Johnson, Ralph H - Manifest Rationality - A Pragmatic Theory of Argument PDF

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title : Manifest Rationality : A Pragmatic Theory of Argument

author : Johnson, Ralph H.
publisher : Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
isbn10 | asin : 0805821732
print isbn13 : 9780805821734
ebook isbn13 : 9780585330693
language : English
subject Reasoning.
publication date : 2000
lcc : BC177.J54 2000eb
ddc : 153.4/3
subject : Reasoning.
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Manifest Rationality
A Pragmatic Theory of Argument
Ralph H. Johnson
University of Windsor
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Copyright © 2000 by Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

All rights reserved. No part of the book may be reproduced in any form, by photostat, microform, retrieval system, or
any other means, without the prior written permission of the publisher.
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., Publishers

10 Industrial Avenue
Mahwah, New Jersey 07430
Cover design by Kathryn Houghtaling Lacey
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Johnson, Ralph H.
Manifest rationality : a pragmatic theory of argument / Ralph H. Johnson.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
ISBN 0-8058-2173-2 (cloth : alk. paper) ISBN 0-8058-2174-0 (pbk. : alk. paper)
1. Reasoning. I. Title.
BC177 .J54 2000
153.4'3dc21
99-058491
Books published by Lawrence Erlbaum Associates are printed on acid-free paper, and their bindings are chosen for
strength and durability.
Printed in the United States of America

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
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To Maggie,
for her love and support through all these years
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CONTENTS
Preface xi
Introduction 1
Part I 9
The Historical Context
1. Context: Argumentation as a Cultural Practice 11
12
Argumentation and Rationality
14
Argumentation Under Seige
21
The Network Problem
23
The Centrality and Importance of Argumentation
24
Argumentation Distinguished
26
The Benefits of Argumentation
27
Conclusion
2. Context: The Study of Argumentation 28
28
The Re-emergence of Argumentation Theory
30
Argumentation Theory versus the Theory of Argument
31
Informal Logic as a Theory of Argument
32
Setting the Stage
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37
The Nature of Theory of Argument
42
Govier's Typology
46
Previous Theories of Argument
52
Adequacy Conditions for a Theory of Argument
56
Conclusion
3. Paradigm Abandoned: Critique of Deductivism 57
58
FDL: A Monistic Theory
59
FDL Criticized
78
FDL Rejected
81
Positivism: A Dualist Theory of Argument
84
Conductivism: A Pluralistic Theory of Argument
88
Conclusion
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4. Lessons from the Past 91
92
The Truth Behind Conductivism
95
Excursus: The Theory of Reasoning
98
Hamblin on the Concept of Argument
102
The Problems With FDL: An Alternative View
104
The Mathematicization of Logic
105
Lessons From the Past
107
Conclusion
Part II 109
A Pragmatic Theory of Argument
5. Informal Logic: An Alternative Theory of Argument 111
112
A Brief Account of the Rise of Informal Logic
116
What Is Informal Logic?
123
Informal Logic and the Theory of Analysis
135
Informal Logic and the Theory of Appraisal
140
Who, or What, Then, Is an Informal Logician?
142
Conclusion
6. Argument as Manifest Rationality: A Pragmatic Conception 143
144
Critique of Current Definitions of Argument
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150
A Brief Detour Into the History of Argumentation
154
A New Framework for the Theory of Analysis
159
Fundamental Characteristics of Argumentation
164
Rethinking the Nature of Argument
169
Objections and Replies
175
Walton on Argument and Reasoning
177
Benefits of the Pragmatic Approach
7. What Makes a Good Argument? Toward a Theory of Evaluation 180
182
Further Reflections on Hamblin
189
Criteria for Good Argument
209
Other Normative Criteria
213
Satisfaction of the Adequacy Conditions
216
Conclusion
8. Principles of Criticism 217
217
Criticism and Evaluation
223
The Principle of Vulnerability
236
The Principle of Parity
237
The Principle of Logical Neutrality
240
The Principle of Discrimination

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247
Responding to Criticism
248
Concluding Reflections on Criticism
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Part III 249

Matters Dialectical
9. Criticisms, Objections, and Replies 251
252
Informal LogicAn Oxymoron
260
Informal LogicSee Formal Logic
263
Informal LogicSee Rhetoric
271
Informal LogicSee Epistemology
283
Informal LogicSee Sexism
289
Conclusion
10. Alternative Theories of Argument 290
290
Dialogue Logics
291
Field Theories
309
The Pragma-Dialectical Approach
320
Willard's Theory of Argumentation
324
Conclusion
11. Outstanding Issues and the Research Agenda 326
326
Possible Solutions to Outstanding Problems
343
Research Agenda for Informal Logic
351
Research Agenda for the Theory of Argument
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353
Conclusion
12. Retrospect and Prospect 354
354
The Gap Between Theory and Practice: Some Reflections on Toulmin's Revolution
359
Future Directions for the Theory of Argument
362
The Theory of Reasoning
365
The Significance of Informal Logic
369
Conclusion
References 371
Author Index 381
Subject index 385
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PREFACE
This book is an attempt to work through some of the theoretical issues that have been accumulating in informal logic
since the 1980s. At the same time, it is an attempt to define a core position in the theory of argument in which those
issues can be further explored. As my position develops, other issues will arise that transcend this discussion and can
only be answered by the development of a theory of reasoning. That is a recurrent theme in what follows.
When I began thinking about arguments and how to appraise them more than 25 years ago, I thought of an argument
mainly as a product. Under the influence of people like my colleagues, Tony Blair, Joe Wenzel, Charles Willard, and
other members of the speech communication community, I gradually came to an appreciation of an argument as a
process. Under the influence of Dewey (as interpreted by Bernstein, 1971) and more recently having benefited from the
work of Govier, Barth, and Walton, I have begun to see the importance of viewing an argument as the product of the
practice of argumentation. A satisfactory theory of argument must include all three dimensions of argument: product,
process, and practice. That, too, is a recurrent theme in this book.
In this volume, I have attempted to occupy middle ground. The approach to argument I advocate is broader than that of
traditional logic, which sees argument as a formal structure. On the other hand, it is narrower and stricter than that
advocated by some other theorists; for example, Willard and Gilbert, who view argument as a type of communication.
The underlying concern that motivates this work is the health of the practice of argumentation as an important cultural
artifact. As I read the signs of the times, they are not propitious as far as argumentation is concerned. If, as I believe,
argumentation belongs on the list of endangered species, we must take special pains to protect it, to ensure its survival,
and to nourish it. Part of what this entails is distinguishing it carefully from, while still seeing it in relationship to other
forms of reasoning and other sociocultural practices that it resembles. That, too, is a recurrent theme in this book.
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A further concern underlying this work is for logic as a discipline. In the 20th century, logic turned to mathematics for
insight and focus. Once result was the development of powerful theorieslogic became a science rich in theory, whereas
a focus on logic as a craft virtually disappeared. Perhaps that is what Nietzsche (1976) was thinking about when he
wrote, "Learning to think: in our schools one no longer has any idea of this, Even in universities, even among the real
scholars of philosophy, logic as a theory, as a practice, as a craft, is beginning to die out . . . (p. 512).1
As is evident, I have been influenced in the development of my views by the work of a great many philosophers,
logicians, speech communication theorists, and discussions and correspondence over the years. I mention only four
here. First, the work of Stephen Toulmin provided important leads and support but whose work I now see as limited in
important ways. Second, I am also heavily indebted to E. M. Barth, whose approach to argumentation combines the
desire for rigor associated with formal logic, along with the recognition that logic must be engaged in the sociopolitical
sphere. Third, it has been with the greatest pleasure that toward the end of the writing of this book, I had the opportunity
to read again a series of papers by Henry W. Johnstone, Jr. I was pleased to find that, in many ways, our ideas are
similar. His work was particularly helpful in the rewriting of chapter 8. Finally, I am deeply indebted to my colleague
and friend, Tony Blair, for more than 25 years of a continuing and fruitful conversation about these (any many other)
matters.
RALPH H. JOHNSON
Acknowledgments
A great many friends and colleagues have read various parts of this work, and provided me with first-rate criticism,
often accompanied by suggestions about how to do it better. I have not taken them all but I am certainly grateful for
having had the benefit of their ideas. These colleagues and friends have also provided the kind of moral support without
which this book could not have been written. Here, discrimination (in the sense talked about in this book) is scarcely
possible and so they are listed here alphabetically. I thank you all, each and every one, and ask forgiveness and
understanding from those whose names I have failed to include.
1Twilight of the Idols (The "Improvers" of Mankind), p. 512.
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I also wish to thank the editors at Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. for shepherding this project along, beginning with
Linda Bathgate, then an assiduous copyeditor whose name I do not know for a thorough job on the typescript, and
especially to Sondra Guideman for her continued guidance and support at crunch time. I also thank my research
assistant, Gary Fogal, for his help nailing down references and compiling the index.
Colleagues: Former students:
Jonathan Adler Jill Binker

Derek Allen Brad Bowen
Else Barth Donald Caron
Robert Binkley Debra Cox
Tony Blair Wichert Hochert
Jerry Cederblom Takuzo Konishi
Frans van Eemeren Jay Latkoczky
Alec Fisher David Macdonald
James Freeman Salim Murad
Dick Fulkerson Jessica Shumake
Michael Gilbert Matthias Mooij
Jen Glaser Elizabeth Skakoon
Jean Goodwin
Trudy Govier
Leo Groarke
Rob Grootendorst
Hans Villem Hansen
David Hitchcock
John Hoaglund
Sally Jackson
Scott Jacobs
Fred Kauffeld
Erik C. W. Krabbe
Michael Leff
John Mackenzie
Dennis Matthies
Gerald Nosich
Richard Paul
Bob Pinto
Nicholas Rescher
Michael Scriven
Harvey Siegel
Christopher Tindale
Marius Vermaak
Douglas Walton
Perry Weddle
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INTRODUCTION
The Re-emergence of Argumentation Theory
Argumentation theory, or the theory of argument, has (re-)emerged as an important focal point of interdisciplinary
research and interest.1 Not just philosophers and logicians but also linguists, speech communication theorists,
rhetoricians, and psychologistsamong othershave written extensively about it. In my own discipline of philosophy, what
has come to be known in some circles as the Informal Logic Movement has been partly responsible for bringing the
theory of argument back into the limelight. But there are other philosophical sources of interest. Thus, Habermas (1981)
wrote, ''The concept of rationality that I have introduced . . . has to be elucidated in terms of a theory of argumentation.
Notwithstanding a venerable tradition going back to Aristotle, however, this theory is still in its beginnings" (p. 22).
Habermas was right in wanting to connect rationality and argumentation, but I think he had it backwards: rationality
first, argumentation afterward. In other words, if the practice of argumentation is to be understood, it must be
understood in terms of rationality. A basic theme developed in this book is that the practice of argumentation is best
understood as an exercise in manifest rationality.
1 I do not think that a great deal depends on whether I refer to this study as "the theory of argument," as many
philosophers and logicians refer to it, or "the theory of argumentation," as, for example, those in the speech
communication community refer to it, or "argumentation theory." In any event, I continue to use both terms
until chapter 2, where I discuss a way of differentiating them. For evidence of the renewed interest, see van
Eemeren, Grootendorst, Snoeck Henkemans et al. (1996).
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In addition to the philosophical interest in argumentation, there have been other developments that have sparked
renewed interest in the theory of argumentation. One of the most important has been the emergence of the thinking
skills movement, the goal of which is to install the teaching of thinking into its rightful place in education at all levels.
This has led to the development of a number of initiatives, some of which focus on critical thinking, others that focus on
problem solving, others on some other form of thinking or reasoning, and so on.2 This plurality of initiatives is what
Resnick (1987) referred to when she wrote in her survey:
Philosophers promote critical thinking and logical reasoning skills, developmental psychologists point to
metacognition, and cognitive scientists study cognitive strategies and heuristics. Educators advocate training
in study skills and problem solving. How should we make sense of these many labels? Do critical thinking,
metacognition, cognitive strategies and study skills refer to the same kind of capabilities? And how are they
related to problem-solving abilities that mathematicians, scientists and engineers try to teach their students?
(p. 1)
Such questions as these, important and right-minded in my view, give rise to what I call The Network Problem,3 to be
discussed in detail in chapter 1.
The Emergence of Informal Logic
As one who has been involved with informal logic for over 25 years, I would like to tell at least part of the story of its
emergence, for I believe that story has a bearing on the resurgence of interest in the theory of argument.
In 1966 I was hired by the Department of Philosophy at the University of Windsor. Symbolicmathematical logic had
been one of my areas of specialization in graduate school, so I naturally inherited the logic course. Things went along
well enough for the first couple of years but around 1970, students began to approach me with the following complaint,
"This logic doesn't really help me much in my daily life." I said, "That's right, nor was it meant to." They said, "So
where do we go?" I said, ''I don't know."
About this time, my Department Head, Peter Wilkinson, had been picking up similar vibrations from students and
suggested that I think about devel-
2 See Nickerson, Perkins, and Smith (1985) for a comprehensive overview of thinking programs.
3 During the height of the debate about the terms "analytic" and "synthetic," it was evident that the discussion
about these two terms would inevitably have implications for other terms in their neighborhood: conceptual,
empirical, formal, contingent, necessary, and so forth. See Grice and Strawson (1956).

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oping a new course in logic that would respond to these demands. I began looking around for a possible textbook but
could not find one, until a sales representative gave me a prepublication sample chapter of Kahane's Logic and
Contemporary Rhetoric (1971), in which I read the following lines:
Today's students demand a marriage of theory and practice. That is why so many of them judge introductory
courses on logic, fallacy, and even rhetoric not relevant to their interests.
In class a few years back, while I was going over the (to me) fascinating intricacies of the predicate logic
quantifier rules, a student asked in disgust how anything he'd learned all semester long had any bearing
whatever on President Johnson's decision to escalate again in Vietnam. I mumbled something about bad logic
on Johnson's part, and then stated that Introduction to Logic was not that kind of course. His reply was to ask
what courses did take up such matters, and I had to admit that so far as I knew none did.
He wanted what most students today want, a course relevant to everyday reasoning, a course relevant to the
arguments they hear and read about race, pollution, poverty, sex, atomic warfare, the population explosion,
and all the other problems faced by the human race in the second half of the twentieth century. (p. vii)
Kahane understood that students wanted logic to be useful, to be relevant! No doubt he was responding to what was
widely known as The Student Revolt of the late 1960s, replete with its sit-ins and takeovers, student demand for
representation in the governing process, and the demand for relevance in courses.
In the fall of 1970, I offered a course called Applied Logic, using Kahane's text. The basic idea was to teach students
how to appraise arguments by looking for characteristic failings called fallacies. I could see right away that this kind of
course was going to work much better and also that it was going to be a lot of work, both theoretically and
pedagogically. It occurred to me that it would be good to have someone with whom to share the undertaking. I put out a
call to my colleague Tony Blair, who was eager to join in the process of further developing and refining such a course.
Following Kahane's lead, we started down the road of (what we would later call) informal logic by using fallacy theory.
Instead of asking whether an argument is sound (whether it has true premises and is a valid argument), the question we
asked was, "Does the argument contain any fallacies?" As we worked with Kahane's text for several years, we found
ourselves unsatisfied by various aspects of his presentation. First, Kahane's descriptions of fallacies were often
inadequate to allow the student to identify them. He described "begging the question" as an argument in which the
premise fails to support the conclusion. This description could equally well be a description of irrelevant reason.
Second, Kahane did not require that students

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produce justification for their charges of fallacy. Indeed, his own practice of criticism often went no further than merely
asserting that such-and-such a fallacy had been committed. We sought to remedy this deficiency by developing identity
conditions for each fallacy. We required the student to justify any claim that a certain fallacy had occurred by showing
that the conditions for the occurrence of that fallacy were satisfied. Third, we were dissatisfied with Kahane's
classification of fallacy. As we reflected on the fallacies in the inventory, we developed the hypothesis that every fallacy
could be seen as a violation either of the relevance requirement, of the sufficiency requirement, or of the acceptability
requirement. We developed this approach to argument using fallacy theory as modified by these ideas in our own
informal logic text, Logical Self-Defense, first published in 1977 by McGrawHill Ryerson of Toronto.
The goal that led us to the (re-)development of informal logic was pedagogical. We were looking for a better way to
teach logic and better logical tools to put into our students' hands. But it must not be thought that this interest alone
fueled the development of informal logic. Other lines of force were already at work at the theoretical level. They are
discussed in chapter 2.
The argument of this book is that informal logic, properly developed, is well positioned to satisfy the deeper needs of a
theory of argument. To an identification of those deeper needs, I now turn.
Limitations of Traditional Logic
Suppose for the moment that Habermas (1981) was right in thinking that an adequate theory of argumentation does not
exist. That is, an adequate theoretical answer is not had for the normative question, "What criteria or features must an
argument possess in order for it to be a good argument?"
The approach to the study of argument in this book may be broadly characterized as logical rather than rhetorical or
epistemological. It situates itself within the tradition of inquiry that traces itself back to the work of Aristotle and Plato.
I argue that the logical tradition of the 20th century does not equip scholars to answer the question. Logicians in the
20th century have been interested in other questions and although it has been possible to tease out a story about good
arguments from their answers to those questions, I argue that this theory is inadequate as a theory of argument and that
what is needed is a refocusing within logic itself. In my view, informal logic provides just such a refocusing.
In chapter 7, I discuss the normative question in detail. But to foreshadow developments there, I offer here three
suggestions to explain why there is not a satisfactory answer to the normative question.

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First, 20th century logicians have been tended to be hide-bound by a tradition that was largely a prioristic in nature. I
develop this point in chapter 4.
Second, the 20th century tradition in logic has been working with a deficient (anemic) concept of argumentone that does
not distinguish clearly enough between argument and inference. There is an important conceptual issue about the very
nature of argument that must be dealt with before an adequate normative theory of argument can hope to be developed. I
discuss this aspect of the theory in chapters 5 and 6.
Third, and as a result of the first and second, logicians have paid insufficient attention to the practice of argumentation
and to looking and seeing what qualities good arguments possess.
These reflections suggest to me that the time has come to revise the reorientation begun by Toulmin (1958) and
Perelman (1969). Each of them identified the culprit as the traditional model of argument. Each sought to develop a new
and better modelalthough in different ways. As important as they were historically, both of these important initiatives
seem to me to have the same defect: each relies too heavily on the jurisprudential model. More on this point in chapter 2.
Toward a More Adequate Normative Theory of Argument
These reflections point to a need for a more adequate theory of argumentation. I deliberately avoid the temptation to call
for yet another revolution or paradigm shift. The place to begin is by developing a healthy concept of argument. We
need to go as far as we can with that concept and attempt to draw from it the appropriate normative criteria. But we
need, as well, to take the empirical turn.4 This turn will serve two purposes. First, it will provide a reference point
against which to measure our intuitions. Second, it may help us to uncover aspects of argumentative strength that we
would not otherwise have noticed. In that way, we can wed the normative and the empirical. We find specimens of
argumentation that, in intuitions, are regarded as good (strong) arguments, and then seek to identify the qualities that
make them so.
As becomes apparent in chapter 1, the recent history of the practice of argumentation has not been a happy one. On the
one hand, logicians (following Russell and Whitehead) largely abandoned it. On the other hand, it
4 Weinstein (1993) complained that informal logicians have been a prioristic. I discuss this complaint in
chapters 10 and 11.

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has been besieged by the broader intellectual (and commercial) culture. In no small part is the motivation for this work
therapeutic: to rescue and shore up the practice of argumentation and to restore it to a place of centrality. In working
toward these ends, I do not suppose that there was a Golden Age in the past when the practice of argumentation reigned
supreme. No such fiction is needed to emphasize the importance of refurbishing the practice, nor do I need to
downgrade what were the central developments in logic (theory of entailment and proof theory) and in culture (the shift
from text to image) in order to achieve this. Yet I have to fight my way through some of the clutter and obscuring
mechanisms that occurred with what I call the mathematization of logic (a phrase I explain in chapter 4) and the
consequent impoverishment of the conception of argument.
The Plan of the Book
The main thesis I develop is that the normative dimension of the theory of argument (what I call the theory of appraisal)
must develop out of a proper understanding of the practice of argumentation and in that sense will be pragmatic in
character. I further argue that to solve the problems, it will be necessary to abandon some privileged conceptions about
argument; that is, that it is essentially inferential and formal in character. Informal logic presents itself as a framework
within which to carry out these tasks.
This book divides into four parts. Chapters 1 through 4 present the historical context for this work. Chapter 1 situates
the problem, explaining the recent emergence of the theory of argument and why in our contemporary culture it is
important to develop a better theory of argumentation. Chapter 2 focuses on the theory of argument as an area of
philosophical inquiry and, in particular, the seminal efforts of Hamblin, Toulmin, and Govier. In chapter 3, I argue that
none of the traditional theories can provide an adequate theory of argumentation. In chapter 4, I give my attempt to
explain in greater detail why an adequate theory of argumentation is lacking.
Part II, comprising chapters 5 through 8, presents the theoretical core of my position. In chapter 5, I discuss the
possibilities for the theory of argument represented by the emergence of informal logic. In chapter 6, I turn to the task of
developing and presenting a richer conception of argument. This requires that I step back and first discuss the practice
of argumentation. From that, I proceed to develop a fortified conception of argument. In chapter 7, I present the
normative part of my theory. I outline my answer to the question, "What standards should be invoked in evaluating an
argument?" In chapter 8, I present and argue for principles of argument criticism (which I distinguish from standards of
evaluation).

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Part III, comprising chapters 9 through 11, is dialectical in character. In chapter 9, I look at some of the objections to
informal logic as the theory of argument, then I discuss my responses to them. In chapter 10, I review some of the
alternative theories of argument. Chapter 11 is my attempt to solve some of the problems that have emerged. I also
propose a research agenda.
Chapter 12 is my conclusionan attempt to link up the problems discussed in this work with the need for the theory of
reasoning as well as with issues on the broader philosophical scene.

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PART I
THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT

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Chapter 1
Context:
Argumentation as a Cultural Practice
Argumentation is an extremely powerful and valuable cultural practice that has fallen on hard times. In the course of
this book, I attempt to explain why this has happened. My hope is that the approach to argumentation developed here
will help to revitalize this valuable practice and restore it to a place of prominence.
Because an argument is an exercise in rationality, its status and fate in the wider culture depend on that culture's
assumptions about the nature and value of rationality. After a preliminary specification of what is meant here by
rationality, I discuss the evidence that the practice of argumentation does not enjoy a place of prominence in this
culture. (By "this culture," I mean the North American and European cultures of the second half of the 20th century.)
Argumentation is an extremely important human practice, perhaps never more important than at this moment in history.
Still, the situation is not altogether bleak; there are some promising signs. For the past 20 or so years, momentum has
been building in various parts of the academy in various countries around the worldall to some degree focusing on the
practice of argumentation. Much work is still needed and what I have attempted in this book is to define more clearly
the nature of the work that is needed in order to shore up the practice of argumentation. I believe that informal logic has
a vital contribution to make to the future development of the study of argumentation.
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Argumentation and Rationality
Argumentation:
A Preliminary Specification
By now, most who study argumentation are familiar with the processproduct distinction as it applies to argument.1 The
term "argument" can be used to refer either to the process or to the product of that process. My main concern in this
book is with argument as a productand particularly with the normative issues surrounding it: How to evaluate it and how
to criticize it.
However, the theory that I offer here proceeds on the assumption that to understand the product called argument, it is
necessary to situate it within its proper context: the practice of argumentation.
By "the practice of argumentation," I understand the sociocultural activity of constructing, presenting, interpreting,
criticizing, and revising arguments. (This is very close to what MacIntrye, 1981, called a "tradition.") This activity
cannot be understood as the activity of any individual or group of individuals but rather must be understood within the
network of customs, habits, and activities of the broader society that gives birth to it, that continues to maintain it and
that the practice serves.
An argument is a product of that practice that means that typically it is the outcome of a process of arguing that involves
both the arguer and the other. Thus, the matrix I propose for theorizing about the practice of argumentation is composed
of these three elements: (a) the productargument, (b) the processarguing, and (c) the agentsthe arguer and other. (See
Fig. 1.1.)
The Connection between Argumentation and Rationality
The connection between argumentation and rationality becomes evident when I take up, in detail, the nature of the
practice. I can anticipate some of that discussion here, however, and say that the practice of argumentation is
teleological. Argumentation clearly serves to help us achieve many different goals, among them persuasion,
justification, inquiry, belief maintenance, decision making, and so forth.
These claims belong to the level of theory and so the intimate connection between argumentation as a practice and
rationality suggests, as well, a theoretical link between their corresponding studies, as the earlier introductory quote
from Habermas suggests.
Argumentation as a practice is intimately connected with rationality. First, argumentation depends on rationality.
Indeed, it depends on a specifically human form of rationality.2 There may well be empirical evidence that
1 See O'Keefe (1977, 1982).

2 Such as Bennett (1989) is after, for example.

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The Process
The Arguer The Other
The Product = The Argument
Fig. 1.1
The practice of argumentation.
dolphins can think. Perhaps they can solve problems. To that extent, it may be argued that they must be able to master
some logic. But there is no evidence that dolphins (or any other form of animal life) have within their form of life a
practice in any way similar to the practice of argumentation in our culture. Not only does argumentation depend on
rationality, argumentation exhibits rationality and increases it. Rationality is highly implicated in argumentation. (More
on this in chapter 6.) The thesis underlying the current work is that if argumentation is to be properly understood, it
must be seen as an exhibition of rationality, specifically of what I call manifest rationality. But this is to get ahead of the
story. The next step must be to provide a preliminary specification of rationality.
Rationality:
A Preliminary Specification
The issue here is how to understand rationality for the purpose at handwhich is to show the contribution that informal
logic can make to the development of a better theory of argumentation.
The idea that rationality is at the heart of argumentation is not unique to Habermas. Biro and Siegel (1992) said,
"Rationality is thus at the heart of argumentation, and argumentation theory should be understood as being concerned
with the ability of arguments to render beliefs rational" (p. 97). The only caveat I would add is that this formulation
seems to suggest that before the argument is presented, the belief may not be rational. Also, the conclusion of an
argument will typically be a belief. An argument renders the conclusion more rational than it was before the argument
was available. I would also suggest that the arguer's conclusion need not be one that is believed. The arguer may simply
wish to explore the development of a line of thought without committing to the conclusion. However, the main point
here I agree with completely is that rationality lies at the heart of the practice. Now the question arises (and is urged by
MacIntyre in his own way): whose rationality? There are multiple approaches to rationality. Which of them shall I
choose? I will rely on the work of Siegel (1988)a work focused on the development of a theory of critical thinking.
There, Siegel devoted a postscript to this very topic. His reflections are both illuminating and helpful.
Siegel began by noting that there are many conceptions of rationality but that the one that appears most in line with the
needs of the theory of critical

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thinking is the meansend approach to rationality. However, Siegel saw important limitations in that approach. For one
thing, this approach tends to undercut the distinction between what it is prudent and what it is moral. Because the theory
proposed here will have a moral dimension, if Siegel was right, no meansend approach to rationality will be satisfying.
Another weakness is that this approach to rationality is incapable of taking into account the role of character. Siegel was
concerned with this because his own approach to critical thinking relied heavily on character. We find that the practice
of argumentation also places demands on character; that is, the rules that govern the arguer and his behavior are such
that for the arguer to satisfy them, certain character traits appear to be necessary. I agree, then, with Siegel (1988) when
he wrote:
At a minimum, then, we need a better account of rationality than the means-end account if we are to further
our understanding of rationality, and of the many philosophical problems which center on that notion. We
need an account of rationality which recognizes various sorts of reasons and which provides in sight into the
nature and epistemic force of reasons, and which affords the possibility of the rational scrutiny of ends. (p.
131)
In other words, no merely instrumental understanding of rationality will suffice. To put the matter in terms of Habermas'
three interests of knowledge (1978), to meet the demands of this task, a satisfactory theory of rationality must be at the
practical or theoretical level.
My preliminary specification of rationality, then, is this: Rationality is the ability to engage in the practice of giving and
receiving reasons. Accordingly, to be rational means to be able to engage in the giving and receiving of reasons. This
bare bones specification is rudimentary enough to cohere with a fully developed theory of the sort Siegel envisaged and
allows me to develop my own theory of argumentation.
Having discussed the connection between rationality and argumentation and the nature of rationality, I turn next to the
task of assessing the current state of the practice of argumentation. In the next section, I look at some threats to the
practice. In the section that follows, I look at some more hopeful indicators.
Argumentation under Siege
The practice of argumentation has been under siege in this culture from different directions. At the practical level, the
challenge comes from values in the culture itself. At the theoretical level, the challenge comes from the divorce that
took place between logic and argumentation earlier in this century. One hope I have for this book is that it provides
some basis for

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rapprochement between logic and argumentation, for closer ties, and in that way help to bolster the practice.
I first discuss the conditions for the practice of argumentation and then indicate why the situation in our culture is not
conducive to this practice.
Conditions of the Practice
What are the conditions of the practice of argumentation? What conditions must be present in a culture before the
practice of argumentation can take root and prosper? I suggest that at least the following four are involved:
1. Common interest. Such a practice in any culture presupposes some common interest(s) that unites some members of
that culture in some fashion. There are various ways to describe that common interest: It might be described as getting
to the truth, it might be described as inquiry, or it might be described as persuasion. But there must be some common
interest for this practice to exist.
2. Different viewpoints. We must presuppose that, among the members of the culture, there must be some serious level
of disagreement about some issue of importance to their interests such that it makes sense for the arguer to attempt to
persuade others of his or her point of view. For this to occur, a culture must have achieved some degree of rationality,
have moved beyond a mythopoetic standpoint. A society in which disagreement is absent, downplayed, minimized, or
forbidden is not likely to have a strong tradition of the kind of discourse required for argumentation.
3. Trust in rationality. We must suppose that a culture in which rationalityat least in the minimal sense previously
definedhas achieved a modest presence. Rationality must be understood and valued. It need not be the culture's highest
ideal, and yet there must exist within the culture a tacit agreement that it is desirable to attempt a resolution of at least
some differences by rational means. I must suppose that members of that culture jointly possess the viewwhether or not
it is articulated by themthat one way to achieve their goal, to realize their common interest or purpose, is by rational
means. An agreement that the attempt to win assent in any way other than by the force of the evidence and reasoning is
something to be avoided.
4. Openness to change. The agreement implicit in the trust in rationality, in its turn, implies that those who participate in
the practice are open to changing their views as a result of argument. That is, unless one of the possible outcomes of the
process were a change in view, there would not be any incentive for a rational mind to engage in the practice.
When I think of the present cultural environment with these four conditions in mind, I can better understand why the
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threatened, for it seems that at least two of the four conditions either are not satisfied, or only barely so.
About Condition 1. Is there, for example, a common interest in North America such as would be necessary here? How
might that common interest be described?
About Condition 2. This condition seems well satisfied for there are many differences in the culturelifeworld (so many
that it seems questionable whether condition 1 can be satisfied).
About Condition 3. This condition raises this question: Is there something in the culture that might be described as a
faith in rationality? I discuss this in greater detail in the next section.
About Condition 4. This condition appears on the surface to be satisfiable, for the culture seems restless and eager for
changeeven to the point of being obsessed by the new. But that is not what this condition is about: Here, I am speaking
of openness to change in one's point of view, in one's repertoire of beliefs. What seems to be in evidence here is
dogmatism. Many have noted that public discourse is in disarray in this culture (Kingwell, 1995).
The crucial factor in any assessment of the status of argumentation would have to be condition 3, and so I now propose
to discuss some threats to the trust in rationality presupposed by the practice of argumentation.
The First Threat:

Logic Itself
Strange to say, but one basic threat to the practice of argumentation has come from a place one would least expect
itfrom logic itself. This claim will strike many as strange because, historically, the connection between the two has been
strong. One way of stating the connection is that logic has been understood to be the theory of argumentor at least the
normative part of it. What can it mean, then, to suggest that logic is a threat to the practice of argumentation?
The answer to this question is given in detail in chapter 4. To briefly anticipate that discussion here, let me just say that
in the 20th century, logic came under the influence of mathematics. The result was a gradual shift in logic's self-
understandingaway from the study of argumentation as a practice in natural language and toward the abstract study of
entailment relationships, especially as these can be modeled in formalized languages.

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Mention the word logic and for many people, the walls go up. The very word tends to bring to mind certain
misperceptions. When people in this society think of logic, they may recall their college experience. For many it was a
disastrous episode in which they were introduced either to the highly technical form of logic called symbolic or
mathematical logic or else given an updated version of Aristotelian syllogistic. For most, such experiences were enough
to persuade them that logic had nothing to offer. Worse still, they might have come away from such encounters with the
belief that they were not logical. But the logic to which they were introduced was only distantly related to the logic of
argumentation. On the one hand, then, logic distanced itself from argumentation. On the other hand, educational
experience created barriers for many people.
So it is that logic itself represents a threat to the practice of argumentation.
The Second Threat:

Contemporary Culture and the Underevaluation of Argumentation
From its very inception, the United States has been suspicious of, if not hostile to, intellectual experience (Hofstadter,
1963). To that degree, one might expect a skeptical attitude to an intellectual practice such as argumentation. In the 20th
century, this antipathy has grown.
The Image of Thinking in Our Culture
The problem is that there is none! Or almost none. This is not a culture or society that values thinking highly, at least
not if we are to judge by the images and values that we see on the most important cultural mediumTV. Television holds
out to the viewer a world in which what counts is the hustle, the wisecrack, brawn, money, sex appealindeed, it seems
almost every human trait except reasoning. One would be hard pressed to think of a character on prime time TV whose
essential attractiveness comes from the fact that he or she is an intelligent person who uses his or her mind
constructively and effectively. The power of the human mind is rarely given powerful or compelling representation on
TV.
Now, you might point to Star Trek and Spock as possible counterexamples. Spock is clearly intelligent, but his is an
intelligence in which emotion has no place. That is worrisome because although Spock is intelligent and has well-
developed analytic skills, his head and his heart seem to dwell in different universes. This creates the idea that being
logical means being unemotional, aseptic, or clinical. This is a lamentable mythology: Logic and emotion can, do, and
should work together. A human without emotion and

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affect is quite as deranged as one without mind and reason.3 What is needed is the integration, of these qualities, which
is why Spock is a bad representation of human intelligence.
Someone may point to the more intellectually sophisticated programming on Public Television. Someone else may
point out that cable television has immensely widened the range of choices and the types of content that TV can
provide. The problem with such views is that they overlook the degree to which network television still furnishes much
of the content of cable television programming. Although each of these has had a mitigating influence on mainline
network television, I do not believe that this alters the fundamental point I am making, which is that television has had a
deleterious influence on rationality and particularly on argumentation. Insofar as we take TV as a window on our culture
and look through that window, the conclusion we must come to is that thinking, the life of the mind as it represents
itself in a practice like argumentation, has no significant presence in our culture.
The Image of Argumentation in Our Culture
When the average person hears talk of an argument, what probably comes to mind immediately is a dispute or a quarrel.
They will think perhaps of a TV talk show in which people argue about issues (like abortion, affirmative action,
pornography) and about personal affairs (sleeping with the wife's best friend). This limited conception of argumentation
is far from the practice that is the focus of this work. But mention of TV talk shows leads naturally to a discussion of the
next threat.
It does not help, then, that what transpires on talk shows, like the Oprah Winfrey show, whatever their value (and I do
not deny that there is value) may be, is often thought to be a forum where one can see argumentation at work. There is
some plausibility to such a view. After all, the mother and the daughter are shown staking out a point of view on the
issue (whether she should be allowed to marry a senior citizen, for example); each regards her point of view as true;
each advances reasons; each criticizes the otherusually in heated and personal terms. There is an audience to whom they
are addressing their arguments and who they are seeking to persuade.
But real arguments, such as is the focal point of the theory developed in this book, complete with their core and
dialectical trappings, will appear too erudite, too talky, or too rational to make an appearance on Oprah. There is a gulf
between entertainment values (which rule TV and, in particular, talk shows) and rational values, a point that leads
naturally to the third threatTV.
3 Kierkegaard (1845) already expressed this clearly. Contemporary neurological research supports it. See
Damasio (1994).

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A Third Threat:
The TV Image
Television is an enormously popular and powerful cultural force. In their study of television Lichter, Lichter, and
Rothman (1994) asserted, ''Television has transcended its role as mere entertainment to become a potent force shaping
everyday life" (p. 12). In North America, televisions are found in 99% of the homes. More homes have TV than have
telephones or any other cultural item. The amount of time spent watching TV exceeds time devoted to any other single
activity except sleeping. Given that it is a force of this magnitude, it is only to be expected that it will have its
detractors. Indeed, television has been held responsible for many of the ills that beset the culture: the breakdown of the
family and the family dinner hour, decline in literacy, increase in violence, and so forth.
My concern here is the influence that TV has had on the practice of argumentation. I believe that the influence is largely
negative and can be discussed under a number of headings.
1. Television competes with books for time and attention. Because my view holds text as the primary repository of
argumentation, the less time people spend with text, the less the experience they have with an orientation conducive to
argumentation.
2. Television rarely engages the rational mind at its rational level. People turn on the TV to escape from the work day
world with its problems and frustrations. The last thing that they want is to be confronted with the demands of thinking.
It has been said that the level of programming on network TV in the United States is that of an adolescent. (That may
well be a generous estimate.)
3. Another reason television represents an obstacle to argumentation is that TV is an imagistic medium that aims at the
emotions, whereas print (the main medium for argumentation) is a much more abstract medium that aims at the mind. A
4-year-old child has all the equipment needed to watch (almost all) TV. But to be able to read, the child's mind must be
more developed, capable of more than imagistic pattern recognition.
Let me develop this contrast, with thanks to Postman (1979) who argued that television is "the first curriculum." With
that evocative phrase, Postman called attention to such considerations as these. First, TV is the first instructor (aside
from parents) that a child of this culture encounters. Television has become a kind of baby-sitter. Children are
accustomed to it and its lessons from a very early age. Second, because the school curriculum's primary form of
information is language, its style of teaching is expository. It concerns itself with facts and argument. The school
curriculum is both rationalistic and secular in its outlook. Television is both aesthetic and [at

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least] quasi-religious because its primary form of information is the image; its style of teaching is narration. And
because of that, it is concerned with showing concrete people and situations toward which one responds either by
accepting or rejecting them on emotional grounds.4 Third, TV is a permissive instructor. You can talk while being
instructed, you can eat, you can read the newspaper. There are no prerequisites for watching Laverne and Shirley in the
way that mathematics is a prerequisite for some kinds of physics. In the school curriculum, if the student repeatedly
does not pay attention, the teacher may remove him from class. In the TV curriculum, if the student repeatedly does not
pay attention, the teacher is removed from class (i.e., the program is removed).
Postman contrasted digital and analogic symbols. A digital symbol is one like a letter or word or statement whose
relation to what it symbolizes is arbitrary. An analogic symbol (a picture, icon, or TV image) bears a striking similarity
to what it symbolizes. Postman's thesis is that TVrelying as it does on analogic symbolshas changed the educational and
the wider human environment in important ways. I think Postman was right. His thesis becomes somewhat more
alluring when the waves of fact about TV consumption and penetration of our culture are allowed to wash over us.
Although many students have enormous trouble connecting with this practiceargumentationthat is so crucial for critical
thinking, there is still no denying the fact that they are visually literate and indeed sophisticated in some sensevery quick
to spot and to appreciate creative uses of images and pictures. One need only observe how quickly today's generation
can process rock videos, play Nintendo, and grasp commercials, all of which are highly sophisticated products.
In effect, the attempt to initiate students into the practice of argumentation is akin to introducing them to a foreign
culture.
Conclusion
It has often been said that democracy depends on an informed electorateone that is capable of weighing and debating the
issues. Its citizens must be able to argue with one another and with their leaders and would-be leaders, to argue about
the issues of the day. This activity continues but there have been some basic changes.
One way to index these changes is the following type of contrast. In 1858, when Abraham Lincoln and Stephen Douglas
were both running for Illinois Senator, they staged a series of debates. These debates lasted for hours and
4 Postman's own literate orientation manifests itself in the phrase "accepting or rejecting them on emotional
grounds" (p. 59). I have reservations about whether that is an apt characterization.

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the citizens who attended followed them closely and carefully. Contrast that to how such debates occur today, in highly
structured settings, under the presence of the television camera. No candidate gets to speak for more than a few minutes
at a time. Each candidate wants to avoid making a fatal mistake (such as Ford made against Carter in 1976). Each wants
to parry the other effectively the way that Reagan did Carter in 1980 or the way that Mulroney did Turner in the
Canadian federal election in 1983. How can anyone expect to develop a relatively complex line of argumentation in
such a context? The answer is clear: It cannot be done.
I have been discussing what appears to me to be serious threats both in the Academy and in the wider culture to the
practice of argumentation. Now for the good news.
The Network Problem
One of the most hopeful developments has been the emergence of the thinking-skills movement, which has as the aim
of installing the teaching of thinking skills into its rightful place in education at all levels. This has led to the
development of a number of initiatives, some of which target critical thinking, others that target some other form of
thinking or reasoning, others that focus on problem solving, and so on.5 It was this plurality of initiatives that Resnick
(1987) had in mind when she asked:
How should we make sense of these many labels? Do critical thinking, metacognition, cognitive strategies and
study skills refer to the same kind of capabilities? And how are they related to problem-solving abilities that
mathematicians, scientists and engineers try to teach their students? (p. 1)
Such questions as these, important and right-minded in my view, form part of what I call The Network Problem.
The Network Problem:

First Form
How are these various constructs that have been introduced to improve thinking skills related to one another? How is
critical thinking related to problem solving? to metacognition? to argumentation? to informal logic? and to reasoning in
general?
The Network Problem is the term I give to the task of providing a clear understanding of these concepts and their
interrelationships. The implica-
5 See Nickerson, Perkins, & Smith (1985) for a comprehensive overview of thinking programs.

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tion of adopting this term is that because these terms are part of a network, clarity about any one of them necessarily involves
not only seeing it clearly but seeing it in relationship to the others in the network. To understand what critical thinking is, one
must not only have some kind of definition of what it is but also some idea of how it is like and how it is different from, say,
problem solving, higher-order thinking, or metacognition. And if it is true, as I think it is, that all of these denotes forms or
types of reasoning, that fact may provide the key to the solution.
The questions just raised strike me as being as interesting as they are reasonable. But what kind of question am I dealing with
here? These questions are matters of definition. What kind of definition? There is too much divergence, too much apparent
difference for any definition to be lexical. At this point, any definition must be stipulative. A stipulative definition without the
necessary theory and argumentation to support it will not satisfy my needs. I need to see what happens if I approach matters as
this theory suggests and what happens when I approach them another way.
What is ultimately needed, in my view, is a theory of reasoning in which these terms are all given appropriate definition and
their relationship to one another is developed. That theory will contain recommendations about how to understand critical
thinking and its relationship to problem solving. It is my hypothesis that these terms must be understood in relationship to one
another and not, as is presently the case, in isolation from one another. (See Fig. 1.2.)
To expand on this point briefly, to use the terms "critical thinking" and "problem solving" as though they were interchangeable,
or mean the same thing, is confusing. Such confusion cannot be cleared up simply by providing a definition of critical thinking
because what needs to be seen is not just the real nature of critical thinking but the nature of problem solving also, and how
these two stand in relation to each other. Such clarification is the work of what I call the theory of reasoning. At present, no
such theory exists. My hope is that this book underscores the importance of such a theory and may even indicate the direction in
which it must go.
This, then, is my formulation of the first format of The Network Problem and it leads directly to a second form of this same
problem.
Critical Thinking
Problem Solving Metacognition Higher Order Thinking Informal Logic
Reasoning
Fig. 1.2
The network problemfirst form.

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The Network Problem:

Second Form
The second form of The Network Problem emerges once we begin to focus attention on reasoning and argumentation and find
ourselves confronting another set of questions, among them: How does reasoning relate to argumentation? How is reasoning
related to rationality? to intelligence? to knowledge? to thinking? to argument? These terms also form a network in the sense
that clarity about any one of them appears to some degree to be dependent on the others. (See Fig. 1.3.)
It is evident that the crucial term here is reasoning because it is the only one that figures in both forms of the problem.
Moreover, when one looks at the terms in this second form of The Network Problem, one realizes that the situation is
anomalous: There is much work done on the theory of knowledge, the theory of rationality, and the theory of intelligence, but
there is next to nothing that can be looked to as a theory of reasoning.
One of the implications of the argument of this book is that the theory of argumentation itself requires supplementation by the
development of the theory of reasoning. I hope to demonstrate that, although I may make some progress in the course of this
book in dealing with questions about argumentation, in the final analysis, I cannot hope for adequate comprehension without
support from a theory of reasoning.
The Centrality and Importance of Argumentation
In response to the list of impediments discussed earlier, I can well imagine someone who says, "So what? What's at stake here
anyway? What hangs in the balance?" Before I answer that question, it is important to acknowledge that outside the academy, in
what some would call the "life-world" (Phenomenology) or the arena (Barth, 1987), I notice also that the decay of the old world
order, which was based largely on post-World War II coalitions existing under the threat of military force and power, are
everywhere giving way to new alignments. The dismantling of the Berlin Wall in 1989 by its own citizens was a remarkable
event, as was the end of the Soviet Regime
Reasoning
Knowledge Intelligence Rationality Thinking
Argument
Fig. 1.3
The network problemsecond form.

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in Russia. There is talk of a New World Order, one based on common interest and rational persuasion. As we reach the
end of the millennium and the year 2000, it must be understood that the only force that can be used is the force of the
stronger argument.
This point was made by Lasch (1992). According to Leo (1995):
Lasch argued that a citizenry can't be informed unless it argues. He wrote that only an impassioned political
argument makes the arguer look hard for evidence that will back up or tear down his position. Until we have
to defend our opinions in public, he said, they remain half-formed convictions based on random impressions:
"We come to know our minds only be explaining ourselves to others." (p. 24)
Later on, Leo concluded: "We need a lot more emphasis on public discourse and common problems, and a lot less
moaning about our individual psyches" (p. 24).
In his defense of political liberalism, Rawls (1993) made a similar point. He said: "Public reason is characteristic of a
democratic people: it is the reason of its citizens, of those sharing the status of equal citizenship" (p. 213). Although
Rawls spoke of what he called "public reason," much of what he said applies to argumentation as it is discussed in this
book. In fact, it could be argued that argumentation just is public reason.
The practice of argumentation offers important benefits to the state, the public, and the individual. But if those benefits
are to stand clear, I need at this point to differentiate between argumentation and the other types of reasoning with
which it is sometimes confused or identified.
Argumentation Distinguished
The full development of the contrasts that follow will raise questions to some degree, in that I am assuming,
provisionally, an understanding of argument and argumentation that will be developed later in chapter 6. As I showed
earlier this chapter, argument belongs to a network of terms that have been driven to the forefront by the recent attention
given to thinking and argumentation in education. I here attempt only the sketch of their differences.
Argument as Distinguished from Inference and Implication
By the term "argument," I understand an intellectual product, essentially public and social in character, that seeks to
persuade rationally. By "inference," I understand a movement (of the mind) from one item (usually a thought) to
another, where the former serves as the basis for and leads to the latter. An inference may become the conclusion of an
argument, but it need not be. (The term "inference" is ambiguous: It refers both to the mental

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activity and the result of that activity. Here I am most concerned with the latter.) By "implication," I understand a logico-
linguistic relationship between two linguistic items (probably best thought of as propositions), such that one of them
follows from the other(s). An implication may well be nested in any argument, but need not be. If I am right, an
argument cannot be reduced to a concatenation of implicatures nor inferences.
Argument, inference, and implication are all types of reasoningand their full and proper definition and differentiation is
the subject of what I call the theory of reasoning. For too long, the intellectual culture of the 20th century (under the
influence of the positivist ideal) more or less merged the identity of these three. If this book is successful in its
argument, then one effect will be to reconceptualize argument in such a way that its difference from these other related
cognitive activities becomes clear. That, in turn, will become an entry point to the theory of reasoning. For the moment,
all I hope to achieve is some basis for distinguishing argument from implication and inference. All three are important
but they have different conditions and confer different benefits and play important, different and, indeed,
complementary roles in the intellectual life of both the individual and the culture.
Argumentation Distinguished from Conflict ManagementNegotiation, on the One Hand and Quarreling and Bickering,
on the Other Hand
For many, the term "argument" connotes a quarrel or verbal fight with one party throwing abuse at the other and the
other responding in kind. That is not the sense of argument being discussed here. On the other hand, there are these
more polished strategies, like mediation conflict management and negotiation, that aim at producing some form of
agreement among parties engaged in conflicta conflict that is often nothing more than quarreling and bickering. The
chief differentiating factor is that in the practice of argumentation, truth is a fundamental consideration, whereas in
conflict management mediation and negotiation, it plays a background role. In other words, if, in attempting to resolve a
conflict, we happen to agree on something that later turns out not to have been true, that need not upset our resolution.
However, if you and I are arguing and we both take something to be true and it later turns out to be false, well, that
discovery will have a retroactive effect on our argumentation.
Argumentation Distinguished from Problem Solving, Critical Thinking, and Other Forms of Reasoning
To some degree, to draw these distinctions would require that I have at least a partial solution to The Network Problem
and that these distinctions take me in the direction of the theory of reasoning. The focus of problem

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solving is, obviously, a problem that requires solving. This activity may or may not be abetted by argumentation.
Critical thinking, as I understand it, is the ability to evaluate an intellectual product in terms of its strengths and
weaknesses.6 Although much of critical thinking focuses on argument and, hence, requires skills of argumentation,
critical thinking has a wider focus. To think critically, one must be able not only to argue but also to make good
inferences, to clarify meaning, to look for evidence, and so forth. Once again, these issues are the proper subject of the
theory of reasoning.
Argumentation as Discussed Here Contrasted with Legal Argumentation
The model of legal argumentation has had an important influence on the development of the theory of argument. Yet,
argumentation as a practice that stresses personal responsibility contrasts with the legal situation, where the point is to
make the best possible case for one's client (regardless of truth value). More important, much of legal argumentation is
founded on an adversarial approach that says the best interest of society is served if each side makes the strongest
possible case so that the judge or jury has the benefit of both in making the final determination. However,
argumentation as discussed here is not adversarial. In fact it can be and has been argued that the adversarial approach is
inimical to argumentation.
The Benefits of Argumentation
Having thus distinguished, in a preliminary way, argumentation from other forms of reasoning, I want to list some of
the benefits that participation in the practice of argumentation may confer. To the degree that one has been initiated into
and is a participant in the practice of argumentation, the following benefits may be expected:
An increase in rationality: As a result of participation in the practice, the participants become more rational than before.
Argumentative space is rational space par excellence. This point will become clearer in chapter 6.
Respect for evidence: To argue, one must gather the evidence that one believes supports one's conclusion; one must
learn to put that evidence together so that it leads to the conclusion and is seen to do so, also.
Respect for different, even opposing, points of view: Opposition and difference are presuppositions of the practice and,
hence, built into it.7 Argu-
6 There are many definitions of critical thinking. I discuss several of them and propose my own, just quoted,
in Johnson (1992).
7 For a strong expression of this claim, see Govier (1995).

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mentation is about learning how to manage these differences rationally and, in some cases, actually resolving them. But
none of this can happen unless each participant has at least the ability to hear the argument offered by the other and at
some level has some respect for that point of view. A conclusion that seems, at first blush, to be outrageous can, when
viewed in light of the argument for it, come to be seen as rational.
An appreciation of the value of criticism: I argue that criticism (by which I do not necessarily mean adverse
commentary) is internal to the practice of argumentation. It is one of the internal goods of the practice (to use
MacIntyre's terminology).
I do not claim that argumentation alone bestows these benefits, for it is clear that most of them can come about through
other means. For example, openmindedness can be encouraged by the sharing of alternative views and learning to
appreciate other ways of looking at the world. Travel in a foreign land has been known to confer this benefit. Respect
for evidence and opposing viewpoints can also be learned in the practice of scientific theorizing. And so on.
These benefitsmuch needed in our current climatewill be available to those who engage in argumentation on a regular
basis.
Conclusion
One conclusion these reflections have suggested to me is the need for a more adequate theoretical approach to the
practice of argumentation, particularly in the normative dimensions.
As I have argued, logicians in the 20th century (following Russell and Whitehead) largely abandoned argumentation as
a practice. To make matters worse, I find the practice has been besieged in the broader intellectual (and commercial)
culture. In no small part, the motivation for this work is to rescue the practice and restore it to a place of centrality. In
working toward this end, however, I do not suppose that there was a Golden Age in the past when argumentation
reigned supreme. Nor do I need to downgrade what were the central developments in logic (theory of entailment and
proof theory) and in culture (the shift from text to image) in order to do this. Still, it is true that in order to see
argumentation properly, I shall have to fight my way through some of the misconceptions that occurred with what I call
the mathematization of logic (a phrase I explain in chapter 4) and the consequent impoverishment of the conception of
argumentation.
In the next chapter, I take a closer look at the current state of the study of argumentation.

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Chapter 2
Context:
The Study of Argumentation
The Re-Emergence of Argumentation Theory
Argumentation theory and the theory of argument have (re-)emerged as important focal points of interdisciplinary
research. Not just philosophers and logicians but also linguists, speech communication theorists, rhetoricians, and
psychologists, among others, have written extensively about it. The reader should consult the Proceedings of the Second
ISSA Conference on Argumentation (1991a, 1991b) and the Third ISSA Conference on Argumentation (1995a, 1995b,
1995c, 1995d). They consist of papers from scholars all over the world and from a great variety of disciplinesall in one
fashion or another addressing issues having to do with argumentation. I give here a brief survey of recent activity in this
area to indicate the scope of that interest within the Academy.
Within Logic and Philosophy
There have been important changes in the past 25 years. What is known in some circles as the Informal Logic
Movement has been partly responsible for bringing the theory of argumentation back into the logico-philosophical
limelight.
The change in philosophy took place gradually through the 1930s and 1940s as the prevailing program (positivism)
gradually unraveled. It was not that positivists did not value argumentation, but two aspects of their program had the
result of diminishing the practice. First, their emphasis on

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making logic scientific in the mode of mathematics resulted in the virtual disappearance of argumentation from logic's
orbit of concern. As logic increasingly took on the identity of mathematical logic, its focus shifted away from
argumentation in natural language and from developing the normative theory necessary to the development of logistic
systems as vehicles for the study of formalized languages.1
The second effect was to severely limit the realm of meaningful discourse. According to Ayer (1936), for example,
there are the conceptual issues of logic and philosophy and there are the empirical issues of science. The latter are
addressed by scientific theorizing, the former by analysis. But substantive disputesethics, art, and religious mattersare
declared noncognitive and, hence, there is no point in arguing about them. They are not amenable to rational resolution.
The role of argument is thus severely limited.
The first clear signal that something new was afoot can be seen in the appearance of Toulmin (1958), which self-
consciously set about the task of revitalizing our understanding of argumentation. Toulmin's strategy for doing that was
to reconceptualize the notion of argument by changing the model. Toulmin argued that the geometrical model has
dominated logical thinking and that it must give way to a jurisprudential one. Both in The Uses of Argument and later in
his text Reasoning (1979), Toulmin devised just such a model, including a new way of conceptualizing the elements of
argumentdata, warrant, backing, and so forth. More about this approach later in this chapter.
In an interestingly similar vein, although approaching his subject through rhetoric rather than through logic, Perelman
(1958) argued that the old rhetoric, driven as it was by Cartesian and Platonic ideals, must yield to a new rhetoric.
Perelman, too, looked to jurisprudential practices for enlightenment.
Looking back to the sources of the reemergence of this interest in argumentation among philosophers and logicians, one
would also have to mention Hamblin (1970), which was the first monograph devoted to the study of fallacies and which
in fact goes well beyond the topic of fallacy to deal with the conception of argument and to introduce the notion of
formal dialectic.
Other Disciplines
In the fields of rhetoric and speech communication, the study of argumentation has long been a focus of continuing
study and research. In 1979, the Speech Communication Association organized a conference on argumenta-
1 See Church (1956). In Quine's Mathematical Logic, there is exactly one reference to the term ''argument,"
and that use is the mathematical one.

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tion that has been held every second summer since then in Utah, the proceedings of which are published. The
connection between rhetoric and argumentation is too well known to require commentary here.
In linguistics, the work of Grize (1982) and Anscombre and Ducrot (1983) is an indication of the influence of linguistics
on argumentation theory. Worth mentioning here also is that the Pragma-dialectical approach of van Eemeren and
Grootendorst (1984, 1992; to be discussed in chapter 11) was strongly influenced by Speech Act theory.
Until recently in psychology, there has been very little work by cognitive psychologists that focuses specifically on
argumentation. Once again, the truth of this claim will appear dubious to those who operate with the current conception
of argument as inference or implication. There have been significant research undertakings in the study of both
implication (deductive) and inference (inductive). For the former, one must mention Johnson-Laird (1983) and Wason
(1972); Johnson and Wason-Laird (1972); for the latter, Nisbett and Ross (1980). Kuhn (1991) marks the emergence of
a new and welcome strand of psychological research into argument. Additional evidence of change in the direction of
greater interest in argumentation by psychologists can be seen in a recent issue of the journal Argumentation devoted to
Argumentation and Psycholinguistics: Developmental Studies.
In law and jurisprudence, there is a long tradition in which legal argumentation is the focal point. In education, there has
been ongoing interest in matters related to argumentation theorywitness McPeck (1981) and Siegel (1988).
All of this activity indicates that within the academy, there exists a renewed interest in the subject and the practice of
argumentation.2
Argumentation Theory versus the Theory of Argument
Thus far, I have been speaking as if argumentation theory and the theory of argument were the same thing. But there is a
point here to distinguishing between the study of the practice of argumentationwhat I call argumentation theory or the
theory of argumentationand the study of the product (argument) of that practice, which is what I call the theory of
argument.
Indeed, something like this distinction is crucial for the argument of this book. The point I am making is that many
recent theories of argumentation have been focused more on the process of arguing. As healthy as this focus
2 The reader interested in history should consult, inter alia, Barth and Martens (1982), Cox and Willard
(1982), Johnson and Blair (1994), van Eemeren, Grootendorst, and Snoeck Henkemans (1996).

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is, it needs to be balanced by proper work in the theory of argument, which is what I hope to provide.
As I have described it here, the theory of argumentation is that inquiry that studies the practice of argumentation. This
study has normative, empirical, and conceptual dimensions. The theory of argument is a component of the theory of
argumentation, in much the same way that argument is a component of the practice of argumentation. A theory of
argumentation will necessarily have to address the issues raised in the theory of argument; whether it does so by name
or not does not matter. In addition to considering the product, a theory of argumentation will also have to take into
account the process of arguing and the arguer. A theory of argumentation will, it seems to me, have, in addition to the
conceptual and normative dimensions mentioned already, a strong, empirical element. What I am describing here as the
theory of argumentation, others would call argumentation theory, meaning to refer to a multidisciplinary investigation
whose focal point is argumentation. Argumentation theory refers to a theory involving logic, rhetoric, speech
communication, composition, psychology, and so on. Thus, argumentation theory is the wider descriptor.
The theory of argument refers to that aspect of argumentation theory devoted to the study of the product of the practice:
the argument itself. Informal Logic refers to a specific initiative within the theory of argument whose conceptual and
normative basis is logical in character. The revisionary move made by informal logic within the discipline of logic lies
at the core of the argument of this book and is discussed in detail in chapter 5. Informal logic may be seen as a response
to formal logic, specifically as an attempt to redress imbalances that occurred when formal deductive logic was put
forward as a theory of argument.
Having described the overall terrain and discussed terminological matters, I want now to zero in on the theory of
argument.
Informal Logic as a Theory of Argument
Govier (1987) argued, persuasively, that better theories of argument are needed. She reviewed the current theories of
argument, found them wanting, and concluded, "These theories are not satisfactory; we await a better one" (p. 34). The
theories she referred to here are deductivism and positivism. I have more to say about these theories and her critique of
them in chapter 3.
The position I take now is that informal logic, not as presently understood or constituted but developed in ways
indicated in this book, can meet the needs identified by Govier and provide a better theory of argument. But it can do
this only if it significantly revises our conception of argument, which has been corrupted by FDL (an abbreviation for
Formal, Deductive Logic),

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which itself was overly influenced by mathematical logic. For this to occur, the theory of argument must situate itself
within the context of a theory of argumentation.
My claim is that informal logic is ideally positioned to assist in these undertakings. In the final analysis, the problems
confronting any theory of argument and theory of argumentation point beyond themselves to the need for a theory of
reasoning. As the argument of this book develops, it becomes clear that solutions to the questions that confront the
theory of argument involve questions that take us beyond that theory.
In the remainder of this chapter, I set the stage for that discussion by first of all presenting two specimens of argument
and raising the fundamental question, "How is one to appraise these specimens?" Presumably, that is what a theory of
argument will aid us in doing. I begin with Govier's understanding of the theory of argument as a field of investigation.
After that, I present and then revise a set of useful distinctions credited to Govier, following which I review three
attempts to formulate a theory of argument: those of Toulmin, Perelman, and Hamblin. All of this should provide a
clearer picture of just what a theory of argument involves. Last, I turn to the question, "What are the adequacy
conditions a successful theory of argument must satisfy?"
Usage Note. Although what Govier calls the theory of argument might more appropriately be termed the theory of
argumentation, for sake of uniformity of reference and intelligibility, I continue to use the phrase "theory of argument."
I use the phrase "the theory of argument" to refer to the theory type and ''a theory of argument" to refer to tokens or
instances. For instance, I argue that Govier's contribution is to, first of all, make everyone aware of an important inquiry
called "the theory of argument" and that in addition, she proposed her own theory of argument, which will be examined
in a later section.3
Setting the Stage
One important purpose of a theory of argument is to provide guidance in the tasks of evaluating and criticizing
argument. I begin with a couple of examples.
3 This "athe" ambiguity is familiar in philosophy at least: The theory of knowledge refers to an important
subdiscipline within philosophy. When a philosopher works his reflections into such theoretical shape as to
address the important questions, he may be said to have formulated a theory of knowledge. The aim of
everyone who proposes such a theory of knowledge is that it will become the theory of knowledge.

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Senator Paul Martin was well known for extolling the virtues of his hometown of Windsor, Ontario. On this particular
occasion, Senator Martin rose to defend Windsor against a slur contained in Hailey's novel about the U.S. auto industry,
Wheels. Hailey wrote of "grimy Windsor" across the border from Detroit, "matching in ugliness the worst of its U.S.
senior partner." According to press reports, Martin responded:
When I read this I was incensed . . . Those of us who live there know that [Windsor] is not a grimy city. It is a
city that has one of the best flower parks in Canada. It is a city of fine schools, hard working and tolerant
people.
This argument seems to me a common, garden-variety typesomeone addressing an issue and attempting its resolution
using an argument. Not all examples are this straightforward.
For a slightly more complicated example, consider this argument.
Prof. J. Philippe Rushton became a controversial figure in Canada and the United States when he went public with his
views about the racial basis of intelligence. In the argument that follows, John Starkey, who was President of the
Ontario College of University Faculty Associations when this column was published in 1989, offered a kind of
argument in defense of Rushton's right to hold his views:
1. Since Prof. J. Philippe Rushton presented his paper "Evolutionary Biology and Heritable Traits with
Reference to OrientalWhiteBlack Differences" at the annual meeting of the American Association for the
Advancement of Science on January 19 in San Francisco he has been at the centre of continuing controversy
and escalating media coverage including a recently televised debate with Dr. David Suzuki and a planned
appearance on a U.S. television talk show. The controversy is a very emotional one in which academic
freedom has been widely discussed by academics and non-academics alike. However, in many instances the
concept of academic freedom has been confused with the substance of Prof. Rushton's research. Academic
freedom is so central to academia that is worth trying to extricate this from the general debate.
2. I do not know Prof. Rushton, and I do not share his views but I believe that all academics have an interest
in preserving his right to present his opinions.
3. The defence of academic freedom is not a defence of "the freedom within the law for academic staff to
question and test perceived wisdom and to put forward new and controversial or unpopular opinions without
placing individuals in jeopardy or losing their jobs" (this definition was used by the Committee of Vice-
Chancellors and Principals of the universities in the U.K., 1987). As the Vice-Chancellors made clear,
academic freedom is not an absolute freedom, it does not take precedence over any existing provincial or
federal laws.

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4. In the present controversy it has been claimed that what Prof. Rushton has published is "bad science."
However, one cannot require that only "good science" be published. Similarly one cannot require that only
"correct research" be published. In an attempt to ensure that these criteria are met academic publications are
subject to peer evaluation. Advances in knowledge often occur because wrong research results are published
which generate questions in the minds of others.
5. Professor Rushton's peers have already made judgments about his research describing it as "shoddily
presented," "rife with errors," and containing far too many "sweeping and unsupportable conclusions." Indeed
some have argued that his work is unworthy of any consideration whatsoever.
6. Some seem to be arguing that because the research of Prof. Rushton has social implications the
considerations mentioned above do not apply and he has stepped beyond the bounds of academic freedom. In
the television debate Dr. Suzuki made passing reference to Galileo. The parallel between Galileo and Rushton
is not a good one but the same principle applies to both. It was wrong for the Roman Inquisition to curtail
Galileo's academic freedom. It would be wrong for our society to fire Rushton.
7. Society has benefited greatly from academic freedom. Throughout history it has been essential to the
production of new ideas. To be sure, there have been times and there will continue to be occasions when the
free search for new knowledge will create difficulties. Academic freedom can be problematic. But as Thomas
Walkom points out elsewhere in this issue, "it is better than the alternative."
8. University of Western Ontario President George Pedersen was correct in refusing to fire Professor Rushton.
To have done so, would have deprived us all of the right to espouse and advocate unpopular views. President
Pedersen was also correct in deploring in strong terms bigotry, intolerance and racism in any form.
9. The fight against racism is something we must all be alert to. The Premier of the province contributes little
to this fight with his outburst: "If I had the power to fire him [Rushton] I would."
10. To denounce the ideas advanced by an individual is one thing and perfectly appropriate. To call for that
person's dismissal is quite another. The speed with which Premier Peterson was prepared to dispense with
academic freedom and have Rushton fired was positively frightening.
This argument, it is evident, has a much more complicated structure, not just because it is longer but because it is more
complex internally. That may have something to do with the topicthe subject of academic freedom is more complicated
than the issue of whether Windsor is a grimy city. But that is not the main factor. It is just that this arguer has gone more
deeply into the issue addressed. Not only did Starkey lay out the reasons that supported his own position, he also
defended his position against possible

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objections, as when he said, "In the present controversy it has been claimed that what Prof. Rushton has published is
'bad science.' However, one cannot require that only 'good science' be published. . . ." The move Starkey made here is
typical in argumentation: He listed an objection to his argument and then responded to it. The objection here would
presumably be, "Bad science does not deserve the protection of academic freedom, and Rushton's science is bad
science." To which Starkey responded, "One cannot require that only 'good science' be published. . . ." (p. 2)
In addition to such arguments as my two examples, even more complicated arguments are also possible. Thus, the
argument in a judicial opinion may run to 40 to 50 pages and indeed an entire book may be said to constitute an
argument. The Critique of Pure Reason is a sustained argument to show that reason as a faculty is limited and cannot
furnish proof of metaphysical theses. Not only length but also dialectical complexity become factors in the different
types of argument.
Here I need to consider two objections. The first objection is:
By giving those specimens as samples, you have wed the theory of argument to the task of appraising to rather
than constructing arguments.
This is an important limitation to recognize. It is possible that if one approached the theory of argument with a different
orientationthat of constructing argumentsthe theory might develop in very different ways. In defense of the orientation
adopted in this book, I say here that it has been the standard orientation (not that that makes it right), and it has been
thought that if one knows how to criticize an argument, one is aware of what one needs to know in order to construct an
argument.
The second objection is:
Your sample is not representative. You have omitted forms of discourse that could be called arguments. For
example, you seem to omit argument as interplay between two speakers.
This is a second limitation of the theory I develop. My theory is focused on argumentative text rather than
argumentative speech. In chapter 6, I further defend this focus and in chapter 10, I examine a prominent theory that is
based on spoken rather than written arguments. In the final analysis, although recognizing the importance of spoken
argumentation and its difference, I believe that the best foundation for the theory of argument is text or written
discourse.4
Let us then suppose that someone is interested in the issue that the argument put forward by the arguer concerns.
Suppose further that the
4 In her Preface to Johnson (1996), Govier rightly identified and discussed the importance of this orientation.

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other is rational and wishes to behave rationally. If all this is true, the Other's best course of action will be to engage in
the practice of argumentation in the appropriate way by taking on the role of critic. How will the critic go about this
task? What is involved? It seems clear that he or she will have to accomplish the following tasks.5
Task 1
Interpretation and Reconstruction of the Argument
First, the critic will have to arrive at a fairly clear understanding of the structure of the argument. Although relatively
easily accomplished with arguments like the first one given earlier in this chapter, this is not so easy when it comes to
examples like the second given earlier, and is still more difficult when it comes to The Critique of Pure Reason.
By interpretation, I mean that the critic will ask questions like, "Is Pn supposed to support P1 or some other premise?
What does the internal argument here look like? What kind of arguments are P5 through P7?"
By reconstruction, I mean setting forth the structure of the argument in such fashion as to ready it for criticism. In
addition to the interpretive tasks previously mentioned, this task may include providing any so-called missing premises.
It seems clear that the theory of argument should provide the necessary theoretical guidance for the critic to accomplish
these tasks.
In short, the theory of argument should provide necessary principles of interpretation along with guidance about how to
lay out the structure of an argument in a clear way, including how to provide the missing ingredients.
Let us assume, then, that our theory has provided such guidance and that the interpreted and reconstructed argument is
before us. What comes next?
Task 2
Identification of Potential Problems
Next, the critic must probe the reconstructed argument for potential problems. What are these problems? What flaws or
shortcomings or weaknesses should be looked for? Some theory of evaluation will guide the critic in this task. But it
will differ in character from the theory previously mentioned. It will be a theory of appraisal rather than a theory of
analysis. The theory will have to specify some standards (or criteria) of evaluation. But if one aims to be a good critic, it
is not enough just to evaluate the argument. The critic is under some obligation to do more than just produce a litany of
complaints. The critic is under some obligation to make judgments of im-
5 The reader may wish to compare this list with Govier's (1987) list on p. 141.

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portance about the problems discovered (with the aid of the theory of evaluation). That leads to a third task.
Task 3
Prioritization of the Problems
Suppose, then, as is likely in the case of more complicated arguments like my second example, there are several
problems. If the critic's purpose here is to produce useful criticism (this assumption is crucial and comes to the fore in
chap. 8), the critic will have to decide which of the many problems is most serious. The theory of argument must
provide support in this task of prioritizing the problems.
Task 4
Critique of the Argument
Finally, the critic will need to produce a critique of the argument. What are the qualities of a good critique? The theory
of argument must answer this question by guiding the critic in the construction of the critique. There are certain
principles that must be understood as guiding the practice of the critic.
My position is that none of the extant theories of argument do a satisfactory job of guiding the critic in the handling of
these basic tasks. It is best to begin by clarifying in some detail exactly what is involved in a theory of argument.
The Nature of Theory of Argument
In order to understand the theory of argument as an inquiry, we cannot do better than follow the path laid down by
Govier (1987) in Problems in Argument Analysis and Evaluation, where she gave this question and related ones the
benefit of sustained consideration. First of all, let me say a few words about this important work.
The book consists of 13 chapters, most of which were previously published at different times in various forums on a
variety of topics: the theory of argument, informal logic, fallacies, and critical thinking. The book has many important
contributions to make to these topics, chief of which is to make the case that the theory of argument is a serious area of
research. If these chapters have a recurrent theme, it might be said that it is the limits of deductivism and positivism as
theories of argument, along with the consequent suggestion that we need better theories of argument. (Govier herself
seemed to favour a pluralist approach to argumentationwhich I shall shortly explain.)

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A second great strength of Govier's book lies in the connections she drew between the theory of argument and informal
logic and other areas of philosophy. For example, Govier relied heavily on the writings on moral philosophers like
Thompson, Baier, and Wellman. One major weakness of her book is that it lacks a sustained focus. In many of the
chapters, the focus is on some aspect of the study of argument. Yet it could not be said that there exists a pattern of
development that the reader can readily follow.6
Govier on the Theory of Argument
What then did Govier take the theory of argument to be? She wrote:
Except in limited circles, there is no recognized subject called "the theory of argument." Yet there are clearly
a number of questions about arguing and argument not answered by formal logic and of considerable interest.
A theory of argument would discuss the nature and purpose of argument and specify and defend standards for
the appraisal of arguments. It would specify how many different types of argument there are and what
standards are appropriate to assess each type. It would explain when and why it is reasonable to read into
discourse statements which are not explicitly stated, and whether and how the personalities and the beliefs of
the arguers and audiences logically affect the merits of argumentation. Ideally, a theory of argument would
apply to all natural arguments. But is there, or could there be, any such thing as a theory of argument? (p. 13)
Govier approached the theory of argument by seeing it as an inquiry whose purpose is to answer a series of questions.
Let me itemize those questions.
1. What is the nature and purpose of argument?
2. What are the standards for the appraisal of arguments?
3. What are the different types of argument?
4. What standards are appropriate to assess each type?
5. How are we justified in reconstructing argument so as to include elements not explicitly asserted by the arguer?
6. How do the personalities and beliefs of the arguer and the audience affect the merits of an argument?
Later, Govier added other questions for the theory to deal with:
6 For a critique of Govier's book, see Allen (1990). In chapter 3, I have a close look at Groarke's (1992)
response to Govier's critique of deductivism.

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7. When and why should we regard an argument as having missing or unstated premises? (p. 13)
8. Is the truth of the premises too strong a condition to demand for soundness of argument? (p. 13, 33)
There is some redundancy in this list, so let me prune it. Both questions 2 and 4 are not needed so I will discard 4 and
keep 2 because the latter seems more open-ended. Question 4 seems to assume that there are various types of argument.
Because question 7 seems to be covered by question 5, I will keep 5; it is the more general of the two. I then come up
with the following revised set of questions for our theory of argument to answer:
6. Is the truth of the premise too strong a condition to demand soundness of argument?
Let me assume that listing the questions that must be addressed is a viable way to specify a theory of this sort. If I want
a better understanding of exactly what a theory of argument comprises, I have to ask two questions (metaquestions)
about this list:
Metaquestion 1. Is this list of questions complete? If not, what needs to be added?

Metaquestion 2. Is there a discernible pattern in this list that might be the basis of a more general
description of the theory of argument?
The answer to Metaquestion 1 is extremely complicated, and it may even turn out that the question is ill-formulated. I
limit myself here to observing that there are other questions that belong on the list. At least the following strike me as
important additions to the list:
7. How is argument to be understood or defined?
8. What is the relationship between argument and inference?

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9. Is there an important difference between evaluating an argument and criticizing it?
I am sure that there are others that I have overlooked. But for the moment, let me assume that I have identified most of the
important questions clearly. Let me look at Metaquestion 2: Is there a pattern in this series of questions?
There appear to be two quite different types of question. First, there are the questions that are conceptual in character, such as
what is the real nature of argument. These are questions that will be involved in carrying out Task 1 discussed earlier. The other
kind of basic question is normative in character. The basic questions that must be confronted are:
10. What constitutes logical virtue in an argument? What are the qualities that make an argument a good argument?
11. What constitutes profitable criticism of an argument?
These are the questions that are involved in carrying out Tasks 2 through 4.
The Theory of Argument Subdivided
My proposal then, drawing on Govier's work but adding my own overlay, is that two basic subdivisions within the theory of
argument are needed, as Fig. 2.1 indicates.
The theory of analysis has the task of dealing with the questions concerning the nature, structure, and typology of argument. In
terms of my list of questions, the ones that belong to the theory of analysis are questions 1, 3, 4, 7, and 8. Although all of these
questions would, in principle, fall to the theory of analysis, there are problems with respect to some of these items. For instance,
it is far from clear to me why I should need a policy for the identification of arguments. Are arguments so difficult to detect that
a policy or set of procedures is needed? Do I have a similar need when it comes to explanations or scientific theories? The
answer is No. Then why here in connection with arguments? This is a question I propose to answer in chapter 6. One further
point: Govier assumed that the elements of arguments will turn out to be premises and conclusion, in spite of the fact that one of
the most important theorists, Toulmin, specifically avoided this terminology because of its association with the old model.
THEORY OF ARGUMENT
THEORY OF ANALYSIS THEORY OF APPRAISAL
Fig. 2.1
Subdividing the theory of argument.

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The theory of appraisal has the task of coming up with the standards and criteria and types of evaluation andor criticism.
(I use the term "appraisal" so as to avoid using evaluation and criticism, which will be assigned other duties.) In terms
of the list of questions, those belonging to the theory of appraisal are questions 2, 5, 6, 9, 10, and 11.
Govier described the other component of the theory of argument as:
The other has to do with the pragmatics and dialectics of argument: whether premises in a good argument
need to be true or only acceptable; whether personal attributes of the arguer having to do with authority or
credibility ever have a legitimate bearing on their appraisal of the argument; how rebuttals, pros and cons, and
counter-arguments are to fit our structural model and many related factors. (p. 34)
With the exception of the last mentioned item, all of these questions belong to what I call the theory of appraisal.
It seems useful to make the kind of cut suggested, because there might be areas where two theorists agreefor example,
on issues of what an argument is and how many typesand yet disagree about what theory of appraisal to adopt. One
theorist may wish to argue for fallacy theory as a theory of appraisal; another theorist may wish to develop some
alternative theory of criticism. Yet, they may well agree on how the structure of arguments is to be understood.
There is a further reason for distinguishing these two aspects of our theory of argument. It seems likely that one's theory
of appraisal should be based on the theory of analysis. Before one can properly answer the questions, "How should an
argument be evaluated? What are the appropriate standards?" one must first of all have a clear and adequate conception
of argument. It turns out that an important reason for the failure of formal deductive logic to provide an adequate theory
of argument is that its conception of argument is deficient. In any event, one's theory of appraisal must grow out of one's
theory of analysisnot necessarily that it will be derivable (in the strict sense of entailment) from it, but at least it will be
based on and emerge from it.7
Thus, the inquiry known as the theory of argument may initially be defined by a series of questions (like those
previously posed) along with the proposed subdivision into the theory of analysis and the theory of appraisal. Now that
we have a somewhat better grasp of the theory of argument as an area of inquiry, I want to look at Govier's
classification of theories of argument.
7 Historically, this has not always been the case, as my discussion of Hamblin's theory in chapter 6 shows.

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Govier's Typology
Govier's work on the theory of argument is wide-ranging. First, Govier discussed the theory of argument abstractly
considered, as I just explained. Second, she reviewed and criticized specific theories of argument: deductivism and
positivism. Third, she hinted at a new theory of argument. The second and third items are taken up in the next chapter.
What I want to track here is Govier's classification of theories of argument. In the course of the discussion that takes
place largely in chapters 1 through 4, Govier introduced the elements of a vocabulary for describing the various
possibilities within the theory of analysis.
Monistic versus Pluralistic Theories
Govier distinguished between monolithic theories and pluralistic ones, a distinction she drew while she discussed
spectrum theory (about which, more in a moment):
It is not surprising that teachers and students of natural argumentation should find a spectrum theory initially
attractive. It strikes a convenient balance between monolithic and pluralistic theories. Like monolithic theories
it avoids the need to classify arguments. . . . Like pluralistic theories, the spectrum theory is able to avoid the
need to impose one model of good reasoning on all natural argument. (p. 30)
From this passage, I might infer that a monolithic, or as I shall say from now on for reasons that become clear shortly, a
monistic theory holds that there is but one type of argument. Thus monism is a position in the theory of analysis. The
classic example of this position is Deductivismall arguments are deductive in character. Deductivism first appears as a
theory about types of argument. It is part of the theory of analysis. The pluralist, on the other hand, does not impose one
model of good reasoning. Pluralism holds that goodness in argument is not to be exhausted by any one criteria or set of
criteria, for example, soundness. Thus, I see what Govier called a pluralistic theory as taking a position on issues that
belong to the theory of appraisal. The pluralistic approach is perhaps best represented by someone like Thomas (1973)
or Finocchiaro (1981), both of whom Govier took to be representative of what she called spectrum theory. We can see
now why there is something inappropriate in Govier's having chosen the term ''monolithic" to contrast with pluralistic.
But there is also something amiss in her contrast here. She used "pluralistic" to refer to what is in fact a theory of
appraisal. If we follow her in this, we will not be able to use the natural contrast of monism versus pluralism because
monism is a theory of analysis,

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whereas pluralism is a theory of appraisal. They belong to different areas of the theory of argument and, hence, are not
competitors in the way Govier's description suggests. What to do?
To avoid confusion, I suggest two different types of labels are needed: one type to be used to label theories of analysis,
the other to label theories of appraisal. Let me use "pluralism" to describe a theory of analysis and "monism" as the term
referring to its competitor. (That explains why I have chosen to use the term ''monistic" rather than "monolithic" to refer
to a specific theory of analysis.)
Spectrum Theories
What then is spectrum theory? Here is how Govier introduced it:
According to the spectrum theory, the strength of the connection between the premises and the conclusion of
an argument is susceptible to degrees. There are tighter and looser connectionsdegrees of strength. The
deductive connection is the tightest, but it is not the only kind. Arguments may work with looser connections;
the various possibilities fall on a kind of spectrum . . . (p. 28)
At one end of the spectrum we have no support at all; at the other end, we have deductive entailment. (p. 29)
There is an ambiguity built into this formulation that makes it unclear whether spectrum theory properly belongs to the
theory of analysis as a theory about the types of argument or to the theory of appraisal as a theory of evaluation. In fact,
I think spectrum theory is really best thought of as a theory of argument committed to a pluralistic theory of analysis.
I can test this supposition by considering the positions of Thomas and Finocchiaro, both of whom Govier regarded as
spectrum theorists. In the formulation just described, it would seem that spectrum theory is a theory of appraisal, for one
end of the spectrum is the worst possible case: no support at all. To say that the premises provide no support at all is to
make an evaluation or judgment on the argument. At the other end of the spectrum is the best possible case: deductive
entailment. This understanding of what constitutes spectrum theory squares with Govier's notion that this is
Thomas' (1973) position. Thomas took validity to be a matter of degreea position Govier took issue with.
Govier also represented Finocchiaro as a spectrum theorist because his theory of argument allows for different types of
argument. Finocchiaro appeared to be describing three types of argument when he discussed three different kinds of
fallacy: (a) arguments that claim to be deductively valid but that are actually invalid, (b) arguments that claim to be
inductively

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strong but that are actually inductively weak, and (c) arguments that claim to have some inductive strength but have
none. This theory seems to be mixed in that the very typology used by Finocchiaro mixes the classificatory issues of the
theory of analysis with the evaluative issues that fall to the theory of appraisal. Look at his first category. It consists of
"arguments that claim to be deductively valid"presumably this categorization would belong to a theory of analysis, as
classifying of a type of argument. The other part, "but that are actually invalid"is a category that clearly belongs to the
theory of appraisal. Thus, Finocchiaro's classification is mixed, involving descriptions that belong both to the theory of
analysis and those that belong to the theory of appraisal.
It seems that there is a kind of ambiguity built into these descriptors. Govier confirmed this when she wrote:
The problem is that we are given no explanation what the degree of support are degrees of support of. They
cannot be degrees of deductive validity, because that notion makes no sense . . . A closely related point is that
the nature of the 'spectrum' on which the various degrees of support are located is yet to be explained. (p. 31)
It seems to me most natural to take spectrum theory in the first instance to be a theory of argument that holds that there
are different standards for the different types of argument. For spectrum theory, there is a strong connection between the
theory of analysis and the theory of appraisal.
Now, I would expect that theories of appraisal would show the same polarity as theories of analysis, so I need a dual set
of designators.
Overall, then, I require at least these two different types of descriptors: one to classify theories in terms of their
typology, the other to classify theories according to their standards of evaluation. Although one might expect
isomorphism between any typology of arguments and standards of appraisal (one standard per type), it seems unwise to
define the situation in such a way as to rule out the possibility of there being several types of argument yet one standard
that suffices for them all. That is, there may be a theory that opts for a manyone relationship between types and
standards. To avoid foreclosing options at the level of theory, then, I need one descriptor to classify theories as to their
position on what types of argument there are. I need another to sort them out according to their position on standards of
evaluation. Accordingly, I adopt the following terminology.
As to Types of Argument, There are Two Basic Possibilities
A monistic theory holds that there is but one type of argument. Either it recognizes no other types or it holds that any
other apparent type is reducible to it. Thus, deductivism is a monistic theory because it holds that all

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arguments are deductive. Arguments that appear to belong to other types are either not arguments (so called inductive
arguments) or are reducible to it (so-called conductive arguments).
A pluralistic theory holds that there are a number of types of argument and not all of them are reducible to any one
specified type. Within pluralism, there may well arise the issue of whether one type is better than another. This is partly
an issue for the theory of analysis and partly for the theory of appraisal. The theory that Govier described as positivism
is a dualist theory, a type of pluralism.
These terms, then, describe the possibilities for a theory of analysis. I also need descriptors for the theory of appraisal.
A Second Type of a Descriptor Will Be Needed to Cover the Evaluative Standards of the Theory
A univalent theory holds that there is but one standard for the appraisal of all arguments. It is natural to expect that
monistic theories will be univalent.
A multivalent theory holds that there is a range of standards. It is natural to expect that pluralistic theories will be
spectrum theories.
With these distinctions in hand, we can see that what Govier called spectrum theory can best be described as theory of
argument comprised of a pluralistic theory of analysis and a multivalent theory of appraisal. To be sure, other
possibilities exist and must be acknowledged as theoretically possible. As previously mentioned, one might be both a
pluralist in typology and yet hold to a univalent theory of appraisal. (Thomas, e.g., seems to hold such a position.) See
Fig. 2.2 for a typology for the theory of argument.
Fig. 2.2
Typology for the theory of argument.

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Theory of Analysis
Monistic Pluralistic
Theory Univalent Formal Deductive Logic (FDL) Thomas
of
Appraisal
Multivalent Field Theories Toulmin Spectrum Theory Positivism Conductivism
Fig. 2.3
Possible configurations in a theory of argument.
Now that we have a fairly adequate grasp of the theory of argument and its various types, we are in a position to contrast it with
some instances.
There are four possible configurations for a theory of argument as laid out in Fig. 2.3. The theory that I advocate in this book
falls in the lower left panel. It is monistic in that I reject the deductiveinductiveconductive distinction as a valid way to
distinguish types of argument. It is multivalent in that I acknowledge a variety of normative standards. But it differs in
important respects from field theories.
Previous Theories of Argument
Over the centuries, there have been many theories of argument, and it would be impossible to discuss them all. Here I discuss
briefly three contemporary theorists whose work has been seminal: Toulmin, Perelman, and Hamblin.
Toulmin's Theory of Argument
In the beginning, one might say, there was Toulmin. The Uses of Argument (1958) marks a crucial moment in the development
of theory of argument. In that work, Toulmin argued that the Aristotelian ideal of logic as episteméformal scienceis what
allowed the mathematicization of logic to occur.8 His desire was to break its hegemony by developing an alternative model of
argumentation that takes jurisprudential reasoning as its model. Toulmin offered an entirely different way of conceiving the
structure of argument. As opposed to the traditional logical conception of premises that are supposed to lead necessarily to a
conclusion, Toulmin offered the now-famous
8 This phrase is not found in Toulmin's work but I believe it fits with the spirit behind it. The closest he came is where
he wrote:
I suggested that one motive for attempting to cast the principles of logic into the form of a mathematical system
was the hope that by doing so one could bring into play in the logical field more potent varieties of necessity and
possibility (p. 207).
I have more to say about this development in chapter 4.

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Fig. 2.4
Toulmin's approach to the layout of argument structure.
model of grounds data leading to the claim mediated by the warrant (which may in turn require a backup) and modified
by model qualifiers and tempered by possible rebuttals.
Construing an argument along the lines of a case in court, Toulmin then followed up this theory of analysis by:
introducing the idea of a field of argument
raising the question of whether the standards are field dependent or field invariant.
Not only has Toulmin presented a novel theory of analysis, but he is thought as well by many to be the chief proponent
of the claim that most, if not all, important standards of appraisal are discipline specific. Toulmin's work has been
immensely influential, although less in philosophy and logic than in the rhetoric, forensic, and speech communication
communities (Johnson & Blair, 1980).
This brief overview is not intended to do justice to Toulmin's theory. The upshot was not immediate, but Toulmin's
work did raise interest in questions such as, "What is argument? What is logic? If logic is not formal science, then what
is it?" If one looks at the theory of argument as an emergent area of logico-philosophical inquiry, then Toulmin must be
seen as one of its founding fathers.
I have argued elsewhere that there are problems with the details of Toulmin's approachat least as it was presented in the
1980 text based on his theory.9 I want to now discuss some broader or deeper difficulties. In
9 For a detailed critique of Toulmin's approach to arguments, see Johnson (1981b). See also the insightful
chapter "Toulmin's Model of Argumentation" in van Eemeren et al. (1996), in which the authors raise
important problems with Toulmin's model. For some indication of how his work was received by philosophers
and logicians, see Blair and Johnson (1980).

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particular, I want to discuss three crucial assumptions that Toulmin made, each of which is debatable.
Toulmin Assumed That if the Geometric Model Does Not Work, Then a Better Model Must Be Found Elsewhere.
Toulmin wrote, "to break the power of old models and analogies, we can provide ourselves with a new one" (p. 7).
Toulmin seemed to assume that if the geometrical model is rejected for logic, then it must be replaced with a model
from some other area of inquiry. His proposal was that it be replaced with a jurisprudential model. My question is this:
Why should it be assumed that argumentation must be modeled after something outside itself? This move may have
been necessary when the practice of argumentation was in its infancy, when it was theoretically undernourished. There
has been sufficient experience in the last 2,000 years to think that if we need a new model, it can be generated from
within the practice itself. (I make this a conditional proposition, for perhaps in any interesting sense of the term
"model," it will turn out that there is no model.)
Toulmin Assumed That the Jurisprudential Model Is an Appropriate One for ArgumentationPerhaps Even the Best One.
Toulmin wrote, "So let us forget about psychology, sociology, technology and mathematics, ignore the echoes of
structural engineering and collage in the words 'grounds' and 'backing', and take as our model the discipline of
jurisprudence" (p. 7). Somewhat later, he wrote:
This inquiry has, I hope, illustrated one thing: namely, the virtues of the parallel between procedures of
rational assessment and legal procedureswhat I called earlier the jurisprudential analogy. (p. 42)
The analogy between rational assessment and judicial practice presents us with a rival model for thinking
about the idea of logic form. (p. 43)
In a few fields, where logical self-consciousness can be of practical value, the study of applied logic has
already gone a good waythough sometimes under other names. Jurisprudence is one subject which has always
embraced a part of logic within its scope and what we call to begin with "the jurisprudential analogy" can be
seen in retrospect to amount to something more than an analogy. If the same as has long been done for legal
arguments were done for arguments of other types, logic would make great strides forward. (p. 255)
Notice first that Toulmin vacillated in his characterization of the model he wished to recommend. It is variously
described as "jurisprudential," as "judicial practice," or as "legal procedures'' or process. These are quite different
designators. Jurisprudence is a narrower term, referring to the more philosophical foundations of the study of law.
Jurisprudence, one

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might say, is a department within the Faculty of Law and as such will have the same sort of structure as one might find
in any academic discipline. The term "legal practice" is perhaps closer to what Toulmin intended. The idea of a model
based on legal practice is that of a more wide-ranging modelone that would be more practical or real in character. It is
one thing to suggest that the model for argumentation be taken as the process of arguing that occurs within
jurisprudence; it is quite another to take as the model what happens before the local magistrate in civil matters, which is
different from what happens in criminal matters, which in turn is different from the process at the appellate level.
Forensic debate is quite different from the kind of argumentation that takes place among the jurors, the kind of
argumentation a judge employs in writing up his judgment, and the kind two lawyers employ when they discuss tactics.
The terms "legal process" and "legal practice" may be said to refer to all of these. Without further specification, the
suggestion of a model based on legal process is too wide-ranging to be illuminating.
However, this objection is not fatal because it seems clear from Toulmin's treatment that what he meant to serve as the
model is the legal process of making a case. He meant the sort of process that an advocate uses to prosecute or defend.
My position is that such a model, however it is characterized, is not a good model for argumentation because of its
fundamentally adversarial character. The basic assumption of legal practice is that if the prosecution makes the strongest
case it can, and if the defending attorney rebuts with his strongest case, then in the long run and on balance, the best
possible outcome will be achieved.
The hope is that more often than not, the guilty will have been found guilty and the innocent will have been exonerated.
The primary concern of this sort of argumentation is not to get at the truth of the matter (as I argue is the case with
ordinary argumentation) but rather to dispense justice and to be seen to be doing so. The legal process permits the
advocate to do things in his argument that would not be allowed in the practice of argumentation. The advocate may
know of evidence that has a negative bearing on her client's case but may choose not to introduce that evidence or refer
to it in her presentation. It is the other attorney's job to do that. The advocate may attempt to steer the direction of the
proceedings away from certain questions. The advocate may believe that the client is guilty and yet argue for innocence.
The advocate may attack the witness' character, not just the witness' testimony. Witnesses may not say what they know
or believe to be the case; they may only answer questions. All of these point to important differences between the legal
argumentation and ordinary argumentation.

