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1.) SPS. MAXIMO LANDRITO, JR. and PACITA EDGALANI, Petitioners, v.

THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS; SPS. BENJAMIN SAN DIEGO and
CARMENCITA SAN DIEGO; The EX-OFFICIO SHERIFF and CLERK OF
COURT of the Regional Trial Court, Makati City; and the REGISTER OF DEEDS,
Makati City, Respondent.
Facts: Petitioners obtained a loan of P350,000.00 with deed of real estate mortgage over their
parcel of land located at Bayanan, Muntinlupa, Rizal from respondent Carmencita San Diego.
After making substantial payments, petitioners again obtained and were granted by Carmencita
San Diego an additional loan of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) together with Amendment of
Real Estate Mortgage the loan shall be paid within six (6) months from 16 September 1991, and if
not paid within said period, the mortgagee shall have the right to declare the mortgage due and
may immediately foreclose the same judicially or extrajudicially, in accordance with law.
It appears that petitioners defaulted in paying their loan and continuously refused to comply with
their obligation despite repeated demands prompting respondent Carmencita San Diego filed a
petition for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. One year after the registration sheriff's
certificate of sale with the Office of the Register of Deeds petitioner filed their complaint for
annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure and auction sale, with damages. The RTC dismissed the
complaint on the ground petitioner’s cause of action is barred by laches from their failure or neglect
to pay the debt on time and failure to redeem the property within 1 yr. after the said registration
which the CA affirmed.
Petitioner elevated the case to SC argued that the mortgaged property was illegally foreclosed
since it is a well settled rule that an action to foreclose a mortgage must be limited to the amount
mentioned in the mortgage.
Issue: whether or not the execution of mortgage property was illegally foreclosed?
Held: Argument is without merit. It is true under sec.8 (e) rule 39 writ of execution shall
specifically state the amount of the interest, cost damage, rents or profits due as of the date of the
issuance of the writ, In this case, P1,000,000.00, which amount was allegedly bloated by
respondent Carmencita San Diego to P1,950,000.00. However, petitioner’s act of filing their
complaint later than 1 yr. from registration of sheriff's certificate of sale with the Office of the
Register of Deeds which they are due informed but then refused to attend is indicative of their
refusal to pay the redemption price on the alleged deadline. if they so believed that their loan
obligation was only for P1,000,000.00, petitioners should have made an offer to redeem within
one (1) year from the registration of the sheriff's certificate of sale, together with a tender of the
same amount. Because of this act petitioner bared by laches.
The period of redemption is not a prescriptive period but a condition precedent provided by law to
restrict the right of the person exercising redemption. If a person exercising the right of redemption
has offered to redeem the property within the period fixed, he is considered to have complied with
the condition precedent prescribed by law and may thereafter bring an action to enforce
redemption. If, on the other hand, the period is allowed to lapse before the right of redemption is
exercised, then the action to enforce redemption will not prosper, even if the action is brought
within the ordinary prescriptive period. Moreover, the period within which to redeem the property
sold at a sheriff's sale is not suspended by the institution of an action to annul the foreclosure sale
2.) TERESA CHAVES BIACO, Petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE COUNTRYSIDE RURAL BANK, Respondent.
FACTS:
Ernesto Biaco is the husband of petitioner Ma. Teresa Chaves Biaco. While employed in the
Philippine Countryside Rural Bank (PCRB) as branch manager, Ernesto obtained several loans
from the respondent bank.
As security for the payment of the said loans, Ernesto executed a real estate mortgage in favor of
the bank covering the parcel of land which the real estate mortgages bore the signatures of the
spouses Biaco.
When Ernesto failed to settle the above-mentioned loans on its due date, respondent bank through
counsel sent him a written demand, however, proved futile.
Respondent bank filed a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage against the spouses Ernesto and
Teresa Biaco before the RTC of Misamis Oriental. Summons was served to the spouses Biaco
through Ernesto at his office (Export and Industry Bank). The RTC ruled against them; a writ of
execution was served on the spouses.
Petitioner sought the annulment of the Regional Trial Court decision contending that
extrinsic fraud prevented her from participating in the judicial foreclosure proceedings. According
to her, she came to know about the judgment in the case only after the lapse of more than six (6)
months after its finality. She claimed that extrinsic fraud was perpetrated against her because the
bank failed to verify the authenticity of her signature on the real estate mortgage and did not inquire
into the reason for the absence of her signature on the promissory notes. She moreover asserted
that the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction because summons were served on her through her
husband without any explanation as to why personal service could not be made.
The Court of Appeals considered the two circumstances that kept petitioner in the dark
about the judicial foreclosure proceedings: (1) the failure of the sheriff to personally serve
summons on petitioner; and (2) petitioner's husband's concealment of his knowledge of the
