University of Cebu

College of Law
UCLASS Bar Operations
Political Law Society

POLITICAL LAW
JURISPRUDENCE
2012
Chairperson: Paul Nejudne
Vice Chair: Lester Wee

Members:
Robie Quino, Gibran Abubakar,
Jhona Grace Alo, Leah Lara Bardoquillo,
Jennelyn Bilocura, Joy Bolivar,
Kristine Athena Nedamo,
Kristine Nejudne, Chelisa Roxas

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References: Law Textbooks, Codes, Reviewers, Notes, Compilations, Articles and Internet Sources

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powers highlights the intent to grant the President the

widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power

SELECTED SUPREME
to call out because it is considered as the lesser and
more benign power compared to the power to suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power
COURT DECISIONS to impose martial law, both of which involve the
curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights
IN and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating
safeguards by Congress and review by the Court.

POLITICAL LAW In view of the constitutional intent to give the President

2000
IBP vs. Zamora G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000
Facts:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief
under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President
directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to
coordinate with each other for the proper deployment
and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in
preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence.
The President declared that the services of the Marines in
the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature
and for a reasonable period only, until such time when
the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition
seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine
Marines null and void and unconstitutional.
Issue/s:
(1) Whether or not the President’s factual determination
of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to
judicial review
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to
assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the
constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the
military and the civilian character of the PNP
full discretionary power to determine the necessity of
calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the
petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally
bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to
discharge such heavy burden, as there is no evidence to
support the assertion that there exists no justification for
calling out the armed forces.
The Court disagrees to the contention that by the
deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law
enforcement is “militarized” in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II
of the Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does
not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause.
The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of
military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local
police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility
patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the
PNP
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the
PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police
force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with
the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with
the military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated
or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no
appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the
deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols
does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.

Ruling:

When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or

suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he
necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested
in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution,
Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual
basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent
provision dealing with the revocation or review of the
President’s action to call out the armed forces. The
distinction places the calling out power in a different
category from the power to declare martial law and
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would
have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided
for their revocation and review without any qualification.

