G.R. No.

L-630 November 15, 1947
ALEXANDER A. KRIVENKO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, CITY OF MANILA,
respondent and appellee.
Gibbs, Gibbs, Chuidian and Quasha of petitioner-
appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor
Carreon for respondent-appellee.
Marcelino Lontok appeared as amicus curies.
which should have been granted outright, and reference is
made to the ruling laid down by this Court in another case
to the effect that a court should not pass upon a
constitutional question if its judgment may be made to rest
upon other grounds. There is, we believe, a confusion of
ideas in this reasoning. It cannot be denied that the
constitutional question is unavoidable if we choose to
decide this case upon the merits. Our judgment cannot to
be made to rest upon other grounds if we have to render
any judgment at all. And we cannot avoid our judgment
simply because we have to avoid a constitutional question.
We cannot, for instance, grant the motion withdrawing the
appeal only because we wish to evade the constitutional;
issue. Whether the motion should be, or should not be,
granted, is a question involving different considerations
now to be stated.

According to Rule 52, section 4, of the Rules of Court, it is

MORAN, C.J.:
Alenxander A. Kriventor alien, bought a residential lot from
the Magdalena Estate, Inc., in December of 1941, the
registration of which was interrupted by the war. In May,
1945, he sought to accomplish said registration but was
denied by the register of deeds of Manila on the ground
that, being an alien, he cannot acquire land in this
jurisdiction. Krivenko then brought the case to the fourth
branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila by means
of a consulta, and that court rendered judgment sustaining
the refusal of the register of deeds, from which Krivenko
appealed to this Court.
There is no dispute as to these facts. The real point in
issue is whether or not an alien under our Constitution
may acquire residential land.
It is said that the decision of the case on the merits is
unnecessary, there being a motion to withdraw the appeal
discretionary upon this Court to grant a withdrawal of
appeal after the briefs have been presented. At the time
the motion for withdrawal was filed in this case, not only
had the briefs been prensented, but the case had already
been voted and the majority decision was being prepared.
The motion for withdrawal stated no reason whatsoever,
and the Solicitor General was agreeable to it. While the
motion was pending in this Court, came the new circular of
the Department of Justice, instructing all register of deeds
to accept for registration all transfers of residential lots to
aliens. The herein respondent-appellee was naturally one
of the registers of deeds to obey the new circular, as
against his own stand in this case which had been
maintained by the trial court and firmly defended in this
Court by the Solicitor General. If we grant the withdrawal,
the the result would be that petitioner-appellant Alexander
A. Krivenko wins his case, not by a decision of this Court,
but by the decision or circular of the Department of
Justice, issued while this case was pending before this
Court. Whether or not this is the reason why appellant
seeks the withdrawal of his appeal and why the Solicitor
General readily agrees to that withdrawal, is now
immaterial. What is material and indeed very important, is
whether or not we should allow interference with the
regular and complete exercise by this Court of its
constitutional functions, and whether or not after having
held long deliberations and after having reached a clear
and positive conviction as to what the constitutional
mandate is, we may still allow our conviction to be
silenced, and the constitutional mandate to be ignored or
misconceived, with all the harmful consequences that
might be brought upon the national patromony. For it is but
natural that the new circular be taken full advantage of by
many, with the circumstance that perhaps the
constitutional question may never come up again before
this court, because both vendors and vendees will have no
interest but to uphold the validity of their transactions, and
very unlikely will the register of deeds venture to disobey
the orders of their superior. Thus, the possibility for this
court to voice its conviction in a future case may be
remote, with the result that our indifference of today might
signify a permanent offense to the Constitution.
All thse circumstances were thoroughly considered and
weighted by this Court for a number of days and the legal
result of the last vote was a denial of the motion
withdrawing the appeal. We are thus confronted, at this
stage of the proceedings, with our duty, the constitutional
question becomes unavoidable. We shall then proceed to
decide that question.
Article XIII, section 1, of the Constitutional is as follows:
Article XIII. — Conservation and utilization of natural
resources.
SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral
lands of the public domain, water, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines
belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of
the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least
sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such
citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or
concession at the time of the inaguration of the
Government established uunder this Constitution. Natural
resources, with the exception of public agricultural land,
shall not be alienated, and no licence, concession, or
lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of
any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another
twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation,
water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water "power" in which cases beneficial
use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.
The scope of this constitutional provision, according to its
heading and its language, embraces all lands of any kind
of the public domain, its purpose being to establish a
permanent and fundamental policy for the conservation
and utilization of all natural resources of the Nation. When,
therefore, this provision, with reference to lands of the
public domain, makes mention of only agricultural, timber
and mineral lands, it means that all lands of the public
domain are classified into said three groups, namely,
agricultural, timber and mineral. And this classification
finds corroboration in the circumstance that at the time of
the adoption of the Constitution, that was the basic
classification existing in the public laws and judicial
decisions in the Philippines, and the term "public
agricultural lands" under said classification had then
acquired a technical meaning that was well-known to the
members of the Constitutional Convention who were
mostly members of the legal profession.
As early as 1908, in the case of Mapa vs. Insular
Government (10 Phil., 175, 182), this Court said that the
phrase "agricultural public lands" as defined in the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902, which phrase is also to be found
in several sections of the Public Land Act (No. 926),
means "those public lands acquired from Spain which are
neither mineral for timber lands." This definition has been
followed in long line of decisions of this Court. (See
Montano vs. Insular Government, 12 Phil., 593; Ibañez de
Aldecoa vs. Insular Government, 13 Phil., 159; Ramos vs.
Director of Lands, 39 Phil., 175; Jocson vs. Director of
Forestry, 39 Phil., 560; Ankron vs. Government of the
Philippines, 40 Phil., 10.) And with respect to residential
lands, it has been held that since they are neither mineral
nor timber lands, of necessity they must be classified as
agricultural. In Ibañez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government
(13 Phil., 159, 163), this Court said:
Hence, any parcel of land or building lot is susceptible of
cultivation, and may be converted into a field, and planted
with all kinds of vegetation; for this reason, where land is
not mining or forestal in its nature, it must necessarily be
included within the classification of agricultural land, not
because it is actually used for the purposes of agriculture,
but because it was originally agricultural and may again
become so under other circumstances; besides, the Act of
Congress contains only three classification, and makes no
special provision with respect to building lots or urban
lands that have ceased to be agricultural land.
In other words, the Court ruled that in determining whether
a parcel of land is agricultural, the test is not only whether
it is actually agricultural, but also its susceptibility to
cultivation for agricultural purposes. But whatever the test
might be, the fact remains that at the time the Constitution
was adopted, lands of the public domain were classified in
our laws and jurisprudence into agricultural, mineral, and
timber, and that the term "public agricultural lands" was
construed as referring to those lands that were not timber
or mineral, and as including residential lands. It may safely
be presumed, therefore, that what the members of the
Constitutional Convention had in mind when they drafted
the Constitution was this well-known classification and its
technical meaning then prevailing.
Certain expressions which appear in Constitutions, . . . are
obviously technical; and where such words have been in
use prior to the adoption of a Constitution, it is presumed
that its framers and the people who ratified it have used
such expressions in accordance with their technical
meaning. (11 Am. Jur., sec. 66, p. 683.) Also Calder vs.
Bull, 3 Dall. [U.S.], 386; 1 Law. ed., 648; Bronson vs.
Syverson, 88 Wash., 264; 152 P., 1039.)
It is a fundamental rule that, in construing constitutions,
terms employed therein shall be given the meaning which
had been put upon them, and which they possessed, at
the time of the framing and adoption of the instrument. If a
word has acquired a fixed, technical meaning in legal and
constitutional history, it will be presumed to have been
employed in that sense in a written Constitution.
(McKinney vs. Barker, 180 Ky., 526; 203 S.W., 303;
L.R.A., 1918 E, 581.)
Where words have been long used in a technical sense
and have been judicially construed to have a certain
meaning, and have been adopted by the legislature as
having a certain meaning prior to a particular statute in
which they are used, the rule of construction requires that
the words used in such statute should be construed
according to the sense in which they have been so
previously used, although the sense may vary from strict
literal meaning of the words. (II Sutherland, Statutory
Construction, p. 758.)
Therefore, the phrase "public agricultural lands" appearing
in section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution must be
construed as including residential lands, and this is in
conformity with a legislative interpretation given after the
adoption of the Constitution. Well known is the rule that
"where the Legislature has revised a statute after a
Constitution has been adopted, such a revision is to be
regarded as a legislative construction that the statute so
revised conforms to the Constitution." (59 C.J., 1102.)
Soon after the Constitution was adopted, the National
Assembly revised the Public Land Law and passed
Commonwealth Act No. 141, and sections 58, 59 and 60
thereof permit the sale of residential lots to Filipino citizens
or to associations or corporations controlled by such
citizens, which is equivalent to a solemn declaration that
residential lots are considered as agricultural lands, for,
under the Constitution, only agricultural lands may be
alienated.
It is true that in section 9 of said Commonwealth Act No.
141, "alienable or disposable public lands" which are the
same "public agriculture lands" under the Constitution, are
classified into agricultural, residential, commercial,
industrial and for other puposes. This simply means that
the term "public agricultural lands" has both a broad and a
particular meaning. Under its broad or general meaning,
as used in the Constitution, it embraces all lands that are
neither timber nor mineral. This broad meaning is
particularized in section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141
which classifies "public agricultural lands" for purposes of
alienation or disposition, into lands that are stricly
agricultural or actually devoted to cultivation for
agricultural puposes; lands that are residential;
commercial; industrial; or lands for other purposes. The
fact that these lands are made alienable or disposable
under Commonwealth Act No. 141, in favor of Filipino
citizens, is a conclusive indication of their character as
public agricultural lands under said statute and under the
Constitution.
It must be observed, in this connection that prior to the
Constitution, under section 24 of Public Land Act No.
2874, aliens could acquire public agricultural lands used
for industrial or residential puposes, but after the
Constitution and under section 23 of Commonwealth Act
No. 141, the right of aliens to acquire such kind of lands is
completely stricken out, undoubtedly in pursuance of the
constitutional limitation. And, again, prior to the
Constitution, under section 57 of Public Land Act No.
2874, land of the public domain suitable for residence or
industrial purposes could be sold or leased to aliens, but
after the Constitution and under section 60 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, such land may only be
leased, but not sold, to aliens, and the lease granted shall
only be valid while the land is used for the purposes
referred to. The exclusion of sale in the new Act is
undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional limitation,
and this again is another legislative construction that the
term "public agricultural land" includes land for residence
purposes.
Such legislative interpretation is also in harmony with the
interpretation given by the Executive Department of the
Government. Way back in 1939, Secretary of Justice Jose
Abad Santos, in answer to a query as to "whether or not
the phrase 'public agricultural lands' in section 1 of Article
XII (now XIII) of the Constitution may be interpreted to
include residential, commercial, and industrial lands for
purposes of their disposition," rendered the following
short, sharp and crystal-clear opinion:
Section 1, Article XII (now XIII) of the Constitution
classifies lands of the public domain in the Philippines into
agricultural, timber and mineral. This is the basic
classification adopted since the enactment of the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902, known as the Philippine Bill. At
the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the
Philippines, the term 'agricultural public lands' and,
therefore, acquired a technical meaning in our public laws.
The Supreme Court of the Philippines in the leading case
of Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil., 175, held that
the phrase 'agricultural public lands' means those public
lands acquired from Spain which are neither timber nor
mineral lands. This definition has been followed by our
Supreme Court in many subsequent case. . . .
Residential commercial, or industrial lots forming part of
the public domain must have to be included in one or more
of these classes. Clearly, they are neither timber nor
mineral, of necessity, therefore, they must be classified as
agricultural.
Viewed from another angle, it has been held that in
determining whether lands are agricultural or not, the
character of the land is the test (Odell vs. Durant, 62 N.W.,
524; Lorch vs. Missoula Brick and Tile Co., 123 p.25). In
other words, it is the susceptibility of the land to cultivation
for agricultural purposes by ordinary farming methods
which determines whether it is agricultural or not (State vs.
Stewart, 190 p. 129).
Furthermore, as said by the Director of Lands, no reason
is seen why a piece of land, which may be sold to a
person if he is to devote it to agricultural, cannot be sold to
him if he intends to use it as a site for his home.
This opinion is important not alone because it comes from
a Secratary of Justice who later became the Chief Justice
of this Court, but also because it was rendered by a
member of the cabinet of the late President Quezon who
actively participated in the drafting of the constitutional
provision under consideration. (2 Aruego, Framing of the
Philippine Constitution, p. 598.) And the opinion of the
Quezon administration was reiterated by the Secretary of
Justice under the Osmeña administration, and it was firmly
maintained in this Court by the Solicitor General of both
administrations.
It is thus clear that the three great departments of the
Government — judicial, legislative and executive — have
always maintained that lands of the public domain are
classified into agricultural, mineral and timber, and that
agricultural lands include residential lots.
Under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural
resources, with the exception of public agricultural land,
shall not be aliented," and with respect to public
agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino
citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving
agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may
easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who
may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is
partly to prevent this result that section 5 is included in
Article XIII, and it reads as follows:
Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private agricultural land will be transferred or assigned
except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in
the Philippines.
This constitutional provision closes the only remaining
avenue through which agricultural resources may leak into
aliens' hands. It would certainly be futile to prohibit the
alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all,
they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming
private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens.
Undoubtedly, as above indicated, section 5 is intended to
insure the policy of nationalization contained in section 1.
Both sections must, therefore, be read together for they
have the same purpose and the same subject matter. It
must be noticed that the persons against whom the
prohibition is directed in section 5 are the very same
persons who under section 1 are disqualified "to acquire
or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines." And
the subject matter of both sections is the same, namely,
the non-transferability of "agricultural land" to aliens. Since
"agricultural land" under section 1 includes residential lots,
the same technical meaning should be attached to
"agricultural land under section 5. It is a rule of statutory
construction that "a word or phrase repeated in a statute
will bear the same meaning throughout the statute, unless
a different intention appears." (II Sutherland, Statutory
Construction, p. 758.) The only difference between
"agricultural land" under section 5, is that the former is
public and the latter private. But such difference refers to
ownership and not to the class of land. The lands are the
same in both sections, and, for the conservation of the
national patrimony, what is important is the nature or class
of the property regardless of whether it is owned by the
State or by its citizens.
Reference is made to an opinion rendered on September
19, 1941, by the Hon. Teofilo Sison, then Secretary of
Justice, to the effect that residential lands of the public
domain may be considered as agricultural lands, whereas
residential lands of private ownership cannot be so
considered. No reason whatsoever is given in the opinion
for such a distinction, and no valid reason can be adduced
for such a discriminatory view, particularly having in mind
that the purpose of the constitutional provision is the
conservation of the national patrimony, and private
residential lands are as much an integral part of the
national patrimony as the residential lands of the public
domain. Specially is this so where, as indicated above, the
prohibition as to the alienable of public residential lots
would become superflous if the same prohibition is not
equally applied to private residential lots. Indeed, the
prohibition as to private residential lands will eventually
become more important, for time will come when, in view
of the constant disposition of public lands in favor of
private individuals, almost all, if not all, the residential
lands of the public domain shall have become private
residential lands.
It is maintained that in the first draft of section 5, the words
"no land of private ownership" were used and later
changed into "no agricultural land of private ownership,"
and lastly into "no private agricultural land" and from these
changes it is argued that the word "agricultural" introduced
in the second and final drafts was intended to limit the
meaning of the word "land" to land actually used for
agricultural purposes. The implication is not accurate. The
wording of the first draft was amended for no other
purpose than to clarify concepts and avoid uncertainties.
The words "no land" of the first draft, unqualified by the
word "agricultural," may be mistaken to include timber and
mineral lands, and since under section 1, this kind of lands
can never be private, the prohibition to transfer the same
would be superfluous. Upon the other hand, section 5 had
to be drafted in harmony with section 1 to which it is
supplementary, as above indicated. Inasmuch as under
section 1, timber and mineral lands can never be private,
and the only lands that may become private are
agricultural lands, the words "no land of private ownership"
of the first draft can have no other meaning than "private
agricultural land." And thus the change in the final draft is
merely one of words in order to make its subject matter
more specific with a view to avoiding the possible
confusion of ideas that could have arisen from the first
draft.
If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as
not including residential lots or lands not strictly
agricultural, the result would be that "aliens may freely
acquire and possess not only residential lots and houses
for themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns
and cities," and that "they may validly buy and hold in their
names lands of any area for building homes, factories,
industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and
vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds,
airfields, and a host of other uses and purposes that are
not, in appellant's words, strictly agricultural." (Solicitor
General's Brief, p. 6.) That this is obnoxious to the
conservative spirit of the Constitution is beyond question.
One of the fundamental principles underlying the provision
of Article XIII of the Constitution and which was embodied
in the report of the Committee on Nationalization and
Preservation of Lands and other Natural Resources of the
Constitutional Convention, is "that lands, minerals, forests,
and other natural resources constitute the exclusive
heritage of the Filipino nation. They should, therefore, be
preserved for those under the sovereign authority of that
nation and for their posterity." (2 Aruego, Framing of the
Filipino Constitution, p. 595.) Delegate Ledesma,
Chairman of the Committee on Agricultural Development
of the Constitutional Convention, in a speech delivered in
connection with the national policy on agricultural lands,
said: "The exclusion of aliens from the privilege of
acquiring public agricultural lands and of owning real
estate is a necessary part of the Public Land Laws of the
Philippines to keep pace with the idea of preserving the
Philippines for the Filipinos." (Emphasis ours.) And, of the
same tenor was the speech of Delegate Montilla who said:
"With the complete nationalization of our lands and natural
resources it is to be understood that our God-given
birthright should be one hundred per cent in Filipino hands
. . .. Lands and natural resources are immovables and as
such can be compared to the vital organs of a person's
body, the lack of possession of which may cause instant
death or the shortening of life. If we do not completely
antionalize these two of our most important belongings, I
am afraid that the time will come when we shall be sorry
for the time we were born. Our independence will be just a
mockery, for what kind of independence are we going to
have if a part of our country is not in our hands but in
those of foreigners?" (Emphasis ours.) Professor Aruego
says that since the opening days of the Constitutional
Convention one of its fixed and dominating objectives was
the conservation and nationalization of the natural
resources of the country. (2 Aruego, Framing of the
Philippine Constitution, p 592.) This is ratified by the
members of the Constitutional Convention who are now
members of this Court, namely, Mr. Justice Perfecto, Mr.
Justice Briones, and Mr. Justice Hontiveros. And, indeed,
if under Article XIV, section 8, of the Constitution, an alien
may not even operate a small jitney for hire, it is certainly
not hard to understand that neither is he allowed to own a
pieace of land.
This constitutional intent is made more patent and is
strongly implemented by an act of the National Assembly
passed soon after the Constitution was approved. We are
referring again to Commonwealth Act No. 141. Prior to the
Constitution, there were in the Public Land Act No. 2874
sections 120 and 121 which granted aliens the right to
acquire private only by way of reciprocity. Said section
reads as follows:
SEC. 120. No land originally acquired in any
manner under the provisions of this Act, nor any
permanent improvement on such land, shall be
encumbered, alienated, or transferred, except to persons,
corporations, associations, or partnerships who may
acquire lands of the public domain under this Act; to
corporations organized in the Philippine Islands authorized
therefor by their charters, and, upon express authorization
by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of countries the
laws of which grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the
same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of,
or alienate land, or permanent improvements thereon, or
any interest therein, as to their own citizens, only in the
manner and to the extent specified in such laws, and while
the same are in force but not thereafter.
SEC. 121. No land originally acquired in any
manner under the provisions of the former Public Land Act
or of any other Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or
any other provision of law formerly in force in the
Philippine Islands with regard to public lands, terrenos
baldios y realengos, or lands of any other denomination
that were actually or presumptively of the public domain or
by royal grant or in any other form, nor any permanent
improvement on such land, shall be encumbered,
alienated, or conveyed, except to persons, corporations,
or associations who may acquire land of the public domain
under this Act; to corporate bodies organized in the
Philippine Islands whose charters may authorize them to
do so, and, upon express authorization by the Philippine
Legislature, to citizens of the countries the laws of which
grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the same right to
acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate
land or pemanent improvements thereon or any interest
therein, as to their own citizens, and only in the manner
and to the extent specified in such laws, and while the
same are in force, but not thereafter: Provided, however,
That this prohibition shall not be applicable to the
conveyance or acquisition by reason of hereditary
succession duly acknowledged and legalized by
competent courts, nor to lands and improvements
acquired or held for industrial or residence purposes, while
used for such purposes: Provided, further, That in the
event of the ownership of the lands and improvements
mentioned in this section and in the last preceding section
being transferred by judicial decree to
persons,corporations or associations not legally
capacitated to acquire the same under the provisions of
this Act, such persons, corporations, or associations shall
be obliged to alienate said lands or improvements to
others so capacitated within the precise period of five
years, under the penalty of such property reverting to the
Government in the contrary case." (Public Land Act, No.
2874.)

It is to be observed that the pharase "no land" used in
these section refers to all private lands, whether strictly
agricultural, residential or otherwise, there being
practically no private land which had not been acquired by
any of the means provided in said two sections. Therefore,
the prohibition contained in these two provisions was, in
effect, that no private land could be transferred to aliens
except "upon express authorization by the Philippine
Legislature, to citizens of Philippine Islands the same right
to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate
land." In other words, aliens were granted the right to
acquire private land merely by way of reciprocity. Then
came the Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 141
was passed, sections 122 and 123 of which read as
follows:
SEC. 122. No land originally acquired in any
manner under the provisions of this Act, nor any
permanent improvement on such land, shall be
encumbered, alienated, or transferred, except to persons,
corporations, associations, or partnerships who may
acquire lands of the public domain under this Act or to
corporations organized in the Philippines authorized
thereof by their charters.
SEC. 123. No land originally acquired in any
manner under the provisions of any previous Act,
ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision
of law formerly in force in the Philippines with regard to
public lands terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any
other denomination that were actually or presumptively of
the public domain, or by royal grant or in any other form,
nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be
encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except to persons,
corporations or associations who may acquire land of the
public domain under this Act or to corporate bodies
organized in the Philippines whose charters authorize
them to do so: Provided, however, That this prohibition
shall not be applicable to the conveyance or acquisition by
reason of hereditary succession duly acknowledged and
legalized by competent courts: Provided, further, That in
the event of the ownership of the lands and improvements
mentioned in this section and in the last preceding section
being transferred by judicial decree to persons,
corporations or associations not legally capacitated to
acquire the same under the provisions of this Act, such
persons, corporations, or associations shall be obliged to
alienate said lands or improvements to others so
capacitated within the precise period of five years;
otherwise, such property shall revert to the Government.
These two sections are almost literally the same as
sections 120 and 121 of Act No. 2874, the only difference
being that in the new provisions, the right to reciprocity
granted to aliens is completely stricken out. This,
undoubtedly, is to conform to the absolute policy
contained in section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution
which, in prohibiting the alienation of private agricultural
lands to aliens, grants them no right of reciprocity. This
legislative construction carries exceptional weight, for
prominent members of the National Assembly who
approved the new Act had been members of the
Constitutional Convention.
It is said that the lot question does not come within the
purview of sections 122 and 123 of Commonwealth Act
No. 141, there being no proof that the same had been
acquired by one of the means provided in said provisions.
We are not, however, diciding the instant case under the
provisions of the Public Land Act, which have to refer to
land that had been formerly of the public domain,
otherwise their constitutionality may be doubtful. We are
deciding the instant case under section 5 of Article XIII of
the Constitution which is more comprehensive and more
absolute in the sense that it prohibits the transfer to alien
of any private agricultural land including residential land
whatever its origin might have been.
And, finally, on June 14, 1947, the Congress approved
Republic Act No. 133 which allows mortgage of "private
real property" of any kind in favor of aliens but with a G.R. No. 108998 August 24, 1994
qualification consisting of expressly prohibiting aliens to
bid or take part in any sale of such real property as a
consequence of the mortgage. This prohibition makes no
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
distinction between private lands that are strictly
agricultural and private lands that are residental or vs.
commercial. The prohibition embraces the sale of private
lands of any kind in favor of aliens, which is again a clear THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES MARIO B.
implementation and a legislative interpretation of the LAPIÑA AND FLOR DE VEGA, respondents.
constitutional prohibition. Had the Congress been of
opinion that private residential lands may be sold to aliens
under the Constitution, no legislative measure would have Byron V. Belarmino and Juan B. Belarmino for private
been found necessary to authorize mortgage which would respondents.
have been deemed also permissible under the
Constitution. But clearly it was the opinion of the Congress
that such sale is forbidden by the Constitution and it was
such opinion that prompted the legislative measure
intended to clarify that mortgage is not within the BIDIN, J.:
constitutional prohibition.

Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a

It is well to note at this juncture that in the present case we parcel of land which he acquired by purchase while still a
have no choice. We are construing the Constitution as it is citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who has complied
and not as we may desire it to be. Perhaps the effect of with the requirements for registration under the Public
our construction is to preclude aliens, admitted freely into Land Act (CA 141)?
the Philippines from owning sites where they may build
their homes. But if this is the solemn mandate of the
Constitution, we will not attempt to compromise it even in
The Republic would have us rule on the negative and asks
the name of amity or equity. We are satisfied, however,
this Court to nullify the decision of the appellate court
that aliens are not completely excluded by the Constitution
which affirmed the judgment of the court a quo in granting
from the use of lands for residential purposes. Since their
the application of respondent spouses for registration over
residence in the Philippines is temporary, they may be
the lots in question.
granted temporary rights such as a lease contract which is
not forbidden by the Constitution. Should they desire to
remain here forever and share our fortunes and
misfortunes, Filipino citizenship is not impossible to
acquire. On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots 347
and 348, Cad. s38-D, as their residence with a total area
of 91.77 sq. m. situated in San Pablo City, from one
Cristeta Dazo Belen (Rollo, p. 41). At the time of the
For all the foregoing, we hold that under the Constitution
purchase, respondent spouses where then natural-born
aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural lands,
Filipino citizens.
including residential lands, and, accordingly, judgment is
affirmed, without costs.
On February 5, 1987, the spouses filed an application for
registration of title of the two (2) parcels of land before the
Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Branch XXXI. This
time, however, they were no longer Filipino citizens and
have opted to embrace Canadian citizenship through
naturalization.
An opposition was filed by the Republic and after the
parties have presented their respective evidence, the court
a quo rendered a decision confirming private respondents'
title to the lots in question, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby
approves the said application and confirms the title and
possession of herein applicants over Lots 347 and 348,
Ap-04-003755 in the names of spouses Mario B. Lapiña
and Flor de Vega, all of legal age, Filipino citizens by birth
but now Canadian citizens by naturalization and residing
at 14 A. Mabini Street, San Pablo City and/or 201-1170-
124 Street, Edmonton, Alberta T5M-OK9, Canada.
Once this Decision becomes final, let the corresponding
decree of registration be issued. In the certificate of title to
be issued, there shall be annotated an easement of .265
meters road right-of-way.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 25)
On appeal, respondent court affirmed the decision of the
trial court based on the following ratiocination:
In the present case, it is undisputed that both applicants
were still Filipino citizens when they bought the land in
controversy from its former owner. For this reason, the
prohibition against the acquisition of private lands by
aliens could not apply. In justice and equity, they are the
rightful owners of the subject realty considering also that
they had paid for it quite a large sum of money. Their
purpose in initiating the instant action is merely to confirm
their title over the land, for, as has been passed upon,
they had been the owners of the same since 1978. It
ought to be pointed out that registration is not a mode of
acquiring ownership. The Torrens System was not
established as a means for the acquisition of title to private
land. It is intended merely to confirm and register the title
which one may already have (Municipality of Victorias vs.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-31189, March 31, 1987).
With particular reference to the main issue at bar, the High
Court has ruled that title and ownership over lands within
the meaning and for the purposes of the constitutional
prohibition dates back to the time of their purchase, not
later. The fact that the applicants-appellees are not Filipino
citizens now cannot be taken against them for they were
not disqualified from acquiring the land in question
(Bollozos vs. Yu Tieng Su, G.R. No. L-29442, November
11, 1987). (Rollo, pp. 27-28)
Expectedly, respondent court's disposition did not merit
petitioner's approval, hence this present recourse, which
was belatedly filed.
Ordinarily, this petition would have been denied outright
for having been filed out of time had it not been for the
constitutional issue presented therein.
At the outset, petitioner submits that private respondents
have not acquired proprietary rights over the subject
properties before they acquired Canadian citizenship
through naturalization to justify the registration thereof in
their favor. It maintains that even privately owned
unregistered lands are presumed to be public lands under
the principle that lands of whatever classification belong to
the State under the Regalian doctrine. Thus, before the
issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant is not in the
jurisdical sense the true owner of the land since it still
pertains to the State. Petitioner further argued that it is
only when the court adjudicates the land to the applicant
for confirmation of title would the land become privately
owned land, for in the same proceeding, the court may
declare it public land, depending on the evidence.
As found by the trial court:
The evidence thus presented established that applicants,
by themselves and their predecessors-in-interest, had
been in open, public, peaceful, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the two adjacent
parcels of land applied for registration of title under a
bona-fide claim of ownership long before June 12, 1945.
Such being the case, it is conclusively presumed that all
the conditions essential to the confirmation of their title
over the two adjacent parcels of land are sought to be
registered have been complied with thereby entitling them
to the issuance of the corresponding certificate of title
pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree. (Rollo, p. 26)
Respondent court echoed the court a quo's observation,
thus:
The land sought to be registered has been declared to be
within the alienable and disposable zone established by
the Bureau of Forest Development (Exhibit "P"). The
investigation conducted by the Bureau of Lands, Natural
Resources District (IV-2) reveals that the disputed realty
had been occupied by the applicants "whose house of
strong materials stands thereon"; that it had been declared
for taxation purposes in the name of applicants-spouses
since 1979; that they acquired the same by means of a
public instrument entitled "Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan"
duly executed by the vendor, Cristeta Dazo Belen, on
June 17, 1978 (Exhibits "I" and "J"); and that applicants
and their predecessors in interest had been in possession
of the land for more than 30 years prior to the filing of the
application for registration. But what is of great
significance in the instant case is the circumstance that at
the time the applicants purchased the subject lot in 1978,
both of them were Filipino citizens such that when they
filed their application for registration in 1987, ownership
over the land in dispute had already passed to them.
(Rollo, p., 27)
The Republic disagrees with the appellate court's concept
of possession and argues:
17. The Court of Appeals found that the land was
declared for taxation purposes in the name of respondent
spouses only since 1979. However, tax declarations or
reality tax payments of property are not conclusive
evidence of ownership. (citing cases)
18. Then again, the appellate court found that
"applicants (respondents) and their predecessors-in-
interest had been in possession of the land for more than
30 years prior to the filing of the application for
registration." This is not, however, the same as saying that
respondents have been in possession "since June 12,
1945." (PD No. 1073, amending Sec. 48 [b], CA NO. 141;
sec. also Sec. 14, PD No. 1529). So there is a void in
respondents' possession. They fall short of the required
possession since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto. And,
even if they needed only to prove thirty (30) years
possession prior to the filing of their application (on
February 5, 1987), they would still be short of the required
possession if the starting point is 1979 when, according to
the Court of Appeals, the land was declared for taxation
purposes in their name. (Rollo, pp. 14-15)
The argument is myopic, to say the least. Following the
logic of petitioner, any transferee is thus foreclosed to
apply for registration of title over a parcel of land
notwithstanding the fact that the transferor, or his
predecessor-in-interest has been in open, notorious and
exclusive possession thereof for thirty (30) years or more.
This is not, however, what the law provides.
As petitioner itself argues, Section 48 of the Public Land
Act (CA 141) reads:
Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by wars or
force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis
supplied)
As amended by PD 1073:
Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and
Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are
hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall
apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant
himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12,
1945.
It must be noted that with respect to possession and
occupation of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, the law employs the terms "by
themselves", "the applicant himself or through his
predecessor-in-interest". Thus, it matters not whether the
vendee/applicant has been in possession of the subject
property for only a day so long as the period and/or legal
requirements for confirmation of title has been complied
with by his predecessor-in-interest, the said period is
tacked to his possession. In the case at bar, respondents'
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the disputed land
not only since June 12, 1945, but even as early as 1937.
Petitioner does not deny this except that respondent
spouses, in its perception, were in possession of the land
sought to be registered only in 1978 and therefore short of
the required length of time. As aforesaid, the disputed
parcels of land were acquired by private respondents
through their predecessors-in-interest, who, in turn, have
been in open and continued possession thereof since
1937. Private respondents stepped into the shoes of their
predecessors-in-interest and by virtue thereof, acquired all
the legal rights necessary to confirm what could otherwise
be deemed as an imperfect title.
At this juncture, petitioner's reliance in Republic v.
Villanueva (114 SCRA 875 [1982]) deserves scant
consideration. There, it was held that before the issuance
of the certificate of title, the occupant is not in the juridical
sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to
the State.
Suffice it to state that the ruling in Republic v. Villanueva
(supra), has already been abandoned in the 1986 case of
Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court (146
SCRA 509; and reiterated in Director of Lands v. Iglesia ni
Cristo, 200 SCRA 606 [1991]) where the Court, through
then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Narvasa,
declared that:
(The weight of authority is) that open, exclusive and
undisputed possession of alienable public land for the
period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby
the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure
and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases
to be public land and becomes private property. . . .
Herico in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative:
. . . Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act
No. 1942, which the respondent Court held to be
inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's
proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years
since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-
interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner so as
to segregate the land from the mass of public land.
Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public
Land Act as by free patent . . .
xxx xxx xxx
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as
specified in the foregoing provision are complied with, the
possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of
law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the
necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land,
therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and beyond
the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The
application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of
which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as
would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to
be issued upon the strength of said patent.
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical
inevitability of considering possession of public land which
is of the character and duration prescribed by the statute
as the equivalent of an express grant from the State than
the dictum of the statute itself (Section 48 [b]) that the
possessor(s) ". . . shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title ..." No
proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive
presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be
little more than a formality, at the most limited to
ascertaining whether the possession claims is of the
required character and length of time; and registration
thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a
title already vested. The proceedings would not originally
convert the land from public to private land, but only
confirm such a conversion already affected by operation of
law from the moment the required period of possession
became complete. As was so well put in Cariño, ". .
.(There are indications that registration was expected from
all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it,
ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the
proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to
establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by
earlier law. (Emphasis supplied)
Subsequent cases have hewed to the above
pronouncement such that open, continuous and exclusive
possession for at least 30 years of alienable public land
ipso jure converts the same to private property (Director of
Lands v. IAC, 214 SCRA 604 [1992]; Pineda v. CA, 183
SCRA 602 [1990]). This means that occupation and
cultivation for more than 30 years by an applicant and his
predecessors-in-interest, vest title on such applicant so as
to segregate the land from the mass of public and
(National Power Corporation v. CA, 218 SCRA 41 [1993]).
The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove
that (a) the land is alienable public land and (b) his
possession, in the concept above stated, must be either
since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the
Public Land Act (Director of Lands v. Buyco, 216 SCRA 78
[1992]). When the conditions set by law are complied with,
the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a
right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity
of a certificate of title being issued (National Power
Corporation v. CA, supra). As such, the land ceases to be
a part of the public domain and goes beyond the authority
of the Director of Lands to dispose of.
In other words, the Torrens system was not established as
a means for the acquisition of title to private land
(Municipality of Victorias v. CA, 149 SCRA 32 [1987]). It
merely confirms, but does not confer ownership. As could
be gleaned from the evidence adduced, private
respondents were able to establish the nature of
possession of their predecessors-in-interest. Evidence
was offered to prove that their predecessors-in-interest
had paid taxes on the subject land and introduced
improvements thereon (Exhibits "F" to "F9"). A certified
true copy of the affidavit executed by Cristeta Dazo and
her sister Simplicia was also formally offered to prove that
the subject parcels of land were inherited by vendor
Cristeta Dazo from her father Pedro Dazo with the
conformity of her only sister Simplicia (Exhibit "G").
Likewise, a report from the Bureau of Lands was
presented in evidence together with a letter from the
Bureau of Forest Development, to prove that the
questioned lots were part of the alienable and disposable
zone of the government and that no forestry interest was
affected (CA GR No. 28953, Records, p. 33).
In the main, petitioner seeks to defeat respondents'
application for registration of title on the ground of foreign
nationality. Accordingly, the ruling in Director of Lands v.
Buyco (supra) supports petitioner's thesis.
We disagree.
In Buyco, the applicants therein were likewise foreign
nationals but were natural-born Filipino citizens at the time
of their supposed acquisition of the property. But this is
where the similarity ends. The applicants in Buyco sought
to register a large tract of land under the provisions of the
Land Registration Act, and in the alternative, under the
provisions of the Public Land Act. The land registration
court decided in favor of the applicants and was affirmed
by the appellate court on appeal. The Director of Lands
brought the matter before us on review and we reversed.
This Court, speaking through Justice Davide, Jr., stated:
As could be gleaned from the evidence adduced, the
private respondents do not rely on fee simple ownership
based on a Spanish grant or possessory information title
under Section 19 of the Land Registration Act; the private
respondents did not present any proof that they or their
predecessors-in-interest derived title from an old Spanish
grant such as (a) the "titulo real" or royal grant (b) the
"concession especial" or especial grant; (c) the
"composicion con el estado" title or adjustment title; (d) the
"titulo de compra" or title by purchase; and (e) the
"informacion posesoria" or possessory information title,
which could become a "titulo gratuito" or a gratuitous title
(Director of Forestry v. Muñoz, 23 SCRA 1183 [1968]).
The primary basis of their claim is possession, by
themselves and their predecessors-in-interest, since time
immemorial.
If indeed private respondents and their predecessors have
been in possession since time immemorial, the rulings of
both courts could be upheld for, as this Court stated in Oh
Cho v. Director of Lands (75 Phil. 890 [1946]):
. . . All lands that were not acquired from the Government,
either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public
domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that
should have been in the possession of an occupant and of
his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for
such possession would justify the presumption that the
land had never been part of the public domain or that if
had been a private property even before the Spanish
conquest (Cariño v. Insular Government, 41 Phil 935
[1909]; 212 U.S. 449; 53 Law. Ed., 594) The applicant
does not come under the exception, for the earliest
possession of the lot by his first predecessor in interest
began in 1880.
. . . alienable public land held by a possessor, personally
or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly,
continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory
period (30 years under the Public Land Act, as amended)
is converted to private property by the mere lapse or
completion of said period, ipso jure. (Director of Lands v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, supra)
It is obvious from the foregoing rule that the applicant must
prove that (a) the land is alienable public land and (b) his
possession, in the concept above stated, must be either
since time immemorial, as ruled in both Cariño and Susi,
or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. As to
the latter, this Court, in Gutierrez Hermanos v. Court of
Appeals (178 SCRA 37 [1989]), adopted the rule
enunciated by the Court of Appeals, per then Associate
Justice Hugo R. Gutierrez, Jr., . . ., that an applicant for
registration under Section 48 of the Public Land Act must
secure a certification from the Government that the lands
which he claims to have possessed as owner for more
than thirty (30) years are alienable and disposable. It is the
burden of the applicant to prove its positive averments.
In the instant case, private respondents offered no
evidence at all to prove that the property subject of the
application is an alienable and disposable land. On the
contrary, the entire property . . . was pasture land (and
therefore inalienable under the then 1973 Constitution).
. . . (P)rivate respondents' evidence miserably failed to
establish their imperfect title to the property in question.
Their allegation of possession since time immemorial, . . .,
is patently baseless. . . . When referring to possession,
specifically "immemorial possession," it means possession
of which no man living has seen the beginning, and the
existence of which he has learned from his elders (Susi v.
Razon, supra). Such possession was never present in the
case of private respondents. . . .
. . ., there does not even exist a reasonable basis for the
finding that the private respondents and their
predecessors-in-interest possessed the land for more than
eighty (80) years, . . .
xxx xxx xxx
To this Court's mind, private respondents failed to prove
that (their predecessor-in-interest) had possessed the
property allegedly covered by Tax Declaration No. 15853
and made the subject of both his last will and testament
and the project of partition of his estate among his heirs —
in such manner as to remove the same from the public
domain under the Cariño and Susi doctrines. Thus, (when
the predecessor-in-interest) died on 31 May 1937, he
transmitted no right whatsoever, with respect to the said
property, to his heirs. This being the case, his possession
cannot be tacked to that of the private respondents for the
latter's benefit pursuant to Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, the alternative ground relied upon in their
application . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Considering that the private respondents became
American citizens before such filing, it goes without saying
that they had acquired no vested right, consisting of an
imperfect title, over the property before they lost their
Philippine citizenship. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the application in Buyco were denied registration
of title not merely because they were American citizens at
the time of their application therefor. Respondents therein
failed to prove possession of their predecessor-in-interest
since time immemorial or possession in such a manner
that the property has been segregated from public domain;
such that at the time of their application, as American
citizens, they have acquired no vested rights over the
parcel of land.
In the case at bar, private respondents were undoubtedly
natural-born Filipino citizens at the time of the acquisition
of the properties and by virtue thereof, acquired vested
rights thereon, tacking in the process, the possession in
the concept of owner and the prescribed period of time
held by their predecessors-in-interest under the Public
Land Act. In addition, private respondents have
constructed a house of strong materials on the contested
property, now occupied by respondent Lapiñas mother.
But what should not be missed in the disposition of this
case is the fact that the Constitution itself allows private
respondents to register the contested parcels of land in
their favor. Sections 7 and 8 of Article XII of the
Constitution contain the following pertinent provisions, to
wit:
Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of
this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who
has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of
private lands, subject to limitations provided by law.
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 8, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution above
quoted is similar to Section 15, Article XIV of the then
1973 Constitution which reads:
Sec. 15. Notwithstanding the provisions of
Section 14 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines who has lost his citizenship may be a
transferee of private land, for use by him as his residence,
as the Batasang Pambansa may provide.
Pursuant thereto, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185 was passed
into law, the relevant provision of which provides:
Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the
Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship and who
has the legal capacity to enter into a contract under
Philippine laws may be a transferee of a private land up to
a maximum area of one thousand square meters, in the
case of urban land, or one hectare in the case of rural
land, to be used by him as his residence. In the case of
married couples, one of them may avail of the privilege
herein granted; Provided, That if both shall avail of the
same, the total area acquired shall not exceed the
maximum herein fixed.
In case the transferee already owns urban or rural lands
for residential purposes, he shall still be entitled to be a
transferee of an additional urban or rural lands for
residential purposes which, when added to those already
owned by him, shall not exceed the maximum areas
herein authorized.

