EVIDENCE – ATTY.

SAN PEDRO

Ivan Lee

2018 - 0282

Ong Chia v Republic

Facts:

Ong Chia was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. He arrived in Manila when he was 9 years old, since then, he has stayed in the
Philippines where he found his employment and eventually started his own business, married a Filipino with whom he had 4 children.

On July 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen under CA 473 a.k.a. the Revised Naturalization
Law, as amended. On Chia, after stating his qualification and the lack of disqualifications, stated that his petition for citizenship was not acted upon by
the Special Committee on Naturalization, OSG, since the same was not reconstituted after the February 1986 revolution.

During the hearings, Ong Chia along with 3 witnesses testified as to his qualification. Since the Prosecutor was impressed and decided not
to counteract the testimonies, the trial court granted the petition and admitted Ong Chia to Philippine citizenship.

However, the State, through the OSG, appealed (with annexed documents) contending that Ong Chia: (1) failed to state all the names by
which he is or had been known i.e. Loreto Chia Ong; (2) failed to state all his former places of residence in violation of CA 473 i.e. J.M. Basa Street,
Iloilo; (3) failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the Philippines i.e. he cohabited with his wife 8
years prior to their marriage (annexed is the marriage contract in 1977 and Joint Affidavit of Ong Chia and his wife); (4) has no known lucrative trade
or occupation and his previous incomes has been insufficient or misdeclared as per the annexed income tax returns; and (5) failed to support his petition
with the appropriate documentary evidence i.e. marriage contract for the alleged first marriage before a judge in 1953.

The CA reversed the trial court decision. Hence, the present petition by Ong Chia contending that CA erred in considering the documents
which had merely been annexed by the State to it’s appellant’s brief. Not having been presented and formally offered as evidence, they are mere scraps
of paper devoid of any evidentiary value contrary to Rule 132, sec. 34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence which provides that the court shall consider
no evidence which has not been formally offered.

Issue: WON the Revised Rules on Evidence applies in the case

Held: No.

According to Rule 143 of the Rules of Court: “These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and
insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and
convenient.” (Emphasis added)

Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, §34) now being invoked by Ong Chia is clearly not applicable to the present
case involving a petition for naturalization. The only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is
"practicable and convenient." That is not the case here, since reliance upon the documents presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact,
appears to be the more practical and convenient course of action considering that decision in naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule on
res judicata. Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not preclude the State from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization
on the basis of the same documents.

Ong Chia claims that as a result of the failure of the State to present and formally offer its documentary evidence before the trial court, he was denied
the right to object against their authenticity, effectively depriving him of his fundamental right to procedural due process. The Court is not persuaded.
Indeed, the reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been formally offered is to afford the opposite party the chance to
object to their admissibility. Ong Chia cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of the documents submitted to the
appellate court by the State. He could have included his objections, as he, in fact, did, in the brief he filed with the Court of Appeals. Indeed, the
objection is flimsy as the alleged discrepancy is trivial, and, at most, can be accounted for as a typographical error on the part of petitioner himself.
That "SCN Case No. 031767," a copy of which was annexed to the petition, is the correct case number is confirmed by the Evaluation Sheet of the
Special Committee on Naturalization which was also docketed as "SCN Case No. 031767." Other than this, Ong Chia offered no evidence to disprove
the authenticity of the documents presented by the State.

Furthermore, the Court notes that these documents - namely, the petition in SCN Case No. 031767, Ong Chia's marriage contract, the joint affidavit
executed by him and his wife, and Ong Chia's income tax returns - are all public documents. As such, they have been executed under oath. They are
thus reliable. Since Ong Chia failed to make satisfactory showing of any flaw or irregularity that may cast doubt on the authenticity of these documents,
it is the Court’s conclusion that the appellate court did not err in relying upon them.

The Court additionally discussed the effect of Ong Chia's failure to include the address "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" in his petition, in accordance with §7,
C.A. No. 473. This address appears on his Immigrant Certificate of Residence, a document which forms part of the records as Annex A of his 1989
petition for naturalization. He admits that he failed to mention said address in his petition, but argues that since the Immigrant Certificate of Residence
containing it had been fully published, with the petition and the other annexes, such publication constitutes substantial compliance with §7. This is
allegedly because the publication effectively satisfied the objective sought to be achieved by such requirement, i.e., to give investigating agencies of
the government the opportunity to check on the background of the applicant and prevent suppression of information regarding any possible misbehavior
on his part in any community where he may have lived at one time or another.

It is settled, however, that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant.

Cecilia Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:

Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor
of medicine, and forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband’s clinic and took certain possessions and documents belonging to Dr.
Martin. It was to be used as evidence for the suit Cecilia filed against her husband. Dr. Martin filed an action before the RTC of Manila which
rendered a decision declaring him as “the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 of plaintiff’s Complaint or those further
described in the Motion to Return and Suppress.”The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and
her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from “using or submitting/admitting as evidence” the documents and papers in question. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.