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said

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2001
People of the Philippines vs. Ricardo de Guzman
G.R. No. 134844-45 (2001)
Facts:
On or about the month of December, 1995 and
of October 2, 1996, in Tagig, Metro Manila, the accused,
with lewd designs and by means of force and intimidation,
unlawfully have sexual intercourse with Marlyn Perlas y
Roque, fourteen (14) years old, against her will and
consent. The accused is the common-law spouse of the
victim’s mother, but the prosecution failed to allege the
relationship in the information. Two information were
charged against the accused docketed as Criminal Case
No. 110978-H and 110979-H.
The prosecution presented five (5) witnesses
who testified against the accused and further
corroborated finding that the victim was indeed raped
and intimidated due to the fact the she had poor mental
development who acts like a 7-8 year old girl even if she
was already 15 years old.
The accused entered a plea of “no guilty”, upon
arraignment, on the two information charging him the
crime of simple rape. Presiding judge, however, rendered
judgment of conviction for two (2) counts of the crime of
rape, sentencing accused to suffer death penalty.
A perusal of the Information reveals that
Prosecutor Ma. Paz Reyes Izon intended to charge
accused-appellant "with the crime of violation of Art. 335
(rape) of the RPC in relation to Section 5, R.A. 7610",
(AN ACT PROVIDING FOR STRONGER DETERRENCE AND
SPECIAL PROTECTION AGAINST CHILD ABUSE,
EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES)
Issues:
Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in imposing
two (2) death penalties upon accused-appellant despite
failure of the prosecution to allege in the two (2)
information that accused-appellant is the common-law
spouse of the victim’s parent.
Ruling:
The court held that the two information charged
accused-appellant with the crime of simple rape,
penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code
with the indivisible penalty of reclusión perpetua.
There is no indication in the two Information
that the crime charged is punishable by death under the
foregoing law. Republic Act No. 7610 covers child
prostitution, which is not the case here. Besides, Republic
Act No. 7610 itself does not impose death for rape but
rather refers the matter to Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code as the applicable law.
Under the rules of criminal procedure, a qualifying
circumstance to be considered as such must be so
alleged in the information, which is not required of
aggravating circumstances.
"It has long been the rule that qualifying circumstances
must be properly pleaded in the indictment. If the same
are not pleaded but proved, they shall be considered only
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as aggravating circumstances, since the latter admit of
proof even if not pleaded. Indeed, it would be a denial of
the right of the accused to be informed of the charges
against him, and, consequently, a denial of due process,
if he is charged with simple rape and be convicted of its
qualified form punishable with death, although the
attendant circumstance qualifying the offense and
resulting in capital punishment was not alleged in the
indictment on which he was arraigned"
GEORGE MANANTAN vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
SPOUSES MARCELINO NICOLAS and MARIA
NICOLAS G.R. No. 107125 (2001)
Facts:
On or about the 25th day of September 1982, in
the municipality of Santiago, province of Isabela,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, being then the driver and
person-in-charge of an automobile, willfully and
unlawfully drove and operated the same while along the
Daang Maharlika at Barangay Malvar, in said municipality,
in a negligent, careless and imprudent manner, without
due regard to traffic laws, regulations and ordinances and
without taking the necessary precaution to prevent
accident to person and damage to property, causing by
such negligence, carelessness and imprudence said
automobile driven and operated by him to sideswipe a
passenger jeep driven by Charles Codamon, thereby
causing the said automobile to turn down (sic) resulting
to the death of Ruben Nicolas a passenger of said
automobile.
The defense version as to the events prior to the
incident was essentially the same as that of the
prosecution, except that defense witness Miguel Tabangin
declared Manantan did not drink beer that night.
The lower court promulgated a decision in
petitioner’s favor. It finds the accused NOT GUILTY of the
crime charged and hereby acquits him.
Private respondents filed their notice of appeal
on the civil aspect of the trial court's judgment. In their
appeal, the appellate court decided in favor of the
respondents. Decision appealed from is MODIFIED in that
defendant-appellee is held civilly liable and sentenced to
indemnify plaintiffs-appellants.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the
appellate court denied the motion. Hence, the present
case.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the decision of the trial court
acquitting the petitioner of the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting to homicide foreclosed any
further inquiry on the accused’s negligence or
reckless imprudence because by then he will be
placed in “double jeopardy” and therefore the
Court of Appeals (CA) erred in passing upon the
same again.
2. The CA did not have jurisdiction to award
damages and indemnity to the private
respondents considering that the non-
declaration of any indemnity or award of
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damages by the lower court was itself consistent
with the petitioner’s acquittal for the reason that
the civil action was impliedly instituted with the
criminal action and there was no express waiver
of the civil action or reservation to institute it
separately by the private respondents in the trial
court.
3.
4. The CA did not have jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the case and render the decision
sought to be reviewed when the same was
prosecuted by the private respondents in their
personal capacities and the filing fees not having
been paid, thus violating the Manchester
doctrine.
Ruling:
The court ruled that:
1st issue: That the petitioner had once been
placed in jeopardy by the filing of Criminal Case No. 066
and the jeopardy was terminated by his discharge. The
judgment of acquittal became immediately final. Note,
however, that what was elevated to the Court of Appeals
by private respondents was the civil aspect of Criminal
Case No. 066. Petitioner was not charged anew with a
second criminal offense identical to the first offense. The
records clearly show that no second criminal offense was
being imputed to petitioner on appeal. In modifying the
lower court's judgment, the appellate court did not
modify the judgment of acquittal. Nor did it order the
filing of a second criminal case against petitioner for the
same offense. Obviously, therefore, there was no second
jeopardy to speak of. Petitioner's claim of having been
placed in double jeopardy is incorrect.
2nd issue: The court supports the conclusion of
the appellate court that the acquittal was based on
reasonable doubt; hence, petitioner's civil liability was
not extinguished by his discharge. We note the trial
court's declaration that did not discount the possibility
that "the accused was really negligent." However, it
found that "a hypothesis inconsistent with the negligence
of the accused presented itself before the Court" and
since said "hypothesis is consistent with the record…the
Court's mind cannot rest on a verdict of conviction."The
foregoing clearly shows that petitioner's acquittal was
predicated on the conclusion that his guilt had not been
established with moral certainty. Stated differently, it is
an acquittal based on reasonable doubt and a suit to
enforce civil liability for the same act or omission lies.
3rd issue: The actual damages claimed by the
offended parties, as in this case, are not included in the
computation of the filing fees. Filing fees are to be paid
only if other items of damages such as moral, nominal,
temporate, or exemplary damages are alleged in the
complaint or information, or if they are not so alleged,
shall constitute a first lien on the judgment. Criminal
Case No. 066 contained no specific allegations of
damages. Considering that the Rules of Criminal
Procedure effectively guarantee that the filing fees for the
award of damages are a first lien on the judgment, the
effect of the enforcement of said lien must retroact to the
institution of the criminal action. The filing fees are
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deemed paid from the filing of the criminal complaint or
information.
CITY OF MANDALUYONG vs. ANTONIO N.,
FRANCISCO N., THELMA N., EUSEBIO N., RODOLFO
N., all surnamed AGUILAR G.R. No. 137152 (2001)
Facts:
On August 4, 1997, petitioner filed with
the Regional Trial Court a complaint for expropriation.
Petitioner sought to expropriate three (3) adjoining
parcels of land with an aggregate area of 1,847 square
meters registered under Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
59780, 63766 and 63767 in the names of the defendants,
herein respondents.
Respondents, except Eusebio N. Aguilar
who died in 1995, denied having received a copy of
Mayor Abalos' offer to purchase their lots. They alleged
that the expropriation of their land is arbitrary and
capricious, and is not for a public purpose; the subject
lots are their only real property and are too small for
expropriation, while petitioner has several properties
inventoried for socialized housing. As counterclaim,
respondents prayed for damages of P21 million.
Respondents filed a "Motion for
Preliminary Hearing" claiming that the defenses alleged in
their Answer are valid grounds for dismissal of the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendants and lack of cause of action. Respondents
prayed that the affirmative defenses be set for
preliminary hearing and that the complaint be dismissed.
Petitioner filed an Amended Complaint
which was admitted by the trial court. Respondents filed
a "Manifestation and Motion" adopting their "Answer with
Counterclaim" and "Motion for Preliminary Hearing" as
their answer to the Amended Complaint.
The motion was granted. The trial court
issued an order dismissing the Amended Complaint after
declaring respondents as "small property owners" whose
land is exempt from expropriation under Republic Act No.
7279. The court also found that the expropriation was not
for a public purpose for petitioner's failure to present any
evidence that the intended beneficiaries of the
expropriation are landless and homeless residents of
Mandaluyong.
In 1992, the Congress of the Philippines
passed Republic Act No. 7279, the "Urban Development
and Housing Act of 1992." The law lays down as a policy
that the state, in cooperation with the private sector,
undertake a comprehensive and continuing Urban
Development and Housing Program. Section 9 also
exempts from expropriation parcels of land owned by
small property owners. Petitioner argues that the
exercise of the power of eminent domain is not anymore
conditioned on the size of the land sought to be
expropriated.
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Issues:
Whether or not respondents qualify as "small property
owners” as defined in Section 3 (q) of R.A. 7279.
Section 3.
Ruling:
Lands for socialized housing under R.A. 7279 are
to be acquired in several modes. Among these modes are
the following: (1) community mortgage; (2) land
swapping, (3) land assembly or consolidation; (4) land
banking; (5) donation to the government; (6) joint
venture agreement; (7) negotiated purchase; and (8)
expropriation. The mode of expropriation is subject to
two conditions: (a) it shall be resorted to only when the
other modes of acquisition have been exhausted; (b)
parcels of land owned by small property owners are
exempt from such acquisition.
Respondents therefore appear to own real
property other than the lots in litigation. Nonetheless, the
records do not show that the ancestral home in Paco,
Manila and the land on which it stands are owned by
respondents or anyone of them. Petitioner did not
present any title or proof of this fact despite Antonio
Aguilar's testimony.
Finally, this court notes that the subject lots are
now in the possession of respondents. Antonio Aguilar
testified that he and the other co-owners filed ejectment
cases against the occupants of the land before the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Mandaluyong, Branches 59 and
60. Orders of eviction were issued and executed on
September 17, 1997 which resulted in the eviction of the
tenants and other occupants from the land in question.71
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED
and the orders dated September 17. 1998 and December
29, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 168, Pasig
City in SCA No. 1427 are AFFIRMED.
SPOUSES ALEJANDRO MlRASOL and LILIA E.
MIRASOL vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL and PHILIPPINE EXCHANGE CO., INC.,
respondent G.R. No. 128448 ( 2001)
Facts:
The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters.
Philippine National Bank (PNB) financed the Mirasols'
sugar production venture FROM 1973-1975 under a crop
loan financing scheme. The Mirasols signed Credit
Agreements, a Chattel Mortgage on Standing Crops, and
a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB. The Chattel
Mortgage empowered PNB to negotiate and sell the
latter's sugar and to apply the proceeds to the payment
of their obligations to it.
President Marcos issued PD 579 in November,
1974 authorizing Philippine Exchange Co., Inc. (PHILEX)
to purchase sugar allocated for export and authorized
PNB to finance PHILEX's purchases. The decree directed
that whatever profit PHILEX might realize was to be
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remitted to the government. Believing that the proceeds
were more than enough to pay their obligations,
petitioners asked PNB for an accounting of the proceeds
which it ignored. Petitioners continued to avail of other
loans from PNB and to make unfunded withdrawals from
their accounts with said bank. PNB asked petitioners to
settle their due and demandable accounts. As a result,
petitioners, conveyed to PNB real properties by way of
dacion en pago still leaving an unpaid amount. PNB
proceeded to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgaged
properties. PNB still had a deficiency claim.
Petitioners continued to ask PNB to account for
the proceeds, insisting that said proceeds, if properly
liquidated, could offset their outstanding obligations. PNB
remained adamant in its stance that under P.D. No. 579,
there was nothing to account since under said law, all
earnings from the export sales of sugar pertained to the
National Government.
On August 9, 1979, the Mirasols filed a suit for
accounting, specific performance, and damages against
PNB.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the Trial Court has jurisdiction to
declare a statute unconstitutional without notice to the
Solicitor General where the parties have agreed to
submit such issue for the resolution of the Trial Court.
2. Whether PD 579 and subsequent issuances thereof
are unconstitutional.
3. Whether or not said PD is subject to judicial review.
Ruling:
It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the
authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality
of a statute, presidential decree, or executive order. The
Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the
power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive
agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all
Regional Trial Courts.
The purpose of the mandatory notice in Rule 64,
Section 3 is to enable the Solicitor General to decide
whether or not his intervention in the action assailing the
validity of a law or treaty is necessary. To deny the
Solicitor General such notice would be tantamount to
depriving him of his day in court. We must stress that,
contrary to petitioners' stand, the mandatory notice
requirement is not limited to actions involving declaratory
relief and similar remedies. The rule itself provides that
such notice is required in "any action" and not just
actions involving declaratory relief. Where there is no
ambiguity in the words used in the rule, there is no room
for construction. 15 In all actions assailing the validity of
a statute, treaty, presidential decree, order, or
proclamation, notice to the Solicitor General is mandatory.
Petitioners contend that P.D. No. 579
and its implementing issuances are void for violating the
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due process clause and the prohibition against the taking
of private property without just compensation. Petitioners
now ask this Court to exercise its power of judicial review.
Jurisprudence has laid down the following
requisites for the exercise of this power: First, there must
be before the Court an actual case calling for the exercise
of judicial review. Second, the question before the Court
must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the person
challenging the validity of the act must have standing to
challenge. Fourth, the question of constitutionality must
have been raised at the earliest opportunity, and lastly,
the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of
the case.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
RAMIL VELEZ RAYOS G.R. No. 133823, February 7,
2001
Facts:
On or about the 9th day of April, 1997 at about
6 o'clock in the evening, more or less, at Barangay
Binitinan, Balingasag, Misamis Oriental, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with force and intimidation, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge with a nine-year old retardate Mebelyn B.
Ganzan against her will and consent and with intent to
kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously attack, assault and stab the victim with the
use of a knife which accused previously provided himself
thus hitting her on the different parts of her body,
causing her instantaneous death."
The accused, when arraigned, entered
a plea of “not guilty”. The facts were culled from the
testimony of the individual witnesses presented, by the
prosecution and the defense in the course of trial. It
showed that the circumstantial evidence points out to the
accused. However accused appellant contended that ohe
was brought to the municipal hall on the same night and
placed behind bars until he would have recovered from
drunkenness. Eventually, he was released from jail but
he was soon brought back to the police station and held
for the rape-slay of the child victim.
Accused-appellant, in the instant appeal,
maintains his innocence and seeks a reversal of the
decision rendered by the trial court holding him
responsible for the rape-slay of the victim. He further
contends that he has been coerced into executing his
extrajudicial confession and insists that he only has been
forced to affix his signature on the document by a
policeman.
Issues:
Whether or not the trial court has erred in finding the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape with homicide, claiming to have been coerced into
executing his extrajudicial confession.
Ruling:
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A confession is often said to constitute evidence
of high order but before it can be taken in evidence,
several requirements have to be satisfied. Chiseled in our
jurisprudence are the four fundamental conditions
needed for admissibility of a confession, to wit: (1) The
confession must be voluntary; (2) the confession must be
made with the assistance of a competent and
independent counsel; (3) the confession must be express;
and (4) the confession must be in writing. Confessing to a
crime has the semblance, at least insofar as its legal
repercussions are concerned, of a plea of guilt. Extreme
care must thus be taken by lawyers, prosecutors, and the
police in seeing to it that the person under investigation
for the commission of an offense has been properly
secured in his constitutional rights. Article III, Section 2,
of the 1987 Constitution requires that –
"(1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel,
he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
"(3) Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of this or section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible
in evidence against him."
The right to counsel, particularly, is designed to
avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false
confessions or coerced admissions and to preclude the
slightest suspicion that an accused would be led to an
imprudent act. It ought to follow that a lawyer should see
to the protection of an accused in ensuring his basic
rights. The accused is entitled to no less than an effective
and vigilant counsel who must be present and able to
advise and assist his client from the time the confessant
answers the first question asked by the investigating
officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession.
Counsel should ascertain that the confession is
voluntarily made and that the person making the same
fully understands the nature and consequences of his
extrajudicial confession.
But while the Court in this case is not
comfortable in giving weight to the confession made by
the accused and holding it to bear out a faithful
observance of the Constitution, the guilt of accused-
appellant, nevertheless, has here been independently
established. When there are no eyewitnesses to a crime,
resort to circumstantial evidence becomes almost
certainly unavoidable. Circumstantial evidence would be
sufficient for conviction, if (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences
have been derived are proven; (c) the combination of all
the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances must be
consistent with each other, from which the only rational
hypothesis that can be drawn there from would be that
the accused is guilty. The circumstances must create a
solid chain of events, coherent and intrinsically believable,
that pinpoints the accused, to the exclusion of others, as
being the perpetrator of the crime and thereby
sufficiently overcome the presumption of innocence in his
favor.
Here, the pieces of evidence, taken in their
entirety, unmistakably point to the guilt, not innocence,
of accused-appellant. In rape with homicide, the evidence
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against an accused is basically circumstantial. The nature
of the crime, where only the victim and the rapist would
have been around during its commission makes the
prosecution of the offense particularly difficult since the
victim could no longer testify against the perpetrator.
Thus, resorting to circumstantial evidence is inevitable
and to demand direct evidence proving the modality of
the offense and the identity of the perpetrator would be
unreasonable.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
FLORENCIO FRANCISCO Y ALEJO, G.R. No. 135200,
(2001)
Facts:
On 3 October 1995, while the victim was asleep
together with her mother, five (5) sisters and three (3)
brothers in their tenement at No. 9 J. P. Rizal St.,
Barangay Sta. Lucia, Novaliches, Quezon City, her father,
the accused, woke her up and told her to look for his
slippers as he was going out to buy cigarettes. When she
told him that she could not find his slippers he suddenly
covered her mouth tightly with his hands and forcibly
dragged her towards the toilet, undressed her, feasted on
her young breast and inserted his penis into her vagina
while the two (2) of them were standing" with the
accused propping her up on the seat of the toilet bowl.
Afterwards, he warned her not to tell anyone about what
happened. Since the accused had been beating her and
her siblings in the past, she was afraid of what the
accused would do if she would tell anyone about what he
did to her this time.
Editha further disclosed that her father
had been sexually abusing her repeatedly since she was
only nine (9) years old until she learned that her father
was also sexually molesting her two (2) younger sister,
Baby Flor and Maria Coralyn.
The accused alleged that his wife
Isabelita Jucutan fabricated the charge as he denied the
accusation against him. According to him, he used to
beat and spank his wife and their daughters. He
countered that it was actually the brother of his wife,
Amuncio Jucutan, who sexually abused Editha but he did
not file any charges against him upon the request of his
wife Isabelita.
The trial court then found the accused
guilty of qualified rape and sentenced him to death, plus
civil indemnity, moral and exemplary damages.
The accused appealed contending that
rape was not committed and that he finds it
inconceivable that Editha did not make any outcry when
their house and those of her relatives were adjacent to
the toilet where the rape was supposedly perpetrated. He
also argues the absence of allegation in the information
of the special qualifying circumstance of his relationship
to Editha, which made it legally impossible to sentence
him to death. Consequently, he must be imposed the
penalty next lower in degree, i.e., reclusion perpetua.
Issues:
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1. Whether or not the trial court erred in giving
credence to the testimony of Editha despite her
silence or failure to shout and cry for help.
2. Whether or not the trial court erred in holding
him liable only for qualified rape as the
Complaint failed to allege the special qualifying
circumstance of his relationship to Editha.
Ruling:
The court disagree with accused-appellant that
simply because complaining witness failed to shout for
help he could not be guilty of rape. Even if accused-
appellant did not cover the mouth of Editha, her silence
would not by itself be sufficient to negate the conclusion
that rape was committed. Being complainant’s father,
accused-appellant had moral ascendancy and influence
over his daughter who was then of tender years. Her fear
of her father was more than enough to intimidate her to
submit to his lewd advances without shouting for help.
The answers of accused-appellant to the charges
consisted only of bare denials and allegations that would
not suffice to disprove rape.
The court, however, ruled in favor of the
accused in that the failure of the prosecution to allege in
the Complaint the special qualifying circumstance of
relationship between him and the victim will not allow the
imposition of the death penalty. Under Sec. 11 of RA
7659, the death penalty shall be imposed for the crime of
rape if the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and
the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim. These circumstances are in the
nature of qualifying circumstances that must be jointly
alleged in the complaint or information. Such failure of
the Complaint to implead the relationship of accused-
appellant to the victim makes it legally impossible to
convict him of qualified rape. Hence, he can only be
convicted of simple rape. Indeed, it would be a denial of
the right of the accused to be informed of the charges
against him, and, consequently, a denial of due process,
if he is charged with simple rape and be convicted of its
qualified form punishable with death, although the
attendant circumstance qualifying the offense and
resulting in capital punishment was not alleged in the
indictment on which he was arraigned.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
NASARIO MOLINA y MANAMA @ "BOBONG" and
GREGORIO MULA y MALAGURA @ "BOBOY", G.R. No.
133917, (2001)
Facts:
On or about August 8, 1996, in the City of
Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in
conspiracy with each other, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously was found in their possession
946.9 grants of dried marijuana which are prohibited.
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Upon arraignment, accused-appellants
pleaded not guilty to the accusation against them. Trial
ensued, wherein the prosecution presented Police
Superintendent Eriel Mallorca, SPO1 Leonardo Y.
Pamplona, Jr., and SPO1 Marino S. Paguidopon, Jr. as
witnesses.
The trial court then found the
appellants guilty and through counsel, jointly filed a
Demurrer to Evidence, contending that the marijuana
allegedly seized from them is inadmissible as evidence
for having been obtained in violation of their
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizures. The demurrer was denied by the trial court. A
motion for reconsideration was filed by accused-
appellants, but this was likewise denied. Accused-
appellants waived presentation of evidence and opted to
file a joint memorandum. The Solicitor General filed a
Manifestation and MO1ion (In Lieu of Brief), wherein he
prayed for the acquittal of both accused-appellants.
The case was elevated to this Court on
automatic review.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the marijuana is inadmissible
in evidence for having been seized in violation of
appellants’ constitutional rights against
unreasonable, searches and seizures;
2. Whether or not, assuming it is admissible in
evidence, the government has otherwise proved
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and
3. Whether or not, assuming their guilt has been
proved beyond reasonable doubt, the imposable
penalty for violation of Sec. 8 of RA No. 7659
(sic), in the absence of any aggravating
circumstance, is life imprisonment, not death.
Ruling:
The fundamental law of the land mandates that
searches and seizures be carried out in a reasonable
fashion that is, by virtue or on the strength of a search
warrant predicated upon the existence of a probable
cause. The pertinent provision of the Constitution
provides:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
Complementary to the foregoing provision is the
exclusionary rule enshrined under Article III, Section 3,
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paragraph 2, which bolsters and solidifies the protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Thus:
Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding.
Without this rule, the right to privacy would be a
form of words, valueless and undeserving of mention in a
perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties; so too,
without this rule, the freedom from state invasions of
privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed
from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all
brutish means of coercing evidence as not to merit this
Court's high regard as a freedom implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty.
The foregoing constitutional proscription,
however, is not without exceptions. Search and seizure
may be made without a warrant and the evidence
obtained there from may be admissible in the following
instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2)
search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation
of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5)
when the accused himself waives his right against
unreasonable searches and seizures; and (6) stop and
frisk situations (Terry search).
In the case at bar, the court a quo anchored its
judgment of conviction on a finding that the warrantless
arrest of accused-appellants, and the subsequent search
conducted by the peace officers, are valid because
accused-appellants were caught in flagrante delicto in
possession of prohibited drugs. This brings us to the
issue of whether or not the warrantless arrest, search
and seizure in the present case fall within the recognized
exceptions to the warrant requirement.
Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante
delicto ... arrest preceding the search in light of the lack
of personal knowledge on the part of the arresting officer,
or an overt physical act, on the part of petitioner,
indicating that a crime had just been committed, was
being committed or was going to be committed. Accused-
appellants manifested no outward indication that would
justify their arrest. In holding a bag on board a trisikad,
accused-appellants could not be said to be committing,
attempting to commit or have committed a crime.
Moreover, it could not be said that accused-
appellants waived their right against unreasonable
searches and seizure. Implied acquiescence to the search,
if there was any, could not have been more than mere
passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all
within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.
Withal, the Court holds that the arrest of
accused-appellants does not fall under the exceptions
allowed by the rules. Hence, the search conducted on
their person was likewise illegal. Consequently, the
marijuana seized by the peace officers could not be
admitted as evidence against accused-appellants, and the
Court is thus, left with no choice but to find in favor of
accused-appellants.
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DELA CRUZ vs. ADJUTO ABILLE, G.R. No. 130196,
(2001)
Facts:
Herminio Abille, now deceased, had a total
landholding of 13.0561 hectares, located in Infanta,
Pangasinan, in which 2.84 hectares were tilled by Balbino
dela Cruz, as an agricultural tenant since 1968, who died
in 1981. After his death, he was, nevertheless, issued a
Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) No. 0-064711pursuant
to Presidential Decree No. 27. The certificate was entered
in the Registration Book of the Registry of Deeds of
Pangasinan. Tax Declaration No. 3 in the name of
Herminio Abille was cancelled and Tax Declaration No.
1134 was issued in the name of Balbino dela Cruz.
In 1987, Abille filed a petition for exemption
under Operation Land Transfer (OLT) of his landholdings
alleging that he was not notified of the coverage of his
land under OLT; that he learned of its coverage only on
March 25, 1987; that prior to the issuance of the
Certificate of Land Transfer No. 0-064711, DAR did not
notify him or his representative; that he has been
deprived of his constitutional right to due process.
1989, Regional Director Antonio M. Nuesa of the
Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance, Region I, San
Fernando, La Union, issued an Order, denying the
petition for exemption, and granted the right of extension
of not more than seven (7) hectares instead. He directed
the petitioner to immediately select the retention areas,
canceling the Certificates of Land Transfer issued on the
tenants on the retained area and ordered MARO to
prepare Agricultural Leasehold Contracts between the
petitioner and the tenants and implement the Order.
Herminio selected the 7-hectare retention area,
which included the area covered by CLT No. 0-064711
issued to Balbino dela Cruz; hence, said CLT was
automatically cancelled.
Petitioners, on the other hand, who are the
compulsory heirs of the late Balbino dela Cruz, filed with
the Department of Agrarian Reform a petition for the
issuance of emancipation patent, which was later referred
to the Regional Director I, San Fernando, La Union, for
appropriate action. They prayed for the dismissal of the
petition for the issuance of emancipation patent on the
ground that DAR Order, ordering the cancellation of the
Certificate of Land Transfer of the retained area, had
become final and had been implemented by the Provincial
Agraria Officer of Pangasinan; hence, the petition had
become moot and academic.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the
said Decision of the Secretary of DAR having been denied,
they filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals.
However, the Court of Appeals dismissed the said petition
for review. Their motion for reconsideration was also
denied by the appellate court.
Petitioners argued that it was incorrect for the
Court of Appeals to hold that they were accorded due
process when the validity of the cancellation of Certificate
of land Transfer No. 0-064711 was resolved in the Order
dated April 19, 1989; and that their petition for issuance
of an emancipation patent is a different proceeding from
the petition filed by Herminio Abille where in Regional
Director Antonio Nuesa ordered the cancellation of their
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predecessor's (Balbino dela Cruz) Certificate of Land
Transfer; that in the said petition filed by Herminio Abille,
they were not notified and given the opportunity to be
heard. Petitioners maintained that they were denied due
process so that the Order dated April 19,1989 of Regional