From the adoption of the 1987 Constitution up to the
present, no other law has been passed by the legislature
on the same subject. Thus, what governs the disposition
of private lands in favor of a natural-born Filipino citizen
who has lost his Philippine citizenship remains to be BP
185.
Even if private respondents were already Canadian
citizens at the time they applied for registration of the
properties in question, said properties as discussed above
were already private lands; consequently, there could be
no legal impediment for the registration thereof by
respondents in view of what the Constitution ordains. The
parcels of land sought to be registered no longer form part
of the public domain. They are already private in character
since private respondents' predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous and exclusive possession and
occupation thereof under claim of ownership prior to June
12, 1945 or since 1937. The law provides that a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine
citizenship may be a transferee of a private land up to a
maximum area of 1,000 sq.m., if urban, or one (1) hectare
in case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence
(BP 185).
It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of a
private land, were natural-born citizens of the Philippines.
For the purpose of transfer and/or acquisition of a parcel
of residential land, it is not significant whether private
respondents are no longer Filipino citizens at the time they
purchased or registered the parcels of land in question.
What is important is that private respondents were
formerly natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and as
transferees of a private land, they could apply for
registration in accordance with the mandate of Section 8,
Article XII of the Constitution. Considering that private
respondents were able to prove the requisite period and
character of possession of their predecessors-in-interest
over the subject lots, their application for registration of
title must perforce be approved.
The dissenting opinion, however, states that the
requirements in BP 185, must also be complied with by
private respondents. Specifically, it refers to Section 6,
which provides:
Sec. 6. In addition to the requirements provided
for in other laws for the registration of titles to lands, no
private land shall be transferred under this Act, unless the
transferee shall submit to the register of deeds of the
province or city where the property is located a sworn
statement showing the date and place of his birth; the
names and addresses of his parents, of his spouse and
children, if any; the area, the location and the mode of
acquisition of his landholdings in the Philippines, if any; his
intention to reside permanently in the Philippines; the date
he lost his Philippine citizenship and the country of which
he is presently a citizen; and such other information as
may be required under Section 8 of this Act.
The Court is of the view that the requirements in Sec. 6 of
BP 185 do not apply in the instant case since said
requirements are primarily directed to the register of deeds
before whom compliance therewith is to be submitted.
Nowhere in the provision is it stated, much less implied,
that the requirements must likewise be submitted before
the land registration court prior to the approval of an
application for registration of title. An application for
registration of title before a land registration court should
not be confused with the issuance of a certificate of title by
the register of deeds. It is only when the judgment of the
land registration court approving the application for
registration has become final that a decree of registration
is issued. And that is the time when the requirements of
Sec. 6, BP 185, before the register of deeds should be
complied with by the applicants. This decree of registration
is the one that is submitted to the office of the register of
deeds for issuance of the certificate of title in favor of the
applicant. Prior to the issuance of the decree of
registration, the register of deeds has no participation in
the approval of the application for registration of title as the
decree of registration is yet to be issued.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the
decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-17587 September 12, 1967
PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION, representing the
estate of JUSTINA SANTOS Y CANON FAUSTINO,
deceased, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
LUI SHE in her own behalf and as administratrix of the
intestate estate of Wong Heng, deceased, defendant-
appellant.
Nicanor S. Sison for plaintiff-appellant.
Ozaeta, Gibbs & Ozaeta for defendant-appellant.
CASTRO, J.:
Justina Santos y Canon Faustino and her sister Lorenzo
were the owners in common of a piece of land in Manila.
This parcel, with an area of 2,582.30 square meters, is
located on Rizal Avenue and opens into Florentino Torres
street at the back and Katubusan street on one side. In it
are two residential houses with entrance on Florentino
Torres street and the Hen Wah Restaurant with entrance
on Rizal Avenue. The sisters lived in one of the houses,
while Wong Heng, a Chinese, lived with his family in the
restaurant. Wong had been a long-time lessee of a portion
of the property, paying a monthly rental of P2,620.
On September 22, 1957 Justina Santos became the
owner of the entire property as her sister died with no
other heir. Then already well advanced in years, being at
the time 90 years old, blind, crippled and an invalid, she
was left with no other relative to live with. Her only
companions in the house were her 17 dogs and 8 maids.
Her otherwise dreary existence was brightened now and
then by the visits of Wong's four children who had become
the joy of her life. Wong himself was the trusted man to
whom she delivered various amounts for safekeeping,
including rentals from her property at the corner of Ongpin
and Salazar streets and the rentals which Wong himself
paid as lessee of a part of the Rizal Avenue property.
Wong also took care of the payment; in her behalf, of
taxes, lawyers' fees, funeral expenses, masses, salaries
of maids and security guard, and her household expenses.
"In grateful acknowledgment of the personal services of
the lessee to her," Justina Santos executed on November
15, 1957 a contract of lease (Plff Exh. 3) in favor of Wong,
covering the portion then already leased to him and
another portion fronting Florentino Torres street. The lease
was for 50 years, although the lessee was given the right
to withdraw at any time from the agreement; the monthly
rental was P3,120. The contract covered an area of 1,124
square meters. Ten days later (November 25), the
contract was amended (Plff Exh. 4) so as to make it cover
the entire property, including the portion on which the
house of Justina Santos stood, at an additional monthly
rental of P360. For his part Wong undertook to pay, out of
the rental due from him, an amount not exceeding P1,000
a month for the food of her dogs and the salaries of her
maids.
On December 21 she executed another contract (Plff Exh.
7) giving Wong the option to buy the leased premises for
P120,000, payable within ten years at a monthly
installment of P1,000. The option, written in Tagalog,
imposed on him the obligation to pay for the food of the
dogs and the salaries of the maids in her household, the
charge not to exceed P1,800 a month. The option was
conditioned on his obtaining Philippine citizenship, a
petition for which was then pending in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal. It appears, however, that this application
for naturalization was withdrawn when it was discovered
that he was not a resident of Rizal. On October 28, 1958
she filed a petition to adopt him and his children on the
erroneous belief that adoption would confer on them
Philippine citizenship. The error was discovered and the
proceedings were abandoned.
On November 18, 1958 she executed two other contracts,
one (Plff Exh. 5) extending the term of the lease to 99
years, and another (Plff Exh. 6) fixing the term of the
option of 50 years. Both contracts are written in Tagalog.
In two wills executed on August 24 and 29, 1959 (Def
Exhs. 285 & 279), she bade her legatees to respect the
contracts she had entered into with Wong, but in a codicil
(Plff Exh. 17) of a later date (November 4, 1959) she
appears to have a change of heart. Claiming that the
various contracts were made by her because of
machinations and inducements practiced by him, she now
directed her executor to secure the annulment of the
contracts.
On November 18 the present action was filed in the Court
of First Instance of Manila. The complaint alleged that the
contracts were obtained by Wong "through fraud,
misrepresentation, inequitable conduct, undue influence
and abuse of confidence and trust of and (by) taking
advantage of the helplessness of the plaintiff and were
made to circumvent the constitutional provision prohibiting
aliens from acquiring lands in the Philippines and also of
the Philippine Naturalization Laws." The court was asked
to direct the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel the
registration of the contracts and to order Wong to pay
Justina Santos the additional rent of P3,120 a month from
November 15, 1957 on the allegation that the reasonable
rental of the leased premises was P6,240 a month.
In his answer, Wong admitted that he enjoyed her trust
and confidence as proof of which he volunteered the
information that, in addition to the sum of P3,000 which he
said she had delivered to him for safekeeping, another
sum of P22,000 had been deposited in a joint account
which he had with one of her maids. But he denied having
taken advantage of her trust in order to secure the
execution of the contracts in question. As counterclaim he
sought the recovery of P9,210.49 which he said she owed
him for advances.
Wong's admission of the receipt of P22,000 and P3,000
was the cue for the filing of an amended complaint. Thus
on June 9, 1960, aside from the nullity of the contracts, the
collection of various amounts allegedly delivered on
different occasions was sought. These amounts and the
dates of their delivery are P33,724.27 (Nov. 4, 1957);
P7,344.42 (Dec. 1, 1957); P10,000 (Dec. 6, 1957);
P22,000 and P3,000 (as admitted in his answer). An
accounting of the rentals from the Ongpin and Rizal
Avenue properties was also demanded.
In the meantime as a result of a petition for guardianship
filed in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, the
Security Bank & Trust Co. was appointed guardian of the
properties of Justina Santos, while Ephraim G. Gochangco
was appointed guardian of her person.
In his answer, Wong insisted that the various contracts
were freely and voluntarily entered into by the parties. He
likewise disclaimed knowledge of the sum of P33,724.27,
admitted receipt of P7,344.42 and P10,000, but contended
that these amounts had been spent in accordance with the
instructions of Justina Santos; he expressed readiness to
comply with any order that the court might make with
respect to the sums of P22,000 in the bank and P3,000 in
his possession.
The case was heard, after which the lower court rendered
judgment as follows:
[A]ll the documents mentioned in the first cause of action,
with the exception of the first which is the lease contract of
15 November 1957, are declared null and void; Wong
Heng is condemned to pay unto plaintiff thru guardian of
her property the sum of P55,554.25 with legal interest
from the date of the filing of the amended complaint; he is
also ordered to pay the sum of P3,120.00 for every month
of his occupation as lessee under the document of lease
herein sustained, from 15 November 1959, and the
moneys he has consigned since then shall be imputed to
that; costs against Wong Heng.
From this judgment both parties appealed directly to this
Court. After the case was submitted for decision, both
parties died, Wong Heng on October 21, 1962 and Justina
Santos on December 28, 1964. Wong was substituted by
his wife, Lui She, the other defendant in this case, while
Justina Santos was substituted by the Philippine Banking
Corporation.
Justina Santos maintained — now reiterated by the
Philippine Banking Corporation — that the lease contract
(Plff Exh. 3) should have been annulled along with the four
other contracts (Plff Exhs. 4-7) because it lacks mutuality;
because it included a portion which, at the time, was in
custodia legis; because the contract was obtained in
violation of the fiduciary relations of the parties; because
her consent was obtained through undue influence, fraud
and misrepresentation; and because the lease contract,
like the rest of the contracts, is absolutely simulated.
Paragraph 5 of the lease contract states that "The lessee
may at any time withdraw from this agreement." It is
claimed that this stipulation offends article 1308 of the Civil
Code which provides that "the contract must bind both
contracting parties; its validity or compliance cannot be left
to the will of one of them."
We have had occasion to delineate the scope and
application of article 1308 in the early case of Taylor v. Uy
Tieng Piao.1 We said in that case:
Article 1256 [now art. 1308] of the Civil Code in our
opinion creates no impediment to the insertion in a
contract for personal service of a resolutory condition
permitting the cancellation of the contract by one of the
parties. Such a stipulation, as can be readily seen, does
not make either the validity or the fulfillment of the contract
dependent upon the will of the party to whom is conceded
the privilege of cancellation; for where the contracting
parties have agreed that such option shall exist, the
exercise of the option is as much in the fulfillment of the
contract as any other act which may have been the
subject of agreement. Indeed, the cancellation of a
contract in accordance with conditions agreed upon
beforehand is fulfillment.2
And so it was held in Melencio v. Dy Tiao Lay 3 that a
"provision in a lease contract that the lessee, at any time
before he erected any building on the land, might rescind
the lease, can hardly be regarded as a violation of article
1256 [now art. 1308] of the Civil Code."
The case of Singson Encarnacion v. Baldomar 4 cannot
be cited in support of the claim of want of mutuality,
because of a difference in factual setting. In that case, the
lessees argued that they could occupy the premises as
long as they paid the rent. This is of course untenable, for
as this Court said, "If this defense were to be allowed, so
long as defendants elected to continue the lease by
continuing the payment of the rentals, the owner would
never be able to discontinue it; conversely, although the
owner should desire the lease to continue the lessees
could effectively thwart his purpose if they should prefer to
terminate the contract by the simple expedient of stopping
payment of the rentals." Here, in contrast, the right of the
lessee to continue the lease or to terminate it is so
circumscribed by the term of the contract that it cannot be
said that the continuance of the lease depends upon his
will. At any rate, even if no term had been fixed in the
agreement, this case would at most justify the fixing of a
period5 but not the annulment of the contract.

Nor is there merit in the claim that as the portion of the
property formerly owned by the sister of Justina Santos
was still in the process of settlement in the probate court
at the time it was leased, the lease is invalid as to such
portion. Justina Santos became the owner of the entire
property upon the death of her sister Lorenzo on
September 22, 1957 by force of article 777 of the Civil
Code. Hence, when she leased the property on November
15, she did so already as owner thereof. As this Court
explained in upholding the sale made by an heir of a
property under judicial administration:
prepared the lease contract on the basis of data given to
him by Wong and that she told him that "whatever Mr.
Wong wants must be followed."7
The testimony of Atty. Yumol cannot be read out of
context in order to warrant a finding that Wong practically
dictated the terms of the contract. What this witness said
was:
Q Did you explain carefully to your client, Doña Justina,
the contents of this document before she signed it?

That the land could not ordinarily be levied upon while in

custodia legis does not mean that one of the heirs may not
sell the right, interest or participation which he has or
might have in the lands under administration. The ordinary
execution of property in custodia legis is prohibited in
order to avoid interference with the possession by the
court. But the sale made by an heir of his share in an
inheritance, subject to the result of the pending
administration, in no wise stands in the way of such
administration.6
A I explained to her each and every one of these
conditions and I also told her these conditions were quite
onerous for her, I don't really know if I have expressed my
opinion, but I told her that we would rather not execute any
contract anymore, but to hold it as it was before, on a
verbal month to month contract of lease.
Q But, she did not follow your advice, and she went with
the contract just the same?

It is next contended that the lease contract was obtained

by Wong in violation of his fiduciary relationship with
A She agreed first . . .
Justina Santos, contrary to article 1646, in relation to
article 1941 of the Civil Code, which disqualifies "agents
(from leasing) the property whose administration or sale
may have been entrusted to them." But Wong was never Q Agreed what?
an agent of Justina Santos. The relationship of the parties,
although admittedly close and confidential, did not amount
to an agency so as to bring the case within the prohibition A Agreed with my objectives that it is really onerous and
of the law. that I was really right, but after that, I was called again by
her and she told me to follow the wishes of Mr. Wong
Heng.
Just the same, it is argued that Wong so completely
dominated her life and affairs that the contracts express
not her will but only his. Counsel for Justina Santos cites xxx xxx xxx
the testimony of Atty. Tomas S. Yumol who said that he
Q So, as far as consent is concerned, you were
satisfied that this document was perfectly proper?
xxx xxx xxx
A Your Honor, if I have to express my personal
opinion, I would say she is not, because, as I said before,
she told me — "Whatever Mr. Wong wants must be
followed."8
Wong might indeed have supplied the data which Atty.
Yumol embodied in the lease contract, but to say this is
not to detract from the binding force of the contract. For
the contract was fully explained to Justina Santos by her
own lawyer. One incident, related by the same witness,
makes clear that she voluntarily consented to the lease
contract. This witness said that the original term fixed for
the lease was 99 years but that as he doubted the validity
of a lease to an alien for that length of time, he tried to
persuade her to enter instead into a lease on a month-to-
month basis. She was, however, firm and unyielding.
Instead of heeding the advice of the lawyer, she ordered
him, "Just follow Mr. Wong Heng."9 Recounting the
incident, Atty. Yumol declared on cross examination:
Considering her age, ninety (90) years old at the time and
her condition, she is a wealthy woman, it is just natural
when she said "This is what I want and this will be done."
In particular reference to this contract of lease, when I said
"This is not proper," she said — "You just go ahead, you
prepare that, I am the owner, and if there is any illegality, I
am the only one that can question the illegality."10
Atty. Yumol further testified that she signed the lease
contract in the presence of her close friend, Hermenegilda
Lao, and her maid, Natividad Luna, who was constantly by
her side.11 Any of them could have testified on the undue
influence that Wong supposedly wielded over Justina
Santos, but neither of them was presented as a witness.
The truth is that even after giving his client time to think
the matter over, the lawyer could not make her change her
mind. This persuaded the lower court to uphold the validity
of the lease contract against the claim that it was procured
through undue influence.
Indeed, the charge of undue influence in this case rests on
a mere inference12 drawn from the fact that Justina
Santos could not read (as she was blind) and did not
understand the English language in which the contract is
written, but that inference has been overcome by her own
evidence.
Nor is there merit in the claim that her consent to the lease
contract, as well as to the rest of the contracts in question,
was given out of a mistaken sense of gratitude to Wong
who, she was made to believe, had saved her and her
sister from a fire that destroyed their house during the
liberation of Manila. For while a witness claimed that the
sisters were saved by other persons (the brothers
Edilberto and Mariano Sta. Ana)13 it was Justina Santos
herself who, according to her own witness, Benjamin C.
Alonzo, said "very emphatically" that she and her sister
would have perished in the fire had it not been for
Wong.14 Hence the recital in the deed of conditional
option (Plff Exh. 7) that "[I]tong si Wong Heng ang siyang
nagligtas sa aming dalawang magkapatid sa halos ay
tiyak na kamatayan", and the equally emphatic avowal of
gratitude in the lease contract (Plff Exh. 3).
As it was with the lease contract (Plff Exh. 3), so it was
with the rest of the contracts (Plff Exhs. 4-7) — the
consent of Justina Santos was given freely and voluntarily.
As Atty. Alonzo, testifying for her, said:
[I]n nearly all documents, it was either Mr. Wong Heng or
Judge Torres and/or both. When we had conferences,
they used to tell me what the documents should contain.
But, as I said, I would always ask the old woman about
them and invariably the old woman used to tell me: "That's
okay. It's all right."15
But the lower court set aside all the contracts, with the
exception of the lease contract of November 15, 1957, on
the ground that they are contrary to the expressed wish of
Justina Santos and that their considerations are fictitious.
Wong stated in his deposition that he did not pay P360 a
month for the additional premises leased to him, because
she did not want him to, but the trial court did not believe
him. Neither did it believe his statement that he paid
P1,000 as consideration for each of the contracts (namely,
the option to buy the leased premises, the extension of the
lease to 99 years, and the fixing of the term of the option
at 50 years), but that the amount was returned to him by
her for safekeeping. Instead, the court relied on the
testimony of Atty. Alonzo in reaching the conclusion that
the contracts are void for want of consideration.
Atty. Alonzo declared that he saw no money paid at the
time of the execution of the documents, but his negative
testimony does not rule out the possibility that the
considerations were paid at some other time as the
contracts in fact recite. What is more, the consideration
need not pass from one party to the other at the time a
contract is executed because the promise of one is the
consideration for the other.16
With respect to the lower court's finding that in all
probability Justina Santos could not have intended to part
with her property while she was alive nor even to lease it
in its entirety as her house was built on it, suffice it to
quote the testimony of her own witness and lawyer who
prepared the contracts (Plff Exhs. 4-7) in question, Atty.
Alonzo:
The ambition of the old woman, before her death,
according to her revelation to me, was to see to it that
these properties be enjoyed, even to own them, by Wong
Heng because Doña Justina told me that she did not have
any relatives, near or far, and she considered Wong Heng
as a son and his children her grandchildren; especially her
consolation in life was when she would hear the children
reciting prayers in Tagalog.17
She was very emphatic in the care of the seventeen (17)
dogs and of the maids who helped her much, and she told
me to see to it that no one could disturb Wong Heng from
those properties. That is why we thought of the ninety-nine
(99) years lease; we thought of adoption, believing that
thru adoption Wong Heng might acquire Filipino
citizenship; being the adopted child of a Filipino citizen.18
This is not to say, however, that the contracts (Plff Exhs.
3-7) are valid. For the testimony just quoted, while
dispelling doubt as to the intention of Justina Santos, at
the same time gives the clue to what we view as a scheme
to circumvent the Constitutional prohibition against the
transfer of lands to aliens. "The illicit purpose then
becomes the illegal causa"19 rendering the contracts void.
Taken singly, the contracts show nothing that is
necessarily illegal, but considered collectively, they reveal
an insidious pattern to subvert by indirection what the
Constitution directly prohibits. To be sure, a lease to an
alien for a reasonable period is valid. So is an option
giving an alien the right to buy real property on condition
that he is granted Philippine citizenship. As this Court said
in Krivenko v. Register of Deeds:20
[A]liens are not completely excluded by the Constitution
from the use of lands for residential purposes. Since their
residence in the Philippines is temporary, they may be
granted temporary rights such as a lease contract which is
not forbidden by the Constitution. Should they desire to
remain here forever and share our fortunes and
misfortunes, Filipino citizenship is not impossible to
acquire.
But if an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an
option to buy, a piece of land, by virtue of which the
Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his
property,21 this to last for 50 years, then it becomes clear
that the arrangement is a virtual transfer of ownership
whereby the owner divests himself in stages not only of
the right to enjoy the land ( jus possidendi, jus utendi, jus
fruendi and jus abutendi) but also of the right to dispose of
it ( jus disponendi) — rights the sum total of which make
up ownership. It is just as if today the possession is
transferred, tomorrow, the use, the next day, the
disposition, and so on, until ultimately all the rights of
which ownership is made up are consolidated in an alien.
And yet this is just exactly what the parties in this case did
within the space of one year, with the result that Justina
Santos' ownership of her property was reduced to a hollow
concept. If this can be done, then the Constitutional ban
against alien landholding in the Philippines, as announced
in Krivenko v. Register of Deeds,22 is indeed in grave
peril.
It does not follow from what has been said, however, that
because the parties are in pari delicto they will be left
where they are, without relief. For one thing, the original
parties who were guilty of a violation of the fundamental
charter have died and have since been substituted by their
administrators to whom it would be unjust to impute their
guilt.23 For another thing, and this is not only cogent but
also important, article 1416 of the Civil Code provides, as
an exception to the rule on pari delicto, that "When the
agreement is not illegal per se but is merely prohibited,
and the prohibition by law is designed for the protection of
the plaintiff, he may, if public policy is thereby enhanced,
recover what he has paid or delivered." The Constitutional
provision that "Save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned
except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in
the Philippines"24 is an expression of public policy to
conserve lands for the Filipinos. As this Court said in
Krivenko:
It is well to note at this juncture that in the present case we
have no choice. We are construing the Constitution as it is
and not as we may desire it to be. Perhaps the effect of
our construction is to preclude aliens admitted freely into
the Philippines from owning sites where they may build
their homes. But if this is the solemn mandate of the
Constitution, we will not attempt to compromise it even in
the name of amity or equity . . . .
For all the foregoing, we hold that under the Constitution
aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural lands,
including residential lands, and, accordingly, judgment is
affirmed, without costs.25
That policy would be defeated and its continued violation
sanctioned if, instead of setting the contracts aside and
ordering the restoration of the land to the estate of the
deceased Justina Santos, this Court should apply the
general rule of pari delicto. To the extent that our ruling in
this case conflicts with that laid down in Rellosa v. Gaw
Chee Hun 26 and subsequent similar cases, the latter
must be considered as pro tanto qualified.
The claim for increased rentals and attorney's fees, made
in behalf of Justina Santos, must be denied for lack of
merit.
And what of the various amounts which Wong received in
trust from her? It appears that he kept two classes of
accounts, one pertaining to amount which she entrusted to
him from time to time, and another pertaining to rentals
from the Ongpin property and from the Rizal Avenue
property, which he himself was leasing.

With respect to the first account, the evidence shows that
he received P33,724.27 on November 8, 1957 (Plff Exh.
16); P7,354.42 on December 1, 1957 (Plff Exh. 13);
P10,000 on December 6, 1957 (Plff Exh. 14) ; and
P18,928.50 on August 26, 1959 (Def. Exh. 246), or a total
of P70,007.19. He claims, however, that he settled his
accounts and that the last amount of P18,928.50 was in
fact payment to him of what in the liquidation was found to
be due to him.
He made disbursements from this account to discharge
Justina Santos' obligations for taxes, attorneys' fees,
funeral services and security guard services, but the
checks (Def Exhs. 247-278) drawn by him for this purpose
amount to only P38,442.84.27 Besides, if he had really
settled his accounts with her on August 26, 1959, we
cannot understand why he still had P22,000 in the bank
and P3,000 in his possession, or a total of P25,000. In his
answer, he offered to pay this amount if the court so
directed him. On these two grounds, therefore, his claim of
liquidation and settlement of accounts must be rejected.
After subtracting P38,442.84 (expenditures) from
P70,007.19 (receipts), there is a difference of P31,564
which, added to the amount of P25,000, leaves a balance
of P56,564.3528 in favor of Justina Santos.
As to the second account, the evidence shows that the
monthly income from the Ongpin property until its sale in
Rizal Avenue July, 1959 was P1,000, and that from the
Rizal Avenue property, of which Wong was the lessee,
was P3,120. Against this account the household expenses
and disbursements for the care of the 17 dogs and the
salaries of the 8 maids of Justina Santos were charged.
This account is contained in a notebook (Def. Exh. 6)
which shows a balance of P9,210.49 in favor of Wong. But
it is claimed that the rental from both the Ongpin and Rizal
Avenue properties was more than enough to pay for her
monthly expenses and that, as a matter of fact, there
should be a balance in her favor. The lower court did not
allow either party to recover against the other. Said the
court:
[T]he documents bear the earmarks of genuineness; the
trouble is that they were made only by Francisco Wong
and Antonia Matias, nick-named Toning, — which was the
way she signed the loose sheets, and there is no clear
proof that Doña Justina had authorized these two to act for
her in such liquidation; on the contrary if the result of that
was a deficit as alleged and sought to be there shown, of
P9,210.49, that was not what Doña Justina apparently
understood for as the Court understands her statement to
the Honorable Judge of the Juvenile Court . . . the reason
why she preferred to stay in her home was because there
she did not incur in any debts . . . this being the case, . . .
the Court will not adjudicate in favor of Wong Heng on his
counterclaim; on the other hand, while it is claimed that
the expenses were much less than the rentals and there in
fact should be a superavit, . . . this Court must concede
that daily expenses are not easy to compute, for this
reason, the Court faced with the choice of the two
alternatives will choose the middle course which after all is
permitted by the rules of proof, Sec. 69, Rule 123 for in the
ordinary course of things, a person will live within his
income so that the conclusion of the Court will be that
there is neither deficit nor superavit and will let the matter
rest here.
Both parties on appeal reiterate their respective claims but
we agree with the lower court that both claims should be
denied. Aside from the reasons given by the court, we
think that the claim of Justina Santos totalling P37,235, as
rentals due to her after deducting various expenses,
should be rejected as the evidence is none too clear about
the amounts spent by Wong for food29 masses30 and
salaries of her maids.31 His claim for P9,210.49 must
likewise be rejected as his averment of liquidation is belied
by his own admission that even as late as 1960 he still
had P22,000 in the bank and P3,000 in his possession.
ACCORDINGLY, the contracts in question (Plff Exhs. 3-7) G.R. No. L-36637 July 14, 1978
are annulled and set aside; the land subject-matter of the
contracts is ordered returned to the estate of Justina
Santos as represented by the Philippine Banking GENEROSO MENDOZA, substituted by his wife and
Corporation; Wong Heng (as substituted by the defendant- administratrix DIEGA DE LEON VDA. DE MENDOZA,
appellant Lui She) is ordered to pay the Philippine Banking
petitioner,
Corporation the sum of P56,564.35, with legal interest
from the date of the filing of the amended complaint; and vs.
the amounts consigned in court by Wong Heng shall be
applied to the payment of rental from November 15, 1959 THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DANIEL GOLE CRUZ
until the premises shall have been vacated by his heirs. and DOLORES MENDOZA, respondents.
Costs against the defendant-appellant.

