doi: 10.1111/1467-8675.

12072

A Discursive General Will: How Collective Reasoning

Strengthens Social Freedom

Shay Welch

In this article I argue that a discursive version of a general will grounded in collective rea-
soning mechanisms can, at least in one respect, enhance individual freedom. The individual
freedom I target here is individual social freedom. For the purposes of this paper, I under-
stand a general will to simply be a dialogical, participatory version of a collective will of
the individuals who constitute a community. I understand social freedom to be the freedom
to choose and act with and through other members of the community and to partake in the
construction of the values, norms, and institutions of that community that shape one’s own
daily life. Social freedom is determined by the extent to which individuals self-determine
through social interactions with others in relations, including both public and private inter-
personal relationships. I restrict my attention to social freedom since it is this sort of freedom
that I believe is cultivated through a general will. Critics have resisted the potentially freeing
aspects of previous conceptualizations of a general will because they have conceived of free-
dom either atomistically or as communitarian. The recognition of an individualistic, though
social, form of freedom creates space for an individual, liberatory, participatory freedom that
is distinctively cultivated only through communal exchanges.
Because I understand a general will to be a unique community will and because social
freedom targets the freedom individuals develop and exercise qua community membership,
the participatory democratic model is best suited for fostering a freedom enhancing, rather
than inhibiting, general will. Thus I propose a feasible participatory model that strength-
ens individual social freedom through communal discourse. I argue that if a participatory
democratic society utilizes a form of premise-driven collective reasoning outlined by Philip
Pettit and Christopher McMahon, then the common good put forward by that society will
represent a general will that promotes, rather than limits, individual freedom. A general will
prescribes processes that even dissenters can recognize as minimally acceptable as their own
because they would have been active contributors to the pool of reasons that generate the
general will.1 It is through dissenters’ acceptance qua toleration that their individual social
freedom is preserved and through the act of participation that it is enhanced.
A key problem of a general will is the conflict between individuals’ public and private
interests.2 I argue that the processes of collective reasoning mitigate this conflict in individu-
als’ judgments in participatory societies. This is because, as Pettit informs us, “the collective
judgment of a social integrate may be discontinuous with the individual judgments made
by members of the collectivity.”3 This means that an individual can have one judgment in
her role as a community member and another judgment just as herself, even if these two
judgments are contrary to one another. If society members view themselves as a collective,
which is a hallmark of a participatory society, it is possible to maintain—and make sense
of—the claim that political consenters and dissenters alike would be strengthened rather
than forced as free interrelated community members when complying with the constructed
common good. This conflict in wills simply is the conflict in the two aspects of individual
freedom—atomistic and social—that individuals can exercise simultaneously. By conceiving
of a general will as an expression of individual social freedom we can refurbish a distinctively

Constellations Volume 21, No 1, 2014.


C 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
 A Discursive General Will: Shay Welch 97

utopian aspect of community based theories—freedom for the individual that evolves from
membership in a free and equal community—that are otherwise barred by the authoritarian
undercurrents of the traditional and notorious Rousseauian conception.
While Rousseau utilized the term “general will” as the basis of his social contract, my
analysis is neither a reconceptualization of his theory nor an extension of it—this is why
I speak of a general will and not the general will. I use the term because I analyze this
conception of collectivity in terms of dialogically constructed shared moral understandings
that emphasize inclusion and the needs of community dissenters and is distinct from standard
notions of collective intentions. The term does not indicate a second-order or meta-will; it is
merely a simple, uncomplicated use of the term “general.”
In the first section, I clarify what the term ‘social freedom’ means. I then distinguish
individual social freedom from individual simple freedom and explain how the tension
between these two freedoms gives rise to an underlying tension within a conception of a
general will. This tension can be ascribed to notions such as a collective will, a common
good, etc. and is not entirely distinct from a general will; yet the tension is most notorious
in relation to a general will vis-à-vis modern political theory and so occupies a central
role in this analysis. In the second section, I conceptualize a general will in a discourse-
based participatory context. I demonstrate how participatory democracy gives rise to a
discursive general will and how deliberative practices can open space for individuals to truly
contribute to and shape their community’s general will. In section three, I identify a unique
participatory practice—premise-driven collective reasoning—and argue that this practice
enhances multiple aspects of individuals’ social freedom in community decision-making.
I maintain that features such as “remainder reasons” and “reasons for us” are especially
cooperative and contribute to social freedom and so are necessary if participatory systems
that generate a general will are to promote individual freedom qua the community. In the
final section, I raise the problem of inter-individual and intra-individual disagreement—
disagreement between individuals and within an individual—for a participatory general will
and argue that there are means of assuaging and accommodating disagreement within this
framework.
If it turns out, as I argue it does, that individual social freedom can be enhanced by a
discursive general will, then political theorists and political activists alike can gain further
confidence in the efficacy of their promotion of public conversations about contested social
issues for the purpose of generating negotiation and conflict mitigation and, generally, more
peaceable and free communities.

I. Social Freedom
Because there are competing conceptions of freedom, many of which can be exercised by
an individual concurrently or that function as complements to one another, it is important
to clarify which form of individual freedom I believe is enhanced by a general will.4 The
form of freedom enhanced by a society regulated by a general will is an individual’s social
freedom.
I use ‘social’ in a distinct sense, but one I find to be the most fundamental and fundamen-
tally relevant aspect of the concept – sociality. Social activities are largely the constitutive
activities of daily life; they are ordinary, routine, and ongoing. Thus, when I speak of the ‘so-
cial,’ I have in mind real encounters and interactions with others as the context for exercising
and expanding freedom. They are, as Jean Keller describes, the “everyday communicative
practices through which we achieve the mutual understanding necessary to coordinate our