foreclosure proceedings. On the validity of the service of summons, the appellate court ruled that
judicial foreclosure proceedings are actions quasi in rem. As such, jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant is not essential as long as the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. Noting that the
spouses Biaco were not opposing parties in the case, the Court of Appeals further ruled that the
fraud committed by one against the other cannot be considered extrinsic fraud.
Her motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the instant Petition for
Review, asserting that even if the action is quasi in rem, personal service of summons is essential
in order to afford her due process. The substituted service made by the sheriff at her husband's
office cannot be deemed proper service absent any explanation that efforts had been made to
personally serve summons upon her but that such efforts failed. Petitioner contends that extrinsic
fraud was perpetrated not so much by her husband, who did not inform her of the judicial
foreclosure proceedings, but by the sheriff who allegedly connived with her husband to just leave
a copy of the summons intended for her at the latter's office.
ISSUE: Whether or not the annulment of judgment is valid
RULING:
Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional
cases as where there is no available or other adequate remedy. Jurisprudence and Sec. 2, Rule 47
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules of Court) provide that judgments may be annulled
only on grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process.
Petitioner asserts that extrinsic fraud consisted in her husband's concealment of the loans
which he obtained from respondent PCRB; the filing of the complaint for judicial foreclosure of
mortgage; service of summons; rendition of judgment by default; and all other proceedings which
took place until the writ of garnishment was served.
Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a fraudulent act committed by the prevailing
party outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party was prevented from presenting
fully his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by the prevailing party. Extrinsic
fraud is present where the unsuccessful party had been prevented from exhibiting fully his case,
by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a
false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being
kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority
assumes to represent a party and connives at his defeat; or where the attorney regularly employed
corruptly sells out his client's interest to the other side. The overriding consideration is that the
fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court.
With these considerations, the appellate court acted well in ruling that there was no fraud
perpetrated by respondent bank upon petitioner, noting that the spouses Biaco were co-defendants
in the case and shared the same interest. Whatever fact or circumstance concealed by the husband
from the wife cannot be attributed to respondent bank.
Moreover, petitioner's allegation that her signature on the promissory notes was forged
does not evince extrinsic fraud. It is well-settled that the use of forged instruments during trial is
not extrinsic fraud because such evidence does not preclude the participation of any party in the
proceedings.
3.) Cole vs Court of Apppeals
Facts:
 What initially started as a simple sale of townhouse units, owned by private respondent
Agda, gave rise to these five (5) consolidated petitions. These petitions are sequel to the
complaint for non-delivery of title filed with the Arbiter of the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board [hereinafter HLURB], by spouses Cinco, Leila Cingco-Jingco and
Emmanuel Jingco, Lolita and Pete Cole against Agda and PNB, as mortgagee of the
property.
 On 1991, the HLU arbiter rendered against Agda and PNB ordering them to deliver the
title to the propert.
 PNB appealed the Arbiter’s decision to the HLU Board of Commissioners, which on
February 27, 1995.affirmed the same. Not satisfied, PNB appealed the Board of
Commissioners’ decision to the Office of the President. After one year the Office of the
President affirmed the appealed decision in toto.
 Agda, on the other hand, questioned the Arbiter’s decision before the Court of Appeals via
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
 After six (6) years from the rendition of Arbiter’s decision in 1991, the CA dismissed the
petition, ruling that the HLURB Rules of Procedure provided that the decision of the
Arbiter may be appealed to the Board of Commissioners and thereafter to the Office of the
President within the specified period.
 The CA even bolstered its dismissal on the ground of laches after finding that the petition
was filed only six (6) years after the Arbiter’s decision on February 20, 1991. This CA
decision became final and executory on July 23, 1997, and an entry of judgment was made
on November 13, 1997.
 Agda filed with the CA a petition for annulment of judgment of the Arbiter’s decision
rendered on February 20, 1991, and that of the Office of the President dated February 27,
1996. Petitioner Cole moved to dismiss the petition.
 CA thru Justice Ibay-Somera ruled on the annulment of judgment case by declaring null
and void the decisions of the Arbiter dated February 20, 1991 and the Office of the
President dated February 27, 1996 for having been rendered without jurisdiction.
 From the Somera decision, two (2) separate petitions under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
were filed with this Court. The first was filed on July 14, 1999 by Lolita Cole and her son
Atty. Cole, docketed as G.R. No. 139099 and the second, on September 7, 1999, by Charito
Cole-Alfaro, daughter of Lolita Cole, docketed as G.R. No. 139729