Petitioner contends that a previous ruling of a different nature involving the same documents were admissible as evidence.
Issue:

Whether or not the documents and papers unwillingly seized by petitioner be admissible as evidence.

Held:

The documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring “the privacy of communication and
correspondence [to be] inviolable” is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity) who
is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a
“lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.” Any violation of this provision renders the
evidence obtained inadmissible “for any purpose in any proceeding.

People v. Yatar

FACTS:

This is an automatic review after the accused, Joel Yatar,was sentenced to Death for the special complex crime of Rape with Homicide. Yatar, prior
his separation to his wife, used to live with the latter and the victim, Kathlyn Uba, in the house of his mother-in-law. On June 30, 1998, Yatar was
found by several witnesses acting strangely in and along the vicinity of the house of the victim. Later that day, the victim’s lifeless body was found
with stab wounds, her intestine protruding from her stomach, and bruises. The victim’s clothes were likewise found near the cadaver. The post-
mortem report of the victim’s body revealed the presence of semen in her vagina. By DNA examination, it was found that it matches Yatar’s DNA.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the judgement of conviction was meritorious. RULING:

Yes. The Court affords much respect and credibility to the testimonies of the witnesses absent any showing that some fact or circumstance of weight
and influence has been overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted. The trial court latter is in a better and unique position of
hearing first hand the witnesses and observing their deportment, conduct and attitude.

Furthermore, the circumstantial evidence presentedby the prosecution proves beyond doubt that the accused committed the crime. The requirements
to determine the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence were complied with as follows: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) facts on which
the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The DNA evidence presented strengthens the conviction by circumstantial evidence.

TATING v. MARCELLA, TATING and COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

On October 14, 1969, Daniela sold the subject property to her granddaughter, herein petitioner Nena Lazalita Tating. The contract of sale
was embodied in a duly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in favor of Nena. Subsequently, title over the subject property was
transferred in the name of Nena. She declared the property in her name for tax purposes and paid the real estate taxes due thereon for the years 1972,
1973, 1975 to 1986 and 1988.However, the land remained in possession Daniela. On December 28, 1977, Daniela executed a sworn statement claiming
that she had actually no intention of selling the property; the true agreement between her and Nena was simply to transfer title over the subject property
in favor of the latter to enable her to obtain a loan by mortgaging the subject property for the purpose of helping her defray her business expenses; she
later discovered that Nena did not secure any loan nor mortgage the property; she wants the title in the name of Nena cancelled and the subject property
reconveyed to her. Daniela died on July 29, 1988 leaving her children as her heirs. In a letter dated March 1, 1989, Carlos informed Nena that when
Daniela died they discovered the sworn statement she executed on December 28, 1977 and, as a consequence, they are demanding from Nena the return
of their rightful shares over the subject property as heirs of Daniela. Nena did not reply. Efforts to settle the case amicably proved futile. Hence, her
son filed a complaint with the RTC praying for the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale. RTC decide in favour or the plaintiff and was affirmed
by the CA.

ISSUE:
 Whether the Sworn Statement should have been rejected outright by the lower courts.

RULING:

The Court finds that both the trial court and the CA committed error in giving the sworn statement probative weight. Since Daniela is no
longer available to take the witness stand as she is already dead, the RTC and the CA should not have given probative value on Daniela's sworn
statement for purposes of proving that the contract of sale between her and petitioner was simulated and that, as a consequence, a trust relationship was
created between them. Considering that the Court finds the subject contract of sale between petitioner and Daniela to be valid and not fictitious or
simulated, there is no more necessity to discuss the issue as to whether or not a trust relationship was created between them. WHEREFORE, the assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The complaint
of the private respondents is DISMISSED.

People of the Philippines vs. Rodrigo Salafranca y Bello

Facts:
Past midnight on July 31, 1993, Bolanon was stabbed near the Del Pan Sports Complex in Binondo, Manila whereby his assailant ran away.
Bolanon was still able to walk to the house of his uncle Rodolfo B. Estaño in order to seek help. His uncle rushed him to the Philippine General Hospital
by taxicab. When they are on their way to the hospital Bolanon told Estaño that it was Salafranca who had stabbed him. Bolanon eventually succumbed
at the hospital at 2:30 am despite receiving medical attention and that the stabbing of Bolanon was personally witnessed by Augusto Mendoza, then
still a minor of 13 years, who was in the complex at the time.
Salafranca fled after stabbing Bolanon. He evaded arrest for a long period, despite the warrant for his arrest being issued. He was finally
arrested on April 23, 2003, and detained at the Manila City Jail. RTC convicted Salafranca. On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings and conclusions
of the RTC, citing the dying declaration made to his uncle pointing to Salafranca as his assailant, and Salafranca’s positive identification as the culprit
by Mendoza. Hence the petition
.
Issue:
Whether or not the declaration of Bolanon that Salfranca is his assailant is admissible either as a dying declaration or as a part of the res
gestae, or both.

