Plato: Protagoras

James W. Dye

Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 16, Number 4, October 1978,

pp. 467-468 (Review)

Published by Johns Hopkins University Press

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2008.0233

For additional information about this article

https://muse.jhu.edu/article/227458/summary

Access provided at 18 Sep 2019 17:06 GMT from Boston University Libraries
 Book Reviews
Plato: Protagoras. Translated with commentary by C. C. W. Taylor. Clarendon Plato Series.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976. Pp. vi ' 230. $17.25)

The explicit purpose of this volume, as with others in this series, is to provide an accurate
translation together with a commentary emphasizing the philosophical content of the dia-
logue. The translation certainly does not excel in literary merit or stylistic finesse; for example,
one gets the impression that at least every other sentence begins with a conjunction. However,
judged in terms of the avowed aim of accurately rendering the Greek, the translation is suc-
cessful. Especially commendable is the wording of ambiguous passages so as to preserve the
original's range of possible meaning. Some terminological decisions may be less astute.
"Aperfi is usually translated as "excellence" in order to avoid the moralistic restrictions im-
plicit in "virtue"; but since the former word seems to share some of the archaic flavor of the
latter, one wonders whether "merit," "value," or "worth of character" would not have been
preferable. Still more significant for the argument of the dialolgue is the translation of
ococppoo6vrl as "good sense" or, more frequently, as "soundness of mind," for the commen-
tary maintains that the sense of the text requires this meaning rather than the idea of control of
bodily appetites conveyed by the more conventional "temperance." Although this point is
basically well taken (some qualification is necessary since the two connotations tend to merge
in Plato: showing good sense is to listen to one's reason, which means ignoring one's ap-
petites), again the choice of "soundness of mind" seems awkward; the term carries an out-of-
the-lexicon aura and would never be encountered as the colloquial opposite of "folly" as the
text requires. "Sound judgment," "discretion," or even "prudence" would have been better
synonyms to provide variety alongside the perfectly acceptable "good sense."
The commentary is largely devoted to the analysis of individual arguments and discussion of
specific problems of interpretation and translation. There are a few comments on personages
and historical background. No attempt is made to assess the overall significance of the work or
to propose any general thesis about how the whole dialogue is to be read. Any subtleties com-
municated through dramatic structure or irony usually go unremarked, even in such extra-
ordinary passages as 318B-319A, wherein Protagoras, the itinerant lecturer, unabashedly
claims to be a teacher of the "art of running a city" just after Socrates has given some ex-
amples suggesting that one might naturally suppose the expert practitioners of an art to be
those most capable of teaching it. The comments also have little to say about the historical or
philosophical interest of the ideas involved, that is, about the importance of the topics being
discussed (an exception is the treatment of Protagoras's remarks about punishment).
Emphasis is placed upon determining the meaning of claims, displaying the structure of the
various arguments (including putting them into symbolic form), and assessing their validity.
The arguments are all taken seriously and the possibility of Socratic irony is not considered.
Within these bounds, the issues are addressed in a thoroughly competent manner. Controver-
sial interpretations are defended through criticism of the arguments that have been given for
alternative readings. For the most part, the arguments responded to are those found in quite
recent literature. Such competing views are fairly presented, and the reasons given for rejecting
them in favor of another interpretation are normally cogent and clearly stated.
As for the perennial problem of Socrates's apparent hedonism in the last section of the dia-
logue, beginning at 351B, Taylor's view is that Socrates does maintain the strongest of the
several possible senses of "pleasure is the good," that is, that "pleasure is identical with the
good" (p. 209). In accordance with the aforementioned serious approach to the conversations
of the dialogue, this conclusion is based principally on an interpretation of 360A2-3 that

[4671
468 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

would find Socrates "dishonest" if he did not share the assumption that only pleasant things
are good. The treatment of the earlier passages relevant to this issue is scrupulous in noting
that alternative construals are not excluded by the text. There is no discussion of the relation
between Socrates's position here and the treatments of pleasure in other dialogues.
There is a selected bibliography, index locorum, and general index.
JAMES DYE
Northern Illinois University