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Toulmin Assumed an Idealized Form of the Legal Process. Toulmin wrote:
There must be an initial stage at which the charge or claim is clearly stated, a subsequent phase in which the
evidence is set out or testimony given in support of the charge or claim, leading on to the final stage at which
a verdict is given, and the sentence or other judicial act issuing from the verdict is pronounced. There may be
variations of detail within this general pattern, but the outline will be the same in most types of cases. (p. 16)
Toulmin qualified his claim by allowing for variations of detail. This description can be charged with being unempirical
and misleading in terms of its portrait of rationality. Where, for example, is the recognition of plea bargaining, a
perfectly valid stage within the legal process by which a great many actions are decidedand that has no counterpart
within the process of argumentation? Moreover, if the case goes to trial, the issue is this: To what degree can the forces
that shape the verdict be accurately described as rational or logical in character? This will, to some degree, depend on
the kind of court and case, but there is evidence that rationality is not the main determinant of the outcome.10 Legal lore
has it that in many trials, the selection of the jury determines the outcome. This process depends almost entirely on
psychological strategy, not argumentation. When the decision rests with the judge, one must hope that the judge is in a
good frame of mind, did not get out of bed on the wrong side, and so on. In other words, in the legal process as it
actually occurs, a number of factors, including economy and psychology, play a significant role in determining the
outcome. In the case of argumentation, it must be the force of the better reasoning alone that determines the outcome.
Thus, it seems clear that there are serious problems with Toulmin's proposal of the jurisprudential model. More about
this in chapter 11.
Perelman's Theory of Argument11
The same year that witnessed the publication of Toulmin's The Uses of Argument also saw the publication of Perelman's
and Olbrechts-Tyteca's magnum opusThe New Rhetoric (1958/1969). This work's influence on the theory of argument
has been felt more in its legitimizing its project and certain general features than in the impact of its details. The first
chapter in particular, with its relegation of the domain of formal logic to demonstration in contrast to argumentation, its
emphasis on the importance of argu-
10 The notorious O.J. Simpson trial in 1995 may be taken as evidence of this point.
11 My brief treatment of Perelman here parallels the discussion in van Eemeren et al. (1996).

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mentation of the speaker and the audience, the distinction of truth-oriented discussion from victory-oriented debate, the
idea that individual deliberative reflection can be argumentative in characterthese and other general ideas have had an
important impact on the theory of argument. In contrast, the lists of patterns of argument and their classifications, which
form the bulk of this big book, have received less attention and had less influence on the theory of argument. It is
noteworthy also that Perelman found himself drawn to a jurisprudential model like the one that attracted Toulminand to
the degree that this informs his theory, it will be subject to the same criticisms. For a detailed examination of Perelman's
theory, see Fundamentals of Argumentation Theory (1996).
Hamblin's Theory of Argument
No account of the history of the theory of argument would be complete without reference to the work of Hamblin whose
main work, Fallacies (1970), provides an important source of theoretical inspiration. In that work, Hamblin ranged back
and forth between historical exposition, critical commentary, and, in the latter stages of the book, the development of
his own theory. The first six chapters deal with the topic of fallacy. In chapter 1, Hamblin introduced the idea that there
is something called The Standard Treatment found in logic textbooks. Chapter 2 is Hamblin's discussion of Aristotle's
list of the fallacies, followed in chapter 3 by the way in which this list was added to in the Aristotelian tradition. Chapter
4 is a discussion of the ad fallaciesad hominem, for examplestemming from Locke. Chapter 5 deals with the Indian
tradition and chapter 6 with formal fallacies. Chapter 7 is a discussion of the nature of argument and the criteria of good
argument. Chapter 8 is about formal dialecticHamblin's extension of formal logic. Chapter 9 treats equivocation.
The many achievements of Fallacies include the following:
1. Hamblin was the first to take a close look at textbook accounts of fallacy and to criticize somewhat systematically the
presentations of fallacy found there.
2. Hamblin gave us a history of fallacy that has, in large measure, been purchased by those doing research on fallacies.
3. Hamblin is chiefly responsible for articulating the current conception of fallacy (discussed later this chapter).
4. Hamblin convinced many that "we have no theory of fallacy."
5. Hamblin argued that criteria for a good argument must be dialectical rather than alethic or epistemicthereby
persuading many informal logicians to drop truth as a requirement of a good argument.

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6. Hamblin introduced the idea of formal dialectic as a supplement to formal logic and was partly responsible for the
emergence of dialogue logics.
In addition to its many strengths, Hamblin's theoretical views also have some important shortcomings. I have more to
say about Hamblin's theory in chapters 4 and 6.
It is now time to raise the question Govier only implicitly addressed: "What are the adequacy conditions that a theory of
argument must meet?"
Let us begin by reflecting for a moment about what kind of question this is. This question is of a different order than the
questions we have been considering thus far. It is metatheoretical. But what metatheory is it housed in? My answer is
that the metatheory in question here is the theory of reasoning. I have more to say about this topic in chapter 4.
Ideally, a theory of argument will address the variety of issues, chiefly normative and conceptual, that we have seen
emerge. (There are also empirical issues.) Still, a theory can make a contribution without doing both. Thus, Toulmin's
theory of argument is, as I have argued, largely a theory of analysis. Fallacy theory, on the other hand, has, in its history,
been largely a theory of appraisal; committed, it seems, to no particular theory of analysis.
From what was said earlier in this chapter, it appears that a complete theory of argument would consist of a theory of
analysis, a theory of appraisal, and a bridge between the two theoriesshowing how the theory of analysis leads into or
supports the theory of appraisal. Ideally, a theory of argument would guide theorists through the tasks specified earlier
in this chapter. Recall that they were:
Task 1: Reconstruction and interpretation.
Task 2: Identification of and location of the potential problems.
Task 3: Prioritization of the problems.
Task 4: Critique of the argument.
With these leads, we can proceed to work out a set of adequacy conditions.
Any theory of argument that seeks to apply to argumentative discourse and to play an instrumental role in addressing
the tasks that arise in the

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practice of rationally conducted argumentation must accommodate the following adequacy conditions.
Adequacy Condition 1
The theory must contain a definition of argument and the elements that constitute an argument.
Justification. It stands to reason that a theory of argument must begin with and operate from a self-consciously
developed understanding of just what argument is and what the elements or components of an argument are. The term
"argument" has been used in a wide variety of senses and it is worth attempting to get a clear definition of it. This work
falls to the theory of analysis. I deal with this question thematically in chapter 6.
The theory must contain an account of how to understand the structure of arguments and how that structure may be
displayed in a clear and precise manner.
Justification. Because it is evident that one cannot adequately evaluate, appraise, or criticize an argument unless one
understands its structure, the theory of argument must provide guidance on these matters. If there are various types of
argument, this typology must be developed and justified. The theory of analysis must likewise give guidance on how to
represent the structure of an argument.
The theory must contain a theory of appraisal that recognizes that there can be good arguments for a given position as
well as good arguments against it.
Justification. I credit Hamblin (1970) with having made this point. He stated, "There are often good arguments for a
given conclusion and also good arguments against it" (p. 232). I take Hamblin's point to be evident from the history of
thought, most particularly the history of philosophy. There are good arguments for idealism (Plato) and against it
(Aristotle); for phenomenalism (Berkeley, Ayer) and against it (Hume, Wittgenstein); for skepticism (Descartes,
Montaigne) and against it (Moore, Wittgenstein). Nor is Hamblin alone on this score. Johnstone (1978) made a similar
point with special reference to philosophical argumentation:

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Assume that there are valid philosophical arguments, understanding "valid" in any way you choose. Suppose a
position P is supported by such arguments. Then, as the most cursory reading of the history of philosophy
shows, there must also be arguments against P answering to the same criteria of validity . . . No position in the
history of philosophy is so strong that we should want to say that only the arguments favoring it are valid; and
none so weak that we should want to say that only the arguments opposing it are valid. (p. 79)
Although Johnstone used this reasoning in a reductio to support the view that validity is a problematic notion with
respect to philosophical argumentation, the point he made supports the adequacy condition under consideration here.
For a commonplace mention of this point, see Himmelfarb (1995) who wrote that, "for every Beatrice Webb . . .
opposing the suffrage, there was a . . . Josephine Butler (the social reformer) . . . favoring it. And for all the arguments
against it, there were as plentiful and cogent arguments for it" (p. 103).
Finally, consider the Supreme Court of the United States. The jurists are practiced in both constructing and appraising
arguments, the arguments are made by highly competent lawyers, the judges are impartial, they have as much time as
they need, they have unlimited research resources available. Yet they very often come with split verdicts, which
indicates that in that forum, there are strong arguments on opposite sides.
As obvious as this adequacy condition may be, its implications are disastrous for deductivism as a theory of argument.
The theory must contain a theory of appraisal such that arguments exist in a continuum from strong to weak, with
various points in between. To put it slightly differently, there are degrees of logical virtue in arguments and the theory
must reflect this.
Justification. This adequacy condition seems reasonable enough. Arguments are, after all, a human product and so may
be expected to run the same range as other constructs. If we look at arguments in natural language, arguments of all
types drawn from different areasphilosophy, ordinary affairs, politics, moralitywe may expect that they will fall into a
spectrum from strong to weak. And we want our theory of appraisal to guide us in the first instance in locating the
argument at some point on that spectrum, assigning it some appropriate degree of logical virtue and then justifying that
verdict.
This means then that a theory of appraisal, if it is to accommodate this adequacy condition, must have more possibilities
than just good and not

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good. There must be a continuum of worthiness with points along the way. Arguments can be very strong, strong,
moderately strong, weak, or poor. Our theory of appraisal must reflect this continuum; it must not preclude or forbid it.
The next adequacy condition has to do with the applicability of the standards.
The criteria for the appraisal of argument should be such that, in principle, the ordinary reasoner can decide whether or
not these are satisfied in a given instance. In short, the criteria should be user-friendly.
Justification. If the theory of appraisal that we wish to apply to the argumentation does not satisfy this adequacy
condition, the reasoner will be effectively distanced from the realm of discourse that it is proposed he or she evaluate.
Now, it is quite possible that a human activity like argumentation should develop standards the appreciation and
understanding of which places them beyond the grasp of the ordinary reasoner. Such seems to be the case with certain
portions of statistics and probability theory. However the idea that argumentationa fundamental human social
practiceshould be evaluated according to standards beyond the capacity of the ordinary reasoner to understand and
deploy seems unattractive and counterintuitive.
The next adequacy condition has to do with the effects of the application.
The theory of appraisal must be such as to allow for fruitful criticism.
Justification. I take it that in appraising an argument, we want to provide the arguer with good criticism so that he or she
can make changes to the argument. I cannot fully justify this criterion until chapter 6.
The final adequacy condition has to do with the legitimization of the component theories.
The criteria that belong to the theory of appraisal should be justified as to their appropriateness for the tasks assigned
and in relation to the theory of analysis.
Justification. All too frequently, the criteria for the evaluation of argumentation are presented without sufficient
justification; they appear to emerge full-blown, like Minerva from the head of Zeus. As we see in chapter 6, Hamblin's
exposition of the concept of argument demonstrates this point.

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As reasonable as these seven adequacy conditions seem to be, my claim is that no extant theory of argument
accommodates them all. But if you ask how I know that these are the appropriate adequacy conditions for a theory of
argument, or whether these form a complete set, then I will admit that I am without a satisfying answer to such
important questions and point yet again to the importance of developing a theory of reasoning in which such questions
can be properly addressed.
Conclusion
Having discussed the nature of the theory of argument and developed a rudimentary typology and its adequacy
conditions, I am ready to next consider the status of what is arguably the most powerful and attractive theory of
argument ever developed: that provided by FDL.

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Chapter 3
Paradigm Abandoned:
Critique of Deductivism
None of the theories of argument emanating from classical logic is adequate. We need better theories. That pair of
statements might be said to summarize Govier's position.
The most developed theory of argument is the one that emanates from FDL. It provides both a theory of analysis built
around the notions of deductive argument and logical form and a theory of appraisal built around the notions of validity
and soundness. Even though FDL is grievously flawed as a theory of argument and even though very few pure
deductivists remain, FDL continues to exercise a hold on logicians and some philosophers and makes its presence felt as
well when people work out issues in the theory of argument. (Note: I use the term "FDL," whereas Govier used
"deductivism." We are referring to the same program, although for the most part Govier abstracted from the theory of
appraisal and appeared to be more focused on the theory of analysis.)
After her critique of deductivism, Govier next investigated positivism, a somewhat broader theory that allows for
inductive as well as deductive arguments. But it too, Govier argued, has serious shortcomings. Having shown that both
deductivism and positivism have serious shortcomings as theories of argument, Govier suggested a third possibility. She
did not name this approach but I call this position "conductivism." Although it is a promising lead, it is underdeveloped.
The conclusion must be that at this time, logic cannot provide us with a viable theory of argument.

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FDL:
A Monistic Theory
''FDL" does not refer to one theory but, rather, a collection of theories whose common denominator is their reliance on
validity (as technically defined) as the normative standard for the evaluation of arguments. Because of its close
connection to the positivist research program, FDL achieved the status of a paradigm (in Kuhn's sense), and that is
likely what Govier referred to when she wrote, "In logic, a paradigm is at work. But it blinds us. I recommend
revolution" (p. 10).
FDL's theory of argument is composed of a theory of analysis and a theory of appraisal. FDL's theory of analysis can be
simply stated. An argument is understood as a set of propositions (or statements) so related that one (the conclusion) is
supposed to follow logically from the others (the premises). The crucial notion in FDL's theory of analysis is that every
argument has a logical form associated with it. What must be grasped in order to appraise the argument is its logical
form.
The theory of appraisal of FDL is also relatively simple to state: An argument is a good one if it is sound. An argument
is sound if it satisfies two requirements: All of the premises are true and the argument is valid.1 The truth requirement is
as old as Plato and the practice of dialectic. The requirement that arguments be valid can be traced back to Aristotle's
syllogistic, although the term "valid" does not enter the vocabulary of logicians until much later. The conception of
soundness (as a valid argument with true premises) does not enter the lexicon until much later still. The notion of
validity employed in FDL is a technical one. It means that the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises.
Sometimes it is put this way: An argument is valid if it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion to be
false.
Most of the apparatus developed in modern logicand it is supported by an impressive array of solid theoretical workhas
been devoted to the attempt to capture formally the notion of validity. Thus, the development of modal logics (Lewis &
Langford, 1932) and of relevance logics (Anderson & Belnap, 1975) can be attributed, in some measure, to the desire to
improve on the truthfunctional notion of validity operative in classical propositional logic.
Crucial to FDL is the view that there is a unique way to specify the so-called logical form of the propositions that
together constitute the argument and that once that form is known, we can decide whether the argument is valid. (See
Massey, 1981, for a discussion of some of the difficulties connected with this position.) The idea of logical form can be
traced as far back as Aristotelian syllogistic, but its modern development, as an instru-
1 For a textbook exposition of FDL, see Lambert and Ulrich (1980).

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ment of deductive logic, can be traced to the work of Russell and Whitehead (1962), who in turn are building on work
done by Frege (1960).
What about FDL's theory of appraisal? The great power and advantage of this theory are its universality (it applies to
any argument in any field) and its decidability. In many cases, it is possible to specify by means of a decision procedure
whether an argument is valid or not. However, neither the validity requirement nor the truth requirement is without
problems. Of the two, the validity requirement appears to pose the greater and more intractable problems for
deductivism as an adequate theory of argument. Let me turn to Govier's discussion of deductivism to see what some of
them are. (I do not discuss problems with the truth requirement here, preferring to take those up in chap. 7.)
FDL Criticized
Deductivism
The theory of argument that I call FDL is closely related to what Govier called deductivism. Deductivism has a long
history, going back to Plato's view that deduction is the essence of reasoning. Aristotle differed with Plato in this respect
because Aristotle's theory of argument allows for other than deductive arguments to be good arguments. Aristotle was a
pluralist in terms of his theory of argument.
The term "deductivism" has a shorter history.2 Its home is the philosophy of science and the debate about the nature of
scientific explanation. Another expression closely related to it is the term "deductive chauvinism," sometimes used in
the same way that Govier used deductivism.3 Deductive chauvinism is encapsulated in the claim that, ''Every inference
is either deductive or defective." (This pithy formulation, whose origin I do not know, already raises a crucial problem:
the extent to which inference and argument have been identified in this tradition.)
Govier offered the following characterization of deductivism:
There is fundamentally only one type of (good) argument. A good argument must be deductively valid: the
premises must entail the conclusion. In a good argument, it is impossible for the conclusion to be false
provided that the premises are true. Furthermore, the premises are true. (p. 22)
2 According to Grunbaum and Salmon (1988), the term itself is due to Cioffa. For a thorough discussion of
deductivism, see Grunbaum and Salmon (1988).
3 I first heard the term used by Merilee Salmon in the Conference on Logic and Liberal Learning in Pittsburgh in
1979.

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Two comments are in order. First, it is clear that Govier referred to what I have termed FDL and the ideal of soundness.
However, for the most part in her critique, she focused on the problems connected with the validity requirement. The
result is that when she discussed deductivism's shortcomings, Govier tended to ignore problems with the truth
requirement. This creates some problems for her critique. Second, the deductivist view has to involve more than just the
claim that there is one type of argument. For in the face of claims to the contrarythat is, that there are inductive
argumentsdeductivism must make some response to such claims, typically by advocating a form of reductionism.
Deductivism can be more accurately formulated as, "There is only one type of argumenta deductive argument. All other
types of argument are either not really arguments or are reducible to deductive arguments."
Govier's Critique of Deductivism
Govier's critique of deductivism is spread throughout the first four chapters of her book but of particular interest is the
material in chapter 1, in a middle section of chapter 2, and finally in chapter 4. I deal with them in order, and after
giving an account of Govier's critique, I present my reflections on her critique.
The Critique in Chapter 1
In chapter 1, Govier argued that deductivism purchases its rigor and objectivity at the cost of being applicable to real
arguments:
Real arguments in natural language are not amenable to fully precise treatment. They deal with topics of
controversy, disputed facts, plausible hypotheses, approximately correct analogies. To evaluate them, we must
sort out ambiguities, see how diverse factors fit together, weigh pros and cons, consider the credibility of
those on whom we may depend for credibility and expertise. Formal logic is, by its very nature, incompetent
to address such matters. At best, it will apply to some arguments in natural language, after virtually all
interesting questions about the interpretation, content and substantive truth they contain have already been
resolved. (p. 5)
She illustrated her claims by analyzing an argument taken from MacIntyre, the upshot of which is to show that the
problems in the argument are not formal ones. Deductivism is not applicable, or if so then not illuminating, when
applied to the area of real argumentation.
Part of the applicability problem is that validity is an all-or-nothing affair, whereas in real lifeGovier wanted to saythe
value of an argument may

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not be so clear cut and is typically a matter of degree. Often we are inclined to assess an argument (as Govier did to an
argument of Galbraith's) as one that goes part of the way toward establishing its conclusion, although not all the way.
Govier also hinted here at the inadequacy of the deductiveinductive distinctionan issue she took up more fully in a later
chapter and that looms larger in her critique of positivism.
In the final part of the chapter, Govier pointed the finger at logicians' desire to imitate mathematicsthe attainment of
certainty by means of proof-like chains of deductive reasoning has influenced philosophers (and logicians) since the
time of Plato. Govier noted that this ideal has been criticized and she referred to the work of Perelman (1969) and
Toulmin (1958) as well as to the revolution in the teaching of logic:
It was largely a concession to the sixties' students demands for relevance that philosophy departments started
to teach courses in which actual arguments were the primary basis for study, and critical thinking or informal
logic courses became the focus of attention. (p. 8)
On the whole, I find myself in agreement with these criticisms by Govier, each of which raises an important issue that I
would like to mark.
Govier was criticizing FDL's theory of analysis for being based on simple, unrealistic specimens of argument. This
raises a very important issue for the theory of analysis concerning both the nature and the typology of argument. Exactly
what is the realm of discourse to which we want our theory of argument to apply? Natural argumentation? Ordinary
arguments? Naturally occurring arguments? How shall we characterize the terrain the typology proposes to map? How
many types of argument are there? What precisely do we mean by argument? These questions are important ones for the
theory of analysis, and I take them up in detail in chapter 6.
Govier implicitly criticized FDL for not meeting Adequacy Condition 4the requirement that the theory allow for
degrees of logical virtue. Validity and soundness are both all-or-nothing affairs. But as Govier argued, in the process of
evaluating real arguments, we shall find ourselves wanting to deliver mixed verdicts, saying that an argument it is "good
up to a point," that "it has these strengths and those weakness," or that "it does a moderately good job.'' FDL as a theory
of appraisal does not accommodate these needs.
The Critique from Chapter 2
In chapter 2, Govier provided her most thorough critique of deductivism. She began by noting that there are two forms
of deductivism. Literal deductivism (LD) holds that an argument is a good argument only if, as naturally

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expressed, it is valid. (Here Govier looked at just part of the picture.) The problem with this view is that it means that
almost all ordinary arguments4 are invalid and therefore not good. Govier stated: "Few wish to draw the conclusion that
most naturally occurring arguments are poor ones" (p. 22). Hence, most logicians opt for the other versionreconstructive
deductivism (RD)the view that an argument is a good argument only when reconstructed (i.e., when missing elements,
such as missing premises are added). All arguments as reconstructed must satisfy the validity requirement.
Govier further distinguished between two versions of RDformal and the nonformal. She said, "Formal deductivism
would have it that all good arguments are deductively valid in virtue of their form; nonformal deductivism would have it
that all good arguments are deductively valid in virtue either of meaning or form" (p. 23). Because her critical points
apply to both versions, she made no further reference to the distinction. It is here that she noted that she would also
abstract from the requirement that the premises be true. She further noted that RD is not limited to formal logicians like
Lambert and Ulrich, but can be found as well in the work of an informal logician like Nosich.5
First Line of Criticism:

Stove's 1970 Article
Govier's first line of criticism built on points made by Stove (1970) in which he claimed that very little defense had
been offered for this position, "Stove reported in 1970 that he could discover no published arguments whatever for
deductivism, and it still seems to be true that many people assume some version of the theory unreflectively" (p. 27).
This criticism is easily met, either by pointing to defenses that did exist or that have been offered since. I return to this
matter shortly.
Stove's next criticism of deductivism was to show that deductivism has unacceptable consequences. Stove distinguished
two senses of conclusiveness for arguments. Arguments are positively conclusive if they would give a completely
rational being some positive degree of belief in the conclusion and they are absolutely conclusive if they would give as
great a degree of belief in the conclusion as in the premises. An argument is absolutely irrational if the premises add no
support to the conclusion. This distinction enabled Stove to characterize deductivism as the thesis that "all invalid
arguments are absolutely irrational." Stove conceded he might be attacking
4 There is some difficulty in precisely identifying the domain of argumentation that Govier was interested in
that she referred to it sometimes as "naturally occurring arguments."
5 There is something strange and potentially misleading about this classification of Nosich as an informal logician.
If we make the abandonment of validity a necessary condition for the goodness of arguments a necessary condition
for being an informal logician, then Nosich (1982) does not qualify. More on what makes for an informal logician
in chapter 5.

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a straw person but pointed out that "the rather common philosophical practice of showing an argument invalid (we
assume that this is a reconstructed argument) and then inferring immediately that no further criticism of it is needed"
presupposes the truth of deductivism in just this extreme form.
Govier appeared to be satisfied with Stove's critique, but I can see two problems here. First, what Stove said about the
lack of defense may have been true in 1970, although there are classic expressions of deductivism in the writings of
philosophers like Russell and Popper. There, deductivism is nested in a theory of science rather than a theory of
argument. Stove's claim has lost its force in the interval because, as Govier realized, there are been more recent
articulations of deductivism as a theory of argument.6 (My guess is that the relative paucity of defenses for deductivism
prior to 1970 merely reflect its strong hold on the thinking of logicians.)
Second, Stove's critique involves a number of questionable moves. Grant that many philosophers may engage in the
practice described by Stove. They show that an argument is invalid and then dismiss it, a move that may perhaps be
thought to imply that no further criticism of it is needed. But such a dismissal hardly can be taken to presuppose an
endorsement of the thesis that the argument is absolutely irrational. They may simply believe that the argument is a bad
one because it does not satisfy one of the two conditions for being a good argument. That is hardly tantamount to
viewing the argument as irrational.
Moreover, one wonders what it is for an argument to be irrational in the first place. According to Stove, an argument is
"absolutely irrational if the premises provide no support for the conclusion." But the situation described herepremises
furnish no support for the conclusioncould just as well be described as a bad argumentand certainly one would think that
an argument can be a bad one without being termed irrational. So not only is it not clear what it is for an argument to be
irrational, it is not clear that Stove's attribution is at all warranted.
Finally, the notions of positively and absolutely conclusive depend on the idea of a completely rational beinga fiction to
which a realistic theory of argument cannot assign a working role. The very idea of an absolutely conclusive argument
turns out to be a nonstarter in any theory of argument that allows for there to be good arguments for opposing points of
view. (I discuss this issue in detail in chapter 8.)
I conclude that Stove's arguments against deductivism are weak because they are dated and they depend on questionable
assumptions and views in
6 For a fairly recent and wide-ranging discussion of logic as presenting a humanist ideal, see the chapters on
"Formal Logic and the Liberal Arts," in Teaching Philosophy (1981). Particularly reflective of deductivist
points of view are the papers by Covey, Massey, and Belnap.

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the theory of argument that seem dubious. Fortunately, Govier's critique of deductivism does not depend heavily on
Stove.
Govier's Second Line:

The Costs (Consequences) of Deductivism are Unacceptably High
In nuce, Govier's second line of criticism against deductivism takes the form of showing that its consequences are
unacceptable. Either it leads to radical skepticism or too high a price for RD is paid, and it is at odds with two important
traditions: the tradition that holds that there are reasonable nonconclusive arguments and the tradition that holds that
there are fallacies.
Govier conceded that there are great advantages to deductivism. Foremost among them is its simplicity. As a form of
monistic theory, deductivism holds that there is but one type of argumenta deductive argument. Disputes about the type
of argument do not arise on this theory. Hence, there is no need for a cumbersome typology. Further, there is but one
standard of argument and either an argument satisfies it or else it does not. There are clearly articulated (and
theoretically well-developed) procedures for determining deductive validity in some systems of modern logic.
Therefore, if deductivism is correct, we have a simple theory of analysis and the assurance of the relevance of an
established and recognized body of precise knowledge.
However, Govier argued, too great a price is paid for this simplicity. Either deductivism must embrace the view that all
invalid arguments are equally flawed or else some invalid arguments are redeemed though the route of reconstruction.
The former position might be termed Pure Deductivism (PD). Govier claimed that PD leaves the deductivist in a
radically skeptical position. This claim is difficult to credit unless Govier believed that all knowledge claims are based
on arguments and argumentation. But that cannot be true, given that we will likely assign a place to observation
statements. Thus, it is not clear that PD must lead to skepticism. However, because RD is the more likely version of
deductivism, I turn my attention to how Govier dealt with it.
In RD, the standard of validity is applied only to the reconstructed argument. But, Govier argued, the costs associated
with RD are also too great. What are these consequences?
First, Govier repeated a point made earlier: "The pro-and-con situation in which we find ourselves with many issues
does not naturally fit a deductivist account which makes the merit of an argument an all-or-nothing affair" (p. 25). This
amounts to the claim that this form of deductivism cannot satisfy Adequacy Condition 4the requirement that the theory
allows that there are degrees of logical virtue.

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I find this line of argument generally persuasive. But we must recognize an important complexity here. Govier's
argument to some degree profits from an ambiguity previously noted in her treatment of deductivism. If attention is
restricted to the standard of validity as this is usually understood, validity is an all-or-nothing affair. There are no
degrees of validity.7 The conclusion necessarily follows from the premises or it does not. But we must not forget that
FDL also has the truth requirement, so that a deductivist might seek to accommodate Adequacy Condition 4 by taking
the position that there are degrees of truth.
A further problem is that someone sympathetic to FDL might argue that even if we cannot distinguish degrees of
validity, we can distinguish types of invalidity and, in that way, attempt to accommodate the Adequacy Condition 4
requirement.8 I am not sanguine about these proposals, but at least it must be admitted that such possibilities would
have to be dismissed before this line of criticism could be effective. (This point comes up again later this chapter when I
review FDL in terms of the adequacy criteria.)
The deductivist has three options for a theory of appraisal. The first option says that the deductivist can maintain that
both truth and validity are all-or-nothing concepts. In this case, the theory cannot satisfy Adequacy Condition 4. The
second option says that the deductivist can make truth a matter of degree and can retain validity as an all-or-nothing
affair. This alternative raises interesting theoretical issues that must be answered before it is clear whether such a theory
can satisfy Adequacy Condition 4. What happens, I want to know, when the theory mixes together two different types
of criteria? Do I get a spectrum? Until such questions are answered, it is not clear that this option can satisfy Adequacy
Condition 4. The third and final option states that the deductivist can attempt to distinguish types of invalidity and have
truth as a matter of degree. The option calls for a drastic revision of deductivism, the result of which can satisfy
Adequacy Condition 4. But then the question becomes whether it is close enough to the core intuition to warrant the
label "deductivism."
Another consequence of deductivism is that most arguments will have to be reconstructed. This is labor-intensive work
and, in the case of longer arguments in natural language, to say the least, daunting. Imagine the work that would have to
go to the reconstruction of the Starkey argument, quoted at the beginning of chapter 2. But that is not the problem
Govier wished to call attention to here.
RD fails because there is always a reconstruction of an argument that will render that argument valid. If all else fails,
one just plugs in the associ-
7 In the very next section, Govier took up (and argued against) a suggestion from Thomas that looked very
like it.
8 Hansen made just such a proposal in private correspondence.

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ated conditionalthe conditional proposition whose antecedent is the conjunction of the premises and whose consequent
is the conclusion. When added to the original argument, this premise will make that argument valid. So any argument,
no matter how outrageous in its natural expression, will be valid (under reconstruction). Here is Govier's example:
Roses are red, violets are blue; therefore Ed loves Sue.
It is hard to take this seriously as a naturally occurring argument, for its artificiality is apparent. But let that pass.
Govier's point was that, as expressed, the argument is clearly invalidand we would want our theory of appraisal to so
instruct us. In line with the policy of RD, we reconstruct the argument by plugging in the associated conditional:
If roses are red and violets are blue, then Ed loves Sue.
The argument as reconstructed is now valid. The consequence is that any argument can be made valid and, although
Govier did not explicitly say this, deductivism loses its capacity to make the very discriminations it was supposed to
make.
This is one of those points where Govier appeared to be profiting from her failure to take into account the whole theory
of appraisal of FDL, which could provide this ready rejoinder for RD:
Of course, you can transform the argument from an invalid argument to a valid one by inserting the associated
conditional. But in the case of an "invalid-before-reconstruction" argument, that associated conditional will be
false, and in some cases obviously so. Consider the present case where the AC is: "If roses are red and violets
are blue, Ed loves Sue." Certainly the claim will be that this AC is false. Hence the argument fails to be a
good argument under a full-blown policy of RD.
This is a fair rejoinder, and it shows that Govier's argument fails against a properly decked-out version of deductivism.
However, the interesting point is that the reasoning for the claim that the reconstructed argument is unsound will be
identical to the reasoning for the claim that the argument (prior to reconstruction) is invalid. In each case, the reasoning
is that it is possible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false. Hence, there really is no gain in reconstruction.
Moreover, it does not follow that FDL loses its capacity to discriminate because in whatever form it chooses to appraise
this particular argument, the argument comes up short, either because it is invalid as it stands (PD) or because it is
unsound as reconstructed (RD). It can therefore be argued that FDL can make the type of

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discrimination needed by a theory of appraisal. I am thus inclined to think that this line of argument against RD is not
effective.
However, our discussion has been worthwhile because it drives into the open an important metatheoretical issue. The
differences between PD and RD may in fact be illusory. Suppose that some unreconstructed argument (A*) is invalid.
And suppose that R* is the reasoning that demonstrates that this is so. Now consider the reconstructed version of that
argument (A**). There is at least one form of this that will be valid but that will have a false missing premise. Hence,
(A**) is unsound. Let R** be the line of reasoning used to establish that MP is false. My claim is that R* = R**. (Allen,
1990, made a similar point.) The very same reasoning that exposes the unsoundness of the unreconstructed argument
also exposes the unsoundness of the reconstructed argument! This reasoning suggests that there is little difference
between PD and RD.
Problems for RD go further still. Not only is there always a way to reconstruct the argument as valid, there is typically
more than one way to do so. Any premise that entails the associated conditional will do the job. Here we encounter the
obverse side of the paradox. PD entailed that almost all arguments in empirical science, scholarly endeavors, and
ordinary discourse are worthless because, as they stand, they are invalid. RD, unless very elaborately qualified, entails
that they are all absolutely worthy because as reconstructed, they are one and all valid. However, this argument goes no
further than its predecessor did to dismantle deductivism because validity is only part of what is required for a good
argument.
Govier argued that RD has other costs as well, in that it runs counter to two strong traditions in logic. The first is that
there are nonconclusive but reasonable arguments, especially in the empirical sciences. RD appears not to provide for
this. This is not an entirely new point. If by nonconclusive arguments Govier meant arguments whose conclusion is not
necessitated by the premises and that such arguments may be said to have some degree of logical virtue, then this point
has been made before using terms like "naturally occurring arguments," "real arguments," and so forth. It is curious that
here Govier appealed to the empirical sciences to make her point. When I think of physics as a domain of inquiry and
knowledge, I think of it as populated by theories rather than by arguments. The methodology of physics is the so-called
scientific method, not the practice of argumentation as it is being discussed here. (I am leery of the move that says, "Oh,
but surely a theory is a form of argumentation.") However, this is a problem for the theory of reasoning, in my view,
rather than for the theory of argument. Accordingly, I propose to take note of it and move on.
The second is that there are fallacies, both formal and informal, and the RD is going to have a difficult time
accommodating this tradition. This criticism depends on two assumptions. First, it assumes that the fallacy

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tradition is theoretically defensible and desirable to retain. Second, it assumes that deductivism cannot provide for it.
Neither of these assumptions is argued for here, although Govier presented her arguments for the fallacy tradition in
chapter 9. Groarke argued that the second assumption is not true, but I postpone discussion of this point until later.
On the whole, then, except where it repeats the earlier claim about the failure of deductivism to satisfy Adequacy
Condition 4, this consequentialist line of criticism does not seem terribly damaging although it does raise some
interesting issues.
Govier's Third Line:

Deductivism Is a Distorting Lens
Govier's (1987) third line of argument revolves around the claim that deductivism is a distorting lens through which to
examine the phenomena of natural arguments. For RD, all errors in reasoning turn out to occur in the premises rather
than in the inference from the premises to the conclusion. Moreover, reconstructing arguments in this way "is ad hoc
and too frequently re-iterative . . . " (p. 27). RD allows and requires us to do too much to the data. It is cumbersome and
appears to misrepresent the original argument. If we look at people's arguments through deductivist spectacles, all
arguments will appear as complete, incomplete, or failed deductions. "But little that is real is seen" (p. 27). We need
some good reason as to why this is the right way to look at arguments, said Govier, reiterating Stove's 1970 critique.
Apart from its apparent simplicity, all that RD appears to have going for it is the claim that in a good argument, the
premises must suffice to prove the conclusion; that is, it must be deductively valid. But in this context, said Govier, such
a claim is question-begging. Govier concluded that, "it still seems to be true that many people assume some version of
the theory unreflectively" (p. 27).
The claim that deductivism distorts in the way that purple-colored glasses distort strikes me as at once misguided and
revelatory. For one thing, there is a way that objects look to normal vision. Against that background, a purple-colored
lens distorts because it makes objects appear purple when in fact they are not. No parallel situation exists in the case of
argument. There is no way that arguments appear prior to the imposition of the spectacles of deductivism. Or if there is,
Govier did not specify what it is. Therefore, this analogy is not persuasive. Govier's point is that RD causes us to do
things to arguments that may well result in their being distorted, and I have more than a little sympathy for this view.
What is revelatory here is that the analogy suggests that there is nothing wrong with deductivism per se, only with its
use as a filter through which to view arguments. There is nothing wrong with putting on purple-colored lenses, provided
this fits with the purpose at hand. Suppose that a purple-colored

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lens is good at filtering out a certain sort of ray that is bad for your eyes. In a somewhat similar fashion, there is nothing
wrong with deductivism, when applied appropriately or focused on the right object: implication. I postpone making that
argument until chapter 4.
The Critique from Govier's Fourth Chapter
Govier added a new dimension to her earlier argument against deductivism in her fourth chapter. Instead of alluding to a
class, kind, or type of argument to which deductivism can only be applied either with great difficulty or by distortion,
Govier presented examples of such arguments. She focused on two new species of argument: Wisdom's idea of a case-
by-case argument and Wellman's notion of a conductive argument. (These are new in the sense that they have not
worked their way into the mainstream.) Her position is that neither of these types of argument can be rendered
deductively. Deductive reconstruction here fundamentally distorts the argument type, each of which must be recognized
as a legitimate type of argument. Hence, deductivism fails as a theory of argument. If Govier was correct on this score,
deductivism appears to be doomed.
I think this is a good, if somewhat elliptical, argument. What I mean is that the argument must be made a great deal
more complex than I have intimated, if these two species of reasoning and argument are supposed to function as
elements of an alternative theory to both deductivism and positivism. I propose to defer further examination of this
aspect of her case until I take up conductivism later this chapter.
Summary
As it unfolds over the course of her three chapters, Govier's critique of deductivism seemed to have five separate
strands. In chapter 1, Govier argued that deductivism fails to satisfy the adequacy criterion that allows degrees of logical
virtue. In chapter 2, we saw three different lines. The first is that Stove's criticism remains valid (i.e., deductivists do not
appear to have good reasons for their position). The second is that the consequences are enormous and too costly. The
third is that deductivism inherently distorts its objects. Finally, Govier argued that there are other types of argument that
are not reducible to deductivism.
Govier's arguments may not be enough to dispose of deductivism entirely, but they seem sufficient to cast doubts on its
viability. In my view, the strongest criticisms are that deductivism does not satisfy the adequacy condition and that there
are other species of argument; it turns out that these are related criticisms. The argument that there is another species of
argument, call it conductive, and that this is not reducible (which argument

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we need to look at) is perhaps the most telling blow against deductivism. Less telling are the criticisms from Govier's
second chapter. The Stove criticism is easily dispatched and has been remedied in the literature by those who have
provided arguments for deductivism. The claim that the consequences of deductivism are too costly is marred by poor
arguments.
As we have seen, the discussion of Govier's arguments has raised a number of important issues both for the theory of
argument and the theory of reasoning. Hence, even if one is not completely persuaded that deductivism is wrong on the
basis of Govier's arguments, one must acknowledge the importance and fertility of her critique. I now turn to Groarke's
defense of deductivism.
Groarke's Defense of Deductivism
Introduction
Groarke (1992) sought to defend deductivism against Govier's criticisms. Groarke was not out to promote deductivism
as a self-sufficient theory and said, "My suggestion is the more modest claim that we need a synthesis of formal and
informal notions and must not unthinkingly reject every aspect of the formal approach" (p. 120). I do not see the point
of this remark. In this context, it would suggest that Govier's critique of deductivism argued for wholesale repudiation
of the formal approach. That is not how I read Govier. In any event, one can repudiate deductivism as a theory of
argument while yet conceding a role for formal methods.
Groarke (1992) portrayed his own central argument as:
(P1) Deductivism can account for inconclusive arguments.
(P2) Deductivism can account for standard fallacies.
(P3) Deductivism does not entail an untenable policy of reconstructing implicit premises in ordinary argument.
Therefore
(C) The standard criticisms of deductivism (a la Govier) are misguided. (p. 119)
One important dialectical consideration is that Groarke's argument does not cover all of Govier's case. Groarke made no
reference to Govier's use of Stove's argument and did not directly address what may well be Govier's strongest
argument; that is, the counterexamples taken from Wisdom's idea of case-by-case reasoning and Wellman's idea of
conductive argument. (I can be fairly certain what strategy Groarke would usea reductivist one.) But certainly (P1) and
(P3) constitute major prongs in Govier's case, so let me now turn to Groarke's arguments for deductivism.

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Deductivism Can Account for Inconclusive Arguments
Groarke argued that deductivism can accommodate inconclusive arguments by making an adjustment to what is allowed
in the premise set. It can thus account for arguments with probabilistic conclusions by building a modal qualifier into
the premisesconclusion. Here are his examples. First, the argument as originally expressed:
1*. Lithuania will eventually leave the Soviet Union, so probably its economy will decline. (p. 115)
The argument as reconstructed deductively would be expressed as:
1. If Lithuania ever leaves the Soviet Union, its economy will probably decline; Lithuania will eventually
leave the Soviet Union; therefore its economy will probably decline.
A second example:
2*. The examination of a random sample of Brand X computers in 1989 shows that 95% of them are
defective. Hence it is probable that there is something wrong with the one you bought. (p. 115)
And its reconstruction:
2. The examination of a random sample of brand X computers manufactured in 1989 shows that 95% of them
are defective, therefore it is probable that there is something wrong with the one you bought.
Groarke claimed that 1 and 2 are accurate renderings of 1* and 2* and that each is a valid argument with an
inconclusive conclusion. Hence, deductivism can handle probabilistic arguments. Groarke claimed that a similar
strategy will suffice for other kinds of argument: ''Once again it follows that deductivism can distinguish different
degrees of logical support, and more or less conclusive reasoning" (p. 116). Groarke suggested that deductivism can
handle pro and con reasoning, and "balance of considerations" type of argument. This is as close as Groarke comes to
illustrating the reduction:
If one unreliable witness says the butler committed the murder and five reliable ones say that it was the
chauffeur then, assuming we have no other evidence to go on, the claim that "On balance it appears that the
chauffeur is the murderer" follows deductively (for we cannot escape the conclusion that there are more
reasons for this conclusion than the alternative). (p. 116)

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Groarke's argument faces three problems. The first is that he may be guilty of the modal fallacy of quantifying across
contexts. Thus Groarke suggested that the following inference:
(1) If P, then probably-Q; P; therefore probably-Q.
There is little doubt that 1* is a deductively valid argument. But are 1 and 1* equivalent? I believe they are not. A fuller
treatment of this issue would require a detour into inductive logic and probability theory that I cannot undertake here. If
the kind of move that Groakre has suggested here were to be generally and effectively deployed, it would seem to
follow that deductive logic is capable of handling inductive arguments. Inductive logic becomes futile, a conclusion that
seems highly implausible. Hence, I am suspicious of Groarke's proposed method of recasting probable arguments.
Second, deductivism as modified by Groarke still does not accommodate Adequacy Condition 4 (about degrees of
logical virtue) because validity remains an all-or-nothing affair. Either an argument is valid or it is not. There is no
intermediate position; there are no degrees of necessary consequence. The same would seem to be true of soundness,
unless Groarke could show how it could be otherwise.
Third, Groarke's proposal for reconstructing balance of considerations arguments as deductive ones is problematic in
several ways. In the first place, his case would be much stronger had he shown us how to accomplish the reduction with
one or more of the many examples that Govier provided. Second, Govier explicitly addressed the question of reduction,
whereas Groarke omitted any response to that discussion, which must be reckoned to be, at the very least, a dialectical
weakness in his case.
Deductivism Can Handle Fallacies
Groarke argued that Govier's position was compromised by too narrow a conception of fallacy. He referred to her
characterization of fallacy as a mistake or error in reasoning and responded by saying that, "it makes more sense to
construe 'reasoning' and 'fallacy' in a broader way that encompasses questions and problems about the status of premises
in arguments" (p. 117). And, in fact, Groarke proposed that a deductivist account of fallacies is possible by "treating
fallacies as problems with the premises of arguments" (p. 117).
Both Govier's criticism and Groarke's rejoinder (which has the status of a promissory note: I would have to see the
details before I could judge the viability of the program of analysis marked here) presuppose that there is an important
distinction between the premises of the argument and the inference from the premises to the conclusion. There is a long-
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arguments as sacrosanct. However, I believe that there are good reasons for challenging this view of the structure of
argument. (This approach may be appropriate for representing the structure of inference, provided a distinction is drawn
between interference and argument. But that is another matter entirely.) What reasons are there for challenging the well
ensconced traditional view?
The so-called inference from the premises to the conclusion can itself always be embodied in the argument as a missing
premise. Thus, the argument
(A1) P1, P2infaC
can be represented as
(A2) P1, P2, MPinfbC
where the MP is a premise version of the inference (infa) in (A1)or what we have now come to call the associated
conditional. And it would seem that (A1) is a good argument if and only if (A2) is a good argument, even though they
are not the same argument.
The problem here is not identical to the one that Lewis Carroll (1967) originally posed but close enough to warrant
discussion. A brief description of the problem follows.
The Tortoise taunts Achilles (who has won the race) with a problem that "really consists of an infinite number of
distances, each of which is no longer than the previous one" (p. 431)? Using a set of propositions from Euclid, the
Tortoise inquires whether having accepted propositions A and B as true, is one obligated to accept Z? The Tortoise can
be forced to accept Z only if he is first required to accept C, which is what we are calling the associated conditional. But
now the Tortoise focuses attention on the new argument, consisting of A, B, C, and Z. The Tortoise now argues that he
must accept this conclusion on the basis of these premises only if he accepts its associated conditional, consisting of the
A, B, C, D, and Z. And so on.
It seems clear why Carroll named this puzzle as he has. The names Achilles and the Tortoise are intended to evoke for
his readers the paradoxes of Zeno. The clue from the title would seem to be this: The puzzle is meant to show that
something that we know to be possible (in the original version, a faster runner overtaking a slower one; in the current
version, forcing someone to accept a conclusion) is not possible. In the original, the absurdity is that Achilles cannot
pass the Tortoise. But we know he can, so there is something wrong with the reasoningbut what? Similarly, this new
paradox argues that we can never force our interlocutor to accept an argument as valid because the interlocutor can
always successfully resist

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the forcing move by appealing to his prior need to accept a missing premise of a specifiable type. That is, Achilles
attempts to get the Tortoise to understand that he is forced to accept the conclusion Z on the basis of A and B, both
which Tortoise accepts. But the Tortoise avoids this by claiming that for this to be true he has also to accept Cthe
associated conditional. So add that to the argument. Now must he must accept Z? No, because there is yet another
conditional associated with this revised argument that he must also accept. That is plugged in. Now must he accept the
conclusion? No, because . . . and so on. Implied here is that there is something wrong with this reasoning because we
know that we can force people to accept such a conclusion without getting stuck in this infinite regress. So what has
gone wrong in the reasoning here?
Commentators do not agree, and I make no attempt to solve this matter here.9 But I want to note that one way of
blocking the reasoning would be to refuse to accept (A2) as a rewrite of (A1) and instead portray it as:
(A3) P1, P2, MPC
where "" is meant to indicate that there is no inference here at all. Once the associated conditional has been written in,
the inference has disappeared and what remains is a structure in which reasons (P1, P2, and MP) are given for a
conclusion. The question then becomes whether these reasons are good reasons to accept the conclusion. This question
is not to be treated as a two part request: (a) Are the premises true? And (b) is the inference from the premises to the
conclusion warranted? There is just one question: Are the reasons given good reasons?
Thus, if we adopt the traditional way of analyzing the structure of argument, that an argument is composed of premises
plus an inference (often
9 There is some controversy over exactly what the argument is designed to show. Toulmin and Ryle gave one
interpretation: The argument is designed to illustrate the mistake of confusing two different roles played in the
argument. The principle of inference cannot be one of the premises or part of a premise. It is a mistake to
represent a rule of inference as a premise. Toulmin (1958) endorsed Ryle's notion of the difference and of an
inference license and said it shows to "what impossible conclusions one is led to if one treats the Principle of
the Syllogism as a super-major premise instead of an inference license." Bartley (1977) disputed this
interpretation, claiming that it is not at all clear what the moral of this story is. He took it to be that, "given a
challenge to the validity of an argument, we give no defense by simply adding in, as another premise, a
version of the logical rule in accordance with which the argument proceeds" (p. 468) and Govier said, "the
dialogue shows that inference is impossible unless the mind is willing to move from some claims to others
according to a rule which is not 'written in''' (p. 96). I have yet another comment: The argument raises the
question whether we should conceive of argument as an inference from a set of premises to a conclusion. In
other words, I believe Carroll's argument may be interpreted as a challenge to the (P + I) conception of
argument. For an explanation of "the (P + I) conception," see page 75.

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metaphorically represented as a bridge or link) from the premises to the conclusion, and if we admit the possibility of
missing premises (Govier is one of few theorists to have questioned this idea10), then are we not in effect, admitting
that we can always embody the inference into an MP? This admission will lead us down the road that Achilles is led
down by the Tortoise. I have suggested that one implication of this apparent paradox (although it is not, I think, the one
that Carroll intended) is that we should reject the traditional conception of the structure of argument as consisting of
premises plus an inference from the premises to the conclusion. I refer to this conception of argument as the (P + I)
conception. But if an argument is not to be viewed as a set of premises and an inference from them to the conclusion,
then what view should be adopted of the structure of an argument? This issue is taken up in chapter 6.
Let me now return to Groarke. The whole issue of whether deductivism can handle the tradition of fallacies is embroiled
in a context defined by a set of questions that includes not only those posed previously (theory of analysis) but also the
theory of appraisal (whether or not there are fallacies and how these are to be understood). Neither Govier's claim that
RD cannot handle fallacies nor Groarke's claim that it can appear justified at this point.
Consequences of RD not Untenable
Finally, Groarke argued that the costs of RD are not unacceptably high. Govier had argued that RD runs afoul because
its reconstructive policy is untenable. Groarke claimed: "It must . . . be said that the recognition of implicit premises in
arguments is not required only by deductivism, and that any plausible theory of argument must make some room for
implicit premises" (p. 117). But is this true? On the face of it, although this has been an operative assumption for many
theoreticians, it seems far from an obvious truth. It is not clear to me that, for example, a conductivist must view a
conductive argument as an incomplete argument that must be completed by the addition of missing premises. In any
event, this discussion raises the question, Is the idea of a missing premise inherently linked to deductivism?
Groarke admitted there are problems with implicit premises but claimed that this does not favor the nondeductivist
account. The crux of that argument is the claim that the nondeductivist account is simpler, but:
Any such impression is an illusion, however, for rather than eliminate the complexities associated with such
arguments, the non-deductivist exchanges one kind of complexity for another, eliminating the complexities of
implicit premises, replacing them with the complexities required by an account of the
10 Her thoroughgoing discussion of the topic is found in her chapter 5.

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relationship between premises and conclusion that must distinguish different kinds of inferences. (p. 118)
Finally Groarke took up Govier's reconstruction of the "Roses are red . . . " argument:
If someone really does forward such an argument, however, and if one really wants to understand it, such an
approach [deductive reconstruction] is preferable to a simple dismissal of the argument on the grounds that
the premises are obviously irrelevant to the conclusion (what Govier seems to favour). (p. 119)
It is not clear to me on what basis Groarke attributed this view to Govier, although I must say that I find it an attractive
one, when suitably presented. In the present case, if I were to take this seriously as an argument,11 my instinct would be
to claim that the premises are irrelevant to the conclusion. Such a claim would itself have be supported and so is never
tantamount to a simple dismissal. Groarke did not show to my satisfaction why his approach (deductive reconstruction)
is preferable to the one Govier and I would take.
Groarke continued:
In contrast, the deductivist approach suggests that we should ask why this particular reasoner believes that this
conclusion follows (deductively) from their premises, trying to answer this with implicit premises that explain
their reasoning. If we find that the arguer believes (i) that a material implication theory of inference is correct
and (ii) that it is true that "Ed loves Sue," then their argument is not ridiculous, but deductively valid (but not
sound). (p. 119)
Here one wants to say, "Just what in the deductivist policy requires us to undertake an investigation of the arguer's
theory of implication?" That is far from clear. In order to pursue a deductivist policy (a la Groarke), one must first of all
investigate the arguer's beliefs about the theory of implication. This is likely to make the task of evaluating an argument
almost impossible. The task of argument analysis is difficult enough without adding to the critic's burden the task of
deciphering the arguer's theory of argument.
11 Govier called it a ridiculous argument; Groarke suggested that no one would really put this forward as an
argument. My question here would be: Why treat this specimen as an argument at all? The answer, it seems to
me, is just that it appears to have the structure of what people call an argument. But as I explain in Part II, the
best way to handle such case is with a fortified conception of argument rather than a deductivist policy of
appraisal.

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There are, of course, a variety of possibilities and one cannot choose between them without reference to the
particular context in which the argument arises. For our purposes, the important point is that the investigation
of these possibilitiesnot the curt dismissal of the argumentis the best way to understand the argument. (p. 119)
This last statement houses a straw person, as if the contrast were either curt dismissal of such arguments
(nondeductivist) or investigation of possibilities (deductivist). There is in fact a third way as I mentioned: one argues
that the premises cited are not relevant to the conclusion.
Groarke concluded that his defense of deductivism was incomplete, but he did provide an outline of how that more
complete defense would look:
The argument I would propose as a more definitive defense of deductivism would include the additional
premise that deductivism (a) provides, in comparison with non-deductivism, a simpler and more
straightforward account of argument; and (b) better furthers the dialectic process which should be the ultimate
goal of particular arguments, requiring us to ask the kinds of questions that can further this dialectic in the
most useful way. (p. 120)
Groarke's defense of deductivism takes us right into one of the central issues in the theory of argument: What is the goal
of argument? Is it, as Groarke claimed here, to further the dialectic? Or is that perhaps the aim of the practice of
argumentation, as opposed to the goal of the product of the practicethe argument, is to get at the truth? These are issues
that must be taken up, and I do so in chapter 6. Groarke's defense also takes us to issues in the theory of appraisal: What
are the right questions to ask in the evaluation of an argument? Groarke argued that deductivism is better because it
provides a simpler and more straightforward account of argument. But how is it simpler? And at what cost do we
purchase this simplicity? These questions are left hanging by Groarke.
Conclusion
There are problems both with Govier's critique and Groarke's defense of deductivism. Even if Govier had a case for the
existence of conductive arguments, it is not clear that they are nonreducible. Her strongest point seems to me to be that
deductivism is unable to satisfy the all-important Adequacy Condition 4, a point that we have seen remains in force
even if Groarke put his finger on weaknesses in Govier's arguments.
Groarke's defense of deductivism is also problematic in important ways. Not only does it fail to meet the challenge
posed by Govier's counterexam-

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ples head on, but it makes certain assumptions about deductivism, which he himself admitted requires elaboration in a
fuller treatment.12
In my view, the strongest argument against FDLdeductivism as a theory of argument emerges when I view it through
the perspective of the adequacy requirements. Govier's critique contains a strong start and furnishes important leads. In
turning now to those conditions and how well deductivismFDL meets them, I rely on some of her points, seeking now
to imbed them in a more systematic critique.
FDL Rejected
The argument for abandoning FDL as a theory of argument takes the following shape. (Deductivists will appreciate this
form of argumentation.) Any adequate theory of argument must satisfy Adequacy Conditions 1 through 7. But FDL
does not satisfy all of these conditions. Hence, FDL cannot serve as an adequate theory of argument.
To complete this argument, we must go through the adequacy requirements in turn to show that the second premise is
true. (The argument is clearly deductively valid.)
The theory must contain an account of argument and the elements that constitute an argument.
Verdict. FDL satisfies this requirement.
Justification. FDL has a clear (although too permissive) conception of argument as a collection of statements in which
some (the premises) are adduced as support for the other (the conclusion). The elements that constitute the argument are
premises and conclusion. Toulmin's theory of argument is different partly in that it proposes a different way of
understanding the elements of the argument. Hamblin, as well, offered us a different theory of analysis.
12 I regret that I have not been able to take into account Groarke's (1995) later elaboration of his defense of
deductivism.

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Verdict. FDL satisfies this requirement.
Justification. The major work in FDL is done by the notion of logical form. The structure of argument is its logical
form. The story is important for the theory of appraisal because the correct appraisal depends on identifying the logical
form. (One way of telling the story is that an argument is valid if it is an instance of a valid logical form. One might well
argue that one of the great strengths of deductivism and FDL lies in its doctrine of form and validity.)
Verdict. FDL does not satisfy this requirement.
Justification. Even though it can be the case that there is a valid argument for P and a valid argument for not-P, it cannot
be the case that there is a sound argument for P and a sound argument for not-P. Hence, the goodness referred to in
Adequacy Condition 3 cannot be equated with soundness. If this adequacy condition is to be captured by FDL, either
the truth requirement or the validity requirement must be changed; perhaps both.
The theory must contain a theory of appraisal such that arguments exist in a continuum from strong to weak, with
various points in between.
Justification. As was said earlier, validity is an all-or-nothing affair; arguments are either valid or not valid. Depending
on how one unpacks it, there may be some flex in the truth requirement, although it is not typically understood that way.
Because validity is an all-or-nothing requirement and is necessary for soundness, in the end, arguments will be
evaluated as either sound or not sound. There are, for FDL, no degrees of soundness; hence, no degrees of logical virtue
are possible (on the standard interpretation). Govier also made this point.

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The standards for the appraisal of argument should be such that, in principle, the ordinary reasoner can decide whether
or not these are satisfied in a given instance. In short, the criteria should be user-friendly.
Justification. There is a problem with validity, understood in the technical sense: The conclusion follows necessarily
from the premises. There have been various attempts to make this standard readily available to the ordinary reasoner:
for example, truth trees, possible world scenarios, and so forth. I am not convinced that any of them succeed. Thus, in
my view, the theory of argument posed by FDL does not satisfy this requirement.
Justification. This is largely because FDL's theory of appraisal is so limited (soundunsound). It seems that evaluation
rather than criticism has been the goal of the theory of appraisal associated with FDL. (Here I anticipate a distinction
from chapter 4.)
The criteria that belong to the theory of appraisal should be justified as to their appropriateness for the tasks assigned
and in relation to the theory of analysis.
Verdict. In principle, FDL can satisfy this requirement.
Justification. In practice, it is often the case that, for example, the criteria for appraisal are simply dogmatically put forth
rather than justified by reference to its understanding of the nature of argument.
Conclusion. FDL satisfies Adequacy Conditions 1, 2, and 7, but fails to satisfy Adequacy Conditions 3, 4, 5, and 6. On
the whole, then, the verdict must be that FDL is not a viable theory of argument. It does not accommodate the adequacy
conditions because it fails to make room for arguments that our pretheoretic intuitions judge to be arguments and, at
times, perfectly good ones: Those that are nonconclusive.

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My conclusion is not that FDL is not a viable theory but that it is a viable theory of something other than argument. And
it does not follow that FDL may not have contributions to make to the theory of argument. Having thus set aside FDL
(deductivism) as a theory of argument, let me look at one possible alternative, the theory that Govier called positivism.
Positivism:
A Dualist Theory of Argument
Positivism Explicated
Govier discussed an alternative theory of argument that she dubbed positivism. According to this theory of argument, all
arguments are either inductive or deductive. If the argument is deductive, then the appropriate standard to employ is
validity; if the argument is inductive, then the appropriate standard to employ is probability.
In terms of the alternative Govier discussed, this theory is a degenerate form of pluralism (as to analysis) and a spectrum
theory (as to appraisal). In fact, it is a dualist theory. The reason Govier called it positivist is that its typology runs
parallel to the distinction made by positivists between different kinds of knowledge: knowledge furnished by analysis
(deduction) and knowledge furnished by sensation (induction).
Govier's Critique of Positivism
The chief problem for this theory, said Govier, is that it is founded on the distinction between inductive and deductive, a
distinction that is notoriously difficult to draw. As Govier noted, there has been an ongoing dispute about this
distinction in informal logic going right back to the early 1980s. There still is not a clear consensus about how to
distinguish the two, whether they are distinguishable and indeed whether the distinction is exhaustive.
According to Govier (1987), perhaps the best known expression of positivism is found in Copi:
It is Copi's version which is the most commonly accepted. This is due no doubt partly to the influence of his
texts over several decades. Many of those now teaching formal and informal logic began their studies with
these texts. It is also because this view and it alone allows you to apply the inductive deductive distinction to
all arguments and to have good and bad arguments within each category. Salmon, Neidorf, and Kyburg give a
version of the distinction applicable only to good arguments. Black and Rescher state one which allows
inductive arguments to be either good or poor, but leaves all deductive

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ones as valid. Fohr transfers the distinction to intentions, with the result that it cannot be exhaustive after all.
(p. 44)
A serious problem for Copi was that his way of drawing the distinction involved an essential reference to what the
arguer intends or claims to be the force of the argument. Sometimes there will be conflicting signals. Often, no claim at
all is made about how tightly the conclusion is claimed to be related to the premises, as Govier illustrated using an
argument from Mill. Govier stated that it is not easy to sort actual arguments into the two positivist categories, although
she admitted that application problems do not necessarily signal defeat. There will be application problems for any
pluralistic theory, so that "any theory of argument allowing for several distinct categories will have to make some
allowance for flexibility in interpretation" (p. 49).
The key issue, then, for a positivist theory is the nature of the basic dualism it prescribes, the great divide between the
truths of mathematics and logic (where deduction reigns supreme), and the truth of the empirical sciences (where
induction is appropriate):
The key common idea [to all forms of positivism] is that there is a kind of connection between premises and
conclusion which is deductive, and there is just one other kind of connection. Only one. One side of the
dichotomy is relatively unproblematic. To be satisfied with the positivist theory, however, we have to be
satisfied with both sides. Moreover we have to convince ourselves that this dichotomy is exhaustive. The key
issue for any version of the positivist theory is whether there is just one kind of nondeductive connection. (p.
49)
Govier proceeded to discuss a number of types of nondeductive argument: arguments from analogy, conductive
arguments (Wellman), good reasons arguments (Baier), convergent arguments (Thomas), and nonconclusive
philosophical arguments (Johnstone). Further reflection on the other side (inductive) suggests that this category is much
too cumbersome and all-embracing if understood broadly enough to make the dichotomy workable. And if understood
more narrowly, the exhaustiveness of the distinction becomes problematic.
Thus, if we understand a probabilistic connection to be any form of nondeductive connection (the broad sense), then the
term "inductive" can be used to cover all of these types but it really asserts nothing, for it reveals nothing about what
these various types have in common. The narrower sense of a probabilistic connection would be used in connection with
empirical statements, such that these are based on evidence that makes them more probable than they were in the
absence of such evidence. It is doubtful

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that this sense of probable applies to the types of argument listed previously. After discussing the reasons that
philosophers have favored this theory of argument, Govier concluded her treatment of positivism by saying:
The great divide between deductive and inductive arguments is spurious and theoretically dangerous, because
it makes it too easy to ignore the many nondeductive arguments which are not classically inductive. It thus
leads to false simplicity in our classificatory categories and falsely founded problems of justification in
philosophy and elsewhere. Acknowledging the existence and epistemic legitimacy of other types of argument
would alter our approaches to such problems as the justification of normative and interpretative statements
while at the same time enhancing our understand of natural argumentation. (p. 53)
Critique of Govier's Critique
Essentially, Govier's critique revolves around three points. On the issue of drawing the distinction between induction
and deduction, Govier made some good points. However, the positivist may well respond that this distinction is one of
those fundamental distinctions that can never be perfectly articulated but continues to be usefulin somewhat the way
that the terms "analytic" and "synthetic" continue to be useful, even though Quine argued that they are not, in principle,
distinguishable. The second point is that there exist types of argument that do not fit into either category. The strength
of Govier's argument here depends entirely on her ability to persuade us of the existence of this third type. A third and
equally telling point against positivism is that the category of inductive, as used in this theory, is much too problematic
to be useful. If understood narrowly, it excludes a highly visible type of argumentthe one in which the arguer believes
that the argument provides good but not conclusive reasons for the conclusion and where that goodness is not
quantifiable in the way required by probability theory. If inductive is understood broadly, then the notion of probability
will have been stretched beyond the breaking point.
Conclusion
Positivism does not fare much better than deductivism in Govier's eyes, and I think she was right in claiming that
positivism, although better than deductivism, is not yet pluralistic enough. Thus, Govier's main argument against both
deductivism and positivism was based on the position that there is more than one; indeed, more than two; types of
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this claim is the focal point of an entire chapter, it is time to look more carefully at that chapter.
Conductivism:
A Pluralistic Theory of Argument
Conductivism Proposed
Govier presented the case for a pluralistic theory of argument. She did not give it a name. To preserve the parallel, I call
it Conductivism. It is clearly a form of spectrum theory. Govier said:
The prevailing theories of argument among philosophers seem to be deductivism and positivism. Of course
there have been dissenters from these views. Some dissenters, such as Wittgenstein, Toulmin, and Perelman
were people of considerable professional prominence. Despite this, their views on the theory of argument
have not greatly influenced thinking on formal logic, nor, until quite recently, even in informal logic. Among
dissenting views on reasoning and argument, two are of particular interest (p. 55).
She mentioned Wisdom's idea of case-by-case arguments, and Wellman's idea of a conductive argument:
Although case-by case-reasoning and conductive reasoning are not just the same, they fit into a similar gap in
the theory of argument and may have been ignored by philosophers for similar reasons. Both fail to supply
deductive support to conclusions and yet are frequently used in a priori contexts to resolve issues that are
conceptual, philosophical, normative or in some other important sense nonempirical. In addition both seem
recalcitrant to treatment by general rules. (p. 56)
This latter claim can best be understood as a reference to the strategies available to both the deductivist and to the
positivist. In any event, Govier thought these two types of reasoningargument go some distance toward filling an
important gap in the theory of argument. I interpret this as, in effect, an option for a new theory of argument.
Conductivism, as a theory of argument, might be construed as holding that there are three types of argument: deductive,
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the latter being illustrated by the two types of arguments Govier discussed.13 Conductive argument is described as, ''[it
is] that sort of reasoning in which (1) a conclusion about some individual case (2) is drawn nonconclusively (3) from
one or more premises about the same case (4) without any appeal to other cases" (p. 66). For the sake of simplicity, I
assume that case-by-case reasoning can be subsumed under conduction. Govier offered her own gloss on Wellman's
definition:
A conductive argument, then, depends crucially upon the concept of relevance. It differs from a deductive
argument because the factors cited do not entail, and are not put forward as being sufficient for, the
conclusion stated. It differs from an inductive argument in that it is not a case of confirming or disconfirming
hypotheses by instances and in that (typically) separately relevant reasons are cited in support of a normative,
conceptual or philosophical conclusion. The issue is frequently not empirical. (p. 66)
Having presented in outline form a theory of argument that might be called conductivism, the next and most important
question is, "What standards will be used to evaluate a conductive argument?"
In a conductive argument no one premise deductively entails the conclusion, nor do the premises entail the
conclusion when considered together. The premises count for the conclusion by being relevant to it, in a sense
of "relevant" less than sufficiency. The method by which we assess a conductive argument is not to test for
deductive validity, but rather to ask ourselves whether the premises are relevant, how much support they give
to the conclusion, and whether unmentioned factors that are relevant to the conclusion would "outweigh" the
premises. We may also consider further cases to test the claims of relevance . . . Whether X is relevant to Y in
these contexts is a conceptual, normative, or 'criterial' issue. (p. 70)
What Govier did here was to spell out a standard that might be used to appraise so-called conductive inference. Whether
this proposed standard can pass muster is something to be discussed later.
Conductivism Criticized
Conductivism certainly holds some promise as a theory of argument. But it, too, faces problems both in its theory of
analysis and its theory of appraisal.
13 Conductive inference bears interesting similarities to what Scriven (1987) called probative inference.

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Problems for Conductivism's Theory of Analysis
In the first place, Govier's case for conductivism is not fully developed. Yet there is sufficient material for us to flesh
out the shape of the more complete argument. I believe it would look as follows:
Step 1. It must be shown that conductive inference is not the same as deductive inference. (1987, p. 66)
Step 2. It must be shown that conductive inference is not the same as inductive inference. (1987, p. 66)
Step 3. Hence, conductive inference is different from both inductive and deductive inference. (Inference from 1 & 2.)
Now a second phase of argument must be developed:
Step 4. Conductive inference is not reducible to inductive inference.
Step 5. Conductive inference is not reducible to deductive inference. (1987, p. 73)
Step 6. Conductive inference is not reducible to a system of deductive and inductive inference. (From 4 & 5.)
Step 7. Hence, conductive inference is different from and not reducible to either inductive or deductive inference, nor a
combination of the two. In other words, conductive inference represents an independent type of inference. (From 3 & 6.)
Step 8. Deductivism is an inadequate theory of argument. (1987)
Step 9. Positivism is an inadequate theory of argument. (1987)
Conclusion. Some form of conductivisim is the appropriate theory of argument. (From 7, 8, & 9.)
Now, there is much to say about this argument. Let us assume for the moment that there will not be a problem with
Steps 1 and 2. Step 3 is a conclusion from them. Govier (1987) explicitly argued for Step 5 and I want to look at that
argument shortly. But notice that there is no argument given or suggested for Step 4, which is crucial in deriving Step 7.
So there is a sense in which Govier's argument is importantly incomplete. How did Govier argue for Step 5? She
acknowledged that the deductivist will attempt a reduction. Her argument against it was essentially that the key stroke
here

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is the insertion of the requisite MP, which will transform the conductive argument into a deductive one. (We know this
move is possible.) When the MP has been inserted, Govier argued, following Wellman, the argument is now a different
argument. Our reconstruction has distorted the original conductive argument with which we began. She illustrates this
in connection with the following example:
ARG You should return the book because you promised to do so.
(To turn this into) a deductively valid argument, we will need an additional premise. Possible additional
premises are either false, unverifiable independently of judgement about the individual case, or impossible to
formulate in advance. That you should always keep promises is false; that you should always keep promises
other things being equal is unverifiable independently of a judgement about the case at issue; that you should
always keep promises in circumstances of type (abc) is impossible to formulate in advance. The enthymeme
approach, here as so often, makes an inference watertight at the cost of introducing an unknowable premise.
(p. 73)
And, said Govier, the problems will mount in severity as we consider more complex conductive arguments.
There is something not quite right about Govier's reasoning here. She was committed to the unstated and (I believe)
debatable position that one may not add as a missing premise any candidate that is false, unverifiable independently of
the judgment about the individual case or impossible to formulate in advance. This position dovetails with positions
having to do both with her Principle of Charity and her doctrine of missing premises. I cannot pursue those matters here.
Before leaving Govier's argument against deductive reconstruction of conductive arguments, I wish to note a
consequence that seems both shocking yet potentially profitable. It seems to follow from what she said in formulating
her resistance to enthymeme approach that Govier would not want to adopt the standard position that the argument is
incomplete because of a missing premise. But that leaves only two possibilities. Either we continue to approach
arguments as consisting of premises and inferences from the premise to the conclusion and we define a new species of
inferenceconductive inferenceor we abandon the notion that an argument consists of premises and an inference from the
premises to the conclusion. I believe Govier intended the former and shortly argue against that alternative. I address the
(P + I) conception that came up earlier in chapter 6.
Problems for Conductivism's Theory of Appraisal
The theory of appraisal for conductivism outlined by Govier stresses two questions: How much support do the premises
provide? Are there relevant

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counterconsiderations? Presumably, ways of dealing with these questions would be answered by a theory of conductive
inference, but there is no such theory at the moment. Govier stated:
If P fails to entail Q, but seems nevertheless to offer some reason for Q (as in "the car has a good repair record
in Consumer Reports, so you will not have much problem with repairs if you buy it"), we may say P does
support Q, even though it does not entail Q. But support in this case is not a thinner version of deductive
support. It is not a "degree" of deductive support, but rather something else. (p. 31)
The problem is that we have no theory to illuminate these matters. Govier stated:
The problem is that spectrum theory tells us nothing about these degrees. It does not indicate what kind of
support premises might offer, or whether and why (for example) A might be a stronger argument than B. [A,
B, and C refer to specific arguments found on pp. 3132.] It is not even clear that it makes sense to think of C
as having more or less than the same kind of connection which either holds or fails to hold in C. The spectrum
theory is only a metaphor until it can tell us more about what degrees of support (or connection between
premises and conclusion) are degrees of and what constitutes a great or lesser degree. (p. 32)
So the basic problem with conductivism's theory of appraisal is its underdeveloped state. The whole notion of a
conductive inference, that is, of a link between premises and conclusion that is weaker than deductive implication and
weaker than inductive inference, is far from clear.
At this stage, although conductivism may appear to be the best candidate for a theory of argument, there are serious
problems with both its theory of analysis and its theory of appraisal.
Conclusion
Govier did an excellent job of exposing significant problems with the two extant theories of argument: deductivism and
positivism. Groarke's defense of deductivism, although not without its own interest, comes up short. There appear to be
insuperable problems with FDL, principally in connection with its theory of appraisal (Adequacy Conditions 36). The
traditional ideal of soundness captures perhaps some aspects of logical virtue in argumentation but it is not universal; it
cannot be the whole story.
Although deductivism is not viable as a theory of argument, my suggestion is that it was never really intended to fit that
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it by default, as the result of developments in logic I discuss in the next chapter. It is perhaps no surprise that given the
limitations of deductivism, attempts to modify it (positivism and conductivism) fare no better. Still, our discussion of
these theories has been profitable for it has brought to the surface four important issues:
How shall we demarcate the realm of discourse to which we want our theory of argument to apply? Natural
argumentation? Ordinary arguments? Naturally occurring arguments? How shall we characterize the terrain our
typology proposes to map? How many types of argument are there? What precisely do we mean by argument? These
are questions for the theory of analysis.
Can deductivism (FDL) be modified to meet the adequacy requirements?
Is there in fact a difference between pure deductivism and reconstructive deductivism?
Is the issue of missing premises linked with deductivism?
If the argument of this chapter has been successful, it means that FDL is not a viable candidate for a theory of argument.
But that leaves us with two questions: (a) What role should we assign to FDL? (b) Where do we turn for a viable theory
of argument?
As to (a): What becomes of FDL? Although FDL undeniably presents us with a powerful theory, I believe that FDL is
best viewed not as a theory of argument but rather as a theory of implication. This claim depends on my being able to
clarify the distinction between implication and argumentand that is part of the work of the next chapter.
Here I pause to take account of one possible objection:
Suppose you are right. It's hard to see what is gained by interpreting FDL to a theory of implication. Don't the
exact same problems come back to haunt us here? Won't FDL fail as a theory of implication for just the same
reasons that it fails as a theory of argument?
I think a satisfactory answer to this challenge must await the broader picture of the differences between implication and
argument. Presumably, the demands on a theory of implication will be different than the demands on a theory of
argument, so there is no reason to think that FDL cannot function adequately there. Moreover, because of its close
association with mathematics and the foundation of mathematics, FDL appears to be more naturally tied to the
entailment relationship (which is crucial in mathematics) than it is to argument (where it is less clearly at home)
As to (b): it seems that something like a pluralistic theory that allows for degrees of logical virtue is what we are
looking for. Hence, we need some form of pluralistic theory maybe spectrum theory, as providing a possible

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lead. I argue that the approach to argument evaluation taken by informal logicians can meet this need.
That we do not, at this point, 2,000 plus years into our theorizing about argument, have a viable theory of argument is
an astounding fact and points in two directions: backward, for it seems important to understand, to at least to attempt to,
why this is so; and forward, to the development of an adequate theory. In chapter 4, I look backward to search for some
explanation. Beginning in chapter 5, (Part II), I attempt to develop just such a theory.

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Chapter 4
Lessons from the Past
I argued in chapter 3 that FDLthe oldest, most powerful, and most attractive theory of argument we possessis not an
adequate theory. The alternatives discussed by Govier (positivism and conductivism) fare no better. Thus, it appears that
the inquiry we know as logic has not provided us with an adequate theory of argument. When we stop to think that logic
goes back as far as Aristotle, this realization is likely to cause some bewilderment. "How can this be?" we want to ask.
In this chapter, I want to inquire into some of the reasons for this situation.
My explanation will, of necessity, be sketchy. A complete explanation would take a great deal of space, requiring
thorough discussion of what happened in logic from ancient through medieval, into the early and late modern periods.
Instead I look only at the period from the mid-19th century on, when logicso it is widely believedemerged from the
Dark Ages into the light.
The explanation I propose is not original. Its antecedents can be found in Toulmin's (1958) view that the problem lies in
the "geometric model" that the logicians of this century adopted for their inquiry. Although I do not follow Toulmin in
his prescription for the new model (recall the discussion in chapter 2), I largely agree with his diagnosis of the problem,
which he set forth as, "The ambition to cast logic into a mathematical form is as old as the subject itself. . . . Since the
seventeenth century the subject has, if anything, tended to become more mathematical rather than less. . . ." (p. 177).
The phrase I use to characterize this path of development is: Logic became mathematicized.1
1 See Toulmin's (1958) critique of logic (pp. 177 ff).

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I believe that there are three factors in this development. The first part of the explanation is conceptual in nature: The
lines of demarcation between inference, implication, and argument were blurred. In saying this, I do not mean to
presuppose some hallowed past in which the distinction was clear cut and rigorously observed. But as logic became
more and more mathematical, the focus shifted increasingly from argument to implication.
The second factor is related to the first: The result of the switch in focus is that the developing tradition in logic was
able to coast along with a truncated, anemic conception of argument as a set of propositions, one of which follows from
the others.
The final factor is the failure in the theory of appraisal to distinguish between criticism and evaluation. As long as
argument and implication are thought of as one and the same and because implication largely demands evaluation, the
task of criticism got lost in the shuffle. But I am getting ahead of myself here. I want to begin by picking up the thread
from the end of the last chapter, where we saw that conductivism had something going for it as a theory of argument.
Let me begin by asking what that "something" was.
The Truth Behind Conductivism
Of all the theories of argument considered in chapter 3, conductivism is the one that appears to have the greatest
promise. For one thing, it can accommodate the important adequacy condition that FDL cannot: It can allow for degrees
of logical virtue. The main problem we found with conductivism was its underdeveloped state: The idea of a conductive
inference is just not clear.
What, then, is the truth behind conductivism? I would say that both its theory of argument and appraisal
(underdeveloped although these are) are properly focused on the realm of argument that we most need to interact with.
How to characterize this realm is a difficult matter. As we saw, Govier (1987) used various phrases to refer to it:
"naturally occurring arguments," "natural argumentation," "real arguments." Others have used phrases such as
"mundane argument" or ''everyday argument." Whatever it is called, the sorts of argument with which we began chapter
2 are the very sort we want our theory of argument to recognize and address as arguments, and that we want our theory
of appraisal to help us to evaluate. But neither of them is easily identified as an argument by either FDL or positivism.
Neither is clearly a deductive argument and neither seems in any way to be an argument based on probability. Each
comes closer to being what Govier identified as a conductive argument. So conductivism appears to embrace in its
theory of argument the sort of specimen we want our theory to deal with.
The problem lies in the very notion of a conductive inferenceargument. The idea of deductive inferenceimplication is
clearthe premises necessi-

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tate the conclusion or it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false. The idea behind inductive
inference is clear (although not uncontroversial)the premise(s) render the conclusion probable; that is, it is not
impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false, although it is (depending on the case) improbable.2
What would be the corresponding idea behind conductive inference? On analogy, it would seem to be that the premises
provide good reasons for thinking the conclusion to be true. Or, in a balance-of-considerations argument, it is
acknowledged that there are offsetting considerations but that, on the whole, the positive considerations outweigh them
so that the conclusion in some sense follows.
At the end of chapter 3, Govier was quoted to the effect that the notion of support used in the explanation of conductive
argumentinference is none too clear. If we think of the connection between premises and conclusion as deductive, we
seem to have the tightest possible connection. In a good inductive argument, so the thinking goes, this connection is still
quite strong, but not as strong. And, by parity, we would say that in a conductive argument, the connection is a weaker
connection than either of the other two. The difficulty will be to give this notion coherent and manageable content, for
at this point, we may wonder if the notion of an inference link has not become so attenuated as to be of questionable
merit.
Accordingly, I want to suggest another way of looking at the situation. The conclusion to be drawn is not that we need a
pluralistic theory of argument that recognizes the legitimacy of inductive and conductive inferences no less than
deductive inference but rather that we need to question whether the term "conductive" properly characterizes a mode of
inference or a type of argument at all. (Of course, how one understands inference is the crucial issuea matter I take up in
chapter 6.)
What I am suggesting is that deductivism and positivism are not really theories of argument at all. I will be asked,
"Then what are they? For surely they are theories of some sort or other!" My response is: "Yes, of course." Formal
deductive logic is really a theory of implication. Inductive logic is a theory of inference. What is called conductive
inference is better called argument, for that is what it really isor so says the position I am defending here.
To sum up, I hold that there are differences and similarities among the terms "implication," "inference," and
"argument.'' Each has its own logic, as it were, as Fig. 4.1 indicates.
Implication is to be distinguished from inference, which in turn must be distinguished from argument. The drawing of
such distinctions is not the
2 I bracket the debate about whether there is such a logic as inductive logic and, indeed, whether there is any
such thing as induction. There is no doubt that the ordinary reasoner does make generalizations, causal
inferences, and so on. For a fascinating account of what psychologists have discovered about this kind of
reasoning, see Nisbett and Ross (1980).

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NAME TYPE OF REASONING LOGIC

deduction Implication formal deductive logic
induction inference inductive logic
conduction argument informal logic
Fig. 4.1
Types of reasoning and their logics.
proper work of the theory of argument, but rather of the theory of reasoning. Indeed, if this book is successful in making
its case for informal logic as the nucleus of a theory of argument, then the ways in which argument and inference are
different will become clearer. However, it remains to the theory of reasoning to explicate these distinctions fully.
Let me provide without discussion the following or provisional definitions of these terms:
ImplicationA logical relationship between statements or propositions, in which one follows necessarily from the
others.
Paradigm case: If, if P then Q, and if Q then R, then if P then R.
InferenceThe transition of the mind from one proposition to another in accordance with some principle; at its best,
guided by the theory of probability.
Paradigm case: We always have snow in Windsor in January, so we will have snow in Windsor this January.
ArgumentAn argument is discourse aimed at rational persuasion; that is, the arguer puts forth a proposition (the
conclusion) on the basis of grounds or evidence.
Paradigm cases: The two main examples in chapter 2.
Even if I can make clear in theory the differences between these types of reasoning, it does not follow (and I do not
hold) that there is a rigid demarcation between them. An argument may well contain or be structured along the lines of
an implication. Here's an example:
Look, if it is true that if we want Hansen to come then we will have to get Powers; and if we have to get
Powers we will first have to persuade Pinto; so if we want Hansen to come, we will first have to persuade
Pinto.
This is an argument that has the form of the implication just stated. An inference may give rise to an argument or be
contained within one. We can imagine the inference just cited sparking an argument about whether there ever had been
a January without snow or, more likely, an argument about why winters are milder now than they were in the first half
of the century.

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I want to suggest that the truth behind the reasoning that led Govier to conductivism is this: We should abandon the idea
that an argument consists of a set of premises plus a connection, an inference, from those premises to the conclusion. In
other words, the truth behind conductivism is that arguments ought not to be represented as inferences. Arguments (at
least the central instances of them) and inferences (at least the central instances of them) are entirely distinct, although
related, species of reasoning.
Two comments seem appropriate here. First, I realize that the notion of inference is just a problematic as the notion of
argument and although a preliminary attempt was made in chapter 1 to distinguish the two, that attempt was
rudimentary. That leads to the second point. What is needed here is a fully developed theory of reasoning. The
confusion that has developed around these three types of reasoning makes this an opportune moment to say something
more about what I mean by "the theory of reasoning."
Excursus:
In my view, the task of thinking through such matters as the difference between implication and argument belongs to
the inquiry I call, following Finocchiaro (1984), the theory of reasoning. Because part of the argument of this book is
that the theory of argumentation requires supplementation and completion by the theory of reasoning, this is as good a
time as any for a slight detour to discuss that theory.
I begin with Finocchiaro's (1984) description of the theory of reasoningso far as I know the first one. He described the
theory of reasoning this way:
By theory of reasoning I mean the attempt to formulate, to test, to clarify, and to systematize concepts and
principles for the interpretation, the evaluation and the sound practice of reasoning. I claim that the theory of
reasoning so defined is a legitimate philosophical enterprise which is both viable and important. (p. 3)
If Finocchiaro is right, then an obvious question to be asked is, "Why has not more attention been given by philosophers
[and others] to this enterprise?" If you were to go to any of the standard indices of philosophyThe Philosopher's Index,
for exampleand look up "theory of reasoning," and were given a nickel for every reference, you would not have enough
to make a local phone call. The Encyclopedia of Philosophy contains no entry for the theory of reasoning. Indeed,
although there has been historically a great deal of philosophical interest in the related concept of rationality, only very
recently has there been much interest in reasoning. Why is that?

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My answer is that its development has been blocked by deeply rooted and powerful assumptions. In identifying these
assumptions I am going to use the term "inference" in a slightly extended sense different than that laid down earlier. I
beg the reader's indulgence for this lapse. First, I lay out the assumptions and then show how they worked together to
block the theory of reasoning.
One assumption is:
(A1) Reasoning is inferring.
I call this position Inferentialism. It is widespread, being found in the writings of philosophers and logicians and
cognitive psychologists. Consider the following chapter titles from Revlin and Mayer's (1978) classic study:
1. "Research on Syllogistic Reasoning" (p. 39)
2. "The Effect of Personal Biases on Syllogistic Reasoning" (p. 51)
3. "The Nature of Denied Propositions in the Conditional Sentence Reasoning Task" (p. 83)
4. "The Acceptance of Generalizations about Persons, Objects, and Events" (p. 101)
5. "The Role of Inference in Memory for Real and Artificial Information" (p. 139)
6. "Drawing Inferences from Set Inclusion Information Given in Text" (p. 163)
7. "Inference and Reading" (p. 185)
8. "Making Inferences about Relevance in Understanding Problems" (p. 195)
9. "Effects of Meaningfulness on the Representation of Knowledge and the Process of Inference for
Mathematical Problem Solving" (p. 207)
Would it not be fair to conclude that for these authors, reasoning and inferring are pretty much the same thing? I think
so. Is there any evidence of a shift on the part of psychologists away from that view in the last 25 years? Very little, as
we shall see.
A second assumption:
(A2) Inferring just is deductive inferring.
This position has been called "deductive chauvinism."
These assumptions combined with the notion that we have a perfectly adequate theory of inferenceFDLand given that
reasoning is inferring, it follows that we have a theory of reasoning. That is how one might arrive at the view that:
(A3) Logic (FDL) is the theory of reasoning.

