Persons and Family Relations Cases
Republic of the Philippines of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
ROMERO, J.:
In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City,
Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually
convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision penned by Judge Manuel
E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4,
1992 at
the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary
to hepatic encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric
malingering. Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution of May 20,
1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required
the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil
liability arising from his commission of the offense charged.
In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of
accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his
commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor General, relying on the
case of People v. Sendaydiego 1 insists that the appeal should still be
resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court
on which the civil liability is based.
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of
the Solicitor General arguing that the death of the accused while judgment
penalties. In support of his position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the
Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia 2 which held that the
civil obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and,
therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die before final
judgment is rendered.
We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of the accused
pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability?
In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo, this issue was settled in
the affirmative. This same issue posed therein was phrased thus: Does the
death of Alfredo Castillo affect both his criminal responsibility and his
civil liability as a consequence of the alleged crime?
It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition:
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling
statute. It reads, in part:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally
extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the
personal penalties; and as to the pecuniary
penalties liability therefor is extinguished
only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment;
With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no
question. The law is plain. Statutory construction is
unnecessary. Said liability is extinguished.
The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability
is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment. Saddled upon us is the task of
ascertaining the legal import of the term "final judgment."
Is it final judgment as contradistinguished from an
interlocutory order? Or, is it a judgment which is final and
executory?
1

We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept
contained in Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code
heretofore transcribed is lifted from Article 132 of the
Spanish El Codigo Penal de 1870 which, in part, recites:
La responsabilidad penal se extingue.
1. Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las
penas personales siempre, y respecto a las
pecuniarias, solo cuando a su fallecimiento
no hubiere recaido sentencia firme.
xxx xxx xxx
The code of 1870 . . . it will be observed employs the term
"sentencia firme." What is "sentencia firme" under the old
statute?
XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Española, p. 473, furnishes
the ready answer: It says:
SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que
adquiere la fuerza de las definitivas por no
haberse utilizado por las partes litigantes
recurso alguno contra ella dentro de los
terminos y plazos legales concedidos al
efecto.
"Sentencia firme" really should be understood as one
which is definite. Because, it is only when judgment is such
that, as Medina y Maranon puts it, the crime is confirmed
— "en condena determinada;" or, in the words of Groizard,
the guilt of the accused becomes — "una verdad legal."
Prior thereto, should the accused die, according to Viada,
"no hay legalmente, en tal caso, ni reo, ni delito, ni
responsabilidad criminal de ninguna clase." And, as Judge
Kapunan well explained, when a defendant dies before
judgment becomes executory, "there cannot be any
determination by final judgment whether or not the felony
upon which the civil action might arise exists," for the
simple reason that "there is no party defendant." (I
Persons and Family Relations Cases
Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, p. 421. Senator
Francisco holds the same view. Francisco, Revised Penal
Code, Book One, 2nd ed., pp. 859-860)
The legal import of the term "final judgment" is similarly
reflected in the Revised Penal Code. Articles 72 and 78 of
that legal body mention the term "final judgment" in the
sense that it is already enforceable. This also brings to
mind Section 7, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which states
that a judgment in a criminal case becomes final "after the
lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal or when the
sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served,
or the defendant has expressly waived in writing his right
to appeal."
By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here
collected funnel down to one positive conclusion: The
term final judgment employed in the Revised Penal Code
means judgment beyond recall. Really, as long as a
judgment has not become executory, it cannot be
truthfully said that defendant is definitely guilty of the
felony charged against him.
Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is
without reason. For where, as in this case, the right to
institute a separate civil action is not reserved, the
decision to be rendered must, of necessity, cover "both the
criminal and the civil aspects of the case." People vs. Yusico
(November 9, 1942), 2 O.G., No. 100, p. 964. See also:
People vs. Moll, 68 Phil., 626, 634; Francisco, Criminal
Procedure, 1958 ed., Vol. I, pp. 234, 236. Correctly, Judge
Kapunan observed that as "the civil action is based solely
on the felony committed and of which the offender might
be found guilty, the death of the offender extinguishes the
civil liability." I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated,
supra.
Here is the situation obtaining in the present case:
Castillo's criminal liability is out. His civil liability is sought
to be enforced by reason of that criminal liability. But then,
if we dismiss, as we must, the criminal action and let the
2

civil aspect remain, we will be faced with the anomalous
situation whereby we will be called upon to clamp civil
liability in a case where the source thereof — criminal
liability — does not exist. And, as was well stated in
Bautista, et al. vs. Estrella, et al., CA-G.R.
No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958, "no party can be found
and held criminally liable in a civil suit," which solely
would remain if we are to divorce it from the criminal
proceeding."
This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case 3 was adopted by
the Supreme Court in the cases of People of the Philippines v. Bonifacio
Alison, et al., 4 People of the Philippines v. Jaime Jose, et al. 5 and People of
the Philippines v. Satorre 6 by dismissing the appeal in view of the death
of the accused pending appeal of said cases.
As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in the Alison case:
The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having
been established, and considering that there is as yet no
final judgment in view of the pendency of the appeal, the
criminal and civil liability of the said accused-appellant
Alison was extinguished by his death (Art. 89, Revised
Penal Code; Reyes' Criminal Law, 1971 Rev. Ed., p. 717,
citing People v. Castillo and Ofemia C.A., 56 O.G. 4045);
consequently, the case against him should be dismissed.
On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases of Buenaventura
Belamala v. Marcelino Polinar 7 and Lamberto Torrijos v. The Honorable
Court of Appeals 8 ruled differently. In the former, the issue decided by
this court was: Whether the civil liability of one accused of physical
injuries who died before final judgment is extinguished by his demise to
the extent of barring any claim therefore against his estate. It was the
contention of the administrator-appellant therein that the death of the
accused prior to final judgment extinguished all criminal and civil
liabilities resulting from the offense, in view of Article 89, paragraph 1 of
the Revised Penal Code. However, this court ruled therein:
We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been
extinguished, in view of the provisions of the Civil Code of
the Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that became
Persons and Family Relations Cases
operative eighteen years after the revised Penal Code. As
pointed out by the Court below, Article 33 of the Civil Code
establishes a civil action for damages on account of
physical injuries, entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action.
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and
physical injuries, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action, may be brought
by the injured party. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.
Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's
civil action for damages was to be considered instituted
together with the criminal action still, since both
proceedings were terminated without final adjudication,
the civil action of the offended party under Article 33 may
yet be enforced separately.
In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that:
xxx xxx xxx
It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability
follows the extinction of the criminal liability under
Article 89, only when the civil liability arises from the
criminal act as its only basis. Stated differently, where the
civil liability does not exist independently of the criminal
responsibility, the extinction of the latter by death, ipso
facto extinguishes the former, provided, of course, that
death supervenes before final judgment. The said
principle does not apply in instant case wherein the civil
liability springs neither solely nor originally from the
crime itself but from a civil contract of purchase and sale.
(Emphasis ours)
xxx xxx xxx
3

In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil liability of
the accused who was charged with estafa could likewise trace its
genesis to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code since said
accused had swindled the first and second vendees of the property
subject matter of the contract of sale. It therefore concluded:
"Consequently, while the death of the accused herein extinguished
his criminal liability including fine, his civil liability based on the
laws of human relations remains."
Thus, it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil liability of
the accused, notwithstanding the extinction of his criminal liability due to
his death pending appeal of his conviction.
To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability to survive, the
court relied on the following ratiocination: Since Section 21, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court 9 requires the dismissal of all money claims against the
defendant whose death occurred prior to the final judgment of the Court
of First Instance (CFI), then it can be inferred that actions for recovery of
money may continue to be heard on appeal, when the death of the
defendant supervenes after the CFI had rendered its judgment. In such
case, explained this tribunal, "the name of the offended party shall be
included in the title of the case as plaintiff-appellee and the legal
representative or the heirs of the deceased-accused should be substituted
as defendants-appellants."
It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo to Torrijos,
the rule established was that the survival of the civil liability depends on
whether the same can be predicated on sources of obligations other than
delict. Stated differently, the claim for civil liability is also extinguished
together with the criminal action if it were solely based thereon, i.e., civil
liability ex delicto.
However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et al. 10 departed
from this long-established principle of law. In this case, accused
Sendaydiego was charged with and convicted by the lower court of
malversation thru falsification of public documents. Sendaydiego's death
supervened during the pendency of the appeal of his conviction.
This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss Sendaydiego's
appeal but only to the extent of his criminal liability. His civil liability was
allowed to survive although it was clear that such claim thereon was
Persons and Family Relations Cases
exclusively dependent on the criminal action already extinguished. The
legal import of such decision was for the court to continue exercising
appellate jurisdiction over the entire appeal, passing upon the correctness
of Sendaydiego's conviction despite dismissal of the criminal action, for
the purpose of determining if he is civilly liable. In doing so, this Court
issued a Resolution of July 8, 1977 stating thus:
The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the
civil liability survived Sendaydiego because his death
occurred after final judgment was rendered by the Court
of First Instance of Pangasinan, which convicted him of
three complex crimes of malversation through
falsification and ordered him to indemnify the Province in
the total sum of P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).
The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly
instituted with the criminal action in the absence of
express waiver or its reservation in a separate action (Sec.
1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court). The civil action for the
civil liability is separate and distinct from the criminal
action (People and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287; Roa
vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).
When the action is for the recovery of money and the
defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First
Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the
manner especially provided in Rule 87 of the Rules of
Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money
judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of
First Instance, the action survives him. It may be
continued on appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-
40336, October 24, 1975; 67 SCRA 394).
The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for
the funds improperly disbursed although he has no
criminal liability (U.S. vs. Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; Philippine
National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).
4

In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of
the appeal of the deceased Sendaydiego insofar as his
criminal liability is concerned, the Court Resolved to
continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over his
possible civil liability for the money claims of the Province
of Pangasinan arising from the alleged criminal acts
complained of, as if no criminal case had been instituted
against him, thus making applicable, in determining his
civil liability, Article 30 of the Civil Code . . . and, for that
purpose, his counsel is directed to inform this Court
within ten (10) days of the names and addresses of the
decedent's heirs or whether or not his estate is under
administration and has a duly appointed judicial
administrator. Said heirs or administrator will be
substituted for the deceased insofar as the civil action for
the civil liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3,
Rules of Court).
Succeeding cases 11 raising the identical issue have maintained
adherence to our ruling in Sendaydiego; in other words, they were a
reaffirmance of our abandonment of the settled rule that a civil liability
solely anchored on the criminal (civil liability ex delicto) is extinguished
upon dismissal of the entire appeal due to the demise of the accused.
But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A re-examination
of our decision in Sendaydiego impels us to revert to the old ruling.
To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego: The resolution of
the civil action impliedly instituted in the criminal action can proceed
irrespective of the latter's extinction due to death of the accused pending
appeal of his conviction, pursuant to Article 30 of the Civil Code and
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:
When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil
liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal
proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil
case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be
sufficient to prove the act complained of.
Persons and Family Relations Cases
Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend support to the ruling
in Sendaydiego. Nowhere in its text is there a grant of authority to
continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the accused's civil liability
ex delicto when his death supervenes during appeal. What Article 30
recognizes is an alternative and separate civil action which may be
brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense
independently of any criminal action. In the event that no criminal
proceedings are instituted during the pendency of said civil case, the
quantum of evidence needed to prove the criminal act will have to be that
which is compatible with civil liability and that is, preponderance of
evidence and not proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Citing or
invoking Article 30 to justify the survival of the civil action despite
extinction of the criminal would in effect merely beg the question of
whether civil liability ex delicto survives upon extinction of the criminal
action due to death of the accused during appeal of his conviction. This is
because whether asserted in
the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex delicto is
extinguished by the death of the accused while his conviction is on appeal.
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is clear on this matter:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. —
Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties;
and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment;
xxx xxx xxx
However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the expressed intent of
Article 89. It allowed claims for civil liability ex delicto to survive by ipso
facto treating the civil action impliedly instituted with the criminal, as one
filed under Article 30, as though no criminal proceedings had been filed
but merely a separate civil action. This had the effect of converting such
claims from one which is dependent on the outcome of the criminal action
to an entirely new and separate one, the prosecution of which does not
even necessitate the filing of criminal proceedings. 12 One would be hard
put to pinpoint the statutory authority for such a transformation. It is to
be borne in mind that in recovering civil liability ex delicto, the same has
perforce to be determined in the criminal action, rooted as it is in the
5

court's pronouncement of the guilt or innocence of the accused. This is but
to render fealty to the intendment of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code
which provides that "every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable." In such cases, extinction of the criminal action due to death
of the accused pending appeal inevitably signifies the concomitant
extinction of the civil liability. Mors Omnia Solvi. Death dissolves all things.
In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final
determination of the criminal liability is a condition precedent to the
prosecution of the civil action, such that when the criminal action is
extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant pending appeal thereof,
said civil action cannot survive. The claim for civil liability springs out of
and is dependent upon facts which, if true, would constitute a crime. Such
civil liability is an inevitable consequence of the criminal liability and is to
be declared and enforced in the criminal proceeding. This is to be
distinguished from that which is contemplated under Article 30 of the
Civil Code which refers to the institution of a separate civil action that
does not draw its life from a criminal proceeding. The Sendaydiego
resolution of July 8, 1977, however, failed to take note of this fundamental
distinction when it allowed the survival of the civil action for the recovery
of civil liability ex delicto by treating the same as a separate civil action
referred to under Article 30. Surely, it will take more than just a summary
judicial pronouncement to authorize the conversion of said civil action to
an independent one such as that contemplated under Article 30.
Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply
Article 30, the resolution of July 8, 1977 notwithstanding. Thus, it was
held in the main decision:
Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the
purpose of showing his criminal liability which is the basis
of the civil liability for which his estate would be liable. 13
In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability,
concomitantly made a determination on whether Sendaydiego, on the
basis of evidenced adduced, was indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of committing the offense charged. Thus, it upheld Sendaydiego's
conviction and pronounced the same as the source of his civil liability.
Consequently, although Article 30 was not applied in the final
determination of Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was a reopening of the
criminal action already extinguished which served as basis for
Persons and Family Relations Cases
Sendaydiego's civil liability. We reiterate: Upon death of the accused
pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished
inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the
civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso
facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal.
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to serve as
another basis for the Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977. In citing Sec.
21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the Court made the inference that civil
actions of the type involved in Sendaydiego consist of money claims, the
recovery of which may be continued on appeal if defendant dies pending
appeal of his conviction by holding his estate liable therefor. Hence, the
Court's conclusion:
"When the action is for the recovery of money" "and the
defendant dies before final judgment in the court of First
Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the
manner especially provided" in Rule 87 of the Rules of
Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money
judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of
First Instance, the action survives him. It may be
continued on appeal.
Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the standpoint
of procedural law, this course taken in Sendaydiego cannot be sanctioned.
As correctly observed by Justice Regalado:
xxx xxx xxx
I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in
both Torrijos and Sendaydiego which, relying on the
provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, drew
the strained implication therefrom that where the civil
liability instituted together with the criminal liabilities
had already passed beyond the judgment of the then Court
of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), the Court
of Appeals can continue to exercise appellate jurisdiction
thereover despite the extinguishment of the component
criminal liability of the deceased. This pronouncement,
6

which has been followed in the Court's judgments
subsequent and consonant to Torrijos and Sendaydiego,
should be set aside and abandoned as being clearly
erroneous and unjustifiable.
Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil procedure in
ordinary civil actions. There is neither authority nor
justification for its application in criminal procedure to
civil actions instituted together with and as part of
criminal actions. Nor is there any authority in law for the
summary conversion from the latter category of an
ordinary civil action upon the death of the offender. . . .
Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal proceeding for
recovery of civil liability ex delicto can hardly be categorized as an
ordinary money claim such as that referred to in Sec. 21, Rule 3
enforceable before the estate of the deceased accused.
Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be viewed
in light of the provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 involving claims against the
estate, which in Sendaydiego was held liable for Sendaydiego's civil
liability. "What are contemplated in Section 21 of Rule 3, in relation to
Section 5 of Rule 86, 14 are contractual money claims while the claims
involved in civil liability ex delicto may include even the restitution of
personal or real property." 15 Section 5, Rule 86 provides an exclusive
enumeration of what claims may be filed against the estate. These are:
funeral expenses, expenses for the last illness, judgments for money and
claim arising from contracts, expressed or implied. It is clear that money
claims arising from delict do not form part of this exclusive enumeration.
Hence, there could be no legal basis in (1) treating a civil action ex delicto
as an ordinary contractual money claim referred to in Section 21, Rule 3
of the Rules of Court and (2) allowing it to survive by filing a claim therefor
before the estate of the deceased accused. Rather, it should be
extinguished upon extinction of the criminal action engendered by the
death of the accused pending finality of his conviction.
Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon extinction of the
civil liability ex delicto desires to recover damages from the same act or
omission complained of, he must subject to Section 1, Rule 111 16 (1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate civil action, this
time predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other sources
Persons and Family Relations Cases
of obligation. The source of obligation upon which the separate civil action
is premised determines against whom the same shall be enforced.
If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-delict or
may, by provision of law, result in an injury to person or property (real or
personal), the separate civil action must be filed against the executor or
administrator 17 of the estate of the accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87
of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought
against executor or administrator. — No action upon a
claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest
thereon shall be commenced against the executor or
administrator; but actions to recover real or personal
property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to
enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for
an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be
commenced against him.
This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala 18 where we held that,
in recovering damages for injury to persons thru an independent civil
action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code, the same must be filed against
the executor or administrator of the estate of deceased accused and not
against the estate under Sec. 5, Rule 86 because this rule explicitly limits
the claim to those for funeral expenses, expenses for the last sickness of
the decedent, judgment for money and claims arising from contract,
express or implied. Contractual money claims, we stressed, refers only to
purely personal obligations other than those which have their source in
delict or tort.
Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also arises from
contract, the separate civil action must be filed against the estate of the
accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As
opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior
to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil
7
 Persons and Family Relations Cases

liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is DISMISSED with
i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore." costs de oficio.

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the SO ORDERED.
death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of
obligation other than delict. 19 Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ.,
as a result of the same act or omission: concur.

a) Law 20 Cruz, J., is on leave.

b) Contracts

c) Quasi-contracts

d) . . .

e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an

action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a
separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be
enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is
based as explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right
to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the
prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-
offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case,
the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during
the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article
1155 21 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on
a possible privation of right by prescription. 22

Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of
appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability
based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal
is hereby dismissed without qualification.

8

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 96740 March 25, 1999
VIRGINIA P. SARMIENTO and APOLONIA P. CATIBAYAN, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SIMON ARGUELLES, respondents.
PURISIMA, J.:
At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the Decision, 1 dated October 26, 1989
and the Resolution, 2 dated January 4, 1991, of the Court of Appeals 3 in
CA — G.R. CV No. 11750, reversing the Decision 4 , dated May 30, 1986, of
Branch XV, Regional Trial Court, in Trece Martires City 5 in Civil Case No.
NC-75.
The antecedent facts that matter are as follows:
Virginia P. Sarmiento and Apolonia P. Catibayan, the petitioners herein,
filed a complain for partition of a piece of land, more particularly
described as Lot No. 926 of the Naic Estate, G.L.R.O., Record No. 8340, in
Naic, Cavite, with an area of 1,779 square meters, covered by TCT No.
21877 issued on September 1, 1941 to co-owners, Francisco Arguelles
and Petrona Reyes.
Petitioners are sisters, their parents being Tiburcio Pangilinan and
Leogarda Arguelles, who died in 1946. Leogarda was the daughter of
Francisco Arguelles who died on February 18, 1949 and Emilia Pineli, who
died on May 2, 1950. Private respondent Simon Arguelles is a half brother
of Leogarda, with Francisco Arguelles as their common father.
Petitioners claim that as granddaughters of Francisco Arguelles, they and
private respondent Simon Arguelles are co-owners of the 1/2 portion of
Lot No. 926, as the only heirs of the late Francisco Arguelles. But according
Persons and Family Relations Cases
to private respondent, petitioners are not the legal heirs of Francisco
Arguelles because their (petitioners') mother, Leogarda Arguelles, was
allegedly an illegitimate child of his father, Francisco Arguelles, and Emilia
Pineli who were not married. Under the old Civil Code, which should be
applied since Francisco Arguelles died in 1949, before the effectivity of
the New Civil Code, an illegitimate child did not have successional rights.
After trial, the lower court came out with a decision ordering the parties
herein to partition among themselves subject 1/2 portion of Lot No. 926;
and disposing thus:
In view of all the foregoing, plaintiffs Virginia P. Sarmiento
and Apolonia P. Catibayan and defendant Simon Arguelles
are hereby ordered to partition among themselves the
one-half portion of Lot No. 926 of the Naic Estate, located
in Naic, Cavite, covered by Transfer Certificate of title No.
21877, pertaining to the deceased Francisco Arguelles.
The counterclaim, for lack of merit, is hereby dismissed.
No pronouncement is made as to cost.
SO ORDERED.6
Dissatisfied therewith, the private respondent went to the Court of
Appeals on a Petition for Review; theorizing that:
I. The Lower Court erred in holding that Francisco
Arguelles and Emilia Pineli were legally married and that
Leogardo (sic) Arguelles was their legitimate daughter.
II. The Lower Court erred in not holding that the cause of
action of the plaintiffs-appellees if any, had already
prescribed.
III. The Lower Court erred in ordering the partition of the
property involved in this case among the plaintiffs-
appellees and the defendant-appellant. 7
9

On October 26, 1989, the Court of Appeals handed down its judgment,
reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court of origin and disposing
as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered REVERSING
the decision appealed from and DISMISSING the
complaint for judicial partition. Without pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.8
With the denial with their Motion For Reconsideration on January 4, 1991,
petitioners found their way to this court via the present Petition; posing
as issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT A MAN AND A WOMAN WHO LIVED
TOGETHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE ARE PRESUMED
MARRIED; and.
II. WHETHER THE BORN OUT OF SUCH MARRIAGE IS
LEGITIMATE OR NOT.9
The pivotal issue for determination is: whether or not the petitioners
offered sufficient evidence to substantiate their submission that Francisco
Arguelles and Emilia Pineli were legally married.
Sec. 3 (aa) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions, —The following
presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but
maybe contradicted or overcome by other evidence
xxx xxx xxx
(aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage;
xxx xxx xxx
Persons and Family Relations Cases
Guided by the aforecited provision of law, the trial court ratiocinated:
The fact that no marriage certificate of Francisco Arguelles
and Emilia Pineli was submitted in evidence does not lead
to the conclusion that the said parties were not legally
married and that Leogarda was their illegitimate child.
The defendant admitted that his father and Emilia Pineli
lived and cohabited together as husband and wife, even
staying in the same house were he was also residing. The
presumption is that 'A man and woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage (sic) (Sec. 5(bb), Rule 131,
Rules of Court). 10 Every intendment of law or facts leans
toward the validity of marriage and the legitimacy of
children (Art. 220, Civil Code). In this case, no evidence
was adduced by defendant Arguelles to rebut this
presumption. Neither did he attempt to show that
Francisco and Emilia could not validity marry each other
because of some legal impediments to their marriage.11
While it is true that Francisco Arguelles and Emilia Pineli cohabited as
husband and wife, private respondent Simon Arguelles testified that the
said cohabitation was without the benefit of marriage. In People vs.
Borromeo 12, this Court held that persons living together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, absent any counter presumption or evidence
special to the case, to be in fact married. 13
In the case under consideration, the presumption of marriage, on which
the trial court premised its decision, has been sufficiently offset. 14
Records reveal that petitioners tried to justify the non-presentation of the
marriage certificate of Francisco and Emilia by submitting a certification
issued by Assistant Treasurer Lucila Lucero of Naic, Cavite, to the effect
that:
the Marriage Certificate of Francisco Arguelles married to
Emilia Pineli on the 18th day of August, 1918 at Naic,
Cavite, is no longer available due to destruction of the
records during the Japanese occupation, and as such no
certified copy of Marriage could be issued to the parties
concerned.15
10

However, Assistant Treasurer Lucila Lucero admitted later 16 on the
witness stand that she signed the said certificate prepared by a certain
Consuelo Pangilinan, without verifying its correctness. In reality, the
records of marriages of Naic are intact. The said records were brought and
examined before the trial court, and its pages 20 to 22 containing entries
from July 3, 1917 to May 30, 1918 do not reflect the names of Francisco
Arguelles and Emilia Pineli.
So also, the death certificate of Francisco Arguelles contained the word
"none" opposite the phrase "surviving spouse", indicating that he died a
widower on February 18, 1949. His deceased wife was Petrona Reyes, the
mother of private respondent. 17
Then too, TCT No. 21877 covering Lot 926 as well as the reconstituted
TCT No. 21877, RT-19055, show the status of Francisco Arguelles as
"widower". 18 On this point, the respondent court said:
. . . Emilia would not have allowed Francisco Arguelles to
place the property in his name alone as widower if in fact
they were legally married to each other. If there was a
mistake in indicating in the title Francisco's status as a
widower, the same could have been easily cured by
presenting a petition for correction in the proper court. If
it is true, as Tiburcio Pangilinan testified, that the
certificate of title was the possession of Emilia Pineli and
was given to him (Tiburcio) before her death, there is no
conceivable reason why Emilia never exerted any effort to
correct the mistake in the description of Francisco's status
in the certificate of title as 'widower' knowing that she
would not be able to transmit any part of the property to
her heirs upon her death if the error was not corrected.
Her omission only serves to bolster the proposition that
she had no right to protect, in the first place, because she
was not legally married to
Francisco.19
Consequently, with the presumption of marriage sufficiently overcome,
the onus probandi of the private respondent shifted to the petitioners. It
then became the burden of the petitioners, Virginia P. Sarmiento and
Apolonia P. Catibayan, to prove that their deceased grandparents,
Francisco Arguelles and Emilia Pineli, were legally married.
Persons and Family Relations Cases
In Trinidad vs. Court of Appeals, et a1. 20, this Court ruled that as proof of
marriage may be presented: a) testimony of a witness to the matrimony;
b) the couple's public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after
the alleged wedlock; c) the birth and baptismal certificate of children born
during such union; and d) the mention of such nuptial in subsequent
documents.
Pertinent records show that the petitioners failed to substantiate their
theory that Francisco Arguelles and Emilia Pineli were married. What is
more, the available records of marriage contradict the allegation that
Francisco Arguelles and Emilia Pineli were legally married. But
petitioners, to whom the burden of proving the fact of marriage shifted,
did not present anybody who witnessed the marriage ceremony of
Francisco Arguelles and Emilia Pineli. As aptly reasoned out by the
respondent court:
. . . Not one of the three witnesses for plaintiffs ever
declared having observed that Francisco and Emilia acted
as husband and wife. Tiburcio Pangilinan testified mainly
on the fact that he is the father of the plaintiffs and
husband of the late Leogarda Arguelles who was the
daughter of Francisco Arguelles and Emilia Pineli. The rest
of his testimony touched on the certificate of tittle
covering Lot 926 which Emilia allegedly delivered two
weeks before she died but was later on taken from him by
defendant. Plaintiffs on their part did not testify that
Francisco Arguelles and Emilia Pineli lived together as
husband and wife, which may be explained by the fact that
Virginia Sarmiento and Apolonia Catibayan where only 6
and 5 years old, respectively, when Emilia Pineli died and
were then too young to perceive the nature of whatever
the relationship existed Francisco and Emilia.21
Evidently, petitioners relied mainly on the legal presumption that
Francisco Arguelles and Emilia Pineli were married, without introducing
any evidence to prove the marriage theorized upon.
In a belated attempt to establish the legitimacy of Leogarda Arguelles,
petitioners have theorized for the first time, in the present Petition, that
the birth certificate 22 of Leogarda Arguelles which they allegedly
presented during the trial below, shows the legitimate status of Leogarda
11
 Persons and Family Relations Cases

Arguelles. 23 Concededly, such birth certificate may be used to show the

alleged marriage. But be that as it may, the totality of evidence for the
private respondent preponderates over petitioners'. Preponderant
evidence means that, as a whole, the evidence adduced by one side
outweighs that of the adverse party. 24 Compared with the evidence
introduced by the private respondent, petitioners rely heavily on the legal
presumption of marriage which, as earlier pointed out, has been
effectively rebutted. We are concluded by the factual findings of the Court
of Appeals.

