JMM Promotion and Management vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 120095 – 260 SCRA 319 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Police
Power

Due to the death of one Maricris Sioson in 1991, Cory banned the
deployment of performing artists to Japan and other destinations. This was
relaxed however with the introduction of the Entertainment Industry
Advisory Council which later proposed a plan to POEA to screen and train
performing artists seeking to go abroad. In pursuant to the proposal POEA
and the secretary of DOLE sought a 4 step plan to realize the plan which
included an Artist’s Record Book which a performing artist must acquire
prior to being deployed abroad. The Federation of Talent Managers of the
Philippines assailed the validity of the said regulation as it violated the right
to travel, abridge existing contracts and rights and deprives artists of their
individual rights. JMM intervened to bolster the cause of FETMOP. The
lower court ruled in favor of EIAC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the regulation by EIAC is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of the lower court. The regulation is a valid
exercise of police power. Police power concerns government enactments
which precisely interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote the general welfare or the common good. As the assailed
Department Order enjoys a presumed validity, it follows that the burden
rests upon petitioners to demonstrate that the said order, particularly, its
ARB requirement, does not enhance the public welfare or was exercised
arbitrarily or unreasonably. The welfare of Filipino performing artists,
particularly the women was paramount in the issuance of Department
Order No. 3. Short of a total and absolute ban against the deployment of
performing artists to “”high risk”” destinations, a measure which would only
drive recruitment further underground, the new scheme at the very least
rationalizes the method of screening performing artists by requiring
reasonable educational and artistic skills from them and limits deployment
to only those individuals adequately prepared for the unpredictable
demands of employment as artists abroad. It cannot be gainsaid that this
scheme at least lessens the room for exploitation by unscrupulous
individuals and agencies.

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC vs. HON.

DRILON
G.R. No. 81958, June 30, 1988
Digested by: RL Lagundino

Facts:
The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI), a
recruitment firm for overseas placement," challenges the Constitutional validity of
Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and
Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE
TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC
AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS.” In this petition for certiorari and prohibition,
PASEI, challenges the validity of Department Order No. 1 (deployment ban) of the
DOLE on the following grounds: 1) it is discriminatory as it only applies to female
workers; 2) it is an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. The respondents
invoke the police power of the Philippine State.

Issue: Whether or not the enactment of DO No. 1 is a valid exercise of police

power.

RULING:
Yes, it is a valid exercise of police power. Police power has been defined as
the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare." It constitutes an implied
limitation on the Bill of Rights. However, police power is not without its own
limitations. It may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably.
DO No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not thereby
make an undue discrimination between the sexes. “Equality before the law" admits
of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not
confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the
same class. It is the avowed objective of DO No. 1 to "enhance the protection for
Filipino female overseas workers. Discrimination in this case is justified.
 Police power is the domain of the legislature, but it does not mean that such
an authority may not be lawfully delegated. The Labor Code itself vests the DOLE
with rulemaking powers in the enforcement whereof. Hence it is a valid exercise of
police power.

CASE: PNB vs. Cabansag

Facts:

Florence Cabansag went to Singapore as a tourist. While she was there, she looked for a job and
eventually applied with the Singapore Branch of the Philippine National Bank. PNB is a private
banking corporation organized and existing under Philippine laws. She was eventually employed
and was issued an employment pass. In her job offer, it was stated, among others, that she was to
be put on probation for 3 months and termination of her employment may be made by either
party after 1 day notice while on probation, and 1 month notice or 1 month pay in lieu of notice
upon confirmation. She accepted the terms and was issued an OEC by the POEA. She was
commended for her good work. However, she was informed by Ruben Tobias, the bank
president, that she would have to resign in line with some cost cutting and realignment measures
of the company. She refused but was informed by Tobias that if she does not resign, he will
terminate her instead.

Issues:
W/N the arbitration branch of the NLRC has jurisdiction
W/N the arbitration of the NLRC in the NCR is the proper venue
W/N Cabansag was illegally dismissed

Ruling:
Labor arbiters have original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising from employer-
employee relations including termination disputes involving all workers, including OFWs. Here,
Cabansag applied for and secured an OEC from the POEA through the Philippine Embassy. The
OEC authorized her working status in a foreign country and entitled her to all benefits and
processes under our statutes. Although she may been a direct hire at the commencement of her
employment, she became an OFW who was covered by Philippine labor laws and policies upon
certification by the POEA. When she was illegally terminated, she already possessed the POEA
employment certificate.

