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nature of the questions themselves, and not the solution.-;. in the way
ihi^e questions dir asked and not the answers. W'hence the general
impression or powerlcssness and incoherence chat rules our
m inds/1
1 his admission o f powerlcssness in die face of die surging
up o f unexpected and catastrophic events forces us to try to
reverse the usual trend chat exposes us to die accident in order
to establish a new kind of museology or niuseography: one
that would now entail exposing the accident, all accidents,
from the most banal to the most tragic, from natural catas
trophes to industrial and scientific disasters, without avoiding
die too often neglected category o f the happy accident, the
stroke o f luck, the coup -defeatin' or even die roup degrd&l
loday. thanks to television, 'what survives is reduced ro
the event-instant, progress o f all kinds converging on an
inescapable problem which is the problem o f perception and
im age/2
Apart from the historic terrorist attack of l i September
2001 and its broadcasting on a continuous loop on the televi
sion screens of the entire world, two recent events deserve to
come in for some harsh analysis on this wore. Oil tile one hand,
we have die revelation, sixteen year.< too hire, of the damage done
to eastern France through contamination from Chernobyl,
about which dhow running die services tasked with sounding
chc alert in France declared in April. 1986: ‘If uv do detect
anything, it trill juft hr <i purely sdrutiftc problem.' On the other
hand, we have the very recent decision of the Caen Memorial
Peace Museum to import from the United States, as a sym
bolie object, an atomic bomb an H-bomb - emblematic of the
‘balance of terror during the Cold War between Hast and West.
Apropos, and reworking the dismissive remark of the
French experts who covered up the damage done by the
Chernobyl accident, we might say: ‘If we exhibit a/t atom bomb,
it willjust be <tpurely cultural problem.' and on that note, throw
ing open the doors o f the first Museum of Accidents.
Caution
the -iim of scaring the hordes as che mass media so often do.
bur only of finally taking accidents seriously.
Along the lines or the work of someone like Proud on our
relationship to death and the impulse towards it. it is now a
matter o f scrupulously examining our relationship to tIk end. to
ail ends, in ocher words to fn men ess.
'Accumulation puts an end to the impression of chance."
wrote Sigmund Freud, some tune between 1914 and 1915.
Indeed, after the twentieth century and che sudden aipitaliza-
rioii ofiragcdies and catastrophes of all kinds, we really should draw
up the bankruptcy report on a technoscientific Progress that
che ninetccnth-ccntury positivists were so proud of.
Since those days the serial production o f the wizards oi
business has literally industrialized the artificial accident, an acci
dent whose once artisanal character most often expressed itself
discreetly, even while natural accidents took on a cataclysmic
dimension ail of their own. with the exception o f wars of
annihilation.
If we take the realm o f private car ownership, for example,
the way the carnage on the highways has become common
place is Freudian proof that the accumulation o f traffic acci
dents largely puts an end to ‘chance’ - and che multiple
securin’ systems our vehicles are equipped w ith don't alter this
fact. one iota: in the course of the twentieth century, the acci
dent became a heavy industry.
But lets get back to this technoanalvsis revelatory o f ‘sub
stance" —m other words, what lies beneath technicians' know
ledge. lechniqucs are always streets ahead of the mentalities of
competent personnel in the area o f innovation, as the essayist.
John Berger, likes to claim, in any case (7n ivery creation,
whether it involves an original idea, a painting or a poem, error
always sits alongside skill. Ski;; is never presented on its own; there
is no skill, no rcaiire talent, without error').- But this is because the
accident is inseparable from the speed with which a unexpectedly
singes up. And so this ’virtual speed" o f the catastrophic surprise
77,v Inrcntion of. incidents 13
With the television image, we have looked on, live, since the
end ot last century, at endless overkill in the broadcasting of
horror and, especially since the boom in live coverage, in the
instantaneous broadcasting of cataclysms arid terrorist out
rages that have largely had the jum p on disaster films.
F.ven more to die point, following the standardization of
opinion rhaL came in with the nineteenth century, we are now
witnessing the sudden synchronization o f emotions.
The ratings war o f the television networks has turned the
catastrophic accident into a scoop, not to say a fantastic spec
tacle sought after by all.
W hen Guy Dcbord spoke o f die 'showbiz society*, he
forgot to mention that this adaptation of life to die screen is
1 lit' A id denr .\lusrnnt 1/
The feeling o f insecurity that has crept up over die last dozen
years or so in the city is not only linked to the discourteous
acts of so-called ‘incivility’ currently plaguing city dwellers.