Premises studiedly considered, we are of the ineluctable conclusion, and

so hold, that the Court of Appeals erred not in reversing the decision of
the Regional Trial Court a quo.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision, dated

October 26, 1989, and Resolution, dated January 4, 1991, of the Court of
Appeals AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Romero, Vitug, Panganiban and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

12

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 72964 January 7, 1988
FILOMENO URBANO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate
Court which affirmed the decision of the then Circuit Criminal Court of
Dagupan City finding petitioner Filomeno Urban guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.
The records disclose the following facts of the case.
At about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of October 23, 1980, petitioner
Filomeno Urbano went to his ricefield at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian,
Pangasinan located at about 100 meters from the tobacco seedbed of
Marcelo Javier. He found the place where he stored his palay flooded with
water coming from the irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed.
Urbano went to the elevated portion of the canal to see what happened
and there he saw Marcelo Javier and Emilio Erfe cutting grass. He asked
them who was responsible for the opening of the irrigation canal and
Javier admitted that he was the one. Urbano then got angry and demanded
that Javier pay for his soaked palay. A quarrel between them ensued.
Urbano unsheathed his bolo (about 2 feet long, including the handle, by 2
inches wide) and hacked Javier hitting him on the right palm of his hand,
which was used in parrying the bolo hack. Javier who was then unarmed
ran away from Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano who hacked him
again hitting Javier on the left leg with the back portion of said bolo,
causing a swelling on said leg. When Urbano tried to hack and inflict
further injury, his daughter embraced and prevented him from hacking
Javier.
Persons and Family Relations Cases
Immediately thereafter, Antonio Erfe, Emilio Erfe, and Felipe Erfe brought
Javier to his house about 50 meters away from where the incident
happened. Emilio then went to the house of Barangay Captain Menardo
Soliven but not finding him there, Emilio looked for barrio councilman
Felipe Solis instead. Upon the advice of Solis, the Erfes together with Javier
went to the police station of San Fabian to report the incident. As
suggested by Corporal Torio, Javier was brought to a physician. The group
went to Dr. Guillermo Padilla, rural health physician of San Fabian, who
did not attend to Javier but instead suggested that they go to Dr. Mario
Meneses because Padilla had no available medicine.
After Javier was treated by Dr. Meneses, he and his companions returned
to Dr. Guillermo Padilla who conducted a medico-legal examination. Dr.
Padilla issued a medico-legal certificate (Exhibit "C" dated September 28,
1981) which reads:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that I have examined the wound of
Marcelo Javier, 20 years of age, married, residing at
Barangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan on October
23, 1980 and found the following:
1 -Incised wound 2 inches in length at the upper portion
of the lesser palmar prominence, right.
As to my observation the incapacitation is from (7-9) days
period. This wound was presented to me only for medico-
legal examination, as it was already treated by the other
doctor. (p. 88, Original Records)
Upon the intercession of Councilman Solis, Urbano and Javier agreed to
settle their differences. Urbano promised to pay P700.00 for the medical
expenses of Javier. Hence, on October 27, 1980, the two accompanied by
Solis appeared before the San Fabian Police to formalize their amicable
settlement. Patrolman Torio recorded the event in the police blotter
(Exhibit A), to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
13

Entry Nr 599/27 Oct '80/103OH/ Re entry Nr 592 on page
257 both parties appeared before this Station
accompanied by brgy. councilman Felipe Solis and settled
their case amicably, for they are neighbors and close
relatives to each other. Marcelo Javier accepted and
granted forgiveness to Filomeno Urbano who shoulder
(sic) all the expenses in his medical treatment, and
promising to him and to this Office that this will never be
repeated anymore and not to harbour any grudge against
each other. (p. 87, Original Records.)
Urbano advanced P400.00 to Javier at the police station. On November 3,
1980, the additional P300.00 was given to Javier at Urbano's house in the
presence of barangay captain Soliven.
At about 1:30 a.m. on November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the
Nazareth General Hospital in a very serious condition. When admitted to
the hospital, Javier had lockjaw and was having convulsions. Dr. Edmundo
Exconde who personally attended to Javier found that the latter's serious
condition was caused by tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence of a
healing wound in Javier's palm which could have been infected by tetanus.
On November 15, 1980 at exactly 4:18 p.m., Javier died in the hospital. The
medical findings of Dr. Exconde are as follows:
Date Diagnosis
11-14-80 ADMITTED due to trismus
adm. at DX TETANUS
1:30 AM Still having frequent muscle spasm. With diffi-
#35, 421 culty opening his mouth. Restless at times.
Febrile
11-15-80 Referred. Novaldin 1 amp. inj. IM. Sudden
cessation of respiration and HR after muscular spasm.
Persons and Family Relations Cases
02 inhalation administered. Ambo bag resuscitation and cardiac massage
done but to no avail. Pronounced dead by Dra. Cabugao at 4:18 P.M. PMC
done and cadaver brought home by relatives. (p. 100, Original Records)
In an information dated April 10, 1981, Filomeno Urbano was charged
with the crime of homicide before the then Circuit Criminal Court of
Dagupan City, Third Judicial District.
Upon arraignment, Urbano pleaded "not guilty." After trial, the trial court
found Urbano guilty as charged. He was sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of from TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayor,
as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) years, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1)
DAY of reclusion temporal, as maximum, together with the accessories of
the law, to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Marcelo Javier, in the amount
of P12,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and
to pay the costs. He was ordered confined at the New Bilibid Prison, in
Muntinlupa, Rizal upon finality of the decision, in view of the nature of his
penalty.
The then Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the conviction of Urbano
on appeal but raised the award of indemnity to the heirs of the deceased
to P30,000.00 with costs against the appellant.
The appellant filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial. The
motion for new trial was based on an affidavit of Barangay Captain
Menardo Soliven (Annex "A") which states:
That in 1980, I was the barrio captain of Barrio Anonang,
San Fabian, Pangasinan, and up to the present having been
re-elected to such position in the last barangay elections
on May 17, 1982;
That sometime in the first week of November, 1980, there
was a typhoon that swept Pangasinan and other places of
Central Luzon including San Fabian, a town of said
province;
That during the typhoon, the sluice or control gates of the
Bued irrigation dam which irrigates the ricefields of San
Fabian were closed and/or controlled so much so that
14

water and its flow to the canals and ditches were regulated
and reduced;
That due to the locking of the sluice or control gates of the
dam leading to the canals and ditches which will bring
water to the ricefields, the water in said canals and ditches
became shallow which was suitable for catching
mudfishes;
That after the storm, I conducted a personal survey in the
area affected, with my secretary Perfecto Jaravata;
That on November 5, 1980, while I was conducting survey,
I saw the late Marcelo Javier catching fish in the shallow
irrigation canals with some companions;
That few days there after,or on November l5, l980, I came
to know that said Marcelo Javier died of tetanus. (p. 33,
Rollo)
The motion was denied. Hence, this petition.
In a resolution dated July 16, 1986, we gave due course to the petition.
The case involves the application of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code
which provides that "Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By any
person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended ..." Pursuant to this provision "an
accused is criminally responsible for acts committed by him in violation
of law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting
therefrom." (People v. Cardenas, 56 SCRA 631).
The record is clear that Marcelo Javier was hacked by the petitioner who
used a bolo as a result of which Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on
his right palm; that on November 14, 1981 which was the 22nd day after
the incident, Javier was rushed to the hospital in a very serious condition
and that on the following day, November 15, 1981, he died from tetanus.
Under these circumstances, the lower courts ruled that Javier's death was
the natural and logical consequence of Urbano's unlawful act. Hence, he
was declared responsible for Javier's death. Thus, the appellate court said:
Persons and Family Relations Cases
The claim of appellant that there was an efficient cause
which supervened from the time the deceased was
wounded to the time of his death, which covers a period of
23 days does not deserve serious consideration. True, that
the deceased did not die right away from his wound, but
the cause of his death was due to said wound which was
inflicted by the appellant. Said wound which was in the
process of healing got infected with tetanus which
ultimately caused his death.
Dr. Edmundo Exconde of the Nazareth General Hospital
testified that the victim suffered lockjaw because of the
infection of the wound with tetanus. And there is no other
way by which he could be infected with tetanus except
through the wound in his palm (tsn., p. 78, Oct. 5, 1981).
Consequently, the proximate cause of the victim's death
was the wound which got infected with tetanus. And the
settled rule in this jurisdiction is that an accused is liable
for all the consequences of his unlawful act. (Article 4, par.
1, R.P.C. People v. Red, CA 43 O.G. 5072; People v. Cornel
78 Phil. 418).
Appellant's allegation that the proximate cause of the
victim's death was due to his own negligence in going back
to work without his wound being properly healed, and
lately, that he went to catch fish in dirty irrigation canals
in the first week of November, 1980, is an afterthought,
and a desperate attempt by appellant to wiggle out of the
predicament he found himself in. If the wound had not yet
healed, it is impossible to conceive that the deceased
would be reckless enough to work with a disabled hand.
(pp. 20-21, Rollo)
The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of the
death of Marcelo Javier was due to his own negligence, that Dr. Mario
Meneses found no tetanus in the injury, and that Javier got infected with
tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his farm and tended his
tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing the wound to harmful
elements like tetanus germs.
15

The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by
Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the
wound. The evidence merely confirms that the wound, which was already
healing at the time Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal ailment,
somehow got infected with tetanus However, as to when the wound was
infected is not clear from the record.
In Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina (102 Phil. 1181), we adopted the
following definition of proximate cause:
xxx xxx xxx
... A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in
Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American Jurisprudence,
cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as follows:
... "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred."And more comprehensively, "the proximate
legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury,
either immediately or by setting other events in motion,
all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events,
each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately
effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the
cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or
default that an injury to some person might probably
result therefrom." (at pp. 185-186)
The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not there was an efficient
intervening cause from the time Javier was wounded until his death which
would exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death.
We look into the nature of tetanus-
The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between
injury and the appearance of unmistakable symptoms,
Persons and Family Relations Cases
ranges from 2 to 56 days. However, over 80 percent of
patients become symptomatic within 14 days. A short
incubation period indicates severe disease, and when
symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of injury the mortality
rate approaches 100 percent.
Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness,
irritability, and headache are encountered occasionally,
but the commonest presenting complaints are pain and
stiffness in the jaw, abdomen, or back and difficulty
swallowing. As the progresses, stiffness gives way to
rigidity, and patients often complain of difficulty opening
their mouths. In fact, trismus in the commonest
manifestation of tetanus and is responsible for the familiar
descriptive name of lockjaw. As more muscles are
involved, rigidity becomes generalized, and sustained
contractions called risus sardonicus. The intensity and
sequence of muscle involvement is quite variable. In a
small proportion of patients, only local signs and
symptoms develop in the region of the injury. In the vast
majority, however, most muscles are involved to some
degree, and the signs and symptoms encountered depend
upon the major muscle groups affected.
Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first
symptom, an interval referred to as the onset time. As in the
case of the incubation period, a short onset time is
associated with a poor prognosis. Spasms are caused by
sudden intensification of afferent stimuli arising in the
periphery, which increases rigidity and causes
simultaneous and excessive contraction of muscles and
their antagonists. Spasms may be both painful and
dangerous. As the disease progresses, minimal or
inapparent stimuli produce more intense and longer
lasting spasms with increasing frequency. Respiration
may be impaired by laryngospasm or tonic contraction of
respiratory muscles which prevent adequate ventilation.
Hypoxia may then lead to irreversible central nervous
system damage and death.
16

Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at
least 14 days and an onset time of more than 6 days.
Trismus is usually present, but dysphagia is absent and
generalized spasms are brief and mild. Moderately severe
tetanus has a somewhat shorter incubation period and
onset time; trismus is marked, dysphagia and generalized
rigidity are present, but ventilation remains adequate
even during spasms. The criteria for severe tetanus
include a short incubation time, and an onset time of 72
hrs., or less, severe trismus, dysphagia and rigidity and
frequent prolonged, generalized convulsive spasms.
(Harrison's Principle of Internal Medicine, 1983 Edition,
pp. 1004-1005; Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a
man's body depends on the incubation period of the disease.
In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm
when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident
took place on October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on November 14, 1980,
he suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The
following day, November 15, 1980, he died.
If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already
infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that
Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because
the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking
incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore,
the onset time should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died
on the second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is
that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe
form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's
wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident.
Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound
could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days
before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and
logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused.
(People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are dealing with a criminal
conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must
Persons and Family Relations Cases
convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings,
however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound
by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time
Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore,
distinct and foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038).
Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the
remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary
precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's
death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. As we ruled in Manila
Electric Co. v. Remoquillo, et al. (99 Phil. 118).
"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an
action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish
the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the
injury was made possible, if there intervened between
such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct,
successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury,
even though such injury would not have happened but for
such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the
condition except because of the independent cause, such
condition was not the proximate cause. And if an
independent negligent act or defective condition sets into
operation the instances which result in injury because of
the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or
condition is the proximate cause." (45 C.J. pp. 931-932).
(at p. 125)
It strains the judicial mind to allow a clear aggressor to go scot free of
criminal liability. At the very least, the records show he is guilty of
inflicting slight physical injuries. However, the petitioner's criminal
liability in this respect was wiped out by the victim's own act. After the
hacking incident, Urbano and Javier used the facilities of barangay
mediators to effect a compromise agreement where Javier forgave Urbano
while Urbano defrayed the medical expenses of Javier. This settlement of
minor offenses is allowed under the express provisions of Presidential
Decree G.R. No. 1508, Section 2(3). (See also People v. Caruncho, 127
SCRA 16).
We must stress, however, that our discussion of proximate cause and
remote cause is limited to the criminal aspects of this rather unusual case.
17

It does not necessarily follow that the petitioner is also free of civil
liability. The well-settled doctrine is that a person, while not criminally
liable, may still be civilly liable. Thus, in the recent case of People v. Rogelio
Ligon y Tria, et al. (G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987), we said:
xxx xxx xxx
... While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution
must be established beyond reasonable doubt, only a
preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for
damages. (Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment of
acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only
when it includes a declaration that the facts from which
the civil liability might arise did not exist. (Padilla v. Court
of Appeals, 129 SCRA 559).
The reason for the provisions of article 29 of the Civil
Code, which provides that the acquittal of the accused on
the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt does not necessarily exempt him from
civil liability for the same act or omission, has been
explained by the Code Commission as follows:
The old rule that the acquittal of the
accused in a criminal case also releases
him from civil liability is one of the most
serious flaws in the Philippine legal
system. It has given use to numberless
instances of miscarriage of justice, where
the acquittal was due to a reasonable
doubt in the mind of the court as to the
guilt of the accused. The reasoning
followed is that inasmuch as the civil
responsibility is derived from the criminal
offense, when the latter is not proved, civil
liability cannot be demanded.
This is one of those causes where confused
thinking leads to unfortunate and
deplorable consequences. Such reasoning
fails to draw a clear line of demarcation
Persons and Family Relations Cases
between criminal liability and civil
responsibility, and to determine the logical
result of the distinction. The two liabilities
are separate and distinct from each other.
One affects the social order and the other,
private rights. One is for the punishment
or correction of the offender while the
other is for reparation of damages suffered
by the aggrieved party. The two
responsibilities are so different from each
other that article 1813 of the present
(Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There
may be a compromise upon the civil action
arising from a crime; but the public action
for the imposition of the legal penalty shall
not thereby be extinguished." It is just and
proper that, for the purposes of the
imprisonment of or fine upon the accused,
the offense should be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of
indemnity the complaining party, why
should the offense also be proved beyond
reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or
violation of every private right to be
proved only by a preponderance of
evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved
person any less private because the
wrongful act is also punishable by the
criminal law?
"For these reasons, the Commission
recommends the adoption of the reform
under discussion. It will correct a serious
defect in our law. It will close up an
inexhaustible source of injustice-a cause
for disillusionment on the part of the
innumerable persons injured or
wronged."
The respondent court increased the P12,000.00 indemnification imposed
by the trial court to P30,000.00. However, since the indemnification was
18
 Persons and Family Relations Cases

based solely on the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the

homicide case, the civil liability of the petitioner was not thoroughly
examined. This aspect of the case calls for fuller development if the heirs
of the victim are so minded.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned

decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime
of homicide. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and,Cortes, JJ., concur.

19

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18193 February 27, 1963
NICASIO BERNALDES, SR., PERPETUA BESAS DE BERNALDES and
JOVITO BERNALDES, aided by NICASIO BERNALDES, SR., as
Guardian-ad-litem, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
BOHOL LAND TRANSPORTATION, INC., defendant-appellee.
Lilio L. Amora and Peter L. Amora for plaintiffs-appellants.
Filemon B. Barria for defendant-appellee.
DIZON, J.:
In a complaint for damages filed in the Court of First Instance of Bohol by
appellants, the spouses Nicasio Bernaldes, Sr. and Perpetua Besas and
their minor son, Jovito, against appellee, the Bohol Land Transportation
Co., a domestic corporation engaged in business as a common carrier in
said province, they alleged, in substance, that, in the afternoon of
November 27, 1958, Jovito Bernaldes and his brother, Nicasio, boarded
one of appellee's passenger trucks (B.L.T. Co. No. 322 with plate No. 1470)
in the town of Guindulman, Bohol, bound for Tagbilaran of the same
province; that on the way the bus fell off a deep precipice in barrio
Balitbiton, municipality of Garcia-Hernandez, of the said province,
resulting in the death of Nicasio and in serious physical injuries to Jovito.
Defendant moved for the dismissal of the complaint on two grounds,
namely, that the cause of action alleged therein was barred by a prior
judgment, and that it did not state a cause of action.
At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, it was established that in Criminal
Case No. 2775 of the same court, Leonardo Balabag, driver of the bus
involved in the accident, was charged with double homicide thru reckless
imprudence but was acquitted on the ground that his guilt had not been
established beyond reasonable doubt, and that appellees, through Attys.
Persons and Family Relations Cases
Amora and Tirol, intervened in the prosecution of said case and did not
reserve the right to file a separate action for damages.
Relying on the case of Maria C. Roa vs. Segunda de la Cruz, et al., G.R. No. L-
13134, promulgated February 13, 1960, the lower court sustained the
motion on the ground of bar by prior judgment, and dismissed the case.
Hence, this appeal.
The issues in this appeal are first, whether a civil action for damages
against the owner of a public vehicle, based on breach of contract of
carriage, may be filed after the criminal action instituted against the
driver has been disposed of, if the aggrieved party did not reserve his right
to enforce civil liability in a separate action, and second, whether the
intervention of the aggrieved party, through private prosecutors, in the
prosecution of the criminal case against the driver — who was acquitted
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence — will bar him from suing the
latter's employer for damages for breach of contract, in an independent
and separate action.
Article 31 of the New Civil Code expressly provides that when the civil
action is based upon an obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of
the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. This
provision evidently refers to a civil action based, not on the act or
omission charged as a felony in a criminal case, but to one based on an
obligation arising from other sources, such as law or contract. Upon the
other hand it is clear that a civil action based on contractual liability of a
common carrier is distinct from the criminal action instituted against the
carrier or its employee based on the latter's criminal negligence. The first
is governed by the provisions of the Civil Code, and not by those of the
Revised Penal Code, and it being entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, the same may be instituted and prosecuted
independently of, and regardless of the result of the latter. (Visayan Land
Transportation Co. vs. Mejia, et al., G.R. Nos. L-8830, L-8837-39. 52 O.G. p.
4241)..
The civil action instituted against appellee in this case is based on alleged
culpa contractual incurred by it due to its failure to carry safely the late
Nicasio Bernaldes and his brother Jovito to their place of destination,
whereas the criminal action instituted against appellee's driver involved
exclusively the criminal and civil liability of the latter arising from his
20
 Persons and Family Relations Cases

criminal negligence. In other words, appellant's action concerned the civil from is hereby set aside and the case is remanded to the lower court for
liability of appellee as a common carrier, regardless of the liabilities of its further proceedings.
driver who was charged in the criminal case. Therefore, as held in Parker,
et al. vs. Panlilio, et al., (G.R. No. L-4961, March 5, 1952), the failure, on the Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L.,
part of the appellants, to reserve their right to recover civil indemnity Barrera, Paredes, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
against the carrier can not in any way be deemed as a waiver, on their
part, to institute a separate action against the latter based on its
contractual liability, or on culpa aquiliana, under Articles 1902-1910 of
the Civil Code. As a matter of fact, such reservation is already implied in
the law which declares such action to be independent and separate from
the criminal action. Moreover, it has been held that the duty of the
offended party to make such reservation applies only to defendant in the
criminal action, not to persons secondarily liable (Chaves, et al. vs. Manila
Electric, 31 Phil. 47).

True, appellants, through private prosecutors, were allowed to intervene

— whether properly or improperly we do not here decide — in the
criminal action against appellee's driver, but if that amounted
inferentially to submitting in said case their claim for civil indemnity, the
claim could have been only against the driver but not against appellee
who was not a party therein. As a matter of fact, however, inspite of
appellee's statements to the contrary in its brief, there is no showing in
the record before Us that appellants made of record their claim for
damages against the driver or his employer; much less does it appear that
they had attempted to prove such damages. The failure of the court to
make any pronouncement in its decision concerning the civil liability of
the driver and/or of his employer must therefore be due to the fact that
the criminal action did not involve at all any claim for civil indemnity.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of

facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without
prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not
covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët

Lastly, as appellee's driver was acquitted only on reasonable doubt, a civil

action for damages against him may be instituted for the same act or
omission (Rule 107, par. [d]; Art. 29, New Civil Code). If such is the rule as
against him, a fortiori, it must in the case of his employer.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find the appeal interposed by

appellants to be meritorious. As a result, the order of dismissal appealed

21

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-69866 April 15, 1988
ROGELIO ABERCA, RODOLFO BENOSA, NESTOR BODINO NOEL
ETABAG DANILO DE LA FUENTE, BELEN DIAZ-FLORES, MANUEL
MARIO GUZMAN, ALAN JAZMINEZ, EDWIN LOPEZ, ALFREDO
MANSOS, ALEX MARCELINO, ELIZABETH PROTACIO-MARCELINO,
JOSEPH OLAYER, CARLOS PALMA, MARCO PALO, ROLANDO
SALUTIN, BENJAMIN SESGUNDO, ARTURO TABARA, EDWIN
TULALIAN and REBECCA TULALIAN petitioners,
vs.
MAJ. GEN. FABIAN VER, COL. FIDEL SINGSON, COL. ROLANDO
ABADILLA, COL. GERARDO B. LANTORIA, COL. GALILEO KINTANAR,
1ST LT. COL. PANFILO M. LACSON, MAJ. RODOLFO AGUINALDO,
CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO, 1ST LT. PEDRO TANGO, 1ST LT. ROMEO
RICARDO, 1ST LT. RAUL BACALSO, MSGT BIENVENIDO BALABA and
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch
XCV (95), Quezon City, respondents.
YAP, J.:
This petition for certiorari presents vital issues not heretofore passed
upon by this Court. It poses the question whether the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for
illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of
rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution. If such action for
damages may be maintained, who can be held liable for such violations:
only the military personnel directly involved and/or their superiors as
well.
This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other
violations of the rights and liberties of plaintiffs by various intelligence
units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known as Task Force
Makabansa (TFM) ordered by General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-
Persons and Family Relations Cases
emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground
houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances
in Metro Manila," Plaintiffs allege, among others, that complying with said
order, elements of the TFM raided several places, employing in most cases
defectively issued judicial search warrants; that during these raids,
certain members of the raiding party confiscated a number of purely
personal items belonging to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were arrested
without proper warrants issued by the courts; that for some period after
their arrest, they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; that
plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and
counsel; that military men who interrogated them employed threats,
tortures and other forms of violence on them in order to obtain
incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them;
that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a
concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and
incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and
punish them, said plans being previously known to and sanctioned by
defendants.
Plaintiffs sought actual/compensatory damages amounting to
P39,030.00; moral damages in the amount of at least P150,000.00 each or
a total of P3,000,000.00; exemplary damages in the amount of at least
P150,000.00 each or a total of P3,000,000.00; and attorney's fees
amounting to not less than P200,000.00.
A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, through their counsel, then
Solicitor-General Estelito Mendoza, alleging that (1) plaintiffs may not
cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their detention in the
guise of a damage suit because, as to them, the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended; (2) assuming that the courts can entertain
the present action, defendants are immune from liability for acts done in
the performance of their official duties; and (3) the complaint states no
cause of action against the defendants. Opposition to said motion to
dismiss was filed by plaintiffs Marco Palo, Danilo de la Fuente, Benjamin
Sesgundo, Nel Etabag, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin on July 8,
1983, and by plaintiffs Edwin Lopez, Manuel Mario Guzman, Alan
Jasminez, Nestor Bodino, Carlos Palma, Arturo Tabara, Joseph Olayer,
Rodolfo Benosa, Belen Diaz, Flores, Rogelio Aberca, Alex Marcelino and
Elizabeth Marcelino on July 21, 1983. On November 7, 1983, a
Consolidated Reply was filed by defendants' counsel.
22

Then, on November 8, 1983, the Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Region, Branch 95, Judge Willelmo C. Fortun, Presiding, 1 issued a
resolution granting the motion to dismiss. I sustained, lock, stock and
barrel, the defendants' contention (1) the plaintiffs may not cause a
judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their detention in the guise of a
damage suit because, as to them, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
is suspended; (2) that assuming that the court can entertain the present
action, defendants are immune from liability for acts done in the
performance of their official duties; and (3) that the complaint states no
cause of action against defendants, since there is no allegation that the
defendants named in the complaint confiscated plaintiffs' purely personal
properties in violation of their constitutional rights, and with the possible
exception of Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Sergeant Bienvenido Balabo
committed acts of torture and maltreatment, or that the defendants had
the duty to exercise direct supervision and control of their subordinates
or that they had vicarious liability as employers under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code. The lower court stated, "After a careful study of defendants'
arguments, the court finds the same to be meritorious and must, therefore,
be granted. On the other hand, plaintiffs' arguments in their opposition
are lacking in merit."
A motion to set aside the order dismissing the complaint and a
supplemental motion for reconsideration was filed by the plaintiffs on
November 18, 1983, and November 24, 1983, respectively. On December
9, 1983, the defendants filed a comment on the aforesaid motion of
plaintiffs, furnishing a copy thereof to the attorneys of all the plaintiffs,
namely, Attys. Jose W. Diokno, Procopio Beltran, Rene Sarmiento, Efren
Mercado, Auguso Sanchez, Antonio L. Rosales, Pedro B. Ella Jr., Arno V.
Sanidad, Alexander Padilla, Joker Arroyo, Rene Saguisag, Ramon Esguerra
and Felicitas Aquino.
On December 15, 1983, Judge Fortun issued an order voluntarily
inhibiting himself from further proceeding in the case and leaving the
resolution of the motion to set aside the order of dismissal to Judge Lising,
"to preclude any suspicion that he (Judge Fortun) cannot resolve [the]
aforesaid pending motion with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge
and to put an end to plaintiffs assertion that the undersigned has no
authority or jurisdiction to resolve said pending motion." This order
prompted plaintiffs to reesolve an amplificatory motion for
reconsideration signed in the name of the Free Legal Assistance Group
(FLAG) of Mabini Legal Aid Committee, by Attys. Joker P. Arroyo, Felicitas
Persons and Family Relations Cases
Aquino and Arno Sanidad on April 12, 1984. On May 2,1984, the
defendants filed a comment on said amplificatory motion for
reconsideration.
In an order dated May 11, 1984, the trial court, Judge Esteban Lising,
Presiding, without acting on the motion to set aside order of November 8,
1983, issued an order, as follows:
It appearing from the records that, indeed, the following
plaintiffs, Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la Fuente and Marco
Palo, represented by counsel, Atty. Jose W. Diokno, Alan
Jasminez represented by counsel, Atty. Augusta Sanchez,
Spouses Alex Marcelino and Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino,
represented by counsel, Atty. Procopio Beltran, Alfredo
Mansos represented by counsel, Atty. Rene Sarmiento, and
Rolando Salutin, represented by counsel, Atty. Efren
Mercado, failed to file a motion to reconsider the Order of
November 8, 1983, dismissing the complaint, nor
interposed an appeal therefrom within the reglementary
period, as prayed for by the defendants, said Order is now
final against said plaintiffs.
Assailing the said order of May 11, 1984, the plaintiffs filed a motion for
reconsideration on May 28,1984, alleging that it was not true that
plaintiffs Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la Fuente, Marco Palo, Alan Jasminez,
Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, Alfredo Mansos and
Rolando Salutin failed to file a motion to reconsider the order of
November 8, 1983 dismissing the complaint, within the reglementary
period. Plaintiffs claimed that the motion to set aside the order of
November 8, 1983 and the amplificatory motion for reconsideration was
filed for all the plaintiffs, although signed by only some of the lawyers.
In its resolution of September 21, 1984, the respondent court dealt with
both motions (1) to reconsider its order of May 11, 1984 declaring that
with respect to certain plaintiffs, the resolution of November 8, 1983 had
already become final, and (2) to set aside its resolution of November 8,
1983 granting the defendants' motion to dismiss. In the dispositive
portion of the order of September 21, 1984, the respondent court
resolved:
23
 Persons and Family Relations Cases

(1) That the motion to set aside the order of finality, dated
May 11, 1984, of the Resolution of dismissal of the
complaint of plaintiffs Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la Fuente,
Marco Palo, Alan Jasminez Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth
Protacio-Marcelino, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin
is deed for lack of merit;
(2) For lack of cause of action as against the following
defendants, to wit:
1. Gen Fabian Ver
the motion to reconsider and set aside the Resolution of
dismissal dated November 3, 1983 is granted and the
Resolution of dismissal is, in this respect, reconsidered
and modified.
Hence, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari on March 15,
1985 seeking to annul and set aside the respondent court's resolution of
November 8, 1983, its order of May 11, 1984, and its resolution dated
September 21, 1984. Respondents were required to comment on the
petition, which it did on November 9, 1985. A reply was filed by
petitioners on August 26, 1986.