Director Nuesa cancelling the Certificate of Land Transfer
No. 0-064711 in the name of Balbino dela Cruz is null
and void, and cannot be used to deny their petition for
the issuance of an emancipation patent.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in holding that
the petitioners were accorded due process
when the validity of the cancellation of
Certificate of land Transfer No. 0-064711
was resolved.
2. Whether or not the petition for the issuance
of emancipation patent may be granted due
to lack of due process.
Ruling:
The petition is devoid of merit.
The court ruled that the CA was correct
in holding that although the petitioners were not given
the opportuniy to be heard when Regional Director
Antonio Nuesa in his Order regarding the cancellation of
Certificate of Land Transfer No. 0-064711 on the retained
area, nevertheless, in their petition for issuance of an
emancipation patent, petitioners were given the
opportunity to be heard as they raised in issue the
validity of the cancellation of the said CLT, which was
resolved by DAR Regional Director Eligio P. Pacis and also
in their (petitioners') motion for reconsideration, which
was treated as an appeal by the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform and was resolved. The essence of due process is
simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to seek
a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of (emphasis supplied). Futher, the petition filed by
landowner Herminio Abille, which was for exemption of
his property from the coverage of Operation Land
Transfer, cognizable by Region I Director Antonio M.
Nuesa of the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance, did not
require notice to petitioners.
Furthermore, the Certificate of Land
Transfer No. 0-064711 was validly cancelled. Said
certificate was issued to petitioners' predecessor, Balbino
dela Cruz, before landowner Herminio Abille was
informed of such issuance and that his landholding was
subject to Operation Land Transfer. Subsequently,
Herminio Abille, who was found to own riceland with an
area of 9.2903 hectares, was granted the right to retain
an area not exceeding seven (7) hectares, and the right
to select and segregate such area under P.D. No. 27.
Where there is no showing, as in the case at bar,
that there was fraud, collusion, arbitrariness, illegality,
imposition or mistake on the part of a department head,
in rendering his questioned decisions or of a total lack of
substantial evidence to support the same, such
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administrative decisions are entitled to great weight and
respect and will not be interfered with.
DE RAMA vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS (NINTH
DIVISION, THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and
FLORENIO RAMOS, G.R. No. 131136 , (2001)
Facts:
Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of
Pagbilao, Quezon, petitoner Conrado De Rama wrote a
letter to the CSC seeking the recall of the appointments
of 14 municipal employees. Petitioner justified his recall
request on the allegation that the appointments of said
employees were “midnight” appointments of the former
mayor, done in violation of Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the
Constitution. The CSC denied petitioner’s request for the
recall of the appointments of the 14 employees for lack of
merit. The CSC dismissed petitioner’s allegation that
these were “midnight” appointments, pointing out that
the constitutional provision relied upon by petitioner
prohibits only those appointments made by an outgoing
President and cannot be made to apply to local elective
officials. The CSC opined that the appointing authority
can validly issue appointments until his term has expired,
as long as the appointee meets the qualification
standards for the position.
Petitioner moved for the
reconsideration of the CSC's Resolution, but petitioner's
motion for reconsideration was denied
Petitioner then filed a petition for
review before the Court of Appeals, arguing that the CSC
arrived at the erroneous conclusion after it ignored his
"supplement to the consolidated appeal and motion for
reconsideration" wherein he laid out evidence showing
that the subject appointments were obtained through
fraud. The Court of Appeals denied for lack of merit the
petition for review.
Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration arguing that the appellate court erred in
upholding the CSC's resolutions despite the following
defects:
I. No screening process and no criteria were
adopted by the Personnel Selection Board in nominating
the respondents;
II. No posting in three (3) conspicuous public
places of notice of vacancy as required by the rules and
the law;
III. Merit and fitness requirements were not
observed by the selection board and by the appointing
authority as required by the Civil Service rules;
IV. Petitioner has valid grounds to recall the
appointments of respondents.
The Court of Appeals denied the motion
for reconsideration.
Hence, the instant petition for review
on certiorari.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the public respondent Court
of Appeals, gravely and seriously erred in
finding that the Civil Service Commission
was correct in not upholding the petitioner's
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recall of the appointments of private
respondents in the face of fraud and
violation of rules and laws on issuance of
appointments.
2. Whether or not the public respondent Court
of Appeals seriously erred in finding
that the particular grounds namely:
I. No screening process and no criteria
were adopted by the Personnel Selection Board
in nominating the respondents;
II. No posting in three (3) conspicuous
public places of notice of vacancy as required by
the rules and the law;
III. Merit and fitness requirements were
not observed by the selection board and by the
appointing authority as required by the Civil
Service rules;
IV. Petitioner has valid grounds to
recall the appointments of respondents.
Petitioner assails the findings of both the CSC
and the Court of Appeals for being contrary to
law and not being supported by the evidence on
record.
Ruling:
The CSC correctly ruled that the constitutional
prohibition on so-called “midnight appointments,”
specifically those made within 2 months immediately
prior to the next presidential elections, applies only to the
President or Acting President. There is no law that
prohibits local elective officials from making
appointments during the last days of his or her tenure.
The records reveal that when the petitioner
brought the matter of recalling the appointments of the
fourteen (14) private respondents before the CSC, the
only reason he cited to justify his action was that these
were "midnight appointments" that are forbidden under
Article VII, Section 15 of the Constitution. However, the
CSC ruled, and correctly so, that the said prohibition
applies only to presidential appointments. In truth and in
fact, there is no law that prohibits local elective officials
from making appointments during the last days of his or
her tenure. Petitioner certainly did not raise the issue of
fraud on the part of the outgoing mayor who made the
appointments. Neither did he allege that the said
appointments were tainted by irregularities or anomalies
that breached laws and regulations governing
appointments. His solitary reason for recalling these
appointments was that they were, to his personal belief,
"midnight appointments" which the outgoing mayor had
no authority to make.
It has been held that upon the issuance of an
appointment and the appointee's assumption of the
position in the civil service, "he acquires a legal right
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which cannot be taken away either by revocation of the
appointment or by removal except for cause and with
previous notice and hearing."17 Moreover, it is well-
settled that the person assuming a position in the civil
service under a completed appointment acquires a legal,
not just an equitable, right to the position. This right is
protected not only by statute, but by the Constitution as
well, which right cannot be taken away by either
revocation of the appointment, or by removal, unless
there is valid cause to do so, provided that there is
previous notice and hearing.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
ARNEL MATARO y ELIZAGA and NICK PERUCHO y
SINGSON, G.R. No. 130378, (2001)
Facts:
Two separate information were filed against
appellants Amel Mataro and Nick Perucho. That on or
about the 23rd day of October 1992 in Quezon City,
Metro Manila, Philippines, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating with other persons whose true
identities, whereabouts and other personal circumstances
of which have not as yet been ascertained and mutually
helping one another, with intent to kill, with treachery,
superior strength and evident premeditation, did, then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and employ personal violence upon the person of
one SPO1 ENRIQUE CASTILLO, JR. y BALBIN, by then
and there shooting the latter with the use of firearms
thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds
which were the direct and immediate cause of his
untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs
of the said SPO1 ENRIQUE CASTILLO, JR., y BALBIN.
The prosecution presented two
eyewitnesses, Victor Nilo Fernandez and Reden Guzman,
seeing the two accused shot the victim.
Appelants on the other hand, denied
accusation against him, averring that they were in Aklan
from June until November.
Trial court rendered its decision, finding
the appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime of murder, both to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay jointly and severally the heirs of
Enrique Castillo the following: 1) P725,000.00 as actual
damages; 2) P1,000,000.00 as moral damages; and 3) to
pay the cost.
The appellants question the credibility
of Femandez and Guzman. They aver that during the
investigation, a certain Ebalde gave his statements to the
police that the car used by the assailants was a gray Kia
Pride. They also point out that the witnesses of the
prosecution did not agree on the number of persons
riding the car which was stopped by Castillo. They
likewise raise that during the initial investigation, the
eyewitnesses described Mataro as a man between 35 to
40 years old. Mataro was only 24 years old at the time of
the incident. Finally, they invoke the "equipoise" rule15
because their guilt had not been established beyond
reasonable doubt.
Issues:
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Whether or not the trial court erred in:
...CONVICTING THE ACCUSED APPELLANTS AND IN NOT
ACQUITTING THEM:
(A) ON GROUNDS OF REASONABLE DOUBT;
AND
(B) BY APPLYING THE "EQUIPOISE RULE."
Ruling:
The accused appellants invoke the “equipoise”
rule because their guilt had not been established beyond
reasonable doubt. The SC said that it has enumerated
the requisites for credible identification in the case of
People v. Teehankee, Jr., 249 SCRA 54 (1995)
as follows:
1) the witness’ opportunity to view the
criminal at the time of the crime;
2) witness’ degree of attention at that time;
3) the accuracy of any prior description
given by the witness;
4) the level of certainty demonstrated by
the witness at the identification;
5) the length of time between the crime
and the identification; and
6) the suggestiveness of the identification
procedure. 18
The Court held that in their view, these
requirements were met. In the instant case, there is no
question that both witnesses had the opportunity to view
the incident as it unfolded before them with a degree of
attention that allowed them to take in the important
details and recall them clearly. Moreover, as repeatedly
stressed, appellate court should accord to the factual
findings of trial courts and their evaluation great weight
and respect concerning the credibility of witnesses. The
conditions of visibility being favorable and these
witnesses not appearing to be biased, the conclusion of
trial courts regarding the identity of the malefactors
should normally be accepted.
The SC also held that the trial court did
not err in qualifying the killing as murder. There was
treachery in this case since, as testified to by prosecution
witness Fernandez, the victim had already dismissed the
appellants after they talked to him. The victim was
deliberately allowed to enjoy a false sense of security.
They shot the victim when the latter had his hands raised.
The SC therefore affirmed the ruling of the lower court,
but made modifications with the costs to be paid by the
accused.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
ANGELES STA. TERESA, G.R. No. 130663, (2001)
Facts:
That sometime in the month of October, 1996,
at Brgy. Soledad, Municipality of Sta. Rosa, Province of
Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
design, and by means of force, violence and intimidation,
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did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge of his own minor daughter LORNA
STA. TERESA, who is about 12 years old, taking
advantage of her tender age and innocence, against her
will and without her consent, to her damage and
prejudice.
When arraigned, appellant with the
assistance of his counsel de oficio pleaded "not guilty."
But after the prosecution presented its witnesses -- Dr.
Maria Lorraine De Guzman, medico-legal officer, and the
rape victim withdrew his plea of "not guilty" and changed
it to a plea of "guilty." He said that he "had no intention
to commit such act at the time but because I was drunk,
I was not on my right mind x x x." He then asked that he
be pardoned for his deed.
The trial court then admitted all the
documentary exhibits offered by the prosecution without
any comment and/or objection from the defense counsel.
It granted the motion of appellant to change his plea to
one of guilt.
The trial court, after evaluating the prosecution
evidence and considering appellant's admission of the
crime, convicted him of rape and sentenced him to death.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred
in not entering a plea of not guilty for the
accused-appellant and in not affording the latter
the opportunity to adduce controverting
evidence in blatant violation of his right to due
process.
2. Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred
in convicting the accused-appellant in spite of
the material inconsistencies and improbabilities
that tainted the testimony of the private
complainant.
3. Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred
in convicting the accused-appellant in spite of
the fact that the testimony of the private
complainant is contrary to the common
knowledge and experience of mankind.
4. Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred
in convicting the accused-appellant in spite of
complainant's failure to offer any resistance
prior to and even during her alleged rape.
Ruling:
The court finds that the stringent constitutional
standards impelled by due process have not been
complied with in the court a quo, thus necessitating the
remand of this case for further proceedings.
As can be gleaned from this Rule, the trial court
must, if the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense,
first, conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of
the plea and the accused's full comprehension of the
consequences thereof; second, require the prosecution to
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present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and
the precise degree of his culpability; and third, ask the
accused if he desires to present evidence on his behalf
and allow him to do so if he desires. As shown in the
records of the case, the trial court, after a brief exchange
of remarks with appellant's counsel de oficio, and finally
with appellant himself, issued the Order dated May 16,
1997 or nine (9) days after the accused was initially
arraigned.
The court held that the abbreviated and aborted
presentation of the prosecution evidence and appellant's
improvident plea of guilty, with the scanty and lackluster
performance of his counsel de oficio, are just too
exiguous to accept as being the standard constitutional
due process at work enough to snuff out the life of a
human being.
The right to counsel proceeds from the
fundamental principle of due process which basically
means that a person must be heard before being
condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a
person's basic rights; it is not a mere formality that may
be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily.
"The right to counsel must be more than just the
presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere
propounding of standard questions and objections. The
right to counsel means that the accused is amply
accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who
commits himself to the cause for the defense and acts
accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement by
the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial of
the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic
rights of the accused, his being well-versed on the case,
and his knowing the fundamental procedures, essential
laws and existing jurisprudence. The right of an accused
to counsel finds substance in the performance by the
lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his client. Tersely
put, it means an efficient and truly decisive legal
assistance and not a simple perfunctory representation."
Using this standard, the court believes that the
defense counsel's conduct falls short of the commitment
and zeal required of him as appellant's attorney. Barely
nine (9) days after appellant pleaded "not guilty" to the
crime charged, his counsel de oficio made a
manifestation in open court that his client is changing his
plea to that of "guilty."
AKBAYAN – Youth, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
G.R. No. 147066, (2001)
MICHELLE D. BETITO, vs. CHAIRMAN ALFREDO
BENIPAYO (COMELEC),G.R. No. 147179, (2001)
Facts:
Petitioners in this case represent the youth
sector and they seek to seek to direct COMELEC to
conduct a special registration before the May 14, 2001
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General Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21. According
to them, around four million youth failed to register on or
before the December 27, 2000 deadline set by the
respondent COMELEC.
However, the COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 3584 disapproving the request for
additional registration of voters on the ground that
Section 8 of R.A. 8189 explicitly provides that no
registration shall be conducted during the period starting
one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election
and that the Commission has no more time left to
accomplish all pre-election activities.
Aggrieved by the denial, petitioners
filed before the SC the instant which seeks to set aside
and nullify respondent COMELEC's Resolution and/or to
declare Section 8 of R. A. 8189 unconstitutional insofar
as said provision effectively causes the
disenfranchisement of petitioners and others similarly
situated. Likewise, petitioners pray for the issuance of a
writ of mandamus directing respondent COMELEC to
conduct a special registration of new voters and to admit
for registration petitioners and other similarly situated
young Filipinos to qualify them to vote in the May 14,
2001 General Elections
Issues:
1. Whether or not respondent COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion in issuing COMELEC Resolution;
2. Whether or not the SC can compel respondent
COMELEC to conduct a special registration of new
voters during the period between the COMELEC's
imposed December 27, 2000 deadline and the
May 14, 2001 general elections.
Ruling:
1. No
The right of suffrage invoked by
petitioners is not at all absolute. The exercise of the right
of suffrage, as in the enjoyment of all other rights is
subject to existing substantive and procedural
requirements embodied in our Constitution, statute books
and other repositories of law. As to the procedural
limitation, the right of a citizen to vote is necessarily
conditioned upon certain procedural requirements he
must undergo: among others, the process of registration.
Specifically, a citizen in order to be qualified to exercise
his right to vote, in addition to the minimum
requirements set by thefundamental charter, is obliged
by law to register, at present, under the provisions of
Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as the "Voter's
Registration Act of 1996." Section 8, of the R.A. 8189,
explicitly provides that "No registration shall, however,
be conducted during the period starting one hundred
twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety
(90) days before a special election." The 100-day
prohibitive period serves a vital role in protecting the
integrity of the registration process. Without the
prohibitive periods, the COMELEC would be deprived of
any time to evaluate the evidence on the application. If
we compromise on these safety nets, we may very well
Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!
end up with a voter's list full of flying voters, overflowing
with unqualified registrants, populated with shadows and
ghosts.
Likewise, petitioners invoke the so
called "standby" powers or "residual" powers of the
COMELEC, as provided under the relevant provisions of
Sec. 28 of RA 8436 "Designation of Other Dates for
Certain Pre- election Act".. The act of registration is
concededly, by its very nature, a pre-election act. Under
Section 3(a) of R.A. 8189, "(a) Registration refers to the
act of accomplishing and filing of a sworn application for
registration by a qualified voter before the election officer
of the city or municipality wherein he resides and
including the same in the book of registered voters upon
approval by the Election Registration Board. It bears
emphasis that the provisions of Section 29 of R.A. 8436
invoked by herein petitioners and Section 8 of R.A. 8189
volunteered by respondent COMELEC, far from
contradicting each other. SC hold that Section 8 of R.A.
8189 applies in the present case, for the purpose of
upholding the assailed COMELEC Resolution and denying
the instant petitions, considering that the aforesaid law
explicitly provides that no registration shall be conducted
during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days
before a regular election. The provisions of Section 28,
R.A. 8436 would come into play in cases where the pre-
election acts are susceptible of performance within the
available period prior to election day.The "stand-by
power" of the respondent COMELEC under Section 28 of
R.A. 8436, presupposes the possibility of its being
exercised or availed of, and not otherwise.
Moreover, the petitioners in the instant
case are not without fault or blame. They admit in their
petition that they failed to register, for whatever reason,
within the period of registration and came to this Court
and invoked its protective mantle not realizing, so to
speak, the speck in their eyes. Impuris minibus nemo
accedat curiam. Let no one come to court with unclean
hands. Well-entrenched is the rule in our jurisdiction that
the law aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on
their rights.Vigilantis sed non dormientibus jura in re
subveniunt.
2. NO .
SC believes that petitioners failed to
establish, to the satisfaction of this Court, that they are
entitled to the issuance of this extraordinary writ so as to
effectively compel respondent COMELEC to conduct a
special registration of voters.
TUNG CHIN HUI vs.RUFUS B. RODRIGUEZ,
Commissioner of Immigration and the BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation, G.R. No. 141938, (2001)
Facts:
Petitioner, a "Taiwanese national," arrived in this
country, as a temporary visitor. A few days later, he was
arrested by several policemen, who turned him over to
the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID). He
was then duly charged, and the Bill of Commissioners
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issued Summary Deportation Order, finding him guilty of
possessing a tampered passport earlier cancelled by
Taiwanese authorities.
Petitioner filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila a Petition for Habeas Corpus on the
ground that his detention was illegal. In their Return of
Writ, respondents denied petitioner's claim. In a Decision,
the trial court granted his Petition and ordered his release
and consequently denied respondents' Motion for
Reconsideration.
Respondents then filed a Notice of
Appeal which was granted. Subsequently, the appellate
court rendered its Decision, which as earlier mentioned
reversed the trial court.
Meanwhile, during the pendency of the
proceedings before the CA, petitioner filed a Petition for
Certiorari before this Court, contending that the
RTC should have rejected the appeal for allegedly being
filed late-beyond the 48-hour period provided under the
pre-1997 Rules of Court. In its decision, which became
final, this Court denied the Petition.
The appellate court held that petitioner
was not entitled to the writ of habeas corpus, because
the BID Board of Commissioners had found him guilty of
violating Section 37 (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act
of 1940, as amended. Citing documents from the Taiwan
Economic and Cultural Offices (TECO), the CA found that
petitioner's passport had been cancelled by the Republic
of China on the ground that its holder was not the real
Tung Chin Hui, but a fugitive from justice who had
tampered the passport. The CA also held that the TECO
documents, being public in nature, need not be testified
to by the persons who had issued them.
Issues:
A. PRINCIPAL ISSUES:
(1) Is the reglementary period within which to appeal in
habeas corpus cases forty-eight hours from notice of the
Decision appealed from? (as petitioner contends); or is it
15 days similar to other cases from notice of the
Decision? (as contended by the respondents);
(2) Was the appeal taken by the respondents from the
Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 26,
denying respondents' Motion for Reconsideration, proper?
(as postulated by the respondents) or improper and not
allowable being violative of Sec. 1 (a), Rule 41, of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure? (as comprehended by the
petitioner)
A. SECONDARY ISSUES:
(1) Should the Court of Appeals give weight to findings of
fact arrived at by the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 26, based on the evidence presented or adduced
during the trial of the case, in keeping with established
precedents?
(2) May the Honorable Court of Appeals consider
extraneous facts brought out by the respondents in their
Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!
memorandum but are not supported by the evidence
presented, identified and admitted by the trial court
during the hearing of the case?
(3) Did the Court of Appeals acquire jurisdiction over the
case when the appeal was filed out of time and the Order
appealed from is not appealable?"
Ruling:
The Petition is not meritorious.
Propriety of the Appeal
The reglementary period for filing an
appeal in a habeas corpus case is now similar to that in
ordinary civil actions and is governed by Section 3, Rule
41 of the 1997 Rules, which provides:
'SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. - The appeal
shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record
on appeal is required the appellant shall file a notice of
appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days
from notice of the judgment or final order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a
timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion
for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be allowed.'
In this light, the appeal was seasonably filed
within the 15-day reglementary period.
Propriety of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of
Court provides that "the writ of habeas corpus shall
extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which
the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the
person entitled thereto." The objective of the writ is to
determine whether the confinement or detention is valid
or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued.
In the instant case, petitioner was
properly charged before the Bureau of Immigration for
illegally entering the Philippines with the use of a
passport issued to another person and cancelled by the
Taiwanese government in 1995.
Alleged Lack of Notice
The court rejects petitioner's reliance
on the ruling of the trial court that "[w]hile it may be true
that there is a Summary Deportation Order against the
petitioner allegedly for being [an] undocumented alien,
having used a passport which had already been cancelled,
there is no showing that he was informed about it. There
is no sufficient basis to overturn the presumption that the
Bureau of Immigration conducted its proceedings in
accordance with law.
In sum, the court hold that petitioner's
confinement was not illegal; hence, there is no
justification for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
Moreover, he has not shown any cogent reason to
warrant the nullification of the Board of Commissioners'
Summary Deportation Order.
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES and ALFREDO DE
TORRES vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, G.R. No.
132860, April 3, 2001
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Facts:
Dr. Alfredo B. De Torres is an Associate
Professor of the University of the Philippines in Los Baños
(UPLB) who went on a vacation leave of absence without
pay from September 1, 1986 to August 30, 1989 due to
his service as the Philippine Government'' official
representative to the Centre on Integrated Rural
Development for Asia and [the] Pacific (CIRDAP).
When the term of his leave of absence
was about to expire, CIRDAP requested the UPLB for an
extension of said leave of absence for another year, but
was denied by then Director of the Agricultural Credit
Corporation, Inc. (ACCI) of UPLBm advised De Torres to
report for duty; while the then UPLB Chancellor apprised
him on the rules of the Civil Service on leaves and
warned of the possibility of being considered on Absence
Without Official Leave (AWOL) if he failed to return and
report for duty as directed.
Dr. De Torres wrote UPLB that he had
'no alternative but to pursue the matter in continuing his
commitment to CIRDAP, and was advised that failure to
report within 30 days, he would be dropped from the rolls
of personnel. Despite the warning, Dr. De Torres did not
report to work.
After almost five years of absence
without leave, Dr. De Torres wrote the incumbent
Chancellor Ruben L. Villareal that he was reporting back
to duty. He was then notified he [was] considered to be
on AWOL. Thus, he was advised to re-apply with UPLB.
Dr. De Torres sought reconsideration
and was further granted. Meanwhile, members of the
academic Personnel Committee requested the Civil
Service Commission regarding the employment status of
Dr. De Torres.
The Commission ruled that Dr. De
Torres is considered to have been dropped from the
service, hence, his re-employment requires the issuance
of appointment subject to the requirements of Civil
Service Law and Rules.'
Dr. De Torres and the University of the
Philippines at Los Baños (UPLB) filed separate requests
for reconsideration of aforesaid CSC Resolution. The
commission denied the motion for reconsideration,
further stating that CSC Resolution [stood] and that since
separation from the service [was] non-disciplinary in
nature, the appointing authority may appoint Dr. De
Torres to any vacant position pursuant to existing civil
service law and rules.
From the unfavorable Resolutions of the
CSC, petitioners sought recourse before the Court of
Appeals, but was dismissed for finding no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of CSC. Petitioners' Motion
for Reconsideration was denied.
Issues:
1. Whether or not a new appointment is still necessary
for Dr. de Torres to resume his post at the
UNIVERSITY despite having remained continuously with
the Civil Service, not having been dropped from the rolls
of the University, and after returning to fulfill his
service contract as a government scholar.
Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!
2. Whether or not the issuance by the
COMMISSION of Resolution Nos. 95-3045 and 961041,
was in excess of its authority.
3. Whether or not the COMMISSION violated the
Subido-Romulo Agreement which is still in force and
effect.
4. Whether or not the express repeal of the old
law had the effect of doing away with the policy of
automatic dropping from the government service in favor
of notice before dropping.
5. Whether or not Section 33 of Rule XVI is ultra
vires as it does not relate or is not in any way
connected with any specific provision of R.A. No. 2260.
6. Whether or not Resolution No. 95-3045
violated Dr. de Torres' constitutional right to due
process."
In the main, the issue is the validity of Dr.
Alfredo de Torres automatic separation from the civil
service due to his prolonged absence without official
leave.
Ruling:
The Petition is meritorious.
Petitioner De Torres was never actually
dropped from the service by UP. He remained in the
UPLB's roll of academic personnel, even after he had
been warned of the possibility of being dropped from the
service if he failed to return to work within a stated
period. The action of the Chancellor, though, in advising
the petitioner on the Civil Service Rules regarding leaves,
constituted a sufficient notice.
However, UP's actuations, in spite of
Section 33, Rule XVI of the Revised Civil Service Rules,
are consistent with the exercise of its academic freedom.
We have held time and again that "the University has the
academic freedom to determine for itself on academic
grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it
shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study."
Clearly, this freedom encompasses the
autonomy to choose who should teach and, concomitant
therewith, who should be retained in its rolls of
professors and other academic personnel.
Needless to say, UP definitely
recognizes and values petitioner's academic expertise. As
the vice chancellor for academic affairs explained,
"[d]ropping him from the rolls will utterly be a waste of
government funds and will not serve the best interest of
the country which is suffering from 'brain-drain'."
Consequently, there is no need for the
issuance of a new appointment in favor of Dr. De Torres.
His service in UP is deemed uninterrupted during his
tenure at CIRDAP.
PHILHOUSE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and/or
SPS. JOVENAL and CELIA TORING, vs.
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CONSOLIDATED ORIX LEASING and FINANCE
CORPORATION, G.R. No. 135287, (2001)
Facts:
Petitioners were declared in default when they
and their counsel, Atty. Rodolfo L. Vega, failed to appear
at the pretrial hearing on 22 April 1993. The order of
default was subsequently lifted. Petitioners were again
declared in default for having been absent in the pretrial
hearing scheduled on that day. Respondent presented its
evidence ex-parte. the default order was once more lifted
but the evidence presented was retained in the records
subject to cross-examination by petitioners. In the next
pretrial hearing, petitioners and counsel still failed to
show up. For the third time, they were declared in default.
This time, the trial court considered the case submitted
for decision.
The trial court ruled in favor of
respondent in a decision. Petitioners filed a "Motion for
Reconsideration and/or Set Aside Judgment by Default",
but were subsequently denied by the trial court.
Petitioners then filed a "Petition for
Relief from Judgment." Petitioners claimed that they were
deprived of their right to present their evidence. Their
non-appearance in the pretrial hearing was according to
them, was due to their counsel’s "honest mistake and
excusable negligence" of entering in his calendar the date
of the pretrial to be "May 23" when it should have been
"May 16".
The trial court dismissed the petition for
relief for lack of merit. The court said that the mistake of
counsel cannot be countenanced and could not in any
manner be attributed to fraud or deception committed by
the prevailing party that could call for the setting aside of