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Because logic is already the theory of reasoning, there is no need to develop such a theory.
However, these assumptions can no longer be held dogmatically. The whole question of what constitutes reasoning has
opened up, according to Walton (1996)whose views are the subject of attention later. But here is a list of questions that
need answers:
1. What is reasoning? Is reasoning either identical to, essentially the same as, or else reducible to,
inferenceimplicationentailment? (Once again, I hold there are differences among these three, but they do not matter at
the moment.) How does reasoning differ from thinking?
2. To move to a different-level question: What is the relationship between reasoning and rationality? Are they the same
concept under different guises? And what about reasoning and intelligence? Reasoning and knowledge? This is the
Second Form of The Network Problem, discussed in the Introduction, and the view taken here is that its appropriate
forum is the theory of reasoning.
3. At a still different level: Is there a discernible pattern in the historical development of the various exemplifications of
reasoning? And what can we learn from various historical theories of reasoning?
4. Again: Are there universal principles of reasoning? Or are substantive principles of reasoning always field dependent,
as McPeck (1981) and others held?
5. At another different level, we must face questions such as: What is an appropriate conceptual scheme (or framework)
for the theory of reasoning? How can reasoning be most plainly categorized?
6. And at a still different level: What are the criteria of adequacy that a theory of reasoning must satisfy?
I am sure that I have missed other questions that naturally fall to this theory. If Finocchiaro's description is combined
with this list of questions, a reasonable picture of the theory of reasoning results.
In the 20th century, the boundaries have been blurred. The idea that FDL is, in some sense, the normative study of
inferences andor arguments promotes this blurring because FDL has nothing to do with either inference or argument
directly but instead has to do with the implicative relationship, which may or may not be imbedded in inferences andor
arguments.
As far as the theory of reasoning is concerned, FDL has mapped only a small portion of the terrain. There is much more
work to be done here. No one will deny the importance that such logic played in the research program developed by
analytic philosophy in the 20th century. Yet the arguments developed by Woods (1972) and Harman (1986), among
others, show that the principles of FDL cannot be normative with respect to inference, if by

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"inference" we mean something like moving from one state of mind (belief) to another (belief) in accordance with some
principle. The best that can be claimed is that if you want to know whether one statement, assertion, proposition follows
logically from some other(s)that is, whether the one is implied by the othersthen FDL is the theory to consult. (Even this
is not entirely true; FDL cannot provide a normative theory powerful enough to deal with all forms of implicature; e.g.,
what Grice, 1975, called conversational implication.) But FDL will not help you qua inferrer. You may get help from
what is called inductive logic. And FDL will not help you qua arguer. Here, you need what I call informal logic.
The issue we have brushed up against just nownamely the distinction between implication, inference, and argumentis
one that requires for its solution a perspective outside the theory of argument. Once again, we see why a theory of
argument ultimately requires completion by a theory of reasoning.
In his chapter 7, Hamblin (1970) took direct aim at the concept of argument. It is a provocative chapter in which
Hamblin made a great many important points about the limitations of the traditional view (which I have called FDL)
while remaining to some degree captive to that tradition.
Hamblin on the Concept of Argument
Because logicians operating under the FDL program blurred the line between inference and argumentation, it is no
surprise that, looking at argument in purely formal or structural terms, the very concept of argument has become
attenuated. Hamblin is a pivotal figure here because although his criticisms of FDL reveal some of its important
limitations, other weaknesses escape notice. I argue that his strategy for developing a theory of appraisal is importantly
flawed.
Hamblin's Account of Argument
Hamblin took up the question, "What is an argument?" He began with the commonplace idea that "an argument is
generally regarded as being whatever it is that is typically expressed by the form of words 'P, therefore Q,' 'P, and so Q';
or, perhaps, 'Q, since P', 'Q because P'" (p. 228). Two things immediately strike me about this passage. First, Hamblin
understood that it has become traditional to conceive argument in terms of structure; it is thought of as discourse that
assumes a particular form. This structuralist approach runs up against the objection that one just as often explains
something using many of these same forms. Hence, either there is no difference between an argument and an
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of reasoning) or else we need more than formalstructural considerations in our conception of argument. Second,
although it is clear that Hamblin was not himself sympathetic to this point of view, he did not seem direct enough in his
confrontation with it.
Hamblin's next series of points was (to anticipate the distinction shortly to be introduced) neither alethic nor epistemic
but, rather, dialectical. When he said, for example, that "an argument is more than just a collection of statements" (p.
229), I try to imagine a context that would give this remark its force. But that is difficult because I cannot think of a
single person who denies this point. Even formal logicians have a more stringent definition than that. In the next
paragraph, we read:
Now it is important to notice that when P is adduced in support of Q, it may actually not support Q. This is
only to say that an argument may be invalid. However, it is important to emphasize than an argument is not to
be identified with an implication. (p. 229)
Although the first two sentences seem quite obvious, the third contains what I am convinced is a crucial and not-widely-
credited insight. It slips by without notice because Hamblin did not give it the attention it needs. I attempted to do that
in chapter 2. And Hamblin further muddied the waters later on when, in the space of some 15 lines, he used the terms
"argument," "reasoning," and "inference process'' as though they were interchangeable. Let me look at the passage in
question.
At this point, Hamblin was discussing the nature of argument. This occurs in a passage where Hamblin was discussing a
variant of the liar paradox:
Epimenidies was telling the truth when he said "I am lying."
Therefore, Epimenides was lying when he said "I am lying."
Here is his comment:
We can, if we choose, hold firm to the conviction that an argument cannot be valid if the conclusion
contradicts a premise; and, if we do, we are forced to find a fault in the reasoning in this example, such as by
insisting that "I am lying" is not a genuine statement. In place of this rigid attitude, however, it would seem
better to admit that there are circumstances within which accepted inference-processes may lead to
unacceptable conclusions and that, if we have to, we can learn to live with this situation. (pp. 230231)
What stands out for me is how Hamblin shifted from "argument" to "reasoning" to "inference process" as if these were
pretty much the same notion.
Hamblin then turned his attention to "the actual logical relation between premises and conclusion" (p. 230) and
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and deductibility. If we distinguish, as he suggested between inference, implication, and argument, such problems can
properly be referred to the theory of deduction, where they belong. So Hamblin was right when he said, "All this sets
the theory of arguments apart from Formal Logic and gives it an additional dimension" (p. 231). I believe that Hamblin
is on the right track here in separating FDL from the theory of argument. Why not make the break straightaway and
pursue the features that give arguments this additional dimension? Why continue to be mesmerized by formal logic and
its focus on implication?
Hamblin's reflections have reached the fork in the road and he said that instead of asking what an argument is, we
should instead "approach it by discussing how arguments are appraised and evaluated" (p. 231). This approach seems to
me the reverse of what the process should be. It is as though we could hope to find out what an argument is by finding
out how we evaluate it rather than first getting clear on what an argument is and then using that insight to generate the
needed criteria.3
What, then, are the criteria by which arguments are to be appraised? Hamblin began his inquiry by invoking the
standard FDL view, according to which we must distinguish between the truth or falsity of the premises and conclusion
on the one hand and the inference process from premises to conclusion on the other.
Hamblin wrote, "A valid argument, it is said, may be built on completely false premises and it may thus have a
completely false conclusion. But this is a complete misrepresentation of the nature of argument" (p. 232). I agree,
although I am not sure I fully understand how it is a complete misrepresentation. But he was probably correct when he
said, "we do not describe an argument as a good one if the premises are false" (p. 232). Still in the process, he slightly
misrepresented the tradition. In his treatment, he failed to mark the customary distinction between soundness and
validity. What was just said about a valid argument could not have been said about a sound argument. Hamblin could
not have written "A sound argument may be built on completely false premises and it may thus have a completely false
conclusion." Thus, his critique of the traditional view is off target here.
This led Hamblin to the question, "What about the conclusion? Must an argument have a true conclusion to be
good?" (p. 232). In answer to this question, Hamblin said that, "there are good arguments that are not deductive"an
important observation! He said also that "there are often good arguments for a given conclusion and also good
arguments against it" (p.
3 Hamblin's (1970) suggestion is not without precedent in philosophy. Thus, Wittgenstein began the The Blue
and Brown Books (1960) by inquiring into what counts as the explanation of the meaning of a word, "for
whatever that explains will be the meaning" (p. 1). But it is not clear that the situation Wittgenstein described
is similar enough to this one for there to be transfer.
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232). The significance of this claim should not be underestimated for it shows that goodness and soundness are not
identical standards of appraisal. To reprise the argument of the last chapter, if we admit that there can be good
arguments for both a conclusion and its opposite, we have conceded thereby that the goodness of these arguments
cannot be explicated in terms of the ideal of soundness. We have conceded that FDL cannot satisfy the third adequacy
condition. That means that the FDL's theory of appraisal cannot be adequate. Although I already have discussed this
point, I wanted the record to show both that Hamblin was aware of this but that he did not really develop the insight.
Hamblin made another crucial observation:
At the very least we should move one step closer to reality. When we put up an example of an argument we
should imagine someone actually arguing, not merely imagine someone imagining someone arguing. It is very
easy, later, to ascend the theoretical ladder by conditionalizing what is said; but it is not nearly so easy, if we
start from the other end, to restore the additional dimensions of reality. (p. 234)
Once again, we have an insight with which more could be done. When do real people argue? Why do they do it?
Reflection on such questions and on the real practice of argumentation might have led Hamblin to appreciate the
significant differences between deduction, implication, and inference on the one hand and argumentation on the other.
Strengths and Weaknesses
Hamblin's reflections on the concept of argument were uneven in quality. They contain many important insights:
Hamblin saw that an argument is "more than just a collection of statements" (p. 229). He resisted any attempt to identify
an argument with an implication and was clear that a theory of argument must outrun FDL. He stressed the importance
of dealing with real arguments as opposed to imagined or hypothetical or artificially constructed ones, and he explicitly
stated what I have called Adequacy Condition 3: There can be good arguments for a given conclusion and good
arguments against it. Hamblin understood that arguments serve more than one purpose. Although he did not develop
this point in detail, Hamblin criticized the traditional for taking proof to be a model of rational argument. He understood
that there are few, if any, conclusive or knock-down arguments.
It seems clear that Hamblin's intention is to move the theory of argument away from Formal Logic and toward Formal
Dialectic. To that end, Hamblin took a critical stance toward the tradition I call FDL. I find Hamblin's reflections on the
concept of argument are uneven in quality. They contain several important insights: That implication and argument are
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that there can be good arguments for as well as against a given conclusion but these do not receive the development they
warrant.
Hamblin's reflections on argument are marred by three important short-comings:
1. Hamblin did not see the limitations of the formal approaches to argument. Hamblin seemed more or less content with
the traditional idea of argument as a certain structure of discourse displaying a certain form. To that degree, his critique
remained well within the orbit of traditional logic (with its bias for deductivism), even though his thinking contained
hints of a significant break with that tradition.
2. Hamblin was fuzzy on the distinction between argument, inference, and implication. Although Hamblin appears to
cleanly distinguish implication from the rest, he seemed to regard the others (inference, argument, and reasoning) as
more or less interchangeable. At the very least, clear boundaries have not been put in place.
3. The theory of appraisal is not properly grounded. By this I mean that Hamblin reviewed the traditional notion of an
argument and, without ever cleanly resolving that issue, presented a theory of appraisal that has not been derived in any
explicit fashion from the conception of argument that he tabled. Indeed, dialectic appears to proceed from a discussion
of what constitutes a good argument to the idea of argument (although Hamblin did not actually discuss the endpoint of
this suggested process.) In my view, this is the wrong way to approach these matters. It would be better to begin by
getting clear on the nature of argument and then using that understanding as the foundation for a derivation of the
appropriate criteria. That is, we move from the theory of analysis to the theory of appraisal. That is the strategy I pursue
in chapters 5 through 7.
I have accused Hamblin and others of not differentiating between argument, inference, and implication. A full account
of this difference is beyond the scope of this work and my main interest in this book lies with the concept of argument.
So I forge ahead, mindful of the debts that I am accumulating.
The Problems with FDL:

An Alternative View
When it comes to diagnosing the problems with FDL and learning what lessons we can, there are two different (and not
incompatible) diagnoses. The first is that the problem lies with the formalist commitments of FDL. This diagnosis is
what stands behind the development of informal logic, and I deal with it in chapter 5.

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A second, different, and perhaps equally attractive, diagnosis is that the problem is not the formalist proclivity of FDL
but rather its deductivism. This is the diagnosis given by, among others, Barth. I want to take note briefly here of that
diagnosis.
Barth's Critique of Deductivism
According to Barth, the problem with FDL is not the formal part but rather the deductive part. Her phrase for it is the
deductive nomological paradigmDNP. According to DNP, reasoning is essentially deduction, and logic as the study of
reasoning is itself deductive in character.
Barth was opposed to this view. She argued against it in several articles, particularly in 1992, where she argued that the
broader deductivist views, when applied to logic, are such that the justification for them is circular and completely
unconvincing. She argued:
The only way in which I could justify a belief that logic is and should remain (deductive) science is by
claiming first, that mathematics itself necessarily is a deductive science and, second, that logic is a part of
mathematics. The latter is of course nothing but a dogma issued in a certain interest. There is therefore no
contradiction in saying: For political purposes (in the widest sense), formal logic is essentially a set or sets of
rules for the assignments of rights and duties in discussions that take place under conflicts of opinion, and in
no way fundamentally a science of deduction, to say nothing of a deductive science. (p. 667)
In Barth's view, then, the problem with FDL is not the formalism but the deductivism, which she identified with the
program to reduce logic to mathematics, which itself is construed as essentially deductive in character. Moreover, she
identified DNP with "an objectivist epistemology of anonymous rationality or else with a subjectivist epistemology of
constructivist mentalism" (p. 667). Barth, too, wanted to resist the mathematicization of logic. Her own response to this
development was the development of dialogue logic, an initiative that warrants a deeper, more thorough discussion than
I can give here.
Whichever diagnosis one leans to, it seems clear that in this century, logic was invaded by mathematics.4 It is time to
discuss this claim in more detail.
4 Wittgenstein (1964) made a claim very much like this in his Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics,
IV, #46: "The curse of the invasion of mathematics by mathematical logic is that now any proposition can be
represented in a mathematical symbolism, and this makes us feel obliged to understand it. Although of course
this method of writing is nothing but the translation of vague ordinary prose" (p. 155e).

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The Mathematicization of Logic
Toulmin presented his view that in the 20th century logic was mathematicized. What does Toulmin understand by this
process? Since the very beginning, he said, logicians have harbored the desire to turn logic into a formal system. They
have accepted a mathematical ideal for logical theory; this has been progressively the case since the time of Leibniz. He
said: "By now, mathematical logic has become a frozen calculus, having no functional connection with the canons for
assessing the strength and cogency of argument" (p. 186).
What is missing from Toulmin's account (of which I have given just the barest sketch here) is any reference to the way
that this new mathematicized logic became part of the philosophical research program explored at the beginning of the
century by Russell and Wittgenstein, both of whom were heavily indebted to Frege. Careful study of the origins of this
project reveals that the interest behind the project is not the desire to make logic a better instrument for the evaluation of
argument, but rather to clarify and settle disputes about the nature and foundation of mathematics.5
Thus, the mathematicization of logic denotes several things. First, it refers to the distance between logical theory and the
task of evaluating argument; it acknowledges distance between logic and argumentation. Second, it leads in the
direction of an a prioristic perspective (most in evidence in Wittgenstein's [1922] Tractatus) and a complete disdain for
the empirical as being psychologism. Third, it connects with the positivist research program according to which there
are only two forms of knowledge: the a priori, formal knowledge characteristic of logic and mathematics and the
empirical knowledge characteristic of the special sciences.
That logic and mathematics became closely identified is a matter of historical record. However, developments since
suggest that the time is ripe
5 Frege wrote:
The ideal of a strictly scientific method in mathematics, which I have tried to realize here, and which perhaps
might be named after Euclid, I should like to describe in the following way. (137)
The novelty of this book does not lie in the content of the theorems but in the development of the proofs and
the foundations on which they are based. (p. 139)
With this book I accomplish an object which I had in view in my Begriffsschrift of 1879 and which I
announced in my Grundlagen der Arithmetik. I am here trying to prove the opinion on the concept of number
that I expressed in the book last mentioned. (p. 140)
It is evident from these passages that Frege was not interested in logic as the inquiry into what makes for a good
argument but, rather, insofar as it is implicated in questions of the foundations of mathematics. I would argue that
this is no less true of Russell, who may be called the architect of modern symbolic or mathematical logic.

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to rethink this relationship, for whatever its virtues were, it certainly had some vices, one of which has been of concern
to us herethe virtual disappearance from the mandate of logic of the focus on real arguments and the need for a theory
that would help in their evaluation and criticism.
Lessons from the Past
Introduction
In Barth (1987, p. 7), we read the following words of advice:
Do not take leave of established sciences entirely or too soon.
If you do, be sure to do it for the right reasons.
Beware of creating new isolated playing-grounds with their own esoteric languages. It is bad enough as it is.
This advice is excellent, and I hope to follow it. If we abandon FDL as a theory of argument, as I have argued we must,
then we must take leave for the right reasons. What are those reasons?
Reasons to Abandon FDL as a Theory of Argument
In light of the discussion of this and the preceding chapter, what are those reasons? If we reflect on the limitations of
FDL as a theory of argument, they will suggest this question. What was FDL intended for in the first place? Is it the
case that FDL was devised as a theory of argument? If so, does its failure mean one thing? Or was FDL devised for
some other purpose, in which case its failure as a theory of argument would have quite a different meaning.
Let me then ask, "What is the origin of FDL? How did it come about?" FDL was never cut out to be the theory of
argument it was to become. If we look at the development of what is called modern formal logic, we can see quite
clearly that it was never the intent of this logic to help me assess arguments. It was the intent of this logic to provide a
proper foundation for mathematics. Certainly, Frege's intent cannot be described as developing a logic that would help
with the assessment of arguments. His goal was to clear up certain problems in the foundations of logic and
mathematics and the desire to impose greater standards of rigor and clarity on logic.
Russell and Whitehead extended Frege's program as part of a broader aim that of showing that mathematics was
reducible to logic. One can hunt in vain for any hint that this logic is intended to help the evaluation of

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arguments. This very powerful theory, its central notions and techniques, was developed for a specific purposeto clear
up issues in the foundations of mathematics.
Consider, for example, the origin of quantification theory. What was Frege up to here? Was he attempting to develop a
theory that would help us identify the kinds of mistakes that people make when they argue with quantifiers? Not at all.
Frege realized that the validity of some implications depended on more than just the propositional form:
(1) All men are mortal, and

Jones is a man, to infer
Jones is mortal,
has a logical form of fundamentally different character than
(2) Either the flag is white or black.

It is not white,
therefore it is black.
There was no theory to appeal to here other than the Aristotelian term "theory" (syllogistic), so Frege developed what is
now called predicate logic and the rudiments of quantification theory to help show the significant differences in logical
form.
Someone will remind me that just because that is what logic was invented for does not mean that it cannot have some
useful application to other areas. Indeed, one of the great discoveries is that the same formal theory can be given
different interpretations. That is not the issue here: It is not the issue of interpreting but of applying some theory to
arguments in natural language.
Consider the provenance of the notion of validity. Ultimately, that notion traces back to Aristotle in Prior Analytics,
where he discussed it as, "certain things being assumed, others things follow of necessity from their being so." I think it
is fair to say that in the Analytics, taken in its totality, Aristotle is at least partially aiming at a theory of argument. Prior
Analytics studies one kind of argumentsyllogistic argument. Posterior Analytics studies demonstration. Other kinds of
argument are studied in, for example, the Topics, where he discussed what he called probable reasoning. For Aristotle,
then, deductive argument was, at best, part of the complete study of argument. Hence, validity was one standard but not
the only one.
Think, as well, about one of the crucial notions for formal, deductive logiclogical form. What is its origin? What was it
devised for? Russell (1915) developed the notion of logical form to allow him to solve problems in the philosophy of
logic, or, as he called it, philosophical logic. In other words, the notion of logical form does not originate with Russell's
desire to understand how to evaluate argumentation. It has a quite different origin and function.

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So the origins of FDL seem clearly to suggest that it was never intended to constitute a theory of argument. However,
we have noted that in this tradition, there is a gradual blurring of the lines between implication, inference, and argument.
When logicians turned their attention to the task of writing introductory logic texts, it was only to be expected that they
would draw on the powerful theory developed in FDL. Given the tendency to construe implication as argument, we can
perhaps understand how it was that FDL came to be thought of as a theory of argument.
What I am suggesting, then, is one good reason to abandon FDL as a theory of argument is that it was not devised to
serve that purpose and, as we saw in the last chapter, does not in fact serve that purpose.
An Objection
There is an objection that I need to take account of: Is not disjunctive syllogism the form of an argument?
I concede that an argument may well have this structure. But I argue later that it cannot have just this structure.
Conclusion
In chapter 1, I discussed the current state of argumentation in 20th century culture. I argued that it is jeopardized by
developments in the broader culture (such as television), as well as by developments within the academy; hence, the
increased importance of the theory of argumentation. In chapter 2, I attempted the first systematic account of the theory
of argument. Leaning heavily on the work of Govier and other theorists, I first discussed the tasks that a theory of
argument must accomplish and then I surveyed the various possible configurations that such theories might take. I also
formulated the adequacy conditions that any theory of argument must satisfy. In chapter 3, I reviewed Govier's critical
discussions of the two classical theories of argument, deductivism and positivism, and also discussed Govier's proposed
alternativeconductivism. I argued that none of the extant theories is capable of meeting the adequacy conditions set
forth in chapter 2. In this chapter, I looked for an explanation of the astonishing fact that 2,000 years into this inquiry,
scholars still do not have what could be called an adequate theory of argument. Part of the explanation is the
developments that occurred in the field of logic in the 20th century, when, under the influence of Russell and
Whitehead, logic became closely identified with problems in the foundations of mathematics.
The stage is set now for Part II, in which I argue that informal logic, properly reconfigured, can meet the demands of a
theory of argument as they have been outlined in Part I.

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PART II
A PRAGMATIC THEORY OF ARGUMENT

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Chapter 5
Informal Logic:
An Alternative Theory of Argument
In chapter 3, I argued that FDL is inadequate when construed as a theory of argument. In the last chapter, I attempted to
derive lessons from reflection on the history of which FDL was an important part. The purpose of Part II is to show that
informal logic can provide the foundations for a new theory of argument(ation).
To begin Part IIthe theoretical part of this workI review the theory of argument that has emerged under the title of
informal logic. Govier (1987) referred to these developments when she wrote:
Informal logicians, contesting the drive for complete rigor and purity among formalists, contend that the
appraisal of natural arguments requires something other than translation into a technical formal language and
application of formal rules to test validity. However, it is only in the stricter sense of ''formal" that informal
logicians are committed to the view that a theory of natural argument would not be a formal theory. (p. 14)
This passage brings to the fore two important points. First, it raises the issue of what sort of formalism informal logic is
to be contrasted withan issue taken up later in this chapter. It should be noted at the outset that informal logicians are
generally aware of the alternative logics to FDLthe so-called applied (or deviant) logics, such as many-valued logic,
epistemic logic, deontic logic, and the Anderson-Belnap systems of relevance logic.1 The important
1 Modal logic was the first of these breakaway logics. See Lewis and Langford (1932) and, for a good
systematic exposition, see Hughes and Cresswell (1968). A good source for epistemic logic is Hintikka
(1962). For deontic logic, see von Wright (1968): for the Anderson and Belnap approach, see (1975).

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thing for our purposes here is to note that none of these alternative logics represents itself as a logic of argumentation.
Their focus is different from that of informal logic.
Second, this passage once again raises the question of the province of informal logic. Here Govier described it as "the
appraisal of natural arguments." But what exactly is a natural argument? Does informal have a role to play in other
areas, such as argumentation within the disciplines? How can the domain of informal logic be best characterized?
A Brief Account of the Rise of Informal Logic
In this section, I give a brief historical overview of the emergence of informal logic.
From Aristotle to 1970
In logic, as in so many other areas of philosophy, all roads lead back to Aristotle. Prior Analytics is typically identified
as the first work of formal logic. It is customary to trace informal logic back to Aristotle's Topics. The fallacy tradition,
which is so much a part of informal logic, goes back to his De Sophisticis Elenchis. The Rhetoric likewise is an
important sourcebook for informal logic. Thus, Aristotle can be said to have laid down the foundation for both formal
and informal logic.
Formal deductive logic has received the most sustained attention from logicians. Beginning in the 19th century, more
attention has been paid to inductive logic. Although we now know that it is unsatisfactory to state that nothing of
importance happened between Aristotle and Frege in formal logic (see Walton & Brinton, 1997), it does seem possible
to say that almost nothing of importance happened in informal logic between Aristotle and Toulmin's challenge of 1958.
To understand the development of informal logic, it is necessary to understand that the context in which it arose was
pedagogical rather than theoretical. And so I focus now on logic textbooks written for undergraduate instruction in
North America. To get a sense for the developments leading up to informal logic, it is instructive to compare texts from
different periods in the 20th century.
Begin with Joseph (1906). This text clearly shows that Aristotelian syllogistic was still the dominant logical theory, as
far as textbooks were concerned. The first 14 chapters deal in one way or another with the syllogism. In chapter 15,
Joseph turned to hypothetical and disjunctive reasoning. Both of these are treated syllogistically. Chapters 18 through
24 deal with various

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aspects of inductive reasoning, including causal reasoning, explanation, and reasoning by analogy. Chapter 25 deals
with mathematical reasoning and chapter 26 covers the methodology of the sciences. There is an appendix on fallacies,
which follows the Aristotelian division into fallacies in dictione and those extra dictionem. In the former are
equivocation, amphiboly, composition, division, accent, and figure of speech. Treated in the latter list are accident,
secundum quid, ignoratio elenchi, petitio principii, non causa pro causa, the consequent, and many questions. (It is
interesting to note that although the term "inference" is listed in the index, the term "argument" is not.)
I look next at Stebbing (1931) and notice a quite different alignment. Her text has three parts. Although they are not
named, Part I deals with deduction, with traditional syllogistic relationships and elements of propositional logic. Part II
takes up such topics as induction by enumeration and analogy, causality, and hypothesis and for the most part could be
said to deal with induction. Part III deals with definition, abstraction and generalisation, the characteristics of logical
thinking, and, finally, the history of logic. Although Stebbing said explicitly that this was to be an introduction to logic,
not to symbolic logical or mathematical logic, the text shows the influence of the Principia while it maintains the utility
of traditional Aristotelian logic. In other words, the scope of deductive logic has been expanded to include the recent
developments in mathematical or symbolic logic. Her text illustrates the shift in this period whereby syllogistic logic is
complemented by propositional logic.
Next we consider a post World War II text, Black (1946), divided into three sections. Part One is entitled Deductive
Logic (and includes a chapter on the syllogism). Part Two is entitled Language and contains chapters on the uses of
language, ambiguity, definition, and assorted fallacies. Part Three is titled Induction and Scientific Method. (It is
interesting that Black used the title Critical Thinking for what otherwise might be called an introductory logic text.)
What the text betokens is that propositional logic has now become the dominant theory of argument.
Looking next at Quine (1952), I find a complete turnabout. For Quine, not arguments or inferences but rather statements
are the focus of logic. He wrote, "the chief importance of logic lies in implication, which, therefore, will be the main
theme of this book" (xvi). The entire text is taken up with the techniques of modern symbolic logic. A reader familiar
with Quinean themes will find them reflected in the Introduction: the importance of statements, the nature of logical
truth, the under-determination of systems by experience, and so on. The student or teacher who comes to Quine's logic
text hoping for enlightenment about how to appraise the editorial in the morning paper is destined to be frustrated.
Finally, we come to Copi (1954), which embodies what has elsewhere been referred to as the global approach (Blair &
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three parts: Part One is about language; Part Two is about deduction; Part Three is about induction. (This alignment
seems to reflect Black's, 1946.) For whatever reasons, Copi's text caught on and became the standard against which
other texts would have to array themselves.
In the development of logic textbooks in the 20th century, I can see the increasing influence of FDL as the theory in
charge. Inductive logic is second in command. There may be a section or an appendix in which the author deals in
passing with the fallacies. So it was for the next 15 yearsthe typical logic text or course in which the student received
logic instruction (typically referred to as the baby logic course) was predicated on the assumption that deductive logic
was real logic. This did not change until the appearance of Kahane (1971). This text that launched the informal logic
movement and represents the first of what is called the New Wave texts.
Informal Logic Emerges
To understand the emergence of informal logic, one must understand how this text came to be. Kahane's own words,
quoted earlier, make it clear that Kahane wanted logic to be useful, to be relevant. To understand this orientation, we
must take into account the cultural context in which this text appeared: that is, North American universities in the 1960s.
During the 1960s, many students had taken an increasingly political stancenot only toward the university but toward the
culture itself. This was the period of the active antiwar protest movement on campuses across the country. In the
university, students were demanding that their courses relate to their needs as citizens. This activism, kindled by the
Civil Rights movement, and fanned by the anti-Vietnam war movement and the related demand for relevance in
education associated with the 1960s, had an impact on student expectations when they entered their classrooms.
They expected their introductory logic course to have a bearing on the reasoning and argumentation of current affairs.
The texts of the 1950s and 1960s (following Copi) did not satisfy their needs. At the same time, instructors, many of
whom wanted logic to be useful, were sympathetic. Such a cultural Geist seems to be the best explanation for what we
witnessed in the early 1970sthe emergence, almost at the same time but independently of one another, of texts that
replaced the standard introduction to (symbolic) logic courses with a syllabus designed to teach how to assess critically
the logic of natural language argumentation in public discourse. Such courses proved to be popular with students. To
attract enrollments at a time of increased competition for students within colleges and universities, philosophy
departments began to respond to this demand by presenting a logic course with some qualified characteristic of logic
like applied or practicalsomething to indicate that its content would both differentiate it from

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symbolic logic and also be useful or practical. Publishers were quick to sense this new wrinkle so that by the early
1980s, a proliferation of textbooks solicited by market-conscious publishers contributed to more new courses.
Kahane's text can be seen as one type of pedagogical response to this demand. What he did was to take a traditional
subject (logic) and update it. (Others responded to the challenge by changing the curriculum, either by getting rid of
certain courses and bringing others in their steadviz., women's studies.) Kahane took as his focal point what had been a
marginal player in the traditional introduction to logic coursethe part on fallacies. In making this move, Kahane may be
seen as going back to a different part of Aristotle's Organon, to the De Sophisticis Elenchis rather than the Prior
Analytics. Although he did not call this approach "informal logic," it is natural enough that others would do so because
of the prominent position Kahane gave to the "informal fallacies." Kahane did attempt to breath new life into the fallacy
tradition. He purged the hoary examples of amphiboly and replaced them by more up-to-date examples, taken from the
politics and social issues of the day. He added fallacies to the traditional list, so that one will find not only ad hominem
but also the ad verecundiam, not only "hasty conclusion" but also "suppressed evidence." New fallacies appear, such as
"red herring'' and "provincialism." Kahane replaced the traditional chapters on scientific method and probability with
chapters on the mass mediaon advertising and on the news mediaand on textbooks, topics much closer to the interests of
those who wish to deal with contemporary rhetoric.
Kahane's text was an important breakthrough and paved the way for what came to be known as the informal logic
movement.
Conclusion
The Informal Logic Movement began as a revolution in the way logic was taught as an undergraduate subject in North
American universities. The background for this revolution was the logic textbooks of the day, for it was there that these
innovations tend to occur. Reasons are not hard to fathom. The changes were primarily driven by pedagogical concerns
and only secondarily by theoretical problems. At that time, there was no journal dedicated to such theoretical issues.
Later, it became clear that informal logic was not simply about changing the way logic was taught, as though one could
simply change instruments without at the same time making significant adjustments elsewhere. It gradually became
apparent that informal logic is about reforming logic (Johnson & Blair, 1985).
In this way, the development of informal logic presents an interesting contrast with that of formal logic, which began as
a revolution at the level of theory that later trickled down to texts. The recent development of formal logic is typical of
the pattern found in the formal and empirical sciences,

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where textbooks are dependent on the theoretical developments that filter down into the texts over time. This is the
orientation Woods (1992) reflected when he wrote, "Get the theory right first, then take care (if you know how) of
instructional routines" (p. 44). Massey (1981) made a similar assumption when he said that "textbooks are parasitic
upon journals and scholarly tomes, and properly so" (p. 489). But Woods and Massey overlooked the possibility of
reversing this direction: First, be clear on what the tool should look like, then design it. Something like that pattern of
development is what we see in the emergence of informal logic.
Having discussed the historical development of informal logic, I turn next to the thematic question: What is informal
logic?
What Is Informal Logic?
What Informal Logic Is Not
Many readers are probably familiar with Ryle's use of the term. Ryle did not offer an explicit definition of informal
logic, developing it in contrast with formal logic, which he saw as tied up with the study of certain topic-neutral
expressions. Ryle (1962) wrote:
There remains a very important way in which the adjective "logical" is properly used to characterise both the
inquiries which belong to Formal Logic and the inquiries which belong to [Ed. note: we expect Ryle to say
"informal logic" . . . but see what he in fact writes.] philosophy. The Formal Logician really is working out the
logic of and, not, all, some, etc., and the philosopher really is exploring the logic of the concepts of pleasure,
seeing, chance, etc. even though the work of one is greatly unlike the work of the other in procedure and
objectives. (p. 119)
Thus, for Ryle, we might say that informal logic is the logic of concepts. It is termed informal because of Ryle's belief
that only nonformal procedures will reveal this logic. In other words, whereas formal logic can handle the entailment
relationships that surround conjunction and implication, it cannot handle "full-blooded concepts like pleasure or
memory."2 In this usage, informal logic becomes roughly equivalent to conceptual analysis, to what Wittgenstein (1951)
would call the "depth grammar" of an expression. But this usage is not helpful in understanding what informal logic is.
2 This is the same kind of point Davidson (1967) made when he talked about logical grammar and the
difference between the statements "Bardot is good" and "Bardot is a good actress." See Davidson, "Truth and
Meaning," in Martinich (1991).

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Usage after Ryle
The first occurrence of this term in something like the sense in which I am using it in this book is found in Carney and
Scheer (1964), where it appears (without any explanation) as the title of Part One. There are six chapters in Part One.
Chapter 1 is Appraising Arguments Logically; chapter 2 is Traditional Informal Fallacies (divided into fallacies of
relevance, insufficient evidence, and ambiguity); chapter 3 is devoted to definitions and chapter 4 to uses of language;
chapter 5 is about analogy; chapter 6 is about dilemmas and paradoxes. Part Two is Formal Logic. Part Three is called
The Logical Structure of Science.
Carney and Scheer did not tell us what exactly they understood by the term "informal logic," but here is their
description of Part I:
Part I, Informal Logic, contains both new and traditional topics and some novel treatment of traditional topics.
Informal fallacies, which are useful in motivating students in the study of logic, are treated in the traditional
manner. The standard topicsanalogy, dilemmas, uses of language, classifications of methods of defining terms
and types of definitionare also discussed in this part. But two topics are introducedparadoxes and
nonsensewhich are not found in many introductory logic textbooks. The discussions of nonsense and the uses
of language are designed to bring to the attention of the student some of the immediate connections between
logic and language and to show the student the significance of logic to philosophy. (vii)
There are several interesting points here. The first is that Carney and Scheer believe that there are traditional topics for
informal logic, although it is unclear what these traditional topics are. The second point is that their innovations are for
the sake of showing the student the significance of logic to philosophy. They seem less interested in helping students to
appraise reasoning in ordinary life than in showing them why traditional logic is important for philosophy. Third, on the
basis of this description, the best guess at what Carney and Scheer meant by informal logic is that it covers logical
matters not taken up by formal logic.
The term also appears as a part of the subtitle of Fogelin (1978), where he wrote:
For certain purposes, arguments are best studied as abstract patterns . . . The task of logic is to discover the
fundamental principles for distinguishing good arguments from bad ones. The study of those general
principles that make certain patterns of argument reasonable (or valid) and other patterns of argument
unreasonable (or invalid) is called formal logic. A different, but complementary, way of viewing an argument
is to treat it as a particular use of language: arguing is one of the things that we do with words. This approach

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places stress upon arguing as a linguistic activity . . . It raises questions of the following kind: What is the
place of argument within language as a whole? In a given language . . . what words or phrases are
characteristic of argument? What task or tasks are arguments supposed to perform? When an approach to
arguments has this form, the study is called informal logic. (p. vvi)
It appears, then, that by informal logic Fogelin had in mind the study of the linguistic basis of and aspects of argument.3
Johnson and Blair first used the term "informal logic" as part of the title of the 1978 First International Symposium on
Informal Logic. Until that time, the term we used to describe our enterprise was "applied logic." It seemed to us that in
virtue of the renewed interest in the informal fallacies (Kahane, Walton & Woods, and Scriven to a lesser degree), the
term "informal logic" was a better descriptor. What was the intuition behind this? We were engaged in a teaching
students how to evaluate arguments (historically, this task is associated with logic), but the logic we were teaching was
not a formal logic. That is, we made no reference to the logical form of arguments in understanding their structure, nor
did we make use of the standard of validity as part of our theory of appraisalinstead of using fallacy theory. Because the
fallacies in question were the informal fallacies, the term ''informal logic" seemed appropriate.
In our first attempt to articulate the meaning, we (Blair and Johnson, 1980) said:
The label "informal logic" means different things to different people. To many it refers to the lists of informal
fallacies and various descriptions and classifications of the these fallacies . . . To others it designates the
subject matter of a certain sort of introductory logic course . . . which employs various non-formal techniques
to try to teach elementary reasoning skills. To still others, it has come to mark off a field of logical
investigation distinct from formal deductive logic. (p. ix.)
Johnson and Blair avoided any direct statement of what informal logic was but noted two tendencies that seemed to be
identified with this development. First, we mentioned the turn in the direction of actual arguments as contrasted with the
artificial type of argument often found in formal logic textbooks. Second, we noted the growing disenchantment with
the capacity of formal logic to provide the standards of good reasoning. We subdivided informal logic into (a) the
theory of fallacies and (b) the theory of argument.
3 For Fogelin, the normative issues remain the province of formal logic, although it should be noted that the
categoriescriteria of relevance and clarity (neither of which is standard of argument appraisal in typical
presentations of formal logic) are introduced in chapter 4. Clarity is introduced with a brief story; relevance is
given a Gricean justification.

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What, then, can be said about the emergence of this term? Kahane's text showed one way in which logic, both as a
subject matter to be thought about and a subject matter to be taught, could be revitalizedby dipping back into logic,
focusing on the informal fallacies, and using them as, in effect, a theory of criticism for logic. Thus the term "informal"
logic. Later it came to designate any approach to logic that either avoided or minimized the use of the theory of analysis
(the notion of logical form, the definition of arguments as sequences of propositions), and the theory of evaluation of
formal logic (the notions of validity and soundness).
Finally, then, it is important to make it clear that informal logic does not mean formal logic without the formalities.4 In
this regard, one should compare Copi's Introduction to Logic (1982) with his Informal Logic (1986). The main
differences appear to be that the 1986 text deals with tree diagramming and contains very little formal logic. On the
copyright page, we read the following: "A portion of this book is reprinted from Introduction to Logic, Sixth Edition,
copyright (c) 1982, Irving Copi." In fact if you compare the contents of the later text with the earlier, you will find
significant overlap. The main difference appears to be that all sections dealing with deduction have been subtracted
from Informal Logic. Although some new material has been added (chiefly on fallacy), this appears to be largely an
edited version of Introduction to Logic, thereby giving the impression that the way to do informal logic is by deleting
the formal parts.
The Nature of Informal Logic
Having said what informal logic is not, let me attempt to articulate what it is. By informal logic, I mean to designate a
branch of logic whose task is to develop nonformal standards, criteria, procedures for the analysis, interpretation,
evaluation, criticism, and construction of argumentation in everyday discourse (Johnson & Blair, 1987).
An obvious point is that informal takes its meaning in contrast to its counterpartformal. This point manages not to be
made for a very long time; hence the nature of informal logic remained opaque, even to those involved in it, for a long
period of time. Here is it helpful to have recourse to Barth and Krabbe (1982) where they distinguished three senses of
the term "form."
By "form1," Barth and Krabbe meant the sense of the term that derives from the Platonic idea of form, where form
denotes the ultimate metaphysical unit. Barth and Krabbe claimed that most traditional logic is formal in this sense.
That is, syllogistic logic is a logic of terms where the terms could naturally be understood as place holders for Platonic
(or Aristotelian) forms.
4 Others have addressed this issue. See Woods (1980) and Govier (1987). Johnson and Blair (1971) discussed
seven meanings of formalinformal.

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In this first sense of form, almost all logic is informal (not formal). Certainly, neither predicate logic nor propositional
logic can be construed as term logics. However, such an understanding of informal logic would be much too broad to be
useful.
By "form2," Barth and Krabbe meant the form of sentences and statements as these are seen in modern logic. In this
sense, one could say that the syntax of the language to which a statement belongs is very precisely formulated or
formalized or that the validity concept is defined in terms of the logical form of the sentences that make up the
argument. In this sense of formal, most modern and contemporary logic is formal. That is, such logics are formal in the
sense that they canonize the notion of logical form and the notion of validity plays the central role normatively.
In this second sense of form, informal logic is not formal because it abandons the notion of logical form as the key to
understanding structure and likewise abandons validity as constitutive for the purposes of the evaluation or argument
(ation). When Govier (1987) discussed informal logic, it is this second sense of formal that stands in the background.
By "form3," Barth and Krabbe meant to refer to "procedures which are somehow regulated or regimented, which take
place according to some set of rules." Barth and Krabbe said that ''we do not defend formality3 of all kinds and under all
circumstances." Rather, "we defend the thesis that verbal dialectics must have a certain form (i.e., must proceed
according to certain rules) in order that one can speak of the discussion as being won or lost" (19). In this third sense of
form, informal logic can itself also be formal. There is nothing in the informal logic enterprise that stands opposed to
the idea that argumentative discourse should be subject to norms; that is, subject to rules, criteria, standards, or
procedures. What is rejected is that the criteria for evaluating arguments are to be obtained by reflection on the logical
form.
How, then, does informal logic differ from formal logic? Informal logic differs from formal logic not only in its
methodology but also by its focal point. That is, the social, communicative practice of argumentation can and should be
distinguished from both deductive inference and deductive implication, which are the proper subjects of formal logicas
was argued in the last chapter. Informal logic is concerned with the logic of argumentation: the cogency of the support
that reasons provide for the conclusions they are supposed to back up.
Other Perspectives on Informal Logic
The previous account of informal logic is consistent with views of Govier (1987) and Walton (1990b), each of which I
now briefly examine. There are other views about the nature of informal logic (that there is no such thing or that it is
really epistemology), and I deal with them in chapter 9.

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Govier. For Govier (1987), for example, informal logic denotes the art of argument evaluation, a task that she insists is
nonformal in character:
Logic is supposed to be both scientific and practical. . . . There is a tension in these views of logic. We cannot
have it both waysthat logic is entirely formal and yet apples to real argumentation. Either logic is nonformal
or it tells us only a small amount of what we need to know and understand and evaluate arguments (p. 203).
Here, informal logic is seen as the logic of real arguments:
To speak of informal logic is not to contradict oneself but to acknowledge what should be obvious: that the
understanding of natural arguments requires substantive knowledge and insights not captured in the
axiomatized rules of formal logic. The informal fallacies, historically a central topic for informal logic,
involve mistakes in reasoning which are relatively common, but neither formal nor informally characterizable
in any useful way. The fact that an account of informal logic makes it out to be just that does not show that it
is imprecise or lacking in rigor. (p. 204)
Thus, for Govier, informal logic is the logic that helps evaluate natural argumentsa process requiring substantive
knowledge and insights not provided by formal logic. Noteworthy as well is Govier's connection of informal logic with
the informal fallacies and her insistence that the qualities of rigor and precision need not be forfeited when one does
informal logic.
Walton. Walton's (1990b) publication is of interest for many reasons, and I have occasion to refer to it later. Here I am
interested both in his conception of informal logic and his characterization of the relationship between formal and
informal logic. Walton wrote:
Formal logic has to do with the forms of argument (syntax) and truth values (semantics). . . . Informal logic
(or more broadly, argumentation, as a field) has to do with the uses of argumentation in a context of dialogue,
an essentially pragmatic undertaking. (pp. 418419)
Thus, for Walton, informal logic is pragmaticmeaning that it is concerned with the uses of argument. For Walton, this
points to the need to situate argument within the context of dialogue. His later work shows how informal logic gives
way to dialogical approaches. This becomes clear when I look at the entry on informal logic that he wrote for The
Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (1995) in which he said, "Informal logic, also called practical logic, the use of
logic to identify, analyze and evaluate arguments as they occur in contexts of discourse in everyday conversations" (p.
376). Here Walton

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defined the focus of informal logic in ways reminiscent of Govier. However, there is good reason to resist any
conflation of informal logic with practical logic, which has historically been associated with practical
reasoningreasoning about what ought to be done. Such a focus is too restrictive for informal logic. (Walton's suggestion
that argumentation is a field of inquiry is echoed by Willard's (1989) suggestion that Argumentation should become a
discipline. I discuss this proposition in chapter 12.)
Discussing the relationship between formal and informal logic, Walton wrote:
Hence the strongly opposed current distinction between informal and formal logic is really an illusion, to a
great extent. It is better to distinguish between the syntactic/semantic study of reasoning, on the one hand, and
the pragmatic study of reasoning in arguments on the other hand. The two studies, if they are to be useful to
serve the primary goal of logic, should be regarded as inherently interdependent, and not opposed, as the
current conventional wisdom seems to have it. (p. 419)
What Walton meant is that when properly understood, these two studies are not in competition but, rather, are
complementary.5 (The claim that they are interdependent needs elaboration.) To spell out their complementary nature,
Walton relied on the traditional distinction between syntax, semantic and pragmatics, assigning to formal logic the
syntactical and semantical aspects of the study of argumentation, and to informal logic the pragmatic aspects.
It appears that for Walton, as for Govier, informal logic is to be distinguished from formal logic not only by
methodology by also by its focal pointargumentation in ordinary and natural contexts. This same view regarding the
focus of informal logic is adopted by Tully in his entry on informal logic in The Oxford Companion to Philosophy
(1995): "Informal logic examines the nature and function of arguments, in natural language, stressing the craft rather
than the formal theory of reasoning" (p. 500). He concluded that "informal logic lacks the precision and elegance of
formal theory . . . but probably comes as close as any enterprise ever will to being a science of argumentation" (p. 500).
Thus it appears that there is a developing consensus that informal logic is especially concerned with argument(ation)
that can and should be distinguished from inferenceimplicationthe proper concern of formal logic. That was part of the
thrust of the last chapter in which a preliminary distinction between argument and inference was drawn. Having
discussed what informal logic is, I want now to review developments in the theory of argument emanating from
informal logic, beginning with its theory of analy-
5 Not everyone views them as opposed. See Johnson (1989).

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sis and then moving to its theory of appraisal. After that discussion and after we have reviewed how informal logic and
its theory of argument fare with respect to the adequacy conditions set forth in chapter 2, we will then be in a better
position to distinguish between formal and informal logic.
Informal Logic and the Theory of Analysis
In this section, I discuss how informal logicians have addressed the main issues in the theory of analysis; that is, the
conceptualization of argument, the question of the interpretation of argumentative texts in general and of particular
arguments in such texts, including how exactly to understand and to display the structure of the argument, how to
conceive of the tacit elements, and other problems involved in the task of reconstruction.
The Definition of Argument
Formal logicians have tended to see an argument as a sequence of propositions (or sentences). Here is the definition
from a widely used formal logic text (Kalish & Montague, 1964), "An argument, as we shall understand it, consists of
two partsfirst, a sequence of sentences called its premises and secondly, an additional sentence called its conclusion" (p.
13). As an example, they gave:
Free love is justified only if the sex drive is primary. Freud's theory is correct provided that the sex drive is
primary. It is not the case that if psychoanalysis is therapeutic, Freud's theory is correct. Therefore free love is
justified. (pp. 2425)
It would seem that if informal logic is going to improve on FDL's theory of analysis, a different conception of argument
would be needed. But that raises the question: How do informal logicians conceive of or understand argument?
Kahane (1971) said, "Let's call uses of language or pictures intended to persuade anyone of anything an argument" (p.
1). This definition is as broad as the formalist definition is narrow. Kahanes's examples include warning, "Don't go near
the edge; you might fall" and also an advertisement. I do not deny that these are attempts to persuade, but any definition
of argument that broad is unsatisfactory, even if it is far cry from the definition given in standard formal logic texts.
Thomas (1973) said, "An argument is a sentence or sequence of sentences containing statements some of which are set
forth as supporting, making probable or explaining others (p. 2). The standard idea is discernible here,

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although it has been expanded to allow for inductive arguments as arguments and also for explanations as arguments.
Thomas pointed out that in ordinary language, the term usually means a quarrel. Then he said, "we shall use it to refer to
a discourse having a certain logical structure" (p. 3). There is something to Thomas's approach, although I am unhappy
with the identification of explanation and argument. Further, my preference is to treat inductive reasoning as a type of
inference rather than a type of argument.
Scriven (1976) did not offer a definition of argument but how he understood it is clear from the following passage:
The main point of argument presentation is to show that some kind of inconsistency or implausibility is
involved in accepting the premises of the argument and rejecting the conclusion. Arguments are meant to be
persuasive; and they succeed in being persuasive if they begin with assertions that the listener or reader is
known to accept, and if they continue by showing that acceptance of those assertions (they are called the
premises) requires acceptance of the conclusion.6 (p. 32)
Scriven avoided the pitfall of either relying on examples from FDL or of presenting a structural account. His conception
emphasizes the persuasive function of arguments and offers a narrower conception of persuasion than did Kahane.
Johnson and Blair (1977) gave an account in which after citing four examples, they said, "All four examples have one
thing in common: they attempt to persuade us of something by citing reasons intended to support that claim and prove
its truth" (p. 3). Along with Scriven, Johnson and Blair emphasized the persuasive function of argument and the idea of
support. (The reference to proof is unfortunate inasmuch as this mathematical note fits better with the demands of
formalism than with informal logic.)
Fogelin (1978) did not offer a definition either, but his understanding of argument is apparent when one looks at his
discussion of the structure of arguments:
Arguments are not statements, yet they are constructed out of statements. Now let's ask a very simple
question: What words indicate that an argument is being presented? Suppose we start with a simple list of
statements:
6 Note that here Scriven seemed to take acceptance as a criterion. Elsewhere, it appeared that the requirement
is truth. Note further that Scriven wanted to distinguish argument from implication (the index refers the reader
to pages 4647, although I wasn't able to find the reference) and from inference. For Scriven, inference is the
link from the premise to the conclusion.

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Socrates is mortal.
All men are mortal.
Socrates is a man.
This is not an argument, but we can turn it into an argument by using the single word "therefore":
Socrates is mortal.
All men are mortal.
Therefore, Socrates is a man.
We now have an argumentin fact, a very bad argument, since the conclusion does not follow from the reasons
stated in its behalf, but it is an argument nonetheless. (p. 29)
For a so-called informal logic text, there is much here that is problematic. First, the account of argument is structural in
nature. It gives no indication of the purpose that an argument may serve. Second, the hoary example drawn from the
FDL tradition suggests that as far as argument is concerned, there is no difference between formal and informal logic. In
my view, developed in chapter 6, it is questionable whether this specimen is an argument in any but an extended sense
of the term. Be that as it may, the most important deficiency here is the suggestion that what makes for an argument is
the presence of the word "therefore"; it was alone able to transform the nonargument into an argument.
Conclusion. In the first wave of informal logic texts, there is no consensus about how to conceive of argument. In fact,
there is a wide range from those like Fogelin, whose understanding of argument comes very close to FDL, to those like
Kahane, which are extremely broad.
Over time, it seems that informal logicians have moved toward a common view, the nucleus of which I would
characterize as follows: "An argument is a collection of statements in which some (the premises) are put forth as
support for the other (the conclusion)." The key idea here is that of support and the tacit concession in the definition that
there may be other forms of support than deductive implication. It seems to me that this position is still deficient in
important respects. However, I postpone a fuller discussion of this matter of defining argument until chapter 6.
Interpretation and Analysis
As we saw in chapter 2, a second task for the informal logician at the level of the theory of analysis stems from the fact
that arguments as expressed in ordinary language generally call for some interpretation. (This is not typically the case
with the specimens produced by formal logic.) Recall that

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in chapter 2, we discussed the list of tasks that a theory of argument had to cope with, the first one of which was
reconstruction and interpretation.
First, the critic will have to get a fairly clear picture of the structure of the argument. Although relatively easily
accomplished with arguments like the first given in chapter 2, this is not so easy when it comes to the second, and still
more difficult when it comes to the argumentation in The Critique of Pure Reason. With such more complex specimens
like the second one given in chapter 2, the critic will have to engage in the tasks of interpretation and reconstruction.
Interpretation involves asking questions like: Is this statement meant to support the first premise or some other premise?
What does the internal argument here look like? What kind of argument is that second argument?
Indeed, a prior question often arises: Is the text in fact an argument at all? If so, what precisely is the conclusion? How
is this to be determined? If it is an argument, how do we arrive at its elements? What are its elements: premise and
conclusion? Or should we follow Toulmin's advice and abandon the traditional terminology, wed as it is to the
geometric model?
Govier (1987) said this about this task of interpretation:
Interpretation is involved when we extract an argument from discourse in our own language, but in this
context we presume a basic understanding of customs, meaning and syntax. . . . We are interpreting a speech
or text in order to determine whether it contains an argument, and, if so, what that argument is. . . . There are
at least six pertinent stages:
1. We determine whether the speech or passage contains an argument or not.
2. We determine, for argumentative passages, which sentences within them express premises or conclusions.
3. We determine, for terms within those sentences that are ambiguous or indeterminate in reference, what the
meaning or referent is likely to be, and whether the words are meant literally or figuratively.
4. We determine whether the stated premises and conclusion constitute the argument or whether there is
implicit material that needs to be added.
5. If implicit material is to be added, we decide what that material is and how it should be articulated.
6. We decide what inference standard should be used to appraise the argument. (pp. 141142)
The problem with Govier's list (as useful as it is) is that it is theory-laden. For example, Step 2 is formulated in terms of
premises and conclusion, which obviates a Toulmin-type theory. Step 6 seems to presuppose a pluralistic theory. If one
were a deductivist, there is only one standard and hence no decision is needed; hence no Step 6.

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The important point for my purpose is that for the informal logician, the task of analysis brings out the need for
interpretation. Once I recognize the problem of interpretation, I need to make use of the principle of charity.
The Principle of Charity
The principle of charity is a principle of interpretation, which in its most general formulation could be explained as,
"When interpreting a text, make the best possible sense of it." This would mean, for example, that given a choice
between two interpretations, the principle of charity advises us to choose the one that puts the text in the best light,
given its purposes.7
To cite an example where the principle was apparently not followed, I quote excerpts from a letter by Kerrigan (1994),
who in September 1993 took part in a Forum about sex between professors and students that initiated a spate of hostile
responses, in reply to which Kerrigan himself wrote:
I am said to have defined eighteen-year-old women as cases of unnaturally prolonged virginity. Why not
suppose (as was the case) that the women I referred to were much older and few in number? Why not suppose
(as was the case) that they were not enrolled in my courses at the time in question? Why not suppose (as was
the case) that they themselves defined their virginity as unnaturally prolonged? A will to distort rather than
understand made national news of my remarks. (p. xxx)
Kerrigan's complaint is in effect that his critics violated the principle of charity.
However the principle is to be understood, what we are concerned with here is its role in informal logic, particularly in
connection with the theory of analysis. It is instructive to note that no counterpart to this problem seems to have existed
for formal deductive logic. The best explanation of this is that formal logic was to the maximum possible degree context-
independent, hence it minimized the need for interpretation, whereas the arguments that informal logic consider are to
the maximum possible degree context-dependent. For further references, see Hansen (1990).
7 Govier (1989) traced the principle to Wilson in a 1959 article in which he recommended the following rule
for translators: "We select as designatum that individual which will make the largest possible number of
statements true" (p. 133). Thus, suppose we are translating "alphamin" and we have two possible designata:
D1 would make more statements true than D2. Then we should choose the theory that includes D1. Why?
Wilson did not say but Govier ascribed this reason: We assume that others aim to tell the truth. We might also
add: We should treat the discourse of others the way we would like ours to be treated.

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In any event, the principle of charity, its proper formulation and justification, continues to be a topic of interest to
informal logicians.
The Structure of Arguments
If one approaches arguments in natural language on their own terms and without the doctrine of logical form as a
template, then one faces some formidable challenges. The turn to actual arguments has forced theorists to face up to the
ill-organized, incompletely stated, wandering-off-topic arguments often found in written and spoken texts. Informal
logicians have begun to address the complex theoretical issues arising from the attempt to explain how we manage to
interpret such discourse. They have found themselves relying on the insights of linguists, speech communication
theorists, and philosophers of language. The doctrine in textbooks has been ad hoc rather than theoretically motivated.
Informal logicians have focused their attention on the issue of how to lay out the assertions playing argumentative roles
in such discourse in a perspicuous way for the purpose of evaluating and critiquing the argument.
The major contributions of informal logicians to the task of understanding and displaying the structure of arguments are:
1. a challenge to the conventional way of understanding the elements (Toulmin, 1958);
2. the development of tree diagrams as a vehicle to display structure (Beardsley, 1950; Scriven 1976);
3. the convergentdivergent distinction (Beardsley, 1950; Thomas, 1971);
4. the issue of argument typology (Freeman, 1991; Govier, 1987; Thomas, 1971);
5. the notion of argumentation schemes (Freeman, 1991; Snoeck Henkemans, 1992; Walton, 1996).
I now discuss the first three of these developments in a bit more detail.
On the question of how to understand and display the structure of an argument, a variety of approaches now exists.
Toulmin was the first to propose an alternative approach to understanding the structure of argument. It was discussed
briefly in the last chapter and I propose to deal with it in greater detail still in chapter 12 when I look at alternative
theories. Toulmin's model has not had as much influence on informal logic as it has in other areas, such as the speech
communication tradition. Among those who have made use of Toulmin's approach are Freeman (1988) and Weinstein
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Thomas (1971) basically adopted Beardsley's (1950) approach, adding some refinements of his own. Beardsley
introduced a diagrammatic approach to the task of understanding the structure of arguments. His diagrams aim to
capture not the propositional structure of the argument but rather the argumentative relationships. Thus, in the case
where one premise supports a conclusion, an arrow is drawn from the premise to the conclusion to indicate this. There
are different ways in which the premises of an argument may support the conclusion and Beardsley was the first, so far
as I am aware, to have developed a terminology to reflect this. He introduced the distinction between convergent,
divergent, and serial arguments, which has been quite influential. According to Beardsley's doctrine, an argument is
convergent if several independent reasons support the same conclusion. It is divergent if the same reason supports
several conclusions. It is serial if it contains a statement that is both a conclusion and a reason for a further conclusion.
Later writers have adopted and attempted to refine this distinction, which will, of course, eventually prove problematic.
But Beardsley must certainly be credited with having taken a step forward for an informal theory of analysis with this
innovative approach. To this doctrine, Thomas added the concept of a linked" argument "when a step of reasoning
involves the logical combination of two or more reasons" (p. 58). One problem is that Beardsley and Thomas both
required that each premise be written out in full, which makes such diagrams cumbersome methods to use when
displaying the structure of longer arguments.8
Scriven (1976) offered further refinements to this method of laying out the structure according to a method he called "a
tree diagram" (p. 41). Scriven numbered each sentence playing an argumentative role, and then constructed a diagram of
the supporting relationships using just the circled numbers and lines joining them. This approach allows the structure to
be represented without having to write out each sentence in the portrait. Scriven also introduced the convention of using
a minus sign to symbolize negative support so that he can diagram what came to be called balance of considerations
argumentsarguments balancing reasons for and reasons against the conclusion. Scriven's third innovation was to use
letters to represent reconstructed missing premises (about which more follows) and putting them in the diagram at the
appropriate place to reconstruct the argument so as to show their role in joining with stated premises to strengthen the
inference.
Johnson and Blair (1977, 1983) developed an adaptation of Scriven's diagramming method for use with longer
(extended) arguments, using letters
8 Articles by Yanal (1991), Conway (1991), and Vorobej (1993) discuss the "linkedconvergent" distinction.
At this point, it seems that this doctrine seems destined to prove as vexatious for informal logicians as the
deductiveinductive distinction was for traditional logicians.

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to represent paragraphs in the text, putting all the letters that represent the paragraphs developing each line of argument
inside one circle, and using arrows to show the direction of support. They used dotted lines pointing away from the
conclusion to represent objections cited in the argument and solid lines back to the conclusion to represent the fact that a
line of argument is an answer to such an objection.
Later texts modified and amplified these basic approaches to the task of representing the structure of arguments. A text
that shows how many of these initiatives can be integrated is Freeman (1988).
Before I leave behind the matter of displaying the structure of argument, I want to discuss the view presented by Fisher
(1992), that informal logicians ought not discard the techniques of formal logic:
If one asks ''Why is the structure of argumentat(ion) important in the informal logic, Toulmin and
argumentation traditions?' the surprising answer appears to be that we need a notion of structure so that we
can be as clear as possible what reasons are being offered for and against which claims and so that we can
display the reasoning in some perspicuous way (perhaps with the aid of a diagram). (p. 170)
Fisher was right on target thus far. He went on to say, "The interest in structure in these traditions appears to have
nothing to do with evaluating the argument(ation) beyond recognizing the obvious fact that one cannot evaluate an
argument(ation) unless it is clear what the argument(ation) is" (p. 170). The obvious fact is not so obvious. One could
evaluate an argument if one knew certain things about its structure. For example, one might not understand all aspects
of the argument's structure but know enough to see that the argument hinges on one particular premise. One might
therefore evaluate the argument in the sense of judging that it was a bad argument, if one knew that a crucial premise
was false or otherwise deficient. Thus, in some cases, the argument can be evaluated without knowledge of the entire
structure. It is an entirely different matter whether an argument can be criticized without understanding the structure,
which does not seem likely. But that then raises the issue of the difference between evaluation and criticism, a topic
taken up in chapter 8.
Fisher continued his argument:
Now, to take this line is to operate with an impoverished notion of structure, just as the "logical form"
tradition operates with an unduly restricted one. The point I want to stress is that the structures exhibited by
both the informal logicians, by Toulmin's and by argumentation theorists' diagrams are gross structures, which
play only a minimal role in the evaluation of argument(ation). (p. 170)

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This last assertion certainly stands in need of some defense. In Logical Self-Defense, Blair and I (Blair & Johnson,
1993) distinguished between macrostructure and microstructure. If Fisher's thesis is that problems at the level of
microstructure tend to be more important for the evaluation of arguments than those at the level of macrostructure, he
may be right, although it is not at all obvious. In any event, there most certainly are arguments in which the significant
flaw(s) are found at the level of macrostructure (Johnson & Blair, 1993). Also, Fisher assumed that the flaws at the
microstructure level are those that formal logic will help us to detect and expose.
Fisher came to his main point and said:
I want to insist that, in order to evaluate argument(ation), one commonly has to go much more deeply into the
"internal" structures of reasons and conclusion, to see how they are related to each other, and that the logician
[Which one?] has started us off in the right direction in this respect. It is true that it is very difficult to apply
first order predicate calculus to many everyday arguments, but that is not a reason for rejecting the "logical
form" tradition to which I am referring; rather it is a reason for accepting that that tradition developed in
blinkered ways and may have lost its way in recent times. (p. 170)
Here Fisher argued that FDL has a contribution to make to the task of argument analysis. I agree with this. Specifically,
he argued that one commonly must go deeply into the internal structure (the structure that is revealed by means of
logical form) to see how reasons and conclusions are related. Here I think Fisher and I have differing beliefs about how
frequently the refined tools of analysis provided by FDL will actually come into play. I grant that an occasional
argument in ordinary discourse, or even stylized discourse, is guilty of a quantifier manipulation error and that such
errors will be more readily detected if the evaluator has recourse to first-order predicate logic. But that truth must be
played off against the difficulties encountered in deploying the apparatusa difficulty he himself recognized. In any
event, the matter of how to understand and represent the structure of arguments without recourse to the idea of logical
form (as that has been understood by FDL) has provided informal logicians with a formidable task.
Missing Premises
Attention to the issue of the structure of actual arguments has invariably been accompanied by the attempt to account
for assumptionsmissing, hidden, unexpressed, tacit, or unstated premises. Here is how Scriven (1976) framed the issue:

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I sometimes think that one can best spotlight the gap between formal logic and real reasoning by pointing out
that almost every real argument involves assumptions, but that, as far as I know, there has never been an even
moderately successful attempt to analyse the concept of an assumption. . . . Without such an analysis,
effective criticism of an argument, or an arguer, is hopelessly crippled. (p. xvi)
As I explained in chapter 3, there has been considerable discussion in the informal logic literature of such questions
surrounding the problem of missing premises. (See Hansen, 1990, for a list of articles.) This issue dovetails with the
questions about approaches to reconstruction. Which argument should be reconstructedthe speaker's, the strongest
possible (given what is stated), or something else? Should the argument be reconstructed so the premises logically
imply the conclusion, so that they provide strong support, merely so that they are relevant, or something else? Should
the missing premises supplied be (likely to be) believed by the arguer, known by the arguer, what the arguer (likely)
expected the listener to believe, or something else?
The issue of missing premises has obvious connections with the principle of charity, which, in turn, takes us to the issue
of the purpose(s) for which we engage in argument analysis in the first place. Some take the view that the purpose of
analysis is to get at the truth of the matter, so the argument should be reconstructed in a way that maximizes that goal,
regardless of whether the argument is the one intended by the arguer. The other view is that the purpose of analyzing the
argument is to criticize the argument so that the arguer may improve it. On this view, it is crucial to reconstruct the
argument in a way that is consistent with what is known about the arguer. Both views are plausible and it does not seem
possible to decide between them or reconcile them without a thorough articulation of the nature of argument(ation)
itselfa task deferred to the next chapter.
Some believe, Govier among them, that the so-called problem of missing premises is itself problematic. What does that
mean? In traditional syllogistic logic, it was recognized that there were enthymemesarguments with premises that have
been suppressed. The problem of providing what is missing is manageable for a theory like syllogistic where the notion
of structure is tightly circumscribed. For propositional logic, the problem has an obvious extension. It is fairly evident
that if an arguer goes from (A v B) to B, the arguer had in some sense dismissed A and so holds -A (as tacit, missing, or
suppressed). Once we graduate from basic forms into more complicated propositional structures, the idea of a missing
premise becomes much less clear. As Scriven (1976) rightly said, "The enthymeme approach is not even moderately
successful as a pragmatic device" (p. xvi).
The whole notion of missing premise becomes fuzzier, and the task of providing them more formidable, in informal
logic, given the state of inde-

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terminacy that exists with respect to the issue of structure. This sort of realization may have been what Govier was
thinking of when, in an earlier publication, she linked the discovery of missing premises to the idea of a "complete
argument" that could be universally applied. She came to believe her earlier position required modification and said,
"We need a concept of a complete argument that we can properly apply to the case at hand. It need not be applicable to
all arguments" (p. 102). Still, it is not at all easy to see how this assuages that earlier concern. In order to satisfy this
new requirement, we need a complete typology of argument as well as an idea of completeness that makes sense for
each type. This seems no less onerous a requirement than the earlier one.
The issues surrounding missing premises are too complex to allow for resolution here. I make just two observations.
First, Ennis (1982) has been widely cited. Ennis referred to missing premises as "gap fillers" and there he distinguished
between used assumptions and needed assumptions. Roughly, the distinction comes to this: Needed assumptions are
those that the argument, position, or explanation needs in order to be at its best. Assumptions that were actually used by
the person in reaching the conclusion or offering the explanation are used assumptions.
Second, Govier's (1987) chapter "The Problem of Missing Premises" is an excellent source if one wishes a thorough
airing of the theoretical issues. Her conclusion said:
Are there gaps in arguments? Or are they projected by the critic? They are really there, provided all the critic/s
interpretive and theoretical judgements, employed to identify the gaps, are correct. They are not "just-there" in
a theory-neutral sense. Dogmatic pronouncements to the effect that arguments surely have this or that missing
premise should always be regarded with suspicion . . . Whether a statement is a missing premise in some
argument depends on our theory of argument, our purpose in analyzing the argument, and much else. (pp.
102103)
Even if we abandon the idea of missing premises as a hangover from deductivist approaches, reasoning and argument
(ation) often involve tacit or unarticulated elements, assumptions of which we are not aware. The difficult thing is to
develop a way of identifying them. In other words, Scriven's challenge as expressed previously remains unanswered.
Conclusion
At this point I want to review several questions posed in chapter 2 for a theory of analysis and see where matters stand
with regard to the work done by informal logicians.

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A start has been made toward the task of rethinking the idea of argument; rethinking its nature, one might say; and
moving away from formal and structural approaches and moving toward context and purpose and other pragmatic
aspects. Still the structural approach remains dominanteven among informal logicians.
Not much work has been done on this issue. Informal logicians have tended to accept the conventional typology of
deductive and inductive: thus Thomas, thus Kahane, thus Fogelin. The one important change that has been made here is
Govier's suggestion (following Wellman and Wisdom) of the conductive argumenta suggestion that has been picked up
by a number of informal logicians: see Hitchcock (1983) and Freeman (1988). Govier's (1987) suggestion that there are
three types of argument (deductive, inductive, and conductive) is based not on the structure so much as it is based on the
standard that will be applied to evaluate the argument. In short, it is safe to say that the whole matter of typology of
argument deserves much more study than it has so far been given.9
There has been a fair amount of treatment of this issue. It takes us into the core issues of why we engage in argument
analysis and evaluation in the first place. It seems that different schools of thought have emerged. The basic answers
that appear to have emerged thus far revolve around the principle of charity and the application of Grice's (1975) Co-
operative Principle.
7. How is argument to be understood or defined?
To some degree, of course, this question is very much like question 1. We have not moved far beyond the conventional
wisdom here. To the degree that has been achieved toward moving away from a purely structural account, it cannot be
said that informal logicians have yet developed an adequate conceptualization of argument.
9 See van Eemeren, Grootendorst, and Kruiger (1987b) and van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992). See also
Kienpointner (1992), Snoeck Henkemens (1992), and Walton (1996).

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8. What is the relationship between argument and inference?
Very little progress seems to have been made on this front. The assumption made by many still seems to be that these
are one and the sameor at least very closely related. This is really a problem that outruns, to some degree, the theory of
argument and points, as I have argued, to the need for a theory of reasoning.
To summarize, then, although improvements have been noted, much work remains to be done in the area of the theory
of analysis. If I am right, a crucial step in moving forward will be to approach the nature of argument from a different
perspectivea claim I endeavour to make good on in chapter 6.
Informal Logic and the Theory of Appraisal
Introduction
A crucial question for any theory of argument, and also for informal logic, is what theory of evaluationcriticism to use.
Suppose I laid out the structure of the argument, giving as plausible a reconstruction as I can in accordance with the
principle of charity and without recourse to logical form. Now I face the question, "How good is this argument?"
Informal logicians must be able to answer this question without relying on the doctrine of soundness.
One might expect that something like the same variation I found in theories of analysis is evident also in theories of
appraisal. Thus far, the variety of approach has not yet developed nor has the question of evaluation been pursued as
vigorously as has the question of analysis. Perhaps this is a hangover from the days when FDL ruled the scene. Perhaps
logicians still take the view that nothing much can be said about the evaluation of arguments from within the orbit of
logic.
In any event, activity in this area has been less extensive and, correspondingly, it can be discussed in shorter space than
was the theory of analysis. After reviewing the theories proposed in the First Wave, I then discuss the two dominant
theories.
Theories of Appraisal in the First Wave
As I have shown, Kahane (1971) adopted (then modified) fallacy theory as his theory of appraisal. An argument is to be
evaluated by seeing whether it contains any fallacy where fallacy is defined as, "an argument which ought not persuade
a rational person of its conclusion" (p. 1). This definition is not a particularly satisfactory one, but I postpone discussion
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chapter 8. Kahane presented an updated and revitalized inventory of the fallacies and plenty of illustrations.
Thomas (1973) was more focused on structure than were other First Wave texts. As I showed in chapter 2, Thomas was
a spectrum theorist in that he held that various types of links between premises and conclusion are possible. To evaluate
the argument, one must first correctly identify the type of linkage between the premises and the conclusion and then
decide whether that linkage is in fact achieved. Thomas also included a treatment of "some informal fallacies": the
genetic fallacy, the argumentum ad hominem, equivocation, the black or white fallacy, hasty generalization, straw man,
begging the question, and the argumentum ad ignorantium. So Thomas' theory of appraisal is a mixture of fallacy
theory with a remnant of FDL and some inductive logic.
Scriven (1976) had the most developed approach to appraisal of all those who belong to this first wave. Scriven
officially eschewed the apparatus of formal logic, whose usefulness he saw as quite restricted, and instead presented his
own 7-step method of argument analysis:
1. Clarification of meaning
2. Identification of conclusions
3. Portrayal of Structure
4. Formulation of (Unstated) Assumptions
5. Criticism of:
a. The Premises (given and missing)
b. The Inferences
6. Introduction of other relevant arguments
7. Overall evaluation of this argument (p. 39)
Step 5 is, of course, the crucial step. What theory did Scriven employ here or what approach did he take? He said,
"Criticizing a premise requires that, if the argument is going to be any good as a way of marshalling support, the forces
it calls upon had better be strong, i.e., the premises must be reliable" (p. 43). But he did not tell his readers what the
term "reliable" meant, nor were any criteria of reliability given. Elsewhere, Scriven used both "true" and "acceptable'' to
characterize the standard to be applied to the premises. I postpone discussion of the problems this creates until chapter 7.
When it comes to criticism of the inferences, one might think that, given his conception of argument as premises forcing
the conclusion to be true, Scriven was a deductivist. Not clearly so:
Criticizing an inference from statement 1 to statement 2 means criticizing the claim that 1 supports 2. You do
not need to know whether 1 is true or not in

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order to consider whether it supports 2. You just have to ask, if 1 were true, wouldn't 2 have to be true, or at
least very likely be true. (p. 43)
Thus, the architecture of Scriven's theory of appraisal resembles that of FDL. Instead of validity, Scriven broadened the
concept of inference connection to allow for weaker than necessary consequence. (Later, Scriven, 1987, called this type
of inference "probative inference.")
Johnson and Blair (1977), following Kahane, used fallacy theory as their theory of appraisal. An argument is, by
implication, a good argument if it does not contain any fallacy, by which they understood a violation of one of the
criteria that govern good arguments: relevance, sufficiency, and acceptability (more about this later).
Fogelin (1978) resembled Thomas in adopting the most wide-ranging theory of appraisal, for he introduced both
inductive and deductive criteria, along with some fallacies.
After the First Wave, I continue to find these same options reworked time and again. About all that one can say about
the theory of appraisal presented in informal logic texts is that it seems to contain a combination of elements of fallacy
theory, deductive logic, and inductive logicwithout much consideration being given to whether and how these can be
integrated.
Over time, however, a number of informal logicians have adopted some variant of the Johnson and Blair (1977) scheme.
According to that theory, the premises of an argument must satisfy three criteria: they must be relevant, sufficient, and
acceptable.10 These standards, it turns out, are every bit as difficult to ground theoretically as their formal counterparts.
I shall not attempt here a full-scale unpacking, preferring to deal with that question in chapter 7.
Historical Note
I would like to add here a note on how our theory of appraisal originated. It developed in three steps. When Blair and I
were doing our research for the first edition of Logical Self-Defense (1977), we were committed to something like the
following proposition: The traditional fallacies could be made to constitute a viable theory of appraisal. Kahane had
persuaded us that this was the case. That was our first stepto adopt fallacy theory as a theory of appraisal for arguments.
We were aware of problems with Kahane's presentation. First, it was sloppy; the fallacies were not given precise
delineation. His description of
10 This account first appears in Johnson and Blair (1977) and later in a revised form in Govier (1985), where
she changed sufficiency to adequacy, Damer (1987), Freeman (1988), Little, Groarke, and Tindale (1989),
Barry (1992), and Seech (1992).

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begging the question could serve to characterize other fallacies no less than that one. Second, the organization and
classification of the fallacies was not satisfactory. Categories like "fallacious even if valid" and "fallacious because
invalid" suggested that validity was still in the driver's seat as far as a theory of evaluation. Third, the examples were
culturally skewed. As one would expect of an American text, the examples and issues were drawn from U.S. culture.
But our students were Canadian and some (not all) resented being asked to analyze an argument that depended on
background knowledge of the United States. (This was in the early 1970s; one student said, "Why should I have to
analyze an argument about whether Wally Hickel is a good Secretary of the Interior when we don't even have one?")
We were aware of the various classificatory schemes to be found in the literature but not satisfied by any of them. Thus,
our next step was to review the mainline traditional fallacies and ask ourselves of each in turn, "What criterion was
implicit in calling that type of argument a fallacy?" It soon became fairly clear that some fallacies were the result of
failure of a relevance criterion (like ad hominem, as we understand it, and straw person). Next, there were fallacies like
hasty generalization or hasty conclusion in which the criterion violated was not relevance but rather a sufficiency
criterion. The problem with the argument was that the arguer had not provided enough evidence. Finally, it was
apparent that a third category was required for fallacies like inconsistency and begging the question. We could have
proposed truth as the third criterion, but we at that time had both been influenced by Hamblin's arguments against
alethic and epistemic criteria and persuaded by his position on acceptability. (My current problems with this criterion
are discussed in chapter 7, in the discussion of acceptability.) Acceptability thus became our third standard. The final
step was to sort through a sensible inventory of fallacies to see if each fallacy could be placed in one of the three
categories. We found that they could and adopted the approach in the first edition of Logical-Self Defense (1977).
Conclusion
I review the questions from chapter 2 that bear on the theory of appraisal and determine where matters stand with regard
to work done by informal logicians.
Although some informal logicians appear to flirt with maintaining large parts of the theory of appraisal they inherited
from FDL (this is true of Scriven 1976, also true of Nosich (1982), if he is to be accounted an informal logician), there
is evidence a new approach is emerging. In part, this is the

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result of the more sophisticated approach to the study of fallacies that has emerged in the wake of Hamblin's (1970)
challenge, which stimulated the work of the 1980s and 1990s (to be discussed in chapter 9). There does appear to be
some degree of convergence around the RSA triad.11
This issue has not been addressed in great detail. The standard view still tends to be that found in discussions of the ad
hominem argument, which is that the personality and the beliefs of the arguer are generally out of bounds as far as an
assessment of the argument is concerned. Walton (1985a) discussed aspects of this issue.
6. Is the truth of the premise too strong a condition to demand soundness of argument?
This issue has been debated in some detail. Some (Blair & Johnson, 1987, Govier, 1987) appeared to think that truth is
too strong; others (Allen, 1998; Johnson, 1990b) questioned this view. The whole question of the role of truth in a
theory of appraisal is still very much a live issue. I set forth my own views on this matter in chapter 7.
9. Is there an important difference between evaluating an argument and criticizing it?
The distinction between these two activities does not appear to have gained much recognition at this point. I attempt to
clarify the difference. In chapter 7, I deal with the theory of evaluation for arguments. In chapter 8, I deal with the
theory of criticism.
10. What constitutes logical virtue in an argument? What are the qualities that make an argument a good argument?
The tendency is still to look at this question in light of the premise versus inference distinction; hence to look on the one
hand at the issue of what constitutes premise adequacy and on the other hand what constitutes inference adequacy.
Other views about virtue can be found in fallacy theorya good argument is one that does not commit any fallacies, but to
some this seems like the view that virtue is the absence of vice (Hintikka, 1989). A view
11 See note 10.

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that has broad appeal but is undeveloped is the view that an argument is a good argument if it is able to withstand strong
criticism.
11. What constitutes profitable criticism of an argument?
As far back as Scriven (1976), one can find articulation of what I later call The Principle of Discrimination, which is
that the critic should practice strong criticism. But exactly how does one identify strong criticism? In asking this
question, the informal logic enterprise makes a step that has no precedent in formal logic, for which one invalidity is
pretty much the same as another.
As our review shows, there is still a lot of work that must be done to before it can be said that informal logic possesses a
satisfactory theory of appraisal.
Who, or What, Then, Is an Informal Logician?
Introduction
If my claim that informal logic has the potential to develop a theory that satisfies the adequacy conditions is to be
validated, then I must be able decide whose or which theories proposed or which modifications of current theories will
count as informal logic. So the questions here are, "Who or what counts as an instance of an informal logic approach?
On what basis is someone to be considered an informal logician?" I gave a partial answer to that question earlier but in
the light of the intervening discussion, a more precise answer is now possible. My answer is that an informal logician is
a logician whose theory is informal2 (going back to the BarthKrabbe, 1982, distinction). That means that the theory of
argument differs in significant ways from that of formal logic.
In terms of the theory of analysis, the informal logician takes a pragmatic andor teleological approach of the nature of
argument(ation) rather than a formal or structural approach. The informal logician pays attention to the task of
interpreting and reconstructing the argument and the difficulties of doing this. In terms of analyzing the structure, the
informal logician understands the logical structure of argumentation using concepts that are not dependent on the notion
of logical form as that idea emerged in the logistic tradition of the 20th century.
In terms of the theory of appraisal, the informal logician is one who accepts Adequacy Condition 3 as binding; that is,
whose theory of appraisal accommodates the fact that there can be good arguments for and good

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arguments against a given thesis. The informal logician also accepts Adequacy Condition 4 that there are degrees of
logical virtue, that arguments fall at points along a spectrum from strong to weak. Hence, the informal logician
understands logical virtue in terms other than validity and does not have recourse to validity as an essential construct for
understanding logical virtue. Many informal logicians have adopted some form of fallacy theory but this is neither
necessary (because there are other ways to evaluate) nor sufficient (because some rhetoricians also use fallacy theory).
Moreover, an informal logician understands the vital role of criticism in the process of argumentation and provides
guidance on how to distinguish strong from weak criticism.
Finally, I would take into consideration a writer's own self-description. Someone who refers to himself or herself as an
informal logician is likely to be an informal logician. (This consideration is defeasible because of the heterogenous
usage of the term "informal logic" in the present climate.)
Some Examples
Let me cite some clear cases.
At the theoretical level, the most important works in the area of informal logic are by Govier (1987) and Walton (1984,
1985b, 1987, 1989). They are particularly important for their contributions to informal logic. Still at the theoretical
level, I would include many but not all of the articles that have appeared in Informal Logic and many that have appeared
in Argumentation.
At the textbook level, I would regard the following as clear examples of informal logic texts: Johnson and Blair (1993),
Govier (1996), and Freeman (1992).
There are problem cases, however. For example, what does one say about Kahane, who adopts fallacy theory but at the
same time retains validity as a normative criterion? What about Thomas, who makes validity a matter of degree? What
about Cederblom and Paulsen? Here I get to an issue perhaps best looked at in light of Wittgenstein's (1953) notion of a
family resemblance. That, in any event, is how I would propose to think about such matters, which I can only
acknowledge without any attempt at a solution here.
It is apparent that there are a number of thorny problems for the theory of argument developed within informal logic. In
the first place, there is little consensus about how to understand the nature and structure of argument. One might expect
that the main differences would show up in the theory of appraisal but that is not the case; it is in the theory of analysis
where the greatest differences turn up. This heterogeneity at the level of theory is discomfiting to some, particularly to
those who are used to the unanimity thought to be characteristic of formal logicians.

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Second, no solid and dominant theory of appraisal has emergedalthough there does appear to be some degree of
convergence around the relevancesufficiencyacceptability triad. There are problems for this approach, however. The
first is that the fundamental criteria of relevance, sufficiency, and acceptability do not enjoy anything like the level of
theoretical support that FDL can provide for the standard of validity. Our understanding of them cannot compare to the
formal logician's control over validity. I say more about these criteria in chapter 7. The next problem concerns the
acceptability requirement. There are difficulties both in interpreting what acceptance actually means and also with its
viability as a criterion. I discuss these problems in detail in chapter 7. Finally, there is the issue of the exclusion of truth
as a criterion for the evaluation of arguments. Because this criterion plays such a prominent role in many useful
strategies of argument analysis, such as pressing on the consistency front, counterexampling, and so forth, I need to
question whether I can dispense with it altogether. I postpone discussion of this issue until chapter 7.
In conclusion, I want to stress that there is (at least in my understanding of these terms) no incompatibility between
being a formal logician and an informal logician; there is not even a problem with being both under the same cover. In
the final analysis, it is largely a question of the conceptions and analytic tools in which one places one's faith. That
seems to me to be a pragmatic issue to be decided by which tools best fit the needs of the situation. My argument here
has been to the effect that if one's interest is to evaluate and eventually to criticize arguments in natural language (to use
Thomas' characterization), then informal logic has the promise of being able to develop a theory of argument that will
enable one to do just that.
Conclusion
At this point, it seems apparent that neither informal nor formal logic has the right stuff as far as providing an adequate
theory of argument. I now want to investigate the idea that, paradoxically, both fail for the same reason. That is, neither
begins from an adequate conceptualization of argument, and each has developed its normative theory in a strange
waybereft of the guidance that such a conceptualization understanding can provide. (In the final analysis, this is less
serious for FDL than for informal logic because the proper object of study of formal logic is not argument but
implication.) I suggest further that the possession of an adequate conceptualization is a crucial step toward finding
solutions to the problems in the theory of analysis and the theory of appraisal we have been discussing.
Thus, the next task must be to develop a proper conceptualization of argument and to that task I turn my attention in
chapter 6.

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Chapter 6
Argument as Manifest Rationality:
A Pragmatic Conception
In chapter 3, I argued that none of the extant theories of argument is viable. In chapter 4, I suggested that one possible
explanation for this situation is that none of these theories begins with an adequate conception of argument. If we lack
an adequate conception of argument, it will be impossible to answer the basic question, "What makes an argument a
good argument?" Or (perhaps better), "What qualities are we looking for in a good argument?" Conversely, when we
see clearly what an argument is, we will be in a better position to understand what is necessary for an argument to be a
good one. In short, the theory of appraisal should be based on the theory of analysis.
One conclusion that emerges from the recent literature on argumentation is that there has been an important shift in the
way logicians think about argument. That shift can be described in various ways. One way is to describe it as a shift
from seeing argument along the lines of proof to seeing it in terms of dialogue. Such a shift is evident in the last chapter
of Hamblin's Fallacies, in which formal logic is replaced by formal dialectic. Others who have adopted such an
approach to argument are Barth and Krabbe (1982), van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1987, 1992), Walton (1990b) and,
more recently, Walton and Krabbe (1995). Another, not incompatible, initiative has been to view argumentation from a
pragmatic point of view. Those who have taken this approach include Govier (1987), Walton (1990), and Barth (1985).
That characterization broadly describes the approach that I take here.
From this vantage point, one might say that the traditional conception of argument was limited in two important
respects. First, it did not situate the argument within the context of argumentation, being content rather to conceive
argument in structural terms, the result being an understanding of

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argument at once formal and abstract.1 Second, it failed to see that the development of the argument is just one phase of
the entire dialectical process that also includes the response by the critic, the arguer's response to that intervention,
modification of the original argument, further criticism, and so on.
Even more central to the theory of argument developed in this book is that the traditional view fails to satisfy because it
underplays the role of rationality. The central thesis of this book is that to properly understand the practice of
argumentation, we must view it as an exercise in manifest rationality.
What is distinctive of argumentation is that it is an exercise in manifest rationality, by which I mean not only that a good
argument is itself a rational producta product of reasons, reasoning, and reasonersbut that it is part of the nature of the
enterprise that this product must appear to be rational as well. I have more to say about the look of rationality later in
this chapter. This feature serves to distinguish argument from explanation. An explanation may be perfectly rational but
not appear to be so, and its not appearing to be so is no mark against its being a good one.
The task of this chapter is to develop a more adequate conception of argument. I continue to use the phrase "argument
(ation)" because although my ultimate interest lies with the product (the argument itself), I believe it is crucial to
understand that this product emerges from the practice of argumentation and must be understood in that context.2
The plan for this chapter is as follows: I begin with a critique of the prevailing accounts of argument found in the work
of informal logicians as these were identified in the last chapter. I then dip back into history in attempt to recover some
important elements in our conceptualization that were lost in the twin processes of formalization and mathematicization.
After that, I introduce some needed distinctions. Then, I present an improved conceptualization argument(ation). Last, I
take account of some objections to my proposed reconceptualization.
Critique of Current Definitions of Argument
Introduction
The question before me is, "What is an argument?" But first is it worth asking, "Why raise this question? What bearing
does it have our inquiry?"
1 This distinction between argument and argumentation is getting more attention: see Walton (1990b), who
ultimately discarded it, and Fisher (1992), who maintained it.
2 The separation of the product from the practice is what van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1987) complained about
when they said, "Probably chiefly due to the influence of a tradition inspired by logicians, argumentation is
frequently presented solely as an abstract product separate from language" (p. 8).

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When he was struggling to develop his position on the nature of logic during the period from 1910 to 1914,
Wittgenstein found himself repeatedly coming back to the question, "What is a proposition?" He wrote, "All this would
get solved of itself if we understood the nature of the proposition." (33e). Somewhat later (1961), he wrote, "My whole
task consists in explaining the nature of the proposition" (39e). The question, "What is the nature of a proposition?" was
fundamental for him. His hope was that if he got the fundamentals right, the rest would follow.
The question, "What is an argument?" occupies a similar position in my investigation. Having just mentioned
Wittgenstein with approval, I realize that I open myself to the following line of objectionone that stems from
Wittgenstein (1961) himself. The objection goes that we know perfectly well what an argument is. Because we know
how to use the word argument, it follows (at least from the Wittgensteinian viewpoint) that we know what an argument
is. My response is to concede that in some sense, we know what an argument is. However, there are problems in the
way in which traditional theoreticians of argument understand this fundamental concept, and we have seen how an
inadequate apprehension takes a toll, both in the theory of analysis and the theory of appraisal.
There are serious differences in the way in which the term "argument" is used in the various intellectual communities in
which it plays a role. For example, Wreen (1988) took this statement as an argument, "Thief to victim: Your money or
your life!" This is the so-called ad baculum that Wreen and others would consider an argument. (For more on this, see
also Wreen, 1988b, and Brinton, 1992.) I do not think that such reasoning and discourse should be considered
arguments because here the reasoning is being used to threaten someone. That threatening is a violation of the rules that
define the practice of argumentation.
Further to be noted is that the term "argument" has undergone significant shifts in meaning in its history. (It would be a
worthwhile project to trace the development of and changes in the meaning of argument.) In Aristotle, an argument is a
premiseconclusion structure. However, in Quine's Mathematical Logic, the term "argument" appears just once and then
as a mathematical term.3 This significant shift in the use of the term illustrates, in a striking way, the mathematicization
of logic that I discussed in chapter 4.
Moreover, I have argued that there are serious shortcomings in the very way in which logicians currently understand the
nature of argument. I give
3 See Quine (1940):
But there are further relations x which, though not functions in this sense, do fulfil (1) for certain choices of y.
Such relations may, by a natural extension, be spoken of as functions in a derivative sense; viz. as functions
with respect to this or that appropriate argument y" (p. 222)

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further evidence of this in the next subsection of this chapter. Thus, the task of definition lies ahead.
What kind of definition is needed here? Agreeing with Rowland (1987), I would say that the definition will be
stipulative. Along with Rowland, as well, I believe that a good definition must stress both the function of argument and
its rational nature: ''The rational function of argument makes evaluation a necessary component of any adequate theory
of argument" (p. 150).4 But before I move to my own definition, it will be helpful to review some current ones.
Review and Critique of Current Definitions
As I explained in the last chapter, one view of argument sees it as a set of statements, (propositions, assertions, beliefs,
and judgments), one of which, the conclusion, is supported by the othersthe premises. A definition of this sort can be
found in every kind of logic text, whether deductive or inductive, formal or informal. On this view, an argument is a text
or discourse that has a certain structure: Claim supported by reason(s). Here are a few examples of authors who take this
view.
In Copi's (1961) Introduction to Logic, the oldest logic textbook in North America, is the following definition, "An
argument, in the logician's sense, is any group of propositions of which one is claimed to follow from the others which
are regarded as providing evidence for the truth of that one" (p. 7). In later editions, "evidence" is replaced by "support
or grounds" (1986, p. 6). A few lines later, Copi added: "An argument is not a mere collection of propositions, but has a
structure" (p. 7).
In a popular critical thinking text, Barry and Rudinow (1992) wrote, "An argument is a set of assertions one of which is
understood or intended to be supported by the other(s)" (p. 95).
Cederblom and Paulsen (1996) wrote, "When someone gives reasons to support a point of view, that person is usually
offering an argument" (p. 15). The hedge "usually" softens matters here. But the basic idea of argument as reasons
offered in support of a view is evident.
Hinderer (1991) wrote, "In logic, the term 'argument' means that at least one reason is offered to influence a person's
belief about something" (p. 16).
Schwarz (1994) wrote:
4 Let me add that I am not as sanguine about Rowland's view of argument as problem solving, although much
depends on how the term "problem solving" is itself understoodand here I am again in the grips of The
Network Problem.

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A discourse is any sentence or group of sentences. In reasoning we are especially interested in a particular
kind of discourse called an argument. An argument is any discourse in which someone attempts to support a
claim by giving reasons. The reasons that are given as supporting the claim are the premises of the argument,
and the claim that is to be supported is called the conclusion of the argument. (p. 1)
In all of these definitions, we can see the influence of the view that an argument is a group of propositions in which
some (the premises) support the other (the conclusion).
To be sure, the traditional view is not all wrong. It highlights one important aspect of argumentits structure. But this
way of understanding argument ultimately must fail because it does not distinguish argument from other forms of
reasoning. I may give a reason in support of a claim to influence a person's belief and yet not be making an argument.
I offer reasons in support when I explain, "The reason that your car won't start is that you have a dead battery, and also
the starter is defective." Here I am supporting one claim (your car won't start) by another (you have a dead battery) and
another (your starter is defective), yet this discourse is not argument but, rather, explanation.5 Or, "The reason we are
having such a crazy summer is the influence of El Nino." Here I offer a reason (the influence of El Nino, which is not
even a statement) that is intended to support some other assertion (we are having such a crazy summer), but the function
of this relationship is not to persuade the hearer of the truth of the proposition for which support is given. Supposing
that the hearer already grants its truth, the reasoner is offering an explanation why.
I offer reasons when I instruct, "If you want to get the best light for this shot, you're going to have to use a XDX1000
filter combined with . . . " Here I offer a reason (you're going to have to use a XDX1000 filter) as support for the claim
(If you want to get the best lighting), but the function of the discourse is not to persuade anyone that the claim is true.
Presumably, the hearer (here, the apprentice) is prepared to accept the instructor's instruction; they are not going to
argue about it. So although that discourse fits the standard definition of argument given previously, it does not seem to
have the character of an argument.
I offer reasons when I make an excuse, "I can't go to the show tonight because I have to study for my exam tomorrow."
Here we have the structure of argument as defined, but that is not sufficient to qualify it as an argument.
5 For a fuller account of the differences between argument and explanation, see Govier (1987). Ultimately,
the problem of providing an adequate account of the difference between argument and explanation belongs to
the theory of reasoning.