2. Col. Fidel Singson We find the petition meritorious and decide to give it due course.

3. Col. Rolando Abadilla At the heart of petitioners' complaint is Article 32 of the Civil Code which
provides:
4. Lt. Col. Conrado Lantoria, Jr.
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private
5. Col. Galileo Montanar individual who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats,
violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the
6. Col. Panfilo Lacson following rights and liberties of another person shall be
liable to the latter for damages:
7. Capt. Danilo Pizaro
(1) Freedom of religion;
8. 1 Lt Pedro Tango
(2) Freedom of speech;
9. Lt. Romeo Ricardo
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a
10. Lt. Raul Bacalso periodical publication;

the motion to set aside and reconsider the Resolution of (4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
dismissal of the present action or complaint, dated
November 8, 1983, is also denied but in so far as it affects (5) Freedom of suffrage;
and refers to defendants, to wit:
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due
1. Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo, and process

2. Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba (7) of law;

24

(8) The right to a just compensation when private
property is taken for public use;
(9) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
(10) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures;
(11) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(12) The privacy of cmmunication and correspondence;
(13) The right to become a member of associations or
societies for purposes not contrary to law;
(14) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to
petition the Government for redress of grievances;
(15) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any
form;
(16) The rigth of the accused against excessive bail;
(17) The rigth of the aaccused to be heard by himself and
counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial,
to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witness in behalf;
(18) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness
against ones self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or
from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward
to make such confession, except when the person
confessing becomes a State witness;
(19) Freedom from excessive fines or cruel and unusual
punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted in
accordance with a statute which has not been judicially
declared unconstitutional; and
Persons and Family Relations Cases
(20) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or
not the defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal
offense, the against grieved party has a right to commence
an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages,
and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be
instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of
evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary
damages may also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from
a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation
of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
It is obvious that the purpose of the above codal provision is to provide a
sanction to the deeply cherished rights and freedoms enshrined in the
Constitution. Its message is clear; no man may seek to violate those sacred
rights with impunity. In times of great upheaval or of social and political
stress, when the temptation is strongest to yield — borrowing the words
of Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee — to the law of force rather than the
force of law, it is necessary to remind ourselves that certain basic rights
and liberties are immutable and cannot be sacrificed to the transient
needs or imperious demands of the ruling power. The rule of law must
prevail, or else liberty will perish. Our commitment to democratic
principles and to the rule of law compels us to reject the view which
reduces law to nothing but the expression of the will of the predominant
power in the community. "Democracy cannot be a reign of progress, of
liberty, of justice, unless the law is respected by him who makes it and by
him for whom it is made. Now this respect implies a maximum of faith, a
minimum of Idealism. On going to the bottom of the matter, we discover
that life demands of us a certain residuum of sentiment which is not
derived from reason, but which reason nevertheless controls. 2
Seeking to justify the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint, the respondents
postulate the view that as public officers they are covered by the mantle
of state immunity from suit for acts done in the performance of official
25

duties or function In support of said contention, respondents maintain
that —
Respondents are members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines. Their primary duty is to safeguard public
safety and order. The Constitution no less provides that
the President may call them "to prevent or supress lawless
violence, invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent
danger thereof." (Constitution, Article VII, Section 9).
On January 17, 1981, the President issued Proclamation
No. 2045 lifting martial law but providing for the
continued suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in view of the remaining dangers to the security of
the nation. The proclamation also provided "that the call
to the Armed Forces of the Philippines to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, insuitection rebellion and
subversion shall continue to be in force and effect."
Petitioners allege in their complaint that their causes of
action proceed from respondent General Ver's order to
Task Force Makabansa to launch pre-emptive strikes
against communist terrorist underground houses in
Metro Manila. Petitioners claim that this order and its
subsequent implementation by elements of the task force
resulted in the violation of their constitutional rights
against unlawful searches, seizures and arrest, rights to
counsel and to silence, and the right to property and that,
therefore, respondents Ver and the named members of the
task force should be held liable for damages.
But, by launching a pre-emptive strike against communist
terrorists, respondent members of the armed forces
merely performed their official and constitutional duties.
To allow petitioners to recover from respondents by way
of damages for acts performed in the exercise of such
duties run contrary to the policy considerations to shield
respondents as public officers from undue interference
with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of
hability (Aarlon v. Fitzgerald 102 S. Ct. 2731-1 Forbes v.
Chuoco Tiaco, 16 Phil. 634), and upon the necessity of
Persons and Family Relations Cases
protecting the performance of governmental and public
functions from being harassed unduly or constantly
interrupted by private suits (McCallan v. State, 35 Cal. App.
605; Metran v. Paredes, 79 Phil. 819).
xxx xxx xxx
The immunity of public officers from liability arising from
the performance of their duties is now a settled
jurisprudence Alzua v. Johnson, 21 Phil. 308; Zulueta v.
Nicolas, 102 Phil. 944; Spalding v. Vilas, 161 US 483; 40 L.
Ed. 780, 16 S. Ct. 631; Barr v. Mateo, 360; Butz v.
Economon, 438 US 478; 57 L. Ed. 2d 895, 98 S. Ct. 2894;
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 US 232; Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco,
supra; Miller v. de Leune, 602 F. 2d 198; Sami v. US, 617 F.
2d 755).
Respondents-defendants who merely obeyed the lawful
orders of the President and his call for the suppression of
the rebellion involving petitioners enjoy such immunity
from Suit.3
We find respondents' invocation of the doctrine of state immunity from
suit totally misplaced. The cases invoked by respondents actually
involved acts done by officers in the performance of official duties written
the ambit of their powers. As held in Forbes, etc. vs. Chuoco Tiaco and
Crossfield: 4
No one can be held legally responsible in damages or
otherwise for doing in a legal manner what he had
authority, under the law, to do. Therefore, if the Governor-
General had authority, under the law to deport or expel
the defendants, and circumstances justifying the
deportation and the method of carrying it out are left to
him, then he cannot be held liable in damages for the
exercise of this power. Moreover, if the courts are without
authority to interfere in any manner, for the purpose of
controlling or interferring with the exercise of the political
powers vested in the chief executive authority of the
Government, then it must follow that the courts cannot
26

intervene for the purpose of declaring that he is liable in
damages for the exeercise of this authority.
It may be that the respondents, as members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, were merely responding to their duty, as they claim, "to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and
subversion" in accordance with Proclamation No. 2054 of President
Marcos, despite the lifting of martial law on January 27, 1981, and in
pursuance of such objective, to launch pre- emptive strikes against alleged
communist terrorist underground houses. But this cannot be construed
as a blanket license or a roving commission untramelled by any
constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights and
liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in and protected by the
Constitution. The Constitution remains the supreme law of the land to
which all officials, high or low, civilian or military, owe obedience and
allegiance at all times.
Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee
or any private individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional
rights and liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not exempt
the respondents from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from
liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not
constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
This is not to say that military authorities are restrained from pursuing
their assigned task or carrying out their mission with vigor. We have no
quarrel with their duty to protect the Republic from its enemies, whether
of the left or of the right, or from within or without, seeking to destroy or
subvert our democratic institutions and imperil their very existence.
What we are merely trying to say is that in carrying out this task and
mission, constitutional and legal safeguards must be observed, otherwise,
the very fabric of our faith will start to unravel. In the battle of competing
Ideologies, the struggle for the mind is just as vital as the struggle of arms.
The linchpin in that psychological struggle is faith in the rule of law. Once
that faith is lost or compromised, the struggle may well be abandoned.
We do not find merit in respondents' suggestion that plaintiffs' cause of
action is barred by the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. Respondents contend that "Petitioners cannot circumvent the
suspension of the privilege of the writ by resorting to a damage suit aimed
at the same purpose-judicial inquiry into the alleged illegality of their
Persons and Family Relations Cases
detention. While the main relief they ask by the present action is
indemnification for alleged damages they suffered, their causes of action
are inextricably based on the same claim of violations of their
constitutional rights that they invoked in the habeas corpus case as
grounds for release from detention. Were the petitioners allowed the
present suit, the judicial inquiry barred by the suspension of the privilege
of the writ will take place. The net result is that what the courts cannot do,
i.e. override the suspension ordered by the President, petitioners will be
able to do by the mere expedient of altering the title of their action."
We do not agree. We find merit in petitioners' contention that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy
petitioners' right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and
detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The
suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention.
What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release
from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of
obtaining his liberty.
Moreover, as pointed out by petitioners, their right and cause of action for
damages are explicitly recognized in P.D. No. 1755 which amended Article
1146 of the Civil Code by adding the following to its text:
However, when the action (for injury to the rights of the
plaintiff or for a quasi-delict) arises from or out of any act,
activity or conduct of any public officer involving the
exercise of powers or authority arising from Martial Law
including the arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff,
the same must be brought within one (1) year.
Petitioners have a point in contending that even assuming that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus suspends
petitioners' right of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention, it
does not and cannot suspend their rights and causes of action for injuries
suffered because of respondents' confiscation of their private belongings,
the violation of their right to remain silent and to counsel and their right
to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and against
torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment.
However, we find it unnecessary to address the constitutional issue
pressed upon us. On March 25, 1986, President Corazon C. Aquino issued
27

Proclamation No. 2, revoking Proclamation Nos. 2045 and 2045-A and
lifting the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The
question therefore has become moot and academic.
This brings us to the crucial issue raised in this petition. May a superior
officer under the notion of respondent superior be answerable for
damages, jointly and severally with his subordinates, to the person whose
constitutional rights and liberties have been violated?
Respondents contend that the doctrine of respondent superior is
applicable to the case. We agree. The doctrine of respondent superior has
been generally limited in its application to principal and agent or to
master and servant (i.e. employer and employee) relationship. No such
relationship exists between superior officers of the military and their
subordinates.
Be that as it may, however, the decisive factor in this case, in our view, is
the language of Article 32. The law speaks of an officer or employee or
person 'directly' or "indirectly" responsible for the violation of the
constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone
(i.e. the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under
Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the
damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party.
By this provision, the principle of accountability of public officials under
the Constitution 5 acquires added meaning and asgilrnes a larger
dimension. No longer may a superior official relax his vigilance or
abdicate his duty to supervise his subordinates, secure in the thought that
he does not have to answer for the transgressions committed by the latter
against the constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the citizen.
Part of the factors that propelled people power in February 1986 was the
widely held perception that the government was callous or indifferent to,
if not actually responsible for, the rampant violations of human rights.
While it would certainly be go naive to expect that violators of human
rights would easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damage suits, it
should nonetheless be made clear in no ones terms that Article 32 of the
Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly,
responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors.
In the case at bar, the trial court dropped defendants General Fabian Ver,
Col. Fidel Singson, Col. Rolando Abadilla, Col. Gerardo Lantoria, Jr., Col.
Persons and Family Relations Cases
Galileo Kintanar, Col. Panfilo Lacson, Capt. Danilo Pizarro, lst Lt. Pedro
Tango, Lt. Romeo Ricardo and Lt. Ricardo Bacalso from the acts of their
subordinates. Only Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Master Sgt. Bienvenido
Balaba were kept as defendants on the ground that they alone 'have been
specifically mentioned and Identified to have allegedly caused injuries on
the persons of some of the plaintiff which acts of alleged physical violence
constitute a delict or wrong that gave rise to a cause of action. But such
finding is not supported by the record, nor is it in accord with law and
jurisprudence.
Firstly, it is wrong to at the plaintiffs' action for damages 5 Section 1,
Article 19. to 'acts of alleged physical violence" which constituted delict
or wrong. Article 32 clearly specifies as actionable the act of violating or
in any manner impeding or impairing any of the constitutional rights and
liberties enumerated therein, among others —
1. Freedom from arbitrary arrest or illegal detention;
2. The right against deprivation of property without due
process of law;
3. The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures;
4. The privacy of communication and correspondence;
5. Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against
one's self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from
being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to
make a confession, except when the person confessing
becomes a state witness.
The complaint in this litigation alleges facts showing with abundant
clarity and details, how plaintiffs' constitutional rights and liberties
mentioned in Article 32 of the Civil Code were violated and impaired by
defendants. The complaint speaks of, among others, searches made
without search warrants or based on irregularly issued or substantially
defective warrants; seizures and confiscation, without proper receipts, of
cash and personal effects belonging to plaintiffs and other items of
property which were not subversive and illegal nor covered by the search
warrants; arrest and detention of plaintiffs without warrant or under
28

irregular, improper and illegal circumstances; detention of plaintiffs at
several undisclosed places of 'safehouses" where they were kept
incommunicado and subjected to physical and psychological torture and
other inhuman, degrading and brutal treatment for the purpose of
extracting incriminatory statements. The complaint contains a detailed
recital of abuses perpetrated upon the plaintiffs violative of their
constitutional rights.
Secondly, neither can it be said that only those shown to have participated
"directly" should be held liable. Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses
within the ambit of its provisions those directly, as well as indirectly,
responsible for its violation.
The responsibility of the defendants, whether direct or indirect, is amply
set forth in the complaint. It is well established in our law and
jurisprudence that a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint
states no cause of action must be based on what appears on the face of the
complaint. 6 To determine the sufficiency of the cause of action, only the
facts alleged in the complaint, and no others, should be considered. 7 For
this purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of
the facts alleged in the complaint. 8
Applying this test, it is difficult to justify the trial court's ruling, dismissing
for lack of cause of action the complaint against all the defendants, except
Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba. The
complaint contained allegations against all the defendants which, if
admitted hypothetically, would be sufficient to establish a cause or causes
of action against all of them under Article 32 of the Civil Code.
This brings us to the last issue. Was the trial court correct in dismissing
the complaint with respect to plaintiffs Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la
Puente, Marco Palo, Alan Jazminez, Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth Protacio-
Marcelino, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin, on the basis of the alleged
failure of said plaintiffs to file a motion for reconsideration of the court's
resolution of November 8, 1983, granting the respondent's motion to
dismiss?
It is undisputed that a timely motion to set aside said order of November
8, 1983 was filed by 'plaintiffs, through counsel. True, the motion was
signed only by Atty. Joker P. Arroyo, counsel for Benjamin Sesgulido; Atty.
Antonio Rosales, counsel for Edwin Lopez and Manuel Martin Guzman;
Persons and Family Relations Cases
Atty. Pedro B. Ella, Jr., counsel for Nestor Bodino and Carlos Palma; Atty.
Arno V. Sanidad, counsel for Arturo Tabara; Atty. Felicitas S. Aquino,
counsel for Joseph Olayer; and Atty. Alexander Padilla, counsel for Rodolfo
Benosa.
But the body of the motion itself clearly indicated that the motion was
filed on behalf of all the plaintiffs. And this must have been also the
understanding of defendants' counsel himself for when he filed his
comment on the motion, he furnished copies thereof, not just to the
lawyers who signed the motion, but to all the lawyers of plaintiffs, to wit:
Attys. Jose Diokno, Procopio Beltran, Rene Sarmiento, Efren Mercado,
Augusto Sanchez, Antonio Rosales, Pedro Efla Jr., Arno Sanidad, Alexander
Padilla, Joker Arroyo, Rene Saguisag, Ramon Esguerra and Felicitas S.
Aquino.
In filing the motion to set aside the resolution of November 8, 1983, the
signing attorneys did so on behalf of all the plaintiff. They needed no
specific authority to do that. The authority of an attorney to appear for
and in behalf of a party can be assumed, unless questioned or challenged
by the adverse party or the party concerned, which was never done in this
case. Thus, it was grave abuse on the part of respondent judge to take it
upon himself to rule that the motion to set aside the order of November 8,
1953 dismissing the complaint was filed only by some of the plaintiffs,
when by its very language it was clearly intended to be filed by and for the
benefit of all of them. It is obvious that the respondent judge took
umbrage under a contrived technicality to declare that the dismissal of
the complaint had already become final with respect to some of the
plaintiffs whose lawyers did not sign the motion for reconsideration. Such
action tainted with legal infirmity cannot be sanctioned.
Accordingly, we grant the petition and annul and set aside the resolution
of the respondent court, dated November 8, 1983, its order dated May 11,
1984 and its resolution dated September 21, 1984. Let the case be
remanded to the respondent court for further proceedings. With costs
against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
29

Gutierrez, Jr., J., concur in the result.
Padilla, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
The Court's judgment at bar makes clear that all persons, be they public
officers or employees, or members of the military or police force or
private individuals who directly or indirectly obstruct, defeat, violate or
in any manner impede or impair the constitutional rights and civil
liberties of another person, stand liable and may be sued in court for
damages as provided in Art. 32 of the Civil Code.
The case at bar specifically upholds and reinstates the civil action for
damages filed in the court below by petitioners-plaintiffs for illegal
searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of their
constitutional rights and liberties. At the same time it rejects the
automatic application of the principle of respondeat superior or command
responsibility that would hold a superior officer jointly and severally
accountable for damages, including moral and exemplary, with his
subordinates who committed such transgressions. However, the
judgment gives the caveat that a superior officer must not abdicate his
duty to properly supervise his subordinates for he runs the risk of being
held responsible for gross negligence and of being held under the cited
provision of the Civil Code as indirectly and solidarily accountable with
the tortfeasor.
The rationale for this rule of law was best expressed by Brandeis in wise:
"In a government of laws, existence of the government be imperilled
following it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the
potent omnipresent teacher. For good or ill, it teaches the whole people
by example. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes the law
breaker, it breeds contempt for the law, it invites every man to become a
law unto himself, it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration
of criminal law the end justifies the means ... would bring terrible
retribution." 1
Persons and Family Relations Cases
As the writer stress in Hildawa vs. Enrile 2 Which Was an action to enjoin
the operations of the dreaded secret marshals during the past regime, 'In
a democratic state, you don't stoop to the level of criminals. If we stoop to
what they do, then we're no better than they ... there would be no
difference. ... The Supreme Court stands as the guarantor of the
Constitutional and human rights of all persons within its jurisdiction and
cannot abdicate its basic role under the Constitution that these rights be
respected and enforced. The spirit and letter of the Constitution negates
as contrary to the basic precepts of human rights and freedom that a
person's life be snuffed out without due process in a split second even if
he is caught in flagrante delicto — unless it was caned for as an act of self-
defense by the law agents using reasonable means to prevent or repel an
unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased.
Needless to say, the criminal acts of the "Sparrow Units" or death squads
of the NPA which have infutrated the cities and suburbs and performed
their despicable killings of innocent civilians and military and police
officers constitute an equally perverse violation of the sanctity of human
life and must be severely condemned by all who adhere tothe Rule of the
Law.
It need only be pointed out that one of the first acts of the present
government under President Corazon C. Aquino after her assumption of
office in February, 1986 was to file our government's ratification and
access to all human rights instruments adopted under the auspices of the
United Nations, declaring thereby the government's commitment to
observe the precepts of the United Nations Charter and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. More than this, pursuant to our Constitution
which the people decisively ratified on February 2, 1987, the independent
office of the Commission on Human Rights hats been created and
organized with ample powers to investigate human rights violations and
take remedial measures against all such violations by the military as well
as by the civilian groups.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
The Court's judgment at bar makes clear that all persons, be they public
officers or employees, or members of the military or police force or
private individuals who directly or indirectly obstruct, defeat, violate or
30
 Persons and Family Relations Cases

in any manner impede or impair the constitutional rights and civil
liberties of another person, stand liable and may be sued in court for
damages as provided in Art. 32 of the Civil Code.
The case at bar specifically upholds and reinstates the civil action for
damages filed in the court below by petitioners-plaintiffs for illegal
searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of their
constitutional rights and liberties. At the same time it rejects the
automatic application of the principle of respondeat superior or command
responsibility that would hold a superior officer jointly and severally
accountable for damages, including moral and exemplary, with his
subordinates who committed such transgressions. However, the
judgment gives the caveat that a superior officer must not abdicate his
duty to properly supervise his subordinates for he runs the risk of being
held responsible for gross negligence and of being held under the cited
provision of the Civil Code as indirectly and solidarily accountable with
the tortfeasor.
The rationale for this rule of law was best expressed by Brandeis in wise:
"In a government of laws, existence of the government be imperilled
following it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the
potent omnipresent teacher. For good or ill, it teaches the whole people
by example. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes the law
breaker, it breeds contempt for the law, it invites every man to become a
law unto himself, it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration
of criminal law the end justifies the means ... would bring terrible
retribution." 1
Needless to say, the criminal acts of the "Sparrow Units" or death squads
of the NPA which have infutrated the cities and suburbs and performed
their despicable killings of innocent civilians and military and police
officers constitute an equally perverse violation of the sanctity of human
life and must be severely condemned by all who adhere tothe Rule of the
Law.
It need only be pointed out that one of the first acts of the present
government under President Corazon C. Aquino after her assumption of
office in February, 1986 was to file our government's ratification and
access to all human rights instruments adopted under the auspices of the
United Nations, declaring thereby the government's commitment to
observe the precepts of the United Nations Charter and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. More than this, pursuant to our Constitution
which the people decisively ratified on February 2, 1987, the independent
office of the Commission on Human Rights hats been created and
organized with ample powers to investigate human rights violations and
take remedial measures against all such violations by the military as well
as by the civilian groups.

As the writer stress in Hildawa vs. Enrile 2 Which Was an action to enjoin
the operations of the dreaded secret marshals during the past regime, 'In
a democratic state, you don't stoop to the level of criminals. If we stoop to
what they do, then we're no better than they ... there would be no
difference. ... The Supreme Court stands as the guarantor of the
Constitutional and human rights of all persons within its jurisdiction and
cannot abdicate its basic role under the Constitution that these rights be
respected and enforced. The spirit and letter of the Constitution negates
as contrary to the basic precepts of human rights and freedom that a
person's life be snuffed out without due process in a split second even if
he is caught in flagrante delicto — unless it was caned for as an act of self-
defense by the law agents using reasonable means to prevent or repel an
unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased.

31
 Persons and Family Relations Cases

Republic of the Philippines "CONSIDERING that the cause of action of the complaint filed in this case
SUPREME COURT arose out of a criminal case which is still pending and which is not among
Manila those exceptions provided for in Article 33, new Civil Code, the motion of
counsel for the plaintiffs under date of July 27, 1955, is hereby denied."
Hence this request to vacate the above order and for a writ of mandamus.
GR No. L-9623 January 22, 1957 The petitioners, allege error and/or abuse of discretion, because the civil
action "is predicated on culpa aquiliana and not on the criminal liability
LEONCIO DYOGI v. NICASIO YATCO of respondents Franco and Liggayu"; and also because anyway the civil
action could proceed, without regard, to the criminal prosecution, in
accordance with art. 33 of the New Civil Code as construed in Carandang
v. Valenton, 51 Of. Gaz. 2878.
DECISION
Obviously the trial, court followed the Rule that after a criminal action has
BENGZON, J.: been commenced a civil action arising from the same offense shall be
suspended until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been
Petition to compel the respondent judge to hear Civil Case No, 2239 of his rendered, (107 Rules of Court sec. 1 par. c). This Rule however, has been
Quezon City court independently of the proceedings in Criminal Case No. partially amended by article 33 of the New Civil Code providing that a civil
4367 of tho Rizal court of first instance. action for damages brought by the injured party in cases of defamation,
fraud and physical injuries shall proceed independently of the criminal
On June 26, 1953, Teresita Young de Dyogi was run over and mortally prosecution. Herein petitioners urged application of this article,
injured on Samson Road, Caloocan, by the automobile of Basilia Vda. de contending that the civil action (No. 2239) for damages arose out of
Franco, allegedly driven at the time by Benjamin Liggayu and, her minor "physical injuries". The court declined to apply the article, probably
son Roy Franco. The victim died the same day. believing that homicide having resulted from the wrong not mere physical
injuries the claim did not come within the amendment, or exception to the
As a result, an information for homicide thru reckless negligence was filed rule as His Honor put it.
against Liggayu and Roy (Criminal Case No. 4367). And later the surviving
husband of Teresita (Leoncio Dyogi), together with their nine children Such belief constituted error, because in Carandang v. Valenton, supra, it
instituted a civil action against both drivers and the owner of the car to was held that "physical injuries" in article 33 included bodily injuries
recover damages for the death (Civil Case No. 2239). Against the drivers, causing death.
action was based on their negligent acts.
But there is a stronger reason advanced, by petitioners: articles 2176 and
The owner was impleaded as such and also as mother and guardian of her 2177 of the New Civil Code which provide,
minor son. "ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged, to pay for the damage done. Such fault
Defendants denied liability, and the case having come up for hearing in or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
July 1954, counsel for the Francos asked, for suspension thereof in view parties, is called, a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
of the criminal proceeding. Over plaintiffs' objection the petition was Chapter."
granted. After a year of wait, plaintiffs prayed in a written motion (July 27,
1955) that the case be heard "without, awaiting 'the criminal, action". "ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding
Acting on such, petition the respondent judge on August 22, 1955 issued article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
his order of the following tenor:

32
 Persons and Family Relations Cases

negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission of the defendant."
Petitioners as plaintiffs in the court below, explained that their action for
damages rested on culpa aquiliana, defendants' liability[1] being
independent from the criminal offense of reckless negligence. Indeed the
complaint's allegations quoted in respondents' memorandum sufficiently
describe a demand for damages caused by defendants' quasi-delict,
negligence, or tortious conduct. "Joint tort-feasors", "negligence" were the
words used. Such being the situation, in line with article 2177 above
quoted, the demand must be considered separate and apart from the
criminal proceeding, not subordinate to the outcome of the latter[2]. The
reason is evident: whatever the result of such proceeding, it can not affect
the civil action, the course of which may not consequently be suspended.

In the Carandang case, supra, the trial judge refused, to hear the civil suit
for damages for physical injuries before the termination of the criminal,
proceeding arising from the same wrong. Upon petition of the interested
partly we directed said judge to proceed with such civil case[3]. There is
no reason to adjudge differently now. The order of August 22 is Leoncio
Dyogi, et al. v. Nicasio Yatco, et al., revoked, and the writ of mandamus will
be issued as prayed for. So ordered.

Paras, C.J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, Bautista, Labrader, Concepcion,

Reyes, J.B.L., and Endencia, JJ., concur.
Felix, J., I reserve my vote.