the judgment.
Still undaunted, petitioners filed a
notice of appeal to the order denying the petition for
relief, which notice was approved by the court a quo.
The Court of Appeals sent a letter-
notice to petitioners’ counsel, Atty. Rodolfo L. Vega,
requiring him to file the appellants’ brief within 45 days
from notice. Meanwhile, counsel filed with the Court of
Appeals a "Motion for Leave to Admit Late Payment with
Notice of Change of Address," prompting the appellate
court to send anew a letter-notice to counsel. Atty. Vega
filed a "Motion for Extension to file Brief" alleging that he
received the first notice on 04 October 1997 and praying
for an additional 90 days, or until 12 February 1998,
within which to file the required pleading. The motion for
extension was granted by the Court of Appeals. Noting
that counsel had, in fact, received the first letter-notice,
the appellate court withdrew the second notice.
Despite the extension, Atty. Vega still
failed to file the appellants’ brief. The Court of Appeals
thus considered the appeal by petitioners to have been
abandoned and accordingly dismissed the case pursuant
to Rule 50, Section 1(e), of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. After the receipt of the notice of dismissal,
that counsel filed a "Very Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration." Consequently, the appellate court
dismissed the motion for having been filed out of time.
Petitioners, with a new counsel, now
come before this Court in this petition for review on
certiorari seeking the remand of the case to the appellate
court and another chance to file the appellants’ brief on
Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!
the ground that failure of their former counsel to file the
required brief constitutes gross mistake or negligence
which should not bind them as to do so would deprive
them of due process and will cause them serious injustice.
Issues:
Whether or not the negligent act of counsel in failing to
file the appellants’ brief, resulting in the dismissal of an
appeal, a matter that binds the client.
Ruling:
Regrettably, the Court finds itself unable to hold
that the appellate court has committed a reversible error.
Rule 50, Section 1(e), of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that an appeal may be
dismissed by the Court of Appeals on its own accord or
on motion of the appellee for failure of the appellant to
serve and file the required number of copies of his brief
or memorandum within the time prescribed by the Rules.
The obvious reason for this rule is that upon appeal, the
appellate court can only but place reliance on the
pleadings, briefs and memoranda of parties such as may
be required. The dereliction of duty by counsel affects the
client. While, exceptionally, the client may be excused
from the failure of counsel, the factual and case settings
in this instance, however, would not warrant such an
exception; indeed, petitioners themselves may not be
said to be entirely faultless.
Petitioners have not been denied their
day in court. It is basic that as long as a party is given
the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he
would have no reason to complain, for it is this
opportunity to be heard that makes up the essence of
due process. Where opportunity to be heard, either
through oral argument or through pleadings, is accorded,
there can be no denial of procedural due process.
Furthermore, petitioners could not have
failed to notice the succession of blunders committed by
their counsel, yet they took no precautionary measures
such as by forthwith seeking the help of another counsel.
No prudent party would leave the fate of his case
completely to his lawyer. It should be the duty of the
client to be in touch with his counsel so as to be
constantly posted about the case.
Spouses VIRGILIO AND GLYNNA F. CRYSTAL, acting
for themselves and as parents of minor children
MONICA CLAIRE CRYSTAL and FRANCES LORRAINE
CRYSTAL vs.
CEBU INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL, G.R. No. 135433 ,
April 4, 2001
Facts:
The petitioners-spouses Virgilio and Glynna
Crystal alleged that they sent all their children — Sheryll
Louise, Doreen Angeli, Monica Claire and Frances Loraine
— to study at the private respondent Cebu International
School (CIS). In 1996, the petitioners' parents and
children went to CIS to enroll. After complying with the
school's enrollment and admission requirements, they
were given the schedule of fees as well as the summary
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of total fees due upon enrollment in the amount.
However, without any justifiable reason, the school
refused to accept the payment by the petitioners of the
enrollment fees unless they also pay the other charges
called 'land purchase deposit' in the amount of P50,
000.00 per student plus surcharge of 2.5% per month
starting from the school year 1995-1996.
The petitioners thereafter repeatedly
tendered payment of the total fees due upon enrollment
computed at and pleaded for the admission of their
daughters for enrollment and for the release of their
report cards but were just ignored by the respondents.
Accordingly, they prayed for the
following reliefs:
1. Immediately enjoining the defendants from
enforcing and collecting the 'land purchase deposit' and
its 'surcharge' as prerequisite for enrollment and/or
ordering the defendants to immediately accept, the
plaintiffs' application for admission and/or to immediately
admit the plaintiffs in Grade 4 and Grade 8 respectively
at the defendant school and to accept the payment in the
amount of P35, 187.00;
2. After trial, making the injunction above
mentioned permanent and:
a. Declaring the imposition and collection of
'land purchase deposit' and surcharge of 2.5% per month
as illegal, unreasonable and oppressive;
b. Declaring the imposition and collection of the
increase in tuition fees and other fees not approved by
the Department of Education and Culture as illegal and
ordering the refund thereof to the plaintiffs;
c. Ordering the defendants to jointly and
severally pay plaintiffs the amount of P2,000,000.00 as
moral damages; the amount of P500,000.00 as
exemplary damages; the amount of P100,000;00 as . . .
nominal damages; the amount of P100,000.00 as
attorney's fees; and costs of this suit;
3. Plaintiffs pray for such other reliefs and
remedy consistent with law and equity.
After the summary hearing, the
respondent court issued a temporary restraining order,
restraining defendants from imposing on the plaintiffs
any amount, except the total amount due upon
enrollment, as reflected in the Schedule of Fees for
Grades 4 and 8.
Meanwhile, private respondents, in
their answer averred that petitioner did not pay with cash
but with checks postdated. The postdated checks were
not accepted because the respondent CIS Board of
Trustees had earlier decided that the petitioners should
pay either in cash or in manager's check because on
several instances in the past their personal checks either
bounced or were delayed in encashment due to their
advice not to cash the same until further notice.
The land purchase deposit of is not an
additional requirement for enrollment or admission as it
is refundable once the student graduates or otherwise
decides to leave the school. It was imposed after prior
consultation with the parents and upon agreement of all
parents, including the petitioners, to enable the school to
purchase a piece of land and to construct new school
buildings and other facilities to which the CIS will transfer
and occupy after the expiration of its lease contract with
the Province of Cebu over its present site. The 2.5%
surcharge per month refers to the late payment of the
Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!
deposit under Option 3 which the petitioners themselves
finally chose after they were not able to comply with
Option 2 which was their earlier preference.
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration
of the RTC Order was denied. Petitioners filed before the
CA a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. They
contended that the RTC had acted without or in excess of
its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when it
issued its Order.
The CA issued a Temporary Restraining
Order enjoining respondents from collecting from
petitioners the questioned land purchase deposit. The
appellate court promulgated the assailed Decision
denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, holding
that the RTC committed no grave abuse of discretion in
denying petitioners' prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction. The
former held that petitioners had not shown the existence
of a right that was free from doubt.
Issues:
1. Whether the respondents' insistence on the
land purchase deposit which is judicially
admitted; by them as not a precondition or an
additional requirement for enrollment is a valid
challenge to the petitioners' right to enrollment.
2. Whether or not the minor children have a
clear and legal right to be admitted to
respondent school.
3. Whether or not respondents have the right to
reject or bar the petitioners' children from
enrollment for refusal to pay the land purchase
deposit which is judicially admitted as [a] non-
enrollment [requirement].
4. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
not issuing the writ of a preliminary mandatory
injunction." 7
In the main, the Court is called upon to
determine whether petitioners are entitled to a writ of
preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction.
Ruling:
The Petition is devoid of merit.
A writ of preliminary injunction is
issued only upon proof of the following: (1) a clear legal
right of the complainant, (2) a violation of that right, and
(3) a permanent and urgent necessity for the writ to
prevent serious damage.
Petitioners have failed to show that
they have a clear and unmistakable right that has been
violated. Neither have they shown permanent and urgent
necessity for the issuance of the writ.
Furthermore, petitioners have no right
or standing to pray for the issuance of an injunctive writ,
because they failed to pay the required school fees on
time. Not only had their personal checks bounced several
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times in the past, but these had been postdated as well;
sometimes they were not even encashed upon
petitioners' advice.
It was not clearly shown any urgent
and permanent necessity for the writ since the children
are already enrolled in another school.
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. No. 128055, April 18, 2001
Facts:
That on or about October 17, 1988, or sometime
prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, a public officer, being
then the Commissioner of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation, with evident bad faith and
manifest partiality in the exercise of her official functions,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally
approve the application for legalization for the stay of the
aliens in violation of Executive Order No. 324 dated April
13, 1988 which prohibits the legalization of said
disqualified aliens knowing fully well that said aliens are
disqualified thereby giving unwarranted benefits to said
aliens whose stay in the Philippines was unlawfully
legalized by said accused.
Two other criminal cases, one for violation of the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 46 and the other for
libel, were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
docketed, respectively, No. 91-94555 and No. 91-94897.
Petitioner, then filed with the Sandiganbayan a
Motion to "Redetermine Probable Cause" and to dismiss
or quash said information. Pending the resolution of this
incident, the prosecution filed on 31 July 1995 with the
Sandiganbayan a motion to issue an order suspending
petitioner.
On 22 August 1995, petitioner filed her
opposition to the motion of the prosecution to suspend
her.
The petition assails the authority of the
Sandiganbayan to decree a ninety-day preventive
suspension of Mme. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, a Senator
of the Republic of the Philippines, from any government
position, and furnishing a copy thereof to the Senate of
the Philippines for the implementation of the suspension
order
Issues:
Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction issuing
suspension to petitioner.
Ruling:
The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the
preventive suspension of an incumbent public official
charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act
No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support.
Section 13 of the statute provides:
"SECTION 13. Suspension and loss of
benefits. — Any incumbent public officer against whom
any criminal prosecution under a valid information under
this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal
Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!
Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government
or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a
complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and
mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be
suspended from office.
In view of suspension NOT as a penalty
It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty
of the court to issue an order of suspension upon
determination of the validity of the information filed
before it. Once the information is found to be sufficient in
form and substance, the court is bound to issue an order
of suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to
be "no ifs and buts about it."
Thus, it has been held that the use of the word
"office" would indicate that it applies to any office which
the officer charged may be holding, and not only the
particular office under which he stands accused.
The law does not require that the guilt of the
accused must be established in a pre-suspension
proceeding before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither
does it contemplate a proceeding to determine (1) the
strength of the evidence of culpability against him, (2)
the gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether or not
his continuance in office could influence the witnesses or
pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records
and other evidence before the court could have a valid
basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the
trial of the case. All it secures to the accused is adequate
opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the
proceedings against him, such as, that he has not been
afforded the right to due preliminary investigation, that
the acts imputed to him do not constitute a specific crime
warranting his mandatory suspension from office under
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, or that the
information is subject to quashal on any of the grounds
set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure.
In view of multiple petitions
Petitioner next claims that the
Amended information did not charge any offense
punishable under Section 3 (e) of RA. No. 3019 because
the official acts complained therein were authorized
under Executive Order No. 324 and that the Board of
Commissioners of the Bureau of Investigation adopted
the policy of approving applications for legalization of
spouses and unmarried, minor children of "qualified
aliens" even though they had arrived in the Philippines
after December 31, 1983. She concludes that the
Sandiganbayan erred in not granting her motion to quash
the information.
"In a motion to quash, the accused the accused
admits hypothetically the allegations of fact in the
information (People vs. Supnad, 7 SCRA 603 [1963]).
Therefore, petitioner admitted hypothetically in her
motion that:
(1) She was a public officer,
(2) She approved the application for legalization of
the stay of aliens, who arrived in the Philippines after
January 1, 1984;
(3) Those aliens were disqualified;
(4) She was cognizant of such fact; and
(5) She acted in 'evident bad faith and manifest
partiality in the execution of her official functions.'
In view of RA 3019 and Sec 16, Art VI of
the Constitution
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The order of suspension prescribed by
Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of
Congress to discipline its own ranks.
Section 16, Article VI of the Constitution —
which deals with the power of each House of Congress
inter alia to 'punish its Members for disorderly behavior,'
and 'suspend or expel a Member' by a vote of two-thirds
of all its Members subject to the qualification that the
penalty of suspension, when imposed, should not exceed
sixty days — is unavailing, as it appears to be quite
distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of
RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary,
preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the
latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior
as a Member of the House of Representatives."
In view of the power of the Court
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its
coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore,
the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the
assailed preventive suspension order.
Attention might be called to the fact that
Criminal Case No. 16698 has been decided by the First
Division of the Sandiganbayan on 06 December 1999,
acquitting herein petitioner. The Court, nevertheless,
deems it appropriate to render this decision for future
guidance on the significant issue raised by petitioner.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO, G.R. No. 133254-55,
April 19, 2001
Facts:
Two charges against accused-appellant for
violations of R.A. No. 6425 were filed docketed as Case
No. Q-95-64357 and Case No. Q-95-64358 alleging the
facts as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of December
1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly possess
and/or use 11.14 grams of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride (Shabu) a regulated drug, without the
necessary license and/or prescription therefor, in
violation of said law and knowingly have in his possession
and under his custody and control 1,254 grams of
Marijuana, a prohibited drug.
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant
pleaded not guilty.
Prosecution presented three witnesses.
For the defense, accused-appellant testified in his own
behalf. His testimony was corroborated by his mother-in-
law.
After hearing, the trial court rendered its
decision, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged and he is hereby accordingly
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence with a
minimum of six (6) months of arresto mayor and a
maximum of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional; and, accordingly sentenced to suffer
reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00.
Issues:
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1. Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred
in declaring the search warrant valid
2. Whether the court a quo erred in convicting
accused-appellant for illegal possession of
methamphetamine hydro-chloride (SHABU)
3. Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred
in convicting accused-appellant for violation Sec
8, R.A. No. 6425.
4. Whether or not the court a quo erred in
admitting in evidence the two (2) bricks of
marijuana.
5. Whether or not the court a quo erred in not
finding that the policemen used excessive force
in enforcing the search warrant.
Ruling:
First. It was held that the first part of the search
warrant, authorizing the search of accused-appellant's
house for an undetermined quantity of shabu, is valid,
even though the second part, with respect to the search
for drug paraphernalia, is not. Evidence was presented
showing probable cause of the existence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
However, the fact that there was no probable
cause to support the application for the seizure of drug
paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the
search warrant is void. This fact would be material only if
drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. The
fact is that none was taken by virtue of the search
warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is
void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug
paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of
methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which evidence
was presented showing probable cause as to its existence.
Second. Because the location of the shabu was
indicated in the warrant and thus known to the police
operatives, it is reasonable to assume that the police
found the packets of the shabu first. Once the valid
portion of the search warrant has been executed, the
"plain view doctrine" can no longer provide any basis -for
admitting the other items subsequently found.
Accordingly, for failure of the prosecution to
prove that the seizure of the marijuana without a warrant
was conducted in accordance with the "plain view
doctrine," we hold that the marijuana is inadmissible in
evidence against accused-appellant. However, the
confiscation of the drug must be upheld.
Third. The court justified the police officers’
claim that they had to use some force in order to gain
entry cannot be doubted. The occupants of the house,
especially accused-appellant, refused to open the door
despite the fact that the searching party knocked on the
door several times. Furthermore, the agents saw the
suspicious movements of the people inside the house.
These circumstances justified the searching party's
forcible entry into the house, founded as it is on the
apprehension that the execution of their mission would
be frustrated unless they do so.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
ALBERTO PASUDAG y BOKANG @ "BERTING",G.R.
No. 128822, May 4, 2001
Facts:
Information was filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Pangasinan, Urdaneta charging accused Alberto
Pasudag y Bokang with violation of R.A. No. 6425, Sec. 9.
That on or about September 26, 1995 and prior dates
thereto at barangay Artacho, municipality of Sison,
province of Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously plant,
cultivate, and culture seven (7) hills of marijuana in the
land tilled by him and situated beside the house of the
accused, without authority or permit to do so.
Contrary to Sec. 9 of R.A. 6425.
The trial court arraigned the accused who
pleaded not guilty. The trial court rendered a decision
finding the accused guilty as charged and, taking into
consideration his educational attainment (he reached
only grade IV), imposed the minimum of the imposable
penalty. He is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00
without subsidiary penalty and other accessories of the
law.
Issues:
1. Whether or not trial court erred in finding
that the marijuana plant submitted for
laboratory examination was one of the
seven (7) marijuana plants confiscated from
his garden; and
2. Whether or not the trial court erred in
concluding that the confiscation report was
not an extrajudicial admission which
required the intervention of his counsel; and
in convicting him on the basis of inference
that he planted, cultivated and cultured the
seven (7) plants, owned the same or that
he permitted others to cultivate the same.
Ruling:
The court found the appeal meritorious.
As a general rule, the procurement of a
search warrant is required before a law enforcer may
validly search or seize the person, house, papers or
effects of any individual.The Constitution provides that
"the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, x x x." Any evidence obtained
in violation of this provision is inadmissible. In the case
at bar, the police authorities had ample opportunity to
secure from the court a search warrant. SPO2 Pepito
Calip inquired as to who owned the house. He was
acquainted with marijuana plants and immediately
recognized that some plants in the backyard of the house
were marijuana plants. Time was not of the essence to
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uproot and confiscate the plants. They were three
months old and there was no sufficient reason to believe
that they would be uprooteds on that same day.
The Court is not unmindful of the difficulties of
law enforcement agencies in suppressing the illegal traffic
of dangerous drugs. However, quick solutions of crimes
and apprehension of malefactors do not justify a callous
disregard of the Bill of Rights. With the illegal seizure of
the marijuana plants subject of this case, the seized
plants are inadmissible in evidence against accused-
appellant.
Obviously, accused-appellant was a suspect
from the moment the police team went to his house and
ordered the uprooting of the marijuana plants in his
backyard garden.
The implied acquiescence to the search, if there
was any, could not have been more that mere passive
conformity given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all
within the purview of the constitutional guarantee." Even
if the confession or admission were "gospel truth", if it
was made without assistance of counsel and without a
valid waiver of such assistance, the confession is
inadmissible in evidence.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COMPACION, G.R.
No. 124442, July 20, 2001
Facts:
Acting on a confidential tip supplied by a police
informant that accused-appellant was growing and
cultivating marijuana plants, SPO1 Gilbert L. Linda and
SPO2 Basilio Sarong of the 6th Narcotic Regional Field
Unit of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) of the Bacolod
City Detachment conducted a surveillance of the
residence of accused-appellant who was then the
barangay captain of Barangay Bagonbon, San Carlos City,
Negros Occidental on July 9, 1995. During the said
surveillance, they saw two (2) tall plants in the backyard
of the accused-appellant which they suspected to be
marijuana plants. Despite failing to obtain a warrant, the
team proceeded to Barangay Bagonbon and arrived at
the residence of accused-appellant in the early morning
of July 13, 1995. SPO4 Villamor knocked at the gate and
called out for the accused-appellant. What happened
thereafter is subject to conflicting accounts. The
prosecution contends that the accused-appellant opened
the gate and permitted them to come in. He was
immediately asked by SPO4 Villamor about the suspected
marijuana plants and he admitted that he planted and
cultivated the same for the use of his wife who was
suffering from migraine. The operatives then uprooted
the suspected marijuana plants. Accused-appellant’s
version of what transpired is that around one-thirty in the
early morning of July 13, 1995 while he and his family
were sleeping, he heard somebody knocking outside his
house. He went down bringing with him a flashlight. After
he opened the gate, four (4) persons who he thought
were members of the military, entered the premises then
went inside the house. It was dark so he could not count
the others who entered the house as the same was lit
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only by a kerosene lamp. One of the four men told him to
sit in the living room. Some of the men went upstairs
while the others went around the house. None of them
asked for his permission to search his house and the
premises.
Issues:
Whether or not the search and seizure performed at
the backyard of the accused was valid.
Ruling:
NO. In the instant case, the search and seizure
conducted by the composite team in the house of
accused-appellant was not authorized by a search
warrant. It does not appear either that the situation falls
under any of the exceptions. Consequently, accused-
appellant's right against unreasonable search and seizure
was clearly violated. It is extant from the records that
accused-appellant did not consent to the warrantless
search and seizure conducted. While the right to be
secure from unreasonable search and seizure may, like
every right, be waived either expressly or impliedly, such
waiver must constitute a valid waiver made voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently. The act of the accused-
appellant in allowing the members of the military to enter
his premises and his consequent silence during the
unreasonable search and seizure could not be construed
as voluntary submission or an implied acquiescence to
warrantless search and seizure especially so when
members of the raiding team were intimidatingly
numerous and heavily armed.
As a general rule, objects in the "plain view" of
an officer who has the right to be in the position to have
that view are subject to seizure without a warrant. It is
usually applied where a police officer is not searching for
evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. Thus,
the following elements must be present before the
doctrine may be applied: (a) a prior valid intention based
on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b)
the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police
who have the right to be where they are; (c) the
evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d) "plain
view" justified were seizure of evidence without further
search.
Here, there was no valid warrantless arrest.
They forced their way into accused-appellant's premises
without the latter's consent. It is undisputed that the
NARCOM agents conducted a surveillance of the
residence of accused-appellant on July 9, 1995 on the
suspicion that he was growing and cultivating marijuana
when they allegedly came in "plain view" of the
marijuana plants. When the agents entered his premises
on July 13, 1995, their intention was to seize the
evidence against him. In fact, they initially wanted to
secure a search warrant but could not simply wait for one
to be issued. The NARCOM agents, therefore, did not
come across the marijuana plants inadvertently when
they conducted a surveillance and barged into accused-
appellant’s residence.
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SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INCORPORATED and
KAMAHALAN PUBLISHING CORPORATION, doing
business as MANILA STANDARD, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 147571,
May 5, 2001
Facts:
Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS)
is a private non-stock, non-profit social research
institution conducting surveys in various fields, including
economics, politics, demography, and social development,
and thereafter processing, analyzing, and publicly
reporting the results thereof. On the other hand,
petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation publishes
the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation,
which features newsworthy items of information including
election surveys.
Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to
enjoin the Commission on Elections from enforcing
Section 5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election Act), which
provides:
Surveys affecting national candidates shall not
be published fifteen (15) days before an election and
surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published
seven (7) days before an election.
The term "election surveys" is defined in Section
5.1 of the law as follows:
Election surveys refer to the measurement of
opinions and perceptions of the voters as regards a
candidate's popularity, qualifications, platforms or a
matter of public discussion in relation to the election,
including voters preference for candidates or publicly
discussed issues during the campaign period (hereafter
referred to as "Survey").
The implement of Section 5.4, Resolution 3636,
Sec. 24(h), dated March I, 2001, of the COMELEC enjoins:
Surveys affecting national candidates shall not
be published fifteen (15) days before an election and
surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published
seven (7) days before an election.
Issues:
Whether or not Section 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006
constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom
of speech, expression, and the press.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled Section 5.4 of R.A.
No.9006 as unconstitutional.
To be sure, Section 5.4 Iays a prior restraint on
freedom of speech, expression, and the press prohibiting
the publication of election survey results affecting
candidates within the prescribed periods of fifteen (15)
days immediately preceding a national election seven (7)
days before a local election. Because of the preferred
status of the constitutional rights of speech, expression,
and the press, such a measure is vitiated by a weighty
presumption of invalidity. Indeed, any system of prior
restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a
heavy presumption against its constitutional validity. The
Government thus carries a heavy burden of showing
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justification for in enforcement of such restraint. There,
thus a reversal of the normal presumption of validity that
inheres in every legislation.
What test should then be employed to determine
the constitutional validity of Sec. 5.4? The United States
Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Warren, held in
United States v. O 'Brien:
“[A] Government regulation is sufficiently
justified [1] if it is within the constitutional power of the
Government; [2] if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; [3] if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [4]
if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedoms [of speech, expression and press] is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.”
First, Sec. 5.4 fails to meet criterion [3] of the O
'Brien test because the causal connection of expression to
the asserted governmental interest makes such interest
"not related to the suppression of free expression." By
prohibiting the publication of election survey results
because of the possibility that such publication might
undermine the integrity of the election, Sec. 5.4 actually
suppresses a whole class of expression, while allowing
the expression of opinion concerning the same subject
matter by newspaper columnists, radio and TV
commentators, armchair theorists, and other opinion
takers. In effect, Sec. 5.4 shows a bias for a particular
subject matter, if not viewpoint, by referring personal
opinion to statistical results. The constitutional guarantee
of freedom of expression means that "the government
has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.
Second. Even if the governmental interest
sought to be promoted is unrelated to the suppression of
speech and the resulting restriction of free expression is
only incidental, Sec. 5.4 nonetheless fails to meet
criterion [4] of the O 'Brien test, namely, that the
restriction be not greater than is necessary to further the
governmental interest. As already stated, Sec. 5.4 aims
at the prevention of last-minute pressure on voters, the
creation of bandwagon effect, "junking" of weak or
"losing" candidates, and resort to the form of election
cheating called "dagdag-bawas." Praiseworthy as these
aims of the regulation might be, they cannot be attained
at the sacrifice of the fundamental right of expression,
when such aim can be more narrowly pursued by
punishing unlawful acts, rather than speech because of
apprehension that such speech creates the danger of
such evils.
PANFILO LACSON, MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO and
CESAR O. MANCAO, vs.
SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ, P/DIRECTOR
LEANDRO MENDOZA, and P/SR. SUPT. REYNALDO
BERROYA
357 SCRA 756; G.R. No. 147780 ; May 10, 2001
Facts:
President Macapagal-Arroyo declared a State of
Rebellion (Proclamation No. 38) on May 1, 2001 as well
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as General Order No. 1 ordering the AFP and the PNP to
suppress the rebellion in the NCR. Warrantless arrests of
several alleged leaders and promoters of the “rebellion”
were thereafter effected. Petitioner filed for prohibition,
injunction, mandamus and habeas corpus with an
application for the issuance of temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners
assail the declaration of Proc. No. 38 and the warrantless
arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof. Petitioners
furthermore pray that the appropriate court, wherein the
information against them was filed, would desist
arraignment and trial until this instant petition is resolved.
They also contend that they are allegedly faced with
impending warrantless arrests and unlawful restraint
being that hold departure orders were issued against
them.
Issues:
Whether or Not Proclamation No. 38 is valid, along with
the warrantless arrests and hold departure orders
allegedly effected by the same.
Ruling:
President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting
of Proc. No. 38 on May 6, 2006, accordingly the instant
petition has been rendered moot and academic.
Respondents have declared that the Justice Department
and the police authorities intend to obtain regular
warrants of arrests from the courts for all acts committed
prior to and until May 1, 2001. Under Section 5, Rule 113
of the Rules of Court, authorities may only resort to
warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion in
suppressing the rebellion if the circumstances so warrant,
thus the warrantless arrests are not based on Proc. No.
38. Petitioner’s prayer for mandamus and prohibition is
improper at this time because an individual warrantlessly
arrested has adequate remedies in law: Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court, providing for preliminary investigation,
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, providing for the
period in which a warrantlessly arrested person must be
delivered to the proper judicial authorities, otherwise the
officer responsible for such may be penalized for the
delay of the same. If the detention should have no legal
ground, the arresting officer can be charged with
arbitrary detention, not prejudicial to claim of damages
under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Petitioners were
neither assailing the validity of the subject hold departure
orders, nor were they expressing any intention to leave
the country in the near future. To declare the hold
departure orders null and void ab initio must be made in
the proper proceedings initiated for that purpose.
Petitioners’ prayer for relief regarding their alleged
impending warrantless arrests is premature being that no
complaints have been filed against them for any crime,
furthermore, the writ of habeas corpus is uncalled for
since its purpose is to relieve unlawful restraint which
petitioners are not subjected to.
Petition is dismissed. Respondents, consistent and
congruent with their undertaking earlier adverted to,
together with their agents, representatives, and all
persons acting in their behalf, are hereby enjoined from
arresting petitioners without the required judicial
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warrants for all acts committed in relation to or in
connection with the May 1, 2001 siege of Malacañang.
FRANCISCO YAP, JR., a.k.a. EDWIN YAP vs. COURT
OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 141529. June 6, 2001
Facts:
The right against excessive bail, and the liberty
of abode and travel, are being invoked to set aside two
resolutions of the Court of Appeals which fixed bail at
P5,500,000.00 and imposed conditions on change of
residence and travel abroad. For misappropriating
amounts equivalent to P5,500,000.00, petitioner was
convicted of estafa and was sentenced to four years and
two months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight
years of prision mayor as maximum, “in addition to one
(1) year for each additional P10,000.00 in excess of
P22,000.00 but in no case shall it exceed twenty (20)
years.” He filed a notice of appeal, and moved to be
allowed provisional liberty under the cash bond he had
filed earlier in the proceedings.
Issues:
Was the condition imposed by the CA on accused’s bail
bond violative of the liberty of abode and right to travel?
Ruling:
Imposing bail in an excessive amount could
render meaningless the right to bail. Under the
circumstances of this case, we find that appropriate
conditions have been imposed in the bail bond to ensure
against the risk of flight, particularly, the combination of
the hold-departure order and the requirement that
petitioner inform the court of any change of residence
and of his whereabouts. Although an increase in the
amount of bail while the case is on appeal may be
meritorious, we find that the setting of the amount at
P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive, and
constitutes an effective denial of petitioner’s right to bail.
ESTER M. ASUNCION vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
Second Division, MABINI MEDICAL CLINIC and DR.
WILFRIDO JUCO
G. R. No. 129329, July 31, 2001
Facts:
Petitioner was an accountant/bookkeeper of the
Mabini Medical Clinic. The NCR company discovered upon
petitioner’s disclosure that there were violations of the
Labor Standards Law. Later a memo was issued charging
petitioner with chronic absenteeism, habitual tardiness,
wasting time, getting money without a receipt, and
disobedience and was asked to explain why she should
not be terminated so she submitted her response. She
was dismissed on the same day so she filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter ruled that there
was illegal dismissal. The NLRC set it saying that
petitioner admitted that charges.
Issues:
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Whether or not there was illegal dismissal.
Ruling:
The SC ruled in favor of petitioner. For a valid
dismissal not only must there be just cause supported by
clear and convincing evidence, there must also be an
opportunity ;to be heard. The employer has the burden
to prove that the dismissal was just or authorized cause.
Failure to discharge this burden means that the
dismissal ;is unjustified. Here the evidence submitted
was merely unsigned handwritten records and printouts.
This is insufficient to justify a dismissal. The provision for
flexibility in administrative procedure does not justify
decisions without basis in evidence having rational
probative value. Here both the handwritten listing and
computer print outs being unsigned, so the authenticity is
suspect and devoid of any rational probative value. Nor
was there due process. There is no showing that there
was warning of the absences and tardiness. The 2-day
period given to answer the allegations is an unreasonably
short period of time. The clinic can’t have given ample
opportunity to answer the charges filed. There are
serious doubts as to the factual basis of the charges
against petitioner. There doubts shall be resolved in her
favor in line with the policy rule list that if doubts exists
between the evidence presented by the employer and the
employee, the scales of justice must be titled in favor of
the latter.
CITY OF MANILA vs. OSCAR, FELICITAS, JOSE,
BENJAMIN, ESTELITA, LEONORA AND ADELAIDA,
ALL SURNAMED SERRANO, G.R. No. 142304, June
20, 2001
Facts:
On December 21, 1993, the City Council of
Manila enacted Ordinance 7833, authorizing the
expropriation of certain properties in Manila’s First
District in Tondo, covered by TCTs 70869, 105201,
105202, and 138273 of the Register of Deeds of Manila,
which are to be sold and distributed to qualified
occupants pursuant to the Land Use Development
Program of the City of Manila. One of the properties
sought to be expropriated, denominated as Lot 1-C,
consists of 343.10 square meters, and was in the name
of Feliza de Guia. Lot 1-C was assigned to Edgardo De
Guia, one of the heirs of Alberto De Guia, in turn one of
the heirs of Feliza de Guia. On 29 July 1994, the said
property was transferred to Lee Kuan Hui, in whose name
TCT 217018 was issued. The property was subsequently
sold on 24 January 1996 to Demetria De Guia to whom
TCT 226048 was issued. On 26 September 1997, the City
of Manila filed an amended complaint for expropriation
(Civil Case 94-72282) with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 16, Manila, against the supposed owners of the
lots covered by TCTs 70869 (including Lot 1-C), 105201,
105202, and 138273, which included herein respondents
Oscar, Felicitas, Jose, Benjamin, Estelita, Leonora,
Adelaida, all surnamed Serrano. On November 12, 1997,
the Serranos filed a consolidated answer, praying the
exemption of Lot 1-C from expropriation. Upon motion by
the City, the trial court issued an order, dated October 9,
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Political Law Jurisprudence
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1998, directing the City to deposit the amount of
P1,825,241.00 equivalent to the assessed value of the
properties. After the City had made the deposit, the trial
court issued another order, dated 15 December 1998,
directing the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of
the City. The Serranos filed a petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals. On November 16, 1999, the Court
of Appeals rendered a decision holding that although Lot
1-C is not exempt from expropriation because it
undeniably exceeds 300 square meters which is no longer
considered a small property within the framework of RA
7279, the other modes of acquisition of lands
enumerated in Sec. 9-10 of the law must first be tried by
the city government before it can resort to expropriation,
and thus enjoined the City from expropriating Lot 1-C. In
its resolution, dated February 23, 2000, the Court of
Appeals likewise denied two motions for reconsideration
filed by the City. The City filed a petition for review on
certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Issues:
Whether it was premature to determine whether the
requirements of RA 7279, Sec. 9-10 have been
complied with.
Ruling:
Rule 67, Sec. 2 provides that “Upon the filing of
the complaint or at any time thereafter and after due
notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall have the right
to take or enter upon the possession of the real property
involved if he deposits with the authorized government
depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of
the property for purposes of taxation to be held by such
bank subject to the orders of the court. Such deposit
shall be in money, unless in lieu thereof the court
authorizes the deposit of a certificate of deposit of a
government bank of the Republic of the Philippines
payable on demand to the authorized government
depositary. If personal property is involved, its value
shall be provisionally ascertained and the amount to be
deposited shall be fixed by the court. After such deposit
is made the court shall order the sheriff or other proper
officer to forthwith place the plaintiff in possession of the
property involved and promptly submit a report thereof
to the court with service of copies to the parties.” Thus, a
writ of execution may be issued by a court upon the filing
by the government of a complaint for expropriation
sufficient in form and substance and upon deposit made
by the government of the amount equivalent to the
assessed value of the property subject to expropriation.
Upon compliance with these requirements, the issuance
of the writ of possession becomes ministerial. Herein,
these requirements were satisfied and, therefore, it
became the ministerial duty of the trial court to issue the
writ of possession. The distinction between the Filstream
and the present case is that in the former, the judgment
in that case had already become final while herein, the
trial court has not gone beyond the issuance of a writ of
possession. Hearing is still to be held to determine
whether or not petitioner indeed complied with the
requirements provided in RA 7279. Whether the City has
complied with these provisions requires the presentation
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of evidence, although in its amended complaint petitioner
did allege that it had complied with the requirements.
The determination of this question must await the
hearing on the complaint for expropriation, particularly
the hearing for the condemnation of the properties
sought to be expropriated. Expropriation proceedings
consists of two stages: first, condemnation of the
property after it is determined that its acquisition will be
for a public purpose or public use and, second, the
determination of just compensation to be paid for the
taking of private property to be made by the court with
the assistance of not more than three commissioners.
SANTIAGO ESLABAN, JR., in his capacity as Project
Manager of the National Irrigation Administration,
vs. CLARITA VDA. DE ONORIO,
G.R. No. 146062, June 28, 2001
Facts:
Clarita Vda. de Onorio is the owner of a lot in
Barangay M. Roxas, Sto. Nino, South Cotabato with an
area of 39,512 square meters (Lot 1210-A-Pad-11-
000586, TCT T-22121 of the Registry of Deeds, South
Cotabato). On 6 October 1981, Santiago Eslaban, Jr.,
Project Manager of the NIA, approved the construction of
the main irrigation canal of the NIA on the said lot,
affecting a 24,660 square meter portion thereof. De
Onorio’s husband agreed to the construction of the NIA
canal provided that they be paid by the government for
the area taken after the processing of documents by the
Commission on Audit. Sometime in 1983, a Right-of-Way
agreement was executed between De Onorio and the NIA.
The NIA then paid De Onorio the amount of P4,180.00 as
Right-of-Way damages. De Onorio subsequently executed
an Affidavit of Waiver of Rights and Fees whereby she
waived any compensation for damages to crops and
improvements which she suffered as a result of the
construction of a right-of-way on her property. The same
year, Eslaban offered De Onorio the sum of P35,000,00
by way of amicable settlement (financial assistance)
pursuant to Executive Order 1035, §18. De Onorio
demanded payment for the taking of her property, but
Eslaban/NIA refused to pay. Accordingly, De Onorio filed
on 10 December 1990 a complaint against Eslaban before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), praying that Eslaban/NIA
be ordered to pay the sum of P111,299.55 as
compensation for the portion of her property used in the
construction of the canal constructed by the NIA,
litigation expenses, and the costs. Eslaban admitted that
NIA constructed an irrigation canal over the property of
De Onorio and that NIA paid a certain landowner whose
property had been taken for irrigation purposes, but
Eslaban interposed the defense that: (1) the government
had not consented to be sued; (2) the total area used by
the NIA for its irrigation canal was only 2.27 hectares,
not 24,600 square meters; and (3) that De Onorio was
not entitled to compensation for the taking of her
property considering that she secured title over the
property by virtue of a homestead patent under
Commonwealth Act 141. On 18 October 1993, the trial
court rendered a decision, ordering the NIA to pay to De
Onorio the sum of P107,517.60 as just compensation for
the questioned area of 24,660 square meters of land
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owned by De Onorio and taken by the NIA which used it
for its main canal plus costs. On 15 November 1993, the
NIA appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on 31
October 2000, affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court. NIA filed the petition for review.
Issues:
Whether the valuation of just compensation is
determined at the time the property was taken or at
the time the complaint for expropriation is filed.
Ruling:
Whenever public lands are alienated, granted or
conveyed to applicants thereof, and the deed grant or
instrument of conveyance (sales patent) registered with
the Register of Deeds and the corresponding certificate
and owner’s duplicate of title issued, such lands are
deemed registered lands under the Torrens System and
the certificate of title thus issued is as conclusive and
indefeasible as any other certificate of title issued to
private lands in ordinary or cadastral registration
proceedings. The only servitude which a private property
owner is required to recognize in favor of the government
is the easement of a “public highway, way, private way
established by law, or any government canal or lateral
thereof where the certificate of title does not state that
the boundaries thereof have been pre-determined.” This
implies that the same should have been pre-existing at
the time of the registration of the land in order that the
registered owner may be compelled to respect it.
Conversely, where the easement is not pre-existing and
is sought to be imposed only after the land has been
registered under the Land Registration Act, proper
expropriation proceedings should be had, and just
compensation paid to the registered owner thereof.
Herein, the irrigation canal constructed by the NIA on the
contested property was built only on October 6, 1981,
several years after the property had been registered on
13 May 1976. Accordingly, prior expropriation
proceedings should have been filed and just
compensation paid to the owner thereof before it could
be taken for public use. With respect to the compensation
which the owner of the condemned property is entitled to
receive, it is likewise settled that it is the market value
which should be paid or “that sum of money which a
person, desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner,
willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a
price to be given and received therefore.” Further, just
compensation means not only the correct amount to be
paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the
land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without
prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered
“just” for then the property owner is made to suffer the
consequence of being immediately deprived of his land
while being made to wait for a decade or more before
actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his
loss. Nevertheless, there are instances where the
expropriating agency takes over the property prior to the
expropriation suit, in which case just compensation shall
be determined as of the time of taking, not as of the time
of filing of the action of eminent domain. The value of the
property, thus, must be determined either as of the date
Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!
of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint,
“whichever came first.”
ANTONIO BENGZON III vs. HOUSE of
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and
Teodoro Cruz, 357 SCRA 545; G. R. No. 142840,
May 7, 2001
Facts:
Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente,
Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The
fundamental law then applicable was the 1935
Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however,
respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine
Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the
Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United
States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship
for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a
Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other,
"rendering service to or accepting commission in the
armed forces of a foreign country.” He was naturalized in
US in 1990. On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz
reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation
under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and was elected
as the Representative of the Second District of
Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won over
petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for
re-election.
Issues:
Whether or not respondent Cruz is a natural born
citizen of the Philippines in view of the constitutional
requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the
House of Representative unless he is a natural-born
citizen.”
Ruling:
Respondent is a natural born citizen of the
Philippines. As distinguished from the lengthy process of
naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking
of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine
and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the
place where the person concerned resides or last resided.
This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former
status as a natural-born Filipino.
CITY WARDEN OF THE MANILA CITY JAIL vs.
RAYMOND S. ESTRELLA, G.R. No. 141211, August
31, 2001
Facts:
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines National
Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA) initiated a jail visitation
program. IBP volunteer lawyers and law students visited
various jails in Metro Manila. In the City Jail of Manila,
they found 34 prisoners, herein respondents, whom they
believed were entitled to be released after deducting time
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allowances for good conduct in the service of their
respective sentences. Respondents asked herein
petitioner Rosendo M. Dial, City Warden of the Manila
City Jail, to effect their release on the ground that they
had already served their sentences, less time allowances
for good conduct. Respondents invoked Arts. 97 and 99
of the Revised PenalCode.
Issues:
Does the Director of Prisons have control and
supervision of the city jails of Manila?
Ruling:
No. Under the Revised Charter of the City of
Manila (R.A. No. 409), the Director of Prisons did not
have control and supervision of the city jails of Manila. It
was the Chief of Police of Manila who under Section 34 of
the Charter "shall exercise supervision, administration,
and control over the city jail and municipal prisoners."
There is no inconsistency between Art. 99 and R.A. No.
6975. Repeals by implication are not favored. To the
contrary, every statute must be so interpreted and
brought in accord with other laws as to form a uniform
system of jurisprudence. Interpretare et concordare
leqibus est optimus interpretendi. For there to be an
implied repeal, there must be a clear showing of
repugnance. The language used in the later statute must
be such as to render it irreconcilable with what has been
formerly enacted. An inconsistency that falls short of that
standard does not suffice.
ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW Labor Party vs.
COMELEC ,G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001
Facts:
Petitioner challenged a resolution issued by the
COMELEC. Petitioner seeks the disqualification of certain
major political parties in the 2001 party-list elections
arguing that the party-list system was intended to benefit
the marginalized and underrepresented and not the
mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or
overrepresented.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not political parties may participate
in the party-list elections.
(2) Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive
to marginalized and under-represented sectors
and organizations.
Ruling:
Under the Constitution and RA 7941, major
political parties cannot be disqualified from the party-list
elections merely on the ground that they are political
parties. But while even major political parties are
expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to
participate in the party-list system, they must comply
with the declared statutory policy of enabling Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
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sectors to be elected to the House of Representatives. In
other words, while they are not disqualified merely on the
ground that they are political parties, they must show,
however, that they represent the interests of the
marginalized and underrepresented.
LACSASA M. ADIONG vs. COURT OF APPEALS ,G.R.
No. 136480, December 4, 2001
Facts:
In this petition for review on certiorari,
petitioner seeks the review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals as well as its resolution denying reconsideration
thereof.
On December 6, 1994, Mayor Sultan Serad A.
Batua issued a permanent appointment to Nasiba A.
Nuska to the position of Municipal Local Civil Registrar.
The same appointment was duly approved by the Civil
Service Commission Office, Marawi City on December 9,
1994. The new mayor, Lacsasa M. Adiong issued a
memorandum informing all municipal employees of the
termination of their appointment and directing them to
clear themselves from money and property
accountabilities. On July 1, 1995, another memorandum
clarified this by specifying that the mass termination of
services applied only to temporary or casual workers and
requiring those holding approved permanent
appointments to submit copies of their appointments.
Due to respondent Nuska's failure to submit a copy of her
appointment coupled with her failure to make a courtesy
call on the petitioner as the new mayor, he terminated
her services and appointed a certain Nanayaon Samporna
in her stead.
On August 27, 1995, respondent Nuska wrote
Mayor Adiong requesting for her reinstatement and
payment of salaries covering the period July 1, 1995 to
August 31, 1995. Mayor Adiong failed to act on the
request. Hence, on March 11, 1996, respondent Nuska
appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The
latter issued a resolution declaring the termination of
Nuska’s employment to be invalid and ordering her
immediate reinstatement.
On March 17, 1997, petitioner Mayor Adiong
filed a motion for reconsideration. On December 11, 1997,
the CSC denied the motion. Mayor Adiong filed with the
Court of Appeals a petition for review with preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order. The CA
dismissed the petition and affirmed the resolution of CSC.
Issues:
Whether or not respondent Nuska’s termination of
employment was valid.
Ruling:
NO. The Constitution provides that: "No person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws." It further mandates that: "No
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officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed
are suspended except for cause provided by law."
In this case, respondent Nuska had a permanent
appointment to the position of municipal civil registrar of
Ditsaan Ramain, Lanao Del Sur. She thus enjoyed
security of tenure as guaranteed by law. As an employee
in the civil service and as a civil service eligible,
respondent Nuska entitled to the benefits, rights and
privileges extended to those belonging to the classified
service. She could not be removed or dismissed from the
service without just cause and without observing the
requirements of due process.
The reasons advanced by petitioner why
respondent Nuska's employment was terminated were
the following: failure to make a courtesy call, failure to
submit her appointment papers, and failure to report to
work which was tantamount to abandonment. The failure
to make a courtesy call to one's superior is not an offense,
much less a ground to terminate a person's employment.
Respondent Nuska's failure to submit her appointment
papers is not a cause for her outright dismissal. It was
not shown that respondent Nuska was informed of the
July 1, 1995 memorandum requiring those with
permanent appointments to submit their papers. At the
very least, petitioner could have reminded her to submit
the documents without terminating her employment
immediately.
On the alleged abandonment by respondent
Nuska of her position, the same is without any basis. It is
significant to note that Nuska, in her letter dated 27
August 1995, informed Mayor Adiong that she did not
resign and that the termination of her services was not in
accordance with existing Civil Service rules and
regulations. She requested that she be reinstated to her
lawful position and her back salaries be paid accordingly.
The foregoing explains that although Nuska was
physically absent in the office premises, all the while, she
had the intention to return to work. Hence, she could not
be deemed to have abandoned or relinquished her right
to the position under an appointment with permanent
employment status.
A person holding a public office may abandon
such office by non-user or acquiescence. Non-user refers
to a neglect to use a right or privilege or to exercise an
office. However, nonperformance of the duties of an
office does not constitute abandonment where such
nonperformance results from temporary disability or from
involuntary failure perform
Abandonment may also result from
acquiescence by the officer in his wrongful removal or
discharge, for instance, after a summary removal; an
unreasonable delay by an officer illegally removed in
taking steps to vindicate his rights may constitute an
abandonment of the office. If a person was still willing to
return to work despite his physical absence, it would not
constitute as abandonment.
BENEDICTO and RIVERA vs. COURT OF APPEALS ,
G.R. No. 125359, September 4, 2001
Facts:
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On December 27, 1991, Mrs. Imelda Marcos and
Messrs. Benedicto and Rivera were indicted for violation
of Section 10 of Circular No. 960 1 in relation to Section
34 of the Central Bank Act (Republic Act No. 265, as
amended) in five Informations filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Manila. Docketed as Criminal Cases Nos.
91-101879 to 91-101883, the charge sheets alleged that
the trio failed to submit reports of their foreign exchange
earnings from abroad and/or failed to register with the
Foreign Exchange Department of the Central Bank within
the period mandated by Circular No. 960. Said Circular
prohibited natural and juridical persons from maintaining
foreign exchange accounts abroad without prior
authorization from the Central Bank.
On August 11, 1994, petitioners moved to quash
all the Informations filed against them in Criminal Cases
Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883; 91-101884 to 91-101892,
and 91-101959 to 91- 101969. Their motion was
grounded on lack of jurisdiction, forum shopping, and
absence of a preliminary investigation and extinction of
criminal liability with the repeal of Circular No. 960.
On September 6, 1994, the trial court denied
petitioners' motion. A similar motion filed on May 23,
1994 by Mrs. Marcos seeking to dismiss the dollar-salting
cases against her due to the repeal of Circular No. 960
had earlier been denied by the trial court in its order
dated June 9, 1994. Petitioners then filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the trial court likewise denied this
motion on October 18, 1994.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
denying the Motion to Quash for absence of a valid
preliminary investigation.
(2) Whether or not the repeal of Central Bank Circular
No. 960 and Republic Act No. 265 by Circular No. 1353
and Republic Act No. 7653 respectively, extinguish the
criminal liability of petitioners.
Ruling:
(1) NO. Preliminary investigation is not part of
the due process guaranteed by the Constitution. It is an
inquiry to determine whether there is sufficient ground to
engender a well- founded belief that a crime has been
committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof.
Instead, the right to a preliminary investigation is
personal. It is afforded to the accused by statute, and
can be waived, either expressly or by implication.
When the records of the case were disclosed to
them, in opting to enter their respective pleas to the
charges, and filed various motions and pleadings, they
are deemed to have made an express waiver of their
right to have a preliminary investigation.
(2) NO. In the instant case, it must be noted
that despite the repeal of Circular No. 960, Circular No.
1353 retained the same reportorial requirement for
residents receiving earnings or profits from non-trade
foreign exchange transactions. Even the most cursory
glance at the repealing circulars, Circular Nos. 1318 and
1353 shows that both contain a saving clause expressly
providing that the repeal of Circular No. 960 shall have
no effect on pending actions for violation of the latter
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Circular. A saving clause operates to except from the
effect of the repealing law what would otherwise be lost
under the new law. In the present case, the respective
saving clauses of Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 clearly
manifest the intent to reserve the right of the State to
prosecute and punish offenses for violations of the
repealed Circular No. 960, where the cases are either
pending or under investigation.
BERNARDO vs. ABALOS , G.R. No. 137266,
December 5. 2001
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari seeking the
nullification of Resolution No. 98-3208 of the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc promulgated on
December 1, 1998 dismissing the complaint for vote
buying filed by petitioners against respondents.
On April 21, 1998, petitioners Antonio M.
Bernardo, Ernesto A. Domingo, Jr. and Jesus C. Cruz filed
with the COMELEC a criminal complaint against
respondents Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr., Benjamin C. Abalos,
Jr., Dr. Eden C. Diaz, Romeo Zapanta and Arcadio de
Vera for vote buying in violation of Section 261,
paragraphs (a), (b) and (j) of the Omnibus Election Code
(OEC), in relation to Section 28 of Republic Act 6646 and
Section 68 of the OEC. The complaint, docketed as E.O.
Case No. 98-110, alleged that: “Respondents sponsored,
arranged and conducted an all-expense-free
transportation, food and drinks affair for the
Mandaluyong City public school teachers, registered
voters of said city, at the Tayabas Bay Beach Resort,
Sariaya, Quezon Province.
“Mayor Benjamin Abalos, Sr. delivered a speech
wherein he offered and promised the Mandaluyong City
public school teachers and employees a ‘hazard’ pay of
P1,000.00, and increasing their allowances from
P1,500.00 to P2,000.00 for food, or with a total of
P3,000.00 which they will get by the end of the month.
“The offers and promises to said public school
teachers, who are members of the Board of Election
Inspectors of Mandaluyong City and registered voters
thereat, were made a few weeks before the election to
induce or unduly influence the said teachers and the
public in general (the other guests) to vote for the
candidacy of Benjamin ‘Benhur’ Abalos, Jr.”
On December 1, 1998, the COMELEC En Banc
issued the assailed Resolution No. 98- 3208 dismissing
the complaint "for insufficiency of evidence to establish
prima facie case." On February 09, 1999, petitioners,
without first submitting a motion for reconsideration, filed
the instant petition with this Court.
Issues:
Whether petitioner’s failure to submit a motion for
reconsideration was fatal to his cause of action.
Ruling:
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YES. Petitioners did not exhaust all the remedies
available to them at the COMELEC level. Specifically, they
did not seek a reconsideration of the assailed COMELEC
En Banc Resolution as required by Section 1, Rule 13 of
the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Petitioners'
failure to file the required motion for reconsideration
utterly disregarded the COMELEC Rules intended "to
achieve an orderly, just, expeditious and inexpensive
determination and disposition of every action and
proceeding brought before the Commission."
Contrary to petitioners' statement that a resort
to a motion for reconsideration is "dilatory," it bears
stressing that the purpose of the said motion is to give
the COMELEC an opportunity to correct the error imputed
to it. If the error is immediately corrected by way of a
motion for reconsideration, then it is the most
expeditious and inexpensive recourse. But if the
COMELEC refuses to correct a patently erroneous act,
then it commits a grave abuse of discretion justifying
recourse by the aggrieved party to a petition for certiorari.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, can only be
resorted to if "there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.''
Having failed to file the required motion for
reconsideration of the challenged Resolution, petitioners'
instant petition is certainly premature. Significantly, they
have not raised any plausible reason for their direct
recourse to this Court.
CRUZ and PAITIM vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION ,
G.R. No. 144464, November 22, 2001
Facts:
On September 9, 1994 it was discovered by the
Civil Service Commission (CSC) that Paitim, Municipal
Treasurer of Bulacan took the non-professional
examination for Cruz after the latter had previously failed
in the said examination three times.
The CSC found after a fact finding investigation
that a prima facie case exists against you for
DISHONESTY, GRAVE MISCONDUCT and CONDUCT
PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST INTEREST OF THE SERVICE.
The petitioners filed their Answer to the charge
entering a general denial of the material averments of
the "Formal Charge." They also declared that they were
electing a formal investigation on the matter. The
petitioners subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss
averring that if the investigation will continue, they will
be deprived of their right to due process because the Civil
