in Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Local Government
Code,16 which reads, thus:

Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang
panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants
pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of
the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:

....

(4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and structures within the city in
order to promote the general welfare and for said purpose shall:

....

(vii) Regulate the establishment, operation, and maintenance of any

entertainment or amusement facilities, including theatrical performances,
circuses, billiard pools, public dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna baths,
massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or amusement; regulate
such other events or activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly those
which tend to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants, or require the
suspension or suppression of the same; or, prohibit certain forms of amusement
or entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the
community.
Citing Kwong Sing v. City of Manila,17 petitioners insisted that the power of regulation spoken of in
the above-quoted provision included the power to control, to govern and to restrain places of
exhibition and amusement.18

Petitioners likewise asserted that the Ordinance was enacted by the City Council of Manila to
protect the social and moral welfare of the community in conjunction with its police power as
found in Article III, Section 18(kk) of Republic Act No. 409, 19 otherwise known as the Revised
Charter of the City of Manila (Revised Charter of Manila)20 which reads, thus:

ARTICLE III

THE MUNICIPAL BOARD

. . .

Section 18. Legislative powers. – The Municipal Board shall have the following legislative
powers:

. . .

(kk) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and
safety, the furtherance of the prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace, good
order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and such
others as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties
conferred by this chapter; and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances which shall
not exceed two hundred pesos fine or six months' imprisonment, or both such fine and
imprisonment, for a single offense.

Further, the petitioners noted, the Ordinance had the presumption of validity; hence, private
respondent had the burden to prove its illegality or unconstitutionality. 21

Petitioners also maintained that there was no inconsistency between P.D. 499 and
the Ordinance as the latter simply disauthorized certain forms of businesses and allowed the
Ermita-Malate area to remain a commercial zone.22 The Ordinance, the petitioners likewise
claimed, cannot be assailed as ex post facto as it was prospective in
operation.23 The Ordinance also did not infringe the equal protection clause and cannot be
denounced as class legislation as there existed substantial and real differences between the
Ermita-Malate area and other places in the City of Manila. 24

On 28 June 1993, respondent Judge Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr. (Judge Laguio) issued an ex-parte
temporary restraining order against the enforcement of the Ordinance.25 And on 16 July 1993,
again in an intrepid gesture, he granted the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by MTDC. 26

After trial, on 25 November 1994, Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision, enjoining the
petitioners from implementing the Ordinance. The dispositive portion of said Decision reads:27

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 778[3], Series of

1993, of the City of Manila null and void, and making permanent the writ of preliminary
injunction that had been issued by this Court against the defendant. No costs.

SO ORDERED.28
Petitioners filed with the lower court a Notice of Appeal29 on 12 December 1994, manifesting that
they are elevating the case to this Court under then Rule 42 on pure questions of law. 30

On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that the following errors were
committed by the lower court in its ruling: (1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance
is ultra vires, or otherwise, unfair, unreasonable and oppressive exercise of police power; (2) It
erred in holding that the questioned Ordinancecontravenes P.D. 49931 which allows operators of
all kinds of commercial establishments, except those specified therein; and (3) It erred in
declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.32

In the Petition and in its Memorandum,33 petitioners in essence repeat the assertions they made
before the lower court. They contend that the assailed Ordinance was enacted in the exercise of
the inherent and plenary power of the State and the general welfare clause exercised by local
government units provided for in Art. 3, Sec. 18 (kk) of the Revised Charter of Manila and
conjunctively, Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code.34 They allege that theOrdinance is a valid
exercise of police power; it does not contravene P.D. 499; and that it enjoys the presumption of
validity.35

In its Memorandum36 dated 27 May 1996, private respondent maintains that

the Ordinance is ultra vires and that it is void for being repugnant to the general law. It reiterates
that the questioned Ordinance is not a valid exercise of police power; that it is violative of due
process, confiscatory and amounts to an arbitrary interference with its lawful business; that it is
violative of the equal protection clause; and that it confers on petitioner City Mayor or any officer
unregulated discretion in the execution of the Ordinance absent rules to guide and control his
actions.

This is an opportune time to express the Court's deep sentiment and tenderness for the Ermita-
Malate area being its home for several decades. A long-time resident, the Court witnessed the
area's many turn of events. It relished its glory days and endured its days of infamy. Much as the
Court harks back to the resplendent era of the Old Manila and yearns to restore its lost grandeur,
it believes that the Ordinance is not the fitting means to that end. The Court is of the opinion, and
so holds, that the lower court did not err in declaring the Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires and
therefore null and void.

The Ordinance is so replete with constitutional infirmities that almost every sentence thereof
violates a constitutional provision. The prohibitions and sanctions therein transgress the cardinal
rights of persons enshrined by the Constitution. The Court is called upon to shelter these rights
from attempts at rendering them worthless.

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit
to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform
to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit
but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be
unreasonable.37

Anent the first criterion, ordinances shall only be valid when they are not contrary to the
Constitution and to the laws.38 The Ordinance must satisfy two requirements: it must pass muster
under the test of constitutionality and the test of consistency with the prevailing laws. That
ordinances should be constitutional uphold the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution. The
requirement that the enactment must not violate existing law gives stress to the precept that local
government units are able to legislate only by virtue of their derivative legislative power, a
delegation of legislative power from the national legislature. The delegate cannot be superior to
the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. 39

This relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been
enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy.
The national legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its
will or modify or violate it.40

The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power, an enactment
of the City Council acting as agent of Congress. Local government units, as agencies of the
State, are endowed with police power in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the
declared objects of their creation.41 This delegated police power is found in Section 16 of the
Code, known as the general welfare clause, viz:

SECTION 16. General WelfareEvery local government unit shall exercise the powers
expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary,
appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the
preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of
the people to a balance.d ecology, encourage and support the development of
appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public
morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among
their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of
their inhabitants.

Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies; in this
case, thesangguniang panlungsod or the city council. The Code empowers the legislative bodies
to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
province/city/municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the Code and in the proper
exercise of the corporate powers of the province/city/ municipality provided under the Code. 42 The
inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of such delegated power.

The Ordinance contravenes

the Constitution

The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the
constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be
reasonable and for the public good.43In the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an
invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.

The relevant constitutional provisions are the following:

SEC. 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property,
and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people
of the blessings of democracy.44

SEC. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men. 45

SEC. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws. 46
 Sec. 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. 47

A. The Ordinance infringes

the Due Process Clause

The constitutional safeguard of due process is embodied in the fiat "(N)o person shall be deprived
of life, liberty or property without due process of law. . . ." 48

There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to
which governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in
each appropriate case, be valid. This standard is aptly described as a responsiveness to the
supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice, 49 and as such it is a limitation upon the
exercise of the police power.50

The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and
property of individuals; to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of the
government, unrestrained by the established principles of private rights and distributive justice; to
protect property from confiscation by legislative enactments, from seizure, forfeiture, and
destruction without a trial and conviction by the ordinary mode of judicial procedure; and to
secure to all persons equal and impartial justice and the benefit of the general law. 51

The guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation, and private corporations and
partnerships are "persons" within the scope of the guaranty insofar as their property is
concerned.52

This clause has been interpreted as imposing two separate limits on government, usually called
"procedural due process" and "substantive due process."

Procedural due process, as the phrase implies, refers to the procedures that the government
must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. Classic procedural due process
issues are concerned with what kind of notice and what form of hearing the government must
provide when it takes a particular action.53

Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes, asks whether the government has an
adequate reason for taking away a person's life, liberty, or property. In other words, substantive
due process looks to whether there is a sufficient justification for the government's action. 54 Case
law in the United States (U.S.) tells us that whether there is such a justification depends very
much on the level of scrutiny used.55 For example, if a law is in an area where only rational basis
review is applied, substantive due process is met so long as the law is rationally related to a
legitimate government purpose. But if it is an area where strict scrutiny is used, such as for
protecting fundamental rights, then the government will meet substantive due process only if it
can prove that the law is necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose. 56

The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with utmost
observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law. Such
power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically 57 as its exercise is subject to a
qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the respect and regard due to the prescription
of the fundamental law, particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it
bears emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the
legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.58 Due process requires the intrinsic validity
of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and property. 59

Requisites for the valid exercise

of Police Power are not met
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of
the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear
that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require
an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. 60 It must be evident
that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can
work. A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the
means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public
interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be
arbitrarily invaded.61

Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an
arbitrary intrusion into private rights62 a violation of the due process clause.

The Ordinance was enacted to address and arrest the social ills purportedly spawned by the
establishments in the Ermita-Malate area which are allegedly operated under the deceptive
veneer of legitimate, licensed and tax-paying nightclubs, bars, karaoke bars, girlie houses,
cocktail lounges, hotels and motels. Petitioners insist that even the Court in the case of Ermita-
Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila 63 had already taken
judicial notice of the "alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in
Manila traceable in great part to existence of motels, which provide a necessary atmosphere for
clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus become the ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-
seekers."64

The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of the social and
moral values of the community. Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of
the Ordinance are within the scope of the City Council's police powers, the means employed for
the accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.

It is undoubtedly one of the fundamental duties of the City of Manila to make all reasonable
regulations looking to the promotion of the moral and social values of the community. However,
the worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the community's social ills can be
achieved through means less restrictive of private rights; it can be attained by reasonable
restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. The closing down and transfer of businesses or
their conversion into businesses "allowed" under the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to
the accomplishment of its purposes. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated
establishments will notper se protect and promote the social and moral welfare of the community;
it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it
arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.

Conceding for the nonce that the Ermita-Malate area teems with houses of ill-repute and
establishments of the like which the City Council may lawfully prohibit, 65 it is baseless and
insupportable to bring within that classification sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars,
night clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns. This is
not warranted under the accepted definitions of these terms. The enumerated establishments are
lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to the moral welfare of the community.

That these are used as arenas to consummate illicit sexual affairs and as venues to further the
illegal prostitution is of no moment. We lay stress on the acrid truth that sexual immorality, being a
human frailty, may take place in the most innocent of places that it may even take place in the
substitute establishments enumerated under Section 3 of the Ordinance. If the flawed logic of
the Ordinance were to be followed, in the remote instance that an immoral sexual act transpires
in a church cloister or a court chamber, we would behold the spectacle of the City of Manila
ordering the closure of the church or court concerned. Every house, building, park, curb, street or
even vehicles for that matter will not be exempt from the prohibition. Simply because there are no
"pure" places where there are impure men. Indeed, even the Scripture and the Tradition of
Christians churches continually recall the presence and universality of sin in man's history. 66

The problem, it needs to be pointed out, is not the establishment, which by its nature cannot be
said to be injurious to the health or comfort of the community and which in itself is amoral, but the
deplorable human activity that may occur within its premises. While a motel may be used as a
venue for immoral sexual activity, it cannot for that reason alone be punished. It cannot be
classified as a house of ill-repute or as a nuisance per se on a mere likelihood or a naked
assumption. If that were so and if that were allowed, then the Ermita-Malate area would not only
be purged of its supposed social ills, it would be extinguished of its soul as well as every human
activity, reprehensible or not, in its every nook and cranny would be laid bare to the estimation of
the authorities.