Demetrio B. Encarnacion & Carlos J. Antiporda for

petitioner.

Norberto S. Gonzalez for private respondents.

SANTOS, J.:

This petition for review by certiorari seeks the reversal of

the decision of the Court of Appeals * dated February 27,
1973 in CA-G.R. No. 46581-R entitled "Generoso
Mendoza, applicants", applicant-appellee vs. Daniel Gole
Cruz, et al., movant, which upheld the registration in the
names of herein private respondents, purchasers of the
landholdings subject matter of an application for
registration, notwithstanding that they were not parties in
the original registration proceedings.

Relevant antecedent facts follow. On May 15, 1964,

Generoso Mendoza, herein petitioner, 1 filed with the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan an application for the
registration of two parcels of land, with a residential house
thereon, situated in the Poblacion of Sta. Maria Bulacan. A
notice was issued on December 3, 1964 setting the date
of initial hearing on June 18, 1965. Said notice was duly
published, posted and served but nobody appeared nor
filed an answer or opposition within the period allowed for
that purpose. Consequently, the registration court entered
on July 6, 1965, an order of general default and allowed
the applicant to present his evidence ex-parte. 2
From the evidence presented by applicant Generoso
Mendoza, herein petitioner, it was proven that he and his
wife, Diega de Leon, were the owners of the parcels of
land subject of the application but the same were sold by
them, during the pendency of the case, to the spouses
Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores Mendoza, herein private
respondents, subject to the vendors' usufructuary rights.
The instrument embodying such sale was presented as
Exhibit 1. On the basis of such evidence, the registration
court rendered a decision on July 21, 1965, ordering the
registration of the two parcels of land in the names of the
vendees, Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores Mendoza, subject
to the usufructuary rights of the vendors, Generoso
Mendoza and Diega de Leon. On the same day, a copy of
said decision was received by Generoso Mendoza. 3
On November 5, 1965. after the decision had become
final, the applicant-vendor, Generoso Mendoza, filed a
motion for the issuance of the decree. On May 16, 1967,
Decree No. 114454 was issued confirming the title to the
land of vendees Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores Mendoza,
and ordering the registration of the same in their names,
subject to the usufructuary rights of the vendors.
Consequently, Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3787 was
issued to spouses Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores
Mendoza. 4
On April 16, 1968, Generoso Mendoza filed an urgent
petition for reconsideration praying that the decision dated
July 21, 1965 and the decree issued pursuant thereto
dated May 16, 1967 be set aside and that Original
Certificate of Title No. 03787 be cancelled, on the ground
that the vendees, the registered owners, had failed to pay
the purchase price of the lands. 5
The registration court considered said urgent petition for
reconsideration as a petition for review of the decree and
issued an order dated September 3, 1968 setting aside its
decision, its order for the issuance of the decree, and the
decree of registration, on the ground that it did not have
jurisdiction to order the registration of the lands in the
names of the vendees, who were not parties to the
application for registration. Moreover, said court ordered
the cancellation of O.C.T. No. 03787 and directed the
registration of the lands in the names of spouses,
Generoso Mendoza and Diega de Leon, subject to the
rights of vendees, Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores
Mendoza, stated in the deed of sale. 6
On September 17, 1968, spouses Cruz and Mendoza
moved to reconsider the order, but their motion was
denied on October 17, 1968. On December 19, 1968, said
spouses appealed from the order dated September 3,
1968. On March 11, 1969, Mendoza filed a motion to
dismiss the appeal and on April 10, 1969, the registration
court dismissed the appeal. 7
The spouses Cruz and Mendoza then filed with the Court
of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari, mandamus
and prohibition, which was docketed as CA-G.R. No.
43250-R. The Court of Appeals on January 5, 1970,
ordered the registration court to give due course to the
appeal. The registration court approved the Record on
Appeal and forwarded the same to the Court of Appeals
together with all the evidence adduced during the trial. 8
Acting on said appeal which was docketed as CA-G.R.
No. 46581- R, the Court of Appeals rendered on February
27, 1973, the decision, subject matter of the present
petition for review. It set aside the order of the land
registration court of September 3, 1968 which set aside its
decision of July 21, 1965 and the decree issued pursuant
thereto. It also denied applicant Mendoza's petition for
reconsideration dated April 15 (filed April 16), 1968, which
was considered as a petition for review of the decree.
Hence, this Petition for Review which alleges that the
respondent Court of Appeals erred —
1. ... IN HOLDING THAT THE APPELLEE
HIMSELF CAUSED THE REGISTRATION OF THE TITLE
TO THE LAND IN QUESTION IN THE NAME OF THE
APPELLANTS.
2. ... IN HOLDING THAT ALTHOUGH THERE WAS
NO FORMAL AMENDMENT OF THE APPLICATION FOR
REGISTRATION SUBSTITUTING THE VENDEES FOR
THE APPLICANT, THE REGISTRATION COURT COULD
LEGALLY ORDER THE TITLE ISSUED IN THE NAME
OF VENDEES BECAUSE THE APPLICANT HIMSELF
PROVIDED THE BASIS FOR ADJUDICATION; AND
THAT THE APPLICATION COULD HAVE BEEN
AMENDED TO CONFORM TO THE EVIDENCE
ALREADY ADVANCED BY SUBSTITUTING THE
VENDEES FOR THE SAID APPLICANT.
3. ... IN HOLDING THAT THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION WAS NOT BASED ON FRAUD
PERPETRATED ON THE APPELLEE BY THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT. 9
The foregoing assigned errors question the decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals ordering the registration of
the landholdings subject matter of the application for
registration in the names of herein private respondents
who are the purchasers of the landholdings,
notwithstanding that they were not parties in the original
registration proceedings before the lower court.
In the first assignment of error, the petitioner assails the
Court of Appeals' holding that he himself caused the
registration of the land in question in the name of the
vendees, the herein private respondents. But whether or
not the petitioner did in fact cause the registration of the
land in favor of private respondents is a question of fact
which cannot properly be raised in the present petition for
review inasmuch as Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court expressly provides that in an appeal from the Court
of Appeals to this Court, only questions of law my be
raised. 10 Thus, the finding of the Court of Appeals that
petitioner caused the registration of the land in favor of the
private respondents cannot now be raised in this Appeal
much less disturbed by this Court.
However, by petitioner's insistence that he could not be
deemed to have caused the registration of the land in the
names of private respondents as he never testified in court
having sold the same to said Private respondents 11 he, in
effect, invokes the exception to the above-stated rule of
conclusiveness of the Court of Appeals' findings of fact,
namely: that the Court of Appeals' finding is grounded
entirely on surmises or conjectures and has no basis in
the evidence on record. 12 Consequently, We are tasked
with the e petition of the records of the case to determine
the veracity of petitioner's claim that he never testified in
court as having sold the property to the herein private
respondents. And it must here be emphasized that should
the records confirm such claim of the petitioner, the Court
of Appeals' holding that he caused the registration of the
land in the names of private respondents would have no
basis in the evidence and should, thus, be reversed.
A careful study and consideration of the records of the
case, however, belie petitioner's claim that he did not
testify relative to the aforementioned deed of sale. The
transcript of the stenographic notes of the hearing on the
application for registration held on July 6, 1965 all too
clearly show that petitioner and his wife testified before the
deputed commissioner, Mr. Ricardo Cruz, that they sold
the property sought to be registered to the private
respondents. Thus, the records show that petitioner ATTY. VALENTIN:
testified as follows:

Q. Do you know the two parcels of land subject

xxx xxx xxx matter of this registration proceedings?

Atty. Valentin: A. Yes, sir.

Q. You said that you are the owners of these two xxx xxx xxx
parcels of land subject matter of this litigation, after you
have caused the filing of this application, was there any
transaction that took place with respect to the same? Q. Do you know who are now in possession of these
properties.

A. Yes sir, we have sold these two parcels of land to

Daniel Gole Cruz and his wife Dolores Mendoza.
Q. Showing to you this document which is an
original carbon copy of a deed of sale written in Tagalog
and executed and ratified on October 15, 1964, would you
kindly tell this Honorable Court which is Exhibit I, will you
tell this Honorable Court if you know this Exhibit I? (sic)
A. We, I, my husband and Daniel Gole Cruz and
and his wife, Dolores Mendoza are in actual possession of
the same.
Q. Why are Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores Mendoza
co-possessing with you these two parcels of land?

A. Because on October 15, 1964, we sold this

A. Yes, sir, that is the carbon copy of the deed of
property to them with one of the conditions that until my
sale I have just mentioned. 13 (Emphasis supplied) husband and myself or anyone of us die, we will live with
them. 14 (Emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

Similarly, applicant-petitioner's wife, Diega de Leon,

testified as follows: Furthermore, applicant-petitioner even presented the
private respondent Daniel Gole Cruz to confirm the
aforesaid sale of the subject property. Thus, Cruz testified
xxx xxx xxx as follows:
xxx xxx xxx petitioner's petition for review of the decree and ordered
the re-registration of the land in his name, the Court,
nevertheless, expressly declared in the very same order
ATTY. VALENTIN: that:

Generoso Mendoza was the original applicant in this case.

xxx xxx xxx
At the hearing, he himself produced evidence that on
October 15,1964 he and his wife sold the Land in favor of
the spouses Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores Mendoza for
Q. Do you know the property covered by this the amount of P6,000.00 payable in installments (Exh. 1).
registration proceedings? ...16 (Emphasis supplied).

A. Yes sir. In view of the foregoing, it is crystal clear that the

respondent Court of Appeals did not incur any error when
it held that applicant. Petitioner himself caused the
Q. Why do you know the same? registration of the land in the names of private
respondents.

A. Because we have been living in said place since I

got married and besides, on October 15, 1964, the said
two parcels of land were sold to us by the herein applicant
and his wife.
Q. Showing to you this Exhibit 1, would you Identify
and tell this Honorable Court if you know the same?
A. Yes sir, Exhibit I is the carbon original of the deed
of sale executed in our favor. 15 (Emphasis supplied).
Petitioner, however, insists in his second assignment of
error, that the registration court could not legally order the
registration of the land in the names of the vendees-
respondents, who were neither the applicants nor the
oppositors in the registration case below. Petitioner
overlooks Section 29 of the Land Registration Act which
expressly authorizes the registration of the land subject
matter of a registration proceeding in the name of the
buyer or of the person to whom the land has been
conveyed by an instrument executed during the interval of
time between the filing of the application for registration
and the issuance of the decree of title, thus —

xxx xxx xxx
Finally, even the registration court itself did not believe
applicant-petitioner's claim that he did not previously
cause the registration of the subject property in the names
of private respondents. For, while it granted applicant-
SEC. 29. After the filing of the application and before the
issuance of the decree of title by the Chief of the General
Land Registration Office, the land therein described may
be dealt with and instruments relating thereto shall be
recorded in the office of the register of said at any time
before issuance of the decree of title, in the same manner
as if no application had been made. The interested Party
may, however, present such instruments to the Court of
First Instance instead of presenting them to the office of
the register of deeds, together with a motion that the same
be considered in relation with the application, and the
court after notice to the parties, shall order such land
registered subject to the ecumbrance created by a said
instruments, or order the decree of registration issued in
the name of the buyer or of the person to whom the
property has been conveyed by said instruments. ...
(Emphasis supplied).
It is clear from the above-quoted provision that the law
expressly allows the land subject matter of an application
for registration to be "dealt with", i.e., to be disposed of or
encumbered during the interval of time between the filing
of the application and the issuance of the decree of title,
and to have the instruments embodying such disposition
or encumbrance presented to the registration court by the
,interested party" for the court to either "order such land
registered subject to the encumbrance created by said
instruments, or order the decree of registration issued in
the name of the buyer or of the person to whom the
property has been conveyed by said instruments. 17 The
law does not require that the application for registration be
amended by substituting the "buyer" or the person to
whom the property has been conveyed" for the applicant.
Neither does it require that the "buyer" or the "person to
whom the property has been conveyed" be a party to the
case. He may thus be a total stranger to the land
registration proceedings. The only requirements of the law
are: (1) that the instrument be presented to the court by
the interested party together with a motion that the same
be considered in relation with the application; and (2) that
prior notice be given to the parties to the case. And the
peculiar facts and circumstances obtaining in this case
show that these requirements have been complied with.
As heretofore stated, the instrument embodying the sale of
the subject property by the petitioner to the private
respondents was duly presented to the registration court
for consideration. That the purpose was to have the land
registered in the names of private respondents subject to
the usufructuary rights of petitioner and his wife is explicit
in the following facts and circumstances. Firstly, it was the
petitioner himself, the applicant in the registration
proceedings, who presented the deed of sale (Exh. I) to
the court and testified before the same that he did sell the
land to the private respondents. This was done by him
despite the fact that he could easily have the land
registered in his name — as an order of general default
had been issued and the hearing on the application for
registration had been conducted EX-PARTE. Secondly, as
if to fully convince the court of the fact of sale, petitioner
presented his wife, Diega de Leon, and private
respondent, Daniel GolE Cruz, to confirm the said sale of
the land and the stipulated usufructuary rights. Finally, the
petitioner even filed the motion for the issuance of the
decree of confirmation of title after having received the
decision of the court ordering the registration of the title to
the land in the names of vendees-respondents, subject to
the stipulated usufructuary rights — thereby signifying his
full assent to the same.
It is true that no written motion was filed seeking the
consideration of the deed of sale in relation with the
application for registration. But the law does not require
that the motion accompanying the presentation of the
instrument be in writing. And the above- enumerated acts
of the applicant-petitioner and the circumstances
surrounding the same accept of no interpretation than that
the applicant-petitioner did in fact move the court to order
the registration of the title to the land in the names of
vendees- respondents, subject only to the stipulated
usufructuary rights of the petitioner and his wife. There
was, therefore, sufficient compliance with the first
requirement of the law.
Anent the second requirement of prior notice to the
parties, the relevant fact to be considered is that an order
of general default had been issued prior to the
presentation of the deed of sale by the applicant-
petitioner, since nobody filed an opposition to the
application for registration. Thus, the only person who
should have been entitled to a notice from the court was
the applicant-petitioner himself, as the only party with a
legal standing in the proceedings. In view thereof, no legal
objection to the court's jurisdiction to order the registration
of the lands in the names of vendees-respondents may be
interposed on the ground of non-compliance with the
requirement of prior notice to the parties.
Since there was sufficient compliance with the aforestated
requirements of the law, respondent Court of Appeals did
not, therefore, err in holding that the lower court had
jurisdiction to order the registration of the lands in the
names of vendees-respondents.
The petitioner, finally, contends — in a desperate effort to
justify the validity of the appealed order of September 3,
1968 — that respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding
that he was not the victim of fraud perpetrated by the
vendees, private respondents, herein, who allegedly failed
to pay the purchase price of the landholdings. This is also
without merit. Section 38 of the Land Registration Act
provides as follows —
SEC. 38. If the court after hearing finds that the applicant
or adverse claimant has title as stated in his application or
adverse claim and proper for registration, a decree of
confirmation and registration shall be entered. ... Such
decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence,
infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby,
nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing
judgments or decree: subject, however, to the right of any
person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein
by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the
competent Court of First Instance a petition for review
within one year after entry of the decree provided no
innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest. ...
(Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear from the foregoing provision that the only ground
upon which a decree of registration may be set aside is
fraud in obtaining the same. In the instant case, applicant-
petitioner cannot complain of fraud in obtaining the decree
of registration for as heretofore stated, it was solely upon
his testimony and proof that the lots were ordered
registered in the names of the vendees-respondents and it
was also upon his motion that the decree of registration
was issued by the lower court. What the applicant-
petitioner actually invokes in this case is not fraud in
obtaining the decree of registration but the alleged failure
of the vendees-respondents to pay the purchase price of
the landholdings. But as correctly held by respondent
Court of Appeals:
(B)reach of contract is not a ground for a petition for a
review. And the registration court has no jurisdiction to
decide the contentious issue of whether or not the deed of
sale, Exh. "1", should be rescinded for the alleged failure
of the vendees to pay the purchase price. The issue on
the breach of contract has to be letigated in the ordinary
court.18
In view of all the foregoing, We hold that the Honorable
Court of Appeals did not commit any error in setting aside
the order of the lower court dated September 13, 1968,
and thus allowing the registration of the lots of the names
of the vedees, herein private respondents.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
February 17, 1973 is hereby affirmed with costs against
petitioner.
G.R. No. 102858 July 28, 1997
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, Petitioner, v. COURT OF
APPEALS and TEODORO ABISTADO, substituted by
MARGARITA, MARISSA, MARIBEL, ARNOLD and MARY
ANN, all surnamed ABISTO, Respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Is newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in
an original land registration case mandatory or directory?
Statement of the Case
The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural
and that the failure to cause such publication did not
deprive the trial court of its authority to grant the
application. But the Solicitor General disagreed and thus
filed this petition to set aside the Decision 1 promulgated
on July 3, 1991 and the subsequent Resolution 2
promulgated on November 19, 1991 by Respondent Court
of Appeals 3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 23719. The dispositive
portion of the challenged Decision reads: 4
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of
dismissal appealed from is hereby set aside, and a new
one entered confirming the registration and title of
applicant, Teodoro Abistado, Filipino, a resident of
Barangay 7, Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro,
now deceased and substituted by Margarita, Marissa,
Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado,
represented by their aunt, Miss Josefa Abistado, Filipinos,
residents of Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, to
the parcel of land covered under MSI (IV-A-8) 315-D
located in Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.
The oppositions filed by the Republic of the Philippines
and private oppositor are hereby dismissed for want of
evidence.
Upon the finality of this decision and payment of the
corresponding taxes due on this land, let an order for the
issuance of a decree be issued.
The Facts
On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro
Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title
over 648 square meters of land under Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 1529. 5 The application was docketed as Land
Registration Case (LRC) No. 86 and assigned to Branch
44 of the Regional Trial Court of Mamburao, Occidental
Mindoro. 6 However, during the pendency of his petition,
applicant died. Hence, his heirs - Margarita, Marissa,
Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado -
represented by their aunt Josefa Abistado, who was
appointed their guardian ad litem, were substituted as
applicants.
The land registration court in its decision dated June 13,
1989 dismissed the petition "for want of jurisdiction."
However, it found that the applicants through their
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
exclusive and peaceful possession of the subject land
since 1938.
In dismissing the petition, the trial court reasoned: 7
. . . However, the Court noted that applicants failed to
comply with the provisions of Section 23 (1) of PD 1529,
requiring the Applicants to publish the notice of Initial
Hearing (Exh. "E") in a newspaper of general circulation in
the Philippines. Exhibit "E" was only published in the
Official Gazette (Exhibits "F" and "G"). Consequently, the
Court is of the well considered view that it has not legally
acquired jurisdiction over the instant application for want of
compliance with the mandatory provision requiring
publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of
general circulation.
The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General
thus elevated this recourse to us. This Court notes that the
petitioner's counsel anchored his petition on Rule 65. This
is an error. His remedy should be based on Rule 45
because he is appealing a final disposition of the Court of
Appeals. Hence, we shall treat his petition as one for
review under Rule 45, and not for certiorari under Rule 65.
9

The trial court also cited Ministry of Justice Opinion No.

48, Series of 1982, which in its pertinent portion provides: The Issue
8

Petitioner alleges that Respondent Court of Appeals

It bears emphasis that the publication requirement under committed "grave abuse of discretion" 10 in holding -
Section 23 [of PD 1529] has a two-fold purpose; the first,
which is mentioned in the provision of the aforequoted
provision refers to publication in the Official Gazette, and . . . that publication of the petition for registration of title in
is jurisdictional; while the second, which is mentioned in LRC Case No. 86 need not be published in a newspaper
the opening clause of the same paragraph, refers to of general circulation, and in not dismissing LRC Case No.
publication not only in the Official Gazette but also in a 86 for want of such publication.
newspaper of general circulation, and is procedural.
Neither one nor the other is dispensable. As to the first,
publication in the Official Gazette is indispensably
Petitioner points out that under Section 23 of PD 1529, the
necessary because without it, the court would be
notice of initial hearing shall be "published both in the
powerless to assume jurisdiction over a particular land
Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general
registration case. As to the second, publication of the
circulation." According to petitioner, publication in the
notice of initial hearing also in a newspaper of general
Official Gazette is "necessary to confer jurisdiction upon
circulation is indispensably necessary as a requirement of
the trial court, and . . . in . . . a newspaper of general
procedural due process; otherwise, any decision that the
circulation to comply with the notice requirement of due
court may promulgate in the case would be legally infirm.
process." 11

Unsatisfied, private respondents appealed to Respondent

Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that
Court of Appeals which, as earlier explained, set aside the
failure to comply with the requirement of publication in a
decision of the trial court and ordered the registration of
newspaper of general circulation is a mere "procedural
the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado.
defect." They add that publication in the Official Gazette is
sufficient to confer jurisdiction. 12