Service Commission was the complainant, the Prosecutor
and the Judge, all at the same time. On November 16,
1995, Dulce J. Cochon issued an "Investigation Report
and Recommendation" finding the Petitioners guilty of
"Dishonesty" and ordering their dismissal from the
government service
Petitioners maintain that the CSC did not have
original jurisdiction to hear and decide the administrative
case. Allegedly, in accordance with Section 47(1),
Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title 1, Book V, Administrative
Code of 1987, the CSC is vested with appellate
jurisdiction only in all administrative cases where the
penalty imposed is removal or dismissal from the office
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and where the complaint was filed by a private citizen
against the government employee.
Issues:
Whether or not petitioners’ right to due process was
violated when the CSC acted as investigator,
complainant, prosecutor and jugde all at the same time.
Ruling:
NO. The fact that the complaint was filed by the
CSC itself does not mean that it could not be an impartial
judge. As an administrative body, its decision was based
on substantial findings. Factual findings of administrative
bodies, being considered experts in their field, are
binding on the Supreme Court. The records clearly
disclose that the petitioners were duly investigated by the
CSC.
After a careful examination of the records, the
Commission finds respondents guilty as charged. The
photograph pasted over the name Gilda Cruz in the
Picture Seat Plan (PSP) during the July 30, 1989 Career
Service Examination is not that of Cruz but of Paitim.
Also, the signature over the name of Gilda Cruz in the
said document is totally different from the signature of
Gilda Cruz.
Petitioners' contention that they were denied
due process of law by the fact that the CSC acted as
investigator, complainant, prosecutor and judge, all at
the same time against the petitioners is untenable. The
CA correctly explained that the CSC is mandated to hear
and decide administrative case instituted by it or
instituted before it directly or on appeal including actions
of its officers and the agencies attached to it pursuant to
Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 3, Section 12,
paragraph 11 of the Administrative Code of 1987.
It cannot be denied that the petitioners were
formally charged after a finding that a prima facie case
for dishonesty lies against them. They were properly
informed of the charges. They submitted an Answer and
were given the opportunity to defend themselves.
Petitioners cannot, therefore, claim that there was a
denial of due process much less the lack of jurisdiction on
the part of the CSC to take cognizance of the case.
DE LEON vs. COURT OF APPEALS ,G.R. No. 127182,
December 5, 2001
Facts:
In the Decision sought to be reconsidered, we
ruled that private respondent's appointment on August
28, 1986, as Ministry Legal Counsel - CESO IV of the
Ministry of Local Government, was temporary. Applying
the case of Achacoso v. Macaraig, we held that since
private respondent was not a Career Executive Service
(CES) eligible, his appointment did not attain
permanency because he did not possess the required
CES eligibility for the CES position to which he was
appointed. Hence, he can be transferred or reassigned
without violating his right to security of tenure.
It appears, however, that in Jacob Montesa v. Santos,
et al., decided on September 26, 1990, where the
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nature of private respondent's appointment as Ministry
Legal Counsel - CESO IV, of the Ministry of Local
Government, was first contested, this Court issued a
Minute Resolution dated March 17, 1992, holding that
Achacoso v. Macaraig is not applicable to the case of
private respondent.
There was no Career Executive Service Board
during the Freedom Constitution or at the time of
appointment of petitioner. The CESO was only
reconstituted by the appointment of its Board of six (6)
members sometime in August 1988. There was no
CESO eligibility examination during petitioner's
incumbency in the Department, as there was no CESO
board. The first CESO examination was given on
August 5 and 12, 1990. The CESO eligibility was not a
requirement at the time of the appointment of
petitioner. The only eligibility required is that of a first
grader and petitioner is a first grade eligible. Therefore,
having met all the requirements for the position to
which he was appointed, he cannot be removed in
violation of the constitutional guarantee on security of
tenure and due process.
Invoking res judicata, private respondent
contends that the nature of his appointment can no
longer be passed upon and controverted in the present
case considering that said issue had already been
settled in the foregoing Minute Resolution of the Court.
Issues:
Whether or not res judicata applies.
Ruling:
NO. Concededly, if we follow the conventional
procedural path, i.e., the principle on conclusiveness of
judgment set forth in Rule 39, Section 47, paragraph (c)
of the Rules of Court, 3 would bar a re-litigation of the
nature of private respondent's appointment. Indeed, once
an issue has been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of
a competent court, it can no longer be controverted anew
and should be finally laid to rest.
Yet, the Court is not precluded from re-
examining its own ruling and rectifying errors of
judgment if blind and stubborn adherence to res judicata
would involve the sacrifice of justice to technicality. It
must be stressed that this is not the first time in
Philippine and American jurisprudence that the principle
of res judicata has been set aside in favor of substantial
justice, which is after all the avowed purpose of all law
and jurisprudence.
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, GR 148560, 19
November 2001
Facts:
On 4 April 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman
filed before the Sandiganbayan 8 separate Informations,
docketed as: (a) Criminal Case 26558, for violation of
Republic Act (RA) 7080, as amended by RA 7659; (b)
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Criminal Cases 26559 to 26...562, inclusive, for violation
of Sections 3, paragraph (a), 3, paragraph (a), 3,
paragraph (e), and 3, paragraph (e) of RA 3019 (Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), respectively; (c)
Criminal Case 26563, for violation of Section 7,
paragraph (d), of RA 6713 (The Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees); (d)
Criminal Case 26564, for Perjury (Article. 183 of The
Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Criminal Case 26565, for
Illegal Use Of An Alias (Commonwealth Act 142, as
amended by RA 6085). On 11 April 2001, Joseph Estrada
filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to
the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation with
respect to specification “d” of the charges in the
Information in Criminal Case 26558; and, for
reconsideration / reinvestigation of the offenses under
specifications “a,” “b,” and “c” to give the accused an
opportunity to file counter-affidavits and other
documents necessary to prove lack of probable cause.
The grounds raised were only lack of preliminary
investigation, reconsideration / reinvestigation of
offenses, and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause.
The purported ambiguity of the charges and the
vagueness of the law under which they are charged were
never raised in that Omnibus Motion thus indicating the
explicitness and comprehensibility of the Plunder Law. On
25 April 2001, the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued
a Resolution in Criminal Case No. 26558 finding that “a
probable cause for the offense of plunder exists to justify
the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused.”
On 25 June 2001 petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
was denied by the Sandiganbayan. On 14 June 2001,
Estrada moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case
26558 on the ground that the facts alleged therein did
not constitute an indictable offense since the law on
which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness,
and that the Amended Information for Plunder charged
more than one (1) offense. On 9 July 2001, the
Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s Motion to Quash.
Issues:
Whether the Plunder law, and the information, are clear
to inform Estrada of the accusations against him as to
enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense.
Ruling:
As it is written, the Plunder Law contains
ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters
which would enable the accused to determine the nature
of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its
description of the acts,... conduct and conditions required
or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime
with reasonable certainty and particularity. As long as the
law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that
would inform those who are subject to it what conduct
would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will
be sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its
application; the counsel, in defending one charged with
its violation; and more importantly, the accused, in
identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct. Indeed, it
can be understood with little difficulty that what the
assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in
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amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least
P50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts
enumerated in Section 1, paragraph (d), of the Plunder
Law. Herein, the amended Information itself closely
tracks the language of the law, indicating with reasonable
certainty the various elements of the offense which
Estrada is alleged to have committed. There was nothing
that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse Estrada in
his defense. Factual assertions clearly show that the
elements of the crime are easily understood and provide
adequate contrast between the innocent and the
prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions,
Estrada is completely informed of the accusations against
him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense.
There is no basis for Estrada’s claim that the Supreme
Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its
entirety. A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a
vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of
possible “chilling effect” upon protected speech. The
theory is that “[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe
speech and no readily apparent construction suggests
itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single
prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of
constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify
allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no
requirement that the person making the attack
demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated
by a statute drawn with narrow specificity.” This rationale
does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have
general in terrorem effect resulting from their very
existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this
reason alone, the State may well be prevented from
enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the
area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in
the area of free speech. The void-for-vagueness doctrine
states that “a statute which either forbids or requires the
doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application, violates the first essential of
due process of law.” The over breadth doctrine, on the
other hand, decrees that “a governmental purpose may
not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms.” The doctrines of strict scrutiny, over breadth,
and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing
“on their faces” statutes in free speech cases. “On its
face” invalidation of statutes has been described as
“manifestly strong medicine,” to be employed “sparingly
and only as a last resort,” and is generally disfavored.
JUDGE RENATO A. FUENTES vs. OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN-MINDANAO, et al. G.R. No. 124295,
October 23, 2001
Facts:
The Republic of the Philippines (represented by
DPWH) filed an expropriation case against the owners of
the properties affected by the project before the trial
court presided by petitioner Judge Renato A. Fuentes.
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DPWH won the expropriation case and as of 19 May 1994,
it still owed the lot owners the following amounts:
Reynaldo Lao – P489, 000; Tessie Amadeo – P1, 094,200;
and Alfonso Galo – P13, 927,215. On 5 April 1994, the
trial court granted Amadeo’s motion for the issuance of a
writ of execution against the DPWH to satisfy her unpaid
claim. The writ was served by Sheriff Paralisan to the
DPWH-Region IX. On 3 May 1994, Paralisan issued a
Notice of Levy addressed to the Regional Director
describing the properties subject of the levy. The auction
sale pushed through on 18 May 1994 with Alex Bacquial
as the highest bidder and the corresponding certificate of
sale was issued by Paralisan.
On 19 May 1994, Bacquial and Paralisan
attempted to withdraw the auctioned properties but were
prevented from doing so by the custodian of the subject
DPWH properties. On 20 May 1994, Bacquial filed an ex-
parte urgent motion for the issuance of a “break-through”
order to enable him to effect the withdrawal of the
auctioned properties. The motion was granted by
petitioner on the same date. Armed with the court order,
Bacqiual succeeded in hauling off the properties for 5
successive days until the lower court issued another
order temporarily suspending the writ of execution earlier
issued. However, on 21 June 1994, the lower court
issued another order upholding the validity of the writ of
execution.
On the basis of letters from Cong. Manuel Garcia
of the 2nd District of Davao City and the DPWH custodian,
the Court Administrator, Supreme Court directed
petitioner and Paralisan to comment on the report
recommending the filing of an administrative case against
the sheriff and other persons responsible for the
anomalous implementation of the writ of execution. By
virtue of an administrative complaint filed by the DPWH,
Paralisan was dismissed from the service by the Supreme
Court on 23 August 1995. The Court further directed the
Court Administrator to conduct an investigation on
petitioner and to charge him if the investigation so
warrants.
On 15 January 1996, Dir. Antonio Valenzuela of
the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao recommended
that petitioner be charged before the Sandiganbayan with
violation of R.A. 3019, Sec. 3(e) and likewise be
administratively charged before the Supreme Court for
acts unbecoming of a judge. On 22 January 1996,
Valenzuela filed with the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Mindanao a criminal complaint charging
petitioner with violation of R.A. 3019, Sec. 3 (e). On 22
February 1996, petitioner filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao a motion to dismiss complaint
and/or manifestation to forward all records to the
Supreme Court. The motion was denied.
Issues:
Whether or not the Ombudsman may conduct an
investigation of acts of a judge in the exercise of his
official functions alleged to be in violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in the absence of an
administrative charge for the same acts before the
Supreme Court.
Ruling:
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NO. R.A. 6770, otherwise known as the
Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides: “Sec. 15. Powers,
Functions and Duties. – The Office of the Ombudsman
shall have the following powers, functions and duties: (1)
Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by
any person, any act or omission of any public officer or
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It
has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary
jurisdiction; it may take over, at any stage, from any
investigatory agency of the Government, the
investigation of such cases.”
“Sec. 21. Officials Subject to Disciplinary
Authority, Exceptions. – The Office of the Ombudsman
shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and
appointive officials of the Government and its
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including
members of the Cabinet, local government, government-
owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries,
except over officials who may be removed only be
impeachment, or over Members of Congress, and the
Judiciary.”
Thus, the Ombudsman may not initiate or
investigate a criminal or administrative complaint before
his office against petitioner judge, pursuant to his power
to investigate public officers. The Ombudsman must
indorse the case to the Supreme Court, for appropriate
action. Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution
exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative
supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the
Presiding Judge of the Court of Appeals to the lowest
municipal trial court clerk. Hence, it is the Supreme Court
that is tasked to oversee the judges and the court
personnel and take the proper administrative action
against them if they commit any violation of the laws of
the land. No other branch of government may intrude
into this power, without running afoul of the
independence of the judiciary and the doctrine of
separation of powers.
Petitioner’s questioned orders directing the
attachment of government property and issuing a writ of
execution was done in relation to his office, well within
his official functions. The order may be erroneous or void
for lack or excess of jurisdiction. However, whether or
not such order of execution was valid under the given
circumstances, must be inquired into in the course of the
judicial action only by the Supreme Court that is tasked
to supervise the courts. “No other entity or official of the
Government, not the prosecution or investigation service
of any other branch, not any functionary thereof, has
competence to review a judicial order or decision—
whether final and executory or not—and pronounce it
erroneous so as to lay the basis for a criminal or
administrative complaint for rendering an unjust
judgment or order. That prerogative belongs to the
courts alone.”
PCGG vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, et al. G.R. Nos.
119609-10, September 21, 2001
Facts:
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On August 28, 1990, PCGG sent Corporate
Secretary Victor A. Africa of Oceanic Wireless Network,
Inc. (OWNI), a letter dated August 3, 1990, directing him
to send notices to all stockholders of record of OWNI for
special stockholders' meeting. On September 17, 1990,
during the special stockholders' meeting of OWNI, PCGG
voted all the Class "A" shares in the election of directors
and elected to the board of directors Commissioners
Maceren, Parlade and Gutierrez representing the Class
"A" shares and Brooker and Miller representing Class "B"
and "C" shares. None of the registered Class "A"
shareholders of OWNI was present in that, special
stockholders meeting. PCGG sequestered the Class "A"
shareholding about 60% of the outstanding capital stock,
and PCGG voted all the Class "A" shares.
On October 9, 1990, Corporate Secretary Africa
wrote the SEC questioning the election of PCGG
nominees as directors of the OWNI board on the ground
that they were not stockholders of OWNI.
On January 27, 1991, the special stockholders'
meeting of OWNI took place. Stockholders owning 63,573
Class "A" shares were represented. An election of
directors for Class "A" shares was held. Nieto, Jr., J.
Africa and A. Africa were elected as directors for Class
"A" shares for 1991 until their successors are elected and
qualified. Class "B" and "C" shareholders did not attend
the meeting. No new directors for them were elected.
On July 29, 1991, PCGG, acting for itself and in
behalf of OWNI, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint
for injunction with damages against V. Africa, J. Africa,
Nieto, Jr. and Ocampo. PCGG sought to enjoin the
defendants from interfering with PCGG's management of
OWNI and/or representing themselves as director.
Issues:
Whether or not the PCGG's takeover of OWNI is legal
Ruling:
NO. In PCGG v. Cojuanco, Jr., the Court ruled
that who should vote the sequestered shares requires the
determination of the ill-gotten character of those shares
and consequently the rightful ownership thereof. The
issue was still pending in the main case in the
Sandiganbayan. This is only an incident of the main case
and is limited to the stockholders' meeting held on
September 17, 1990. This is without prejudice to the final
disposition of the merits of the main suit. The ownership
of the shares is still under litigation. It is not known
whether the shares are part of the ill-gotten wealth of
former President Marcos and his "cronies." We find the
writ of sequestration issued against OWNI not valid
because the suit in Civil Case No. 0009 against Nieto, Jr.
and J. Africa as shareholders in OWNI is not a suit
against OWNI. This Court has held that "failure to
implead these corporations as defendants and merely
annexing a list of such corporations to the complaints is a
violation of their right to due process for it would in effect
be disregarding their distinct and separate personality
without a hearing.''
Furthermore, PCGG issued the writs of
sequestration on August 3, 1988, which was beyond the
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period set by the Constitution. Article XVIII, Section 26,
of the 1987 Constitution provides:
"Sec. 26.The authority to issue sequestration or
freeze orders under Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25,
1986 in relation to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth shall
remain operative for not more than eighteen months
after the ratification of this Constitution. However, in the
national interest, as certified by the President, the
Congress may extend said period.
"A sequestration or freeze order shall be issued
only upon showing of a prima facie case. The order and
the list of the sequestered or frozen properties shall
forthwith be registered with the proper court. For orders
issued before the ratification of this Constitution, the
corresponding judicial action or proceeding shall be filed
within six months from its ratification. For those issued
after such ratification, the judicial action or proceeding
shall be commenced within six months from the issuance
thereof.
"The sequestration or freeze order is deemed
automatically lifted if no judicial action or proceeding is
commenced as herein provided."
The sequestration orders issued against
respondents shall be deemed automatically lifted due to
the failure of PCGG to commence the proper judicial
action or to implead the respondents therein within the
period prescribed by Article XVIII, Section 26 of the 1987
Constitution.
The lifting of the writs of sequestration will not
necessarily be fatal to the main case since the lifting of
the subject orders does not ipso facto mean that the
sequestered property are not ill- gotten. The effect of the
lifting of the sequestration against OWNI will merely be
the termination of the role of the government as
conservator thereof. In other words, the PCGG may no
longer exercise administrative or housekeeping powers
and its nominees may no longer vote the sequestered
shares to enable them to sit on the corporate board of
the subject firm.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARANZADO,[G.R.
Nos. 132442-44, September 24, 2001
Facts:
ZENY was born on 19 November 1984 in Sto.
Nino, South Cotabato. Her parents were BERNARDINO
and Lourdes Gerongani. At about midnight of 7 March
1997, she was sleeping with her sisters and younger
brother in their house at Poblacion, Esperanza, Sultan
Kudarat, when the knocking at the door of their room
awakened her. When she opened the door, her father
immediately slapped her and demanded to know why she
locked the door. Then, BERNARDINO asked her daughter:
"Can I touch your vagina?" Repulsed by the suggestion,
ZENY refused, only to find just as quickly that her father
had poked a knife at her neck. BERNARDINO thereafter
pulled ZENY's hair, forcibly held her down the floor and
boxed her stomach. Recognizing the weakness of his
daughter, he undressed her; and while choking her he
imposed his lechery. He was obstinate to her daughter's
pleas for mercy and compassion. He warned her not to
tell anyone of the deed or he would kill her. He then
stood up, dressed up and left the daughter to her
weeping. Unsatisfied with that single act of carnality,
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BERNARDINO repeated the assault, twice on the honor
and chastity of ZENY about midnight of 10 March 1997.
Upon arraignment on 19 May 1997,
BERNARDINO, assisted by his counsel Atty. Balo, entered
a plea of not guilty in each case. On 20 October 1997,
BERNARDINO, through his counsel Atty. Balo, moved to
withdraw his previous plea of not guilty in each of the
three cases and to substitute the same upon re-
arraignment with pleas of guilty.
Issues:
Whether or not the accused was accorded with due
process.
Ruling:
NO. The Court found that the trial court failed,
albeit regrettably, to observe the rigid and severe
constitutional mandate on due process, more particularly
the demands of Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court,
which reads:
SECTION 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense;
reception of evidence. - When the accused pleads guilty
to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching
inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of
the consequences of his plea and shall require the
prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of
culpability. The accused may present evidence in his
behalf.
As pointed by the Office of the Solicitor General,
the Supreme Court had already outlined how compliance
with said rule, where an accused pleads guilty to a capital
offense, should be attained by the trial court, thus:
1. The court must conduct a searching inquiry
into the voluntariness and full comprehension [by the
accused] of the consequences of his plea;
2. The court must require the prosecution to
present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and
precise degree of his culpability, and
3. The court must ask the accused if he desires
to present evidence in his behalf
and allow him to do so if he desires.
There is no debate that the trial court had
persuasively observed the second command of the rule
by directing the prosecution to adduce evidence to
determine the exact culpability of the accused, taking
into account the presence of other possible aggravating
or mitigating circumstances. On the first requirement, it
bears to note that a searching inquiry must focus on the
voluntariness of the plea and the full comprehension of
the consequences of the plea so that the plea of guilty
can be truly said to be based on a free and informed
judgment. While there can be no hard and fast rule as to
how a judge may conduct a "searching inquiry," it would
be well for the court to do the following:
1. Ascertain from the accused himself
a.) how he was brought into the custody of the
law;
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b.) whether he had the assistance of a
competent counsel during the custodial and preliminary
investigations; and
c.) under what conditions he was detained and
interrogated during the investigations. These the court
shall do in order to rule out the possibility that the
accused has been coerced or placed under a state of
duress either by actual threats of physical harm coming
from malevolent or avenging quarters.
2. Ask the defense counsel a series of questions
as to whether he had conferred with, and completely
explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences
of a plea of guilty.
3. Elicit information about the personality profile
of the accused, such as his age, socio- economic status,
and educational background, which may serve as a
trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and
informed plea of guilty.
4. Inform the accused the exact length of
imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the law and
the certainty that he will serve such sentence. Not
infrequently indeed an accused pleads guilty in the hope
of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of
promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty
should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty
of the judge to see to it that the accused does not labor
under these mistaken impressions.
SALES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 369 SCRA 293 G.R.
NO. 143802; 16 NOV 2001
Facts:
The petitioner, the incumbent mayor of Pagudpud Ilocos
Norte, shot the former mayor and his political rival Atty.
Benemerito. After the shooting, he surrendered himself
and hence the police inspector and wife of the victim filed
a criminal complaint for murder against him. The judge
after conducting the preliminary examination (p.e. for
brevity) found probable cause and issued a warrant of
arrest. Also after conducting the preliminary investigation
(p.i. for brevity), he issued a resolution forwarding the
case to the prosecutor for appropriate action. Petitioner
received a subpoena directing him to file his counter
affidavit, affidavit of witnesses and other supporting
documents. He did it the following day. While
proceedings are ongoing, he filed a petition for habeas
corpus with the C.A alleging that: the warrant was null
and void because the judge who issued it was a relative
by affinity of the private respondent and the p.e. and the
p.i. were illegal and irregular as the judge doesn’t have
jurisdiction on the case. The C.A. granted the petition
holding that the judge was a relative by affinity by 3rd
degree to the private respondent and the p.i. he
conducted has 2 stages, the p.e. and the p.i. proper. The
proceeding now consists only of one stage. He conducted
the requisite investigation prior to the issuance of
warrant of arrest. Moreover he did not complete it. He
only examined the witness of the complainant. But the
prosecution instead of conducting p.i. of his own
forwarded the records to the Ombudsman (OMB for
brevity) for the latter to conduct the same. The OMB
directed the petitioner to submit his counter affidavit, but
he did not comply with it finding the same superfluous.
The graft investigator recommended the filing of
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information for murder which the OMB approved.
Petitioner received a copy of the resolution but prevented
seeking reconsideration thereof he filed a motion to defer
issuance of warrant of arrest pending the determination
of probable cause. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion.
This is now a petition for review on the decision of the
Sandiganbayan.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the OMB followed the procedure in
conducting preliminary investigation.
(2) Whether or Not petitioner was afforded an
opportunity to be heard and to submit controverting
evidence.
Ruling:
The proper procedure in the conduct of
preliminary investigation was not followed because of the
following reasons. Firstly, the preliminary investigation
was conducted by 3 different investigators, none of
whom completed the preliminary investigation There was
not one continuous proceeding but rather, cases of
passing the buck, the last one being the OMB throwing
the buck to the Sandiganbayan. Secondly, the charge of
murder is a non bailable offense. The gravity of the
offense alone should have merited a deeper and more
thorough preliminary investigation. The OMB did nothing
of the sort but wallowed the resolution of the graft
investigator. He did a worse job than the judge, by
actually adopting the resolution of the graft investigator
without doing anything and threw everything to the
Sandiganbayan for evaluation. Thirdly, a person under
preliminary investigation by the OMB is entitled to a
motion for reconsideration, as maintained by the Rules of
Procedure by the OMB. The filing of the motion for
reconsideration is an integral part of the preliminary
investigation proper. The denial thereof is tantamount to
the denial of the right itself to a preliminary investigation.
This fact alone renders preliminary investigation
conducted in this case incomplete. And lastly, it was
patent error for the Sandiganbayan to have relied purely
on the OMB’s certification of probable cause given the
prevailing facts of the case much more so in the face of
the latter’s flawed report and one side factual findings.
The court cannot accept the Sandiganbayan’s
assertion of having found probable cause on its own,
considering the OMB’s defective report and findings,
which merely rekied on the testimonies of the witnesses
for the prosecution and disregarded the evidence for the
defense.
Judgment is rendered setting aside the
resolution of the Sandiganbayan, ordering the
Sandiganbayan to quash the warrant of arrest and
remanding the OMB for completion of the preliminary
investigation.
YOUSEF AL-GHOUL, et al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
et al. G.R. No. 126859, September 4, 2001
Facts:
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Presiding judge of the RTC of Kalookan City,
issued search warrants for the search and seizure of
certain items in Apartment No. 2 at 154 Obiniana
Compound, Deparo Road, Kalookan City. The police
searched Apartment No. 8, in the same compound and
found one (1) .45 caliber pistol. Found in Apartment No.
2 were 2 M-16 rifles with 2 magazines and 20 live M-16
ammunitions, among others.
Petitioners were charged before the Regional
Trial Court information accusing them with illegal
possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives,
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1866. Thereafter,
petitioners were arrested and detained.
At the hearing for bail, the RTC denied
petitioners' motion for bail earlier filed for the accused
are being charged of two criminal offenses and both
offenses under Presidential Decree 1866, Sections 1 and
3 thereof prescribe the penalty of Reclusion Temporal in
its maximum period to Reclusion Perpetua. Under Rule
114 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended by
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 12-94,
particularly Section 7 thereof, no person charged with a
capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is
strong shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of
the criminal prosecution.
Petitioners contend that the search and seizure
orders violated Sections 2 and 3 of the Bill of Rights as
well as Section 3 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court on
Criminal Procedure because the place searched and
articles seized were not described with particularity.
Issues:
Whether or not the respondent court erred and gravely
abused its discretion when it ruled that the search and
seizure orders in question were valid and the objects
seized admissible in evidence.
Ruling:
As held in PICOP v. Asuncion, the place to be
searched cannot be changed, enlarged nor amplified by
the police. Policemen may not be restrained from
pursuing their task with vigor, but in doing so, care must
be taken that constitutional and legal safeguards are not
disregarded. Exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence is
the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Hence, we are constrained to declare that the search
made at Apartment No. 8 is illegal and the .45 caliber
pistol taken thereat is inadmissible in evidence against
petitioners. Now, in contrast, the search conducted at
Apartment No. 2 could not be similarly faulted. The
search warrants in question specifically mentioned
Apartment No. 2. The search was done in the presence of
its occupants, herein petitioners, in accordance with
Section 7 of Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioners allege lack of particularity in the
description of objects to be seized pursuant to the
warrants. That the articles seized during the search of
Apartment No. 2 are of the same kind and nature as
those items enumerated in the search warrant appears to
be beyond cavil. The items seized from Apartment No. 2
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were described with specifity in the warrants in question.