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Generally, then, the mere existence of discoursereasoning in which a claim is in some fashion supported by others is not
a sufficient condition, although it is a necessary one, for construing that discourse as an argument.
The conception of argument I have been discussing might be called the structural view, and I have produced samples
from textbooks to show that it is widespread. But it would be wrong to think that this view is restricted to textbooks.
Theorists like Hamblin (1970) also adopted this view: "Argument is generally regarded as being whatever it is that is
typically expressed by the form of words 'P, therefore Q,' 'P, and so Q'; or, perhaps, 'Q, since P', 'Q because P'" (p.
228).6 Wreen (1988) also expressed this view: "If we think of offering an argument as simply offering a reason, or
reasons, for a conclusion, where such offering is conceptual in nature . . . " (p. 77). Or look at the entry on argument in
The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (1995), where an argument is "a sequence of statements such that some of
them (the premises) purport to give reason to accept another of them the conclusion" (p. 37). The entry for argument in
The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Honderich, 1995) is slightly more useful but still reflects this gap:
The word has three main senses:
1. A quarrel, as when . . .
2. In the most important sense for philosophy an argument is a complex consisting of a set of propositions
(called its premises) and a proposition (called its conclusion). You can use an argument by asserting its
premises and drawing or inferring its conclusion. (p. 47)
There is some validity to the structural view. We produce arguments for a reason, to serve a purpose. We engage in the
practice of argumentation because we wish to persuade someone of something, and to do so rationally. We recognize
that if we want to persuade the Other of something rationally, it is incumbent on the arguer to put forth reasons. Hence
the view that argument consists of a thesis plus the reasons for it. What this line of reflection shows is that argument has
its structure (reasons in support of a thesis, or premises plus conclusion) because of the purpose it servesrational
persuasion. A significant limitation of the structural view is that it ignores this important aspectpurpose or function. The
moral of the story is that if a satisfactory conceptualization of argument is to be developed, the purpose or the function
of the discourse must be referred to, an idea that is alluded to obliquely in this definition from Johnson and Blair (1983),
6 See also Nickerson (1986): "Here the term argument will be given a somewhat broader connotation than its
strictly deductive one. It will be used to connote any set of assertions that is intended to support some
conclusion or influence a person's belief" (p. 68).

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"By an argument we mean a collection of claims (or statements) whose purpose is to lay out a route which leads from
the acceptance of some claims (the premises) to the acceptance of some other target claim (the conclusion)" (p. 3). This
articulation is moderately better than the standard structural account, at least in so far as it alludes to function or purpose
no less than structure. But better still would be an account that linked the two ideas. This is what a pragmatic approach
accomplishes.7 What do I understand by this phrase?
A pragmatic approach to argument begins by asking: What purpose(s) does argument serve? What function (or
functions) do argument(s) have? The answer is: Many, no doubt. But preeminent among them is the function of
persuading someone (I call this person the Other) of the truth of something (I shall call this the Thesis) by reasoning, by
producing a set of reasons whose function is to lead that person rationally to accept the claim in question. There are
other purposes or functions that argument serves, such as to inquire into some matter or to solidify a point of view. For
example, the use of argumentation for inquiry (which may be described as self-persuasion) is dependent on argument as
persuasion: We first learn the practice of persuading others then we can use that practice to inquire; that is, to persuade
ourselves. Just as one might argue that we first learn to talk to others and then learn to talk to ourselves, I would claim
that in the first instance, argumentation serves the purpose of rational persuasion. First we learn how to persuade others
and then we learn how to persuade ourselves [argumentation as inquiry]. In other words, the public precedes the private
in the practice of argumentation as elsewhere in language, if Wittgenstein's views are right. For the moment, I want to
set those other purposes to one side and focus on rational persuasion.
7 The term "pragmatic" calls to mind Peirce and James and their development of a philosophical outlook that
came to be known as "pragmatism." Peirce said the term emerged from his reflections on Kant, which he read
and reflected on every day for 2 years (so he said). The idea of pragmatisch is the reference to action and
activity. With Peirce, it became the signal for a different approach to inquiry and belief, in which belief is
viewed not as a matter of something that takes place in the mind (a propositional attitude) but rather as a plan
of action or a way of acting. For Peirce, the idea of action became a vital component in his theory of inquiry.
It gave him a new way of thinking about the nature of belief and meaning. James broadened this theory of
meaning to include a theory of truth, according to which, a belief is true if it works. It is from this location that
the term then eventually enters the vocabulary of North American life.
The transformation that Peirce went through with the term "pragmatic" is worthy of note. For as he himself told us
some years later, the idea that action is the end-all and be-all of human life is a doctrine that recommends itself
with more force to a man of 30 than one of 50. As he reflected on the term "pragmatism" and his own
philosophical thought, Peirce saw that action is not an end in itself but always refers us back to purpose. And so,
for Peirce, the term "pragmatism," while it emphasizes activity, ultimately refers us to human purpose.

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From the pragmatic point of view, then, an argument is discourse directed toward rational persuasion.8 By rational
persuasion, I mean that the arguer wishes to persuade the Other to accept the conclusion on the basis of the reasons and
considerations cited, and those alone. In entering the realm of argumentation, the arguer agrees to forswear all other
methods that might be used to achieve this: force, flattery, trickery, and so forth.
I showed previously that form follows function. Given its purpose as rational persuasion, the structure of argument
follows. That is, because I wish to persuade the Other by reason, I recognize that the claim I make must be supported by
reasons or evidence of some sort. It is standard practice to refer to this material as the argument's premises. Hence, an
argument initially appears as a premiseconclusion structure: A set of premises adduced in support of some other
proposition that is the conclusion. Willard (1989), for example, referred to this as the "claims-reason-complex." I follow
Blair (1995) in this matter and refer to this level as "the illative core." This illative core is what most definitions of
argument capture.
But when we consider the full implications of the fact that the arguer's purpose is to persuade rationally, it becomes
clear that there must be more to an argument than just this illative core. The practice of argumentation itself, as well as
any instance of it, takes place against a background of controversy. To argue is, we all realize, to enter into a space
shared by many others also interested in the same issue, many of whom take a different position. The illative core is
meant to initiate the process of converting them, persuading them of the arguer's position. In this context, more will be
required to achieve this than just the material in the illative core.
I return to this idea shortly, but first I want to pause in the exposition in order to pick up a historical thread, for it will
offer us greater clarity about a neglected aspect of argument.
A Brief Detour into the History of Argumentation
The word argument comes from the Latin argumentum, which in turn comes from the Greek argos, which means "to
put into clear light."
It would be fascinating to study the origins of this practice in Greek society. Unfortunately, there is no such history of
argumentation, so the best that I can do is to draw some lessons from two of its expert practitioners: Plato and Aristotle.
What I want to suggest here is that all of the
8 Beginning with Perelman (1958), there is a literature that distinguishes between persuasion and conviction.
See Cox and Willard (1982). Here, I make no attempt to distinguish them.

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elements of the fortified conception of argument I shortly present are found already in the works of Plato and Aristotle. I
am not able here to do more than offer a sketch of these elements.
Aristotle's Practice
I begin not with Plato but rather with the Father of LogicAristotle. Once argument becomes conceptualized as basically
a certain way of structuring propositions, the syllogism becomes the paradigm and so I look back to Aristotle's
syllogistic theory (primarily treated in Prior Analytics) as the embodiment of his conception. In so doing, I am correct
but also I thereby present a truncated picture of the richness of Aristotle's logic (a term unknown to Aristotle), which
included works devoted to forms of reasoning other than the necessary consequential characteristic of syllogism. I may
be tempted to overlook the extremely important and fertile contribution of the Topics, in which Aristotle investigated
probable reasoning, and the De Sophisticis Elenchis, in which he studied what we now call "fallacies."
Moreover, when anyone wishes to know about Aristotle's conception of argument, look not only beyond Prior Analytics
to these other works but beyond The Organon to Aristotle's practice. If Aristotle is observed as dialectician, things can
be noticed about how he conceived the practice of argumentation that might otherwise be missed. Consider, for
example, the way Aristotle argued his case in the De Anima by first considering the standard positions on the topic of
soul. He said that he would first "call into council the views of those of our predecessors who have declared any opinion
on this subject, in order that we may profit by whatever is sound in their suggestions and avoid their errors" (pp.
403b2023). The same sort of dialectical review can also be found in Physics and Metaphysics.
Aristotle's practice thus reveals explicitly what is only implicit in his conception. And although Aristotle did not put the
matter this way, I think he would agree with this point. If argumentation is to be an exercise in rationality, the arguer has
an obligation to take into account the positions of others who have also taken a rational position because to fail to so do
would not be rational. More important, to fail to do so would not be in keeping with the very nature of argument as a
display of rationality. If the arguer takes seriously the positions of others and in the course of his own argument
addresses himself to them, the result is a display that not only is rational but is also one that appears to be rational. More
on this shortly. I am not claiming that Aristotle defines argumentation as I do; I am only claiming that his practice
illustrates tacit awareness of argumentation as manifest rationalitya phrase I introduce and explain later this chapter.

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Plato as Dialectician
Traces of a dialectical conception of argument as are also to be found in Plato. Consider Book I of the Republic, where
Plato had his various interlocutors express three well-known views about justice, each of which is examined and found
wanting. After someone gave his account and made his argument, Socrates typically subjected that arguer to
questioning, which often revealed an assumption embedded in the structure of the reasoning (what logicians today
might call a missing premise); he might have taken issue with a premise; or he might have pointed out an unintended
but unwelcome consequence. Plato often had his interlocutor raise objections that would have been raised by an
opponent if he were present. Plato often had his discussants engage dialectical material; for example, by confronting
standard objections and alternative viewpoints. Thus, in Book II of the Republic, after the discussion with
Thrasymachus, Adeimantus said:
First, I will state what is commonly held about the nature of justice and its origin; secondly, I shall maintain
that it is always practiced with reluctance, . . . and thirdly, that this reluctance is reasonable, because the life of
injustice is much the better life of the twoso people say. This is not what I think myself, Socrates; only I am
bewildered by all that Thrasymachus and every so many others have dinned into my ears . . . (358B)
I call this material the dialectical tier; the illative core of Plato's arguments is furnished in later chapters of the Republic.
In this way, the practice of argumentation as embodied in Plato's dialogues exhibits the contents of what I call the
dialectical tier and also the character of rationality.
Thus, the exoteric work of Plato and the esoteric work of Aristotle exhibit the essential features of the practice of
argumentation and the essential ingredients of the conception of argument I wish to present: the illative core, the
dialectical tier, and manifest rationality. These ideas are further developed later this chapter.
An Afterthought:
Why No History of Argumentation?
As already noted, there does not now exist a history of argumentation. Why is this? I suspect that part of the reason has
to do with what I called, in chapter 4, the mathematicization of logic. As long as it is thought that inference, argument,
and implication are pretty much the same thing, and that these are all subject matters of logic, then because there are
quite a few histories of logic, that means there are histories of argument.9
9 Important histories of logic are: Bochenski (1961), Kneale and Kneale (1962), Prior (1962). Nye's (1990)
work is more critical than historical, but important and interesting. None of them accorded any primacy to
argumentation.

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If I attempt to look into the history of the practice of argumentation, I immediately encounter an important question:
What is this to be a history of? What gets counted as argumentation? There is a difficult conceptual issue here. For
Finocchiaro (1980), Galileo's Dialogues represent a paradigm of argumentation. This is probably a safe call, yet it
illustrates how interwoven are the conceptual and the empirical issues. If I am going to study argumentation in its
historical setting (an empirical study), I must have recourse to some pretheoretic intuition of what to count as
argumentation. Finocchiaro addressed this question without actually defining argumentation. His approach was
ostensive. He would include Plato's Republic in his empirical study of argumentationand I agreeand he would exclude
works of poetry and fictionand again, I agree. Finocchiaro would disqualify Descartes' Meditations on the grounds of its
being too narrowly philosophical, and he would include, as already mentioned, Galileo's Dialogues (I'm not sure about
this) and "selections of judicial opinions of bodies like the United States Supreme Court" (pp. 8283).
I have some difficulty with these latter examples. There is a kind of discourse that might be called scientific argument,
yet the core of scientific activity is certainly not to be found there but rather in the construction, elaboration,
justification, and revision of scientific theory. The role that argumentation plays in this activity is unclear to me. As for
legal argumentation, the problem is, as I showed in chapter 2, that there is no one thing called legal argumentation.
There are the arguments that the lawyer presents to the judge, the arguments that the judge reviews, the argument that
he writes in delivering his decision, the argument that lawyer must use to persuade the client, and so forth. Although
there are resemblances between the argumentation in the courtroom (an adversarial context) and regular argument, there
are also important differences. Reasoning in the adversarial context does not seem to obey a fundamental principle of
argumentation: The strength of the better reasoning, and nothing else, shall determine the outcome. This is not always
so in the realm of legal argument, where, for example, the skills of the barrister, the rhetorical presence, the strategy
used in selecting the jury, cross-examination skills, a superior information base, the advocate's shrewdnessany or all of
these may play a greater role in determining the outcome than the force of the advocate's reasoning.
In sum, although I agree with Finocchiaro about the usefulness of studying reasoning and argumentation empirically;
that is, historically; the way in which the empirical and conceptual strands come together here presents the investigator
with considerable challenges. Such challenges are the material with which a theory of reasoning must reckon, and it is
one of the contentions of this book that just such a theory is needed.
Back to the question at issue: As long as logicians continue to think of argument as essentially a structure, without
taking into account the pur-

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pose(s) of that structure, it will not be possible to write such a history. This brief detour through the history of thinking
about the practice of argumentation has indicated that in practice, arguments consist of more than an illative core. There
is also something called the dialectical tier. But no theory of analysis that I am aware of makes explicit provision for
such dialectical material.10 These remarks indicate the importance of a new theory of analysis and in the next section, I
begin to construct one.
A New Framework for the Theory of Analysis
Thus far I have argued that the traditional, dominant approach that sees argument essentially in structural terms is too
limited and requires fortification (See Johnson, 1992a). The aim of this section is to present such a conceptualization of
argument. I do this by situating the argument within the wider context of the practice of argumentation.
Up to now, I have been using the term "argument(ation)," because I wanted to establish in the reader's mind the
importance of their connection, of seeing argument within the context of argumentation. The time has come to sort
things out. In chapter 4, I argued that one of the principal defects in current ways of conceptualizing argument is that
these tend to be structural in character, ignoring the purpose(s) of argument. But that is really only part of the story. We
are accustomed now to distinguishing between argument as process and argument as product (O'Keefe, 1982). But we
should not stop there. To develop an adequate understanding of argument, we must situate it within the practice of
argumentation, which includes as components (a) the process of arguing, (b) the agents engaged in the practice (the
arguer and the Other), and (c) the argument itself as a product. I now provide my account of each of these components.
The Practice of Argumentation
To understand the product that we call an argument, it is necessary to situate it within its proper context: the practice of
argumentation. By this, I mean to refer to the sociocultural activity of constructing, presenting, and criticizing and
revising arguments. This activity cannot be understood as the activity of any individual or group of individuals but
rather must be understood within the network of customs, habits, and activities of the broader society that gives birth to
it, which continues to maintain it and
10 It has been argued that Toulmin's theory does make room for such material.

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that the practice serves. Hence, my understanding of practice is quite close to MacIntyre's (1981):
By a "practice," I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative
human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity area realized in the course of trying to
achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of
activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and
goods involved, are systematically extended. (p. 175)
The activity here is, of course, the activity of constructing and responding to arguments. The goods internal to that
activity are generally an increase in rationality and specifically a deeper understanding, andor being rationally
persuaded, andor coming closer to an acceptable position. The important question that needs to be dealt with is, "What
are the standards of excellence that are definitive of this activity?" I deal with that question in the next chapter.
Consider, for illustrative purposes, the practice of exchanging gifts at Christmas. This practice exists in North America
but not, say, in the Republic of China. To say that something is a practice is not to say that all members of the society
engage in it, nor indeed that all members necessarily approve of or support it. It is to say, rather, that a shared
understanding exists that at a particular time of the year, the exchanging of gifts between family, friends, and associates
is commonplace. (Some Christians believe that the celebration of Christmas has become too materialistic and
commercialized and so oppose it; for most members of the Jewish faith, the celebration is seen as inherently Christian
and, hence, they simply opt out.) Typically, there are no written rules to govern the practice but, rather, a shared
understanding that allows for significant variation in how people actually work it out. All of this is quite in line with
calling this a practice.
One result of there being this practice is that these activities receive their intelligibility within the practice; they do not
require further explanation. Generally speaking, I do not have to explain why I am going shopping for my sister on
December 23rd other than to say, "I don't have anything for her for Christmas."
The practice of argumentation is a rich intellectual practice that exists in some, but not all, cultures. It exists in North
American culture but not all other cultures. It probably does not appear in so-called primitive cultures, like that of the
Tasaday.
My approach largely agrees with Habermas' (1991) way of marking the distinction between argumentation and
argument:

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We use the term argumentation for that type of speech in which the participants thematize contested validity
claims and attempt to vindicate or criticize them through arguments. An argument contains reasons or
grounds that are connected in a systematic way with the validity claim of a problematic expression. (p. 18)
The main difference is that Habermas' approach seems focused on speech. Although my approach acknowledges the
reality of oral argumentation, its dominant concern remains with the written text. The reason for this orientation stems
from my belief that whereas the oral argument precedes written argument both in sociocultural and personal history,
written argument is the most stable form of argument and therefore a more suitable candidate as the foundation of the
practice.11 Walton (1990b), on the other hand, saw no point in distinguishing between argumentation and argument,
stating, ''Such a pragmatic perspective suggests a new way of defining argument to make it co-extensive with
argumentation. The only difference between the two is one of connotation" (p. 410). On the contrary, I believe I have at
least one good reason for distinguishing the practice of argumentation from its product. I want to separate the normative
issues that surround the practice of argumentation from those that surround the process of arguing, and both of those in
turn from issues that concern the product.
The Process of Arguing
Within the practice, the crucial role is played by the process of arguinga specific type of interchange between two or
more participants. In the typical interchange, there is a difference in point of view that has crystallized around an issue
and one of the participants. The arguer is attempting to persuade the Other of the truth of the thesis being advocated.
This process may occur in a variety of formats. The process may unfold in episodes: X is having an argument with Y
about the advisability of Z. This process may take place in a confined and quite restricted way, as when X and Y argue
on May 5, 1991 for about 30 minutes, come to a resolution, and move on. Or the process may extend over a long period
of time, as, for example, philosophical arguments tend to do. Even today, philosophers are engaged in the process of
arguing with Plato, who has been dead for over 2,000 years. (Here is one reason for making written arguments the
foundation of my approach; if there were only spoken arguments, then ready access to Plato's arguments would not
exist.) Thus, the process of arguing has its own mode of temporality. Arguments can go on for months, years, even
11 Govier rightly understood my reasons for taking written argument as the focus. See her Preface in Johnson
(1996).

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centuries. Nor does the process preclude other episodes in which other arguers get into the process. But there is more to
the process than merely the arguer trying to convince the Other of the truth of his thesis.
Walton (1990b) referred to "the global process of defending and criticizing a thesis" (p. 410). This "global process" of
arguing includes the arguer's attempt to support or defend a thesis. It also includes the response by the Other, which will
typically take the form of introducing objections to or criticisms of the argument. To engage in the process by putting
forth an argument is implicitly to ask for a response from other participants, a response that will take the form of
criticism. Stated another way, anyone who put forth an argument and expected that the audience would accept it without
question, without careful inspection and challenge, would display shocking ignorance of the real nature of the practice.
There are limits to the form that the criticism may take and I have more to say about this later. The point here is that the
process of arguing includes, by its very nature, feedback from the Other. Nor does the process of arguing end there.
Also included as part of the process must be the response by the arguer to those objections and criticisms, as well as any
revisions made by the arguer. In other words, the process of arguing is an unfolding dynamic in which the arguer puts
forth an argument, the Other responds, the arguer responds, now the Other may respond again and so on, until they
agree to stop. (An important benefit of the pragmatic approach is that it makes evident that criticism and revision are
both internal to the process of arguing. They are not externalities that may or may not happen; they are not
supererogatory efforts on the part of the participants; they are integral parts of the process of arguing.)
The Agent(s)
As was clear in our discussion of the process, arguing involves two participants; or if you prefer, it has two poles and
the process takes place between those poles. I now focus on these two poles.
The arguer may be viewed as the participant in the practice who initiates the process by producing an argument. There
is little more that needs to be said about the arguer for the moment. However, the arguer is only half the story because
the very nature of the process requires that there be an Other whose response to the argument is internal to the process
of arguing. The process is incomplete without this Other, who we ultimately call the critic.
It may be the case that the same individual plays the role of both arguer and critic. The arguer puts forward an
argument, then steps back and criticizes it; if the arguer is too demanding, (s)he will not get very far in the process; if
the arguer is too lenient, the argument will not stand its own

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against criticism. Certainly, it will often be useful for the arguer to direct his or her argument to the Other.
The role of the Other goes beyond the ontological level. If the arguer is to be successful, the argument must be
appraised by the Other and pass scrutiny. An argument depends on the Other for its success and well-being. To
understand this, we must go back to the practice of argumentation and be reminded of its purpose(s). The fundamental
purpose, although admittedly not the only one, is to arrive at the truth about some issue. The practice exists because
everyone realizes that to achieve that goal, they need to reason; they need to give reasons and then access them. But it is
also known full well that intellectual imaginations may be limited, that there may be a failure to see certain limitations
in the arguments produced. In eagerness, certain items of evidence may be overrated and others may be underrated or
ignored. And it does not matter how fertile imaginations are; there will be objections that cannot be imagined or
anticipated. These are the limitations for which the Other can compensate. Hence the importance of criticism (as
opposed to mere evaluation) and the opportunity for the arguer to revise the argument. Consider the following points.
Perhaps nowhere is the practice of argumentation more central than in philosophy. Philosophers are notoriously self-
critical.12 It is a regular part of their mode of argumentation that they anticipate and ward off objections. But very few
have been able to be such strong critics of their arguments as to have seen the need to move away from them altogether
as a result of the criticism. That is to say, philosophers abandon their positions with great reluctance. The instinct is to
modify the argument to deal with the objection, or to show why the criticism is not apt. I can think of only two
philosophers whose imagination and intellect were strong enough to allow them to generate the seeds of destruction of
their own theories. The two figures are Plato and Wittgenstein, both of whose philosophical thought underwent a
significant shift (as opposed to revision or modification) as a result of their own criticisms. Yet, even here I suspect that
their own ability to be self-critical must have been nurtured by active interchange with critical Others, (Plato by
Aristotle; Wittgenstein by Russell and Ramsey).
As a collectivity, then, and as a result of joint efforts, a deeper understanding or a truer position may be reached as a
result of criticism. In fact, however, this result will occur only if some participant gets the ball rolling, as it were, by
advocating some thesis and rationally attempting to persuade Others of its truth.
Thus, the agent of the argumentthe arguercannot really be understood as apart from the receiver of the argumentthe
Other. Both are essential
12 For an interesting treatment of this aspect of argument, see Adler (1994).

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participants in the process, and both have an active role to play. I have more to say about both in chapter 7, when I
discuss the normative constraints on the agents.
Argument as the Product of the Practice
Finally, then, we come to the argument itself, best represented as the product (or the distillate) of the process. At a
certain point in the process, the arguer distils elements from what has transpired in the process and encodes them in the
form of an argument. It may be set forth in either speech or text. This encoding may well be a provisional move, in
order to receive criticism in order to make the argument stronger. Or it may be that the arguer now believes (s)he can
achieve the objective of rational persuasion of the Other with this product. In any event, the product comes out of the
process and bears its imprint, as offspring tend to do. "As the twig is bent, so the tree is inclined."
This is an apt preliminary description of the product called argument. I can provide a deeper insight into it by focusing
my attention on the practice of argumentation and at its salient characteristics. (Clearly, not all arguments will embody
all the features of the process. My conceptualization of argument must recognize this fact.) For it is not really possible
to achieve this deeper understanding of the product without a fuller, deeper appreciation of the practice of which it is the
product.
Fundamental Characteristics of Argumentation
The practice of argumentation is characterized by three features it is important to understand if I am to fully explain
what an argument is.
Argumentation as Teleological
To understand any practice, we need to take into consideration first of all its purpose. As mentioned earlier, I view the
purpose of rational persuasion as the fundamental purpose of argumentation. The emphasis here is on rational means,
for I know that there are other methods. Indeed, the practice of majority rule is just such a practice. It says that the
verdict of the majority shall stand as the verdict of the whole. It is one way to achieve closure on an issue. This is
certainly an efficient method and, in that sense, a rational one. But the idea behind the practice of argumentation, as I
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is not to produce consensus or reach closure no matter what but rather to achieve consensus in which the parties agree
that the strength of the better reasoning, and that alone, has determined the outcome.
Now it is time to consider the impact of this feature of argumentation on the nature and structure of argument. As I said
earlier, the standard way of defining an argument is structural in character. An argument is defined as a form of
discourse with a certain structure typically portrayed as premises leading to a conclusion.
Because rational persuasion is the telos, participants in the practice recognize that any claim made must be supported by
reasons or evidence of some sort. (Reasons and evidence are not the sameevidence could include physical objects,
studies, and such.) In the first instance, an argument appears as a premiseconclusion structure: Reasons are produced to
justify a target proposition, which is the conclusion. This is the first tier, what I called the illative core of the argument.
But there is more to the story.
Because the arguer's purpose is rational persuasion, a second tier is required as well. Why? I have shown that the
practice of argumentation presupposes a background of controversy. The first tier (the illative core) is meant to initiate
the process of converting Others, winning them over to the arguer's position. But they will not easily be won over, nor
should they be, if they are rational. The participants know that there will likely be objections to the arguer's premises.
Indeed, the arguer must know this, so it is typical that the arguer will attempt to anticipate and defuse such objections
within the course of the argument. If the arguer does not deal with the objections and criticisms, then to that degree, the
argument is not going to satisfy the dictates of rationality; more precisely, to that very degree the argument falls short of
what is required in terms of structurenever mind the content; that is, the adequacy of the response to those objections.
For those at whom it is directed, those who know and care about the issue, will be aware that the argument is open to
objections from those who disagree with its reasons, conclusion, andor reasoning. Hence, if the arguer wishes to
persuade Others rationally, the arguer is obligated to take account of these objections and opposing points of view. To
ignore them, not to mention them, or to suppress themthese could hardly be considered the moves of someone engaged
in the process of rational persuasion; thus, the process of argumentation must include a seconddialecticaltier in which
objections and criticisms are dealt with.
We are now in a position to appreciate the connection between the teleological aspect of argumentation and the next
feature I want to discuss: its dialectical nature. Because the practice exists to achieve rational persuasion of the Other as
a rational agent, the practice must also be dialectical. Thus, the second feature of the practice of argumentation comes to
the fore.

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Argumentation as Dialectical
To say that argumentation is a dialectical practice is almost a platitude. And yet I believe that the force of this all-too-
familiar characterization has not been fully appreciated.
The root meaning of dialectical is dialoguea logos (which I take to mean "reasoned discourse") that is between two (or
more) people.13 That requires more than just speech between two parties because as we all know, such talking may be
nothing more than a monologue conducted in the presence of another. Genuine dialogue requires not merely the
presence of the Other, or speech between the two, but the real possibility that the logos of the Other will influence one's
own logos. An exchange is dialectical when, as a result of the intervention of the Other, one's own logos (discourse,
reasoning, or thinking) has the potential of being affected in some way.
Specifically, the arguer agrees to let the feedback from the Other affect the product. The arguer consents to take
criticism and to take it seriously. Indeed, the arguer not only agrees to take it when it comes, as it typically does, (s)he
may actually solicit it. In this sense, argumentation is a (perhaps even the), dialectical process par excellence. If (as is
likely) the arguer now modifies that argument as a result of the intervention by the Other, the result is an improved
producta better argument. The intervention of the Other is thereby seen to lead to the improvement of the product. It has
become a better argument, a more rational product.
Thus do these first two features of argumentationits being rational and dialecticalnot only reinforce each other, they lead
to discussion of the final feature of the practicemanifest rationality.
Argumentation as Manifest Rationality
Connections between the practice of argumentation and rationality are strong and multiple, as I stated in chapter 1.
When I discussed the nature of rationality and its connection with argumentation, I was content to follow Siegel (1988)
in the belief that no instrumental theory of rationality would be adequate for my purposes. Nor can I offer further
clarification here regarding the nature of rationality. I must bypass the fascinating theoretical debates about the nature of
rationality and simply say that rationality can be understood as the disposition to, and the action of, using, giving, andor
acting on the basis of reasons.14
13 I want to thank Robert Binkley of the University of Western Ontario for pointing out an error in an earlier
version of this section.
14 This is from the perspective of Habermas' view that there are three kinds of rationality: instrumental, practical
and theoretical. My view would be that the kind of rationality both presupposed and in turn furthered by argument
is theoretical rationality.

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I now discuss several aspects of the connection between argumentation and rationality.
Argumentation Embraces Rationality. To engage in the practice, the participants must embrace and endorse and to some
degree cherish rationality. There are so many other ways of handling the business of rational processing: putting one's
trust in an authority, intuition, speculation, and so forth. (Not to mention the two greatest and most prominent onesforce
and fear.) Each of these has some degree of rationality associated with it. It is rational to take some matters on authority
because no one can undertake to learn everything from the bottom up. Fear can be rational, as when it is based on an
accurate reading of the real situation. The fear that keeps tourists away from dangerous parts of a city at night is a
rational fear. Yet each also cuts away from rationality, often at the crucial moment. If authorities disagree or if your
authority is silent on the issue, what then? Argumentation, on the other hand, shares with other rational processeslike
proving and theorizingthe requirement that nothing be accepted but what is shown to have reason behind it.
Argumentation Depends on Mutual Rationality. It may be true that animals are rational and draw inferences. But there is
no reliable evidence that any form of animal life engages in the practice of argumentation as it has been described here.
There is no evidence that one dolphin assumes the role of the arguer while another takes on the role of the critic.
Dolphin culture reveals no traces or deposits of actual arguments. The kind of rationality that argumentation depends on
is at once human (there is no evidence of its existence elsewhere) and mutual (it requires a partner who is also rational).
Argumentation Increases Rationality. As a result of engaging in the practice, the participants are more rational and the
amount of rationality in the world has increased. The arguer and the critic have each exercised reasoning powers. If the
critic has found a problem in the argument, then the arguer, having seen and accepted this criticism, is now in a better,
more rational, position with respect to the issue addressed in the argument. If the critic's objections have been found
wanting, then the arguer will have to have exercised his reasoning powers to show this, and his position will, to that
degree, be more rational, having warded off objections. This rationality increases with each succeeding episode. As a
result of each instance of the practice of argumentation, then, the world becomes a slightly more rational place.
Argumentation Exhibits Rationality. It is not just that the participants embrace rationality, which they might do secretly
but not publicly. No, the participants in the practice exhibit what it is to be rational. To give reasons;

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to weigh objections; to revise over them or to reject themall of this describes a vintage performance of rationality. The
arguer acknowledges that there are objections and problems with the position, as contrasted with the rhetor (see next
section) or the dogmatist, neither of whom will make this concession. The critic acknowledges that there is rationality in
the arguer's position. Thus, I might think of argumentation as a prize exhibit of rationality.
Argumentation and Rhetoric. To clarify what I have in mind, it may be helpful to compare and contrast the rhetor with
the arguer with respect to the role that rationality plays for each of them. The rhetorthe agent in a speech act situationis
certainly rational, for the rhetor must use reason and reasons to shape his message to the audience and other constraints
such as time and place. How does the rhetor differ from the arguer? Rationality cannot distinguish them. Although
rationality is internal to and constitutive of the practice of argumentation, the same can be said about rhetoric.
Rationality is, in effect, the glue that binds both practices together. What separates rhetoric from argumentation is that
the latter is bound by the requirement of manifest rationality. The arguer cannot ignore objections to his argument, even
if it is not known how to forestall them, because it would not appear to be rational and so it would violate the
requirement of manifest rationality. The rhetor is under no such constraint: If ignoring the objection will lead to a more
effective communication, and if doing so is rational, then the objection can be ignored.
Manifest Rationality. To say that the practice of argumentation is characterized by manifest rationality is to say that it is
patently and openly rational. To whom? To the participants, whether they be arguer, critic, or those interested in the
issue. They agree to do nothing that would compromise either the substance or the appearance of rationality.
In many ways, this is analogous to the way that the ideal of justice is prized by those who support the legal system. Not
only are these persons committed to the pursuit of justice, they are also committed that in this pursuit, the appearance of
justice be clear. A judge who might be entirely fair-minded but who enjoys an association with one of the appellants
must disqualify her- or himself because to remain would compromise the very appearance of impartiality required of the
judge. If justice alone were the goal, the judge might well remain on the bench, for (s)he might well be fully capable of
distancing her- or himself from those representing the form and dispensing justice fairly. But this course of action does
not serve the appearance of justice.
This additional consideration, this clothing of rationality, is what makes argumentation more than just an exercise in
rationality. Manifest rationality is why the arguer is obligated to respond to objections and criticisms from

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others and not ignore them or sweep them under the carpet. It is not just that to do so would not be rational or would not
be in keeping with the spirit of the practice. It is that it would be an obvious violation of itand it would be seen to be
such. Thus, to put the matter somewhat strangely, it would not only not be rational; it would not look rational.
Further, the requirement of manifest rationality explains why the arguer must respond even to criticisms that are
believed (or known) to be misguided. If the arguer were obligated only by the dictates of rationality (rather than those of
manifest rationality), then this person can well afford to ignore the criticism, as indeed the rhetor can. It is in this matter
of dealing with criticisms, then, that the arguer and the rhetor part company. The rhetor may know of serious objections
to the thesis and to the discourse and may or may not choose to include reference to these in the discourse. One could
not accuse him of any lapse of rationality if the rhetor failed to do so. But if the arguer fails to deal with well-known
objections, this is a serious lapse. Thus, participants in the practice of argumentation not only exercise their rationality
but they need to be seen to be so doing.15
Conclusion
I have argued that argumentation is characterized by these features that are, it is clear, intimately related. Because
argumentation is a teleological practice that aims at rational persuasion, it must be dialectical; because argumentation is
both rational and dialectical, it must be manifestly rational. With these characteristics in hand, I can now turn to the task
of developing a deeper understanding of the nature of argument.
Rethinking the Nature of Argument
If the previous account is anywhere near the target, certain modifications in how we understand the concept of argument
appear warranted. First, we should adopt an approach that recognizes the need for not just the illative core but also the
dialectical tier. Second, we need to understand that the illative core is not well represented by the (P + I) model.
15 To use a parallel, in his discussion of the theory of names, Evans (1991) wrote, "Intentions alone don't
bring it about that a name gets a designation; without the intentions being manifest there cannot be the
common knowledge required for the practice" (p. 304). In the same spirit, I would argue that the idea of
rationality alone cannot illuminate the practice of argumentation; without the rationality being manifest, there
cannot be the common knowledge required for the practice. Thus, participants in the practice of
argumentation not only exercise their rationality but they need to be seen to be so doing.

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The Illative Core and Dialectical Tier
From the vantage point of the current proposal, there are three important limitations in the traditional, logical ways of
approaching the definition of an argument. The first limitation is that the definition is structural rather than functional.
That point has been discussed sufficiently. The second limitation is the failure to give adequate representation of the
dialectical character of argumentation. I need to say more about that.
From what has been said, it becomes clear why the structure of an argument must be more complex than the traditional
conception envisages. In that conception, an argument is a set of reasons that support a target assertion, what others call
the premises in support of a conclusion. The requirements of manifest rationality make it obligatory that, if I wish to
persuade you of the truth or the acceptability of some thesisstatement and wish to do so in accordance with the dictates
of rationality, recognizing your rationality, then I must give reasons. Thus there is ample justification for the illative
core of argumentation. It consists of the reasons the arguer has advanced in support of the conclusion; what others call
the premises of the argument.
The interesting questions become, "Is this enough? Does providing a set of reasons for a conclusion satisfy the
requirements of argumentation as manifestly rational?" My answer is "No." Although the arguer has given reasons or
evidence for his conclusion, in this dialectical situation, that is not enough. The Other who one wishes to persuadeand I
eventually discuss the character of the Other to understand this process thoroughlyalready knows that there are
objections to the argument, whether to the thesistarget assertion, the reasons supporting it, or both. Realizing this, the
arguer, who we are supposing is rational, is under a rational obligation to address these dialectical dimensions:
alternative positions, and standard objections. This material forms the second tier of the argument, the dimension I call
the dialectical tier.
As indicated earlier, the notion of the dialectical tier as an essential part of any argument has long been recognized in
the practice of argumentation. Philosophers and others for whom argumentation is the principal methodology routinely
include in their own arguments a section in which they voice and then deal with objections to their position. In fact,
when students are taught to argue, they are advised to consider possible objections. Thus, Meiland (1980), Solomon
(1989), and Johnson and Blair (1993) all advised that the arguer consider possible objections. The interesting point is
that although their instruction in practice includes reference to what I call the dialectical tier, the theories they advocated
do not include any such reference. Solomon advised the student to "anticipate objections to your position and your
argument and take the offensive against rival positions" (p. xiii),

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but when he later discussed logic and the standards of argument, Solomon was content to repeat the orthodox position
and made no mention at all of the requirements of the dialectical tier. More about this gap between theory and practice
in chapter 12.
About the dialectical tier, it will be asked, ''Which objections must the arguer deal with? How many must the arguer
deal with? And what form must that dealing take?" Clearly, the arguer cannot be expected to deal with all of the
possible andor actual objections. So how does one specify which ones? I call this The Specification Problem, and I have
more to say about it in chapter 11.
In practice, many arguments consist of the first tier onlythe illative core. That is only to be expected because often,
those engaged in the practice are casual rather than dedicated participants. What I mean by that is they argue on
occasion; it is not their life-blood. If, on the other hand, we look to the best practices of those who have the most at
stake in this process, philosophers and logicians and others who have a vested interest in this practice, we will find that
their arguments almost always take account of the standard objections. They realize that to establish their own positions
in an intellectually satisfactory way, they will have to do so by discharging their dialectical obligations.
Arguments with a dialectical tier are found in nonacademic discourse as well: Remember my second example in chapter
2. Objections to the arguments of others on the grounds that they contain dialectical lapses, although not common, may
still be encountered. Here is one in a letter to the editor of The Atlantic Monthly (1994), in which the writer is criticizing
an earlier article by Fish: "The argument has tremendous emotional power but will not stand up to intellectual criticism
because of its unwarranted assumptions [which the writer now identifies] . . . Moreover Fish doesn't deal with a number
of other arguments against affirmative action." The critic here is complaining that Fish's argument is deficient in the
dialectical tier; it does not do a good enough job of dealing with other positions.
Clearly, then, if we wish to conceptualize the structure of argumentation adequately, we need at least these two
dimensions: both an illative core and a dialectical tier. For if we have only the illative core, we are left wondering how
this arguer proposes, with this argumentative material, to deal with the objections that must be addressed. The argument
is, as it were, unfinished, incomplete. The same would be true if the arguer dealt only with the objections and failed to
give us the illative core. Even if the arguer can handle the objections, we still want to know what reasons he proposes to
justify the conclusion. The argument as it stands is unfinished, incomplete.
Finally, I turn to a discussion of a third limitation of the traditional view in the way in which the illative core has been
understood, what I call the (P + I) model, the view that an argument should be seen as consisting of a

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set of premises, plus an inference from them to the conclusion. The inference is typically represented as a bridge or a
link from the premises to the conclusion.
Why do I propose discarding the (P + I) model?16 For three reasons.
First, this model promotes the tendency to confuse inference with argument, or perhaps even to equate them because, on
this model, inference is a part of an argument and so is hard wired into its very being.
Second, this model has led to the search for a type of inference appropriate for real argumentsa type less strong than a
deductive linkage and also less strong than inductive. This quest has led some, Hitchcock (1983) and Govier (1987) to
name but two, to embrace the notion of conductive inference, following Wellman (1971). I gave reasons in chapter 4 for
questioning whether conductive inference can really be called a type of inference at all. Now, if we abandon the idea
that an argument is composed of a set of premises plus the inference from them to the conclusion, then we no longer
have to provide an account of inference. This in turn will help keep the boundaries between inference and argument
distinct.
Third, if on the (P + I) model we admit the existence of missing premises, the distinction between premises and
inference can be challenged. Either we block the idea that there are missing premises, or it seems we may be forced to
admit that the distinction between premise and inference is unsuccessful.
But, the question will be asked, with what do you propose to replace the (P + I) model? My answer is that everything
we need to understand the structure of argument is available to us in the notion that an argument consists of reasons put
forth as rational support for the thesis. To understand the structure of the argument is to get clear on which reasons are
offered as support for the thesis; to evaluate that structure, it will be sufficient to ask whether these reasons provide
rational support for this thesis. To answer that question, as I explain in the next chapter, no mention need be made to an
inference from the reasons to the thesis, or the premises to the conclusion.
A Revised Definition of Argument
Accordingly, I propose the following as a better way to conceptualize argument:
16 Toulmin also proposed abandoning the premiseconclusion terminology. In his model, the role of inference
is replaced with the notion of a warrant. He developed his own way of conceptualizing the structure. The
question will then be asked, "Why not just adopt that approach?" In my view, not only are there inherent
problems with Toulmin's theory of structure (see Johnson, 1981b, for my account of them), but as was
indicated in chapter 2, I also have reservations about adequacy of the jurisprudential model on which this
approach is based.

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An argument is a type of discourse or textthe distillate of the practice of argumentationin which the arguer
seeks to persuade the Other(s) of the truth of a thesis by producing the reasons that support it. In addition to
this illative core, an argument possesses a dialectical tier in which the arguer discharges his dialectical
obligations.
Some Reflections on the Definition
Note that this definition:
1. makes reference to purpose, with the notion of structure in a secondary role;
2. emphasizes argument as part of the practice of argumentation;
3. makes no reference to premises and conclusion; and
4. includes the dialectical tier within the definition.
In the next section, I take account of some of the objections that will be raised.
As I said at the outset, I am clear that the definition is stipulative; it is my recommendation about how we should
understand and define the term. Let me fill out that idea a bit more here so that it is clear what I am proposing.
I suppose that the term "argument" has a wide range of application; that there is a spectrum to which it applies. As Fig.
6.1 illustrates, the central part of the spectrum is occupied by the notion of argument I have introduced and that other
specimens (like scientific theory and proof) are arguments in a secondary or derivative sense.17 A better way of
understanding what I propose is this: Take "argument" to be a term whose meaning is best grasped neither as the
essentialist would have us understand it nor yet as the Wittgensteinian would have us, but rather as the spectral theorist,
according to whom certain terms are best understood as a kind of penumbraa center and wings. What I am attempting to
do here is address the issue of how the center is understood. The sense of the term ''argument" that I am concerned with
and am focusing on here is that which occupies the center of the spectrum. Perhaps we shall call a scientific theory an
argument, an advertisement an argument, or a proof an argument. All these attributions make some sense, but that sense
has to be unpacked in terms of clear center. My claim is that such a clear understanding of the center has been lacking
since logic, which had hitherto been strongly connected with argumentation, became mathematicized. The informal
logic movement can be seen as one
17 My understanding is that recent work in linguistics, especially in concept development, has strongly
recommended some such model as this; that is, that a child learns the meaning of the term "dog" by being
given cases at the center of the spectrum and gradually learning to extend it to other uses. See Keil (1989).

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Fig. 6.1
Range of application of the term "argument."
attempt to free logic from those constraints and recover part of what was lostin effect to recover the center.
I have just given a definition of argument that I believe is not open to the criticisms of the standard traditional
definitions. But that definition, as well as the argument that one is needed, are both open to objections. By my own
account, if my argument is to be complete, I have dialectical obligations of my own to deal with. I turn to those matters
now.
Objections and Replies
There are objections to this definition and to the approach I have outlined, chiefly to the idea that in order for a piece of
reasoning or discourse to qualify as an argument, it needs more than just the illative core; it requires a dialectical tier. I
want to consider and respond to some of those objections here.
Objection #1. Your fortified definition of argument is too restrictive. It means that many examples of reasoning
classified as arguments by the traditional account will not be classified as such under your definition, merely because of
the absence of a dialectical tier.18
Response. Let me deal first with the spirit that animates this objection, and then with the substantive point it raises.
The spirit behind this type of objection seems to be a desire to preserve the traditional understanding of an argument as
essentially a premiseconclusion structure. But when we understand more fully the background of this tradition, how it
became enmeshed with a particular program for logic and philosophy (chap. 4), and how it is at odds with best practice,
it seems to me there is ample reason for revising the tradition, or reconstructing it, rather than maintaining it as is. And
that is the spirit that motivates my approach to these matters.
18 This objection is due to Blair and many others (Gilbert, Weddle, and Paul), who find my approach
restrictive and out of step with the tradition and the practice.

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Some specimens that are presented as paradigms of argument in the traditional view would no longer be able to claim
that status. But let me show what this revision entails by taking as an example a specimen from the tradition that would
be acknowledged as an argument:
If Argentina boycotts the alliance, then Bolivia will withdraw. If Bolivia withdraws, then Chile will also.
Therefore if Argentina boycotts the alliance, Chile will also.
Traditionalists will want to call this an argument, and perhaps proceed to evaluate and or criticize it, whereas I would
not classify this as a paradigm case of argument. What will my response then be? I would certainly not ignore it. I
would say this reasoning might represent the ground floor of an argument but that it lacks a dialectical tier. The arguer
needs to complete it by showing how (s)he intends to handle certain objections. As it stands, my suggestion would then
be to classify this reasoning as an implication and evaluate it according to the standards of formal deductive logic.
What my position comes down to, then, is that the central case of "argument" is the entire structure composed of the
illative core and the dialectical tier that has emerged in my investigation. I propose that this will be understood as the
paradigm case of argument, the sense of the term over which policy is made, particularly policies regarding argument
evaluation and criticism. (To avoid confusion, a term like "proto-argument" might be used to apply to what has
traditionally been called an argument; i.e., reasoning consisting of the illative core alone. In 1993, Johnson & Blair used
the term "proto-argument" to refer to "an attempt to persuade rationally by giving reasons for some claim, one which
lacks a clear structure . . . " (323). The only correction I would suggest is that adding the words "or complete'' after
"clear.") But we need not go that far; we can simply understand that a piece of reasoning containing only what I have
called the illative core is an argument in a derivative sense; it does not occupy the central part of the spectrum. A
cartoon that is reconstructed as an illative core may also be considered an argument in this extended sense, presumably
because in that case, it can be seen that there has been an attempt at rational persuasion.
To the question, "What, then, does your theory recommend we do with respect to those arguments that lack the
dialectical tier?" I am suggesting that they be viewed as incomplete products, as works in progress, and be treated
accordingly. In some cases, the author would be asked to rework it, whereas in others, one might as well make some
critical remarks about the illative core.
It is true that my approach may appear to be upping the ante, for I am stressing that the construction and presentation of
an argument be understood as an intellectual enterprise. Unlike inference, which is typically spon-

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taneous and natural, there is nothing at all natural about argumentation. In this respect, argumentation resembles the
activity of scientific theorizing and the construction of a scientific theory. Kuhn (1962) called attention to about how
rare it is to find civilizations that support a scientific culture:
Every civilization of which we have records has possessed a technology, an art, a religion, a political system,
laws, and so on. In many cases those facets of civilization have been as developed as our own. But only the
civilizations that descend from Hellenic Greece have possessed more than the most rudimentary science. The
bulk of scientific knowledge is a product of Europe of the last four centuries. No other place and time has
supported the very special communities from which scientific productivity comes. (pp. 166167)
There is something rare about communities that support argumentation, and my definition attempts to show how very
special the practice of argumentation is.19
One final question: "But what about those cases where the arguer is setting forth a novel argument to which there are
not as yet any objections or criticisms to take account of? Here it appears that your definition cannot be satisfied and,
yet, surely one wants to make room for such reasoning."
My answer is that in constructing this argument, even if the arguer has not encountered criticisms or objections from
others, that the arguer will have encountered in his own thinking some possible objections, and these could be the stuff
of the dialectical tier.
Objection #2. The dialectical tier is unnecessary. The requirement that the arguer discharge dialectical obligations is an
appropriate one, but there are other ways to incorporate this requirement into our theory of analysis. For example, this
requirement can be incorporated into the account of sufficiency.20 It could be required that to produce sufficient
evidence for the position, the arguer must deal with the dialectical matters. Allen (personal communication, June 1995)
suggested one may think of the dialectical tier as a component part of an extended argument, or a case. Govier (1997)
suggested that I might want to distinguish between the original argument
19 Having just mentioned scientific theory, a point of comparison comes to mind. There is a loose sense of the
word "theory" in which a single thought may lay claim to the status of a theory. But there is also a much more
restricted sense of the word "theory" (as it is used in science) in which the construction of a theory requires a
great deal of work. The loose sense is ultimately derived from the strict sense of theorya scientific or
philosophical or mathematical theory. (Matthies, whose training as an undergraduate was in physics, once
relayed to me how startled he was to discover how glibly philosophers tossed around the term ''theory".)
20 See Blair and Johnson (1987) for an elaboration of this approach.

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and the supplementary arguments in which the arguer discharges these dialectical obligations.
Response. It seems to me that the ground that separates my position from that behind the objectors is about the means to
achieve an end, and that we agree about the endthe need for an arguer to respond to objections and criticisms. The
alternatives suggested here are reasonable. In Blair's approach, an argument without a dialectical tier becomes a bad
argument because it fails to satisfy the sufficiency requirement. In Allen's view, the argument without a dialectical tier
is an argument, but it is not an extended argument.
One problem with Blair's view is that it does not allow us to distinguish conveniently between an argument that takes on
objections but does a poor job of it (and therefore is guilty of a hasty conclusionat least of violating the relevance
requirement), and an argument that fails to take on objections at all (and therefore is also guilty of violating the
sufficiency requirement in a quite different way).
Allen's suggestion is also reasonable: to make the dialectical tier a requirement for some larger reasoning calls for an
extended argument (or case). Thus, the example on page 170 is an example of an argument but not an extended
argument. The problem then becomes in what circumstances is an argument necessary and in what circumstances is an
extended argument necessary?
In my approach, an argument without a dialectical tier is not an argument. Let me draw an analogy that requires me to
switch back for the moment to the conventional (traditional) idea of an argument. Consider the statement that "the
argument lacks a conclusion." If this is really what is meant, and not merely that the argument lacks a stated conclusion,
then this statement is incoherent (because by definition, an argument has a conclusion) and the making of such a
statement means that the speaker has not grasped what an argument is. Likewise, I want to say that a person who says,
"this is an argument although the arguer does not address himself to the well-known objection that . . . " is making a
statement that is fundamentally incoherent and reveals that the speaker has not really grasped what is involved in
argument and has, in some crucial way, failed to understand the very nature of the process of arguing.
It may be objected that then it follows that an entire tradition of logic that presented this conception of argument did not
really know what an argument was. This does not follow. Those in this tradition certainly know and understand the rich
sense of argument that I have put forward, and I am confident that in their practice, this conception is exemplified. But
their theoretical adumbration of it is impoverished. And there is good reason why

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this is so: The tradition was more focused on implication than on argument and saw argument through a lens that
distorted fundamental aspects of it.
Objection #3. Your definition is circular. You define an argument as the distillate of the practice; yet in presenting the
practice of argumentation, you make reference to the notion of argument.
Response. There may be some circularity, but I do not think it is problematic. I hold that in the order of intelligibility, a
grasp of the practice of argumentation must precede an understanding of the real nature of argument. To discuss the
practice without mentioning the word argument is scarcely possible. On the other hand, that discussion of the practice
does not commit one to any particular definition of argument. The treatment of argument as the product of the practice
could support (although perhaps not equally well) the traditional definition as well my own. Hence I do not think my
definition is circular in any vicious sense.
Objection #4. Your claim that there has not been any representation of the dialectical tier in earlier theories is mistaken.
What you call the dialectical tier is similar to what Toulmin called a rebuttal.21
Response. Toulmin's idea of a rebuttal might be extended to cover what I have called the dialectical tier; but as it is
introduced (1958), it is much more limited. Here is how Toulmin introduced it:
Again it is often necessary in the law-courts, not just to appeal to a given statute or common-law doctrine, but
to discuss explicitly the extent to which this particular law fits the case under consideration, whether it must
inevitably be applied in this particular case, or whether special facts may make the case an exception to the
rule in or one in which the law can be applied only subject to certain qualifications. (p. 101)
True, Toulmin did not call these limiting features rebuttal, although from what follows it is evident that this is his intent:
If we are to take account of these features of our argument also, our pattern will become more complex.
Modal qualifiers (Q) and conditions of exception or rebuttal (R) are distinct both from data and from warrants,
and need to be given a special place in our layout. (p. 101)
21 James Freeman and Mark Weinstein raised this objection at a presentation of a preliminary version of this
chapter at Sonoma in 1989.

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Fig. 6.2
An example of Toulmin's layout of an argument.
In the actual example reproduced from Toulmin (1958; see Fig. 6.2), (R) here stands for the claims "Both his parents
were aliens/he has become a naturalized American." It is easy to see how someone who wished to use Toulmin's
approach could see, in his concept of a rebuttal, an approximation to what I have called the dialectical tier. The rebuttal
is in effect a blocking move by the arguer in which an objection is anticipated: But what if his parents are aliens? Or
another one: But what if he has become a naturalized American? In this instance, the arguer concedes the force of these
objections and builds protection from them into the rebuttal.
However, no matter how closely they may in some cases resemble one another, I hold that there is an important
difference between a rebuttal and the dialectical tier. The latter is a broader notion than the former; this narrowness of
the conception illustrates, it seems to me, a point I made in chapter 2: that Toulmin paid a price for having chosen a
jurisprudential model.
Objection #5. This is all just semantics anyway! There is no one thing that the word "argument" means; there are
various meanings, various approaches, and the important thing is to understand which one is being dealt with, which is
always a matter of context; there is no one approach, no correct meaning.
Response. I conceded the force of part of this objection previously when I announced that my definition would be
stipulative. I intend this stipulative definition to cover the range of reasoning that is associated with the practice of
argumentation, and so I want to be able to make sense of the notion of an emotional argument (Gilbert, 1995) and to
include the realization that there are different purposes that can be served by argumentation and by arguments. But if
there is a multiplicity of purposes, that does not preclude there being some purpose that is fundamental, and that is the
position I have taken here. The purpose of rational persuasion is fundamental. And if it is true that there is a wide range
of arguments from proofs at one end to

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joke and threats on the other hand, and I agree that there is sense to this view, still there must be a core or a center, and
that is the ground I have sought to define and clarify in my theory of analysis and with this definition.
As for the claim that this is "just semantics," I concede that this is semantics in some sense; we are about the work of
grasping the meaning. But that this is "just" semantics suggests that somehow such work is trivial; and that is a
suggestion that ought to be rejected.
The objection might also mean to say that there are other ways to cut the pie. I have not denied that, but with each come
certain consequences. In the final analysis, any stipulative definition must be judged by how well it serves us in our
intellectual needs. My claim is that the approach I have taken pays important dividends not found in other approaches. I
speak more about this at the end of the chapter, but, for one thing, my approach (like others who take this same
approach) brings the entire practice of argumentation to the fore and allows me to see more clearly the important,
pivotal role of rationalityindeed, manifest rationalityplays here. It shows as well that the dialectical tier is essential,
rather than peripheral. More dividends emerge in the next three chapters.
Walton on Argument and Reasoning
Earlier in this chapter, I alluded to Walton's (1990b) views on argument, and I have been critical of philosophers and
logicians for not making a clear distinction between argument and reasoning. Walton cannot be accused of that failure.
He set out to differentiate between argument and reasoning. Because he distinguished the two and because that
distinction is part of a larger account of argument and logic, his views warrant attention.
Walton on Reasoning
I briefly summarize Walton before going into detail. He began by quoting Govier's (1987) distinction between
reasoning and argument to the effect that reasoning is what may be done before you argue and the argument expresses
the (best) reasoning. But much reasoning is done before and outside the context of arguing. For Walton, "reasoning is
the making or granting of assumptions called premises and the process of moving toward conclusions (end points) from
these assumptions by means of warrants" (p. 403). Now, this is supposed to be a definition of reasoning, not of
inferring, nor of arguing. Accepting such a definition would mean that any discourse that lacked the premiseconclusion
structure would not be reasoningwhich seems much too narrow a view to take of reasoning. Nor does this definition
seem to sit well with the views quoted from Govier that Walton seems to

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endorse. If the reasoning that goes on before and outside the context of arguing has the structure imputed to it by
Walton, then the difference between reasoning and arguing is nugatory.
Walton distinguished kinds of reasoning: monolectical (a single reasoner functioning alone) and dialectical (two
participants reasoning together), alethic and epistemic reasoning, static and dynamic reasoning, and practical and
theoretical reasoning. These are helpful distinctions but these issues, how to define reasoning and how to make
profitable distinctions, seem to me more appropriately discussed in the context of a theory of reasoning. Accordingly, I
leave off discussing them here and go on to Walton's views on argument.
Walton on Argument
Walton (1990b) turned directly to the question, "What is an argument?" He started with Angeles' definition and
discussed its shortcomings, then reviewed Copi's definition and its shortcomings: both, he said, are guilty of ignoring or
shortchanging the interactive context. He then cited the definition from Webster's, which, he said, "suggests a
conception of argument that is broader than the truncated version expressed in the traditional logicians' definitions." It is
broader because it acknowledges the dialectical dimension, which Walton here identified with "what van Eemeren and
Grootendorst call argumentation." (p. 410)
After this preliminary work, we are ready for a new definition. Walton said, "Argument is a social and verbal means of
trying to resolve, or at least to contend with, a conflict or difference that has arisen or exists between two or more
parties." (p. 411) Further:
The conflict or difference . . . that is the origin of the argument could be a different kindit could be a conflict
of opinions, an unsolved problem, an unproven hypothesis, or event a situation where both parties are blocked
from further actions. (p. 411)
Thus, for Walton, argument was a very broad term, encompassing such diverse reasoning activities as problem solving,
theorizing, and negotiation. For Walton, dialogue and argument were intimately related. Walton went on to list no less
than eight different types of argumentative dialogue, distinguished in terms of their initial situation, the goal, and the
benefits. Last, Walton discussed the nature of logic, the difference between formal and informal logic, and showed that
the two are complementary rather than adversarial. I already touched on his views on this matter.
There is much that Walton and I agree on: Both of us want a pragmatic approach; both of us are unhappy with
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roughly the same reasons; and both of us see the mandates of formal and informal logic in roughly the same way:
formal logic deals with the syntactical and semantical aspects, whereas informal logic is more concerned with the
pragmatic aspects.
However, Walton did not see the point of distinguishing between the practice of argument and the process of arguing;
and in the final analysis, I think his views about the nature of reasoning, the nature of argument, and the relationship
between the two are questionable. The idea that there is a significant difference between arguing and reasoning leads, it
seems to me, to the view that reasoning is a special kind of process, different in kind from arguing and also from
inferring. And yet when one looks at Walton's definitions of reasoning and arguing, one sees that they are not all that
different. If reasoning is moving from premises to conclusion by means of warrants, then reasoning is pretty much what
most people would call arguing. If arguing is a means of trying to resolve a conflict of opinion, it would seem that
arguing and reasoning (moving from premises to conclusion) are not all that different.
In my view, the problem with Walton's view of reasoning is that it is too narrow. Walton essentially bought into an
inferentialist account. I plan to discuss the problems with such an account in detail in a subsequent book on reasoning.
The problem with Walton's view of argument is just the reverse: It is too broad. It encompasses too much that is not
argument.
Benefits of the Pragmatic Approach
I recognize the danger in the road I have taken here, which narrows the conception of argument. My justification for this
move is that when the practice itself is in jeopardy, as I believe it is, then any attempt to assimilate it to other practices is
tantamount to driving nails into its coffin.
To conclude, I want to discuss four benefits of the pragmatic approach to the conceptualization of argument.
First, this approach offers an improved view of the notion of argument. I have shown that the structural view is
inadequate for three reasons. First, argument cannot really be grasped as structure without reference to the purpose(s)
that the structure is meant to realize. Second, the real structure is more complicated than the standard view would
suggest. There must be more to an argument than just reasons leading to the conclusion; a dialectical tier is also
necessary. Third, our approach suggests that an adequate conceptualization of argument cannot be had apart from seeing
it as a product situated in the practice of argumentation.
Second, the difference between inference and argument becomes clear. We can begin to get a handle on differentiating
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inference. Arguments, as I have shown, are outcomes within the practice that are dialectical in nature and characterized
by manifest rationality. What is an inference? In chapter 4, I presented inference as in one important sense something
that happens in the mind, an activity perhaps spontaneous, perhaps calculated, by which the mind moves from one
thought to another. Some of the characteristics associated with inference are:
1. It is natural and spontaneous movement of the mind.
2. It goes from an input (a situation, a perception, a datum of some sort) to an output (typically, a thought and even more
typically a statement or claim).
3. It is guided by past experience, background knowledge, and information.
4. It may or may not be articulated.
Contrast argument on these four points. One might argue that argument and inference are alike in the first three respects,
but there is a clear differentiation on the fourth point. An inference can be what it is while remaining within the mind of
the inferrer; this is not true of argument. One way of drawing this contrast is to say that inferring is monolectical,
whereas arguing is a dialectical process. Moreover, argument must be seen within the practice of argumentation, but no
comparable requirement exists for inference.
Third, the pragmatic approach carries with it some important consequences for the process of evaluating arguments.
Here are three. The first benefit is a fuller approach to evaluation. Generally, a product is evaluated in terms of whether
it meets the needs of the practice. This suggests that when arguments are evaluated, the evaluator must be led by a
notion of the goal of the practice of argumentation. It is not enough to ask, "Does the evidence support the conclusion?"
But this must be asked as well: "Does the argument deal with and defuse well-known objections, differentiate itself
from other positions on the issue and respond to them?" Such material constitutes what I have called the dialectical tier
and, accordingly, any theory of evaluation needs to take account of it. More is said about this in the next chapter. A
second benefit is the difference between evaluation and criticism. As I have shown, arguments by their nature require
criticism, whereas inferences do not. Absent the distinction between inference and argument, you have ipso facto taken
the ground out from underneath the distinction between evaluation and criticism. A third benefit is that from this
perspective, I can see that some fallacies occur in the structural core (hasty conclusion), whereas others are better
characterised as dialectical; for example, fallacies such as ad hominem and straw person. To say that

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they are dialectical is to say that they arise in an argument when the arguer is dealing with objections, alternative
positions, and so forth. This helps put a different light on fallacy theory. More on this in chapter 8.
Finally, the distinction between informal and formal logic becomes clearer still. Formal deductive logic provides a
normative theory of evaluation for implication; inductive logic provides a normative theory of evaluation for inference;
informal logic provides a normative theory of evaluation and criticism for argumentation. This distinction between the
two depends not only on the distinction between inference and argument but also on the distinction between evaluation
and criticism, which is dealt with in chapter 8.
Having discussed the nature of argument and the benefits of this pragmatic approach, I have at least provided a sketch
of a theory of analysis. I turn in the next chapter to the task of outlining a theory of appraisal.

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Chapter 7
What Makes a Good Argument? Toward a Theory of Evaluation
Using the results of the last chapter, I shift the focus now to the task of developing a theory of appraisal that derives
from informal logic. This theory has two components. The first component is a theory of evaluation. This theory
answers the question, "What qualities or properties make an argument a good one?" I deal with that question in this
chapter. The second component will be a theory of criticism.1 That theory will answer the question, "What are the
principles that govern good criticism?" I deal with that question in chapter 8.
Traditionally, various answers have been proposed to the normative question. Some (Plato, Descartes) have taken the
view that an argument must be conclusive in order to be a good one. As we have seen, the position adopted by formal
logicians has been that an argument must be sound: its premises should be true and its conclusion must follow
necessarily from its premises. The inadequacies of that theory were discussed in chapter 3. Some informal logicians
have adopted the view that a good argument is one that is fallacy-free. This position, although promising, is a negative
characterization and consequently not terribly enlightening. Our preliminary discussion of this theory in chapter 5
turned up several problems with the criteria that informal logicians have adopted. As regards the criteria for the illative
core, I offered an account according to which the criteria are relevance, sufficiency, acceptability, and truth. Each of
these criteria stands in need of deeper clarification. I offer some suggestions later in this chapter.
1 Here I distinguish between evaluation and criticism. I defend and further explain this distinction in chapter 8.

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To answer the normative question satisfactorily, we need to go back to the discussion of argumentation as a practice.
Arguments are outcomes of this practice. They are, typically, a codification of lines of reasoning that have emerged in
the dialectical process. The goodness of the argument cannot be understood apart from the process that produces it, nor
yet from the arguers that produce it, although I shall defend that part of the traditional view that minimizes the role that
consideration of the person of the arguer plays in evaluating the argument.
In chapter 6, I said that the fundamental principle of argumentation is the force of the better reasoning and that alone
should determine the outcome. What I need to do next is understand what makes for better reasoning in the realm of
argumentation.
To answer the normative question, our theory must incorporate the factors that have emerged during the course of our
discussion:
1. There can be good arguments for and against a particular thesis. (chap. 2)
2. There are degrees of goodness in arguments. (chap. 2)
3. A good argument will display certain characteristics best understood in terms of the purpose(s) of argument and only
secondarily in terms of its structure. (chap. 6)
4. An argument need not be conclusive in order to be a good argument. (chap. 6)
5. A good argument is one that can withstand criticism. (chap. 6)
Let us begin the discussion of the normative question with the view that a good argument is one that fulfills its purpose.
The standpoint of this work has been that the primary purpose is rational persuasion. That is, the purpose of the
argument is to persuade the Other of the truth of the thesis imbedded in the conclusion and on the basis of the
considerations advanced in the argument. If the Other is persuaded by the argument to accept the conclusion but not for
the reasons cited, then the argument has not truly achieved its purpose although it may have advanced the cause of
rationality.
We can start by saying that an argument is a good one if it should succeed in persuading the Other of the Thesis on the
basis of the reasoning advanced. But we must now ask: What should the Other require in order to be thus persuaded?
The assumptions are that the other is rational and that the process is understood by the participants to be under the
constraint of manifest rationality.
In chapter 6, I argued that a proper understanding of argument must see its structure as more complex than that
envisaged either by FDL or informal logic. The illative core is not well represented by the (P + I) conception I

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argued further that any argument, if it is to achieve the goal of rational persuasion, must have, in addition to the illative
core, a dialectical tier.
Each of these claims has important implications for our normative theory. The implication of the first claim is that our
normative theory cannot be derived from a normative theory of inference. The criteria for the evaluation of the illative
core will have to be other than those provided by either FDL or by inductive logic, even if those will come into play on
occasion. The implication of the second claim is that in addition to criteria for the illative core, we will require separate
criteria for the dialectical tier.
The task of this chapter is to draw these strands together to start the process of developing an appropriate normative
theory. My overall approach sees argument as a product of the practice of argumentation; the normative issue for the
other components of the practice must be addressed as well. Part of the task, then, is to (discuss the process of how to)
generate the norms for (a) the process of arguing, (b) the arguer, and (c) the practice. The final task will be to show that
the theory outlined here can satisfy the adequacy conditions listed in chapter 2.
Before presenting my own account, I want to review Hamblin's approach to the normative question, both because it has
been so influential in thinking about these matters and because it has a direct bearing on the question of how to generate
the sought-for criteria.
Further Reflections on Hamblin2
In chapter 5, I went over Hamblin's discussion of the nature of argument. In the second half of his chapter, Hamblin
turned to the real question, ''What are the criteria by which arguments are appraised?" Hamblin considered, in turn, three
different types of criteria: alethic, epistemic, and, finally (his own preference), dialectical. Because his reasons for
recommending dialectical criteria stem partly from the problems that arise from the other two types of criteria, I begin
with Hamblin's discussion of them.
Hamblin on Alethic Criteria
Hamblin began the quest for the criteria of good argument at an obvious starting point:
(A1) The premises must be true. (p. 234)
This criterion turns out to be the main culprit. Further:
(A2) The conclusion must be implied by them (in some suitable sense of the word "implied").
2 This discussion of Hamblin is based largely on my "Acceptance is Not Enough" (1990b).

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The next requirement is that the conclusion must follow reasonably soon. How much of Hamblin's own thinking about
this is under the influence of formal models was evident when he wrote, "Take some fairly advanced theorem of
Geometry . . . Although this follows from any suitably complete set of geometrical axioms, it would not be sufficient,
by way of premisses for this conclusion, just to give such a set of axioms" (p. 234). This remark is surely good guidance
for someone constructing a proof, but it is appropriate here only if we suppose some connection between the enterprise
of arguing and that of provingan assumption Hamblin questioned later when he wrote:
[The modern formal logician's] conception of argument is well-illustrated by the formal concept of proof . . .
A proof, I take it, is just a knock-down argument; but this model of proof, far from setting high criteria of
argument-worth for us, completely lets slip certain important desiderata. (p. 249)
The last comment suggests that Hamblin did not regard proof as an appropriate model for argumentation. I suggest
taking this line of thinking one step further and ask, "Is a proof properly construed as argumentation at all?" (I deal with
this question in greater detail in chapter 8.) If one conceives of argument as a species of implication or deductibility,
then one will see the two as closely related. But this very consequence seems to me a good reason for distinguishing
between argument and implicationa position I already argued for in chapter 4. In any event, reflection on the difference
between proof and argument yields a third requirement:
(A3) The conclusion must follow reasonably immediately. (p. 235)
Typically, when people argue, they do not state all of their premises; some are left tacit or unexpressed. This fact leads
to a fourth requirement:
(A4) If some of the premises are unstated, they must be of a specifiable omissible kind. (p. 235)
Having fleshed out these alethic criteria, Hamblin subjected them to critique. He showed that these alethic criteria,
principally that the premises must be true (A1), do not work. Then Hamblin considered an epistemic modification that
produced a set of epistemic criteria and argued that they do not work either. Finally, Hamblin produced a set of
dialectical criteria. Because my interest is how Hamblin handled the matter of premise adequacy and not his view on the
other matters (inferential adequacy, missing premises, immediacy) I discuss his position only as it bears on (A1).
I want to pause to ask, "How did Hamblin arrive at these criteria?" What sort of process of reflection was used to elicit
these criteria? It is fairly clear

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that Hamblin accepted the (P + I) model. An argument for Hamblin is composed of premises plus an inference (link)
from those premises to the conclusion. It also seems clear that Hamblin was working from the theory of appraisal
borrowed from FDL. This is most apparent with (A1) and (A2). For (A1) is the truth requirement; (A2) is the validity
requirement. Hamblin's approach thus illustrates what I call the a priori approach to be discussed shortly.
Hamblin's strategy was to argue that these criteria are too strong and to use that discussion as a basis for modifying
them. Hamblin's position was that "there is one very important respect in which alethic tests are not sufficient, and
another important respect in which they are not necessary" (p. 236). When Hamblin said this, he was thinking mainly of
(A1), against which he raised what he saw as the decisive objection: Truth is neither a necessary nor a sufficient
criterion for the goodness of the premises of an argument.
Hamblin's argument that truth is not sufficient depends mainly on one pivotal move: Suppose the premises are true, but
no one knows them to be true. We need to look carefully at the example Hamblin gave:
The argument that oranges are good for orangutans because they contain dietary supplements might or might
not carry some weight in the second half of the twentieth century but would rightly carry none at all as
between two ancient Romans who had never heard of vitamins. (p. 236)
Hamblin did not spell it out, but his reasoning must have gone something like this:
This argument would not be a good argument to have presented in Roman times because even though the
premise is true, the Romans would not/could not know it to be true. Truth is not a sufficient condition for
premise-adequacy. Thus alethic criteria won't get the job done.
I consider this example problematic for a number of reasons. First, I want to ask, "Is this specimen the sort over which
policies should be made?" What I see here is not much more than a claim with one reason supporting it. Although such
discourse falls well within the scope of argument as traditionally understood, the position developed in chapter 6
requires more of argumentative discourse than the mere giving of reasons. There must be a context, so it would have to
be supposed that our Roman friends had somehow been engaged by this issue of how to nurture orangutans. We will
then need to suppose that there has been controversy, with some Romans favoring one approach, whereas others favor a
different approach. Hence, our arguer will know that there are people who disagree with his conclusion

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(i.e., that oranges are good for orangutans) and will realize that his argument must, in some fashion or other, deal with
their objections. Such an argument would have to contain a dialectical tier that is not in evidence here. The arguer
would say things like, "I realize there is an objection to my basic premise that I must deal with . . . " And so on. (I shall
shortly indicate why, in this case, the development of such a tier is unlikely.)
Second, I think Hamblin has misdiagnosed the problem. The reason that our Roman friends would be justified in
rejecting the argument is not the reason that Hamblin gave; that is, that although the premise is true, they do not know it
to be true. We would hardly expect a critic in Roman times to have said, "That premise about vitamins may be true but
since no one knows it to be true, the argument is a poor one." The reason they would be justified in rejecting the
premise in question is that the premise would be unintelligible to them.
Moreover, if the purpose of the argument is to persuade rationally, it is hard to comprehend why the arguer would have
put such a premise (one that his audience will not understand) in play in the first place. One might object, "Well,
perhaps the arguer just misread his audience's knowledge." But that merely postpones the problem, for how would that
kind of misreading be possible in the context of real-world, real-life argumentation? How could the arguer have thought
that this audience of Romans would accept a premise containing a concept with which they were completely unfamiliar?
Thus, the problem for the Romans would not be knowing whether the premise is true but, rather, would be
understanding its meaning. This problem is neither alethic nor epistemic in nature but, rather, semantic. Thus Hamblin's
example does not convince me that truth is not a sufficient criterion for premise acceptability and I conclude that
Hamblin's case against truth as a requirement is not successful, based as it is on an untenable supposition, an
underdeveloped conception of argument, and an example that raises more questions than it answers.3
For these reasons, then, I am unhappy with Hamblin's argument that truth should be rejected as sufficient criterion for
premise adequacy. The second
3 This line of reasoning has been quite persuasive for many. When I presented a paper on this issue at Sonoma
in 1990, I challenged the audience to give me an example from real inquiry. Mark Weinstein responded by
presenting a case from the history of science regarding heliocentric theory. It is too complicated an example to
replay here and although it is an example that certainly proves a point, it does not prove the point at issue
here. Weinstein thought I was asking for "an instance of relevant evidence that is warranted in the sense of
being supported by the available information, but yet is untrue." But that is not what I am looking for. I am
looking for a plausible scenario involving a real issue and real arguers where the arguer is justifiably
confronted with the following criticism, "Your premise is true but you don't know it to be true." Such a
rejection is quite different than the one that goes, "But you don't know that to be true!"

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half of the argument against alethic criteria is folded into his argument against epistemic criteriato which I turn now.
Hamblin on Epistemic Criteria
Epistemic criteriapresumably criteria in which epistemic concepts such as knowledge and belief play a decisive roleare
now introduced as possible successors to the alethic ones. Thus instead of (A1) we would have:
(E1) The premises must be known to be true.4
Hamblin argued that alethic criteria and epistemic criteria are both too strong. His argument seemed more directed at
epistemic criteria than alethic, for he started by noting that knowledge is a very strong condition to impose and that in
argumentative practice, participants often proceed on less than knowledge. That is, rather than demanding that the
premises be known, arguers are satisfied if the premises are matters of belief or acceptance:
An argument that proceeds from accepted premises on the basis of an accepted inference process may or may
not be a good one in the full, alethic sense, but it is certainly a good one in some other sense which is much
more germane to the practical application of logical principles. (pp. 240241)
We need to pause to take note of an hermeneutic point here, for this passage suggests that there are different senses (or
criteria) of goodness: alethic, epistemic, and (the as-yet-unnamed-other-sense) dialectical. An argument might not be
good in the alethic sense and yet good in the dialectical sense. Therefore, we face the question whether alethic and
dialectical criteria are to be construed as alternative criteria, perhaps to be invoked on different occasions or in differing
contexts, or as rivals for the mantle of goodness.
I have come the heart of the issue: What is goodness, logical virtue, in the realm of argumentation? Hamblin believed
that acceptance is the crucial factor as far as premise adequacy is concerned. I am not so sure, and I come back to this
point later.
Hamblin anticipated (accurately, I think) an objection. Logicians will accuse him of lowering his sights in proposing
acceptability, of siding with persuasion (a subjective criterion) against validity (an objective criterion). In his response
to this objection, Hamblin for the first time mentioned
4 This is a strong formulation of epistemic criteria. In chapter 9, I examine a weaker formulation due to Pinto
(1994).

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purpose. He talked about "different possible purposes a practical argument may have":
Let us suppose, first, that A wishes to convince B of T, and discovers that B already accepts S: A can argue "S,
therefore T" independently of whether he himself accepts S or T and independently of whether S and T are
really true. Judged by B's standards, this is a good argument and, if A is arguing with B and has any notion at
all of winning, he will have to start from something B will accept . . . One of the purposes of argument,
whether we like it or not, is to convince, and our criteria would be less than adequate if they had nothing to
say about how well an argument may meet this purpose. (p. 241)
Hamblin understood that argumentation serves more than one purpose and that one purpose is to convince others (and
perhaps also ourselves) of the truth of some statement about which there is doubt. However, an argument might be quite
convincing; all of its premises are statements that B accepts; or the inference could be of a sort acceptable to B and yet
be a poor argument. (In saying this, the reader must keep in mind that for this discussion, the fundamental purpose of
argument is rational persuasion.) Suppose, for example, the arguer uses tricks that (s)he knows will move B; for
example, deliberately distorting an alternative position in order to win assent and acceptance. If the main reason for
discarding epistemic criteria in favor of dialectical ones turns out to be that the latter are more in line with this purpose
of winning the audience, then that seems to me a fundamental weakness in Hamblin's position.
In any event, the drift of Hamblin's argument is that epistemic criteria are too strong, for they are not necessary for
premise adequacy. Thus, truth is neither necessary nor sufficient. Alethic criteria are unsatisfactory. Epistemic criteria
fare no better. The door is open for Hamblin to bring in his own candidate: dialectical criteria, to a consideration of
which I now turn.
Hamblin on Dialectical Criteria
Having criticized both alethic and epistemic criteria, Hamblin introduced the type of criteria he called "dialectical."
They will be formulated without benefit of the terms "true, "valid" and "known" and presumably any other term that
would imply truth or knowledge. With that difference, they run parallel to epistemic criteria:
(D1) The premises must be accepted.
From this, one would think that the relevant dialectical standard is acceptance. But in an earlier passage, Hamblin
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acceptability." Are we to infer that Hamblin thought it not important to distinguish these two? Or did he have something
stronger in mind:
The case in which Smith tries to convince Jones on grounds which Jones will accept but Smith may not is,
after all, somewhat less general than will satisfy us: we should consider, also, the case in which someone, with
good reason, accepts a given set of premises and a given inference-process and becomes convinced of a
consequent conclusion. (p. 241)
One problem here is identifying just what this pivotal dialectical standard is. Is it acceptability? acceptance? acceptance
with good reason? rational acceptance? Each of these is mentioned at some point and although acceptance is the one
that appears in Hamblin's formulation of dialectical criteria, there is some doubt in my mind that it is the one he really
wanted. I defer further discussion of this issue until later.
Hamblin continued the development of his views, distinguishing between the onlooker's perspective and the
participant's and concluding with this passage:
Logicians are, of course, allowed to express their sentiments [about the value of any given argument] but there
is something repugnant about the idea that Logic is a vehicle for the expression of the logician's own
judgements of acceptance and rejection of statements and arguments. The logician does not stand above and
outside practical argumentation or, necessarily, pass judgement on it. He is not a judge or a court of appeal,
and there is no such judge or court; he is at best a trained advocate. It follows that it is not the logician's
particular job to declare the truth of any statement, or the validity of any argument. (p. 244)
I agree with Hamblin's basic point; that is, that Logic cannot be a vehicle for the expression of the logician's own
viewpoints. Hamblin came close to articulating what I call the principle of logical neutrality, to be discussed in chapter
8. Two points. First, it is not clear just who Hamblin had in mind with this cautionary reminder. Logicians who
advocate the ideal of soundness typically disavow any attempt to make judgments of acceptance or rejection of
particular statements within an argument. Nor do they make judgments of the validity of particular arguments. They see
their task as the purely theoretical one of the development of a theory of validity. Informal logicians are no different;
they do not see their task as pronouncing on the worth of individual arguments, except to illustrate the way in which
certain standards might be applied. Second, when Hamblin wrote, "There is no judge or court," he was correct. But it
does not follow that there are no standards, criteria, or rules. Indeed, he himself argued for dialectical criteria as opposed
to epistemic or alethic ones.

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Conclusion
I have led the reader through a fairly lengthy discussion of Hamblin, which I think is justified because of the importance
his position has had in the development of theories. His arguments appear to have persuaded Johnson and Blair (1977),
Govier (1985), and many others. But Hamblin's case for dialectical criteria has run into some difficulties. First, there is
a problem with identifying the central dialectical concept: Is it acceptance? acceptability? or acceptance for good
reason? Second, if we take him to be advocating acceptance as a replacement for truth, there are problems. It is not clear
just what counts as acceptance, and it seems that this is too weak a standard. Indeed, what Hamblin's dialectical criteria
seems to capture is not so much logical virtue as rhetorical virtue. Third, the conception of argument evident in
Hamblin's argumentation seems underdeveloped. Finally, his approach to developing criteria seems flawed. That is, it
seems he began by anchoring himself in a theory of appraisal of FDL, where truth and validity are the criteria, and then
attempting to work his way out from therechiefly by weakening the requirements of FDL. We may wonder whether this
is the best way to go about generating a set of criteria for argumentation.
Hamblin's critique of the conventional candidates for criteria of good argument has, as I have mentioned before, won
quite widespread acceptance. From a rhetorical point of view, then, one would have to say that his arguments were
effective and, in that sense, were good. But are they, in fact, good arguments? I believe this question makes sense. I
want to hold open the possibility that even if his arguments were effective and persuasive, they are not good arguments.
I have given some reason to think they are problematic, and this precisely illustrates the real problem with dialectical
criteria. I return to this issue when I discuss dialectical standards in the next section.
Criteria for Good Argument
The question before us then, is, "What criteria must an argument satisfy if it is to be judged a good argument?"
Hitchcock (1997) claimed that the question "What is a good argument?" is akin to the question "What is a good knife?"
It depends on the purpose. The qualities that make for a good carving knife are not necessarily those that make for a
good paring knife. Similarly, what qualities make for a good argument depend on the purpose being examined. Here,
the purpose I have assigned to argument is rational persuasion. The goodness I am after consists in those qualities that
are necessary for the argument to achieve the goal of rational persuasion. The basic intuition I defend is that a good
argument is one that achieves its purpose of rational persuasion. The discussion of chapter 6 showed that such an

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argument will require at least two levels. The first is the structural level, the illative core, that consists of the reasons
given for the conclusion. The second level is the dialectical tier. This is the part of the argument where the arguer
discharges her dialectical obligations. It follows that my theory of evaluation must have at least two types of criteria:
one set for the illative core, the other for the dialectical tier. I begin by discussing the structural criteria, and then I move
to the dialectical.
Generation of the Criteria for the Illative Core
How shall we determine the criteria to be used in the evaluation of an argument? What alternatives are there? I see three.
The A Priori Approach. This was the approach evident in Hamblin, who appeared to have arrived at his criteria by
weakeningdownsizing if you willthe criteria furnished by FDL. Given the discussion in chapter 3 of the limits of FDL
as a theory of argument, that approach does not seem likely to yield a viable theory of evaluation.
The Empirical Approach. Another alternative would be what Nisbett called "dustbin empiricism." This approach would
begin by identifying many specimens of good arguments. Then, by reflection on these examples, it would derive the
theory of evaluation. To my knowledge, this approach has never been tried. I suspect the reason is the fear of
psychologism that many informal logicians have inherited from their exposure to FDL.
The Pragmatic Approach. Yet another alternative is the pragmatic approach, which I have adopted in this book, which
starts by reflecting on argument in terms of its purpose. A good argument is one that achieves its purpose(s). The
purpose I have focused on is rational persuasion. Accordingly, a good argument is one that rationally persuades the
Other of its conclusion. This specification is quite general, however. I want to know specifically what criteria must the
illative core satisfy in order to achieve this purpose. To that question, I turn now.
Criteria for the Illative Core
What criteria will be used to evaluate the illative core? Clearly, there must be some form of acceptance requirement, for
if the Other does not accept the premises offered by the arguer, the argument cannot achieve its goal. However, as I
argued in the previous section, there are problems both with the formulation of this requirement and with the
requirement read as a substitute for truth. I have argued that Hamblin's case against truth and for acceptance falls short. I
believe that there is at least a prima facie case for

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including truth among the criteria. It is natural enough for the Other to criticize an argument by claiming that a premise
is false. If the premise is false, it would not be rational to accept it as a basis for accepting the conclusion. Hence, I
propose to add truth as a criterion for the illative core.
By including both an acceptance requirement and a truth requirement, I encounter the following problem: How can a
theory contain both when they can at times be in conflict? I call this problem The Integration Problem and defer further
discussion of it until chapter 11.
Thus far, I have stated that premises must satisfy both an acceptability and a truth requirement. But that is not enough.
An assertion might be true and might even be such that the Other will accept it. Yet, if it is not relevant to the
conclusion, it does not deserve to persuade. Relevance must therefore be added to the list of criteria. Nor can I stop
there, for the premises might all be accepted and true and relevant and yet fail to persuade rationally if they do not
provide enough support. Hence, I must add the criterion of sufficiency: The premises taken together must provide
sufficient support for the conclusion,
Thus the criteria for the illative core are acceptance, truth, relevance, and sufficiency.5 This raises another problem: Is
this set of criteria for the illative core complete? I refer to this as The Completeness Problem and defer discussion of it
until chapter 11.
A third problem waits in the wings. Assuming that my theory of evaluation contains these four criteria, it may be asked:
In what order are they to be applied? Does it matter? Are some more important or more fundamental then others? I call
this The Application Problem and deal with it also in chapter 11.
It is beyond the scope of this book to attempt to develop a viable account of each of these criteria. Instead, I attempt to
provide an overview that may serve to indicate what an adequate account of these criteria would look like. I begin with
acceptability.
Acceptability
The criterion of acceptability appears to play, for some informal logicians, a role parallel to the truth requirement in the
FDL doctrine of soundness. Influential in the emergence of acceptability as a criterion was Hamblin, who
5 Here I anticipate future developments in the sense that I include both acceptability and truth in the list of
criteria. I ask the reader to bear with me for the moment. I also must face the objection (Biro & Siegel, 1992)
that says that relevance is not necessary as a separate requirement because it is included in the very notion of
sufficiency. I deal with that objection in chapter 10. My situation, although more complicated than that of
most informal logicians, is less complicated that Toulmin (1958), who, in the course of his discussion,
included all of the following: sufficiency, appropriateness, relevance, reliability, applicability, consistency,
validity, soundness, and weight.

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argued, as I previously dicussed, that truth was an inappropriate criterion for arguments with a given audience, context,
and occasionarguing that it was too strong. Hamblin mentioned at least three different candidates for this dialectical
criterion: (a) acceptance, (b) acceptability, and (c) acceptance for good reason. None was carefully defined and each
encounters some problems.
Look first at acceptance. Hamblin said, ''If we are to draw the line anywhere, acceptance by the person the argument is
aimed atthe person for whom the argument is an argumentis the appropriate basis of a set of criteria" (p. 242). There are
a number of problems with this way of understanding the criterion. The first is understand exactly what is meant by
acceptance. It seems clear that acceptance is not the same as belief. Just what is meant by acceptance and how it differs
from belief.6 Can someone accept both P and not-P?
There are no problems with acceptance as a necessary condition for the premises of a good argument. If an argument is
an exercise in rational persuasion and persuasion requires some form of acceptance, it would seem to follow that
acceptance (or something like it) is a necessary condition. What troubles me is the suggestion from Hamblin that it may
also be sufficient. Here are, then, some worries about acceptance as the criterion.
1. Suppose that, as the arguer, I have no specific person in mind, or more than one. When, for example, one constructs a
philosophical argument, one knows that the audience is anything but homogeneous in what it is prepared to accept.
Take this fact too seriously and one will surely be paralyzed. The premise that is acceptable to the idealist will probably
not be so to the realist. The same will be true of political argumentation, where one's audience will consist of various
members of the commentary with their widespread allegiances. To some degree, this concern may perhaps be gotten
around by the use of constructs like "ideal audience" (Perelman, 1969) or "model interlocutor" (Blair & Johnson, 1987).
But just how much mileage one can get from such constructs is unclear.
The point is that if the audience is sufficiently heterogeneous, it is going to be difficult for the arguer to put any premise
into play if the desideratum is acceptance. On the other hand, there are also problems if the audience is homogeneous. If
it is a hostile audience, it is going to be difficult to locate the premises the audience will accept without defense. If it is
friendly, then finding such premises should not be a task. But then we run up against the preaching-to-the-converted
phenomenon. Thus, acceptance as a requirement runs into some serious problems.
6 For an interesting theoretical treatment of the difference between acceptance and belief, see Cohen (1991).

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2. Suppose I discover that my audience accepts a proposition that I know or have good reason to believe is false, but
that would, if accepted, provide strong support for the conclusion. If I take acceptance as a criterion, it seems that I not
only may, but should, use that proposition. That seems entirely inappropriate, at least where argument is conceived as
rational persuasion. Is it rational on my part to expect the Other to be rationally moved by an assertion that I believe to
be false?7 What could possibly justify my using such a premise, even if it was accepted by or acceptable to my
audience? I could justify it if my aim were to persuade at all costs, but that is not the telos I have assigned to argument
for the purpose of this inquiry.
3. What happens to the requirement of consistency? Scriven (1976) held that this notion is imbedded in the very idea of
an argument. He said that an argument says that if you assert A and B, then (under certain conditions) you must (if you
wish to be consistent) also assert C. That explains why inconsistency is thought to be such a serious charge against an
argument. But now, if we discard the truth requirement and instead adopt acceptance, and ifas seems possiblesomeone
can accept both P and not-P, then inconsistency is no longer a vice. An argument can (other things being equal) be quite
all right even though it contains both P and not-P, provided the addressee accepts both. This situation is not uncommon;
those engaged seriously in the practice of argumentation can find both sides of the argument attractive, which I take to
be roughly equivalent to either accepting or being inclined to accept both P and not-P. If we take acceptance without
some constraint, then we will be forced to give up consistency as a virtue possessed by good arguments.
4. Another problem is that I want to allow for is the possibilityindeed likelihoodthat there can be an argument that is
logically good but whose premises are not accepted by (at least some of) those to whom it is directed. Suppose I say that
an argument is effective if it satisfies criteria the dialectical criteria set forth by Hamblin. The problem is that it is not
clear to me that every good argument is effective nor that every effective argument is good. An argument might be
accepted by its audience but contain tricks or cheats. In urging on us the standard of acceptance, Hamblin has, it seems,
replaced the logical criterion of goodness with the rhetorical criterion of effectiveness. In the best of all possible worlds,
the good and the effective would merge. But there is no guarantee that this is such a world.
To bring this line of reflection to a conclusion, let me reformulate my concerns in a slightly different way: Consider
argument A [consisting of premises P1Pn and conclusion C] formulated by Smart, and addressed to
7 Herein lies the nucleus of the solution I propose in chapter 11. It seems clear to me that my knowledge that
the proposition is false must override my knowledge that the proposition is acceptable to my audience.