The Ordinance seeks to legislate morality but fails to address the core issues of morality. Try as
the Ordinancemay to shape morality, it should not foster the illusion that it can make a moral man
out of it because immorality is not a thing, a building or establishment; it is in the hearts of men.
The City Council instead should regulate human conduct that occurs inside the establishments,
but not to the detriment of liberty and privacy which are covenants, premiums and blessings of
democracy.

While petitioners' earnestness at curbing clearly objectionable social ills is commendable, they
unwittingly punish even the proprietors and operators of "wholesome," "innocent" establishments.
In the instant case, there is a clear invasion of personal or property rights, personal in the case of
those individuals desirous of owning, operating and patronizing those motels and property in
terms of the investments made and the salaries to be paid to those therein employed. If the City
of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication and other social ills, it can instead
impose reasonable regulations such as daily inspections of the establishments for any violation of
the conditions of their licenses or permits; it may exercise its authority to suspend or revoke their
licenses for these violations;67 and it may even impose increased license fees. In other words,
there are other means to reasonably accomplish the desired end.

Means employed are

constitutionally infirm

The Ordinance disallows the operation of sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars,
beerhouses, night clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and
inns in the Ermita-Malate area. In Section 3 thereof, owners and/or operators of the enumerated
establishments are given three (3) months from the date of approval of the Ordinance within
which "to wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside the Ermita-Malate area
or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area." Further, it states
in Section 4 that in cases of subsequent violations of the provisions of the Ordinance, the
"premises of the erring establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently."

It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of its
purposes, the governmental interference itself, infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a
person's fundamental right to liberty and property.

Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the right to
exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into
mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the
right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to
such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare." 68 In accordance with this case, the
rights of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will;
to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; and to pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced
in the concept of liberty.69

The U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Roth v. Board of Regents,70 sought to clarify the meaning
of "liberty." It said:

While the Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty. . . guaranteed [by
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments], the term denotes not merely freedom from bodily
restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally
to enjoy those privileges long recognized…as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men. In a Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the
meaning of "liberty" must be broad indeed.

In another case, it also confirmed that liberty protected by the due process clause includes
personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child
rearing, and education. In explaining the respect the Constitution demands for the autonomy of
the person in making these choices, the U.S. Supreme Court explained:

These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a
lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's
own concept of existence, of meaning, of universe, and of the mystery of human life.
Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood where they
formed under compulsion of the State.71

Persons desirous to own, operate and patronize the enumerated establishments under Section 1
of the Ordinancemay seek autonomy for these purposes.

be it stressed that their consensual sexual behavior does not contravene any fundamental state
policy as contained in the Constitution.Motel patrons who are single and unmarried may invoke
this right to autonomy to consummate their bonds in intimate sexual conduct within the motel's
premises72 Adults have a right to choose to forge such relationships with others in the confines of
their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. The liberty protected by the
Constitution allows persons the right to make this choice. 73 Their right to liberty under the due
process clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the
government, as long as they do not run afoul of the law. Liberty should be the rule and restraint
the exception.

it is the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.Liberty in the
constitutional sense not only means freedom from unlawful government restraint; it must include
privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is the beginning of all
freedom74

The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual whose claim to privacy and interference
demands respect. As the case of Morfe v. Mutuc,75 borrowing the words of Laski, so very aptly
stated:

Man is one among many, obstinately refusing reduction to unity. His separateness, his
isolation, are indefeasible; indeed, they are so fundamental that they are the basis on
which his civic obligations are built. He cannot abandon the consequences of his
isolation, which are, broadly speaking, that his experience is private, and the will built out
of that experience personal to himself. If he surrenders his will to others, he surrenders
 himself. If his will is set by the will of others, he ceases to be a master of himself. I cannot
believe that a man no longer a master of himself is in any real sense free.

Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was recognized in Morfe, the invasion of
which should be justified by a compelling state interest. Morfe accorded recognition to the right to
privacy independently of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional
protection. Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of
the citizen.76

There is a great temptation to have an extended discussion on these civil liberties but the Court
chooses to exercise restraint and restrict itself to the issues presented when it should. The
previous pronouncements of the Court are not to be interpreted as a license for adults to engage
in criminal conduct. The reprehensibility of such conduct is not diminished. The Court only
reaffirms and guarantees their right to make this choice. Should they be prosecuted for their
illegal conduct, they should suffer the consequences of the choice they have made. That,
ultimately, is their choice.

Modality employed is
unlawful taking

In addition, the Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it substantially divests the

respondent of the beneficial use of its property. 77 The Ordinance in Section 1 thereof forbids the
running of the enumerated businesses in the Ermita-Malate area and in Section 3 instructs its
owners/operators to wind up business operations or to transfer outside the area or convert said
businesses into allowed businesses. An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of
property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be
recognized as a taking of the property without just compensation. 78 It is intrusive and violative of
the private property rights of individuals.

The Constitution expressly provides in Article III, Section 9, that "private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation." The provision is the most important protection of
property rights in the Constitution. This is a restriction on the general power of the government to
take property. The constitutional provision is about ensuring that the government does not
confiscate the property of some to give it to others. In part too, it is about loss spreading. If the
government takes away a person's property to benefit society, then society should pay. The
principal purpose of the guarantee is "to bar the Government from forcing some people alone to
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole. 79

There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A "possessory" taking occurs when
the government confiscates or physically occupies property. A "regulatory" taking occurs when the
government's regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property. 80

In the landmark case of Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon,81 it was held that a taking also could be
found if government regulation of the use of property went "too far." When regulation reaches a
certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and
compensation to support the act. While property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.82

No formula or rule can be devised to answer the questions of what is too far and when regulation
becomes a taking. In Mahon, Justice Holmes recognized that it was "a question of degree and
therefore cannot be disposed of by general propositions." On many other occasions as well, the
U.S. Supreme Court has said that the issue of when regulation constitutes a taking is a matter of
considering the facts in each case. The Court asks whether justice and fairness require that the
economic loss caused by public action must be compensated by the government and thus borne
by the public as a whole, or whether the loss should remain concentrated on those few persons
subject to the public action.83

What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that government regulation is a

taking if it leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes
with reasonable expectations for use.84A regulation that permanently denies all economically
beneficial or productive use of land is, from the owner's point of view, equivalent to a "taking"
unless principles of nuisance or property law that existed when the owner acquired the land make
the use prohibitable.85 When the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all
economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property
economically idle, he has suffered a taking.86

A regulation which denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land will require
compensation under the takings clause. Where a regulation places limitations on land that fall
short of eliminating all economically beneficial use, a taking nonetheless may have occurred,
depending on a complex of factors including the regulation's economic effect on the landowner,
the extent to which the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations and
the character of government action. These inquiries are informed by the purpose of the takings
clause which is to prevent the government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole. 87

A restriction on use of property may also constitute a "taking" if not reasonably necessary to the
effectuation of a substantial public purpose or if it has an unduly harsh impact on the distinct
investment-backed expectations of the owner.88

The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the "prohibited" establishments three (3)
months from its approval within which to "wind up business operations or to transfer to any place
outside of the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable
within the area." The directive to "wind up business operations" amounts to a closure of the
establishment, a permanent deprivation of property, and is practically confiscatory. Unless the
owner converts his establishment to accommodate an "allowed" business, the structure which
housed the previous business will be left empty and gathering dust. Suppose he transfers it to
another area, he will likewise leave the entire establishment idle. Consideration must be given to
the substantial amount of money invested to build the edifices which the owner reasonably
expects to be returned within a period of time. It is apparent that the Ordinance leaves no
reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable
expectations for use.

are confiscatory as well. The penalty of permanent closure in cases of subsequent violations
found in Section 4 of the to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or to convert
into allowed businessesThe second and third options Ordinance is also equivalent to a "taking"
of private property.

The second option instructs the owners to abandon their property and build another one outside
the Ermita-Malate area. In every sense, it qualifies as a taking without just compensation with an
additional burden imposed on the owner to build another establishment solely from his coffers.
The proffered solution does not put an end to the "problem," it merely relocates it. Not only is this
impractical, it is unreasonable, onerous and oppressive. The conversion into allowed enterprises
is just as ridiculous. How may the respondent convert a motel into a restaurant or a coffee shop,
art gallery or music lounge without essentially destroying its property? This is a taking of private
property without due process of law, nay, even without compensation.

The penalty of closure likewise constitutes unlawful taking that should be compensated by the
government. The burden on the owner to convert or transfer his business, otherwise it will be
closed permanently after a subsequent violation should be borne by the public as this end
benefits them as a whole.

Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning ordinance. A zoning
ordinance, although a valid exercise of police power, which limits a "wholesome" property to a
use which can not reasonably be made of it constitutes the taking of such property without just
compensation. Private property which is not noxious nor intended for noxious purposes may not,
by zoning, be destroyed without compensation. Such principle finds no support in the principles of
justice as we know them. The police powers of local government units which have always
received broad and liberal interpretation cannot be stretched to cover this particular taking.

Distinction should be made between destruction from necessity and eminent domain. It needs
restating that the property taken in the exercise of police power is destroyed because it is noxious
or intended for a noxious purpose while the property taken under the power of eminent domain is
intended for a public use or purpose and is therefore "wholesome." 89 If it be of public benefit that a
"wholesome" property remain unused or relegated to a particular purpose, then certainly the
public should bear the cost of reasonable compensation for the condemnation of private property
for public use.90

Further, the Ordinance fails to set up any standard to guide or limit the petitioners' actions. It in no
way controls or guides the discretion vested in them. It provides no definition of the
establishments covered by it and it fails to set forth the conditions when the establishments come
within its ambit of prohibition. The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted
power to close down establishments. Ordinances such as this, which make possible abuses in its
execution, depending upon no conditions or qualifications whatsoever other than the unregulated
arbitrary will of the city authorities as the touchstone by which its validity is to be tested, are
unreasonable and invalid. The Ordinance should have established a rule by which its impartial
enforcement could be secured.91

Ordinances placing restrictions upon the lawful use of property must, in order to be valid and
constitutional, specify the rules and conditions to be observed and conduct to avoid; and must not
admit of the exercise, or of an opportunity for the exercise, of unbridled discretion by the law
enforcers in carrying out its provisions.92

Thus, in Coates v. City of Cincinnati,93 as cited in People v. Nazario,94 the U.S. Supreme Court
struck down an ordinance that had made it illegal for "three or more persons to assemble on any
sidewalk and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by." The
ordinance was nullified as it imposed no standard at all "because one may never know in
advance what 'annoys some people but does not annoy others.' "

Similarly, the Ordinance does not specify the standards to ascertain which establishments "tend
to disturb the community," "annoy the inhabitants," and "adversely affect the social and moral
welfare of the community." The cited case supports the nullification of the Ordinance for lack of
comprehensible standards to guide the law enforcers in carrying out its provisions.

Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated establishments without infringing
the due process clause. These lawful establishments may be regulated, but not prevented from
carrying on their business. This is a sweeping exercise of police power that is a result of a lack of
imagination on the part of the City Council and which amounts to an interference into personal
and private rights which the Court will not countenance. In this regard, we take a resolute stand to
uphold the constitutional guarantee of the right to liberty and property.

Worthy of note is an example derived from the U.S. of a reasonable regulation which is a far cry
from the ill-considered Ordinance enacted by the City Council.
In FW/PBS, INC. v. Dallas,95 the city of Dallas adopted a comprehensive ordinance regulating
"sexually oriented businesses," which are defined to include adult arcades, bookstores, video
stores, cabarets, motels, and theaters as well as escort agencies, nude model studio and sexual
encounter centers. Among other things, the ordinance required that such businesses be licensed.
A group of motel owners were among the three groups of businesses that filed separate suits
challenging the ordinance. The motel owners asserted that the city violated the due process
clause by failing to produce adequate support for its supposition that renting room for fewer than
ten (10) hours resulted in increased crime and other secondary effects. They likewise argued than
the ten (10)-hour limitation on the rental of motel rooms placed an unconstitutional burden on the
right to freedom of association. Anent the first contention, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
reasonableness of the legislative judgment combined with a study which the city considered, was
adequate to support the city's determination that motels permitting room rentals for fewer than ten
(10 ) hours should be included within the licensing scheme. As regards the second point, the
Court held that limiting motel room rentals to ten (10) hours will have no discernible effect on
personal bonds as those bonds that are formed from the use of a motel room for fewer than ten
(10) hours are not those that have played a critical role in the culture and traditions of the nation
by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs.

The ordinance challenged in the above-cited case merely regulated the targeted businesses. It
imposed reasonable restrictions; hence, its validity was upheld.

The case of Ermita Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of
Manila,96 it needs pointing out, is also different from this case in that what was involved therein
was a measure which regulated the mode in which motels may conduct business in order to put
an end to practices which could encourage vice and immorality. Necessarily, there was no valid
objection on due process or equal protection grounds as the ordinance did not prohibit motels.
The Ordinance in this case however is not a regulatory measure but is an exercise of an
assumed power to prohibit.97

The foregoing premises show that the Ordinance is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of
property and personal rights of citizens. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade,
it cannot, even under the guise of exercising police power, be upheld as valid.

B. The Ordinance violates Equal

Protection Clause

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both
as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be
treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against
others.98 The guarantee means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same
protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like circumstances. 99 The
"equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws." 100 It limits governmental
discrimination. The equal protection clause extends to artificial persons but only insofar as their
property is concerned.101

The Court has explained the scope of the equal protection clause in this wise:

… What does it signify? To quote from J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Land Tenure Administration:
"The ideal situation is for the law's benefits to be available to all, that none be placed
outside the sphere of its coverage. Only thus could chance and favor be excluded and
the affairs of men governed by that serene and impartial uniformity, which is of the very
essence of the idea of law." There is recognition, however, in the opinion that what in fact
exists "cannot approximate the ideal. Nor is the law susceptible to the reproach that it
does not take into account the realities of the situation. The constitutional guarantee then
 is not to be given a meaning that disregards what is, what does in fact exist. To assure
that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may
cut into the rights to liberty and property. Those adversely affected may under such
circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show that the
governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal
was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no
support in reason." Classification is thus not ruled out, it being sufficient to quote from the
Tuason decision anew "that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under
similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the
conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed.
Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal
protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances which, if not
identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that
fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on
some in the group equally binding on the rest. 102

Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation. If the classification is
reasonable, the law may operate only on some and not all of the people without violating the
equal protection clause.103 The classification must, as an indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary.
To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements:

1) It must be based on substantial distinctions.

2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law.

3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only.

4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.104

In the Court's view, there are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns, pension houses,
hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. By definition, all are commercial
establishments providing lodging and usually meals and other services for the public. No reason
exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other
similar establishments. The classification in the instant case is invalid as similar subjects are not
similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it does not
rest on substantial distinctions bearing a just and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance.

The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the
Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. A noxious establishment does not become any
less noxious if located outside the area.

one of the hinted ills theThe standard "where women are used as tools for entertainment" is
also discriminatory as prostitution Ordinance is not a profession exclusive to women. Both men
and women have an equal propensity to engage in prostitution. It is not any less grave a sin when
men engage in it. And why would taims to banishhe assumption that there is an ongoing
immoral activity apply only when women are employed and be inapposite when men are in
harness? This discrimination based on gender violates equal protection as it is not substantially
related to important government objectives.105 Thus, the discrimination is invalid.

Failing the test of constitutionality, the Ordinance likewise failed to pass the test of consistency
with prevailing laws.

C. The Ordinance is repugnant

to general laws; it is ultra vires
The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code as the latter merely empowers local government
units to regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof.

The power of the City Council to regulate by ordinances the establishment, operation, and
maintenance of motels, hotels and other similar establishments is found in Section 458 (a) 4 (iv),
which provides that:

Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang
panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants
pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of
the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:

. . .

(4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and structures within the city in
order to promote the general welfare and for said purpose shall:

. . .

(iv) Regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants,

beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar
establishments, including tourist guides and transports . . . .

While its power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of any entertainment or
amusement facilities, and to prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment is provided
under Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code, which reads as follows:

Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang
panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants
pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of
the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:

. . .

(4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and structures within the city in
order to promote the general welfare and for said purpose shall:

. . .

(vii) Regulate the establishment, operation, and maintenance of any

entertainment or amusement facilities, including theatrical performances,
circuses, billiard pools, public dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna baths,
massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or amusement; regulate
such other events or activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly those
which tend to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants, or require the
suspension or suppression of the same; or, prohibit certain forms of amusement
or entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the
community.

Clearly, with respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses,
lodging houses, and other similar establishments, the only power of the City Council to legislate
relative thereto is to regulate them to promote the general welfare. The Code still withholds from
cities the power to suppress and prohibit altogether the establishment, operation and
maintenance of such establishments. It is well to recall the rulings of the Court inKwong Sing v.
City of Manila106 that:

The word "regulate," as used in subsection (l), section 2444 of the Administrative Code,
means and includes the power to control, to govern, and to restrain; but "regulate" should
not be construed as synonymous with "suppress" or "prohibit." Consequently, under the
power to regulate laundries, the municipal authorities could make proper police
regulations as to the mode in which the employment or business shall be exercised. 107

And in People v. Esguerra,108 wherein the Court nullified an ordinance of the Municipality of
Tacloban which prohibited the selling, giving and dispensing of liquor ratiocinating that the
municipality is empowered only to regulate the same and not prohibit. The Court therein declared
that:

(A)s a general rule when a municipal corporation is specifically given authority or power
to regulate or to license and regulate the liquor traffic, power to prohibit is impliedly
withheld.109

These doctrines still hold contrary to petitioners' assertion 110 that they were modified by the Code
vesting upon City Councils prohibitory powers.

Similarly, the City Council exercises regulatory powers over public dancing schools, public dance
halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or amusement as found
in the first clause of Section 458 (a) 4 (vii). Its powers to regulate, suppress and suspend "such
other events or activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb
the community or annoy the inhabitants" and to "prohibit certain forms of amusement or
entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community" are stated in the
second and third clauses, respectively of the same Section. The several powers of the City
Council as provided in Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code, it is pertinent to emphasize, are
separated by semi-colons (;), the use of which indicates that the clauses in which these powers
are set forth are independent of each other albeit closely related to justify being put together in a
single enumeration or paragraph.111 These powers, therefore, should not be confused,
commingled or consolidated as to create a conglomerated and unified power of regulation,
suppression and prohibition.112

The Congress unequivocably specified the establishments and forms of amusement or

entertainment subject to regulation among which are beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension
houses, lodging houses, and other similar establishments (Section 458 (a) 4 (iv)), public dancing
schools, public dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or
amusement (Section 458 (a) 4 (vii)). This enumeration therefore cannot be included as among
"other events or activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb
the community or annoy the inhabitants" or "certain forms of amusement or entertainment" which
the City Council may suspend, suppress or prohibit.

The rule is that the City Council has only such powers as are expressly granted to it and those
which are necessarily implied or incidental to the exercise thereof. By reason of its limited
powers and the nature thereof, said powers are to be construed strictissimi juris and any doubt or
ambiguity arising out of the terms used in granting said powers must be construed against the
City Council.113 Moreover, it is a general rule in statutory construction that the express mention of
one person, thing, or consequence is tantamount to an express exclusion of all others. Expressio
unius est exclusio alterium. This maxim is based upon the rules of logic and the natural workings
of human mind. It is particularly applicable in the construction of such statutes as create new
rights or remedies, impose penalties or punishments, or otherwise come under the rule of strict
construction.114

The argument that the City Council is empowered to enact the Ordinance by virtue of the general
welfare clause of the Code and of Art. 3, Sec. 18 (kk) of the Revised Charter of Manila is likewise
without merit. On the first point, the ruling of the Court in People v. Esguerra,115 is instructive. It
held that:

The powers conferred upon a municipal council in the general welfare clause, or section
2238 of the Revised Administrative Code, refers to matters not covered by the other
provisions of the same Code, and therefore it can not be applied to intoxicating liquors,
for the power to regulate the selling, giving away and dispensing thereof is granted
specifically by section 2242 (g) to municipal councils. To hold that, under the general
power granted by section 2238, a municipal council may enact the ordinance in question,
notwithstanding the provision of section 2242 (g), would be to make the latter superfluous
and nugatory, because the power to prohibit, includes the power to regulate, the selling,
giving away and dispensing of intoxicating liquors.

On the second point, it suffices to say that the Code being a later expression of the legislative will
must necessarily prevail and override the earlier law, the Revised Charter of Manila. Legis
posteriores priores contrarias abrogant, or later statute repeals prior ones which are repugnant
thereto. As between two laws on the same subject matter, which are irreconcilably inconsistent,
that which is passed later prevails, since it is the latest expression of legislative will. 116 If there is
an inconsistency or repugnance between two statutes, both relating to the same subject matter,
which cannot be removed by any fair and reasonable method of interpretation, it is the latest
expression of the legislative will which must prevail and override the earlier. 117

Implied repeals are those which take place when a subsequently enacted law contains provisions
contrary to those of an existing law but no provisions expressly repealing them. Such repeals
have been divided into two general classes: those which occur where an act is so inconsistent or
irreconcilable with an existing prior act that only one of the two can remain in force and those
which occur when an act covers the whole subject of an earlier act and is intended to be a
substitute therefor. The validity of such a repeal is sustained on the ground that the latest
expression of the legislative will should prevail. 118

In addition, Section 534(f) of the Code states that "All general and special laws, acts, city
charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts
thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly." Thus, submitting to petitioners' interpretation that the Revised Charter of
Manila empowers the City Council to prohibit motels, that portion of the Charter stating such must
be considered repealed by the Code as it is at variance with the latter's provisions granting the
City Council mere regulatory powers.