The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in

the challenged CA Resolution dared November 19, 1991.
In reversing the decision of the trial court, Respondent
Court of Appeals ruled: 13
. . . although the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation is
couched in mandatory terms, it cannot be gainsaid that the
law also mandates with equal force that publication in the
Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction
upon the court.
Further, Respondent Court found that the oppositors were
afforded the opportunity "to explain matters fully and
present their side." Thus, it justified its disposition in this
wise: 14
. . . We do not see how the lack of compliance with the
required procedure prejudiced them in any way. Moreover,
the other requirements of: publication in the Official
Gazette, personal notice by mailing, and posting at the site
and other conspicuous places, were complied with and
these are sufficient to notify any party who is minded to
make any objection of the application for registration.
The Court's Ruling
We find for petitioner.
Newspaper Publication Mandatory
The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No.
1529 requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing
reads as follows:
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. - The
court shall, within five days from filing of the application,
issue an order setting the date and hour of the initial
hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor
later than ninety days from the date of the order.
The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the
application for land registration by means of (1)
publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.
1. By publication. -
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for
initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration
shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once
in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the
publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to
confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be
addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in
the land involved including the adjoining owners so far as
known, and "to all whom it may concern." Said notice shall
also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a
certain date and time to show cause why the prayer of
said application shall not be granted.
xxx xxx xxx
Admittedly, the above provision provides in clear and
categorical terms that publication in the Official Gazette
suffices to confer jurisdiction upon the land registration
court. However, the question boils down to whether,
absent any publication in a newspaper of general
circulation, the land registration court can validly confirm
and register the title of private respondents.
We answer this query in the negative. This answer is
impelled by the demands of statutory construction and the
due process rationale behind the publication requirement.
The law used the term "shall" in prescribing the work to be
done by the Commissioner of Land Registration upon the
latter's receipt of the court order setting the time for initial
hearing. The said word denotes an imperative and thus
indicates the mandatory character of a statute. 15 While
concededly such literal mandate is not an absolute rule in
statutory construction, as its import ultimately depends
upon its context in the entire provision, we hold that in the
present case the term must be understood in its normal
mandatory meaning. In Republic vs. Marasigan, 16 the
Court through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. held that
Section 23 of PD 1529 requires notice of the initial hearing
by means of (1) publication, (2) mailing and (3) posting, all
of which must be complied with. "If the intention of the law
were otherwise, said section would not have stressed in
detail the requirements of mailing of notices to all persons
named in the petition who, per Section 15 of the Decree,
include owners of adjoining properties, and occupants of
the land." Indeed, if mailing of notices is essential, then by
parity of reasoning, publication in a newspaper of general
circulation is likewise imperative since the law included
such requirement in its detailed provision.
It should be noted further that land registration is a
proceeding in rem. 17 Being in rem, such proceeding
requires constructive seizure of the land as against all
persons, including the state, who have rights to or
interests in the property. An in rem proceeding is validated
essentially through publication. This being so, the process
must strictly be complied with. Otherwise, persons who
may be interested or whose rights may be adversely
affected would be barred from contesting an application
which they had no knowledge of. As has been ruled, a
party as an owner seeking the inscription of realty in the
land registration court must prove by satisfactory and
conclusive evidence not only his ownership thereof but the
identity of the same, for he is in the same situation as one
who institutes an action for recovery of realty. 18 He must
prove his title against the whole world. This task, which
rests upon the applicant, can best be achieved when all
persons concerned - nay, "the whole world" - who have
rights to or interests in the subject property are notified
and effectively invited to come to court and show cause
why the application should not be granted. The elementary
norms of due process require that before the claimed
property is taken from concerned parties and registered in
the name of the applicant, said parties must be given
notice and opportunity to oppose.
It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general
circulation should be deemed mandatory when the law
already requires notice by publication in the Official
Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of which
have already been complied with in the case at hand. The
reason is due process and the reality that the Official
Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as
newspapers and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation,
such that the notices published therein may not reach the
interested parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such
parties may not be owners of neighboring properties, and
may in fact not own any other real estate. In sum, the all-
encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the
consequences of default orders issued against the whole
world and the objective of disseminating the notice in as
wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory
construction of the requirements for publication, mailing
and posting.
Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit
publication requirement of the law. Private respondents
did not proffer any excuse; even if they had, it would not
have mattered because the statute itself allows no
excuses. Ineludibly, this Court has no authority to
dispense with such mandatory requirement. The law is
unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and again, this
Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and
categorical language, there is no room for interpretation,
vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for
application. 19 There is no alternative. Thus, the
application for land registration filed by private
respondents must be dismissed without prejudice to
reapplication in the future, after all the legal requisites
shall have been duly complied with.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed
Decision and Resolution are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The application of private respondent for land
registration is DISMISSED without prejudice. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-55152 August 19, 1986
FLORDELIZA L. VALISNO and HONORIO D. VALISNO,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE ANDRES B. PLAN, Presiding Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Isabela, Second Branch, and
VICENCIO CAYABA, respondents.
Francisco A. Lava, Jr. for petitioners.
Diosdado B. Ramirez for private respondent.
FERNAN, J.:
Challenged in this petition for certiorari with prayer for a
temporary restraining order are two [2] orders issued by
respondent judge in Land Registration Case No. Branch
11-N-204 of the then Court of First Instance of Isabela,
Second Branch, entitled, "Application for Registration of
Title, Vicencio Q. Cayaba, Applicant, vs. Flordeliza Valisno
and Honorio D. Valisno, Oppositors," the order dated July
2, 1980, dismissing the opposition filed by petitioners on
the ground of res judicata, and the order dated September
19, 1980, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The antecedents are as follows:
On August 21, 1964, petitioners-spouses Flordeliza and
Honorio Valisno purchased from the legal heirs of Agapita
V. Blanco, namely, Guillermo, Guillermo, Jr., Manuel and
Rosario, all surnamed Blanco, two parcels of land,
particularly described as follows:
[a] a tract of land situated at Sitio Sisim Barangay
Cabaruan, Municipality of Cauayan, Province of Isabela,
having an area of Five Thousand (5,000) square meters or
fifty (50) meters facing the Provincial Road by one
hundred (100) meters long; bounded on the North by
Pedro del Rosario, on the South by Alberto Tungangui, on
the East by the Provincial Road; and on the West, by
Terreno del Estado, now Matias del Rosario;
and,
[c] a parcel of land situated in the Municipality of
Cauayan, Province of Isabela, having an area of Six
Thousand Two Hundred Fifty (6,250) square meters or
fifty (50) meters at the east side by one hundred twenty-
five (125) meters at the North and South; bounded on the
north by Matias del Rosario, on the south by Alberto
Tungangui, on the east by Agapita Blanco and on the west
by Cauayan Diversion Road and Matias del Rosario.
[Annex "B", Petition, pp. 41-42, Rollo.]
Thereafter, petitioners declared the above-described
parcels of land in their name for taxation purposes and
exercised exclusive possession thereof in the concept of
owners by installing as caretaker one Fermin Lozano, who
had his house built thereon.
On August 12, 1968, private respondent Vicencio Q.
Cayaba, claiming to be the owner of the land in question
by virtue of a deed of sale executed in his and one
Bienvenido G. Noriega's favor on June 30, 1967 by the
heirs of Dr. Epifanio Q. Verano, ousted Fermin Lozano
from possession of the land. He subsequently erected a
six-door apartment on said land.
On January 22, 1970, petitioners instituted before the then
Court of First Instance of Isabela a complaint against
private respondent for recovery of possession of said
parcels of land. The case, docketed as Civil Case No.
Branch II-895, was in due time resolved in favor of
petitioners who were declared owners thereof. On appeal,
however, by private respondent to the then Court of
Appeals, the appeal being docketed as CA-G.R. No.
60142-R, the appellate court in a decision promulgated on
January 19, 1978, reversed the decision of the lower court
and dismissed the complaint of petitioners on a finding
that:
Firstly, the 'land in question described in the complaint and
sketched in Exhibit C ... by Dr. Guillermo Blanco,' is
completely different from the land appearing in the
Subdivision Plan of the appelles appellant, their respective
area and boundaries being completely dissimilar.
Clearly, we fail to see anything in the evidence of the
appellees showing that their property encroaches, much
less covers that of the property presently occupied by the
appellant, except the self-serving sketch prepared by the
appellees' own witness, Dr. Blanco. We refuse to give any
weight to this piece of evidence because it was prepared
by someone who' has an incentive to exaggerate or give
false color to his statement or to suppress or prevent the
truth or to state what is false. [Deering v. Wisona
Harvester Workers, 155 U.S. Sup. Ct. Rep. 238]
Therefore, as the land occupied by the appellant has not
been successfully Identified with that described in the
complaint, the instant action should have been dismissed
outright, in view of the provision of Article 434 of the New
Civil Code which reads.
Art. 434. In an action to recover, the property must be
Identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his
title and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim' as
well as the doctrine enunciated in a long line of decision
[sic] starting from Lim vs. Director of Lands, 64 Phil. 343.
Secondly, it is undisputed that the appellant is the present
occupant of the land since he purchased the same from
Tomasita F. Verano on June 30, 1967, having constructed
a six-door apartment in the premises which he lets to both
transients and residents of the locality. Being the actual
possessor of the property, he, therefore, possesses it with
a just title and he need not show or prove why he is
possessing the same. [Arts. 433 and 541 of the New Civil
Code].
Finally, between the evidence of the appellees and that of
the appellant, We unhesitatingly choose the latter in the
matter of Identifying the property in question because it is
a vicinity plan [Exhibit "8"] showing the position of the land
in relation not only to the properties adjoining the same but
also with known boundaries and landmarks in the area.
On the other hand, the appellees' evidence, particularly
the description in Tax Declaration No. 17009, is unreliable,
since the area and boundaries of the property are mere
estimations, reached thru pure guess-work. [Smith Bell &
Co. vs. Director of Lands, 50 Phil. 8791]. Expressing the
same sentiment, one noted authority states:
The proposition that in Identifying a particular piece of land
its boundaries and not the area are the main factors to be
considered holds true only when the boundaries given are
sufficiently certain and the Identity of the land proved by
the boundaries clearly indicates that an erroneous
statement concerning the area can be disregarded.' [Bilog,
Effective Judicial Implementation of Land and Forestry
Laws, Fourth Advanced Course for Municipal Courts
(1971), cit. Paterno v. Salud, L-15620, September 30,
19631. (Annex "C-l," Petition, pp. 5355, Rollo.]
A petition for review on certiorari of said decision filed by
petitioners before this Court was denied due course.
Subsequently, on September 25, 1979, private respondent
filed before the Court of First Instance of Isabela an
application for registration in his name of the title of the
lands in question, basing his entitlement thereto on the
aforementioned deed of sale as well as the decision of the
appellate court in CA-G.R. No. 60142-R, [Annex "A",
Petition, pp. 32-40, Rollo).
On April 26, 1980, petitioners filed an opposition to the
application. [Annex "B", Petition, p. 41, Rollo] Private
respondent, however, moved for the dismissal of said
opposition on the ground that the same is barred by a prior
judgment, i.e., the appellate court's decision in CA-G.R.
No. 60142-R. Despite the opposition of petitioners to said
motion to dismiss, the lower court issued the first of the
assailed orders dismissing the petitioner's opposition on
the ground of res judicata. [Annex "E", Petition, p. 83,
Rollo] When their motion for reconsideration was denied,
petitioners filed the instant petition, raising as grounds
therefor the following:
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN
DISMISSING PETITIONERS' OPPOSITION TO
RESPONDENTS' APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION
OF TITLE, WHICH IS HIGHLY IRREGULAR IN LAND
REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS.
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN
DISREGARDING THE PRECEDENT OF ABELLERA VS.
FAROL THAT RES JUDICATA CANNOT BE SET UP IN A
LAND REGISTRATION CASE.
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN HOLDING
THAT THE REQUISITES FOR RES JUDICATA EXIST IN
THE CASE AT BAR, ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT A
MOTION TO DISMISS OPPOSITION IS PROPER IN A
LAND REGISTRATION CASE, AND THAT RES
JUDICATA MAYBE RAISED IN SAID MOTION TO
DISMISS.
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN
DEPRIVING PETITIONERS HEREIN OF THEIR DAY IN
COURT, SPECIALLY IN THE FACE OF STRONG
INDICATIONS, ALREADY IN THE RECORD, THAT
RESPONDENT CAYABA IS ACTUALLY TRYING TO
SECURE TITLE TO WHAT REALLY IN THE LAND OF
THE PETITIONERS.
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY, WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN ISSUING HIS ORDERS OF JULY
2,1980 [ANNEX "E"] AND SEPTEMBER 19, 1980
[ANNEX "H"]. (pp. 18-19, Rollo)
On April 1, 1981, this Court gave due course to the
petition and required the parties to file their briefs.
Petitioners did so on August 26, 1981. Private respondent,
on the other hand, failed to file his brief within the given
period which expired on October 9, 1981. Thus, the case
was consider submitted for decision without the brief of
private respondent.
On July 8, 1985, this Court received a copy of the motion
to amend application filed by Bienvenido G. Noriega, Sr.,
thru counsel, in LRC Case No. Br. II-N-204, praying that
he be included as co-applicant to the land sought to be
registered.
In the course of our study of pertinent jurisprudence, We
observe that the situation obtaining in the case at bar, i.e.,
a motion to dismiss the opposition having been filed and
more importantly, granted, is indeed unique and peculiar.
But while this may be so, it is not highly irregular as
petitioners would characterize it.
Verily, the Land Registration Act [Act 496] does not
provide for a pleading similar or corresponding to a motion
to dismiss. Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, however,
allows the application of the rules contained therein in land
registration proceedings in a suppletory character or
whenever practicable and convenient. Thus, for the
expeditious termination of the land registration case, this
Court in Duran v. Oliva, 3 SCRA 154, sustained the
dismissal of the application for registration of therein
appellants upon a motion to dismiss filed by five [5]
oppositors, it having been indubitably shown that the court
a quo did not have jurisdiction over the res as the lands
sought to be registered in appellants' name had previously
been registered in the names of the oppositors. To have
allowed the registration proceeding to run its usual course
would have been a mere exercise in futility. The same
consideration applies to the case at bar.
It must be noted that the opposition partakes of the nature
of an answer with a counterclaim. In ordinary civil cases,
the counterclaim would be considered a complaint, this
time with the original defendant becoming the plaintiff. The
original plaintiff, who becomes defendant in the
counterclaim may either then answer the counterclaim or
be declared in default, or may file a motion to dismiss the
same. The latter choice was what respondent Cayaba
opted for. Although as We have earlier said, such situation
rarely, if ever, happens in land registration cases, the
irregularity that petitioners complain of stems basically
from the infrequent use of a motion to dismiss in land
registration cases, and not from it being unauthorize.
The case of Abellera vs. Farol 74 Phil. 284, heavily relied
upon by petitioners needs re-evaluation. In said case, Mr.
Justice Bocobo, speaking for the Court, ruled that "while in
a cadastral case, res judicata is available to a claimant in
order to defeat the alleged rights of another claimant,
nevertheless, prior judgment can not be set up in a motion
to dismiss. " Concurring in said opinion were then Chief
Justice Yulo and Associate Justices Moran and Ozaeta.
Mr. Justice Paras dissented, saying "in my opinion, Rule
132 in connection with Rule 8 of the Rules of Court,
instead of prohibiting expressly authorizes the lower court
in land registration or cadastral proceedings to entertain a
motion for dismissal on the ground of res judicata or
prescription. Of course, the dismissal of petitioner's claim
will not necessarily or automatically mean adjudication of
title to the individual respondents but it will certainly
facilitate the consideration of their claims which cease to
be contested. Prompt disposal of cases or such claims is
the main purpose of said rules. Let there be no
retrogression in the application of sound rules and
doctrines." [Ibid, pp. 286-287) In support of his opinion,
Justice Paras cited the cases of Menor v. Quintana, 56
Phil. 657, Versoza v. Nicolas, 29 Phil. 425 and Santiago v.
Santos, 54 Phil. 619, wherein the Court invariably ruled
that a "final judgment in an ordinary civil case determining
the ownership of certain land is res judicata in a
registration case when the parties and the property are the
same as in the former case. " [Menor v. Quintana, supra.]
There is no doubt that the principle of res judicata
operates in the case at bar. For said principle to apply: [a]
the former judgment must be final, [b] it must have been'
rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject
matter and of the parties, [c] it must be a judgment on the
merits and [d] there must be between the first and second
actions identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause
of action. [Carandang v. Venturanza, 133 SCRA 344] The
decision in CA-G. R. No. 60142-R is a final judgment on
the merits rendered by a court which had jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties. There is, between the
registration case under consideration and the previous
civil action for recovery of property, identity of parties,
subject matter and cause of action. The inclusion of
private respondent Cayaba's co-owner, Bienvenido
Noriega, Sr., in the application for registration does not
result in a difference in parties between the two cases.
One right of a co-owner is to defend in court the interests
of the co-ownership. [Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines,
Annotated, Vol. II, 7th Edition, p. 258] Thus, when private
respondent Cayaba defended his ownership over the land
in question, he was doing so in behalf of the co-ownership.
This is evident from the fact that one of the evidence he
presented to prove ownership was the deed of sale
executed by the heirs of Dr. Epifanio Q. Verano is his and
Bienvenido Noriega's favor.
With respect to the subject matter, there can be no
question that the land sought to be recovered by
petitioners are the very same parcels of land being sought
to be registered in Cayaba's and Noriega's names.
While the complaint in the first action is captioned for
recovery of possession, the allegations and the prayer for
relief therein raise the issue of ownership. In effect, it is in
the nature of an accion reinvidicatoria. The second case is
for registration of title. Consequently, between the two
cases there is identity of causes of action because in
accion reinvidicatoria, possession is sought on the basis of
ownership and the same is true in registration cases.
Registration of title in one's name is based on ownership.
In both cases, the plaintiff and the applicant seek to
exclude other persons from ownership of the land in
question. The only difference is that in the former case,
the exclusion is directed against particular persons, while
in the latter proceedings, the exclusion is directed against
the whole world. Nonetheless, the cause of action remains
the same. In fact, this Court held in Dais v. Court of First
Instance of Capiz, [51 Phil. 896] that the answers in a
cadastral proceedings partake of an action to recover title,
as real rights are involved therein. It is only the form of
action which is different. "But the employment of two
different forms of action, does not enable one to escape
the operation of the principle that one and the same cause
of action shall not be twice litigated." [Yusingco v. Ong
Hing Lian, 42 SCRA 590 and the cases cited therein,
Gonzales v. Gonzales, 26 SCRA 76; Aguilar v. Tuason
Co., 22 SCRA 690; Albano v. Coloma, 21 SCRA 411;
Sumarariz v. Development Bank of the Phil., 21 SCRA
1378; Abes, et al. v. Rodil, et al., 17 SCRA 824; Cayco, et
al. v. Cruz et al., 106 Phil. 68; Ma. Garcia de Lim Toco v.
Go Pay, 81 Phil. 258; San Diego v. Cardona, et al., 70
Phil. 281].
Petitioners complain that by dismissing their opposition,
respondent court had denied them their day in court. It is
well to remind petitioners that they had their day in court in
Civil Case No. Branch II-895 as well as CA-G.R. No.
60142-R, where their claim over the land in question was
fully aired and ventilated.

The conflicting claims of petitioners and respondent

It does not matter that the first case was decided by a
court of general jurisdiction, while the second case is
being heard by one of a limited jurisdiction, such as a
registration court. It is enough that the court which decided
the first case on the merits had validly acquired jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties. That both courts
should have equal jurisdiction is not a requisite of res
judicata.
Cayaba [in behalf of the co-ownership] with respect to the
land under consideration had been put to rest in CA-G.R.
No. 60142-R. Said decision having attained finality, the
same remains the law of the case between the parties.
Finding no error to have been committed by respondent
judge in dismissing petitioners' opposition, such dismissal
must be affirmed.

If, as the Abellera case, supra, held that res judicata can
be set up by a claimant to defeat the alleged right of WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed.
another claimant, what useful purpose would be served by Cost against petitioners.
allowing a party to present evidence of ownership over the
land sought to be registered when the final result would
necessarily be in favor of the claimant who had set up the
defense of res judicata? And supposing the land SO ORDERED.
registration court finds that the party against whom the
principle of res judicata operates does have a better right
or title to the land, what happens to the principle of res
judicata? Can a court sitting as a land registration court in
effect, annul a final judgment of another court of general
jurisdiction?

To our mind, therefore, the better policy, both for

practicality and convenience, is to grant the dismissal of
either the application for registration or the opposition
thereto, once it has been indubitably shown, as in the case
at bar, that one or the other is barred by a prior judgment.
The ruling in the Abellera case, should therefore be, as it
is, hereby abandoned.
G.R. No. L-16995 October 28, 1968
JULIO LUCERO, movant-appellee,
vs.
JAIME L. LOOT, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
Ramon Gonzales for movant-appellee.
Jaime L. Loot for and in his own behalf as oppositor-
appellant.
FERNANDO, J.:
The order of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, the former
Judge Wenceslao L. Fernan presiding, dated September
21, 1959, now on appeal before this Court, speaks to this
effect: "Regarding the writ of possession, once the final
decree has been issued the issuance of a writ of
possession is only a matter of course if nothing in the past
has been issued in favor of the registered owner. There is
no period of prescription as to the issuance of a writ of
possession, and inasmuch as the final decree has already
been entered, it follows that a writ of possession should be
issued in favor of the registered owner."1
Accordingly, it granted a writ of possession in favor of
movant, now appellee, Julio Lucero. There was an
opposition on the part of oppositors, all surnamed Loot,
now appellants. The lower court failed to see merit in the
opposition interposed. It explained why: "The opposition
interposed by the oppositors to the effect that there are
defects in the reconstitution of the records and that the
motion is not under oath is trivial in its nature and
consequently untenable."2 Accordingly, the writ of
possession, as prayed for, was issued.
There was an urgent motion to quash the writ of
possession filed by the oppositors on September 25,
1959,3 followed by a motion for reconsideration on
October 10, 1959,4 which was denied in an order of
October 23, 1959.5 As set forth in such order of denial:
"After weighing the arguments adduced by the movant
represented by Atty. Gonzales and the oppositor
represented by Atty. Loot, this Court adheres to the
previous ruling that inasmuch as no writ of possession has
been issued in this case, it is the ministerial duty of this
Court to issue one in compliance of the provisions of Act
496 as amended." There was a second motion for
reconsideration filed by oppositors on November 3, 1959,6
which was denied in an order of December 10, 1959.7 Not
satisfied, there was still another motion for reconsideration
of the above order filed by oppositors on December 28,
1959,8 which similarly met the same fate, an order of
denial being issued on February 20, 1960.9 The appeal
was taken direct to us.
The sore issue, therefore, is whether on the above facts,
the order granting the writ of possession was in
accordance with law. The answer must be in the
affirmative. This appeal cannot prosper.
No other view would be compatible with the pertinent
provision of the Land Registration Act,10 as uniformly
interpreted by this Court. As was noted in the order of
September 21, 1959, there was a final decree in a land
registration case which arose from a decision promulgated
in 1938, the final decree being issued on October 29,
1941. It was not incorrect for the lower court to state,
therefore, that "the issuance of a writ of possession is only
a matter of course if nothing in the past has been issued in
favor of the registered owner."11 It is equally true, as
likewise mentioned therein, that there is "no period of
prescription as to the issuance of a writ of possession,
..."12In Pasay Estate Co. v. Del Rosario,13 it has been
made clear that the purpose of the statutory provision
empowering the then Court of Land Registration, now the
ordinary courts of first instance, to enforce its orders,
judgments or decrees in the same way that the judiciary
does is so that the winning party could be placed in
possession of the property covered by such decree.
Thereby, there would be an avoidance of the
inconvenience and the further delay to which a successful
litigant would be subjected if he were compelled "to
commence other actions in other courts for the purpose of
securing the fruits of his victory."
There was a restatement of the above principle in
Demorar v. Ibañez,14 the closest in period of time to the
challenged order of the lower court. Thus: "We have
heretofore held that a writ of possession may be issued
not only against the person who has been defeated in a
registration case but also against anyone adversely
occupying the land or any portion thereof during the land
registration proceedings ... The issuance of the decree of
registration is part of the registration proceedings. In fact,
it is supposed to end the said proceedings. Consequently,
any person unlawfully and adversely occupying said lot at
any time up to the issuance of the final decree, may be
subject to judicial ejectment by means of a writ of
possession and it is the duty of the registration court to
issue said writ when asked for by the successful claimant."
As a matter of fact, in a 1948 decision,15 it was held by us
that "the fact that the petitioners have instituted, more than
one year after the decree of registration had been issued,
an ordinary action with the Court of First Instance
attacking the validity of the decree on the ground of fraud,
is not a bar to the issuance of the writ of possession
applied for by the registered owners."
A few months after the issuance of such a challenged
order of September 21, 1959, Marcelo v. Mencias was
decided,16 where this Court went so far as to hold that "if
the writ of possession issued in a land registration
proceeding implies the delivery of possession of the land
to the successful litigant therein, ... a writ of demolition
must, likewise, issue, especially considering that the latter
writ is but a complement of the former which, without said
writ of demolition, would be ineffective."
It is clear, therefore, to repeat, that on the facts as found,
the validity of the challenged order cannot be impugned. It
is equally clear that this being a direct appeal to us, no
questions of fact may be raised. As was held recently in
Perez v. Araneta:17 "Nothing is better settled than that
where the correctness of the findings of fact of the lower
court are assailed, the Court of Appeals is the proper
forum. If resort be had directly to us, then appellant must
be deemed to have waived the opportunity otherwise his
to inquire into such findings and to limit himself to
disputing the correctness of the law applied."
The problem thus confronting oppositors-appellants in
bringing the matter direct to us was to show that the above
two-page order on the meager but sufficient facts as
found, was vitiated by error or errors in law. It was far from
easy, therefore, considering as above shown that on the
authority of applicable decisions, the lower court was left
with no choice but to issue the writ of possession sought.
Resolute and undaunted, oppositors did their best to
accomplish a task formidable in its complexity. It seemed
they overdid it. They assigned twenty-one errors a great
many of them factual, and, therefore, not for us to
consider, and the remaining, except the last, far from
decisive in view of the rather settled state of the law
concerning the issuance of a writ of possession. Nor did
the twenty-first error assigned suffice to call for a reversal,
as will be more fully explained. That is why, as earlier
stated, the appeal was doomed to futility.
It would not be amiss, though, to discuss even briefly one
of them, the fourteenth. Invoking three of our previous
decisions,18 they would impugn the issuance of the writ of
possession on the ground that they were not oppositors
and defeated parties in the land registration proceeding.
They would ignore the fact, however, that in the above
decisions relied upon, the basis for the impropriety of
issuing a writ of possession was that the parties adversely February 20, 1960, denying the reconsideration thereof,
affected entered the property in question after the are affirmed. With costs against oppositors-appellants.
issuance of the decree. There is nothing in the challenged
order that such is the case here. Thus, they would raise a
factual issue — a matter not properly cognizable by us.