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Brilliant and Dull. Brilliant accepts the premises and, having no other problem with the argument, pronounces it a good
one. Dull does not accept, let us say, P2 and P3, and so pronounces the argument a bad one. If we take Hamblin's
approach, we will say that the argument was a good one for Brilliant but not a good one for Dull. We cannot, it seems,
ask whether the argument is a good one in itself, a good one simpliciter, or a good one objectively. In other words,
acceptance as a criterion leads to the subjectivity and relativity of appraisal of argument.
Suppose now that we distinguish between Dull-1 and Dull-2. Dull-1 rejects P2 and P3 but cannot give any decent
reasons why (suppose he is just perverse or ego involved with the subject), whereas Dull-2 rejects P2 and P3 but is
willing to give reasons and can give them. I, for one, want to be able to distinguish these two and yet I fear that
Hamblin's position does not allow for such differentiation. (This objection applies to simple acceptance but not to a
revised version of it, such as acceptability or acceptance, for good reason.)
Thus, simple acceptance does not seem to be in line with the requirements of rationality. If we require that an argument
achieve the goal of persuasion rationally, then I think we must rule out simple acceptance and substitute instead a
stronger criterion: acceptance for good reason, rational acceptance, or acceptability.
The Acceptability Requirement. It is clear that each premise of an argument must be such that it will be a statement that
the audience finds acceptable, else the argument cannot hope to achieve the goal of rational persuasion. Each premise
will therefore be in one of the two following situations. Either that premise has been put forth with some defense, in
which case the question whether it is rational to accept the premise will be decided by asking whether it is rational to
accept the argument presented in its defense, or it will be a premise that has been put into play without support, yet it is
rational for the arguer to believe that the audience will accept the premise and that it is rational to do so without support.
It is clear that it must be rational under some specifiable situations for the Other to accept the premise even though that
premise has not been defended. If every premise in an argument had to be defended, we would be caught in an infinite
regress. At the same time, the constraint of rationality requires, as we have shown, that if an arguer puts forth a thesis,
the arguer generally is under an obligation to furnish support for the thesis. Thus, in this pragmatic approach, the burden
of proof lies with the arguer. The arguer has an obligation to defend any premise that the audience will not be able to
accept without support.
At some point, however, it is evident the arguer must put into play premises that he or she does not defend, that it is
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audience will accept, and that it is rational for the audience to accept. An adequate account of the criterion of
acceptability must allow for this.
Hence a viable account of acceptability as a criterion will have to take account of the following features:
A1) Acceptability will have to be understood as rational acceptance.
A2) Acceptability inheres in each premise individually.
That is, the criterion is to be applied to each premise individually.
A3) Acceptability is a dialectical criterion.
That is, acceptability will have to be understood in terms of a dialectical situation, of the interplay between arguer and
Other. Some would say that this means it will be a pragmatic criterion.
I turn next to a discussion of truth as a criterion for the illative core.
The Truth Requirement
Earlier in this chapter, I reviewed Hamblin's arguments against the truth requirement. But that is not the end of the
matter, for there are good reasons for questioning the truth requirement, as there are also good reasons for endorsing it. I
hope to provide better ones for questioning the truth requirement, and after that argue that there are even better grounds
for including it. What then are the supposed problems with truth requirement?
Bad Reasons for Questioning the Truth Requirement. In addition to arguing that truth is neither necessary nor sufficient,
a second line of argument found in Hamblin's critique is the view that truth and validity "are onlookers' concepts and
presuppose a God'seyeview of the arena" (p. 242)a claim I find both confused and confusing. (See also Toulmin, 1958.)
Consider validity first. The claim that validity presupposes a God's eye view seems both irrelevant and wrong. It is
irrelevant because the issue under discussion is whether alethic and epistemic concepts are too strong, and validity is
neither an epistemic nor an alethic concept but, rather, a logical oneor so I would argue. The claim is wrong because to
judge that one proposition follows necessarily from another does not require an Empyrean vantage point. It can be done
in any number of earthly ways: the use of Venn diagrams, deduction rules, truth-tables, truth-trees, none of which
require any more than human calculating powers.
Hamblin seemed on firmer ground in his claim about truth, although here his argument overlooks the point that there are
various ways, philosophically, of defining or understanding truth. At most, Hamblin might have

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argued that certain forms of the correspondence theory presuppose omniscience. (Not all forms of correspondence
theory can be said to presuppose thatelse one would have to be a theist to hold that theory.) Other theories of
truthcoherence, idealist, pragmatist, instrumentalist, and, of course, relativistdo not require omniscience, and hence
could be adopted by arguers without requiring that they forfeit their posture within the dialogue. Thus, it appears that
there are problems connected with Hamblin's second line of objection to the truth requirement.
Good Reasons for Questioning the Truth Requirement. There are considerations that militate against any wholesale
adoption of the truth requirement (such as envisaged by FDL) while nevertheless indicating that any adequate normative
account must make some provision for truth.
As one moves away from science and toward other spheres of reasoningthe practical sphere of human decision making;
the areas of morals, ethics, politics and everyday human affairsthat doctrine begins to seem questionable. This is not
because the criterion of truth is inapplicable to human affairs but rather because, as one reviews the nature and functions
of argumentation in this arena, it seems clear that the premises need not be true in order for the argument to be a good
one. (See Blair & Johnson, 1987.)
Further, if one assumes that an appropriate requirement for the premise of an argument is that it be true, then it will
follow that logic can say nothing at all about whether this virtue is displayed in a given argument. The reason is that to
decide whether the premise is true will take us outside of logic and into the specific field of knowledge or inquiry to
which the premise belongs. Hence, logicians in the 20th century have virtually nothing to say about the matter of
premise adequacy.
Yet if we think about it for a moment or two, the situation is not so simple and straightforward as this doctrine would
have us think. I argued earlier that any premise introduced into an argument should be defended unless there is some
reason to exempt it. If this view is correct, then the introduction of a controversial and undefended premise is a logical
failure and one would not have to have any special expertise to make this criticism. The whole issue of burden of proof
also comes up here. So it is apparent that logicians need to deal with the issue of premise adequacy.
No doubt we like our premises to be true. But there are many circumstances in which we may find an argument quite
strong even without knowing that its premises are true. Further still, in some arguments with a welter of premises, the
mere presence of one false premise is not really enough to wreck the argument if the other true premises are sufficiently
powerful to cover for it. Here is an example. The argument begins:

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January 1998 has begun, with all major cities throwing parties with fireworks and people breaking in the new
year with hopes of a better life.
The arguer now goes on to argue that all people need to get involved in the process of helping to heal the earth. Now
suppose that the premise is false because some major cities (Tokyo, Madrid) did not throw such parties; only most cities
did. Will this falsity be enough to warrant rejecting the argument? Not if the other premises of the argument are true and
strong enough to compensate for this weakness.
So there are good reasons for rejecting the truth requirement. But there are also reasons, even better ones, to accept it,
and I want to turn to them now.
Good Reasons for Maintaining the Truth Requirement. Put most simply, the case for the truth requirement is that it is
hard to imagine doing the work of argument evaluation without some recourse, whether explicit or implicit to it.
The strongest argument for the truth requirement emerges when I consider the situation of those theorists who have
officially discharged the truth requirement. If we look carefully, we will find that these theorists continue to rely on the
truth requirement in any or all of the following ways:
1. making unofficial use of it even after they have discharged it;
2. continuing to rely on it by using terms in their theory of evaluation that themselves presuppose some commitment to
the truth requirement; for example, inconsistency, contradiction, assumption, validity. Moreover, it is questionable
whether a term like "acceptability" (often put forward as an alternative to the truth requirement) can be rendered
intelligible without recourse to the truth requirement. The same can be said for relevance.
3. using the truth requirement in their metatheory; that is, in the metalanguage in which they set up their theory of
evaluation.
The second situation is by far the most common and the one I illustrate here. Johnson and Blair (1993) embraced
acceptability rather than truth as the appropriate logical requirement for the premise adequacy. They did not exclude
truth as an appropriate criterion in many cases, where the arguer is attempting to establish "the way things are in the
world . . . for such arguments . . . the premises must be true" (p. 62). But they maintained that truth is not a logical
requirement. This is part of their larger view that criticizing a premise for not being true is a substantive rather than a
logical criticism. Johnson and Blair acknowledged the role of truth in argument evaluation but did not regard it as a
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Still, when it comes to the discussion of some of the fallacies, their account seems to clearly presuppose the truth
requirement. For example, when they discussed the fallacy of inconsistency, Johnson and Blair relied heavily on the
truth requirement. They adopted the standard view that two premises are inconsistent if they cannot be true together.
Viewing inconsistency as a fallacy clearly entails that premises being true together is a value and, hence, that there is an
expectation that the premises be true.
The truth requirement makes its presence felt elsewhere in their theory. Consider the test they proposed for determining
relevance, "Let me suppose that P is true; does the truth of P dictate a truth value for C (the conclusion)?" (pp. 5455).
Now, if truth is required in order to explain relevance and relevance itself is a criterion for the evaluation of the
premises of an argument, would that not suggest that truth should be included as a criterion? For it seems that wherever
it would make sense to challenge relevance, it would also be appropriate to challenge truth. The truth requirement also
makes an appearance in their formulation of the conditions for popularity and dubious assumption, among others. It is
hard to imagine any account of the fallacy of popularity that would not invoke as a norm the following claim: That
many or all persons believe a premise to be true does not make it true.8
Thus, although truth is not included among the logical criteria that the premises must satisfy, it still appears to be highly
functional in their theory of evaluation.
Moreover, we need to recall what Hamblin appeared to forget: Various concepts of truth are available. For example, a
relativistic concept of truth would make for a theory that is largely indistinguishable from theories governed by
dialectical criteria. A correspondence theory would appear to be open to the sorts of criticisms mentioned by Hamblin.
So the task of developing an appropriate theoretical apparatus here is significant.
We do have some leads.
T1) The truth requirement applies, like that of acceptability, to premises individually.
T2) The truth requirement should be suspectible of a reading according to which there will be degrees of truth.
T3) Because various theories and approaches to truth are available, the task for the theory of evaluation is to find one
that best coheres with the other demands of the theory.
8 Notice what happens if instead of truth, we invoke acceptability. This fallacy disappears. The fact that most
or all accept a premise does likely mean that it is acceptable, at least in some versions of acceptability.

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At this point, I leave the discussion of the truth requirement and move on to discuss relevance.
The Relevance Requirement
Nothing is more basic to reasoning generally and to argumentation specifically than relevance. The very idea of one
statement's being a reason for accepting another statement contains the idea that the former is relevant to the latter. As
basic as it is, relevance has likewise proven to be strongly resistant to analysis. It appears to have resisted the efforts and
talents of formal logicians. Woods (1994) wrote:
Of all the notions of argumentative and dialectical appraisal none is more intuitive than relevance, and none is
in worse theoretical shape. In plainer terms, we have no theory of relevance; and so in an important sense, we
do not know what relevance is. (p. 82)
My aim here is not to provide such a theory but rather to specify those features of relevance as a criterion for arguments
that such a theory will have to incorporate.
What are the salient properties of relevance considered here as a criterion for the assessment of argument? In my view,
answers to these questions form at least part of the database that a theory of relevance will have to come to grips with.
As I said earlier, relevance is basic to reasoning, communication, and argumentation.9 To engage in the practice of
reasoning is to grasp the idea that one unit paves the way for the next one. Much of what is understood about
communication testifies to Grice's (1975) idea that interventions are expected to be relevant. In argumentation as well,
the very idea of relevance is again basic. Blair (1989) wrote, "Premise relevance seems to be analytically connected to
the concept of argument and its premise-conclusion relationship. Premises are presumed relevant until challenged or
questioned" (p. 81). Even though the relationship between the concepts of premise and relevance is tight, it cannot be
analytic because the idea of an irrelevant premise is not contradictory. Yet to count an item of discourse as a premise in
an argument is to have already made a judgment that it is thought by the arguer to have a bearing on the conclusion.
Because this judgment is typically tacit, relevance very often does not emerge explicitly in the process of
argumentation, operating rather behind the scenes as a kind of negative constraint. It often emerges during the
dialectical moment when the critic complains, "But that's got nothing to do with it."
The point Blair was onto here is that judgments about relevance are typically built into the very premises themselves
and hence are typically
9 See Sperber and Wilson (1986) for the case that relevance is basic to communication.

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not argued for. (We have here, I think, an important clue as to why judgments of relevance are so hard to defend.) In
putting forth P as a premise, the arguer must be understood as claiming that the content of P is relevant to the issue. The
question of who has the burden of proof here is a difficult one that I bypass for the time being.
There are two ways in which relevance could be basic. The scholastics used to distinguish between the ordo
cognoscendi and the ordo essendi; and although relevance is basic in the ordo cognoscendiroughly the order of learning,
or coming to know thingsit does not seem as basic or fundamental in the order of being. The criterion of truth (if it
enters our theory of evaluation) would seem even more basic because it is easy to see how we might define relevance in
terms of truth. We can say that "P is relevant to Q" means "P has bearing on the truth of Q"; hence, we may be able to
define relevance in terms of truth. The opposite derivation from truth to relevance does not seem plausible.
To say that relevance is basic in the order of learning is to say that it is a ground-floor notion that a reasoner must grasp.
Without some understanding of and appreciation of what relevance is, it is difficult to see how instruction about
reasoning or arguing can move very far. Thus,
R1 Relevance is basic.
The next question to be considered is, "Of what is relevance to be predicated? What is it that is or is not relevant?" A
variety of candidates have been proposed: topical relevance, internal relevance and audience relevance (Tindale, 1994),
and agenda relevance (Woods, forthcoming). Then there are a host of other considerations listed by Walton (1982).
However, it seems clear that something like propositional relevance is basic, at least as far as argumentation is
concerned. Relevance is a property of propositions. (See Blair, 1989; Bowles, 1989a, 1990; Walton, 1982.)
How does relevance inhere in the argument? Does it, for example, inhere each premise singly (like acceptability and
truth) or in the total set (like sufficiency, as is argued shortly)? The answer, it seems to me, is neither. That is, relevance
does not function in just the way that truth and acceptability function, nor yet as sufficiency functions. In this respect,
relevance is idiosyncratic. Let me develop this point by contrast with how we apply the other criteria.
When we apply the truth criterion, we focus on a single premise and ask, "Is this premise true?" When, for example, the
arguer asserts that, "In every state where there is capital punishment, the rate of murder has declined since the
installation of it" and the respondent says, "That is false, because in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, there was an
increase in the rate of murder," the respondent is rejecting that premise as false. In making this

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judgment, the critic considers the premise by itself, in its relationship to the world; she or he abstracts from the
relationship between that premise and the audience and between the premise and the conclusion.
When we apply the criterion of acceptability, we ask, "Is this premise one which my audience is prepared to accept (for
good reason), or do I need to provide argumentation for it?" Once again, acceptability is determined by looking at that
individual premise in relationship to the audience.
When we apply the sufficiency criterion, we must take into consideration all the premises that the arguer has put into
play to support the conclusion. We ask whether the total set of premises gives us enough evidence for the conclusion.
We must consider the premises taken together in their relationship to the conclusion.
The relevance criterion is sui generis. As with sufficiency, we must have one eye on the conclusion. Like sufficiency,
but unlike truth, we have often to make the determination based on more than just that premise. We may need to
consider additional material (missing premises). We may need to bring in what Blair called a relevance warrant, or one
of the other premises, before we can determine relevance. Sometimes the relevance is a property of a premise set, to use
Blair's phrase. Yet this is not always the case. Consider this example:
[P] Trudeau introduced the most enlightened social policies in the history of Canada.
which seems clearly relevant to the claim that
[C] Trudeau was an excellent prime minister.
whereas it seems clearly not relevant to the claim that
[C*] Trudeau was an excellent husband.
These judgments can be made directly, without consideration given to the intervention of other premises.
Relevance thus appears as a variable property as regards its inherence. In this respect, it appears to differ from its peers:
sufficiency, truth, and acceptability. I conclude:
R2 Relevance possesses variable inherence conditions. It may inhere in premises individually, in premise sets, or in
premises taken collectively.
Many theorists have taken the view that relevance is an all-or-nothing affair. The premise either is relevant or it is not.
Like a light switch, it is on

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or off. That would mean that statements like the following made by Siegel (1988) in reference to McPeck would not be
possible: ''I note in passing McPeck's ambivalence as to whether logic is entirely irrelevant to critical thinking, or only
largely irrelevant (so that logic is at least somewhat relevant)" (p. 25). Because this sentence seems to me to make
perfectly good sense, I think that one premise may well be more relevant than another, or that a premise may be said to
have very little, if any, relevance. Or that it may be weakly relevant or strongly relevant. Consider my example:
[P] Trudeau introduced the most enlightened social policies in the history of Canada.
which seems clearly relevant to the claim that
[C1] Trudeau was an excellent prime minister.
but certainly not as relevant to the claim that
[C2] Trudeau was a great thinker.
This idea fits with Blair's (1989) gloss, which says that a premise is relevant means that "accepting the premise should
lead one to be either more inclined or less inclined to accept the conclusion than one would be if one didn't accept the
premise" (p. 68). Thus,
R3 Relevance is a matter of degree.10
It is clear that, in some sense, relevance is context dependent in ways that truth is not. Here is Blair's example:
"Hetta is a woman" is relevant to "Hetta should not get the job" (in Saudi Arabia).
"Hetta is a woman" is not relevant to "Hetta should not get the job" (in Canada).
Presumably, "Hetta is a woman" is true, if true, both in Canada and in Saudi Arabia. (p. 81)
Another way of putting this idea is that relevance is a pragmatic property. What is relevant in one context is not
necessarily relevant in another. However, we need to distinguish this noncontroversial form of the claim that relevance
is relative [weak relativity] from a more controversial ver-
10 A similar result follows if I were (following Bowles, 1990, and overruling for the moment objections from
Woods, 1994) to attempt a probabilistic reading of relevance: For if P increases the likelihood of Q {makes
it .6} and if R also increase the likelihood of Q {makes it .7}, then assuming both are relevant, it follows that
R is more relevant than P to Q.

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sion. In the stronger version, the claim is that the standard of relevance is itself field or subject-matter bound. In this
stronger sense, it shows up in the view that what counts as relevant in one field, discipline, or inquiry will not
necessarily count in another. Thus Blair appeared to endorse strong relativity:
Where there are specialized subjects or domains of practice in which argumentation plays a role, the laws,
rules or principles established therein will be available to serve as relevance warrants should they be
needed . . . Hence the "type" of relevance warrant will be as varied as these subjects or practices. (p. 80)
The weak relativity of relevance seems obvious enough. I do not think that strong relativity is at all obvious, nor is weak
relativity a sufficient basis for proclaiming it. Let us pursue the matter of strong relativity a bit further.
Blair said, "In general the kinds of consideration that can warrant the relevance of premises seem as varied as the kinds
of topic that can be argued about" (p. 80). This position requires a brief explanation of the idea of a relevance warrant.
Blair extended the notion of warrant developed by Toulmin, the idea being that when a particular data is put forth as the
basis for some conclusion, it is often done through the mediation of a relevance warrant. Blair stated:
Whatever the specifics, at some point the proponent might be required to produce some consideration
designed to show that a premise in question is relevant. This consideration I call the relevance warrant of the
argument. (p. 76)
The idea of a relevance warrant and the claim that these are, in effect, field dependent is intriguing. I limit myself to
three observations.
First, good examples of this scenario are important. It is necessary to see how this proposal works out in concreto.11
Second, if we push this point about relevance and relevance warrants all the way, then it will turn out that there is no
concept of relevance per se;
11 I remember recently being at a conference and discussing the criteria of relevance, sufficiency, and
acceptability and suggesting that these might vary from one discipline to the next. Someone in the audience of
about 50 (these were mostly university teachers from a variety of disciplines) queried this. So a member made
a suggestion, put forth a putative candidatean instance of an argument that depended on a relevance warrant
where that warrant appeared to come from some particular field. As soon as the warrant had been put forward,
another member of the audience stated, "No that's the same as my field." There were other attempts, too, each
of which met with the same fate. To be sure, this sample is too limited to base any position on. I am not
attempting to saddle Blair and others with the position that a relevance warrant for one field cannot be a
relevance warrant in another field, but the interchange within the audience on that occasion left some of us
wondering whether the idea of a field-specific view of relevance is warranted.

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but rather that we have Relevancemathematics; Relevancephysics; Relevancephilosophy and so on. At this point,
something like the Quinean objection (1963) to Carnap's attempt to render analyticity via semantic rules comes into
play.
Third, if indeed it turns out that there are relevance warrants, then this will prove to be yet another distinguishing feature
of relevance, for it seems unlikely that we will find parallels for the other criteria. That is, I do not find much
intelligibility in the idea of there being truth warrants, acceptance warrants, and sufficiency warrants. Those are some
difficulties with the strong relativity thesis for relevance.
In any event, if we use the standard semantic, syntactic, or pragmatic distinction, we see that relevance is pragmatic;
that is, it is essentially tied to context.
R4 Relevance is a pragmatic propertynot syntactic or semantic.
Finally, I want to approach relevance using Hamblin's classification of criteria: alethic, epistemic, and dialectical, and
ask into which of these categories relevance falls. It does not depend essentially on truth; for, as Blair (1993) argued,
relevance can be defined using the notion of acceptability. It does not appear to be epistemic; we don't need to use the
concept of knowledge to define relevance; hence, it seems that relevance is a dialectical criterion.
R5 Relevance is a dialectical criterion.
If I am right, then R1R5 are among the salient facts of the case that a theory of relevance will have to take account of. I
move on now to discuss the final criterion: sufficiency.
The Sufficiency Requirement
The sufficiency requirement is that the premises must provide sufficient support for the conclusion. It may seem
counterintuitive to say so, but the situation with respect to the sufficiency requirement is just as bad, if not worse, as the
situation with relevance. Almost no work has been done by informal logicians on this criterion.12 Consequently, there
is little to discuss in this review.
There are at least two dimensions to sufficiency: There is the issue of whether there is enough of the type of evidence
that has been produced. There is the separate question as to whether the range of evidence is adequate. To illustrate:
One type of evidence about fitness levels in Canada
12 In his bibliography, Hansen (1990) listed nine entries under the topic of relevance; the topic of sufficiency
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would be obtained by discovering the number of people who work out in health clubs as a percentage of the population.
If one were to survey only health and fitness clubs in metropolitan areas, the result would be an unrepresentative
sample. However, even if the sample were representative, that would not mean that the sufficiency requirement has
been satisfied; there are other types of evidence that would have to be taken into account: general health indices, reliable
surveys, mortality rates, and so on.
I turn then to the properties of sufficiency that this doctrine must capture.
It seems clear that the question to be asked requires that the critic look at all the evidence produced by the arguer and
ask whether the premises, taken together, provide enough support for the conclusion. Unlike acceptability, which
inheres in perhaps a single premise, sufficiency resides in the premise set.
S1 Sufficiency is a property of the premise set.
Premise sets may be more or less sufficient to justify the conclusion. It makes sense to say that this set of premises
offers almost but not quite enough evidence to support is conclusion.
S2 Sufficiency is a matter of degree.
Sufficiency is a pragmatic property, which means that what is sufficient in one set of circumstances may not be
sufficient in others. What needs to be studied in greater detail is just how the context affects the requirement of
sufficiency. For example, in the wake of the much publicized O. J. Simpson trial, many people now realize that the
evidence required to convict someone in a civil trial in the United States is the preponderance of evidence. If a juror
believes that the evidence makes it more probable that the defendant is guilty, that is sufficient to conclude that the
defendant is guilty. But that same standard is not sufficient in a criminal trial where the stakes are greater. Here the
standard is stricter: The juror must be able to conclude that the evidence points to guilt beyond any reasonable doubt.
The difficult question for informal logic and the theory of argument is how to define context for the purposes of
assessing and critiquing arguments.
S3 Sufficiency is a pragmatic property.
Suffice to say, then, a great deal more work needs to be done on sufficiency as a criterion of argument, but it will have
to incorporate these three properties.
This completes my discussion of the criteria I propose for the evaluation of the illative core of an argument:
acceptability, truth, relevance, and sufficiency. At this point, we do not have an adequate theoretical account of

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any of these criteria. I hope that others will be stimulated to undertake that work. We also have not dealt with the
question whether these criteria are in some sense a complete set of criteria for evaluating the illative core of an
argument. I refer to this problem as The Completeness Problem and propose to defer further consideration of it until
chapter 11.
Criteria for the Dialectical Tier
When I refer in what follows to dialectical criteria, I mean the criteria used in evaluating the dialectical tier. I do not
mean what Hamblin meantcriteria based on the notion of acceptance.
In chapter 6, I argued that the illative core is not sufficient for an argument. Because of the dialectical nature of
argumentation, the elevator of argumentation needs to rise higher. That there is an argument in the first place means that
the conclusion is at least potentially controversial. There is a mixture of opinion, a background of experience,
information, and knowledge about this issue. There are those who take a different view; there are adversary views; there
are typically well-known objections. An argument that does not take into account these dialectical realities is in some
important sense incomplete. Not just poor, but incomplete. It lacks the dialectical tier. To focus the discussion, consider
the argument below:
P1 Trudeau introduced the most enlightened social policies in the history of Canada.
P2 Trudeau provided leadership in the country's gravest crisisthe FLQ crisis.
P3 Trudeau was returned to office 3 times.
C Trudeau was an excellent prime minister.
In connection with this argument, some of the dialectical issues would include:
Anticipating an Objection to a Premise
Argumentative positions are located within a dialectical context, which means that not only are there alternative
positions but also standard objections to that position. Thus, for example, if the arguer's position can be characterized as
pro-life, there are standard objections that must be dealt with, such as the objection that the fetus that is aborted is not
viable and hence not entitled to protection under the law; or that the pro-life position results in discriminatory
intervention. If the arguer's position can be characterized as pro-choice, there are standard objections that he or she has
to face, such as the objection that the pro-choice position results in decreased

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respect for life or that it unjustly deprives the unborn of their right to life, and so forth. With respect to the Trudeau
argument, someone might object by saying, "There are those who believe that Trudeau mishandled the FLQ crisis and
in fact manufactured it."
To take account of this objection into the fabric of the argument is a relatively simple matter, the arguer can add a
premise like, "The objection that Trudeau mishandled the FLQ crisis is wrong because . . . " Of course, the hard part is
to fill in what follows the "because."
Anticipating Other Criticisms
And there will be other types of criticism: "Some will object that failure to achieve the repatriation of the Constitution is
an essential weakness in Trudeau's regime and that having failed to achieve his central purpose tells against the
conclusion." This is not an objection to a specific premise but rather to the conclusion; it too can be incorporated into
the fabric of the argument. In any event, this suggests that the following question is appropriate for the dialectical tier:
[D1] How well is the arguer able to deal with the standard objections and criticism?
(It is interesting to note that there does not exist any single term or concept to denote the property of an argument that
satisfies [D1].)
There are some problems that need to be noted here. Clearly, the arguer cannot respond to all of the objections and
perhaps not even to all of the standard ones, not without making the argument prolix. Some selection process must be at
work. But how to specify the arguer's obligations is a difficult issueI call it The Specification Problem. I postpone
discussion of it until chapter 12.
This criterion is related to the notion that has been expressed by many that an argument is strong if it can withstand
significant objection. Because, in some important sense, the argument consists of the premises, conclusion, and
dialectical material, once the objection has been raised, there is really no way for the argument to respond to the
objection. The argument is what it is. It is the arguer who must respond and must do so using the material from the
stated argument while maintaining its integrity.
Dealing with Alternative Positions
In the present case, I would expect the arguer to deal with alternative positions on this issue. Such a move might be
signaled by saying, "Some theorists have argued that Trudeau's tenure as PM actually resulted in a weakening of
federalism, but . . . " As with the earlier example, I do not have

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a single term to refer to the quality in question here. By this, I mean that I do not have a single term that I use to refer to
that quality an argument displays when it addresses itself effectively to alternative positions.
When the arguer attempts to satisfy this obligation but fails, such failure will often result in a fallacious move. One who
fails to engage satisfactorily with alternative positions may commit the fallacy of straw person (if the argument is
distorted), the fallacy of ad hominem (if the arguer personalizes inappropriately) and the fallacy of red herring (if he or
she goes off on a tangent). Thus, some fallacies are best seen as dialectical in character; others have to do with defects
in the illative core.
Such reflection about the process of arguing leads us to a second question that the arguer must satisfy in the dialectical
tier:
[D2] How well does the argument address itself to alternative positions?
Anticipating the Consequences and Implications
Often criticism will take the form of showing that the position leads to untenable consequences or has unacceptable
implications. Thus, in the case I have been considering, someone might raise this objection: "If you admit Trudeau to
the class of excellent Prime Ministers, then what becomes of a Pearson?"
Often the arguer must attempt to deal with this form of objection and incorporate that as a premise. Hence, yet another
dialectical criterion for argumentation is contained in the following question:
[D3] How well does the argument deal with consequences/implications?
These are some of the criteria that seem appropriate for the dialectical tier.
Conclusion
To summarize: I have argued that for an argument to achieve its intended purpose of rational persuasion (and therefore
be a good argument), the illative core must satisfy four requirements: the acceptability requirement, the truth
requirement, the relevance requirement, and the sufficiency requirement. I have not attempted to provide a complete
analysis of these criteria, being content rather to specify the properties that such an analysis would have to account for.
In each case, we have shown that requirement is one that admits of degrees, thus generally being in line with the crucial
adequacy condition, Adequacy Condition 4. I further argued that to be a

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rationally persuasive argument, the argument must have a dialectical tier in which three further requirements are
satisfied.
It seems to me that an argument that satisfies these requirements will have a good claim to being rationally persuasive,
to being a good argument. But there is a question that may legitimately be raised concerning the completeness of the
complete set? Are there other criteria for the dialectical tier to satisfy in order to be a good argument? These questions
raise various aspects of The Completeness Problem and I defer further discussion of them until chapter 11.
Having thus dealt with the issue regarding the normative requirement for the evaluation of the argument taken as the
product of the practice, I move now to a discussion to the normative issues related to the remaining components of the
practice: the process of argument, the arguer, and the practice itself.
Other Normative Criteria
Introduction
We have now developed a set of criteria to guide us in the determination of the logical virtues of the argument
considered as the product of the practice. We need also consider what norms and criteria exist for the process, the
arguer, and the practice itself.
I have argued that a pragmatic approach to argumentation is the appropriate one, so let us see what such an approach
entails here. The practice does not exist for itself but rather because it yields a product of value to human society.
Hence, broadly speaking, the practice may be deemed to be in good shape if it yields good products. If, then, we regard
the product as basic from the normative point of view,13 we may suppose that the process of arguing is good just to the
degree that it is the type of process that tends to produce good products; that an arguer is good just to the degree that his
or her argumentative behavior promotes the process of arguing; and that the practice is in good shape (we might say
healthy) just to the degree that the arguers, the processes, and the products are satisfying the appropriate norms.
Normative Considerations Regarding the Process
By the process of arguing, I understand an essentially dialectical process between two persons or points of view,
according to which one attempts
13"If . . . " because there may be those who do not view the product as the endpoint; some may argue that it is
the process that is the endpoint and the product is secondary.

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to persuade the Other rationally by producing a good argument. The Other then has the responsibility of either accepting
the argument or of offering criticism. The arguer then has the responsibility of hearing that criticism and either rejecting
it or revising his argument accordingly.
The ProcessProduct Issue
There is a view within argumentation theory according to which the proper approach is to see an argument as a dialogue
between two or more participants and to see this exchange as a process that is governed by rules. The purpose of
argumentation theory then is to develop a set of rules according to which such a dialogue may be carried out. Among
the theorists who take this perspective are Barth and Krabbe, van Eemeren and Grootendorst, and Walton and
Krabbe.14 In chapter 10, I discuss such theories. Such an approach develops rules that govern the process that in some
sense replaces the criteria just discussed.
As I have shown, criticism is essential to the process of arguing. If it were the basic purpose for the Other merely to
evaluate the argument offered by the arguer, then the Other could simply apply the criteria and make his or her
evaluation. But because the practice of argumentation has a different telos, the Other is called on not just to evaluate but
also to criticize. What forms such criticisms should take is a matter that has partly been dealt with in this chapter: are the
premises relevant, and so on. I have more to say on the topic of what counts as good criticism in the next chapter.
Rules Regarding Process
Thus, we may say that the process of arguing is a good one provided the following conditions obtain:
The arguer presents the case in a rational manner.
The critic responds to the argument in a rational manner.
The argument is subjected to review in the light of the criticisms that are offered.
An appropriate response to the criticism is given.
All of these are required in the process of arguing to meet the constraints of manifest rationality. Thus, for example, if
an arguer received criticism, acknowledged its force, but did not appropriately revise the argument, then that part of the
process would no longer appear to be rational. Of course, these rules are general and require the kind of specification
that dialogical approaches offer. I shall not myself attempt any such specification.
14 Is it coincidental that dialogue theorists seem to work in pairs?

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Normative Conditions Regarding the Person or the Arguer
Once the arguer has put the argument before the audience, their obligation is to respond to the argument and direct
reflective energies toward it. The arguer fades from the scene. The argument can be evaluated and criticized even if
nothing is known about the arguer. Plato's argument for the pre-existence of the soul can be evaluated without taking
Plato's own personality and character into consideration. It may be that something about the milieu in which the
argument occurred will need to be known in order to understand the argument or its force. But, so traditional theory
goes, the person of the arguer is off limits. Attacking the arguer as a way of getting at the argument is the traditional
fallacy known as ad hominem.
A strong consideration in favor of this view is evident in the process of blind refereeing. Here the idea is to make sure
that the referee does not know the identity of the arguer, lest it influence evaluation. Built into this practice is the belief
that it is entirely possible for the referee to render a fair and informed verdict on the argument without knowing
anything about the arguer's identity. The argument, as it were, speaks for itself.
There is validity to this way of thinking, but there are also limits. There are circumstances in which the arguer himself
becomes a legitimate focus, and I want to know what these are.
In the first place, there are exceptions to the basic rule that says that when the arguer has represented the argument,
attention must be directed away from the arguer and toward the argument itself. What are these exceptions?
Credibility. If the arguer puts forth a premise and in doing so appeals to his or her credibility, then it is legitimate for the
critic to challenge that credibility. This might look like an ad hominem (typically a circumstantial one), but it would not
be a case of attacking the arguer instead of the argument; rather, it will be a case of attacking the argument by attacking
the arguer. The focus of the attack would have to be limited to those matters related to the arguer's credibility. An attack
on other aspects of the arguer's character would not be allowed.
Conflict of Interest or Bias. Any arguer has an interest in the conclusion. That does not open automatically the door to
an attack on the person. Otherwise, such attacks would always be legitimate because the arguer almost always has this
vested interest. So when is the conflict of interest normatively inappropriate? When the arguer's argument especially
depends on expertise and there is reason to believe that the arguer had a conflict of interest, then it is legitimate for the
critic to point that out.

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Issues of Character. Sometimes the character of the arguer is a legitimate topic of concern. Thus, when someone is a
candidate for public office, that person will likely put forth proposals for policies, arguments, position papers, and such.
It is legitimate for the critic to raise issues that have to do with the character of the arguer andor candidate. Not any and
all are legitimate, but some are. For example, in recent years, the question has been debated whether marital infidelity
by a politician is relevant in assessing character as it pertains to office.
Complaints to the effect that the arguer is closed-minded or biased are perhaps best interpreted not so much as attempts
to criticize the argument but rather an objection that the arguer is not really living up to the spirit of the practice. In
other words, it is a complaint about the arguer to the effect that he or she is not satisfying the requirements of the
process. It amounts to a claim of bad faith. Like all such claims, these may be true and warranted or not. But such
complaints do not reveal any inherent weakness in the argument itself.
Over and above these considerations, there are legitimate expectations that may be placed on participants in the practice
of argumentation. And where those are or appear to be violated, then it may be said that the norms on the arguer have
not been satisfied. To see what these are, I need to look at the normative conditions on the practice.
Normative Conditions on the Practice
Like any other mode of human activity, practices are subject to critique. For example, the practice of having a bride
adopt the last name of her husband has been criticized and, as a result of that criticism, the practice is changing. It has
been criticized because one of its preconditions (the assumption that the woman is subject to the man; that she is in
effect a kind of property) is no longer a viable assumption.
In many locations in North America, the practice of going from house to house on Halloween (trick-or-treating, it is
called in some places) is on the wane, not because people were upset with or critical of the practice (although some
were) but because some have abused the practice. An absolute precondition of this practice is the assumption of good
will: that people giving children treats would do just that. When some deranged souls began to insert razor blades into
apples or other fruit, the trust that was required for the practice began to erode.
The issue of under what conditions a practice remains healthy is not one that can be discussed at great length here.
Suffice it to say that the practice of argumentation as an ongoing cultural form depends on a number of conditions, and
as I showed in my discussion in chapter 1, there are reasons to wonder how many of them contemporary North
American culture satisfies.

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Conclusion
Having discussed the normative conditions on the process, the arguer, and the practice, I now propose to review the
theory of evaluation proposed here in light of the adequacy conditions set forth in chapter 2 and discussed in
preliminary fashion at the end of chapter 5.
Satisfaction of the Adequacy Conditions
In the last two chapters, I have sketched or outlined a new approach to the theory of argument and presented the
elements of both a theory of analysis and a theory of appraisal. I want to show that, at least in principle, this theory is
capable of meeting the adequacy conditions set forth in chapter 2.
The theory must contain a definition of argument and the elements that constitute an argument.
Discussion. The theory that I propose does satisfy this condition. An argument is viewed as a part of the practice of
argumentation. Against the traditional view that an argument is a certain structure, I developed a more pragmatic view
that stresses purpose and that reveals the structure to be far more complex than the traditional view would suggest. An
argument must contain an illative core but also a dialectical tier.
Discussion. The theory I have proposed does not take a specific stand on this important matter. It is clear that whatever
method of display is adopted, it must be sufficiently complex to embrace the two-tier structure of argument revealed by
analysis in chapter 6. As I showed in chapter 5, there are a number of initiatives for approaching the task of
understanding and displaying the structure of arguments that seem to have promise. So there is good reason to think that
an approach coming out of the tradition of informal logic, suitably fortified can satisfy this requirement.

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Discussion. The theory discussed in this chapter allows for this in principle. That is, the situation presented in Fig. 7.1
can occur.
According to the theory I propose, both arguments can be good, for both can satisfy the criteria for the illative core.
Relevance. It seems clear that any account of relevance that satisfied the conditions sketched in this chapter will allow
for this condition to be satisfied. That is, that P1 through P3 will be relevant to C1 and P4 through P6 will be relevant to
C2. This will likely be because the two premise sets are heterogeneous; that is, no premise for A1 is such that it is
incompatible with any premise for A2.
Sufficiency. Can both arguments satisfy the sufficiency requirement? It would seem not, for if P1 through P3 are
sufficient for C1 and C1 is contradictory to C2, then it would seem that P1 through P3 are sufficient to show not-C2.
Here, it is important to remember that it is not unusual for different sides in the argument to point to different pieces of
evidence. In other words, the premises in such a case will likely be heterogeneous and compatible. In scientific studies,
this is often the case. One set of studies provides very good evidence that high levels of cholesterol are associated with
CAD, whereas another reputable set of studies shows just the opposite. Further,
Fig. 7.1
Schema showing possibility of good argument for conflicting propositions.

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it should be recalled that the sufficiency criterion has been interpreted as a matter of degree.
Acceptability. It will be asked whether in the previous situation both arguments can satisfy the acceptability
requirement. I believe the answer is yes. Appropriately understood, it is possible for someone accept P1 through P3 and
also to accept P4 through P6. In part this is because acceptance is relative and also because acceptance of P is not
incompatible with acceptance of not-P. The cost of this approach makes some uncomfortable paying it, for it raises the
general issue of relativism that must be dealt with in a later chapter.
Truth. Can both premise sets satisfy the truth requirement? Clearly they can, if they are heterogeneous, as discussed
previously. The problem would occur if, for example, any of P1 through P3 and any of P4 through P6 were
contradictory; clearly, it is not possible for both arguments to also satisfy the truth requirement. I discuss this problem in
chapter 11.
Looking now at the dialectical tier, A1 and A2 might both be comparable. They might deal with different objections or
they would handle some of the same objections and criticisms, but differently.
I want to pause here to take stock of a consequence of this condition. I have just argued that the theory of argument I
have proposed can satisfy Adequacy Condition 3. A further consequence of this needs to be noted here: If there is a
good argument for not-T, then no argument for T will be conclusive. What this shows is that it is not necessary that an
argument be conclusive in order for it to be a good argument. This view conflicts with a long-standing bias in logic and
philosophy that would seek to make conclusiveness a requirement of a really good argument. More about this in the
next chapter.
The theory of appraisal must allow that arguments exist in a continuum from strong to weak.
Discussion. Because all of the criteria in my theory admit of degrees of satisfaction, it would seem to follow that, on this
theory, arguments can occupy all points in the spectrum from strong to weak.
The criteria for the appraisal of argument should be such that, in principle, the ordinary reasoner can decide whether or
not these are satisfied in a given instance. In short, the criteria should be user-friendly.

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Discussion. All of the criteria that belong to our theory of appraisal are accessible, even though not everyone has the
same degree of capacity to use these terms.
This condition will be shown to be satisfied by developments in the next two chapters.
The criteria must be justified as to their appropriateness for the tasks assigned. This I have done.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I outlined a theory of evaluation that comes out of the informal logic tradition. I saw that this theory is
not without its problems, chiefly a less-than-satisfactory theoretical articulation of some of its fundamental criteria,
particularly relevance. I also saw several problems emerge (The Integration Problem, The Application Problem, and
The Completeness Problem), which are discussed in chapter 11.
More recently, I argued that informal logic appears to be capable of providing an adequate theory of argument. Because
I have made much of the difference between evaluation and criticism, I need to show how informal logic's theory of
appraisal can also yield a theory of criticism and satisfy the demands of strong criticism. I turn to that task in the next
chapter.

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Chapter 8
Principles of Criticism
Rilke said, ''A work of art is a work of infinite loneliness and with nothing to be reached so little as with criticism."
Argumentation, on the other hand, is work of the minda dialectical undertaking that looks forward to the moment of
critical inspection. The purpose of this chapter is to present the outlines of a theory of criticism. I begin by
distinguishing between evaluation and criticism, after which I present and discuss several principles of criticism.
Two levels of principle emerge. First, I discuss two metaprinciples: the principle of vulnerability and the principle of
parity. Then I discuss two first-order principles: the principle of discrimination and the principle of logical neutrality.
The justification for each principle takes the form of showing that the principle must be assumed if I am to make sense
of argumentation in the way I discussed it in chapter 6, particularly for it to be conducted as an exercise in manifest
rationality. Two of the principles discussedthe principle of discrimination and the principle of logical neutralityhave
received prior articulations in the literature, but to the best of my knowledge, the other twothe principle of vulnerability
and the principle of parityhave not.
Criticism and Evaluation
Introduction
To set the stage for this discussion, recall that Adequacy Condition 4 for the theory of argumentmight be called The
Continuum Hypothesis for Argumentationstated that arguments exist in a continuum from strong to weak.

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To repeat some of what was said in chapter 2, this hypothesis seems reasonable enough. Arguments are, after all, a
human product and so may be expected to run the same range as other human inventions. Most arguments fall
somewhere in the middle part of the range. That being so, it stands to reason that almost all arguments can be improved.
But how will this improvement occur? The arguer can attempt to find the weak spots in the argument, and a skilled
arguer can become a good critic of his or her own argument. But if the arguer were able to locate every weakness, they
would have been eliminated and, thus, a different argument would have been constructed. At some point, then, the
arguer's capacity for self-criticism runs out, and the arguer says, "good enough" and puts the argument forth to persuade
the Other. What will happen next?
It is natural that the arguer hope for a favorable evaluation. The arguer might like nothing better than for the critic to
say, "Yes, that's a good argument; it satisfies all the criteria; I find myself persuaded by it." At some level, the arguer
perhaps believes that the argument will resolve the issue, perhaps even think that the argument is conclusive.
However, such outcomes are much less likely than another, where the critic reviews the argument and finds it wanting
(in terms of the appropriate criteria). If the argument has any degree of complexity, the critic will find more than one
problem. Thus, the critic says, "Well, it's not a bad argument; it has some good points, but . . . " and proceeds to list
some of the problems with the argument. The Other has moved beyond the moment of simple evaluation and moved
into the role of a critic. The moment of criticism begins when the Other sees the evaluation as a springboard for
providing feedback for the arguer. It is no longer for the Other. It is now for the arguer's benefit.
The simplest form of criticism would be for the critic simply to itemize the flaws that have been found. However, for
this articulation to qualify as genuine criticism, it should exhibit the same qualities as the argument at which it is
directed. That is to say, the criticism will be reasoned. The critic must provide not just the evaluation but the reasoning
behind it. Without such articulation, the criticism, even if rational, will not appear to be rational. The critic would be
making claims but not supporting them with reasonshardly in keeping with his or her role and responsibilities in the
practice of argumentation as I have described it here. In this way, then, the Other moves beyond mere evaluation to
criticism.
The important issue I want to address is: What counts as good criticism of argument? My answer is that the requirement
of manifest rationality dictates that this process of criticizing an argument take place within certain constraints and abide
by certain principles. I shortly bring forward my candidates.
Before that, I want to complete the discussion of criticism and how it differs from evaluation. The difference is
important because, in my view, traditional logic has been more focused on evaluation than on criticism. One

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of the contributions of informal logic has been to recognize the difference between them and the importance of criticism.
Evaluation and Criticism Distinguished
I have claimed that there is a difference between criticism and evaluation and have hinted at what the difference is. It is
now time to discuss this issue in greater detail.1
By evaluation, I understand the process (or the result of the process) of assessing a product (I use the term here very
loosely) in terms of criteria (or set of criteria), where the purpose of such assessment is for the evaluator to establish the
value of the product. The main function an evaluation serves is to contribute to the evaluator's knowledge and
understanding, typically as a prelude to decision or action.
Suppose that I am shopping for a used car. I have determined that what is most important for me is that the car get good
mileage, be less than $3,000, and be between 5 and 7 years old. Those are my criteria for evaluation. I may evaluate a
particular car in terms of this set of criteria and the result of that evaluation will be an overall judgment of how good the
car is: Very Good, Good, and so forth. The purpose of the evaluation is internal, to help me to decide whether or not I
am interested in purchasing that car. I do the evaluation for myself. I may share this evaluation with a salesman, or I
may not. It does not matter, given the purpose at hand, whether I share the evaluation with others. It can be argued, of
course, that my evaluation will be better if I share it. In any event, it may be said that evaluation (of this sort) is
monolectical, meaning that its primary function is to develop a rationale for the agent doing the evaluation.
By criticism, on the other hand, I understand the articulated and reasoned evaluation of something communicated to the
creator with the view that it will help improve the product.2 Criticism goes beyond evaluation in that it must take into
account the strengths as well as the weaknesses of the product and is intended for the one who produced the argument as
a vehicle whereby the argument may be improved. Thus, it may be said that criticism is part of a dialectical process,
whereas evaluation is not.
With this in mind, consider the difference between the assessment of a skater's performance by the judge (which I
would classify as an evaluation) and the assessment by the coach (which I would regard as criticism). The judge holds
up card with his or her rating5.1 out of 6. That is the evaluation. There is no justification, no mention of strengths and
weaknesses (although these may have occurred in the deliberation leading up to the evaluation).
1 For a different view of the relationship between evaluation and criticism, see Scriven (1991).
2 Finocchiaro (1994) noted that "'criticism' tends to have a negative connotation, in the sense of negative
evaluation" (p. 21).

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The evaluation plays its role in this way. The absence of a developed and articulated rationale is not an impediment to
its achieving its purpose. The coach, on the other hand, may not assign a rating or grade at all to the performance but
will critique the skater's performance. The coach will discuss with the skater the strong and the weak points in the
performance, and this is done precisely to help the skater achieve a stronger performance the next time. Here the
assignment of a grade or an evaluation is strictly secondary. Here the presence of a developed and articulated rationale
is essential.
Given this understanding, it seems to follow that it is possible to evaluate an argument without criticizing it, and
alsoalthough perhaps much less likelyto criticize without evaluating. The two processes are alike in that each process
makes reference to some criteria. They differ in their context and purpose.
A theory of evaluation would have the task of developing the appropriate criteria for judgment. A theory of evaluation
for arguments would propose criteria according to which an argument is to be evaluated as good or bad, strong or weak
(whatever evaluative criteria are central to the theory.)
A theory of criticism has the task of providing guidance about the weighting and the integration of the criteria used in
the evaluation of arguments, and of generally laying down the guidelines by which the process of criticism is carried
out. A theory of criticism for arguments would discuss the nature of criticism and develop principles of criticism.
Thus, although evaluation and criticism both make use of criteria, criticism is a more complex undertaking that requires
not only that potential difficulties in the argument be located but that they be presented in such a way as to maximize
the chance that this feedback will help the arguer revise the argument.
Criticism so understood is not necessarily a negative thing. Criticism includes the idea that the critic must take account
of strengths of the argument as well as the weaknesses. In our culture, the term "criticism" has, unfortunately, acquired a
negative connotation. It means an adverse judgment or evaluation. Here's an example of such usage:
People find it a whole lot easier to be critical of others in another part of the country. To be critical of people
they will never have to face. It takes a little more courage to question the actions of people in your own
neighborhood.3
Here, being critical means making some form of adverse judgment.
In intellectual work, however, we are accustomed to speak of teaching students to develop the critical spirit,4 and we
teach subjects like literary
3 Charlie Vincent, "NIT pickers, Rose dial the wrong numbers," Detroit Free Press, C1, March 15 (1994).
4 This phrase is prominent in Siegel (1988).

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criticism. Here, criticism means something closer to its original meaning of good judgment and appreciation. The word
derives from the Greek word krineinfrom which come the words "critic" and "critical"which means to estimate the
value of something. Thus, a critic is a person who judges, appreciates, and estimates the value of something.5
One psychologist made the following observations about criticism:
There is one thing that everyone wants to give and no one wants to receive. Criticism. You can call it
"correction," "feedback," "guidance," or any nicer sounding name, but most people still hate it. It is a rare
person who likes criticisms . . . Yet it is crucial. After all, how can we know if we're doing a good job if our
strengths and weaknesses aren't evaluated and told to us.
This is well said. Notice the tension between the idea of criticism as something that no one wants (because it is
negative) and criticism as helping us see our strengths and weaknesses (which some people do want). The same
psychologist then stated: "The truly wise and strong will actively solicit criticism. They want it, chase it, and are
excited . . . because it is an opportunity to learn." This remark certainly applies in the practice of argumentation as I
have been describing it here. Once the arguer has produced an argument, the arguer will want feedback, if indeed the
purpose of the argument is (as I have imagined it to be) rational persuasion. If the purpose of the exercise were just to
cow the Other into submission or to make the arguer feel good about himself, then criticism and feedback would not be
unwelcome. But I am supposing the contrary. The arguer is thus essentially interested in receiving criticism; if no
criticism should come his way, then the arguer will make arrangements to go out and get some.
An Illustration
I want to bring the discussion to a close with an illustration from university life. There is a variety of responses that an
instructor may provide when marking student papers. Over the years, I have observed that such responses tend to fall
into three types.
5 I am indebted to Margaret Lee (April, 1989) for the following account of the changing meaning of the word
"critical": "Critical" is a word with an interesting story. Suggested synonyms are indicative of the first and
most popular understanding of the wordfaultfinding, captious, cavilling, carping and censorious. The OED
traces the changing nuances from the first usenotably by Shakespeare's Othello: 'I am nothing if not
critical,'meaning "given to judging in an especially adverse or unfavourable way"to Sir Thomas Browne's use
in the 17th century meaning 'involving or exercising careful judgement or observation on the basis of which
right decisions might be made' to the use by Thomas Jefferson of critical as 'a turning point of decisive
importance in relation to an issue.'"

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Type 1. The instructor assigns a grade to the paper, but there is no or very little commentary. Such an evaluation serves
the purpose of assigning a grade and the needs of marking, but it is of little help to the student. (Many students do not
care about the feedback; they are only interested in the grade).
Type 2. The instructor assigns a grade and makes copious comments about the paper's problems, but does not, in the
end, provide any perspective or overview about these many criticisms. This is what I would call criticism. Such
feedback will undoubtedly meet not only the needs of the registrar (who records the grades) but will also allow the
student to improve the product if he or she is willing. But there is a danger that the student will get bogged down in the
many details while missing the big picture. Hence, I come to the third type of response.
Type 3. The instructor does all that the instructor for Type 2 did but, in addition, rank orders his or her comments. That
is, they are all put into an overall perspective. It seems to me that this is the most useful kind of feedback for the
students, and, hence, the one that best serves the practice of argumentation. In the terminology to be introduced later,
the instructor who engages in Type 3 response has followed the principle of discrimination to be discussed later this
chapter, whereas the Type 2 instructor has not.
(It is possible that an instructor's giving a student an "F" might so enrage the student that he makes it his life's work to
rewrite the paper and get it published. Here the mere fact of negative evaluation caused the improvement of the
product.6 Yet this will not generally be the case.)
As thus understood, criticism is internal and essential to the process of arguing. This important insight is one of the
fruits of the theory of argument presented in chapters 5 and 6. What, then, shall be the guiding principles of criticism for
arguments? Here we need to recall that argumentation as a practice is characterized by three features: (a) it is
teleological; (b) it is dialectical; (c) it is manifestly rational. If criticism is to be part of this practice, then it too must
exhibit the same features.
What, then, is the purpose of argument criticism? One can assign many possible purposes or ends; but if the purpose of
argument is to get at the truth or to arrive at the best possible view of the matter and in this way to persuade rationally, I
will assign this same telos to criticism. Its purpose is not just to show the arguer where he is wrong, nor yet to destroy
the argument as if this were an exercise in intellectual fighting and sparring (which it has often been confused with).
The purpose must rather be to provide the arguer with feedback that will help in the reassessment of his own product.
6 On the different roles of negative and positive evaluation, see Finocchiaro (1994).

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It follows that such criticism must itself be reasoned; that is, the arguer must not just make claims but must back them
up by referring to the argument itself. Such criticism must be balanced; because we may well expect a priori that the
argument has both strengths and weaknesses, the critic will take account of both. Because it is in the areas where it is
weak that the argument requires improvement, the critic will focus on these. More about this shortly.
A further benefit from the distinction between evaluation and criticism is that it helps the difference between formal and
informal logic become clearer. We are now in a better position to appreciate the distinction between them drawn in
chapter 6. There, I stated that formal deductive logic is concerned with providing a normative theory of evaluation for
implication; inductive logic is concerned with providing a normative theory of evaluation for inference; informal logic
is concerned with providing a normative theory of criticism for argumentation.
FDL provides a theory of evaluation (although not a theory of criticism) whose best application is to inference. The
standard of evaluation is soundnessthe premises must be true premises and the inference must be valid. One takes the
inference and evaluates it as good or bad, depending on whether it is sound or not. If it were to turn out that the
premises are false and the argument is invalid, one is not expected to decide which of these flaws is more serious.7
One reason traditional logicians overlooked the difference between evaluation and criticism is the way that inference/
implication and argument coalesced. Arguments by their nature require criticism, whereas, as we have seen, neither
inferences nor implications do. Absent the distinction between inference and argument, you have ipso facto taken the
ground out from underneath the distinction between evaluation and criticism.
Having distinguished between evaluation and criticism, I now go on to discuss four principles of criticism.
The Principle of Vulnerability8
Statement of the Principle
The principle of vulnerability plays a role in the realm of argumentation similar to the role that Popper envisaged for the
principle of falsifiability in
7 FDL can be so extended, as Hansen reminded me in private correspondence. But even if that is true, it still
seems to me that FDL is better suited to render decisions about the validity of implications than the goodness
of arguments.
8 Earlier versions of the principle discussed in this section were delivered at the Conference on Argumentation and
Education, sponsored by the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation, May 5 through 7, 1995 at Brock
University; at Conference 95 on Critical Thinking
(footnote continued on next page)

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the realm of scientific theorya way of demarcating between the genuine and the bogus. To be a legitimate scientific
theory, according to Popper, a theory must be falsifiable. Likewise, to be a legitimate argument, an argument must be
vulnerable to criticism. This principle applies, in the first instance, to the arguer. Observance of this principle is
fundamental in the practice of argumentation for it opens the door to criticism. Violation of it closes the door.
Although some such principle is implicit in many accounts of argumentation, it has rarely been made explicit. Van
Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992) included something like the principle of vulnerability as one of their ten rules for
rational discourse: "Parties must not prevent each other from advancing standpoints or casting doubts on
standpoints" (p. 208). They described the specific phenomenon I am talking about by saying, "This may also happen by
declaring particular standpoints sacrosanct, so that the opponent is prohibited from casting doubt on them and they are
rendered immune to criticism" (p. 108).9 They pointed out that doing this is "putting obstacles to the development of a
critical discussion" (p. 108). Fogelin (1978) also touched on this principle when he referred to what he called self-
sealing arguments, "So far, we have seen two ways in which an argument can be self-sealing: (1) it can invent an ad hoc
or arbitrary way of dismissing every possible criticism. . . . (2) A theory can counter criticism by attacking its critics" (p.
98).
His first point describes a way of violating the principle I am discussing here. My point is that an argument that displays
this feature is not a genuine argument. It may look like an argument, it may have all the elements of an argument, but if
the arguer claims to have insulated the argument against all possible criticism, then this is no arguer and no argument.
Violations of the Principle
There are two different ways in which an arguer might violate the principle of vulnerability. The first and most obvious
form of insulation occurs when the arguer seeks to undermine (or dismiss) in advance every possible criti-
(footnote continued from previous page)
and Informal Logic at George Mason University, June 15 through 18, 1995; and at the 15th Annual
Conference on Critical Thinking and Educational Reform, Sonoma State University, August 3 through 6,
1995. I am very grateful to all those who have challenged my views and thus helped me to say more clearly
and cogently what I want to say. Particular thanks are due to Jonathan Adler and Chris Tindale.
9 See their discussion of this in chapter 9. Their basic defense is in terms of the ideal of freedom of speech,
although they also suggested that the attempt to restrict discussion is wrong because "it puts obstacles to the
development of a critical discussion" (p. 108) and that such action is "an attempt to eliminate him as a serious
partner in the discussion" (p. 108).

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cism.10 Will (1994) attributed a move something like this to Catherine MacKinnon:
MacKinnon reasons serenely, as fanatics do, within a closed circle of logic: If you do not see our wicked
society as she does, that just proves how wickedly society has "constructed" your false consciousness. Thus
all critics are dismissable.11
I do not here take a position on whether MacKinnon is guilty as charged but rather merely use this situation as a
possible illustration of one way of violating the principle.
Another example is furnished by an anecdote about a student who sought to challenge the viewpoint being presented by
the professor in a University class. The professor told the student, "This is not subject to argument or disagreement; it
has been conclusively established by consensus!" I take this response to be equivalent to the assertion that the argument
under consideration was immune to criticism and so could not be criticized. (I find it incredible that this should have
been said in a university.)12
A second way the principle can be violated occurs when the arguer continues to reject every criticism directed against
the argument. The arguer puts forth the argument; someone lodges a criticism of the argument; the arguer rejects that
criticism as invalid. Someone else puts forth another criticism; the arguer rejects it. A third person puts forth a criticism;
the arguer rejects it. Now, a certain amount of this is compatible with the conviction that naturally accompanies the
arguer who has done his or her homework, has even anticipated objections and has been able, so he or she thinks, to
deflect them. However, if this pattern continues, one begins to suspect that the arguer is not prepared to countenance
any criticism as legitimate and it may be suspected that the arguer regards his argument as insulated against all possible
criticism. Such insulation violates the principle of vulnerability.
Here it is natural to think of Flew's (1955, p. 99) challenge where he put this question to the symposiasts: "What would
have to occur or to have occurred to constitute for you a disproof of the love of, or the existence of, God?"13 In my
terms, Flew asked these symposiasts, particularly those who argue that God exists or that God loves us, what might
count against their argument. He asked them to indicate the vulnerability of their positions.
10 Gilbert suggested calling this the global approach.

11 Will (1994).
12 Perhaps I should not be so surprised. After all, there is, as James reminded me, a little dogmatist lurking behind
the scene in all of us.
13 Flew's challenge bears obvious debts to Popper's views about falsifiability.

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(The very same request could be directed to atheists, agnostics, and, indeed, to Flew himself.)
It is customary to point out that in the case of empirical theories, the proponent must be prepared to indicate what would
cause the abandonment of the theory. The same is true of arguments. It is perfectly legitimate to ask the arguer, "What
would or could upset your argument?" The arguer may not know the answer to this question in some cases. All the
same, the arguer must be prepared to concede at least the possibility of such a challenge.
There are, then, these two distinct ways of violating the principle, both of which give the appearance of the argument's
having been insulated against criticism.
It is important to distinguish violation of this principle from the legitimateindeed, necessarystep in which the arguer
seeks to discharge the dialectical duties by taking on and defusing objections and criticisms. It might be asked, "Is not
the arguer here aiming at making the argument conclusive, hence invulnerable to criticism? What is wrong with that?"
The difference between the two situations is this: In the former case, the arguer attempts to determine in advance and
disarm all legitimate criticism. In the latter case, the arguer acknowledges the legitimacy of certain types of criticism
and seeks to show how his or her position handles them.
Having formulated the principle and discussed violation, I can now formulate it more clearly: The arguer may not
represent his or her argument as invulnerable to legitimate criticism. I turn next to the task of justifying the principle.
Justification of the Principle
The justification of this principle is found at two levels. The basic line of justification stems from the very nature of
argumentation as I have discussed it. At a certain point, this line of justification merges with empirical considerations
about argumentation.
The a Priori Justification
The justification for the principle of vulnerability rests on the fact that, by its very nature, an argument is open to,
indeed in some sense expects, criticism. The attempt to forestall criticism altogether endangers the practice because (a)
it does not accord with the telos of rational persuasion, (b) it violates the dialectical nature of argumentation, and (c) it
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Take the last point firstthat such insulation violates manifest rationality. An arguer who represents the argument as
invulnerable to criticism will appear to be a fanatic, a zealot, and will certainly not be thought to be operating in accord
with the requirements of manifest rationality. That the move violates dialecticality is obvious, for the arguer who wishes
to persuade rationally but will not listen to criticism in effect is turning his or her back on the Other, refusing to take any
criticisms or objections. It is as if to say, ''I cannot learn anything from you." Such a posture is not in keeping with the
practice of argumentation and undermines the dialectical nature of the process.
Finally, an arguer who represents the argument as uncriticizable is not being respectful of the aim of rational persuasion
and, in fact, is not acting rationally. It is not rational to act as if one's argument was perfect and beyond the pale of
criticism.
The arguer's obligation to face criticism is noted by Johnstone (1978) in his discussion of philosophical argumentation:
"I shall begin by remarking that it is commonly supposed that anyone who makes a philosophical statement is under
some obligation to respond to the criticisms of those to whom the statement is addressed." (p. 14). The basis for this
supposition must be the understanding of the practice of argumentation as an exercise in rationality. What Johnstone
said of philosophical argument, I would generalize to cover argumentation of all sorts. Johnstone continued:
He need not, of course, reply to all criticisms or questions. But associated with any philosophical statement is
a class of criticisms and questions more or less relevant to the statement and with these he must deal. His
critic is naturally under a similar obligation. (p. 14)
Here Johnstone invoked the principle of parity to be discussed in the next section.
I want now to shift to the empirical dimension of the problem of the justification of the principle.
The Empirical Dimension of Justification
The empirical dimension of justification emerges from reflection on both the kind of thing an argument is as well as the
history of the practice.
First, arguments are human products; hence, liable one and all to be defective in some respect. As arguers, we commit
recurrent flawssome would call them fallaciessuch as failing to consider relevant evidence distorting the position we
wish to criticize, or engaging in irrelevancies. In Johnson and Blair (1993) the authors wrote: "Rarely is an argument so
good that it cannot profit from criticism and seldom is an argument so bad that

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it cannot be improved by criticism" (p. 43). (In effect, this is a descriptive version of the principle of vulnerability.)
But, it might be responded, although it is generally true that arguments will have defects that criticism will reveal, there
is nothing in principle that would rule out the possibility of a flawless argument that would not be vulnerable to
legitimate criticism. After all, one occasionally hears talk of a flawless performance by a pianist or remember how many
10s Olga Korbut racked up in the 1976 Olympics. So why is the same thing not possible in the realm of argumentation?
What is different about argumentation that would entail this result?
Here, it seems to me, we can, with profit, consider the history of the practice of argumentation. Although some arguers
have sought to render their arguments immune to criticism, none have ever successfully done so. To my knowledge,
there has never been a serious argument put forth by a serious arguer that has not been thought criticizable and in fact
been criticized. Not Plato, not Kant, not Russell, not Marxno philosopher has been in this position with respect to any of
his arguments. None has put forward an argument that has not been subjected to legitimate criticism. Nor did any of
them represent their arguments as invulnerable. If these great dialectical talents in a discipline that especially
emphasizes the practice of argumentation have not been able to to construct conclusive arguments, then it is not likely
that lesser minds will be able to do so.
Let me approach this same point from a different angle. Suppose that there was such an argument, one that was
conclusive and hence invulnerable to criticism. That would certainly be a remarkable achievement. If we did know of
such a specimen (and I take it for granted that we would), then we would certainly call attention to it in our teachings.
We would haul this magnificent piece of reasoning out and say, "Ecce! Behold this perfect specimen." Logic texts
would include it and display it prominently. But no such argument is on display and for good reasonno such argument
exists.
The empirical line of justification thus revolves around what I take to be a fact and that is there are not and have not
been any conclusive arguments. If there were conclusive arguments, then there would be arguments that could rightly be
said to be invulnerable to criticism and vice-versa; if there were arguments that really were invulnerable to legitimate
criticism, they would be conclusive.
Before I present my argument for this telling fact, however, I need to do two things. First, I need to distinguish the claim
I am making here from another to which it might be assimilated. Second, I need to consider an objection that would
undermine this entire line of reasoning.
First, I want to distinguish between my position and the position that there are no conclusive statements. I do not hold
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am not arguing for it here. I believe that there are conclusive statements. Some examples would be statements that
record perceptions, sense datum type statements, and certain analytic truths. I also believe that certain sorts of mundane
statements are conclusive: that is, the Green Bay Packers won the first Super Bowl, beating Oakland 35 to 7 in 1967.
But now there develops the following objection, "What about, for example, those who wish to argue that the Holocaust
never happened? Isn't your view that there are no conclusive arguments just an inducement to such people to take wild
and irresponsible positions and to defend their right to do so by citing the claim that no arguments are conclusive?"14
My response to this objection is two-fold. First, even among those who believe that it is incontrovertible that there was a
Holocaust, it does not follow that the arguments for this assertion are unimpeachable. In other words, it may well be the
case that the conclusion is as true as any empirical statement of fact could be; yet the argument for the claim may well
be a poor argument. And if we take the view (the opposite to the one proposed here) that such arguments are
invulnerable because we happen to believe in the truth of their conclusions, we have taken a position that is at odds with
the practice of argumentation. Second, this objection is no more a problem for my position than it is for any other theory
of argument that takes argumentation to involve something as fundamental as the right to freedom of speech.
Next there is an objection, from Adler, that would undercut this whole empirical line of justification. That objection
hinges on the claim that the connection I have made between being conclusive and being criticizable is a red herring.
Adler argued along the following lines:
Even if an argument is conclusive, that does not mean that it would not be criticizable.
For even if I have produced a conclusive argument (and so may be said to know that the conclusion is true,
given the premises), still it does not follow that I know that I know; and this is what the criticism of the
argument would show. Hence even conclusive arguments are criticizable.
Adler was right to point out that there is a difference between whether an argument is conclusive and whether the arguer
is justified in claiming that it is conclusive. That is, if one holds that there are conclusive arguments, one might well
hold that the arguer cannot know or believe justifiably that this is so until the argument has been tested against
criticisms. I am justified
14 An objection much like this was raised by Tindale in his commentary in an earlier version of this paper,
delivered at the Conference in Argument and Education of Ontario Society for Study of Argumentation, May,
1995. I am grateful to him for this and other helpful criticisms.

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in claiming that my argument is conclusive only when I show how the argument responds to legitimate criticisms.
Hence, it would follow that my approach here is a red herring because the question of whether the argument is
conclusive is irrelevant to whether it is subject to legitimate criticism. The difference between Adler's position and mine
is on the first-order issue of whether there are conclusive arguments; that is, arguments that were not subject to any
legitimate criticism or a criticism that shows that one of the criteria for its being a good argument is not satisfied. He
believed that there are such; I do not.
I proceed now to argue that there are no conclusive arguments.15 Here is how I argue the case: I begin by clarifying
what is meant by a conclusive argument and what is required for an argument to be conclusive. Next, I discharge burden
of proof by arguing that there is good reason to think that no argument has ever satisfied these conditions. Third, I
discuss alleged counterexamples to my claim. Fourth, I argue that the argument has shifted the burden so that the other
side now has the burden of proof.
Requirements for a Conclusive Argument
To begin the discussion of what a conclusive argument would look like, consider the following nominal definition:
DF: A conclusive argument is an argument that conclusively established its conclusion as true on the basis of the
premises offered.
If there were such arguments, then there would be arguments that were invulnerable to legitimate criticism. If there are
not such, or if there is good reason to believe that there is not such, then there is good reason to believe that any
argument will be criticizable and, hence, the attempt to immunize it against such criticism is mistaken or misguided.
By legitimate criticism, I mean reasoned criticism directed at the argument (as distinct from the arguer) and specified in
terms of the normative criteria discussed in chapter 7 (or in terms of some other theory). In other words, simply to
dispute a crucial premise without supporting that with reasons would not, in my view, count as legitimate criticism
because it would fail to satisfy the requirements of rationality and manifest rationality.
What, then, would a conclusive argument look like? Much depends on how we understand the term "argument." At this
point, I need to pause to consider yet another objection that goes this way: There are conclusive arguments; proofs are
conclusive and they are arguments.
15 Siegel suggested that this view is really just fallibilism applied to the realm of argument.

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Proof Contrasted with Argument
My response to this objection is to concede that proofs are conclusive and yet to deny that they are arguments. A proof
and an argument have something in common: both are instruments of rational persuasion. They are different in crucial
respects. To see that, I must ask: What is meant here by a proof?
The term proof is wide-ranging, covering everything from the formidable structures developed by mathematicians to the
proof of age or citizenship that consists in possessing and showing a document of a certain type. There are different
standards of proof, from the mathematical requirement that the conclusion be established as necessary given the
premises to the different standards in criminal and civil law (absence of reasonable doubt vs. preponderance of
evidence) to the somewhat weaker standards implicit in the practice of furnishing a driver's license as proof of age.
Arguments, it has been suggested, similarly range from those that are deductive (in which the conclusion follows
necessarily as in proofs) to those that are inductive to those that are conductive. Arguments, like proofs, aim at rational
persuasion. Thus, it is natural enough to see an analogy between argument and proof.
I assume that the sort of proof at issue in this objection is the sort found in the mathematics. Proof of age is always
defeasible, never conclusive; even in a criminal case where the evidence is overwhelming, there is always the possibility
that the argument will be revised on appeal and so is not conclusive.
If we are looking for conclusive arguments, we can do no better than take the paradigm of mathematical proofs; for
example, the proof that there is no greatest prime number. Here, a proof is a sequence of steps, each of which is either
an axiom (or an otherwise incontestable step) or a valid derivation from previously accepted lines. The issue is whether
such reasoning may properly be cited as an example of a conclusive argument. Indeed, the question I want to ask is: Is a
proof properly termed an argument at all?
Here, again, much depends on one's conception of argument. Of the traditional conception, one might well say that such
sequences are arguments, for the traditional conception of argument is a formalstructural one: An argument is a certain
type of formal structure, consisting of premises leading to a conclusion. There is a striking similarity between proof and
argument in the traditional (formalstructural) sense. The conclusion I draw from this is that this conception of argument
is inadequate because it analogizes proof with argument.
Given the conception of argument offered here, a proof differs from an argument in several important respects. First, a
proof will require axioms that are as clearly specified as rules of inference. But in the realm of argu-

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mentation, there are no axioms to which arguments may appeal. Johnstone (1978) wrote, "Again a mathematical
reduction depends on axioms, but no cogent philosophical argument can do this, since any supposititious axioms
brought into an argument of this kind would be subject to an appropriate doubt" (p. 26).
Second, a proof must be deductive; its conclusion must follow necessarily.16 However, I argued in chapter 3 that
deductivism as a theory of argument is misguided, whether as substantive or methodological. Reasoning need not be
deductive in character in order to qualify as an argument. This is a second difference between an argument and a proof.
Third, a proof establishes its conclusion not just as true but as a necessary truth. About the conclusion of almost no
argument (whether philosophical or mundane) will this be the case.
Last, an argument requires a dialectical tier, whereas no mathematical proof has or needs to have such.
Thus, there are significant differences between argument (whether as traditionally conceived or as discussed here) and
mathematical proofs.17 I conclude that even though mathematical proofs are conclusive, they are not arguments and so
are not conclusive arguments.
This discussion bears on the issue under discussion: When we say that a proof is conclusive, what do we mean? We
mean that everyone recognizes the proof as a proof and as a result, there is no longer any debate about whether the
conclusion is true.18 If asked for a basis why the conclusion is true, people will cite the line of reasoning stated in the
proof to support the claim. Thus, the proof that there is no greatest prime number is conclusive, meaning that anyone
who knows anything about such matters sees that the conclusion must be true and for the reasons given. Moreover, the
proof put an end to anyone's attempting to show that X is the greatest prime number. Arguments do not function the
same way, and so again I conclude that proofs are not arguments.
I turn now to the question of what would constitute a conclusive argument.
The Properties of a Conclusive Argument
To be conclusive, an argument would have to display four properties, three internal and one external. I discuss each in
turn.
16 The proof of the four-color theorem creates a potential problem for this position.
17 Finocchiaro suggested that the difference between an argument and a proof is one of perspective. That is, a
proof is an argument that has been found to have certain properties. I am not sure how to respond to this objection.
18 It is no objection to this line of reasoning to cite, for example, that someone, somewhere, disagrees about its
being a proof. That someone would have to have standing in the appropriate discourse community for their dissent
to matter.

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Internal Properties
In order for an argument to be conclusive, this would be a necessary condition:
(C1) Its premises would have to be unimpeachable or uncriticizable.
It looks obvious enough that (C1) is never going to be satisfied simpliciter. If one takes a fallibilist (or Quinean)
position on such matters, then it is evident straightaway that no argument can be conclusive because no premise can
satisfy (C1).
One possibility here would be to evaluate premises using dialectical criteria, which in turn refers me to context and,
hence, to a particular discourse community. One might claim that although no premise can be unimpeachable
simpliciter, a premise might have this status within a particular discourse community. But for a premise to be
unimpeachable within a particular discourse community, even if it were achievable (which seems unlikely), that would
not confer on that premise the status of being uncriticizable. Someone from outside that community of discourse might
well have a legitimate criticism of the statement (as appears to have happened in the history of science.) It is unlikely,
then, that any argument can satisfy (C1).
The second internal requirement concerns the connection between the premises and the conclusion:
(C2) The connection between the premises and the conclusion would have to be unimpeachablethe strongest possible.
I take it that no inductive argument, and no conductive argument (if there are such), could be conclusive because they
do not meet C2. Each of them is such that the premises could be true and the conclusion false. Hence, no such argument
could be conclusive. To be conclusive, the argument would have to be deductive in character. There is no problem with
satisfying this requirement. But arguments have more than just an illative core, and so any soi-disant conclusive
argument must have what I call a dialectical tier, in which the important objections to and criticisms of that illative core
are dealt with in such fashion as to remove the ground from underneath them. For an argument to be conclusive, then, it
would have to satisfy yet another criterion:
(C3) A conclusive argument is one that can successfully (and rationally) resist every attempt at legitimate criticism.
There are both theoretical and practical problems with regard to satisfying (C3). The theoretical problem is that no
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head off all possible objections and criticisms; some limitation would have to be placed on what is expected, something
like "all significant criticisms and objections." Here is one place where the arguer may be expected to run into difficulty.
He or she may either underestimate or overestimate the force of some position or objection, may fail to anticipate
altogether an important objection, or may not know of some very important criticism. One of the basic reasons that we
put our arguments out for criticism is that we recognize our own limitations in these matters. The practical requirement
is that even if it is supposed that the arguer can identify and respond to all the extant legitimate criticisms, to address
them all in the argument would result in an unduly long and protracted argument. Both of these points raise broader
concerns that I deal with in chapter 11 when I discuss The Specification Problem.
Thus, it appears that no argument can satisfy the internal properties required for a conclusive argument, principally
because of the difficulty of satisfying (C1) but also because of (C3). I now discuss the one external property.
External Property
To be conclusive, the argument would also have to satisfy one external property:
(C4) The argument would be regarded as a conclusive argument.
Here there is an analogy with proof. Part of being a proof is being regarded as a proof. Similarly, part of an argument's
being conclusive would be having people discuss the argument in such terms. "As X's argument conclusively
showed . . . " (I am not saying that no one has ever said such a thing, or that no one has ever claimed that some
argument was conclusive; I am saying that no one who did so was justified in making that claim.) But, as I argued
previously, if there were such an argument, when people were taught about arguments, this argument would be given
them an exemplar or model. It would be celebrated in texts. Everyone would know it by name. But so far as I know,
there is no such argument.
Because no argument has satisfied all these conditions (the internal and external properties for being a conclusive
argument), I conclude that there are no conclusive arguments.
Of course, if someone can produce an example of an argument that satisfies C1C4, then it would follow that there is a
conclusive argument. And it would follow that the argument would be invulnerable to criticism. It might in fact be
criticized, but it could be shown that those criticisms were not warranted.

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Another Objection
Now I can imagine another objection that says: "Suppose someone violates this principle? Then what? Nothing serious
happens, because really no one is going to be impressed by the arguer's attempt to immunize the argument. They will
just proceed to criticize the argument anyway. So it begins to look like this principle is gratuitous."
In response, I would agree that someone who violates this principle is not likely to get away with it. It is not a regulative
principle in the sense that the principle of discrimination is. Rather, this principle is constitutive.19 If someone violates
it, that violation suggests that this person is not really a participant in the practice of argumentation but rather has some
ulterior motive and is engaging the practice in bad faith.
Alleged Counterexamples
I need to take into account here that there are at least apparent conclusive arguments. Let me take a famous example:
Socrates is a man.
All men are mortal.
Therefore Socrates is mortal.
First, let me observe that this does not appear to be the sort of issue that people actually argue about. Second, the
argument lacks any dialectical tier (these two points are connected, of course). So its credentials as an argument are
somewhat suspect. But we know that there are those who do not accept the claim that all men are mortal and so would
crititize one of the premises; we also know that Mill criticized the inference from the premises to the conclusion on the
grounds that it begs the question.
A second sort of example would be trivial arguments, arguments that can satisfy (C1) and (C2), so long as we deal with
rather trivial issues. Thus, the following argument, appropriately contextualized, is sound and, to that degree,
invulnerable to criticism:
If it rains, the ground is wet.
It rains.
The ground is wet.
19 For the distinction between a regulative and a constitutive rule, see Searle (1991).

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I regard these as marginal cases of argument. For one thing, the issue here is scarcely worth arguing over; second, the
argument lacks a dialectical tier. Reasoning such as this seems closer to implication than to argument. In any event,
such specimens are not the sort that we want to make policy over.
A different sort of counterexample is the famous Gettier counterexample to the classical view of knowledge as justified
true belief. One wants to say, "Everyone agrees that this counterexample is indeed a counterexample; so it is conclusive
and so there are conclusive arguments." In response, I want to say that a counterexample is not itself an argument, at
least not in the paradigm sense previously discussed. It has, for example, no dialectical tier. Therefore, it is not a clear
case of an argument. More to the point, I can imagine two things that could impugn the Gettier counterexample. First,
someone finds a significant (but hitherto unknown) flaw in Gettier's reasoning. Second, someone shows how the
justified true belief account can be maintained in the face of the Gettier counterexample. Unless both of these can be
positively ruled out, it seems overly strong to claim that the counterexample is conclusive.
Conclusion
In the preceding section, I have presented my case for the empirical claim that there are no conclusive arguments. The
very least I hope to have accomplished by this argument is to have shifted the burden of proof away from the position
that there are no conclusive arguments and to those who hold that there are. This burden is easily discharged by
producing an argument that meets the requirements set forth here and is therefore conclusive. Two important
consequences ensue. First, it would follow that arguers, because they are rational, will not represent their arguments as
invulnerable to criticism. Every argument is and should be regarded as subject to legitimate criticism. Second, because
there are good arguments, it follows that an argument need not be conclusive in order to be good.
The Principle of Parity
The next principle of criticism I discuss is the principle of parity, which says any legitimate line of reasoning or
argument that one party uses can also be used by the other. If the arguer uses a certain line or mode of argument, the
arguer cannot object if the critic also uses that same line or mode of argument. If the critic uses a certain line of
criticism, then he or she cannot object if the arguer, in responding to the criticism, now also uses that same line of
criticism.20 To put the matter colloquially, what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.
20 Johnstone (1978) discussed a principle something like this that he called bilaterality.

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This principle bears some resemblance to one of the rules for rational discussion developed by van Eemeren and
Grootendorst (1987). In its fullest formulation, it appears as Rule 7, one of the rules for the argumentation stage:
Before the start of the argumentation stage of the discussion the language users who . . . are to assume the
roles of protagonist and antagonist [for me, the arguer and the critic] agree what rules are to govern the
protagonist's defense of his initial point of view, what rules determine whether a protagonist has successfully
defended his point of view and what rules determine whether the antagonist has successfully attacked it; these
rules apply throughout the discussion and may not be questioned by either party during the discussion itself.
(pp. 163164)
This rule is far more general and more demanding than the principle enunciated previously. Indeed, my complaint about
this rule is not that it is idealistic so much as that it is unrealistic and too restrictive. I develop that point in chapter 11.
The Principle of Logical Neutrality21
Statement of the Principle
The principle of logical neutrality might be formulated as: The critic should be clear regarding the nature of the
criticism and should not pass off substantive criticism under the guise of logical criticism. Any argument may warrant
of both kinds of criticism, but the critic must be clear on which is which. Hamblin implicitly appealed to some such
principle as this when he criticized the author of a logic textbook, saying, ''If someone wants to pay lip service to a
principle while making convenient exceptions, at least he should not be allowed to enlist the authority of Logic" (p.
170). Hamblin said that the author has made a substantive criticism but has masked it as a logical one. Such a move
would be a violation of the principle I am discussing here.
Substantive versus Logical Criticism
In principle at least, most argumentation theorists would agree that there is a difference between criticizing the logic of
the argument and criticizing its content. If one adopts the conventional approach to argument as com-
21 In this exposition, I lean heavily on the presentation of this principle found in Johnson and Blair (1993).

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posed of a set of premises plus the inference from the premises to the conclusion, then one would say that the criticism
of the inference is logical criticism, whereas criticism of the premises (in terms of truthfalsity) is substantive criticism.
Because I have already argued against this approach to the structure of argument, my approach to this distinction is
different.
To make this distinction is not to adopt the view that there is a rigid demarcation or precise boundary between
substantive and logical criticism. In some cases, the boundary is not easily drawn, but there are a great many cases
where the difference is clear. For instance, to criticize an argument because one of the premises is problematic is to
make a logical criticism of that argument; to criticize the argument because one of the premises is false is to make a
substantive criticism. Both are perfectly proper criticisms to make. The point is that they are different types of criticism.
Let me work a bit more with the example just mentioned. The claim that a given premise is problematic is a claim about
the logical status of that statement in a specified context (namely within the argument into which it has been
incorporated). To call that premise problematic is to point out that, in this context, it fails to function adequately as a
premise because it ought to have been defended, but was not. In saying, on the other hand, that a premise is false, we are
making a statement, at least sometimes, about its relationship to the world. We are saying that it is not in accord with the
facts. This type of criticism is independent of its occurrence in this or that argument. If the premise is false, it will
presumably be false in any argument.
Consider an example from the ongoing debate about abortion. One might challenge the position of those who favor
abortion on demand by claiming, "Those who support abortion on demand are guilty of bad argumentation because they
hold that the fetus is not a person, but that is false." I would classify this as a substantive criticism. The critic's point is
that the fetus is in fact a person. The critic and the arguer have a substantive disagreement about the status of the fetus.
On the other hand, to claim, "Those who support abortion on demand are guilty of bad argumentation because they have
not defended the claim that the fetus is not a person, and they should" is to make a logical criticism. The critic's point is
that the arguer has put into play a premise that has not been defended and in the present context should have been
defended. This is a logical point.
Origin of the Principle
The distinction between the two forms of criticism is implicit already in FDL, where it would be marked by observing
that criticizing an argument for being invalid was a formal and logical criticism; criticizing a premise for

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being false is a material and substantive criticism. (See Church, 1956.) The first explicit mention of this principle so
titled is found in Fogelin (1983). The first appearance of this principle in a logic textbook is in Johnson and Blair (1983).
Justification of the Principle
The justification for this principle emerges from consideration of the requirement of manifest rationality. The critic who
violates this principle is in effect saying: Logic favors my position. Yet it is clear that logic does not favor either side in
any debate (except perhaps some debates within logic). Logic deals with the criteria that make an argument a good
argument; the application of those criteria to a specific argument in such fashion as to render a judgment is the work of
the arguer. On the issue of which position is the stronger, the pro-choice or the pro-life, logic does not decide. Logic
itself is neutral with respect to the substantive issues. Hence, the attempt to make it appear that logic favors one side
violates the requirement of manifest rationality.
There is one complication that needs to be addressed. Given that logic grows out of and is dependent on the practice of
argumentation, and given that the practice of argumentation itself is dependent on certain values and views about the
world and our ways of behaving within it, there is a sense in which logic cannot be completely neutral in terms of
worldviews. Logic must, in some sense, favor a worldview in which rationality and the freedom to inquire are valued.
This is not such a limitation as one might think at first glance because anyone who engages in the practice of
argumentation may be supposed to support these values. That does not mean that they will agree on the nature of these
values. For example, it is notoriously true that the nature of rationality is the subject of much dispute. In the adjudication
of all such disputes, logic itself will be neutral.
One other complication also needs to be addressed. The previous principle finds its most natural articulation in terms of
the standard approach to arguments as composed of premises plus an inference from the premises to the conclusion. In
this approach, criticism of the inferences is logical; criticism of the premises is extralogical (or substantive).
I have argued that this way of looking at arguments should be discarded. How, then, am I to mark the distinction
between logical criticism and substantive criticism? In my view, substantive criticism occurs when the critic challenges
the relationship between the premises and the world; otherwise, if the critic focuses on the relationship to the audience
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The principle of logical neutrality applies chiefly to the role of the critic. The next principle I discuss also is one that
applies to the critic.
The Principle of Discrimination
The next principle I discuss is a fundamental (but thus far neglected) principle of logical criticism. That this principle is
neglected is apparent if I look at the existing theories of criticism and at the practice of criticism as it is exemplified in
logic texts and elsewhere.
A careful review of the various theories of appraisal reveals that most of them are geared to evaluation rather than
criticism. To accommodate Adequacy Condition 4, a theory must have more possibilities in its evaluative range than
just good and not good (bad). My theory of appraisal must allow the user to situate arguments within a spectrum:
arguments can be very strong, strong, moderately strong, weak, or poor (whatever evaluative terms one selects). By
probing for, locating, and then discussing its strengths and weaknesses, the critic locates the argument in that spectrum.
Thus, a viable theory of criticism must make this kind of ranking possible. No normative theory that I am aware of
contains any such provision.
Typical presentations of argumentation theory rarely mention the need to order the criticisms that have been
produced.22 That is to say, there is barely any acknowledgment of the principle of discrimination. In many texts, the
student is encouraged to critique an argument by locating fallaciesor other mistakes. Particularly in longer, more
complex arguments where there may be more than one potential problem, of the logic texts I have reviewed that
included Kahane (1992), Govier (1993), Freeman (1988), Groarke, Tindale, and Little (1991), Copi (1986), and Parker
and Moore (1992)only oneGroarke et al.gives the slightest recognition of the need for integration in the practice of
criticism. After a critique of the argument they are considering, they wrote, "Pulling together the strands of this
analysis . . . " (p. 217). More typical is Freeman (1988), who after discussing a variety of flaws in the example he was
treating, said, "in light of all this we do not have much of a case for the conclusion" (p. 304). Were I the arguer whose
argument had been so discussed, I would say, ''It would be helpful to me if you were to focus your complaints and
invest them with some order or perspective."
The practice of argument criticism as it is discussed in texts thus reveals a general failure to require the critic to
prioritize the criticisms. In my view, discrimination is a hallmark of strong criticism, and the principle I articulate and
justify in this section makes it evident that this is the sort of criticism that belongs to the practice of argumentation.
22 The only text where I found explicit mention of this principle was Johnson and Blair (1983).

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The Origin of the Principle
The first explicit awareness of this principle that I can find in the literature is found in Scriven (1976). Though he
discussed it under the rubric of the principle of charity, there is little doubt that Scriven had the essential idea when he
distinguished between strong and weak criticism:
Roughly speaking, the difference is that a weak criticism is one that can be refuted by rather modest changes
in the argument. . . . By contrast a strong criticism is one that gets to the heart of the argument, hits it in a way
that can't be avoided without giving up the main thrust of the argument, rests on indubitable interpretations
and highly like claims, and so on. (p. 72)
Let's focus on the type of criticism that is desirable, that is, well-supported and incisive criticism. To use other
terms, we want to be careful to produce criticism that "goes to the heart of the argument" and that succeeds in
showing that it failed there, not in some peripheral way. (p. 73)
In short, Scriven said that the critic should practice strong criticism.
The philosopher who baptized the principle as the principle of discrimination (and thereby differentiated it from the
principle of charity) is Binkley.23 Its first occurrence in a logic text, formulated as an explicit principle of criticism, in
the second edition of Johnson and Blair (1983), "The basic idea of "discrimination" can be put roughly as follows: in
criticizing an argument, you should strive to get to the heart of the matter" (p. 214). Here, the principle is simply
introduced by a rough characterization. An explicit and precise formulation is not attempted, nor is much consideration
of the need for a thorough justificationa task that will be the focal point of this chapter.
The Principle Articulated and Clarified
Building on the work of Scriven and Binkley, I propose this formulation of the principle of discrimination:
When criticizing an argument, the critic should practice discrimination; that is, should display balance (that is,
assess both the strengths and the weaknesses of the argument), perspective, (in discussing the problems, the
critic should focus on the most important problems), and integration (i.e., so structure the critique as to give
greatest emphasis to those criticisms which are major).24
23 The first occurrence is in what Binkley called The London Close Reasoner.
24 This formulation I am aware of first appears in Johnson (1992).