C 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
98 Constellations Volume 21, Number 1, 2014

action plans and create a shared form of life.”5 On this understanding, the social sphere is
where individuals develop and express their individuality, and this is a function of the rela-
tionships they hold with friends, members of the community, and community institutions.
Our relationships with others, including how we see ourselves in relation to them, impact the
sorts of choices that are available to us and which decisions we (can) then make. Because
social relations take many forms and constitute the majority of our immediate relationships
in all areas of life, social freedom is pertinent to both the public and private realms. More-
over, given the normative values of connection that regulate a general will, social freedom is
fundamental to freedom within the political sphere. However, social freedom is quite distinct
from political freedom. Social freedom is about sociality and the contributions individuals
make in the processes of social construction. Political freedom is the legal freedom individ-
uals possess to contribute to legislation and the construction of legal positive laws. Because
I focus solely on social freedom, the arguments I make concern public deliberation at a
social level and do not address formal political processes and procedures. The question of
how participatory processes at the social level translate into participatory processes at the
legislative level are a separate question not addressed in this paper.
My restricted focus on social freedom in the context of a general will is both reason-
able and theoretically advantageous because of the emphasis that participatory democracy
generally assigns to connection in communities.6 Social interdependence, relationality, and
interdependence are all mainstays of these frameworks. Social freedom captures a distinctive,
and crucial, understanding of self-determining, individual freedom that arises through these
communal and social relations and it appears that a general will model can also capture this
conception of freedom.
Given the fact of multiple and competing senses of freedom, the tension underlying the
conflict between private and public wills is not as clear-cut as it first appears. I take the
conflict to be grounded in a tension between an individual’s simple—or atomistic—freedom
and her social freedom. Individuals frequently encounter situations in which they boil down
all available options to two: one option would cohere with her simple freedom, which is the
freedom she has to advance her pure self-interest absent any connection to or consideration
of others, and the other would cohere with her social freedom, which is the freedom she
exercises in connection or interaction with others. This phenomenon is a basic feature of
autonomous choice. In such conflicts there may be a clear winner and in some conflicts the
individual has to consider the preferences of her future self—how she would want her future
to pan out and the effects an atomistic or social choice would have on that future. Choices in
how we exercise our freedom(s) and which freedom(s) we choose to exercise are a perpetual
conflict that, itself, cannot be resolved. What can be done, however, is uncover the ways
in which these freedoms can be enhanced so that when conflicts arise, more information is
available to aid individuals in their autonomous choices.
A general will qua its intersubjective and collective nature would prioritize social free-
dom over simple freedom. This means that any choice the individual makes to enhance
her social freedom will limit her simple freedom. But this does not undermine the extent
to which her individual freedom—her individual social freedom—is strengthened through
her communally based, participatory choices. The conflict, then, is between two sorts of
individual freedoms rather than a conflict between an individual freedom and communal
(communitarian) freedom. The difference between these two sorts of freedom largely con-
cerns the construction of the individual. Communitarian theories maintain that the individual
is wholly shaped by her community and context and leaves little room for exit from harmful
communities and relationships. Individual theories of freedom maintain that an individual


C 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
 A Discursive General Will: Shay Welch 99

is self-created to a large extent. The recognition of an individual social form of freedom is

specifically feminist because of the acknowledgement of the role of relationships with others
(social construction) without an insistence on social determinism or denial of autonomy and
self-interest. Interaction and connectivity constitutive of participatory societies are couched
in mutuality but simple freedom concerns only one active party—the individual herself.
Therefore when social freedom, which attends to and requires more than one person and her
interests for its exercise, is introduced to the equation, the fundamental conflict of a general
will subsides.

II. A Discursive General Will

A participatory general will is a discursive entity—a vicissitude.7 That is, its discovery
comes about through deliberative construction rather than location in some transcendental
realm. This means that a general will only comes about through interaction and deliberation
with others.8 In this section, I show how a general will is discursive and that its content is
comprised of shared moral understandings that evolve through interaction. A conceptual-
ization of a general will as something that must be collectively, dialogically constructed is
central to understanding how practices and procedures of collective reasoning are capable of
generating such a phenomenon. However, as with any discursive practice—and forms of so-
cial cooperation more generally—there is always the problem of irresolvable but reasonable
conflict. The problem of disagreement is discussed at the end of the paper.
A fact of sociality is that community members largely possess a shared social language
of meanings and sets of practices, either through linguistics, non-verbal perlocutionary
gestures, or embodied communications, which are all facets of interdependence and inter-
subjectivity this is why social construction is possible at the most basic level. Communities
use these concepts and practices to manufacture shared moral concepts through discur-
sive engagement.9 Individuals negotiate the meanings of such concepts through formal and
informal mediums10 of interaction and those concepts then configure into shared moral
understandings vis-à-vis corresponding social arrangements and provide individuals with a
picture of how they do and should live as a community.11 This historically dependent, causal
interdependence between moral concepts and social arrangements is a method of world mak-
ing since changes individuals make in either concepts or arrangements will cause the shared
moral understandings, along with the corresponding conception of the common good, to
evolve.12
Discursive practices facilitate an incipient general will since the logic of participatory
processes has an educative effect.13 Dialogical interaction formulates a public interest that
differs from private interests since individuals must hear from others what is of value and
what constitutes goods for community members who occupy differing social roles.14 And
when interpersonal exchanges transpire, people can then manufacture a public interest that
stems from a diverse perspective. Individuals’ incorporation of others’ perspectives into their
own is important because a multifarious perspective more accurately represents community
needs that emerge from shared moral concepts. Individuals navigate their sociability in
terms of their ability to properly contribute to and construct their general will with, through,
and in conjunction with others.15 Thus, interactive engagement is fundamental because the
freedom of participation gives individuals an understanding of themselves as a facet of the
common good. Moreover, the interactive relations between community members dialogically
constructs the individual herself since the concepts developed and shared together shapes
individuals’ public and private preferences.16


C 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
100 Constellations Volume 21, Number 1, 2014