It is, it would seem, a symptom o f и new expectation
horizon, a third kind o f horizon after 'revolution' and 'war',
the drear War, the ‘war to end ward. ] am talking about the
expectation of the integral accident, this Great Accident
that is not merely ecological. The latter has been part o f our
general mindset for the last thirty years or so. The integral
accident is also, and above all. eschatological, it is the acci
dent of a world now foreclosed in what is touted as ‘global
ization'. this internationalization at once desired and dreaded,
now die subject o f endless debate, as though the anthropo
logical horizon o f ideas and ideals suddenly felt blocked off.
both by the foreclosure represented by a geographical lock-
down and by the suddenness of worldwide interactivity o f
exchange.
There is immense expectation now, in fact, o f an integral
accident. Horror films are not just the formatted products of
the Hollywood dream machine and of the bid to system
atically scare viewers- or cinemagoers. as though hell lay at the
heart o f the world. No. What this is about is the recent emer
gence o f an end-of-thc-world feeling - an end in no way
fhc Expectation Horizon 39
And that about wraps it up. you’d chink, but no, there is
more, a wisecrack from Pierre Memlcs-Francc. delivered in
1968: ‘Its 1788, only without the revolution o f the following
year.' And char, indeed, was die case, five events o f that spring
remained 'events', a sort of literary Commune, and nothing
more. The concept of 'revolution- had exhausted its ideo
logical fecundity arid after that remained only a mute anxiety,
the expectation o f some nameless catastrophe in which fledg
ling ecology was shortly to take over from the Big Night that
was to end. w hats more, in the implosion o f the USSR soon
after Chernobyl, a premonitory' cataclysm of a future noc so
much radiant as radioactive.
call a loss of" die sense of reality, driving adults and adolescent:«*
into a groundless parallel world, where each individual grad
ually gets used to inhabiting the accident o f an audiovisual
continuum, independent of the real space of their life.
At this stage o f cybernetic seclusion, presented as the
crowning achievement of Progress, where t he most trifling bit
o f information and the most trivial event zip around the world
in an instant, globalization puts paid to “revolution’just as it
does to the classic “world war'. For, thanks to the ubiquity of
television, the slightest incident can become 'revolutionary'
and the most piddling attack relayed on a loop can take on the
gigantic proportions o f a worldwide conflagration!
That, is finally the effect of this omega point humanity has
reached, a 'meteorological' effect that reproduces the one
where a butterfly beats its wings in an Amazonian rainforest
and causes a hurricane in Europe - just as the F.l Nino phe
nomenon is now playing havoc with the climate o f the globe.
in this sense, as Maurice Blanchot pointed our in relation
to the Age of Enlightenment, “Shuiiing in the outside means
setting it up as an inferiority o f expectation or exception: this
is the requirement that leads society to cause madness to exisL.
meaning to make it possible.’''
This is precisely what is happening to our globalized soci
eties. where the local is the exterior, and the global the inter
ior o f a finite world, exclusively defined by the existence of
networks o f instantaneous information and communication,
to the detriment o f any geopolitics, since the real time of
(economic, political) exchanges wins hands down over the
real space o f the geophysics o f the worlds regions.
that at its inception war was already pare and parcel of (liar col
lective mass psychosis that al diets the besieged, buried alive .-is
they are behind their protective enclosures.
Siege warfare was at the political origins of lIu- history of
cities and o f nations. Mobile warfare came later on. We should
also note that territorial conflicts have never stopped acceler
ating. finally turning into this "Time War'that will soon over
rule the war of the geostrategic space of empires, and in
which sea power will be taken over by the power of air-naval
and, finally, air-orbital forces.
Today, though, globalization and its poliorcetic foreclosure
arc spreading on a planetary scale. But by the same token,
what is surfacing with this global state o f siege arc no longer
the enclosure and its colossal fortifications, despite the illu
sory anti-missile system o f the Uniced States. First and fore
most what it produces is the inordinate spread o f panic, a
panic chat is still mure, certainly, but that never ceases to grow
at the rate o f all the accidents and disasters and 'mass terrorist
attacks' chat point to the emergence, not so much of some
hyperterrorism as o f this post-Clausewitzian 'hyperwar' that
outpaces all political givens regarding conflicts, national or
international.
Damaging strategy, in other words, the geostrategy that so
long rejected its new chronostrategic dimension, this sudden
internationalization o f real time imposes ex uhrupto, a different
tyranny that o f instamaneity and ubiquity - not only on mil
itary commanders and planners bui on che democratically
elected politicians who are supposed to be running the show.
In lace, after mass and energy (atomic or otherwise), war
now opens into its third dimension: information chat is instan
taneous, or as good as.
Whence che untimely emergence of information astro-
strategy chat each and every one o f us benefits from, whether
military- or civilian, soldier-citizen or terrorise, not to mention
simple common-law criminal.