33

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 91856 October 5, 1990
YAKULT PHILIPPINES AND LARRY SALVADO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, WENCESLAO M. POLO, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of Br. 19 of the RTC of Manila, and ROY CAMASO,
respondents.
Tomas R. Leonidas for petitioners.
David B. Agoncillo for private respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Can a civil action instituted after the criminal action was filed prosper
even if there was no reservation to file a separate civil action? This is the
issue in this petition.
On December 24, 1982, a five-year old boy, Roy Camaso, while standing
on the sidewalk of M. de la Fuente Street, Sampaloc, Manila, was
sideswiped by a Yamaha motorcycle owned by Yakult Philippines and
driven by its employee, Larry Salvado.
Salvado was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to
slight physical injuries in an information that was filed on January 6, 1983
with the then City Court of Manila, docketed as Criminal Case No. 027184.
On October 19, 1984 a complaint for damages was filed by Roy Camaso
represented by his father, David Camaso, against Yakult Philippines and
Larry Salvado in the Regional Trial Court of Manila docketed as Civil Case
No. 84-27317.
In due course a decision was rendered in the civil case on May 26, 1989
ordering defendants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiff the sum of
P13,006.30 for actual expenses for medical services and hospital bills;
P3,000.00 attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. Although said
Persons and Family Relations Cases
defendants appealed the judgment, they nevertheless filed a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals challenging the jurisdiction of the trial
court over said civil case.
Petitioners' thesis is that the civil action for damages for injuries arising
from alleged criminal negligence of Salvado, being without malice, cannot
be filed independently of the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil
Code. Further, it is contended that under Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure such a separate civil action may not be filed
unless reservation thereof is expressly made.
In a decision dated November 3, 1989, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition.1 A motion for reconsideration thereof filed by petitioners was
denied on January 30, 1990. Hence this petition.
The petition is devoid of merit.
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure provides as
follows:
SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — When a criminal
action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to
institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised
Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission
of the accused.
A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The
institution of, or the reservation of the right to file, any of said civil
actions separately waives the others.
The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions
shall be made before the prosecution starts to present its evidence
and under circumstances affording the offended party a
reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
34

In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the accused.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the
accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary
damages, the filing fees for such civil action as provided in these
Rules shall constitute a first lien on the judgment except in an
award for actual damages.
In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is
alleged in the complaint or information, the corresponding filing
fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in
court for trial. (1a)
Although the incident in question and the actions arising therefrom were
instituted before the promulgation of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, its provisions which are procedural may apply retrospectively
to the present case. 2
Under the aforecited provisions of the rule, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to
institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal
Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
It is also provided that the reservation of the right to institute the separate
civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts to present its
evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a
reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
In this case, the offended party has not waived the civil action, nor
reserved the right to institute it separately. Neither has the offended party
instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action. However, the civil
action in this case was filed in court before the presentation of the
evidence for the prosecution in the criminal action of which the judge
presiding on the criminal case was duly informed, so that in the
disposition of the criminal action no damages was awarded.
Persons and Family Relations Cases
The civil liability sought arising from the act or omission of the accused in
this case is a quasi delict as defined under Article 2176 of the Civil Code as
follows:
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties,
is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of
this Chapter.
The aforecited revised rule requiring such previous reservation also
covers quasi-delict as defined under Article 2176 of the Civil Code arising
from the same act or omission of the accused.
Although the separate civil action filed in this case was without previous
reservation in the criminal case, nevertheless since it was instituted
before the prosecution presented evidence in the criminal action, and the
judge handling the criminal case was informed thereof, then the actual
filing of the civil action is even far better than a compliance with the
requirement of an express reservation that should be made by the
offended party before the prosecution presents its evidence.
The purpose of this rule requiring reservation is to prevent the offended
party from recovering damages twice for the same act or omission.
Thus, the Court finds and so holds that the trial court had jurisdiction over
the separate civil action brought before it.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The questioned decision of the
Court of Appeals dated November 3, 1989 and its resolution dated
January 30, 1990 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ.,
concur.Fernan, C.J. and Paras, J., are on leave.
35

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 148193 January 16, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
RAFAEL JOSE CONSING, JR., respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to set aside the May 31, 2001 decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2
in CA-G.R. SP No. 63712, which reversed and set aside the January 23,
2001 order 3 of the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 21, in
Criminal Case No. 7668-00 denying respondent's motion for deferment of
arraignment.
Sometime in February 1997, respondent Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. and his
mother, Cecilia de la Cruz, 4 represented to Plus Builders, Inc. (PBI) that
they are the true and lawful owners of a 42,443 square meter lot situated
in Imus, Cavite and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 687599 in
the name of Cecilia de la Cruz. They further represented that they
acquired said lot, which was previously covered by TCT No. 191408 from
Juanito Tan Teng and Po Willie Yu. Relying on the representations of
respondent and his mother, PBI purchased the questioned lot.
In April 1999, PBI discovered that respondent and his mother did not
have a valid title over the subject lot. PBI came to know that Juanito Tan
Teng and Po Willie Yu never sold said lot to respondent and his mother
and that TCT No. 191408 upon which TCT No. 687599 was based is not
on file with the Register of Deeds.
In August 1999, PBI was ousted from the possession of the disputed lot by
Juanito Tan Teng and Po Willie Yu. Despite written and verbal demands,
respondent and his mother refused to return the amount of
P13,369,641.79 alleged to have been initially paid by PBI.
Persons and Family Relations Cases
On July 22, 1999, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 68, an action for "Injunctive Relief" docketed as Civil Case No.
SCA 1759, against PBI, Unicapital Inc, Unicapital Realty Inc., Jaime
Martires, Mariano D. Martinez, Cecilia de la Cruz and 20 other John Does.
5 Respondent sought a declaration that he was merely an agent of his
mother, Cecilia de la Cruz, and therefore was not under any obligation to
PBI and to the other defendants on the various transactions involving TCT
No. 687599.
On October 13, 1999, PBI filed against respondent and his mother a
complaint for "Damages and Attachment," docketed as Civil Case No. 99-
95381, with Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. 6 Respondent
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum shopping and pendency
of Civil Case No. SCA 1759. 7
On January 21, 2000, a criminal case for estafa through falsification of
public document was filed against respondent Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. and
his mother with the RTC of Imus, Cavite. 8
On April 7, 2000, respondent filed a motion to defer arraignment on the
ground of prejudicial question, i. e., the pendency of Civil Case Nos. SCA
1759 and 99-95381. 9 On January 27, 2000, the trial court denied
respondent's motion.
A motion for reconsideration thereof was likewise denied on February 27,
2001. 10
Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction with
the Court of Appeals seeking to enjoin the arraignment and trial of the
estafa through falsification case. 11 The Court of Appeals granted
respondent's prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order in
a resolution dated March 19, 2001. 12
On May 31, 2001, a decision was rendered setting aside the January 27,
2000 order of the, trial court and permanently enjoining it from
proceeding with the arraignment and trial of the criminal case until the
civil cases for Injunctive Relief and for Damages and Attachment shall
have been finally decided.
36

Hence, the People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor General,
filed the instant petition seeking the reversal of the May 31, 2001 decision
of the Court of Appeals.
The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether or not the pendency of
Civil Case Nos. SCA 1759 and 99-95381, for Injunctive Relief and for
Damages and Attachment, is a prejudicial question justifying the
suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case for estafa through
falsification of public document, filed against the respondent.
A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case, the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein,
and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial
question must be determinative of the case before the court but the
jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another
court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from
the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt
or innocence of the accused. For a civil action to be considered prejudicial
to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the criminal proceedings
until the final resolution of the civil action, the following requisites must
be present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those
upon which the criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution
of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said
question must be lodged in another tribunal. 13
If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues or the issue in one is
intimately related to the issues raised in the other, then a prejudicial
question would likely exist, provided the other element or characteristic
is satisfied. It must appear not only that the civil case involves the same
facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that
the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would be necessarily
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. If the resolution of
the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility
of the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or there is
no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the
criminal case, therefore, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial
question. 14
In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question that would justify the
suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case. The issue in Civil Case
Persons and Family Relations Cases
No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is whether or not respondent merely
acted as an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz; while in Civil Case No.
99-95381, for Damages and Attachment, the question is whether
respondent and his mother are liable to pay damages and to return the
amount paid by PBI for the purchase of the disputed lot. Even if
respondent is declared merely an agent of his mother in the transaction
involving the sale of the questioned lot, he cannot be adjudged free from
criminal liability. An agent or any person may be held liable for conspiring
to falsify public documents. Hence, the determination of the issue
involved in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is irrelevant to
the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal case for estafa
through falsification of public document.
Likewise, the resolution of PBI's right to be paid damages and the
purchase price of the lot in question will not be determinative of the
culpability of the respondent in the criminal case for even if PBI is held
entitled to the return of the purchase price plus damages, it does not ipso
facto follow that respondent should be held guilty of estafa through
falsification of public document. Stated differently, a ruling of the court in
the civil case that PBI should not be paid the purchase price plus damages
will not necessarily absolve respondent of liability in the criminal case
where his guilt may still be established under penal laws as determined
by other evidence.
Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the
criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each
other. 15 Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the
Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended
party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the
offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission
charged in the criminal action.
Thus, in Rojas v. People, 16 the petitioner was accused in a criminal case for
violation of Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code, for executing a new
chattel mortgage on personal property in favor of another party without
consent of the previous mortgagee. Thereafter, the offended party filed a
civil case for termination of management contract, one of the causes of
action of which consisted of petitioner having executed a chattel mortgage
while the previous chattel mortgage was still valid and subsisting.
37
 Persons and Family Relations Cases

Petitioner moved that the arraignment and trial of the criminal case be SO ORDERED.
held in abeyance on the ground that the civil case was a prejudicial
question, the resolution of which was necessary before the criminal Davide, Jr., C .J ., Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ ., concur.
proceedings could proceed. The trial court denied the suspension of the
criminal case on the ground that no prejudicial question exist. We
affirmed the order of the trial court and ruled that:

. . . the resolution of the liability of the defendant in the civil case

on the eleventh cause of action based on the fraudulent
misrepresentation that the chattel mortgage the defendant
executed in favor of the said CMS Estate, Inc. on February 20,
1957, that his D-6 "Caterpillar" Tractor with Serial No. 9-U-6565
was "free from all liens and encumbrances" will not determine the
criminal liability of the accused in the said Criminal Case No.
56042 for violation of paragraph 2 of Article 319 of the Revised
Penal Code . . . (i) That, even granting for the sake of argument, a
prejudicial question is involved in this case, the fact remains that
both the crime charged in the information in the criminal case and
the eleventh cause of action in the civil case are based upon fraud,
hence both the civil and criminal cases could proceed
independently of the other pursuant to Article 33 of the new Civil
Code which provides: "In cases of defamation, fraud and physical
injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence." (j) That, therefore, the act of respondent judge in
issuing the orders referred to in the instant petition was not made
with "grave abuse of discretion."

In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment
on account of the alleged fraud committed by respondent and his mother
in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an independent civil action under
Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial
question that will justify the suspension of the criminal case at bar.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is

GRANTED. The May 31, 2001 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 63712 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The permanent injunction
issued by the Court of Appeals is LIFTED and the Regional Trial Court of
Imus, Cavite, Branch 21 is ORDERED to proceed with the arraignment
and trial in Criminal Case No. 7668-00.

38

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 112381 March 20, 1995
ISABELO APA, MANUEL APA and LEONILO JACALAN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. RUMOLDO R. FERNANDEZ, HON. CELSO V. ESPINOSA, and SPS.
FELIXBERTO TIGOL, JR. and ROSITA TAGHOY TIGOL, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a special civil action of certiorari to set aside orders of respondent
Judge Rumoldo R. Fernandez of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, at
Lapu-Lapu City, denying petitioners oral motion for the suspension of
their arraignment in Criminal Case No. 012489, entitled: "People of the
Philippines v. Isabelo Apa; Manuel Apa and Leonilo Jacalan," as well as
their motion for reconsideration.
Criminal Case No. 012489 is a prosecution for violation of P.D. 772
otherwise known as the Anti-Squatting Law. The information alleges:
That on February 1990, or prior thereto, in Agus, Lapulapu
City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused [herein
petitioners Isabelo Apa, Manuel Apa and Dionisio Jacalan],
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with one
another, without the knowledge and consent of the owner,
ROSITA TIGOL, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take advantage of the absence or tolerance of
the said owner by occupying or possessing a portion of her
real property, Lot No. 3635-B of Opon Cadastre, covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 13250, situated in Agus
Lapulapu City, whereon they constructed their respective
residential houses against the will of Rosita Tigol, which
acts of the said accused have deprived the latter of the use
Persons and Family Relations Cases
of a portion of her land, to her damage and prejudice
because despite repeated demands the said accused failed
and refused, as they still fail and refuse to vacate the
premises above-mentioned.
Petitioners moved for the suspension of their arraignment on the ground
that there was a prejudicial question pending resolution in another case
being tried in Branch 27 of the same court. The case, docketed as Civil Case
No. 2247-L and entitled "Anselmo Taghoy and Vicente Apa versus
Felixberto Tigol, Jr. and Rosita T. Tigol, et al.," concerns the ownership of
Lot No. 3635-B.1 In that case, petitioners seek a declaration of the nullity
of TCT No. 13250 of Rosita T. Tigol and the partition of the lot in question
among them and private respondent Rosita T. Tigol as heirs of Filomeno
and Rita Taghoy. The case had been filed in 1990 by petitioners, three
years before May 27, 1993 when the criminal case for squatting was filed
against them.
On August 25, 1993, the trial court denied the petitioners' motion and
proceeded with their arraignment. Petitioners, therefore, had to enter
their plea (not guilty) to the charge.
On September 2, 1993, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but
their motion was denied by the court in its order dated September 21,
1993. Hence, this petition.
The only issue in this case is whether the question of ownership of Lot No.
3635-B, which was pending, in Civil Case No. 2247-L, is a prejudicial
question justifying suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case
against petitioners.
We hold that it is.
A prejudicial question is a question which is based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that its
resolution is determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. To
justify suspension of the criminal action, it must appear not only that the
civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the
criminal prosecution is based but also that the decision of the issue or
issues raised in the civil case would be decisive of the guilt or innocence
of the accused.2 Rule 111, §5 provides:
39
 Persons and Family Relations Cases

Sec. 6. Elements of prejudicial question. — The two (2)
essential elements of a prejudicial questions are: (a) the
civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related
to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.
property to the plaintiff, he has given up its temporary possession. But in
the case at bar, no such agreement is asserted by private respondent.
Rather private respondent claims the right to possession based on her
claim of ownership. Ownership is thus the pivotal question. Since this is
the question in the civil case, the proceedings in the criminal case must in
the meantime be suspended.

In the criminal case, the question is whether petitioners occupied a piece
of land not belonging to them but to private respondent and against the
latter's will. As already noted, the information alleges that "without the
knowledge and consent of the owner, ROSITA TIGOL" petitioners
occupied or took possession of a portion of "her property" by building
their houses thereon and "deprived [her] of the use of portion of her land
to her damage and prejudice.
Now the ownership of the land in question, known as Lot 3635-B of the
Opon cadastre covered by TCT No. 13250, is the issue in Civil Case 2247-
L now pending in Branch 27 of the RTC at Lapulapu City. The resolution,
therefore, of this question would necessarily be determinative of
petitioners criminal liability for squatting.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and respondent judge is ordered
to SUSPEND the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 012489 until the
question of ownership in Civil Case No. 2247-L has been resolved with
finality and thereafter proceed with the trial of the criminal case if the civil
case is decided and terminated adversely against petitioners. Otherwise
he should dismiss the criminal case.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado and Puno, JJ., concur.

In fact it appears that on February 23, 1994, the court trying the civil case
rendered a decision nullifying TCT No. 13250 of private respondent and
her husband and declared the lot in question to be owned in common by
the spouses and the petitioners as inheritance from their parents
Filomeno and Rita Taghoy. While private respondents claim that the
decision in that case is not yet final because they have filed a motion for
new trial, the point is that whatever may be the ultimate resolution of the
question of ownership, such resolution will be determinative of the guilt
or innocence of petitioners in the criminal case. Surely, if petitioners are
co-owners of the lot in question, they cannot be found guilty of squatting
because they are as much entitled to the use and occupation of the land as
are the private respondent Rosita T. Tigol and her family.3

Private respondents argues that even the owner of a piece of a land can
be ejected from his property since the only issue in such a case is the right
to its physical possession. Consequently, they contend, he can also be
prosecuted under the Anti-Squatting Law.

The contention misses the case is the essential point that the owner of a
piece of land can be ejected only if for some reason, e.g., he has let his
40

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 126746 November 29, 2000
ARTHUR TE, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and LILIANA CHOA, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse the
Decision of the Court of Appeals Tenth Division, dated 31 August 1994 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 239711 and CA-G.R. SP No. 261782 and the Resolution
dated October 18, 1996 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Arthur Te and private respondent Liliana Choa were married
in civil rites on September 14, 1988. They did not live together after the
marriage although they would meet each other regularly. Not long after
private respondent gave birth to a girl on April 21, 1989, petitioner
stopped visiting her.3
On May 20, 1990, while his marriage with private respondent was
subsisting, petitioner contracted a second marriage with a certain Julieta
Santella (Santella).4
On the basis of a complaint-affidavit filed by private respondent sometime
in June 1990, when she learned about petitioner’s marriage to Santella, an
information charging petitioner with bigamy was filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City on August 9, 1990.5 This case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409.6
Persons and Family Relations Cases
Meanwhile, on July 20, 1990, petitioner filed in the RTC of Quezon City an
action for the annulment of his marriage to private respondent on the
ground that he was forced to marry her. He alleged that private
respondent concealed her pregnancy by another man at the time of their
marriage and that she was psychologically incapacitated to perform her
essential marital obligations.7
On November 8, 1990, private respondent also filed with the Professional
Regulation Commission (PRC) an administrative case against petitioner
and Santella for the revocation of their respective engineering licenses on
the ground that they committed acts of immorality by living together and
subsequently marrying each other despite their knowledge that at the
time of their marriage, petitioner was already married to private
respondent. With respect to petitioner, private respondent added that he
committed an act of falsification by stating in his marriage contract with
Santella that he was still single.8
After the prosecution rested its case in the criminal case for bigamy,
petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence with leave of court and motion to
inhibit the trial court judge for showing antagonism and animosity
towards petitioner’s counsel during the hearings of said case.
The trial court denied petitioner’s demurrer to evidence in an Order dated
November 28, 1990 which stated that the same could not be granted
because the prosecution had sufficiently established a prima facie case
against the accused.9 The RTC also denied petitioner’s motion to inhibit
for lack of legal basis.10
Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court judge, Judge
Cezar C. Peralejo, for (1) exhibiting antagonism and animosity towards
petitioner’s counsel; (2) violating the requirements of due process by
denying petitioner’s [motion for reconsideration and] demurrer to
evidence even before the filing of the same; (3) disregarding and failing to
comply with the appropriate guidelines for judges promulgated by the
Supreme Court; and (4) ruling that in a criminal case only "prima facie
evidence" is sufficient for conviction of an accused. This case was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 23971.11
Petitioner also filed with the Board of Civil Engineering of the PRC (PRC
Board), where the administrative case for the revocation of his
41

engineering license was pending, a motion to suspend the proceedings
therein in view of the pendency of the civil case for annulment of his
marriage to private respondent and criminal case for bigamy in Branches
106 and 98, respectively of the RTC of Quezon City.12 When the Board
denied the said motion in its Order dated July 16, 1991,13 petitioner filed
with the Court of Appeals another petition for certiorari, contending that
the Board gravely abused its discretion in: (1) failing to hold that the
resolution of the annulment case is prejudicial to the outcome of the
administrative case pending before it; (2) not holding that the
continuation of proceedings in the administrative case could render
nugatory petitioner’s right against self-incrimination in this criminal case
for bigamy against him; and (3) making an overly-sweeping
interpretation that Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the
Regulation and Practice of Professionals does not allow the suspension of
the administrative proceeding before the PRC Board despite the pendency
of criminal and/or administrative proceedings against the same
respondent involving the same set of facts in other courts or tribunals.
This petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 26178.14
The two petitions for certiorari were consolidated since they arose from
the same set of facts.
On 31 August 1994, the Court of Appeals, Tenth Division, rendered the
assailed decision in the consolidated petitions. The appellate court upheld
the RTC’s denial of the motion to inhibit due to petitioner’s failure to show
any concrete evidence that the trial court judge exhibited partiality and
had prejudged the case. It also ruled that the denial of petitioner’s motion
to suspend the proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question was in
accord with law.15 The Court of Appeals likewise affirmed the RTC’s
denial of the demurrer to evidence filed by petitioner for his failure to set
forth persuasive grounds to support the same, considering that the
prosecution was able to adduce evidence showing the existence of the
elements of bigamy.16
Neither did the appellate court find grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the Board’s Order denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings
in the administrative case on the ground of prejudicial question.
Respondent court held that no prejudicial question existed since the
action sought to be suspended is administrative in nature, and the other
action involved is a civil case.17
Persons and Family Relations Cases
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of
the Court of Appeals but the same was denied.18
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition raising the following issues:
I
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN
REFUSING TO SUSPEND THE LEGAL [CRIMINAL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE] PROCEEDINGS DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF
THE CIVIL CASE FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.
II
PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND
COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN DUE
COURSE.
III
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS LEGAL ERROR IN
NOT HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE A QUO SHOULD HAVE
INHIBITED HIMSELF.19
The petition has no merit.
While the termination of Civil Case No. Q-90-6205 for annulment of
petitioner’s marriage to private respondent has rendered the issue of the
propriety of suspending both the criminal case for bigamy before the RTC
of Quezon City, Branch 98 and the administrative case for revocation of
petitioner’s engineering license before the PRC Board moot and academic,
the Court shall discuss the issue of prejudicial question to emphasize the
guarding and controlling precepts and rules.20
A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the
criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the
42

civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined.21 The rationale behind the principle of suspending a
criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting
decisions.22
The Court of Appeals did not err when it ruled that the pendency of the
civil case for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner against private
respondent did not pose a prejudicial question which would necessitate
that the criminal case for bigamy be suspended until said civil case is
terminated.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to
private respondent had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s
innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is
required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be
subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.23 Petitioner’s
argument that the nullity of his marriage to private respondent had to be
resolved first in the civil case before the criminal proceedings could
continue, because a declaration that their marriage was void ab initio
would necessarily absolve him from criminal liability, is untenable. The
ruling in People vs. Mendoza24 and People vs. Aragon25 cited by petitioner
that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a marriage
which is void ab initio has been overturned. The prevailing rule is found
in Article 40 of the Family Code, which was already in effect at the time of
petitioner’s marriage to private respondent in September 1988. Said
article states that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may not be
invoked for purposes of remarriage unless there is a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void. Thus, under the law, a marriage,
even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared
otherwise in a judicial proceeding.26 In Landicho vs. Relova,27 we held
that:
Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its
nullity, for this must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts
and only when the nullity of a marriage is so declared can it be held as
void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption of
marriage exists.28
It is clear from the foregoing that the pendency of the civil case for
annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent did not give rise
to a prejudicial question which warranted the suspension of the
Persons and Family Relations Cases
proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy since at the time of the alleged
commission of the crime, their marriage was, under the law, still valid and
subsisting.
Neither did the filing of said civil case for annulment necessitate the
suspension of the administrative proceedings before the PRC Board. As
discussed above, the concept of prejudicial question involves a civil and a
criminal case. We have previously ruled that there is no prejudicial
question where one case is administrative and the other is civil.29
Furthermore, Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the
Regulation and Practice of Professionals of the PRC Board expressly
provides that the administrative proceedings before it shall not be
suspended notwithstanding the existence of a criminal and/or civil case
against the respondent involving the same facts as the administrative
case:
The filing or pendency of a criminal and/or civil cases in the courts or an
administrative case in another judicial body against an examinee or
registered professional involving the same facts as in the administrative
case filed or to be filed before the Board shall neither suspend nor bar the
proceeding of the latter case. The Board shall proceed independently with
the investigation of the case and shall render therein its decision without
awaiting for the final decision of the courts or quasi-judicial body.
It must also be noted that the allegations in the administrative complaint
before the PRC Board are not confined to the issue of the alleged bigamous
marriage contracted by petitioner and Santella. Petitioner is also charged
with immoral conduct for continued failure to perform his obligations as
husband to private respondent and as father to their child, and for
cohabiting with Santella without the benefit of marriage.30 The existence
of these other charges justified the continuation of the proceedings before
the PRC Board.
Petitioner also contends that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the
trial court’s denial of his demurrer to evidence in the criminal case for
bigamy, arguing that the prosecution failed to establish the existence of
both the first and second marriages beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner
claims that the original copy of marriage contract between him and
private respondent was not presented, the signatures therein were not
properly identified and there was no showing that the requisites of a valid
43

marriage were complied with. He alleges further that the original copy of
the marriage contract between him and Santella was not presented, that
no proof that he signed said contract was adduced, and that there was no
witness presented to show that a second marriage ceremony participated
in by him ever took place.31
We are not persuaded. The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is
left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling on the matter
shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such discretion.32
In this case, the Court of Appeals did not find any grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the trial court, which based its denial of the demurrer on
two grounds: first, the prosecution established a prima facie case for
bigamy against the petitioner; and second, petitioner’s allegations in the
demurrer were insufficient to justify the grant of the same. It has been
held that the appellate court will not review in a special civil action for
certiorari the prosecution’s evidence and decide in advance that such
evidence has or has not yet established the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.33 In view of the trial court’s finding that a prima facie
case against petitioner exists, his proper recourse is to adduce evidence
in his defense.34
The Court also finds it necessary to correct petitioner’s misimpression
that by denying his demurrer to evidence in view of the existence of a
prima facie case against him, the trial court was already making a
pronouncement that he is liable for the offense charged. As correctly held
by the Court of Appeals, the order of the RTC denying the demurrer was
not an adjudication on the merits but merely an evaluation of the
sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence to determine whether or not a
full-blown trial would be necessary to resolve the case.35 The RTC’s
observation that there was a prima facie case against petitioner only
meant that the prosecution had presented sufficient evidence to sustain
its proposition that petitioner had committed the offense of bigamy, and
unless petitioner presents evidence to rebut the same, such would be the
conclusion.36 Said declaration by the RTC should not be construed as a
pronouncement of petitioner’s guilt. It was precisely because of such
finding that the trial court denied the demurrer, in order that petitioner
may present evidence in his defense and allow said court to resolve the
case based on the evidence adduced by both parties.
Lastly, petitioner contends that his motion to inhibit Judge Peralejo in
Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409 should have been granted since said judge
Persons and Family Relations Cases
exhibited partiality and bias against him in several instances. First, when
petitioner manifested that he would file a motion for reconsideration of
the denial of his motion to suspend the proceedings in said case, the judge
said such motion was dilatory and would be denied even though the
motion for reconsideration had not yet been filed. Second, when
petitioner’s counsel manifested that he had just recovered from an
accident and was not physically fit for trial, the judge commented that
counsel was merely trying to delay the case and required said counsel to
produce a medical certificate to support his statement. Third, when
petitioner manifested that he was going to file a demurrer to evidence, the
judge characterized the same as dilatory and declared that he would deny
the same. According to petitioner, the judge’s hostile attitude towards
petitioner’s counsel as shown in the foregoing instances justified the grant
of his motion to inhibit.
We agree with the appellate court that the grounds raised by petitioner
against Judge Peralejo did not conclusively show that the latter was biased
and had prejudged the case.37 In People of the Philippines vs. Court of
Appeals,38 this Court held that while bias and prejudice have been
recognized as valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of a judge under
Section 1, Rule 137, the rudimentary rule is that the mere suspicion that
a judge is partial is not enough. There should be clear and convincing
evidence to prove the charge of bias and partiality.39
Furthermore, since the grounds raised by petitioner in his motion to
inhibit are not among those expressly mentioned in Section 1, Rule 137 of
the Revised Rules of Court, the decision to inhibit himself lay within the
sound discretion of Judge Peralejo. Said provision of law states:
Section 1. Disqualification of judges. – No judge or judicial officer shall sit
in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as
heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either
party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel
within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law,
or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or
counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling
or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all
parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
44
 Persons and Family Relations Cases

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself

from sitting in the case, for just and valid reasons other than those
mentioned above.

Thus, it was not mandatory that the judge inhibit himself from hearing
and deciding the case.

This Court does not find any abuse of discretion by respondent judge in
denying petitioner’s motion to inhibit. The test for determining the
propriety of the denial of said motion is whether petitioner was deprived
a fair and impartial trial.40 The instances when Judge Peralejo allegedly
exhibited antagonism and partiality against petitioner and/or his counsel
did not deprive him of a fair and impartial trial. As discussed earlier, the
denial by the judge of petitioner’s motion to suspend the criminal
proceeding and the demurrer to evidence are in accord with law and
jurisprudence. Neither was there anything unreasonable in the
requirement that petitioner’s counsel submit a medical certificate to
support his claim that he suffered an accident which rendered him
unprepared for trial. Such requirement was evidently imposed upon
petitioner’s counsel to ensure that the resolution of the case was not
hampered by unnecessary and unjustified delays, in keeping with the
judge’s duty to disposing of the court’s business promptly.41

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

45
 Persons and Family Relations Cases

Republic of the Philippines On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the
SUPREME COURT proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of
Manila a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship
between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the
SECOND DIVISION outcome of Civil Case No. 04-7392 would have a bearing in the criminal
case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.
G.R. No. 172060 September 13, 2010
The Decision of the Trial Court
JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL, Petitioner,
vs. The RTC Quezon City issued an Order dated 13 May 20053 holding that
MARIA CHRYSANTINE L. PIMENTEL and PEOPLE OF THE the pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial
PHILIPPINES, Respondents. question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it. The
RTC Quezon City held that the issues in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415
DECISION are the injuries sustained by respondent and whether the case could be
tried even if the validity of petitioner’s marriage with respondent is in
CARPIO, J.: question. The RTC Quezon City ruled:

The Case WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the Motion to Suspend
Proceedings On the [Ground] of the Existence of a Prejudicial Question is,
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 of the for lack of merit, DENIED.
Court of Appeals, promulgated on 20 March 2006, in CA-G.R. SP No.
91867. SO ORDERED.4

The Antecedent Facts
The facts are stated in the Court of Appeals’ decision:
On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private
respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito R.
Pimentel (petitioner), docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415, before
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, which was raffled to Branch 223
(RTC Quezon City).
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22 August 2005
Order,5 the RTC Quezon City denied the motion.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order before the
Court of Appeals, assailing the 13 May 2005 and 22 August 2005 Orders
of the RTC Quezon City.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals

On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72 (RTC Antipolo) for the
pre-trial and trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392 (Maria Chrysantine Lorenza L.
Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under
Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.
In its 20 March 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.
The Court of Appeals ruled that in the criminal case for frustrated
parricide, the issue is whether the offender commenced the commission
of the crime of parricide directly by overt acts and did not perform all the
acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance. On the other hand, the issue in the civil action for
annulment of marriage is whether petitioner is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The Court
46

of Appeals ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner and
respondent would be declared void, it would be immaterial to the criminal
case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts
constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had already been
committed. The Court of Appeals ruled that all that is required for the
charge of frustrated parricide is that at the time of the commission of the
crime, the marriage is still subsisting.
Petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court assailing the Court
of Appeals’ decision.
The Issue
The only issue in this case is whether the resolution of the action for
annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the
suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Civil Case Must be Instituted
Before the Criminal Case
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure6 provides:
Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a prejudicial
question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal
action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.
The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the
filing of the criminal action. In this case, the Information7 for Frustrated
Parricide was dated 30 August 2004. It was raffled to RTC Quezon City on
25 October 2004 as per the stamped date of receipt on the Information.
The RTC Quezon City set Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 for pre-trial and
trial on 14 February 2005. Petitioner was served summons in Civil Case
No. 04-7392 on 7 February 2005.8 Respondent’s petition9 in Civil Case No.
04-7392 was dated 4 November 2004 and was filed on 5 November 2004.
Clearly, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the
Persons and Family Relations Cases
criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Section
7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since
the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.
Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question
in Criminal Case for Parricide
Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that
would warrant the suspension of the criminal action.
There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action
are both pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue which must
be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal
case.10 A prejudicial question is defined as:
x x x one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent
of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to
another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from
the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt
or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it
must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to
those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that
in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.11
The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in
the crime of parricide,12 which punishes any person "who shall kill his
father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his
ascendants or descendants, or his spouse."13 The relationship between
the offender and the victim distinguishes the crime of parricide from
murder14 or homicide.15 However, the issue in the annulment of marriage
is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for
parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim
is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is
whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was
47
 Persons and Family Relations Cases

charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
the acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a Associate Justice
consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of
causes independent of petitioner’s will.16 At the time of the commission of
the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The LUCAS P. BERSAMIN* ROBERTO A. ABAD
subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case Associate Justice Associate Justice
No. 04-7392 is granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that was
committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.**
the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner Associate Justice
could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of
the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.1avvphi1 ATTESTATION
We cannot accept petitioner’s reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals17 I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
that "the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the the Court’s Division.
marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned x x x."
First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
of a second or subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological
Associate Justice
incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy. There was no issue of
Chairperson
prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro that
"[t]here is x x x a recognition written into the law itself that such a
marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences."18 CERTIFICATION
In fact, the Court declared in that case that "a declaration of the nullity of
the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned."19 Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the decision of the Court of to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
Appeals. The trial in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 may proceed as the
resolution of the issue in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is not determinative of RENATO C. CORONA
the guilt or innocence of petitioner in the criminal case. Chief Justice

