In Octoer 1991, Francisco died and in 1993, the lot received

by Cirila had a market value of P57,105 and assessed value
1 of P28,550. The decedent’s nephews and nieces and his
Arcaba vs Tabancura Vda de Batocael
Arcaba vs. Tabancura Vda De Batocael
GR No. 146683, November 22, 2001
FACTS:
Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became
the registered owners of Lot No. 437-A located at Balintawak
St. and Rizal Avenue in Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte
in January 1956. Zosima died in 1980 hence Francisco and
his mother in law executed a deed of extrajudicial partition
with waiver of rights, where the latter waived her share
consisting of ¼ of the property in favor of Francisco. Since
Francisco do not have any children to take care of him after
his retirement, he asked Leticia, his niece, Leticia’s cousin,
Luzviminda and Cirila Arcaba, the petitioner, who was then a
widow and took care of Francisco’s house as well as the
store inside.
According to Leticia, Francisco and Cirila were lovers since
they slept in the same room. On the other hand, Erlinda
Tabancura, another niece of Francisco claimed that the latter
told her that Cirila was his mistress. However, Cirila
defensed herself that she was a mere helper who could
enter the master’s bedroom when Francisco asked her to
and that Francisco was too old for her. She denied having
sexual intercourse with Francisco. When the nieces got
married, Cirila who was then 34 year-old widow started
working for Francisco who was 75 year old widower. The
latter did not pay him any wages as househelper though her
family was provided with food and lodging. Francisco’s
health deteriorated and became bedridden. Tabancura
testified that Francisco’s only source of income was the
rentals from his lot near the public streets.
During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages.
heirs by intestate succession alleged that Cirila was the
common-law wife of Francisco.
ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos
executed by Francisco in Arcaba’s favor was valid.
HELD:
The court in this case considered a sufficient proof of
common law relationship wherein donation is not valid. The
conclusion was based on the testimony of Tabancura and
certain documents bearing the signature of “Cirila Comille”
such as application for business permit, sanitary permit and
the death certificate of Francisco. Also, the fact that Cirila
did not demand her wages is an indication that she was not
simply a caregiver –employee.
Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially
when one of the parties is already old and may no longer be
interested in sex at the very least, cohabitation is a public
assumption of men and women holding themselves out to
the public as such.
Hence, the deed of donation by Francisco in favor of Cirila is
void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.
2 On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the
San Luis v San Luis (Conflict of Laws)
San Luis v San Luis
2007
G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007
EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SAN
LUIS, Respondent.
His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942
out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila,
Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963,
Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry
Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on
October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a
Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the First
Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.),
which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and
Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. On June
20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis,
then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr.
William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at
Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. He had
no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years
from the time of their marriage up to his death on December
18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of
Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a
petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial
Court
children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to
dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to
state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for
letters of administration should have been filed in the
Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of
residence prior to his death. He further claimed that
respondent has no legal personality to file the petition
because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the
latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to
Merry Lee.

In January 1991, few months before Francisco died, he
executed a “Deed of Donation Inter Vivos” where he ceded a
portion of Lot 437-A composed of 150 sq m., together with
his house to Cirila who accepted the same. The larger
portion of 268 sq m. was left under his name. This was
made in consideration of the 10 year of faithful services of
the petitioner. Atty Lacaya notarized the deed and was later
registered by Cirila as its absolute owner.
x ---------------------------------------------------- x DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) Trial Court: denied the motion to dismiss, ruled that
G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007 respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal
standing to file the petition and that venue was properly laid.
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD Mila filed a motion for inhibition against Judge Tensuan on
SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent. November 16, 1994. Thus, a new trial ensued.
(2) Trial Court (new): dismissed the petition for letters of
FACTS: administration. It held that, at the time of his death,
Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of
FACTS: the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have
been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It
found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving
Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the
Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino
citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family
Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair
the vested rights of Felicisimo’s legitimate children.
(3) CA: reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court
ISSUES:
(1) Whether venue was properly laid, and
(2) Whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse
abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code,
considering that Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was
solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code
took effect on August 3, 1988.
(3) Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject
petition for letters of administration.
RULING:
(1) Yes, the venue was proper. Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the
estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial
Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his
death."
For purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the
"residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical
habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may
not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided
he resides therein with continuity and consistency. While
petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta.
Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a
residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of
his death. From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a
resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the
venue of the settlement of his estate.
(2) Yes. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the
1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case
involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree
validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the
Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is
capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. As such, the
Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation
where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and
paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the
law already established through judicial precedent.
The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which
absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested
Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition
as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show
that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the
divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A.
With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly
solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies
of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the
Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that
their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As
stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.
 where both spouses are of disposing mind. Hence, he
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for
further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained
by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
(3) Yes. Respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject
petition for letters of administration may arise from her status
as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under
Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family
Code.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry
respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has
the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of
administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of
Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired
through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
3 consent. In this case, trial court found that subject spouse
Uy vs CA
Uy vs. CA
GR No. 109557, November 29, 2000
FACTS:
Dr. Ernesto Jardelaza suffered stroke that rendered him
comatose. Gilda, wife of the latter, filed a petition in RTC
Iloilo to be allowed as sole administrator of their conjugal
property and be authorized to sell the same as her husband
is physically incapacitated to discharge his functions. She
further contest that such illness of the husband necessitated
expenses that would require her to sell their property in Lot
4291 and its improvement to meet such necessities. RTC
ruled in favor of Gilda contending that such decision is
pursuant to Article 124 of FC and that the proceedings
thereon are governed by the rules on summary proceedings.
