Title: Nestle Philippines v.

Court of Appeals On 16 December 1983, the Board of Directors and stockholders of Nestle
G.R. No. 86738 approved resolutions authorizing the issuance of 344,500 shares out of the
Topic: Weight accorded to contemporaneous construction previously authorized but unissued capital stock of Nestle, exclusively to San
Miguel Corporation and to Nestle S.A.
Provision: Section 6(a) (4) of the Revised Securities Act San Miguel Corporation subscribed to and completely paid up 168,800 shares,
“Sec. 6. Exempt transactions. — a) The requirement of registration under subsection while Nestle S.A. subscribed to and paid up the balance of 175,700 shares of
(a) of Section four of this Act shall not apply to the sale of any security in any of the stock.
following transactions:
(4) The distribution by a corporation, actively engaged in the business authorized by its On 28 March 1985, Nestle filed a letter signed by its Corporate Secretary, M.L.
articles of incorporation, of securities to its stockholders or other security holders as a
Antonio, with the SEC seeking exemption of its proposed issuance of
stock dividend or other distribution out of surplus; or the issuance of securities to the
additional shares to its existing principal shareholders, from the registration
security holder or other creditors of a corporation in the process of a bona fide
reorganization of such corporation made in good faith and not for the purpose of requirement of Section 4 of the Revised Securities Act and from payment of
avoiding the provisions of this Act, either in exchange for the securities of such security the fee referred to in Section 6(c) of the same Act. In that letter, Nestle
holders or claims of such creditors or partly for cash and partly in exchange for the requested confirmation of the correctness of two (2) propositions submitted by
securities or claims of such security holders or creditors; or the issuance of additional it:
capital stock of a corporation sold or distributed by it among its own stockholders 1. "issuance of additional capital stock"
exclusively, where no commission or other remuneration is paid or given directly or 2. "increased capital stock"
indirectly in connection with the sale or distribution of such increased capital stock.” Nestle argued that Section 6(a) (4) of the Revised Securities Act embraces
“not only an increase in the authorized capital stock but also the issuance of
Doctrine: It is a principle too well established to require extensive
additional shares to existing stockholders of the unissued portion of the
documentation that the construction given to a statute by an administrative
unissued capital stock”.
agency charged with the interpretation and application of that statute is entitled
Both the SEC and the Court of Appeals resolved the ambiguity by construing
to great respect and should be accorded great weight by the courts, unless
Section 6 (a) (4) as referring only where there is an increase in the authorized
such construction is clearly shown to be in a sharp conflict with the governing
capital stock of a corporation. In the case at bar, since the 344,500 shares of
statute or the Constitution and other laws.
Nestle capital stock are proposed to be issued from already authorized but still
unissued capital stock and since the present authorized capital stock of
Facts:
6,000,000 shares with a par value of P100.00 per share is not proposed to be
Sometime in February 1983, the Authorized Capital Stock (ACS) of Nestle
further increased, the SEC and the Court of Appeals rejected Nestle's petition.
Philippines Inc. ("Nestle") was increased from P300 million divided into 3
million shares with a par value of P100.00 per share, to P600 million divided
Issue: Should Nestle’s application for exemptions be granted?
into 6 million shares with a par value of P100.00 per share. Nestle underwent
the necessary procedures involving Board and stockholders’ approvals and
Ruling: No. SC held that the construction thus given by the SEC and the Court
effected the necessary filings to secure the approval of the increase of ACS
of Appeals to Section 6 (a) (4) of the Revised Securities Act must be upheld.
by respondent, Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), which approval
Both the SEC and the Court of Appeals resolved the ambiguity by construing
was in fact granted. Nestle also paid to the SEC the amount of P50,000.00 as
Section 6(a)(4) as referring only to the issuance of shares of stock as part of
filing fee in accordance with the Schedule of Fees and Charges being
and in the course of increasing the authorized capital stock of Nestle. In the
implemented by the SEC under the Corporation Code.
case at bar, since the 344,500 shares of Nestle capital stock are proposed to
Nestle has only two principal stockholders: San Miguel Corporation and Nestle
be issued from already authorized but still unissued capital stock and since the
S.A.
present authorized capital stock of 6,000,000 shares with a par value of
P100.00 per share is not proposed to be further increased, the SEC and the
Court of Appeals rejected Nestle's petition. We believe and so hold that the
construction thus given by the SEC and the Court of Appeals to Section 6(a)(4)
of the Revised Securities Act must be upheld.
Notes:
Examining the words actually used in Section 6(a)(4) of the Revised Securities
Act, the statutory phrase "issuance of additional capital stock" is indeed
infected with a certain degree of ambiguity. This phrase may refer either to:
a) the issuance of capital stock as part of and in the course of increasing the
authorized capital stock of a corporation; or
(b) issuance of already authorized but still unissued capital stock.
By the same token, the phrase "increased capital stock" found at the end of
Section 6(a)(4), may refer either:
1) to newly or contemporaneously authorized capital stock issued in the course
of increasing the authorized capital stock of a corporation; or
2) to previously authorized but unissued capital stock.
Title: Koppel v. Yatco
G.R. No.
Topic: (1) when contemporaneous construction disregarded; (2) Stare
Decisis
Doctrine:
1. Doctrine of disregard of the corporate fiction - A corporation will be
looked upon as a legal entity as a general rule, and until sufficient reason to
the contrary appears; but, when the notion of legal entry is used to defeat
public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the law will
regard the corporation as an association of persons. The corporate entity is
disregarded where it is so organized and controlled, and its affairs are so
conducted, as to make it merely an instrumentality, agency, conduit or adjunct
of another corporation.
2. Doctrine of stare decsis - undoubtedly entitled to more respect in
the construction of statutes that the interpretation given by officers of the
administrative branches and government, even those entrusted with the
administration of particular laws.
Issue:
1. (first case issue) Whether Koppel Philippines is a domestic corporation
distinct and separate from, and not a mere branch of Koppel Industrial Car and
Equipment Co.
2. (repeated case issue) Whether the ruling on the Secretary of Finance, can
be binding to the present case
Facts:
Koppel Philippines Inc. (KPI) is a corporation duly organized and
existing under the virtue of Philipinne laws. It has a capital stock divided into
thousand (1,000) shares at P100 each. The Koppel Industrial Car and
Equipment Company (KICEC), a corporation organized and exisitng under the
laws of the State of Pennsylvania, owns 995 shares of the total capital stock.
The remaining five (5) shares of KPI are owned one each by officers of the
KPI.
Their main duty consisted of the following:
(1) When a local buyer was interested in the purchase of railway materials,
machinery, and supplies, it asked for price quotations from KPI;
(2) KPI then cabled for the quotation desired from Koppel Industrial Car and
Equipment Company;
(3) KPI, however, quoted to the purchaser a selling price above the figures
quoted by Koppel Industrial Car and Equipment Company;
(4) On the basis of these quotations, orders were placed by the local
purchasers
 Exhibit H of the evidence: It is clearly understood that the intent of this therewith. The doctrine of stare decisis is undoubtedly entitled to more respect
contract is that the broker shall perform only the functions of a broker as set in the construction of statutes that the interpretation given by officers of the
forth above, and shall not take possession of any of the materials or equipment administrative branches and government, even those entrusted with the
applying to said orders perform any acts or duties outside the scope of a administration of particular laws.
broker; and in no sense shall this contract be construed as granting to the
broker the power to represent the principal as its agent or to make
commitments on its behalf. The CFI found KPI to be a mere dummy or branch
of KICEC. It did not deny the legal personality of KPI, but in effect its conclusion
was that, in transactions involved herein, the public interest and convenience
would be defeated and what would amount to tax evasion perpetrated, unless
resort is had to the doctrine of disregard of the corporate fiction.