Issue: WON the decision of Justice Somer for the Annulment of Judgement is correct?
Ruling:
No. Although the grounds set forth in the petition for annulment of judgment are fraud and
lack of jurisdiction, said petition cannot prosper for the simple reason that the decision sought
to be annulled was not rendered by the Regional Trial Court but by an administrative agency
(HLU Arbiter and Office of the President), hence, not within the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals. There is no such remedy as annulment of judgment of the HLURB or the Office of
the President. Assuming arguendo that the annulment petition can be treated as a petition for
review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the same should have been
dismissed by the Court of Appeals, because no error of judgment was imputed to the HLURB
and the Office of the President. Fraud and lack of jurisdiction are beyond the province of
petitions under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, as it covers only errors of judgment. A petition
for annulment of judgment is an initiatory remedy, hence no error of judgment can be the
subject thereof. Besides, the Arbiter and the Office of the President indisputably have
jurisdiction over the cases brought before them in line with our ruling in Francisco Sycip, Jr.
vs. Court of Appeals, promulgated on March 17, 2000, where the aggrieved townhouse buyers
may seek protection from the HLURB under Presidential Decree No. 957, otherwise known
as "Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective Decree."
4.) Republic vs. Saludares
Facts:
 This special civil action for certiorari assails the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Lianga, Surigao del Sur, Branch 28, dated March 19, 1993. At issue is the jurisdiction of
the trial court over properties owned by Lianga Bay Logging Company, Inc. (LBLC), but
allegedly sequestered by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG).
 The writ of sequestration was based on the ground that the shares of stocks in LBLC owned
by Peter A. Sabido formed part of "illegally acquired wealth." On July 27, 1987, the
Republic of the Philippines through the PCGG and the Office of the Solicitor General filed
before the Sandiganbayan a complaint 3 for reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
restitution and damages against, among others, Peter A. Sabido.
 On August 12, 1991, Sabido filed a Motion to Lift the Writs of Sequestration before the
Sandiganbayan. On November 29, 1991, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion.
 On December 11, 1991, PCGG filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of
Sandiganbayan praying for the nullification of the order which lifted the writ of
sequestration of LBLC.
 In the meantime, on February 11, 1993, private respondent Hung Ming Kuk filed a
complaint 5 for sum of money against LBLC, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
attachment, with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. The
PCGG was not impleaded by Hung Ming Kuk as party-defendant nor was the sequestration
case referred to the RTC’s proceedings.
 Thus, the Republic of the Philippines filed a special civil action 6 for certiorari under Rule
65, dated March 29, 1993, with the Supreme Court. This petition, docketed as G.R. No.
109314, was later on consolidated with other similar cases.
 Meantime, on February 15, 1993, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion for reconsideration
of PCGG
 On February 17, 1993, the trial court granted the writ of preliminary attachment in favor
of Hung Ming Kuk.
 Thereafter, Hung Ming Kuk filed a motion to declare LBLC in default for failure to file
responsive pleadings pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court. The RTC of Lianga,
acting on the motion of Hung Ming Kuk, issued an order dated March 4, 1993, declaring
LBLC as in default. Consequently, on March 19, 1993, the RTC rendered judgment by
default.
 In the meantime, on January 23, 1995, the Supreme Court en banc issued its decision in
the consolidated cases of Republic v. Sandiganbayan (First Division), 240 SCRA 376
(1995). The decision included the nullification of the resolution of the Sandiganbayan that
lifted the writ of sequestration of LBLC properties in G.R. No. 109314. Hence, the Court
effectively confirmed the validity of the writ of sequestration over said properties. Peter A.
Sabido’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Finally, an entry of judgment was issued
on April 22, 1997, in G.R. No. 109314.
 Private respondent, however avers that his original complaint was for a sum of money. It
was a demand for payment of a valid obligation owed to him by LBLC. He adds that it
would be unfair and unjust to declare the entire RTC proceedings regarding his claim for
sum of money null and void.
 Private respondent further claims that the attachment order of the trial court was issued
after the Sandiganbayan had lifted the writ of sequestration against LBLC. But petitioner
asserts that this order of the Sandiganbayan was reversed by the Supreme Court in a banc
decision 8 dated January 23, 1995, resolving several consolidated cases for which G.R. No.
109314 was included. Petitioner stresses that said reversal had become final and executory
on April 22, 1997.
 In the case at bar, the claim of private respondent Hung Ming Kuk is for a sum of money
arising from a debt incurred by LBLC. Under a contract, private respondent had extended
cash advances and supplied LBLC hardware materials, auto spare parts, and rendered
services, for cutting and hauling logs. The total claim amounts to P18,031,563.78.
Following Section 19 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691 on March 25, 1994,
the complaint falls within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.