The son of the spouses, Teodoro, filed a motion for
reconsideration contending that the petition made by her
mother was essentially a petition for guardianship of the
person and properties of his father. As such it cannot be
prosecuted in accordance with the provisions on summary
proceedings instead it should follows the ruled governing
special proceedings in the Revised Rules of Court requiring
procedural due process particularly the need for notice and a
hearing on the merits. He further reiterated that Chapter 2 of
the FC comes under the heading on “Separation in Fact
Between Husband and Wife” contemplating a situation
argued that this should not be applied in their case.
During the pendency of the motion, Gilda sold the property to
her daughter and son in law. Upon the appeal by Teodoro,
CA reversed the decision of the lower court.
ISSUE: WON Gilda as the wife of a husband who suffered
stroke, a cerebrovascular accident rendering him comatose,
without motor and mental faculties, may assume sole powers
of administration of the conjugal property and dispose a
parcel of land with improvements.
HELD:
SC ruled in favor of Teodoro. The rule on summary
proceedings does not apply to cases where the non-
consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give
was incompetent who was in a comatose condition and with
a diagnosis of brain stem infract. Hence, the proper remedy
is a judicial guardianship proceeding under the Revised
Rules of Court. The law provides that wife who assumes
sole powers of administration has the same powers and
duties as a guardian. Consequently, a spouse who desires
to sell real property as administrator of the conjugal property,
must observe the procedure for the sale of the ward’s estate
required of judicial guardians, and not the summary judicial
proceedings under FC. SC further held that such incapacity
of the trial court to provide for an opportunity to be heard is
null and void on the ground of lack of due process.
4

Tarrosa v. De Leon, G.R. No. 185063, July 23, 2009
FACTS: On July 20, 1965, Bonifacio De Leon, then single,
and the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation
(PHHC) entered into a Conditional Contract to Sell for the
purchase on installment of a lot situated in Quezon City. On
April 24, 1968, Bonifacio married Anita de Leon. They had
two children, Danilo and Vilma. On June 22, 1970, PHHC
executed a Final Deed of Sale in favor of Bonifacio upon full
payment of the price of the lot. TCT was issued on February
24, 1972 in the name of Bonifacio, “single.” On January 12,
1974, Bonifacio sold the lot to his sister, Lita, and her
husband, Felix Tarrosa. The Deed of Sale did not bear the
written consent and signature of Anita. On February 29,
1996, Bonifacio died.
Three months later, Tarrosa spouses registered the Deed of
Sale. Anita, Danilo, and Vilma filed a reconveyance suit
allegeing that Bonifacio was still the owner of the lands.
Tarrosa spouses averred that the lot Bonifacio sold to them
was his exclusive property because he was still single when
he acquired it from PHHC. They further alleged that they
were not aware of the marriage between Bonifacio and Anita
at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale.
The RTC ruled in favor of Anita De Leon et al stating that the
lot in question was the conjugal property of Bonifacio and
Anita. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: W/N the property that Bonifacio has purchased on
installment before the marriage although some installments
were paid during the marriage would be considered conjugal
property
HELD: Yes. The subject lot which was once owned by PHHC
and covered by the Conditional Contract to Sell was only
transferred during the marriage of Bonifacio and Anita. The
title to the property was only passed to Bonifacio after he
had fully paid the purchase price on June 22, 1970. This full
payment was made more than 2 years after his marriage to
Anita on April 24, 1968. In effect, the property was acquired
during the existence of the marriage. Hence, ownership to
the property is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership.
5
Dela Cruz vs Dela Cruz
Dela Cruz vs. Dela Cruz
GR 19565, January 30, 1968
FACTS:
Estrella, the plaintiff, and Severino, the defendant were
married in Bacolod and begotten 6 children. During their
coverture, they acquired several parcels of land and were
engage in various businesses. The plaintiff filed an action
against her husband for the separation of their
properties. She further alleged that her husband aside from
abandoning her, also mismanaged their conjugal
properties. On the other hand, Severino contended that he
had always visited the conjugal home and had provided
support for the family despite his frequent absences when he
was in Manila to supervise the expansion of their
business. Since 1955, he had not slept in the conjugal
dwelling instead stayed in his office at Texboard Factory
although he paid short visits in the conjugal home, which
was affirmed by Estrella. The latter suspected that her
husband had a mistress named Nenita Hernandez, hence,
the urgency of the separation of property for the fear that her
husband might squander and dispose the conjugal assets in
favor of the concubine.
ISSUE: WON there has been abandonment on the part of
the husband and WON there has been an abused of his
authority as administrator of the conjugal partnership.
HELD:
The husband has never desisted in the fulfillment of his
marital obligations and support of the family. To be legally
declared as to have abandoned the conjugal home, one
must have willfully and with intention of not coming back and
perpetual separation. There must be real abandonment and
not mere separation. In fact, the husband never failed to
give monthly financial support as admitted by the wife. This
negates the intention of coming home to the conjugal
abode. The plaintiff even testified that the husband “paid
short visits” implying more than one visit. Likewise, as
testified by the manager of one of their businesses, the wife
has been drawing a monthly allowance of P1,000-1,500 that
was given personally by the defendant or the witness
himself.