Ruling:
1. NO.
The Supreme Court stated that Koppel Philippines is a mere branch,
subsidiary or agency of KICEC. A corporation will be looked upon as a legal
entity as a general rule, and until sufficient reason to the contrary appears; but,
when the notion of legal entry is used to defeat public convenience, justify
wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the law will regard the corporation as an
association of persons. The corporate entity is disregarded where it is so
organized and controlled, and its affairs are so conducted, as to make it merely
an instrumentality, agency, conduit or adjunct of another corporation.
In so far as the sales involved, Koppel Philippines and Koppel
Industrial are to all intents and purposes one and the same; or, to use another
mode of expression, that as regards those transactions, the former corporation
is a mere branch, subsidiary of agency of the latter. This is conclusively borne
out of the fact, among others, that the amount of so-called “share in the profit”
of Koppel Philippines was ultimately left to the sole, unbridled control of Koppel
Industrial. Title: Hilado v. CIR
G.R. No. L-9408
2. NO. Topic: Erroneous contemporaneous construction does not preclude
The second assignment of error stated was that the courts should correction nor create rights; e
have adopted the ruling of the Secretary of Finance with regards to the
principle of stare decisis. According to the Supreme Court, the ruling cannot Circular No. V·123: losses of property which occurred during the period of
be binding upon the trial court, much less upon this tribunal where the duty World War II from fires, storms, shipwreck or other casualty, or from robbery,
and power or interpreting the laws rests on the judicial department, and not in theft, or embezzlement are deductible for income tax purposes in the year of
the financial department. Koppel cannot be excused from abiding by this legal actual destruction of said property.
principle, nor it properly be heard to say that it relieves on the Secretary’s ruling
and that therefore the courts should not now apply an interpretation at variance
Doctrine:It is a legal maxim, that excepting that of a political nature, ‘Law once
established continues until changed by some competent legislative power. It
is not changed merely by change of sovereignty.’
“It seems too clear for serious argument that an administrative officer cannot
change a law enacted by Congress. A regulation that is merely an
interpretation of the statute when once determined to have been erroneous
becomes nullity. An erroneous construction of the law by the Treasury
Department or the collector of internal revenue does not preclude or estop the
government from collecting a tax which is legally due.”
Facts: In his 1951 income tax return, Emilio Hilado claimed for a deduction of
the portion of his war damage claim (which had been duly approved by the
Philippine War Damage Commission under the Philippine Rehabilitation Act of
1946) but which was not paid and never has been paid pursuant to a notice
served upon him by said Commission that said part of his claim will not be paid
until the United States Congress should make further appropriation. He claims
that said amount represents a “business asset” within the meaning of said Act
which he is entitled to deduct as a loss in his return for 1951.
Emilio Hilado filed the said income tax return with the treasurer of Bacolod
City, claiming a deductible item of P12,837.65 from his gross income pursuant
to General Circular V-123 issued by the Collector of Internal Revenue.
The Secretary of Finance, through the Collector, issued General Circular V-
139 which revoked and declared void Circular V-123; and laid down the rule(s)
that losses of property which occurred in World War II from fires, storms,
shipwreck or other casualty, or from robbery, theft, or embezzlement are
deductible in the year of actual loss or destruction of said property. The
deductions were disallowed in the lower courts.
Issue:
1. Is the ‘Internal Revenue Laws’ still enforced during the war?
2. Can Hilado claim compensation for the destruction of his property during
the war?
Held:
1. Yes. Hilado’s contention that during the last war and as a consequence of
enemy occupation in the Philippines, there was no taxable year within the
meaning of our internal revenue laws because during that period they were
unenforceable, is without merit.Philippines Internal Revenue Laws are not
political in nature and as such were continued in force during the period of
enemy occupation and in effect were actually enforced by the occupation
government. Such tax laws are deemed to be laws of the occupied territory
and not of the occupying enemy. As of the end of 1945, there was still no law
which could have entitled Hilado claim for the destruction of his properties
during the battle for the liberation of the Philippines. Under the Philippine
Rehabilitation Act of 1948, the payment of claims by the War Damage
Commission depended upon its discretions non-payment of which does not
give rise to any enforceable right. Assuming that the loss (deductible item)
represents a portion of the 75% of his war damage claim, the amount would
be at most a proper deduction of his 1950 gross income (not on his 1951 gross
income) as the last installment and notice of discontinuation of payment by the
War Damage
2. No. Assuming that the said amount represents a portion of Hilado’s war
damage claim which was not paid, the same would not be deductible as a loss
in 1951 because, according to him, the last installment he received from the
War Damage Commission, together with the notice that no further payment
would be made on his claim, was in 1950. In the case at hand, said amount
would at most be a proper deduction from his 1950 gross income (and not
1951). Neither can the said amount be considered as a “business asset” which
can be deducted as a loss in contemplation of law because its collections are
not enforceable as a matter of right, but is dependent merely upon the
generosity and magnanimity of the U.S. government.
Title: CIR v. Insular Life Assurance (WENCESLAO)
G.R. No.
Topic:
Legal Maxim: Stare Decisis et non movere - to stand by decisions and do not
disturb the undisturbed.
Provision:
Sec. 199. Documents and Papers Not Subject to Stamp Tax. – The provisions
of Section 173 to the contrary notwithstanding, the following instruments,
documents and papers shall be exempt from the documentary stamp tax:
 a. Policies of insurance or annuities made or granted by a fraternal or
beneficiary society, order, association or cooperative company,
operated on the lodge system or local cooperation plan and organized
and conducted solely by the members thereof for the exclusive benefit
of each member and not for profit.
Section 3(e) of R.A No. 6939
Section 3. Powers, Functions and Responsibilities. – The Authority shall have
the following powers, functions and responsibilities:
(e) Register all cooperatives and their federations and unions, including their
division, merger, consolidation, dissolution or liquidation. It shall also register
the transfer of all or substantially all of their assets and liabilities and such other
matters as may be required by the Authority;
Doctrine: Stare Decisis - Time and again, the Court has held that it is a very
desirable and necessary judicial practice that when a court has laid down a
principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that
principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially the
same.
Issue: Whether or not the ruling in the Sunlife case be applicable to the case
at bar?
Facts:
This petition for review on certiorari filed by the CIR against Insular
Life, challenging the decision and resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals
(CTA).
CIR is the official duly authorized under Section 4 of the National
Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1997, as amended, to assess and collect
internal revenue taxes, as well as the power to decide disputed assessments,
subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of this Court.
The Insular Life Assurance, Co., Ltd. is a corporation duly organized
and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Republic of the Philippines,
with principal office located at IL Corporate Center, Insular Life Drive,
FilinvestCorporate City, Alabang, Muntinlupa City. It is registered as a non-
stock mutual life insurer with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
On October 7, 2004, Insular received an Assessment Notice with
Formal Letter of Demand both dated July 29, 2004, assessing Documentary
Stamp Tax (DST) deficiency on its direct business/sums assured for the year
2002, amounting to P93,934,359.21 (includes already the basic tax, interest,
and penalty). Thereafter, Insular submitted a Protest Letter which was denied
the CIR and in a Final Decision, on Disputed Assessment dated April 15, 2005,
which was received by the former only on June 23, 2005.
Due to the result, Insular appealed for a review to the CTA.
Fortunately, the CTA ruled in favor of Insular, that the latter was able to prove
that it is a cooperative company, thus, it is exempt from DST on insular policies
it grants to its members.
Undaunted, CIR filed for a motion for reconsideration and review with
the CTA, which were both denied. The decision for such denial was due to the
fact that under a Supreme Court already laid down that registration with CDA
is not a prerequisite to avail such tax exemption under Republic vs Sunlife.
The CTA established that the two cases are similar based on the following:
engaged in mutual life insurance in the PH, non-stock mutual life
insurance, purely cooperative cooperation to engage in mutual
insurance, claiming for DST exemption under Sec 199 (a) of the NIRC.
Ruling: YES!
The Court held that there being no cogent reason for the Court to
deviate from its ruling in Sunlife, the Court holds that Insular, being a
cooperative company not mandated by law to be registered with the CDA,
cannot be required under RMC No. 48-91, a mere circular, to be registered
prior to availing of DST exemption.
While administrative agencies, such as the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, may issue regulations to implement statutes, they are without
authority to limit the scope of the statute to less than what it provides, or extend
or expand the statute beyond its terms, or in any way modify explicit provisions
of the law. Indeed, a quasi-judicial body or an administrative agency for that
matter cannot amend an act of Congress. Hence, in case of a discrepancy
between the basic law and an interpretative or administrative ruling, the basic
law prevails.
The Court has three justifications in Sunlife why registration with the
CDA was not necessary for cooperatives to claim DST exemption. Firstly,
there is no provisions in the NIRC that requires a registration from the CDA to
avail the tax exemption. Secondly, the provisions of the Cooperative Code of
the Philippines does not apply. When the Cooperative Code was enacted
years later, all cooperatives that were registered under PD 175 and previous
laws were also deemed registered with the CDA. Since Insular was not
required to be registered under the old law on cooperatives, it followed that it
was not required to be registered even under the new law. Lastly, the
Insurance Code does not require registration with the CDA.
Tung Chin Hui v. Rodriguez
G.R. No. 141938
Topic: Stare decisis
Provision:
Section 37(a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940: Those aliens who
remain in the Philippines in violation of any limitation or condition (in the
present case being the condition of presenting unexpired passports) shall be
arrested.
Doctrine:
The writ of habeas corpus cannot be issued in cases in which the Bureau of
Immigration has duly ordered the deportation of undocumented aliens,
specifically those found guilty of illegally entering the Philippines with the use
of tampered and previously cancelled passports.
Facts:
Petitioner, Tung Chin Hui, a "Taiwanese national," arrived in the PH on
November 5, 1998, as a temporary visitor. A few days later, he was arrested
by several policemen, who turned him over to the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID) where he was duly charged guilty of possessing a tampered
passport earlier cancelled by Taiwanese authorities.
Tung Chin Hui filed before the RTC of Manila a petition for Habeas Corpus on
the ground that his detention was illegal, which was granted by the RTC and
ordered his release.
Prior to the decision of the CA, a petition for certiorari was raised by Tung Chin
Hui to the SC, questioning the late filing of the notice of appeal by the
Respondents against the petition for habeas having been done beyond the 48
hour reglementary period, thus the notice of appeal should have been
dismissed. The Court denied the petition since the reglementary period for
ordinary appeal, which is 15 days, also applies to the filing of an appeal from
a judgment regarding habeas corpus. Thus, the issue regarding the
reglementary period has become final.
CA reversed the trial court’s decision, and dismissed the petition for habeas
corpus. The CA held that petitioner could not seek relief through habeas
corpus since he was found guilty of violating Sec. 37 (a) Philippine Immigration
Act of 1940, for allegedly holding a passport that had already been cancelled
and that its holder was not the real Tung Chin Hui.
Issue: Was the confinement of Tung Chin Hui legal?
Held:
Yes. Tung Chin Hui’s Petition is not meritorious. Under Section 37(a) of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, those aliens who remain in the Philippines
in violation of any limitation or condition (in the present case being the
condition of presenting unexpired passports) shall be arrested. Such violation
of 37(a) was properly charged and a deportation order was issued. Petitioners
contentions that no evidence was presented showing him to be an
undocumented alien is unmeritorious. The return of the writ by the
respondents, which shows Petitioner was lawfully charged of violation the PIA,
is considered prima facie evidence of the cause of restraint. In addition to the
Return of Writ, attached to it were official letters of the Taiwan Economic and
Cultural Offices, which show that Petitioner was actually named Chen Kuan-
Yuan, and was using a passport already cancelled by the Taiwanese
Government. The Petitioners confinement being legal, the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus is DENIED.
Note:
Habeas corpus is a writ directed to a person detaining another, commanding
the former to produce the body of the latter at a designated time and place
Title: Bustamante v. NLRC
G.R. No.
Topic:
Doctrine: The clear intent of the legislative in amending RA 6715 is to give
more benefits to workers than was previously given them under other rules.
Thus, a closer adherance to the policy behind the RA points to “full backwages”
as meaning exactly that, ie. without deducting from backwages the earnings
derived elsewhere by the concerned employee during the period of his
dismissal. In other words, the provision calling from full backwages to illegally
dismissed employees is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, and therefore
must be applied without attempted or strained interpretation. Index animi
sermo est.
Issue: Whether the illegally dismissed employees are entitled to claim
backwages
Facts:
Evergreen Farms, Inc., the private respondent, moves to reconsider the
decision set forth by the Court (First Division) in ruling that the NLRC erred in
setting aside the backwages and ruled that the petitioners should be paid their
backwages beginning from the day of said illegal dismissal.
Evergreen Farms’ contention is that (1) petitioners are not entitled to
recover backwages because they were not actually dismissed but their
probationary employent was not converted to permanent employment, and (b)
assuming that the petitioners are entitled to backwages, computation thereof
should not start from cessation of work up to actual reinstatement, and that
salary earned elsewhere (during the period of illegal dismissal) should be
deducted from the award of such backwages.
Ruling: YES.
The Court has over the years, applied different methods in
computation of backwages. The first labor relations law governing the award
of backwages was RA 875, the Industrial Peace Act.
Sec. 5. Unfair Labor Practice Cases -
(c). . . if, after investigation, the Court shall be of the opinion that any person
named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any unfair labor practice, then
the Court shall state its findings of fact and shall issue and cause to be served on such
person an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor
practice and take such affirmative action as will effectuate the policies of the Act,
including (but not limited to) reinstatement of employees with or without back-pay and
including rights of the employees prior to dismissal including seniority . . .
Sec. 15. Violation of Duty to Bargain Collectively - . . . Any employee whose
work has stopped as a consequence of such lockout shall be entitled to back-pay.
In accordance with these provisions, backpay could be awarded in the
opinion of the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR). They were given wide
digression as to awarding backpays to employees. THus, in the exercise of its
jurisdiction, the CIR increased or decreased the award of backpay, depending
on the circumstances, among them the good faith of the employer.
March 1989, RA 6715 took effect, amending the Labor Code. It stated
that:
Art. 279. Security of Tenure. - . . . An employee who is unustly dismissed from
work shall be entitiled to reinstatement without loss or seniority rights and other
privilages and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and his other benefits of
their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation is withheld from
him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.
 In accordance with this, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to
his full backwages from the time his compensation was withheld from him
(which as a rule is from the time of his illegal dismissal) up to the time of his
actual reinstatement. The Court states that backwages awarded to illegally
dismissed employees, should not, as a general rule, be diminished or reduced
by the earnings derived by hi, elsewhere during the period of his illegal
dismissal. The underlying reason for this is that the employee, while litigating
the legality or illegality of the dismissal, must still earn a living to support
himself and family, while full backwages have to be paid by the employer as
part of the price or penalty he has to pay for illegally dismissing the employees.
The clear intent of the legislative in amending RA 6715 is to give more
benefits to workers than was previously given them under other rules. Thus, a
closer adherance to the policy behind the RA points to “full backwages” as
meaning exactly that, ie. without deducting from backwages the earnings
derived elsewhere by the concerned employee during the period of his
dismissal. In other words, the provision calling from full backwages to illegally
dismissed employees is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, and therefore Title: People v. AMIGO (WENCESLAO)
must be applied without attempted or strained interpretation. Index animi G.R. No.
sermo est. Topic:

Legal Maxim: Dura lex sed lex - it is harsh, but it is the law.

Provision: Constitution Art III SECTION 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be
imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall
death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already
imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

Doctrine: Statutory Doctrine: It is a settled rule of legal hermeneutics that if

the language under consideration is plain, it is neither necessary nor
permissible to resort to extrinsic aids, like the records of the constitutional
convention, for its interpretation.

Criminal Law: The duty of courts is to apply the law disregarding their feelings
of sympathy or pity for an accused

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in imposing the penalty of reclusion
perpetua against him?

Fact:
 This is an appeal from a decision of the RTC of Davao, which rendered
a decision that Patricio Amigo guilty of murder. The penalty imposed by the
lower court was reclusion perpetua to death and to indemnify the family of
Benito Uy. There were two Informations filed against Patricio, the first one was
charging him of frustrated murder. However, this was later amended to murder
upon the death of Benito Uy in the hospital. Benito was hospitalised for three
weeks before he expired.
Benito Uy was driving his Ford Fiera back home. With him was his two
daughters and his two year old son. On their way home, they were involved
in an accident with Virgilio Abogada, which was the driver of the car they
bumped into. Benito and Virgilio both alighted their vehicles and ensued oral
arguments. Likewise, while the altercation between the two, Patricio Amigo,
passenger of Virgilio, went to talk to Benito. However, upon his interference,
Benito and Patricio had an altercation which resulted in the stabbing of Patricio
of the former.
Amigo contends that under the 1987 Constitution and prior to RA
7659, the death penalty had been abolished and hence, the penalty that should
have been imposed for the crime of murder should be reclusion temporal in its
medium (17 years, 4 months, 1 day) to 20 years of reclusion temporal.
Ruling: NO!
The Court held that A reading of Section 19(1) of Article III will readily
show that there is really nothing therein which expressly declares the abolition
of the death penalty. The provision merely says that the death penalty shall
not be imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the
Congress hereafter provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be reduced to
reclusion perpetua. The language, while rather awkward, is still plain enough.
And it is a settled rule of legal hermeneutics that if the language under
consideration is plain, it is neither necessary nor permissible to resort to
extrinsic aids, like the records of the constitutional convention, for its
interpretation.
Instead, we return to our original interpretation and hold that Article III,
Section 19(1) does not change the periods of the penalty prescribed by Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code except only insofar as it prohibits the imposition
of the death penalty and reduces it to reclusion perpetua. The range of the
medium and minimum penalties remains unchanged.
The Court find that there being no generic aggravating or mitigating
circumstance attending the commission of the offenses, the applicable
sentence is the medium period of the penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code which, conformably to the new doctrine here adopted and
announced, is still reclusion perpetua.
Title: Aguila v. Court of First Instance
G.R. No.
Topic:
Legal Maxim:
1. Dura lex sed lex - it is harsh, but it is the law.
2. aequetas nunquam contravenit legis - Equity never contravenes the
law.
a. Application: Emotional appeals for justice cannot justify
disregard of the mandate of the law
Issue: Whether the court erred in not allowing the petitioners to present
evidence for their case.
Facts:
Juliana Matienzo had two husbands in succession, namely,
Escolastico Alabastro and, after his death, Daniel Aguila. The petitioner is
claiming the disputed property as the only surviving child of the second
marriage. The private respondents are resisting this claim as the children of
Maria Alabastro, the sole offspring of the first marriage.
The petitioner, Daniel Aguila and his current wife argues that they
should be entitled of the property in dispute which were argued otherwise by
the respondents because according to them, Aguila and Juliana, during their
marriage acquired no properties.
The lower court rendered a decision in favor of the heirs of Maria
Alabastro when the petitioners and his current wife were precluded from
presenting their evidence due to the “Gross ineptitude of their counsel” for not
being able to attend the 2 scheduled hearings for the case. Subsequently, a
series of Motion for reconsideration and appeals were filed however, they were
all denied and dismissed because according to the court, the decision about
the civil case is already final and executory.
The court filed a writ of execution which allowed the sale of the
property in dispute in favor of the heirs of Alabastro and this was contested by
aguila. The respondents argue the doctrine of Res Judicata as one of their
defenses. On the other hand, Aguila argues that the requisites of Res Judicata
wasn't completely met and that it was a violation of their constitutional rights
when they were not allowed to present their evidence in court. Hence, this
petition. Title: Regalado v. Yulo (G.R. No. 42935, February 15, 1935)
Felipe Regalado, petitioner
Ruling: No, the court did not commit a mistake. Jose Yulo, Secretary of Justice, Juan G. Lesaca, Judge of First Instance of
The petitioners have already waived their right to present their Albay, and Esteban Villar, defendant
evidence and make an appeal when they failed and missed to appear in the Title: Statute must be capable of interpretation, otherwise inoperative
earlier 2 scheduled hearings for the civil case due to the “gross ineptitude” of
their counsel. It is with the presumption that when a person passes the bar, Doctrine: The intent of the Legislature to be ascertained and enforced
they already have the minimum requirements to become a lawyer which their is the intent expressed in the words of the statute. If legislative intent is
counsel were able to show. Also, despite having the information that their not expressed in some appropriate manner, the courts cannot by
counsel have failed to do their obligation regarding the case, the petitioners
interpretation speculate as to an intent and supply a meaning not found
did not even attempt to do anything in order to remedy it.
in the phraseology of the law. In other words, the courts cannot assume
The fact is, they were allowed by the court to submit their evidence
which were examined by the court however, dismissed it due to it being some purpose in no way expressed and then construe the statute to
insufficient for their claims. Also as stated, they have already waived their right accomplish this supposed intention.
of doing so because of the inaction of their counsel. Provisions: Section 203 of the Administrative Code, as amended
by Act No. 3899: (ORIGINALLY IN SPANISH)