It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause
authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a
nuisance per se, or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be
summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. It can not be said that motels are
injurious to the rights of property, health or comfort of the community. It is a legitimate business. If
it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. A
motel is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention. 119

Notably, the City Council was conferred powers to prevent and prohibit certain activities and
establishments in another section of the Code which is reproduced as follows:
 Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang
panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants
pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of
the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:

(1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and effective city
government, and in this connection, shall:

. . .

(v) Enact ordinances intended to prevent, suppress and impose appropriate penalties for
habitual drunkenness in public places, vagrancy, mendicancy, prostitution, establishment
and maintenance of houses of ill repute, gambling and other prohibited games of
chance, fraudulent devices and ways to obtain money or property, drug addiction,
maintenance of drug dens, drug pushing, juvenile delinquency, the printing, distribution or
exhibition of obscene or pornographic materials or publications, and such other activities
inimical to the welfare and morals of the inhabitants of the city;

. . .

If it were the intention of Congress to confer upon the City Council the power to prohibit the
establishments enumerated in Section 1 of the Ordinance, it would have so declared in uncertain
terms by adding them to the list of the matters it may prohibit under the above-quoted Section.
The Ordinance now vainly attempts to lump these establishments with houses of ill-repute and
expand the City Council's powers in the second and third clauses of Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the
Code in an effort to overreach its prohibitory powers. It is evident that these establishments may
only be regulated in their establishment, operation and maintenance.

It is important to distinguish the punishable activities from the establishments themselves. That
these establishments are recognized legitimate enterprises can be gleaned from another Section
of the Code. Section 131 under the Title on Local Government Taxation expressly mentioned
proprietors or operators of massage clinics, sauna, Turkish and Swedish baths, hotels, motels
and lodging houses as among the "contractors" defined in paragraph (h) thereof. The same
Section also defined "amusement" as a "pleasurable diversion and entertainment," "synonymous
to relaxation, avocation, pastime or fun;" and "amusement places" to include "theaters, cinemas,
concert halls, circuses and other places of amusement where one seeks admission to entertain
oneself by seeing or viewing the show or performances." Thus, it can be inferred that the Code
considers these establishments as legitimate enterprises and activities. It is well to recall the
maxim reddendo singula singulis which means that words in different parts of a statute must be
referred to their appropriate connection, giving to each in its place, its proper force and effect,
and, if possible, rendering none of them useless or superfluous, even if strict grammatical
construction demands otherwise. Likewise, where words under consideration appear in different
sections or are widely dispersed throughout an act the same principle applies. 120

Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs counter to the provisions of
P.D. 499. As correctly argued by MTDC, the statute had already converted the residential Ermita-
Malate area into a commercial area. The decree allowed the establishment and operation of all
kinds of commercial establishments except warehouse or open storage depot, dump or yard,
motor repair shop, gasoline service station, light industry with any machinery or funeral
establishment. The rule is that for an ordinance to be valid and to have force and effect, it must
not only be within the powers of the council to enact but the same must not be in conflict with or
repugnant to the general law.121 As succinctly illustrated in Solicitor General v. Metropolitan
Manila Authority:122
 The requirement that the enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. Local
political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative
power from the national legislature (except only that the power to create their own
sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). They are
mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates
of the Congress, the local government units cannot contravene but must obey at all times
the will of their principal. In the case before us, the enactment in question, which are
merely local in origin cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of
a statute.123

Petitioners contend that the Ordinance enjoys the presumption of validity. While this may be the
rule, it has already been held that although the presumption is always in favor of the validity or
reasonableness of the ordinance, such presumption must nevertheless be set aside when the
invalidity or unreasonableness appears on the face of the ordinance itself or is established by
proper evidence. The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it
contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against
public policy or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common
right.124

Conclusion

All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs
personal privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is
discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that
abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council
under the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and void.

Concededly, the challenged Ordinance we reiterate our support for it. But inspite of its virtuous
aims, the enactment of thewas enacted with the best of motives and shares the concern of the
public for the cleansing of the Ermita-Malate area of its social sins. Police power legislation of
such character deserves the full endorsement of the judiciary Ordinance not even under the
guise of police power.has no statutory or constitutional authority to stand on. Local legislative
bodies, in this case, the City Council, cannot prohibit the operation of the enumerated
establishments under Section 1 thereof or order their transfer or conversion without infringing the
constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of laws

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Regional Trial Court
declaring the Ordinancevoid is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona,

Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Chico-Nazario and Garcia, JJ., concur
Panganiban, J., in the result.
Ynares- Santiago, J., concur in the result only.

Footnotes

City of Manila vs Judge Perfecto Laguio

22112010
 Police Power

On 30 Mar 1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7783 entitled AN ORDINANCE
PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN
FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-
MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES. It basically prohibited establishments such as bars, karaoke bars, motels and
hotels from operating in the Malate District which was notoriously viewed as a red light
district harboring thrill seekers. Malate Tourist Development Corporation avers that the
ordinance is invalid as it includes hotels and motels in the enumeration of places
offering amusement or entertainment. MTDC reiterates that they do not market such nor
do they use women as tools for entertainment. MTDC also avers that under the LGC,
LGUs can only regulate motels but cannot prohibit their operation. The City reiterates
that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power as provided as well in the LGC. The
City likewise emphasized that the purpose of the law is to promote morality in the City.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 7783 is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled that the said Ordinance is null and void. The SC noted that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by
law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements:

(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;

(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;

(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;

(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;

(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and

(6) must not be unreasonable.

The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to
the constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise
must be reasonable and for the public good. In the case at bar, the enactment of the
Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and
repugnant to general laws.
 Police Power
Howard
Chan This is an appeal from an order of the lower court dismissing a suit for declaratory relief
Site Owner challenging the constitutionality based on Ordinance No. 4964 of the City of Manila, the
Posts: 414 contention being that it amounts to a deprivation of property of petitioners-appellants of
their means of livelihood without due process of law. The assailed ordinance is worded
thus: "It shall be prohibited for any operator of any barber shop to conduct the business of
massaging customers or other persons in any adjacent room or rooms of said barber shop,
or in any room or rooms within the same building where the barber shop is located as long
as the operator of the barber shop and the rooms where massaging is conducted is the
same person." As noted in the appealed order, petitioners-appellants admitted that criminal
cases for the violation of this ordinance had been previously filed and decided. The lower
court, therefore, held that a petition for declaratory relief did not lie, its availability being
dependent on there being as yet no case involving such issue having been filed.

Even if such were not the case, the attack against the validity cannot succeed. As pointed
out in the brief of respondents-appellees, it is a police power measure. The objectives
behind its enactment are: "

(1) To be able to impose payment of the license fee for engaging in the business of
massage clinic under Ordinance No. 3659 as amended by Ordinance 4767, an entirely
different measure than the ordinance regulating the business of barbershops and,

(2) in order to forestall possible immorality which might grow out of the construction of
separate rooms for massage of customers."

The SC has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare
clause. As far back as U.S. v. Salaveria, a 1918 decision, the SC through Justice Malcolm
made clear the significance and scope of such a clause, which "delegates in statutory form
the police power to a municipality. As above stated, this clause has been given wide
application by municipal authorities and has in its relation to the particular circumstances of
the case been liberally construed by the courts. Such, it is well to recall, is the progressive
view of Philippine jurisprudence." As it was then, so it has continued to be. There is no
showing, therefore, of the unconstitutionality of such ordinance.

MAYOR MAGTAJAS & CITY OF CAGAYAN v. PRYCE PROPERTIES & PAGCOR

Facts:
PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this
end, it leased aportion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc.,
renovated and equipped the same,and prepared to inaugurate its casino there during
the Christmas season.
. Civic organizations angrily denounced the project. The religious elements
echoed the objectionand so did the women's groups and the youth. Demonstrations
were led by the mayor and the citylegislators. The media trumpeted the protest,
describing the casino as an affront to the welfare of the city.
The contention of the petitioners is that it is violative of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Cagayande Oro City Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of
buildings for the operation of a casino andOrdinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the
operation of casinos.
 On the other hand, the respondents invoke P.D. 1869 which created PAGCOR
to help centralizeand regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea
within the territorial jurisdiction of thePhilippines.
The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents. Hence, the petition for review.

Issue: Whether or not the Ordinance No. 3353 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 are valid

Held:No

Ratio:
Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to
enact ordinances forthe purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is
expressly vested with the police power underwhat is known as the General Welfare
Clause now embodied in Section 16 as follows:
***Sec. 16. — General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise the
powersexpressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers
necessary,appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and
those which are essentialto the promotion of the general welfare. Within their
respective territorial jurisdictions, localgovernment units shall ensure and support,
among other things, the preservation and enrichmentof culture, promote health and
safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology,encourage and support
the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific andtechnological
capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social
justice,promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order,
and preserve thecomfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
There is a requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute.
Municipalgovernments are only agents of the national government. Local councils
exercise only delegatedlegislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the
national lawmaking body. The delegate cannotbe superior to the principal or exercise
powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest thatthe local
government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their
power inthe first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.
Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute
that cannot
be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance.
Therefore, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals
is
AFFIRMED

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994

MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO, petitioners,

vs.
PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING
CORPORATION,respondents.

Aquilino G. Pimentel, Jr. and Associates for petitioners.

R.R. Torralba & Associates for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in Cagayan
de Oro City. Civic organizations angrily denounced the project. The religious elements
echoed the objection and so did the women's groups and the youth. Demonstrations were
led by the mayor and the city legislators. The media trumpeted the protest, describing the
casino as an affront to the welfare of the city.

The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its tremendous success in several cities,
PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this end, it leased a
portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., one of the herein
private respondents, renovated and equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its
casino there during the Christmas season.

The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile.
On December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353 reading as follows:

ORDINANCE NO. 3353

AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ISSUANCE OF BUSINESS PERMIT

AND CANCELLING EXISTING BUSINESS PERMIT TO ANY
ESTABLISHMENT FOR THE USING AND ALLOWING TO BE USED ITS
PREMISES OR PORTION THEREOF FOR THE OPERATION OF CASINO.

BE IT ORDAINED by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cagayan

de Oro, in session assembled that:

Sec. 1. — That pursuant to the policy of the city banning the operation of
casino within its territorial jurisdiction, no business permit shall be issued to
any person, partnership or corporation for the operation of casino within the
city limits.

Sec. 2. — That it shall be a violation of existing business permit by any

persons, partnership or corporation to use its business establishment or
portion thereof, or allow the use thereof by others for casino operation and
other gambling activities.
 Sec. 3. — PENALTIES. — Any violation of such existing business permit as
defined in the preceding section shall suffer the following penalties, to wit:

a) Suspension of the business permit for sixty

(60) days for the first offense and a fine of
P1,000.00/day

b) Suspension of the business permit for Six

(6) months for the second offense, and a fine
of P3,000.00/day

c) Permanent revocation of the business

permit and imprisonment of One (1) year, for
the third and subsequent offenses.