Held:
The testimony of Estano provides for the circumstances which qualified the utterance of Bolanon as both a dying declaration and as part of
the res gestae, considering that the Court has recognized that the statement of the victim an hour before his death and right after the hacking incident
bore all the earmarks either of a dying declaration or part of the res gestae either of which was an exception to the hearsay rule.
A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay character, may nonetheless be admitted when the
following requisites concur, namely: (a) that the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) that at
the time the declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an impending death; (c) that the declarant is competent as a witness; and (d)
that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim.
A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the
following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act, theres gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the declarant had
time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. The court ruled
that the requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the res gestae concur in the case at bar.

SCC CHEMICALS CORPORATION v. CA

FACTS:

SCC Chemicals Corporation through its chairman, private respondent DaniloArrieta and vice president, Pablo (Pablito) Bermundo, obtained a
loan from State Investment House Inc (hereinafter SIHI) in the amount of P129,824.48. The loan carried an annual interest rate of 30% plus penalty
charges of 2% per month on the remaining balance of the principal upon non-payment on the due date-January 12, 1984. To secure the payment of the
loan, DaniloArrieta and private respondent LeopoldoHalili executed a Comprehensive Surety Agreement binding themselves jointly and severally to
pay the obligation on the maturity date.
SCC failed to pay the loan when it matured. SIHI then sent demand letters to SCC, Arrieta and Halili, but notwithstanding receipt thereof, no
payment was made.
SIHI filed Civil Case for a sum of money with a prayer for preliminary attachment against SCC, Arrieta, and Halili with the Regional Trial
Court of Manila.
In its answer, SCC asserted SIHI's lack of cause of action. Petitioner contended that the promissory note upon which SIHI anchored its cause
of action was null, void, and of no binding effect for lack or failure of consideration.
The case was then set for pre-trial. The parties were allowed to meet out-of-court in an effort to settle the dispute amicably. No settlement was
reached, but the following stipulation of facts was agreed upon:
1. Parties agree that this Court has jurisdiction over the plaintiff and the defendant and that it has jurisdiction to try and decide this case on its
merits and that plaintiff and the defendant have each the capacity to sue and to be sued in this present action;
2. Parties agree that plaintiff sent a demand letter to the defendant SCC Chemical Corporation dated April 4, 1984 together with a statement
of account of even date which were both received by the herein defendant; and
3. Parties finally agree that the plaintiff and the defendant SCC Chemical Corporation the latter acting through defendants Danilo E. Arrieta
and Pablito Bermundo executed a promissory note last December 13, 1983 for the amount of P129,824.48 with maturity date on January 12, 1984.
 The case then proceeded to trial on the sole issue of whether or not the defendants were liable to the plaintiff and to what extent was the liability.
SIHI presented one witness to prove its claim. The cross-examination of said witness was postponed several times due to one reason or another
at the instance of either party. The case was calendared several times for hearing but each time, SCC or its counsel failed to appear despite notice. SCC
was finally declared by the trial court to have waived its right to cross-examine the witness of SIHI and the case was deemed submitted for decision.
On March 22, 1993, the lower court promulgated its decision in favor of SIHI.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the testimony of private respondent’s witness is hearsay.

2. Whether the promissory note was genuine and genuinely executed as required by law.
3. Whether the “best evidence rule” should be applied.

RULING:

1. The Court of Appeals correctly found that the witness of SIHI was a competent witness as he testified to facts, which he knew of his personal
knowledge. Thus, the requirements of Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court as to the admissibility of his testimony were satisfied.
Rule 130, Section 36 reads:
SEC. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. – A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows
of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.

Petitioner's reliance on Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is misplaced. As a rule, hearsay evidence is excluded and carries no probative
value. However, the rule does admit of an exception. Where a party failed to object to hearsay evidence, then the same is admissible. The rationale for
this exception is to be found in the right of a litigant to cross-examine. It is settled that it is the opportunity to cross-examine which negates the claim
that the matters testified to by a witness are hearsay. However, the right to cross-examine may be waived. The repeated failure of a party to cross-
examine the witness is an implied waiver of such right. Petitioner was afforded several opportunities by the trial court to cross-examine the other party's
witness. Petitioner repeatedly failed to take advantage of these opportunities. No error was thus committed by the respondent court when it sustained
the trial court's finding that petitioner had waived its right to cross-examine the opposing party's witness. It is now too late for petitioner to be raising
this matter of hearsay evidence.

2. Petitioner's admission as to the execution of the promissory note by it through private respondent Arrieta and Bermundo at pre-trial sufficed
to settle the question of the genuineness of signatures. The admission having been made in a stipulation of facts at pre-trial by the parties, it must be
treated as a judicial admission. Under Section, 4 Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, a judicial admission requires no proof.

3. Respondent SIHI had no need to present the original of the documents as there was already a judicial admission by petitioner at pre-trial of
the execution of the promissory note and receipt of the demand letter. It is now too late for petitioner to be questioning their authenticity. Its admission
of the existence of these documents was sufficient to establish its obligation. Petitioner failed to submit any evidence to the contrary or proof of payment
or other forms of extinguishment of said obligation. No reversible error was thus committed by the appellate court when it held petitioner liable on its
obligation