SEC. 203. Appointment and distribution of justices of the peace —

One justice of the peace and one auxiliary justice of the peace shall be
appointed by the Governor-General, with the advice and consent of the
Philippine Senate, for the City of Baguio, and for each municipality, township,
and municipal district in the Philippine Islands, and if the public interests shall
so require, for any other minor political division or unorganized territory in said
Islands: Provided, That justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be
appointed to serve until they have reached the age of sixty-five years:
Provided, further, That the present justices and auxiliary justices of the peace
who shall, at the time this Act takes effect, have completed sixty-five years of
age, shall automatically cease to hold office on January first, nineteen hundred
and thirty-three; and the Governor- General, with the advice and consent of
the Philippine Senate, shall make new appointments to cover the vacancies
occurring by operation of this Act."
Facts:
This is an action of quo warranto originally brought in the
Supreme Court to determine the respective rights of petitioner Felipe
Regalado and Esteban Villar, to the office of justice of the peace of
Malinao, Albay.
Felipe Regalado (Regalado) qualified for the office of justice of
the peace of Malinao, Albay, on April 12, 1906. On September 13,
1934, Regalado became sixty-five years of age. As a consequence,
shortly thereafter, the judge of first instance of Albay, acting in
accordance with instructions from the Secretary of Justice, designated
Esteban T. Villar, justice of the peace of Tabaco, Albay, to act as a
justice of the peace of Malinao, Albay. Regalado surrendered the office
to Villar under protest. On December 17, 1934, Villar qualified as justice
of the peace of Malinao, Albay, and entered upon the discharge of the
duties of the office.
Regalado, insists that the law is clear and accordingly needs no
interpretation. To him the meaning of the law, only those justices of the
peace and auxillary justices of the peace are ceased to hold office who
had completed the age of sixty-five on or before November 16, 1931,
when Act No. 3899 took effect.
Issue: Whether or not under the provisions of section 203 of the
Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3899, the justices and
auxiliary justices of the peace appointed prior to the approval of the last-
mentioned Act reached the age of sixty-five years after the said Act took
effect shall cease to hold office upon reaching the age of sixty-five
Ruling: No.
The Court deemed that the natural and reasonable meaning of
the language used in Act No. 3899 leaves no room for no other
deduction than that a justice of the peace appointed prior to the
approval of the Act and completed the age of sixty-five on September
13, 1934 subsequent to the approval of the Act, which was on
November 16, 1931, and who by the law was required to cease to hold
office on January 1, 1933, is not affected by the said Act. Accordingly,
it is our judgment that the respondent Esteban T. Villar be ousted from
the office of justice of the peace of Malinao, Albay, and that the
petitioner Felipe Regalado be placed in possession of the same.
Also, the Court reached to its decision by delving deeply into the
meaning of the law and interpreted the words of the law to be able to
understand the intent of the Legislature, at the time Act No. 3899 took
effect Regalado was one of the "actuales jueces de paz" (present
justices of the peace); the term "al tiempo de la vigencia de la ley" the
ordinary meaning of "at the time this Act takes effect", which was on
November 16, 1931, on that date the petitioner was not sixty-five years
of age. Further, the phrase "hayan cumplido sesenta y cinco años de
edad", in English as "have completed sixty-five years of age", is of the
past tense and could not regularly be taken to contemplate the future.
Finally the phrase "el primero de enero de mil novecientos treinta y
tres", in English "on January first nineteen hundred thirty-three", is also
a date in the past, for on that date the petitioner had not yet reached
the age of sixty-five.
The intent of the Legislature to be ascertained and enforced is
the intent expressed in the words of the statute. If legislative intent is
not expressed in some appropriate manner, the courts cannot by
interpretation speculate as to an intent and supply a meaning not found
in the phraseology of the law. In other words, the courts cannot assume
some purpose in no way expressed and then construe the statute to
accomplish this supposed intention.
Solicitor General’s dissenting opinion:
According to the Solicitor General, the real intention of the law,
the only sensible and proper construction that could be placed on the
proviso in question is that under its provisions that all justices of the
peace and auxiliary justices of the peace, whether appointed prior to
the approval of the Act or subsequent thereto, who had completed the Justice have interpreted the proviso in question that all justices of the
age of sixty-five at the time of the approval of the Act, and those who peace and auxiliary justices of the peace no matter when appointed
shall complete that age thereafter, shall cease to hold office, the former who had completed the age of sixty-five to the approval of the law and
on January 1, 1933, and the latter at the time they complete that age. those who shall complete that age thereafter, shall cease to hold office
upon their attaining that age.
Although, Act No. 3899 and Sec. 203 Administrative Code are
written in Spanish texts. Its translation to English text may be consulted
but it is understandably deficient. Nevertheless, the Spanish text was
still considered to be the language which should prevail in the
interpretation. With this deficiency, the Solicitor General properly
provides the history of the law and from its history the legislative intent
can be effectuated.

The history is summarized by understanding that judges of first

instance and justices of peace had no age limits on their tenures of
office. However, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 2347, that
provided “judges of first instance shall serve until they have reached
the age of sixty-five and further provided that the present judges of
Courts of First Instance should vacate their positions upon taking effect
of this Act; and that with the advice and consent of the Philippine
Commission, shall make new appointments of judges of the Courts of
First Instance.” Also, Section 203 of the Administrative Code amended
by Sec. 1 of Act No. 3107, “That justices and auxiliary justices of the
peace shall be appointed to serve until they have reached the age of
sixty-five years,” which was held that the law should be given
prospective effect only and was not applicable to justices and auxiliary
justices of the peace appointed before it went to effect. Thereafter, the
matter again came before the Legislature to make the law fixing the age
limit for justices of the peace retroactive in nature. At least the bill as
introduced in the Senate have appeared to have this purpose which
can be gleaned from the debates but the bill when it left the Legislature
was in a different form.

It is a cardinal rule that the practical construction of a statute by

the department whose duty it is to carry it into execution is entitled to
great weight. Wherein both the Solicitor General and Secretary of

Santiago v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 123325
Topic: Departure from literal interpretation - statute must be capable of
interpretation, otherwise inoperative
Doctrine: If no judicial certainty can be had as to its meaning, the court is not
at liberty to supply and make one.
Issue: Is RA 6735 (An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum
and Appropriating Funds Therefor) inadequate to implement the power of the
people to amend the Constitution?
Facts:
1. In 1996, Atty. Delfin filed with COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the
Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's
Initiative"
● He alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of the
Movement for People's Initiative, a group of citizens and other
volunteers who intend to exercise the power to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution granted under
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
● He further alleged that the provisions sought to be amended
are Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of Article VII, and
Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution.
● The proposed amendments sought to remove the term limits
of the Senators, Representatives, President and Vice-
President, and of local officials.
2. According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be
submitted to the people, and after it is signed by at least 12% of the
total number of registered voters in the country, it will be formally filed
with the COMELEC.
3. Prior to Delfin’s efforts, the COMELEC, in 1991, had already passed
Resolution No. 2300 to govern the conduct of initiative on the
Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local laws.
4. Petitioners Santiago et. al. filed an action alleging the following:
● There is no implementing legislation. The constitutional
provision on people's initiative to amend the Constitution can
only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No
such law has yet been passed.
● RA 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely, (1)
initiative on the Constitution, (2) on statutes, and (3) on local
legislation. However, it failed to provide a subtitle about
initiative on the Constitution unlike in the other modes of
initiative.
▪ This deliberate omission indicates that the matter
of people's initiative to amend the Constitution
was left to some future law.
● RA 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication
in print media.
▪ This indicates that the Act covers only laws and
not constitutional amendments because the latter
take effect only upon ratification and not after
publication.
● COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is ultra vires insofar as
initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned,
since the COMELEC has no power to provide rules and
regulations for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend
the Constitution. Only Congress is authorized by the
Constitution to pass the implementing law.
● The people’s initiative is limited to amendments to the
Constitution, not to revision thereof.
Ruling: YES, RA 6375 is inadequate to implement the power of the people to
amend the Constitution. RA 6375, was, as history reveals, intended to cover
initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. However, as it is
presently worded, it is not a full compliance with the power and duty of
Congress to “provide for the implementation of the exercise of the right.”
Contrary to the assertion of the COMELEC, Sec. 28 of RA 6735 does not
suggest an initiative to amendments to the Constitution; the inclusion of the
word “Constitution” therein was a delayed afterthought and the same is neither
germane nor relevant to the said section, which exclusively relates to initiative
and referendum on national and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. Sec.
28 is, in addition, silent as to amendments in the Constitution. The people are
not accorded the power to “directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole
or in part, the Constitution” through the system of initiative. They can only do d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith
so with respect to “laws, ordinances, or resolutions”. DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).