Sec. 4. — This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days from publication
thereof.

Nor was this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93 reading as
follows:

ORDINANCE NO. 3375-93

AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE OPERATION OF CASINO AND

PROVIDING PENALTY FOR VIOLATION THEREFOR.

WHEREAS, the City Council established a policy as early as 1990 against

CASINO under its Resolution No. 2295;

WHEREAS, on October 14, 1992, the City Council passed another

Resolution No. 2673, reiterating its policy against the establishment of
CASINO;

WHEREAS, subsequently, thereafter, it likewise passed Ordinance No. 3353,

prohibiting the issuance of Business Permit and to cancel existing Business
Permit to any establishment for the using and allowing to be used its
premises or portion thereof for the operation of CASINO;

WHEREAS, under Art. 3, section 458, No. (4), sub paragraph VI of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (Rep. Act 7160) and under Art. 99, No. (4),
Paragraph VI of the implementing rules of the Local Government Code, the
City Council as the Legislative Body shall enact measure to suppress any
activity inimical to public morals and general welfare of the people and/or
regulate or prohibit such activity pertaining to amusement or entertainment in
order to protect social and moral welfare of the community;

NOW THEREFORE,

BE IT ORDAINED by the City Council in session duly assembled that:

 Sec. 1. — The operation of gambling CASINO in the City of Cagayan de Oro
is hereby prohibited.

Sec. 2. — Any violation of this Ordinance shall be subject to the following

penalties:

a) Administrative fine of P5,000.00 shall be imposed against the proprietor,

partnership or corporation undertaking the operation, conduct, maintenance
of gambling CASINO in the City and closure thereof;

b) Imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more than one (1) year or
a fine in the amount of P5,000.00 or both at the discretion of the court against
the manager, supervisor, and/or any person responsible in the establishment,
conduct and maintenance of gambling CASINO.

Sec. 3. — This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days after its publication
in a local newspaper of general circulation.

Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR
as intervenor and supplemental petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On March 31, 1993,
the Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to
prohibit their enforcement. 1 Reconsideration of this decision was denied on July 13, 1993. 2

Cagayan de Oro City and its mayor are now before us in this petition for review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. 3 They aver that the respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding
that:

1. Under existing laws, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cagayan

de Oro does not have the power and authority to prohibit the establishment
and operation of a PAGCOR gambling casino within the City's territorial
limits.

2. The phrase "gambling and other prohibited games of chance" found in

Sec. 458, par. (a), sub-par. (1) — (v) of R.A. 7160 could only mean "illegal
gambling."

3. The questioned Ordinances in effect annul P.D. 1869 and are therefore
invalid on that point.

4. The questioned Ordinances are discriminatory to casino and partial to

cockfighting and are therefore invalid on that point.

5. The questioned Ordinances are not reasonable, not consonant with the
general powers and purposes of the instrumentality concerned and
inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State.

6. It had no option but to follow the ruling in the case of Basco, et al. v.
PAGCOR, G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991, 197 SCRA 53 in disposing of the
issues presented in this present case.
PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and regulate all
games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines. In Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation, 4 this Court
sustained the constitutionality of the decree and even cited the benefits of the entity to the
national economy as the third highest revenue-earner in the government, next only to the
BIR and the Bureau of Customs.

Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact
ordinances for the purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expressly vested
with the police power under what is known as the General Welfare Clause now embodied in
Section 16 as follows:

Sec. 16. — General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise
the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well
as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective
governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general
welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units
shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and
enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the
people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of
appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve
public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full
employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve
the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.

In addition, Section 458 of the said Code specifically declares that:

Sec. 458. — Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. — (a) The

Sangguniang Panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general
welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and
in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for
under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:

(1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and
effective city government, and in this connection, shall:

xxx xxx xxx

(v) Enact ordinances intended to prevent,

suppress and impose appropriate penalties
for habitual drunkenness in public places,
vagrancy, mendicancy, prostitution,
establishment and maintenance of houses of
ill repute,gambling and other prohibited
games of chance, fraudulent devices and
ways to obtain money or property, drug
addiction, maintenance of drug dens, drug
pushing, juvenile delinquency, the printing,
distribution or exhibition of obscene or
pornographic materials or publications, and
 such other activities inimical to the welfare
and morals of the inhabitants of the city;

This section also authorizes the local government units to regulate properties and
businesses within their territorial limits in the interest of the general welfare. 5

The petitioners argue that by virtue of these provisions, the Sangguniang Panlungsod may
prohibit the operation of casinos because they involve games of chance, which are
detrimental to the people. Gambling is not allowed by general law and even by the
Constitution itself. The legislative power conferred upon local government units may be
exercised over all kinds of gambling and not only over "illegal gambling" as the respondents
erroneously argue. Even if the operation of casinos may have been permitted under P.D.
1869, the government of Cagayan de Oro City has the authority to prohibit them within its
territory pursuant to the authority entrusted to it by the Local Government Code.

It is submitted that this interpretation is consonant with the policy of local autonomy as
mandated in Article II, Section 25, and Article X of the Constitution, as well as various other
provisions therein seeking to strengthen the character of the nation. In giving the local
government units the power to prevent or suppress gambling and other social problems, the
Local Government Code has recognized the competence of such communities to determine
and adopt the measures best expected to promote the general welfare of their inhabitants in
line with the policies of the State.

The petitioners also stress that when the Code expressly authorized the local government
units to prevent and suppress gambling and other prohibited games of chance, like craps,
baccarat, blackjack and roulette, it meant allforms of gambling without distinction. Ubi lex
non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemos. 6 Otherwise, it would have expressly excluded
from the scope of their power casinos and other forms of gambling authorized by special law,
as it could have easily done. The fact that it did not do so simply means that the local
government units are permitted to prohibit all kinds of gambling within their territories,
including the operation of casinos.

The adoption of the Local Government Code, it is pointed out, had the effect of modifying the
charter of the PAGCOR. The Code is not only a later enactment than P.D. 1869 and so is
deemed to prevail in case of inconsistencies between them. More than this, the powers of
the PAGCOR under the decree are expressly discontinued by the Code insofar as they do
not conform to its philosophy and provisions, pursuant to Par. (f) of its repealing clause
reading as follows:

(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which
are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed
or modified accordingly.

It is also maintained that assuming there is doubt regarding the effect of the Local
Government Code on P.D. 1869, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the petitioners, in
accordance with the direction in the Code calling for its liberal interpretation in favor of the
local government units. Section 5 of the Code specifically provides:

Sec. 5. Rules of Interpretation. — In the interpretation of the provisions of this

Code, the following rules shall apply:
 (a) Any provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally
interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be
resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower local government
unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power shall be
interpreted in favor of the local government unit concerned;

xxx xxx xxx

(c) The general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally interpreted
to give more powers to local government units in accelerating economic
development and upgrading the quality of life for the people in the
community; . . . (Emphasis supplied.)

Finally, the petitioners also attack gambling as intrinsically harmful and cite various
provisions of the Constitution and several decisions of this Court expressive of the general
and official disapprobation of the vice. They invoke the State policies on the family and the
proper upbringing of the youth and, as might be expected, call attention to the old case
of U.S. v. Salaveria, 7 which sustained a municipal ordinance prohibiting the playing
of panguingue. The petitioners decry the immorality of gambling. They also impugn the
wisdom of P.D. 1869 (which they describe as "a martial law instrument") in creating PAGCOR
and authorizing it to operate casinos "on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines."

This is the opportune time to stress an important point.

The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is
generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the
Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even
mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise
of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without
limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it
may consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries,
cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its own
wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it been said
that courts do not sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories. 8 That is the prerogative of
the political departments. It is settled that questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or
practicibility of statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only by the
legislative and executive departments, to which the function belongs in our scheme of
government. That function is exclusive. Whichever way these branches decide, they are
answerable only to their own conscience and the constituents who will ultimately judge their
acts, and not to the courts of justice.

The only question we can and shall resolve in this petition is the validity of Ordinance No.
3355 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 as enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan
de Oro City. And we shall do so only by the criteria laid down by law and not by our own
convictions on the propriety of gambling.

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions 9 has held that to
be valid, an ordinance must conform to the following substantive requirements:

1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.

 2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.

3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.

4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.

5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.

6) It must not be unreasonable.

We begin by observing that under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local
government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling
and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance
which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law. The petitioners are less than
accurate in claiming that the Code could have excluded such games of chance but did not.
In fact it does. The language of the section is clear and unmistakable. Under the rule
of noscitur a sociis, a word or phrase should be interpreted in relation to, or given the same
meaning of, words with which it is associated. Accordingly, we conclude that since the word
"gambling" is associated with "and other prohibited games of chance," the word should be
read as referring to only illegal gambling which, like the other prohibited games of chance,
must be prevented or suppressed.

We could stop here as this interpretation should settle the problem quite conclusively. But we
will not. The vigorous efforts of the petitioners on behalf of the inhabitants of Cagayan de Oro
City, and the earnestness of their advocacy, deserve more than short shrift from this Court.

The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that they contravene P.D. 1869 and the
public policy embodied therein insofar as they prevent PAGCOR from exercising the power
conferred on it to operate a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. The petitioners have an
ingenious answer to this misgiving. They deny that it is the ordinances that have changed
P.D. 1869 for an ordinance admittedly cannot prevail against a statute. Their theory is that
the change has been made by the Local Government Code itself, which was also enacted by
the national lawmaking authority. In their view, the decree has been, not really repealed by
the Code, but merely "modified pro tanto" in the sense that PAGCOR cannot now operate a
casino over the objection of the local government unit concerned. This modification of P.D.
1869 by the Local Government Code is permissible because one law can change or repeal
another law.

It seems to us that the petitioners are playing with words. While insisting that the decree has
only been "modifiedpro tanto," they are actually arguing that it is already dead, repealed and
useless for all intents and purposes because the Code has shorn PAGCOR of all power to
centralize and regulate casinos. Strictly speaking, its operations may now be not only
prohibited by the local government unit; in fact, the prohibition is not only discretionary
but mandated by Section 458 of the Code if the word "shall" as used therein is to be given its
accepted meaning. Local government units have now no choice but to prevent and suppress
gambling, which in the petitioners' view includes both legal and illegal gambling. Under this
construction, PAGCOR will have no more games of chance to regulate or centralize as they
must all be prohibited by the local government units pursuant to the mandatory duty imposed
upon them by the Code. In this situation, PAGCOR cannot continue to exist except only as a
toothless tiger or a white elephant and will no longer be able to exercise its powers as a
prime source of government revenue through the operation of casinos.
It is noteworthy that the petitioners have cited only Par. (f) of the repealing clause,
conveniently discarding the rest of the provision which painstakingly mentions the specific
laws or the parts thereof which are repealed (or modified) by the Code. Significantly, P.D.
1869 is not one of them. A reading of the entire repealing clause, which is reproduced below,
will disclose the omission:

Sec. 534. Repealing Clause. — (a) Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise
known as the "Local Government Code," Executive Order No. 112 (1987),
and Executive Order No. 319 (1988) are hereby repealed.