A migrant worker “refers to a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a
remunerated activity in a state of which he or she is not a legal resident; to be used
interchangeably with overseas Filipino worker.” Here, Cabansag was a Filipino, not a legal
resident of Singapore, and employed by petitioner in its branch office in Singapore. She is
clearly an OFW/migrant worker. Thus, she has the option where to file her Complaint for illegal
dismissal. She can either file at the Regional Arbitration Branch where she resides or the RAB
where the employer is situated. Thus, in filing her Complaint before the RAB office in Quezon
City, she has made a valid choice of proper venue.
The appellate court was correct in holding that respondent was already a regular employee at the
time of her dismissal, because her three-month probationary period of employment had already
ended. This ruling is in accordance with Article 281 of the Labor Code: “An employee who is
allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee.” Indeed,
petitioner recognized respondent as such at the time it dismissed her, by giving her one month’s
salary in lieu of a one-month notice, consistent with provision No. 6 of her employment
Contract.

PEOPLE VS DIAZ
GR No. 112175
26 July 1996

FACTS: Three women (Navarro, Fabricante, and Ramirez) were enrolled at the
Henichi Techno Exchange Cultural Foundation in Davao City, studying Niponggo,
when they were informed by their teacher, Mrs. Aplicador, that she knew of a Mr.
Paulo Lim who also knew of one Engineer Erwin Diaz who was recruiting
applicants for Brunei.

Accompanied by Mrs. Aplicador, the three women went to Mr. Lim who told them
that his children had already applied with Engr. Diaz. The four women were then
accompanied by Mr. Lim to the CIS Detention Center where Engr. Diaz was
already being detained. After Navarro and Ramirez had already given 20k as
placement fee, Fabricante went to the office of the POEA and found out the Engr.
Diaz was not licensed. Fabricante informed the two women about her discovery
and they all withdrew their applications. Engr. Diaz refunded their payments.

The trial court held Engr. Diaz guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale.
ISSUE: WON Diaz was engaged in illegal recruitment.
HELD: YES. Diaz was neither a licensee nor a holder of authority to qualify him
to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement activity. Appellant told the three
women that he was recruiting contract workers for abroad, particularly Brunei, and
promised them job opportunities if they can produce various amounts of money for
expenses and processing of documents. He manifestly gave the impression to the
three women that he had the ability to send workers abroad. Misrepresenting
himself as a recruiter of workers for Brunei, he promised them work for a fee and
convinced them to give their money for the purpose of getting an employment
overseas.
People vs. Panis,
142 SCRA 664
G.R. Nos. L-58674-77 July 11, 1990
FAST FACTS: SerapioAbug was charged with illegal recruitment. His
defense was that the informations filed against him did not constitute an
offense because in each of the four informations filed against him, each
denote that he was only recruiting one person whereas the statute
requires “two or more persons”
ISSUE: Determination of the proper interpretationof Art 13(b) of PD
442/ Labor Code:
b) Recruitment and placement' refers to any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, hiring, or procuring workers,
and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising
for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not:
Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers
or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be
deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
HELD: The specification of two or more persons is not to create a
condition prior to filing but rather it states a presumption that the
individual is engaged in recruitment in consideration of a fee, however
the number of persons is not an essential ingredient to the act of
recruitment or placement, and it will still qualify even if only one person
has been involved.
PEOPLE vs. LOMA GOCE y OLALIA, DAN GOCE and NELLY D. AGUSTIN
[G.R. No. 113161 August 29, 1995 ]

Ponente: REGALADO, J.:

Nature:
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the order of the trial quashing the information in favor of the private
respondent.

Facts:

On January 12, 1988, an information for illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate and in large scale, punishable
under Articles 38 and 39 of the Labor Code (Presidential Decree No. 442) as amended by Section 1(b) of Presidential Decree No.
2018, was filed against spouses Dan and Loma Goce and herein accused-appellant Nelly Agustin for alleged representing
themselves to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad without first having
secured the required license or authority from the Department of Labor.
On January 21, 1987, a warrant of arrest was issued against the three accused but not one of them was arrested.
Eventually, Nelly Agustin was apprehended by the Parañaque police. Agustin denied any participation in the illegal recruitment
and maintained that the recruitment was perpetrated only by the Goce couple. Agustin also denied any knowledge of the receipts
representing placement fee presented by the prosecution. She insisted that the complainants included her in the complaint
thinking that this would compel her to reveal the whereabouts of the Goce spouses which she failed to do so because in truth, so
she claims, she does not know the present address of the couple. All she knew was that they had left their residence in 1987.
The trial court rendered judgment finding herein appellant guilty as a principal in the crime of illegal recruitment in
large scale, and sentencing her to serve the penalty of life imprisonment and fine. In her present appeal, appellant Agustin raises
the following arguments: (1) her act of introducing complainants to the Goce couple does not fall within the meaning of illegal
recruitment and placement under Article 13(b) in relation to Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) there is no proof of conspiracy to
commit illegal recruitment among appellant and the Goce spouses; and (3) there is no proof that appellant offered or promised
overseas employment to the complainants.
Issue:
Whether or not the act of introducing complainants to the Goce couple falls within the meaning of illegal recruitment
and placement under Article 13(b) in relation to Article 34 of the Labor Code.
Ruling:

YES. Under said Code, recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting,
utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally
or abroad, whether for profit or not; provided, that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. On the other hand, referral is the act
of passing along or forwarding of an applicant for employment after an initial interview of a selected applicant for employment to
a selected employer, placement officer or bureau.
The testimonial evidence shows that she indeed further committed acts constitutive of illegal recruitment. All four
prosecution witnesses testified that it was Agustin whom they initially approached regarding their plans of working overseas. It
was from her that they learned about the fees they had to pay, as well as the papers that they had to submit. It was after they had
talked to her that they met the accused spouses who owned the placement agency. As correctly held by the trial court, being an
employee of the Goces, it was therefore logical for appellant to introduce the applicants to said spouses, they being the owners of
the agency. As such, appellant was actually making referrals to the agency of which she was a part. She was therefore engaging
in recruitment activity. Agustin played a pivotal role in the operations of the recruitment agency, working together with the Goce
couple.
There is illegal recruitment when one gives the impression of having the ability to send a worker abroad." It is
undisputed that appellant gave complainants the distinct impression that she had the power or ability to send people abroad for
work such that the latter were convinced to give her the money she demanded in order to be so employed. It cannot be denied that
Agustin received from complainants various sums for purpose of their applications. Her act of collecting from each of the
complainants payment for their respective passports, training fees, placement fees, medical tests and other sundry expenses
unquestionably constitutes an act of recruitment within the meaning of the law.

DARVIN VS CA

G.R. No. 125044

July 13, 1998

FACTS: Imelda Darvin was convicted of simple illegal recruitment under the Labor Code by the
RTC. It stemmed from a complaint of one Macaria Toledo who was convinced by the petitioner
that she has the authority to recruit workers for abroad and can facilitate the necessary papers in
connection thereof. In view of this promise, Macaria gave her P150,000 supposedly intended for
US Visa and air fare.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto, hence this petition.

ISSUE:WON appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment.

HELD: Art. 38 of the Labor Code provides:

a.)Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 43 of
the Labor Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed
illegal and punishable under Article 39 of the Labor Code.

Applied to the present case, to uphold the conviction of accused-appellant, two elements need to
be shown: (1) the person charged with the crime must have undertaken recruitment activities:
and (2) the said person does not have a license or authority to do so.

In the case, the Court found no sufficient evidence to prove that accused-appellant
offered a job to private respondent. It is not clear that accused gave the impression that she was
capable of providing the private respondent work abroad. What is established, however, is that
the private respondent gave accused-appellant P150,000.By themselves, procuring a passport,
airline tickets and foreign visa for another individual, without more, can hardly qualify as
recruitment activities. Aside from the testimony of private respondent, there is nothing to show
that appellant engaged in recruitment activities.

At best, the evidence proffered by the prosecution only goes so far as to create a
suspicion that appellant probably perpetrated the crime charged. But suspicion alone is
insufficient, the required quantum of evidence being proof beyond reasonable doubt. When the
People’s evidence fail to indubitably prove the accused’s authorship of the crime of which he
stand accused, then it is the Court’s duty, and the accused’s right, to proclaim his innocence.

HEADNOTES OR EPIGRAPHS

People vs. Yabut

58 SCRA 499 (1933)

Facts:

On August 1, 1932, appellant Antonio Yabut, then a prisoner serving sentence in

the Bilibid Prison, hit Sabas Arceo, also a prisoner in the Bilibid Prison, with a
wooden club inflicting upon various physical injuries on different parts of the body
which caused the latter’s death after 24 hours. At the time of the commission of the
crime, the appellant was a recidivist, he having been previously convicted twice of
the crime of homicide and once of serious physical injuries, by virtue of final
sentences rendered by a competent tribunal. The Court of First Instance of manila,
in punishing the appellant, applied article 160 of the Revised Penal Code which
states that: “Commission of another crime during service of penalty imposed for
another previous offense –Penalty—Besides the provision of Rule 5 of Article 62
any person who shall commit a felony after having been convicted by final
judgment, before beginning to serve such sentence, or while serving the same, shall
be punished by the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new
felony.