SC held that lower court erred in holding that mere refusal or
failure of the husband as administrator of the conjugal
partnership to inform the wife of the progress of the business
constitutes abuse of administration. In order for abuse to
exist, there must be a willful and utter disregard of the
interest of the partnership evidenced by a repetition of
deliberate acts or omissions prejudicial to the latter.
6
BA Finance Corp vs CA
BA Finance Corp vs. CA
GR 61464, May 28 1988
FACTS:
Augusto Yulo secured a loan from the petitioner in the
amount of P591,003.59 as evidenced by a promissory note
he signed in his own behalf and as a representative of A&L
Industries. Augusto presented an alleged special power of
attorney executed by his wife, Lily Yulo, who managed the
business and under whose name the said business was
registered, purportedly authorized the husband to procure
the loan and sign the promissory note. 2months prior the
procurement of the loan, Augusto left Lily and their children
which in turn abandoned their conjugal home. When the
obligation became due and demandable, Augusto failed to
pay the same.
The petitioner prayed for the issuance of a writ of attachment
alleging that said spouses were guilty of fraud consisting of
the execution of Deed of Assignment assigning the rights,
titles and interests over a construction contract executed by
and between the spouses and A. Soriano Corporation. The
writ hereby prayed for was issued by the trial court and not
contented with the order, petitioner filed a motion for the
examination of attachment debtor alleging that the properties
attached by the sheriff were not sufficient to secure the
satisfaction of any judgment which was likewise granted by
the court.
ISSUE: WON A&L Industries can be held liable for the
obligations contracted by the husband.
HELD:
A&L Industries is a single proprietorship, whose registered
owner is Lily Yulo. The said proprietorship was established
during the marriage and assets were also acquired during
the same. Hence, it is presumed that the property forms part
of the conjugal partnership of the spouses and be held liable
for the obligations contracted by the husband. However, for
the property to be liable, the obligation contracted by the
husband must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. The obligation was contracted by Augusto for
his own benefit because at the time he incurred such
obligation, he had already abandoned his family and left their
conjugal home. He likewise made it appear that he was duly
authorized by his wife in behalf of the company to procure
such loan from the petitioner. Clearly, there must be the
requisite showing that some advantage accrued to the
welfare of the spouses.
Thus, the Court ruled that petitioner cannot enforce the
obligation contracted by Augusto against his conjugal
properties with Lily. Furthermore, the writ of attachment
cannot be issued against the said properties and that the
petitioner is ordered to pay Lily actual damages amouting to
P660,000.00.
7 property can be held liable. And since the pwer of the
Johnson & Johnson vs CA
Johnson & Johnson vs CA
GR No. 102692, September 23, 1996
FACTS:
Delilah Vinluan purchased products from petitioner for her
retail business under the name of “Vinluan Enterprises”
incurring an obligation of P235,880.89 for which she issued
seven checks of varying amounts and due dates that
bounced and were dishonored for having been drawn
against insufficient funds. Partial payments were made after
several demands. When no further payments were made to
settle the obligation, J&J filed a complaint against the
spouses for collection of the principal obligation plus interest
with damages. RTC rendered decision in favor of J&J and
found that there was no “privity of contract between J&J and
defendant husband Alejo Vinluan regarding the obligations
incurred by the wife”. Husband was made a co-owner of the
enterprise afer the obligation involved in this action has been
incurred. The court then issued a writ of execution directing
the sheriff to execute judgment on the properties of the
wife. However, the 2 notices of levy on execution covered
not only her exclusive paraphernal properties but also the
properties of the conjugal partnership of the spouses. This
led the husband to file a third-party claim seeking the lifting
of the levy on the conjugal properties. Trial court denied the
third-party claim since Alejo’s consent became evident when
he did not seek the intervention of the Court to air his
objections in his wife’s engaging business coupled by the
fact that he made several representations for the settlement
of his wife’s account. Thus, even his own capital may be
liable aside from the conjugal and paraphernal property.
Private respondent elevated the matter to CA, charging the
trial court with grave abuse of discretion for effectively
reversing its own final judgment. CA upheld private
respondent. Hence this petition by J&J.
ISSUE: WON a husband may be held liable for the debts
incurred by his wife without his consent and did not benefit
the conjugal partnership?
HELD:
SC held that respondent court correctly ruled that the trial
court cannot, in the guise of deciding the third-party claim,
reverse its final decision. Only the wife and her paraphernal
execution of judgment extends only to properties belonging
to the judgment debtor alone, the conjugal property and the
capital of the husband cannot be levied upon. In any event
that Delilah’s paraphernal properties are insufficient, in order
to bind the conjugal partnership properties, the debts and
obligations contracted by either the husband or the wife must
be for the benefit of the conjugal partnership and that the
husband must consent to his wife’s engaging in
business. The respondent court already found that the
husband did not give his consent neither did the obligation
incurred by the wife redound to the benefit of the family.
8 and therefore had nothing of the land to bequeath by will of
Villanueva vs IAC
Villanueva vs. IAC
GR No. 67582, October 29, 1987
FACTS:
Modesto Aranas, husband of Victoria, inherited a land from
his father. Dorothea and Teodoro, Modesto’s illegitimate
children, borrowed money from private respondent Jesus
Bernas, mortgaging as collateral their father’s property. In
the loan agreement, Aranas described themselves as the
absolute co-owners. Dorothea and Teodoro failed to pay the
loan resulting to extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage in 1977
and thereafter Bernas acquired the land as the highest
bidder. Aftewards, the Aranases executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition in 1978, in which they adjudicated the
same land unto themselves in equal share pro-
indiviso. Bernas then consolidated his ownership over the
lot when the mortgagors failed to redeem it withn the
reglementary period, and had the title in the name of
Modesto cancelled and another TCT issued in his name.