(b) Presidential Decree Nos. 684, 1191, 1508 and such other decrees,
orders, instructions, memoranda and issuances related to or concerning the
barangay are hereby repealed.

(c) The provisions of Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Republic Act No. 1939 regarding
hospital fund; Section 3, a (3) and b (2) of Republic Act. No. 5447 regarding
the Special Education Fund; Presidential Decree No. 144 as amended by
Presidential Decree Nos. 559 and 1741; Presidential Decree No. 231 as
amended; Presidential Decree No. 436 as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 558; and Presidential Decree Nos. 381, 436, 464, 477, 526, 632, 752,
and 1136 are hereby repealed and rendered of no force and effect.

(d) Presidential Decree No. 1594 is hereby repealed insofar as it governs

locally-funded projects.

(e) The following provisions are hereby repealed or amended insofar as they
are inconsistent with the provisions of this Code: Sections 2, 16, and 29 of
Presidential Decree No. 704; Sections 12 of Presidential Decree No. 87, as
amended; Sections 52, 53, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, and 74 of
Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended; and Section 16 of Presidential
Decree No. 972, as amended, and

(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which
are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed
or modified accordingly.

Furthermore, it is a familiar rule that implied repeals are not lightly presumed in the absence
of a clear and unmistakable showing of such intention. In Lichauco & Co. v. Apostol, 10 this
Court explained:

The cases relating to the subject of repeal by implication all proceed on the
assumption that if the act of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part
of the lawmaking power to abrogate the prior law, this intention must be given
effect; but there must always be a sufficient revelation of this intention, and it
has become an unbending rule of statutory construction that the intention to
repeal a former law will not be imputed to the Legislature when it appears
that the two statutes, or provisions, with reference to which the question
arises bear to each other the relation of general to special.

There is no sufficient indication of an implied repeal of P.D. 1869. On the contrary, as the
private respondent points out, PAGCOR is mentioned as the source of funding in two later
enactments of Congress, to wit, R.A. 7309, creating a Board of Claims under the Department
of Justice for the benefit of victims of unjust punishment or detention or of violent crimes, and
R.A. 7648, providing for measures for the solution of the power crisis. PAGCOR revenues
are tapped by these two statutes. This would show that the PAGCOR charter has not been
repealed by the Local Government Code but has in fact been improved as it were to make
the entity more responsive to the fiscal problems of the government.

It is a canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting one statute against another in an
inevitably destructive confrontation, courts must exert every effort to reconcile them,
remembering that both laws deserve a becoming respect as the handiwork of a coordinate
branch of the government. On the assumption of a conflict between P.D. 1869 and the Code,
the proper action is not to uphold one and annul the other but to give effect to both by
harmonizing them if possible. This is possible in the case before us. The proper resolution of
the problem at hand is to hold that under the Local Government Code, local government
units may (and indeed must) prevent and suppress all kinds of gambling within their
territories except only those allowed by statutes like P.D. 1869. The exception reserved in
such laws must be read into the Code, to make both the Code and such laws equally
effective and mutually complementary.

This approach would also affirm that there are indeed two kinds of gambling, to wit, the
illegal and those authorized by law. Legalized gambling is not a modern concept; it is
probably as old as illegal gambling, if not indeed more so. The petitioners' suggestion that
the Code authorizes them to prohibit all kinds of gambling would erase the distinction
between these two forms of gambling without a clear indication that this is the will of the
legislature. Plausibly, following this theory, the City of Manila could, by mere ordinance,
prohibit the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office from conducting a lottery as authorized by
R.A. 1169 and B.P. 42 or stop the races at the San Lazaro Hippodrome as authorized by
R.A. 309 and R.A. 983.

In light of all the above considerations, we see no way of arriving at the conclusion urged on
us by the petitioners that the ordinances in question are valid. On the contrary, we find that
the ordinances violate P.D. 1869, which has the character and force of a statute, as well as
the public policy expressed in the decree allowing the playing of certain games of chance
despite the prohibition of gambling in general.

The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is
obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils
exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national
lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher
than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the
acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by
mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.

Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights
wholly from the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which
they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As it may destroy, it may
abridge and control. Unless there is some constitutional limitation on the right,
the legislature might, by a single act, and if we can suppose it capable of so great
a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal
corporations in the State, and the corporation could not prevent it. We know of no
limitation on the right so far as to the corporation themselves are concerned.
They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature. 11
This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has
not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local
autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy, we here confirm that Congress
retains control of the local government units although in significantly reduced degree now
than under our previous Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power to
destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to withhold or recall. True, there are
certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local
government units of the power to tax, 12which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By
and large, however, the national legislature is still the principal of the local government units,
which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.

The Court understands and admires the concern of the petitioners for the welfare of their
constituents and their apprehensions that the welfare of Cagayan de Oro City will be
endangered by the opening of the casino. We share the view that "the hope of large or easy
gain, obtained without special effort, turns the head of the workman" 13 and that "habitual
gambling is a cause of laziness and ruin." 14 In People v. Gorostiza, 15 we declared: "The
social scourge of gambling must be stamped out. The laws against gambling must be
enforced to the limit." George Washington called gambling "the child of avarice, the brother
of iniquity and the father of mischief." Nevertheless, we must recognize the power of the
legislature to decide, in its own wisdom, to legalize certain forms of gambling, as was done in
P.D. 1869 and impliedly affirmed in the Local Government Code. That decision can be
revoked by this Court only if it contravenes the Constitution as the touchstone of all official
acts. We do not find such contravention here.

We hold that the power of PAGCOR to centralize and regulate all games of chance, including
casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, remains
unimpaired. P.D. 1869 has not been modified by the Local Government Code, which
empowers the local government units to prevent or suppress only those forms of gambling
prohibited by law.

Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that
cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting
the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the
operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to
P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the respondent Court
of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno,
Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 141259. July 18, 2003]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. LAMBERTINO
PRIETO, appellant.

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR. J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
[1]

Danao City, Branch 25, convicting appellant Lambertino Prieto of murder,

sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and directing him to indemnify the heirs of
the victim Geraldo Prieto in the amount of P75,000.00.
On July 7, 1995, an Information was filed with the RTC, charging Lambertino
with murder:

That on or about July 4, 1995 at 9 o’clock in the evening more or less, in

Sibacan, Danao city [sic], Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring and confederating
together with the other three persons whoes [sic] identities are at present still
unknown, with intent to kill and treachery, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously suddenly and unexpectedly stab Geraldo Prieto with
the use of stainless knife several times thereby inflicting upon him – stab
wounds in the abdomen of protussion [sic] of small intestine umentum –
causing his death minutes later.

CONTRARY TO LAW. [2]

The accused was arrested on July 25, 1995. On January 19, 1996, with the
assistance of counsel, he was duly arraigned of the charge and entered a plea of
not guilty.
[3]

The Evidence of the Prosecution [4]

The Spouses Geraldo and Dulcesima Prieto and their sixteen-year- old
daughter Liliosa resided in their farm at Sitio Titip, Barangay Sibacan, Danao
City. The couple cultivated mango trees, bananas and cassava. About thirty
meters away from their house lived Geraldo’s nephew, accused Lambertino
(Bentong) Prieto, the son of Ciriaco Prieto, Geraldo’s first cousin. The accused
frequented his uncle’s house and had drinking sprees with the latter. Since 1992,
he had been residing with his mother Dolores Prieto at Lapu-lapu corner
Bonifacio Street, Danao City, but also maintained a house near his farm. Once a
week, the accused went to his farm to work in the fields.
By the end of June 1995, the Prieto spouses were able to sell the produce
from their farm and earned P40,000. They kept the amount in their house. On
July 2, 1995, Dulcesima was working in their farm. The accused, on the other
hand, was spraying the mango trees in his farm. He inquired from Dulcesima
what she was doing, and the latter replied that she was just weeding grasses.
At 7:00 p.m., of July 4, 1995, Geraldo and Dulcesima were sleeping in their
bedroom, on the ground floor of their house. Liliosa was sleeping in her bedroom
upstairs. The sala was lit by a kerosene lamp placed on a wrought iron stand
about three feet high, and a meter away from the door of the couple’s
bedroom. Before they slept, they dimmed the light of the kerosene
lamp. Outside, it was raining hard.
At about 9:00 p.m., the couple were awakened by someone calling: “Tay,
tay, abli, kay mopalit kog lamas!” (Tay, tay, open, I want to buy spices!).
Dulcesima recognized the voice of the accused. She also heard their dogs
[5]

barking. Dulcesima cautioned her husband not to open the door because it was
the accused calling. Geraldo ignored his wife’s warning and went out of the
bedroom. Dulcesima was barely a meter behind her husband. To her left was
the kerosene lamp.
Geraldo forthwith unbolted the door. Dulcesima was shocked when she saw
the accused, armed with a stainless knife. A white handkerchief was tied on the
lower part of his face, covering his mouth. Before Dulcesima could utter a word,
the accused barged through the door and stabbed Geraldo on the abdomen and
the lower part of the chest. Geraldo fell to the floor. The accused faced
Dulcesima and punched her on the face. Another male person followed
Lambertino into the house while two more persons stood outside the
door. Dulcesima tried to pull the bolo placed on the wall of the house from its
scabbard to defend herself. The handkerchief covering the face of the accused
fell from his face. Dulcesima was able to confirm that, indeed, the assailant of her
husband was the accused. [6]

In a belated attempt to hide his identity, the accused kicked the chair on
which the kerosene lamp was placed. The lamp fell to the floor. The accused
then attempted to get Dulcesima’s earrings but failed to do so. Dulcesima
shouted for help: “Ay tabang kamo mga silingan kay gitulis kami” (Hay, neighbors
help us because we are being robbed). The accused and his cohort forthwith
[7]

exited from the house through one of the windows, leaving Geraldo sprawled on
the floor, mortally wounded, and Dulcesima trembling with fear. Meanwhile,
Toribia, the couple’s neighbor, heard Dulcesima’s cries for help, and herself
shouted: Tabangan nato his Dulce ug Geraldo kay gisaka sila ug mga tawo (Let
us help Dulce and Geraldo because there are persons intruding into their house).
She thereafter ran to the house of her nephew Francisco Ejolen, who in turn
[8]

rushed to the Prieto residence.