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 20 March 2006

Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

48

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 161921 July 17, 2013
JOYCE V. ARDIENTE, PETITIONER,
vs.
SPOUSES JAVIER AND MA. THERESA PASTORFIDE, CAGAYAN DE
ORO WATER DISTRICT AND GASPAR GONZALEZ,* JR.,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 and
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated August 28, 2003 and
December 17, 2003, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 73000. The CA
Decision affirmed with modification the August 15, 2001 Decision3 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 24, while the
CA Resolution denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The facts, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:
[Herein petitioner] Joyce V. Ardiente and her husband Dr. Roberto S.
Ardiente are owners of a housing unit at Emily Homes, Balulang, Cagayan
de Oro City with a lot area of one hundred fifty-three (153) square meters
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 69905.
On June 2, 1994, Joyce Ardiente entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement (Exh. "B", pp. 470-473, Records) selling, transferring and
conveying in favor of [respondent] Ma. Theresa Pastorfide all their rights
and interests in the housing unit at Emily Homes in consideration of
₱70,000.00. The Memorandum of Agreement carries a stipulation:
Persons and Family Relations Cases
"4. That the water and power bill of the subject property shall be for the
account of the Second Party (Ma. Theresa Pastorfide) effective June 1,
1994." (Records, p. 47)
vis-a-vis Ma. Theresa Pastorfide's assumption of the payment of the
mortgage loan secured by Joyce Ardiente from the National Home
Mortgage (Records, Exh. "A", pp. 468-469)
For four (4) years, Ma. Theresa's use of the water connection in the name
of Joyce Ardiente was never questioned nor perturbed (T.S.N., October 31,
2000, pp. 7-8) until on March 12, 1999, without notice, the water
connection of Ma. Theresa was cut off. Proceeding to the office of the
Cagayan de Oro Water District (COWD) to complain, a certain Mrs. Madjos
told Ma. Theresa that she was delinquent for three (3) months
corresponding to the months of December 1998, January 1999, and
February 1999. Ma. Theresa argued that the due date of her payment was
March 18, 1999 yet (T.S.N., October 31, 2000, pp. 11-12). Mrs. Madjos later
told her that it was at the instance of Joyce Ardiente that the water line
was cut off (T.S.N., February 5, 2001, p. 31).
On March 15, 1999, Ma. Theresa paid the delinquent bills (T.S.N., October
31, 2000, p. 12). On the same date, through her lawyer, Ma. Theresa wrote
a letter to the COWD to explain who authorized the cutting of the water
line (Records, p. 160).
On March 18, 1999, COWD, through the general manager, [respondent]
Gaspar Gonzalez, Jr., answered the letter dated March 15, 1999 and
reiterated that it was at the instance of Joyce Ardiente that the water line
was cut off (Records, p. 161).
Aggrieved, on April 14, 1999, Ma. Theresa Pastorfide [and her husband]
filed [a] complaint for damages [against petitioner, COWD and its
manager Gaspar Gonzalez] (Records, pp. 2-6).
In the meantime, Ma. Theresa Pastorfide's water line was only restored
and reconnected when the [trial] court issued a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction on December 14, 1999 (Records, p. 237).4
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment holding as follows:
xxxx
49

In the exercise of their rights and performance of their duties, defendants
did not act with justice, gave plaintiffs their due and observe honesty and
good faith. Before disconnecting the water supply, defendants COWD and
Engr. Gaspar Gonzales did not even send a disconnection notice to
plaintiffs as testified to by Engr. Bienvenido Batar, in-charge of the
Commercial Department of defendant COWD. There was one though, but
only three (3) days after the actual disconnection on March 12, 1999. The
due date for payment was yet on March 15. Clearly, they did not act with
justice. Neither did they observe honesty.
They should not have been swayed by the prodding of Joyce V. Ardiente.
They should have investigated first as to the present ownership of the
house. For doing the act because Ardiente told them, they were negligent.
Defendant Joyce Ardiente should have requested before the cutting off of
the water supply, plaintiffs to pay. While she attempted to tell plaintiffs
but she did not have the patience of seeing them. She knew that it was
plaintiffs who had been using the water four (4) years ago and not hers.
She should have been very careful. x x x5
The dispositive portion of the trial court's Decision reads, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering defendants [Ardiente, COWD and Gonzalez] to pay jointly and
severally plaintiffs, the following sums:
(a) ₱200,000.00 for moral damages;
(b) 200,000.00 for exemplary damages; and
(c) 50,000.00 for attorney's fee.
The cross-claim of Cagayan de Oro Water District and Engr. Gaspar
Gonzales is hereby dismissed. The Court is not swayed that the cutting off
of the water supply of plaintiffs was because they were influenced by
defendant Joyce Ardiente. They were negligent too for which they should
be liable.
SO ORDERED.6
Petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez filed an appeal with the CA.
Persons and Family Relations Cases
On August 28, 2003, the CA promulgated its assailed Decision disposing
as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED,
with the modification that the awarded damages is reduced to
₱100,000.00 each for moral and exemplary damages, while attorney's
fees is lowered to ₱25,000.00. Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.7
The CA ruled, with respect to petitioner, that she has a "legal duty to honor
the possession and use of water line by Ma. Theresa Pastorfide pursuant
to their Memorandum of Agreement" and "that when [petitioner] applied
for its disconnection, she acted in bad faith causing prejudice and [injury
to] Ma. Theresa Pastorfide."8
As to COWD and Gonzalez, the CA held that they "failed to give a notice of
disconnection and derelicted in reconnecting the water line despite
payment of the unpaid bills by the [respondent spouses Pastorfide]."9
Petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez filed their respective Motions for
Reconsideration, but these were denied by the CA in its Resolution dated
December 17, 2003.
COWD and Gonzalez filed a petition for review on certiorari with this
Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. 161802. However, based on
technical grounds and on the finding that the CA did not commit any
reversible error in its assailed Decision, the petition was denied via a
Resolution10 issued by this Court on March 24, 2004. COWD and Gonzalez
filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied with finality
through this Court's Resolution11 dated June 28, 2004.
Petitioner, on the other hand, timely filed the instant petition with the
following Assignment of Errors:
7.1 HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (ALTHOUGH IT HAS
REDUCED THE LIABILITY INTO HALF) HAS STILL COMMITTED
GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT UPHELD THE JOINT AND
SOLIDARY LIABILITY OF PETITIONER JOYCE V. ARDIENTE WITH
CAGAYAN DE ORO WATER DISTRICT (COWD) AND ENGR.
GASPAR D. GONZALES FOR THE LATTER'S FAILURE TO SERVE
50

NOTICE UPON RESPONDENTS SPOUSES PASTORFIDE PRIOR TO
THE ACTUAL DISCONNECTION DESPITE EVIDENCE ADDUCED
DURING TRIAL THAT EVEN WITHOUT PETITIONER'S REQUEST,
COWD WAS ALREADY SET TO EFFECT DISCONNECTION OF
RESPONDENTS' WATER SUPPLY DUE TO NON-PAYMENT OF
ACCOUNT FOR THREE (3) MONTHS.
7.2 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE
AND SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT RULED TOTALLY AGAINST
PETITIONER AND FAILED TO FIND THAT RESPONDENTS ARE
GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE WHEN THEY FAILED
TO PAY THEIR WATER BILLS FOR THREE MONTHS AND TO
MOVE FOR THE TRANSFER OF THE COWD ACCOUNT IN THEIR
NAME, WHICH WAS A VIOLATION OF THEIR MEMORANDUM OF
AGREEMENT WITH PETITIONER JOYCE V. ARDIENTE.
RESPONDENTS LIKEWISE DELIBERATELY FAILED TO EXERCISE
DILIGENCE OF A GOOD FATHER OF THE FAMILY TO MINIMIZE
THE DAMAGE UNDER ART. 2203 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.
7.3 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED
WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE FACT THAT RESPONDENT
SPOUSES PASTORFIDE ARE LIKEWISE BOUND TO OBSERVE
ARTICLE 19 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE, i.e., IN THE EXERCISE OF
THEIR RIGHTS AND IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR DUTIES TO
ACT WITH JUSTICE, GIVE EVERYONE HIS DUE AND OBSERVE
HONESTY AND GOOD FAITH.
7.4 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
WHEN IT GRANTED AN AWARD OF MORAL AND EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES AS AGAINST PETITIONER
ARDIENTE.12
At the outset, the Court noticed that COWD and Gonzalez, who were
petitioner's co-defendants before the RTC and her co-appellants in the CA,
were impleaded as respondents in the instant petition. This cannot be
done. Being her co-parties before the RTC and the CA, petitioner cannot,
in the instant petition for review on certiorari, make COWD and Gonzalez,
adversary parties. It is a grave mistake on the part of petitioner's counsel
to treat COWD and Gonzalez as respondents. There is no basis to do so,
considering that, in the first place, there is no showing that petitioner filed
a cross-claim against COWD and Gonzalez. Under Section 2, Rule 9 of the
Persons and Family Relations Cases
Rules of Court, a cross-claim which is not set up shall be barred. Thus, for
failing to set up a cross-claim against COWD and Gonzalez before the RTC,
petitioner is already barred from doing so in the present petition.
More importantly, as shown above, COWD and Gonzalez's petition for
review on certiorari filed with this Court was already denied with finality
on June 28, 2004, making the presently assailed CA Decision final and
executory insofar as COWD and Gonzalez are concerned. Thus, COWD and
Gonzalez are already precluded from participating in the present petition.
They cannot resurrect their lost cause by filing pleadings this time as
respondents but, nonetheless, reiterating the same prayer in their
previous pleadings filed with the RTC and the CA.
As to the merits of the instant petition, the Court likewise noticed that the
main issues raised by petitioner are factual and it is settled that the
resolution of factual issues is the function of lower courts, whose findings
on these matters are received with respect and considered binding by the
Supreme Court subject only to certain exceptions, none of which is
present in this instant petition.13 This is especially true when the findings
of the RTC have been affirmed by the CA as in this case.14
In any case, a perusal of the records at hand would readily show that the
instant petition lacks merit.
Petitioner insists that she should not be held liable for the disconnection
of respondent spouses' water supply, because she had no participation in
the actual disconnection. However, she admitted in the present petition
that it was she who requested COWD to disconnect the Spouses
Pastorfide's water supply. This was confirmed by COWD and Gonzalez in
their cross-claim against petitioner. While it was COWD which actually
discontinued respondent spouses' water supply, it cannot be denied that
it was through the instance of petitioner that the Spouses Pastorfide's
water supply was disconnected in the first place.
It is true that it is within petitioner's right to ask and even require the
Spouses Pastorfide to cause the transfer of the former's account with
COWD to the latter's name pursuant to their Memorandum of Agreement.
However, the remedy to enforce such right is not to cause the
disconnection of the respondent spouses' water supply. The exercise of a
right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established
and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to
51

harm another.15 Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured party will
attach.16 In the present case, intention to harm was evident on the part of
petitioner when she requested for the disconnection of respondent
spouses’ water supply without warning or informing the latter of such
request. Petitioner claims that her request for disconnection was based
on the advise of COWD personnel and that her intention was just to
compel the Spouses Pastorfide to comply with their agreement that
petitioner's account with COWD be transferred in respondent spouses'
name. If such was petitioner's only intention, then she should have
advised respondent spouses before or immediately after submitting her
request for disconnection, telling them that her request was simply to
force them to comply with their obligation under their Memorandum of
Agreement. But she did not. What made matters worse is the fact that
COWD undertook the disconnection also without prior notice and even
failed to reconnect the Spouses Pastorfide’s water supply despite
payment of their arrears. There was clearly an abuse of right on the part
of petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez. They are guilty of bad faith.
The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in Article 19 of the Civil Code
provides that every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.
In this regard, the Court's ruling in Yuchengco v. The Manila Chronicle
Publishing Corporation17 is instructive, to wit:
xxxx
This provision of law sets standards which must be observed in the
exercise of one’s rights as well as in the performance of its duties, to wit:
to act with justice; give everyone his due; and observe honesty and good
faith.
In Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. Court of Appeals, it was
elucidated that while Article 19 "lays down a rule of conduct for the
government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order,
it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for
damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper." The Court
said:
Persons and Family Relations Cases
One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the
codification of "some basic principles that are to be observed for the
rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the
social order." [REPORT ON THE CODE COMMISSION ON THE PROPOSED
CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, p. 39]. The framers of the Code, seeking
to remedy the defect of the old Code which merely stated the effects of the
law, but failed to draw out its spirit, incorporated certain fundamental
precepts which were "designed to indicate certain norms that spring from
the fountain of good conscience" and which were also meant to serve as
"guides for human conduct [that] should run as golden threads through
society, to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal, which is the
sway and dominance of justice." (Id.) Foremost among these principles is
that pronounced in Article 19 x x x.
xxxx
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the
principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be
observed not only in the exercise of one's rights, but also in the
performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act
with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good
faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights;
that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19
must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or
granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some
illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform
with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another,
a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the
government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order,
it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for
damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.
Corollarilly, Article 20 provides that "every person who, contrary to law,
willfully or negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the
latter for the same." It speaks of the general sanctions of all other
provisions of law which do not especially provide for its own sanction.
When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform to the
standards set forth in the said provision and results in damage to another,
a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be
responsible. Thus, if the provision does not provide a remedy for its
52
 Persons and Family Relations Cases

violation, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 of bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiffs’ plainly valid, just and
the Civil Code would be proper. demandable claim.

The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been
violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or other applicable
provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case. x x x18
To recapitulate, petitioner's acts which violated the abovementioned
provisions of law is her unjustifiable act of having the respondent
spouses' water supply disconnected, coupled with her failure to warn or
at least notify respondent spouses of such intention. On the part of COWD
and Gonzalez, it is their failure to give prior notice of the impending
disconnection and their subsequent neglect to reconnect respondent
spouses' water supply despite the latter's settlement of their delinquent
account.
WHEREFORE, instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated August 28, 2003
and December 17, 2003, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 73000 are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Abad, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
July 24, 2013
N O T I C E OF J U D G M E N T

On the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart Sirs/Mesdames:
from the ruling of both the RTC and the CA that petitioner, COWD and
Gonzalez are solidarily liable. Please take notice that on ___July 17, 2013___ a Decision, copy attached
herewith, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case,
The Spouses Pastorfide are entitled to moral damages based on the the original of which was received by this Office on July 19, 2013 at 2:25
provisions of Article 2219,19 in connection with Articles 2020 and 2121 of p.m.
the Civil Code.
Very truly yours,
As for exemplary damages, Article 2229 provides that exemplary
damages may be imposed by way of example or correction for the public (SGD)
good. Nonetheless, exemplary damages are imposed not to enrich one LUCITA ABJELINA SORIANO
party or impoverish another, but to serve as a deterrent against or as a Division Clerk of Court
negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actions.22 In the instant
case, the Court agrees with the CA in sustaining the award of exemplary
damages, although it reduced the amount granted, considering that
respondent spouses were deprived of their water supply for more than
nine (9) months, and such deprivation would have continued were it not
for the relief granted by the RTC.

With respect to the award of attorney's fees, Article 2208 of the Civil Code
provides, among others, that such fees may be recovered when exemplary
damages are awarded, when the defendant's act or omission has
compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses
to protect his interest, and where the defendant acted in gross and evident

53

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 179799 September 11, 2009
ZENAIDA R. GREGORIO, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SANSIO PHILIPPINES, INC., and EMMA J.
DATUIN, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a petition1 for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated January 31,
2007 and its Resolution3 dated September 12, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No.
63602, entitled "Sansio Philippines, Inc., et al. v. Hon. Romulo SG.
Villanueva, et al."
The case arose from the filing of an Affidavit of Complaint4 for violation of
Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) by
respondent Emma J. Datuin (Datuin), as Officer-in-Charge of the Accounts
Receivables Department, and upon authority of petitioner Sansio
Philippines, Inc. (Sansio), against petitioner Zenaida R. Gregorio
(Gregorio) and one Vito Belarmino, as proprietors of Alvi Marketing,
allegedly for delivering insufficiently funded bank checks as payment for
the numerous appliances bought by Alvi Marketing from Sansio.
As the address stated in the complaint was incorrect, Gregorio was unable
to controvert the charges against her. Consequently, she was indicted for
three (3) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, docketed as Criminal Case Nos.
236544, 236545, and 236546, before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC), Branch 3, Manila.
The MeTC issued a warrant5 for her arrest, and it was served upon her by
the armed operatives of the Public Assistance and Reaction Against Crime
(PARAC) of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) on
Persons and Family Relations Cases
October 17, 1997, Friday, at around 9:30 a.m. in Quezon City while she
was visiting her husband and their two (2) daughters at their city
residence. Gregorio was brought to the PARAC-DILG Office where she was
subjected to fingerprinting and mug shots, and was detained. She was
released in the afternoon of the same day when her husband posted a
bond for her temporary liberty.
On December 5, 1997, Gregorio filed before the MeTC a Motion6 for
Deferment of Arraignment and Reinvestigation, alleging that she could
not have issued the bounced checks, since she did not even have a
checking account with the bank on which the checks were drawn, as
certified by the branch manager of the Philippine National Bank, Sorsogon
Branch. She also alleged that her signature was patently and radically
different from the signatures appearing on the bounced checks.
The MeTC granted the Motion and a reinvestigation was conducted. In the
course of the reinvestigation, Datuin submitted an Affidavit of Desistance7
dated August 18, 1998, stating, among others, that Gregorio was not one
of the signatories of the bounced checks subject of prosecution.
Subsequently, the assistant city prosecutor filed a Motion to Dismiss8
dated November 12, 1998 with respect to Criminal Case Nos. 236544-46.
The MeTC granted the motion and ordered the B.P. Blg. 22 cases
dismissed.9
On August 18, 2000, Gregorio filed a complaint10 for damages against
Sansio and Datuin before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Ligao,
Albay. The complaint, in part, reads —
4. That on or about December 15, 1995, defendant Emma J. Datuin
filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila an "Affidavit
of Complaint" wherein, among others, she alleged under oath that
as an Officer In-charge of the Accounts Receivables Department of
SANSIO PHILIPPINES, INC., she was duly authorized and
empowered by said company to file cases against debtors,
customers and dealers of the company;
xxxx
5. That while acting under authority of her employer namely the
defendant SANSIO PHILIPPINES, INC., defendant EMMA J. DATUIN
54

falsely stated in the "Affidavit of Complaint" (Annex "A"), among
others, that plaintiff Zenaida R. Gregorio issued and delivered to
their office the following checks, to wit:
a. PNB Check No. C-347108 dated November 30, 1992 in
the amount of ₱9,564.00;
b. PNB Check No. C-347109 dated November 30, 1992 in
the amount of ₱19,194.48; and
c. PNB Check No. C-347104 dated December 2, 1992 in the
amount of ₱10,000.00
and that the above-mentioned PNB Checks bounced when
deposited upon maturity;
6. That as a result of the filing of the "Affidavit of Complaint"
(Annex "A") wherein defendant Emma J. Datuin falsely charged
the plaintiff with offenses of Estafa and/or violation of B.P. Blg. 22
on three (3) counts, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila
issued a Resolution dated April 1, 1996 finding the existence of a
probable cause against the plaintiff for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 on three counts;
xxxx
7. That in the "MEMO OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION"
attached hereto as Annex "C," signed by defendant Emma J. Datuin
she falsely indicated the address of plaintiff to be at No. 76
Peñaranda Street, Legaspi City when the truth of the matter is that
the latter’s correct address is at Barangay Rizal, Oas, Albay;
8. That as a consequence of the aforegoing false and misleading
indication of address, plaintiff was therefore not duly notified of
the charges filed against her by defendant Emma J. Datuin; and
more, she was not able to controvert them before the investigating
prosecutor, finally resulting in the filing in court of three (3)
informations accusing her of violating B.P. 22;
xxxx
Persons and Family Relations Cases
9. That as pernicious result of the unwarranted and baseless
accusation by the defendants which culminated in the filing of
three (3) informations in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 3 indicting the plaintiff on three counts of the offense of
violating B.P. 22, the said court issued a Warrant of Arrest on July
22, 1996 ordering the arrest of the plaintiff;
xxxx
10. That taking extra effort to expedite the apprehension of
plaintiff, defendants’ retained private prosecutor managed to
obtain the Warrant for the Arrest of said plaintiff from the Court
as evidenced by the copy of the letter of lawyer Alquin B.
Manguerra of Chua and Associates Law Office (Annex "H") so
much so that in the morning of October 17, 1997, while plaintiff
was visiting her husband Jose Gregorio and their two daughters at
their city residence at 78 K-2 Street, Kamuning, Quezon City, and
without the slightest premonition that she was wanted by the law,
armed operatives of the Public Assistance and Reaction Against
Crime (PARAC) of DILG suddenly swooped down on their
residence, arrested the plaintiff and brought her to the PARAC
DILG Office in Quezon City where she was fingerprinted and
detained like an ordinary criminal;
xxxx
11. That feeling distraught, helpless and hungry (not having eaten
for a whole day) the plaintiff languished in her place of
confinement until the late afternoon of October 17, 1997 when her
husband was able to post a bond for her temporary liberty and
secure an order of release (Annex "J") from the court. It was
providential that a city judge was available in the late afternoon of
October 17, 1997 which was a Friday, otherwise plaintiff would
have remained in confinement for the entire weekend;
12. That because of her desire to prove and establish her
innocence of the unjustified charges lodged against her by the
defendants, the plaintiff was thus compelled to retain the services
of counsel resulting in the filing of a Motion for Deferment of
Arraignment and Reinvestigation (Annex "K") which was granted
by the court; the filing of a Request for Reinvestigation with the
55

prosecutor’s office (Annex "L"); and the submission of a Counter-
Affidavit to the investigating prosecutor. All of these culminated
in the filing by the investigating prosecutor of a Motion to Dismiss
(Annex "M") the three criminal cases as a consequence of which
the Court issued an Order dated June 1, 1999 (Annex "N")
dismissing Criminal Cases No. 236544, No. 236545 and No.
236546, copy of which was received by plaintiff only on July 7,
2000;
13. That previous to the filing of the above-mentioned Motion to
Dismiss by the prosecutor and having been faced with the truth
and righteousness of plaintiff’s avowal of innocence which was
irrefutable, defendants had no recourse but to concede and
recognize the verity that they had wrongly accused an innocent
person, in itself a brazen travesty of justice, so much so that
defendant Emma J. Datuin had to execute an Affidavit of
Desistance (Annex "O") admitting that plaintiff is not a signatory
to the three bouncing checks in question, rationalizing, albeit
lamely, that the filing of the cases against the plaintiff was by
virtue of an honest mistake or inadvertence on her (Datuin’s) part;
14. Be that as it may, incalculable damage has been inflicted on the
plaintiff on account of the defendants’ wanton, callous and
reckless disregard of the fundamental legal precept that "every
person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of
mind of his neighbors and other persons" (Art. 26, Civil Code of
the Philippines);
15. That the plaintiff, being completely innocent of the charges
against her as adverted to in the preceding paragraphs, was
socially humiliated, embarrassed, suffered physical discomfort,
mental anguish, fright, and serious anxiety as a proximate result
of her unjustified indictment, arrest and detention at the PARAC
headquarters – all of these ordeals having been exacerbated by
the fact that plaintiff is a woman who comes from a respected
family in Oas, Albay, being the wife of an executive of the
Philippine National Construction Corporation, the mother of two
college students studying in Manila, a pharmacist by profession, a
businesswoman by occupation, and an incumbent Municipal
Councilor (Kagawad) of Oas, Albay, at the time of her arrest and
detention; and that she previously held the following positions:
Persons and Family Relations Cases
(a). President, Philippine Pharmaceutical Association
(Albay Chapter);
(b). Chairman of the Board, Albay Pharmaceutical
Marketing Cooperative (ALPHAMAC);
(c). Charter Secretary, Kiwanis Club of Oas;
(d). Chairman, Polangui Ladies Multi-Purpose
Cooperative, Polangui, Albay;
(e). Vicarial Regent, Daughters of Mary Immaculate
International, District IX;
(f). Chapter President and Municipal Coordinator, Albay
Women Volunteers Association, Inc., Legaspi City;
(g). Regent, Daughters of Mary Immaculate International
Virgo Clemens Circle, Oas, Albay;
(h). Secretary, Girl Scout of the Philippines District
Association; and
(i). Director, Albay Electric Cooperative (ALECO),
not to mention the undue aspersion cast upon her social,
professional and business reputation because of defendants’
tortious act of accusing her of Estafa and/or issuing bouncing
checks – even without a scintilla of evidence;
16. That to compound the aforegoing travails and sufferings of the
plaintiff she had to devote and spend much of her time, money and
efforts trying to clear her tarnished name and reputation,
including traveling to and from Manila to confer with her lawyer,
attend the hearings at the prosecutor’s office and at the
Metropolitan Trial Court;
17. By and large, defendants’ fault or, at the very least, their
reckless imprudence or negligence, in filing the three (3) criminal
cases against the plaintiff unequivocally caused damage to the
56

latter and because of defendants’ baseless and unjustified
accusations, plaintiff was constrained to retain the services of a
lawyer to represent her at the Metropolitan Trial Court and at the
Office of the City Prosecutor at Manila in order to establish her
innocence and cause the dismissal of the three (3) criminal cases
filed against her, reason for which she spent ₱20,000.00; and in
order to institute this instant action for the redress of her
grievances, plaintiff have to pay the sum of ₱50,000.00 as
attorney’s fees and incur litigation expenses in the amount of
₱35,000.00;
18. That by reason of all the aforegoing and pursuant to the
provision of law that "whoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done," (Article 2176, Civil Code of the Philippines), the
plaintiff is entitled to and hereby claims the following items of
damages:
a. ₱3,000,000.00 as moral damages
b. ₱50,000.00 as actual damages
c. ₱50,000.00 as nominal damages
d. ₱70,000.00 as attorney’s fees
e. ₱35,000.00 as litigation expenses
19. That defendants herein are jointly and solidarily liable for the
payment of the above items of damages being co-tortfeasors.
Moreover, defendant SANSIO PHILIPPINES, INC. is vicariously
liable as the employer of defendant Emma J. Datuin who patently
acted within the scope of her assigned tasks (Vide: Art. 2180, Civil
Code of the Philippines).11
Sansio and Datuin filed a Motion to Dismiss12 on the ground that the
complaint, being one for damages arising from malicious prosecution,
failed to state a cause of action, as the ultimate facts constituting the
elements thereof were not alleged in the complaint. Gregorio opposed13
the Motion. Sansio and Datuin filed their Reply14 to the Opposition.
Gregorio, in turn, filed her Rejoinder.15
Persons and Family Relations Cases
On October 10, 2000, the RTC issued an Order16 denying the Motion to
Dismiss. Sansio and Datuin filed a Motion for Reconsideration17 of the
October 10, 2000 Order, but the RTC denied the same in its Order18 dated
January 5, 2001.
Sansio and Datuin went to the CA via a petition19 for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the presiding judge of the RTC in denying their motions to dismiss and for
reconsideration.
Meanwhile, on March 20, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision in the civil
case for damages instituted by Gregorio, directing Sansio and Datuin,
jointly and solidarily, to pay Gregorio ₱200,000.00 as moral damages;
₱10,000.00 as nominal damages; ₱35,000.00 as litigation expenses;
₱30,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and costs of the suit. The RTC expressly
stated in its Decision that the complaint was one for damages based on
quasi-delict and not on malicious prosecution.
Aggrieved by the March 20, 2003 Decision, Sansio and Datuin appealed to
the CA, and the same is now pending resolution.
On January 31, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision on the certiorari case
granting the petition and ordering the dismissal of the damage suit of
Gregorio. The latter moved to reconsider the said Decision but the same
was denied in the appellate court’s Resolution dated September 12, 2007.
Hence, this petition.
The core issue to be resolved, as culled from the factual circumstances of
this case, is whether the complaint, a civil suit filed by Gregorio, is based
on quasi-delict or malicious prosecution.
It is the position of Sansio and Datuin that the complaint for damages filed
by Gregorio before the RTC was for malicious prosecution, but it failed to
allege the elements thereof, such that it was aptly dismissed on appeal by
the CA on the ground of lack of cause of action. In their comment, citing
Albenson Enterprise Corporation v. Court of Appeals,20 they posit that
Article 26 of the Civil Code, cited by Gregorio as one of the bases for her
complaint, and Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the same Code, mentioned by the
RTC as bases for sustaining the complaint, are the very same provisions
upon which malicious prosecution is grounded. And in order to further
57

buttress their position that Gregorio’s complaint was indeed one for
malicious prosecution, they even pointed out the fact that Gregorio
prayed for moral damages, which may be awarded only in case of
malicious prosecution or, if the case is for quasi-delict, only if physical
injury results therefrom.
We disagree.
A perusal of the allegations of Gregorio’s complaint for damages readily
shows that she filed a civil suit against Sansio and Datuin for filing against
her criminal charges for violation of B.P. Blg. 22; that respondents did not
exercise diligent efforts to ascertain the true identity of the person who
delivered to them insufficiently funded checks as payment for the various
appliances purchased; and that respondents never gave her the
opportunity to controvert the charges against her, because they stated an
incorrect address in the criminal complaint. Gregorio claimed damages
for the embarrassment and humiliation she suffered when she was
suddenly arrested at her city residence in Quezon City while visiting her
family. She was, at the time of her arrest, a respected Kagawad in Oas,
Albay. Gregorio anchored her civil complaint on Articles 26,21 2176,22 and
218023 of the Civil Code. Noticeably, despite alleging either fault or
negligence on the part of Sansio and Datuin, Gregorio never imputed to
them any bad faith in her complaint.
Basic is the legal principle that the nature of an action is determined by
the material averments in the complaint and the character of the relief
sought.24 Undeniably, Gregorio’s civil complaint, read in its entirety, is a
complaint based on quasi-delict under Article 2176, in relation to Article
26 of the Civil Code, rather than on malicious prosecution.
In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff
has to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by
him; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person to
whose act he must respond; (3) the connection of cause and effect
between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred; and (4) that
there must be no preexisting contractual relation between the parties.25
On the other hand, Article 26 of the Civil Code grants a cause of action for
damages, prevention, and other relief in cases of breach, though not
necessarily constituting a criminal offense, of the following rights: (1)
right to personal dignity; (2) right to personal security; (3) right to family
Persons and Family Relations Cases
relations; (4) right to social intercourse; (5) right to privacy; and (6) right
to peace of mind.26
A scrutiny of Gregorio’s civil complaint reveals that the averments
thereof, taken together, fulfill the elements of Article 2176, in relation to
Article 26 of the Civil Code. It appears that Gregorio’s rights to personal
dignity, personal security, privacy, and peace of mind were infringed by
Sansio and Datuin when they failed to exercise the requisite diligence in
determining the identity of the person they should rightfully accuse of
tendering insufficiently funded checks. This fault was compounded when
they failed to ascertain the correct address of petitioner, thus depriving
her of the opportunity to controvert the charges, because she was not
given proper notice. Because she was not able to refute the charges
against her, petitioner was falsely indicted for three (3) counts of violation
of B.P. Blg. 22. Although she was never found at No. 76 Peñaranda St.,
Legaspi City, the office address of Alvi Marketing as stated in the criminal
complaint, Gregorio was conveniently arrested by armed operatives of
the PARAC-DILG at her city residence at 78 K-2 St., Kamuning, Quezon
City, while visiting her family. She suffered embarrassment and
humiliation over her sudden arrest and detention and she had to spend
time, effort, and money to clear her tarnished name and reputation,
considering that she had held several honorable positions in different
organizations and offices in the public service, particularly her being a
Kagawad in Oas, Albay at the time of her arrest. There exists no
contractual relation between Gregorio and Sansio. On the other hand,
Gregorio is prosecuting Sansio, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, for
its vicarious liability, as employer, arising from the act or omission of its
employee Datuin.
These allegations, assuming them to be true, sufficiently constituted a
cause of action against Sansio and Datuin. Thus, the RTC was correct when
it denied respondents’ motion to dismiss.
Sansio and Datuin are in error when they insist that Gregorio’s complaint
is based on malicious prosecution. In an action to recover damages for
malicious prosecution, it must be alleged and established that Sansio and
Datuin were impelled by legal malice or bad faith in deliberately initiating
an action against Gregorio, knowing that the charges were false and
groundless, intending to vex and humiliate her.27 As previously
mentioned, Gregorio did not allege this in her complaint. Moreover, the
fact that she prayed for moral damages did not change the nature of her
58
 Persons and Family Relations Cases

action based on quasi-delict. She might have acted on the mistaken notion
that she was entitled to moral damages, considering that she suffered
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation on
account of her indictment and her sudden arrest.
Verily, Gregorio was only acting within her right when she instituted
against Sansio and Datuin an action she perceived to be proper, given the
factual antecedents of the case.
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 31,