But the individual’s interest in converging with the common good is not merely an
altruistic venture. If individuals belong to a society that depends on participation, then they
have a stake in the success of the general will. It is through having such a stake, within
the context of equal power in contribution and participation, that particular wills begin to
merge with the general will, allowing individuals to begin to see that the common good
is really good for themselves as a unique individual as well.17 The common good is not
just the good for the community to which the individual has to surrender; it is a good for
herself – self-interestedly – as well. However, it is important to note here that unanimity
and consensus are not the final aim of a discursive general will, though they are desirable.
The aim is, as much as possible, to include all community members’ inputs, especially those
who have been historically segregated from the processes of social construction, so that any
development of a common good can be reasonably viewed as such. While not all social and
public decisions will result in a truly common good or general will, a participatory society
promoting equality and freedom will pursue inclusive and converging deliberations as much
as possible. Additionally, the aim is not to eliminate or ignore self-interest; rather, the idea
is that the fact of interconnection reveals the extent to which much of our purely, atomistic
self-interest goes against the grain of freedom in community. Individual social freedom is
the meeting place between self-interest and connection; and a general will, according to this
understanding, is a representation of such reconciliation.
It is helpful to think of a general will in a participatory framework as a dominant shared
moral understanding. And like all shared understandings, the common good can and will
change with continued interaction. Most basically, changes in the conception of the common
good happen when individuals change their minds and deliberation is a practice that has the
change of individuals’ minds as its ultimate objective.18 McMahon’s description of creating
a dominant view and his reasoning supporting the possibility of changing minds is clear and
precise, so I quote him at length here:
Some of the members of a polity will have formed, prior to their participation in shared
deliberation, a view on the issue being addressed. The changing of minds will consist
partly in the revision or abandonment of some of these views as deliberation proceeds.
Deliberation can change how the available concepts are interpreted or how the relative
weights of the corresponding reasons are understood. It can do this by identifying mistakes
in the reasoning underlying the initial positions, or by presenting in speech cases that expand
the familiarity of the participants with relatively similar or dissimilar situations . . . insofar
as the goal is to secure a majority for one’s view, attempting to change the thinking of people
whose views are already close to one’s own will make more sense than attempting to change
the thinking of people with sharply opposed views. But argument with people whose views
are sharply opposed can be an effective means of changing the thinking of other people if
the arguments take place in a public forum . . . . The deliberative approach to assembling a
majority envisages a group of people who share a set of normative and evaluative terms, but
proceed from different examples of the correct employment of these terms- proceed within
different personal histories of judgment. Through shared deliberation, they make the sets of
examples from which they proceed more alike by presenting to each other in speech cases
they hold to be relevantly similar to dissimilar to the case calling for decision.19
This description highlights the variability of shared moral understandings and provides
reasonable examples of (re)negotiating a general will. The goal of deliberation is for indi-
viduals to give recognition to critiques in ways that help them understand why the critiques
are made, even if the critiques do not turn out to be worthy of a change in mind. And that
is exactly the point. While inclusive deliberation can and sometimes does produce a negoti-
ated agreement, the moral importance of such practices is for everyone to understand their


C 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
 A Discursive General Will: Shay Welch 101

own and each other’s reasons for making the claims they do, which in turn can facilitate
social cooperation. Expressions of dissent raised through participatory processes lead all
deliberating individuals to re-examine one’s own position to see if it remains justified in
light of criticisms.20 This deliberative goal sits at the heart of many liberal political theories
in the form of reflective equilibrium, but can seem opaque. Modes of (re)negotiation such
as example giving and analogy comparison are practical, ordinary incidents that can take
place in any forum and help deliberators better understand the importance of reasons in
communities. It is important to recognize exchange mediums that facilitate influence at any
level of interaction since individuals’ public and private construction occurs simultaneously.
Individuals are just as capable of amending others’ public conceptions in private spaces as
they are in public spaces. And this means that the community’s conception of the general
will is being (re)negotiated at all time and in all relations.21
Discursive processes function dynamically, contributing both to the inputs and outputs
of communicated exchanges. Joshua Cohen purports that the shared understanding of the
common good provides a shared framework for collective judgments and decisions that
defines a general will.22 Participatory, discursive practices construct individuals’ shared
understanding of the common good and also generate principles for reasoning about their
general will. These shared understandings are constructed by and, in return, feed back into
communicative activities - those “perceptive, imaginative, appreciative, and expressive skills
and capacities”—that keep community members incessantly connected even when they are
not in direct interaction.23 The processes through which communities construct their moral
concepts and social arrangements pervade all relevant aspects of identity, preference, and
value construction at the individual and collective level, feeding into the articulation of a
general will. And this dynamic aspect of the general will is pivotal for its integration into a
collective reasoning framework.

IV. Cooperation, Collective Reasoning, and Freedom

Collective reasoning is a form of cooperation. The assumption of individuals’ possession of
a socially cooperative disposition, broadly construed, remains the dominant perspective in
social and political theory outside of the domain of game theory and individual rational choice
theory.24 It is believed by some—and rightly so—that most social undertakings could not
take off if individuals in society were in a constant state of competition.25 More specifically,
collective reasoning is a cooperative process by which individuals develop collective, “we”
intentions.26 This allows community members to proceed according to their chosen instances
of shared cooperative activity to pursue the common good that all have constructed and agreed
upon. In this section, I explain what collective reasoning is and show how this method of
discursive participation is capable of generating a properly cooperative and general will. In
short, I show how collective reasoning in a participatory community ipso facto increases
individual freedom through its production of a collective will.
To start, it is important to glean what social cooperation in dialogical participation amounts
to. When aiming at a general will, individuals—as members of communities—cooperate to
construct the pattern of organization that is most advantageous to interrelated, individual
flourishing. They are cooperating at the interpersonal level to arrange their overarching
cooperative organization. To shape society subsequent to a common good, all individuals
have to make concessions in their own conceptualization of the common good. It is through
concession and compromise that individuals construct and converge upon a dominant shared
understanding.