Felix Capuno lived about sixty meters away from the Prieto’s. He was
resting in his house that fateful night when he heard his neighbor Toribia
shouting: Felix, tabangan ta si Geraldo ug Dulce kay gisaka sila ug mga
tawo (Let us help Geraldo and Dulce because there are persons who intruded
into their house). Felix took his flashlight, and together with his son Romulo,
[9]
rushed to Geraldo’s house. When they were about five arm’s length away from
the place, Felix saw two persons jumping through the window, one after the
other. With his flashlight focused on the intruders, Felix recognized the accused
as the second man. Felix stood still as he observed the accused and saw that he
was armed with a knife. When Felix saw Dulcesima coming out of the house
holding a kerosene lamp, he called her and rushed to the house to help. Felix
saw Geraldo sprawled on the floor, his hands bloodied, covering the wounds he
sustained in the abdomen.
For his part, Romulo rushed to the house of Uldarico Esteros, which was
about ten meters away. Uldarico had died and was lying in
state. A pamuhat was being held in his house. Romulo informed Angelino
Prieto, Geraldo’s nephew, and Pepito Prieto, Geraldo’s son, that Geraldo had just
been stabbed. Pepito and Angelino rushed to the scene of the crime, and saw
Felix Capuno, Francisco Ejolen, and other neighbors already in the house.
Angelino and about ten others made a hammock out of a blanket and
bamboo poles. Geraldo was gingerly carried on the make-shift stretcher to the
Danao General Hospital. Dulcesima went with the group carrying with her the
clothes of her husband. During the trip, blood oozed from Geraldo’s wounds, his
nose and his face, visibly weakening him. However, he managed to tell Angelino
and Dulcesima that he was stabbed and nearly robbed by the accused. Geraldo
died before they could reach the hospital.
[10]

On July 5, 1995, Dr. Jose Arturo Allego, the Assistant City Health Officer of
Danao City, performed an autopsy on the cadaver of the victim and submitted a
postmortem certificate on his autopsy containing the following findings:

(1) Stab wound in the left antero-lateral portion of the chest; pre-
axillary area & 12 cm. from the left nipple.

- 6 cm in lenght [sic] & 0.5 cm in width

- 0.5 cm. in depth
(2) Stab wound in the abdomen & located 3 cm. from the umbilicus
- 5 cm. in length
- 2.5 cm. in width
- protrussion +[sic] of the small intestine omentum

Cause of Death:

Internal Hemorrhage 2° to Stab wound in the abdomen with protrussion [sic] of

the small intestine & omentum. [11]

On July 6, 1995, Dulcesima gave a sworn statement to SPO1 Manuel M.

Buot of the Danao City Police Station where she identified the accused as the
assailant of her husband.[12]
 The Evidence of the Accused [13]

The accused denied killing his uncle Geraldo. He stated that when Geraldo
was stabbed to death, he was at the house of Atty. Exuperio Gonzales, a retired
Clerk of Court of the RTC, at Villa Socorro, Danao City, about thirty kilometers
away from Sibacan. He adduced evidence that in the afternoon of July 4, 1995,
he left their house at the corner of Bonifacio and Lapulapu Streets to make a
chicken cage for Atty. Gonzales. He passed by the New Danao Public Market
where he saw his aunt Angeles Matugas, who had just alighted from a passenger
jeepney coming from her house in Sacsac, Asturias, Cebu, about twenty
kilometers away from Danao City. She asked the accused where he was going
and the latter replied that he was on his way to the house of Atty.
Gonzales. They agreed to meet later in the evening in the house of the
accused. He arrived in the house of Atty. Gonzales at 5:00 p.m. and worked until
10:00 p.m. When he finished the chicken cage, he left and boarded a tri-
sicad driven by Manuel Dayon. When he got home, Angeles was waiting for
him. The accused told his aunt that he arrived late because he had to finish the
chicken cage for Atty. Gonzales. He was arrested on September 6, 1995. [14]

The accused further testified that he and the Prieto spouses were not in good
terms. Sometime in 1992, the couple tied their farm animals near his farm, and
consequently, close to a hundred corn plants were eaten. He admonished the
couple, but did not report the incident to the barangay officials. [15]

He also had differences with Angelino, Geraldo’s nephew. Sometime in April

1993, he mortgaged his land to Angelino for P8,000 but when he was paying his
debt, Angelino refused to accept the amount insisting that his debt
was P10,000. He sold his property to Lucio Perez who in turn redeemed the
property from Angelino in the amount of P8,000. [16]

The accused also had differences with Felix Capuno. In February

1993, Felix tied his carabao to a mango tree in the accused’s
farm. Consequently, the carabao ate the leaves of one of the mango trees in the
farm of the accused, destroying a branch thereof. [17]

Manuel Dayon, a tri-sicad driver, testified that at 9:00 p.m. of July 4, 1995,
the accused boarded his tri-sicad near the house of Atty. Gonzales. They talked
along the way, and the accused told him that he was working late because Atty.
Gonzales wanted his chicken cage finished. He brought the accused to the
corner of Bonifacio and Lapu-lapu Streets. Dolores Prieto, the mother of the
[18]

accused, told him on the same day that the latter had been charged for the
killing of Geraldo.
[19]

Francisco Ejolen testified that Geraldo and his mother were cousins. In the
evening of July 4, 1995, it was raining hard and the area in the neighborhood
was flooded. It was so dark that one could hardly see through the rain. Toribia
Prieto, Francisco’s aunt, arrived in his house and asked for help because the
Prieto spouses were being robbed. He and Toribia rushed to Geraldo’s house
and saw him wounded on the solar plexus. He did not see any other person in
the house. Pepito, Geraldo’s son, arrived later followed by Felix Capuno and
other neighbors. Francisco asked Dulcesima what happened and she replied
that she could not identify the culprit because he was wearing a mask. When he
asked Geraldo, the latter made a similar reply - - he was robbed but because it
was dark and the culprit was wearing a mask, he could not identify the latter. [20]

Dolores testified that on July 4, 1995, her son, the accused, left their house
at 5:00 p.m. He was on his way to the house of Atty. Gonzales to construct a
chicken cage and brought along with him a saw and a hammer. He arrived home
at 10:00 p.m. that same night. At 5:00 a.m. of July 5, 1992, policemen arrived at
[21]

their house looking for her son, but were unable to arrest him. [22]

On August 11, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment convicting the accused
of murder, the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, for proof beyond reasonable doubt, the Court finds accused
Lambertino Prieto GUILTY for the crime of Murder as charged. The Court,
therefore, hereby sentences accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Accused is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of
P75,000.00.

SO ORDERED. [23]

The trial court gave credence and full probative weight to the testimonies of
Dulcesima, Angelino and Felix.
The accused, now the appellant, appealed from the decision. He contends
that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he killed the
victim and that the trial court erred in rejecting his defense of alibi.
The appellant avers that the trial court erred in giving credence and probative
weight to Dulcesima’s testimony. It was impossible for her to have identified the
appellant as her husband’s assailant because (a) there was a heavy downpour
that night and it was pitch black; (b) the assailant was masked and the kerosene
lamp carried by the victim gave little illumination to the interior of the house; (c)
the handkerchief masking the face of the assailant could not have fallen down
from his face unless Dulcesima pulled it down. Even if the assailant had been
unmasked, Dulcesima could not have seen the faces of the appellant and his
cohort as they were jumping out of the window because the area of the stabbing
was in total darkness; (d) it was incredible that the appellant would ask the
couple to open the door to their house for the purpose of buying spices when in
fact the Prietos were not selling them; (e) Geraldo and Dulcesima did not reveal
to Francisco and Felix the assailant’s identity when the two arrived at the victim’s
house; and (f) the testimony that the victim was stabbed only once is belied by
the physical evidence. Equally incredible is the testimony of Felix that when he
was on his way to the house of Geraldo, he saw the appellant and his cohort
jumping out of the window. By the time Felix arrived at the scene, the assailant
and his cohort must have been far away from Geraldo’s house, given the lapse of
time between Dulsecima’s shouting for help and the arrival of Felix and his son
Romulo.
The ruminations of the appellant are bereft of merit. By arguing that the
prosecution failed to prove that he was the assailant, the appellant thereby
assails the credibility of Dulcesima and Felix, the probative weight of their
testimonies, the findings of the trial court, as well as its conclusions based on the
said findings. However, it has been the constant ruling of this Court that the
findings of facts of the trial court, its conclusions anchored on the said findings,
its calibration of the testimonial evidence of the parties and the probative weight
thereof, are accorded by the appellate court high respect, if not conclusive effect
precisely because of its unique advantage of being able to observe and monitor,
at close range, the demeanor, conduct and deportment of the witnesses as they
testify, unless the trial court ignored, misconstrued, or misinterpreted facts and
circumstances of substance which, if considered, would alter the outcome of the
case. [24]

We have no reason to deviate from the findings and conclusions of the trial
court on the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution. In People v. Adoviso,
we ruled that it is the natural reaction of relatives of victims to strive to observe
[25]

the faces and appearance of the assailants, if not ascertain their identities, the
manner in which the crime is committed and to approximate the assailant’s next
move either as an instinctive reaction or as a recourse to help fend off any further
attack. A relative will naturally be interested in identifying the malefactor to secure
his conviction to obtain true justice for the death of his relative. [26]

In this case, Dulcesima recognized the appellant through his voice when he
asked Geraldo: “Tay, please open the door, I will buy spices!” She testified, thus:
Q Now, while your husband was sleeping at 9:00 in the evening, tell this
court, was there any unusual incident that had [sic] happened?
A There was, sir.
Q Tell the court.
A There was somebody who was calling, sir.
Q Somebody was calling, please tell this court, the words which they uttered?
A Tay! please, open the door, I will buy spices.
Q Please tell this court, can you identify the owner of that voice?
A Yes, sir, I can.
Q Who was the owner of that voice?
A Lambertino Prieto.
Q If this Lambertino Prieto is present before this court, can you point to him?
A Yes, sir, I can point to him.
 Q Please point to him?
A That one, sir. (Witness is pointing to accused Lambertino Prieto.)
...[27]
ATTORNEY FAJARDO continues:
That is correct.
Q And when you heard this calling, did you notice that your husband was
awakened already or was still asleep?
A My husband was already awakened, sir.
Q All right. When your husband was awakened and you were also
awakened, both of you tried to figure out who was calling outside, did you
not?
A Yes, sir, and it was the voice of Lambertino Prieto.
Q How was the call made?
A The call was made in this manner, sir: “Tay, Tay, open, I want to buy
spices!”
ATTORNEY FAJARDO:
I see.
ATTORNEY DE DIOS:
May we request, Your Honor, that the Cebu Visayan words be entered first into
the record?
COURT INTERPRETER:
“Tay, tay, abli, kay mopalit kog lamas!” Which when translated into English, it
says: “Tay, Tay, open, I want to buy spices!”
...[28]
The evidence on record shows that the appellant was the nephew of the
victim. He frequented his uncle’s house for drinking sprees, and on the said
occasions, Dulcesima saw and talked with the appellant. The appellant and the
couple had been neighbors for years before the stabbing. On July 2, 1995,
Dulcesima talked with the appellant when they were working in their respective
farms. The widow of the victim gained familiarity with the physical built, face and
voice of the appellant. Once a person has gained familiarity with another,
identification becomes quite an easy task even from a considerable distance.
This Court has ruled that identification by the sound of the voice of a person
[29]

identified, is a sufficient and acceptable means of identification where it is

established that the witness and the accused had known each other personally
and closely for a number of years. [30]