In 1978, petitioner Consolacion Villanueva and Raymundo
Aranas filed a complaint against respondents spouses Jesus
and Remedios Bernas, for the cancellation of the TCT under
the name of the Bernases, and they be declared co-owners
of the land. Petitioner alleged that spouses Modesto and
Victoria in 1987 and 1958 executed 2 separate wills: first
bequeathing to Consolacion and Raymundo and to Dorothea
and Teodoro, in equal shares pro diviso, all of said Victoria’s
shares from the conjugal partnership property; and second
Modesto’s interests in his conjugal partnership with Victoria
as well as his separate properties bequeathed to Dorothea
and Teodoro. Trial court dismissed the complaint, declaring
herein respondents as the legal owners of the disputed
property. IAC likewise affirmed the lower court’s decision.
ISSUE: WON Villanueva had a right over the land and the
improvements thereon made by Victoria who rendered the
lot as conjugal property.
HELD:
The land was not a conjugal partnership property of Victoria
and Modesto. It was Modesto’s exclusive property since he
inherited it from his parents. Moreover, since Victoria died
ahead of Modesto, Victoria did not inherit said lot from him
otherwise to Consolacion.
Article 158 of the Civil Code says that improvements,
whether for utility or adornment made on the separate
property of the spouses through advancements from the
partnership or through the industry of either spouse belong
to the conjugal partnership, and buildings constructed at the
expense of the partnership during the marriage on land
belonging to one of the spouses also pertain to the
partnership, but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to
the spouse who owns the same.
There was no proof presented by Villanueva. Such proof is
needed at the time of the making or construction of the
improvements and the source of the funds used thereof in
order to determine the character of the improvements as
belonging to the conjugal partnership or to one spouse
separately. What is certain is that the land on which the
improvements stand was the exclusive property of Modesto
and that where the property is registered in the name of one
spouse only and there is no showing of when precisely the
property was acquired, the presumption is that is belongs
exclusively to said spouse. It is not therefore possible to
declare the improvements to be conjugal in character.
Furthermore, Bernas’ mode of acquisition of ownership over
the property appears in all respect to be regular, untainted by
any defect whatsoever. Bernas must therefore be deemed
to have acquired indefeasible and clear title to the lot which
cannot be defeated or negated by claims subsequently
arising and of which he had no knowledge or means of
knowing prior to their assertion and ventilation.
9 delivered to the testamentary administrator of the former as
BPI vs Posadas
BPI vs. Posadas
GR No. 34583, October 22, 1931
FACTS:
BPI, as administrator of the estate of deceased Adolphe
Schuetze, appealed to CFI Manila absolving defendant,
Collector of Internal Revenue, from the complaint filed
against him in recovering the inheritance tax amounting to
P1209 paid by the plaintiff, Rosario Gelano Vda de
Schuetze, under protest, and sum of P20,150 representing
the proceeds of the insurance policy of the deceased.
Rosario and Adolphe were married in January 1914. The
wife was actually residing and living in Germany when
Adolphe died in December 1927. The latter while in
Germany, executed a will in March 1926, pursuant with its
law wherein plaintiff was named his universal heir. The
deceased possessed not only real property situated in the
Philippines but also personal property consisting of shares of
stocks in 19 domestic corporations. Included in the personal
property is a life insurance policy issued at Manila on
January 1913 for the sum of $10,000 by the Sun Life
Assurance Company of Canada, Manila Branch. In the
insurance policy, the estate of the deceased was named the
beneficiary without any qualification. Rosario is the sole and
only heir of the deceased. BPI, as administrator of the
decedent’s estate and attorney in fact of the plaintiff, having
been demanded by Posadas to pay the inheritance tax, paid
under protest. Notwithstanding various demands made by
plaintiff, Posadas refused to refund such amount.
ISSUE: WON the plaintiff is entitled to the proceeds of the
insurance.
HELD:
SC ruled that(1)the proceeds of a life-insurance policy
payable to the insured's estate, on which the premiums were
paid by the conjugal partnership, constitute community
property, and belong one-half to the husband and the other
half to the wife, exclusively; (2)if the premiums were paid
partly with paraphernal and partly conjugal funds, the
proceeds are likewise in like proportion paraphernal in part
and conjugal in part; and (3)the proceeds of a life-insurance
policy payable to the insured's estate as the beneficiary, if
part of the assets of said estate under probate
administration, are subject to the inheritance tax according to
the law on the matter, if they belong to the assured
exclusively, and it is immaterial that the insured was
domiciled in these Islands or outside.
Hence, the defendant was ordered to return to the plaintiff
one-half of the tax collected upon the amount of P20,150,
being the proceeds of the insurance policy on the life of the
late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze, after deducting the
proportional part corresponding to the first premium.