C 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
102 Constellations Volume 21, Number 1, 2014

As one might anticipate, the notion of reasonableness is fundamental and attaches to

each aspect of deliberative cooperation.27 One construal of reasonableness belongs to the
individual herself. A reasonable individual is one who has the disposition to actually make
reciprocal concessions that are necessary for cooperation to succeed. Second, the scheme
that individuals choose is reasonable if reasonable individuals find it mutually acceptable.
Moreover, this notion of reasonableness is a moral concept. First, individuals are only required
to make concessions if the act of concession is reciprocated. The ultimate goal is to construct
a conception of the common good that incorporates, represents, and endorses as many values
as possible without forcing others to compromise evaluative commitments. If the general
will can “integrate more values into its ‘life,’ the combining of evaluative perspectives by
collective deliberation may create a common basis on which each member can judge the
implementation of a particular cooperative scheme to be appropriate.”28 No one person can
be burdened more than any other, and all perspectives must be attended to. The second
moral sense of ‘reasonable’ is that a reasonable venture will necessarily require concessions
that go beyond the sort of concessions the individual would make in purely self-interested
bargaining.29 That individuals be reasonable is a central component of a general will, since
the conditions of reasonableness and a general will require that individuals respond to one
another with reciprocity and mutuality.
McMahon defines collective reasoning as a shared deliberation that marks mutually
beneficial cooperation.30 This reasoning differs from individualist versions of reasoning
in that decisions are products of input from each deliberator rather than an aggregate of
each individual’s own preferences. An aggregate vote could easily fail to yield a decision
that all voters consent to or even tolerate as reasonably fair. In fact, in individual voting,
depending on how procedures are set up, each person could contribute a vote that none of the
others share. The chosen option may not only be intolerable but also ineffective and further
damaging to the conditions of the minority’s needs. Individual voting informs others of one’s
own, non-deliberative preferences.31 Collective reasoning, on the other hand, begins with
individual opinions concerning the target and then moves to converge onto or meld them into
one choice—or shared understanding—by adjusting, repairing, or reordering preferences by
taking all reasons for those preferences into consideration. When individual judgments, as
options, are deliberated upon collectively, the result is more substantively fair and reflective
than if determined by an aggregate vote.32 In the case of women’s violence, collective
deliberation could generate some combination of the two options that had originally not been
on the table. We could imagine a solution being constructed that requires the community
to institute an organization resembling a dual contribution but largely publicly determined
system like PBS (public broadcasting). Even if the decision is not unanimous, the minority is
more prone to accept it since their participation enlarges the pool of reasons for the selection
and adjustment of judgments and so affects some change in the majority’s original opinions.33
There are two senses in which participatory, dialogical mechanisms reflect collective rea-
soning as cooperative action. The most obvious sense is in individuals’ explicit participation
in negotiation over clearly identified, contended issues. But the subtler forms of negotia-
tion over moral constructs are meta-collective. Negotiation of moral meaning and social
arrangements that constitute shared moral understandings is a form of collective reasoning.
It creates shared meanings of constructs by using them in conversation until most, if not
all, interlocutors use the concept in a consistent, accepted manner. The general commonality
of meaning in daily life is part of what makes deliberation more than an individual, ag-
gregate venture. Because meanings are negotiated through communicative exchange, most
of the reasons explaining judgment ordering are, from the outset, products of cooperation.


C 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
 A Discursive General Will: Shay Welch 103

Meanings are a socially embedded medium of understanding and adjustment and so desires
and preferences are collectively constructed, at least through the communities in which in-
dividuals are connected.34 To assume that the claims made during deliberation are wholly
unique is to overlook the extent to which the meanings that constitute those claims are
collective.
There are many frameworks for collective construction, but one mode appears preeminent
for formulating a general will: premise-driven reasoning.35 This contrasts with the more
common conclusion-driven reasoning. In conclusion-driven reasoning individuals reason and
make choices solely on the consequents that a set of preferences produce.36 Pettit explains
that conclusion-driven deliberation leaves all reasoning up to individuals and allows the votes
to determine the collective decision; this approach would produce an aggregate that lacks a
robust sense of harmony. Problematically, in conclusion-driven reasoning there could be a
situation where the group as a whole endorses certain premises but then rejects the subsequent
conclusion, resulting in a set of inconsistent decisions. Premise-driven deliberation, on the
other hand, constrains the pattern of voting so that reason is instantiated at the group level;
a group will not reject the constructed product of the premises that it collectively endorses
since deliberation takes place at the level of premises rather than conclusions. Therefore, its
superset of choices will be coherent.37 A simple example involves only one reasoner.38 I may
want improved school facilities, repaired roads, etc., all of which are premises of the further
conclusion that if I want these things then I must also accept increased taxes. However, there
can be a disconnect between the premises endorsed and the conclusion that follows. If I were
to utilize conclusion-driven reasoning, and I did not want increased taxes, I would—oddly
enough—go against a state of affairs I desire. However, if I follow premise-driven reasoning,
then I would prefer the benefits—one consequence being that I would incur increased taxes.39
It is true that any one of these propositions could occupy the role of either premise or
conclusion. However, the impact lies in how propositions are presented to the voters. If they
are presented as conclusions, then no room is available for negotiation, and they must be
voted on as is. If they are presented as reasons, they are open to adjustment and compromise.
Premise-driven reasoning is fit for constructing a general will since it allows individuals with
unique opinions to deliberate towards a decision that is acceptable and belongs to each and
the whole.40 Given the commonality of disconnect between the premises individuals endorse
and their consequents, choosing only from among conclusions eliminates a wider range
of reasons for discussion that underlie those conclusions (final preferences) and frequently
begins in gridlock since there is nothing over which to negotiate.
It may seem as if this approach to collective reasoning is not suited to produce a general
will since premise-driven reasoning involves individuals’ own opinions concerning the com-
mon good—what they think about the common good and what it is or ought to be. When
aiming to conceive a general will a reflective individual must ask herself: does X conform
with our conception of the general will? Thus it would seem that an individual-centered—
though collective—approach would not constitute a general will. But such an option would
need to be mined from somewhere for individuals to confirm or deny its accord with the
general will.41 The possible interpretations of a general will had to have been constructed
somewhere and there is no other place for options to be constructed than from individuals’
own opinions. The opinions individuals advocate could easily be their public interests and not
their private interests (though I do think private interests will have a role very early on in the
construction process). Thus premise-driven reasoning comports with the proper procedure
for generating a general will; it simply approaches a general will from one step back in the
process of construction. Premise-driven reasoning may not be able to guarantee unanimous


