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Facts
Petitioners directly filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus before the Court,
seeking to compel the Secretary of Interior and Local Government, et al. (the
public respondents) to first secure an eviction and/or demolition order from the
court prior to their implementation of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279.
The petitioners justify their direct recourse before this Court by
1. generally averring that they have no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.
2. respondents gravely abused their discretion in implementing Section 28 (a)
and (b) of RA 7279 which are patently unconstitutional.
3. They are injured by the respondents’ threats of evictions and demolitions.
5. The petitioners argue that Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 offend their
constitutional right to due process because they warrant evictions and
demolitions without any court order
1. the petitioners ignored the hierarchy of courts when they directly filed a
Rule 65 petition before the Court (SC)
3. the petitioners failed to particularly state the grave abuse of discretion that
the Mayor of Navotas allegedly committed.
4. the petition does not present any justiciable controversy since the City of
Navotas had already successfully evicted the petitioners in San Roque,
Navotas on November 28, 2011.
b) The Mayor also disputes the petitioners’ claim that RA 7279 does not
afford the informal settlers procedural due process prior to evictions
and demolitions.
The Court DISMISS the petition for its serious procedural defects
The petition assails the constitutionality of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279, the
petition failed to show the essential requisites that would warrant the Court’s
exercise of judicial review. It is a rule firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence that
the courts will not determine the constitutionality of a law unless the requisites are
present.
In Magkalas v. NHA, this Court had already ruled on the validity of evictions and
demolitions without any court order. In that case, we affirmed the validity of
Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1472 which authorizes the NHA to summarily
eject all informal settlers’ colonies on government resettlement projects as well as
any illegal occupant in any homelot, apartment or dwelling unit owned or
administered by the NHA. In that case, we held that Caridad Magkalas’ illegal
possession of the property should not hinder the NHA’s development of Bagong
Barrio Urban Bliss Project.
The court noted that Section 10, Article 13 of the 1987 Constitution provides that
urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwelling demolished,
except in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner. Paragraph 1,
Section 28 of RA 7279 allows summary evictions and demolition in cases
where persons or entities occupy danger areas and when persons or entities
occupy areas where government infrastructure projects with available funding are
about to be implemented.
To ensure that evictions and demolitions are conducted in a just and humane
manner, paragraph 2, Section 28 of RA 7279
This Department of the Interior and Local Government and the Housing and
Urban Development Coordinating Council carry out the provision.
- In short, stare decisis on the case at bar provides that Section 28 (a) and (b)
of RA 7279 are constitutional; eviction and demolition are exercise of their
constitutional rights provided that it is conducted in a just and humane
manner
We deny Dela Merced & Sons' petition, but grant that of the DENR-PAB.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION as to the amount of fine imposed.
1. Respondents were Not Denied Due Process
SC quotes CA on this matter:
The opportunity to be heard was made completely available to petitioner, Dela
Merced & Sons who participated in all stages of the administrative proceeding
before the DENR-PAB. The respondent [PAB] after issuing the notice of violation
and possible imposition of fines to the petitioner, gave it time to comply with the
requirements of the environmental laws
Subsequent inspection of the facility showed that the petitioner still failed to
comply with the DENR effluent standards despite the extension given by
respondent. Thus, the respondent was compelled to issue a cease and desist order.
Whatever procedural defect there may have been in the subject proceedings was
cured when Dela Merced & Sons moved for reconsideration.
In questioning the constitutionality of the fine, Dela Merced & Sons merely
alleges that the amount is "exorbitant” and "too excessive as to cause grave
impact on the business operations, the very survival of petitioner as a
business entity and its employees as a whole."
unsubstantiated allegations are not enough to strike down the fine
as unconstitutional for being excessive.
b) Sec. 28 of R.A. 9275 cannot be declared unconstitutional simply because the
fine imposed may cause grave impact on Dela Merced & Sons' business operations.
the possibility that a law may work hardship does not render it
unconstitutional.
c) the basis for the amount of fine imposed by the PAB and the CA (i.e. P10,000 per
day of violation) is the minimum imposable amount under the law. Since penalties
are prescribed by statute, their formulation is essentially and exclusively
legislative.
Having no authority to modify the penalties already prescribed, the
courts can only interpret and apply them.
U.S. v. Borromeo:
During the deliberations on Senate Bill No. 2115 (which was the origin of R.A.
9275), one of the senators made the following statement:
The lack of usable, clean water resources is a problem that confronts us today. This
is the reason, Mr. President, this committee thought of submitting this measure as
our humble contribution in finding alternative solutions. This bill is not lacking in
incentives and rewards and it has muscle to penalize acts that further pollute all our
water sources as well. We increased the fines so that with strict implementation, we
can curb the damage we continue to inflict, ironically, to our life source.
Clearly, the legislature saw the need to protect and conserve our water
resources. To this end, it formulated rules with concomitant penalties to
ensure compliance with the law. We will not interfere with its wisdom in
drafting the law, especially since the presumption of its constitutionality
has not been overturned.
Laude v Ginez-Jabalde
Facts
On October 11, 2014, Jeffrey "Jennifer" Laude (Jennifer) was killed in
Olongapo City allegedly by 19-year-old US Marine L/CPL Joseph Scott
Pemberton
Complaint for murder was filed by Jennifer's sibling, Marilou S. Laude,
against Pemberton before the Olongapo City Office of the City
Prosecutor. Pemberton was detained in Camp Aguinaldo, the general
headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
On the same day, Marilou S. Laude filed an Urgent Motion to Compel
the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused
to the Olongapo City Jail and a Motion to Allow Media Coverage.
On December 23, 2014, Judge Ginez-Jabalde denied petitioners'
Urgent Motion for lack of merit
Petitioners argued that Respondent Judge committed grave abuse of
discretion tantamount to an excess or absence of jurisdiction when
she dismissed the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the
Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail
based on mere technicalities.
Petitioners advance that Philippine authorities ought to "have primary
jurisdiction over Respondent Pemberton's person while he is being
tried in a Philippine Court" in accordance with Article V, paragraph (3)
(b) of the Visiting Forces Agreement:
3. In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent,
the following rules shall apply:
(a) Philippine authorities shall have the primary right to
exercise jurisdiction over all offenses committed by
United States personnel . . .
However, in the provisions of VFA, the Court finds that the moment the
accused has to be detained, e.g., after conviction, the rule that governs is
Article V of Criminal Jurisdiction of the VFA:
Sec. 10 states not only that the detention shall be carried out
in facilities agreed on by authorities of both parties, but also
that the detention shall be "by Philippine authorities."
In any case, Pemberton is confined, while undergoing trial, in Camp
Aguinaldo, which by petitioners' own description is the "General Head
Quarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. "Their claim that the
detention facility is under the "control, supervision and jurisdiction of
American military authorities" is not substantiated.