God as Form: Essays in Greek Theology with Special Reference to Christianity and the Con-
temporary Theological Predicament. By Curtis Bennett. (Albany: State University of
New York Press, 1976. Pp. xiv + 344)

Avec courage et assurance, Curtis Bennett nous livre ses m6ditations sur le message spirituel
de la po6sie grecque et, ~ partir de cette vision du monde qu'il adopte, tente d'appr6cier la
signification religieuse du christianisme. L'entreprise est ambitieuse et pourrait ~tre compar6e,
par l'ampleur du champ qu'elle envisage et par la multiplicit6 des connaissances qu'elle met en
oeuvre, au programme d'un R. Bultmann dont elle constitue tacitement l'antith~se sur bien
des points.
Que sont les dieux du porte grec de 1'6poque classique? Certainement pas, selon l'auteur,
des ~tres transcendants vivant dans un autre monde et bouleversant le cours de ce monde-ci au
gr~ de sentiments et de desseins personnels. Les dieux grecs ne sont que l'instrument po~tique,
oeuvre de l'imagination humaine, par lequel l'homme prend conscience de sa place dans la
nature, pergoit sa d6pendance ~t l'6gard des processus involontaires du monde ext6rieur, des
forces sociales ou des pouss6es instinctuelles, et assume sa vie comme destin, non comme
l'expression de sa volont6 personnelle. S'il est un message des dieux, que ne doivent pas
masquer le chant de victoire des h6ros vainqueurs et les pri~res des suppliants, c'est que
l'homme n'6crit pas lui-m~me sa propre histoire et que I'action des dieux ne se d6ploie jamais
au service de l'homme et de sa volont~. Les dieux sont des forces impersonnelles, insensibles ~t
tout objectif moral, qui symbolisent non pas le triomphe de la volont~ humaine, mais sa
destruction. Dans l'orgueil de la victoire, autant que dans l'exp6rience de la pouss~e in-
coercible de l'instinct ou dans la confrontation ultime avec la mort, l'homme grec perqoit la
fragilit6 de sa volont6 individuelle et d6couvre sa vie comme :'donn6e," "ph6nom6nale."
En tant que forme imaginaire pour l'appr6ciation de I'exp&ience humaine, en tant que
"th6ologie"--c'est-~-dire, selon l'auteur, non pas discours sur une divinit6 transcendante,
mais theos comme logos du cours naturel des 6v6nements--la po6sie religieuse grecque
acquiert une valeur religieuse aujourd'hui nullement r6volue, sinon dans le mode mythique
qu'elle a autrefois rev~tu. Elle pr6sente m~me sur le judaisme et le christianisme un avantage
important: elle n'enseigne ni gouvernement rationnel et juste du monde, ni action providen-
tielle des dieux, ni immortalit~ personnelle, projections typiques dans I'ordre de la nature des
aspirations de la volont6 humaine.
Cette th6ologie classique qui rev~t chez Hombre, Sappho, Pindare ou ies Tragiques, le mode
du mythe, l'auteur en suit la transposition "no6tique" devenue indispensable iorsque les
philosophes--notamment X ~ n o p h a n e - e u r e n t r6v616 l'origine psychique des repr6sentations
religieuses. Rendu conscient du processus par lequel il s6cr~tait les mythes, l'esprit ne pouvait
plus utiliser cet instrument pour traduire sa propre relation aux processus 6ternels dont il se
savait l'expression. Mais, par delh l'abandon de toute mythologie, c'est la m~me conception
du monde que l'on retrouve, sur le mode discursif, dans le naturalisme d'un Thucydide qui
proclame comme une loi naturelle la pr6carit6 des cit6s et des empires, ainsi que la r6currence
historique de mod61es 6ternels, ou d'un Platon chez qui les Id6es rappellent la pure
contingence des 6v6nements du monde naturel.
L'expression la plus significative de cette conception religieuse et celle qui, selon l'auteur, a
exerc6 la plus grande influence sur la litt6rature religieuse post6rieure, est le mythe de Castor et