Issue: Whether or not the provisional remedy of attachment issued by the trial court in
favor of the private respondent is valid

Ruling:

The order of attachment issued by the public responded is declared null and void.

By an order of attachment, a sheriff seizes property of a defendant in a civil suit so that it


may stand as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be obtained, and not
disposed of, or dissipated, or lost intentionally, or otherwise, pending the action. 12 When
a writ of attachment has been levied on real property or any interest therein belonging to
the judgment debtor, the levy creates a lien which nothing can destroy but its dissolution.
13 This well-settled rule is likewise applicable to a writ of sequestration.

Attachment is in the nature of a proceeding in rem. It is against a particular property of a


debtor. The attaching creditor thereby acquires a specific lien upon the attached property
which ripens into a judgment against the res when the order of sale is made. Such a
proceeding is in effect a finding that the property attached is an indebted thing and results
in its virtual condemnation to pay for the owner’s debt. The law does not provide the length
of time during which an attachment lien shall continue after the rendition of the judgment,
and it must therefore continue until the debt is paid, or sale is had under execution issued
in the judgment, or until the judgment is satisfied, or the statement discharged or vacated
in some manner provided by law. 14

In our view, the disputed properties of LBLC were already under custodia legis by virtue
of a valid writ of sequestration 15 issued by the PCGG on April 2, 1986, when respondent
Judge Saludares issued the assailed writ of attachment in favor of private respondent Hung
Ming Kuk. At that time the writ of sequestration issued by PCGG against LBLC was
subsisting. Said writ of the PCGG could not be interfered with by the RTC of Lianga,
because the PCGG is a coordinate and co-equal body. The PCGG had acquired by
operation of law the right of redemption over the property until after the final determination
of the case or until its dissolution.
5.) DAVAO LIGHT & POWER CO., INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS
DOCTRINES:
 Preliminary attachment may be validly applied for and granted before defendant is
summoned or is heard from.

 Rule 57 xxx speaks of the grant of the remedy “at the commencement of the action or at
any time thereafter --- commencement refers to the date of the filing of the complaint

 A preliminary attachment may be defined, paraphrasing the Rules of Court, as the


provisional remedy in virtue of which a plaintiff or other proper party may, at the
commencement of the action or at any time thereafter, have the property of the adverse
party taken into the custody of the court as security for the satisfaction of any judgment
that may be recovered

RULE APPLICABLE: Rule 57


FACTS:
 Davao Light Power Co., Inc. (hereafter, simply Davao Light) filed a verified complaint
for recovery of a sum of money and damages against Queensland Hotel, etc. and
Teodorico Adarna. The complaint contained an ex parte application for a writ of
preliminary attachment. The ex parte application was granted and the attachment bond
is P4,600,513.37.

 The attachment bond having been submitted by Davao Light, the writ of attachment issued.

 The summons and a copy of the complaint, as well as the writ of attachment and a copy
of the attachment bond, were served on defendants Queensland and Adarna; and pursuant
to the writ, the sheriff seized properties belonging to the latter.

 Defendants Queensland and Adarna filed a motion to discharge the attachment for lack
of jurisdiction to issue the same because at the time the order of attachment was
promulgated (May 3, 1989) and the attachment writ issued (May 11,1989), the Trial Court
had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the cause and over the persons of the
defendants.

 CA granted to discharge the writ and declared that Court does not acquire jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant until he is duly summoned or voluntarily appears.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not a writ of preliminary attachment may issue ex parte against a defendant
before acquisition of jurisdiction of the latter’s person by service of summons or his
voluntary submission to the Court’s authority.