10
Wong vs IAC
Wong vs. IAC
GR No. 70082, August 19, 1991
FACTS:
Romario Henson married Katrina on January 1964. They
had 3 children however, even during the early years of their
marriage, the spouses had been most of the time living
separately. During the marriage or on about January 1971,
the husband bought a parcel of land in Angeles from his
father using the money borrowed from an
officemate. Sometime in June 1972, Katrina entered an
agreement with Anita Chan where the latter consigned the
former pieces of jewelry valued at P321,830.95. Katrina
failed to return the same within the 20 day period thus Anita
demanded payment of their value. Katrina issued in
September 1972, check of P55,000 which was dishonored
due to lack of funds. The spouses Anita Chan and Ricky
Wong filed action for collection of the sum of money against
Katrina and her husband Romarico. The reply with
counterclaim filed was only in behalf of Katrina. Trial court
ruled in favor of the Wongs then a writ of execution was
thereafter issued upon the 4 lots in Angeles City all in the
name of Romarico Henson married to Katrina Henson. 2 of
the lots were sold at public auction to Juanito Santos and the
other two with Leonardo Joson. A month before such
redemption, Romarico filed an action for annulment of the
decision including the writ and levy of execution.
ISSUE: WON debt of the wife without the knowledge of the
husband can be satisfied through the conjugal property.
HELD:
The spouses had in fact been separated when the wife
entered into the business deal with Anita. The husband had
nothing to do with the business transactions of Katrina nor
authorized her to enter into such. The properties in Angeles
were acquired during the marriage with unclear proof where
the husband obtained the money to repay the loan. Hence,
it is presumed to belong in the conjugal partnership in the
absence of proof that they are exclusive property of the
husband and even though they had been living
separately. A wife may bind the conjugal partnership only
when she purchases things necessary for support of the
family. The writ of execution cannot be issued against
Romarico and the execution of judgments extends only over
properties belonging to the judgment debtor. The conjugal
properties cannot answer for Katrina’s obligations as she
exclusively incurred the latter without the consent of her
husband nor they did redound to the benefit of the
family. There was also no evidence submitted that the
administration of the partnership had been transferred to
Katrina by Romarico before said obligations were
incurred. In as much as the decision was void only in so far
as Romarico and the conjugal properties concerned,
Spouses Wong may still execute the debt against Katrina,
personally and exclusively.
11
Carlos vs Abelardo
Carlos vs. Abelardo
GR No. 146504, April 4, 2002
FACTS:
Honorio Carlos filed a petition against Manuel Abelardo, his
son-in-law for recovery of the $25,000 loan used to purchase
a house and lot located at Paranaque. It was in October
1989 when the petitioner issued a check worth as such to
assist the spouses in conducting their married life
independently. The seller of the property acknowledged
receipt of the full payment. In July 1991, the petitioner
inquired from spouses status of the amount loaned from him,
the spouses pleaded that they were not yet in position to
make a definite settlement. Thereafter, respondent
expressed violent resistance to the extent of making various
death threats against petitioner. In 1994, petitioner made a
formal demand but the spouses failed to comply with the
obligation. The spouses were separated in fact for more
than a year prior the filing of the complaint hence spouses
filed separate answers. Abelardo contended that the amount
was never intended as a loan but his share of income on
contracts obtained by him in the construction firm and that
the petitoner could have easily deducted the debt from his
share in the profits. RTC decision was in favor of the
petitioner, however CA reversed and set aside trial court’s
decision for insufficiency of evidence. Evidently, there was a
check issued worth $25,000 paid to the owner of the
Paranaque property which became the conjugal dwelling of
the spouses. The wife executed an instrument
acknowledging the loan but Abelardo did not sign.
ISSUE: WON a loan obtained to purchase the conjugal
dwelling can be charged against the conjugal partnership.
HELD:
Yes, as it has redounded to the benefit of the family. They
did not deny that the same served as their conjugal home
thus benefiting the family. Hence, the spouses are jointly
and severally liable in the payment of the loan. Abelardo’s
contention that it is not a loan rather a profit share in the
construction firm is untenable since there was no proof that
he was part of the stockholders that will entitle him to the
profits and income of the company.
Hence, the petition was granted and Abelardo is ordered to
pay the petitioner in the amount of $25,000 plus legal
interest including moral and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees.
12
Ching v. CA, 423 SCRA 356, February 23, 2004
FACTS: Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI)
obtained two loans from the Allied Banking Corporation
(ABC). (PBMCI) Executive Vice-President Alfredo Ching
executed a continuing guaranty with the ABC for the
payment of the said loan. The PBMCI defaulted in the
payment of all its loans so ABC filed a complaint for sum of
money against the PBMCI. Trial court issued a writ of
preliminary attachment against Alfredo Ching requiring the
sheriff of to attach all the properties of said Alfredo Ching to
answer for the payment of the loans. Encarnacion T. Ching,
wife of Alfredo Ching, filed a Motion to Set Aside the levy on
attachment allegeing inter alia that the 100,000 shares of
stocks levied on by the sheriff were acquired by her and her
husband during their marriage out of conjugal funds.
Petitioner spouses aver that the source of funds in the
acquisition of the levied shares of stocks is not the
controlling factor when invoking the presumption of the
conjugal nature of stocks under Art. !21 and that such
presumption subsists even if the property is registered only
in the name of one of the spouses, in this case, petitioner
Alfredo Ching. According to the petitioners, the suretyship
obligation was not contracted in the pursuit of the petitioner-
husband’s profession or business.44
ISSUE: WON 100,000 shares of stocks may be levied on by
the sheriff to answer for the loans guaranteed by petitioner
Alfredo Ching
HELD: No.