Contrary to the contention of the appellant, the area from the door to the sala
of the house was not in total darkness. The place was lit by the kerosene lamp
placed on a chair about three feet high, less than a meter from the door to the
house of the victim to Dulcesima’s left who, at the time, was less than a meter
behind her husband, as the latter opened the door to let the appellant in:
ATTORNEY FAJARDO continues:
All right.
Q Now, your husband was holding the kerosene lamp, did I get you right? Is
that correct?
A The kerosene lamp was placed on top of the chair, sir.
Q All right. Before your husband went to the door to open, did not your
husband picked [sic] up the lamp, carried [sic] it with him towards the door?
A It was just placed on top [sic] the chair, sir.
...
Q This chair on which this kerosene lamp was placed was quite far from the
door, is that not correct?
A Around one (1) meter, sir.
Q Around one (1) meter. All right. At the moment when your husband
opened the lock of the door, in relation to you, how close were you to him
at the moment he opened the door?
A Less than a meter, sir.[31]
When the victim opened the door, Dulcesima saw the appellant. After the
victim was stabbed and had fallen to the floor, the appellant and Dulcesima were
face to face with each other:
ATTORNEY FAJARDO continues:
Q Now, Mrs. Prieto, you heard this sound from that person whom you alleged
to be Lambertino. You merely heard this; you did not see the face of
Lambertino?
A I saw the face of Lambertino because we were facing each other, sir.
...[32]
Considering the illumination from the kerosene lamp, and
Dulcesima’s proximity to her husband, to the door, and to the appellant,
Dulcesima could easily see and recognize the appellant when the latter stabbed
the victim and punched her in the face. In People v. Adoviso, we ruled that the
[33]

illumination produced by kerosene lamp or wicklamps, and flashlights, moonlight

or starlight may in proper situations be considered as sufficient illumination,
making the attack on the credibility of witnesses solely on that ground
unmeritorious.
When Dulcesima pulled the bolo from its scabbard on the wall in the sala of
their house after the appellant had stabbed the victim and punched Dulcesima in
the face, the handkerchief covering half of appellant’s face fell off. She saw the
[34]
face of the appellant, without the mask. It was only then that the appellant kicked
the stand on which the kerosene lamp was placed:
Q - After Lambertino Prieto stabbed your husband what transpired next?
A - When my husband fell to the cement floor Lambertino Prieto rain me with
fistic blows using his left hand and attempted to get my earring [sic] but
because I did not loss [sic] conciousness [sic] he was not able to get my
earrings. I then try [sic] to grabbed [sic] my bolo which I placed at the wall
and at this juncture the white handkerchief which Lambertino Prieto used
as mask to hide his face fell and I clearly saw his face and recognized
him. Lambertino Prieto then kicked the chair and the kerosene lamp on it
fell to the cement floor. Both Lambertino Prieto and his companion jumped
through the window and they all run [sic] away to [sic] the dark.[35]
When asked during her testimony to point to the assailant of her husband,
Dulcesima positively and spontaneously pointed to the appellant as the culprit. [36]

The appellant’s insistence that Dulcesima did not divulge to the barangay
and police authorities the identity of her husband’s killer, is doubtful. Dolores
Prieto, the mother of the appellant, had admitted that in the early morning of July
5, 1995, a few hours after the stabbing, policemen arrived in their house to arrest
the appellant. Since the only eyewitness to the crime was Dulcesima, she must
have been the one who informed the authorities that the appellant killed her
husband.
Moreover, Dulcesima gave her sworn statement to the police investigator,
pointing to and identifying the appellant as the assailant in the afternoon of July
6, 1995, or barely two days after the stabbing incident.
Admittedly, the victim and his wife did not sell spices in their house. It was,
however, not impossible for the appellant to have said: “Tay, tay, abli, kay mopalit
kog lama,” as he stood by the door to the house of the victim. Obviously, the
appellant pretended to be buying spices to inveigle the Prieto spouses to open
the door and at the same time hide his identity, not realizing that he could be
identified by his voice alone. The ploy of the appellant worked. But Dulcesima, at
the outset, had suspected that it was the appellant who was at the door and was
up to something sinister, because she warned her husband not to open the door.
Her husband ignored her warnings and answered the call. After all, the appellant
was his nephew:
ATTORNEY FAJARDO continues:
Q - How did you tell your husband?
A - I told my husband in this manner, sir: “Why did you open the door when in
fact it was Lambertino Prieto?”
Q - You mean you were blaming your husband why he opened that door
because that voice calling outside was Lambertino Prieto?
A - Yes, sir, I blamed my husband why he opened the door.
 Q - You blamed your husband because you had known before that if
Lambertino would be allowed to enter the house, he would do harm to you
and your husband?
A - Yes, sir.[37]
Before Dulcesima could ask the caller why the appellant was in their house at
such an ungodly hour, her husband opened the door. Dulcesima was speechless
when she saw the appellant armed with a knife, a white handkerchief covering
half of his face from the mouth down; and before she could recover her bearings,
the appellant stabbed her husband, thus:
ATTORNEY FAJARDO continues:
Q - Mrs. Witness, so your husband picked up the kerosene lamp and went to
the door to open it, is that correct?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - Now, what about you, were you immediately behind your husband as he
opened the door?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - Before your husband opened the door, did it not occur to your mind to ask
him why he was there at that time at the wee hour of the night; asking to be
opened or asking to enter your house, did you not ask that person outside?
A - I did not, sir.
Q - Your husband did not also ask that person outside as to why he wanted to
buy spices during that wee hour of the night?
A - He did not, sir.
Q - Neither did your husband ask why that person outside . . . . Withdrawn.
Neither did your husband ask for what did that person outside use the spices he
wanted to buy?
A - He did not, sir.
Q - Did not your husband also ask that person outside whether he has other
companions outside?
A - He did not, sir. He just immediately opened the door.
Q - What about you, did you not ask or you did not utter the name of
Lambertino, like saying, “Lambertino, why are you here at this wee hour of
the night,” you did not also?
A - I did not, sir, because when my husband opened the door, he immediately
stabbed my husband.
Q - I was asking before your husband opened the door. What about you, did
you not ask that person outside, “Why are you here, Lambertino?”
A - I did not, sir, because I was speechless.
 Q - You were speechless. Did you not tell that person outside that we don’t
have spices in the house for sale; as [a] matter of fact, spices alone we do
not have?
ATTORNEY DE DIOS:
Already answered, Your Honor. She was speechless.
COURT:
Speechless.
ATTORNEY FAJARDO continues:
Speechless. All right.
Q - Now, as a precaution, Mrs. Prieto, considering that the night was dark and
your place is remotely situated from the barangay population center, did
you not caution your husband not to open the door for that person outside
might be bad elements?
A - I cautioned my husband, sir.
Q - Did you not caution your husband that they wanted --- this person outside --
wanted to buy spices, you might as well give the spices through the door or
through the window?
A - I did not, sir.
Q - Now, so before that main door was opened, you will admit, Mrs. Witness,
that nothing at all was ever said by you or your husband inquiring or
mentioning the name of Lambertino, asking him, “Why you are [sic] here?”
ATTORNEY DE DIOS:
Already answered, Your Honor. [W]itness said that she was speechless.
ATTORNEY FAJARDO:
I mean throughout that process, Your Honor.
COURT:
Witness may answer.
WITNESS continues:
A - No, I did not, sir.[38]
It would be unnatural for Dulcesima to impute to her nephew, the appellant,
the heinous crime of murder if he could be sentenced to death if he was
innocent, exposing him to the ultimate penalty of death and thereby allow the real
culprit to escape prosecution and conviction. The appellant’s claim that
[39]

Dulcesima testified against him and imputed to him the killing of her husband
because he admonished the couple for tying their farm animals near his farm
three years before the incident is incredible. Aside from his testimony, the
appellant offered no corroborating evidence. He admitted that he did not report
the incident to the barangay or police authorities.
 The trial court correctly rejected the appellant’s defense of alibi. Such a
defense cannot prevail over the positive and straightforward identification of the
appellant as the assailant. It bears stressing that alibi is the weakest of all
defenses because it is facile to fabricate and difficult to disprove, and is generally
rejected. The appellant was burdened to prove with clear and convincing
[40]

evidence that at the time of the commission of the crime charged, he was in a
place other than the situs of the crime such that it was physically impossible for
him to have been at thesitus criminis when the crime was committed. [41]

In this case, as early as July 5, 1995, the appellant, through his mother,
alleged that policemen had arrived at their house to arrest him for the killing of
Geraldo. However, the appellant and his mother did not bother going to the
police station to inform the police authorities that he was in the house of Atty.
Gonzales when the crime was committed. Equally incredible is the testimony of
Manuel Dayon that Dolores had told him in the evening of July 5, 1995 that the
appellant was charged for the killing of Geraldo when it was only in the morning
of September 5, 1995 that Dolores learned that her son was a suspect in the
killing.

The Crime Committed by the Appellant

The trial court convicted the appellant of murder qualified by treachery, with
the aggravating circumstance of dwelling. We agree. The prosecution failed to
adduce proof that the appellant ever attempted to divest Dulcesima of her
earrings. Indeed, she even failed to describe her earrings or testify on the value
thereof. Treachery was attendant because the appellant suddenly and without
provocation, stabbed Geraldo twice on the chest and abdomen when the
unarmed victim opened the door to his house. The bare fact that the appellant
was facing the victim when the latter was stabbed does not preclude treachery.
The appellant killed the victim in his house; hence, dwelling is aggravating.
[42]

However, because the said aggravating circumstance was not alleged in the
[43]

information as mandated by Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal

Procedure, it cannot be considered against the accused. Although the crime was
committed before the effectivity of the said Rule, the same should not be applied
retroactively as it would be unfavorable to the appellant. Murder is penalized,
[44]

under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659, with reclusion perpetua to death. Since there is no modifying circumstance
attendant in the commission of the crime, the imposable penalty on the appellant
is reclusion perpetua.

The Civil Liabilities of the Appellant

The trial court awarded P75,000 to the heirs of the victim Geraldo Prieto as
civil indemnity. The court did not award moral and exemplary damages. The
prosecution did not adduce any testimonial or documentary evidence to prove
the expenses for the burial and the wake of the victim. Hence, the decision of
the trial court must be modified. The award for civil indemnity is reduced
to P50,000, conformably to current jurisprudence. The heirs are entitled to
[45]

moral damages in the amount of P50,000, considering the pain and anguish of
the victim’s family. The said heirs are likewise entitled to exemplary damages in
[46]

the amount of P25,000. [47]

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial

Court of Danao City, Branch 25, in Criminal Case No. DNO-1446, is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. The appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
murder qualified by treachery, defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. There being neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstances attendant in the commission of the crime, appellant
Lambertino Prieto is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. He is directed to pay the heirs of the victim Geraldo Prieto the amount
of P50,000 as civil indemnity; P50,000 as moral damages; and P25,000 as
exemplary damages. With costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., on official leave.