The nature of the items ordered to be seized did not
require a technical description. Moreover, the law does
not require that the things to be seized must be
described in precise and minute details as to leave no
room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities,
otherwise, it would be virtually impossible for the
applicants to obtain a search warrant as they would not
know exactly what kind of things they are looking for.
Substantial similarity of those articles described as a
class or species would suffice.
The case of Bache and Co. (Phil.), Inc. v. Ruiz,
37 SCRA 823, 835 (1971), pointed out that one of the
tests to determine the particularity in the description of
objects to be seized under a search warrant is when the
things described are limited to those which bear direct
relation to the offense for which the warrant is being
issued. A careful examination of the Search Warrants
shows that they were worded in such a manner that the
enumerated items to be seized could bear a direct
relation to the offense of violation of Section 1 and 3 of
Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, penalizing
illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and
explosives. What the warrants authorized was the seizure
of articles proscribed by that decree, and no other.

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2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BALTAZAR
BONGALON y MATEOS G.R. No. 125025 January 23,
2002
Facts:
On December 8, 1994, Baltazar Bongalon not
being lawfully authorized by law, and by means of motor
vehicle, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell, deliver and give away to another, one (1)
heat-sealed transparent plastic bag/sachet containing
brown crystalline substance weighing 250.70 grams,
which was found positive to the test for
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a regulated
drug, in violation of. When arraigned, the accused pled
not guilty.
he prosecution presented the following
witnesses, to wit: (1) PO3 Noel Castañeto, the poseur-
buyer who discussed in details the preceding incidents
prior to the entrapment operation; (2) PO3 Rogelio Galos,
member of the buy-bust operation team who testified the
same; and (3) Police Senior Inspector Julita de Villa, the
forensic chemist who showed his findings of the specimen
confiscated in the position of the accused. The
presentation of PO2 Felipe Metrillo, member of the buy-
bust team, was dispensed with after the prosecution and
the defense had stipulated at the trial that he would
merely corroborate the testimony of PO3 Galos.
For its part, the defense presented the accused
himself, Baltazar Bongalon who denied the allegations
and saying among others that his house was search
without securing any search warrant.
After the trial, the trial court found the accused
guilty as charged. The accused filed a Notice of Appeal.
Thereafter, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration/New
Trial to present additional witnesses that included his 4-
year old son, Mark Anthony. The motion was denied by
the trial court on the ground that the additional witnesses
he offered to present were available during the trial
proper of the case. Subsequently, the accused filed
several motions including a motion to inhibit, but they
were all denied. The trial court ordered the transmittal of
the records of the case to this Court for automatic review.
In the meantime, the accused filed a “MOTION
FOR NEW TRIAL” with this Court. Pursuant to its directive,
the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment. After
considering their pleadings, we denied the motion for
new trial for lack of merit. The accused’s motion for
reconsideration was also denied. Finally, the appellant
and the Solicitor General filed their respective briefs.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the arrest without warrant is a valid
arrest.
2. Whether or not the search conducted by the NARCOM
agents constitutes a valid search even without securing a
search warrant.
Ruling:
Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!
Yes, it is a valid arrest. The appellant cannot
assail the validity of his arrest on account of the absence
of a warrant. He was caught in flagrante delicto selling
shabu. There was, therefore, no need for a warrant to
effect his arrest pursuant to Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules on Criminal procedure. Said section
provides:
“Sec. 5. Arrest, without warrant; when lawful—A
peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
xxx
x
xx xxx.”
Moreover, the rule is that an accused is
estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he
failed to move to quash the information against him
before his arraignment. Any objection involving the
arrest or the procedure in the acquisition by the court of
jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made
before he enters his plea, otherwise, the objection is
deemed waived. Even in the instances not allowed by law,
a warrantless arrest is not a jurisdictional defect, and
objection thereto is waived where the person arrested
submits to arraignment without objection. The
subsequent filing of the charges and the issuance of the
corresponding warrant of arrest against a person illegally
detained will cure the defect of that detention.
2. Yes, it is a valid search. The appellant claims
that the search conducted in his house was unlawful. He
also laments that the NARCOM agents robbed him of his
personal properties during the search and they received
money from his relatives after his arrest. This Court
need not tarry on the validity of the said search for the
appellant consented to the search. He admitted that he
voluntarily accompanied the policemen to his house. As
for the charges of robbery and extortion, as in the
alleged unlawful search made in his house, those
incidents transpired after his arrest. Whether true or not,
his liability for the unlawful sale of shabu remains.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. ANTHONY
ESCORDIAL G.R. Nos. 138934-35. January 16,
2002
Facts:
On December 27, 1996, the said accused,
armed with a deadly weapon, a knife, with intent of gain
and by means of violence and intimidation on the person,
did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take from Michelle Darunday y Jintula the sums of
P3,650.00, belonging to said offended party and on the
occasion thereof have carnal knowledge with the
complainant Michelle Darunday y Jintula, against her will,
and inside her room wherein she was temporarily
residing as a boarder. When arraigned on February 25,
1997, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the
charges, whereupon the two cases were jointly tried.
The prosecution presented eight witnesses,
namely, Jason Joniega and Mark Esmeralda who were
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playing inside a jeepney in front of the boarding house
where the complainant resides and said accused told
them to go home; Erma Blanca, one of the roommates of
the victim who was in the room when the accident took
place; Dr. Joy Ann Jocson who examined the victims and
found bruises and lacerations; PO3 Nicolas Tancinco, one
of the policemen who responded to the report shortly
after the commission of the crime; Leo Asan, an
employee at the City Health Office in Bacolod; Ma. Teresa
Gellaver; and Michelle Darunday. The victim herself
narrated facts pointing the appellant as accused. She said
that eventhough she was blindfolded when raped, she
could identify the accused because of the scar and rough
skin which she accidentally touch and it so happened that
the same scar was found in the body of the accused.
The defense presented as its witnesses Elias
Sombito, Aaron Lavilla, PO2 Rodolfo Gemarino, Ricardo
Villaspen, Nestor Dojillo, the barangay captain of
Barangay Miranda, accused-appellant Anthony Escordial,
Jerome Jayme, and Lucila Jocame. These witnesses gave
a different account of the events that led to the arrest of
accused-appellant. The accused as his defense put up an
alibi stating among others that he was in Pontevedra
when the incident happened. However, the trial court
found the accused guilty of the crime charged and is
ordered to pay for damages. Hence, the accused
appealed. In his appeal, he contends among others that
the court erred in convicting him guilty of the crime
charged.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the arrest conducted against the
accused constitutes an illegal arrest.
2. Whether or not the constitutional rights of the
accused to remain silent and to have an independent
counsel are violated.
3. Whether or not the presence of counsel is needed in
the conduct of police lineup.
Ruling:
1. Yes. Accused-appellant questions the legality
of his arrest without a warrant. Indeed, PO3 Nicolas
Tancinco admitted that he and his companions had
arrested accused-appellant without any warrant issued by
a judge. Art. III, §2 of the Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
To implement this provision, Rule 113, §5 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a
peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person only under the following circumstances:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
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(b) When an offense has just been
committed and he has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
The cases at bar do not fall under paragraphs (a)
or (c) of the aforequoted rule. At the time of his arrest,
accused-appellant was watching a game in a basketball
court in Barangay Miranda, Pontevedra, Negros
Occidental. He was not committing or attempting to
commit a crime when he was arrested by the police on
that day. Nor was he an escaped prisoner whose arrest
could be effected even without a warrant.
The question is whether these cases fall under
paragraph (b) because the police officers had personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances that would lead
them to believe that accused-appellant had just
committed a crime. The phrase “personal knowledge” in
paragraph (b) has been defined in this wise:
Personal knowledge of facts in arrests without a
warrant under Section 5(b) of Rule 113 must be based
upon “probable cause” which means “an actual belief or
reasonable grounds of suspicion.” The grounds of
suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual
belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the
person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the
offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create
the probable cause of guilt of the person to be
arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be
founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on
the part of the peace officer making the arrest.
In these cases, the crime took place on
December 27, 1996. But, accused-appellant was arrested
only on January 3, 1997, a week after the occurrence of
the crime. As the arresting officers were not present
when the crime was committed, they could not have
“personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances of
the commission of the crime” so as to be justified in the
belief that accused-appellant was guilty of the
crime. The arresting officers had no reason for not
securing a warrant.
However, the records show that accused-
appellant pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged
against him during his arraignment on February 25, 1997
without questioning his warrantless arrest. He thus
waived objection to the legality of his arrest. As this
Court has held in another case:
The accused waived objections based on the
alleged irregularity of their arrest, considering that they
pleaded not guilty to the charges against them and
participated in the trial. Any defect in their arrest must
be deemed cured when they voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court. For the legality of an arrest
affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person
of the accused. Consequently, if objections based on this
ground are waived, the fact that the arrest was illegal is
not a sufficient cause for setting aside an otherwise valid
judgment rendered after a trial, free from error. The
technicality cannot render subsequent proceedings void
and deprive the State of its right to convict the guilty
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when all the facts on record point to the culpability of the
accused.
2. No. Accused-appellant invokes Art.
III, §12(1) of the Constitution which provides that “[a]ny
person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except
in writing and in the presence of counsel.” He contends
that he was subjected to custodial interrogation without
being informed of his right to remain silent and to have
independent counsel preferably of his choice. Hence, he
contends, the trial court erred in not excluding evidence
obtained from him during such interrogation for violation
of accused-appellant’s rights under this provision.
While it cannot be denied that accused-appellant
was deprived of his right to be informed of his rights to
remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel, he has not shown that, as a result of his
custodial interrogation, the police obtained any statement
from him – whether inculpatory or exculpatory - which
was used in evidence against him. The records do not
show that he had given one or that, in finding him guilty,
the trial court relied on such statement. In fact, accused-
appellant testified that at no point, even when subjected
to physical torture, did he ever admit committing the
crime with which he was charged. In other words, no
uncounseled statement was obtained from accused-
appellant which should have been excluded as evidence
against him.
3. No. As a rule, an accused is not
entitled to the assistance of counsel in a police line-up
considering that such is usually not a part of the custodial
inquest. However, the cases at bar are different
inasmuch as accused-appellant, having been the focus of
attention by the police after he had been pointed to by a
certain Ramie as the possible perpetrator of the crime,
was already under custodial investigation when these
out-of-court identifications were conducted by the police.
An out-of-court identification of an accused can
be made in various ways. In a show-up, the accused
alone is brought face to face with the witness for
identification, while in a police line-up, the suspect is
identified by a witness from a group of persons gathered
for that purpose. During custodial investigation, these
types of identification have been recognized as “critical
confrontations of the accused by the prosecution” which
necessitate the presence of counsel for the accused. This
is because the results of these pre-trial proceedings
“might well settle the accused’s fate and reduce the trial
itself to a mere formality.” We have thus ruled that any
identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police
line-up, or in a show-up for that matter, after the start of
the custodial investigation is inadmissible as evidence
against him.
Here, accused-appellant was identified by
Michelle Darunda in a show-up on January 3, 1997 and
by Erma Blanca, Ma. Teresa Gellaver, Jason Joniega, and
Mark Esmeralda in a police line-up on various dates after
his arrest. Having been made when accused-appellant
did not have the assistance of counsel, these out-of-court
identifications are inadmissible in evidence against him.
Consequently, the testimonies of these witnesses
Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!
regarding these identifications should have been held
inadmissible for being “the direct result of the illegal
lineup ‘come at by exploitation of [the primary] illegality.’”
Be that as it may, as the defense failed to object
immediately when these witnesses were presented by the
prosecution or when specific questions regarding this
matter were asked of them, as required by Rule 132, §36
of the Rules on Evidence, accused-appellant must be
deemed to have waived his right to object to the
admissibility of these testimonies.
Furthermore, the inadmissibility of these out-of-
court identifications does not render the in-court
identification of accused-appellant inadmissible for being
the “fruits of the poisonous tree.” This in-court
identification was what formed the basis of the trial
court’s conviction of accused-appellant. As it was not
derived or drawn from the illegal arrest of accused-
appellant or as a consequence thereof, it is admissible as
evidence against him. However, whether or not such
prosecution evidence satisfies the requirement of proof
beyond reasonable doubt is another matter altogether.
STA. CLARA HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION v.
Spouses VICTOR MA. GASTON and LYDIA GASTON,
G.R. No. 141961 : January 23, 2002
Facts:
Spouses Victor Ma. Gaston and Lydia M. Gaston
were residents of San Jose Avenue, Sta. Clara
Subdivision located in Mandalagan, Bacolod City. They
purchased their lots in the said subdivision sometime in
1974, and at the time of purchase, there was no mention
or requirement of membership in any homeowners'
association. From that time on, they have remained non-
members of Sta. Clara Homeowners’ Association (SCHA).
They also stated that an arrangement was made wherein
homeowners who were non-members of the association
were issued "non-member" gatepass stickers for their
vehicles for identification by the security guards manning
the subdivision's entrances and exits. This arrangement
remained undisturbed until sometime in the middle of
March 1998, when SCHA disseminated a board resolution
which decreed that only its members in good standing
were to be issued stickers for use in their vehicles.
Thereafter, on three separate incidents, Victor M. Gaston,
the son of the spouses Gaston who lives with them, was
required by the guards on duty employed by SCHA to
show his driver's license as a prerequisite to his entrance
to the subdivision and to his residence therein despite
their knowing him personally and the exact location of his
residence. On March 29,1998 Victor Ma. Gaston was
himself prevented from entering the subdivision and
proceeding to his residential abode when security guards
Roger Capillo and a "John Doe" lowered the steel bar of
the KAMETAL gate of the subdivision and demanded from
him his driver's license for identification. On April 1,1998,
Spouses Victor Ma. Gaston and Lydia M. Gaston filed a
complaint for damages with preliminary
injunction/preliminary mandatory injunction and
temporary restraining order before the Regional Trial
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Court in Negros Occidental at Bacolod City against Santa
Clara Homeowners Association (SCHA) thru its Board of
Directors, namely: Arneil Chua, Luis Sarrosa, Jocelyn
Garcia, Ma. Milagros Vargas, Lorenzo Lacson, Ernesto
Piccio, Dindo Ilagan, Danilo Gamboa, Jr., Rizza de la
Rama and Security Guard Capillo and 'John Doe', and
Santa Clara Estate, Incorporated (Civil Case 98-10217,
RTC-Branch 49, Bacolod City); alleging that the acts of
SCHA, et al., done in the presence of other subdivision
owners had caused the spouses Gaston to suffer moral
damage. On 8 April 1998, SCHA, et al. filed a motion to
dismiss arguing that the trial court had no jurisdiction
over the case as it involved an intra-corporate dispute
between SCHA and its members pursuant to Republic Act
580, as amended by Executive Orders 535 and 90, much
less, to declare as null and void the subject resolution of
the board of directors of SCHA, the proper forum being
the Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC).
To support their claim of intra-corporate controversy,
SCHA, et al. stated that the Articles of Incorporation of
SCHA, which was duly approved by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) on 4 October 1973,
provides "that the association shall be a non-stock
corporation with all homeowners of Sta. Clara
constituting its membership"; and that its by-laws
contains a provision that "all real estate owners in Sta.
Clara Subdivision automatically become members of the
association", among others. On 6 July 1998, the lower
court resolved to deny SCHA et al.'s motion to dismiss,
finding that there existed no intra-corporate controversy
since the Spouses Gaston alleged that they had never
joined the association. On July 18,1998, SCHA, et al.
submitted a Motion for Reconsideration, adding lack of
cause of action as ground for the dismissal of the case.
On August 17,1998, the trial court denied the said
motion without however ruling on the additional ground
of lack of cause of action. On August 18,1998, SCHA, et
al. filed a motion to resolve its motion to dismiss on
ground of lack of cause of action. On September 8,1998,
the trial court issued an order denying the motion. On
September 24,1998, SCHA. et al. elevated the matter to
the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari. On
August 31,1999, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
Petition and ruled that the RTC had jurisdiction over the
dispute. The appellate court likewise denied SCHA, et
al.'s motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated 11
February 2000. SCHA, et al. filed the petition for review.
Issues:
Whether or not the Spouses Gaston are to be
considered members of the SCHA.
Ruling:
No. The constitutionally guaranteed freedom of
association includes the freedom not to associate. The
right to choose with whom one will associate oneself is
the very foundation and essence of that partnership.
Further, the Spouses Gaston cannot be compelled to
become members of the SCHA by the simple expedient of
including them in its Articles of Incorporation and By-laws
without their express or implied consent. True, it may be
to the mutual advantage of lot owners in a subdivision to
band themselves together to promote their common
welfare, but that is possible only if the owners voluntarily
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agree, directly or indirectly, to become members of the
association. True also, memberships in homeowners'
associations may be acquired in various ways — often
through deeds of sale, Torrens certificates or other forms
of evidence of property ownership. Herein, however,
other than the said Articles of Incorporation and By-laws,
there is no showing that the Spouses Gaston have agreed
to be SCHA members. The approval by the SEC of the
said documents is not an operative act which bestows
membership on the Spouses Gaston because the right to
associate partakes of the nature of freedom of contract
which can be exercised by and between the homeowners
amongst themselves, the homeowners' association and a
homeowner, and the subdivision owner and a
homeowner/lot buyer. Clearly, no privity of contract
exists between SCHA and Spouses Gaston. When the
Spouses Gaston purchased their property in 1974 and
obtained Transfer Certificates of Titles T-126542 and T-
127462 for Lots 11 and 12 of Block 37 along San Jose
Avenue in Sta. Clara Subdivision, there was no
annotation showing their automatic membership in the
SCHA. Furthermore, the records are bereft of any
evidence that would indicate that the Spouses Gaston
intended to become members of the SCHA. Prior to the
implementation of the aforesaid Resolution, they and the
other homeowners who were not members of the
association were issued non-member gate pass stickers
for their vehicles; a fact not disputed by SCHA. Thus, the
SCHA recognized that there were subdivision landowners
who were not members thereof, notwithstanding the
provisions of its Articles of Incorporation and By-laws.
SALVADOR H. LAURELvs . HON. ANIANO A.
DESIERTO G.R. No. 145368, April 12, 2002
Facts:
President Aquino issued Administrative Order No.
223 "constituting a Committee for the preparation ofthe
National Centennial Celebration in 1998." The Committee
was mandated "to take charge of thenationwide
preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine
Centennial of the Declaration ofPhilippine Independence
and the Inauguration of the Malolos Congress.” President
Ramos issued Executive Order No. 128, "reconstituting
the Committee for the preparation ofthe National
Centennial Celebrations in 1988." It renamed the
Committee as the "National CentennialCommission" and
Vice-President Laurel was appointed as chair. Its duty is
to "take charge of the nationwide preparations for the
National Celebration of the Philippine Centennial of the
Declaration of Philippine Independence and the
Inauguration of the Malolos Congress and its existence
shall terminate upon thecompletion of all activities
related to the Centennial Celebrations.
A corporation named the Philippine Centennial
Expo ’98 Corporation (Expocorp) was created. Laurel was
among the nine (9) Expocorp incorporators and was
elected Expocorp Chief Executive Officer. Senator
Coseteng delivered a privilege speech denouncing alleged
anomalies in the construction andoperation of the
Centennial Exposition Project at the Clark Special
Economic Zone. The privilege speech was referred to the
Blue Ribbon Committee for investigation.
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President Estrada issued Administrative Order
No. 35, creating an ad hoc and independent
citizens’committee to investigate all the facts and
circumstances surrounding the Philippine centennial
projects. Senator Saguisag was appointed to chair the
Committee. Blue Ribbon Committee filed its report
recommending the prosecution by the Ombudsman/DOJ
ofLaurel, chair of NCC and of EXPOCORP for violating the
rules on public bidding, relative to theaward of centennial
contracts to AK (Asia Construction & Development Corp.);
for exhibiting manifest bias in the issuance of the NTP
(Notice to Proceed) to AK to construct the FR (Freedom
Ring) even in the absence of a valid contract that has
caused material injury to government and for
participating in the scheme to preclude audit by COA of
the funds infused by the government for the
implementation of the said contracts all in violation of the
anti-graft law.
The Saguisag Committee issued its own report.
It recommended the further investigation by the
Ombudsman, and indictment, in proper cases of Laurel
for violations of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, Section
4(a) in relation to Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713, and
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman
issued its Evaluation Report, recommending:
that a formal complaint be filed and preliminary
investigation be conducted before theEvaluation and
Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB), Office of the
Ombudsman against former NCC and EXPOCORP chair
Salvador H. Laurel, former EXPOCORP President Teodoro
Q. Peña and AK President Edgardo H. Angeles for
violation of Sec. 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No.3019, as
amended in relation to PD 1594 and COA Rules and
Regulations;
That the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau of
this Office, act as the nominal complainant. Apostol, OIC-
Director of the EPIB, directed Laurel to submit his
counter-affidavit and those of his witnesses. Laurel filed
with the Office of the Ombudsman a Motion to Dismiss
questioning the jurisdiction of said office.
Ombudsman denied motion to dismiss. EPIB
found probable cause to indict respondents LAUREL and
PEÑA before the Sandiganbayan for conspiring to violate
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, in relation to
Republic Act No. 1594. Desierto, in his capacity as
Ombudsman, approved the resolution with respect to
Laurel but dismissed the charge against Peña. Laurel
moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied.
Hence this present petition for certiorari.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Ombudsman has jurisdiction over
the case; Whether EXPOCORP is a private corporation
and not a GOCC; Whether NCC was not a public office;
Whether or not Laurel is not a public officer.
Ruling:
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The Ombudsman has the power to investigate
any malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance by a
public officer or employee of the government, or of any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations. Neither
the Constitution nor the Ombudsman Act of 1989,
however, defines who public officers are. A definition of
public officers cited in jurisprudence 13 is that provided
by Mechem, a recognized authority on the subject: a
public office is the right, authority and duty, created and
conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either
fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating
power, an individual is invested with some portion of the
sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised
by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so
invested is a public officer.
The characteristics of a public office, according
to Mechem, include the delegation of sovereign functions,
its creation by law and not by contract, an oath, salary,
continuance of the position, scope of duties, and the
designation of the position as an office.
We hold that the NCC performs executive
functions. The executive power "is generally defined
as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the
power of carrying the laws into practical
operation and enforcing their due observance." The
executive function, therefore, concerns the
implementation of the policies as set forth by law.
The NCC was precisely created to ensure a more
coordinated and synchronized celebration ofthe Philippine
Centennial and wider participation form the government
and non-government or privateorganizatiuons and to
rationalize the relevance of historical links with other
countries and to carrythem into effect.
E.O. No. 128, reconstituting the Committee for
the National Centennial Celebrations in 1998, cited the
"need to strengthen the said Committee to ensure a
more coordinated andsynchronized celebrations of the
Philippine Centennial and wider participation from the
governmentand non-government or private
organizations." It also referred to the "need to rationalize
the relevanceof historical links with other countries."
There can hardly be any dispute that the
promotion of industrialization and full employment is
afundamental state policy. Clearly, the NCC performs
sovereign functions. It is, therefore, a publicoffice, and
petitioner, as its Chair, is a public officer.
That petitioner allegedly did not receive any
compensation during his tenure is of little consequence. A
salary is a usual but not a necessary criterion for
determining the nature of the position. It is not
conclusive. The salary is a mere incident and forms no
part of the office. Where a salary or fees is annexed, the
office is provided for it is a naked or honorary office, and
is supposed to be accepted merely for the public good.
Hence, the office of petitioner as NCC Chair may be
characterized as an honorary office, as opposed to a
lucrative office or an office of profit, i.e., one to which
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Political Law Jurisprudence
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salary, compensation or fees are attached. But it is a
public office, nonetheless.The petition is DISMISSED.
SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLDMINING CORP. vs.
BALITE PORTAL MINING COOP., et al.[G.R. No.
135190, April 3, 2002
Facts:
On March 10, 1988, Marcopper Mining
Corporation (Marcopper) was granted Exploration Permit
No. 133 (EP No. 133) over 4,491 hectares of land, which
included the Diwalwal area. On June 27, 2991, Congress
enacted Republic Act No. 7076, or the People's Small-
Scale Mining Act.The law established a People's Small-
Scale Mining Program to beimplemented by the Secretary
of the DENR and created the Provincial Mining Regulatory
Board (PMRB) under the DENR Secretary's direct
supervision and control.
Subsequently, a petition for the cancellation of
EP No. 133 and the admission of aMineral Production
Sharing Arrangement (MPSA) proposal over Diwalwal was
filed before theDENR Regional Executive Director,
docketed as RED Mines Case.
On February 16, 1994, while the RED Mines case