RATIO: The CA erred in holding that by executing a
continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the
private respondent for the payment of the PBMCI loans, the
petitioner-husband was in the exercise of his profession,
pursuing a legitimate business.
The shares of stocks are, thus, presumed to be the conjugal
partnership property of the petitioners. The private
respondent failed to adduce evidence that the petitioner-
husband acquired the stocks with his exclusive money.
The appellate court erred in concluding that the conjugal
partnership is liable for the said account of PBMCI.
Article 121 provides: The conjugal partnership shall be liable
for: (1) All debts and obligations contracted by the husband
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those
contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the
cases where she may legally bind the partnership.
For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that
should appertain to the husband alone, there must be a
showing that some advantages accrued to the spouses.
In this case, the private respondent failed to prove that the
conjugal partnership of the petitioners was benefited by the
petitioner-husband’s act of executing a continuing guaranty
and suretyship agreement with the private respondent for
and in behalf of PBMCI. The contract of loan was between
the private respondent and the PBMCI, solely for the benefit
of the latter. No presumption can be inferred from the fact
that when the petitioner-husband entered into an
accommodation agreement or a contract of surety, the
conjugal partnership would thereby be benefited. The private
respondent was burdened to establish that such benefit
redounded to the conjugal partnership.
13
ROBERTO and VENUS BUADO vs COURT OF APPEALS
and ROMULO NICOL
FACTS:
- Mr. and Mrs. Buado filed a civil case against Erlinda Nicol.-
On April 1987, the trial court rendered a decision
ordering Erlinda to pay damages to the petitioners.-
The personal properties of Erlinda were insufficient to pay th
e damages.-
The sheriff levied and auctioned the property of Erlinda.- An
auction sale was held with the petitioners as the
highest bidder. A certificate of sale was issued in favor of
Mr.and Mrs. Buado.- After almost one year, the husband of
Erlinda, Romulo Nicol, filed a complaint for the annulment
of certificate of sale and damages with preliminary injunction
against petitioners and deputy sheriff.- He argued that
there was no proper publication and posting for the auction
sale. He also claimed that the judgmentobligation of Erlinda
Nicol amounted to P40,000 only. The spouses Buado
obtained the P500,000 worth of propertyfor only P51,685.-
The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition of Romulo N
icol.- The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
RTC and held that Branch 21 has jurisdiction to act
on thecomplaint filed by the respondent in this case.- The
petitioners filed a petition where they said that the Court
of Appeals committed a grave abuse of discretion
for reversing the decision given by the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the obligation of Erlinda Nicol arising from
her criminal liability is chargeable to the conjugal partnership.
HELD:
NO. Erlinda Nicol‟s liability is not
chargeable to the conjugal partnership.Unlike in the system
of absolute community where liabilities incurred by either
spouse by reason of a crime or
quasi-delict
is chargeable to the absolute community of property, in the
absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of
thedebtor-spouse, the same advantage is not accorded in
the system of conjugal partnership of gains. The
conjugalpartnership of gains has no duty to make advance
payments for the liability of the debtor-spouse.Petitioners
argue that the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal
liability is chargeable to the conjugal partnership.The
Supreme Court does not agree to the contention of Mr. and
Mrs. Buado.In Guadalupe v. Tronco, this Court held that the
car which was claimed by the third party complainant to be
conjugalproperty was being levied upon to enforce "a
judgment for support" filed by a third person, the third-party
claim of the wifeis proper since the obligation which is
personal to the husband is chargeable not on the conjugal
property but on hisseparate property. Hence, the filing of a
separate action by Romulo Nicol was proper.The decision of
the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
14
Mallilin vs Castillo
Mallilin vs. Castillo
GR No. 136803, June 16, 2000
FACTS:
Eustaquio Mallilin Jr. and Ma. Elvira Castillo were alleged to
be both married and with children but separated from their
respective spouses and cohabited in 1979 while respective
marriages still subsist. They established Superfreight
Customs Brokerage Corporation during their union of which
petitioner was the President and Chairman and respondent
as Vice President and Treasurer. They likewise acquired
real and personal properties which were registered solely in
respondent’s name. Due to irreconcilable conflict, the couple
separated in 1992. Petitioner then demanded his share from
respondent in the subject properties but the latter refused
alleging that said properties had been registered solely in her
name. Furthermore, respondent denied that she and
petitioner lived as husband and wife because they were still
legally married at the time of cohabitation.
Petitioner filed complaint for partition of co-ownership shares
while respondent filed a motion for summary judgment. Trial
court dismissed the former and granted the latter.
ISSUE: WON petitioner can validly claim his share in the
acquired properties registered under the name of the
respondent considering they both have subsisting
relationship when they started living together.
HELD:
The Court ruled that trial court erred that parties who are not
capacitated to marry each other and were living together
could not have owned properties in common. Under Article
148, if the parties are incapacitated to marry each other,
properties acquired by them through their joint contribution,
property or industry, shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their contributions which, in the absence of
proof to the contrary, is presumed to be equal. Hence, there
is co-ownership even though the couples in union are not
capacitated to marry each other.
Furthermore, when CA dismissed petitioner’s complaint for
partition on grounds of due process and equity, his right to
prove ownership over the claimed properties was
denied. Such dismissal is unjustified since both ends may
be served by simply excluding from the action for partition
the properties registered in the name of Steelhouse Realty
and Eloisa Castillo, not parties in the case.