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In effect, the principle of discrimination says that the critic should practice strong criticism. That means keeping the
focus on the serious flaws in the argument and avoiding the most common pitfalls:
nit-pickingthat is, going after small points while neglecting more important ones;
fault-findinglooking only at what is wrong rather than also what is right; and
shotgunning the argumentthrowing down as many criticisms as possible in the hope that one or more will strike the
target. This is more to be found in student critiques, although it will often be encountered when there is a strong
ideological gulf between the arguer and the critic.
Note that this principle is independent of any specific theory of evaluation. I am working through it here using the
theory of evaluation that I associate with informal logic, but nothing in its formulation prevents its being used in
conjunction with other theories.
The Principle Justified
Suppose we look at an argument from a logical point of view and ask why one should embrace the principle of
discrimination. Here everything depends on what is meant by the logical point of view. If the logic in question is formal
logic, then it will not be possible to develop any justification because, from the standpoint of formal logic, an
argumentinference is either valid or it is not, and there does not appear to be any basis for rating one kind of invalidity
as better or worse than any other. Hence, from the vantage point of formal logic, there is no need for discrimination and
no point in adopting a principle that enjoins it.
If, on the other hand, we consider the problem from the perspective of informal logic, its richer (fortified) conception of
argument as outlined in chapter 6, and the distinction between evaluation and criticism outlined earlier in this chapter,
then the argument being developed in this book would mean that the requisite justification should be developed by
reflecting on the practice of argumentation. To justify the principle of discrimination, we must raise the question, How
and why does criticism enter into the practice of argumentation?
In answering this, let me refer back to our earlier discussion of purposes of the practice of argumentation. The primary
purpose from our perspective is that of rational persuasion. The arguer constructed the argument to show that the
conclusion was rationally defensible. Because the arguer is rational, he or she is aware that there may well be defects in
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now show that it is in the arguer's best interest to become aware of such defects and if we grant that strong criticism is
more likely to achieve that than weak criticism, we will have the requisite justification for the principle.
To see why it is in the arguer's best interest to become aware of potential defects in the argument, we must remind
ourselves that the arguer has put forth the argument to get to the truth of the matter (or some other telos), not simply in
order to silence an opponent, to appear smarter, or to win. Had the arguer merely wanted to convince, he or she could
have engaged any of various other, more effective methods: flattery, psychological strategies, deceit, power plays, and
so forth. If the arguer is interested in the argument as an instrument for arriving at the truth, then he or she has a vested
interest in becoming aware of any and all serious deficiencies in the argument so that they may, if possible, be repaired.
On the other side of the dialectical fence, the critic realizes that the point of the criticism is not to devastate the opponent
nor the argument. That would be true if this were some other kind of practicedebating, perhaps, or some other form of
contest in which winning is the point. But such is not the telos that I have assigned to the practice of argumentation. The
critic's obligation is to provide the best; that is, the strongest criticism. Why is this? Because strong criticism that gets at
the core problems in the argument will be the one most likely to advance the dialectic.
In this way, the interests of the arguer and the critic converge around strong criticism that most serves the cause of
manifest rationality. How so? Because if the arguer receives strong criticism, both parties will be better off, and it will
be apparent to both that they are. No result could better serve the requirements of manifest rationality.
But now we must show that this is the case. If we can, it will make it clear that one reason argumentation is such a
powerful practice is that if each party does its very best, then both sides will gain as a result of the process. (In this
respect, it resembles negotiations where each party wins, at least in the ideal order.) If the arguer receives strong
criticism, then he or she must inevitably gain. If the criticism exposes a real defect in the argument, then that defect can
either be remedied, in which case the argument is now a stronger and more rational product; or else the arguer must find
a new argument, in which case a poor line of reasoning has been retired and the interests of rationality have been
served; or else the arguer may have to give up the position, in which case, again, the interests of rationality have been
served. If the argument is able to withstand the criticism, then its value as a rational product has been further confirmed.
It has been tested. Prospects for rationality are improved. The same result appears if I now review the situation from the
point of view of the critic. If it turns out that criticism is easily responded to, then the critic has learned something. If the
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turns out to be a strong one, then this paves the way for a dialectical step forward. Thus, whatever the outcome, the
interests of rationality will have been served.
Suppose, instead, that the arguer does not receive strong criticism. Suppose the critic engages in nitpicking; that is,
pursuing small points as though they were major problems. There is a chance that the arguer might succumb to the
temptation to pursue these tangents, thereby getting bogged down and retarding rather than advancing the dialectic. In
this event, one of the purposes of the practiceto increase chances of getting at the truth, to increase and exhibit
rationalityis jeopardized, as the real weaknesses of the argument are lost in the shuffle. To be sure, this kind of thing
will happen from time to time, even when the critic advances strong criticism. Practices can continue even when the
conditions on which they are premised are not always satisfied. Still, the proper functioning of the practice depends on
the critic doing the job properly, which means with criticism that is discriminating. It comes down to the realization that
strong criticism is what best serves the practice of argumentation, the interests of rationality, and the requirements of
manifest rationality. This, then, is the logico-pragmatic justification for principle of discrimination.
The Principle Deployed
The principle of discrimination enjoins the critic to practice strong criticism. What counts as strong criticism? Following
Scriven, I take the position that the strength of the criticism is directly proportional to its effect on the argument. A
criticism is weak if, with minimal adjustment to the argument, it can be rendered impervious to that criticism; in other
words, a weak criticism is one that can be superseded by making minor changes in the argument. A strong criticism is
one that, because it goes to the heart of the matter, will force the arguer to make extensive adjustments and changes or,
perhaps, in the extreme situation, abandon that line of argument altogether.25
Objections and Problems
In this section, I want to take account of some possible (and actual) objections to and criticisms of the principle I have
proposed.
25 Strong criticism gets at the core of the problem if there is a problem. This is what Scriven (1976) was
driving at when he wrote:
Attack with your strongest weapons first; do not start by making picky points, following the order of the
statements in the original. Start in on the key weaknesses; start with your strongest criticism. Strong criticisms
are those that could not be met except by extreme modification or complete capitulation. (p. 72)

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Objection #1. There is the objection that might be phrased as, "In your articulation, the principle of discrimination says:
'Lead with your best punch.' But why? Why should we begin critique with the most important criticisms?"
Response. To answer this question, we need remind ourselves of the intimate connection between argument and
criticism. In argumentation, in the putting forth and critiquing of argument, the process of criticism is an internal one.
The argument will likely be revised in light of criticism. Criticism here has the potential to loop back and affect the
argument.26 Therefore, it is important that criticism be done well. And one way to get the arguer to focus in thinking
about possible revisions is to start with the most serious criticisms. If the arguer cannot handle these, it will not matter
all that much if he or she can handle the weaker criticisms.
In other words, if the strength of the argument is a function of its capacity to handle strong criticism, then it seems more
in keeping with the spirit of rationality and manifest rationality to begin the process of criticism by focusing on the
serious issues.
Objection #2. Why not save the best for last?
There is another kind of objection (due to Hansen, private correspondence) that says, "But also there is a value to
starting with small criticisms because these will create a better climate of respect. Then you can hit the arguer with your
strongest punch."
Response. The latter point has more to do with the rhetoric and the psychology of the practice of criticism. I am
speaking of an idealization when I speak of the practice, in which the two parties are in some important sense beyond
ego, in which the climate of respect is already there. Indeed if there is not proper respect for the Other from the outset,
then I do not see how it can be said that the two are really engaged in the practice.
It seems more in keeping with the conduct of criticism in an openly rational manner that the critic start with the major
points. The idea of holding back the strongest criticism so that you can then "hit the arguer with your strongest punch"
seems more appropriate in other contexts where winning is the goal.
Objection #3. Some have said that in requiring the arguer lead with strong criticism, the demand is too much, for it is
not always possible to say in advance what will have a major impact on the argument and what will have only a minor
impact. Hansen (personal communication) invoked an indeterminacy thesis: "Discrimination is indeterminate and
unpredictable,
26 My late colleague, Prof Stuart Surlin, referred to this aspect of logic as "loopy logic."

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and not open to systematic treatment," and so, "It is impossible to predict beforehand the ease with which any criticism
can be refuted, and hence impossible to decide beforehandin any system of logicwhich criticisms are more and less
serious."
Response. There are cases where the impact of the criticism will be clear, especially if one has understood the structure
of the argument and so knows where the crucial parts are.
It seems to me that, at least in our own minds if not in fact, we can distinguish between criticisms that go to the heart of
the matter and those that are tangential or peripheral. A critic will often preface a criticism by saying, "I know this is not
a core issue but . . . " or, "At the risk of seeming to pick nits, I want to say . . . " thereby indicating that the criticism that
follows is not strong.
Hansen's claim that it cannot be decided beforehandin any system of logicwhich criticisms are more and which are less
serious still wants some showing. Even if the criticisms cannot be generated systematically, that does not mean that
some order cannot be put into them.
Hansen was right that it cannot always be known beforehand what the impact of the criticism will be on the arguer.
What one may regard as a small point may have a major impact on the arguer; and what one may regard as serious, the
arguer may just fluff off. But one must distinguish between the effect of the criticism on the argument and its effect on
the arguer. Hansen's indeterminacy thesis seems more appropriate with respect to the arguer than with respect to the
argument.
In any event, in light of this objection and its validity, the principle needs an epistemic modifier: The critic should give
prominence to those criticisms that, in his or her view, are the strongest.
Objection #4. This objection (due to Hansen) is a variation of one posed earlier and goes like this: "The principle of
discrimination seems to presuppose perfect understanding of an argument since one has to understand the argument
totally in order to decide where the major and minor problems lie. In practice argument interpretation and criticism
seem to be hard to separate. One begins where one can in the hope of understanding the Other better and this may well
be by what is in effect nitpicking."
Response. I do not think the principle of discrimination requires perfect understanding of the argument. The critic may
not get the argument right, and the arguer may point this out in his response to the criticism. But certainly the critic has
to attempt to get the structure right and has to know what is crucial and what is peripheral if he or she is to get to the
heart of the matter. Nothing precludes a critic's being tentative in criticism. We often

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see the criticism prefaced by a cautionary remark like, "I'm not sure I understand how this argument is supposed to
work. Nevertheless, let me proceed along the lines of the following interpretation, and so forth."
As to the view that nitpicking may well be the place to start one's critical effort, nothing in the principle of
discrimination prohibits the critic from beginning by picking a nit or two. All that is prohibited is that one should, as it
were, write one's final draft that way. In other words, the practice of criticism, no less than the argument it criticizes, is
part of a process and the critic will probably have to go through several iterations before producing the critique that goes
to the arguer. One can begin anywhere one wishes in order to gain a toehold; what is required is that in the end there is
discrimination.
The Principle Revised
In light of these criticisms I now propose the following revised version of the principle:
When criticizing an argument, the critic should practice discrimination; that is, should focus the critique on
what he or she takes to be the major or most important criticisms and should so structure the critique as to
give greatest emphasis to those criticisms that reveal what the critic takes to be the major problems with the
argument.
With this revision, I conclude my treatment of the principle of discrimination and the four principles of criticism.
Responding to Criticism
Confronted with a legitimate criticism of an argument, the arguer may respond in any of various ways. The arguer may:
1. argue that the challenge or criticism is inappropriate;
2. acknowledge the force of the criticism and revise the argument accordingly;
3. acknowledge the force of the criticism and indicate how the argument can survive it;
4. acknowledge the force of the criticism and discard the argument;
5. ask for time to reflect on the challenge.
All of these seem to be appropriate responses to criticism. There are others. Contrast the repertoire of moves with those
that subvert the process. That happens when the arguer:

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6. attacks (usually personally) the person making the criticism;
7. refuses to admit the possibility of criticism;
8. simply ignores the criticism;
9. admits the criticism but pays lip service to any modification of the argument;
10. clings tenaciously to the argument.
These are all familiar moves. Six is the ad hominem response. Seven constitutes a violation of the principle of
vulnerability. Peirce (1955) identified ten as the method of tenacity.
Concluding Reflections on Criticism
Criticism is the dialectical moment par excellence. The arguer has prepared the argument and has put it out for the
world (the audience) to behold. This is a difficult moment because a part of the arguer is reluctant to do this. What the
arguer wants most (appreciation and recognition of the strength and the worth of his product) is almost exactly what
cannot happen.
The benefits of criticismespecially strong criticismare too well known to be recited in detail here. Wittgenstein (1953)
wrote, "I am grateful to the criticism practiced on my ideas by P. Sraffa." I also know how crucial were the criticisms of
Ramsey in the development of his later philosophy. Or again, consider Nietzsche. The spirit behind what I am calling
strong criticism is reflected in this remark by Nietzsche (1969), "The strength of those who attack can be measured in a
way by the opposition they require: every growth is indicated by the search for a mighty opponentor problem." When
one looks behind the martial tone here, what Nietzsche seemed to say is that strong arguers demand strong critics and
strong criticism, for they recognize that both are vital to their growth.
The purpose of this chapter was to introduce and discuss the basic principles of argument criticismthe principle of
vulnerability and the principle of discrimination, and to discuss more briefly two other principles: the principle of
logical neutrality, the principle of parity. No claim has been made or intended about the completeness of this set of
principles. My claim is that a full-scale and explicit discussion of principles of argument criticism (as distinguished
from criteria of evalution) has hitherto been lacking and is much needed if we are to have better and better theories of
argumentation. The elaboration of real principles is intended as a contribution to that end.

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PART III
MATTERS DIALECTICAL

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Chapter 9
Criticisms, Objections, and Replies
In Part I, I discussed the theory of argument as an inquiry and made the case that it was in need of improvement and that
logic, specifically informal logic, could help. In Part II, I presented a theory of argument that derives from the informal
logic tradition. I developed specific suggestions for the theory of analysis, where I argued for a revised conception of
argument and understanding argumentation as manifest rationality. In chapters 7 and 8, I developed specific suggestions
for the theory of appraisal. I argued for a specific theory of evaluation and also for a distinction between evaluation and
criticism. I also presented some principles of criticism. Thus, Part II was in effect an argument that informal logic could
provide the foundation for a viable theory of argument.
Now, according to the dictates of my own theory, I must discharge my dialectical obligations by dealing with objections
to and criticisms of this approach. That is the purpose of this chapter. The objections and criticisms I consider are
directed not so much at the specifics of my theory as to its general character as informal logic.
Behind each of the objections I have chosen stands an opportunity to clarify the relationship of informal logic (as I have
presented it here) to some other inquiry. Thus, the objection that informal logic is really just formal logic requires
clarification of the relationship between informal and formal logic. The objection that informal logic is really just
rhetoric asks for clarification of the relationship between informal logic and rhetoric. The objection that informal logic
is really just applied epistemology requires clarification of its relationship to that inquiry; and, finally, the objection that
informal logic is sexist provides an opportunity to clarify the relationship between informal logic and psychology.

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The first objection that I deal with, however, is none of these but is rather the peremptory challenge: There really is no
such thing as informal logic.
Informal LogicAn Oxymoron
Various authors have made the objection that there really is no such thing as informal logic. I call this The Peremptory
Challenge. There are actually two versions of this objection:
(O1) There is not yet anything that could be called informal logic.
This could be termed the weak thesis.
(O2) There cannot be such a thing as informal logic.
This could be termed the strong thesis.
Both forms of the thesis depend strongly on what the objector takes informal logic to be. My response is that neither
version of this objection is successful when directed at informal logic as developed here.
I review several different formulations of this objection: first from Goldman, then from Massey, then Woods, and
finally Hintikka.
Goldman's Objection
Here is Goldman's (1986) way of putting this objection:
It is widely assumed that logic deals with principles of good reasoning. Logic is often characterized as the art
of reasoning. Unfortunately, such a billing is a bit of a sham. It isn't that logic courses are not useful for good
reasoning; it's just that there are no well-established principles of good reasoning (good cognitive state
transitions), and no satisfactory theory of how good reasoning is related to formal logic. In short, there is not a
really well-established discipline of informal logic. (p. 82)
Because Goldman stopped short of a definitive statement that there is no such thing but rather said that it is not really
well-established, I take him to be defending the weak thesis here.1 By ''informal logic," Goldman understood something
quite different, something much broader, than I am discussing here. What he called informal logic would develop
principles of good rea-
1 This view represents a slight shift in Goldman's thinking, because he had written: "The term 'logic' is also
used to refer to a subject called 'informal logic' often taught to introductory philosophy students.
Unfortunately, there are no established truths of informal logic; indeed, it is quite unclear what the content of
informal logic is or should be" (1985, p. 65).

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soning (conceived as cognitive state transitions) and would also clarify the relationship between good reasoning and
formal logic.
I have no disagreement with Goldman on the importance of these tasks. The difference between us is that I see the task
of developing principles of good reasoning as the generic task of logicnot of informal logic specificallyand the task of
clarifying the relationship between good reasoning and formal logic as the task of the theory of reasoning.
Whether there is such an inquiry as informal logic depends in part of what I take informal to mean and what I take logic
to mean. As I showed in chapter 5, there are a number of possible interpretations of informal logic. I attempted to set
forth my own conception and distinguish it from the familiar Rylean conception. I showed that there is a potential for
misunderstanding and ambiguity because of the ambiguity of the term "informal." The conception presented there was
an informal2 logicthat is, a logic that did not rely on the notions of validity and logical form. But a logic that is
informal2 is not necessarily informal3. In any event, Goldman was certainly right if I take him to be commenting on the
current status of informal logic, which is radically underdeveloped and so not well-established as a discipline.
Massey's Objection
Massey (1981) presented a different kind of argument against informal logic. There, Massey raised three objections
against so-called informal logic textbooks. First, he said, they are preoccupied with taxonomy. Second, they are
malnourished theoretically; and, third, they are directionless and exhibit shoddy thinking. I do not think these charges
can be sustained, but that is not the issue I want to pursue here.2
At the theoretical level, Massey's argument against informal logic develops out of the claim that there cannot be a
theory of invalidity; but a theory of fallacy requires a theory of invalidity because a fallacy is an argument that appears
to be valid although it is invalid. Hence, there can be no theory of fallacy and consequently (assuming again that
informal logic and fallacy are interdependent), there can be no theory of informal logic.
There are problems with this line of reasoning. The first is that informal logic as an inquiry is not dependent on fallacy
theory. If the theory of evaluation presented in chapter 7 is viable, then it follows that there can be a theory of
evaluation that is not dependent on fallacy theory. The second problem with Massey's critique is that he took over
Hamblin's conception of fallacy. This adoption is understandable, given the widespread impact of Hamblin's definition.
However, I have defended a conception of fallacy that
2 I will not here respond to these claims, having done so in Johnson (1989).

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does not invoke the notion of invalidity (Johnson, 1989). So even if there is no theory of invalidity (and not everyone
will concede to Massey this point: See MacKay, 1984), that does not preclude there being a theory of fallacy in the
sense in which I have been using that term. Hence I disagree with Massey's claim that there cannot be any theory of
fallacy (and, to that degree, no such thing as informal logic).
Woods' Objection
Woods (1995) developed an argument that shows the formidable obstacles formal logic faces in coming to grips with
arguments in natural language. His argument claims to show that informal logic is in even worse shape. In fact, Woods
claimed there cannot be such a thing as informal logic. I take Woods to have been upholding the strong thesis.
The important question here is how Woods understood informal logic. He said that informal logic could mean two
things. It might be taken to refer to the study of the informal fallacies; that is, those other than denying the consequent.
But, as Woods was at pains to show, such an approach to defining informal logic fails because there is no way to
distinguish between formal and informal fallacies. Hence, on this understanding, informal logic reduces to formal logic
and its problematic status.
Or we might understand informal logic as that logic that presides over the task of the reconstruction of English language
arguments in propositional calculus (PC) and the need for the argument to be dressed before reconstruction. About this
dressing theory, Woods said:
The dressing theory, thus, must be a logic of implication and consistency for simple sentences of English.
Since those sentences are inputs to the dressing theorem the logic will have to make do without logical forms,
which are the output of reconstruction. This will be an informal logic, if anything is. But, denied the fulcrum
of logical forms, it is greatly to be doubted whether this logic will be able to produce general proof
procedures. (pp. 191192)
Here, by "informal logic," Woods understood a theory that converts simple statements of ordinary language into the
notation of PC. Such a theory would be a logic of implication and consistency without recourse to logical form. The
description here suggests what I have been calling an informal3 logic because the logic described can make no use of
logical form. It may be that Woods was right about the nonexistence of this logic, which is, however, quite far removed
from what most informal logicians (Govier, Walton) have understood informal logic to be.
Woods proceeded to argue that such a logic would not be a logic at all. He said, "no theory is a logic if it lacks proof
procedures" (p. 192). Notice

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that such a claim would appear to exclude most of the Organon (all but the Prior Analytics) from the realm of logic. It
would rule out inductive logic, abductive logic, what Scriven called probative logic, and indeed everything but the
highly mathematicized logistic theories of the 20th century. Thus, the question now becomes not so much what is
informal logic but what is logic?
If we understand logic, generally, as the normative theory of reasoning, it seems overly limiting to require proof
procedures. To be sure, proof procedures have come to be part of what is identified as logic in the wake of its strong
identification with the problematics of set theory and the foundations of mathematics. But that identification is a
historical matter. In the beginning, logic did not require proof procedures, although it included them (Aristotle's Prior
Analytics). I am not arguing that what logic was at its inception, it must always be. Woods and others are free to insist
that the most current conceptualizations are the most appropriate ones. The point here is that Woods' way of stating the
objection seems to depend on a particular conception of logic. The issue thus shifts to whether that sense of logic is
defensible. And that is not an issue that I can pursue here.
Hintikka's Objection
One of the strongest formulations of the peremptory objection I am considering is due to Hintikka (1989), for not only
was Hintikka involved in a reconceptualization of deductive logic and its role in argumentation, but he had, rightly I
believe, located this task within the framework of the theory of argumentation and reasoning. He wrote, "I shall outline
a solution to the problem of the relation of deductive logic to the theory of reasoning and argumentation in general" (p.
8). More on his proposed solution shortly.
Hintikka began from the claim that "the main currently unsolved problem in the theory of argumentation concerns the
function of logic in argumentation and reasoning" (p. 3). The traditional view simply identified logic with the theory of
reasoning and, hence, this view will inherit any defects that cloud our conception of logic.
The context for Hintikka's intervention is the dissatisfaction that has been expressed about the limitations of traditional
deductive logic. Such complaints have led some to look to rhetoric for leads in the theory of argumentation. Although
he did not say so explicitly, Hintikka took a dim view of that approach. Nor was he sanguine about those who pin their
hopes on informal logic:
This problem is an especially burning one on the pedagogical level. Philosophers assigned to teach
introductory courses in formal logic have often been dissatisfied with the educational value of what they have
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students. As a consequence not only has a plethora of courses in "reasoning and critical thinking" or
"argumentation theory" sprung up, but there even exists an organized "informal logic" movement dedicated to
developing a theory and practice of informal argumentation.
Unfortunately, there exists by any reasonable standard no respectable theory of informal argumentation. It
serves no constructive purpose to argue in detail for such a judgement here. If your intellectual tastes are such
that you are satisfied with the theoretical level of traditional rhetorical theories or of so-called theories of
informal reasoning, I am not going to be able to re-educate you in half-an-hour. (p. 4)
Elsewhere in the article, Hintikka said that, "the very term 'informal logic' is a solecism" (p. 13) and later still, Hintikka
claimed that we should not try to replace formal logic by "some mythical 'informal logic'" (p. 20). Nor is Hintikka
optimistic about the possibilities of Harman's (1986) approach, which sees reasoning as a belief change in the presence
of new evidence. The trouble with this approach is that although it may have heuristic value, it lacks anything like an
adequately developed theory.
Having dismissed rhetoric, informal logic and Harman-type approaches as ways of shoring up the defects of traditional
deductive logic (the defect being that it makes no real contribution to the theory of argumentation), Hintikka found the
approach he was seeking in the game theory. What needs clarification, according to Hintikka, is the notion of rules of
inference and the idea that logic is about the formulation of such rules.
Hintikka introduced an important distinctioncrucial for his positionbetween definitory rules and strategic rules and notes
that strategic rules have been ignored in deductive logica hint that, for Hintikka:
(H1) logic = deductive logic.
In fact, I suspect that, for Hintikka:
(H2) logic = formal deductive logic.
Hintikka compared the situation of logical theory today with that of ethical theory in the Victorian area, which allowed
itself to become focused on the question of how to avoid losing one's virtue. Logic has focused on how to avoid making
mistakes in drawing inferences. But this approach is unsatisfying if what we want are optimal strategies for inference, or
argumentation, or both? Or are they, in Hintikka's view, the same? More on this important point later. Continuing with
Hintikka:
Furthermore, the rules of inference, be they formal rules of deductive inference or rules for "inference to the
best explanation," cannot be the proper tools

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for studying skillful inferences. For skill in reasoning is a matter of strategy (and tactics). (p. 7)
The problem with deductive logic, as traditionally constituted, is that is does not help make skillful inferences. But that
does not mean that it cannot do so; in fact, when relocated within the interrogative model, it turns out that deductive
logic will have an important contribution to make. In any event, from this text, we may perhaps infer that, for Hintikka:
(H3) reasoning = inferring.
This hunch is somewhat supported when Hintikka distinguished between corollarial and thematic inferencea distinction
he took over from Peirce, who used the terms "corollarial" and "theorematic" reasoning.
To further complicate matters, there are clear indications that Hintikka believed inference and argumentation to be
pretty much the same thing; which suggests:
(H4) inference = argumentation.
In the text that follows, Hintikka said:
Indeed, if philosophers had been interested in matters of deductive strategy and tactics, they would have every
reason to welcome Peirce's distinction. For even though it deals in the first place with particular steps of
argument, it shows which kind of deductive inference can, and which ones cannot open the door for further
argumentative possibilities. The basic intuitive idea is almost ridiculously simple. In a sense that can be made
precise, theorematic inferences are the ones which introduce a new individual into the argument, whereas
corollarial inferences merely traffic in the individuals which have already been considered in their premises.
From this intuitive description, it is seen at once how theorematic inferences can open new lines of thought for
one's argumentation. . . . (pp. 78, emphasis added)
Even when theorematic deductive arguments are considered in logic texts . . . (p. 8)
From these passages, it is reasonable to infer that Hintikka is thinking of the inference chains so typical of deductive
logic texts. Thus, I may also suspect that for Hintikka:
(H5) inference = deductive inference.
In the intervening sections of the paper (615) which I cannot discuss here in detail, Hintikka advanced his own proposal.
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the model and its implications for the relative importance of the deductive and interrogative moves, Hintikka turned to a
vindication of Sherlock Holmes' sense of logic. He wrote, "These simple observations open an extremely important
perspective in the role of logic and of the rules of logic in the general theory of reasoning." (p. 17) After further
discussion of the respective roles of deduction and interrogation, and the issue of simplifying extra premises, Hintikka
defended his idea of deductive logic as a general theory of reasoning strategies:
Here, then, we have the answer to the question concerning the role of logic in argumentation. Assuming, as I
have done, that the interrogative model is a realistic representation of reasoning in general, we can see that
logic plays only a modest supporting role in the total drama of reasoningon the level of particular steps of
inquiry, i.e., on the level of definitory rules. When it comes to questions of strategy, however, logic suddenly
assumes a new function. It is as if a supporting actor were at the same time the director of the entire play. On
the strategic level, the principles of deductive strategy selection are a major part of the principles of strategy in
the entire process of reasoning. (p. 20)
Thus, logic as refurbished by the interrogative model assumes fundamental importance in line with a theory of
reasoning. What is less clear is how this reconstituted logic does any better than its predecessor in contributing to the
theory of argumentation.
Critique of Hintikka
Hintikka shared with informal logicians skepticism about formal logic. Both saw it as a far more limited theory than
many of its proponents have thought. But after this, they parted company. Hintikka urged an interrogative model,
whereas informal logicians saw the important move as in the direction of everyday or mundane argumentation. It is
clear from my description of Hintikka's position that between what informal logicians thought of as argument and what
Hintikka thought of as argument, there is a considerable gulf.
His dismissal of informal logic as a solecism was not accompanied by any detailed discussion of either what informal
logic is in general nor of problems with specific initiatives.3 Nevertheless, Hintikka was correct in his assessment of the
theoretical underdevelopment of informal logic at this point, and I turn to a discussion of that next. A further problem is
that he
3 Hintikka later returned to this theme. He called it "mythical."

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seemed to treat as unproblematic the notions of argumentation and inference, which leads me to a more important point.
Hintikka's position on the role of logic involves five assumptions, each of which is disputable. For example, in chapter
3, I argued that there is ample reason for questioning (H2). I have argued explicitly against (H4) in chapter 6 and (H5).
(H3) is an issue for the theory of reasoning, as indeed are all of these questions, to some degree. Hintikka seemed to
think that reasoning, argumentation, inquiryall of these can be successfully represented in terms of deductive inference.
I want to challenge that assumption. If I reason from a sample to a population, I am reasoning, but this is not a deductive
inference. If I am giving an explanation, I am reasoning, but it is highly doubtful that all explanation can be successfully
represented as deductive. Certainly, scientific theorizing is a very sophisticated form of reasoning but it is questionable
whether it can be represented deductively. (See Grunbaum & Salmon, 1988.)
From my perspective, the most important consequence of Hintikka's challenge is to draw attention to the importance of
the theory of reasoning, for the issues he raised depend strongly on how one conceives of reasoning. In that respect,
Hintikka's position supports one of the fundamental themes in this book: viz., that the theory of argumentation requires
completion by the development of a theory of reasoning.
Conclusion
I have reviewed several expressions of the peremptory challenge. That objection typically depends either on a dogmatic
view about the nature of formal logic, an ill-conceived view of the nature of informal logic, or both. Yet the peremptory
objection houses an important truth and that is that informal logic, as presently constituted, has not progressed far
enough to present a uniform face to the communities of scholars. This, in turn, is probably due to the fact that informal
logic is theoretically underdeveloped.
The very adjective informal suggests a causal and breezy state of affairs that seems completely incompatible with what
Wittgenstein (1953) called, "the hardness of the logical must" (p. 437). Indeed, if logic is understood as a science for
which there are decision procedures or proof procedures (Woods, 1995), then informal logic as I understand it cannot be
a logic in that sense. In chapter 4, however, I attempted to call attention to the shortsightedness in that way of viewing
logic. To observe that in the 20th century, the main systems of logic have been both formal2 and formal3 in the sense of
Barth and Krabbe (1982) is to make a true historical observation. To claim that logic must, by its nature, be formal2 is
to make a contentious claim that appears to me to be at odds with the history of logic.

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Neither the term "theory" nor the term "rigor" (closely associated with FDL) is univocal in its meaning.4 It may be that
the theory of argument proposed by informal logic is a different kind of theory than the theory of implication as
developed in propositional logic or quantification theory; and it may be that the rigor practiced in informal logic is
different from the rigor practiced in formal logic. But then the rigor that earmarks a good piece of detective work will
also be different from the rigor of formal deductive logic. The word theory itself has a wide variety of uses.
There are those who would respond to this type of peremptory challenge by saying, "Well, it may not be logic as you
think of logic, but whatever it is and whatever it is called, it most certainly exists and it is important; so perhaps we can
call it something else: argumentation theory, for example; or, as Willard (1989) suggested, 'the discipline of
Argumentation.'" Such a response is mistaken, for it concedes too much. It entirely ignores the lessons discussed in
chapter 4. It transforms what was a temporary experiment (the attempt to make logic a formalistic science that could
serve as the foundation for mathematics) into a norm for all times and places, and assumes that such a view is more
truly representative of the nature of logic than other historical conceptions, such as the view that sees logic as the art of
argument, logic as dialectical, or logic as a craft.
Having discussed the peremptory challenge in various guises, I now wish to consider a series of quasi-reductivist
objections. Behind them lurks the question of how informal logic relates to other disciplines.
Informal LogicSee Formal Logic
The next objection I want to consider comes from Weinstein (1990, 1993, 1994), developed a position that is
simultaneously a critique of informal logic and the nucleus of an alternative theory of argumenta Toulmin-type theory.
Here, I want to look at his criticism of informal logic. In chapter 11, I look at Weinstein's proposed alternative theory.
Formalism in Informal Logic
Weinstein (1994) argued that informal logicians have been unwittingly limited by their formalist training and that
informal logic really is not a substantially different logic from formal logic:
My claim is that informal logicians have misconstrued their function, limiting norms that govern argument
and that furnish the concepts for argument analy-
4 For the point developed here, I am indebted to my colleague, J. Anthony Blair.

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sis to general concepts, analogues to the formal logical principles that informal logic must transcend. My
recommendation is that informal logicians see the concepts of their discipline as mere early indications of the
basic concerns of their field, and look more carefully at what the analyses and evaluation of arguments
require. (p. 158).
The objection here has two dimensions. First, Weinstein argued that informal logic is still too formal. Second, he
suggested that the way out is through applied epistemology. In other words, the relevant standards for the assessment of
arguments are furnished by the epistemology of the discipline.
Weinstein (1993) raised the issue of the degree to which informalists have bought into formalism in this way, "Despite
the rejection of formalism, informal logicians are beguiled by the will-o'-the-wisp that led formal logicians in a merry
chase after succinct and general strategies for appraising arguments of all sorts" (p. 2). First, Weinstein and I have a
basic difference in our respective interpretations of formal logic. I have argued that formal logic is not a theory of
argument, even if some logicians have (mistakenly) construed it as one. Formal logic is best construed as a logic of
implication. Thus, the relationship between formal logic and informal logic is complementary rather than adversarial.
Second, it is not clear what these succinct and general strategies are that informal logicians have developed while
pursuing this will-o'-the-wisp. Weinstein continued:
The history of formal logicians' attempts to offer general and transparent analyses of such crucial argument
types as explanations should have afforded a warning to informal logicians. Instead, their philosophical
predilections for aseptic and a priori principles has resulted in their mimicry of their formalist forbears. (pp.
23)
Whatever the case with formal logicians, very few informal logicians assimilate explanation to argument. Indeed,
Govier (1987) argued explicitly against such assimilation, and the distinction between argument and explanation has
become a staple of the informal logic approach. (See also Berg, 1990, and Kasachkoff, 1988; Thomas, 1973, stood apart
on this matter.) Weinstein's critique would be stronger had he provided examples of these offending aseptic and a priori
principles. If, by an "a priori principle," Weinstein meant a principle that is not dependent on experience, then such
principles are to be expected from anything that calls itself logic, unless Weinstein proposed the view that logic is an
empirical study based on a posteriori principles. That suggestion, although intriguing, does not seem to be the direction
that Weinstein was headed in.
To conclude my treatment of Weinstein's objections to informal logic, I wish to make four points.

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First, and on the plus side, because most informal logicians began as formal logicians and only set that aside when they
encountered formidable obstacles, there is some plausibility in Weinstein's claim.
Second, Weinstein assumes that there are but two alternatives for informal logic: either the aseptic, too general and
unuseful norms reminiscent of formal logic or norms located within disciplines. Informal logic is of little help in the
domain Weinstein (1990) called ''stylized argument." But as Govier (1987) pointed out, there is a great deal of
important argumentation that takes place outside of the academy, whatever one chooses to call it: ordinary
argumentation, naturally occurring arguments, or mundane argument. Siegel (1988) made a similar point: "Reasons
frequently are expressed in non-specialized, non-technical language. In such cases full understanding does not require
mastery of specialized language or information" (pp. 2930). There is every reason to think that informal logic has an
important service to perform in this realm. (In the next chapter, I show that Weinstein believes that informal logic has
an important contribution to make to the study of argumentation in the disciplines; indeed, that is its real calling.)
Third, Weinstein's critique would profit greatly if it were carried out with more attention to specifics, both illustrations
and evidence to support strong claims and also sensitivity to the important BarthKrabbe distinction between formal2
and formal3.
Finally, it should be noted that Weinstein's own position is not located within any of the disciplines. His argument is not
historical, not mathematical, not biological. Weinstein's position seems rather to belong to that inquiry I called the
theory of argument, where informal logic represents one important theoretical initiative. So even if it is true (as
Weinstein, 1994, eventually argued) that the important standards for argument evaluation are all discipline-specific, it
does not follow that there is no need for a theory of argument.
Conclusion
There is something right about Weinstein's claim about the presence of formalism in informal logic. Yet the criticism is
undeveloped and, in my mind, not forceful enough to cause anyone to mistake informal logic for formal logic,
particularly not if they are differentiated not only by their approach but by their respective domains, as I have suggested
in chapter 5. I propose to defer further investigation of this issue until the next chapter.
The next reductivist move was already anticipated by Hintikka. It is the move that says that informal logic really is
nothing but rhetoric. As presented by McPeck, this objection also incorporates elements of the peremptory challenge
and of Weinstein's position. Thus, I may appropriately turn to it now.

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Informal LogicSee Rhetoric
McPeck (1981) argued that informal logic is a solecism (Hintikka made the same claim) and that, in fact, it is not really
distinguishable from rhetoric. This objection will provide an occasion to discuss the question of the relationship
between informal logic and rhetoric. Ultimately, McPeck's position is that the most important thing to teach our students
if we want them to engage critically with the discipline they are learning is neither formal nor informal logic, but rather
the epistemology of the discipline. So in a sense, McPeck's position is that informal logic (what there is to it) reduces to
epistemology.
McPeck's Position
In the course of his critique of informal logic, McPeck made the following claims about informal logic:
1. It is not clear what informal logic is; the term "remains about as vague as it could be" (p. 67)
2. The phrase "informal logic" is a contradiction in terms. (p. 69)
3. There is little to differentiate informal logic from rhetoric.
4. Informal logic rests on two articles of faith, both of which are unfounded:
A. If a piece of reasoning is justified, then it is justified by some principle;
B. A principle in one area must also apply in another area.
I discuss the reasoning behind each of these propositions in some detail, with particular emphasis on point 4A because
this is the proposition that lies at the core of his case and because it is the one he argued for in greatest detail. For further
discussion of McPeck's misconstruals of informal logic, see Blair and Johnson (1991) and Johnson (1996).
Before I go on to discuss (4), it should be noted that (1) appears incompatible with (2) and (3). It is hard to see how
McPeck held both (1) and (2); if the term "informal logic" is vague, then its meaning is unclear and if unclear, how
could it be self-contradictory? Further, (1) and (3) do not seem to be consistent. If informal logic is rhetoric, if that is its
content, then informal logic is just as clear, or opaque, as rhetoric.
As to (1): It is difficult to take this claim too seriously. There is, we know, a problem in defining a term like "informal
logic." There are various conceptions of it, as was made plain in chapter 5. But McPeck had before him a perfectly
coherent statement about the nature of informal logic. I know

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this because he proceeded to discuss Johnson and Blair's 1980 definitionobjecting to the use of the word logic.
As to (2): McPeck wrote:
Informal logic and rhetoric distinguish themselves from the demonstrative sciences by the absence of formal
detachment rules, the hallmark of logical systems. Indeed, there is an important sense in which the phrase
"informal logic" is a contradiction in terms; if something is truly informal (that is has no detachment rules)
then it is not logical in the normal sense of the word. (p. 69)
McPeck believed such rules and principles would be a formal logic because he identified formal with systems with
detachment rules. If he meant that in order to qualify as logic, a system must have detachment rules and if he wanted a
clear demarcation between rules and axioms, and if he meant that to qualify as a formal system, a system must specify
its detachment rules (such as modus ponens), then it follows that Aristotle's syllogistic is not formal logic; nor is the
logic of the Stoics a formal logic, nor indeed anything prior to Frege. The absence of clearly specified detachment rules
is not a reason for denying an inquiry the status of logic. McPeck cannot be thinking here of formal2, so it must be that
he was thinking of formal3"procedures which are regimented by rules." But if this is his criticism, then he failed to
appreciate the difference between formal2 and formal3. And his argument goes astray because informal logic has never
aspired to be presented as an informal2 logic.
As to (3): This part of the critique appears to be based on a misunderstanding; that is, McPeck assumed that what
Johnson and Blair (1980) were up to was to differentiate informal logic from rhetoric, whereas what we were attempting
to do was differentiate it from formal logic. In any event, the legitimate issue McPeck's critique raises is how to
understand the relationship between informal logic and rhetoric.
Once again, we are involved in a conceptual dispute that hinges on the meanings that one assigns to the crucial terms
"informal logic" and "rhetoric." McPeck never told us what he understood by rhetoric, but I can make some inferences
from what he wrote.
McPeck began by claiming that informal logic and rhetoric have a common foe (formal demonstration) and, as well,
both approach arguments using the notion of fallacy. (Note that this is true of some, but not all, informal logicians and
some, but not all, rhetoricians.) Both have a common concern with praxis and both are focused on argumentation as
persuasion.
The only thing that would distinguish the two would be if informal logic could bring off a comprehensive theory of
argument, something that McPeck appeared to believe rhetoric has not attempted, "Historically, rhetoric has

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been content to name and describe discrete types of argument and fallacies piecemeal" (p. 70). But, McPeck argued,
such a theory of argument would have to be formal. Hence, there is really no significant difference between the two:
There is ample evidence that rhetoricians, particularly Perelman and Olbrechta-Tyteca, are concerned about
analysis and criticism as informal logicians. Indeed the detailed descriptions of various fallacies and rhetorical
techniques offered by rhetoricians often surpass the best work of informal logicians. (p. 70)
These passages provide some idea of what McPeck understood rhetoric to be, but fall short of a careful delineation of
the field.
I come, then, to (4), and specifically to (4A). This part of his discussion is relevant because here he argued for the claim
that there cannot be a general theory of argument, which is all that would distinguish informal logic from rhetoric.
McPeck holds that a general theory of argument (or reasoning) would require principles:
For one thing, the theory would provide a set of rules or principles to which one could appeal in the successful
evaluation of arguments. But if informal logicians were ever successful at developing all these rules and
principles, they would then have a formal logic of ordinary argument or reasoning. (p. 71)
Govier (1987) argued, and I think rightly, that part of what causes McPeck's argument to go astray here is that he
confused the formal with the general. Further the claim that such principles would be a formal logic takes place in
abstraction from any attempt on his part to specify or nail down the meaning of formal. In what sense of formal is one to
understand this claim: formal2 or formal3? Or some other sense? McPeck's use of the concept formal is thus
unregulated, as Govier also pointed out (p. 14).
McPeck asked whether there were any grounds for thinking that such a theory could be constructed:
At the moment it seems that there is little more than blind faith in the constant requests for principles or rules
to justify inferences or to support charges of fallacy. There is the implicit assumption that for every bit of
reasoning there must be some principle to justify it. And given that principles are by their nature general, the
thinking seems to be that these general principles can be codified into theory of reasoning . . . (p. 71)
There are a number of problems with McPeck's position. First, I want to call attention to the phenomenon observed in
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back and forth between the terms "inference," "argument," and "reasoning," as though these were one and the same.
They are related, we know. But when we are arguing about what sort of theory exists or might need to exist, it is clearly
important to differentiate between a theory of inference, a theory of argument, and a theory of reasoning. If inference
here has the sense of an implicative relationship between premises and conclusion, then such a theory does existFDL. If
inference here has the sense of inductive inference, then again such a theory exists, although its status is controversial. (I
am thinking of the debates in logic and philosophy as to whether there is or is not such a thing as inductive logic.) If we
look to argument, we know that there are various theories of argument, some of which are identical to the previously
named theories and some of which are not. Finally, as to a theory of reasoning, my view is that we lack, at this point, a
developed and coherent theory of reasoning. If the argument of this book is successful, it points in the direction of the
need for such a theory. McPeck's position gets a fair amount of its plausibility by moving back and forth between these
terms and adding others. Thus, it is one thing to assert that informal logic is committed to the view that for every bit of
reasoning (in the sense of argument), there is some principle to justify it. I am not sure exactly what this means and turn
to it in a moment. It is quite another thing to assert the more general (and probably false) claim that every bit of
reasoning needs to be justified in terms of some principle.
Second, McPeck's claim that such a theory of argument assumes that every bit of reasoning (qua argument) requires
some principle to justify it is both unsupported and unclear: How does informal logic make this assumption? What
precisely does this assumption come to? These are questions to keep in mind as I continue, for without clear answers to
them, McPeck's objection will not amount to much. He continued:
One is the view that if a piece of reasoning is justified, then its justification must reside in some further
principle. But the mistake here is to confuse the notion of having a justification with that of the use of a
general principle. Not all justified decisions (or judgements) employ general principlesat least not the kind
required for a theory. In addition to justified sui generis judgements, there are justified decisions and
judgements that rest simply on experience and can be supported in no other way. (p. 71)
Suppose McPeck is right: There are justified decisions that rest on experience alone. What does this have to do with the
claim that an informal theory of argument rests on unsupported faith? Did McPeck believe that there are arguments
whose goodness can be justified in this same wayby an appeal to experience? Again it appears that McPeck's view gets
some of its plausibility by the shifting that takes place between crucial terms such as "argument," "decision," and
"judgment." An argument is not the same as a decision

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nor yet as a judgement, and what is true of the one is not ipso facto going to be true of the other. These are points that I
cannot discuss in detail here but that would properly be taken up in a theory of reasoning.
Perhaps the most revealing text in which McPeck chided informal logicians is:
The informal logician's desire to have it both waysthat is, to know how to reason within an area without
knowing the areastems from the long-held philosophical prejudice, which is that philosophy somehow has a
monopoly on such things as argument, reasoning and proper analysis. (p. 81)
It is not at all clear which philosophers McPeck has in mind. Perhaps Hegel held such a view, but very few philosophers
in the 20th century have held such imperialistic views. Indeed, the contrary has been the tendency. Positivists, for
example, have argued that philosophy is essentially the logic of science. In recent years, the project known as
naturalized epistemology has been arguing that insights about reasoning obtained from psychology are crucial for
philosophers. Rorty is widely interpreted as calling for the end of philosophy as separate inquiry.
Still, it would be naive to ignore the fact that philosophy does enjoy a special connection to the practice of dialectic and
argumentation. But this is only to be expected in an inquiry whose basic methodology is argumentation. It may fairly be
stated that philosophy has a longer and more intense relationship to argumentation than any other discipline and that its
fate as a discipline is vitally dependent on argumentation. But this does not mean that philosophy has, or believes itself
to have, a monopoly on argument, reasoning, and analysis. Nor does it mean that other forms of discourse, such as
narrative and dialogue, have no role to play.
A theory of argument need not make any such assumption about all reasoning. It need only assume that arguments are
governed by or can be appraised by standards or rules.5 With this, all informal logicians will agree. Where they differ is
on the nature of these standards. Some, following Toulmin, hold that they are field-dependent; others take the view that
there are field-invariant standards.
In sum, McPeck's position on informal logic seems to depend on a number of unsatisfactory assumptions. His argument
is weakened by his tendency to equate reasoning, argument, and inference. Moreover, his critique of informal logic rests
on an inadequate understanding of informal logic, a highly dubious assumption in the theory of reasoning that is
completely undeveloped, and a commitment to Toulmin-type theories.
5 See Govier (1987) for an interesting discussion of the view that principles of reasoning must be general. She
took Wisdom's treatment of case-by-case reasoning to be a denial of this point.

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McPeck may have been right to claim that informal logic promised more than it delivered and that its ambitions
exceeded its achievements, but as I pointed out, informal logic was then and still is, to some degree, in its infancy.
Having attempted to raise doubts about the existence of the kind of theory of argumentation that informal logicians call
for, McPeck concluded that, "there is at present little to distinguish informal logic from rhetoric" (p. 72). But given the
absence of an informed account of rhetoric and the number of questionable claims he made about informal logic, this
line of argument is not compelling.
Yet McPeck did raise the question: What is the relationship between informal logic and rhetoric? I want to conclude this
section by offering some thoughts about this question.
Informal Logic and Rhetoric
Both logic and rhetoric trace their provenance to Aristotle, both have had long and complex histories, both are
concerned with the practice of argumentation, and both have undergone important transformations in the latter half of
20th century. If it is possible to speak of a new rhetoric that was ushered in by the work of Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca, it is also possible to speak of a new logic ushered in by the work of Toulmin and Hamblin.
In asking how they are related, much depends on how one conceives of them. I have already presented my account of
informal logic as the normative dimension of the study of argumentation. Rhetoric is now widely conceived as the study
of effective communication.6 Because one prominent form of communication is argumentation, rhetoric has an interest
in the study of argumentation.
Informal logic has been significantly influenced in its development by the work of the rhetoricians and speech
communication theorists. Their influence is evident in a number of developments: the role that informal logicians have
assigned to audience (see Blair and Johnson's (1987) notion of the community of ideal interlocutorsa variation on
Perelman's notion of the universal audience), and the awareness of the importance of context. The influence of rhetoric
can likewise be seen in the way that some informal logicians have dealt with the "ad-" fallaciesexploring the view that
the fallacies are not always fallacies (see Wreen, 1988a, 1988b) or the view that it is not always fallacious to attack the
person or to appeal to emotions (Walton, 1992). The influence is evident in an important shift that occurs in the theory
of evaluation. Under the sway of theorists like Perelman and Hamblin, informal logicians dropped the truth requirement
(which many had brought with them from their earlier exposure to formal logic) and
6 See Foss, Foss, & Trapp (1985) for expressions of this view of rhetoric.

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substituted instead some form of an acceptability requirement. Thus, it seems evident that informal logic has been
influenced by work in rhetoric and speech communication. At the same time, theorists in those areas have read and cited
the work of informal logicians. Thus, it appears that the new logic and the new rhetoric have forged a working alliance.
In spite of this new spirit of cooperation, some traces of the historical animosity between the two disciplines (which it is
customary to lay at the feet of Plato) remain in the suspicion that some logicians have that rhetoric will ultimately
always sell out to the audience and in the concern that many rhetoricians express about the abstract and idealized
models that logicians are fond of creating and then imposing on the practice of argumentation.
Posing the Question
If we ask again the ancient question concerning the relationship of logic and rhetoric, we cannot content ourselves with
traditional accounts that were premised on the belief that logic equals FDL. Sad to say the spectre of FDL still hangs
over this discussion in the view (still adhered to by many in both rhetoric and communication theory) that logic's
approach to argumentation is bound up with a priori and formalistic procedures and conceptions that emphasize
conclusive arguments as the ideal.7
I attempt to crystallize the difference in three ways.
First Difference:
The Teleological Nature of Argument
In assigning to argumentation the telos of rational persuasion, we have located the practice of argumentation within the
domain of the rational. Both logic and rhetoric see argumentation as governed by rationality. Rhetoric sees the shaping
of the argument as rational, for the arguer must use Logos (reason and reasons) to develop the argument. But from the
point of view of rhetoric, the rational force of the argument is not and should not be the only factor in determining
outcomes in argumentative space. There is also the need to take into account the role of Ethos and Pathos. To be
effectively rational, rhetoric will insist that the argument takes account of the human environment and that it, as well,
connects with human sentiment. Logic, on the other hand, sees the telos of rational persuasion as governed especially by
Logos. It does not deny that Ethos and Pathos have roles to play, but these are secondary.
Second Difference:
The Dialectical Obligation
I have argued that the telos of rational persuasion has consequences for how logic depicts the structure of argument: A
dialectical tier is required.
7 See, for example, Dearin's understanding of logic on pages 8083 of his (1982) work.

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Does the telos of effective persuasion have the same impact on the structure of argument as understood by rhetoric? My
answer is "No." Rhetoric will not generally require a dialectical tier in the argument. That is, if the arguer can achieve
the end of producing an effective argument relying only on what I have called the illative core, then the interest of
rhetoric will have been satisfied. It will require this tier only when it is necessary in order for the argumentation to be
effective (persuasive) for a given audience. Thus, for example, when the arguer can anticipate that some member of the
audience will raise a certain objection, it makes sense for the arguer to anticipate and indicate how that objection will be
handled if he or she wishes to persuade the audience.
But this is not generally the case. Suppose that there is an objection; let me call it O*; which the arguer knows about and
which the arguer also has very good reason to believe his audience does not know about. I may suppose, for example,
that the arguer is the editor of a journal that has just received a paper for publication in which this objection is raised;
and we suppose that the arguer knows that the author of the paper is not in the audience. From the point of view of
rhetoric, there is no obligation for the arguer to deal with O*the argument can be perfectly effective without it.
However, from the standpoint of logic, the arguer is under an obligation to deal with this objection, even if, and
especially if, doing so could potentially influence the rationality of the argument. Because even though the audience
does not know of the objection, and so the arguer could get by without dealing with it, the argument will be more
rational in substance and appearance if it can meet the test of this objection. If this objection should create difficulties
for the arguer, then, from the perspective of logic, he or she is all the more obligated to deal with the objection.
Further, the requirement of manifest rationality explains why, in argumentative space as understood by logic, the arguer
must respond even to those criticisms he or she believes (or knows) are misguided. If the arguer were obligated only by
the dictates of rationality (rather than those of manifest rationality), then he or she can afford to ignore the criticism.
From the standpoint of rhetoric and rationality, the arguer is only obligated to respond to the misguided criticism if
doing so is necessary in order to achieve the goal of effective persuasion. But from the perspective of logic and the
requirement of manifest rationality, the arguer is obligated to respond even to those criticisms that are regarded as
misguided because to ignore such criticisms compromises the appearance of rationality.
Thus we have come on a second difference in how their respective teloi influence the structure of argument. From the
perspective of logic, the obligation to deal with dialectical stuff is unconditional; a dialectical tier is required. From the
perspective of rhetoric, this obligation is conditional.

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Third Difference:
Criteria for Evaluation
I believe that there is a third difference that derives from the different ways in which logic and rhetoric consider the task
of the evaluation of arguments. The issue is premise adequacy. Many informal logicians have adopted acceptability as a
criterion for premise adequacy. In dropping the truth requirement and introducing the acceptability requirement,
informal logicians haveso I believebeen persuaded by rhetorical values and concerns.
I argued in the last chapter that a viable theory of evaluation must include both truth and acceptability. The problem of
coordinating these, I have called The Integration Problem. I suggest that in seeking to resolve this problem, informal
logic should tend to favor the truth requirement over the acceptability requirement, whereas rhetoric will, I believe, take
the reverse view.
That there are differences between the way in which rhetoric and logic (here informal logic) view argumentation should
come as no surprise. That there may occasionally be friction between their standpoints should also come as no surprise.
But by and large, as recent history shows, they have much in common: Not only do both have vital contributions to
make to the theory of argumentation, they can and do and should continue to work together to achieve their respective
ends.
Informal LogicSee Epistemology
The last reductionist objection to be considered seeks to reduce informal logic to epistemology. The proper standards
for a theory of argument appraisal are really epistemological in character. (McPeck (1981) held this view with respect to
both informal logic and critical thinking.) There is a strong and various weaker formulation of this thesis:
Strong Form. The appropriate standards for the appraisal of arguments are epistemological. (Biro and Siegel, 1992)
Weak Form. The appropriate standards for the appraisal of arguments are closer to epistemology than they are to formal
logic. (Pinto, 1994).
This objection raises the question of the relationship between informal logic and epistemology that I shall deal with next.

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The Strong Thesis:

BiroSiegel
Biro and Siegel (1992) argued that the standards that informal logicians have adopted are really epistemological, or
perhaps it is more accurate to say that they called for an epistemological treatment of these standards. They put the
question this way: ''What are the standards of rationality to which we ought to appeal in assessing the epistemic
forcefulness of arguments/reasons?" (p. 97). Thus, I can see that the BiroSiegel argument applies chiefly to the
assessment of arguments; hence, to the theory of appraisal. Their argument leaves entirely untouched the question of
whether epistemology can furnish the necessary wherewithal for a theory of analysis.
Biro and Siegel were well aware that the theory of argumentation has a multidisciplinary character. They made it clear
that their own interest is an epistemicnormative issue, and they answered it by saying, "An argument succeeds
epistemically (rather than rhetorically, pragmatically, etc) to the extent that it advances the knowledge of the arguer or
her audience or provides good reasons for the belief or the acceptance of a proposition" (p. 96). There are problems
here. An argument might advance the knowledge of the audience even if it is not a good argument. How? Suppose the
argument is poor yet it stimulates someone to do the sort of research and reasoning that results in that person's having
advanced his or her own knowledge. Also, in restricting successful arguments to the realm of belief and knowledge, the
authors overlook the heuristic function that arguments serve. An argument may show that a particular thesis is rational
even if it does not advance knowledge or result in acceptance by the audience.
Biro and Siegel wrote, "The question thus becomes: What is it for a conclusion to be warranted by an argument?" To
this question, they answered, "Many writers in the informal logic literature appeal to three criteria of argument
assessment: (a) acceptability of premises, (b) relevance of premises to conclusion; and (c) strength of support afforded
by premises to conclusion" (p. 97). They dismissed the second criterion as really just a special case of the third criterion:
"If a premise is irrelevant, it offers no support, and if it is relevant, the crucial issue of the strength of the support it
affords the conclusion must still be addressed . . . so these criteria collapse into two. . . ." (p. 98). But, they argued, these
two remaining criteria themselves depend on a deeper epistemological theory of good reasons in order to tell when and
to what degree they are justified. Hence, the significant criteria for appraising argumentation are really epistemological
in character.
The SiegelBiro argument is that relevance is redundant and that the standards involved (sufficiency and acceptability)
require a foundation in some form of epistemological theory. Not just any form will do: "Our view is that if we are to
understand argumentation epistemically, we must reject epistemological relativism, accept a more or less standard
conception of

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truth and regard justification as a fallible indicator of truth" (p. 98). This raises the important question: What are the
epistemological assumptions of a theory of argumentation? Were Biro and Siegel right that one must reject relativism?
That one must accept a more or less standard conception of truth? There are many who argue that truth is not required
for a normative theory of argumentation. These are contentious matters, to say the least.
Let me leave the issue of the relationship between informal logic and epistemology and return to the proposed reduction
of the standards proposed by informal logicians to epistemological standards.
1. If one is determined to be a reductivist, the question is: Why stop with the reduction of three standards to two? Can it
not equally be argued that acceptability can be subsumed under sufficiency, so that really I only need one standard?
2. Biro and Siegel were wise to attempt the dispatch of relevance because, of the criteria they cited, it is the one that
least resembles epistemological standards. There are, so far as I know, almost no epistemological studies of relevance;
the concept seems to have played little evident role in the discussions of standard issues of epistemologythe nature of
knowledge, belief, and justification. Yet the criterion of relevance lies close to the very heart of argument assessment.
3. Even if the reduction can be achieved, it is not clear that it should be achieved. One may, of course, argue that one
should get by with the minimum possible set of standards, and usually the basis for this reductivist bias is allegiance to
Occam's Razor: Entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity. But that raises the issue of what standards are
necessary for the purposes of appraisal.
Here, it seems to me, that I am wise to recognize that my categorial schemes are inevitably wed to my purposes.8
Because, in my view, the purpose of the theory of appraisal is not simply evaluation of the argument but also criticism
of it, I view the proposed reduction is wrong headed. Even if the criterion of sufficiency in some sense includes
relevance, that is not an adequate reason for dispensing with it as a separate criterion. At the level of criticism, there is
an important difference as to whether a specific premise is irrelevant or whether the problem is that a set of premises is
insufficient. If the purpose were simply evaluation (which may well be the axis of the BiroSiegel approach), then the
BiroSiegel proposal makes sense. But because a crucial issue for the theory of argument is criticism, my view is that it
does not make sense to collapse the two.
8 This is a point that Wittgenstein (1953) made when he asked us to think about how many ways there are to
classify pieces. There are many ways to classify chess pieces and which one I accept will depend on the
purpose of the classification.

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To illustrate, consider an illative core:
P1 P2 P3 C
Suppose we criticize the argument and determine that the serious problem with this argument is that P2 is irrelevant to
C. If we take the BiroSiegel approach (so that the only criteria are sufficiency and acceptability), then it looks like the
critic here must say, "This is a bad argument, because P1 through P3 are insufficient to establish C." Yet the grounds
that the critic will have to give here are not the sort that one would expect when the charge is a failure of sufficiency.
Indeed, the reasons the critic presents will precisely those that support the claim that "P2 is irrelevant to C." Hence, if
we have the criterion of relevance available, our criticism will be more precise. If more precise criticism is stronger
criticism, it is preferable according to the principle of discrimination. It is important not to subsume relevance under
sufficiency if one is interested in criticism rather than mere evaluation.
If, on the other hand, the goal were simply evaluation, the BiroSiegel view would be the correct one. This result seems
to me an illustration of the significant difference between evaluation and criticism and the importance of maintaining
this distinction for a theory of argument.
The second problem here concerns what sort of help we can expect to get from epistemology with respect to the other
two criteria invoked by both Biro and Siegelacceptability and sufficiency. Biro and Siegel held that there are two things
we may expect from epistemology:
Such an epistemological account must address at least two questions: to what specific principles ought we to
appeal in assessing the goodness and forcefulness of reasons?; and, what general account of knowledge, truth,
warrant, rationality, and rational justification underwrites those specific principles? (p. 98)
The BiroSiegel position assumes that knowledge, truth, warrant, rationality, and rational justification all in some sense
are epistemological in character, such that a full appreciation of them is to be gotten only or best from epistemology.
Let's look at these notions one at a time and think about their status in theory of argument and epistemology.
Knowledge. With respect to this concept, Biro and Siegel are on solid ground. Certainly, one would turn to
epistemology for an account of knowledge. Hence, if knowledge was a criterion for good argument, if, for example, one
adopted the epistemic view that a premise must be known to be true, then recourse to epistemology would be necessary.
But is an account of

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knowledge necessary for a theory of argument? What is the relationship between argument(ation) and knowledge?
Neither most epistemologists nor most logicians would accept the view that S knows that P just in case S has a good
argument for P. The whole issue of the relationship between knowledge and argument is yet another issue for the theory
of reasoning.
Truth. There are various theories of truth, some developed by epistemologists (coherence theories), some not (Tarski's,
1944, semantic theory of truth). Some theorists (Hamblin, Pinto) hold that truth is not a criterion that the theory of
argument requires. In any event, it is reasonable to expect some help from epistemology here.
Warrant. The status of this concept in epistemology lies within theories of justification. The notion of warrant is
important for Toulmin-type theories of argument, and certainly it seems fair to say that Toulmin's exposure to
epistemology played a role in the use to which he put this concept in his own theory of argument. (On the role of
warrant in epistemology, see Plantinga, 1993.)
Rationality. In chapter 1, I acknowledged that the theory of argument depends on the theory of rationality.
Epistemology also has an interest in rationality, but it is not clear that I am going to get the kind of articulation of it that
I need from those quarters. A more likely place to turn for illumination is rationality theory itself.
Justification. Clearly, justification is a central epistemological concept. What is justified is belief. However, the
connection between belief and argument is problematic. In other words, to know what it is for A to be justified in
believing P and to know under what circumstances A is justified in putting forth P as premise in an argument are two
different, even if related, issues.
This bare-bones sketch of these fundamental concepts and their respective roles in epistemology and the theory of
argument shows again the importance of The Network Problem discussed in chapter 1, and again the need for work in
the theory of reasoning.
To conclude, I agree with Biro and Siegel that the approach to the theory of argument developed here must have
recourse to epistemology. I harken back to Barth's (1987) advice that we should take what help we can from the
established sciences. Although informal logic must welcome help from epistemology, the claim that informal logic is
reducible to it seems unjustified. Biro and Siegel (1992) rightly said that the theory of argument is "an essentially
normative phenomenon," and any theory of argument must account for that normativity; "purely descriptivist accounts
of argumentation simply cannot do so" (p. 99). But the claim that the norms or criteria for

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argumentation are either epistemological in character or such that their analysis will be found in epistemology appears
overstated and unjustified. Of the four criteria that I have proposed for the illative core, only onetruthcan be said to be
inherently epistemologicaland indeed its status is controversial. Anotheracceptabilityalthough perhaps rhetorical in
origin is capable of being enlightened by epistemological reflection. It is less likely that informal logicians will receive
much help from epistemologists with key concepts such as relevance and sufficiency. Where they will receive help is
with the distinction between belief and acceptance, the nature of both, the issues of truth and justification, and the
problems of relativismall good reasons for maintaining an open-door policy.
The Weak Thesis:

Pinto
A somewhat different approach to the question of the relationship between epistemology and informal logic is found in
Pinto (1994). After ruling out soundness as a useful standard of appraisal for arguments, Pinto instead proposed two
standards that, he acknowledged, are audience-dependent: whether the premises are acceptable or reasonable to believe;
and whether the inferential link is suitable. These standards are, like some epistemic standards, relative to persons and
times, which means that informal logic's method of appraisal would come closer to that of epistemology than that of
formal logic (variant of the weak form) because validity and truth are not, according to Pinto, audience-dependent.
(Pinto seemed to assume that the standards for argument are either all absolute or they are all relative. Could it not be
the case that some are absolute and others relative? I see no reason to reject this possibility a priori.)
Weak Epistemic Standards
To defend his view that the proper standards for argument are (weakly) epistemic, Pinto appealed to principles that he
found intuitively plausible rather than reflection on the contexts, goals, and circumstances that might be used to
determine the standards. Those principles are:
AP1: Good arguments provide good reasons for believing their conclusions.
AP2: An argument that it would unreasonable not to accept is a good argument.
These look like reasonable principles. But I make three points.

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First, Pinto's approach adopts the (P + I) conception of argument according to which an argument is constituted of
premises plus a link between the premises and the conclusion. I discussed in chapter 6 my misgivings about this model,
and, hence, any position that depends on it.
Second, Pinto may be construed as presenting a refinement on Hamblin's argument (discussed in chapter 7) by showing
that even if epistemic criteria fail, weak epistemic criteria may not fail. Suppose that Pinto was successful (which I think
he was not) in establishing that there are weak epistemic standards and that, unlike epistemic standards, they are not
open to the objections Hamblin urged against epistemic ones. Pinto noted that Hamblin's case for dialectical criteria
"wanes considerably as one takes weakly epistemic criteria seriously" (p. 4). But it is not altogether clear exactly what
would be the difference between Pinto's weakly epistemic and Hamblin's strongly dialectical criteria: that is, Hamblin
might well argue that the criteria being used should be billed as strongly dialectical, in which the operative criterion is
"accepts for good reason."
Third, like Hamblin, Pinto did not directly engage the issue of how the standards or criteria are to be generated. He
followed Hamblin in adopting a trickle-down approach. That is, one begins with the ideal of soundness that, it is argued,
is too stringent. So one looks for ways to soften or dilute it. Thus, rather than require that the premises be true, one
settles for a weaker criterionacceptance for good reason. And one does not require that the link be the strongest possible
but allows for a weaker connection.
Is this the best way to generate standards of argument? Should we not rather look at the practice we are engaged in and
ask about its purposes and processes and derive our criteria from a consideration of them? If the argument of this book
has merit, then any attempt to derive standards of argumentation by watering down standards devised for implication is
unlikely to be successful.
The core of the argument comes where Pinto proposed two standards that he called weakly epistemic:
WE1: The premises must be reasonable to believe.
WE2: It must be reasonable to infer the conclusion from the premises.
These are said to be weakly epistemic in comparison to Hamblin's candidates because the latter are formulated in terms
of knowledge rather than reasonable belief. For our purposes, it is WE1 that needs to be considered. (I omit discussion
of WE2, being content to point out that very likely Pinto would have to unpack this standard with reference to
deductive, inductive, or conductive theories of inference, or some combination thereof.)
As regards premise acceptability, Pinto's argument resembles Hamblin's argument that alethic standards are neither
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already spelled out in some detail my problems with that argument in chapter 7. But let us see how Pinto made the case.
Truth Is Not Sufficient
Truth is not sufficient because if the premises are true but not known by the arguer to be true, it may well be
unreasonable to accept them, thus violating WE1. Pinto wrote, "Mere truth will not be sufficient. For one does not have
good reasons for accepting a conclusion if one infers it from premises it is unreasonable to believeeven if those premises
happen to be true" (p. 3). Pinto held that it can be the case that a premise is unreasonable to believe, yet true. Hence, the
argument in which that premise appeared was not a good oneas directed to that audience at that time: Directed to
another audience, it might be quite a good argument.
In arriving at these judgments, it seems clear that Pinto assigned the greater weight to the acceptability requirement. But
is that a defensible policy? Does that policy square with the requirements of rationality and manifest rationality? In a
conflict between truth and acceptability, which should prevail? I deal with this problemThe Integration Problemin
chapter 11.
Pinto held that the argument about orangutans and vitamins, had it been proposed to the Romans, would not have been a
good argument because the premise is not one that it would have been reasonable for the Romans to believe. That same
argument, however, might be a good one now. Thus, Pinto's position raises the problem of relativism. To accept Pinto's
position, one must be prepared to allow that a given argument may be a good argument for Paul but not for Peter, or a
good one for Sheila at one time but not a good one for her at another time.
The problem of relativism is admittedly a difficult one here in the theory of argument, no less than it is in epistemology.
My own view is that relativism in the way that Pinto presented it here is wrong-headed. I see that argument as having
two components. The first is that the worth of arguments is relative to time. The orangutanvitamin argument would not
have been a good argument for the Romans but might be a good argument now. (Presumably this means that some
people living today might find the argument a good one, others not.) But it seems to me that the orangutanvitamin
argument is a positive nonstarter as far as the Romans are concerned. It is not that it is a bad argument; it is that it is
unintelligible. The second component is the idea that an argument maybe a good one for Peter but not a good one for
Josie. Clearly, if something like acceptability is the significant criterion for premise adequacy, then this is the likely
outcome. But that takes me into the arms of The Integration Problem, discussion of which I defer until chapter 11.

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Truth Is Not Necessary
On the question whether truth is necessary for a good argument, Pinto was somewhat more reticent. He began by citing
Govier's (1987) argument that this position had the consequences that "in many times and places people should not be
convinced by arguments at all" (p. 280). That is because what is reasonable to believe and therefore suitable premise
material is false, so good arguments will not be possible. Pinto regarded this as having merit, "though the case still has
to be made for the unacceptability of this consequence" (p. 4). And I would like to add: Some examples of this
phenomenon and how it might occur would help.
Next he cited Hamblin's argument to the effect that a logician's passing judgment on the truth of someone else's premise
is simply expressing agreement or disagreement and that there is something repugnant in the idea that logic should be
the vehicle for the expression of the logician's judgments. Pinto accepted part of this: The logician's judgments have
effect only to the degree they are supported; but that does not, said Pinto, mean that "objecting to a premise on the
ground that it's false is somehow a mistake, unhelpful or inappropriate" (p. 119). I agree, but I do not think this rejoinder
quite captures the thrust of Hamblin's complaint against truth as a necessary condition. He said that all "p is true" can
mean is "I accept p'' and that such personal judgments are clearly inappropriate.
Thus, there are at least two separate issues. The first issue, as I see it, is whether this proposed reduction is viable. I do
not think it is. It is obvious that although "I accept p" means that "I regard p as true," the meaning of the latter is
different in an important way from the meaning of "p is true." Indeed, the truth conditions of the two are very different.
Thus, in deciding whether "p is true" is true, no reference to my psyche will be needed as a rule. But in deciding
whether "I regard p as true is true," the appeal to my psyche is definitive. (I can always apply the Moorean test: "I
accept p, yet I wonder whether it really is the case that p."9)
What is behind this aversion to embracing truth as a criterion (whether necessary or sufficient), one supposes, is the
notorious difficulty of finding a definition, criterion, or theory of truththere being many different varieties. But such
difficulties seem to me insufficient reasons for dropping the term "true" from the evaluative vocabulary. At the very
least, Hamblin's argument, which fails to give a hearing to theories other than correspondence theories, is not a
sufficient reason for rejecting it. And given the enormous amount of useful work that "true" performs in our commerce
with arguments, and its obvious utility in many instances, it seems that the language is better off with it than without it.
9 See Moore (1903). Ayer (1936) adopted a version of this strategy.

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The second point is that Hamblin failed to distinguish questions of the appropriate criteria for argument evaluation
(which is a question for logic) and whether a given argument meets the criteria (which is not a question for logic).
A final line of argument (Pinto's own, I take it) is that sometimes an argument has false premises that it is not
reasonable not to accept; that is to say, its premises, although false, are beyond reasonable doubt.
I have two problems with this line of argument.
First, the argument is too abstract to be fully satisfying. Following in the footsteps of Hamblin and Govier, Pinto asked
us to concede this possibility. But his case, like theirs, would be stronger with an illustration to exemplify this
possibility.10
Second, what does Pinto's argument, if successful, show about truth and premise acceptability? Does it show that truth
is not a viable standard? No; at best it shows that truth is neither a necessary nor yet a sufficient condition. It does not
follow that truth is not an appropriate criterion or standard. Something can be a standard, or a criterion, without being
either a necessary andor sufficient condition. Here is an example. Having the won the most games in the league in one
season is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for being selected as the Cy Young Award winner. There are
pitchers who have won the award without having won the most games and there are pitchers who have won the most
games and not won the award (because it was given to a reliever); hence, winning the most games is neither necessary
nor sufficient. But does it follow that it is not a standard or a criterion to use in judging who the best pitcher is? I do not
think so. Thus, I conclude that Pinto's arguments do not show that truth is not an appropriate criterion for premise
acceptability.
10 There is a rejoinder here, due to Binkley, that would let Pinto off the hook. Binkley argued that the
HamblinPinto position is not in the least bit odd, resembling as it does the well-known epistemic situation: I
know that some of my beliefs are false, but I cannot name any specific one. This, Binkley claimed, is similar
to the case of a premise's being true but not known to be true. However, I do not think this reasoning works
because the analogy is ill-designed. My reasoning is this: Knowledge about human knowledge and about my
own epistemic history provides me with ample reason for holding that at least one of the beliefs I currently
hold to be true is in fact false, even though I cannot specify it. (If I could, then I would, presumably, reject it.)
What justification can be provided for my claim with respect to the argument of another that one of its
premises is true but it is not known to be so? No generic line of reasoning appears to be available, as it was in
the analogue. To justify this claim, I have to produce reasons that support my claim that the premise in
question is true, and at the same time, I have to produce reasons that the arguer does not know the premise to
be true or reasons why it is not reasonable for the arguer to accept the premise. It is not clear how the critic
will know this about the arguer. To know this, I will have to know a fair amount about the contents of the
arguer's mental repertoire, whereas in the former case I need know nothing about the contents of any
believer's mental repertoire. Hence, it seems to me, Binkley's analogy fails.

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Conclusion
Let me end with a few more observations about Pinto's views. First, Pinto owed us an account of what is meant by
reasonable to believe because this concept lies at the heart of his account of good arguments. Second, Pinto was more
sanguine than I am that there is gold in them thar hills. Epistemologists have been notoriously preoccupied with
questions like whether knowledge is possible, responding to the skeptic, offering analyses of "S knows that p," and so
onnone of which strikes me as having any immediate payoff either for the theory of analysis or for the theory of
appraisal. But I must admit that this is an open question and that informal logicians need all the help we can get from
whatever quarter. Third, the connection between knowledge and argument, between knowledge and good arguments, is
difficult territory and an important part of The Network Problem that can only be resolved, in my view, by an adequate
theory of reasoning.
I conclude that Pinto's argument for weakly epistemic criteria for the premises is unsatisfactory, in spite of the useful
points that it contains. And because it is committed to the notion that arguments are best seen as composed of
inferences, that is yet another problem from my perspective. Hopes for any such approach stand or fall with whether an
adequate theory of conductive inference is available.
Informal Logic and Epistemology
What, then, can be said about the relationship between informal logic and epistemology?
Clearly there is overlap between informal logic and epistemology. Yet any reduction of one to the other seems unlikely.
Why? Take argument to be the fundamental notion of informal logic and take knowledge to be the fundamental notion
of epistemology. It seems obvious that I can know a proposition to be true without its being the conclusion of good
argument. I can know by sensation; I can know by reason alone. It also seems obvious that neither the premises nor the
conclusion of an argument must be known in order for the argument to be a good argument. It is further clear that both
argument and knowledge are dependent on reasoning and rationality. These realizations take us back to what I called
The Network Problem, the awareness of the inter-relationships and mutual lines that run between argument, knowledge,
reasoning, and rationality.
There are, I think, four additional good reasons to resist any attempt to think that the structure and concerns of
legitimate knowledge and belief will be exactly the same as those of legitimate argument.
First, we have seen that argument is dialectical, whereas neither belief nor knowledge can properly be characterized in
that way. Belief, especially, seems closer to inference in being monolectical in character. (Some view

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knowledge as dialectical in the sense that justification requires reference to norms and that such norms are always
communitarian in nature.)
Second, when we analogize argument to knowledge, as we will be tempted to do by the epistemological reduction, we
will find it natural to make the following extrapolation: Just as knowledge consists in beliefs that are justified, argument
consists in holding a conclusion that is justified by premises. This approach promotes the view that an argument is
essentially a matter of the illative core, whereas we have seen that for argument, in the deep sense, a dialectical tier will
be necessary. No corresponding structure (no dialectical tier) exists for knowledge.
Third, with respect to belief, it is not clear that the arguer must believe the truth of the premises of the argument. One
can develop a line of reasoning for the sake of argument.
Fourth, one wonders about both the utility and the provenance of such reductionism. As to the latter, it must remind us
of the drive in logic in the first part of the 20th century to discover the smallest primitive basis for axiomatic theory.
Russell's axiom set for propositional logic contained 5 axioms, one of which was redundant. Whatever the role of such
reductionism there, it appears to play no significant role here. Even if all standards could be reduced to one, I have
shown that the analytic accomplishments of the reduction will still have to be played off against the needs of both
evaluation and criticism.
Hence, the objection that the normative part of the theory of argument is either reducible to or strongly dependent on
epistemology seems unwarranted. My rejection of the strong thesis should not be taken as an attempt to isolate
epistemology totally from informal logic, nor to reject the weaker thesis that epistemology can provide sustenance for
informal logic, both of which points I have embraced in my discussion of Biro and Siegel.
Indeed, because there are obvious ways in which the interests of informal logic and those of epistemology converge
(both, for example, being interested in rationality), there is clearly going to be overlap. In addition to what emerged in
discussion of the BiroSiegel thesis, it seems evident that epistemology will be helpful in elucidating such matters as
credibility and the appeal to knowledge, both of which play a role in argument analysis. Nor is it beyond the scope of
possibility that as informal logic develops, traffic may move the other way: That is, that epistemologists may look to
informal logicians for help with some of their problems as well. What seems ill-advised is for either to engage in
reductionist claims. Fortunately, there is little evidence that such disputes are of much interest to either epistemologists
or informal logicians.
Disciplinary disputes inevitably look foolish to the outsider. But how boundaries are drawn around intellectual
enterprises is a significant issue and often revelatory of deep assumptions about the nature of these disci-

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plines. In the long run, such questions are rarely settled by the sort of give-and-take that occurs here but rather by the
quality and texture of the initiatives within the disciplines.
Informal LogicSee Sexism
A very different sort of objection to informal logic that I want to consider next is the claim by some feminists (Nye,
1990) that logic is sexist. As a form of logic, it would appear that such a charge is applicable to informal logic no less
than formal logic, which is Nye's actual target. However, I focus on Nye because something like this very charge of
sexism has been levelled specifically against informal logic by Orr (1989).
Orr on Informal Logic
Orr began by discussing the sources of her current dissatisfaction: her own experience as a student, her experience as a
teacher, and her interest in epistemology and women's studies have "led me to think that my style of rationality . . . is
not wrong but rather simply different from the dominant style" (pp. 12). This led her to formulate a general thesis that
"this culture's conception of rationality, especially as it is reflected in our educational institutions and the materials and
practises that we as teachers use, is far too narrow" (p. 2). There is also a specific thesis that is more germane to my
discussion, which is "that it is time for the informal logic movement . . . to recognize, theoretically ground and
incorporate into its texts alternative styles of rationality" (p. 2). Her focus was on one of these that she called ''the
feminine style."
Orr moved to a discussion of this feminine style of rationality, basing her discussion on the work of Gilligan, Piggott,
and Farrell, in whose writings she found a differentiation between a masculine and a feminine style of thinking. The
male mode has been dominant and developed, Orr said, "with the explicit intent of excluding the emotional and the
subjective" (p. 5), which Orr connected with the female mode. To illustrate this point, she referred to the methodology
of "the widely acclaimed geneticist, Barbara McClintock" (pp. 56). She offered further evidence from the work of
Chodorow and from Belenky et al.
Orr began her discussion by focusing on informal logic and stated that "it is time for informal logic to take the next step,
to expand its understanding of what rationality and argumentation are when they are understood as human, not
masculine, practice" (p. 7). Orr indicated what this might look like when she said:
For informal logic this will mean, among other things, a study of the role and the use of the subjective in the
feminine mode, the study of and description

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of typical patterns of inquiry and persuasion and the identification and study of fallacies typical of this mode
(p. 8).
Finally, she discussed the consequences of the thesis that both the masculine and feminine modestyle of thinking,
rationality, or reasoning need to be stressed. Because she said, gender is an acquisition and not sex determined, both
modes of rationality are open to both sexes. Informal logic should actively foster the development of these alternate
modes of rationality and, in that way, extricate itself from its sexist past.
What, Precisely, Was Orr Targeting?
It is not clear to me exactly what the focus of Orr's critique was. Is it the style of rationality? Or this culture's conception
of rationality? These do not appear to be equivalent. Or is reasoning, rather than rationality, Orr's concern? Was her
concern the differences between men's and women's reasoning or between the masculine mode of reasoning and the
feminine mode of reasoning? Was her concern different styles of thinking? Masculine versus feminine modes of
rational persuasion and inquiry?
There are, we know, important connections between reasoning, rationality, and thinking and also between all of them,
inquiry, and rational persuasion. Perhaps Orr meant to claim that they all display this same duality between a dominant
male and a female mode wherein the male mode has been developed with the explicit intent of excluding the emotional
and the subjective (the female).11 It is one thing to claim that there are gender-based styles of rationality, another thing
to claim that there are gender-based styles of reasoning, and still another to claim that there are gender-based styles of
thinking. Without denying the possible interconnections, I would argue that nothing is gained by assimilating these
different elements of The Network Problem to one another.
(I shall bracket as outside the scope of this work the way in which Orr moved back and forth between the concepts of
sexsexuality (malefemale; masculinefeminine) and gender (menwomen). I also bracket the even more vexing problem
about how to unpack the notions of masculinity and femininity and remain content here to point out that Orr's position
depends on there being some articulable set of differences between the masculine and the femininea position many
would question. For a more detailed look at this part of Orr's case, I recommend Menssen, 1993.)
11 Here Orr ignored the many philosophers who have been strong advocates of the emotions and subjectivity.
Names that immediately come to mind are Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, James, and Sartre. It could hardly be
claimed that these are submissive voices; it is hard to determine at any given moment in philosophy which
voices are dominant and which muted.

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Did Orr Understand the Informal Logic Project?
I see problems in Orr's understanding of logic. She stated that "Informal logic's recent arrival on the scene has
challenged the received belief that formal logic adequately describes how people proceed when they reason in ordinary
language," (p. 7). This claim is not accurate as it stands. I do not hold that formal logic fails because it does not describe
how people proceed when they reason in ordinary language. I hold, as do other informal logicians, that formal logic
fails to provide the proper standards for the evaluation of argumentation in ordinary language.
The approach to argumentation developed in this work is one that sees it as just such a human practice, one in which
both men and women can engage. Informal logic has been criticized for its militaristic (and hence sexist) language
(Ayim, 1988), but I believe it is possible to purge such language without any loss to the project. The approach to
argumentation advocated here construes it as a cooperative enterprise, in which the arguer and the critic are engaged in
a relationship of real dependency and, in many cases, of friendship. It avoids the picture of argument often associated in
such discussion with the masculine and its emphasis on winlose, on competition, and on individuality.
Moreover, in the emphasis that it places on the audience and on real arguments rather than the codified and abstracted
arguments of FDL, informal logic seems to reflect some elements of what might be called the feminine mode of
rationality. Many argumentation theorists have explicitly abandoned or moved away from the idea of argument as proof
to the idea of argument as dialogue, and this also might be seen as a move toward incorporating elements of the
feminine mode.
Having made these observations, I return to what for me is the most difficult question:
What Would Principles Fashioned by the Feminine Mode Look Like?
It is far from clear what Orr had in mind here. Using an analogy, she wrote:
In this paper I would like to discuss the clues that have led me to believe that the toolbox is less than fully
equipped and to make some suggestions as to where informal logic might look to enlarge its stock of
implements. (p. 1)
The problem is that Orr was not forthcoming with suggestions about what these tools are. She said, "To dismiss the
feminine mode of rationality with the stock charge of 'mere psychologism' would be at best question begging, at worst
prejudice" (p. 7). It would be helpful if I could see an illustration

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of what Orr argued against here, of someone who dismissed the feminine mode with the charge of being "mere
psychologism"a position associated with the view that logic is a descriptive rather than a normative science.
Moreover, Orr's argument for her position against psychologism seems to be situated within something like
conventionally understood informal logic. Thus, Orr indicted those who make the charge of psychologism with question
begging. Indeed, her entire article constitutes an argument (in the traditional masculine mode) in which she can be
construed as making a case, citing evidence, appealing to authoritiesall techniques that seem to go hand in hand with
what she referred to as "the masculine mode of rationality." There is nothing wrong with Orr's using the masculine
mode to argue for the need for another, feminine, mode or argumentation. All the same, it does raise questions as to
what such a mode of argumentation would look like.
So, again, the question is: What sorts of principles would informal logic have to embrace in order to satisfy Orr's
challenge? Perhaps there is a clue in her discussion of ethical theory in which she drew a contrast between an ethics of
justice and an ethics of care: She said that in Gilligan's analysis, "the logic underlying an ethic of care is a psychological
logic of relationships, which contrasts with the formal logic of fairness that informs the justice approach." (cited in Orr,
1989, p. 3)
What exactly is a psychological logic? If it is a logic whose principles are furnished by psychology, then the charge of
psychologism is understandable. Yet it is not clear what such principles would be. Would the feminine mode of
rationality propose different standards of evaluation? Different principles of criticism? For example, would the feminine
mode endorse the ad hominem as a legitimate mode of argumentation? Perhaps it would because the ad hominem
fallacy depends on the acceptance of a separation between the arguer (and his or her voice) and the argument. Perhaps
feminists are unwilling to grant the legitimacy of this kind of separation and so would argue that ad hominem
argumentation is perfectly legitimate. My own view is that such an approach is open to very serious objection if it is
intended to function within the realm of argumentation.
Without some guidance from Orr, the claim that there is this alternative style of rationality (which presumably has its
own logic) that informal logic must embrace to supplement the current masculine style remains underdeveloped.
Nye on Logic
I cannot here do justice to the forceful challenge to logic that Nye (1990) has mounted, yet, perhaps in Nye's critique of
logic and its limits, we find a clearer idea of what Orr was driving at.

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Nye's analysis contrasts the moves that one learns to make in logic with those that go with reading. In the concluding
chapter of her book, she referred to the 1988 U.S. presidential campaign to illustrate the difference between these two
skills. Nye observed that two elements were decisive in the success of the Bush campaign. One was Bush's continual
mention of the fact that Dukakis had vetoed a bill in Massachusetts that made it mandatory for teachers to lead the
Pledge of Allegiance. The other was more image than ideathe use of Willie Horton to flag the issue of providing
furloughs to prisoners. She wrote:
The logic of these messages according to Bush was simple. Saluting the flag is the mark of loyalty to the
United States, therefore if you are against it you are disloyal. Criminals are dangerous, therefore there should
be no furlough program. By the necessity of this "logic", both men and women were convinced. (p. 183)
The reference to logic is important for Nye's case because she was about to ask: "What might have helped them to a
better understanding of what was being said to them?" She suggested that had these men and women been better at
reading and perhaps less logical, less under the sway of conventional logic, they would not have been hoodwinked. So I
want to ask: Did she do justice to logic?
It is important to distinguish two senses of the term "logic." In one sense, the logic of something is its rationale. Thus,
the rationale of the Bush ad was to attempt to paint Dukakis as soft on crime. Let me assume that the strategy was as
outlined by Nye. These ads were successful with some? many? Americans. To that degree, the logic of these ads was
successfulin this sense of logic. In the other sense of the term "logic," in which it means the logical adequacy of the
argumentation, these ads were atrocious argumentsas almost anyone with a modicum of logical sense would have seen.
Both formal and informal logic can be used to expose their flaws. The formal logician would point out that the first
argument, although valid, is unsound because the premise is questionable. The formal logician would find the second
argument invalid. The conclusion does not follow from the premise. Hence, neither argument is sound.
How would an informal logician approach these arguments? Take the argument that revolves around the case of Willie
Horton. An astute critic would question the sufficiency of this premise to justify the intended conclusion, would
challenge how representative this instance is, would ask for base-rate data, or would question the stereotype at work.
More to the point, a critic would want to know what arguments and evidence favor of the furlough program and what is
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the informal logician has a variety of options available to critique this argument.
Nevertheless, my instinct would be to question whether this discourse warrants being classified as argument at all.
There is what appears to be an illative core: a reason being given in support of another point. But that is not sufficient to
distinguish it from other types of reasoning. Here the structural view washes out and I need to examine not just the
structure but also the purpose of this discourse. The text does not appear to be part of a dialectical situation. Why?
Because this text is taken from a political advertisement that, like other forms of advertising, has a different telos than
argumentation. The point is not to get at the truth but to install the candidate's message in the mind of the recipient. In
other words, if I approach the Bush advertisement with an enriched conception of argument, I will question whether it is
properly interpreted as an argument at all.
Nye continued with her analysis:
Was it more sophisticated logic that would cleverly tangle the question further: the missing premise, the
principle that an exception does not disprove the rule . . . ? Or were there other more important skills that were
lacking, and that could be learned and taught, the skills of readings: attention, listening, understanding,
responding? (p. 183)
In my view, all of theseattention, listening, understanding, and respondingare inescapably valued by the process of
arguing. The Other must pay attention to what the arguer says and means, must listen carefully, must understand before
engaging in criticism, and of course must respond. It is therefore surprising to read Nye's claim that: "These are not the
same as the skills of logic; in many ways there are antithetical. If logic teaches us to ignore the circumstances in which
something is said, reading asks us to consider it carefully" (p. 183). But logic teaches no such thingneither formal nor
informalunless by circumstances she meant the person of the arguer, which is generally not relevant to the evaluation
and criticism of the argument, although it may well be crucial for the understanding. Informal logicians have stressed
the importance of the context in understanding the argument; some have gone so far as to assert that the context
determines the standards that will be used. Furthermore, when it comes to the criterion of acceptability, circumstances
and context are crucial. When it comes to determining whether an ad hominem fallacy has been committed, one must
look at the circumstances. Nye's understanding of logic appears suspect here:
In the case of the black criminal who went amok on furlough from prison, another even more difficult skill
was needed, the skill to reflect on ourselves as we read, and to be aware of the deep-seated emotions and
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this case racist, that color our reading. Can logic or critical thinking, based on logic, teach these skills? (p. 183)
The answer is a qualified yes. Some element of self-awareness is necessary for those who engage in the process of
argumentation. (See Johnson & Blair, 1993, chapter 7.)
To summarize both this brief discussion of Nye and the longer discussion of Orr, there appears to be some legitimacy to
the charge of sexism against both traditional and informal logic. My response is that such a charge can be rendered
unnecessary by the adoption of the approach to argumentation developed in this book.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I reviewed a number of objections to the informal logic enterprise. Most of these objections were
reductivist in the sense that the objection attempted to reduce informal logic to some other discipline: whether rhetoric,
formal logic, or epistemology. I argued that the informal logic enterprise can handle these objections and that it has its
own distinctive contribution to make to argumentation and the theory of argument. That said, it is not to be denied that
informal logic has points of contact and overlap with these other disciplines or inquiries. From rhetoric, informal logic
has adopted the importance of context and audience in developing any adequate theory of argumentation. From
epistemology, it has received the notions of epistemic authority, justification, and good reasons; reasonable belief; and
the distinction between belief and acceptance. From formal logic, it has received the theory of implication. From
feminist theory, it has taken an appreciation of argumentation as a cooperative rather than adversarial enterprise. All of
these have a contribution to make to the understanding of the process of argumentation and so, also, to informal logic.
Having reviewed some of the prominent objections to informal logic, I want to look at alternative theoretical
approaches. I turn to that task in the next chapter.