RA 6735, in addition, does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December
on the Constitution. Sec. 5, paragraph ( c ) requires, among other things, 1996 is made permanent as against the Commission on Elections, but
statement of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, is LIFTED as against private respondents.
amended or repealed. It does not include, as among the contents of the
petition, the provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended, in the case Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.
of initiative on the Constitution. The use of the clause “proposed laws sought
to be enacted, approved, or rejected, amended or repealed”only strengthens SO ORDERED.
the conclusion that it excludes initiative on amendments to the constitution.
While RA 6735 provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum
(Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is
provided at all for initiative on the Constitution. The silence as to the latter
simply means that the main objective of RA 6375 is initiative and referendum
on national and local laws.

While RA 6735 exerted utmost diligence and care in providing for the details
in the implementation of initiative and referendum on national and local
legislation thereby giving them special attention, it failed, intentionally, to do so
on the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

Dispositive portion:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered

a) GRANTING the instant petition;

b) DECLARING R. A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the

system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and to have
failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;

Title: Ty sue v. Hord (G.R. No. 4495, January 14, 1909)

c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the Ty Sue, et al, plaintiffs-appellees
Commission on Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the John S. Hord, Collector Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant
conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and
Topic: What is within the spirit is within the law; and Literal Import must
yield to intent
Doctrine: It is impossible to satisfactorily harmonize its complicated and
sometimes perplexing provisions so that it becomes the duty of the courts to
choose between convicting theories that which best accords with the letter of
the law and with its purpose.
Provisions: Section 20 of Act. No 1461 or the Opium Law,
(a) Before imported crude opium or imported prepared opium in any
of its forms shall be released from the custom-house, there shall be paid
thereon an internal- revenue tax as follows: On crude opium, two pesos and
fifty centavos a kilo, net weight; and on prepared opium seven pesos and
fifty centavos a kilo, net weight. This tax shall be paid to the Collector of
Customs, under regulations prescribed by the Collector of Internal Revenue,
with the approval of the head of the proper department.
Before any crude opium which is in the Philippine Islands at the time
this Act shall become effective is cooked or prepared for sale or for human
consumption or use, every wholesale dealer shall pay on such crude
opium to the Collector of Internal Revenue, or his duly authorized
representative, an internal- revenue tax of two pesos and fifty centavos
per kilo, net weight. On opium cooked or prepared in the Philippine Islands
for sale or for human consumption or use, every wholesale dealer shall pay on
the removal or withdrawal of such opium from the place in which it is lawfully
kept or stored, to the Collector of Internal Revenue, or his duly authorized
representative, and internal-revenue tax of five pesos on each kilo, net weight.
The burden of proving that the internal-revenue tax hereby imposed has
been paid is imposed on the whole-sale dealer: Provided however, That
no tax shall be paid on opium removed or withdrawn for exportation and
actually exported and not relanded in the Philippine Islands.
"All opium in the possession, or under the control, or subject to the
order or disposition of any retail dealer at the time this Act becomes effective
on which the internal-revenue tax provided by this Act has not been paid by a
wholesale dealer, shall be subject to such tax, and said retail dealer shall pay
on such opium before manufacture, sale, consumption, or use thereof,
an internal-revenue tax, as follows: Crude opium two pesos and fifty
centavos for each kilo, net weight; cooked or prepared opium, or opium
prepared for human consumption or use, five pesos for each kilo, net
weight. The burden of proving that such internal-revenue tax has been duly
paid is hereby imposed on the retail dealer. Net weight shall be determined by
the customs rules and regulations covering the importation of opium into the
Philippine Islands."
Facts: This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila
granting a judgment upon the pleadings in favor of Ty Sue for the recovery of
P4,485.88, paid by them to the Collector of Internal Revenue under protest as
an internal-revenue tax upon opium which Ty Sue, as importers, had in their
possession on April 1, 1906, when the Opium Law, went into effect, and was
thereafter withdrawn to be prepared for commercial use. Ty Sue argues that
the tax at the rate of P2.50 a kilo has already been paid and the sum sued for
is the amount of the additional withdrawal tax at the rate of P5 a kilo. The lower
court held that crude opium in the hands of dealers at the time the Act
went into effect was not subject to the additional duty when withdrawn
for the purpose of preparation for use.
Further, the lower court argued that the first paragraph of section 20
providing for the tax on crude opium in the Philippine Islands at the time of the
going into effect of the Act is supplemented by the second part which
embraces only cooked opium in the Islands on the same date and
consequently does not include such opium as might be cooked at any time
thereafter, so that in effect the words "at the time this Act shall become
effective," which the Court finds in the first sentence of the second paragraph
must be understood as if repeated after the words "Philippine Islands" in the
second sentence thereof.
Clearly fixed by the trial court:
"By the provisions of this section we clearly have fixed as a
tax upon crude opium at the time of its importation the sum of P2.50
per kilo, and on prepared opium the sum of P7.50 per kilo; upon crude
opium in the hands of retail dealers the sum of P2.50 per kilo, and on
cooked or prepared opium in the hands of retail dealers the sum of P5
per kilo; and crude opium in the possession of wholesale dealers in
the Philippine Islands at the time the Act became effective the sum of
P2.50.
Hence, this appeal

Issue: Whether or not the internal-revenue tax imposed by the Opium Law is
only effective on the date of the said law’s effectivity
Ruling: No
The Court deemed that Section 20 was designed to reach both of
these classes – wholesale and retail dealers, otherwise untouched rather than
only one of them and that this purpose is fully met by the natural construction
of the words of the section without the interpolation of any understood phrase,
inasmuch as the words "opium cooked or prepared in the Philippine Islands
for sale or for human consumption or use" naturally apply to the cooking or
preparation without respect to a particular date.
Furthermore, clarifying the tax payments as such, cooked opium
imported is taxed of P7.50 and imported in the crude state and afterwards
cooked to the original tax of P2.50 without the additional P5; existing no reason
for such a wide difference in the duty upon the two classes of cooked opium
which is of the same quality is destined to the same use and is of equal
commercial value.
In the interpretation of this as well as of some other sections of the
opium law it is impossible to satisfactorily harmonize its complicated and
sometimes perplexing provisions so that it becomes the duty of the courts to
choose between convincing theories that which best accords with the letter of
the law and with its purpose.
Therefore, the decision of the Court of First Instance is hereby
reversed, judgment to be entered in favor of the defendant-appellant, Hord,
without costs of this instance.
Title: US v. Toribio
G.R. No.
Doctrine: The intent of the statute is the law. If there are 2 constructions that
could be derived at the provisions of the statute, the ones that manifests its
clear legislative intent should be followed.
Provisions: Sections 30, 31, 32, and 33 of the Act 147 as follows:
"SEC. 30. No large cattle shall be slaughter or killed for food at the municipal
slaughterhouse except upon permit secured from the municipal treasurer.
Before issuing the permit for the slaughter of large cattle for human
consumption, the municipal treasurer shall require for branded cattle the
production of the original certificate of ownership and certificates of transfer
showing title in the person applying for the permit, and for unbranded cattle
such evidence as may satisfy said treasurer as to the ownership of the animals
for which permit to slaughter has been requested. "
SEC. 31. No permit to slaughter carabaos shall be granted by the municipal
treasurer unless such animals are unfit for agricultural work or for draft
purposes, and in no event shall a permit be given to slaughter for food any
animal of any kind which is not fit for human consumption. "
SEC. 32. The municipal treasurer shall keep a record of all permits for
slaughter issued by him, and such record shall show the name and residence
of the owner, and the class, sex age, brands, knots of radiated hair commonly
known as remolinos or cowlicks, and other makes of identification of the animal
for the slaughter of which permit is issued and the date be alphabetically
arranged in the record, together with date of permit. "A copy of the record of
permits granted for slaughter shall be forwarded monthly to the provincial
treasurer, who shall filed and properly index the same under the name of the
owner, together with date of permit. "
SEC. 33. Any person slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human
consumption or killing for food at the municipal slaughterhouse any large cattle
except upon permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, shall be
punished by a fine of not less than ten nor more than five hundred pesos,
Philippine currency, or by imprisonment for not less than one month nor more
than six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of
the court.
Issue: Whether the act only punishes the slaughter of “large cattles” that are
done without permits inside the slaughter houses.
Facts: The evidence of record fully sustains the findings of the trial court that
the appellant (Toribio) slaughter or caused to be slaughtered for human
consumption, the carabao described in the information, without a permit from
the municipal treasurer of the municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in
violation of the provisions of sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, and Act
regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of large cattle.
 The appellant (Toribio) however argues that he should be made
criminally liable for it because he contends that (1), it should first be proved
that the slaughter of the cattle is for human consumption and (2), the slaughter
of the cattle without permit was done inside a slaughterhouse. He contends
that since there are no slaughterhouses present in his province, and that he
did the slaughter outside a slaughterhouse, he has no criminal liability.