A reminder may not be out of place. The apparent ease

with which oppositors-appellants could conjure up so
many alleged errors, while it may be a tribute to their
ingenuity in making a two-page order yield so many
instances of the rankest violation of legal precepts, hardly
contributes to the persuasiveness of their brief. As a
matter of fact, the suspicion could be legitimately
entertained that in thus attempting to paint the highly
unrealistic picture of a terse and brief order being so sadly
riddled with errors, oppositors- appellants were trying in
vain to bolster what inherently was a weak case.

That is all that needs be said about this appeal except for
the disposition of the twenty-first error assigned, referring
to the existence of a pending case between the parties for
reconveyance.19 There was no denial in the brief for
movant-appellee that such a case was then pending at the
time the respective briefs were filed. What is decided here
cannot affect whatever final decision might possibly have
been rendered by this time in the aforesaid reconveyance
action. Nonetheless, the mere fact that such suit was then
pending did not oust the lower court of its jurisdiction to
issue the writ of possession. As stated by our present
Chief Justice in Agreda v. Rodriguez:20 "Besides, it is
clear that respondent Judge had jurisdiction to pass upon
the motion of Santiago Agreda for the issuance of a writ of
possession. Whether or not the motion should have been
denied, in view of institution of said Civil Case No. 6267, is
a matter that does not affect said jurisdiction."

WHEREFORE, the order of September 21, 1959, granting

the writ of possession in favor of movant-appellee, and the
orders of October 23, 1959, December 10, 1959 and
G.R. No. 123346 December 14, 2007
MANOTOK REALTY, INC. and MANOTOK ESTATE
CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 134385
ARANETA INSTITUTE OF AGRI-CULTURE, INC.,
Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF JOSE B. DIMSON, REPRESENTED BY HIS
COMPULSORY HEIRS: HIS SURVIVING SPOUSE,
ROQUETA R. DIMSON AND THEIR CHILDREN, NORMA
AND CELSA TIRADO, ALSON AND VIRGINIA DIMSON,
LINDA AND CARLOS LAGMAN, LERMA AND RENE
POLICAR, AND ESPERANZA R. DIMSON; REGISTER
OF DEES OF MALABON, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
The stability of the country’s Torrens system is menaced
by the infestation of fake land titles and deeds. Any
decision of this Court that breathes life into spurious or
inexistent titles all but contributes to the blight. On the
contrary, the judicial devotion is towards purging the
system of illicit titles, concomitant to our base task as the
ultimate citadel of justice and legitimacy.
These two petitions1 involve properties covered by
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994 which in turn
encompasses 1,342 hectares of the Maysilo Estate.2 The
vast tract of land stretches over three (3) cities, comprising
an area larger than the sovereign states of Monaco and
the Vatican.3 Despite their prime location within
Metropolitan Manila, the properties included in
OCT No. 994 have been beset by controversy and sullied
by apparent fraud, cloudy titles and shady transfers. It may
as well be renamed the "Land of Caveat Emptor."
The controversy attending the lands of OCT No. 994 has
not eluded this Court. Since 1992, our findings and ruling
in MWSS v. Court of Appeals4 have stood as the Rosetta
Stone in deciphering claims emanating from OCT No. 994,
as was done in Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals,5 and in the
Court’s Decision dated 29 November 2005 (2005
Decision) in these cases.6 Yet in the course of resolving
these motions for reconsideration came the revelation that
OCT No. 994 was lost in translation following MWSS.
Certain immutable truths reflected on the face of OCT No.
994 must emerge and gain vitality, even if we ruffle
feathers in the process.
I.
A recapitulation of the facts, which have already been
extensively narrated in the 2005 Decision, is in order. For
clarity, we narrate separately the antecedent facts in G.R.
Nos. 123346 and 134385.
A. G.R. No. 123346, Manotok Realty, Inc.
and Manotok Estate Corporation, vs.
CLT Realty Development Corporation
On 10 August 1992, CLT Realty Development Corporation
(CLT) sought to recover from Manotok Realty, Inc. and
Manotok Estate Corporation (Manotoks) the possession of
Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate in an action filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 129.7
CLT’s claim was anchored on Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-177013 issued in its name by the Caloocan
City Register of Deeds, which title in turn was derived from
Estelita Hipolito (Hipolito) by virtue of a Deed of Sale with
Real Estate Mortgage dated 10 December 1988. Hipolito’s
title emanated from Jose Dimson’s (Dimson) TCT No. R-
15169, a title issued pursuant to an order of the Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Caloocan City, Branch 33. Dimson’s
title appears to have been sourced from OCT No. 994.8
For their part, the Manotoks challenged the validity of the
title relied on by CLT, claiming that Dimson’s title, the
proximate source of CLT’s title, was irregularly issued and,
hence, the same and subsequent titles flowing therefrom
are likewise void. The Manotoks asserted their ownership
over Lot 26 and claimed that they derived it from several
awardees and/or vendees of the National Housing
Authority.9 The Manotok title likewise traced as its primary
source OCT No. 994 which, on 9 September 1918, was
transferred to Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano Leuterio who
had previously acquired
the property on 21 August 1918 by virtue of an "Escritura
de Venta" executed by Don Tomas Arguelles and Don
Enrique Llopis.10 On 3 March 1920, Ruiz and Leuterio
sold the property to Francisco Gonzalez who held title
thereto until 22 August 1938 when the property was
transferred to Jose Leon Gonzalez, Consuelo Susana
Gonzalez, Juana Francisca Gonzalez, Maria Clara
Gonzalez, Francisco Felipe Gonzalez and Concepcion
Maria Gonzalez under TCT No. 35486. The lot was then,
per annotation dated 21 November 1946, subdivided into
seven (7) parcels each in the name of each of the
Gonzalezes.11
The trial court, ruling for CLT, adopted the factual findings
and conclusions arrived at by the majority commissioners
appointed to resolve the conflict of titles. It was
established that the entire Maysilo Estate was registered
under Act No. 496 by virtue of which OCT No. 994 was
issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal;12 that Lot 26
was transferred to CLT by Hipolito whose title was derived
from the Dimson title and that on the basis of the technical
descriptions of the property appearing in the Manotok
titles, the latter’s property indeed encroached on the
property described in CLT’s title.13
The Manotoks appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the decision of the trial court.14 Their motion for
reconsideration having been denied,15 they filed a petition
for review with the Supreme Court, ascribing error to the
appellate court in upholding the trial court’s decision which
decided the case on the basis of the majority
commissioners’ report and overlooked relevant facts in the
minority commissioner’s report.16
B. G.R. No. 134385, Araneta Institute
of Agriculture, Inc. v. Heirs of
Jose B. Dimson, et. al.
On 18 December 1979, Dimson filed with the then CFI of
Rizal, Branch 33, Caloocan City a complaint for recovery
of possession and damages against Araneta Institute of
Agriculture, Inc. (Araneta). Dimson alleged that he was the
absolute owner of part of the Maysilo Estate in Malabon
covered by TCT No. R-15169 of the Registry of Deeds of
Caloocan City. Alleging that Araneta had been illegally
occupying the land and that the latter refused to vacate
the same despite repeated demands, he prayed that
Araneta be ordered to vacate the same and remove all
improvements thereon and to return full possession
thereof to him. Araneta for its part admitted occupancy of
the disputed land by constructing some buildings thereon
and subdividing portions thereof in the exercise of its right
as absolute owner. He alleged that Dimson’s title to the
subject land was void and hence he had no cause of
action.17
The trial court ruled for Dimson in its Decision dated 28
May 1993 with these findings: first, there were inherent
technical infirmities or defects in the titles that formed each
link in the chain of ownership that culminated in the
Manotok title, i.e., that the technical descriptions in the
titles were written in Spanish whereas those in the alleged
mother title, OCT No. 994, were in English, which, an
abnormal state that deviated from the usual practice in the
issuance of titles; and second, it was established
procedure to indicate in the certificate of title, whether
original or transfer certificate, the date of the original
survey of the mother title together with the succeeding
date of subdivision or consolidation. Thus, the absence of
the original survey dates of OCT No. 994 on Manotok’s
chain of titles, the trial court added, should mean that OCT
No. 994 was not the mother title not only because the
original survey dates were different but also because the
original survey date must always be earlier than the issue
date of the original title. OCT No. 994 was issued on May
3, 1917 which was much ahead of the survey date
indicated in the succeeding titles, which is December 22,
1917.18
Undaunted, Araneta interposed an appeal to the Court of
Appeals which, on 30 May 1997, affirmed the lower court’s
decision.19 In so holding, the appellate court declared that
the title of Araneta to the disputed land is a nullity. It noted
that Dimson’s TCT No. R-15169 was derived from "OCT
No. 994 registered on April 19, 1917" and that the same
was obtained by Dimson simultaneously with other titles,
viz: TCT Nos. 15166, 15167, and 15168 by virtue of the
Decision dated October 13, 1977 and Order dated
October 18, 1977, in Special Proceedings No. C-732. It
was also pointed out that Araneta’s TCT No. 13574 and
21343 were both derived from "OCT No. 994 registered on
May 3, 1917" which was previously "declared null and void
by the Supreme Court in Metropolitan Waterworks and
Sewerage System v. Court of Appeals."20
Araneta then filed a petition for review with the Supreme
Court attributing error to the Court of Appeals in failing to
recognize that it had a better right of possession over the
property than did Dimson.21
As both petitions involved interrelated challenges against
the validity of the parties’ separate titles to portions of the
greater Maysilo Estate, they, along with G.R. No.
14876722 , were consolidated per Resolutions dated 21
April 1999 and 6 March 2002. Also in 2002, the Republic
of the Philippines sought and was allowed intervention in
these cases.
On 29 November 2005, the Third Division of the Court
rendered the 2005 Decision,23 the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DENIED and the
assailed Decisions and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
are hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.24
The Court acknowledged that the paramount question I.
raised in the petitions is whether the titles issued in the
name of Dimson and of CLT are valid. Noting that this
question is one purely of fact, the Court held that the same Which of the Certificates of Title of the contending parties
was beyond its power to determine and so, the factual
are valid:
findings of the trial courts in these cases as affirmed by
the Court of Appeals must be accorded the highest degree
of respect and not disturbed at all.
A. Petitioner’s titles:

Nonetheless, the Court proceeded to discuss the absence

of merit in the petitions. First, particularly with respect to 1. Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 7528, 7762,
G.R. No. 123346, the Court upheld the validity of the trial 8012, 9866, C-17272, 21107, 21485, 26405, 26406,
court’s adoption of the commissioners’ majority report as 26407, 33904, 34255, C-35267, 41956, 63268, 55896, T-
part of the decision inasmuch as the same is allowed by 1214528, 163902 and 165119 in the name of Manotok
Section 11, Rule 32 of the Rules of Court and that a case Realty, Inc., and TCT No. T-232568 in the name of
of overlapping titles absolutely necessitates the assistance Manotok Estate Corporation;
of experts in the field of geodetic engineering who, on
account of their experience and expertise, are in a better
position to determine which of the contending titles is 2. TCT Nos. 737 and 13574 in the name of Araneta
valid. For this reason, the Court emphasized, the trial court Institute of Agriculture; and
may well rely on their findings and conclusions. Second,
the Court pointed out that the titles of respondents in all
three cases were derived from OCT No. 994 of the
3. TCT Nos. T-158373 and T-158374 in the name of Sto.
Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City registered on 19 April
Niño Kapitbahayan Association, Inc.
1917. However, because the validity of said mother title
was upheld by the Court itself in MWSS and reiterated in
Heirs of Gonzaga, the Court chose not to delve anymore
into the correctness of the said decisions which had All these titles were derived from Original Certificate of
already attained finality and immutability. Title (OCT) No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917 in the
Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City covering Lot 26 of the
Maysilo Estate, same city.
The Manotoks and Araneta duly filed their respective
motions for reconsideration. On 5 June 2006, the cases
were elevated to the Court en banc, which heard oral B. Respondents’ Title:
arguments on 1 August 2006. The Court formulated the
issues for oral argument, thus:
1. TCT No. T-177013 in the name of CLT Realty
Development Corporation;
From the above petitions, the following principal issues are
gathered:
2. TCT No. R-15169 in the name of Jose B. Dimson; and