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Chapter 10
Alternative Theories of Argument
In this chapter, I examine several alterative theories of argument, with special emphasis on the theory of appraisal.
Several such types exist. I discuss dialogue logics briefly in the next section. Toulmin-type theories hold that the
significant standards are field-dependent. I examine three forms of field theory. Another well-developed alternative
theory that bears examination is the Pragma-dialectical approach of van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992), which does
not represent itself as a logical approach but that clearly intends to be a theory of argumentation. Last, I want to look,
only briefly, at Willard's (1989) theory of argumenta very different approach to argument coming out of the disciplines
of rhetoric and speech communication.
Why do I choose these three theories from the multiplicity of theories of argumentation? Field theories demand
attention because of their attractiveness and popularity with argumentation theorists. Pragma-dialectics is of interest
because of its emphasis on the process of arguing. Willard's theory is of interest because it approaches argumentation
from a wider perspective, seeing it as a form of communication rather than rational persuasion.
What theories have been omitted in this survey? The principal alternative that I have not covered in detail here is
dialogue logic. So let me say a few words about that approach next.
Dialogue Logics
A brief history of dialogue logic can be found in Walton (1984b). He distinguished four different strands of
development of dialogue logic. The first is the logical study of communication, initiated by Harrah (1963). A second

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strand emanates from Hamblin, where he offered a criticism of the ideal of soundness for arguments (a sound argument
has true premises and is deductively valid), which led him to stress the importance of dialectical criteria (as
distinguished from both alethic and epistemic criteria) for the evaluation of argumentation. A third strand is the work of
Lorenzen (1978) and his strip rules for logical constants. A fourth strand is represented by the research of Hintikka on
information seeking dialogues (1976, 1979), which Walton regarded as the most promising development.
Another valuable resource for those interested the emergence of dialogue logic are Barth (1986, 1992). In the latter,
Barth situated the emergence of dialogue logic within the wider philosophical context and traced its role in the
development of the theory of argumentation. Barth saw the emergence of dialogue logic as a result of the rejection of
foundationalism connected with the DeductiveNomological Paradigm, according to which logic was to be the science
that would serve mathematicians in the analysis of strengths and weaknesses of deductivenomological systems.
According to Barth, "One can easily distinguish three post-fundamentalist postphilosophical steps and three
corresponding stages of argumentation theory. Only its second and third stages fall under dialogical philosophy" (p.
667). Those stages are: first, from fundament to justification; second, the justification is related to the specific
concessions of an audience; third, the justification itself essentially contains also the verbal reactions of the audience.
Dialogue logicians seek to present and justify rules according to which a dialogue can be carried on in a rational
fashion. Some make use of formal2 and mathematical models and, in that respect, dialogue logic and informal logic part
company. Still, to the degree that texts and conversations in natural language can be represented once as an argument,
then as a dialogue, it appears that dialogue logic and informal logic are different approaches, each largely governed by a
normative interest. Dialogue logicians assign to logic the task of prescribing rights and duties in the transaction of a
rational dialogue. The informal logician assigns to logic the task of developing the criteria or standards for use in the
evaluation and criticism of arguments. From the perspective of the theory of argumentation, it is possible to see
dialogue logic as having its focus on the process of arguing, whereas informal logic is focused on the product. Hence,
there is some reason to believe that these are not really alternatives so much as they are complementary approaches.
Field Theories
Several theories of argument emanate from Toulmin's work, all characterized by the view that the important standards
for argument are essentially field dependent. To put it differently, these authors claim there are no (interest-

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ing, significant) field-invariant standards (criteria, principles) for the evaluation (appraisal, criticism) of arguments
(inference, reasoning). I begin with a discussion of the mother of all such theories: Toulmin's theory. Then I discuss
McPeck's position (which takes off from some material from the last chapter) and finally Weinstein's ecological
approach.
Toulmin's Theory of Field Dependence
Toulmin's work has already been discussed in several chapters. In chapter 2, I discussed Toulmin's role in shaping the
inquiry known as the theory of argument and some limitations in his choice of a jurisprudential model. Later in chapter
5, I discussed aspects of his model, particularly his theory of analysis. Here, the spotlight will be on Toulmin's theory of
appraisal.
Toulmin presented his theory of argument (1958). His view was that although the force of the standards for arguments
is field-invariant, the standards themselves are field-dependent. Here is how Toulmin set up the issue:
We are now in a position to see the answer to our first major question. When one sets out and criticises
arguments and conclusions in different fields, what feature of the procedure we adopt and of the concepts we
employ will be field-invariant and what features will be field-dependent? (p. 36)
Note to begin with that this way of phrasing the question predisposes us to a certain kind of answer. That is, if there
truly are different fields of argument (and much will depend here on Toulmin's ability to successfully articulate this
notion of a field), then was Toulmin not (by this wording) loading the question in favor of at least a significant measure
of field-dependency?
It seems obvious on the face of it that different fields must have at least some important differences in standards. The
real question is whether there are standards (or criteria or principles) that hold across fields (or disciplines). There is
some reason to think that there could be. FDL gives us at least some reason to think that an affirmative answer is
possible. The standard of validitywhich I see as a standard for appraising implications rather than argumentsis not field-
dependent.1 Validity thus differs from a standard like acceptability that, as I have argued, is audience-driven and that
therefore may be expected to vary in substantive ways from one field to the next.
Here is Toulmin's answer to the question:
1 To be sure, the ability to deploy the standard requires background knowledge.

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For impossibilities and improprieties, we saw the answer was clear enough. The force of the conclusion ''It
cannot be the case that" or "it is impossible" is the same regardless of fields; the criteria or sort of ground
required to justify such a conclusion vary from field to field. (p.36)
The things we must point to in showing that something is possible will depend entirely on whether we are
concerned with a problem in pure mathematics, a problem of team-selection, a problem in aesthetics, or
what; . . . The form that makes a man a possibility for the Davis Cup is one thing; the explanatory power that
makes Professor Fröhlich's theory a possible explanation of superconductivity is another thing; the features of
Piero's painting of the Resurrection which make it possibly the finest picture ever painted are a third; there is
no question of weighing these possibilities all in the same scale. (p. 37)
The gist of the reasoning here is that the criteria or standards will be field-dependent. Thus, Toulmin said:
"Can" and "possible" are, accordingly, like "cannot" and "impossible" in having field-invariant force and field-
dependent standards. This result can be generalized: all the canons for the criticism and assessment of
arguments, I conclude, are in practice field-dependent, while our terms of assessment are invariant in their
force. (p. 38)
Toulmin's claim that "the result can be generalized" strikes me as hasty. I do not think he had done enough to justify this
claim. He examined three closely related concepts that he took to be crucial for the appraisal of argument: "impossible,"
"possible," and "can."2 Toulmin concluded for what looked like good reasons that in the case of these three terms, their
force is field-invariant but the standards themselves are field-dependent. How did Toulmin know that this result can be
generalized to cover the canons (as he called them) of criticism for all fields? Don't we have to have some way of
specifying those canons and then seeing whether the same holds true of them? Don't we need some form of justification
(a warrant, perhaps) about fields and their textures to move from the data Toulmin provided to this categorical
conclusion?
Suppose, for example, that one of the standards were to turn out to be validity? Do standards of validity change from
one field to the next? Are the standards for a valid argument in economics different from the standards for a valid
argument in philosophy? The answers here seem clear. Validity is the same for all, both in meaning and in force. But
Toulmin can spike this
2 That just these concepts emerge as crucial for the question of evaluation is an important fact about the
provenance of Toulmin's theory; that is, FDL is in the background here, and this provides some confirmation
for Weinstein's (1993) complaint about the origin of informal logic's nascent theorizing.

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objection by pointing to the close connection between validity and the geometrical model he was attempting to
transcend.
What about truth? Is the standard of truth different in chemistry than in physics? In order for this argument to go
through, Toulmin must have, first of all, identified the other standards that will be involved in the appraisal of
arguments and then showed that these other canons (or standards) are like the three he examined in all relevant respects.
Because he did not do that, I find his argument for field-dependence incomplete.
One final point: The strongest argument to shore up this position, it seems to me, would be to place before us the
standards of argument appraisal from physics, those from chemistry, those from history, and so on and then show, by
empirical examination, that there are no field-invariant standards. But so far as I know, no field theorist has ever
developed the details that such an argument requires. I discuss this option in more detail later this chapter.
I turn now to a notion that is crucial to Toulmin's position and for every field theoristthe notion of a field of argument.
Toulmin presented this as a technical term:
For the sake of brevity, it will be convenient to introduce a technical term: let us accordingly talk of a field of
arguments. Two arguments will be said to belong to the same field when the data and conclusions in each of
the two arguments are, respectively, of the same logical type; they will be said to come form different fields
when the backing or the conclusions in each of the two arguments are not the same logical type. (p. 14)
Two observations are in order here. First, this distinction could have been drawn more tightly. In defining "same field,"
Toulmin used data and conclusion, whereas in defining "different field," he used the terms ''backing or conclusion." I
suspect this was just carelessness on his part. Second, Toulmin's definition of "field" is heavily dependent of the notion
of "logical type," a notion that orignates in the geometrical model Toulmin was criticizing. To see the force of this
point, recall that Toulmin was attempting to break free of the tradition of logic that has been constructed according to
the mathematical model. His alternative approach to understanding the structure of argument is an important step along
that path. But if the notion of a field of argument is crucial to Toulmin's theory of argument, and if it now turns out that
the notion of field is dependent on the notion of a logical typewhich is one of the defining notions of FDL that itself is
under the strongest possible influence of the mathematical modelthen his break with tradition will be far from clean.
With that caveat in mind, let me have a look at his illustrations:

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The proofs in Euclid's Elements, for example, belong to one field [Geometry, we presume] the calculations
performed in preparing an issue of the National Almanac belong to another [which is what?]. The argument,
"Harry's hair is not black, since I know for a fact that it is red" belongs to a third and rather special field [i.e.?]
though one might perhaps question whether it really was an argument at all, or rather, a counter-assertion
[Correct]. The argument, "Petersen is a Swede, so he is presumably not a Roman Catholic" belongs to a fourth
field [i.e.?] . . . (pp. 1415).
If you thought that a field might be equated with a discipline, then you were wrong, as the third example shows. Still
Toulmin frequently used disciplines to illustrate, as this passage indicates:
Within a field of arguments, questions about comparative stringency and looseness may certainly arise: we
may, for example, compare the standards of rigour recognized by pure mathematicians at different stages in
the history of the subject, by Newton, Euler, Gauss or Weierstrass. How far, on the other hand, it makes sense
to compare the mathematical rigour of Gauss or Weierstrass with the judicial rigour of Lord Chief Justice
Goddard is another matter . . . (p. 15)
Mathematics is a discipline; but will we locate the judicial rigor of the Chief Justice within a discipline? It seems that
every discipline constitutes a field, but there are fields that do not constitute disciplines. If the term "field" is going to do
the kind of work in his theory of argument that it seems it is being called on to do, then at the least Toulmin owed us a
more careful treatment of it as well as some idea of how the notion of a logical type is to be rendered.3
Earlier, I expressed concern that Toulmin's way of putting the issue loads the die in favor of the field-dependent view.
An entirely different way of framing the issue is found in Govier (1987), who instead referred to the realm of ordinary
argumentation.4 In my view, one of the crucial problems facing the theory of argument, generally, and informal logic,
specifically, is this duality of focus. Should my focus be, as Govier suggested, the realm of ordinary argumentation
(however it is characterized), or should it be the more stylized mode of argumentation found in the disciplines, as
Weinstein (1990) urged? It is easy enough to suggest that it must be both. But I need to think about this suggestion,
which I do in chapter 11. For the moment, I want to note that Toulmin's theory can make some claim to have been the
progenitor of both views.
3 Clearly if Toulmin is to succeed, his explication of this crucial concept must be independent of FDL, or
what he calls the geometrical approach.
4 See Govier (1987). I do not mean to suggest that her expression was without its own share of problems.

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There is a further crucial question for the theory of argument: Is there any way that I can keep the theory of analysis
separate from the theory of appraisal? I thought that the answer to this must be "yes," and I criticized Hamblin for
proceeding in the reverse direction. But maybe he was right after all. I want to come back to this, also, in chapter 11.
For now, let me explain how Toulmin developed the rest of his case:
We must ask how far the formal character of sound arguments can be thought of more geometrico, as a matter
of their having the right sorts of shape, and how far it needs to be thought of, rather, in procedural terms, as a
matter of their conforming to the formalities which must be observed if any rational assessment of arguments
is to be possible. (p. 43)
There is a long and a short way of arguing the case that the standards are field-dependent. The short way is what
Toulmin took. He provided a limited basis for the claim and then inferred or generalized to his conclusion. This way is,
I believe, ultimately unsatisfactory. A better approach would be to inventory the various disciplines and fields, identify
their respective standards of evaluation, and then compare them. (I elsewhere characterized this approach as dustbin
empiricism.) Such an empirical inspection will reveal whether there are any standards that cross the borders, or
whetheras this theory predictsthey are all field-specific. McPeck approximated this longer routeso I have a chance to
consider it in greater detail in the next section.
McPeck on Field-Dependence
As I argued in the last chapter, part of McPeck's objection to informal logic was based on his endorsement of the
Toulmin model. McPeck's reasoning here depends on Toulmin's view that significant standards are field-dependent, and
so it seems appropriate to take up this part of his case after examining Toulmin. To pick up the thread again, recall that
McPeck identified two articles of faith he attributed to informal logic. The first onethe implicit assumption that for
every bit of reasoning there must be some principle to justify itwas discussed in the last chapter. The second principle
required of a general theory of argument is: A principle in one area must also apply in another area. Suppose we take it
that by "principle," McPeck meant "principle of reasoning," and suppose we then substitute "principle of argument" for
that. The appropriately revamped article of faith would be that a principle of argumentation in one area must also apply
in another area. Many informal logicians appear to accept some such claim.
I suspect the most charitable reading of McPeck is to attribute to him the view that the important standards of
argumentation are field-dependent. He argued:

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Just as the rules of a particular game do not necessarily apply to other games, so certain principles of reason
apply within some spheres of human experience but not in others. A principle of reason in business or law, for
example, might be fallacious in science or ethics. (p. 72)
His point is clear even if the analogy is unfortunate. It is obvious that the rules of one game almost never apply to
another and it seems pointless to say so. However, the next claim is anything but pointless and anything but obvious,
and it intrigued me sufficiently to take issue with it (Johnson, personal communication, September, 1986):
Whatever prima facie validity this conjecture may possess seems to fade as one looks for examples of, say, a
principle of reason which is valid in law but not in science. Is it, for example, legitimate to attack the person
rather than his or her position in the field of business but not legitimate in science? Short of being presented
with examples of this conjecture, I am not inclined to take it as much of a threat.
What I am looking for is a principle of argument that is valid in law but not applicable to science and so, in that very
broad sense, not valid. What would be interesting is a principle applicable to and valid in law and applicable to but
invalid or fallacious in science. McPeck responded (personal communication, November, 1986):
I could produce a long list of such examples, but I would find that tedious. The list might begin by pointing
out that in law it is legitimate and proper to support arguments by appealing to "precedents" [the whole basis
of Case Law] but it would not be Kosher or valid to argue this way in science. Can you imagine a scientist
trying to support a hypothesis on the sole basis that some previous scientist had thought that way also?
However, a lawyer might very well argue along such lines; indeed it is the strongest line of reasoning that
lawyers can pursue in case law. In legal reasoning to argue from precedents is a fundamental principle of
reasoning; but to argue this way in science would be to misunderstand the nature of science.
His example is the appeal to precedent that he said holds in law (McPeck called it the strongest line of reasoning that
lawyers can pursue in case law) but not in science. McPeck was right, but his argument did not prove what he thought it
did. Let me explain.
My understanding of the appeal to precedent is that it works like this:
In Brown vs. Topeka School Board et al., the United States Supreme Court ruled that separate but equal is not
equal. The present case is similar in all relevant respects [i.e., in all matters of fact] to that one; hence, in this
case, the defendant should be found guilty.

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If I am right, then when we probe below the surface, we find that the deeper principles involved in the appeal to
precedent are, first, the drawing of an analogy between two cases; and, second, the recognition that legal decisions
should be bound by the principle of justice that says that similar cases should be treated similarly. But neither the
argument from analogy nor the appeal to consistency is peculiar to law. Indeed, it is hard to imagine any field in which
inconsistency in argumentation would not be regarded as a flaw. As for the appeal to analogy, its strength depends on
whether the analogy holds in the relevant respects. I find it difficult to imagine any field in which an appeal to analogy
would not be defused by pointing to relevant differences. Hence, it turns out that the appeal to precedent in law depends
on deeper principles (analogy and consistency), both of which appear to apply to all fields where the practice of
argumentation plays a role. Thus, McPeck's first illustration fails.
McPeck (1986) was right when he asked (rhetorically), "Can you imagine a scientist trying to support a hypothesis in
science on the sole basis that some previous scientist had thought this way also?" No, I cannot. But what does this
show? The appeal to precedent in law does not function as part of an attempt to establish the truth of some proposition
except in a vacuous sense of true. The work of science is largely bound up with the development of theories that are
supposed to show us what is true, so I would not expect that precedent would play the kind of role in science that it does
in law. (It does not follow that precedent plays no role in scientific thinking.) The work of science is that of advancing
and testing theories, laws, and hypotheses. However, theory construction and argumentation are different intellectual
enterprises. No matter how much we want to be concessive and include within the sphere of argumentation, broadly
considered, such activities as hypothesizing and theorizing, in the final analysis they are different intellectual activities
that it does no good to assimilate too closely to argumentation.5 Hence, McPeck's example fails to illustrate the point it
was intended to. For it to work, it must be assumed that the standard intellectual work of scientists can be described as
argumentation. I question whether this is an accurate descriptor. This raises the issue to be dealt with in chapter 11 of
the role of argumentation in the disciplines.
Argumentation theorists concede that there are substantive differences between various disciplines, and all will agree
that the way to achieve competence in a discipline is by mastery of its vocabulary, standards, and protocols. What some
informal logicians hold is that there are generic principles of argumentation that hold across and between disciplines. I
myself located these generic elements in the criteria of appraisal (chap. 7)
5 This raises the issue to be dealt with in the next chapter concerning the role of argumentation in the
disciplines.

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and the principles of criticism (chap. 8) and that leads me to consider the next point of McPeck's response, "Secondly, in
law it is often necessary to attack the character and or veracity of a witness, but to do so in science might correctly be
regarded as an ad hominem fallacy" (p. 4).
This is a better and more interesting (because more challenging) example than the earlier one, yet I have several
problems with this counterexample. First, what is the principle of reason(ing) that this example is supposed to show as
invalid? Attacks on the individual are not permissible. I would certainly not defend such a broad formulation because
there are occasions when it is legitimate to attack the person in order to attack his argument. Therefore, it would be
better to formulate the principle rather like this:
If an arguer has put forth an argument, then the other is under a prima facie [logical] obligation to critique the
argument and not the arguer, unless consideration of the arguer is relevant to determination of the merits of
his argument.
If this principle is accepted, then two consequences follow. First, violations of this principle are instances of the ad
hominem fallacy. Second, the cases cited by McPeck do not contradict this principle. In scientific reasoning, there is no
reason whatever to attack the person; such attacks are always irrelevant. It is difficult to think of an example where this
principle has been violated in scientific discourse itself. (Bypass, for this purpose, what takes place in popularizations
and the popular press, where you might find one scientist attacking the character of another. These are not, it seems to
me, the best illustrations of scientific reasoning or argumentation.)
When we turn to legal reasoning, the proposed counterexample has more force. If a witness has put forward as true
statements that depend on her credibility, then it is legitimate to question her credibility and thereby to question the truth
or the acceptability of the statements. However, and here I have a conceptual disagreement with McPeck, attacking the
character or veracity of a witness is not a case of the ad hominem fallacy: It is not a case of attacking the person instead
of attacking the argument but rather attacking the person as a means of questioning his credibility.
Moreover, I would argue that the principle just cited holds across the various disciplines: that is, when a political
scientist argues for a particular conclusion, the economist argues for a particular view about the development of third
world economies, or when a theologian argues that the historical Jesus did not think of himself as God. In each of these
cases, the appropriate critical response is to argue against the argument, not against the arguer.6
6 This reasoning depends on the supposition that, in some cases, the reasoning in these disciplines can
properly be represented as argument in the sense I am discussing it here.

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McPeck continued:
For example in business, if you could show that a certain line of argument would result in the arguer standing
to gain huge sums of money (for his/her personal financial gain) by accepting a certain line of argument (and
others may lose money) then that consideration has a kind of relevance, and poignancy [sic], which would not
effect the assessment of the validity or truth of a scientific argument. What is relevant and important in the
one case (i.e., possible financial gain and loss), is not so in the other. (p. 2)
There are problems with this counterexample also. Suppose a business executive argues that her company should get
into the business of producing rock videos and suppose it is clear that if the company does so, this executive is going to
benefit from that decision. Is that going to have much relevance or poignancy? Or suppose that an account executive
with Young and Rubicam argues that the firm should attempt to lure the Chrysler account away from Leo Burnett and
suppose it is clear that the exec stands to gain huge sums of money from this move. Is that any reason to disqualify his
line of reasoning? The answer here is not so evident.
The best scenario for McPeck's objection might run like this: Suppose that a nutritionist argues that there is no real
evidence that sugar cereals are a health hazard. When it is learned that this individual is not an impartial researcher but
rather is employed as a consultant by Kellogg's, is that fact relevant to the assessment of his argument? It places him in
a conflict of interest, which means that his credibility is diminished. It does not follow from this that his claims are
wrong; it follows only that his credibility is impaired. Hence, any claims in his argument that depend on authority or
credibility will be vulnerable to criticism.
I accept what I take to be the general point that McPeck was making: Whenever a person stands to profit from the
acceptance of a theory or a proposition of which he or she is the advocate, others may reasonably wonder whether the
reasons for advancing the idea are dictated by the desire to improve a personal economic well-being rather than by a
reading of the evidence. When someone has a vested interest in the truth of a particular position, critics may reasonably
question whether the review of the evidence was fair and open-minded.
That strikes me as a good general principle of reasoning that holds across the board. That is why it is expected that
judges disqualify themselves in law cases if they have a conflict of interest, why politicians put their finances in blind
trust, and why people do not necessarily trust that fella over there with the five-o'clock shadow who wants to sell us this
used car! It begins to look like there is yet another universal principle of reasoning.
To sum up, McPeck's counterexamples seem to me to run into serious problems. From this, I do not conclude that there
are not important differ-

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ences in how the disciplines go about their intellectual work. Philosophers do not do experiments; they argue.
Mathematicians do not argue; they construct proofs. Scientists construct and test theories and conduct experiments;
argumentation plays at best a secondary role. Still McPeck's position that informal logic rests on this second article of
faith seems to me not a strong one. Not only does it encounter all of the difficulties of Toulmin-type theories but it is
weighted down with freight of its own.
Weinstein's Ecological Approach
Weinstein developed an important variation on the Toulmin model, on which his theory depends heavily but that it also
supplements in important ways. I want now to consider this variation that Weinstein called an ecological approach. If I
understand ecology as the study of organisms in their environments, the application to argumentation is clear: Weinstein
proposed the study of arguments in their disciplinary environments as the proper way to proceed. In effect, his argument
is that informal logicians and disciplinary theorists should work together. This has not happened because informal
logicians have been preoccupied with success in the market place. (He also accused informal logicians of being
philosophical imperialists.)
Weinstein's broad concern is educational reform. He believed that critical thinking as an educational ideal is a
serviceable construct for the purpose of educational reform but that critical thinking should be seen within the context of
the disciplines. Informal logic likewise has something to contribute to this enterprise but not in its present state.
Weinstein (1993) referred to:
My deep commitment to the ideal of educational reform through critical thinking, and to my conviction that
informal logic has the potential to afford a theory that can ground the rational practices in the disciplines and
in their application to the complex and subtle issues of human affairs. It is therefore a plea to Scriven that he
use his justified preeminence to reform the practices of philosophers among others, so as to begin the dialogue
with our colleagues from all academic fields. We informal logicians have much to learn from them, and if I
am correct, informal logic has the potential to inform and radically change their self-understanding of their
own practices. (p. 5)
Weinstein (1990) combined the ToulminMcPeck thesis about field dependency with the position (reviewed in the last
chapter) that standards have a broadly epistemological character. According to Weinstein's ecological approach, the
standards are furnished by the epistemology of the discipline; such epistemology is of course discipline specific; hence,
the standards are field specific. Weinstein wrote, "Argumentation seen in relation to an enhousing domain and discourse
community exhibits differing and characteristic styles of argument, specific 'inference tickets' (warrants) particular

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epistemologies (backing) and individual requirements for closure. This for me is the insight Toulmin's position
affords" (p. 125).
However, Weinstein's notion of the way epistemology enters into the picture is different from those considered in the
last chapter. His argument here is complex, involving not only his own sense of what applied epistemology is but also
involving his commitment to Toulmin's theory of argument, a Carnap-driven approach to missing premises, reflections
on language, undergraduate education and cognitive psychology, the theory of inquiry, and finally his views on
philosophical argument. Throughout the article, his concern was to show that informal logicians must extend and
broaden their grasp if they wish to realize the promise inherent in their approach.
A crucial premise in Weinstein's argument is the takeover from Toulmin that, in some significant sense, the norms or
standards of argumentation are discipline driven. At bottom, what worried Weinstein was the a prioristic and imperialist
stance he found in the work of informal logicians. What he called for is not domination but cooperation; he wanted
informal logicians to work with rather than legislate to other disciplines. Before going further, I want to pause to
consider a well-known objection to field theories and Weinstein's response.
The Standard Objection
There is a standard objection to this theory of argument. It was first raised by Paul (1985) against McPeck (1985), but
Weinstein had his own way of responding. The objection is that such a theory of argument overlooks the fact that many
arguments are not housed in any particular domain but borrow elements from several domains. Here is how Paul (1985)
raised a similar objection against McPeck:
But it is well to remember that we cannot ask computers multi-categorical questions, especially about those
kinds that cut across the disciplines in such a way as to require reasoned perspective on the data from a global
point of view. Such questions . . . are typically dialectical, settled, that is, by general canons of argument, by
objection (from one point of view) and reply (from another), by case and counter-case, by debate not only
about the answer to the question but also about the very logic of the question itself. (p. 37)
I take the latter point to mean that the critic will typically point to an assumption that lies behind the arguer's ways of
setting up the issue and his resolution of it. Paul sounded a similar challenge later when he asked:
For example in what logical domain does the (technical?) concept of alcoholism solely belong: disease,
addiction, crime, moral failing, cultural pattern,

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lifestyle choice, defect of socialization, self-comforting behaviour, personal weakness . . . ? How many points
of view can be used to illuminate it? (p. 40)
I might want to modify Paul's question to ask not about the concept but rather the issue: To what field does the issue of
alcoholism fall? to psychology? sociology? religion?
This is the first step in the objectionto point to issues and problems of the sort that are going to be the subject of
argumentation but that do not belong to any one field.
The next step in the objection occurs when Paul claimed that the very acts of conceptualization are themselves theory-
laden and contentious:
To place something said or thought into a category, from the perspective of which we intend to judge it, is to
take a potentially contentious position with respect to it. There are no specialists who have the definitive
taxonomy or undebatable means for so deciding. (p. 40)
To put the matter slightly differently, the very act of assigning a particular argument (via its conclusion) to a particular
domain is itself an argumentative maneuver and by its nature one that must transcend the individual disciplines. To
decide that this particular argument is historical in character and hence belongs to history and should be judged by that
epistemology is to make a potentially contentious movethe defense of which will necessarily take the arguer beyond that
domain. Paul (1985) continued:
Logical synthesis, cutting across categories, extracting metaphors from one domain and using them to
organize others, arguing for or against the global metaphors of others are intellectual acts that are grounded
ultimately not in the criteria and the skills of the specialist, not in some science or other or any combination
thereof, but in the art of rationaldialecticalcritical thought, in the art of thinking of anything in its "right"
relationship to things überhaupt. (p. 41)
In other words, logical synthesis or what Paul called elsewhere "the ability to totalize our experience" is required. But
what discipline confers this or helps us with this? The implied answer is that no one discipline can provide this ability.
Thus, the objection as raised by Paul is that the attempt to fit all arguments into domains is mistaken and ill-advised
because it fails to take account of the complexity of the issues that are typically faced.
Weinstein's Response
Weinstein responded more or less directly to this objection as follows:

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Seeing argumentation as occurring within particular domains does not, however, mean that a given argument
need be limited to some particular domain. Many of Toulmin's critics appear to confuse the former view with
the latter, and therefore see the unavailability of a uniquely identifiable domain for particular argument
fragments as a problem for Toulmin. (p. 125)
This is not quite the same as Paul's objection, but it is close enough. Weinstein continued:
It is not. But, more importantly, such criticism has resulted in a pernicious non-sequitur that seems implicit in
the views of many informal logicians and critical thinking theorists. That is, if no particular enhousing domain
is identifiable, the argument needs to be assessed by the growing sub-discipline of philosophy, informal logic
and critical thinking. (p. 125)
I believe it is wrong to attribute to informal logicians the position that if an argument is not assignable to some unique
domain for evaluation, then it should be evaluated by informal logic. Informal logic does not evaluate arguments any
more than FDL evaluates implications. Informal logic provides a theory of evaluation for arguments that a critic may
use. Moreover, informal logicians would argue (with Paul) that the knowledge and information and some of the
procedures that are needed to evaluate many arguments will typically come from a variety of disciplines. This is not to
deny that there are arguments that can and must be evaluated from within a particular discipline. But, even here, it is far
from evident that the standards used will be that different from one discipline to the next. Weinstein continued:
Arguments can be framed by many different kinds of considerations. Doubtful claims can be addressed from
many disciplinary points of view and many combinations of disciplinary perspectives. The question is, which
fields and which approach yields what kinds of success in analyzing and developing the salient aspects of the
argument, finally, offering an adequate assessment of the various considerations put forward as arguments in
respect of the points at issue. (p. 125)
Here, presumably, is Weinstein's defense of the claim that the no-domain objection is not a serious problem for
Toulmin. Let me examine whether it defuses that objection.
I think I need to distinguish three different types of argument.
1. Arguments that take place within a discipline.
Here I place those arguments that are clearly rooted in a discipline. Thus, for example, the question whether skepticism
is refutable belongs to phi-

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losophy. The argument over the causes of World War II belongs to history. And so on.
2. Arguments that cross disciplinary boundaries.
Here I place those arguments that are multidisciplinary or interdisciplinary in character: For example, the question
whether the human mind is a computer falls in part to philosophy of mind, in part to artificial intelligence, and in part to
cognitive science. The issue of whether to allow capital punishment would fall partly to moral philosophy, partly to
psychology and sociology, perhaps partly to history, and so on.
3. Arguments within ordinary social discourse.
Here I place arguments like those with which I began chapter 2. Here I locate the argument over whether Windsor is
like Detroit in respect of grime, the argument about whether affirmative action programs are justified, and so on. These
are arguments that do not appear to be assignable to any discipline or domain, nor yet to any combination of them. (It
does not follow that disciplinary knowledge and information are not relevant to such arguments.) There is no widely
accepted term that has emerged to characterize this realm of argumentation.
Let's assume that disciplinary arguments will be assessed within the relevant discipline, so there is no problem here.
Now we select an argument, A*, which ex hypothesi is to be addressed from various disciplines that we will abbreviate:
D1, D2, D3. It is important to observe that each discipline must be one in which argument plays a nonnegligible role. I
identify this as a potential problem because it is not clear to me that argumentation plays a formal role in mathematics or
in physics. I understand that physicists and mathematicians argue among themselves but the role that argument plays
there is informal. And it is far from clear that mathematical criteria or standards would have any appreciable role to play
in such argument. Proofs in mathematics are deductive, but that would not preclude mathematicians from using
induction when they argue among themselves.
Now, Weinstein's scenario goes like this:
Let D1 evaluate A*, yielding E1.
Weinstein (and Paul seemed to agree here) said it needs to be asked, which of the threeE1, E2, E3has best analyzed A*,
offering an adequate assess-

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ment? Before we proceed, I want to pause for a moment so that we may appreciate how complex this question is.
In order to answer this question, the evaluator will have to go through a series of steps, invoking each standard's
disciplines: Let D1S1, D1S2, D1S3 . . . be the normative standards set by D1 for the evaluation of arguments; let D2S1,
D2S2, D2S3 . . . be the normative standards as set by D2 . . . and so on. I can now distinguish five positions about the
standards.
Position 1. All standards are discipline specific. That is, the standards by which historians judge arguments are specific
to history and different from those that philosophers use to evaluate their arguments. This looks like Toulmin's view.
Position 2. No standards are discipline specific. All standards are general. That is, the standards of a good argument are
exactly the same in history as in philosophy, and so forth. I am not sure who holds this position.
Position 3. All significant standards are discipline specific. That is, aside from some general and unimportant ones, the
standards of good argument are discipline specific. (This is the same as Position 1, except that significant standard
replaces standard.) This is McPeck's (1981) view; he allowed that some standards are general, namely those of formal
logic; but these are trivial. I suspect that this is also Weinstein's view.
Position 4. All significant standards are general or discipline invariant. (No significant standards are discipline specific.)
I am not sure that anyone holds this view; possibly Paul does.
Position 5. Some significant standards for the evaluation of argument are discipline specific; some are general. This is
the view of Siegel (1988); I tend to agree with this view, although I develop it differently than does Siegel.
Which of these possibilities is actually correct, I do not know. The point of interest here is that in order for Weinstein to
establish his view (Position 3), heor rather the evaluatorneeds to be able to make sense of and compare the three
resulting evaluations: E1, E2, and E3. That is, it will have to be shown that E1 (the evaluation using the standards from
D1) is better and more successful as an evaluation than E2. But this step raises a significant problem for Position 3. To
what (transdisciplinary) standards will the evaluator appeal to decide this matter? What standards will be used to make
this overarching judgement? Indeed, what kind of question is this? From whose perspective will this meta-evaluative
question be asked? There are no easy answers to these questions.

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On the other hand, if we take the view that there are general, field-invariant standards, this question has an answer: We
should use those field-invariant standards. This does not mean that we do not need to make use of the knowledge and
information special to each field. I agree with Weinstein when he wrote:
Further we maintain that information from the fields includes methodological principles, principles of
epistemological and logical relevance that are drawn from the practice of the disciplines and are not available
in the general characterizations of methodology developed by philosophers in abstraction from practice. (p.
126)
In Weinstein's view, no discipline, certainly not philosophy, enjoys methodological pride of place:
The issue is still from whose practice is epistemological warrant to be drawn, and in which cases. Is the a
priori practice of the philosophers to be the model, or is it rather the hermeneutic analysis of literary theorists;
is it the narrative explanations of historians, or the descriptive and analytic offerings of sociologists, the
axiomatic practice of mathematicians, the theory bound derivations of physicists, or is it perhaps the
inductively generated account common in the social sciences? Which of these, and in which combination, in
respect of what aspects, and on which particular occasions? (p. 126)
In asking where to look for the epistemological warrant, Weinstein asked where to find the appropriate justification for
the claims under scrutiny. But notice how the focus has changed. No longer are we discussing arguments but
hermeneutic analyses from literary theory, the explanations of historians, the deductive theories of the formal sciences,
and the inductive theories of the social sciences. In other words, Weinstein was really asking a much broader question:
Which model, or combination of models, is to be imposed on a given specimen of reasoning? Should there be one
overarching model for all inquiry? The question that I am pursuing is a much narrower question: Are there, or are there
not, field-invariant standards of argumentation? If there are not, and if there is to be the kind of meta-evaluative
comparison envisaged by Weinstein, then the problem is simply: By what standards is that meta-evaluative task to be
undertaken?
Weinstein's position about multidisciplinary arguments runs into important difficulties chiefly in that it seems to require
that there be a metadisciplinary standpoint from which to compare and contrast competing evaluations and methods by
practitioners from different disciplines. This standpoint does not, according to Weinstein, exist. If, on the other hand, we
allow that there are field-invariant standards, then we have a basis on which to make comparisons.

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But that is only part of the story. What about the third type of argumentordinary arguments? These can be found any
night in your local newspaper, where people try to influence one another on matters of concern. A recent sample of my
local paper revealed the following issues: an argument that the litter problem was getting out of control, an argument
challenging the federal health minister's attack on cigarette smoking, an argument that the casino that was being built
would cause more problems than it would solve, and a letter praising a reporter for doing a good job. Exclude the last
item as not really being an argument. Can we realistically hope to reduce the other three arguments in such fashion that
they fall into a discipline, or into a bunch of them? To me and to others like Paul, this hope seems unrealistic and
unlikely to be satisfied. It is not at all clear how Weinstein's ecological approach extends to this important realm of
argumentation.
Concluding Reflections on Weinstein
In the final analysis, Weinstein's program for reform stands or falls with the idea of renewal of education by instilling
critical thinking through the disciplines. Informal logic is seen as a tool for achieving that. For informal logic to
develop, informal logicians need to quit writing texts dispensing aseptic principles that make grandiose promises that
cannot be delivered. They need to begin to take seriously the task of constructing a theory of argumentation informed by
a real understanding of the various disciplines and their norms and practices.
Weinstein posed a strong challenge to informal logicians. At bottom, Weinstein believed in the promise of informal
logic while being critical of its focus on textbooks and mundane arguments at the expense of deeper involvement with
the disciplines. It seems to me that Weinstein's challenge is reasonable and timely and that informal logicians can, with
profit, focus on what he called ''stylized arguments." Moreover, such a focus will involve informal logicians to some
degree in the empirical study of argumentation that will help to combat the tendency to a priorism that Weinstein, it
seems to me, rightly identified.
However, there are problems with his challenge. In the first place, Weinstein endorsed Toulmin's model, although he
could not be unaware that this model is itself largely a prioristic in character. Toulmin did not arrive at his model by
coming to understand what the individual disciplines do when they argue; he was unsatisfied with the geometrical
model and he looked for an alternative that he found in jurisprudence. Second, Weinstein's position requires that
argumentation in fact plays a significant role in all disciplines, and that is problematic. Third, as I have shown, there are
problems for his position both in connection to its application to mundane arguments and his position on stylized
arguments. However, a research

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project of some magnitude emerges here and it should be considered seriously by informal logicians. That project would
require informal logicians working together with disciplinary specialists to:
1. investigate the role that argumentation plays with that discipline;
2. identify the standards of argumentation for that discipline;
3. compare the results and see what kind of theory of argumentation emerges.
Having recognized this formidable challenge posed by Weinstein's ecological approach, I leave field theories behind
and turn to quite different approachPragma-dialetics.
The Pragma-Dialectical Approach
The Pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation theory was developed by van Eemeren and Grootendorst. This
theory has its basis in linguistics (Speech Act Theory) but borrows also from the work of logicians like Hamblin and
Toulmin, linguistic philosophers like Austin and Searle, and the work of dialogue logicians like Barth. Van Eemeren
and Grootendorst have given two systematic expositions of their theory: Speech acts in argumentative discussions
(1987), and Argumentation, communication and fallacies (1992). I have chosen the more recent articulation for
discussion here. I do not here attempt to provide a thorough analysis of their theory but rather an overview that will
bring to the fore some of the salient similarities and differences between their approach and the one developed here.
Rather than focusing on argument as product, as I have in my theory, van Eemeren and Grootendorst chose a process-
oriented approach, approaching argumentation through the lens of what they called a critical discussion for which they
attempted to establish an appropriate set of rules. They described it as "a code of conduct for rational discussants."
According to their theory, a critical discussion goes through four stages: a confrontation stage in which the issue and the
thesis are declared; an opening stage, in which the discussants stake out their positions; an argumentation stage, in
which the discussants set forth their arguments; and a concluding stage, in which the discussants come to some
agreement. They presented and justified 10 rules that the discussants must follow. After they presented and argued for
these rules, van Eemeren and Grootendorst showed how what are traditionally called fallacies can be incorporated into
the Pragma-dialectical approach.
A couple of points are worth making at the outset. First, van Eemeren and Grootendorst did not offer this as an
empirical model, nor did they hold

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that actual discussions will take place in quite this way. They called it an "ideal model" yet they argued that it is not a
naive one and it is capable of being empirically validated. Second, they presumably held that a discussion that follows
these 10 rules will, provided other conditions are satisfied, be a critical discussion and that any discussion in which
these rules are violated is not a critical discussion. In other words, the 10 rules provide necessary and sufficient
conditions for a critical discussion.
The 10 Rules of Pragma-Dialectics
I now present the 10 rules as presented and, in each case, indicate what, if any, parallel is to be found in the approach of
informal logic. I refer to the two discussants as The Pope (the proponent) and Olga (the opponent),7 and I use "IL" to
stand for informal logic, and "PD" to stand for pragma-dialectics.
Rule 1. Parties must not prevent each other from advancing or casting doubt on standpoints. The Pope may not attempt
to prevent Olga from raising doubts about his argument. He may not say, "I am the Pope and therefore you must accept
the legitimacy of my argument." To do so is precisely uncritical. In my approach, Rule I is covered by the principle of
vulnerability discussed in chapter 8. Other approaches to informal logic might claim that the force of this rule is
imbedded in the practice of argumentation.
Rule 2. A party that advances a standpoint is obliged to defend it if the other party asks him to do so. In Pragma-
dialectics, the burden of proof is initially assigned to the respondent. The Pope can assert whatever he pleases and is
only obliged to give reasons if Olga requests them. In my approach, the arguer is obligatedby the criterion of
acceptabilityto provide reasons for any assertion he makes, unless there is some contextual reason for not doing so. I
discuss this difference later.
Rule 3. A party's attack on a standpoint must relate to the standpoint that has indeed been advanced by the other party.
If the Pope mischaracterizes or distorts Olga's position, he has violated this rule. In IL, this is covered by the relevance
criterion. If the arguer does not properly address the position, he will be guilty of the fallacy of straw person.
Rule 4. A party may defend his standpoint only by advancing argumentation relating to that standpoint. This rule is
meant to preclude other ways of de-
7 In the 1992 formulation, van Eemeren and Grootendorst removed the adversarial language that marked
earlier formulations.

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fending a standpoint, such as some form of trickery or force. Thus, the Pope would violate this rule if he attempted to
defend his standpoint by saying, "Olga, don't you know who I am. I am the Pope." In some versions of IL, there are
fallacies such as the appeal to force or fear that rule out their use in establishing the conclusion of an argument. In my
approach, no such fallacy is needed because the prohibition against such maneuvers is built into my understanding of
the very practice of argumentation; namely, that reasons and reasons only are what may be appealed to. Anyone who
attempted to prevail by trickery or force would, by that very attempt, reveal that he or she was not a good-faith
participant in the practice.
Rule 5. A party may not falsely present something as a premise that has been left unexpressed by the other party or deny
a premise that has been left implicit by that party. Suppose the Pope argues, "The Gospel message is directed to the soul
and hence we need not consider its applicability to animals, only humans." Olga may challenge the Pope's assumption
that only humans have souls. The Pope is accountable for this premise, even though it has not been articulated. (How
and why this is so is discussed in great detail by van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992.) In IL, the force of this rule is
contained in the recognition that an argument may be criticized by formulating and criticizing its missing premises.
Here there is very little divergence between the two approaches.
Rule 6. A party may not falsely present a premise as an accepted starting point nor deny a premise representing an
accepted starting point. This means that Olga and the Pope must reach agreement that certain statements are
permissable without the need for their being defended. These are the accepted starting points. In IL, this is embodied in
the requirement of acceptability; that is, that those premises not defended by the arguer must be such that they are
acceptable to the audience. However, as I have argued, there are problems with the acceptability requirement, both as to
what it means and with its consequences.
The advantage of PD here is that it contains a procedure for indexing these propositions. The question, "How does one
determine whether a proposition is acceptable?" has a simple answer in PD: Check the list of mutually accepted
propositions (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1987). However, I see difficulties, principally this one: How are the
participants to know in advance how their discussion will develop? How are they to know in advance which of the
propositions they believe they should put forward for inclusion on the Index? This rule must somehow be amended or
so understood as to allow for the development of this index in a continuous way throughout the critical discussion.

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Rule 7. A party may not regard a standpoint as conclusively defended if the defense does not take place by means of an
appropriate argumentation scheme that is correctly applied. This means that Olga and the Pope must have some
agreement on the ways of arguing that both accept. In IL, the force of this rule is built into the criteria for good
arguments, and negatively, into the recognition that certain common ways of argumentcall them fallaciesare not
acceptable.
If we look at Rules 6 and 7, their provenance is not hard to discern. The background for these rules is furnished by FDL
and the ideal of soundness that requires that the arguer begin with true premises and then preserve truth by using a valid
argument form. The conclusion will then be true and its truth will be an outgrowth of the argument. Instead of truth,
which criterion PD altogether abandonsit appears nowhere in the rulesPD has premises that belong to an agreed-on and
indexed set of propositions. Instead of validity, which is related to deductive argumentation, PD (wisely, it seems to me)
invokes "a appropriate argumentation scheme that is correctly applied." This does not preclude the use of validity but it
does leave open other possibilities. There are problems with this rule. However, I postpone discussion of them until later.
Note finally that both of these rules suppose that a proposition that has been conclusively defendeda supposition at odds
with the principle of vulnerability. One might claim that a standpoint has been conclusively defended just in case the
Opponent concedes that it has been conclusively defended. But if this is to be a rational undertaking, there should be
some way of spelling out just what is required for a standpoint to have been conclusively defended. However, no such
articulation exists, so far as I am aware.
Rule 8. In argumentation, a party may only use arguments that are valid or capable of being logically validated by
making explicit one or more unexpressed premises. This means that if the Pope presents an argument (P1,P2,P3C), then
that argument must be valid or it must be capable of being validated by the addition of a missing premise. Rule 8
appears to take back the ground that was given in Rule 7; it appears to restrict the argumentation schemes to those that
are valid or capable of being validated. Further, Rule 8 seems to house a commitment to deductivism, and I showed in
chapter 3 what some of the problems associated with deductivism are. Rule 8 has no counterpart in IL. I have more to
say about this later this chapter.
Rule 9. A failed defense must result in the retraction of the standpoint by party that put it forward and a conclusive
defense with the other party retracting his doubt about the standpoint. In other words, if the Pope's defense of his

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standpoint fails, he must withdraw the standpoint. If he successfully parries Olga's doubt, she should withdraw her doubt.
The parallel in IL is that if the arguer cannot meet the criticisms of the critic, then the arguer is obligatedunder the
constraints of rationality at work hereto withdraw the argument. On the other hand, if the criticisms are satisfied, then the
critic is obligated to withdraw them.
Rule 10. A party must not use formulations that are insufficiently clear or confusingly ambiguous and must interpret the
other party's formulations as carefully as possible. Vagueness and ambiguity are covered by IL in the criterion of
acceptability. The principle of charity requires accuracy of interpretation and has been amply discussed in informal logic.
In summary, it seems that there is significant congruence between PD and IL. Each of the 10 rules, with the possible
exceptions of Rules 6, 7, and 8, seems to have a counterpart in IL. Apart from what appear to be some slight differences,
one may well suspect that IL and PD are simply different routes to the same goal, as Fig. 10.1 suggests. The main
differences between Pragma-dialectics and the theory developed in this book appear to fall into three categories:
1. Focus. PD explicitly targets the process of spoken discourse and relies heavily on a speech act approach to discourse,
whereas my approach focuses on texts as products or outcomes and draws more heavily on logic for its analytic and
normative apparatus.
2. Type. PD focuses explicitly on what the authors called a critical discussion, whereas IL focuses on arguments. These are
clearly related. Indeed, it is even said that critical discussions will typically contain arguments as parts. I may also suspect
that arguments typically grow out of critical discussions. Still, the criteria that determine whether or not a discussion is
rational are not in themselves going to yield a verdict whether a particular argument is a good one. The reverse is also true.
3. Evaluative apparatus. PD is formulated in terms of rules of procedure that govern the process; IL makes use of standards
or criteria that apply to
INFORMAL LOGIC PRAGMA-DIALECTICS

medium written spoken
focus product = argument process = critical discussion
normative apparatus criteria rules
Fig. 10.1
Some differences between Pragma-dialectics and informal logic.

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the product. Rules are appropriate normative considerations for a process; criteria are appropriate normative
considerations for a product. If product and process are interdependent, as they are here, there is some reason to think
that the normative force of the rules will be comparable to the normative force of the criteria. That is, my intuition is
that some sort of convergence ought to occur in roughly the following way: Good processes yield good products and
good products are the result of good processes.
The interesting and important theoretical issue raised here is how to verify and justify this judgment about whether such
convergence is a hope or a reality. How, precisely, does one go about comparing the two approaches? This issue seems
an important one for the theory of argument. I do not attempt to deal with that issue here (although I return to it in the
next chapter) and instead proceed with some further comments about PD from the perspective of the theory developed
here.
Some Problems with the Pragma-Dialectical Approach
There are a number of additional problems with these as a set of rules to guide critical discussion. In the first place,
although the rules purport to be rules for rational discussion, van Eemeren and Grootendorst borrowed heavily from
concepts and criteria developed by logicians in their attempt to develop a theory of argument evaluation. That is, it
appears that their theory in some ways presupposes or leans on a theory of argument that focuses on the product. Thus,
Rule 5 makes reference to missing premises. This concept has a natural home in the theory of argument, as I showed in
chapter 2, but how does the concept of a premise (never mind that of a missing premise) fit the idea of a critical
discussion? Similarly, the idea of validity seems to originate from theories that aim to assess arguments as products
rather than the process of arguing.
Having made those general comments, I now discuss some problems with their Rules 7 and 8.
Rule 7 places heavy emphasis on the notion of an appropriately applied argumentation scheme and further requires that
we be able to tell when such a scheme is commonly accepted and when correctly applied.8 Here is an area where the
two approaches meet because both have an interest in the study of argumentation schemes.
However, it should be noted that there may be a tension between this rule and Rule 8 because Rule 7 would allow Olga
and the Pope to make use of inductive argumentation, which Rule 8 seems to prohibit. That is, Rule 8
8 For thoughts on the problems connected with this task, see Blair and Johnson (1993).

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seems to take back the ground that was given in Rule 7. Rule 8 appears to restrict the argumentation schemes to those
that are valid or a capable of being validated. This rule would seem to prohibit Olga and the Pope from using an
inductive method like sampling because the conclusion drawn from a properly constituted sample follows only with
some degree of probability and is not valid in the usual sense.
I say "would seem" because van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992) wanted to avoid equating validity with deductive
validity. They said, "we do not want to take a specific and definitive stance on the question of exactly what kind of
logical validity criterion is to be preferred" (p. 60). They appeared to reject Rescher's idea that an inductive inference is
a failed deductive one and they were sensitive to Govier's critique of deductivism. Yet in their treatment of unexpressed
premises, they committed themselves to propositional logic and first-order predicate logic as the vehicles for fleshing
out missing premises.
What, then, are PD's options regarding validity? I see only four.
1. PD can retain validity (as a necessary consequence) as a necessary condition for good argument. This is the view of
the formalist, but van Eemeren and Grootendorst seem to have ruled it out.
2. PD can retain validity (as a necessary consequence) as one among several criteria. They might, for example, take the
view that there are various genres of argument; and that for deductive arguments, validity is the appropriate criterion;
for inductive inference, strength is the appropriate criterion; and so on, perhaps to embracing even conductive argument.
3. PD can retain validity but reinterpret it so that it becomes a matter of degree. Thomas (1973, 1984) adopted this
approach, as did Berg (1992).
4. PD can abandon validity. Most informal logicians (myself included) advocate this move. I have argued (Johnson,
1992) that validity is an appropriate standard for implications, which must be distinguished from arguments, even if
they are occasionally part of arguments.
My suggestion would be that van Eemeren and Grootendorst abandon validity. It seems to me that the main reason they
had for introducing validity was to handle the problem of missing premises. The irony is that the problem of missing
premises may well be a bogus problem.9 The problem arises most acutely for text-driven approaches of the syllogistic
and
9 Perhaps I should say a problem only if one assumes a deductivist stance in one's theory of argument. See
Govier (1987).

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propositional sort. The reason one has to fill in missing premises or an unexpressed premise is that the arguer has,
apparently, failed to do so and is not present to aid the interlocutor in discovering what is missing. But if the arguer is
present as an interlocutor, as ex hypothesi will be the case in a critical discussion, then Olga can simply observe that
there is a kind of gap in what the Pope has just said and ask the arguer how the Pope proposes to fill it. Thus, if the Pope
has argued, "Angie is a real woman; therefore Angie is nosy," then Olga may simply ask, "But how do you get from that
premise to that conclusion?" The Pope will respond, most likely, "Because all real women are nosy." The point is that
Olga does not need to figure out what the missing premise is; she can ask the Pope to provide it. They may disagree as
to what the Pope is committed to, but that is a separate matter.
It is unfortunate that PD has made use of a standard (validity) that appears both superfluous in the context of a critical
discussion and also to be a central element in the logico-centric approach (which they reject).
Thus far, I have discussed some of the differences that appear when one looks at the IL approach from the direction of
the 10 rules. I have shown that they have different approaches to the question of the burden of proof, to the acceptability
of premises, and the role of validity. I want now to look at PD from the perspective of IL.
In the IL approach as I have developed it here, the arguer is obligated within the course of the argument to address at
least some of the objections to the standpoint presented, if there are suchand there almost always are. This material
constitutes the dialectical tier. There does not seem to be any similar requirement in PD. The only objections that the
proponent must deal with are those raised by the opponent. That seems to me to be a problem.
Suppose that Olga and the Pope are arguing and the Pope puts forward a standpoint and proceeds to defend it in
accordance with the rules. And let me further suppose that the Pope knows of a very serious objection (call it The
Cardinal Objection) to his standpoint and that Olga is not aware of this Cardinal objection and consequently does not
bring it up as a challenge anywhere in the dispute between them. The Pope has satisfactorily met all of Olga's
challenges and so, according to Rule 9, she must withdraw her challenge. The Pope wins.
Something seems amiss here. I believe that the Pope is under a rational obligation to meet that objection, although
nothing in the PD's 10 rules require him to do so. Why do I say this? Suppose that the next day, Olga is strolling along
the Via Negativa, she encounters the Cardinal, and they get to talking about her encounter with the Pope. Olga tells the
Cardinal that she lost the dispute because she was not able to persuade the Pope rationally to withdraw his thesis. When
she is done, the Cardinal says, "Of course,

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you confronted him with the objection that . . . ?" Olga says that she has not heard of that objection. The Cardinal
assures her that the objection is a fairly standard one that, in fact, derives from his own thinking and that the Pope surely
knows it, for he himself has raised it and the Pope did not have an adequate reply! What will Olga think? Will she not
think (with some justification) that she has been, to some degree, hoodwinked by the Pope? Olga might well wonder
whether the resolution of their dispute was rational. From her current perspective, it will certainly not appear to have
been rational.10
Whether approached from the perspective of PD or IL, rationality is an evident characteristic of argument. Both
arguments and critical discussions are rational products; both also exhibit rationality. Here is what van Eemeren and
Grootendorst (1987) said about the norm of rationality:
A language user taking part in an argumentative discussion is a rational language user if in the course of the
discussion he performs only speech acts which accord with a system of rules acceptable to all discussants
which furthers the creation of a dialectic which can lead to a resolution of the dispute at the centre of the
discussion. (p. 18)
This makes the rationality of argumentation a function of the participants' adherence to a set of rules characterised as (a)
acceptable to all discussants; or (b) furthering the creation of dialectic, which can lead to a resolution of the dispute at
the center. Still, a person might violate one of the rules and yet be rational. For example, an arguer might well refuse to
follow Rule 8 in a reconstruction of someone's argument. Would that mean that this person was not a rational language
user? If that is what the norm entails, then it seems much too restrictive. So I see a problem with their articulation of the
norm of rationality.
However the requirement of rationality is to be phrased, it will not be enough. The resolution must not only accord with
the demands of rationality, however these are understood. The resolution must also appear rational to participants and
onlookers. If, then, I am to appreciate the true nature of
10 There are at least two ways that a Pragma-dialectician might attempt to meet this objection. Pinto has
suggested that Olga has not done her homework and so would not have any basis for rational complaint. There
is value in this observation, although whether it is sufficient to dislodge the objection I am raising here is not
clear to me. The theoretical issue that it raises for me is just this: It is clear that the arguer is under an
obligation to discharge some dialectical obligations; that is, answer objections, anticipate criticisms, and so
on. Clearly, the arguer cannot be expected to deal with all of the possible and or actual objections. So how
does one specify which ones? This is The Specification Problem, which I discuss in chapter 11.
Jacobs suggested that the Pope has violated one of the sincerity conditions. This claim, if true, might allow PD to
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argumentation, its real genius, as it were, I must understand it as not only characterized by rationality, but also by
manifest rationality.
Argumentation as understood by IL can satisfy this requirement; I argued this in chapter 5. I am not sure that the same
can be said for PD. Indeed, I have given two reasons to think otherwise. The first is that its position on the burden of
proof does not square with the requirements of manifest rationality. It would seem more in accordance with the idea of
manifest rationality that the one who makes an assertion be responsible for supporting it if it is at all controversial. The
assertor, who is ex hypothesi rational, must realize that if it is controversial and not defended, the interlocutor will (or
should) ask for that defense. So what could be the point in waiting for someone to ask for something that should be
furnished in the first place? Such reluctance is difficult to comprehend and certainly does not appear rational to me.
The second reason that argumentation as understood by PD may fall short of meeting the requirement of manifest
rationality is its position on handling objections and other dialectical material. It may be argued that the absence of any
rule requiring the Pope to deal with objections is still within the norm of rationality (as set forth previously), although I
have doubts. It is a much harder argument to make that the absence of such a rule preserves the requirement of manifest
rationality. How can it appear rational not to entertain objections to a standpoint where any rational antagonist or
participant will know that there are such? Here, I find another substantial difference between PD and IL.
Concluding Reflections
This is not the place to attempt a full assessment of the Pragma-dialectical approach. That would require a detailed
discussion of its merits as a programmatic approach to the theory of argumentation, as well as its limitations.
I have compared the Pragma-dialectical approach to the approach outlined here. In many ways, PD and IL are perhaps
not so much rival theories as alternative approaches to the same end. Earlier, I said that they are focused on different
aspects of the practice of argumentation; that is, that IL is more concerned with establishing criteria for the evaluation of
the argument considered as product, whereas Pragma-dialectics is more concerned with formulating rules for the proper
conduct of the process of arguing.
There is, as I have shown, much overlap between the two. Both are committed to certain basic conditions as necessary
for the practice of argumentation; PD calls them higher-order conditions. Both are committed to the need to theorize
about argumentation in a dialectical and teleological context; both are committed to the idea of argumentation as a
rational

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engagement. Both retain the traditional notion of premiseconclusion structure; both see a role for fallacies in the process
of evaluation, although they understand this concept in different ways. Both are committed to the idea that there are
normative issues that are universal in character rather than subject specific. The criteria used by IL bear interesting
resemblance to the rules of PD, although the metatheoretical issue of how one compares such different systems is a
crucial and, thus far, unanswered one. Both IL and PD make use of relevance and some form of acceptability.
Sufficiency is not mentioned specifically by PD, although one may take it that some such criterion would emerge in
detailed treatments of Rule 7 or 8. The main difference is that PD abandons any reference to truth, whereas I have
argued that IL should embrace a truth requirement. With that much in common, where are the significant differences?
Some differences have emerged in the discussion of the 10 rules put forth by PD. One significant difference appears to
be the type of logic theory that will be employed. Informal logic is committed to the centrality of logic in any account of
the normative issues surrounding argumentation, whereas PD is a more wide-ranging theory and in its attitude toward
logic, it is more ambivalent. Although both IL and PD are critical of the logical tradition (what I have characterized as
FDL, van Eemeren and Grootendorst referred to as ''the logico-centric approach"), PD seems to remain under the
influence of the traditional logic chiefly in its reliance on the conception of validity. It is true that van Eemeren and
Grootendorst attempted to disengage from the formal concept of validity, but they did not provide an analysis of this
broader conception of validity, and their system is heavily dependent on their providing some such.
Moreover, when van Eemeren and Grootendorst mentioned "appropriate argumentation schemes," the question that will
naturally arise is: Is there a taxonomy of argumentation schemes? They discuss argument forms like the argumentum ad
populum, and argumentum ad verecundiam, which leads to the suspicion that what they called argumentation schemes
are closely related to fallacies and the related argument forms or patterns. The question then becomes what sort of
logical theory can be used to generate the notion of validity and to shore up the notion of argumentation schemes.
One final point. The crucial concept of a critical discussion is never analyzed, although descriptions and
characterisations of its features are offered. The question occurs: How does a critical discussion differ from a rational
discussion? In my view, a critical discussion would be characterized by each participant's ability to see the strengths and
weaknesses in the arguments as presented. There is nothing in the rules that ensures that this will occur. Moreover, one
might ask whether these rules really are sufficient (along with what they call higher-order conditions) to capture the
ideal of a critical discussion? On what grounds can it be said that there are not other

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rules? To approach the same concern from a slightly different angle, is it possible for a discussant to violate one of these
rules and yet have that discussion still be considered a rational or critical one?
No less than for the theory I advocate here, there are important unanswered questions for the Pragma-dialectical
approach.
Willard's Theory of Argumentation
Communication Theories and Argument
Argumentation has been the subject of study not only in logic and epistemology and linguistics, but also in the
disciplines of speech communication and rhetoric. Many theorists from these disciplines have developed approaches to
argumentation, among them Ehninger (1974), Wenzel (1987), and Jackson and Jacobs (1980), to name just a few. One
of the most recent attempts to develop a systematic approach argumentation from an alternative theoretical point of
view is that of Willard (1989). In this section, I want to have a brief look at this approach. The thesis that Willard
defended in his theory of argument is that argument is best understood not as a kind of logic but as a processa kind of
communication; in fact, a conversation between two persons who disagree. In some respects, then, Willard's theory
resembles dialogical theories. It differs in several important respects, one of them the role Willard assigned to dissensus.
The theory of communication, rather than logic or linguistic theory, provides the crucial insights for the theory of
argumentation. In developing this theory, Willard made use of a number of theories of communication, including
symbolic interactionism, personal construct theory, constructivism, and most especially O'Keefe's (1986) Message
Design Logic. Willard's view that communication theory provides the optimum context for a theory of argument runs
counter to the claim of this work, that informal logic provides the optimum context. Ultimately, I question Willard's
proposal that communication theory, rather than logic, provides the best foundation, not denying that Willard's theory
makes important and complementary contributions.
Some idea of the range and the breadth of Willard's theory is indicated in this quote:
At first blush, the theory may seem to be little more than Aristotle's dialectic gussied up in modern
communication terms. But Aristotle's dialectic uses a serial predicate sense of argumentordinary argument
being elided syllogisms, things, units of proof and serial predications. . . . The theory defended here . . .
defines argument in terms of encounters based on dissensus . . . (p. 8)

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Willard's theory of argument differs from others (perhaps less so from PD) in its theory of analysis. According to
Willard, the problem with logically driven theories of argument is that their conception of argument is impoverished.
This echoes my own complaint.
Willard addressed several audiences, those like van Eemeren and Grootendorst, who believed that Speech Act Theory is
the proper theoretical framework for approaching argumentation. He likewise addressed those who believe that logic is
the proper vehicle and who therefore see argument primarily as a set of propositions, whether this is understood in a
formalist or informalist way.
It is important likewise to recall, as was mentioned previously, that Willard saw his publication as part of a sequence of
works, the others of which are mentioned in the preface. It is the successor to Argumentation and the Social Grounds of
Knowledge, in which Willard (1983) elaborated in detail the thesis that argumentation aims at dissensus rather than
consensus. It is a prelude to other books to come. Hence, Willard presented us with a theory in process.
Willard's Theory of Argument
Willard's theory of argument is the focus of the first section of the book. The main thesis here is that argument is a type
of communication. Chapter 1 is devoted to an exploration of the theoretical bases. In chapter 2, Willard discussed
argument as interaction. In chapter 3, he looked at argument as emergent action and in chapter 4, he viewed argument as
utterance. In chapter 5, he looked at the epistemic aspect of argument and, in chapter 6, argument as personal influence.
Just from the mention of these topics, it is apparent that Willard's focus was on a much broader conception of argument
than the one offered here. I want now to double back and pick up a few threads in this conception of argument.
The view that argument is a form of interaction yields a harvest of characteristics. It means that argument is a co-
operative activity and an intentional one involving speakers who mean to say particular things; it is also creative and
strategic communication in which the arguer adapts the communication to persons and situations.
Willard then presented his definition of argument and then unpacks its contents. The definition is: "[A]rgument is a kind
of interaction in which two or more people maintain what they construe to be incompatible positions" (p. 42). This
definition is intended to capture at least three different levels of argumentative activity: (a) naturally occurring
argument, (b) epistemic (justificatory, deliberative argument), and finally, (c) disciplined discourse. Because each of
these levels of activity is one that I have focused on, the scope of Willard's definition and the scope of the definition
offered in this work are roughly the same.

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Willard further developed his theory by focusing on the fact that arguments are scenes that develop over time. They are
not fixed in the way that formal, and perhaps informal, logicians have often construed them. He said, "Arguments are
'emergent'; we make them us as we go along. We improvise, change course, and adapt to developments" (p. 67). Seeing
argument as emergent cuts against three ways of regarding themseeing them as speech acts, as situated, and as
utterance. Each of these aspects, although indispensable to my understanding of argument, is, if not carefully handled,
capable of obscuring the emergent character of arguments.
Willard did not deny that arguments also have a serial and structured dimension. They are sequential, ordered serially
according to conventional principles. They are heavily reliant on talk. Their continuity arises from topical coherence,
adaption to situation, and procedural etiquettes. The importance of seeing arguments as emergent is that it gives full
value to the fact that ambiguities can be resolved and that claims can change meaning and, finally, that revisions can
readily be accommodated within this framework but not so readily in a text driven model.
Willard looked at argument as utterance. Willard's point was not to convince anyone to abandon or subordinate
particular views about argument, but to prove that the issue of defining argument utterance and marking it off from
other modes of speech is less important than is commonly thought.
In the final analysis, then, Willard advocated a pluralism that stops at the door of the overt reasons view of argument.
Willard went on to discuss the epistemic effects of argument, finding them to be somewhat exaggerated. Argumentation
is fragile and easily subverted. What is not clear to me is whether the practice of argumentation as he described it is
really so easily subverted.
Willard then investigated two claims: (a) that ethos is a pivotal component of the logic of assent and (b) that ethos is
inextricably tied to rational argument. He discussed the role of authority and individualism and its role here.
Finally, Willard looked at argumentation's place in a family of terms, some of which are rationality and freedom. He
presented that Argumentation should be treated as a Discipline, a recommendation I take up in chapter 12.
Thoughts about Willard's Theory
This is only a sketch of Willard's theory, a proper exposition of which would take much more space than can be allotted
here. I focus on Willard's conception of argument.

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To get some sense of the difference between Willard's approach and mine, consider the following specimen from his
book:
Two academics are discussing a proposed newcomer to their department:
C: An FTE is an FTE.
T: [Whines; shakes head; sour facial expression] Noooooooooo.
C: Look, we ain't gonna get any more lines anytime soon; this is yer classic bird in the hand.
T: [Shakes head; whines; repeats facial expression] Noooo.
C: I can't lose sight of a whole FTE. Man! A whole line.
T: [Whining] An FTE is not an FTE. [Shakes head; holds hands to head as if suffering from a headache]
C: We can get the guy to teach some things for us.
T: What things? What can he do for us?
T: He can teach the baby course.
T: [Whines] Ohhh. We don't neeeeed it.
C: Look, man, law of the jungle: expand or die.
T: Expand and die. Bloated. (p. 93)
Here is Willard's analysis of this text:
The text is too sparse for logical analysis. One cannot formally assess "an FTE is an FTE" without knowing
what C means. One can say that C's reason is weak, but it is unclear from the text whether the reason is
produced to support "an FTE is an FTE" or some other claim that is taken for granted. . . .
T gives no explicit reasons, but his whines and grimaces are pivotal to the conversation's progress. He is
participating in the argument whether or not his utterances fit anybody's criteria for "making an argument."
Like any language user, T depends upon C's memory of past conversations to give sense to T's utterancesan
assumption typical of enthymematic speech. The substitution of paralinguistic cues for serial predication is an
economy measure available to arguers with mature relationships. The relationship's history permits a
shorthand that yields the benefits of dissensus with its costs in time. (p. 94)
From this example and Willard's analysis, we get some sense for both what Willard is interested in and how he
approached his subject. He was interested in argumentation as an interaction between persons, an interaction based
around disagreement, in which the parties contest. For Willard, the focal point is the process of argument as an
emergent event. An argument is, above all else, a conversation. Willard's paramount concern was to understand the
dynamics of such exchanges, to understand how the speaker's moves contribute to the ongoing interchange. Thus,
Willard wrote, "He is

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participating in the argument whether or not his criteria fit anybody's criteria for 'making an argument'" (p. 94).
I would interpret this claim in the following way: T is certainly engaged in the process of arguing, but T has not
formulated his position as an argument in the sense discussed in this book. T may not ever need or intend to do so. We
certainly want theories of communication that will help us to understand the process of arguing as an important form of
human interaction. We also need theories of argument that will help us to understand and evaluate the products of such
interchanges when the arguer takes the time to codify themregarding them, if you willand prettying them up for a wider
audience. Willard's theory of argumentation is focused on the former, whereas mine is focused on the latter. Our
purposes are largely complementary, although I believe there are fundamental disagreements, particularly on whether or
not it makes sense to attempt to constitute Argumentation as a Discipline. That is a discussion for chapter 12.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I discussed several alternative theories and, in each case, attempted to show where and how the theory in
question differs from the theory proposed here, as well as what their relative strengths and weaknesses are.
It is possible that those who advocate some form of field theory are right and that the significant standards of argument
are field-dependent. But I do not believe that a compelling case has been made by any field theorist, certainly not by
Toulmin. The strongest case, it seems to me, would be to show that the standards for a good argument in history are S1,
S2, and S3, whereas the standards for a good argument in philosophy are S4, S5, and S6. To the best of my knowledge,
no one has yet produced the evidence that would be required to show this. Nor do I think it likely. Here is why:
The role that argument plays in the disciplines in which it figures prominently is similar to the role that theory plays in
the sciences. Both are attempts to get at the truth using reasoning and reasoning alone; both produce results that are
likely to be criticized and found wanting. In the case of scientific theory, there is not, so far as I know, one set of
standards for evaluating theories in physics, another for theories in chemistry, and a third for theory in biology. Hence, I
am inclined to think that field theories are false.
With respect to dialogical approaches, in particular Pragma-dialectics, what the discussion seems to me to bring to the
fore is that in the final analysis, a theory of argument is best constructed on argument as product. To put it as
straightforwardly as possible, any process-based theory will

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ultimately find itself having recourse to the results delivered by product-oriented theories. I do not think an argument
can be made for the reverse; that is, that product-based theories will require supplementation from process-based
theories.
In the next chapter, I want to pick up a number of loose threads: problems that I have postponed dealing with and also
the development of a research agenda for informal logic, for the theory of argument and also for the theory of reasoning.

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Chapter 11
Outstanding Issues and the Research Agenda
During the course of this book, problems of different types have emerged. In this chapter, I want to catalog those
problems and, where possible, suggest possible solutions or avenues of approach. On the basis of that discussion, I also
hope to set forth research agendas for the theory of argument in general and, in particular, for informal logic.
The problems that have emerged in the course of this book belong to four different categories. First, there are problems
specific to my theory: The Specification Problem, The Completeness Problem, The Integration Problem and The
Application Problem. I want to present a possible resolution of those problems. Second, I look at those problems that
belong on a research agenda for informal logic. Third, there are problems that belong on a research agenda for the
theory of argument. Fourth, there are problems that point to the need for a theory of reasoning; they will be dealt with in
the next chapter.
Possible Solutions to Outstanding Problems
In chapter 6, The Specification Problem emerged. Briefly, it is this: If the arguer is required by the nature of argument
to deal with objections and criticisms, how are we to specify which ones? (This problem reappeared in chap. 8 during
the discussion of the principle of vulnerability.)
In chapter 7, where I presented my theory of evaluation, three problems emerged in connection with criteria proposed
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a good argument. Recall that those criteria were relevance, sufficiency, acceptability, and truth. Several problems have
accumulated around this theory of evaluation.
First, there was the problem of whether the proposed criteria for evaluation constituted a complete set of criteria. I
called this The Completeness Problem. There are three distinct aspects of this problem. The first is whether the criteria
proposed for the illative core are complete. I refer to this as Completeness1. The second issue is whether the criteria for
the dialectical tier form a complete set. I refer to this as Completeness2. The third issue is whether there is justification
for thinking that the criteria for the illative core and the dialectical tier together are complete. Might an argument not
satisfy the structural and the dialectical criteria and yet not be a good argument? I refer to this as Completeness3.
Second, The Integration Problem stems from the tension in the criteria for the illative core. Specifically, there can be a
conflict between the criteria of truth and acceptability. As I showed in chapter 10, a premise might be true (in some
sense) but not acceptable. A premise might be acceptable but not true. Can I have a theory containing criteria that yield
different verdicts regarding premise adequacy? Is there a way these criteria can be dovetailed?
Finally, there is the more practical problem of how to apply the criteria for the illative core. I call this The Application
Problem.
These are the problems I plan to address, and I begin with The Specification Problem.
The Specification Problem
According to my theory of analysis, every argument should contain a dialectical tier. What are its contents? To develop
this notion a bit further, let us say that a dialectical field takes shape around a certain issue: for example, the legitimacy
of capital punishment. Suppose the arguer wishes to persuade that capital punishment should be forbidden. We may
imagine this conclusion as a point in the center of a given field. The various positions on those issues (those who favor
it for its deterrence value, those who favor it for its retributive value, those who oppose it absolutely, those who oppose
it except for certain cases, and so on) can be represented as points in the neighborhood of the issue. From each of these
locations, there will very likely be objections and criticisms directed at the argument.
What will these objections look like? According to the theory I have advocated here, they will be of two sorts: There
will be objections to the illative core and there will be objections to the dialectical tier. In what follows, I restrict
attention to the former. (I do not believe that the particularities of the theory I have proposed affect the discussion of this
issue.)

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An objection to the illative core will typically take one of the following forms:
a challenge to the truth or acceptability of one (or more) of the premises in the core;
a challenge to the inference from the premises to the conclusion (or, in my theory, a challenge to the relevance or
sufficiency of the premises);
a challenge to an unstated premise;
a challenge to an implication or consequence, typically; or
a challenge to the effect that a proposition in the core has not been clearly formulated.
The question I wish to raise here as part of an effort to understand the contents of the dialectical tier is: How many and
which objections must be dealt with in the dialectical tier, and how does the arguer determine which ones to deal with?1
I can think of four answers, none of which is entirely satisfactory by itself. I discuss them in what I take to be ascending
order of their attractiveness and plausibility and then come up with what I believe is the best formulation of the arguer's
obligations.
Option 1. The arguer must address all possible and actual objections and criticisms.
Option 2. The arguer should address all and only those objections that he or she knows how to defuse.
Option 3. The arguer should address all those objections that the audience will want to see addressed.
Option 4. The arguer should address The Standard Objections (TSO).
There has been little discussion of this problem in the literature of logic and argumentation theory. One who has
addressed it, although from a different angle, is Johnstone (1978), who made the following points, "I shall begin by
remarking that it is commonly supposed that anyone who makes a philosophical statement is under some obligation to
respond to the criticisms of those to whom the statement is addressed" (p. 14). In these re-
1 This is necessary but not, I think, sufficient. The arguer must also handle criticisms (which are a slightly
different matter) and must handle alternative positions (again a slightly different matter). In thinking through
these matters, I want to acknowledge the excellent and insightful criticisms raised by Govier (1998).

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marks, Johnstone was thinking specifically about philosophical argumentation, but I see no reason to think that this
particular point cannot be generalized and considered applicable to all arguments. What is the nature of this obligation?2
One answer is provided by the approach I have advocated here and the characteristic features I have been stressing: that
argumentation is an exercise in rational persuasion, and it is not enough for the arguer simply to provide the evidence
for the thesis. The arguer must therefore deal with objections. The obligation stems, as I argued in chapter 6, from the
very nature of the practice. In the remark quoted previously, it seems that Johnstone was suggesting an option that
combines elements of both Option 2 and Option 4. But before I consider his suggestion, let me look at Option 1, which
Johnstone eliminated by saying, ''He need not, of course, reply to all criticisms or questions" (p. 14). Johnstone did not
say why the arguer need not reply to all criticisms (I shall say objections).
It seems clear that Option 1 is wrong. To see why, let me suppose that I am concerned here with objection tokens rather
than objection types. (I shall assume that the distinction between types and tokens is familiar and I do not need to work
through the details. For clarification, see Martinich, 1996.) To clarify the distinction here, let me refer to the argument
Ayer offered for the elimination of metaphysics. One objection type to Ayer's argument would be that there is no clear
distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions. An objection token would be the claim that Ayer's formulation
of the principle of verification suffers from being stated in terms of propositions.3
A possible objection token would be Quine's (1963) argument that there is no clear boundary between the two. This is
possible because it had not yet been formulated (so far as I know) when Ayer put forth his argument in 1936; yet it is
surely an objection that might have been put forth and could have been anticipated then. I do not think I can say that
Ayer was under an obligation to have anticipated and dealt with the Quine objection. To suggest that Ayer's argument is
incomplete because it does not take account of the Quine objection token seems excessive and places impossible
demands on the arguer. The arguer cannot be obligated to know the future in that way. No one can know what
objections future arguers may bring. Indeed, scholars are not always successful in anticipating the objections that their
contemporaries might wish to press.
2 Hansen reminded me that Kant has distinguished between perfect and imperfect obligations. A perfect
obligation is directed to a specific person, such as an obligation to be faithful to one's wife; an imperfect
obligation is generic, such as the obligation to give to charity, which is not an obligation to any specific
charity. It is not at all clear what sort of obligation the arguer has in the matter of handling objections. Perhaps
it is a mixture of both.
3 Lazerowitz (1937) raises just such an objection. Ayer (1952) credits Lazerowitz with that objection.

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Here, we are up against the cognitive limitations of the arguer. Every arguer has limitations, both with respect to his
knowledge base and powers of imagination. The arguer's dialectical obligations must be understood in light of those
limitations. Indeed, we have here the best possible argument for the need for criticism from others. My experience has
usually been that the very best criticisms or objections to my arguments are those about which I want to say, "I would
never have thought of that objection."
Given the limitations of the minds and imaginations of human arguers, it cannot be reasonable to expect the arguer to
deal with all possible objections, whether type or token.
The same conclusion follows even when we limit the requirement to what seems more reasonableto dealing with all
actual objections. Here again it is clear that we must be thinking of types rather than tokens. The same objection can be
expressed by different respondents on different occasions and in slightly different ways, and it makes no sense to
require the arguer to deal with each and every such articulation because it would be impossible to garner them and,
likewise, impossible to respond to each one of them. Moreover, some of these actual objection tokens will be either
trivial or fairly obviously off.
It is enough if the arguer deals with the gist of the objection: the objection type.
Even this less onerous formulation of the requirement seems excessive. The arguer who is serious will have done a lot
of homework and may be expected to know of and have thought about a wide range of actual objections, but to require
that all such arguments be known seems to go beyond what is reasonable to expect. To put it differently, to charge that
the arguer had failed to discharge the dialectical obligations because he or she failed to deal with one specific objection
that could not reasonably be expected to have been knownthis would not be rational and it certainly would not appear
rational. Thus, this way of specifying the arguer's dialectical obligations fails to meet the requirements discussed in
chapter 6 of manifest rationality.
Finally, if we consider an issue of any degree of complexity, which is the target zone for the theory of argument
proposed here, there will be quite a number of objection types and even if the arguer were aware of all of them, the
argument would become incredibly wordy if the arguer were to attempt to respond to each and every such objection.
There are, then, both theoretical and practical reasons for rejecting the formulation that would require that the arguer
deal with all possible and actual objections. We may reasonably eliminate Option 1.
What about Option 2? The arguer should deal with those objections that (he or she believes) the argument can handle.
By "objections," I mean to refer to predictable objection tokens. It seems clear that this option identi-

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fies a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition. It is necessary because the entire reason for the existence of the
dialectical tier is that the arguer needs to show how to handle objections to his argument. But it cannot be sufficient.
Suppose that there is an objection, call it O*, that the arguer is aware of but that he or she does not know how to deal
with. Is it rational for the arguer to ignore or not respond to this objection? If the purpose of the endeavor was
understood as mere persuasion, the answer seems obvious: "Of course." But I have assigned the goal of rational
persuasion to argumentation and it does not seem to be in keeping with the spirit of the practice so construed to ignore
or fail to mention that objection. If the Other is to be persuaded rationally, he or she will want to know how the arguer
handles this objection. To ignore such an objection as O* would be dishonest and not in keeping with the practice.
What, then, should the arguer do?
There seem to be two possible situations regarding O*. Suppose that O* is, as it were, a lethal objection: that is, it is
such a strong objection that it seems to seriously jeopardize the argument. In this case, it seems to me the arguer ought
to withdraw the argument and think the matter over. If the arguer does not know how the argument can overcome this
serious objection, then the arguer has no business putting it forth in the attempt to persuade others. On the other hand, it
is possible that the arguer regards the objection as one that does not undermine the argument. In that case, the rational
course would be for the arguer to include the objection in the dialectical tier and admit that it is not known how to
handle it. The Other might still be persuaded of the merits of the argument, even with this negative, if the rest of the
argument was strong enough to compensate. We can therefore reasonably eliminate Option 2 because it states a
necessary but not a sufficient condition.
What about Option 3? This option requires the arguer to deal with any objection or criticism he or she has reason to
believe his audience will want to see dealt with. If so, then the arguer is required to have a read on what the audience's
level of knowledge is and also what their expectations are, dialectically speaking. These requirements pose no problem,
as they are presuppositions from the beginning anyway. There is little doubt that Option 3 also states a necessary
condition. The problem would be if it were interpreted as a sufficient condition. About such an approach, Perkins
(personal communication, March, 1994) said:
Certainly the rhetorical solution of anticipating your audience's objections is a practical answer. From a
communicational and persuasive standpoint it's the thing to do. The question left in my mind concerns
whether this collapses the distinction between argument as a manipulative tool of persuasion (where you
might not bring up telling objections you suspect your audience will not think of) and argument as a quest for
truth (or some appropriately constructivist equivalent).

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Perkins's concern seems, to me, well expressed. Clearly, the arguer must deal with objections that he or she has reason
to think the audience will want to hear about. But will that be enough? Suppose the arguer has, in the process of
constructing an argument, come across a line of objection that has not been met with anywhere in the literature and so
has reason to think the audience will not expect it to be dealt with. In my view, the constraint of rationality requires the
arguer to deal with such an objection. Hence, I can set aside Option 3.
So I come to Option 4, which Johnstone (1978) suggested when he wrote, "But associated with any philosophical
statement is a class of criticisms and questions more or less relevant to the statement and with these he must deal. His
critic is naturally under a similar obligation" (p.14). Thus, I come up with the idea that the arguer is expected to deal
with what might be called The Standard Objections. But how shall we unpack this phrase?
It is tempting to say that anyone familiar with the issue will also know the variety of positions and will have heard the
various objections and criticisms, some of which will have achieved greater salience than others. The Standard
Objections, then, would refer to that class of salient objections typically or frequently found in the neighborhood of the
issue. For the arguer to fail to deal with, or to respond to, one of these standard objections is a failure at the dialectical
level, a fault in the dialectical tier that can be every bit as serious as a problem in the illative core.
In summary, it seems that the following can be said about the arguer's dialectical obligations. The arguer must deal with
The Standard Objections. The question is how to specify these. In addition, the arguer is obliged to deal with any
objections that the arguer knows the audience will expect that he or she deal with (if they are not included in TSO) and
also those objections the arguer believes his or her position can handle (even if not included in TSO).
Govier (1998) took the view that the arguer is obligated to handle dialectically significant objections. Govier proposed
to unpack this notion in terms of what is taken seriously by the audience to whom the argument is addressed. That is, an
objection is significant if it is taken seriously by the audience to whom the argument is addressed. My first instinct is to
concede that this is a necessary but not a sufficient condition. There may be significant objections that are not taken
seriously by the audience, and this can happen either for good reasons or bad ones. I want to delay that instinct and
instead question whether this is a necessary condition. How is the arguer to make this determination? What tells him or
her that an objection is taken seriously by the audience? Is it enough to know that one member of the audience takes it
seriously? Is there a quantitative criterion here? Or is it a qualitative one? For example, if Tony Blair takes it seriously,
then it is significant? These are matters that need to be worked out in the theory of argument.

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Govier's suggestion is not unlike one made by Hitchcock (1996), who suggested the following formulation: "The arguer
is expected to deal with any objection which would reasonably be expected to raise a serious doubt about the cogency of
the argument."4 Here I take "expected" to have some kind of audience reference. I am unhappy with any unpacking that
relies heavily on the notion of audience for at least two reasons. First, audiences are notoriously heterogenous: Johnson
took it seriously, Blair did not, Pinto was undecided. Second, there may be worthwhile objections that are not known to
anyone in the audience. Hence, I am led to wonder if we don't have to find some other way to develop the idea of what
it is for an objection to be significant. In any event, Hitchcock's proposal is at best a sufficient condition. It is not a
necessary condition, however. I think we would expect to hear how an arguer handles a well-known objection, even if it
is not likely to cast serious doubt on the cogency of the argument.
My conclusion is that the whole issue of how to specify the arguer's dialectical obligations deserves further study. (See
Johnson, 1999, for more on this issue.)
The Completeness Problems
Three issues about completeness have emerged in my discussion. The first is whether the criteria for the illative core are
complete. Or are there possibly other criteria that have not been mentioned thus far? This is The Completeness1
Problem. The second is whether there are criteria for the dialectical tier that have not been mentioned thus far. This is
the Completeness2 Problem. The third is whether there are criteria of another type. That is, are there criteria for a good
argument over and above those for the illative core and the dialectical tier? This is the Completeness3 Problem.
Before I deal with each of these, there is an objection that needs to be considered: The concern about completeness is a
carryover from FDL and the desire to develop logistic systems and, hence, it is misplaced here.
There is something to the objection. The metatheoretic concerns of consistency, completeness, and independence did
emerge in the attempt to show that a logistic system had captured what it was supposed to capture. And although I see
no role for independence as a metatheoretic concern for informal logic (because there are no axioms that might display
this property), it seems foolish not to ask whether the criteria are mutually consistent (I have already seen and am about
to deal with an issue driven by precisely this concern). Moreover, it seems rational to inquire about completenessthe
question whether there are other important criteria not
4 Hitchcock made this suggestion during the discussion following a reading of my paper in 1996.

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mentioned by the theory. Not to ask these questions merely because they had counterparts in FDL would be shortsighted.
Completeness1:
The Illative Core
The first question concerns the criteria for the illative core: relevance, sufficiency, acceptability, and truth. Is this a
complete set of criteria? To answer this question, we may represent an argument as an intellectual force determined by
three vectors.
The first vector is determined by its direction, which goes from the premises to conclusion. Its magnitude is determined
by the consideration of whether the premises are such that they provide good reasons for the conclusion. This is where
the criteria of relevance and sufficiency enter the picture. The second vector is determined by its direction, which goes
from the premises to the audience; its magnitude is determined by the consideration of whether the premises must be
such that the audience can grant them rationally. This is where the criterion of acceptability enters the picture. The third
vector is determined by the direction that goes from the premises of the argument to the world (at least in some
instances). If the premises of the argument are about the affairs of the world, they must be correct, accurate where this is
possible. Here the criterion of truth enters the picture.
One way to test the supposition that the three vectors of Fig. 11.1 form a complete set would be to look at the criteria
proposed by other theories to see whether they contain an additional criterion that could not be mapped along the lines
of one of these vectors. Toulmin's theory comes to mind here.
As I mentioned in the last chapter, Toulmin's theory of appraisal appears to contain no less than nine standards or
criteria: sufficiency, appropriateness, relevance, reliability, applicability, consistency, validity, soundness, and weight. I
say "appears to" because at no point did Toulmin explicitly set forth his criteria, but he did allude to all of them at some
point or other in his various discussions about the criteria for argument evaluation.
Fig. 11.1
The three vectors of an argument.

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Clearly, Toulmin's evaluative apparatus is more complex than mine, and part of the reason, I suspect, is Toulmin's
unique and more complex method of analysis. There is some overlap in our theories of evaluation. Both theories include
relevance and sufficiency. There is also a salient difference: Toulmin's theory does not contain truth nor any
synonymous criterion or standard, which suggests that the vector that relates the premises to the world is not represented
in his theory. The point at issue here is whether any of the criteria mentioned by Toulmin suggest some other dimension
than the three discussed previously.
Validity, if interpreted in the standard way, would be about the relationship between premises and conclusion (and
belongs to FDL). Soundness either is taken in its ordinary sense of being a good argument, in which case it suggests no
new dimension, or in the sense of FDL, again in which case it suggests no new dimension. Consistency can be
considered an offshoot of the vector relating the premises to the worldan argument with inconsistent premises cannot
satisfy the truth requirement. That leaves appropriateness, reliability, applicability, and weight. Appropriateness and
applicability are standards that derive from Toulmin's theory of analysis that, the reader will recall, sees argument
structure in terms of warrants and backing. My view is that these can be mapped into the premiseconclusion vector; they
are matters of how the warrantbacking relate to the groundwarrant. Reliability would seem to be a factor along the
vector from the premise to the audience. Weight also would seem be a factor for the vector from the premises to the
conclusion.
Thus, I do not see in Toulmin's theory a criterion that could not be mapped into one of the three vectors mentioned
earlier. The conclusion I draw, tentatively, is that the three vectors present a complete framework for dealing with the
question of completeness at the illative core.
I need to add one other comment. In the last chapter, I took note of Weinstein's insistence that informal logicians need
to work more closely with the disciplines in this matter of standards and criteria. Whereas results from inquiries into the
criteria of evaluation in the disciplines might well add criteria or standards, it would be surprising to me if arguments in
any discipline did not involve the four criteria proposed by this theory for the illative core of the argument.
Completeness2:
The Dialectical Tier
What about the criteria for the dialectical tier? My answer is that they can be accounted for in the vector from the
premises to the audience, for among those in the audience are those individuals who may be presumed to raise
objections, and so forth. The vector has two dimensions to it. There is the illative dimension: the acceptance by the
audience of the undefended prem-

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ises in the illative core. There is also the dialectical dimension: the adequacy of the dialectical tier. If this is too
cumbersome, the schema could be revised by adding another vector from the premises to the dialectical tier.
As to the criteria for the dialectical tier, I make no claim for the completeness of the criteria I have offered. I regard this
as an important agenda item for future research on informal logic.
Completeness3:
Other Criteria?
There is still another type of completeness that needs to be considered. Compare two arguments, A and B, that have the
same core structure; but B contains a dialectical tier and A does not. All things being equal, if B does a reasonable job
of dealing with dialectical material according to the theory of evaluation proposed here, B will be a better argument. But
now suppose that arguments A and B have both satisfied the criteria at the illative core and the dialectical level. Recall
that we want the theory of argument to allow for the possibility of there being good arguments for and against a given
conclusion. Is there anything else, from a logical point of view, that would result in A's being a better argument from a
logical point of view than B?
I may wish to appraise the argument for qualities like how well it is expressed in language and how well organized it is,
but these are criteria that seem more appropriate to the rhetorical standpoint.
I do not have a satisfactory answer to this question. Accordingly, I propose to put it on the agenda for informal logic. It
does seem to me that we may want to provide for the possibility of other normative criteria to be applied to argument. I
have in mind such qualities as originality, fertility, ingenuity, and so forth. Some may argue either that such qualities are
not logical attributes but rather rhetorical or something else, or that they can be reduced to first-level properties. To the
first, I only say that if they are not exactly logical, they are still normative. To the second, if such a reduction were
possibleand that would have to be shownthat would support the view that the two sorts of criteria form a complete set.
In any event, I propose to place this question on the research agenda for informal logic.
The next unanswered question for my theory is this: How do the criteria already enunciated come together in the
moment of evaluation? Specifically, how am I to put together two criteriatruth and acceptabilitythat may be in direct
tension with one another? I called this The Integration Problem when it emerged in chapter 7. I turn to it next.
The Integration Problem
In chapter 7, and in Johnson (1992a), I urged that both acceptability and truth be included as criteria in normative
theory. It is clear from the previous discussion that there need be no incompatibility between them. The truth

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criterion concerns the relationship between the premise and the state of affairs in the world. The acceptability criterion
concerns the relationship between the premise and the audience. Hence, it is possible, in principle, for the premises of
an argument to satisfy both. And I, for one, can think of no reason that anyone would not want the premises of
arguments to satisfy both criteria.
The problem arises when there is tension between them. In essence, the acceptability criterion (however it is finally to
be understood) will always be applicable because there will always be an audience that will shape both the construction
and evaluation of the argumentwhich premises to put into play, which of them must be defended, and so forth. On the
other hand, the truth criterion may not always be applicable because there are situations where it is not applicable. In
such cases, there would not be any tension between them because the truth criterion just does not apply.
The problem occurs when there is a premise that brings these two criteria into conflict. This would happen when it is the
determination that a given premise is true but not acceptable. It could also happen if it were the case that a premise were
false but acceptable. The normative question here: How good is such an argument? What verdict should the theory
deliver?
Before I deal with this issue, I want to point out that this question is less important, in the long run, than the question of
how this argument may be criticized. If my interest here is criticism rather than evaluation, the path is clear: I would
point out that the argument has a premise that is true but unacceptable. Or that it contains a premise that is false but
acceptable. It is conceivable that either situation could prove to be almost fatal. Whatever the case, I face this problem
only when I focus on the question of evaluation, the need to assign an answer to the question, "Is this a good argument?"
In chapter 10, I argued that Pinto's position came up against something very like this tension and that he resolved it in
favor of the reasonable-to-believe requirement (his alternative to acceptability). That is, Pinto's instinct was to say that
such an argument was a good one on the grounds that, although false, the premise was reasonable to believe (ceteris
paribus). My instinct here is to judge that it is not a good argument because although the premise is reasonable to
believe, it is false. Thus, I propose to solve the tension by resolving it in favor of the truth requirement. Which of these
is the better approach? Is there some third possibility?
My view is that the issue should be resolved by asking which position best accords with the theory and constraints put
forth in this book. When there is tension between the truth requirement and the acceptability requirement, we should
tend to resolve the issue in favor of the truth criterion. Why? Because, I will argue, such a resolution fits better with the
idea of manifest rationality. How so? To see this, let's consider the two possible

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cases: Case (i): when Pi is false but acceptable, and Case (ii): when Pj is true but unacceptable.
Case (i)
Pi Is False but Acceptable
I examine this situation first from the perspective of the arguer, then from the perspective of the evaluator.
Suppose, then, that the arguer is considering whether to put in play a premise, Pi, that he regards as false but that the
arguer believes would be acceptable to his audience. Here I think the answer is evident: The arguer may not put into
play a premise that is known (or believed) to be false but that would be acceptable to the audience. This is precisely the
orientation of the demagogue, the charlatan, and is opposed to the standpoint of those who participate in the practice of
argumentation. I see no grounds the arguer could appeal to that would justify putting into an argument a premise that is
regarded as false, even if it was acceptable to the audience. It may, of course, be rational for anyone to have been
persuaded by an argument containing a premise that turns out to be false. But I take it that it is agreed that for the arguer
to attempt to persuade by means of a premise that the arguer thinks is false and therefore does not himself accept is in
some important way tantamount to abandoning the telos of rational persuasion in favor of all-out persuasion. Hence, it
is clear that from this perspective, the conflict between truth and acceptability is to be resolved in favor of the truth
requirement that enjoins the arguer to put into play only those premises that (to the best of his knowledge) are true and
prohibits the arguer from putting into play (unless marked) premises that are known (or believed) to be false. Even if an
argument constructed by means of such premises appeared to be rational, it would not be rational to attempt to persuade
someone else using a belief that I know to be false and that I expect that someone to accept as true. So from the
perspective of the arguer, the case in question is to be decided in favor of the truth requirement.
Let me now examine this situation from the point of view of the evaluator. Here, we are supposing that the arguer has
put forth an argument containing a premise that the evaluator takes to be false (we assume the arguer and the audience
hold that it is true) but is also acceptable. Suppose the argument is otherwise impeccable. How good is this argument? I
believe that the evaluator must deliver a negative verdict. If he or she believes the premise is false, the evaluator has a
compelling reason for not accepting the premise, especially in the absence of any argument for itwhich was the case on
the approach to acceptability taken in chapter 7. There is no problem for my theory of evaluation. In this case, the truth
requirement outweighs the acceptability requirement and the evaluator must deliver a negative verdict on the premise.