C 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
104 Constellations Volume 21, Number 1, 2014

compromises, even for small groups, but it does give those involved in the deliberation insight
as to why individuals have the opinions they do and this, in turn, leads to better negotiation
and ultimate confirmation of a final set of collective preferences from which to proceed.
The ability to identify with a conclusion that results from “reasons-for-us” is the first indi-
cation of strengthened social freedom vis-à-vis a general will. If participatory communities
utilize a premise-driven practice then the products of collective reasoning are more likely to
represent a general will that secures equal power in social construction for each individual.
In aggregate processes, the minority simply gets overruled and then disregarded. Cohen
correctly argues that when a minority is outvoted, the distinction between collective choice
and aggregate nondeliberative preferences remains substantial since the supporting reasons
and institutions that underlie collective decisions are far different from decisions that result
from mechanisms that lack individual-community commitments.42 In collective reasoning,
even when a minority materializes, they will have actively participated in the deliberative
process that constructs the shared understandings; this is central to social freedom. Aggre-
gate decision-making, on the other hand, makes the minority prone to be hostile towards
the decision or, at best, apathetic. Yet, when individuals contribute to the final preference
ordering, they can see the decision as reflecting an aspect of themselves, which makes the
conclusions reasonably supportable. Individuals need to see that they are guided by reasons
that are for them by way of ‘reasons-for-us.’43 This participation in the (re)negotiation of
social arrangements through a decision-making mechanism that individual, aggregate rea-
soning lacks provides reasons-for-us and so makes the act of identifying with the community
and its choice as a cohesive will possible.
Second, and relatedly, recognition of dissent by others further strengthens individual
social freedom. Unanimity and resolution are certainly desirable. But reality dictates that
many conflicts cannot be resolved. Thus the fundamental goal from a united community’s
perspective becomes alleviating the costs of alienation through preservation of individuals’
claims. Acts of recognition move a discrete, individual claim into the collective pool of
reasons that communities can utilize when negotiating. So even if individuals’ claims are
rejected as possible alternatives, their reasons for the alternative remain available for consid-
eration during later moments of renegotiation, or uptake. It is important to retain remainder
claims for three reasons. First, construction is ongoing and arrangements will be revisited
and claims discarded now may turn out to be relevant later. Second, it confirms recognition of
participation, which is critical to individuals’ identification with a general will. Third, when
the pool of reasons expands, the implications of specific arrangements become clearer.44
Additionally, uptake brings individuals closer to understanding claims of dissent and so
brings communities’ understandings of moral meanings closer together. When understand-
ings become shared, individuals are better able to justify their own resolute judgments.45
And bringing individuals’ private wills more closely in line with their general will—with
as little internal conflict as possible—is a goal of participatory communities that organize
according to a general will.
Third, the rationality pertaining to collective reasoning strengthens individual freedom,
since acting rationally is one component of autonomy.46 The conditions a general will imposes
on individuals are no more a constraint on individual freedom than are the laws of nature on
our movements; instead, these conditions make possible the experience of freedom through
the structure they provide. Therefore, the attention and response that individuals are required
to give to the claims others make on us is a rational necessity, especially when autonomy is
understood relationally.47 This is important because it elicits the paradox of acting rationally
by not advancing pure, atomistic self-interest. Given the common acceptance of the principle


C 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
 A Discursive General Will: Shay Welch 105

of individual rationality (PIR) and its propensity to prompt individuals to defect in cooperative
ventures, it must be shown that cooperation of this intensity is the most rational action for
the autonomous individual. Individuals cooperate even when they think free-riding would be
more beneficial but do not think that this creates a disconnect with reason. This conceptual
complication prompts a search for a conception of rationality comported to individuals
governed by a general will.
It is this behavior of individuals that must be understood; and it is best understood
according to McMahon’s principle of collective rationality (PCR).48 PIR and PCR differ in
how they compare contribution and defection. On PIR, individuals defect if they can accrue
small gains against other’s contributions. On PCR, individuals must consider the costs and
benefits of defection if all others defect as well.49 When considering the level of connection
that obtains in society, the PIR proves inadequate for rational action since even partial
defection would lead to pareto suboptimal conditions, leading to failed socially cooperative
ventures. When we see that the most benefit can come from acting cooperatively and that
there is a way in which individuals can evaluate circumstances according to a principle that
delivers this conclusion, then it becomes clear how individuals can act rationally—and act
more rationally—by considering the community rather than simply themselves. Thus the
PCR affects individual freedom in two ways. First, the rational action consequent of the PCR
demonstrates autonomy. Second, the benefit gained from acting rational in the collective
sense increases freedom out in the world.
But McMahon does not require either fairness or reciprocity as conditions of the PCR;
he proposes it as a nonmoral principle that must be added to the value of reciprocity.50 This
appears problematic because these two moral conditions are anchors of individual freedom in
participatory communities. But I do not think this aspect of the PCR excludes it from advanc-
ing a general will. As theorists such as Cohen and Joseph Reisert make clear, moral freedom
is only possible when individuals are related to one another as equals in conditions of equal-
ity. Only when – when there is concern over the dominant conception of the common good –
these relations obtain can individuals converge their own will to the will of the community.51
What these arguments convey is that the two interdependent moral qualia of reciprocity and
equality can be used as a sort of checklist for the individual to determine whether or not a
cooperative venture that does not mirror her original conception of the common good is the
rational option. Often, if an individual believes that the option chosen is mistaken, then she
will choose to defect. But according to the PCR, the choice to defect will be based on whether
or not the collective decision is one that will ultimately further the conditions of equality and
community unity, both of which are fundamental to her individual freedom in the community.
If they are not, then the individual is free to defect. In a participatory society, defection would
rarely present itself as the best option. First, individuals in the collective community would
not choose to defect while others continued with the venture, making others more burdened
specifically because she defected. This prohibition is something we’ve seen repeated through-
out. Second, if the choice is dialogically constructed through a premise-driven mechanism, the
choice will include considerations like 1) what properly represents the common good, even if
not her own original conception of it and 2) what would still belong to her because of her par-
ticipation in its construction and so able to recognize it as her own. Individuals governed by a
general will can use the fundamental moral relation conditions as criterion by which to check
the worthiness of a cooperative scheme and see if the existence of the scheme, and so their con-
tribution, would be the rational choice. Because a general will society already has these moral
relations as its foundation, it is not necessary to have the moral features of the society built into
the PCR.