Public ¡-.motion 59
China was nor afraid o f a nuclear war chat would involve hun
dreds o f millions ot dead.
emotion rests, for its part, on sound and light. In ocher words,
on tlic audio-visibility o f a spectacle or. rather, o f an incanth
eory liturgy that is only apparently secular . . . witness the
characteristic abuse o f rebroadcasting not only of commercials
but equally of terrorizing events.
In its grandiloquent fashion, this media phenomenon over
rides the siace itself* in a sort o f accident in political substance
that has particularly far-reaching consequences for the future
of republican freedoms.
‘The electorate no longer knows the party:' wailed a
German journalist after the stinging swing in the brench elec
tions o f March 2004. He went on to specify that ‘the actions
o f those who govern the countries o f Europe today are under
mined by fear (of economic stagnation, o f unemployment,
etc); in other words, fear o f the future.’ Strangely, this list does
not even mention terrorism and its devastating effects on the
Spanish government, kicked out only a fortnight earlier.
Here again, the electoral accident argument wins out over
the argument of the terrorist attack, as in the explosion in the
Toulouse fertilizer factory- in September 2001. just a few days
after the attacks on New York and Washington.
On the subject o f the Toulouse ammonium nitrate explo
sion. we might hazard a gratuitous hypothesis: supposing tliaL
the reverse happened and that the Toulouse investigators had
opted for the terrorist attack line of inquiry. N ot only would
French diplomacy have been quite different, but the Franco-
German ‘peace camp’ would have gone up in smoke under
the pressure o f a public opinion traumatized by the scale of
the disaster - as happened later in Madrid.
Suppose now that the new investigations under way in
Toulouse ended, shortly, in flagrant, proof that the Toulouse
tragedy, in which over 30 people died and over 2000 were
injured, was indeed the result o f a twin attack: I I September in
the United States and 2 1 September in France, at Toulouse, the
city o f the European aerospace industry, host to Aerospatiale.
64 Pan II
Kobe and the sarin gas terrorist attack in the Tokyo under
ground - could well contribute to the outlawing o f this uncivil
war that threatens to wreak havoc, in the near future, not only
on the legitimate state but indeed on the whole panoply of
civilizations.
Alter the privatization o f energy, the privatization of the
public arena will inevitably lead, not to the professionalization
o f the public (police) force now, but to military anarchy.
This veritable ‘defence nihilism’ will no longer involve an
openly declared enemy - much as the Swedish movement
Forvarsnihilism hoped, when it asked, in the 1920s, ‘Is the
invasion o f our territory by another civilized people such a
serious thing?'3 Ir will impact on the military institution itself,
as the basis of that ‘right to defence' that subtends all political
rights.
W hat can you say today, in fact, of the territorial invasion
by a ‘civilized people’when it is precisely a matter o f mass ter
rorism using the complete array o f the democratic amenities
o f transport and telecommunications provided by societies
open to the most incredibly diverse exchanges o f the age of
planetary globalization.
CL AUSTRO POL IS or COSMOPOLIS? A society of
enforced seclusion, as once upon a time, or a society of
forcible control? Actually, tlu: dilemma itself seems illusory,
with the temporal compression of m sum tan city and the ubi
quity o f the age of the information revolution. This interac
tive society is one in which real time overrules the real space
o f geostrategy, promoting a ‘mecrostrategy* in which the city
is less the centre o f a territory, a ‘national’ space, than the
centre o f time, of this global and astronomical time that makes
every city the resonating chamber o f die most incredibly
diverse events (breakdowns, major accidents, terrorist out
rages. etc). Break up of a social order will be triggered by the
extreme emotional fragility o f an aberrant demographic
polarization, with megalopolises that will shortly bring
Public Emotion 69
along from Hast to West. 1went faster than a gallop, faster than
I had ever gone before. I had scarc ely lime to loom, before 1
had lo shrink right down again.'
Building on this drmnoseopic vision, our oak goes on:
Bur have you ever considered the feat accomplished, the skill
involved, when a tree enlarges, simultaneously yet at slightly
different rates and in slightly different manners, tor each one
of forty motorcar drivers lacing two opposite directions, while
at the same time diminishing for forty more who have got then-
hacks to it. meanwhile remembering to loom over each single
one at the right moment: and to do this minute after minute,
hour after hour, from daybreak till nightfall or long after?
for my road had become a busy one; it worked all day long
under almost continual traffic. It worked, and 1 worked. 1did
not jounce and bounce so much any more, but I Sind to run
faster and faster: to grow enormously, to loom in n split
second, to shrink to nothing, all in a hurry, without time to
enjoy the action, and without rest: over and over and over.