2007 and the Resolution dated September 12, 2007 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Costs against respondents.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in

consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

59
 Persons and Family Relations Cases

Republic of the Philippines ’s sale of electr icity to the NPC from 1 January 2005 to 31 October 2005
SUPREME COURT was declared to be entitled to the benefit of effectively zero-rated value
Manila added tax (VAT).7

FIRST DIVISION Petitioner filed its administrative claims for the issuance of tax credit
certificates for its alleged unutilized input taxes on its purchase of capital
G.R. Nos. 198729-30 January 15, 2014 goods and alleged unutilized input taxes on its local purchases and/or
importation of goods and services, other than capital goods, pursuant to
CBK POWER COMPANY LIMITED, Petitioner, Sections 112(A) and (B) of the NIRC of 1997, as amended, with BIR
vs. Revenue District Office (RDO) No. 55 of Laguna, as follows:8
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
Period Covered Date Of Filing
DECISION
1st quarter of 2005 30-Jun-05
SERENO, CJ: 2nd quarter of 2005 15-Sep-05

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure filed by CBK Power Company Limited
(petitioner). The Petition assails the Decision2 dated 27 June 2011 and
Resolution3 dated 16 September 2011 of the Court of Tax Appeals En
Banc (CTA En Banc in C.T.A. EB Nos. 658 and 659. The assailed Decision
and Resolution reversed and set aside the Decision4 dated 3 March 2010
and Resolution5 dated 6 July 2010 rendered by the CTA Special Second
Division in C.T.A. Case No. 7621, which partly granted the claim of
petitioner for the issuance of a tax credit certificate representing the
latter's alleged unutilized input taxes on local purchases of goods and
services attributable to effectively zero-rated sales to National Power
Corporation (NPC) for the second and third quarters of 2005.
The Facts
3rd quarter of 2005 28-Oct-05
Alleging inaction of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR),
petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the CTA on 18 April 2007.
THE CTA SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION RULING
After trial on the merits, the CTA Special Second Division rendered a
Decision on 3 March 2010. Applying Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Mirant Pagbilao Corporation (Mirant),9 the court
a quo ruled that petitioner had until the following dates within which to
file both administrative and judicial claims:

Petitioner is engaged, among others, in the operation, maintenance, and Taxable Quarter Last Day to
management of the Kalayaan II pumped-storage hydroelectric power File Claim for
2005 Close of the quarter Refund
plant, the new Caliraya Spillway, Caliraya, Botocan; and the Kalayaan I
hydroelectric power plants and their related facilities located in the 1st quarter 31-Mar-05 31-Mar-07
Province of Laguna.6
2nd quarter 30-Jun-05 30-Jun-07
On 29 December 2004, petitioner filed an Application for VAT Zero-Rate 3rd quarter 30-Sep-05 30-Sep-07
with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) in accordance with Section
108(B)(3) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1997, as
amended. The application was duly approved by the BIR. Thus, petitioner
60

Accordingly, petitioner timely filed its administrative claims for the three
quarters of 2005. However, considering that the judicial claim was filed
on 18 April 2007, the CTA Division denied the claim for the first quarter
of 2005 for having been filed out of time.
After an evaluation of petitioner’s claim for the second and third quarters
of 2005, the court a quo partly granted the claim and ordered the issuance
of a tax credit certificate in favor of petitioner in the reduced amount of
₱27,170,123.36.
The parties filed their respective Motions for Partial Reconsideration,
which were both denied by the CTA Division.
THE CTA EN BANC RULING
On appeal, relying on Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Aichi Forging
Company of Asia, Inc. (Aichi),10 the CTA En Banc ruled that petitioner’s
judicial claim for the first, second, and third quarters of 2005 were
belatedly filed.
The CTA Special Second Division Decision and Resolution were reversed
and set aside, and the Petition for Review filed in CTA Case No. 7621 was
dismissed. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied
for lack of merit.
Hence, this Petition.ISSUE
Petitioner’s assigned errors boil down to the principal issue of the
applicable prescriptive period on its claim for refund of unutilized input
VAT for the first to third quarters of 2005.11
THE COURT’S RULING
The pertinent provision of the NIRC at the time when petitioner filed its
claim for refund provides:
SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax. –
(A) Zero-rated or Effectively Zero-rated Sales. - Any VAT-
registered person, whose sales are zero-rated or effectively zero-
Persons and Family Relations Cases
rated may, within two (2) years after the close of the taxable
quarter when the sales were made, apply for the issuance of a tax
credit certificate or refund of creditable input tax due or paid
attributable to such sales, except transitional input tax, to the
extent that such input tax has not been applied against output tax:
Provided, however, That in the case of zero-rated sales under
Section 106(A)(2)(a)(1),(2) and (B) and Section 108 (B)(1) and
(2), the acceptable foreign currency exchange proceeds thereof
had been duly accounted for in accordance with the rules and
regulations of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP): Provided,
further, That where the taxpayer is engaged in zero-rated or
effectively zero-rated sale and also in taxable or exempt sale of
goods or properties or services, and the amount of creditable
input tax due or paid cannot be directly and entirely attributed to
any one of the transactions, it shall be allocated proportionately
on the basis of the volume of sales.
xxxx
(D) Period within which Refund or Tax Credit of Input Taxes shall
be Made. - In proper cases, the Commissioner shall grant a refund
or issue the tax credit certificate for creditable input taxes within
one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of submission of
complete documents in support of the application filed in
accordance with Subsections (A) and (B) hereof.
In case of full or partial denial of the claim for tax refund or tax credit, or
the failure on the part of the Commissioner to act on the application
within the period prescribed above, the taxpayer affected may, within
thirty (30) days from the receipt of the decision denying the claim or after
the expiration of the one hundred twenty day-period, appeal the decision
or the unacted claim with the Court of Tax Appeals.
Petitioner’s sales to NPC are effectively zero-rated
As aptly ruled by the CTA Special Second Division, petitioner’s sales to
NPC are effectively subject to zero percent (0%) VAT. The NPC is an entity
with a special charter, which categorically exempts it from the payment
of any tax, whether direct or indirect, including VAT. Thus, services
rendered to NPC by a VAT-registered entity are effectively zero-rated. In
fact, the BIR itself approved the application for zero-rating on 29
61

December 2004, filed by petitioner for its sales to NPC covering January
to October 2005.12 As a consequence, petitioner claims for the refund of
the alleged excess input tax attributable to its effectively zero-rated sales
to NPC.
In Panasonic Communications Imaging Corporation of the Philippines v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue,13 this Court ruled:
Under the 1997 NIRC, if at the end of a taxable quarter the seller charges
output taxes equal to the input taxes that his suppliers passed on to him,
no payment is required of him. It is when his output taxes exceed his input
taxes that he has to pay the excess to the BIR. If the input taxes exceed the
output taxes, however, the excess payment shall be carried over to the
succeeding quarter or quarters. Should the input taxes result from zero-
rated or effectively zero-rated transactions or from the acquisition of
capital goods, any excess over the output taxes shall instead be refunded
to the taxpayer.
The crux of the controversy arose from the proper application of the
prescriptive periods set forth in Section 112 of the NIRC of 1997, as
amended, and the interpretation of the applicable jurisprudence.
Although the ponente in this case expressed a different view on the
mandatory application of the 120+30 day period as prescribed in Section
112, with the finality of the Court’s pronouncement on the consolidated
tax cases Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power
Corporation, Taganito Mining Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, and Philex Mining Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue14 (hereby collectively referred as San Roque), we are
constrained to apply the dispositions therein to the facts herein which are
similar.
Administrative Claim
Section 112(A) provides that after the close of the taxable quarter when
the sales were made, there is a two-year prescriptive period within which
a VAT-registered person whose sales are zero-rated or effectively zero-
rated may apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of
creditable input tax.
Persons and Family Relations Cases
Our VAT Law provides for a mechanism that would allow VAT-registered
persons to recover the excess input taxes over the output taxes they had
paid in relation to their sales. For the refund or credit of excess or
unutilized input tax, Section 112 is the governing law. Given the
distinctive nature of creditable input tax, the law under Section 112 (A)
provides for a different reckoning point for the two-year prescriptive
period, specifically for the refund or credit of that tax only.
We agree with petitioner that Mirant was not yet in existence when their
administrative claim was filed in 2005; thus, it should not retroactively be
applied to the instant case.
However, the fact remains that Section 112 is the controlling provision for
the refund or credit of input tax during the time that petitioner filed its
claim with which they ought to comply. It must be emphasized that the
Court merely clarified in Mirant that Sections 204 and 229, which
prescribed a different starting point for the two-year prescriptive limit for
filing a claim for a refund or credit of excess input tax, were not applicable.
Input tax is neither an erroneously paid nor an illegally collected internal
revenue tax.15
Section 112(A) is clear that for VAT-registered persons whose sales are
zero-rated or effectively zero-rated, a claim for the refund or credit of
creditable input tax that is due or paid, and that is attributable to zero-
rated or effectively zero-rated sales, must be filed within two years after
the close of the taxable quarter when such sales were made. The
reckoning frame would always be the end of the quarter when the
pertinent sale or transactions were made, regardless of when the input
VAT was paid.16
Pursuant to Section 112(A), petitioner’s administrative claims were filed
well within the two-year period from the close of the taxable quarter
when the effectively zero-rated sales were made, to wit:
Period Close of the Last day to File Date of Filing
Covered Taxable Administrative
Quarter Claim
62
 Persons and Family Relations Cases

1st 31-Mar-05 31-Mar-07 30-Jun-05 Mindanao I Geothermal Partnership v. Commissioner of Internal

quarter Revenue,17 this Court has ruled thus:
2005
Notwithstanding a strict construction of any claim for tax exemption or
refund, the Court in San Roque recognized that BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03
2nd 30-Jun-05 30-Jun-07 15-Sep-05 constitutes equitable estoppel in favor of taxpayers. BIR Ruling No. DA-
quarter 489-03 expressly states that the "taxpayer-claimant need not wait for the
2005 lapse of the 120-day period before it could seek judicial relief with the
CTA by way of Petition for Review." This Court discussed BIR Ruling No.
DA-489-03 and its effect on taxpayers, thus:
3rd 30-Sep-05 30-Sep-07 28-Oct-05
quarter Taxpayers should not be prejudiced by an erroneous interpretation by the
2005 Commissioner, particularly on a difficult question of law. The
abandonment of the Atlas doctrine by Mirant and Aichi is proof that the
reckoning of the prescriptive periods for input VAT tax refund or credit is
a difficult question of law. The abandonment of the Atlas doctrine did not
Judicial Claim result in Atlas, or other taxpayers similarly situated, being made to return
the tax refund or credit they received or could have received under Atlas
Section 112(D) further provides that the CIR has to decide on an prior to its abandonment. This Court is applying Mirant and Aichi
administrative claim within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date prospectively. Absent fraud, bad faith or misrepresentation, the reversal
of submission of complete documents in support thereof. by this Court of a general interpretative rule issued by the Commissioner,
like the reversal of a specific BIR ruling under Section 246, should also
Bearing in mind that the burden to prove entitlement to a tax refund is on apply prospectively. x x x.
the taxpayer, it is presumed that in order to discharge its burden,
petitioner had attached complete supporting documents necessary to xxxx
prove its entitlement to a refund in its application, absent any evidence to
the contrary. Thus, the only issue is whether BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 is a general
interpretative rule applicable to all taxpayers or a specific ruling
Thereafter, the taxpayer affected by the CIR’s decision or inaction may applicable only to a particular taxpayer. BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 is a
appeal to the CTA within 30 days from the receipt of the decision or from general interpretative rule because it was a response to a query made, not
the expiration of the 120-day period within which the claim has not been by a particular taxpayer, but by a government agency asked with
acted upon. processing tax refunds and credits, that is, the One Stop Shop Inter-
Agency Tax Credit and Drawback Center of the Department of Finance.
Considering further that the 30-day period to appeal to the CTA is This government agency is also the addressee, or the entity responded to,
dependent on the 120-day period, compliance with both periods is in BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03. Thus, while this government agency
jurisdictional. The period of 120 days is a prerequisite for the mentions in its query to the Commissioner the administrative claim of
commencement of the 30-day period to appeal to the CTA. Lazi Bay Resources Development, Inc., the agency was in fact asking the
Commissioner what to do in cases like the tax claim of Lazi Bay Resources
Prescinding from San Roque in the consolidated case Mindanao II Development, Inc., where the taxpayer did not wait for the lapse of the
Geothermal Partnership v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue and 120-day period.

63
 Persons and Family Relations Cases

Clearly, BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 is a general interpretative rule.1âwphi1 the sales attributable to the input VAT were made following the Mirant
Thus, all taxpayers can rely on BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 from the time of and Aichi doctrines, Philex’s judicial claim was indisputably filed late.
its issuance on 10 December 2003 up to its reversal by this Court in Aichi
on 6 October 2010, where this Court held that the 120+30 day periods are The Atlas doctrine cannot save Philex from the late filing of its judicial
mandatory and jurisdictional. (Emphasis supplied) claim. The inaction of the Commissioner on Philex’s claim during the 120-
day period is, by express provision of law, "deemed a denial" of Philex’s
In applying the foregoing to the instant case, we consider the following claim. Philex had 30 days from the expiration of the 120-day period to file
pertinent dates: its judicial claim with the CTA. Philex’s failure to do so rendered the
"deemed a denial" decision of the Commissioner final and inappealable.
1âwphi1 The right to appeal to the CTA from a decision or "deemed a denial"
decision of the Commissioner is merely a statutory privilege, not a
Period Administrative Expiration of Last day to Judicial Claim
constitutional right. The exercise of such statutory privilege requires
Covered Claim Filed 120-days file Judicial Filed
Claim strict compliance with the conditions attached by the statute for its
exercise. Philex failed to comply with the statutory conditions and must
1st quarter 30-Jun-05 28-Oct-05 27-Nov-05 18-Apr-07 thus bear the consequences. (Emphases in the original)
2005
Likewise, while petitioner filed its administrative and judicial claims
2nd quarter 15-Sep-05 13-Jan-06 13-Feb-06
during the period of applicability of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03, it cannot
2005
claim the benefit of the exception period as it did not file its judicial claim
3rd quarter 28-Oct-05 26-Feb-06 28-Mar-06 prematurely, but did so long after the lapse of the 30-day period following
2005 the expiration of the 120-day period. Again, BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03
allowed premature filing of a judicial claim, which means non-exhaustion
of the 120-day period for the Commissioner to act on an administrative
It must be emphasized that this is not a case of premature filing of a
claim,19 but not its late filing.
judicial claim. Although petitioner did not file its judicial claim with the
CTA prior to the expiration of the 120-day waiting period, it failed to
As this Court enunciated in San Roque , petitioner cannot rely on Atlas
observe the 30-day prescriptive period to appeal to the CTA counted from
either, since the latter case was promulgated only on 8 June 2007.
the lapse of the 120-day period.
Moreover, the doctrine in Atlas which reckons the two-year period from
the date of filing of the return and payment of the tax, does not interpret
Petitioner is similarly situated as Philex in the same case, San Roque,18 in
− expressly or impliedly − the 120+30 day periods.20 Simply stated, Atlas
which this Court ruled:
referred only to the reckoning of the prescriptive period for filing an
administrative claim.
Unlike San Roque and Taganito, Philex’s case is not one of premature filing
but of late filing. Philex did not file any petition with the CTA within the
For failure of petitioner to comply with the 120+30 day mandatory and
120-day period. Philex did not also file any petition with the CTA within
jurisdictional period, petitioner lost its right to claim a refund or credit of
30 days after the expiration of the 120-day period. Philex filed its judicial
its alleged excess input VAT.
claim long after the expiration of the 120-day period, in fact 426 days after
the lapse of the 120-day period. In any event, whether governed by
With regard to petitioner’s argument that Aichi should not be applied
jurisprudence before, during, or after the Atlas case, Philex’s judicial claim
retroactively, we reiterate that even without that ruling, the law is explicit
will have to be rejected because of late filing. Whether the two-year
on the mandatory and jurisdictional nature of the 120+30 day period.
prescriptive period is counted from the date of payment of the output VAT
following the Atlas doctrine, or from the close of the taxable quarter when
64
 Persons and Family Relations Cases

Also devoid of merit is the applicability of the principle of solutio indebiti WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED.
to the present case. According to this principle, if something is received
when there is no right to demand it, and it was unduly delivered through SO ORDERED.
mistake, the obligation to return it arises. In that situation, a creditor-
debtor relationship is created under a quasi-contract, whereby the payor MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
becomes the creditor who then has the right to demand the return of Chief Justice, Chairperson
payment made by mistake, and the person who has no right to receive the
payment becomes obligated to return it.21 The quasi-contract of solutio WE CONCUR:
indebiti is based on the ancient principle that no one shall enrich oneself
unjustly at the expense of another.22 TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
There is solutio indebiti when:
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
(1) Payment is made when there exists no binding relation
Associate Justice Associate Justice
between the payor, who has no duty to pay, and the person who
received the payment; and
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
(2) Payment is made through mistake, and not through liberality Associate Justice
or some other cause.23
CERTIFICATION
Though the principle of solutio indebiti may be applicable to some
instances of claims for a refund, the elements thereof are wanting in this Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
case. conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
First, there exists a binding relation between petitioner and the CIR, the Division.
former being a taxpayer obligated to pay VAT.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Second, the payment of input tax was not made through mistake, since Chief Justice
petitioner was legally obligated to pay for that liability. The entitlement
to a refund or credit of excess input tax is solely based on the distinctive
nature of the VAT system. At the time of payment of the input VAT, the
amount paid was correct and proper.24

Finally, equity, which has been aptly described as "a justice outside
legality," is applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law
or judicial rules of procedure.25 Section 112 is a positive rule that should
preempt and prevail over all abstract arguments based only on equity.
Well-settled is the rule that tax refunds or credits, just like tax exemptions,
are strictly construed against the taxpayer.26 The burden is on the
taxpayer to show strict compliance with the conditions for the grant of the
tax refund or credit.27
65

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. NOS. 147925-26 : June 8, 2009
ELPIDIO S. UY, doing business under the name and style EDISON
DEVELOPMENT & CONSTRUCTION, Petitioner, v. PUBLIC ESTATES
AUTHORITY and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Petitioner Elpidio S. Uy (Uy) appeals by certiorari the Joint Decision1
dated September 25, 2000 and the Joint Resolution2 dated April 25, 2001
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in the consolidated cases CA-G.R. SP Nos.
59308 and 59849.
Respondent Public Estates Authority (PEA) was designated as project
manager by the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA),
primarily tasked to develop its 105-hectare demilitarized lot in Fort
Bonifacio, Taguig City into a first-class memorial park to be known as
Heritage Park. PEA then engaged the services of Makati Development
Corporation (MDC) to undertake the horizontal works on the project; and
Uy, doing business under the name and style Edison Development and
Construction (EDC), to do the landscaping.
For a contract price of Three Hundred Fifty-Five Million Eighty Thousand
One Hundred Forty-One and 15/100 Pesos (P355,080,141.15), PEA and
EDC signed the Landscaping and Construction Agreement3 on November
20, 1996. EDC undertook to complete the landscaping works in four
hundred fifty (450) days commencing on the date of receipt of the notice
to proceed.
EDC received the notice to proceed on December 3, 1996;4 and three (3)
days after, or on December 6, 1996,5 it commenced the mobilization of the
equipment and manpower needed for the project. PEA, however, could
not deliver any work area to EDC because the horizontal works of MDC
Persons and Family Relations Cases
were still ongoing. EDC commenced the landscaping works only on
January 7, 1997 when PEA finally made an initial delivery of a work area.
PEA continuously incurred delay in the turnover of work areas.
Resultantly, the contract period of 450 days was extended to 693 days.
PEA also failed to turn over the entire 105-hectare work area due to the
presence of squatters. Thus, on March 15, 1999, the PEA Project
Management Office (PEA-PMO) issued Change Order No. 2-LC,6 excluding
from the contract the 45-square-meter portion of the park occupied by
squatters.
In view of the delay in the delivery of work area, EDC claimed additional
cost from the PEA-PMO amounting to P181,338,056.30. Specifically, Uy
alleged that he incurred additional rental costs for the equipment, which
were kept on standby, and labor costs for the idle manpower. He added
that the delay by PEA caused the topsoil at the original supplier to be
depleted; thus, he was compelled to obtain the topsoil from a farther
source, thereby incurring extra costs. He also claims that he had to
mobilize water trucks for the plants and trees which had already been
delivered to the site. Furthermore, it became necessary to construct a
nursery shade to protect and preserve the young plants and trees prior to
actual transplanting to the landscaped area. The PEA-PMO evaluated the
EDC's claim and arrived at a lesser amount of P146,484,910.7 The
evaluation of PEA-PMO was then referred to the Heritage Park Executive
Committee (ExCom) for approval.
On November 12, 1999, the Performance Audit Committee (PAC)
reviewed the progress report submitted by the works engineer and noted
that the EDC's landscaping works were behind schedule by twenty
percent (20%). The PAC considered this delay unreasonable and
intolerable, and immediately recommended to BCDA the termination of
the landscaping contract.8 The BCDA adopted PAC's recommendation and
demanded from PEA the termination of the contract with EDC. In
compliance, PEA terminated the agreement on November 29, 1999.
PEA fully paid all the progress billings up to August 26, 1999, but it did
not heed EDC's additional claims. Consequently, Uy filed a Complaint9
with the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC), docketed
as CIAC Case No. 02-2000.
66

On May 16, 2000, the CIAC rendered a Decision,10 the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the [Petitioner]
Contractor ELPIDIO S. UY and Award is hereby made on its monetary
claims as follows:
Respondent PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY is directed to pay the
[petitioner] the following amounts:
P19,604,132.06 - - - for the cost of idle time of equipment.
2,275,721.00 - - - for the cost of idled manpower.
- - - for the construction of the nursery shade net
6,050,165.05
area.
605,016.50 - - - for attorney's fees.
Interest on the amount of P6,050,165.05 as cost for the construction of
the nursery shade net area shall be paid at the rate of 6% per annum from
the date the Complaint was filed on 12 January 2000. Interest on the total
amount of P21,879,853.06 for the cost of idled manpower and
equipment shall be paid at the same rate of 6% per annum from the date
this Decision is promulgated. After finality of this Decision, interest at the
rate of 12% per annum shall be paid on the total of these 3 awards
amounting to P27,930,018.11 until full payment of the awarded amount
shall have been made, "this interim period being deemed to be at that time
already a forbearance of credit" (Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, et al., 243 SCRA 78 [1994]; Keng Hua Paper Products Co., Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, 286 SCRA 257 [1998]; Crismina Garments, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 128721, March 9, 1999).
SO ORDERED.11
Uy received the CIAC decision on June 7, 2000. On June 16, 2000, Uy filed
a motion for correction of computation,12 followed by an amended motion
for correction of computation,13 on July 21, 2000. The CIAC, however,
failed to resolve Uy's motion and amended motion within the 30-day
period as provided in its rules, and Uy considered it as denial of the
motion.
Persons and Family Relations Cases
Hence, on July 24, 2000, Uy filed a Petition for Review 14 with the CA,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 59849. Uy's petition was consolidated with CA-
G.R. SP No. 59308, the earlier petition filed by PEA, assailing the same
CIAC decision.
On August 1, 2000, the CIAC issued an Order15 denying Uy's motion for
correction of computation.
On September 25, 2000, the CA rendered the now assailed Joint Decision
dismissing both petitions on both technical and substantive grounds.
PEA's petition was dismissed because the verification thereof was
defective. Uy's petition, on the other hand, was dismissed upon a finding
that it was belatedly filed. Further, the CA found no sufficient basis to
warrant the reversal of the CIAC ruling, which it held is based on clear
provisions of the contract, the evidence on record and relevant law and
jurisprudence.
The CA disposed thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions in CA-G.R. SP No. 59308,
entitled "Public Estates Authority v. Elpidio S. Uy, doing business under
the name and style of Edison [D]evelopment & Construction," and CA-
G.R. SP No. 59849, "Elpidio S. Uy, doing business under the name and
style of Edison [D]evelopment & Construction v. Public Estates
Authority," are both hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and accordingly
DISMISSED, for lack of merit.
Consequently, the Award/Decision issued by the Construction Industry
Arbitration Commission on May 16, 2000 in CIAC Case No. 02-2000,
entitled "Elpidio S. Uy, doing business under the name and style of
Edison [D]evelopment & Construction v. Public Estates Authority," is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.16
PEA and Uy filed motions for reconsideration. Subsequently, PEA filed
with the CA an Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction,17 seeking to enjoin the CIAC
from proceeding with CIAC Case No. 03-2001, which Uy had subsequently
67

filed. PEA alleged that the case involved claims arising from the same
Landscaping and Construction Agreement, subject of the cases pending
with the CA.
On April 25, 2001, the CA issued the assailed Joint Resolution, thus:
WHEREFORE, the present Motion/s for Reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No.
59308 and CA-G.R. SP No. 59849 are hereby both DENIED, for lack of
merit.
Accordingly, let an injunction issue permanently enjoining the
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission from proceeding with
CIAC CASE NO. 03-2001, entitled ELPIDIO S. UY, doing business under
the name and style of EDISON DEVELOPMENT &
CONSTRUCTION v. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and/or HONORABLE
CARLOS P. DOBLE.
SO ORDERED.18
PEA and Uy then came to us with their respective petitions for review
assailing the CA ruling. PEA's petition was docketed as G.R. NOS. 147933-
34, while that of Uy was docketed as G.R. NOS. 147925-26. The petitions,
however, were not consolidated.
On December 12, 2001, this Court resolved G.R. NOS. 147933-34 in this
wise:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review is DENIED.
The Motion to Consolidate this petition with G.R. No. 147925-26 is also
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.19
Thus, what remains for us to resolve is Uy's petition, raising the following
issues:
I Section 9. Motion for Reconsideration. - As a matter of policy, no motion
Persons and Family Relations Cases
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS HAS DEPARTED
FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
IN DISMISSING PETITIONER UY'S PETITION IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 59849 ON
THE ALLEGED GROUND OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE
REGLEMENTARY PERIOD IN FILING AN APPEAL
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS, IN
AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE CIAC ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL INSOFAR
AS IT DENIED CERTAIN CLAIMS OF PETITIONER UY, HAS DECIDED A
QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND THE
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE COURT
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ACTED
WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
WHEN IT ENJOINED THE PROCEEDINGS IN CIAC CASE NO. 03-2001 IN
ITS JOINT RESOLUTION DATED 25 APRIL 2000, WHICH CASE IS TOTALLY
DIFFERENT FROM THE CASE A QUO20
We will deal first with the procedural issue.
Appeals from judgment of the CIAC shall be taken to the CA by filing a
Petition for Review within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice
of award, judgment, final order or resolution, or from the date of its last
publication if publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the
denial of petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed in
accordance with the governing law of the court or agency a quo.21
Admittedly, Uy received the CIAC decision on June 7, 2000; that instead of
filing a verified Petition for Review with the CA, Uy filed a motion for
correction of computation on June 16, 2000, pursuant to Section 9, Article
XV of the Rules of Procedure Governing Construction Arbitration:
for reconsideration shall be allowed. Any of the parties may, however, file
a motion for correction within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the award
upon any of the following grounds:
68
 Persons and Family Relations Cases

A. An evident miscalculation of figures, a typographical or arithmetical For : Mr. Jaime R. Millan

error; Project Manager
Heritage Park Project
b. An evident mistake in the description of any party, person, date,
amount, thing or property referred to in the award. Subject: EDC's Various Claim
Landscape Development Works
The filing of the motion for correction shall interrupt the running of the
period for appeal. Revision shall be made on our evaluation dated 28 December 1999
concerning various claims of contractor EDC-Landscape Development
With the filing of the motion for correction, the running of the period to Works (Package IV), particularly on the claim on Project Equipment on
appeal was effectively interrupted. Standby (item a of the earlier evaluation).