C 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
106 Constellations Volume 21, Number 1, 2014

V. Conclusion: The Problem of Disagreement

Though I am offering a conception of a general will that is entirely distinct from Rousseau’s
analysis, my account is intellectually motivated by his idea. For this reason, I cannot but help
to find that my own analysis is in danger of suffering from the same paradox that exists in
Rousseau’s framework. Given the nature of a general will, there is worry that such a shared
understanding would constitute a forcing mechanism that overrules individuals’ discrete
desires and, moreover, indicates that these participants ought to view themselves as mistaken
about what the general will consists in when overruled. He follows the curious claim with
the statement that if the mistaken view prevails, then the individual who holds that view
would do something other than what she wants by following her opinion and so would not be
free.52 Mistaken individuals are seemingly treated as something that must be disabused. This
argument functions as a flood gate for objections connected to the problem of disagreement
pertaining to the common good more generally. Evidently the general will cannot always
flow easily from a collective. But this does not have to result in communitarian tyranny or
inimical second-guessing. Therefore, the problem of disagreement must be addressed to see
whether a general will can, in fact, be a freedom enhancing mechanism.
One obvious domain of disagreement obtains when an aggregate decision attempts to
impersonate a general will. What this leads to is an aggravation of disagreement as to
whether the decision actually embodies the set of shared understandings each contributed
to. Conclusion-driven reasoning, which mirrors a will of all, is a non-cooperative entity.
In its presence, individuals tend to moralize and so reify the opposition of interests rather
than use differing judgments to tweak the conception of the common good. Subsequently,
“we see others as aiming not only to get what we would prefer to have, but also to get
what we have a right to . . . [sparking] contests of rights, honor, and worth.”53 If participatory
democracies rest on a free community of moral equals, then competition would nullify
the social conditions that make it such a community. This, however, is not the problem that
concerns us here since disagreement in this instance lacks a general will. Yet disagreement can
exist between community members even when a general will obtains. Disagreement in and
around a representative conception of the common good derives from factual disagreements
about how to best implement the collective’s decisions or how to interpret the general will
on the ground.54 But the practical level of disagreement is also not the place that gives pause.
The concern for the issue of freedom is disagreement that stems from and remains after the
construction of a discursive general will.
Disagreement in the deliberative process concerns which options represent the collective.
This means that there will be discord over which proposed claims are legitimate and how
legitimate claims are to be reconciled for the common good. Given the diversity of perspective
and social location of individuals in a community—even one based on equality—conflicting
claims can each be legitimate leaving different reasons supporting divergent construals
in competition.55 This sort of disagreement is reasonable in a participatory community
and, subsequently, cannot simply be overcome by force of the better argument.56 As one
can infer from previous discussion, a reasonable disagreement evolves from deliberation
between reasonable deliberators who present reasonable, equally valid cooperative schemas
and then are unable to fully square the possibilities even in the face of reasonable, reciprocal
concessions. McMahon specifies that reasonable disagreement is disagreement concerning
how to interpret the concepts expressed by a shared vocabulary of normative evaluative
terms.57 Individuals may initially proffer normative claims about shared understandings
and social arrangements that are consonant with one another but, when fleshed out through


C 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
 A Discursive General Will: Shay Welch 107

assorted perspectives, actually call for conflicting actions. This produces a zone of reasonable
disagreement that cannot be immediately diffused.
Though there have been copious responses offered to this problem, there is one response
that stands out. This response, proffered by Cohen, is notable because he seems to anticipate
precisely McMahon’s difficulty of reasonable disagreement. Cohen argues:
I follow my own will when I follow the judgments of the majority so long as I think both
that the majority is making its decisions on the basis of a sincere effort to advance the
common good as they reasonably (though not correctly) see it, and that the members of the
majority are competent judges of how to advance the common good (again, as they see it).
In this case, I would not simply be endorsing the result because it issues from a process that
treats members as equals in assigning them equal voice, though I do not think that that is an
important commiseration in itself; but also because I could see the result as advancing what
I take to be the fundamental interests of myself and others in the association, according to
an account of the common good- a way of combining those interests- that I think is not
unreasonable, at least in the following sense: I can understand the consideration that might
have led me to endorse that account of the common good, to see is as respecting the idea
of not imposing conditions on others that one would not be prepared to live by oneself.
So I am free in obeying the law because I think the majority is a good judge of how to
advance its conception of the common good; because the process respects the judgments
of all members, and thus treats them as equals in at least that way; and, crucially, because
the result treats people as equals in giving equal weight to the good of each, according to a
way to understand that idea that I think is not unreasonable.58
This explication harks back to my previous argument about the benefits that come from
retaining remainder individual claims during the collective reasoning process. As argued
previously, when individuals engage in premise-driven collective reasoning, they engage at
the level of reasons. As deliberation proceeds, (legitimate) stronger and weaker reasons shape
the option in corresponding ways. Because there are some reasons that either are or appear
weaker, their effect on the product will not be decisive. However, they will still impart some
influence on the shared understanding. This means that though some individuals constitute
a minority, their voice is not completely absent from the resultant general will. For this
reason, they can see that the resultant understanding continues to advance their interests to
a reasonable extent above and beyond their interest in equality. And the reasons advanced
by the minority remain in the pool of reasons to be reexamined during later renegotiations.
By retaining remainder reasons, premise-driven reasoning processes confer more respect to
individuals and their judgments than if those reasons were simply thrown to the way side. By
virtue of playing a role in the construction of the general will, individuals in the minority can
see just what Cohen points out: they can see that they are a part of the collective, that their
interests are still represented to some degree, and that their fellow community members, by
including them in the entirety of the process would be doing nothing other than what is best
for each as a member of the community. And in this, the individual is both strengthened and
free by identifying with the general will in the face of reasonable disagreement.
I do not offer this response as a definitive counter to the reality of reasonable disagreement.
Social freedom, like all other social concepts, is relational and dialogical. It is an ongoing
process, and this means that it is messy. Therefore, there is no outright solution stemming
from interrelatedness to resolve disagreement for the sake of freedom. But this fact of social
life does not shut out the possibility of a general will or the enhanced cooperation that
ethical and inclusive discourse can effect. Membership in deliberative communities expands
one’s knowledge since individuals gain information that they do not, and could not, possess
alone. This shared knowledge not only expands one’s knowledge about the community’s


C 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
108 Constellations Volume 21, Number 1, 2014

needs but also about one’s own needs insofar as one has the conceptual tools to reconsider
and hone one’s own desires and preferences in light of the new information gained from
others. Likewise, one cannot have it all; even if we suppose that individuals could exercise an
entirely unrestricted, simple freedom, there are always aspects of the social and natural world
that interfere with or affect individuals’ choices - this conflict never abates. Yet, freedom
is best not limited to that which is constructed atomistically in terms of individualism. The
conditions of a participatory society that utilize collective reasoning are such that individuals
are not constrained in every instance that their viewpoints do not define the dominant shared
understanding. Social freedom is couched in connection; and connection is maintained only
through compromise and, often times, deferment in and about important stakes. Like other
social concepts, our freedom in action and in self is strengthened through and by others—our
collective.