The case was remanded to lower court for further
proceedings.
15
Francisco vs Master Iron Works
Francisco vs. Master Iron Works Construction
Corporation
GR. No. 151967, February 16, 2005
FACTS:
Josefina Castillo was 24 years old when she and Eduardo
Francisco got married on January 1983. The latter was then
employed as Vice President in a Private
Corporation. Josefina acquired two parcels of land where
Imus Bank executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of
Josefina, married to Eduardo. An affidavit of waiver was
executed by Eduardo where he declared that prior to his
marriage with Josefina, the latter purchased the land with her
own savings and that he waived whatever claims he had
over the property. When Josefina mortgaged the property
for a loan, Eduardo affixed his marital conformity to the
deed. In 1990, Eduardo who was then a General Manager,
bought bags of cement from defendant but failed to pay the
same. The latter filed a complaint for recovery and trial court
rendered judgment against Eduardo. The court then issued
a writ of execution and the sheriif issued a notice of levy on
execution over the alleged property of Josefina for the
recovery of the balance of the amount due under the
decision of the trial court. Petitioner filed a third party claim
over the 2 parcels of land in which she claimed as her
paraphernal property.
ISSUE: WON the subject property is the conjugal property of
Josefina and Eduardo.
HELD:
The Court ruled that petitioner failed to prove that she
acquired the property with her personal funds before her
cohabitation with Eduardo and that she was the sole
owner. The Deed of Absolute Sale on record showed it was
issued after her marriage. Their case fall under Article 148
and since they got married before the Family Code, the
provision, pursuant to Art 256, can be applied retroactively if
it does not prejudice vested rights. Petitioner likewise failed
that she had any vested right.
Where the parties are in a void marriage due to a legal
impediment that invalidates such marriage, Art 148 should
be applied. In the absence of proof that the wife/husband
has actually contributed money, property, or industry to the
properties acquired during such union the presumption of co-
ownership will not arise.
The petition was denied for lack of merit. The decision of CA
that the property was conjugal was affirmed.
16
Facts:
In 1986, John Abing and Juliet Waeyan cohabited as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. Together,
they bought a 2-storey residential house. In December 1991,
Juliet left for Korea and worked thereat, sending money to
John which the latter deposited in their joint account. In
1992, their house was renovated and to it was annex a
structure which housed a sari-sari store. In 1994, Juliet
returned.
In 1995, they decided to partition their properties as their
relationship soured. They executed a Memorandum of
Agreement. Unfortunately, the document was left unsigned
by the parties although signed by the witnesses thereto.
Under their unsigned agreement, John shall leave the
dwelling with Juliet paying him the amount of P428,870.00
representing John's share in all their properties. Juliet paid
John the sum of P232,397.66 by way of partial payment of
his share, with the balance of P196,472.34 to be paid by
Juliet in twelve monthly installment.
Juliet, however, failed to make good the balance. John
demanded Juliet to vacate the annex structure. Juliet
refused, prompting John to file an ejectment suit against her.
John alleged that he alone spent for the construction of the
annex structure with his own funds and thru the money he
borrowed from his relatives. He added that the tax
declaration for the structure was under his name.
Issue:
Does John exclusively own the property subject of the suit?
Held:
No. Other than John's bare allegation that he alone, thru his
own funds and money he borrowed from his relatives, spent
for the construction of the annex structure, evidence is
wanting to support such naked claim.
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to
marry each other, live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a
void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by
them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of
them through their work or industry shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired
while they lived together shall be presumed to have been
obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be
owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article,
a party who did not participate in the acquisition by other
party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed
jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of
the household.
The law is clear. In the absence of proofs to the contrary,
any property acquired by common-law spouses during their
period of cohabitation is presumed to have been obtained
thru their joint efforts and is owned by them in equal shares.
Their property relationship is governed by the rules on co-
ownership. And under this regime, they owned their
properties in common "in equal shares."
Being herself a co-owner, Juliet may not be ejected from the
structure in question. She is as much entitled to enjoy its
possession and ownership as John. Juliet's failure to pay
John the balance of the latter's share in their common
properties could at best give rise to an action for a sum of
money against Juliet, or for rescission of the said agreement
and not for ejectment. (John Abing vs Juliet Waeyan, G.R.
NO. 146294, July 31, 2006)
17
Tumlos vs Fernandez
Tumlos vs Fernandez
GR No. 137650, April 12, 2000
FACTS:
Mario and Lourdes Fernandez were plaintiffs in an action for
ejectment filed against Guillerma, Gina and Toto Tumlos. In
the complaint, spouses Fernandez alleged that they are the
absolute owners of an apartment building that through their
tolerance they allowed the Tumlos’ to occupy the apartment
for the last 7 years without payment of any rent. It was
agreed that Guillerma will pay 1,600 a month while the other
defendants promised to pay 1,000 a month which was not
complied with. Demand was made several times for the
defendants to vacate the premises as they are in need of the
property for the construction of a new building.
Defendants appealed to RTC that Mario and Guillerma had
an amorous relationship and that they acquired the property
in question as their love nest. It was likewise alleged that
they lived together in the said apartment building with their 2
children for about 10 years and that Gullerma administered
the property by collecting rentals from the lessees until she
discovered that Mario deceived her as to the annulment of
their marriage.
ISSUE: WON Guillerma is a co-owner of the said apartment
under Article 148.