Ruling: No.
The provisions of the said act is not limited to that. If there are 2
available constructions in a statute, the ones that would manifest the clear
intent of the law must be followed. In this case, the real intent of the law is to
protect “large cattles” from thieves and for it to be easily and safely returned to
their rightful owners. If the contention of the appellant would be used, then it
would defeat its purpose because thieves and unlawful persons would just
slaughter them outside slaughter houses.
It was evident also that Torribio applied for the said permit in the
municipality however, this was denied because according to the municipality,
the cattle is “not unfit for agricultural work:. Another intent for the creation of
this law is to make sure that cattles, that are still able to properly work are
appropriated for agricultural purposes because it would benefit the public. It
would alleviate the pamine problems in the country because it would help the
local farmers in producing the country’s food necessities.
From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the
provisions of the statute under consideration was required by "the interests of
the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class;" and that
the prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long
as these animals are fit for agricultural work or draft purposes was a
"reasonably necessary" limitation on private ownership, to protect the Title: Planters Association v. Poneferrada
community from the loss of the services of such animals by their slaughter by G.R. No.
improvident owners, tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire
to enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive power Provisions:
of the community may be measurably and dangerously affected.||| (U.S. v. Republic Act No. 809 - (implementable in milling districts with an annual gross
Toribio, G.R. No. 5060, [January 26, 1910], 15 PHIL 85-100) production of 150,000 piculs or more), institutionalized production sharing
scheme, in the absence of any private agreement between the planters and
farm workers, depending on the mill's total production for each immediately
preceding crop year; and specifically providing that any increase in the
planters' share shall be divided in the following manner: 40% of the increase
shall accrue to the planter and 60% to the farm workers.
Presidential Decree No. 621 -, 7 as amended, charged a lien of P2.00 per
picul on all sugar produced, to be pooled into a fund for subsequent distribution
as bonuses to sugar workers.
Section 12 of R.A. No. 6982: Entitled An Act Strengthening the Sugar
Amelioration Program in the Sugar Industry, Providing the Mechanics for its
Implementation, and for other Purposes
“SECTION 12. Benefits under Republic Act No. 809 and P.D. 621, as
Amended. — All liens and other forms of production sharing in favor of the
workers in the sugar industry under Republic Act No. 809 and Presidential
Decree No. 621, as amended, are hereby substituted by the benefits under
this Act: Provided, That cases arising from such laws pending in the courts or
administrative bodies at the time of the effectivity of this Act shall not be
affected thereby. In connection therewith,
"SECTION 14. Non-Diminution of Benefits.— The provisions of Section 12
hereof notwithstanding, nothing in this Act shall be construed to reduce any
benefit, interest, right or participation enjoyed by the workers at the time of the
enactment of this Act, and no amount received by any beneficiary under this
Act shall be subject to any form of taxation."
Doctrine:
Issue: Whether the provisions of RA. 6982 can supercede the 2 laws initially
governing the sugar farmers.
Facts:
Prior to the passage of Republic Act No. 6982, entitled An Act
Strengthening the Sugar Amelioration Program in the Sugar Industry,
Providing the Mechanics for its Implementation, and for other Purposes, there
were two principal laws providing additional financial benefits to sugar farm
workers, namely: Republic Act No. 809 and Presidential Decree No. 621. The
problem occurred when upon the implementation of Act No. 6982, the financial
benefits to be awarded to the sugar farm workers instead of increasing, has
significantly decreased.
For crop year 1991-1992, the sugar farm workers' share in Binalbagan
— Isabela Sugar Company (BISCOM) under R.A. No. 809 was
P30,590,086.92 and under P.D. No. 621 was P2,233;258.26, or with a total
amount of P32,823,345.18. On the other hand, with the implementation of R.A.
6982, the total workers' benefit in BISCOM milling district was only
P5,583,145.61.
PASON) as an organization of sugar farm plantation owners milling
with BISCOM filed with the Court a Petition for Declaratory Relief against the
implementation of the said D.O. No. 2. Subsequently, the trial court held that
the benefits under R.A. No. 6982 did not and can not supersede or substitute
the benefits under R.A. No. 809 and that the sugarcane workers in the
BISCOM milling district shall continue to enjoy the benefits under R.A. 809, in
addition to the benefits that henceforth be provided for by R.A. 6982.
Ruling: No!
The Court ruled that the addition of the monetary rewards under R.A.
No. 6982 to the benefits granted by R.A. 809, is what is called for in the case
under consideration. While it is true that "addition" is different from
"substitution", the circumstances involving subject milling districts (where the
sugar farm workers are enjoying benefits both from R.A. 809 .and P.D. No.
621 prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 6982), necessitate the grant of pecuniary
advantage under R.A. No. 809 as a complement to R.A. No. 6982. Otherwise,
the workers would suffer a diminution of benefits. Therefore, the increase of
monetary advantage in favor of the sugar farm workers, as a consequence of
such interpretation, is merely incidental to the application of the non-diminution
policy of R.A. No. 6982, a labor provision which should be liberally construed
to further its purpose. Its purpose is the increase of the benefits that the sugar
farm workers are receiving hence, it would be illogical to substitute it which
would only result in the opposite of its intent.
Title: Lamp v. Phipps
G.R. No. L-7806
CARROLL H. LAMB, petitioner, vs. W. H. PHIPPS, as Auditor for the
Philippine Islands, respondent
Topic: Qualification of Rule
Doctrine: Clerical errors or misprints, which, if uncorrected, would render the
statute unmeaning or nonsensical or would defeat or impair its intended
operation, will not vitiate the act; they will be corrected by the court and the
statute read as amended, provided the true meaning is obvious, and the real
meaning of the legislature is apparent on the face of the whole enactment.
Facts: This was an application for the writ of mandamus presented to the
Supreme Court.
For the past four years, C.H. Lamb has been the superintendent of the Iwahig
Penal Colony but then voluntarily presented his resignation on December 31,
1911 due to ill health. Prior to this, he has served as a provincial treasurer of
Marinduque, Mindoro, and Laguna. W.H. Phipps is the Insular Auditor who has
the legal duty to issue an auditor's certificate (clearance) to any employee or
agent of the Government who has left the service and show that the accounts
employee or agent are balanced and have been properly accounted for. Lamb
requested for the said clearance but Phipps, though requested both verbally
and in writing, has failed and refused to issue said certificate (clearance).
Because of this, Lamb is unlawfully excluded from the use and enjoyment of
two of his rights:
First. Without this clearance Lamb cannot collect from the
Government the amounts due him for accrued leave, salary and
transportation;
Second. Without this clearance, Lamb is deprived of his liberty and
unable to leave these Islands, and should he even attempt to leave
would be a criminal offense.
The records of the Phipps’ office show that Lamb did already settle his
accounts. Phipps still refuses to grant the said clearance because of the
danger of a probable suit which might be filed by one Fernandez against the
Government. However, the records also show that Fernandez signed the
receipt acknowledging payment from the government. Lamb then filed for a
mandamus to the SC to compel respondent to issue his certificate. However,
the petition was demurred by the Auditor on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction
of the Court to take cognizance of the petitioner's application; and the other
that the facts stated in the application do not constitute a cause of action.
Issue: Whether or not a mandamus may issue to compel the Auditor-
General to issue the certificate of clearance of Lamb. – NO.
Ruling: Act No. 1605 of the Philippine Commission provides that: no
bonded officer or bonded employee of the Insular Government, or of any
provincial or municipal government in the Philippine Islands, or of the city
of Manila, whether in the actual service of such Government or separated
therefrom, shall leave or attempt to leave the Philippine Islands without first
securing a certificate (clearance) from the Auditor showing that his
accounts with the Government of which he is or was such bonded officer
or bonded employee have been finally settled by said Auditor. Said Act
further provides that any such officer or employee violating of the provision
of this Act shall, on conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for
not exceeding six months or by a fine of not more than P1,000 or both, in
the discretion of the court.
It will be noted upon reading the petition that there is no word or intimation
therein indicating in any way (except the allegation that the relator had
been the custodian of Government property and funds) that he was a
bonder officer. Unless he was a bonded officer or employee of the
Government, said Act does not apply to him and there is no necessity for
a clearance. Said Act only applies to bonded officers of employees. It may
be assumed, however, for the purposes of the present case, that the relator
was a bonded officer or employee of the Philippine Government and that
in the absence of the Auditor's certificate or clearance he might be
subjected to a criminal action under said Act (No. 1605) if he attempted to
leave the Philippine Islands without said certificate.
Petitioner alleges that he has rendered an account for all property and
funds of the Government which came into his possession, and concludes
that he is therefore entitled to an Auditor's clearance. Is the mere rendition
of accounts of Government property and funds by an employee all that is
necessary to entitle such employee to his clearance? It is confidently
contended that the Auditor is not obliged under the law to accept a mere
paper accounting as final and conclusive as to the real responsibility of
Government employees and to issue a clearance upon that alone. He may,
it is true, if he is satisfied; but certainly, he may, if he so desires and if he
has any doubt about the correctness of such accounts, make an actual
examination of the funds and property represented by such paper accounts
or balances.
If then, the Auditor is not obliged to accept the mere paper accounts, when
or within what time must he make his investigations and pass upon the
accounts rendered? Must he do so immediately? The law does not so
require. In justice to all parties and especially for the best interests of the
Government, he should verify the accounts rendered as soon as
practicable. The relator resigned from his position on the 31st day of
December, 1911. His resignation was accepted January 2, 1912. Certainly,
his final accounts were not rendered before that date. In the present case,
at least, there seems to have been no unreasonable or unnecessary delay,
and there is no allegation in the petition to that effect.
Whenever a duty is imposed upon a public official and an unreasonable
delay in the exercise of such duty occurs, if it is clear duty imposed by law,
the courts will intervene by the extraordinary legal remedy of mandamus
to compel action. If the duty is ministerial, the courts will require specific
action. If the duty is purely discretionary, the courts by mandamus will
require action only. In the present case, however, the mandamus is not for
the purpose of the compelling action only. It is presented for the purpose
of requiring particular action on the part of the Auditor. There is a very wide
distinction between the use of the writ of mandamus to compel action and
its use to compel particular action on the part of a public official, board, or
officer upon whom particular duties are imposed by law.
The general rule adopted by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands
is that mandamus will never be issued (a) to control discretion, nor (b)
when another adequate remedy exists. As a general rule it may be said
that by the phrase "another adequate remedy" is meant one specially
provided by law. If the remedy is specifically provided by law, it is presumed
to be adequate. We cannot presume that a remedy expressly provided by
the legislative department of the government is not adequate. If,
perchance, and in fact it is not adequate, it is the duty of the legislative
department and not of the judicial department to correct it. Under the law
the decision of the Auditor is final unless an appeal is taken within one
year. The Auditor is the chief or director of one of the executive branches
of the government. The appeal permitted is to the head of that branch of
the government (first to the Governor-General and second to the Secretary
of War.
Our attention has been called to what appears to be a typographical error
in the wording of section 222 of Act No. 190. That section reads in part as
follows:
When the complaint in an action in a Court of First Instance alleges that
any inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust, or station . . . and the court, on trial, finds the
allegations of the complaint to be true, it may, if there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary courts of law, . . . .
It is asserted that the phrase "courts of law" should read "course of law."
Many of the provisions of said Act No. 190 were copied verbatim from the
Code of Civil Procedure of California. Section 222 of Act No. 190 was taken
from section 1085 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. The section of
the California Code reads "course of law," instead of "courts of law." We
believe that a mistake or error has been made in the printing of said
section. We believe that it was the intention of the legislative department
of the government to follow exactly the provision of the California Code and
that they intended to use the phrase "course of law" and not "courts of law.
The Court cannot believe that the legislature intended to limit the
jurisdiction of this court in mandamus to the cases where there was no
other adequate and speedy remedy in the ordinary courts of law. It is our
duty, therefore, to give the statute a sensible construction; such as will
effectuate the legislative intention and, if possible, avoid an injustice or an
absurd conclusion. Clerical errors or misprints, which, if uncorrected, would
render the statute unmeaning or nonsensical or would defeat or impair its
intended operation, will not vitiate the act; they will be corrected by the
court and the statute read as amended, provided the true meaning is
obvious, and the real meaning of the legislature is apparent of the face of
the whole enactment.
Therefore, the decision of the respondent in the present case was not
arbitrary or merely ministerial, but made in the exercise of judgment and
discretion conferred by law, and not controllable by mandamus.