The appellant advances that the lower court erred in applying Article 160 of the
RPC.

The appellant places much stress upon the word "another" appearing in the English
translation of the headnote of article 160 and would have us accept his deduction
from the headnote that article 160 is applicable only when the new crime which is
committed by a person already serving sentence is different from the crime for
which he is serving sentence.

Issue:

Whether or not the term “another” in the epigraph of Article 160 of the Revised
Penal Code applies only in cases where the new crime is different in character
from the former crime for which the defendant is serving the penalty.

Ruling:

No. It is a familiar law that when the text itself of a statute or a treaty is clear and
unambiguous, there is neither necessity nor propriety in resorting to the preamble
or headings or epigraphs of a section for the interpretation of the text especially
where such epigraphs or headings of sections are mere catchwords or reference
aids indicating the general nature of the text that follows.

Recidivist – is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime shall have been
previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title
of the RPC.

Habitual delinquent – when a person within a period of ten years from the date of
release, or last conviction, is found guilty of the crime of serious or less serious
physical injuries, robbery, theft, estafa, or falsification a third time or oftener.

Quasi-recidivist – any person who shall commit a felony after having been
convicted by final judgment, before beginning to serve such sentence or while
serving the same shall be punished with the maximum period of punishment
prescribed by law for the new felony.

STAT CON:

Headnotes, headings or epigraphs of sections of a statute are convenient index to

the contents of its provisions. They are prefixed to sections or chapters of a statute
for ready reference or classification. In case of doubt or ambiguity in the meaning
of the law or the intention of the legislature, they may be consulted in aid of
interpretation.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS SAULO

GR 125903
FACTS

Having learned from a relative of accused-appellant that the latter was recruiting workers for Taiwan, went to
accused-appellants house in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, together with Angeles Javier and Amelia
de la Cruz, in order to discuss her chances for overseas employment. During that meeting which took place
sometime in April or May, 1990, accused-appellant told Maligaya that she would be able to leave for Taiwan
as a factory worker once she gave accused-appellant the fees for the processing of her documents. Sometime in
May, 1990, Maligaya also met with Amelia de la Cruz and Clodualdo de la Cruz at their house in Baesa,
Quezon City and they assured her that they were authorized by the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) to recruit workers for Taiwan.Seeing that he had reneged on his promise to send her to
Taiwan, Maligaya filed a complaint against accused-appellant with the POEA.

The prosecution clearly established that accused-appellant promised the three complainants - Benny Maligaya,
Angeles Javier and LeodigarioMaullon employment in Taiwan as factory workers and that he asked them for
money in order to process their papers and procure their passports. Relying completely upon such
representations, complainants entrusted their hard-earned money to accused-appellant in exchange for what
they would later discover to be a vain hope of obtaining employment abroad. It is not disputed that accused-
appellant is not authorized[11] nor licensed[12] by the Department of Labor and Employment to engage in
recruitment and placement activities.

Assistant City Prosecutor accuses ROMULO SAULO, AMELIA DE LA CRUZ and CLODUALDO DE LA
CRUZ, of the crime of ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IN LARGE SCALE

Accused-appellant contends that he is also a co-applicant for the employment and he could not have committed
the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale since Nancy Avelino, a labor and employment officer at the
POEA, testified that licenses for recruitment and placement are issued only to corporations and not to natural
persons.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT ACCUSED CAN BE GUILTY OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IN

LARGE SCALE

RULING
This argument is specious and illogical. The Labor Code states that any person or entity which, in any manner,
offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and
placement.Thus, any person, whether natural or juridical, that engages in recruitment activities without the
necessary license or authority shall be penalized under Art. 39 of the Labor Code

The essential elements of illegal recruitment in large scale, as defined in Art. 38 (b) of the Labor Code and
penalized under Art. 39 of the same Code, are as follows:

(1) the accused engages in the recruitment and placement of workers, as defined under Article 13 (b) or in any
prohibited activities under Article 34 of the Labor Code;

(2) accused has not complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment,
particularly with respect to the securing of a license or an authority to recruit and deploy workers, whether
locally or overseas; and
(3) accused commits the same against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group.