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Such an argument (one with a false premise that is, however, acceptable to some Other) may succeed, in the moment, in
achieving its goal because the audience may accept the false premise. It may be that the audience is justified in
acceptance of the premise. (See Allen, 1998, for a strong defense of this view.) What this means is that people can be
justified in accepting bad arguments. (This parallels the well-known epistemological result that a person may be
justified in believing p even though p is false.) A bad argument does not, however, cease to be a bad argument just
because it is an argument that some people may be justified in accepting.
To conclude our discussion of Case (i), the verdict required by my theory is that the argument is not a good one because
the truth requirement has been violated and, here, it takes precedence over the acceptability requirement.
Case (ii):
Pj Is True but Unacceptable5
Again let us first imagine this case first from the perspective of the arguer.
Suppose the arguer had good reason to believe that the audience will not accept Pj although it is true. Here the arguer
will find himself pulled in two directions: Because Pj is true, the arguer wants to put it in play; but because Pj is not
going to be acceptable, it will not satisfy the acceptability requirement. The arguer will lose the audience it is hoped will
be reached. The arguer cannot do both. Which path should the arguer take? If this were a rhetorically driven theory, the
answer would probably be to resolve the tension in favor of the audience and not put the premise into play because it
would not pass the acceptability requirement. One might well argue that this approach accords with the requirement that
the argument increase rationality. How can an increase in rationality be expected when the audience will not accept the
premise? However, if one were to pursue this line, the argument would violate the requirement of manifest rationality.
The argument cannot appear to me to be rational, if it fails to include a premise that I believe to be both true and
relevant simply because it is not in my judgment acceptable to my audience. The solution is simple and obvious: The
arguer must provide adequate defense of the premise and thereby seek to render it acceptable.
Next we examine this case from the perspective of the evaluator. Here I suppose that the premise Pj is such that the
evaluator regards it as true but
5 Here I encounter the type of the juxtaposition similar to that discussed earlier in chapter 7 in connection
with Hamblin's claim that a premise might be true but not known to be true; and again in chapter 10, where
Pinto discussed the case of an argument where a premise is true but not reasonable to believe (therefore not
acceptable), and false yet reasonable to believe (acceptable).

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refuses to accept it because it does not pass the acceptability requirement. This situation could occur only if the arguer
has failed to defend Pj. Is this, then, a good argument? I think I have to conclude that it is not a good argument as it
stands, for it contains a premise that, although true, is not acceptable because it requires defense. Hence, it cannot
achieve the aim of rational persuasion. In this case, the acceptability requirement takes precedence over the truth
requirement.
So with this abstract discussion in mind, let us review the Hamblin argument discussed earlier:
The argument that oranges are good for orangutans because they contain dietary supplements might or might
not carry some weight in the second half of the twentieth century but would rightly carry none at all as
between two ancient Romans who had never heard of vitamins. (p. 236)
Here we are supposing that the argument was given to the Romans. Hamblin's position is that it would not be a good
argument directed to the ancient Romans because even though the premise is true, it will not be acceptable to them
because they knew nothing about dietary supplements. But that suggests to me that the problem with this argument is
not properly described as a conflict between acceptability and truth but rather as a failure at the level of meaningfulness
or coherence. It is not that the premise is unacceptable so much as that it is unintelligible. Of course, it will happen that
an arguer introduces an incoherent premise that will usually be challenged on the grounds of being vague or
meaningless. Indeed, this line of reflection reveals something slightly odd about this example, for it is not easy to
explain how this particular incoherence would occur. Perhaps it is due to its being an artificial example.
The Integration Problem is only a problem for those theories that include both truth and acceptability. I have shown that
in one case, the truth requirement takes precedence and in the other case, the acceptability requirement takes
precedence. No simple policy appears to be forthcoming. However, what allows the determination to be made is,
ultimately, reference to the purpose of argumentation, rational persuasion, and also to the requirement of manifest
rationality. For further discussion of this problem, see Allen (1998), Johnson (1998), and Freeman (1999).
Finally, we have seen that this problem is slightly suspect in that it disappears altogether when the issue is situated on
the context of argument criticism rather than evaluation. This, in turn, suggests that the perspective of the evaluator or
judge is less revelatory of the normative stance than the perspective of the critic (or participant).

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The Application Problem
Suppose that there are these four criteria for the evaluation of arguments: relevance, sufficiency, acceptability, and truth.
Suppose that this is a situation in which all four standards have clear application. What is the best order of application of
these standards (or criteria) to a specific argument? Is there a best order? Does it even matter? In any theory that has
multiple standards of evaluation, this problem will exist. Hence, even if you do not happen to agree with my theory of
evaluation, the process I use to think through The Application Problem here may prove instructive.
In what order should these four criteria be applied? Before we can answer that question, we should ask: How are we to
determine this? Why does it matter?
The pragmatic question must come first. That question is: What is the purpose of the evaluation? If the purpose of the
exercise is simple evaluation (i.e., determination of whether this is a good argument or not), then probably what is
wanted is the most direct, quickest path. On the other hand, if the purpose is to produce criticism as a step in the
dialectical process of argumentationthe point of view preferred in this bookthen the purpose of the effort is to locate
potential areas of vulnerability in the argument.
Thus, if the sole aim were evaluation, then one might first raise the sufficiency question. Sufficiency, after all, embraces
relevance. If P1, P2, P3 satisfy the sufficiency requirement, then individually they must satisfy the relevance
requirement. But, again, if the aim of the effort is to produce clear logical criticism, that would not be the place to begin
because, as we have seen, an error in relevance may lie concealed beneath the sufficiency breakdown. In what follows, I
assume that the current interest is criticism rather than evaluation.
Another factor in choosing the order will be internal dependence. If any two of the criteria are such that we cannot apply
Ci unless we have already applied Cj, then that would suggest that Cj should precede Ci.
A last factor would be ease of determination. If Ci is easier to determine than Cj, then the application of Ci should
precede the application of Cj.
Thus, it seems then that factors to be considered in thinking about this would be:
1. The purpose of the process. Evaluation has an internal dynamic: The Other wishes to know whether the argument is a
good argument. The Other should then begin by applying the most powerful criterion and work down to the less
powerful. But criticism has an external and dialectical function. The critic wants to give the arguer the best possible
feedback. In making the determination here, that order should be selected that best meets the needs of criticism.

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2. Internal dependence. If there is some order of dependence among the criteria, that order should be followed, ceteris
paribus. It seems evident that there is something wrong with the order that would apply sufficiency first and then
relevance because sufficiency presupposes relevance. Or to put the matter differently, if you are asking whether or not a
set of premises is sufficient, you have already determined that each of them is individually relevant. What about
sufficiency and truth? If I allow that the premises have satisfied the sufficiency criterion, then I seem to have admitted
that they are true. That would suggest that application of the truth criterion should precede application of the sufficiency
criterion.
3. Ease of determination. All things being equal, it seems sensible to apply the easier criteria before attempting to apply
the more difficult ones. It would seem that the easiest determination is that of relevance; the hardest would be either
truth or sufficiency.
Let's look, then, at the twin issues of dependence and ease of application. We have already seen that sufficiency
presupposes relevance, and, hence, the application of the relevance criterion will precede the application of the
sufficiency criterion. Moreover, because the sufficiency criterion involves taking all premises jointly, it would seem, in
some ways, to be the most difficult and, hence, to come last. Why? Because only when these premises are all in play
does this criterion begin to apply.
Now, if I look at ease of determination, it would seem that acceptability is relatively easy to determine, so it should
come earlier.6 And because it seems easier to apply than either of the other two, I would suggest that it belongs at the
top of the hierarchy, or at the beginning of the process.
Thus we have:
acceptability
sufficiency
There are only two ways to fill in the remaining slots that belong to relevance and truth. On the matter of the difficulty
of application, these are both difficult, but it seems clear that generally it is easier to judge relevance than truth; that is,
if Pi is offered as support for C, the judgment ''Pi is relevant to C" is easierepistemicallythan "Pi is true." (I may know
that a given premise is relevant but not know whether it is true. I may also know that it is true but not know whether it is
relevant.)
Thus the following order thus suggests itself as the most efficient order of application:
6 But Allen (1998) raised some interesting questions and challenges to this view.

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acceptability
relevance
truth
sufficiency
(That order yields ARTS as a mnemonic.)
To illustrate, suppose an argument has 5 premises: P1, P2, P3, P4, and P5. The policy recommended here is to first
check to see whether the premises are individually acceptable because, in some ways, this is the easiest criterion to
determine. Next would be relevance. Then truth (subject to the caveat discussed in the preceding section) and, finally,
sufficiency. Suppose, for example, that P1 is irrelevant (or untrue, or unnacceptable)then P1 won't be allowed in the
premiseset that I then check for sufficiency. In other words, because sufficiency is a global requirement, applying to all
the premises taken together, it should not be applied until the premiseset is stabilized; that is, the set will have been
inspected already for acceptability, truth, and relevance.
This completes my discussion of the problems, some of them, that have emerged in the course of this book. Obviously,
my proposals will not be satisfying to everyone, so these belong on the research agenda for informal logic, to a
discussion of which I turn now.
Research Agenda for Informal Logic
I want to make it clear from the outset here that my concern in this section is to develop an agenda for informal logic
specificallynot for the theory of argument generally. I propose such an agenda for the theory of argument in the next
section. In drawing up this agenda for informal logic, I have relied on two sources. The first source is historical. I
review briefly the agenda proposals formulated by Johnson and Blair (1980, 1985, 1987) and I also discuss Weinstein's
proposals (1990, 1993) for the agenda. The second and more important source is the argument of this book in the course
of which a number of problems and issues related to informal logic have emerged.
I begin by putting on the agenda those problems that have emerged in the course of this book.
The Nature of Informal Logic. This remains a problem because of the various and, in some cases, quite different
conceptions of informal logic that are afoot. If informal logic is to stabilize as a subdiscipline of logic, some agreement
about its nature and its tasks will have to be reached. I made

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my proposal about this in chapter 5. But it is clear that discussion about the nature of the inquiry will continue.
The Conceptualization of Argument. It is apparent that, within the orbit of those who do informal logic, there are quite
different conceptions of argument, as I explained in chapter 6. If it is true that how argument is conceived plays a
determinant role in how it is evaluated and criticized, then progress in informal logic will be hampered severely unless
this situation is addressed. My proposal is for a fortified conception of argument, one that is, in effect, more demanding
that the traditional formal and informal notions. But here, again, alternatives exist. Both Willard (1989) and Gilbert
(1997) offered much broader understandings of argument.
Standards or Criteria for the Evaluation of Argument. In chapter 7, I proposed a theory of evaluation for informal logic,
one that is more or less well rooted in its history. But there are other approaches, and the various strengths and
weaknesses need to be discussed.
Regarding my own theory, I have acknowledged the work that needs to be done to clarify the criteria I have proposed.
Of particular importance is work on the criterion of relevance, with sufficiency not far behind. These problems pertain
to the criteria for the illative core.7 There is also the issue of developing appropriate criteria for the dialectical tiera
problem that remains largely untouched at this point.
Evaluation Versus Criticism and the Theory of Criticism. In chapter 8, I distinguished between evaluation and criticism
and argued that although our theories of evaluation have been quite well worked up, our theories of criticism lag behind.
Whether or not others accept my way of making this distinction, I believe the problem of formulating and developing
adequate justification for appropriate principles of argument criticism rewards a crucial task.
The Relationship of Informal Logic to Other Disciplines. In chapters 9 and 10, the issue of the relationship between
informal logic and other disciplines surfaced at several junctures. Clearly, informal logic stands to profit from
exchanges with other areas of logic and philosophy. Further clarification of the relationship between informal logic and
inductive and deductive logic as well as the various applied and deviant logics, is certainly an important issue. Informal
logic has an agenda that will certainly call for con-
7 In his review of Johnson (1996), Hitchcock rightfully pointed out how underdeveloped is our understanding
of these criteria. See Hitchcock (1999).

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tinuing discussion with epistemology, with those interested in the theory of rationality, and with semantics and
pragmatics.
Looking to other disciplines, informal logic has already profitted from discussions with rhetoric, which is likewise
concerned with argumentation but from a different angle of approach. Perhaps informal logicians can succeed where
their forbears have failed; that is, by developing a healthy relationship between rhetoric and logic, one in which rhetoric
is conceived of as a full partner rather than a suspect interloper (this from the ancient Platonic prejudice). Very little
work has been done on either the sociology or the psychology of argumentation, so many interesting possibilities exist.
What can psychologists tell us about the process of arguing? Until very recently, there were very few studies of
argument done from a psychologicalempirical perspective, probably because of the confusion of argument with
inference, which has been much studied by psychologists. That appears to be changing. We have here to mention not
only the work done by Perkins, Allen, and Haffner (1983), but Kuhn (1991). Work on the sociology of argumentation
appears to be even less well developed. Just as scientific theories are worthy objects of attention for sociologists, so, too,
is the practice of argumentation. What sorts of societies have supported this practice? These and other questions have
yet to be asked, much less answered.
In addition to these questions about the relationship of informal logic to the disciplines, there is also Weinstein's view
that informal logic can realize its intellectual potential only if it abandons its a prioristic ways and enters into a
respectful and open-ended working relationship with the special disciplines and takes seriously its own potential
contribution to developing the appropriate methodology for the evaluation of what he called stylized argumentation.
In addition to these items, there are carry-over items from previous attempts to formulate agendae for informal logic and
I deal briefly with those now.
Carry-Over Items
Johnson and Blair's Agenda Proposals
Johnson and Blair (1980) contains the first articulation of the informal logic approach to argumentation. They outlined
the history of the subject and also proposed a research agenda. From the vantage point of their book, it appears that most
of the items on that list have been picked up in the research and that progress has been made on most of them. Thus, for
example, the issue of the principle of charity has been quite thoroughly discussed. (See Hansen, 1990.) The potential of
fallacy and fallacy theory to sustain work on argumentation, the viability of the inductivedeductive distinction, the
question of how to display the structureall of these have been discussed and we are now in a much better position.

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Other Johnson and Blair Formulations
In 1985 and again in 1987, Johnson and Blair attempted to refine and update the 1980 formulation. The 1985 version of
the agenda updates the 1980 publication while maintaining the same overall framework when it discusses research. One
item that did not appear in the 1980 agenda and was added was argument construction. In the early years, the main
focus of informal logic (and this is something it undoubtedly inherits from formal logic) was on argument evaluation
and criticism. It is now widely recognized that the question of how to construct an argument has its own place on the
agenda and that it cannot be assumed that the answer to this follows automatically from the theory of analysis and
evaluation.
The 1987 formulation of the agenda lists some 10 topics. The new items on that list are the connection between
argument and rationality and the psychology of argumentation, both of which have already been placed on the current
agenda.
Weinstein's Agenda Proposals
In two different articles, Weinstein (1990, 1993) made suggestions about the research agenda for informal logic. I want
to look at each of his proposals. The discussion here will for the most part abstract from the earlier discussion of his
work in chapters 10 and 11.
Weinstein's 1990 Agenda
Weinstein (1990) offered proposals for a research agenda for informal logic. This article is really an argument for what
he called an ecological approach that is based on Toulmin's theory of argument, discussed in detail later this chapter.
Weinstein argued that informal logicians need to co-operate with thinkers in other disciplines in transforming
undergraduate educationa point that I took from him and have already incorporated in the agenda. But the nature of this
co-operative endeavor needs to be carefully thought through. Consider this statement by Baltimore (1996), a professor
of biology at MIT who won the Nobel Prize for medicine in 1975. In this passage, he talked about some disagreements
with fellow biologists:
Maybe someday it was going to turn out that there was a wrong interpretation on the basis that Margot was
suggesting, and maybe not. But you weren't going to answer the questions by arguing about them. You could
only answer them with further research.8
8 See Kevles (1996).

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Weinstein's proposal fit nicely into the schema presented earlier, for it raised the following issues:
1. What is the appropriate theory of argument analysis? Weinstein opted, somewhat dogmatically it seems to me, for a
Toulmin-type theory when it is far from evident that such a theory is superior to its competitors. Weinstein was
certainly within his rights to hold that field-type theories of the sort proposed by Toulmin are, in the long run, the best
hope for a viable theory of argument. But that remains a contentious issue within informal logic specifically and the
theory of argument generally.
2. What is the best focus or target for informal logic? Suppose, that is, that one accepts the argument of this book that
argument, rather than inference or implication, is the appropriate focus for informal logic. Is it the realm of mundane
argumentation (as, for example, suggested by theoreticians like Govier and Scriven) or is it rather what Weinstein called
the stylized discourse of the disciplines? Of course, any theory of argument coming out of informal logic must address
both the needs of mundane and stylized argument. But it is not clear what is gained and what is lost if one or the other is
taken as the dominant interest.
3. How are the appropriate standards for the evaluation of argument to be determined? In Weinstein's view, they are
generated from within the discipline. But as I showed in chapter 10, this view is not without its problems and these
problems must be addressed if theories like Weinstein's are to prevail. Thus, each of the issues raised by Weinstein
already has a place on the agenda.
Weinstein's 1993 Agenda
Weinstein (1993) took issue with Scriven (and others), who believed that informal logic lies at the core of the critical
thinking enterprise. Weinstein was continuing the exploration of his position that "informal logic is severely limited in
its ability to support critical thinking in any significant sense" (p. 2). That position is supported by two lines of
argument. The first distinguishes critical thinking from argument assessment (here he was following Paul and Siegel).
The second traces the inadequacies of the standard conception of informal logic.9 In order to make this argument,
Weinstein relied on an implicit research agenda for informal logic. It is that agenda that is of interest here.
Weinstein claimed that there are four vexing theoretic problems confronting informal logicians and argued that informal
logic "fails to satisfactorily resolve [them]" (p. 2). Nor, he argued, is it likely to solve them because
9 If there is such a thing as the standard conception of informal logic, Blair and I (1996) were not able to
locate it.

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informal logicians appear to be intent on grabbing the lion's share of the critical thinking textbook market, and that
requires theoretic difficulties be minimized. To the degree that they have paid attention to theoretic difficulties, they
have been unable to free themselves from the constraints of formal logic; this, in turn, has kept them from seeing the
standards of argument as closely tied to the epistemology of the discipline.
Suffice to say that if informal logicians are only interested in making a buck, they will not be doing the theoretical work
necessary to answer these questions. But as the present work itself indicates (with its multiple references to and
dependence on serious theoretical work by theorists such as Govier, Siegel, Walton, Barth, Woods, and others), any
such view of informal logic is a caricature. Whatever truth it had in times past, it has long since ceased to be applicable.
Premise Acceptability
Weinstein's position was that premises are not acceptable tout court. Rather, acceptability reflects the varying standards
implicit in the practices of various fields of inquiry. This accords with his view that the task of developing the standards
for the appraisal of argument falls to the special disciplines and is not the proper domain of informal logicians.
The issue of premise acceptability is not a new agenda item. In chapter 7, I showed that the question is difficult. On the
one hand, there are the problems regarding truth and acceptability (some of which I have already dealt with). On the
other hand, there is the general problem of how to understand acceptability as a standard or criterion. All of this was
made clear in chapter 7.
Weinstein wrote, "Mathematicians and psychologists have widely varying policies on the availability and
appropriateness of alternative conceptions" (p. 2). Let me, for the moment, bypass the issue of whether mathematicians
would even recognize acceptability as a criterion. (My guess is that they would not; they will opt for truth.) Weinstein
might have been right, but he owned answers to three questions. First, what is meant by alternative conceptions?
Second, could he provide some sample cases where this is evident? Third, even if this is so, how does this bear on the
question at hand: namely, whether or not there are standards of acceptability that outrun the discipline?
In sum, the discussion of this criterion raises the vexing question of whether andor to what degree the standard of
acceptability is discipline-specific that already occupies a place on the research agenda.
Premise Relevance
The next problem in Weinstein's 1993 agenda is premise relevance. Once again, this item is not new to the agenda and
was discussed in detail in chapter 7. Weinstein wrote:

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Relevance is a function of the relation of a ground to the network of concepts that are constitutive of its
warrants. Grounds can only be seen as relevant in terms of general warrants that support the connection of
grounds to claims. Such warrants are found in the generalizations available within fields. (p. 2)
Maybe so; this is a perfectly legitimate position to take. But it is not the only position, as my discussion of relevance in
chapter 7 showed. Moreover, this position is formulated in Toulmin's terminology and thus begs important questions in
the theory of analysis. For instance, any theory that does not subscribe to the Toulmin mode of analysis is automatically
precluded from providing the kind of account of relevance discussed here. I would not readily accept Weinstein's way
of formulating the problem of relevance.
Weinstein enigmatically said, "inference tickets that license particular relationships of support by adducing acceptable
principles" (p. 2). I am puzzled about the role of this comment here but also want to notice Weinstein's suggestion that
the standard of relevance can be defined in terms of the standard of acceptability. This is an interesting theoretical view,
but much more work is needed to support it.
Argument Reconstruction of Missing Premises
Here again I find an item that already exists on the agenda. Here is what Weinstein said:
The possible missing premises available in support of a claim are, strictly speaking, infinite. The question is
thus, how to choose among them. A sensible beginning is to grant as a missing premise any accepted
proposition in the field within which the argument is put forward. (p. 2)
I see two problems with this way of putting the proposal. First, it requires that we be able to assign every argument to
some one field or some discipline. We have seen the difficulties that attend this view. Second, this approach is not going
to be much help when it comes to choosing between two missing premises, both of which belong to the field in
question. In other words, this policy is of little help. Weinstein said, "This seems to be the sum of the principle of
charity. But then, reconstructing arguments requires substantive knowledge of domains of discourse" (p. 2).
If Weinstein believed that his suggestion is "the sum of the principle of charity," then he had overlooked some
important developments. As Govier (1987) discussed, it is a much more complex matter. First, the principle is not
limited to the problem of missing premises. Second, Govier gave a fairly compelling argument that the problem of
missing premises is tied to deductivism. (Weinstein's instinct in that direction is probably what stands behind his
assertion that there are an infinite number of missing premises; or put

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differently, it is understandable that a deductivist would make such a claim.) Third, anyone can reconstruct some
arguments without a great deal of domain-specific knowledge, especially where those arguments are deductive in
character and the person in question is familiar with deductive logic.
However, it is clear that the issue of how to identify the missing premises to which the arguer is committed, if indeed
this idea makes sense, is clearly a third item for our research agenda.
Premise Sufficiency
Regarding premise sufficiency, Weinstein wrote:
Finally argument cogency requires, in addition to acceptable premises, acceptable standards of inference.
These can range from deductive argument in the theoretic sciences to persuasive analogies in fields like
politics and literary criticism. Without a sense of the levels of rigor appropriate to a dispute it is impossible to
ascertain when an argument should be seen as compelling. (p. 2)
Weinstein opted here for a form of the spectrum theory, and this option runs up against the problem posed by Govier:
How is one to make sense of these less-than-deductive inferential relationships? Weinstein probably wanted to take the
position that such inferential links are discipline specific; and perhaps his advice would have been that informal
logicians should be pursuing the specific varieties of these links in the various disciplines. I showed the difficulties of
this view in the last chapter.
Summary
To summarize, Weinstein (1993) correctly identified and took a position on some of the problems faced by informal
logicians that, therefore, deserve to be placed on the research agenda. I conclude with three observations.
First, Weinstein's agenda proposals do not add any item that was not previously included. (By the way, I do not say this
as a criticism of his views; for it was not, it seems to me, his intention to add items to the research agenda.) Second,
Weinstein's list is obviously incomplete. There are many other vexing theoretical problems that belong to informal logic
as a theory of argument that Weinstein did not mentioned but that I have seen emerge in this inquiry. Thus, for example,
the problem of differentiating between inference, implication, and argument. There is the issue of whether truth should
be a criterion; Weinstein simply assumed (or appeared to) that truth is not among the appropriate criteria. There is also
the issue of the status of fallacy theory as a theory of criticism; the difference between evaluation and criticism, the
development of a proper typology of argument, the need for principles of criticism, and so on. None of these problems
has Weinstein

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in any way touched. Clearly, his position requires a great deal more elaboration before it could be thought to be an
adequate theory of argument. Third, his very formulation and classification of the issues shows the influence of informal
logic; he seemed to have adopted the relevancesufficiencyacceptability framework common to many informal logicians
and, to that degree, his proposals give some credence to that theoretical apparatus.
Although Weinstein's views are both interesting and important in their own way and raise important issues, they do not
contribute anything new to the research agenda for informal logic that I have proposed in this section. Having presented
a basic research agenda for informal logic (with no claims for its completeness), in the next section, I broaden the focus
and undertake to present a research agenda for the theory of argument.
Research Agenda for the Theory of Argument
In the course of this book, we have seen emerge a number of important issues that confront the theory of argument
generically, not just the approach of informal logic specifically. I want to record them here.
Problem 1
The Focus for the Theory
Should my focus be, as Govier suggested, the realm of ordinary argumentation (however it is characterized),10 or
should it be the more stylized mode of argumentation found in the disciplines, as Weinstein urges? It is easy enough to
suggest that it must be both. (It is one indicator of the importance of Toulmin's theorizing that it manages to incorporate
both.) The point I must consider is whether I can devise a theory that fits all. Whether, for example, any typology that
might fit a particular discipline will apply to ordinary argumentation and vice-versa. And that takes me directly to the
next agenda item.
Problem 2
The Typology of Argument
Related to the previous argument but different from it is the issue of typology. How many different types of argument
are there and how is this to be decided? The old deductiveinductive typology appears to have exhausted itself, and I
have argued that the addition of "conduction" is not going to solve the problem. Many informal logicians and
argumentation theorists have adopted the convergentdivergentlinked distinction but it appears to
10 She also used the designations of "natural argument" and "naturally occurring argument."

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have its own problems. At another level, I distinguished between ordinary or mundane arguments and the stylized
arguments that exist within the disciplines. There is also the typology from within; the argument from authority, from
analogy, the tu quoque, and so forth. All of these proposed classifications or types are related to my understanding of
the argumentative structure. (I put to one side the various rhetorical classifications, according to figures of speech, for
example.)
More broadly speaking, there is the matter of conceptualization and nomenclature. The notion of type has not really
been clarified in argumentation theory the way that it was, more or less, for mathematical logic (a la Russell). The term
''modes" is probably as troublesome as "types." So what other terms are available? "Species?" It is difficult not to see
this entire area as conceptual morass. Certainly, this is a problem that deserves the attention of argumentation
theorists.11
Problem 3
The Issue of the Role of Argumentation in the Disciplines
The earlier discussion of Weinstein's agenda proposals saw this question emerge. What is the role of argumentation in
the various disciplines? Here, much depends on how I understand argument. Weinstein's urging that informal logicians
(and argumentation theorists) pay more attention to and co-operate with the specific disciplines presupposes that
argumentation plays a significant role within the disciplines. Whether one regards this presupposition as justified
depends on how one conceives argument and how one relates it to other forms of reasoning such as explanation and
theory construction.
To be sure, inference, inference patterns, and implicature all play a role in the disciplines. But I have argued against any
lingering tendency (from FDL) to equate these. Make the distinction and the assumption that argumentation has a
significant role to play in the reasoning of the sciences, such as physics and biology, seems entirely problematic and at
the very least in need of investigation.
Problem 4
The Issue of the Derivation of Standards
This problem first emerged in chapter 2 in our discussion of Hamblin. How are the standards, criteria, or principles for
the evaluation of argument to be generated? By reflection? Reflection on what? By empirical research? Research into
what? Both approaches have their adherents, both have their
11 Walton (1996) was released too late to be considered in detail. It certainly represents a significant
contribution to the scholarly discussion of this issue.

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strengths and weaknesses. I have referred several times to the approach called dustbin empiricism and this evocative
phrase suggests a very interesting research program that I comment on in chapter 12.
Problem 5
The Relationship between Theory of Analysis and Theory of Appraisal
There is a further crucial question for the theory of argument: Is there any way that we can keep the theory of analysis
separate from the theory of appraisal? I have thought that the answer to this must be "yes," and I have criticized
Hamblin for proceeding in the reverse direction. But this is not so clear and needs further work.
Problem 6:
The Issue of How to Compare Theories
An interesting theoretical issue that has emerged at several junctures is how to compare two different approaches to the
theory of argument: How to compare for example dialogical theories (that focus on the process) with theories that focus
on the product. What sort of metatheoretical considerations will be necessary to guide the comparison? This issue seems
an important one for the theory of argument.
These six problems seem to me important ones that must be addressed by argumentation theorists.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I tried to accomplish three things. First, I attempted to show how some of the problems that emerged in
chapter 7 might be dealt with. Second, I developed a research agenda for informal logic that was based on previous
formulations and to which was added the problems that have accumulated in the course of this work. Third, I have
presented a research agenda for the theory of argument.
With the development of the agenda and attempt to dispatch dialectical obligations, the main work of the book is
complete. In the next chapter, I want to summarize the argument of the book and look at its implication for future work.
In chapter 4, the need for a theory of reasoning emerged. There, we brushed up against the problem of how to draw the
distinction between implication, inference, and argument and we saw that it requires, for its solution, a perspective
outside the theory of argument. A recurrent theme has been that the theory of argument ultimately requires completion
by a theory of reasoning. That idea needs to be developed. I take up that issue in the next and final chapter.

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Chapter 12
Retrospect and Prospect
In this book, I have been largely concerned with the theory of argument. In particular, I have been advocating an
approach to argumentation that grows out of informal (rather than formal) logic. In the last chapter, I set forth my views
concerning the agenda for both the theory of argument and for informal logic. In this chapter, I now want to ask this
question: What is the best course of development for the theory of argument and informal logic? How can they best
achieve solutions to the problems on their respective agendas?
In the next section, I discuss lessons from the past that can help me chart the course of the future development of these
inquiries. Then, I look at two suggestions about the course of development that I find particularly intriguing and I make
my own suggestion about the best course of development. Finally, I discuss the significance of informal logic.
The Gap between Theory and Practice:

Some Reflections on Toulmin's Revolution
In my mind, Toulmin (1958) had a clear read on the problems that beset the theory of argument. They stem from
developments in logic in the 20th century in which logic became mathematicized:
The ambition to cast logic into a mathematical form is as old as the subject itself. . . . Since the seventeenth
century the subject has, if anything, tended to become more mathematical rather than less . . . (p. 177)

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. . . we must be careful before we allow any formal calculus to assume the title of "logic." There may be room
to treat a limited range of problems mathematically in logic, as in physics; . . . Symbolic logic may
accordingly claim to be a part of logicthough not so large a partas mathematical physics is of physics. But can
it claim to be more? (p. 209)
From what Toulmin said earlier, it is clear that it cannot:
So far as formal logicians claim to say anything of relevance to arguments of other than analytic sorts,
judgement must be pronounced against them: for the study of other types of argument fresh categories are
needed, and current distinctionespecially the crude muddle commonly marked by the terms "deductive" and
"inductive" must be set on one side. (p. 147)
Clearly, then, a reordering is needed:
If all were well (and clearly well) in philosophical logic, there would be no point in embarking on these
investigations: our excuse lies in the conviction that a radical re-ordering of logical theory is needed in order
to bring it more nearly into line with critical practice . . . (p. 253)
Toulmin said "philosophical logic" but he really meant logic and, more likely, he meant something like the theory of
argument. In effect, Toulmin called attention to the existence of a gap between theory and practice. His own work can
be seen as one attempt to achieve the radical reordering needed to bring logical theory in line with practice.1
Toulmin's attempt at reordering has had a significant impact on thinking about arguments, but those effects have not yet
been felt in Logical Theory.2 Toulmin's attempt to realign the two suffers from certain problems, however. I argue that
Toulmin leaned too heavily on the side of theory and in his theory revision he was, malgré lui, wed to prior theory. I
claim also that Toulmin did not pay sufficient attention to critical practice; he was not empirical enough. This is
surprising because Toulmin believed he was basing his revision on practice:
The question, "What sort of a science is logic?', leads us into an impasse: we cannot, accordingly, afford to get
too involved with it at the very outset of our inquiries, but must put it on one side to be reconsidered later. . . .
This
1 It is interesting that Toulmin assumes that the way to deal with the gap is to bring the theory in line with
practice. I agree with him, but other prescriptions are not out of the question; namely, bring practice in line
with theory.
2 David Hitchcock (1999) thinks Toulmin's idea of a warrant is "a major and valuable contribution to the
understanding of the macrostructure of arguments . . . the most important contribution since Aristotle distinguished
premises from conclusions."

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question is about about logical theory whereas the starting point of our studies will be logical practice. So let
us begin by attempting to characterize the chief concepts we employ in logical practice. (p. 6)
In a revealing passage, Toulmin wrote:
In tackling our main problems about the assessment of arguments, it will be worthwhile clearing our minds of
ideas derived from existing logical theory and seeing by direct inspection what are the categories in terms of
which we actually express our assessment, and what precisely they mean to us. (pp. 67, emphasis added)
There are two problems here. First, Toulmin thought we could clear our minds of the ideas derived from existing logical
theory. Toulmin saw clearly enough that the old way of looking at arguments (as premises plus an inference to a
conclusion) was inadequate and needed changing, and that is why he proposed a new model and a new layout. In spite
of this, we shall find that Toulmin retained many elements of the geometrical model he sought to displace. For instance,
in defining the notion of a field that is crucial for his position, Toulmin leaned very heavily on the notion of logical
type.3 Other termsalso imported from the lexicon of the geometrical modelthat continue to loom large in Toulmin's
scheme are "logical form," "logical possibility," and "validity.''
A second problematic aspect of Toulmin's approach is the idea that the appropriate categories can be obtained by direct
inspection. Let me say something more about this point, which raises larger issues about how we are to go about
revising our theories of argument.
Descartes believed that by application of his methodical doubt, he would be able to erase all vestiges of the dubious
ideas he had inherited, and that what remained would be the firm and indubitable foundation on which real science
could be erected. There is reason to think that Descartes was mistaken. For example, he did not discard the distinction
between formal and objective reality, to name but one. Nor did Descartes ever doubt that he knew what doubt is or what
he knew of the meaning of the word "doubt."4
Descartes initiated a line of reasoning that has become common in philosophy since and that turns up again in Toulmin.
It is the idea that we must start over and begin anew, and that we can do this by "clearing out minds of the ideas derived
from existing theory." If the history of philosophy since
3 This was shown in chapter 10.

4 I am grateful to my mentor and former colleague, Dr. Harry A. Nielsen, Professor Emeritus, University of
Windsor, for this pointand a great many other things, including introducing me to the work of Wittgenstein.

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Descartes demonstrates anything, it is how unlikely it is that anyone can pull this off. Any indexing of categories will
owe some debt to existing (logical) theory. Thus, although Toulmin declared his intention to exclude terms like "logic,"
"logically necessary," "deductive," and "demonstrative"and was perhaps successful on that frontI have shown that terms
such as ''logical form," "logical type," not to mention "argument," "premise," and "modal term" all continue to do heavy
duty in Toulmin's scheme. These are all carryovers from the vocabulary of existing logical theory elements that
Toulmin retainedmalgré lui.
The lesson seems to be that the slate cannot just be wiped clean. At least Toulmin did not appear to have done so, even
when we allow that his project is not necessarily to banish such terms altogether but rather to remove them from a
substantive role in his theory. The lesson from modern philosophy, played out here, is that we will have to retain
something of the tradition we wish to leave behind.5
If Toulmin was to retain some components of traditional vocabulary while casting out othersfor example, retain modal
terms like "can" and cast out others, such as "premise," "deductive," and "validity," he needed to do two things, neither
of which he did in any self-conscious fashion. First, he needed to acknowledge that this is in fact a reordering (as the
text suggests) and not a wiping clean of the slate (as the text also suggests). Second, Toulmin should have had some
policy to guide the process of selection, some way of answering the question of which elements of prior theory get
selected for significant work in the new theory, which get pushed to the background, and which are to be eliminated
altogetherelse the process appears rather ad hoc.
Furthermore, the idea of a direct inspection to discover those categories that we do or should use in my theory is,
whatever its appeal, fraught with difficulty. The one who carries out the inspection is looking for qualities that go into
argument assessment. Now, either one has some exposure to the other (older) modelsif so, how does one keep that
model from influencing the choices?or one does not, in which case, will the intuitions be helpful, enlightening, or
worthy of being taken seriously?
Toulmin was absolutely right to call attention to a gap between (logical) theory and practice. He attempted to bridge the
gap by developing ab ovo a theory of argument.6 In this move, Toulmin came very close to the tantalizing idea that part
of the problem lies in the conception of logic as an a
5 I attribute this insight to the pragmatic intervention, most particularly as it is evidenced in Peirce.
6 Not entirely ob ovo because Toulmin made the assumption that the gap can be bridged by substituting a
jurisprudential model for the geometrical one.

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priori science; and that if the gap is to be closed, logic must shed its a prioristic skin and, as it were, become more
empirical. It must "look and see" how things are.7 In a way, then, the problem is that Toulmin was not empirical
enough. He retained, although without acknowledging it, large portions of traditional logical theory. As philosophical
reflection has shown time and again, what there is to be seen is at least in part a function of what the conceptual
frameworks, the theories, allow to be seen.8 Moreover, although his having adopted a jurisprudential model is certainly
a move in the direction of a more empirically responsible theory, I argued in chapter 2 that there are problems with that
model.
From the failure of Toulmin's revolution, we can learn several important lessons. First, logic does need to become more
empirical,9 but it cannot achieve this in the way that Toulmin thought. Toulmin failed precisely because he was not
faithful to his own impulse; he leaned much too heavily on the geometrical tradition he claimed to be repudiating. More
on what this might mean follows. Second, in revising our theories, it is simply not possible to make the Cartesian move
of starting over. As the pragmatists, particularly Peirce, argued, we must make use of prior theory. And, when we go
empirical, we must acknowledge the role of prior theory.
What, then, is the alternative to starting over? How can better theories be devised? Much will depend on one's diagnosis
of where the problems lie. Are the problems in the theory? If so, then the practices should be examined with a view to
gaining insights into how to revise the theory. Are the problems rather in the practice that the theory seeks to illuminate?
Then ways need to be found to bring the theory to bear on the practices.
Regarding logic and the theory of argument, I have presented my own diagnosis: There exists a gap between theory and
practice and, in this instance, the gap can only be bridged by significant alterations to the theory. In Part II of this book,
I made clear what alterations I believe need to be made, both in the theory of analysis and the theory of appraisal. In
Part III, I attempted to differentiate my approach from others. Most of the other theorists whose work I have discussed
(Toulmin, Weinstein, van Eemeren and Grootendorst, Govier, and Walton) share the belief articulated by Govier (1987)
that what is needed are better theories of argument. They disagreed on the shape of the required theory. When I think
about future directions for argumentation theory and informal logic, there are at least several other suggestions I would
like to take account of in the next section.
7 The reference here is to Toulmin's teacher, Wittgenstein.

8 Quine (1963).
9 Here one thinks of the work of contemporary logicians like Barth (1985), discussed later this chapter.

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Future Directions for the Theory of Argument
If everyone agrees that we cannot, as it were, start over, and if everyone also agrees that our current theories need
revision, then what alternatives await us? What are the prospects for informal logic and for the theory of argument?
What course of development is the best to follow?
We can, of course, continue on the present path, which might be described as a laissez faire approach: "Let a thousand
flowers bloom." Argumentation theory has been approached from numerous disciplinary standpoints, and we have
witnessed what might be thought of as the advent of various schools: the Pragma-dialectical school, informal logic, the
discipline-specific approach, not to mention the many others that have only been briefly touched on here.10 We scholars
are in a much better, more developed position today in the theory of argumentation than we were at mid-century.
Still, a number of interesting programmatic proposals have been made that deserve at least brief consideration here. The
first is Willard's proposal that argumentation should become a discipline. The second is Weinstein's contention that
informal logic ally itself more closely to the disciplines. The third is the view that logic should become more empirical.
The fourth is that dialectic should be revived.
Argumentation as a Discipline
One way in which argumentation theory might develop in the future is to redefine itself so as to take on the status of a
discipline. This is the position that Willard developed. I can only comment on it briefly here.
As I indicated in chapter 10, Willard approached argumentation mainly from the vantage point of the theory of
communication that construes argumentation as a form of interaction that it seeks to understand. The counterpoint is the
view of argument Willard associated with logic, where argument, so he thought, is understood primarily as a structure: a
CRCa "claimsreasons" complex. Willard was out to broaden our view and that is largely what he attempted. He
addressed the issue of what the best future for argumentation might be:
. . . two different paths, might be taken: expansion or multiplication.
The former involves expanding a single construct: Argument once meant "serial predication" but now also
means "claiming and reasoning in general" and
10 For more complete coverage, the reader may wish to consult van Eemeren et al. (1996).

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"interaction" and so on, or shaping new elements to fit the single construct. The latter involves enlarging the
sphere of relevance surrounding a construct, creating new or refined relevancies to other constructs, and in
general redefining, or refining a discourse for describing a range of phenomena. (p. 205)
Willard's own preference was for the multiplicationist route and it is in this context that Willard made his proposal that
argumentation be construed as a discipline.
He began with a full-scale treatment of the notion of a discipline. Yet it seems that Willard was less concerned with
arguing for transforming argumentation into a discipline than he was with persuading his readers that "Argumentation
should not attempt with the argument construct what informal logicians have attempted with the fallacy construct" (p.
256). This raises the issue of whether Williard's interpretation of informal logic passes muster. I do not think it does, but
I cannot pursue that issue here. Willard did say, "As a social science, Argumentation studies the phenomena relevant to
the empirical processes of argument, no matter how untidy and fuzzy the resultant package may be" (p. 256). But does
this mean that if argumentation were to become a discipline, it would take on the form of a social science rather than,
say, a formal science? Willard's proposal is in line with Toulmin's incipient awareness of the need for logic to become
more empirical, but if Willard was suggesting that logic can completely abandon its formal character (remembering the
various senses of the term "formal''), then I think his proposal will fail, and for many of the same reasons that Toulmin's
fails.
Still, the suggestion that argumentation might take on the status of a discipline is an interesting one. In some respects,
the study of argumentation can be compared to women's studies (or, as I prefer to say, gender studies). In this case, a
particular topic (womengender) that was of interest to a great many disciplines (philosophy, sociology, psychology,
religious studies, literary theory) has gradually taken on the status of a discipline so that there are now departments and
journals devoted to women's studies, men's studies, and gender studies. The same future might well be a possibility for
argumentation. One would want to weigh the pros and con of such a course of development, but that discussion is for
another time and place.
Informal Logic Tied to the Disciplines
An alternative picture of the future of argumentation theory and informal logic is that presented by Weinstein (1990),
according to which informal logic is the general study of warrantsa study that must be carried out not

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from the philosopher's perch on the tree of knowledge but rather from the earth on the grounds of disciplinary
methodology.
That is, things are far from becoming a discipline in the way that Willard seemed to suggest. Weinstein seemed to want
the future of informal logic and the theory of argument to become enmeshed with the specific disciplines. Informal
logicians must come down off their a prioristic high horses and get down and dirty with those who are actually engaged
in argumentation and reasoning in the pursuit of human knowledge.
Because I already dedicated a fair amount of space to Weinstein's proposal in chapter 11, I say nothing more about it
here.
Logic Should Become More Empirical
In line with Weinstein's suggestion but potentially moving off in a different direction is the notion, which also derives
from Toulmin (1958), that logic should become more empirical. I want to explore a little further what exactly this might
mean.
For Toulmin, it meant setting aside the traditional theory that emphasized logic as an a priori science seeking eternal
and necessary truths and coming closer to seeing logic as an inquiry into argumentation as a real-world practice.
For Weinstein, following Toulmin, it meant that logic should abandon its interest in developing aseptic, a priori
principles based on arm-chair speculation and, rather, attach itself to the special disciplines.
Finocchiaro (1992) defined empirical logic as, "the empirical study of reasoning. To be more exact, I mean the attempt
to formulate, to test, to clarify and to systematize concepts and principles for the interpretation, the evaluation and the
sound practice of reasoning" (p. 22). This definition is identical to the definition Finocchiaro (1984) offered of the
theory of reasoning and, as he pointed out, so construed that it has affinity with "a number of recent movements and
proposals that go under such names as informal logic, probative logic, natural logic, ordinary logic and naturalized
logic" (p. 22). In the next section, and in the spirit of Finocchiaro's proposal, I develop my own recipe for the future of
logic and the theory of argument.
Last, but perhaps most worthy of mention, is Barth's proposal. Barth suggested empirical approaches to logic as early as
1985, in which "no attempt will be made here to stipulate a definition of "empirical logic" (p. 15). What is clear is that
Barth saw empirical logic as an alternative to philosophical logic that, in her view, has been dominated by rationalistic
impulses and too far removed from the "Lifeworld." She offered the notion of a dialectical field11 and said that
"empirical logic needs empirical meth-
11 For a fuller treatment of this, see Johnson (1993).

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ods," by which she meant, "inquiry and interview methods taken from the social sciences" and "methods of synchronic
historical analysis." To some degree, Finocchiaro (1980) already began this inquiry.
One final project that might be undertaken in connection with empirical logic is what I have referred to as "dustbin
empiricism." The project might proceed like this: Identify a number of arguments that one believes (on intuitive
grounds) are good arguments. Ask what qualities these arguments display. See what emerges at the end of this process.
This might be said to be an empirical approach to the question of how to generate standards for the evaluation of
argument. In doing this, however, one must be cognizant of the role of prior theory that will undoubtedly make its
presence felt in the intuitions used to identify good arguments. So far as I know, this project has never been carried out,
although Perkins (1983) undertook a project similar to this.
Revive Dialectic
One final suggestion for a future course of development emerges from reflection on the traditional Aristotelian triad:
logic, dialectic, and rhetoric. Both logic and rhetoric have, in the latter part of the 20th century, been revitalized. I am
thinking here most especially but not exclusively of informal logic and of the new rhetoric. Hamblin showed how
dialectic might be revised but that suggestion seems now to have moved in the direction of dialogue logic. Dialectic has,
for all intents and purposes, disappeared. Perhaps it needs to be revived.12
Each of these proposals for the future of our study has merit. However, the course that I propose is different from any,
and yet, I think, compatible with each of them.
In this book, I have sought chiefly to accomplish three things. First, I attempted to give better shape and definition to the
theory of argument. Second, I wanted to make clear the nature of informal logic, how it approaches the theory of
argument, and what it has to offer. Third, from within the scope of logic, I have argued for a pragmatic approach to
argument, one that emphasizes arguments as occurrences within the practice of argumentation. I have argued for
changes in how the very nature of argument is
12 Hansen (personal communication) saw this as a fruitful route. See also Walton and Brinton (1997).

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understood and I have also argued for changes in the approach to evaluation and criticism of arguments.
In working toward these tasks, I have often had occasion to point to the need for a theory of reasoning and have claimed
that a theory of argument can only go so far before it encounters questions that, although pertinent to the inquiry, lie
beyond its scope. Thus, one of the significant conclusions that emerges from this book is that the theory of argument
requires supplementation by the theory of reasoning. While dealing with issues in the theory of argument, we have
repeatedly run into questions and problems that outrun that theory and require solution from the perspective of a higher-
level theory: the theory of reasoning. In the section that follows, I collect those various references together so that we
can see what they indicate for the theory of reasoning.
In chapter 6, when I discussed the history of argumentation, I wrote:
In sum, although I agree with Finocchiaro about the usefulness of studying reasoning and argumentation
empirically; that is, historically; the way in which the empirical and conceptual strands come together here
presents the investigator with considerable challenges. Such challenges are the material with which a theory
of reasoning must reckon, and it is one of the contentions of this book that just such a theory is needed.
Indeed, my belief (for which I later provide some reasoning) is that a theory of argument requires
supplementation by a theory of reasoning.
These were the problems that I encountered that seem to require the intervention of the theory of reasoning.
The Network Problem
In the Introduction, the need for a theory of reasoning emerged when we encountered what I call The Network Problem.
This problem derives from the fact that the term "reasoning" belongs to a network of terms; in fact, to two such
networks. It seems that if we want to be clear about what argument is, we must see it in relationship to other aspects of
our cognitive lives to which it bears close relationship: thinking, intelligence, rationality, and reasoning. When we were
discussing the relationship between epistemology and informal logic, we encountered the question of the relationship
between knowledge and argumentanother dimension of The Network Problem. In my view, one function of the theory
of reasoning is to answer such questions.
It also seems clear that the theory of reasoning can also contribute much to such questions as how critical thinking
relates to problem solving and how these, in turn, relate to metacognition and informal logic. Thus in my view, the
future of the theory of argument, in no small measure, depends

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on developing appropriate solutions to The Network Problem. That is a job for the theory of reasoning.
In chapter 2, I asked the question: "What are the adequacy conditions that the theory of argument must meet?" I
answered that question there to the best of my ability, but this question seems more appropriately raised within the
context of the theory of reasoning, where a fuller understanding of argument as distinguished from and related to its
cognates can be had.
The Distinction Between Reasoning and Argument
In chapter 3, during discussion of reconstructive deductivism, the issue arose as to whether reasoning that occurs in, for
example, physics is properly construed as argument. I think the answer to this question depends not only on how one
understands "argument" but also how one understands other forms of reasoning in their relationship to argument.
Hence, this question also seems to be one whose solution must await developments within the theory of reasoning.
The Distinction Between Inference, Implication, and Argument
In chapter 4, when I was discussing spectrum theory, the importance of the distinction between implication, inference,
and argument came to the fore. In my opinion, this distinction is crucial to a properly developed theory of argument and
it outruns the theory of argument. This issue is clearly related to The Network Problem (Second Form) and, hence, one
of the chief tasks for the theory of reasoning. Also, the distinction between argument and explanation emerged as yet
another item for the theory of reasoning. In chapter 5, in discussing the development of informal logic, the need for a
distinction between argument and inference emerged again. In the critique of current definitions of argument in chapter
6, I confronted the issue of distinguishing argument from inference, implication, and other forms of reasoning.
The Nature of Reasoning
When I was discussing Walton's (1990b) views about argument and reasoning in chapter 6, the issue of how to
understand and define reasoning arose yet again. I argued there that Walton was committed to an inferentialist account,
although it is far from evident that such an account is warranted. In any event, it raised the question yet again: "What is
reasoning?" This question seems to be a central one and forms the core of a theory of

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reasoning. In chapter 4, I had occasion to discuss Walton's views about reasoning. In chapter 9, where I discussed the
peremptory objection to informal logic, and particularly Hintikka's formulation of it, there was evidence that Hintikka
also took an inferentialist view of reasoning. The issue of the nature of reasoning came up again in the discussion of
McPeck's position that informal logic is really rhetoric.
Conclusion
If we are looking to the future of argumentation as a practice and specifically to the theory of argument as an area of
inquiry, the conclusion I come to is that a better theory of argument must await further developments in the theory of
reasoning. Specifically, two things are needed. First, we need a clearer understanding of the nature of reasoning. What is
reasoning and how is it most profitably understood? Second, we need a better grasp of the relationship between
reasoning and other forms of cognition such as argument, implication, inference, and so forth. I argued that one of the
things that has impeded the development of the theory of argument and informal logic both has been the failure to be
clear on the differences between argument, implication, and inference. Again, it is clear that progress in the theory of
argument (particularly on the conceptual front) will be hampered until we come up with a solution to The Network
Problem (here I am thinking mainly of the second form of The Network Problem).
The Significance of Informal Logic
I come now to discuss the significance of informal logic and do so under two headings: first, the relationship between
theory and practice; second, the traditional distinction between syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. Before that, however,
I would like to review briefly what Scriven said on this issue.
Scriven On the Significance of Informal Logic
Scriven (1980) discussed the philosophical and pedagogical significance of informal logic. I am here mainly concerned
with his view of the former. For Scriven, informal logic was significant because it represented an alternative to formal
logic, "To begin with, the emergence of informal logic marks the end of the reign of formal logic. Not by any means the
end of the subject, just its relegation to its proper place in the academic zoo" (p. 147). Informal logic was significant to
Scriven because "it represents a turning back to the proper task of philosophy in general and logic in particular, namely
the study of argument" (p. 149). Here Scriven and I are in agreement, at least verbally. (I say this because I suspect we
have some differences in how we understand the term "argument".) But shortly after, Scriven asked:

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Is it not indicative of the absurdity of standard philosophy that the informal logic movement should find much
of its opposition amongst the ordinary-language establishment? They came to adopt formal logic, perhaps
because they were taught it, without so to speak looking at it, without noticing that it is the enemy. (pp.
148149)
It seems that Scriven saw informal logic and formal logic as adversarial. Although this view accurately represents the
views of many at the time Scriven delivered this peroration, few continue to see the two as adversarial. Rather, most
now see them as complementary.
Theory and Practice
Dewey on Theory and Practice
Dewey (1966) offered us some interesting thoughts about methods of philosophizing. In the present context, this is
important because I have noticed a gap between logic as the theory of argument and practice, and Dewey's reflections,
although not specifically targeting this gap, can perhaps help me make sense of it. Dewey wrote, "The charge that is
brought against the non-empirical method of philosophizing is not that it depends on theorizing, but that it fails to use
refined, secondary products as a path pointing and leading back to something in primary experience" (p. 169). Applied
to logic, I would say that prior theories of logic, particularly those stemming from FDL, did not use their secondary
products (the concepts of logical theory) to explore the world of primary experience (the practice of arguers). Dewey
said:
The objects of reflection in philosophy being reached by methods that seem to those who employ them
rationally mandatory are to be "real" in and of themselvesand supremely real. Then it becomes an insoluble
problem why the things of gross, primary experience, should be what they are, or indeed why they should be
at all. (p. 169)
Dewey thus proposed a test for the value of any philosophy:
Does it end in conclusions which when referred back to ordinary-life experience and their predicaments,
render them more significant, more luminous to us, and make our dealing with them more fruitful? Or does it
terminate in rendering the things of ordinary experience more opaque than they were before? . . . and are
philosophic concepts left to dwell in separation in some technical realm of their own? (p. 170)
The separation I am concerned with is what I called the gap. Certainly, logic in the 20th century has become
increasingly more technical, increasingly remote from the things of ordinary experience (and sometimes one suspects

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logic glories in this separation). I do not say this to demean in any way those rarified objects of reflection that have
emerged in the development of logic in the 20th century.13
One way of understanding the significance of informal logic is that it can be seen as an attempt to meet Dewey's test, by
developing a theory more applicable to the ordinary life experience and that sought to illuminate rather than deprecate
that realm, "The serious matter is that philosophies have denied that common experience is capable of developing from
within itself methods which will secure direction for itself and will create inherent standards of judgement and
value" (p. 170). Here, Dewey seemed to suggest that we could generate, from within our experience of argumentation
and reflection on it, the necessary standards and values for its appraisal. In some ways, this might be said to be an
empirical approach. Informal logic may be seen as one attempt, admittedly imperfect, to pursue this direction.
On the Relationship between Theory and Practice
For reasons that I discussed in chapter 4, there developed a gap between theory (logic) and practice (the best practices).
To some degree, the recent development of informal logic represents not only a noticing of this gap but also one way of
attempting to bridge it. Instead of attempting to force the practices of arguers into a theory that was not devised with
those practices in mind, informal logic may be seen as an attempt to work the opposite direction: to modify or develop
theory out of insights into the practices.
In other words, the real significance of informal logic can best be understood against Massey's (1981) claim about the
relationship between theory and practice. Recall that Massey claimed that "textbooks are parasitic on journals and
scholarly tomes, and properly so. Cut off from their natural source of nourishment, textbooks are likely to suffer from
conceptual malnutrition" (p. 490). I take this to be, in fact, the standard view of the relationship between theory and
practice. The theory is developed in scholarly tomes and journals and from there it trickles down to the textbooks.
Woods (1992) represented this standpoint when he said, "Get the theory right first, then take care (if you know how) of
instructional routines" (p. 44).
As we have seen, formal deductive logic in this century developed in close proximitynot to the practice of
argumentation but rather to certain issues in the foundations of mathematics and logic. Logic was the theory; it was
what scholars wrote about in their scholarly tomes (such as Principia Mathematica) and journal articles. It is what later
became incorporated in textbooks: see Stebbing (1931), Quine (1940), and Church (1956).
13 I do think that Dewey may well be right in saying, "I cannot calculate how much of current cynicism,
indifference and pessimism is due to these causes in the deflection of intelligence they have brought about" (p.
171).

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The question how this theory becomes a theory of argument is an interesting one that I can only speculate on briefly. I
believe a crucial factor was the emerging tendency to view argument, inference, and implication as more or less
identical. Now, because logic provides us with a theory of implication, because logic provides a normative account of
implication and because implication is (so the thinking runs) at the core of argument, it will follow that logic is for all
intents and purposes a theory of argument (even though it was never devised for that purpose).
It is at this point that informal logic enters the scene. What it notices almost immediately is that the instances of
argument featured by FDL are at best remote cousins to the real life arguments that people encounter in their day-to-day
lives. The second thing that informal logic notices is how difficult it is to apply the techniques of FDL to an ordinary or
mundane argument. The third thing is that once such an application has been made, the result tends to be
unilluminating. That is, one decides that the argument as it stands is invalid or one can reconstruct it as valid. But then
the missing premises become questionable. (All this was discussed in chapter 3.)
For these reasons, informal logic drew the conclusion that FDL is not an adequate theory of argument. With one eye
riveted on argumentative practices, informal logic began the process of attempting to develop a better theory. In this
way, informal logic illustrates a pattern of development that is the very reverse of that proposed by both Massey and
Woods. In informal logic, the theory develops out of the practice. The significance of informal logic lies, in part, in its
attempt to bridge the gap from the side of practice rather than theory; to build theory out of practice.
But we informal logicians were hamstrung in our efforts by having adopted the ways of our forbears, as Weinstein
astutely observed. Many informal logicians rejected the theory of evaluation (the ideal of soundness) while retaining
large portions of the theory of analysis: the idea of premise, conclusion structure, the idea of inference as a link between
premise and conclusion (the P + I conception) and the notion of missing premise. Moreover, we retained the idea that
logic is more concerned with evaluation than criticism, that argument is essentially inference from premise to
conclusion, and that we could achieve the reordering by entering more from the side of theory than critical practice. In
short, like Toulmin, we, too, underestimated the degree to which our project was beholden to prior logical theory.
Syntax, Semantic, and Pragmatics
A second lens through which to view the development of informal logic is through the traditional distinction, due to
Morris, of semiotics into semantics, syntax, and pragmatics. Here, syntax is taken as the study of language in a formal
and structural mode and symbols and their relationship to each

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other. Semantics is taken as the study of language that seeks to provide an interpretation and extra-linguistic meaning
for those symbols. Pragmatics is taken to be the study of symbols in relationship to the users of those symbols.
In the 20th century, logic began with issues that were largely syntactical: the question of whether or not, for example,
mathematics is reducible to logicthe classic logicist thesisis, in large measure, part of a syntactical issue. The attempts to
develop various forms of logistic systems and questions of consistency completeness and independence of axiom
systemsthese are all syntactical. A great deal of wind was taken out of these sails by the Gödel Incompleteness Theorem
(1931) and about this time, the beginning of a perceptible shift occurs in logical theory in the direction of semantics.
Perhaps the most significant development here was the completeness theorem for modal logics developed by Kripke
(1959).
However, in the last few decades, the focus appears to have shifted yet againthis time in the direction of pragmatics
where attention must be paid not only to the symbol and its meanings but also to its relationship to its users, to notions
like context. Scriven (1980) made this very point in his assessment of the informal logic movement. He said, "It has
long been obvious that the concept of explanation, in science or elsewhere, is neither syntactic nor semantic but
essentially pragmatic (to use a traditional set of terms that are themselves somewhat contaminated by
formalism)" (p.150). Thus, for example, the question of how to provide missing premises is a pragmatic issue.
Likewise, the whole notion of a dialectical tier outruns (I believe) any attempt at syntactical or semantical analysis and
lands squarely in the territory of pragmatics.
I have frequently used the term "pragmatic" to characterize my own approach to informal logic, and others have also
(Walton, 1990b). Thus, informal logic is significant because it exemplifies the most recent stage in the ongoing
development of logic in this century.
Conclusion
Against Toulmin's proposal to start over, I find myself attracted to the views of the pragmatists, whose position is that
there is such a close connection between concepts and percepts that the idea of direction inspection of the given,
unaided by any conceptualization, makes little sense.
Following Neurath's (1973) metaphor, a latter-day pragmatist might say that even if the judgment is that the ship has
sprung a leak, the ship cannot be picked up out of the water for repairs. What must be done is repairs, plank by plank if
necessary, while the journey continues.
In making those repairs, how to proceed? In another context, Quine (1963) said, "Each man is given a scientific heritage
plus a continuing barrage of

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sensory stimulation; and the considerations which guide him in warping his scientific heritage to fit the continuing
sensory promptings are, where rational, pragmatic'' (p. 46). In the present context, I propose the following adaptation of
Quine's formulation:
Each logical theorist is given a logical heritage plus a continuing barrage of phenomena (in the form of critical
practice). The considerations that guide him in warping his logical heritage to fit the continuing barrage of
data (or vice versa) are, where rational, pragmatic.
In this work, I have sought to show that informal logic, not as historically constituted but as reconstructed in ways I
have indicated, can provide many of the planks needed to rebuild the ship that will take us to the destination Govier
announced more than 10 years agoa better theory of argument.

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Walton, D. N. (1985b). New directions in the logic of dialogue. Synthese, 63, 259274.
Walton, D. N. (1987). Informal fallacies: Towards a theory of argument criticisms. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
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Page 381
AUTHOR INDEX
Adler, J., 158n., 229
Allen, D., 38, 139, 171, 339, 340, 342n
Anderson, A. R., 58, 111n
Anscombre, J. C., 30
Ayer, A. J., 29, 329n
Ayim, M., 285
Barry, V., 137n, 146
Barth, E. M., 23, 30, 103, 105, 119, 120, 140, 143, 183, 259, 275, 291, 358n, 361
Bartley, W.W., 74n
Beardsley, M., 128, 129
Belnap, N., 58, 63n
Bennett, J., 12n
Berg, J., 261, 315
Binkley, R., 161n, 241n, 280n
Biro, J., 13, 191n, 271, 272-276
Black, M., 113, 114
Blair, J. A., 30, 47n, 113, 115, 118, 119, 119n, 124, 129, 131, 137, 137n, 139, 141, 148, 150, 165, 170, 171n, 189, 192,
196, 197, 199, 200, 202, 203, 237n, 239, 240n, 241, 263, 264, 268, 314n, 343, 345-347n
Bochenski, J. M, 152n
Bowles, G., 200, 202n
Brinton, A., 112, 145, 362n
Carney, J., 117

page_381
Cederblom, J., 146
Church, A., 29, 239
Cohen, L. J., 192n
Conway, D., 129n
Copi, I., 113, 119, 146, 172, 240
Covey, P., 63n
Cox, J. R., 30, 150n
Cresswell, M. J., 111n
Damasio, A., 18n
Damer, T. E., 137n
Davidson, D., 116n
Dewey, J., 366, 367, 367n
Ducrot, O., 30
van Eemeren, F. H., 1n, 30, 47n, 50n, 134n, 143, 144n, 176, 224, 237, 244, 290, 309-320, 355
Ehninger, D., 320
Ennis, R., 133
Evans, G. 164
Finocchiaro, M. 42, 43, 95, 153, 219n, 222n, 361, 362
Fisher, A., 130, 131, 144n
Flew, A., 225n
Fogelin, R. J., 117, 124, 137, 224, 239
Foss, K. A., 268n
Foss, S. K., 268n

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Page 382
Freeman, J., 128, 130, 134, 137n, 141, 240, 340
Frege, G., 104n
Gilbert, M., 31, 32, 35, 38, 42-46, 57, 174, 189, 210, 344
Goldman, A., 252, 252n, 253
Govier, T., 26n, 36n, 37, 38, 41-44, 59-70, 74n, 81-88, 92, 120, 121, 125, 126, 127n, 133, 137n, 141, 147, 147n, 171,
189, 261, 262, 265, 267n, 279, 295, 295n, 315n, 328n, 332, 346, 358,
Grice, H. P., 27, 98, 134, 199
Grize, J., 30
Groarke, L. 70-77, 78n, 137n, 240
Grootendorst, R., 1n, 30, 47n, 50n, 134n, 143, 144n, 176, 224, 237, 244, 290, 309-320, 355
Grunbaum, A., 59n
Habermas, J., 1, 4, 14, 155, 161n
Hamblin, C. L., 29, 32, 41, 51-53, 98-102, 132, 148, 182-189, 192, 340
Hansen, H. V., 127, 132, 190n, 345, 362n
Harman, G., 97, 256
Harrah, D., 290
Himmelfarb, G., 54
Hinderer, C., 146
Hintikka, J., 11n, 139, 255-259, 291
Hitchcock, D., 134, 189, 333, 344n, 355n
Hofstadter, R., 17
Honderich, T., 148
Hughes, G., 111n
Jackson, S., 320

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Jacobs, S., 320
Johnson, R. H., 26n, 30, 35, 47n, 113, 115, 118, 119, 119n, 122n, 124, 129, 131, 137, 137n, 139, 141, 148, 154, 156,
167n, 170, 171n, 182n, 189, 192, 197, 227, 237n, 239, 240, 240n, 241, 241n, 253n, 254, 263, 268, 297, 314n, 315, 333,
336, 345, 346, 347n
Johnson-Laird, P. N., 30
Johnstone, Jr., H.W., 221, 227, 236n, 328, 329, 332
Joseph, H. W. B., 112
Kahane, H., 3, 4, 114, 123, 135, 240
Kalish, D., 123
Kasachkoff, T., 261
Kerrigan, W., 127
Kevles, D., 346
Kiel, F., 168n
Kienpointner, M., 134n
Kierkegaard, S., 18n
Kingwell, M., 16
Kneale, M., 152n
Kneale, W. C., 152n
Krabbe, E. C. W., 119, 120, 140, 143, 259
Kripke, S., 369
Kruiger, T., 134n
Kuhn, D., 30, 348
Kuhn, T., 171
Langford, C. H., 111n
Lasch, C., 24
Lazerowitz, M., 329n
Lee, M., 221n
Leo, J., 34

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Lewis, C. I., 111n
Lichter, S. R., 119
Lichter, L. S., 119
Little, J. F., 137n, 240
Lorenzen, P., 291

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Page 383
Martens, J. L., 30
Massey, G., 58, 63n, 116, 253, 254, 367
MacIntyre, A., 12, 155
MacKay, T., 254
Martinich, A., 116n, 329
Mayer, R. E., 96
McPeck, J., 30, 263-268, 271, 296-301, 302, 306
Meiland, J., 165
Mennsen, S., 284n
Montague, R., 123
Moore, B., 240
Moore, G. E., 279, 279n
Neurath, O., 369
Nickerson, R., 2n, 21n, 148n
Nietzsche, F., 248
Nisbett, R., 30, 93n
Nosich, G., 62, 138
Nye, A., 152n, 283, 286-288
O-P
O'Keefe, D., 12n, 154, 320
Orr, D., 283-286
Parker, R., 240
Paul, R., 302, 303
Peirce, C. S., 149n, 248
Perelman, Ch., 5, 32, 50, 51, 61, 150n, 192

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Perkins, D., 2n, 21n, 331, 362
Pinto, R. C., 186n, 271, 276-283
Plantinga, A., 275
Postman, N., 19, 20
Prior, A. N., 152n
Quine, W. V. O., 113, 145, 329, 358, 367, 369, 370
Rawls, J., 24
Resnick, L., 2, 21
Revlin, R., 91
Ross, l., 30, 93n
Rothman, S., 19
Rowland, R., 145, 146
Russell, B., 5, 22, 106
Ryle, G., 115
Salmon, W., 59n
Scheer, R., 117
Schwarz, N., 146
Scriven, M., 85n, 124, 124n, 128, 129, 131, 132, 136-138, 193, 219n, 241, 244n, 365, 366, 369
Searle, J., 235n
Seech, Z., 137n
Siegel, H., 13, 14 18, 19, 30, 161, 191n, 201, 220n, 262, 272-276, 271, 275
Smith, E., 2n, 21n
Snoeck Henkemans, A. F., 30, 47n, 128, 134n
Sperber, D., 199
Solomon, R., 165

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Starkey, J., 33, 34
Stebbing, L. S., 113, 317
Strawson, P. F., 2n
Tarski, A., 275
Thomas, S. N., 42, 43, 46, 123, 128, 129, 136, 315
Tindale, C., 137n, 200, 240
Toulmin, S. E., 5, 29, 36, 46-50, 46n, 61, 91, 91n, 128, 173, 174, 191, 195, 292-296, 354-358, 361
Trapp, R., 268
Tully, R., 122

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Page 384
Vincent, C., 220n
Vorobej, M., 129n
Walton, D. N., 112, 120, 121, 128, 134n, 141, 143, 144n, 156, 157, 175-77, 290, 352n, 362, 364, 369
Wason, P. C., 30
Weinstein, M., 5n, 128, 260-262, 293n, 295, 301-308, 246-251, 360, 361
Wellman, C., 167
Will, G., 225n
Willard, C., 30, 150, 260, 1290, 320-324, 344, 359, 360
Wilson, D., 199
Wittgenstein, L., 100n, 103n, 104, 116, 141, 145, 248, 259, 273n
Woods, J., 97, 116, 119n, 199, 200, 202n, 254, 255, 259, 367
Wreen, M., 116, 145, 148, 268
Wright, J., von, 111n
Yanal, R., 129n

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Page 385
SUBJECT INDEX
Acceptance, 187, 188, 192-194, 272, 279
Acceptability, 137, 138, 142, 180, 185, 191-195, 272, 280, 292, 310, 311, 319, 334, 348
acceptability requirement, 194-195, 204, 310, 311, 334, 336-344
acceptability vs. acceptance, 191-195
Achilles and the Tortoise, 73-74
Adequacy, 52-54, 364
adequacy conditions, 32, 52-56, 78-81, 88, 101, 107, 123, 140, 213-216, 364
adequacy condition, 4, 61, 64, 65, 68, 77, 141, 208, 217, 240
premise, 139, 157, 187, 196, 197, 271, 278, 327
in ferential,
Ad baculum, 311
Ad hominem, 51, 115, 136, 138, 139, 179, 208, 211, 248, 286-289, 298, 299
Ad ignorantium, 136
Ad populum, 319
Ad verecundiam, 115, 319
Agent, 12, 157-159
Alternative positions, 207, 208
Analysis, 125
theory of, 36, 40, 41, 43, 45, 52, 53, 57, 86, 87, 123, 127, 140-142, 154, 296, 353, 368
Ambiguity, 313
Appeal to force (see ad baculum)
Application Problem, 191, 216, 327, 341-343
Appraisal,

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theory of, 36, 41, 45, 53-55, 59, 87-88, 135-142, 179, 180, 246, 290, 296, 357
Arguer, 12, 38, 157-159
Arguing
process of, 12, 30, 154, 156, 157, 209, 210, 309-320
Argument, 13, 24, 94, 124, 124n, 125, 130, 132, 134, 135-137, 139, 142, 174, 294, 308, 312, 317, 321, 322, 324, 325
artificial, 118
as adversarial, 26, 49, 153, 366
as distinguished from inference/implication, 24-25, 59, 92-94, 100, 101, 102, 152, 179, 183, 223, 257, 265, 266,
350, 364, 368
as product, 12, 57, 209, 210
as process (see Arguing)
conception of, 5, 6, 70, 75, 93, 98, 143, 172, 233, 315, 344
(P + I) conception (see P + I conception)
conductive, 69, 70, 75, 82, 84, 93, 233, 315
conclusive, 229-237
construction, 35, 119
convergent, 82, 128, 129n, 351, 352
deductive, 60, 64, 84, 312, 315
defined, 53, 99, 123-125, 134, 146ff, 167, 168, 173, 176
dialectical nature of, 161, 226

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Page 386
divergent, 128, 129n, 351, 352
evaluation, 121, 130, 131, 314
extended, 172
inductive, 84, 124, 233
linked, 128, 129n, 351, 352
model of, 5, 48-57
nature of, 38, 39, 140, 160
naturally occurring, 34, 61, 62, 67, 89, 92, 189, 351n
purpose (function) of, 38, 39, 124, 146, 148, 149, 158, 159, 174
fundamental, 149, 158
as rational persuasion, 148, 150, 157, 158, 159, 160, 170, 174, 185-189, 192, 194, 221, 226, 269, 284, 322,
329, 331, 338
as inquiry, 149
probabilistic, 71
real, 18, 60, 67, 92, 101, 105, 121
realm of, 92, 347, 295, 351
schemes, 128, 312-314, 319
self-sealing, 224ff
serial, 129
structure, 36, 46, 53, 73-75, 123, 128-131, 140, 141, 160, 203, 213, 270, 294
stylized, 295, 308, 345, 352
theory of, 1, 1n, 2, 4, 6, 31, 32, 37-48, 67, 70, 85-88, 90, 91, 94, 105, 118, 122, 123, 126, 140, 142, 205, 216, 256,
261, 264, 265, 266, 268, 273, 282, 289, 292, 294, 295, 314, 321, 324, 351-354, 358, 359, 364, 370
Aristotle, 4, 55, 59, 106, 112, 119, 150, 151, 152, 158, 255, 268
Argumentation, 11, 12, 14, 122, 291, 297, 298, 301, 303, 307, 308, 310, 311, 318, 320, 321
as dialectical, 160, 161, 165, 269, 281, 341
as teleological, 159-68, 269
as manifest rationality (see Manifest rationality)

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benefits of, 26, 27
conditions of, 15, 16
fundamental characteristics of, 159-164
fundamental principle of, 153
legal, 26, 153
practice of, 5, 6, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 144, 153-156, 367
scheme, 128, 312-314, 319
spoken vs. written, 35, 128, 156, 313
theory of, 1, 1n, 5, 6, 13, 28, 30, 31, 116, 248, 256, 258, 271, 290, 291, 309, 318, 324
Assumption, 11, 96, 116, 133, 136, 197, 198, 266
used vs. needed, 133
Audience, 272, 276, 291, 292, 311, 338
universal, 268
Backing, 29, 47
Balance of considerations argument, 71, 72, 93, 129
Begging the question, 3, 138
Burden of proof, 194, 230, 310, 316, 318
Case-by-case argumentation, 69, 84, 267
Charity, principle of (see Principle of charity)
Completeness Problem, 191, 205, 209, 216, 327, 333-336
Communication theory, 320
Conclusion, 13, 100, 123, 124, 124n, 125, 126, 129-132, 136, 294, 315, 319
Conditional
associated, 67
Conductive inference/conduction, 84-88, 94
Conductivism, 46, 57, 69, 84-88, 91, 92, 107, 134
Conflict management, 25

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Page 387
Conflict of interest, 211
Consistency, 193, 298, 334, 335
Convergent argument, 82, 128, 129, 351, 352
Co-operative principle, 134
Context
Credibility, 268, 211
Critical, 221n
critical discussion, 309-314, 319
critical thinking, 2, 14, 22-26, 37, 271, 301, 304, 308, 347, 363
Criteria (see also Standards) 36, 55, 119, 124n, 137, 142, 182, 291, 292, 293, 312, 313, 314, 315, 319, 335, 344
alethic, 138, 182-186, 277, 291
epistemic, 138, 183, 186, 187, 274, 291
dialectical, 183, 187-189, 185, 204
Criticism, 27, 36, 37, 119, 135, 136, 140, 157, 178, 179, 219, 242-244, 291, 292, 293, 300, 312, 337
criticism vs. evaluation, 6, 139, 178, 179, 217-228, 242-244, 334
legitimate, 226, 228, 230, 233, 234, 236
principles of (Chap. 8)
responding to, 247, 248
theory of, 139, 180
strong, 216, 240, 241, 243, 248
substantive vs. logical, 237-239
Cultural environment, 14-21
Deduction, 94, 119
Deductive, 84, 134, 136, 305, 357 argument (see entry under argument, deductive)
chauvinism, 59
criteria, 137

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deductive nomological paradigm, 103, 291
deductive vs. inductive, 46, 61, 81, 82, 351
implication, 92, 20, 125
inference, 120, 257
logic, 137, 174, 255
reasoning, 61
Deductivism (see Chap. 3), 36, 37, 38n, 42, 54, 57, 58-81, 89, 93, 103, 107, 126, 312
literal deductivism, 61
pure deductivism (PD), 64, 66, 67
reconstructive deductivism (RD), 61, 65-67, 75
Definition
stipulative, 22, 146, 175
Dialectic, 317, 318, 320n, 362
Dialectical field, 361
Dialectical tier, 152, 160, 164-173, 182, 186, 232, 233, 269, 270, 282, 316, 327, 331, 335, 336, 369
Dialectical obligations, 190, 251, 269-271, 322, 327-333, 352, 353
Dialogue logic, 210, 290, 291
Discipline, 260, 263, 295, 304-408, 335, 352, 360
argumentation as, 122, 260, 359, 360
Discrimination, principle of (see Principle of discrimination)
Divergent arguments, 128, 129, 352
Dustbin empiricism, 362
Empirical approach, 358, 361, 362, 367
Entailment, 6, 16, 27, 89, 116
Enthymemes, 132
Epistemic standards, 276ff
Epistemology, 120, 271-283, 289, 301, 302
informal logic and, 281-283

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Ethos, 269, 322
Evaluation, 36, 119, 198, 273, 274, 341
evaluation vs. criticism, 6, 139, 178, 179, 217, 218, 242-244, 341, 342, 344, 350
criteria, 271, 341-343

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Page 388
theory of, 36, 138, 139, 180, 304
Explanation, 98-99, 113, 124
Fallacy, 3, 4, 37, 43, 51, 67, 72, 73, 115, 119, 139, 198, 198n, 240, 253, 309, 312, 314, 319, 345
theory of, 3, 4, 41, 118, 136, 137, 139, 253-54, 345, 451
informal, 119, 121
FDL (see entry under Logic, formal)
Feminst theory, 289
Field, 47, 294ff
field dependence, 292, 294, 296, 301
field invariance, 292, 293, 294, 307
Field theories (see Chap. 10), 267, 290, 291-309, 324
Form, 119, 120
form-1, 119
form-2, 120, 259, 262, 264, 265
form-3, 120, 259, 262, 264, 265
Formal, 122, 265
Formalism, 124, 260-262, 369
Formalization, 149
Formal dialectic, 52, 101, 143
Gender studies, 360
Gettier counterexample, 236
Geometrical model, 29, 48, 91, 126, 294, 357n
Goodness in arguments (see Chap. 7), 4, 5, 40, 51, 53, 100, 134, 143, 181, 186, 190, 208, 276, 324
Godel Incompleteness Theorem, 369

page_388
Hasty conclusion/generalization, 115, 136, 138
History of argumentation, 228ff, 363
Ideal audience, 192
Illative core, 150, 152, 160, 164-167, 170, 182, 190, 206, 208, 326-328, 334, 335
Implication, 24, 25, 69, 94, 124n, 137, 142, 152, 183, 254, 255, 261, 315
theory of, 76, 93, 368
Inconsistency, 98, 197
Inductive argument/inference/
induction, 81-84, 231, 315
inductive vs. deductive, 46, 61, 81, 82, 351
Inductive reasoning, 124
Inference, 24, 25, 72, 74n, 92, 94, 95, 97, 122, 124, 124n., 129, 135, 136, 152, 167, 178, 182, 256, 266, 291
Inferential adequacy, 139, 183
Inferentialism, 96, 177, 365
Informal
Informal-2, 140, 253
Informal-3, 253, 254
Informal logic (see Chaps. 5 & 10), 2, 4, 6, 11, 31, 32, 37, 38, 56, 57, 94, 108, 111, 112, 114-125, 127, 128, 130-135,
137, 140-142, 176, 179, 189, 205, 216, 242, 251-253, 258, 260, 263, 287, 289, 291, 294, 296, 297, 301, 302, 304, 308-
322, 325, 326, 343-351, 359, 360, 367, 370
significance of, 365-369
Informal logic movement, 1, 28, 115, 116, 168, 283, 369
Integration problem, 191, 216, 271, 278, 327, 336-340
Interpretátion, 36, 119, 123, 125-127, 140
Invalid, 117
Invalidity, 65, 253, 254
Jurisprudential model, 5, 29, 46, 48-51, 167n, 273, 308, 357n, 358

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Justification, 275, 276, 307

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Page 389
K-L
Knowledge, 14, 23, 104, 121, 272-275, 280n, 281-283, 307, 361
Linguistics, 28, 30
Logic, 14, 16, 17, 28, 31, 63n, 96, 97, 111, 255, 260, 319, 362, 366
Aristotelian (syllogistic), 17, 58, 112, 264, 315
deductive, 114, 255, 256, 350
deontic, 111
dialogue, 210, 290, 291
empirical, 361, 362
epistemic, 111
Formal, 50, 116-118, 118n, 119-121, 123, 125, 127, 130, 131, 136, 140, 142, 306, 321, 348
FDL (formal, deductive logic), 31, 41, 56-58, 61, 66, 78-81, 88, 89, 92, 96, 100-103, 105-107, 111-114, 123-125, 127,
131, 135-138, 142, 170, 191, 255, 269, 285, 292, 293n, 294, 304, 312, 319, 333, 352, 367, 368, informal (see Informal
logic)
inductive, 72, 93, 94, 112, 114, 179, 182, 265, 266
mathematical, 113
modal, 58
natural, 361
predicate, 120
probative, 361
propositional, 58, 113, 120, 254, 315
practical, 121, 122
symbolic, 12, 17, 113-115
Logical form, 57, 106, 107, 128, 135
Logical neutrality (see Principle of logical neutrality)
Logical theory, 335-338
Logical type, 294, 295
Logos, 269

page_389
Manifest rationality, 1, 144, 151, 163, 164ff, 175, 178, 210, 251, 227, 230, 239, 243, 244, 270, 318, 337, 339
Mathematical logic, 7, 104, 113
Mathematicization of logic, 27, 46, 91, 103, 104, 105, 144, 145, 152, 168, 354
Mediation, 25
Message design logic, 320
Missing premises, 36, 39, 62, 75, 131-133, 136, 183, 201, 311, 312, 314-316, 349-350
Model (see also jurisprudential model, geoterical model), 48, 245, 258, 269, 291, 307, 310
Model interlocutor, 192
Monistic theory, 42, 44, 58
Monolectical, 281
Monolithic theory, 42
Multivalent theory, 45, 46
Natural language, 54, 60, 65, 114, 142, 291
Negotiation, 25
Network problem, 2, 21-24, 97, 275, 281, 284, 363-365
first form, 21-22, 97
second form, 22-24
Nit-picking, 242, 244
Normative conditions, 4, 5
for the practice, 212
for the product, 209
for the process, 209, 210
for the person, 210-212
Normative standards, 306
Objection(s), 160, 206, 270, 276, 327

page_389
The Standard Objections 166, 206, 328-33,
token, 329
type, 329
Obligation, 207, 227, 329n, 353
Occam's Razor, 273
Other, the, 12, 13, 149, 150

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Page 390
Pathos, 269
(P + I) conception of argument, 75, 87, 164, 166, 167, 181, 184, 277, 368
Philosophy, 28, 29, 32n, 47, 158, 215, 267, 307, 365, 366
Plato, 4, 58, 61, 119, 150, 152, 158, 211, 269
Pluralism, 37, 42, 44-46, 84
Popularity, 198
Positivism,
as a philosophical movement, 25, 28-29, 104
as a theory of argument, 31, 37, 42, 57, 81-84, 89, 91-93, 107
Practice, 12, 154, 155, 212
Pragma-dialectics, 30, 290, 309-321, 324
Pragmatic, 121, 122, 134, 140, 142, 149n, 204
approach, 149, 177-179, 209, 362, 369
property, 202, 204, 205
Pragmatics, 204, 365, 368, 369
Premise, 123, 124, 124n, 125-129, 132, 136, 139, 291, 301, 312, 314, 319
adequacy, 187
missing (see Missing premises)
implicit (see Missing premises)
Principle of charity, 87, 127, 128, 132, 134, 135, 241, 313, 345
Principle of discrimination, 140, 240-248, 274
Principle of falsifiability, 223, 224
Principle of logical neutrality, 188, 190, 237-240
Principle of parity, 236, 237
Principle of vulnerability, 223-237, 310, 312, 326
Problem solving, 2, 22, 25

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Proof, 183, 254, 255, 259
vs. argument, 231-32
Propositional calculus, 254, 282
Proto-argument, 170
Psychologism, 104, 286
Psychology, 30, 267, 286, 301, 345
Quantification theory, 106
Quarrelling, 25
Rational discussion, 319ff
Rationality, 1, 11, 12-15, 23, 50, 96, 97, 161-64, 239, 275, 283, 284, 317, 318
conceptions of, 284
feminine style of, 283ff
manifest (see Manifest rationality)
styles of, 283-86
Reasoning, 22, 23, 94, 95, 176, 177, 199, 257-258, 284, 291, 364
theory of, 7, 22-23, 70, 94, 95-98, 176, 255, 256, 258, 259, 265, 275, 325, 326, 353, 362-65
principles of, 298-301
by analogy, 113
causal, 113
mathematical, 113
Rebuttal, 47, 173, 174
Reconstruction, 38, 65, 76, 126
Relativism, 272, 272, 276, 278
Relevance, 137, 142, 180, 191n, 198, 272, 273, 276, 319
Relevance requirement, 4, 137, 138, 199-204, 208, 310, 334, 341-343, 348, 349
warrants, 203-04

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Research agenda,
for informal logic, 343-51, 353
for the theory of argument, 351-353
for the theory of reasoning, 354
Rhetoric, 129, 163, 251, 256, 264, 265, 268, 270, 289, 290, 320, 362
informal logic and rhetoric, 265, 268-271
Rigor, 60, 105, 260

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Page 391
Semantics, 122, 204, 365, 368, 369
Sexism in logic, 283-289
Shotgunning, 242
Sociology, 345
Sound/ness, 3, 36, 39, 42, 57, 58, 61, 79, 100, 101, 119, 135, 291, 335, 368
Spectrum, 42, 43-46, 84, 89
Specification problem, 166, 207, 234 326, 327-337
Speech act theory, 30, 309, 321
Standards (see also Criteria,) 34, 38, 272, 277, 291-294, 296, 301, 305-308, 335, 347
Straw person, 138, 179, 207, 310, 352
Structuralist approach, 98, 99, 148, 177
Structure (see argument, structure)
Sufficiency, 137, 142, 180, 191n, 201, 208, 272, 273
sufficiency requirement, 7, 138, 201, 204-206, 214, 334, 341-343, 350
Syllogism, 112, 151, 320n
Syllogistic, 17, 58, 112, 315
theory (logic) 106, 113, 119, 132, 151
Syntax, 122, 126, 204, 365, 368, 369
Television, 17-21
Thinking, 17, 18, 23
Theory vs. practice, 354-359, 367, 368
Truth, 272, 273, 275, 278-280, 294, 300, 319
conceptions of, 198
theories of, 196-198
truth-requirement, 59, 60, 61, 79, 184, 191, 195-198, 200, 208, 215, 271, 334, 336-340, 341-343

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Types of argument, 35, 43, 44, 45, 83, 134
Typology, 42ff, 53, 61, 128, 351, 352
argument, 128
U-W
Univalent theory, 45, 46
Vagueness, 313
Valid, 3, 62, 62n, 65, 100, 117, 297, 312
Validity, 58, 60, 61, 62, 106, 118, 119, 120, 138, 141, 142, 184, 186, 188, 195, 197, 274, 292, 293, 294, 300, 312, 314-
316, 319, 335, 357
validity-requirement, 59, 79, 184
Warrant, 29, 47, 203, 275, 293, 307, 335, 360, 361
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title : Manifest Rationality : A Pragmatic Theory of Argument

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A Pragmatic Theory of Argument

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Copyright © 2000 by Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., Publishers

Cover design by Kathryn Houghtaling Lacey

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Printed in the United States of America

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1. Context: Argumentation as a Cultural Practice 11

2. Context: The Study of Argumentation 28

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3. Paradigm Abandoned: Critique of Deductivism 57

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4. Lessons from the Past 91

5. Informal Logic: An Alternative Theory of Argument 111

6. Argument as Manifest Rationality: A Pragmatic Conception 143

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7. What Makes a Good Argument? Toward a Theory of Evaluation 180

8. Principles of Criticism 217

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Part III 249

9. Criticisms, Objections, and Replies 251

10. Alternative Theories of Argument 290

11. Outstanding Issues and the Research Agenda 326

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12. Retrospect and Prospect 354

Author Index 381

Subject index 385

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1Twilight of the Idols (The "Improvers" of Mankind), p. 512.

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Colleagues: Former students:

Jonathan Adler Jill Binker

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The Re-emergence of Argumentation Theory

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