Title: CIR v. TMX (WENCESLAO)
G.R. No.
Legal Maxim: Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper frienda est, ut evitatur
inconveniens et absurdum -Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as
will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted.
Provision: Section 292 (now Section 230) of the National Internal Revenue
Code provides:
“Sec. 292. Recovery of tax erroneously or illegally collected.·No suit or
proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any national
internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or illegally
assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without
authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner
wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue; but such suit or proceeding may be
maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum has been paid under
protest or duress. In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be begun after
the expiration of two years from the date of payment of the tax or penalty
regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after payment: xxx”
Doctrine: Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid
inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted. Furthermore, courts must give
effect to the general legislative intent that can be discovered from or is
unraveled by the four corners of the statute, and in order to discover said
intent, the whole statute, and not only a particular provision thereof, should be
considered.
Issue: Whether or not TMX is barred from filing a refund?
Facts:
TMX Sales, Inc., a domestic corporation filed its quarterly income tax
return for the first quarter of 1981, declaring an income of P571,174.31, and
consequently, paying an income tax thereon of P247,010.00 on May 15, 1981.
Unfortunately, the Company suffered losses which resulted a net loss
of P6,156,525. On July 9, 1982, TMX filed with Appellate Division of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) thru its external auditor, SGV & Co a refund
in the amount of P247,010.00 representing overpaid income tax. This claim
was not acted upon by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. On March 14,
1984, TMX Sales, Inc. filed a petition for review before the Court of Tax
Appeals against the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR), praying that the
petitioner, as private respondent therein, be ordered to refund to TMX Sales,
Inc. the amount of P247,010.00, representing overpaid income tax for the
taxable year ended December 31, 1981.
In his answer, the CIR averred that "granting, without admitting, the
amount in question is refundable, the petitioner (TMX Sales, Inc.) is already
barred from claiming the same considering that more than two (2) years had
already elapsed between the payment (May 15, 1981) and the filing of the
claim in Court (March 14,1984).
On April 29, 1988 the CTA rendered a judgement in favor of TMX and
ordering CIR to refund the said Company from its income tax payment.
CIR is now before this Court seeking a reversal of the above decision.
Thru the Solicitor General, he contends that the basis in computing the two-
year period of prescription provided for in Section 292 (now Section 230) of
the Tax Code, should be May 15, 1981, the date when the quarterly income
tax was paid and not April 15, 1982, when the Final Adjustment Return for the
year ended December 31, 1981 was filed.
Ruling: NO!
The Court held that Section 292 (now Section 230) of the National
Internal Revenue Code should be interpreted in relation to the other provisions
of the Tax Code in order to give effect the legislative intent and to avoid an
application of the law which may lead to inconvenience and absurdity.
Thus, in resolving the instant case, it is necessary that we consider
not only Section 292 (now Section 230) of the National Internal Revenue Code
but also the other provisions of the Tax Code, particularly Sections 84, 85 (now
both incorporated as Section 68), Section 86 (now Section 70) and Section 87
(now Section 69) on Quarterly Corporate Income Tax Payment and Section
321 (now Section 232) on keeping of books of accounts. All these provisions
of the Tax Code should be harmonized with each other.
The filing of a quarterly income tax returns required in Section 86 (now
68) and implemented per BIR Form 1702-Q and payment of quarterly income
tax should only considered mere installments of the annual tax due. Thus the
Court held that that when a tax is paid in installments, the prescriptive period
of two years provided in Section 306 (Section 292) of the National Internal
Revenue Code should be counted from the date of the final payment.
In the instant case, TMX Sales, Inc. filed a suit for a refund on March
14,1984. Since the two-year prescriptive period should be counted from the
filing of the Adjustment Return on April 15, 1982, TMX Sales, Inc. is not yet
barred by prescription.
Paras v. Comelec
G.R. No. 133169
Topic: Construction to avoid absurdity
Section 47, Local Government Code:
SEC. 74. Limitations on Recall. — (a) Any elective
local official may be the subject of a recall election only
once during his term of once for loss of confidence.
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from
the date of the official’s assumption to office or one (1)
year immediately preceding a regular local election."
Doctrine: Statutes may be extended to cover cases not within the literal
meaning of the terms if their exact and literal import would lead to absurd or
mischievous results.
Issue: Whether or not the recall election is barred based on Section 74(b) of
the Local Government Code?
Facts:
1. Petitioner Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula,
Cabanatuan City who won during the last regular election in 1994.
2. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay waa filed by the registered
voters of the barangay.
3. The COMELEC, however, deferred the recall election in view of
petitioner Paras’ opposition, and set the recall election to be on
December 16, 1995.
 4. In order to prevent the recall election from happening, petitioner Paras
filed before the RTC of Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction
issuing a temporary restraining order.
5. The COMELEC thus for the third time rescheduled the recall election
for January 13, 1996, and petitioner filed the instant petition for
certiorari with the urgent prayer for injunction.
6. Petitioner Paras argues that Section 74(b) of the Local Government
Code, which states that “no recall shall take place within (1) year from
the date of the official’s assumption to office or (1) year immediately
preceding a regular election” bars the January 13, 1996 recall election
from happening.
7. Petitioner Paras argues also that the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK)
election was set by RA 7808 on the first Monday of May 1996, and
every three years thereafter, and that the SK election is a regular local
election, hence no recall election can be had for barely four months
between the SK election and the recall election.
Ruling: NO. It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute
must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the
general intent of the whole enactment. The evident intent of Section 74 is to
subject an elective local official to a recall election once during his term of
office. Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a), which states that
“any elective official may be the subject of a recall election only once during
his term of office for loss of confidence” merely designates the period when
such elective local official may be the subject of a recall election, that is, during
the second year of his term in office. If petitioner Paras’ interpretation of the
phrase regular local election is to include the SK election, then the novel
provision of the Local Government on recall would be completely disregarded,
which is a mode of removal of public officers by initiation of the people before
the end of his term. In addition, if the SK election is to be held every three
years from May 1996 within the definition of a “regular local election”, as
erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no recall election can be conducted at
all, rendering useless the provision contained in the Local Government Code.
could choose the official’s replacement in the said election who certainly has
a longer tenure in office than a successor elected through a recall election. It
would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of Section 74 of the Local
Government Code to construe regular local election as one referring to an
election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled
will be contested, and not an SK election.
Petitioner Paras’ too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which
the Court cannot tolerate. The Court admonishes against a too literal reading
of the law as it is will end up constricting rather than fulfilling its purpose and
will also defeat the intention of its authors. The spirit, rather than the letter of
a law determines its construction; hence, a statute, as in this case, must be
read according to its spirit and intent.
Dispositive portion:
Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation
stated under Section 74 (b) of the Code considering that the next regular
election involving the barangay o􏰀ce concerned is barely seven (7) months
away, the same having been scheduled on May 1997.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed for having become moot and
academic. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on January 12,
1996, enjoining the recall election should be as it is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.

The recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local
government unit necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition
against the conduct of recall election one year immediately preceding the
regular local election. The prohibition is due to the proximity of the next regular
election for the office of the local elective official concerned. The electorate

Title: People v Purisima (G.R. No. L-42050-66, November 20, 1978)
The People of the Philippines, petitioner
Hon. Judge Amante Purisima, Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VII, et
al, respondents
Topic: Construction to avoid injustice
Provisions: Presidential Decree No. 9, "DECLARING VIOLATIONS OF
GENERAL ORDERS NO. 6 and NO. 7 DATED SEPTEMBER 22, 1972, AND
SEPTEMBER 23, 1972, RESPECTIVELY, TO BE UNLAWFUL AND
PROVIDING PENALTIES THEREFORE.
"2. It is unlawful to possess deadly weapons, including hand grenades, rifle
grenades and other explosives, including, but not limited to, 'pill box bombs,'
'molotov cocktail bombs,' 'fire bombs,' or other incendiary device consisting of any
chemical, chemical compound, or detonating agents containing combustible units
or other ingredients in such proportion, quantity, packing, or bottling that ignites by
􏰀re, by friction, by concussion, by percussion, or by detonation of all or part of the
compound or mixture which may cause such a sudden generation of highly heated
gases that the resultant gaseous pressures are capable of producing destructive
effects on continguous objects or of causing injury or death of a persons and any
person convicted thereof shall be punished by imprisonment ranging from ten to
fifteen years as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct.
"3. It is unlawful to carry outside of residence any bladed, pointed or blunt weapon
such as 'fan knife,' 'spear,' 'dagger,' 'bolo,' 'balisong,' 'barong,' 'kris,' or club, except
where such articles are being used as necessary tools or implements to earn a
livelihood and while being used in connection therewith; and any person found
guilty thereof shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from five to ten years
as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct.
"4. When the violation penalized in the preceding paragraphs 2 and 3 is committed
during the commission of or for the purpose of committing, any other crime, the
penalty shall be imposed upon the offender in its maximum extent, in addition to
the penalty provided for the particular offenses committed or intended to be
committed.
Doctrine: It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a
valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a
legislative measure, and that a construction of which the statute is fairly
susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous,
indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequences.
Facts:
This case has 26 Petitions for Review filed by the People of the
Philippines represented by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of
the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General, are
consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one basic question of law.
These Petitions or appeals involve three Courts of First Instance,
namely: the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VII, presided by Hon.
Amante P. Purisima (17 Petitions), the Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch XVIII, presided by Hon. Maximo A. Maceren (8 Petitions) and, the
Court of First Instance of Samar, with Hon. Wenceslao M. Polo, presiding, (1
Petition).
Facts of the case are as follows:
The respective accused – Porfirio Candelosas, Reynaldo Laqui,
Panchito Refuncion and etc, were charged with illegal possession of deadly
weapon in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. A motion to quash was filed
by the accused on the common ground, that the Information did not allege
facts which constitute the offence penalized by P.D. No. 9 because it failed to
state one essential element of the crime.
In the case of Candelosas, the accused allegedly willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and
control one carving knife with a blade of 6-1/2 inches and a wooden handle of
5-1/4 inches, or an overall length of 11-3/4 inches, carried outside of his
residence, the weapon not being used as a tool or implement necessary to
earn his livelihood nor being used in connection therewith.
In the case of Laqui, the accused allegedly willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and knowingly have carry outside of his residence a bladed
weapon and pointed weapon, an icepick with an overall length of about 8-1/2
inches, the same not being used as a tool or implement to earn his livelihood
nor being used in connection therewith.
In the case of Refuncion, the accused allegedly willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and knowingly have carry outside of his residence a deadly weapon
called socyatan, an instrument which from its very nature is no such tool to be
used to earn his livelihood nor being used in connection therewith.
The above mentioned accused filed for dismissing or quashing the
Informations that one essential element of the offence charged is missing the
Information – connected with or related to subversion, insurrection, or
rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder. Wherein Judge Purisima
reasoned that the possession of bladed weapon or the like outside the
residence may be prosecuted and tried under P.D. No. 9, the information must
specifically allege that the possession of bladed weapon charged was for the
purpose of abetting or in furtherance of the condition of rampant criminality,
organized lawlessness, public disorder, etc as are contemplated and recited
in Proclamation No. 1081, as justification. Devoid of this specific allegation,
the information is not complete, as it does not allege sufficient facts to
constitute offense violated in P.D. No. 9.
Judge Maceren’s grounds for dismissing the charges, the desired
results sought to be attained by Proclamation No. 1081 is the maintenance of
law and order throughout the Philippines and the prevention and suppression
of all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion.
It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the forgoing premises that the
carrying of bladed, pointed or blunt weapons outside of one’s residence which
is made unlawful and punishable under P.D. No. 9 (3) abets subversions,
insurrection or rebellion, lawless violence, criminality, chaos and public
disorder or is intended to bring about these conditions.
While Judge Polo’s grounds, a felony was committed in connection or
in furtherance of subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, and
public disorder. Proclamation No. 1081 declaring a state of martial law
throughout the country was issued because of wanton destruction to lives and
properties widespread lawlessness and anarchy. In order to restore the
tranquility and stability of the country and to secure the people from violence
and loss of lives in the quickest possible manner and time, carrying firearms,
explosives, deadly weapons without a permit unless the same would fall under
the exception is prohibited.
The Solicitor General also commented that the main argument
advanced on the issue now under consideration is that a perusal of paragraph
3 of PD 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive
activities; that the act proscribed is essentially a malum prohibitum penalized
for reasons of public policy.
Issue: Are the Information filed by the People sufficient in form and substance
to constitute the offence of “illegal possession of deadly weapon” penalized
under Presidential Decree No. 9?
Ruling: No.
The Court deemed that the offence of the accused carries two
elements: first, the carrying outside one's residence of any bladed, blunt, or
pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or implement for a
livelihood; and second, that the act of carrying the weapon was either in
furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion,
insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder.
It is in the second element which removes the act of carrying a deadly
weapon, if concealed, outside of the scope of the statute or the city ordinance
mentioned above. In other words, a simple act of carrying any of the weapons
described in the presidential decree is not a criminal offense in itself. What
makes the act criminal or punishable under the decree is the motivation behind
it. Without that motivation, the act falls within the purview of the city ordinance
or some statute when the circumstances so warrant.
In the argument that P.D. 9 (3) covers one and all situations, is a
matter of statutory construction. That there is ambiguity in the presidential
decree is manifest from the conflicting views which arise from its
implementation. When ambiguity exists, it becomes a judicial task to construe
and interpret the true meaning and scope of the measure, guided by the basic
principle that penal statutes are to be construed and applied liberally in favor
of the accused and strictly against the state.
In lieu with the matter of statutory construction, the Court used
necessary aids to be able to understand the spirit of the law. Such aids used
are as follows:
 First, the Preamble in the decree, those with “Whereas”, (1) the state concerned, subject however to Our observations made in the proceedings
of martial law in the country pursuant to Proclamation 1081 dated September pages of this Decisions regarding the right of the State or Petitioner herein to
21, 1972; (2) the desired result of Proclamation 1081 as well as General file either an amended information under P.D. No. 9, Paragraph 3, or a new
Orders Nos. 6 and 7 which are particularly mentioned in P.D. 9; and (3) the one under other existing statute or city ordinance as the facts may warrant.
alleged fact that subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence,
criminality, chaos, and public disorder mentioned in Proclamation 1081 are
committed and abetted by the use of firearms and explosives and other deadly
weapons.

Second, the results or effects of the decree must be within its reason
or intent, which is clearly stated in the paragraph after the preamble,

"NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Commander-in-

Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Philippines, in order to attain the
desired result of the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 and General
Orders Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby order and decree that:

That the acts penalized in P.D. 9 are those related to the desired result of
Proclamation 1081 and General Orders Nos. 6 and 7. General Orders Nos. 6
and 7 refer to firearms and therefore have no relevance to P.D. 9(3) which
refers to blunt or bladed weapons.

In the construction of P.D. 9(3) it becomes relevant to inquire into the

consequences of the measure if a strict adherence to the letter of the
paragraph is followed. Thus, it is to be presumed that when P.D. 9 was
promulgated by the President of the Republic there was no intent to work a
hardship or an oppressive result, a possible abuse of authority or act of
oppression, arming one person with a weapon to impose hardship on another,
and so on.

We conclude with high expectations that police authorities and the

prosecuting arm of the government true to the oath of office they have taken
will exercise utmost circumspection and good faith in evaluating the particular
circumstances of a case so as to reach a fair and just conclusion if a situation
falls within the purview of P.D. 9(3) and the prosecution under said decree is
warranted and justified. This obligation becomes a sacred duty in the face of
the severe penalty imposed for the offense.

Wherefore, we DENY these 26 petitions for review and AFFIRM the

orders of the respondent Judges dismissing or quashing the Information