HELD:
SC rejected the claim that Guillerma and Mario were co-
owners of the subject property. The claim was not
satisfactorily proven by Guillerma since there were no other
evidence presented to validate it except for the said
affidavit. Even if the allegations of having cohabited with
Mario and that she bore him two children were true, the
claim of co-ownership still cannot be accepted. Mario is
validly married with Lourdes hence Guillerma and Mario are
not capacitated to marry each other. The property relation
governing their supposed cohabitation is under Article 148 of
the Family Code. Actual contribution is required by the said
provision in contrast to Art 147 which states that efforts in the
care and maintenance of the family and household are
regarded as contributions to the acquisitions of common
property by one who has no salary, income, work or
industry. Such is not included in Art 148. If actual
contribution is not proven then there can be no co-ownership
and no presumption of equal shares.
18
Docena vs Lapesura
Docena vs. Lapesura
GR No. 140153, March 28, 2001
FACTS:
Casiano Hombria, private respondent, filed a complaint for
the recovery of a parcel of land against his lessees,
petitioner-spouses, Antonio and Alfreda Docena. The
spouses claimed ownership of the land based on the
occupation since time immemorial. The petitioners filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with CA alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in issuing
orders and that of the sheriff in issuing the writ of
demolition. CA dismissed the petition on the ground that the
petition was filed beyond the 60-day period provided in the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure and that the certification of
non-forum shopping attached thereto was signed by only
one of the petitioners.
ISSUE: WON it is sufficient that the certification of non-forum
shopping was signed by only one of the petitioners.
HELD: In view of the property involved which is a conjugal
property, the petition questioning the writ of demolition
thereof originated from an action for recovery brought
against the spouses and is clearly intended for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership and the wife as point out was in the
province of Samar whereas the petition was prepared in
Metro Manila, a rigid application of the rules on forum
shopping that would disauthorize a husband’s signing the
certification in his behalf and that of his wife is too harsh.
In the previous court rulings, certificate of non-forum
shopping should be sign by all the petitioners in a
case. However, in the case at bar, such certificate signed by
Antonio Docena alone should be deemed to constitute
substantial compliance with the rules. The two petitioners in
this case are husband and wife and their residence is the
subject property alleged to be a conjugal property. Under
the Family Code, the administration of the conjugal property
belongs to the husband and wife jointly. However, unlike an
act of alienation or encumbrance where the consent of both
spouses is required, joint management or administration
does not require that the husband and wife always act
together. Each spouse may validly exercise full power of
management alone, subject to the intervention of the court in
proper cases.
Hence, petition is granted and the case is remanded to CA
for further proceedings.
19
Hontiveros vs RTC
Hontiveros vs. RTC
GR No. 125465, June 29, 1999
FACTS:
Petitioner spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a
complaint for damages against private respondents Gregorio
Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson. The petitioners alleged that
they are the owners of a parcel of land in Capiz and that they
were deprived of income from the land as a result of the filing
of the land registration case. In the reply, private
respondents denied that they were married and alleged that
Gregorio was a widower while Teodora was single. They
also denied depriving petitioners of possession of and
income from the land. On the contrary, according to the
private respondents, the possession of the property in
question had already been transferred to petitioners by virtue
of the writ of possession. Trial court denied petitioner’s
motion that while in the amended complaint, they alleged
that earnest efforts towards a compromise were made, it was
not verified as provided in Article 151.
ISSUE: WON the court can validly dismissed the complaint
due to lack of efforts exerted towards a compromise as
stated in Article 151.
HELD:
SC held that the inclusion of private respondent Teodora
Ayson as defendant and Maria Hontiveros as petitioner takes
the case out of the scope of Article 151. Under this
provision, the phrase “members of the same family” refers to
the husband and wife, parents and children, ascendants and
descendants, and brothers and sisters whether full or half-
blood. Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are
not given any legal effects in this jurisdiction. Teodora and
Maria as spouses of the Hontiveros’ are regarded as
strangers to the Hontiveros family for purposes of Article
151.
20
Albano vs Gapusan
Albano vs. Gapusan
AM No. 1022-MJ, May 7, 1976
FACTS:
Redentor Albano filed a complaint against Judge Gapusan
seeking disciplinary action involving latter’s malpractice in his
notarization of a separation agreement between Valentina
Andres and Guillermo Maligta and the extrajudicial
liquidation of their conjugal partnership. Likewise, a
complaint was filed alleging that said Judge influenced
Judge Crispin of CFI-Ilocos in deciding two criminal
cases. In the abovementioned separation agreement, it was
stipulated that the spouse guilty of adultery or concubinage
shall be barred to file an action against the other.
Respondent judge denied that he drafted the said agreement
and explained that the spouses had been separated for a
long time when they signed it and the wife had begotten
children with her paramour. He further added that there was
a stipulation in the said agreement that the spouse would live
together in case of reconciliation.
ISSUE: WON Judge Gapusan should be reprimanded
because of notarizing the void agreement between the
spouses.
HELD:
A notary should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage
and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses
and extrajudically dissolving the conjugal partnership.
There is no question that the stipulation contained in the said
separation agreement is contrary to law, morals and good
customs. The family is a basic social institution which public
policy cherishes and protects. To preserve the institution of
marriage, the law considers void any contract for personal
separation between husband and wife and every extra-
judicial agreement for the dissolution of the partnership. SC
held the action of respondent judge Gapusan as contrary to
law.