HELD:
YES.
 It is wrong to assume that the validity of acts done during this period should be dependent
on, or held in suspension until, the actual obtention of jurisdiction over the defendant’s
person.

 An action or proceeding is commenced by the filing of the complaint or other initiatory


pleading. By that act, the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter or nature of the
action or proceeding is invoked or called into activity; and it is thus that the court acquires
jurisdiction over said subject matter or nature of the action

 With regard to the provisional remedies of preliminary attachment, preliminary


injunction, receivership or replevin, they may be validly and properly applied for and
granted even before the defendant is summoned or is heard from.

 A preliminary attachment may be defined, paraphrasing the Rules of Court, as the


provisional remedy in virtue of which a plaintiff or other proper party may, at the
commencement of the action or at any time thereafter, have the property of the adverse
party taken into the custody of the court as security for the satisfaction of any judgment
that may be recovered.

 Rule 57 in fact speaks of the grant of the remedy “at the commencement of the action or at
any time thereafter. The phrase “at the commencement of the action,” obviously refers to
the date of the filing of the complaint to a time before summons is served on the defendant,
or even before summons issues.

 Requisites for writ of attachment:


o by the filing of the complaint
o payment of all requisite docket and other fees
o the affidavit of the applicant or of some other person who personally knows the
facts, that a sufficient cause of action exists, that the case is one of those mentioned
in Section 1 xx (Rule 57), that there is no other sufficient security for the claim
sought to be enforced by the action, and that the amount due to the applicant or the
value of the property the possession of which he is entitled to recover, is as much
as the sum for which the order (of attachment) is granted above all legal
counterclaims
 Remedies given to the defendant to discharge the writ:
o The submission of a counterbond is an efficacious mode of lifting an attachment
already enforced against property, or even of preventing its enforcement altogether.
Section 5 of Rule 57
o When property has already been seized under attach-ment, the attachment may be
discharged upon counterbond in accordance with Section 12 of Rule 57.
o Aside from the filing of a counterbond, a preliminary attachment may also be lifted
or discharged on the ground that it has been irregularly or improperly issued, in
accordance with Section 13 of Rule 57.

 The grant of remedies given to the defendant provides that the attachment debtor
cannot be deemed to have waived any defect in the issuance of the attachment writ by
simply availing himself of one way of discharging the attachment writ, instead of the other.

 Ergo, the proposition that writs of attachment may properly issue ex parte provided that
the Court is satisfied that the relevant requisites therefor have been fulfilled by the
applicant. Ruling of the CA was reversed.
JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS vs FELICIDAD SANDOVAL and TEOFILO CARLOS II
G.R. No. 179922 December 16, 2008
Spouses Felix Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six parcels of land to their
compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos.
· Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and their son. Upon
Teofilo’s death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 (registered in the name of Teofilo) were registered in the name
of respondent Felicidad.
· In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action against respondents for the declaration of
nullity of marriage. Petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late brother Teofilo and
respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license.
· On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
respondents prayed for the dismissal of the case before the trial court. But before the parties could
even proceed to pre-trial, respondents moved for summary judgment.
· Petitioner opposed the motion for summary judgment and lodged his own motion for
summary judgment.
· RTC rendered judgment: defendants (respondents) Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby
denied. Plaintiffs (petitioners) Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted and
summary judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff as follows: Declaring the marriage
between defendant Felicidad Sandoval and Teofilo Carlos null and void ab initio for lack of the
requisite marriage license.
· In the appeal, respondents argued that the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
in rendering summary judgment annulling the marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad.
· CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling.
ISSUE: WON CA committed a serious reversible error in applying (Section 1, Rule 34) of the
Rules of Court providing for judgment on the pleadings, instead of Rule 35 governing Summary
Judgments?
HELD: NO
Whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the CA was correct in
reversing the summary judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules on judgment on the
pleadings and summary judgments have no place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage and even in annulment of marriage.
SEC. 17. Trial. - (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial of the case. No
delegation of evidence to a commissioner shall be allowed except as to matters involving property
relations of the spouses.
(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be proved. No
judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment shall be allowed.
in Republic v. Sandiganbayan.13 In that case, We excluded actions for nullity or annulment of
marriage from the application of summary judgments.
Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for annulment of marriage or declaration of its
nullity or for legal separation, summary judgment is applicable to all kinds of actions.
By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the State of its lawful right and
duty to intervene in the case. The participation of the State is not terminated by the declaration of
the public prosecutor that no collusion exists between the parties. The State should have been given
the opportunity to present controverting evidence before the judgment was rendered.

Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court should order the prosecuting
attorney to appear and intervene for the State. It is at this stage when the public prosecutor sees to
it that there is no suppression of evidence. Concomitantly, even if there is no suppression of
evidence, the public prosecutor has to make sure that the evidence to be presented or laid down
before the court is not fabricated.
All of which are for the preservation of Marriages.
Tantano v. Espino-Caboverde,
G.R. No. 203585, July 29, 2013

Summary: 8 Siblings and their mother are fighting over the land (Mila, Roseller versus Eve,
Fe, Josephine and mother Dominalda). The mother filed for receivership alleging that the
sustenance she receives from the income derived from the lots is insufficient. PETs Mila and
Roseller alleged the grounds invoked by their mom will not qualify for the granting of receivership:
that the mom was not able to prove insufficiency of support and that the CA was wrong in holding
that a bond was no longer required. TC granted the application. CA affirmed. SC overturned.

Doctrines:
1. Even in cases falling under Sec 1 (d), it is essential that there is a clear showing that there is
imminent danger that the properties sought to beplaced under receivership will be lost, wasted or
injured.
2. Sec 2 uses the word “shall” thus, it is mandatory. The consent of the parties to place the
properties in receivership is of no moment.

Facts:
 Petitioners Mila CaboverdeTantano (Mila) and RosellerCaboverde (Roseller) are children
of respondent DominaldaEspina-Caboverde (Dominalda) and siblings of other
respondents: Eve, Fe, Josephine
 PETs Mila, Roseller, and their siblings Ferdinand, Jeanny and Laluna are registered owners
and in possession of Lots 2, 3 and 4 at Bantayan, Sindangan and Poblacion in Zamboanga
del Norte after having bought this from parents Maximo and DominaldaCaboverde
 RESPs Eve and Fe filed a complaint before RTC Sindangan and prayed for annulment of
the Deed of Sale which transferred Lots 2,3 and 4 from their parents to Mila, Roseller,
Jeanny, Laluna and Ferdinand.
 Maximo died and was substituted by his 8 childrenadn wife.
 A Partial Settlement Agreement was eventually entered into by the parties and they fixed
the sharing of the uncontroverted properties among themselves. Under the Agreement,
o Josephine was the Administrator. She has also special authority to provide medicine
for her mother
o Dominalda was entitled to receive ½ of the income from the properties.
 Before the PSA could be approved by the RTC, Dominalda filed a Motion to Intervene
separately in the case, claiming that the verified Answer which she filed with her co-
defendants contained several material averments which were not representative of the true
events and facts of the case
o declaring that there never was a sale of the three (3) contested parcels of land in
favor of Ferdinand, Mila, Laluna, Jeanny and Roseller and that she and her husband
never received any consideration from them. She made it clear that they intended
to divide all their properties equally among all their children without favour.
 Dominalda feared that the properties would be squandered and filed an Urgent
Petition/Application to place the lots under receivership.
o claimed that while she had a legal interest in the controverted properties and their
produce, she could not enjoy them, since the income derived was solely
appropriated by petitioner Mila in connivance with her selected kin.
o Needs for daily sustenance and medical expenses.
 Court heard the Application and persuaded the parties to discuss and agree on how to
address the needs of their mother
 PETs and siblings expressed concurrence for receivership proposal on the condition that
Mila be appointed as receiver and that, after getting the 2/10 share of Dominalda from the
income of the three (3) parcels of land, the remainder shall be divided only by and among
Mila, Roseller, Ferdinand, Laluna and Jeanny.
 Court said that it is averse to a party in the action being a receiver and that parties should
nominate neutral persons.
 TC: granted application for receivership
 Dominalda nominated husband’s relative, Annabelle Saldia while Eve nominated former
barangay kagawad, Jesus Tan
 PET: moved for reconsideration because concerns raised by Dominalda in her Application
for Receivership are not grounds for placing the properties in the hands of a receiver and
that she failed to prove her claim that the income she has been receiving is insufficient
 PETs filed a petition for certiorari with the CA anchored on two grounds, 1) non-
compliance with the substantial requirements under Section 2, Rule 59 of the 1997 Rules
of CivilProcedure because the trial court appointed a receiver without requiring the
applicant to file a bond; and (2) lack of factual or legal basis to place the properties under
receivership because the applicant presented support and medication as grounds in her
application which are not valid grounds for receivership under the rules.
 CA denied the petition:
o PETs are estopped; they themselves agreed to have the properties placed under
receivership on the condition that the same be placed under the administration of
Mila. Thus, the filing of the bond by Dominalda for this purpose becomes
unnecessary.
o Court has the discretion WN to appoint a receiver
(1) WN the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in sustaining the appointment of a receiver
despite clear showing that the reasons advanced by the applicant are not any of those enumerated
by the rules – YES.
 Receivership is a harsh remedy and should be granted with utmost circumspection and only
in exteme situations
 However, in granting applications for receivership on the basis of this section, courts must
remain mindful of the basic principle that receivership may be granted only when the
circumstances so demand, either because the property sought to be placed in the hands of
a receiver is in danger of being lost or because they run the risk of being impaired, and that
being a drastic and harsh remedy, receivership must be granted only when there is a clear
showing of necessity for it in order to save the plaintiff from grave and immediate loss or
damage.
1. Dominalda’s alleged need for income to defray her medical expenses and support is not a
valid justification for the appointment of a receiver.
o RTC approved the application for receivership on the stated rationale that
receivership was the most convenient and feasible means to preserve and administer
the disputed properties. This is based on Sec 1 (d) which is couched in general terms
and broad in scope
o HOWEVER, even in cases falling under such provision, it is essential that
there is a clear showing that there is imminent danger that the properties
sought to be placed under receivership will be lost, wasted or injured.
 What Courts should consider in granting receivership:
o whether or not the injury resulting from such appointment would probably be
greater than the injury ensuing if the status quo is left undisturbed;
o whether or not the appointment will imperil the interest of others whose rights
deserve as much a consideration from the court as those of the person requesting
for receivership
2. No clear showing that the disputed properties are in danger of being lost or materially
impaired and that placing them under receivership is most convenient and feasible means to
preserve, administer or dispose of them.
 Dominalda has not presented or alleged anything else to prove that the disputed properties
were in danger of being wasted or materially injured and that the appointment of a receiver
was the most convenient and feasible means to preserve their integrity.
3. Placing the disputed properties under receivership is not necessary to save Dominalda
from grave and immediate loss or irremediable damage. Contrary to her assertions,
Dominalda is assured of receiving income under the PSA approved by the RTC providing
that she was entitled to receive a share of one-half (1/2) ofthe net income derived from the
uncontroverted properties.
 patently erroneous for the RTC to grant the Application for Receivership in order to ensure
Dominalda of income to support herself because precisely, the PSA already provided for
that
(2) WN the receivership bond is not required prior to appointment despite clear dictates of the
rules. – NO
 Sec. 2 of Rule 59 is very clear in that before issuing the order appointing a receiver the
court shall require the applicant to file a bond executed to the party against whom the
application is presented. The use of the word "shall" denotes its mandatory nature; thus,
the consent of the other party, or as in this case, the consent of petitioners, is of no moment.