3. TCT No. T-1770 in the name of CLT Realty
Development Corporation/
All these titles were derived from OCT No. 994 registered
earlier, or on April 19, 1917, covering the same Lot No. 26
of the Maysilo Estate.
II.
Can this Court still overturn at this point its Decision in
Metropolitan Water Works and Sewerage Systems
(MWSS) v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 103558, November
17, 1992) and Heirs of Luis J. Gonzaga v. Court of
Appeals (G.R. No. 96259, September 3, 1996) sustaining
the validity of OCT No. 994 registered on April 19, 1917
and nullify the same OCT No. 994 registered later, or on
May 3, 1917?
III.
How will the Reports of the Department of Justice and the
Senate Fact-Finding Committee, not presented in
evidence before the trial courts concluding that the valid
title is OCT No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917, affect the
disposition of these cases?
Will it be necessary to remand these cases to the trial
courts to determine which of the Certificates of Title are
valid? If so, which trial court?25
A crucial fact emerged during the oral arguments. The
Republic, through the Solicitor General,26 strenuously
argued that contrary to the supposition reflected in the
Advisory, there was, in fact, only one OCT No. 994.
x x x In this particular case, it appears that on December
3, 1912, the Court of Land Registration, the Judge
Norberto Romualdez presiding, acting on Land
Registration Case No. 4429 rendered judgment ordering
the GLRO to issue a decree. Pursuant to this order, the
GLRO prepared Decree No. 36455 and issued the same
on April 19, 1917 at 9:00 o’clock in the morning, at Manila,
Philippines. It may be observed that at the face of the OCT
994 which was then on file at the Registry of Deeds of
Caloocan and now kept in the LRA, the following entry can
be seen. Received for transcription at the Office of the
Register of Deeds for the province of Rizal this 3rd day of
May 1917 at 7:30 a.m. Obviously, April 19, 1917 is not the
date of inscription or the date of transcription of the decree
into the Original Certificate of Title. It appears that the
transcription of the decree was done on the date it was
received by the Register of Deeds of Rizal on May 3,
1917. There is no other date to speak of. In the records of
the Land Registration Authority, there is only one OCT
994, on its face appears the date of transcript, May 3,
1917. The validity then of all subsequent titles tracing their
origin from OCT 994 should be tested in the light of these
set of facts. x x x27
On the other hand, the counsel for CLT stated during the
same oral argument that he had seen a photocopy of an
OCT No. 994 that was dated 19 April 1917,28 and
manifested that he could attach the same to CLT’s
memorandum.29 At the same time, on even date, the
Court directed the Solicitor General and counsel for CLT
to submit to the Court "certified true copies of the Original
Certificate of Title No. 994 dated May 3 1917 and April 19,
1917, respectively, on or before Friday, August 4,
2006."30
In response to this directive, both the Solicitor General and
the counsel for CLT submitted their separate
"Compliance" to this Court, with their respective copies of
OCT No. 994 attached thereto. Both copies of OCT No.
994 submitted by the Solicitor General and CLT indicate
on their face that the decree of registration issued on 19
April 1917 was received for transcription at the office of
the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal on 3 May
1917. Indeed, there is no evident variance between the
copies of OCT No. 994 submitted by the OSG and CLT,
and CLT admits just as much in its Memorandum dated 3
September 2006.31
The claim of the Solicitor General that there is only one
OCT No. 994 was duly confirmed though belatedly by CLT
itself. Even the ponente of the 2005 Decision has
recognized this fact, as indicated in her present Dissenting
Opinion. The emergence of such fact, contrary as it is to
the crucial predicate underlying the issues presented in
the Court’s Advisory, has changed the essence and
complexion of the controversy. The key to grant or deny
the motions for reconsideration is the answer to the
question: which is the true date of OCT No. 994, 17 April
1917 or 3 May 1917?
II.
We turn to the date of OCT No. 994 as reflected in the
quoted portion of the certified true copy thereof submitted
by the Republic of the Philippines:32
Therefore, it is ordered by the Court that said land be
registered in accordance with the provisions of the Land
Registration Act in the name of said xxx
‘Witness: the Honorable Norberto Romualdez, Associate
Judge of said Court, the 3rd day of December, A.D.
nineteen hundred and twelve.
‘Issued at Manila, P.I., the 19th day of April A.D. 1917 at
9:00 A.M.
ATTEST: ENRIQUE ALTAVAS
Chief of the Land Registration Office of Justice
Received for transcription at the office of the Register of
Deeds for the Province of P.I. this third day of May,
nineteen hundred and seventeen at 7:30 A.M. (emphasis
supplied)
As evident on the face of OCT No. 994, the decree of
registration was issued on 19 April 1917, and actually
"received for transcription" by the Register of Deeds on 3
May 1917. Interestingly, even as CLT admits that there is
only one OCT No. 994, that which the Solicitor General
had presented to the Court,33 it maintains that the OCT
should be deemed registered as of the date of issuance of
the decree of registration, 19 April 1917, instead of the
date it was received for transcription by the Register of
Deeds on 3 May 1917. The argument is based on the
theory that it is "the decree of registration [that] produces
legal effects," though it "is entered before the transmittal of
the same for transcription at the Register of Deeds."34
This argument marks a radical departure from CLT’s
earlier theory that there were two OCTs No. 994, one
dated 19 April 1917 and the other 3 May 2007, a theory
which was likewise reflected in the Court’s earlier Advisory
on the issues prior to the oral argument.35 Yet the
argument smacks of plain sophistry.
The process involved is what this Court called "the method
of giving a paper title."36 It is spelled out in detail in
Sections 41 and 42 of Act No. 496, otherwise known as
the Land Registration Act:
SEC. 41. Immediately upon the entry of the decree of
registration the clerk shall send a certified copy thereof,
under the seal of the court, to the register of deeds for the
province, or provinces, or city in which the land lies, and
the register of deeds shall transcribe the decree in a book
to be- called the 'registration book,' in which a leaf, or
leaves, in consecutive order, shall be devoted exclusively
to each title. The entry made by the register of deeds in
this book in each case shall be the original certificate of
title, and shall be signed by him and sealed
with the seal of the court. All certificates of title shall be
numbered consecutively, beginning with number one. The
register of deeds shall in each case make an exact
duplicate of the original certificate, including the seal, but
putting on it the words 'Owner's duplicate certificate,' and
deliver the same to the owner or to his attorney duly
authorized. In case of a variance between the owner's
duplicate certificate and the original certificate the original
shall prevail. The certified copy of the decree of
registration shall be filed and numbered by the register of
deeds with a reference noted on it to the place of record of
the original certificate of title: Provided, however, That
when an application includes land lying in more than one
province, or one province and the city of Manila, the court
shall cause the part lying in each province or in the city of
Manila to be described separately by metes and bounds in
the decree of registration, and the clerk shall send to the
register of deeds for each province, or the city of Manila,
as the case may be, a copy of the decree containing a
description of the land within that province or city, and the
register of deeds shall register the same and issue an
owner's duplicate therefor, and thereafter for all matters
pertaining to registration under this Act the portion in each
province or city shall be treated as a separate parcel of
land.
SEC. 42. The certificate first registered in pursuance of the
decree of registration in regard to any parcel of land shall
be entitled in the registration book 'Original certificate of
title, entered pursuant to decree of the Court of Land
Registration, dated at' (stating time and place of entry of
decree and the number of case). This certificate shall take
effect upon the date of the transcription of the decree.
Subsequent certificates relating to the same land shall be
in like form, but shall be entitled 'Transfer from number'
(the number of the next previous certificate relating to the
same land), and also the words 'Originally registered'
(date, volume, and page of registration.")
With the plain language of the law as mooring, this Court
in two vintage and sound rulings made it plain that the
original certificate of title is issued on the date the decree
of registration is transcribed. In the first ruling, it was held
that there is a marked distinction between the entry of the
decree and the entry of the certificate of title; the entry of
the decree is made by the chief clerk of the land
registration and the entry of the certificate of title is made
by the register of deeds.37 Such difference is highlighted
by Sec. 31 of Act No. 496 as it provides that the certificate
of title is issued in pursuance of the decree of registration.
In the second, it was stressed that what stands as the
certificate of the title is the transcript of the decree of
registration made by the registrar of deeds in the
registry.38
Otherwise stated, what is actually issued by the register of
deeds is the certificate of title itself, not the decree of
registration, as he is precisely the recipient from the land
registration office of the decree for transcription to the
certificate as well as the transcriber no less. Since what is
now acknowledged as the authentic OCT No. 994
indicates that it was received for transcription by the
Register of Deeds of Rizal on 3 May 1917, it is that date
that is the date of registration since that was when he was
able to transcribe the decree in the registration book, such
entry made in the book being the original certificate of
title.39 Moreover, it is only after the transcription of the
decree by the register of deeds that the certificate of title is
to take effect.
The textbook writers and authorities on Land Registration
are unanimous on the matter. The late Commissioner
Antonio Noblejas, widely acknowledged as the leading
authority on the subject during his time, wrote, thus:
Immediately upon the issuance and entry of the decree of
registration, the Registrar of Land Titles transcribes the
same in the registry book called the "Registration Book"
and issues an owner’s duplicate certificate of title to the
applicant upon payment by him of the necessary
registration fees. The entry made by the Registrar of Land
Titles in his registry book is actually the original copy of
the original certificate of title and shall be signed by him
and sealed with the seal of the Court and of his office.
Pursuant to Rep. Act No. 113, the Registrar of Land Titles
may now use only the seal of his office, dispensing with
the court seal.40
Professor Florencio Ponce, who was also once Register of
Deeds of Quezon City and Deputy Register of Deeds of
Manila, was of the same conviction:
A decree of registration is an order issued under the
signature of the Commissioner of Land Registration
(formerly Chief, G.L.R.O.) in the name of the Judge to the
fact that the land described therein is registered in the
name of the applicant or oppositor or claimant as the case
maybe. When this is transcribed or spread in toto in the
registration book and signed by the register of deeds, the
page on which the transcription is made become the
"original certificate of title," more commonly called the
Torrens title.
xxx
The land becomes a registered land only upon the
transcription of the decree in the original registration book
by the register of deeds, the date and time of such
transcription being set forth in the process and certified to
at the foot of each entry or certificate of title.
xxx
The issuance of the original and owner’s duplicate
certificates are basic for the valid existence of the title.
Issuance of additional copies are permissive and their
non-existence does not affect the status of title. A
certificate of title is deemed as regularly issued with the
issuance of the original copy and owner’s duplicate.41
So was Professor Francisco Ventura:
Immediately upon the issuance and entry of the decree of
registration, the Commissioner of Land Registration sends
a certified copy thereof, under seal of the said office, to the
Register of Deeds of the province where the land lies, and
the register of Deeds transcribes the decree in a book,
called the Registration Book," in which a leaf, or leaves, in
consecutive order should be devoted exclusively to each
title. The entry made by the Register of Deeds in said
book constitutes the original certificate of title and is
signed by him and sealed with the seal of his office.42
The same view came from Professor Narciso Peña, also a
former Assistant Commissioner of the Land Registration
Commission and Acting Register of Deeds of Manila, as
he wrote, thus:
Thus, Section 42 of Act No. 496 provides that the
certificate first registered in pursuance of the decree of
registration in regard to any parcel of land shall be entitled
in the registration book "Original Certificate of Title,
entered pursuant to decree of the Court of Land
Registration, dated at (stating time and place of entry of
decree and the number of the case). This certificate shall
take effect upon the date of the transcription of the decree.
Subsequent certificates relating to the same land shall be
in like form, but shall be entitled. "Transfer from number
(the number of the next previous certificate relating to the
same land)," and also the words "Originally registered
(date, volume, and page of registration).43
The dissent has likewise suggested that the variance
between these two dates is ultimately inconsequential. It
cannot be so for otherwise, the recent decision of the
Court in Alfonso v. Office of the President44 would simply
be wrong. In Alfonso, the Court precisely penalized
Alfonso, the former register of deeds of Caloocan because
she acquiesced to the change of the date of registration of
OCT No. 994, as reflected in several subsequent titles
purportedly derived from that mother title, from 3 May
1917 to 19 April 1917. If indeed the difference in dates
were "inconsequential," then it should not have really
mattered that Mrs. Alfonso, as found by the Court, had
invariably issued certificates of title, reflecting either the 19
April or 3 May date, a circumstance which, the Court
concluded, was irregular. But if the Court were to accede
to the dissent and agree that it did not really matter
whether the date of registration of OCT No. 994 was 3
May or 19 April, then poor Mrs. Alfonso should be spared
of the penalty of dismissal from the service which the
Court had already affirmed.
III.
Even the dissent does not insist, as the 2005 Decision did,
that there is an OCT No. 994 registered or dated 19 April
1917. This new stance squarely contravenes or deviates
from the following unequivocal pronouncement in the 2005
Decision:
We noted in the beginning of this Decision that the issue in
all these three (3) cases involves the validity of the parties'
overlapping titles. The titles of the respondents in these
cases were derived from OCT No. 994 of the Registry of
Deeds of Caloocan City registered on April 19, 1917. The
validity of such mother title has already been upheld by
this Court in G.R. No. 103558, MWSS v. Court of Appeals,
et al. dated November 17, 1992 earlier cited in the
assailed Decisions. Significantly, the ruling in MWSS was
reiterated in G.R. No. 96259, Heirs of Luis J. Gonzaga v.
Court of Appeals dated September 3, 1996.
We cannot delve anymore into the correctness of the
Decision of this Court in MWSS. The said Decision,
confirming the validity of OCT No. 994 issued on April 19,
1917 from which the titles of the respondents in the cases
at bar were derived, has long become final and executory.
Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment
attains finality it becomes immutable and unalterable. It
may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of
whether the modification is attempted to be made by the
court rendering it or by the highest court of the land.45
This new conclusion likewise differs from what the Court
had to say regarding OCT No. 994 "dated April 19, 1917"
in the adverted MWSS v. Court of Appeals46 decision:
It must be observed that the title of petitioner MWSS was
a transfer from TCT No. 36957 which was derived from
OCT No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917. Upon the other
hand, private respondents' title was derived from the same
OCT No. 994 but dated April 19, 1917. Where two
certificates (of title) purport to include the same land, the
earlier in date prevails . . . In successive registrations,
where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a
particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming
under the prior certificate is entitled to the estate or
interest; and the person is deemed to hold under the prior
certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived
directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of
the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof. Hence, in
point of priority of issuance, private respondents' title
prevails over that of petitioner MWSS.47
Four years later, the Court promulgated the Gonzaga v.
Court of Appeals48 decision, which essentially reaffirmed
foregoing factual pronouncements made in MWSS.
Notwithstanding the emerging error in fact that informed
the MWSS and Gonzaga decisions, the dissent now
claims that said decisions confirmed "the validity of the
OCT No. 994 issued on April 19, 1917." But if we examine
MWSS closely, it appears to be beset with semantic
confusion. We make the following relevant references
from that decision, presented sequentially:
(1) "Jose B. Dimson was the registered owner of a parcel
land situated in Balintawak, Kalookan City with an area of
213,012 square meters, more or less, and covered by TCT
No. C-15167 which was registered on June 8, 1978. Said
parcel of land was originally Lot 28 of the Maysilo Estate
(OCT) No. 994 which was registered on April 19, 1917
pursuant to Decree No. 36455 issued in Land Registration
Case No. 4429."49
(2) Although petitioner's title was issued in 1940, it will be
noted that petitioner's title over Lots 2693 and 2695 both
with an area of 599 square meters was based on the
Cadastral Survey of Caloocan City, Cadastral Case No.
34, while private respondents' title was derived from OCT
No. 994 issued on April 19, 1917;50
(3) "It must be observed that the title of petitioner MWSS
was a transfer from TCT No. 36957 which was derived
from OCT No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917. Upon the
other hand, private respondent's title was derived from the
same OCT No. 994 but dated April 19, 1917;"51
(4) "Lastly, a certificate is not conclusive evidence of title if
it is shown that the same land had already been registered
and an earlier certificate for the same is in existence. 5
Since the land in question has already been registered
under OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917, the subsequent
registration of the same land on May 3, 1917 is null and
void;"52
In one (1) out of the four (4) times that reference was
made to the mother title of Dimson in MWSS, it was "OCT
No. 994 issued on April 19, 1917" which is the language
preferred by the dissent since it hews to the date of
issuance of the decree of registration in the authentic OCT
No. 994. However, the same decision inconsistently refers
to it also as OCT No. 994 "registered on April 19, 1917",
"dated April 19, 1917," and "registered under OCT No. 994
dated April 19, 1917." Notably, the context of MWSS in
making the final citation, "registered under OCT No. 994
dated April 19, 1917," was to point out that as a result "the
subsequent registration of the same land on May 3, 1917
is null and void;" hence, no other conclusion can be
reached than that the Court deemed Dimson’s mother title
as having been registered on a date earlier than 3 May
1917.
Since the dissent and even CLT now acknowledge that
there is only one OCT No. 994 which was registered by
the Registry of Deeds of Rizal on 3 May 1917, the earlier
factual finding in MWSS is indefensible. MWSS
recognized an OCT No. 994 registered on 19 April 1917, a
title that never existed and, even assuming that it did exist,
is now acknowledged as spurious.
Gonzaga primarily relied on the ruling of the Court in
MWSS upon a finding that the case involved "facts that
are exactly the same as those that we have passed and
ruled upon in the [MWSS case]." The title which was
affirmed by the Court in Gonzaga, TCT No. C-26806 in the
name of Lilia Sevilla, was "a transfer from Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994 which was registered on
April 19, 1917 pursuant to Decree No. 36455."53 It was
further observed by the Court that "on the one hand,
[therein] petitioners’ titles indicate original registration to
have been made on May 3, 1917, but on the other hand,
private respondents’ title indicates original registration to
have been made on April 19, 1917."54
It was the title originally registered on 19 April 1917 which
was made to prevail in Gonzaga, following MWSS. Since
there is no OCT No. 994 originally registered on 19 April
1917, as now acknowledged, it follows that Gonzaga, like
MWSS, is no longer reliable as well.
The argument has been raised by the ponente of the 2005
Decision that the 3 May 1917 OCT No. 994 must be
distinguished from "OCT No. 994 dated May 3, 1917
involved in the MWSS and Gonzaga cases" because the
former title was "based on the Cadastral Survey of
Kalookan City under Cadastral Case No. 34, also covering
the Maysilo Estate." It is elemental to note that assuming
said 3 May OCT was somehow flawed because it was
based on Cadastral Case No. 34, it does not mean that
the so-called 17 April 1917 OCT No. 994 is valid or had
existed in the first place. Since even the dissent now
discounts the existence of the so-called 17 April 1917
OCT No. 994, it should necessarily follow that any title that
is sourced from the 17 April 1917 OCT is void. Such
conclusion is inescapable whatever questions there may
be about the veracity of the 3 May 1917 OCT based on
Cadastral Case No. 34.
It would be especially incoherent for the Court to reiterate
MWSS and Gonzaga when they effectuated the OCT No.
994 registered on 19 April 1917 and acknowledge at the
same time that the same OCT never existed, the genuine
OCT No. 994 being that which was registered on 3 May
1917. We need not go as far as to revive the MWSS or
Gonzaga decisions, but certainly we can decline to infuse
further validity to their erroneous basic premise that there
was an OCT No. 994 registered on 19 April 1917. The
dissent proposes that we perpetuate the erroneous
premise even as the error is plainly acknowledged, a
stance that will not serve the Court well should it prevail.
Moreover, the two cases should not bind the parties in the
petitions now before us. Undisputedly, the two cases
involved different parcels of land. The present petitioners
could not be bound by the decisions in the two cases, as
they were not parties thereto and and their properties were
not involved therein. As we very recently reaffirmed, it is
basic that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to
which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not
bound by judgment rendered by the court.55
We can take instruction from the tack previously taken by
this Court in dealing with municipalities created by
executive orders. Beginning with Pelaez v. Auditor
General,56 the Court declared as a general principle that
the President had no power to create municipalities
through executive orders. However, instead of nullifying
the creation of all municipalities created in the same
manner, the Court only annulled those municipalities
whose creation was specifically attacked in the petition
filed by then-Vice President
Pelaez.57 With respect to the other municipalities which
were not
annulled in Pelaez, the Court would, in the next few
decades, annul only the municipalities which were
specifically challenged in petitions raised before the
Court.58 However, after the adoption of the Local
Government Code of 1991 that gave statutory recognition
to the de facto municipalities which had not yet been
annulled, the Court started to affirm the legal existence of
such municipalities.59
As in Pelaez, the operative effect of the "doctrines"
pronounced in MWSS and Gonzaga can extend only to
the parties and properties involved in said cases, even if it
can be argued that the rights involving other parties and
properties are afflicted with inconsistency as regards the
legal rulings therein, similar to the municipalities created
which though created by void executive orders were not
however annulled. Yet with the emergence of a new fact–
the enactment of the Local Government Code vis-à-vis
Pelaez, or the present acknowledgment that only the 3
May 1917 OCT No. 994 exists vis-à-vis MWSS and
Gonzaga–subsequent rulings would be informed primarily
by the new developments, rather than by the previous
precedents that were not able to take into account the true
or new factual premises.
IV.
The determinative test to resolve whether the prior
decision of this Court should be affirmed or set aside is
whether or not the titles invoked by the respondents are
valid. If these titles are sourced from the so-called OCT
No. 994 dated 17 April 1917, then such titles are void or
otherwise should not be recognized by this Court. Since
the true basic factual predicate concerning OCT No. 994
which is that there is only one such OCT differs from that
expressed in the MWSS and Gonzaga decisions, said
rulings have become virtually functus officio except on the
basis of the "law of the case" doctrine, and can no longer
be relied upon as precedents.
This approach immensely differs from that preferred by the
2005 Decision and the dissenting view, which dwells in the
main on the alleged flaws in the titles held by the
Manotoks and Araneta, without making a similar inquiry
into the titles held by CLT and the Heirs of Dimson. Since
the decision in favor of CLT and the Heirs of Dimson was
ultimately grounded on a factual predicate now
acknowledged as erroneous, it follows that the primary
focus should have been whether the titles held by CLT
and the Dimsons are valid and with force and effect. To
that end, we need only examine the titles relied upon by
CLT and the Dimsons.
In the Manotok petition, CLT had originally filed a
complaint for annulment of the titles in the name of the
Manotoks, alleging that it was the registered owner of Lot
26 of the Maysilo Estate covered by TCT No. T-177013 of
the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City. Reproduced
below is what appears on the face of TCT No. T-
177013:60
IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that said land was originally
registered on the 19th day of April, in the year, nineteen
hundred and seventeen in the Registration Book of the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, Volume 36455,
page ____, as Original Certificate of Title No. 994,
pursuant to Decree No. 36455 issued in L.R.C. ____
Record No. _____in the name of ___________.
This certificate is a transfer from Trans. Certificate of Title
No. R-17994/T-89, which is cancelled by virtue hereof in
so far as the above-described land is concerned.
Entered at City of Kalookan
Philippines, on the 15th day of March
In the year nineteen hundred and
eighty-nine at 19:48 a.m.
CLT further alleged that it derived TCT No. T-177013 on
10 December 1988 from Estelita Hipolito whose title, TCT
No. R-17994, is depicted, thus:61
IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that said land was originally
registered on the 19th day of April, in the year nineteen
hundred and seventeen in the Registration Book of the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, Volume NA, page
NA, as Original Certificate of Title No. 994, pursuant to
Decree No. 36455 issued in L.R.C. Case No. 4429,
Record No. ________.
This certificate is a transfer from Transfer Certificate of
Title No. R-15166/T-75, which is cancelled by virtue hereof
in so far as the above-described land is concerned.
Entered at the City of Caloocan
Philippines, on the 12th day of December
in the year nineteen hundred and seventy-eight at 3:30
p.m.
Dimson’s original complaint for recovery of possession
against Araneta was founded on the claim that he was the
absolute owner of a parcel of land located at Malabon,
comprising fifty (50) hectares of the Maysilo Estate
covered by TCT No. R-15169 of the Registry of Deeds of
Caloocan City. Said TCT No. R-15169 is reproduced
below:62
IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that said land was originally
registered on the 19th day of April, in the year nineteen
hundred and seventeen, in the Registration Book of the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, Volume NA,
page___ , Original Certificate of Title No. 994, pursuant to
Decree No. 36455, issued in LRC Case No. 4429, Record
No. __
This Certificate is a transfer from Original Certificate of
Title No. [illegible] which is cancelled by virtue hereof in so
far as the above-described land is concerned.
Entered at Caloocan City
Philippines, on the 8th day of June
in the year nineteen hundred and
seventy-eight at 10:34 a.m.
It is evident from all three titles─CLT’s, Hipolito’s and
Dimson’s—that the properties they purport to cover were
"originally registered on the 19th day April, in the year
nineteen hundred and seventeen in the Registration Book
of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal." Note, as
earlier established, there is no such OCT No. 994
originally registered on 19 April 1917.
The conclusion is really simple. On their faces, none of
these three titles can be accorded recognition simply
because the original title commonly referred to therein
never existed. To conclude otherwise would constitute
deliberate disregard of the truth. These titles could be
affirmed only if it can be proven that OCT No. 994
registered on 19 April 1917 had actually existed. CLT and
the Dimsons were given the opportunity to submit such
proof before this Court, but they did not. In fact, CLT has
specifically manifested that the OCT No. 994 they
concede as true is also the one which the Office of
Solicitor General submitted as true, and that is OCT No.
994 issued on 3 May 1917.
Given this essential clarification, there is no sense in
affirming the 2005 Decision which sustained the
complaints for annulment of title and/or recovery of
possession filed by CLT and the Dimson when their
causes of action are both founded on an inexistent mother
title. How can such actions prosper at all even to the
extent of dispossessing the present possessors with title?
The dissent is hard-pressed in defending the so-called 19
April 1917 OCT from which the Dimson and CLT titles are
sourced. As earlier mentioned, the focus is instead placed
on the purported flaws of the titles held by the Manotoks
and Araneta notwithstanding that said parties swere the
defendants before the lower court and,
therefore, the burden of proof did not lie on them. The
established legal principle in actions for annulment or
reconveyance of title is that a party seeking it should
establish not merely by a preponderance of evidence but
by clear and convincing evidence that the land sought to
be reconveyed is his.63 In an action to recover, the
property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on
the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the
defendant's claim.64
V.
The dissenting view perceives a material difference
between the present acknowledgment of the validity of
OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917 and the titles involved in
the Gonzaga and MWSS cases. It dwells on the fact that
the titles debunked in the MWSS and Gonzaga cases,
which find origination from OCT No. 994 dated 3 May
1917, seem to have been derived from Cadastral Case
No. 34 also covering the Maysilo Estate. It is in fact the
theory of the dissent that there are, in effect, two
competing sources of title – the OCT No. 994 dated 3 May
1917 arising from the issuance of Decree No. 36455 in
Land Registration Case No. 4429; and OCT No. 994 dated
3 May 1917 based on the Cadastral Survey of Caloocan
City in Cadastral Case No. 34. It is further opined that the
registration of lands pursuant to Cadastral Case No. 34,
even if the date of such registration is 3 May 1917, is void
since such registration could not supplant the earlier
decision of the land registration court.
The supposition blatantly runs counter to long-established
principles in land cases. Had it been adopted by the Court,
the effect would have been to precipitate the utter
astonishment of legal scholars, professionals and students
alike.
The reality that cadastral courts may have jurisdiction over
lands already registered in ordinary land registration cases
was acknowledged by this Court in Pamintuan v. San
Agustin.65 Such jurisdiction is "limited to the necessary
correction of technical errors in the description of the
lands, provided such corrections do not impair the
substantial rights of the registered owner, and that such
jurisdiction cannot operate to deprive a registered owner
of his title."66 It was further clarified in Timbol v. Diaz67
that the limited jurisdiction of the cadastral court over such
lands even extends to the determination of "which one of
the several conflicting registered titles shall prevail[, as
such] power would seem to be necessary for a complete
settlement of the title to the land, the express purpose of
cadastral proceedings, and must therefore be considered
to be within the jurisdiction of the court in such
proceedings."68
The question raised in Sideco v. Aznar69 concerned the
validity of an order of a cadastral court directing the
issuance of new certificates of title in the name of Sideco
and his children, at Sideco’s own prayer, over land
previously registered in the name of Crispulo
Sideco. This Court ruled that such order was valid and did
not amount to a readjudication of the title. After the
cadastral proceedings therein had been initiated, the chief
surveyor had reported to the cadastral court that the land
was covered by a decree in a land registration proceeding
and registered in the name of Sideco; the surveyor
recommended that the title be cancelled and a new one
issued in the names of such persons as the court may
determine. In ruling that the new titles were valid, the
Court stated that "[t]he proceedings did not in any way
purport to reexamine the title already issued, or to
readjudicate the title of the land. They were precisely
predicated on the finality of the title already issued,
because it was the registered owner who was asked to
express his desire with respect thereto, and the court’s
order precisely followed the petition of the registered
owner."70
The eminent U.P. law professor Francisco Ventura,
himself a former Register of Deeds, explains why
cadastral courts have jurisdiction to order the issuance of
new titles in place of the title issued under voluntary
registration proceedings:
"Inasmuch as the land is identified in the plan by cadastral
number, it is necessary that a new title be issued, giving
the lot its cadastral number in accordance with the
cadastral survey. This does not mean that the court has
the power to alter the decree entered in the previous
registration proceeding. The court cannot change or
modify the said decree. It does not adjudicate the title
anew. It simply deals with the certificate of title. This is for
the
convenience of the landowner because it is easier for him
to identify his property inasmuch as all the lands brought
under the cadastral survey are designated by cadastral
numbers."71
What is prohibited in a cadastral proceeding is the
registration of land, already issued in the name of a
person, in the name of another, divesting the registered
owner of the title already issued in his favor, or the making
of such changes in the title as to impair his substantial
rights.72 Yet such prohibition does not mean that the
cadastral court will not have jurisdiction over the action
involving the previously registered land, as explained in
Pamintuan and Timbol, or that the cadastral court may not
issue a new title at all even if it would not impair the rights
of the previously registered owner, as emphasized in
Sideco. The dissent contents itself with the simplistic
conclusion that because there was a cadastral case
covering the Maysilo Estate from which the titles
emanated, such titles could not have been valid. It is clear
that there could be such titles issued, and they would be
valid for so long as they do not impair the rights of the
original registrant to whom OCT No. 994 dated 3 May
1917 was issued.
VI.
From these premises, the Court is able to make the
following binding conclusions. First, there is only one OCT
No. 994. As it appears on the record, that mother title was
received for transcription by the Register of Deeds on 3
May 1917, and that should be the date which should be
reckoned as the date of registration of the title. It may also
be acknowledged, as appears on the title, that OCT No.
994 resulted from the issuance of the decree of
registration on 17 April 1917, although such date cannot
be considered as the date of the title or the date when the
title took effect.
Second. Any title that traces its source to OCT No. 994
dated 17 April 1917 is void, for such mother title is
inexistent. The fact that the Dimson and CLT titles made
specific reference to an OCT No. 994 dated 17 April 1917
casts doubt on the validity of such titles since they refer to
an inexistent OCT. This error alone is, in fact, sufficient to
invalidate the Dimson and CLT claims over the subject
property if singular reliance is placed by them on the dates
appearing on their respective titles.
Third. The decisions of this Court in MWSS v. Court of
Appeals and Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals cannot apply to
the cases at bar, especially in regard to their recognition of
an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917, a title which we now
acknowledge as inexistent. Neither could the conclusions
in MWSS or Gonzaga with respect to an OCT No. 994
dated 19 April 1917 bind any other case operating under
the factual setting the same as or similar to that at bar.
With these conclusions, what then is the proper course of
action to take with respect to the pending motions for
reconsideration? Considering that CLT and the Dimsons
clearly failed to meet the burden of proof reposed in them
as plaintiffs in the action for annulment of title and
recovery of possession, there is a case to be made for
ordering the dismissal of their original complaints before
the trial court. However, such solution may not
satisfactorily put to rest the controversy surrounding the
Maysilo Estate.
More pertinently, after the instant petitions were filed with
this Court, the Republic of the Philippines, through the
OSG, had sought to intervene.1âwphi1 The Republic did
not participate as a party when these cases were still
before the trial courts and the Court of Appeals. While the
Republic had originally prayed for the grant of the petitions
filed by all the petitioners in these consolidated cases,
instead it presently seeks of the Court the promulgation of
a new ruling upholding the validity of OCT No. 994
issued73 or registered74 on May 3, 1917. Rather than
suggest whether the petitions be granted or denied, the
OSG argues that after a declaration from this Court that it
is the 3 May 1917 mother title that is valid, "a remand of
this case to the Court of Appeals, to settle which among
the private parties derived their titles from the existing
OCT 994, is proper"75
Notably, both the Manotoks and Araneta are amenable to
the remand of the petition, albeit under differing
qualifications. The Manotoks submit that there should be a
remand to the court of origin, consolidating all the present
petitions, and that a full trial be conducted by the trial
court.76 On the other hand, Araneta proposes four (4)
options for the Court to consider: (1) the dismissal of the
original complaint filed by Dimson; (2) a ruling granting
Araneta’s appeal and dismissing Dimson’s complaint, but
at the same time remanding the case to a new division of
the Court of Appeals for factual determination pursuant to
Section 6, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court; (3) the
suspension of the resolution of the present motion for
reconsideration while the case is remanded to the Court of
Appeals for factual determination; or (4) the remand of the
proceedings to the Court of Appeals for the reception of
further evidence, particularly the Senate and DOJ Reports,
pursuant to Section 6, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, and
the consequent resolution by the appellate court of the
instant petitions.
The OSG observes that during the oral arguments on the
motion for reconsideration, then Chief Justice Panganiban
suggested that a remand may be required to determine
the status of the original title.77 Considering that the
genuine OCT No. 994 is that issued on/ registered
on/dated 3 May 1917, a remand would be appropriate to
determine which of the parties, if any, derived valid title
from the said genuine OCT No. 994. On the one hand, the
appreciation of facts is beyond the province of this Court,
since it is not a trier of fact78 as well as not capacitated to
appreciate evidence at the first instance. On the other
hand, the Court of Appeals has the competence to engage
in that undertaking.
Under Section 6 of Rule 46, which is applicable to original
cases for certiorari,79 the Court may, whenever necessary
to resolve factual issues, delegate the reception of the
evidence on such issues to any of its members or to an
appropriate court, agency or office.80 The delegate need
not be the body that rendered the assailed decision.
The Court of Appeals generally has the authority to review
findings of fact.81 Its conclusions as to findings of fact are
generally accorded great respect by this Court. It is a body
that is fully capacitated and has a surfeit of experience in
appreciating factual matters, including documentary
evidence.
In fact, the Court had actually resorted to referring a
factual matter pending before it to the Court of Appeals. In
Republic v. Court of Appeals,82 this Court commissioned
the former Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals to
hear and receive evidence on the controversy, more
particularly to determine "the actual area reclaimed by the
Republic Real Estate Corporation, and the areas of the
Cultural Center Complex which are ‘open spaces’ and/or
‘areas reserved for certain purposes,’ determining in the
process the validity of such postulates and the respective
measurements of the areas referred to."83 The Court of
Appeals therein received the evidence of the parties and
rendered a "Commissioner’s Report" shortly thereafter.84
Thus, resort to the Court of Appeals is not a deviant
procedure.
The provisions of Rule 32 should also be considered as
governing the grant of authority to the Court of Appeals to
receive evidence in the present case. Under Section 2,
Rule 32 of the Rules of Court, a court may, motu proprio,
direct a reference to a commissioner when a question of
fact, other than upon the pleadings, arises upon motion or
otherwise, in any stage of a case, or for carrying a
judgment or order into effect.85 The order of reference
can be limited exclusively to receive and report evidence
only, and the commissioner may likewise rule upon the
admissibility of evidence.86 The commissioner is likewise
mandated to submit a report in writing to the court upon
the matters submitted to him by the order of reference.87
In Republic, the commissioner’s report formed the basis of
the final adjudication by the Court on the matter. The
same result can obtain herein.
VII.
The OSG likewise adverts to the findings reached in the
respective investigations and reports by the Department of
Justice and the Philippine Senate, components of the two
other co-equal branches of the government. Both the DOJ
Report dated 28 August 1997 and the Senate Report
dated 25 May 1998 conclude that there is only one (1)
OCT No. 994 issued or registered on 3 May 1997. The
OSG argues that the contents of both of these reports may
be considered as evidence. It also points out, with basis,
that these reports may be taken judicial notice of by this
Court, following Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.
Indeed, it cannot be disputed that these reports fall within
the ambit of "the official acts of the legislative [and]
executive… departments."88
It bears noting that the DOJ and Senate Reports were
rendered on 28 August 1997 and 25 May 1998
respectively. They were issued some years after the trial
courts had promulgated their respective decisions in the
Manotok and Araneta cases, and even after the Court of
Appeals handed down its decision against the Manotoks
which is assailed in its present petition.89 In Araneta’s
case, the Court of Appeals had first ruled against Araneta
in its Decision dated 30 May 1997, or just shortly before
the rendition of the DOJ and Senate Reports.
Since this Court is not a trier of fact, we are not prepared
to adopt the findings made by the DOJ and the Senate, or
even consider whether these are admissible as evidence,
though such questions may be considered by the Court of
Appeals upon the initiative of the parties. The Court, in the
2005 Decision, refused to take into account
the reports on the regrettable premise that they could
somehow "override" the judicial decisions earlier arrived
at.90 The reports cannot conclusively supersede or
overturn judicial decisions, but if admissible they may be
taken into account as evidence on the same level as the
other pieces of evidence submitted by the parties. The fact
that they were rendered by the DOJ and the Senate
should not, in itself, persuade the courts to accept them
without inquiry. The facts and arguments presented in the
reports must still undergo judicial scrutiny and analysis,
and certainly the courts will have the discretion to accept
or reject them.
There are many factual questions looming over the
properties that could only be threshed out in the remand to
the Court of Appeals. The Manotoks and Araneta advert to
certain factual allegations relating to their titles and
backstories to advance their respective positions. Still, if it
indeed emerges from the determination of the Court of
Appeals on remand that notwithstanding the clear flaws of
the title of respondents the titles of petitioners are cut from
the same counterfeit cloth, then the Republic of the
Philippines, an intervenor in these cases, is armed anyway
with any and all appropriate remedies to safeguard the
legitimate owners of the properties in question.
VIII.
The definitive conclusions reached by the Court thus far in
these cases are spelled out in Part VI of this Resolution.
Said conclusions serve to guide the Court of Appeals in
hearing these cases on remand.
The Court hereby constitutes a Special Division of the
Court of Appeals to hear these cases on remand. The
Special Division shall be composed of three Associate
Justices of the Court of Appeals, namely; Justice Josefina
Guevara-Salonga as Chairperson; Justice Lucas
Bersamin as Senior Member; and Associate Justice Japar
B. Dimaampao as Junior Member.
The Special Division is tasked to hear and receive
evidence, conclude the proceedings and submit to this
Court a report on its findings and recommended
conclusions within three (3) months from finality of this
Resolution.
In ascertaining which of the conflicting claims of title
should prevail, the Special Division is directed to make the
following determinations based on the evidence already
on record and such other evidence as may be presented
at the proceedings before it, to wit:
i. Which of the contending parties are able to trace back
their claims of title to OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917?
ii. Whether the imputed flaws in the titles of the Manotoks
and Araneta, as recounted in the 2005 Decision, are borne
by the evidence? Assuming they are, are such flaws
sufficient to defeat the claims of title of the Manotoks and
Araneta?
iii. Whether the factual and legal bases of 1966 Order of
Judge Muñoz-Palma and the 1970 Order of Judge Sayo
are true and valid. Assuming they are, do these orders
establish a superior right to the subject properties in favor
of the Dimsons and CLT as opposed to the claims of
Araneta and the Manotoks?
iv. Whether any of the subject properties had been the
subject of expropriation proceedings at any point since the
issuance of OCT No. 994 on 3 May 1917, and if so what
are those proceedings, what are the titles acquired by the
Government and whether any of the parties is able to
trace its title to the title acquired by the Government [G.R. No. L-47847 : July 31, 1981.]
through expropriation.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF

v. Such other matters necessary and proper in APPEALS and MANUELA PASTOR, Respondents.
ascertaining which of the conflicting claims of title should
prevail.

WHEREFORE, the instant cases are hereby REMANDED

to the Special Division of the Court of Appeals for further
DECISION
proceedings in accordance with Parts VI, VII and VIII of
this Resolution.

SO ORDERED.

MAKASIAR, J.:

By this petition for review on certiorari, the Director of

Lands seeks to set aside the decision of the Court of
Appeals in C.A.G.R. No. 59853-R affirming the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Batangas in LRC Case No.
N-893 granting the application for registration under R.A.
496 of thirteen cranad(13) parcels of land in the name of
herein private respondent Manuela Pastor.

It appears that on May 8, 1974, respondent Manuela

Pastor filed with the Court of First Instance of Batangas
LRC Case No. N-893, an application for confirmation of
imperfect title over thirteen cranad(13) lots situated in
Gulod and Pallocan, Batangas City.

The application shows that seven cranad(7) of the lots,

specifically Lots Nos. 9186-A, 9186-B, 9186-D, 9330-A,
9330-C, 9402-A and 9402-D were allegedly inherited by
respondent Manuela Pastor from her parents Rafael
Pastor and Natalia Quinio who died on July 1, 1938 and
July 12, 1908, respectively. The other six cranad(6) lots,
namely Lots Nos. 9402-B, 9402-E, 9397-B, 9397-D, 9367
and 9360 were allegedly inherited by respondent from her
aunt Rosario Pastor who died on January 13, 1950 without
any surviving heir except respondent herein. In her
application, the respondent claims that she and her
predecessors-in-interest had been in continuous,
uninterrupted, open, public, adverse and notorious
possession of the lots under claim of ownership for more
than thirty cranad(30) years.
On June 24, 1974 the application was amended to correct
the description of two lots.
The Director of Lands filed an opposition to the application
on the ground that applicant Manuela Pastor and her
predecessors-in-interest neither had title in fee simple nor
imperfect title under Section 48 of the Public Land Law, as
amended, over the lots in question.
No other persons filed opposition to the application.
Accordingly, the Court of First Instance of Batangas,
acting as a land registration court, issued an order of
general default with the exception of the Director of Lands,
and then proceeded to hear the applicant, her witnesses,
and oppositor Director of Lands.
During the hearings, the applicant presented as her
witnesses her nephew Antonio M. Pastor, and Geodetic
Engineer Quirino P. Clemeneo. Applicant Manuela Pastor
testified on her behalf that she has remained the owner
and possessor of the lots in question; that her possession
has been peaceful, public, open, continuous, adverse
against the whole world and in the concept of owner; that
she had paid the taxes thereon; and that the said lots were
planted to sugar cane.
Witness Antonio M. Pastor corroborated in all material
respects the testimony of his aunt Manuela Pastor.
The Geodetic Engineer, Quirino P. Clemeneo, testified
that he conducted the survey of some of the lots and
verified the survey conducted by the Bureau of Lands on
the others. He found that the lots did not encroach upon
private and public lands.
As part of her documentary evidence, applicant Manuela
Pastor presented the certifications of the Treasurer of
Batangas City showing payments of the real estate tax on
the lots from 1965 to 1974 cranad(Exhibits J, J-1, J-2, J-3,
J-4 and J-5) and official receipts of payments of real estate
tax on the same lots for 1975 cranad(Exhibits K, K-1 and
K-2).
Apart from the foregoing, applicant presented, however, a
certification from the Land Registration Commission
cranad(Exhibit L) stating that Lot No. 9330 of the
Cadastral Survey of Batangas, Province of Batangas, was
declared public land in Cadastral Case No. 41, LRC Cad.
Record No. 1706. She likewise submitted another
certification from the Land Registration Commission
cranad(Exhibit L-1) to the effect that Lots Nos. 9186, 9360,
9367, 9397 and 9402 of the Cadastral Survey of
Batangas, Province of Batangas, were the subject of a
decision in Cad. Case No. 43, LRC Cad. Record No.
1712, although no decree of registration has as yet been
issued.
On August 6, 1975 the Court of First Instance of Batangas
rendered a decision pertinent portions of which read as
follows:

“From the evidence presented, it has been established
that as early as in the year 1913, the original owners of the
seven cranad(7) parcels of land located in the barrio of
Gulod, Batangas City, designated as Lots Nos. 9330-A,
9330-C, 9186-A, 9186-B, 9186-D, 9402-A and 9402-D, as
reflected in the plan Csd-12122 Sheet 1 cranad(Exhibit
‘E’), were spouses Rafael Pastor and Natalia Quinio.
Natalia Quinio died on July 12, 1908. Since then, Rafael
Pastor possessed the said lots peacefully, openly,
continuously, adversely against the whole world and in the
concept of owner up to his death in 1938. After the death
of Rafael Pastor on July 1, 1938, Manuela Pastor, the
applicant herein, being the only child and sole heiress,
came into possession and ownership thereof by way of
inheritance. From 1938 when the applicant inherited the
said lots from her deceased parents and up to the present,
she has remained the owner and possessor thereof; that
her possession over the said lots has been peaceful,
public, open, continuous, adverse against the whole world
and in the concept of owner up to the present; that the
applicant had paid the estate and inheritance taxes
thereon before the Japanese Occupation; that the said lots
were planted with sugar cane, and since the year 1964
there were no tenants but paid workers were provided with
huts for their use therein; that there were no buildings,
houses or other improvements thereon. The other six
cranad(6) lots located in the barrio of Pallocan, Batangas
City, designated as Lots Nos. 9397-B, 9397-D, 9367,
9360, 9402-B and 9402-E, as reflected in the plans
marked as Exhibits ‘E’, ‘G’, ‘H’, ‘H-1’, ‘H-1-a’ and ‘H-2’,
were originally owned by the applicant’s aunt, Dra.
Rosario Pastor; that the latter possessed the said lots
peacefully, openly, continuously, adversely against the
whole world and in the concept of owner up to her death in
1950; that after the death of Dra. Rosario Pastor on
January 13, 1950, the applicant, Manuela Pastor, being
the only niece and sole heiress, came into possession and
ownership thereof by way of inheritance. From 1950 when
the said applicant inherited the said lots from her
deceased aunt and up to the present, she has remained
the owner and possessor thereof; that her possession
over the said lots has been peaceful, public, open,
continuous, adverse against the whole world and in the
concept of owner up to the present; that the applicant had
paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon; that the
said lots were planted with sugar cane, and since the year
1964 there were no tenants but paid workers were
provided with huts for their use therein; that there were no
buildings, houses or other improvements thereon.
“Evidence further shows that the late Rafael Pastor and
Dra. Rosario Pastor, are brother and sister. Dra. Pastor
died single and without issue; that applicant, Manuela
Pastor, together with her predecessors-in-interest since
the year 1913 and up to the present have been in open,
public, peaceful, continuous, adverse and uninterrupted
possession over the said thirteen cranad(13) lots in
question; that said lots were covered by tax declarations in
the name of herein applicant, as shown in the Assessment
Certificate issued by the City Assessor of Batangas
cranad(Exhibit ‘1’), and the taxes thereon have been paid
by the applicant cranad(Exhibits ‘J’, ‘J-1’, ‘J-5’, ‘K’, ‘K-1’
and ‘K-2’); that there were no lien or incumbrance affecting
said lots. Furthermore, applicant testified that she did not
claim any portion of the road which bounded the lots in
question, nor the portion of the creeks or river; that any of
the said lots were not within any reservation of any kind.
“As required by this Court, the applicant submitted the
following:
“(a) a certification of the Land Registration Commission
that Lot No. 9330 of the Cadastral Survey of Batangas
Record No. 1706 was declared ‘public land’ in the decision
rendered thereon. It is further certified that copy of said
decision relative to the aforementioned lot is not available
in this Commission cranad(Exhibit ‘L’); cranad(b) a
certification of the Land Registration Commission, that no
decrees of registration have as yet been issued to lots
Nos. 9186, 9360, 9367 and 9397 and 9402 of the
Cadastral Survey of Batangas cranad(Exh. ‘L-1’); and
cranad(c) a certification issued by officer-in-charge
Records Division of the Bureau of Lands to the effect that
the thirteen cranad(13) lots situated in Barrios Gulod and
Pallocan, Batangas City, are not covered by any kind of
public land, application or patent cranad(Exh. ‘M’).
“All the documentary exhibits of applicant were submitted
in evidence as offered, there being no objection on the
part of the oppositor. Oppositor Director of Lands through
City Fiscal of Batangas did not offer any contradictory
evidence.
“Indisputably and by highly credible evidence, the
applicant gave more than ample proof of her rights to the
grant of title over the properties in question. By herself and
through her predecessors-in-interest, the applicant has
been in open, public, peaceful, continuous, uninterrupted
and adverse possession of the thirteen cranad(13) parcels
of land up to the present — all for the requisite period of
time and under a bona fide claim of ownership which
entitle her to confirmation of title over the properties
subject of this application.
“. cra . finding the application for confirmation and grant to
title under Act 496 as amended, to be well-founded and
fully substantiated by evidence sufficient and requisite
under the law, the Court hereby decrees the registration
of:
“x x x
“in favor of applicant, MANUELA PASTOR . cra .”
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary(pp. 49-60, Record on Appeal,
p. 45, rec.).
Not, satisfied with the decision of the Court of First
Instance, petitioner Director of Lands appealed the same
to the Court of Appeals assigning the following errors:
‘First Assignment of Error
‘THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE
APPLICATION OF MANUELA PASTOR FOR
CONFIRMATION OF HER ALLEGED IMPERFECT TITLE
TO LOTS NO. 9330-A AND 9330-C DESPITE EVIDENCE
ADDUCED BY APPLICANT HERSELF THAT SAID LOTS
WERE DECLARED PUBLIC LAND IN A PREVIOUS
CADASTRAL PROCEEDING.’
‘Second Assignment of Error
‘THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE
APPLICATION OF MANUELA PASTOR FOR
CONFIRMATION OF HER ALLEGED IMPERFECT TITLE
TO LOTS NO. 9186-A, 9186-B, 9186-D, 9402-A, 9402-B,
9402-D, 9402-E, 9397-B, 9397-D, 9367 and 9360
DESPITE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY APPLICANT
HERSELF THAT A DECISION RESPECTING SAID LOTS
HAD BEEN RENDERED IN A PREVIOUS CADASTRAL
PROCEEDING.’
‘Third Assignment of Error
‘THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THERE IS ADEQUATE EVIDENCE OF THE ALLEGED
IMPERFECT TITLE OF MANUELA PASTOR TO THE
THIRTEEN cranad(13) LOTS SUBJECT OF THE
APPLICATION’cralaw cranad(pp. 11-12, rec.).
On February 9, 1978 the Court of Appeals rendered
judgment affirming in toto the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Batangas.
Hence, this petition.
I
Substantially, the same issues, as raised by petitioner in
the Court of Appeals, are brought before US.
Petitioner asserts that the decision rendered in Cadastral
Case No. 41 cranad(Exhibit L) declaring Lot No. 9330 —
from which Lots Nos. 9330-A and 9330-C were derived —
constitutes res adjudicata as to the nature of the lots in
question and therefore, a bar to appellee’s application.
Additionally, petitioner also argued that:
“Lots Nos. 9186-A, 9186-B and 9186-D of the Cadastral
Survey of Batangas, were derived from Lot No. 9186. Lots
Nos. 9402-A, 9402-B, 9402-D and 9402-E were derived
from Lot No. 9402. Lots Nos. 9397-B and 9397-D were
derived from Lot No. 9397.
“As shown by applicant’s Exhibit L-1, Lots Nos. 9186,
9360, 9367, 9397 and 9402 were the subject of a decision
rendered in Cad. Case No. 43, LRC Cad. Record No.
1712, although no decree of registration has as yet been
issued therein.
“The certificate, Exhibit L-1, is dated June 4, 1975. The
decision of the lower court was rendered more than two
months later, on August 6, 1975. Thus, on the basis of
Exhibit L, the decision of the cadastral court might already
be final when the appealed decision was rendered. If such
be the case, the decision of the cadastral court constitutes
res adjudicata and it is a bar to the present land
registration proceeding under Act No. 496 cranad(Lopez v.
Director of Lands, 48 Phil. 589; Section 1. paragraph
cranad(f), Rule 16, Rules of Court).
“Assuming that the decision of the cadastral court was not
yet final when the appealed decision was rendered, it was
nevertheless, litis pendentia which, under Section 1,
paragraph cranad(e), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, is
likewise a bar to the present proceeding for land
registration case under Act No. 496.
“Either way, whether the decision of the cadastral court in
Cad. Case No. 43 had become final or not, the present
proceeding for land registration under Act No. 496 cannot
prosper because of the principles of res adjudicata and
litis pendentia” chanroblesvirtualawlibrary(pp. 15-16, rec.).
WE find no legal basis to uphold the foregoing contentions
of petitioner. It is clear from the evidence on record that in
the proceedings had before the Court of First Instance of
Batangas, acting as a land registration court, the oppositor
Director of Lands, petitioner herein, did not interpose any
objection nor set up the defense of res adjudicata with
respect to the lots in question. Such failure on the part of
oppositor Director of Lands, to OUR mind, is a procedural
infirmity which cannot be cured on appeal. Section 2, Rule
9, Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in no uncertain
language, provides that:
“SEC. 2. Defenses and objections not pleaded deemed
waived. — Defenses and objections not pleaded either in
a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived; .
cra .”
All defenses therefore not interposed in a motion to
dismiss or in an answer are deemed waived
cranad(Santiago, et al. vs. Ramirez, et al., L-15237, May
31, 1963, 8 SCRA 157, 162; Torreda vs. Boncaros, L-
39832, January 30, 1976, 69 SCRA 247, 253).
Thus, the defense of res adjudicata when not set up either
in a motion to dismiss or in an answer, is deemed waived.
It cannot be pleaded for the first time at the trial or on
appeal cranad(Phil. Coal Miner’s Union vs. CEPOC, et al.,
L-19007, April 30, 1964, 10 SCRA 784, 789).
But granting for a moment, that the defenses, of res
adjudicata was properly raised by petitioner herein, WE
still hold that, factually, there is no prior final judgment at
all to speak of. The decision in Cadastral Case No. 41
does not constitute a bar to the application of respondent
Manuela Pastor; because a decision in a cadastral
proceeding declaring a lot public land is not the final
decree contemplated in Sections 38 and 40 of the Land
Registration Act.
A judicial declaration that a parcel of land is public, does
not preclude even the same applicant from subsequently
seeking a judicial confirmation of his title to the same land,
provided he thereafter complies with the provisions of
Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended,
and as long as said public land remains alienable and
disposable cranad(now sections 3 and 4, P.D. No. 1073).
With respect to Cadastral Case No. 43, the evidence on
record is too scanty to sustain the view of the petitioner
that the decision rendered therein constitutes res
adjudicata, or in the absence of finality thereof, litis
pendentia. On the contrary, private respondent has amply
shown that no final decree whatsoever was issued in
connection with said cadastral case, even as it is not
known in whose favor said decision was rendered. As
found by the Court of Appeals:
“Again, we sustain the appellee. There is an ambiguity as
to what was adjudicated in Case No. 43. If the lots in
question were in that case awarded to a third party, the
latter should have intervened in this case. But no private
party has challenged the application for registration”
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary(p. 30, rec.).
II
Finally, petitioner argues for the first time on appeal that
“there is no substantial evidence to show that she
cranad(private respondent Manuela Pastor) and her
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the
lots sought to be titled for a period of at least thirty
cranad(30) years and in the manner provided in Section
48, as amended, of the Public Land Law.”
WE find no merit in the foregoing argument of petitioner.
The uncontradicted testimony of private respondent
Manuela Pastor, which was further corroborated by the
testimony of Antonio Pastor, conclusively established
beyond doubt that the respondent, together with her
predecessors-in-interest since the year 1913 and up to the
present, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the lots in
question under a bona fide claim of ownership. Moreover,
the documentary evidence submitted by private
respondent also show that the lots have been declared for
taxation purposes in the name of respondent Manuela
Pastor cranad(Exhibit ‘I’), and the taxes thereon have
been paid by said respondent herein cranad(Exhibits ‘J’,
‘J-1’ to ‘J-5’, ‘K’, ‘K-1’ and ‘K-2’). And finally, Geodetic
Engineer Quirino Clemeneo, who conducted the survey of
some of the lots and verified the survey conducted by the
Bureau of Lands, testified that the thirteen cranad(13) lots
in question did not encroach upon public or private lands.
All these are unmistakable indicia that respondent
Manuela Pastor has performed and complied with all the
conditions essential to entitle her to a confirmation of her
imperfect title over the thirteen cranad(13) lots subject of
her application.

WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF

APPEALS IS AFFIRMED, AND THE PETITION IS
HEREBY DISMISSED. NO COSTS.

SO ORDERED.