NOTES
1. Christopher McMahon, Collective Rationality and Collective Reasoning (Cambridge University
Press, 2001); Phillip Pettit, A Theory of Freedom: From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency (Oxford
University Press, 2001).
2. This problem is the central problem for Rousseau’s conception of the general will.
3. Pettit, A Theory of Freedom, 115.
4. E.g. strict individual freedom, political freedom, negative liberty, positive liberty,
5. Jean Keller, “Dialogue among Friends: Toward a Discourse Ethic of Interpersonal Relationships,”
Hypatia 23, no. 4 (2008): 158–181.
6. Robert Goodin, Reflective Democracy (Oxford University Press, 2003); Amy Gutman and Dennis
Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement: Why Moral Conflicts Cannot be Avoided in Politics and What
Should Be Done About It (Harvard University Press, 1996); Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic
Theory (Cambridge University Press, 1970); Pateman, The Problem of Political Obligation: A Critique of
Liberal Theory (UCLA Press, 1985).
7. Melissa Schwartzberg, “Voting the General Will: Rousseau on Decision Rules,” Political Theory
36, no. 3 (2008): 403–423, 418.
8. Though there are some who maintain that deliberation is not supposed to take place between
community members, see: Phillip Kain. “Rousseau, the General Will, and Individual Liberty,” History
of Philosophy Quarterly 7, no. 3 (1990): 315–334, the common understanding is that deliberation is
necessary to the general will. Jon Mandle compares the general will to Habermasian deliberative democracy,
see: “Rousseauian Constructivism,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 35, no. 4 (1997): 545–562.
There are a few places to locate proper deliberation, e.g. outside of the assembly and in the assembly
so long as no factions are in effect. The precise proper place for deliberation is not determinate for my
purposes.
9. This claim holds for many social scientists and ethico-political and moral philosophers. For
example, see: Christopher McMahon, Reasonable Disagreement: A Theory of Political Morality (Cambridge
University Press, 2009); Margaret Urban Walker, Moral Understandings (Routledge Press,1998); Walker,
Moral Contexts (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003).
10. Walker lists basic and ordinary activities such as talking, listening, and imagining possibilities as
constitutive of this process.
11. Walker, Moral Contexts, 106, 109.
12. Ibid., 61, 165. Worldmaking is also a common notion in feminist theory and narrative ethics.
13. Carole Pateman, The Problem of Political Obligation, 156. Pateman adds that this educative pro-
cess is part of what “strengthens” individuals since the participatory process yields a gradual transformation
in their consciousness.
14. Private interests are also partially social constructed through dialogical interaction. However, a
properly public interest must be wholly constructed through interaction. There have been numerous critiques
of this sort against Rawlsian hypothetical contractarian approaches to public interests. For example, feminists
often reject such approaches since the ability to assume or relate to multiple identities is practically infeasible,
see: Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton University Press, 1990).
15. Steven Affeldt, “The Force of Freedom: Rousseau on Forcing to be Free,” Political Theory 27,
no. 3 (1999): 299–333, 312.


C 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
 A Discursive General Will: Shay Welch 109