PRINCIPLES:
Being a drastic and harsh remedy, receivership must be granted only when there is a clear showing
of necessity for it in order to save the plaintiff from grave and immediate loss or damage.―Sec.
1(d), Rule 59 of the Rules of Court is couched in general terms and broad in scope, encompassing
instances not covered by the other grounds enumerated under the said section. However, in
granting applications for receivership on the basis of this section, courts must remain mindful of
the basic principle that receivership may be granted only when the circumstances so demand, either
because the property sought to be placed in the hands of a receiver is in danger of being lost or
because they run the risk of being impaired, and that being a drastic and harsh remedy, receivership
must be granted only when there is a clear showing of necessity for it in order to save the plaintiff
from grave and immediate loss or damage.

Before appointing a receiver, courts should consider: (1) whether or not the injury resulting from
such appointment would probably be greater than the injury ensuing if the status quo is left
undisturbed; and (2) whether or not the appointment will imperil the interest of others whose rights
deserve as much a consideration from the court as those of the person requesting for receivership.

A receiver should not be appointed to deprive a party who is in possession of the property in
litigation, just as a writ of preliminary injunction should not be issued to transfer property in
litigation from the possession of one party to another where the legal title is in dispute and the
party having possession asserts ownership in himself, except in a very clear case of evident
usurpation.

Section 2 of Rule 59, Rules of Court is very clear in that before issuing the order appointing a
receiver the court shall require the applicant to file a bond executed to the party against whom the
application is presented.

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