CIAC was supposed to resolve the motion for correction of computation Reference to item 4 of the Terms and Conditions of 1998 ACEL Rate
within 30 days from the time the comment or opposition thereto was Equipment Guidebook, the CMO inadvertently did not consider are the
submitted. In Uy's case, no resolution was issued despite the lapse of the wages and salaries of standby operator/driver corresponding to the
30-day period, and Uy considered it as a denial of his motion. Accordingly, equipment standby being claimed.
he elevated his case to the CA on July 24, 2000. But not long thereafter, or
on August 1, 2000, the CIAC issued an Order22 denying the motion for Thus, the corresponding gross amount to be incorporated shall be
correction of computation. P4,925,600.00 computed based on the total man-months of each standby
equipment being claimed.
Obviously, when Uy filed his Petition for Review with the CA, the period
to appeal had not yet lapsed; it was interrupted by the pendency of his A tabulation of the claims is shown hereinbelow:
motion for computation. There is no basis, therefore, to conclude that the
petition was belatedly filed. Works Engineer PMO
Nature of Claim EDC Claim
Evaluation Evaluation
The foregoing notwithstanding, inasmuch as the CA resolved the petition a. Project P95,740,834.30 67,422,840.40 81,851,396.08
on the merits, we now confront the substantive issue - the propriety of the Equipment
CA's affirmance of the CIAC decision. on Standby
Equipment 4,925,600.00
Uy cries foul on the award granted by CIAC, and affirmed by the CA. He Operator/Driver
posits that PEA already admitted its liability, pegged at P146,484,910.10,
b. Manpower on 28,165,022.00 2,275,721.00 2,275,721.00
in its memorandum dated January 6, 2000. Thus, he faults the CA for
Standby
awarding a lesser amount.
c. Topsoil Add l 37,780,200.00 37,780,200.00 37,780,200.00
Hauling
We meticulously reviewed the records before us and failed to discern any
Distance
admission of liability on the part of PEA.
d. Water Truck 19,652,000.00 15,467,800.00 19,652,000.00
The PEA-PMO evaluation dated January 6, 2000,23 where PEA allegedly Operating Cost
admitted its liability, reads in full:
Total P181,338,056.30 122,946,561.40 146,484,917.[08]
MEMORANDUM
69

Further, it is being specified that the PMO maintains the earlier notes of
the CMO in its memo of 18 October 1999 and that legal interpretations on
each item of claims is likewise enjoined.
Attached are pertinent documents for your review and reference
(Sgd.) (Sgd.)
ROGELIO H. IGNACIO FLORO C. URCIA
PMO-B Asst. Project Manager
By no stretch of the imagination can we consider this memorandum an
admission of liability on the part of PEA. First, nowhere in the
memorandum does it say that PEA is admitting its liability. The evaluation
contained in the above memorandum is merely a verification of the
accuracy of EDC's claims. As a matter of fact, the evaluation is still subject
for review by the project manager, whose decision on the matter requires
the approval of the Heritage Park ExCom. Second, Messrs. Ignacio and
Urcia had no legal authority to make admissions on behalf of PEA. Thus,
even assuming that the evaluation contained in the memorandum was in
the nature of an admission, the same cannot bind PEA. Third, Uy filed his
complaint with the CIAC because PEA did not act on EDC's various claims.
This supports our conclusion that PEA never admitted, but on the
contrary denied, whatever additional liabilities were claimed by Uy under
the landscaping contract.
Neither do we find any admission of liability on the part of PEA during the
proceedings before the CIAC. What was admitted by PEA was that PMO
evaluated the claim at the lesser amount of P146,484,910 (Exh. "S").24 The
admission of the evaluation made by PEA cannot translate to an
admission of liability. There is simply no basis for Uy to claim that PEA
had admitted its liability.
This issue disposed of, we now resolve Uy's claims on the basis of the
evidence presented.
Uy claims P95,740,834.30 as the standby equipment cost. CIAC, however,
did not agree and granted only P19,604,132.06 as the cost of standby
equipment using its so-called equitable method:
Persons and Family Relations Cases
[Uy] had mobilized manpower and equipment sufficient to do the
landscaping works for the entire 105 hectares. The unilateral reduction in
scope of work made by [PEA] thus laid idle the men and equipment of [Uy]
in direct proportion to said reduction. In effect, therefore, Uy had on hand
manpower and equipment amounting to 42.85% in excess of that
necessary to perform the landscaping works for the reduced scope of
work. [Uy] thus suffered costs in terms of excess manpower and
equipment in proportion to the reduced scope of work.
xxx
The total contract period - original extensions - to complete the
landscaping works for the entire 105 hectares is 693 days. The reduction
in scope of work 42.85% laid idle his equipment by the same percentage
of 42.85[%] or 296.95 days. Since [Uy] calculated his claim for idled
equipment on a per month basis, it is necessary to convert this into
months. 296.95 days is equivalent of 9.89 months. Multiplied by the rate
of P1,982,217.60 per month of delay, this would translate to
P19,604,132.06 as the cost of idle time for equipment by reason of the
[delay].25
Upon review of the records before us, we find a need to modify, by
increasing, the award for standby equipment cost.
CIAC found that PEA incurred delays in the turnover of work areas:
The first delay was the turn-over of a portion of Area 1 A that was made
on 17 April 1997. The start of work on that area was scheduled for March,
1997. There was, therefore, a delay of about one month. The second delay
was the turn-over of a portion of Area 2 A that was made on 20 October
1997. The start of work on that area was scheduled for May, 1997. There
was, therefore, a delay of about five months. The third delay was the turn-
over of a portion of Area 2 B that was made on 05 March 1998. The start
of work on that area was scheduled for mid-February 1997. There was,
therefore, a delay of more than one (1) year. Altogether,
the several periods of delayed turn-over of work areas total one year and
six months or 546 days.26
Surely, on the days that EDC was waiting for the turn over of additional
work areas, it was paying rentals for the equipment on standby. Yet, CIAC
70

completely ignored these delays in determining the cost of equipment on
standby, reasoning that:
It must be pointed out, however, that the division of the vast area to be
landscaped into distinct work areas with different start of work schedules
under the PERT-CPM, [Uy] could easily have shifted his equipment from
an area where the delivery was delayed to the area where there was an
advanced turn-over.27
This is wrong.
Records establish that EDC promptly commenced the landscaping work
on every area that was turned over. EDC, in fact, shifted its equipment
where there was an advance delivery, if only to minimize the additional
expenses incurred by reason of the long delays in the turnover of the other
work areas. Thus, in addition to the award of P19,604,132.06 for cost of
idle time for equipment by reason of the reduction of scope of work,
Uy is entitled to the cost of idle time for equipment by reason of the delay
incurred in the delivery of work areas.
The period of owner-caused delay was 546 days or 18.2 months. The rate
given by the Association of Carriers and Equipment Lessors (ACEL), Inc.,
and which was also used as basis by CIAC in granting the costs for
equipment on standby, was P1,982,271.60 per month of delay.
Considering that PEA was in delay for 564 days or 18.2 months, Uy is
entitled to an additional award of P36,076,360.32. Accordingly, he is
entitled to an aggregate amount of P55,680,492.38 for the equipment
rentals on standby.
As to the awards of P2,275,721.00, for the cost of idle manpower, and
P6,050,165.05, for the construction of the nursery shade net area, we find
no reason to disturb the same, as Uy never raised this issue in his petition.
Next, we resolve Uy's claims for costs for additional hauling distance of
topsoil and for mobilization of water truck.
The approved hauling cost of topsoil was only P12.00/kilometer or
P120.00 for the 10 kms original source. Uy, however, claims that due to
the delay in delivery of work areas, the original source became depleted;
hence, he was constrained to haul topsoil from another source located at
Persons and Family Relations Cases
a much farther distance of 40 kms. Uy insists that the exhaustion of topsoil
at the original source was solely attributable to the delay in the turnover
of the project site. Thus, he claims from PEA the increased cost of topsoil
amounting to P37,780,200.00.
Article 1724 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 1724. The contractor who undertakes to build a structure or any
other work for a stipulated price, in conformity with plans and
specifications agreed upon with the land-owner, can neither withdraw
from the contract nor demand an increase in the price on account of the
higher cost of labor or materials, save when there has been a change in
the plans and specifications, provided:
(1) Such change has been authorized by the proprietor in writing;
andcralawlibrary
(2) The additional price to be paid to the contractor has been determined
in writing by both parties.
By this article, a written authorization from the owner is required before
the contractor can validly recover his claim. The evident purpose of the
provision is to avoid litigation for added costs incurred by reason of
additions or changes in the original plan. Undoubtedly, it was adopted to
serve as a safeguard or a substantive condition precedent to recovery.28
This provision is echoed in the Landscaping Contract, viz.:
ARTICLE IX
CHANGE OF WORK
xxx
9.3. Under no circumstances shall PEA be held liable for the payment of
change of work undertaken without the written approval of the PEA
General Manager x x x.
ARTICLE X
EXTRA WORK
71

xxx
10.3. Under no circumstances shall PEA be held liable for the payment of
extra work undertaken without the written approval of the PEA General
Manager to perform the said work.29
Admittedly, EDC did not secure the required written approval of PEA's
general manager before obtaining the topsoil from a farther source. As
pointed out by the CIAC:
There is no change order authorizing payment for the increased cost upon
which this claim is based. There is, therefore, no legal right based upon
contract (the landscaping agreement or a change order) that would
impose such a liability upon [PEA]. In a lump sum contract, as that entered
into by the parties, the matter of how the contractor had made [a]
computation to arrive at [a] bid that he submits is completely irrelevant.
The contract amount of delivered topsoil is P780.00 per truckload of 5.5
cubic meters sourced from a distance of [10] km. or 100 [meters]. There
is nothing in Exhibit "L" or in the landscaping contract (Exhibit "A") that
would indicate an agreement of [PEA] to pay for the increase in hauling
cost if the source of topsoil exceeds 10 kilometers. Corollarily, there is also
nothing therein to show that [PEA] would also be entitled to decrease said
costs by paying less if the distance would have been less than 10
kilometers. Had there been such a counterpart provision, there might
have been more arguable claim for [Uy]. Unfortunately, no such provision
exists.30
In Powton Conglomerate, Inc. v. Agcolicol,31 we emphasized:
The written consent of the owner to the increased costs sought by the
respondent is not a mere formal requisite, but a vital precondition to the
validity of a subsequent contract authorizing a higher or additional
contract price. Moreover, the safeguards enshrined in the provisions of
Article 1724 are not only intended to obviate future misunderstandings
but also to give the parties a chance to decide whether to bind one's self
to or withdraw from a contract.
By proceeding to obtain topsoil up to a 40-kilometer radius without
written approval from the PEA general manager, Uy cannot claim the
additional cost he incurred.
Persons and Family Relations Cases
Uy further claims P19,625,000.00 for cost of mobilization of water trucks.
He asserts that PEA completely failed to provide the generator sets
necessary to undertake the watering and/or irrigation works for the
landscaping and construction activities.32
Uy, however, admitted that MDC had already installed a deep well in the
project site, and EDC used it in its landscaping and construction
activities.33 Under the contract, the operational costs of the deep well and
its appurtenant accessories, including the generator sets, shall be borne
by EDC:
The CONTRACTOR shall shoulder all cost of electricity, maintenance,
repairs, replacement of parts, when needed, and all costs of operation of
the deepwell/s, and its appurtenant accessories, i.e. generator sets, etc.
(which are already existing at the project site, constructed by another
Contractor) while such deepwell/s are being used by CONTRACTOR
herein for its landscaping and construction activities. These [deepwells]
shall be turned over to PEA by CONTRACTOR in good operating/usable
condition as when it was first used by CONTRACTOR.34
Thus, Uy cannot claim additional cost for providing generator sets.
Uy also attempts to justify his claim for cost of mobilization of water
trucks by alleging that the water from the deep well provided by MDC and
PEA was grossly insufficient to undertake the watering works for the
project; hence, he was constrained to mobilize water trucks to save the
plants from dying.
Indisputably, Uy mobilized water trucks for the landscaping projects and,
certainly, incurred additional costs. But like his claim for additional cost
of topsoil, such additional expenses were incurred without prior written
approval of PEA's general manager. Thus, he cannot claim payment for
such cost from PEA.
As aptly said by the CIAC:
Since [Uy] had presumably intended all along to charge [PEA] for the
water truck operating costs, considering the very substantial amount of
his claim, the prudence that he presumably has, as an experienced general
contractor of the highest triple A category, should have dictated that he
negotiate with the [PEA] for a change order or an extra work order before
72

continuing to spend the huge amounts that he claims to have spent. [Uy]
did just that in relation to his much smaller claim for the construction of
the nursery shade x x x. He, however, made no effort to negotiate with the
PEA for a similar change order or extra work order to safeguard his even
bigger additional costs to operate the water trucks. No explanation was
offered for such a mystifying differential treatment. He cannot, therefore,
pass on without any contractual basis, such additional costs to the [PEA].
Neither can we hold PEA liable based on solutio indebiti, the legal maxim
that no one should enrich itself at the expense of another. As we explained
in Powton Conglomerate, Inc. v. Agcolicol,35
the principle of unjust enrichment cannot be validly invoked by the
respondent who, through his own act or omission, took the risk of being
denied payment for additional costs by not giving the petitioners prior
notice of such costs and/or by not securing their written consent thereto,
as required by law and their contract.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl
lαω lιbrαrÿ
Uy cannot, therefore, claim from PEA the costs of the additional hauling
distance of topsoil, and of the mobilization of water trucks.
Uy also assails the grant of attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total
amount due. Citing paragraph 24.4 of the Landscaping and Construction
Agreement, Uy asserts entitlement to attorney's fees of twenty percent
(20%) of the total amount claimed. He ascribes error to the CIAC and the
CA for reducing the stipulated attorney's fees from 20% to 10% of the
total amount due.
Paragraph 24.4 of the agreement provides:
Should the PEA be constrained to resort to judicial or quasi-judicial relief
to enforce or safeguard its rights and interests under this Agreement, the
CONTRACTOR if found by the court or [the] quasi-judicial body, as the
case [may be], to have been at fault, shall be liable to PEA for attorney's
fees in an amount equivalent to twenty percent (20%) of the total
[amount] claimed in the complaint, exclusive of [any] damages and costs
of suit.36
Clearly, the cited provision cannot support Uy's insistence. Paragraph
24.4 on stipulated attorney's fees is applicable only in complaints filed by
Persons and Family Relations Cases
PEA against the contractor. The provision is silent on the amount of
attorney's fees that can be recovered from PEA.
Besides, even assuming that Paragraph 24.4 is applicable, the amount of
attorney's fees may be reduced if found to be iniquitous or
unconscionable. Thus:
Articles 1229 and 2227 of the Civil Code empower the courts to reduce
the penalty if it is iniquitous or unconscionable. The determination of
whether the penalty is iniquitous or unconscionable is addressed to the
sound discretion of the court and depends on several factors such as the
type, extent, and purpose of the penalty, the nature of the obligation, the
mode of breach and its consequences.37
The Court finds Uy's claim for attorney's fees equivalent to 20% of
whatever amount is due and payable to be exorbitant. The CIAC and the
CA, therefore, correctly awarded 10% of the total amount due and payable
as reasonable attorney's fees.
Finally, on the propriety of the writ of injunction.
Uy asserts that the CA acted without or in excess of jurisdiction when it
enjoined the proceedings in CIAC Case No. 03-2001, despite the fact that
the said case is totally different from the instant case.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of
discretion is not enough. It must be grave, as when it is exercised
arbitrarily or despotically by reason of passion or personal hostility; and
such abuse must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of
a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to
act at all in contemplation of law.38
The CA granted PEA's prayer for the injunctive writ not without reason.
We quote its Joint Resolution, viz.:
[T]here is no question that Elpidio S. Uy's amended complaint is based on
the same Landscaping and Construction Agreement, as he himself admits.
The claims pertinent thereto had already been arbitrated and passed
upon in CIAC CASE NO. 02-2000 and the decision therein was already
elevated to Us for review and, in view of Our joint decision in the instant
73
 Persons and Family Relations Cases

petitions, a reconsideration thereof.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω
lιbrαrÿ
Based on the foregoing, We are inclined to grant the prayer of PEA to
enjoin the CIAC from further proceeding with CIAC CASE NO. 03-2001,
considering that the allegations therein constrain Us to apply the doctrine
of litis pendentia, which has for its requisites: (a) identity of parties, or at
least such parties who represent the same interests in both actions; (b)
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded
on the same facts; and (c) the identity with respect to the two preceding
particulars in the two (2) cases is such that any judgment that may be
rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful,
would amount to res judicata in the other case. Forum shopping exists
where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. The
principle of bar by prior judgment raised by the PEA, i.e., res judicata, finds
application only upon a showing of a final judgment as one of its
requisites, which is not yet present under the present circumstances.
At this juncture, it bears stressing that the essence of forum shopping is
the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause
of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of
obtaining a favorable judgment. Accordingly, based on Our holding that
the final resolution of the instant petitions takes precedence as it is the
appropriate vehicle for litigating the issues between the parties, now that
the instant petitions before Us have come full circle with this joint
resolution and, if the parties herein so choose, may seek further relief to
the High Tribunal afterwards. We cannot allow CIAC CASE NO. 03-2001 to
proceed because to do so would render inutile the proscriptions against
forum shopping which is frowned upon in Our jurisdiction. Hence, the
grant of injunctive relief. This must be done, or else a travesty of the
efficient administration of justice would lamentably result.39
Landscaping and Construction Agreement. Therefore, the landscaping
agreement is indispensable in prosecuting his claims in both CIAC Cases
Nos. 02-2000 and 03-2001.
As we held in Villanueva v. Court of Appeals:40
A party, by varying the form or action or by bringing forward in a second
case additional parties or arguments, cannot escape the effects of the
principle of res judicata when the facts remain the same at least where
such new parties or matter could have been impleaded or pleaded in the
prior action.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Joint
Decision and Joint Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos.
59308 and 59849 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Respondent
Public Estates Authority is ordered to pay Elpidio S. Uy, doing business
under the name and style Edison Development and Construction,
P55,680,492.38 for equipment rentals on standby; P2,275,721.00 for the
cost of idle manpower; and P6,050,165.05 for the construction of the
nursery shade net area; plus interest at 6% per annum to be computed
from the date of the filing of the complaint until finality of this Decision
and 12% per annum thereafter until full payment. Respondent PEA is
further ordered to pay petitioner Uy 10% of the total award as attorney's
fees.
SO ORDERED.

Indeed, the assailed resolution shows no patent or gross error amounting

to grave abuse of discretion. Neither does it show an arbitrary or despotic
exercise of power arising from passion or hostility.

At this point, it should be stated that the Court is not convinced by Uy's
argument that the claims under CIAC Case No. 03-2001 are different from
his claims in CIAC Case No. 02-2000. There is only one cause of action
running through Uy's litigious undertakings - his alleged right under the

74

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground
(in addition to those enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the
validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the
Code's effectivity, our courts have been swamped with various
petitions to declare marriages void based on this ground. Although
this Court had interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity
in the recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and
lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific
cases. In the present case and in the context of the herein assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled —
exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of his frustration
— Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world."
Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the present case, finds the
need to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2
in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision
of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad,3 Benguet, which declared
the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina
void ab initio, on the ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article
36 of the Family Code.
The Facts
Persons and Family Relations Cases
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by
respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for declaration of
nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition
alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the
San Agustin Church4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that
after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and
irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend
more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money;
that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never
honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent
quarrels between them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was
relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole
breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very
intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged; that
in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live
with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left
Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that
Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of
complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature
and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king
to be served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their
marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared
to be an incompatible marriage from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and
Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife, but contended
that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1)
Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends
even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her
marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the
household and handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14,
1985 at the Church of St. Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre
Olaviano Molina was born on July 29, 1986;
75

3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than
three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her
child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of
the petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and
that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well
as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a
psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She also
submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not
present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the
marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of
Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present
recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals
made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase
'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code)
and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case," adding
that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal
divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied5
heavily on the trial court's findings "that the marriage between the parties
broke up because of their opposing and conflicting personalities." Then, it
added it sown opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee
(hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize the
application of our civil laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded
that:
Persons and Family Relations Cases
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view
psychologically incapacity as a broad range of mental and
behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of
how he or she regards the marital union, his or her
personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his
or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the
principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct, observed
and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to
self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of
marriage, then there is enough reason to leave the spouses
to their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed
no indiscretion in analyzing and deciding the instant case,
as it did, hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the
findings and conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court
of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting
personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining
that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage
of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological
nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital
responsibilities and duties."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice
Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less
than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition
must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo
Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of
the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila,7 Justice Vitug wrote that "the
76

psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that
the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be
more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of
"irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise
constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the
parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons;
it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to
some psychological (nor physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her
husband could nor get along with each other. There had been no showing
of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its
incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable
psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological
incapacity. Dr. Sison testified:8
COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your
findings that it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are
psychologically unfit for each other but they are psychologically fit
with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Persons and Family Relations Cases
The Court has no more questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality
traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of
marriage celebration. While some effort was made to prove that there was
a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and
gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and
intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor
indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows
love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on
the facts of this case vis-a-vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view of
the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty experienced by
many trial courts interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite
two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz,9 Vicar Judicial
(Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a
member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this
occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their informative and
interesting discussions during the oral argument on December 3, 1996,
which they followed up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family
Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This
is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable,"
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes the permanence, inviolability and solidarity
77

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically
or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven
by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not
physical. although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under
the principle of ejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature
explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and
clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of
the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing
illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not
be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
Persons and Family Relations Cases
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles
68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was
taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the
New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which
provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage:
Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations
of marriage due to causes of psychological nature. 14
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to
reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight
should be given to decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject
to our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid should
also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of
the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is
to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church — while
remaining independent, separate and apart from each other — shall walk
together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall he
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court
such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated
under Canon 1095.
78

In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to
grant the petition. Such ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of
the foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo
Molina subsists and remains valid.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr.,
and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the result.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concuring opinion:
I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice Panganiban but
only because of the peculiar facts of the case. As to whether or not the
psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a
marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts
of the case. In Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals and Julia Rosario-Bedia
Santos, G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995, 240 SCRA 20-36, I maintained,
and I still maintain, that there was psychological incapacity on the part of
the wife to discharge the duties of a wife in a valid marriage. The facts of
the present case, after an indepth study, do not support a similar
conclusion. Obviously, each case must be judged, not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its
own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for
annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with
another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the actual
millieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.
Persons and Family Relations Cases
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the Regional Trial Court ruling. upheld petitioner Solicitor
General's position that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not
equivalent to psychological incapacity, for the latter "is not simply the
neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties,
but a defect in their Psychological nature which renders them incapable
of performing such marital responsibilities and duties.
In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo, the
husband, did not constitute so much "psychological incapacity" as a
"difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of
some marital obligations. "It is not enough to prove that the parties failed
to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential
that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological (not physical) illness."
I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of mental
illness. For if it were due to insanity or defects in the mental faculties short
of insanity, there is a resultant defect of vice of consent, thus rendering
the marriage annulable under Art. 45 of the Family Code.
That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center's Civil Code
Revision Committee was to exclude mental inability to understand the
essential nature of marriage and focus strictly on psychological incapacity
is demonstrated in the way the provision in question underwent
revisions.
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use
of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature
of marriage or was psychologically or mentally
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital
obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made
manifest after the celebration.
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced
the following revised provision even before the session was over:
79

(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such
lack or incapacity becomes manifest after the celebration.
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped
any reference to "wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature or marriage" and to "mentally
incapacitated." It was explained that these phrases refer to "defects in the
mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of
appreciation of one's marital obligation." There being a defect in consent,
"it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there
is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the
simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are sanity is curable.
. . . Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has
nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage."1
My own position as a member of the Committee then was that
psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or
mental impotence," Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in he earlier February
9, 1984 session that this term "is an invention of some churchmen who
are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak
phrase." He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as
"psychological or mental incapacity to discharge. . . ." Justice Ricardo C.
Puno opined that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent
with one but not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 is: "Such incapacity must also be
shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex."
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion
of the phrase" and is incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented
that this would give rise to the question of how they will determine
curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic.
Yet the possibility that one may be cured after the psychological
Persons and Family Relations Cases
incapacity becomes manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by
Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that
the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void
marriages, viz:
1. lack of one or more of the essential
requisites of marriage as contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under
"special cases and special situations," hence its special treatment
in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for
avoiding or annulling marriages that even comes close to being
psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the
marriage, such marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of
ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential
requisites, some marriages are void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions
on Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh winds of change in keeping
with the more permissive mores and practices of the time, took a leaf from
the relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are
incapable of contracting marriage: "3. (those) who, because of causes of a
psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage" provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code:
"A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
80

obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two
types of marriages with respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law,
however, recognizes an intermediate state, the voidable or annullable
marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it
actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed in
the first place, for a valid sacramental marriage can never be dissolved.
Hence, a properly performed and consummated marriage between two
living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the formal annulment
process which entails a full tribunal procedure with a Court selection and
a formal hearing.
Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as
severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully
into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil marriage, not being
congruent with those laid down by Canon Law, the former being more
strict, quite a number of married couples have found themselves in limbo
— freed from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but
yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of
civil law sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or enter into
live-in relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous
situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee decided to engraft the
Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity into the Family Code —
and classified the same as a ground for declaring marriages void ab initio
or totally in existent from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while
it did not provide directly for psychological incapacity, in effect
recognized the same indirectly from a combination of three old canons:
"Canon #1081 required persons to 'be capable according to law' in order
to give valid consent; Canon #1082 required that persons 'be at least not
ignorant' of the major elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087
(the force and fear category) required that internal and external freedom
be present in order for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation
produced two distinct but related grounds for annulment, called 'lack of
due discretion' and 'lack of due competence.' Lack of due discretion means
that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at the time of
Persons and Family Relations Cases
the wedding and therefore the union is invalid. Lack of due competence
means that the person was incapable of carrying out the obligations of the
promise he or she made during the wedding ceremony.
"Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and
1960s involving sexual disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania
laid the foundation for a broader approach to the kind of proof necessary
for psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the
first time in several cases that the capacity to give valid consent at the time
of marriage was probably not present in persons who had displayed such
problems shortly after the marriage. The nature of this change was
nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had demonstrated a
cautious willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for
what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious
psychological problems that manifested themselves shortly after the
ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid consent at the time of the
ceremony.
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a
psychological expert became increasingly important in such cases. Data
about the person's entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were
presented to these experts and they were asked to give professional opinions
about a party's mental at the time of the wedding. These opinions were
rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack
of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did
not amount to the addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was
an accommodation by the Church to the advances made in psychology
during the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-
important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital
causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from
that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it
could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that a person who could
intellectually understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give
valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real
obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a
necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.2
81

Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological
incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality
disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming or
carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not
merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each others' body for
heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality, the right to the community of the
whole of life, i.e., the right to a developing. lifelong relationship. Rotal
decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic
capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult
personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to
each other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that the spouses
must be 'other oriented' since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a
self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for
interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a physical
reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of
the obligations of marriage depends. according to Church decisions, on the
strength of this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for
interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the relationship and
consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The
marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference
to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse.3
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the
mature marital relationship:
The courts consider the following elements crucial to the
marital commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful
commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to
children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity;
(5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the
ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc.
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological
conditions that might lead to the failure of a marriage:
At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding
conjugal communion even with the best intentions of the
parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to
his or her inability to fulfill marital obligations are the
following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental
lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2)
Persons and Family Relations Cases
hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom
of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where
personal responses consistently fallshort of reasonable
expectations.
xxx xxx xxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for
anyone who doubts whether he or she has a case for an
annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not
fit into any of the more traditional categories often fits
very easily into the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are
already detecting a shift in their use. Whereas originally
the emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise
proper judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of due
discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the
parties' to assume or carry out their responsibilities an
obligations as promised (lack of due competence). An
advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence
is that the at the time the marriage was entered into civil
divorce and breakup of the family almost is of someone's
failure out marital responsibilities as promised at the time
the marriage was entered into.4
In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting personalities" of the spouses
were not considered equivalent to psychological incapacity. As well in
Santos v. Court of Appeals cited in the ponencia, the Court held that the
failure of the wife to return home from the U.S. or to communicate with
her husband for more then five years is not proof of her psychological
incapacity as to render the marriage a nullity.5 Therefore, Art. 36 is
inapplicable and the marriages remain valid and subsisting.
However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,6 this Court
upheld both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in declaring
the presence of psychological incapacity on the part of the husband. Said
petitioner husband, after ten (10) months' sleeping with his wife never
had coitus with her, a fact he did not deny but he alleged that it was due
to the physical disorder of his wife which, however, he failed to prove.
Goaded by the indifference and stubborn refusal of her husband to fulfill
82

a basic marital obligation described as "to procreate children based on the
universal principle that procreation of children through sexual
cooperation is the basic end of marriage," the wife brought the action in
the lower court to declare the marriage null.
The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the
Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila
(Branch I) on Psychological incapacity concluded:
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses
to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and
the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage
tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity
than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal
is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the
prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse
with his or her spouse is considered a sign of
psychological incapacity.
We declared:
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the
parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and
unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the
studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
1 concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage remains valid
and subsisting absent psychological incapacity (under Art. 36 of the
Family Code) on the part of either or both of the spouses.
VITUG, J., concurring:
I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban in his ponencia, and I find to be most helpful the guidelines
that he prepared for the bench and the bar in the proper appreciation of
Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209 ("The Family Code of the
Philippines"). The term "psychological incapacity" was neither defined
nor exemplified by the Family Code. Thus —
Persons and Family Relations Cases
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The Revision Committee, constituted under the auspices of the
U.P. Law Center, which drafted the Code explained:
(T)he Committee would like the judge to interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience,
the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which,
although not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision was taken from
Canon Law.1
Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from Canon 1095 of
the New Code of Canon Law —
Canon 1095. (The following persons) are incapable of
contracting marriage; (those) —
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment
concerning essential matrimonial rights and duties, to be
given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage —
that should give that much value to Canon Law jurisprudence as
an aid to the interpretation and construction of the statutory
enactment.2
The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that the
several provisions of a Code must be read like a congruent whole. Thus, in
determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36,
one must also read it along with, albeit to be taken as distinct from, the
other grounds enumerated in the Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that
83

would likewise, but for distinct reasons, render the marriage merely
voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation.
Care must be observed so that these various circumstances are not
applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter.
I would wish to reiterate the Court's' statement in Santos vs. Court of
Appeals;3 viz:
(T)he use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under
Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend
all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise
mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely
low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances. . .
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and
construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction
with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus
correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by
Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability of the
spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This
conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code
which considers children conceived prior to the judicial
declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be
"legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception
of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound
mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders
the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46,
Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the
Persons and Family Relations Cases
marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation
under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of
the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the
possibility of these various circumstances being
themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the
disorder, indicia of psychological
incapacity.4
In fine, the term "psychological incapacity," to be a ground for then nullity
of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, must be able to pass the
following tests; viz:
First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not physical, in
nature;
Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere
refusal, to understand, assume end discharge the basic marital obligations
of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering
mutual help and support;
Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
contracted although its overt manifestations and the marriage may occur
only thereafter; and
Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable.
It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has envisioned
Article 36, as not a few observers would suspect, as another form of
absolute divorce or, as still others would also put it, to be a alternative to
divorce; however, the fact still remains that the language of the law has
failed to carry out, even if true, any such intendment. It might have indeed
turned out for the better, if it were otherwise, there could be good reasons
to doubt the constitutionality of the measure. The fundamental law itself,
no less, has laid down in terse language its unequivocal command on how
the State should regard marriage and the family, thus —
Section 2, Article XV:
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State.
84

Section 12, Article II:
Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and
shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution . . . .
Section 1, Article XV:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the
foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen
its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
(The 1987 Constitution)
The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here be significant not
so much for the specific issue there resolved but for the tone it has set.
The Court there has held that constitutional provisions are to be
considered mandatory unless by necessary implication, a different
intention is manifest such that to have them enforced strictly would cause
more harm than by disregarding them. It is quite clear to me that the
constitutional mandate on marriage and the family has not been meant to
be simply directory in character, nor for mere expediency or convenience,
but one that demands a meaningful, not half-hearted, respect.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concuring opinion:
I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice Panganiban but
only because of the peculiar facts of the case. As to whether or not the
psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a
marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts
of the case. In Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals and Julia Rosario-Bedia
Santos, G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995, 240 SCRA 20-36, I maintained,
and I still maintain, that there was psychological incapacity on the part of
the wife to discharge the duties of a wife in a valid marriage. The facts of
the present case, after an indepth study, do not support a similar
conclusion. Obviously, each case must be judged, not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its
own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for
Persons and Family Relations Cases
annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with
another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the actual
millieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the Regional Trial Court ruling. upheld petitioner Solicitor
General's position that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not
equivalent to psychological incapacity, for the latter "is not simply the
neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties,
but a defect in their Psychological nature which renders them incapable
of performing such marital responsibilities and duties.
In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo, the
husband, did not constitute so much "psychological incapacity" as a
"difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of
some marital obligations. "It is not enough to prove that the parties failed
to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential
that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological (not physical) illness."
I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of mental
illness. For if it were due to insanity or defects in the mental faculties short
of insanity, there is a resultant defect of vice of consent, thus rendering
the marriage annulable under Art. 45 of the Family Code.
That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center's Civil Code
Revision Committee was to exclude mental inability to understand the
essential nature of marriage and focus strictly on psychological incapacity
is demonstrated in the way the provision in question underwent
revisions.
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use
of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature
of marriage or was psychologically or mentally
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital
85

obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made
manifest after the celebration.
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced
the following revised provision even before the session was over:
(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such
lack or incapacity becomes manifest after the celebration.
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped
any reference to "wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature or marriage" and to "mentally
incapacitated." It was explained that these phrases refer to "defects in the
mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of
appreciation of one's marital obligation." There being a defect in consent,
"it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there
is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the
simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are sanity is curable.
. . . Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has
nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage."1
My own position as a member of the Committee then was that
psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or
mental impotence," Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in he earlier February
9, 1984 session that this term "is an invention of some churchmen who
are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak
phrase." He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as
"psychological or mental incapacity to discharge. . . ." Justice Ricardo C.
Puno opined that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent
with one but not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 is: "Such incapacity must also be
shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex."
Persons and Family Relations Cases
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion
of the phrase" and is incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented
that this would give rise to the question of how they will determine
curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic.
Yet the possibility that one may be cured after the psychological
incapacity becomes manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by
Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that
the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void
marriages, viz:
1. lack of one or more of the essential
requisites of marriage as contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under
"special cases and special situations," hence its special treatment
in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for
avoiding or annulling marriages that even comes close to being
psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the
marriage, such marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of
ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential
requisites, some marriages are void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions
on Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh winds of change in keeping
with the more permissive mores and practices of the time, took a leaf from
the relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are
incapable of contracting marriage: "3. (those) who, because of causes of a
86

psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage" provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code:
"A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two
types of marriages with respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law,
however, recognizes an intermediate state, the voidable or annullable
marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it
actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed in
the first place, for a valid sacramental marriage can never be dissolved.
Hence, a properly performed and consummated marriage between two
living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the formal annulment
process which entails a full tribunal procedure with a Court selection and
a formal hearing.
Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as
severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully
into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil marriage, not being
congruent with those laid down by Canon Law, the former being more
strict, quite a number of married couples have found themselves in limbo
— freed from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but
yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of
civil law sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or enter into
live-in relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous
situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee decided to engraft the
Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity into the Family Code —
and classified the same as a ground for declaring marriages void ab initio
or totally in existent from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while
it did not provide directly for psychological incapacity, in effect
recognized the same indirectly from a combination of three old canons:
"Canon #1081 required persons to 'be capable according to law' in order
to give valid consent; Canon #1082 required that persons 'be at least not
ignorant' of the major elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087
(the force and fear category) required that internal and external freedom
Persons and Family Relations Cases
be present in order for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation
produced two distinct but related grounds for annulment, called 'lack of
due discretion' and 'lack of due competence.' Lack of due discretion means
that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at the time of
the wedding and therefore the union is invalid. Lack of due competence
means that the person was incapable of carrying out the obligations of the
promise he or she made during the wedding ceremony.
"Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and
1960s involving sexual disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania
laid the foundation for a broader approach to the kind of proof necessary
for psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the
first time in several cases that the capacity to give valid consent at the time
of marriage was probably not present in persons who had displayed such
problems shortly after the marriage. The nature of this change was
nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had demonstrated a
cautious willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for
what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious
psychological problems that manifested themselves shortly after the
ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid consent at the time of the
ceremony.
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a
psychological expert became increasingly important in such cases. Data
about the person's entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were
presented to these experts and they were asked to give professional opinions
about a party's mental at the time of the wedding. These opinions were
rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack
of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did
not amount to the addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was
an accommodation by the Church to the advances made in psychology
during the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-
important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital
causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from
that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it
could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that a person who could
intellectually understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give
87

valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real
obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a
necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.2
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological
incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality
disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming or
carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not
merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each others' body for
heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality, the right to the community of the
whole of life, i.e., the right to a developing. lifelong relationship. Rotal
decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic
capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult
personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to
each other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that the spouses
must be 'other oriented' since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a
self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for
interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a physical
reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of
the obligations of marriage depends. according to Church decisions, on the
strength of this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for
interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the relationship and
consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The
marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference
to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse.3
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the
mature marital relationship:
The courts consider the following elements crucial to the
marital commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful
commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to
children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity;
(5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the
ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc.
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological
conditions that might lead to the failure of a marriage:
At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding
conjugal communion even with the best intentions of the
Persons and Family Relations Cases
parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to
his or her inability to fulfill marital obligations are the
following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental
lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2)
hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom
of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where
personal responses consistently fallshort of reasonable
expectations.
xxx xxx xxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for
anyone who doubts whether he or she has a case for an
annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not
fit into any of the more traditional categories often fits
very easily into the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are
already detecting a shift in their use. Whereas originally
the emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise
proper judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of due
discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the
parties' to assume or carry out their responsibilities an
obligations as promised (lack of due competence). An
advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence
is that the at the time the marriage was entered into civil
divorce and breakup of the family almost is of someone's
failure out marital responsibilities as promised at the time
the marriage was entered into.4
In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting personalities" of the spouses
were not considered equivalent to psychological incapacity. As well in
Santos v. Court of Appeals cited in the ponencia, the Court held that the
failure of the wife to return home from the U.S. or to communicate with
her husband for more then five years is not proof of her psychological
incapacity as to render the marriage a nullity.5 Therefore, Art. 36 is
inapplicable and the marriages remain valid and subsisting.
However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,6 this Court
upheld both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in declaring
the presence of psychological incapacity on the part of the husband. Said
88

petitioner husband, after ten (10) months' sleeping with his wife never
had coitus with her, a fact he did not deny but he alleged that it was due
to the physical disorder of his wife which, however, he failed to prove.
Goaded by the indifference and stubborn refusal of her husband to fulfill
a basic marital obligation described as "to procreate children based on the
universal principle that procreation of children through sexual
cooperation is the basic end of marriage," the wife brought the action in
the lower court to declare the marriage null.
The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the
Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila
(Branch I) on Psychological incapacity concluded:
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses
to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and
the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage
tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity
than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal
is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the
prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse
with his or her spouse is considered a sign of
psychological incapacity.
We declared:
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the
parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and
unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the
studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
1 concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage remains valid
and subsisting absent psychological incapacity (under Art. 36 of the
Family Code) on the part of either or both of the spouses.
VITUG, J., concurring:
I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban in his ponencia, and I find to be most helpful the guidelines
that he prepared for the bench and the bar in the proper appreciation of
Persons and Family Relations Cases
Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209 ("The Family Code of the
Philippines"). The term "psychological incapacity" was neither defined
nor exemplified by the Family Code. Thus —
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The Revision Committee, constituted under the auspices of the
U.P. Law Center, which drafted the Code explained:
(T)he Committee would like the judge to interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience,
the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which,
although not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision was taken from
Canon Law.1
Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from Canon 1095 of
the New Code of Canon Law —
Canon 1095. (The following persons) are incapable of
contracting marriage; (those) —
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment
concerning essential matrimonial rights and duties, to be
given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage —
that should give that much value to Canon Law jurisprudence as
an aid to the interpretation and construction of the statutory
enactment.2
89

The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that the
several provisions of a Code must be read like a congruent whole. Thus, in
determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36,
one must also read it along with, albeit to be taken as distinct from, the
other grounds enumerated in the Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that
would likewise, but for distinct reasons, render the marriage merely
voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation.
Care must be observed so that these various circumstances are not
applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter.
I would wish to reiterate the Court's' statement in Santos vs. Court of
Appeals;3 viz:
(T)he use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under
Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend
all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise
mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely
low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances. . .
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and
construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction
with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus
correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by
Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability of the
spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This
conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code
which considers children conceived prior to the judicial
declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be
"legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception
of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound
Persons and Family Relations Cases
mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders
the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46,
Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the
marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation
under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of
the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the
possibility of these various circumstances being
themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the
disorder, indicia of psychological
incapacity.4
In fine, the term "psychological incapacity," to be a ground for then nullity
of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, must be able to pass the
following tests; viz:
First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not physical, in
nature;
Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere
refusal, to understand, assume end discharge the basic marital obligations
of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering
mutual help and support;
Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
contracted although its overt manifestations and the marriage may occur
only thereafter; and
Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable.
It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has envisioned
Article 36, as not a few observers would suspect, as another form of
absolute divorce or, as still others would also put it, to be a alternative to
divorce; however, the fact still remains that the language of the law has
failed to carry out, even if true, any such intendment. It might have indeed
turned out for the better, if it were otherwise, there could be good reasons
to doubt the constitutionality of the measure. The fundamental law itself,
no less, has laid down in terse language its unequivocal command on how
the State should regard marriage and the family, thus —
90
 Persons and Family Relations Cases

Section 2, Article XV:

Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the

foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State.

Section 12, Article II:

Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and
shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution . . . .

Section 1, Article XV:

Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the

foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen
its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
(The 1987 Constitution)

The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here be significant not
so much for the specific issue there resolved but for the tone it has set.
The Court there has held that constitutional provisions are to be
considered mandatory unless by necessary implication, a different
intention is manifest such that to have them enforced strictly would cause
more harm than by disregarding them. It is quite clear to me that the
constitutional mandate on marriage and the family has not been meant to
be simply directory in character, nor for mere expediency or convenience,
but one that demands a meaningful, not half-hearted, respect.

91

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 195549 September 3, 2014
WILLAWARE PRODUCTS CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
JESICHRIS MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision1 dated November 24,
2010 and Resolution2 dated February 10, 2011 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 86744.
The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), are as follows:
[Respondent] Jesichris Manufacturing Company ([respondent] for short)
filed this present complaint for damages for unfair competition with
prayer for permanent injunction to enjoin [petitioner] Willaware
Products Corporation ([petitioner] for short) from manufacturing and
distributing plastic-made automotive parts similar to those of
[respondent].
[Respondent] alleged that it is a duly registeredpartnership engaged in
the manufacture and distribution of plastic and metal products, with
principal office at No. 100 Mithi Street, Sampalukan, Caloocan City. Since
its registration in 1992, [respondent] has been manufacturing in its
Caloocan plant and distributing throughout the Philippines plastic-made
automotive parts. [Petitioner], on the other hand, which is engaged in the
manufacture and distribution of kitchenware items made of plastic and
metal has its office near that of [respondent]. [Respondent] further
alleged that in view of the physical proximity of [petitioner’s] office to
[respondent’s] office, and in view of the fact that some of the
[respondent’s] employeeshad transferred to [petitioner], [petitioner] had
Persons and Family Relations Cases
developed familiarity with [respondent’s] products, especially its plastic-
made automotive parts.
That sometime in November 2000, [respondent] discovered that
[petitioner] had been manufacturing and distributing the same
automotive parts with exactly similar design, same material and colors
but was selling these products at a lower price as [respondent’s] plastic-
made automotive parts and to the same customers.
[Respondent] alleged that it had originated the use of plastic in place of
rubber in the manufacture ofautomotive underchassis parts such as
spring eye bushing, stabilizer bushing, shock absorberbushing, center
bearing cushions, among others. [Petitioner’s] manufacture of the same
automotive parts with plastic materialwas taken from [respondent’s] idea
of using plastic for automotive parts. Also, [petitioner] deliberately copied
[respondent’s] products all of which acts constitute unfair competition, is
and are contrary to law, morals, good customs and public policy and have
caused [respondent] damages in terms oflost and unrealizedprofits in the
amount of TWO MILLION PESOS as of the date of [respondent’s]
complaint.
Furthermore, [petitioner’s] tortuous conduct compelled [respondent] to
institute this action and thereby to incur expenses in the way of attorney’s
fees and other litigation expenses in the amount of FIVE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (₱500,000.00).
In its Answer, [petitioner] denies all the allegations of the [respondent]
except for the following facts: that it is engaged in the manufacture and
distribution of kitchenware items made of plastic and metal and that
there’s physical proximity of [petitioner’s] office to [respondent]’s office,
and that someof [respondent’s] employees had transferred to [petitioner]
and that over the years [petitioner] had developed familiarity with
[respondent’s] products, especially its plastic made automotive parts.
As its Affirmative Defenses, [petitioner] claims that there can be no unfair
competition as the plastic-made automotive parts are mere reproductions
of original parts and their construction and composition merely conforms
to the specificationsof the original parts of motor vehicles they intend to
replace. Thus, [respondent] cannot claim that it "originated" the use of
plastic for these automotive parts. Even assuming for the sake of
argument that [respondent] indeed originated the use of these plastic
92

automotive parts, it still has no exclusive right to use, manufacture and
sell these as it has no patent over these products. Furthermore,
[respondent] is not the only exclusive manufacturer of these plastic-made
automotive parts as there are other establishments which were already
openly selling them to the public.3
After trial on the merits, the RTC ruled in favor of respondent. It ruled that
petitioner clearly invaded the rights or interest of respondent by
deliberately copying and performing acts amounting to unfair
competition. The RTC further opined that under the circumstances, in
order for respondent’s property rights to be preserved, petitioner’s acts
of manufacturing similar plastic-made automotive parts such as those of
respondent’s and the selling of the sameproducts to respondent’s
customers, which it cultivated over the years, will have to be enjoined. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the defendant liable
to plaintiff Two Million (₱2,000,000.00) Pesos, as actual damages, One
Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos as attorney’s fees and One
Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos for exemplary damages. The
court hereby permanently [enjoins] defendant from manufacturing the
plastic-made automotive parts as those manufactured by plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.4
Thus, petitioner appealed to the CA.
On appeal, petitioner asserts that ifthere is no intellectual property
protecting a good belonging to another,the copying thereof for production
and selling does not add up to unfair competition as competition is
promoted by law to benefit consumers. Petitioner further contends that it
did not lure away respondent’s employees to get trade secrets. It points
out that the plastic spare parts sold by respondent are traded in the
market and the copying of these can be done by simplybuying a sample
for a mold to be made.
Conversely, respondent averred that copyright and patent registrations
are immaterial for an unfair competition case to prosper under Article 28
of the Civil Code. It stresses that the characteristics of unfair competition
are present in the instant case as the parties are trade rivals and
Persons and Family Relations Cases
petitioner’s acts are contrary to good conscience for deliberately copying
its products and employing its former employees.
In a Decision dated November 24,2010, the CA affirmed with modification
the ruling of the RTC. Relevant portions of said decision read:
Despite the evidence showing thatWillaware took dishonest steps in
advancing its business interest against Jesichris, however, the Court finds
no basis for the award by the RTC of actual damages. One is entitled to
actual damages as one has duly proven. The testimony of Quejada, who
was engaged by Jesichris in 2001 to audit its business, only revealed that
there was a discrepancy between the sales of Jesichris from 2001 to 2002.
No amount was mentioned. As for Exhibit "Q," which is a copy of the
comparative income statement of Jesichris for 1999-2002, it shows the
decline of the sales in 2002 in comparison with those made in 2001 but it
does not disclose if this pertains to the subject automotive parts or to the
other products of Jesichris like plates.
In any event, it was clearly shown that there was unfair competition on
the part of Willaware that prejudiced Jesichris. It is only proper that
nominal damages be awarded in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos (₱200,000.00) in order to recognize and vindicate Jesichris’ rights.
The RTC’s award of attorney’s fees and exemplary damages is also
maintained.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated April 15, 2003 of
the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 131, in Civil Case No. C-
19771 is hereby MODIFIED. The award of Two Million Pesos
(₱2,000,000.00) actual damages is deleted and in its place, Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos nominal damages is awarded.
SO ORDERED.5
Dissatisfied, petitioner moved for reconsideration. However, the same
was denied for lack of merit by the CA in a Resolution dated February 10,
2011.
Hence, the present Petition for Review wherein petitioner raises the
following issues for our resolution:
93

(1) Whether or not there is unfair competition under human
relations when the parties are not competitors and there is
actually no damage on the part of Jesichris?
(2) Consequently, if there is no unfair competition, should there
be moral damages and attorney’s fees?
(3) Whether or not the addition of nominal damages is proper
although no rights have been established?
(4) If ever the right of Jesichris refersto its copyright on
automotive parts, should it be considered in the light of the said
copyrights were considered to be void by no less than this
Honorable Court in SC GR No. 161295?
(5) If the right involved is "goodwill" then the issue is: whether or
not Jesichris has established "goodwill?"6
In essence, the issue for our resolution is: whether or not petitioner
committed acts amounting to unfair competition under Article 28 of the
Civil Code.
Prefatorily, we would like to stress that the instant case falls under Article
28 of the Civil Code on humanrelations, and not unfair competition under
Republic Act No. 8293,7 as the present suit is a damage suit and the
products are not covered by patent registration. A fortiori, the existence
of patent registration is immaterial in the present case.
The concept of "unfair competition"under Article 28 is very much broader
than that covered by intellectual property laws. Under the present article,
which follows the extended concept of "unfair competition" in American
jurisdictions, the term coverseven cases of discovery of trade secrets of a
competitor, bribery of his employees, misrepresentation of all kinds,
interference with the fulfillment of a competitor’s contracts, or any
malicious interference with the latter’s business.8
With that settled, we now come to the issue of whether or not petitioner
committed acts amounting tounfair competition under Article 28 of the
Civil Code.
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Persons and Family Relations Cases
Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that "unfair competition in
agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through the
use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust,
oppressive or high-handed method shall give rise to a right of action by
the person who thereby suffers damage."
From the foregoing, it is clear thatwhat is being sought to be prevented is
not competitionper sebut the use of unjust, oppressive or high- handed
methods which may deprive others of a fair chance to engage in business
or to earn a living. Plainly,what the law prohibits is unfair competition and
not competition where the means usedare fair and legitimate.
In order to qualify the competition as "unfair," it must have two
characteristics: (1) it must involve an injury to a competitor or trade rival,
and (2) it must involve acts which are characterized as "contrary to good
conscience," or "shocking to judicial sensibilities," or otherwise unlawful;
in the language of our law, these include force, intimidation, deceit,
machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method. The
public injury or interest is a minor factor; the essence of the matter
appears to be a private wrong perpetrated by unconscionable means.9
Here, both characteristics are present.
First, both parties are competitors or trade rivals, both being engaged in
the manufacture of plastic-made automotive parts. Second, the acts of the
petitioner were clearly "contrary to good conscience" as petitioner
admitted having employed respondent’s formeremployees, deliberately
copied respondent’s products and even went to the extent of selling these
products to respondent’s customers.10
To bolster this point, the CA correctly pointed out that petitioner’s hiring
of the former employees of respondent and petitioner’s act of copying the
subject plastic parts of respondent were tantamount to unfair
competition, viz.:
The testimonies of the witnesses indicate that [petitioner] was in bad faith
in competing with the business of [respondent].1âwphi1 [Petitioner’s]
acts can be characterized as executed with mischievous subtle calculation.
To illustrate, in addition to the findings of the RTC, the Court observes that
[petitioner] is engaged in the production of plastic kitchenware previous
to its manufacturing of plasticautomotive spare parts, it engaged the
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services of the then mold setter and maintenance operator of
[respondent], De Guzman, while he was employed by the latter. De
Guzman was hired by [petitioner] in order to adjust its machinery since
quality plastic automotive spare parts were not being made. It baffles the
Court why [petitioner] cannot rely onits own mold setter and
maintenance operator to remedy its problem. [Petitioner’s] engagement
of De Guzman indicates that it is banking on his experience gained from
working for [respondent].
Another point we observe is that Yabut, who used to be a warehouse and
delivery man of [respondent], was fired because he was blamed of spying
in favor of [petitioner]. Despite this accusation, he did not get angry. Later
on, he applied for and was hired by [petitioner] for the same position he
occupied with [respondent]. These sequence of events relating to his
employment by [petitioner] is suspect too like the situation with De
Guzman.11
Thus, it is evident that petitioner isengaged in unfair competition as
shown by his act of suddenly shifting his business from manufacturing
kitchenware to plastic-made automotive parts; his luring the employees
of the respondent to transfer to his employ and trying to discover the
trade secrets of the respondent.12
Moreover, when a person starts an opposing place of business, not for the
sake of profit to himself, but regardless of loss and for the sole purpose of
driving his competitor out of business so that later on he can take
advantage of the effects of his malevolent purpose, he is guilty of wanton
wrong.13 As aptly observed by the courta quo, the testimony of
petitioner’s witnesses indicate that it acted in bad faith in competing with
the business of respondent, to wit: [Petitioner], thru its General Manager,
William Salinas, Jr., admitted that it was never engaged in the business of
plastic-made automotive parts until recently, year 2000:
Atty. Bautista: The business name of Willaware Product Corporation is
kitchenware, it is (sic) not? Manufacturer of kitchenware and distributor
ofkitchenware, is it not? Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir. Atty. Bautista: And you said
you have known the [respondent] Jesichris Manufacturing Co., you have
known it to be manufacturing plastic automotive products, is it not? Mr.
Salinas: Yes, sir. Atty. Bautista: In fact, you have been (sic) physically
become familiar with these products, plastic automotive products of
Jesichris? Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir.
Persons and Family Relations Cases
How [petitioner] was able to manufacture the same products, in terms of
color, size, shape and composition as those sold by Jesichris was due
largely to the sudden transfer ofJesichris’ employees to Willaware.
Atty. Bautista: Since when have you been familiar with Jesichris
Manufacturing Company?
Mr. Salinas: Since they transferred there (sic) our place.
Atty. Bautista: And that was in what year? Mr. Salinas: Maybe four (4)
years. I don’t know the exact date.
Atty. Bautista: And some of the employees of Jesichris Manufacturing Co.
have transferred to your company, is it not?
Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir.
Atty. Bautista: How many, more or less?
Mr. Salinas: More or less, three (3).
Atty. Bautista: And when, in what year or month did they transfer to you?
Mr. Salinas: First, November 1.
Atty. Bautista: Year 2000?
Mr. Salinas: Yes sir. And then the other maybe February, this year. And the
other one, just one month ago.
That [petitioner] was clearly outto take [respondent] out of business was
buttressed by the testimony of [petitioner’s] witness, Joel Torres:
Q: Are you familiar with the [petitioner], Willaware Product Corporation?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Will you kindly inform this court where is the office of this Willaware
Product Corporation (sic)?
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 Persons and Family Relations Cases

A: At Mithi Street, Caloocan City, sir. Q: Alright, hearing those words, will you kindly tell this court whom did
you gather to be referred to as your "amo"?
Q: And Mr. Witness, sometime second Saturday of January 2001, will you
kindly inform this court what unusual even (sic) transpired between you A: Mr. Jessie Ching, sir.14
and Mr. Salinas on said date?
In sum, petitioner is guilty of unfair competition under Article 28 of the
A: There was, sir. Civil Code.

Q: What is that?
A: Sir, I was walking at that time together with my wife going to the
market and then I passed by the place where they were having a drinking
spree, sir.
However, since the award of Two Million Pesos (₱2,000,000.00) in actual
damages had been deleted and in its place Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱200,000.00) in nominal damages is awarded, the attorney's fees should
concomitantly be modified and lowered to Fifty Thousand Pesos
(₱50,000.00).

Q: You mentioned they, who were they who were drinking at that time? WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
November 24, 2010 and Resolution dated February 10, 2011 of the Court
A: I know one Jun Molina, sir. of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86744 are hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that the award of attorney's fees be lowered to Fifty
Q: And who else was there? Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00).

A: William Salinas, sir. SO ORDERED.

Q: And will you kindly inform us what happened when you spotted upon DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
them drinking? Associate Justice

A: Jun Molina called me, sir. WE CONCUR:

Q: And what happened after that? PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
A: At that time, he offered mea glass of wine and before I was able to drink
the wine, Mr. Salinas uttered something, sir. LUCAS P. BERSAMIN* MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Q: And what were those words uttered by Mr. Salinas to you?
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
A: "O, ano naapektuhan na kayo sa ginaya (sic) ko sa inyo?" Associate Justice

Q: And what did you do after that, after hearing those words? ATTESTATION

A: And he added these words, sir. "sabihin mo sa amo mo, dalawang taon
na lang pababagsakin ko na siya."

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 Persons and Family Relations Cases

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court's Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairerson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTIONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice

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