16. David Hiley, “The Individual and the General Will: Rousseau Reconsidered”, History of Philos-
ophy Quarterly, 7, no. 2 (1990): 159–178, 170; Joseph Reisert, Jean-Jacque Rousseau: A Friend of Virtue
(Cornell University Press, 2003), 16.
17. I thank Nancy Hirschmann for this point.
18. In the Rousseauian sense and in participatory frameworks more generally, the respect of others is
fundamental and so it is not that goal to forcibly change another’s mind so much as it is to lead that person
to change her own mind.
19. McMahon, Reasonable Disagreement, 107, 109. For a discussion of the role of majority view
and its place in and as the general will see: Schwartzberg 2008. Also, for a discussion of the effects of moral
compromise on personal integrity that is at stake in deliberation of this kind see: Jerry Goodstein, “Moral
Compromise and Personal Integrity: Exploring the Ethical Issues of Deciding Together in Organizations,”
Business Ethics Quarterly, 10, no. 4 (2000): 805–819. This issue is important, though tangentially here, in
regards to the effects compromise has on integrity as a component of autonomy. For a discussion of integrity
as an integral component of autonomy, see: Diana T. Meyers, Self, Society, and Personal Choice (Columbia
University Press, 1989). There are also numerous feminist critiques of the traditional understanding of
deliberative methods. One example is that the framework privileges certain communications and expressions,
see: Seyla Benhabib, ed., Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political (Princeton
University Press, 1996); Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford University Press, 2000).
For a feminist critique of dominant shared understandings see: Kathryn Pyne Addelson, Impure Thoughts:
Essays on Philosophy, Feminism, and Ethics (Temple University Press, 1991).
20. McMahon, Collective Rationality and Collective Reasoning, 129.
21. McMahon rightly places normative acceptability conditions on mind changing. Changing one’s
mind out of fear, power, or disinterest is not acceptable. This is consistent with the general will since mind
changing of this sort would stem from amour propre and result in a will of all rather than a general will.
22. Joshua Cohen, Rousseau: A Free Community of Equals (Oxford University Press, 2010), 15.
23. Walker, Moral Contexts, 77.
24. Counter arguments against the claim that individuals are less likely to cooperate in prisoner’s
dilemmas or that cooperative schemes are not properly prisoner dilemma situations include: Elizabeth
Anderson, “Unstrapping the Straightjacket of ‘Preference’: A Comment on Amartya Sen’s Contributions to
Philosophy and Economics,” Economics and Philosophy 17 (2001): 21–38; Virginia Held, “Rationality and
Social Cooperation,” Social Research 44, no. 4 (1977): 707–744; Erin I. Kelly and Lionel K. McPherson,
“Prisoner’s Mistrust”. Ratio 20, no. 1 (2007): 57–70; Amartya Sen, “Rational Fools: A Critique of the
Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 6, no. 4 (1977): 317–344;
Sen, Rationality and Freedom, (Harvard University Press, 2002); Raimo Tuomela, Cooperation (Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 2000); Tuomela, The Philosophy of Social Practices: A Collective Acceptance View
(Cambridge University Press, 2002). Given the centralization of McMahon’s work in this project, it is impor-
tant to note that he assumes that individuals possess a cooperative disposition across his works: “Collective
Rationality,” Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 98,
no. 3 (2000): 321–344; Collective Rationality and Collective Reasoning; Reasonable Disagreement.
25. Held, “Rationality and Social Cooperation,” 737.
26. For various approaches to collectivity, see: Michael Bratman, “Shared Cooperative Activity,” The
Philosophical Review 101, no. 2 (1992): 327–341; Margaret Gilbert, Living Together: Rationality, Sociality,
and Obligation (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1996); Nuno Martins, “Rules, Social Ontology,
and Collective Identity,” Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior 39, no. 3 (2009): 323–344; John Searle,
“Collective Intentions and Actions,” in Intentions in Communication, eds. Phillip R. Cohen, Jerry Morgan,
and Martha E. Pollack (MIT Press, 1990), 401–416; Tuomela, Cooperation; Tuomela, The Philosophy of
Social Practices; Andrea C. Westlund, “Deciding Together,” Philosophers’ Imprint 9, no. 10 (2009): 1–17.
27. McMahon, Reasonable Disagreement.
28. McMahon, Collective Rationality and Collective Reasoning, 165.
29. McMahon, Reasonable Disagreement, 53; Westlund, “Deciding Together.”
30. McMahon, Reasonable Disagreement, 104.
31. I use the term “voting” in a generic sense. It can mean formal or informal means of expressing a
final preference. There is no direct correlation between the term voting and the legislation of positive laws.
32. Ibid., 100.
33. Ibid.
34. Walker, Moral Understandings.
35. For a full discussion of premise-driven and conclusion-driven reasoning, with accompanying
diagrams see: Pettit, A Theory of Freedom, 108–112.
36. This form of reasoning closely resembles individual, aggregate vote.


C 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
110 Constellations Volume 21, Number 1, 2014

37. Pettit, A Theory of Freedom: From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency, 109.
38. Pettit provides more involved examples with multiple parties.
39. This example is not necessarily one concerning positive laws. Deliberation about public matters
occur initially and then largely on the ground before individuals move to the legislative stage. Additionally,
one may reflect on legislative ideas without ever even engaging the political sphere or formal voting.
40. Cohen draws a clear distinction between collective choice and aggregation by drawing a dis-
tinction between opinions and preferences. He claims that opinions can be pooled and preferences can be
aggregated. I accept this distinction and use the term opinion rather than preference since it seems as if pref-
erence represents a conclusion: Cohen, Rousseau, 78. Jon Mandle also draws this distinction: “Rousseauian
Constructivism,” 548.
41. While Rousseau differentiates this question from an “accept or reject” vote, I do not think that
the reality of deliberation can maintain such a distinction. Individuals would need to accept something as a
proper feature of the general will before they can confirm that it so conforms.
42. Joshua Cohen, “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy,” in The Good Polity, eds. A. Hamlin
and P. Pettit (Oxford University Press, 1989), 17.
43. Westlund, “Deciding Together,” 2.
44. McMahon, Collective Rationality and Collective Reasoning, 111.
45. Ibid., 106.
46. For discussions of rationality in society and cooperation, see: Christopher McMahon. “Collective
Rationality” 321–344; Amartya Sen, “Rational Fools”; Sen, Rationality and Freedom.
47. Reisert, Jean-Jacque Rousseau, 129.
This notion is not unique to Rousseau’s work. Kant was very clear in his defense of obligation that
autonomous willing was the source of rational necessity.
For discussions of relational autonomy, see: Marilyn Friedman, “Autonomy and Social Relationships,”
in Feminists Rethink the Self, ed. Diana T. Meyers (Westview Press, 1997),40–61; Friedman, Autonomy,
Gender, and Politics (Oxford University Press, 2003); Meyers, Self, Society, and Personal Choice.
48. McMahon, “Collective Rationality”, 322.
49. Ibid., 328.
50. Ibid., 341.
51. Reisert, Jean-Jacque Rousseau, 133.
52. Jean Jacque Rousseau, The Basic Political Writings, ed. Donald A. Cress (Hackett Publishing
Co.), 206.
53. Ibid., 27.
54. Cohen, Rousseau, 69–70.
55. McMahon, Reasonable Disagreement, 19, 25.
As I have tried to make clear throughout, my arguments here are not meant to overlook feminist concerns
with majorities and dominant conceptions. I am using a wholly equal and participatory society that Rousseau
prescribes as my starting point. Once it becomes clear that the general will can strengthen individuals, then
adjustments and addendums can be proposed for meeting the ideal. My aim here is motivated by feminist
concerns since it seems that- aside from the problems stemming from Emile- feminists continue to go back
to Rousseau time and again and seem to be hindered by the traditional understanding of the general will.
Supposing I can make my claim, feminist will have an even stronger tool in their conceptual knapsack.
56. For a discussion of normative values that ought to be in place for disagreement to be overcome,
see: Amy Gutman and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement. The problem I am discussing is
what remains once these values are in place.
57. McMahon, Reasonable Disagreement, 79.
58. Cohen, Rousseau, 81–82.

Shay Welch is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Spelman College. Her work focuses
on developing a framework of social freedom. She has recently published a book entitled
A Theory of Freedom: Feminism and the Social Contract.


C 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Copyright of Constellations: An International Journal of Critical & Democratic Theory is the
property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or
posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users
may print, download, or email articles for individual use.