was pending, Marcopper assigned itsEP No. 133 to
petitioner Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation
(SEM), which in turnapplied for an integrated MPSA over
the land covered by the permit.
In due time, the Mines and Geosciences Bureau
Regional Office No. XI in Davao City(MGB-XI) accepted
and registered the integrated MPSA application of
petitioner and thereafter,several MAC cases were filed.
On March 3, 1995, Republic Act No. 7942, the Philippine
Mining Act, was enacted.Pursuant to this statute, the
MAC cases were referred to a Regional Panel of
Arbitrators (RPA)tasked to resolve disputes involving
conflicting mining rights.The RPA subsequently
tookcognizance of the RED Mines case, which was
consolidated with the MAC cases.
On June 24, 1997, the DENR Secretary issued
Memorandum Order No. 97-03 whichprovided that the
DENR shall study thoroughly and exhaustively the option
of direct stateutilization of the mineral resources in the
Diwalwal Gold-Rush Area.
On July 16, 1997, petitioner filed a special civil
action for certiorari, prohibition andmandamus before the
Court of Appeals against PMRB-Davao, the DENR
Secretary and BaliteCommunal Portal Mining Cooperative
(BCPMC). It prayed for the nullification of the above-
quotedMemorandum Order No. 97-03 on the ground that
the "direct state utilization" espoused thereinwould
effectively impair its vested rights under EP No. 133; and
that the memorandum orderarbitrarily imposed the
unwarranted condition that certain studies be conducted
before mining andenvironmental laws are enforced by the
DENR.
Issues:
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Whether or not the "direct state utilization scheme"
espoused in MO 97-03 divested
petitioner of its vested right to the gold rush area
under its EP No. 133.
Ruling:
No. MO 97-03 did not conclusively adopt "direct
state utilization" as a policy in resolving the Diwalwal
dispute.The terms of the memorandum clearly indicate
that what wasdirected thereunder was merely a study of
this option and nothing else.Contrary to
petitioner'scontention, it did not grant any
management/operating or profit-sharing agreement to
small-scaleminers or to any party, for that matter, but
simply instructed the DENR officials concerned
toundertake studies to determine its feasibility.
As to the alleged "vested rights" claimed by
petitioner, it is well to note that the same isinvariably
based on EP No. 133, whose validity is still being
disputed in the Consolidated Minescases.A reading of the
appealed MAB decision reveals that the continued efficacy
of EP No. 133 is one of the issues raised in said cases,
with respondents therein asserting that Marcoppercannot
legally assign the permit which purportedly had
expired.In other words, whether or notpetitioner actually
has a vested right over Diwalwal under EP No. 133 is still
an indefinite andunsettled matter.And until a positive
pronouncement is made by the appellate court in
theConsolidated Mines cases, EP No. 133 cannot be
deemed as a source of any conclusive rightsthat can be
impaired by the issuance of MO 97-03.
It must likewise be pointed out that under no
circumstances may petitioner's rights underEP No. 133 be
regarded as total and absolute.As correctly held by the
Court of Appeals EP No.133 merely evidences a privilege
granted by the State, which may be amended, modified
orrescinded when the national interest so requires.This is
necessarily so since the exploration,development and
utilization of the country's natural mineral resources are
matters impressed withgreat public interest.Like timber
permits, mining exploration permits do not vest in the
granteeany permanent or irrevocable right within the
purview of the non-impairment of contract and
dueprocess clauses of the Constitution, since the State,
under its all-encompassing police power,may alter,
modify or amend the same, in accordance with the
demands of the general welfare.
Additionally, there can be no valid opposition
raised against a mere study of analternative which the
State, through the DENR, is authorized to undertake in
the first place. Worthnoting is Article XII, Section 2, of
the 1987 Constitution and Section 4, Chapter II of the
PhilippineMining Act of 1995.
Thus, the State may pursue the constitutional
policy of full control and supervision of theexploration,
development and utilization of the country's natural
mineral resources, by eitherdirectly undertaking the
same or by entering into agreements with qualified
entities.The DENRSecretary acted within his authority
when he ordered a study of the first option, which may
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beundertaken consistently in accordance with the
constitutional policy enunciated above.Obviously, the
State may not be precluded from considering a direct
takeover of the mines, if it isthe only plausible remedy in
sight to the gnawing complexities generated by the gold
rush.
CRUZ and MONEDERO vs. JUDGE AREOLA
A.M. No. RTJ-01-1642, March 6, 2002
Facts:
On November 26, 1998, the Evaluation and
Preliminary Investigation Bureau of the Office of the
Ombudsman issued a Resolution recommending the filing
of an Information forEstafa against Marilyn Carreon, an
employee of the Land Transportation Office, based on
thecomplaint filed by herein complainants.The Office of
the City Prosecutor found no cogent reasonto reverse,
modify, or alter the resolution of the Office of the
Ombudsman and recommended thatthe case be set for
trial. Complainants filed the instant complaint charging
both respondent Judge and his BranchClerk of Court with
ignorance of the law.Complainants take issue of the fact
that althoughrespondent Judge already issued a warrant
of arrest, he still deferred its implementation to giveway
to a reinvestigation of the case on motion of the
accused.They believe that there is nolonger any reason
why the respondent Judge should withhold the issuance
of a warrant of arrestconsidering that the Office of the
City Prosecutor already made a finding that there
existsprobable cause to indict the accused.
In their Joint Comment, respondent Judge
manifests that the issuance of a warrant ofarrest is not a
ministerial function of a judge as he is mandated to
determine the existence ofprobable cause before issuing
a warrant.Respondent Branch Clerk of Court, on the
other hand, claims that it is a ministerial duty on her part
to release duly signed orders, resolutions anddecisions of
the presiding judge of her branch.
Issues:
Whether or not the respondent Judge erred in deferring
the implementations of the warrant of arrest.
Ruling:
NO. The 1987 Constitution provides that no
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce. Preliminary
investigation should be distinguished as to whether it is
an investigation forthe determination of a sufficient
ground for the filing of the information or it is an
investigation forthe determination of a probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first kind
ofpreliminary investigation is executive in nature. It is
part of the prosecution’s job. The secondkind of
preliminary investigation is judicial in nature and is
lodged with the judge.
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In making the required personal determination,
a judge is not precluded from relying onthe evidence
earlier gathered by responsible officers.The extent of
reliance depends on thecircumstances of each case and is
subject to the judge’s sound discretion. It is not
obligatory, but merely discretionary, upon the
investigating judge to issue awarrant for the arrest of the
accused, even after having personally examined the
complainant andhis witnesses in the form of searching
questions and answers. For the determination of whether
aprobable cause exists and whether it is necessary to
arrest the accused in order not to frustratethe ends of
justice, is left to his sound judgment or discretion.
It appears from the records that the challenged
Orders issued by the respondent Judgewere not at all
baseless.The respondent Judge merely exercised his
sound discretion in notimmediately issuing the warrant of
arrest and in suspending further proceedings
pendingreinvestigation of the case.On her part,
respondent Branch Clerk of Court cannot be faulted
forperforming a ministerial function, that is, releasing
Orders duly signed by the respondent Judge.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BALOLOY G.R. No.
140740, April 12, 2002
Facts:
At the waterfalls of Barangay Inasagan, Aurora,
Zamboanga del Sur, on the evening of August 3, 1996,
the dead body of an 11-year-old girl Genelyn Camacho
was found.Autopsy reports found that Genelyn was raped
before she was drowned.The one who caused its
discovery was accused-appellant Juanito Baloloy himself,
who claimed that he had caught sight of it while he was
catching frogs in a nearby creek. While in the wake of
Genelyn, Juanito confessed to the Barangay Captain that
he only wanted to frighten the girl but ended up raping
and throwing her body in the ravine. While in the custody
of the authorities, he was asked incriminating questions
by Judge Dicon who justified his actions saying that
Juanito was not yet incustodial investigation. Based on
his alleged extrajudicial confession, coupled with
circumstantial evidence, the trial court found Juanito
guilty of rape with homicide and sentenced him to death.
On appeal, Juanito maintains that the trial court
violated Section 12(1) of Article III of theConstitution
when it admitted in evidence his alleged extrajudicial
confession to Barangay Captain Ceniza and Judge Dicon.
According to him, the two failed to inform him of his
constitutional rights before they took it upon themselves
to elicit from him the incriminatory information. It is of
no moment that Ceniza and Dicon are not police
investigators, for as public officials it was incumbent upon
them to observe the express mandate of the Constitution.
While these rights may be waived, the prosecution failed
to show that he effectively waived his rights through a
written waiver executed in the presence of counsel. He
concludes that his extrajudicial confession is inadmissible
in evidence.
Issues:
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(1) Whether or not Juanito’s extrajudicial confession
before the barangay captain was
admissible.
(2)Whether or not Juanito’s extrajudicial confession
before the judge was admissible.
Ruling:
1) YES.As to his confession with the Baragay
Captain Ceniza, it has been held that the constitutional
provision on custodial investigation does not apply to a
spontaneous statement, note solicited through
questioning by the authorities but given in an ordinary
manner whereby the suspect orally admits having
committed the crime.Neither can it apply to admissions
or confessions made by a suspect in the commission of a
crime before he is placed under investigation.What the
Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of
incriminating facts or confessions. In the instant case,
Juanito voluntarily narrated to Ceniza that he raped
GENELYN and thereafter threw her body into the ravine.
This narration was a spontaneous answer, freely and
voluntarily given in an ordinary manner. It was given
before he was arrested or placed undercustody for
investigation in connection with the commission of the
offense. Moreover, Juanito did not offer any evidence of
improper or ulterior motive on the part of Ceniza, which
could havecompelled her to testify falsely against him.
(2) NO.However, there is merit in Juanito’s
claim that his constitutional rights during custodial
investigation were violated by Judge Dicon when the
latter propounded to himincriminating questions without
informing him of his constitutional rights. It is settled
that at themoment the accused voluntarily surrenders to,
or is arrested by, the police officers, the
custodialinvestigation is deemed to have started. So, he
could not thenceforth be asked about hiscomplicity in the
offense without the assistance of counsel. Judge Dicon's
claim that no complainthas yet been filed and that
neither was he conducting a preliminary investigation
deserves scantconsideration. The fact remains that at
that time Juanito was already under the custody of
thepolice authorities, who had already taken the
statement of the witnesses who were then beforeJudge
Dicon for the administration of their oaths on their
statements.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MONTERON
[G.R. No. 130709, March 6, 2002]
Facts:
Accused-appellant was formally charged with
rape, he entered a plea of not guilty at his
arraignment.After trial, the lower court convicted him of
the crime of rape. Accused-appellant contends that the
RTC of Davao has committed an error in notacquitting
him of the crime charged in the Information. He argues
that his negative plea to theinformation filed against him,
his filing of the notice of appeal, and his denial of the
rape charges against him during trial, indicate his
innocence.
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Issues:
Whether or not the contention of the accused-appellant
is correct.
Ruling:
NO.Constitutional due process demands that the
accused in a criminal case should be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.The
rationale behind thisconstitutional guarantee are: First, to
furnish the accused with the description of the
chargeagainst him as will enable him to make his defense;
second, to avail himself of his conviction oracquittal, for
protection against a further prosecution for the same
cause; and third, to inform thecourt of the facts alleged,
so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to
support aconviction, if one should be had.
The purpose of arraignment is to apprise the
accused of the possible loss of freedom, even ofhis life,
depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him, or
at the very least to inform himwhy the prosecuting arm
of the State is mobilized against him.Consequently, when
the accused-appellant entered a negative plea during his
arraignment, the same was not binding on the court as
an indication of his innocence.Rather, it is a general
denial of the charges impugned against him and an
exercise of his right to be heard of his plea.
Neither is the accused-appellant’s filing of a
notice of appeal indicative of his innocence.Onthe
contrary, accused-appellant’s appeal was necessitated by
the judgment of convictionrendered against him by the
trial court. While the accused-appellant is guilty of rape,
the same was committed only in its attemptedstage.This
and the fact that the accused-appellant was still a minor
when the crime was committed warrant the modification
of the decision of the RTC of Davao.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BERNAS
[G.R. Nos. 133583-85, February 20, 2002]
Facts:
For automatic review are decisions promulgated
by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Libmanan,
Camarines Sur finding appellant Roberto Bernas y
Nacario guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts
of rape of her two minor daughters. When first arraigned
on the charges, appellant, with the assistance of his
counsel,pleaded not guilty.When the case was submitted
for decision, the prosecution moved to reopenthe case to
present the Birth Certificate of the victims as well as the
Marriage contract of theparents.This motion was granted
over the objection of the defense counsel.Before
theprosecution presented its evidence, appellant, through
his counsel, moved for the change of hisformer plea of
not guilty to that of guilty, a Motion which the RTC
granted.
Appellant was thus rearraigned and pleaded
guilty to the charges. The defense waived itsright to
present evidence and submitted them for decision based
on the evidence presented by the prosecution.The RTC
then rendered the assailed decisions.
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Issues:
Whether or not the conviction of the accused was
proper.
Ruling:
NO.The Constitution guarantees the right of
every person accused in a criminal prosecution to be
informed of the nature and cause of accusation against
him.This right finds amplification and implementation in
the different provisions of the Rules of Court.Foremost
among these enabling provisions is the office of an
Information.The facts stated in the body of the
Information determine the crime that the accused stands
charged and for which he must betried. This recital of the
essentials of a crime delineates the nature and cause of
accusation against an accused. Other than the allegation
of carnal knowledge, no other element of rape asdefined
by law is alleged in the Information.
Since the Information fails to allege the essential
elements of qualified rape, appellant should not have
been convicted of that crime. Otherwise, his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of accusation against him would be violated.
LETICIA R. MERCIALES vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et
al. [G.R. No. 124171, March 18, 2002]
Facts:
On August 12, 1993, criminal cases for rape with
homicide were filed against the private respondents for
the death of Maritess Ricafort Merciales. During the trial,
after presenting seven witnesses, the public prosecutor
filed a motion forthe discharge of accused Joselito Nuada,
in order that he may be utilized as a state
witness.However, the prosecution contended that it was
not required to present evidence to warrant thedischarge
of accused Nuada, since the latter had already been
admitted into the WitnessProtection Program of the
Department of Justice. Consequently, the respondent
judge denied themotion for discharge, for failure of the
prosecution to present evidence as provided for by
Section9, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure.
On July 13, 1994, private respondents filed a
motion to set the case for hearing, invokingtheir
constitutional right to speedy trial.The respondent Judge
granted the motion.On the saiddate, the prosecution filed
a motion for reconsideration, instead of presenting
further evidence.The respondent Judge postponed the
hearing and reset the same for August 9, 1994.
On August 9, 1994, the respondent Judge called
for a recess so as to let the prosecution decide whether
or not to present an NBI agent, who was then present, to
prove the due executionof the accused Nuada's
extrajudicial confession.However, after the recess, the
public prosecutordeclined to present the NBI agent, and
instead manifested that he was not presenting any
furtherevidence. On October 21, 1994, the trial court
issued the assailed Order which acquitted all of
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theaccused.Petitioner Leticia Merciales, who is the mother
of the victim in the said criminal cases filed before the
respondent Court of Appeals a petition to annul the Order
of the trial court.However, the Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition.
Issues:
Whether or not the Order of the trial court is valid.
Ruling:
NO. The trial court, notwithstanding its
knowledge that the evidence for the prosecution was
insufficient to convict, especially after the public
prosecutor tenaciously insisted on utilizing Nuada as
state witness, the trial court passively watched as the
public prosecutor bungled thecase.The trial court was
well aware of the nature of the testimonies of the seven
prosecution witnesses that have so far been
presented.Given this circumstance, the trial court, motu
proprio,should have called additional witnesses for the
purpose of questioning them himself in order to satisfy
his mind with reference to particular facts or issues
involved in the case.
It is evident that petitioner was deprived of her
day in court. Indeed, it is not only the State, but more so
the offended party, that is entitled to due process in
criminal cases. Inasmuch as the acquittal of the accused
by the court a quo was done without regard to due
process of law, the same is null and void.It is as if there
was no acquittal at all, and the same cannot constitute
aclaim for double jeopardy.
By contending that the challenged decision is
void for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the
petition does not violate the right of the accused against
double jeopardy. It is elementary that double jeopardy
attaches onlywhen the following elements concur: (1) the
accused are charged under a complaint orinformation
sufficient in form and substance to sustain their
conviction; (2) the court hasjurisdiction; (3) the accused
have been arraigned and have pleaded; and (4) they are
convicted oracquitted, or the case is dismissed without
their consent.
Thus, the accused would not be placed in double
jeopardy because, from the verybeginning, the lower
tribunal had acted without jurisdiction. Any ruling issued
without jurisdictionis in legal contemplation, necessarily
null and void and does not exist. The dismissal of the
casebelow was invalid for lack of a fundamental
prerequisite, that is, due process.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, et al. [G.R. No. 135789.January
31, 2002]
Facts:
On May 5, 1982, Manuel G. Montecillo, Eduardo
M. Cojuangco, Jr., Cesar C. Zalamea and Jose Y. Campos
organized HMHMI to serve as a holding company for the
shares of stocks of Hans M. Menzi, Jose Y. Campos, Cesar
C. Zalamea and Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. in Bulletin
Publishing Corporation and the shares of stocks of Hans
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M. Menzi in other companies including Liwayway
Publishing Incorporated.
On June 27, 1984, Hans M. Menzi died. On July
6, 1984, the court appointed Manuel G.Montecillo
executor of the Estate of Hans M. Menziand later the
president of HMHMI. With the lone exception of
Montecillo, Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., Cesar C. Zalamea
and Jose Y.Campos, constitute the principal stockholders
and incorporators of HMHMI.
On February 12, 1987, the PCGG issued
Sequestration Writ No. 87-0206 against allshares of
stocks, assets, properties, records and documents of
HMHMI. Forthwith, on February13, 1987, upon the
request of PCGG, Central Bank Governor Fernandez
instructed commercial banks and non-bank financial
institutions to withhold the withdrawal of funds and
assets by Liwayway Publishing Corporation and HMHMI.
On July 29, 1987, petitioner filed with the
Sandiganbayan a complaint for reconveyance,reversion,
accounting, restitution and damages against the following
defendants: Manuel G.Montecillo, Eduardo M. Cojuangco,
Jr., Cesar C. Zalamea, Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda
R.Marcos.On October 17, 1990, the PCGG filed a Second
Amended Complaint naming specifically the estate of
Hans M. Menzi as one of the defendants.
On November 27, 1992, the estate of Hans M.
Menzi, in behalf of HMHMI, filed with the Sandiganbayan
a "Motion to Lift Freeze Order" dated February 12, 1987,
alleging that: (1) Thestocks, assets, properties, records
and documents of HMHMI were sequestered without
anyjudicial action having been filed against it, or without
impleading it as a defendant in Civil Case No. 0022; and
(2) Such issuance of a writ of sequestration without filing
a corresponding judicial action against HMHMI within the
reglementary period established by Section 26, Article
XVIII ofthe 1987 Constitution resulted in the automatic
lifting of the sequestration order on August 12, 1987.
On April 2, 1992, the Sandiganbayan granted
the motion. On October 2, 1992, the Sandiganbayan
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. On
January 15, 1993, the Republicof the Philippines filed
with the Supreme Court a petition for review assailing the
resolution of the Sandiganbayan lifting the freeze order.
On July 16, 1996, the Court set aside the
Sandiganbayan's resolution lifting the freeze order and
remanded the case back to the Sandiganbayan for
resolution.Sandiganbayan lifted the writ of sequestration
dated February 12, 1987, reasoning that there was no
prima facie factual basis for its issuance. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration which the
Sandiganbayan denied.
Issues:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in lifitng the
writ of sequestration over the assets, shares of stock,
property records and bank deposits of HMHMI.
Ruling:
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NO. It is well settled that the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over decisions or final
orders of the Sandiganbayan is limited to questions of
law. A question of law exists when the doubt or
controversy concerns the correct application of law or
jurisprudence to a certain setof facts; or when the issue
does not call for an examination of the probative value of
the evidencepresented, the truth or falsehood of facts
being admitted. A question of fact exists when the
doubtor difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of
facts or when the query invites calibration of thewhole
evidence considering mainly the credibility of the
witnesses, the existence and relevancy ofspecific
surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to
each other and to the whole, andthe probability of the
situation.
The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. It is
not the Court's function to examine and weigh all over
again the evidence presented in the proceedings below.
At any rate, the Court agrees with respondents
that the Sandiganbayan has full authorityto decide on all
incidents in the ill-gotten case, including the propriety of
the writs of sequestrationthat the PCGG initially issued.
Based on the evidence the PCGG submitted so far to
theSandiganbayan, the late Hans M. Menzi owned the
Bulletin Publishing Corporation almost onehundred
(100%) per cent since 1957, except those Bulletin shares
sold to U. S. AutomotiveCorporation in 1985, those
converted to treasury shares in 1986, and those sold to
the generalpublic at public offerings. In the absence of
competent evidence showing thus far that
PresidentFerdinand E. Marcos or his cronies ever acquired
Bulletin shares of the late Hans M. Menzi orHMHMI that
might be subject to sequestration, the Court may not
void the resolutions of theSandiganbayan in question.
O'HARA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al.
[G.R. Nos. 148941-42, March 12, 2002]
Facts:
Petitioner and respondent Jovita Rodriguez were
candidates for the position of vice- governor, province of
Rizal during the May 14, 2001 elections. On May 19,
2001, upon conclusion of the canvassing of the
certificates of canvass coming from the thirteen
municipalities and one component city of Rizal, the
Provincial Board ofCanvassers (PBC) proclaimed
petitioner as the duly elected vice-governor with 216,798
votesover respondent Rodriguez's 215,443 votes.
On May 23, 2001, the Municipal Board of
Canvassers (MBC) of Binangonan, Rizal filedwith the
COMELEC, a petition to correct entries in the certificate of
canvass of votes.It was alleged that there were
typographical errors in the number of votes garnered by
petitioner and respondent resulting in the addition of
7,000 votes to petitioner. The MBC of Binangonan
submitted the affidavit of Evelyn Ramirez, the Municipal
Accountant of Binangonan, Rizal, admitting that she
committed the mathematical error.
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On May 25, 2001, respondent Rodriguez filed
with the COMELEC a petition to annul the proclamation of
the winning candidate for vice-governor of the province
of Rizal, and to correct alleged manifest mathematical
errors. Respondent Rodriguez asserted that after
themathematical error would have been corrected, she
would obtain a plurality of 215,422 votes as against
petitioner's 209,798.
Petitioner filed his answer to the petition,
arguing that there was no manifest error apparent in the
certificate of canvass which respondent Rodriguez and
the MBC of Binangonan sought to correct.
On July 25, 2001, the COMELEC issued a
resolution in the cases, wherein it ordered that
petitioner’s proclamation is annulled, the PBC of Rizal to
reconvene and correct the manifest mathmatical error in
the votes, and to proclaim respondent as the duly elected
Vice-Governor of Rizal.
Accordingly, on July 27, 2001, the PBC of Rizal
reconvened.However, petitioner wasnot notified of the
proceedings of the PBC of Rizal.On the same day, the
PBC of Rizal issued another certificate of canvass of votes
and proclamation of the winning candidates for provincial
officers, and on the basis thereof proclaimed private
respondent as the duly elected vice-governorof Rizal.
Immediately, respondent Rodriguez took her oath of
office before Judge Leila SuarezAcebo, Regional Trial
Court, Pasig City.
Issues:
Whether or not the Comelec gravely abused its
discretion when it annulled the proclamation of
petitioner as vice-governor of Rizal and by ordering the
PBC of Rizal to reconvene and correct the alleged
manifest mathematical error supposedly committed by
theMBC of Rizal.
Ruling:
YES. The COMELEC should have conducted
further investigation or at least a technical inspection or
examination of election returns to verify the existence of
the alleged error before itgave credence to the
statements of the MBC of Binangonan and concluding
outright that theStatement of Votes submitted by
respondents were accurate.
The COMELEC cannot simply rely on these
Statement of Votes because they wereprepared by the
same members of the MBC who claimed to have made a
mistake due to "fatigue, sleepless nights and physical
exhaustion."It would have been more prudent to make a
determination whether these same individuals committed
any other mistake in the tabulation orstatement of votes.
Even based on the statements/affidavits of the
MBC of Binangonan, it is apparent that the errors sought
to be corrected do not appear on the face of the
certificate of canvass.As above-stated, the alleged error
which the COMELEC perceived to be manifest does not
fall under the definition of "manifest error" which was laid
down in Chavez vs. COMELEC . . . “To be manifest, the
errors must appear on the face of the certificates of
canvass or election returns sought to be corrected and/or
objections thereto must have been made before the
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board of canvassers and specifically noted in the minutes
of their respective proceedings.”
The Constitution gives the Commission on
Elections the broad power "to enforce all laws and
regulations to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendumand recall."The Commission
indisputably exercises the power of supervision and
control over boards of election inspectors and boards of
canvassers. The Commission must do everything in its
power to secure a fair and honest canvass of the votes
cast in the elections. The Constitution upgraded to a
constitutional status the statutory authority under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881 to grant the Commission broad and
more flexible powers to effectively perform its duties and
to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections, and to serve as the guardian of the people's
sacred right of suffrage.
In the absence of any manifest error in the
certificate of canvass sought to be corrected, the
Commission should have ordered the re-canvass of the
election returns or the re-counting of the ballots in the
municipality of Binangonan in order to validate the claim
of its MBC.
If after the re-canvass of the election returns or
the re-counting of the official ballots, the clerical error or
mathematical mistake in the addition of the votes had
been established, the Commission should have annulled
the canvass and proclamation based on the erroneous
certificate of canvass. If the records had borne out that
petitioner's proclamation was the result of a clerical error
or simple mathematical mistake in the addition of votes
and did not reflect the true and legitimate will of the
electorate, there could have been no valid proclamation
to speak of. The issue would involve a pre-proclamation
controversy.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
[G.R. No. 88435, January 16, 2002]
Facts:
In 1986, the Philippine Government, under the
administration of then President Corazon C. Aquino,
obtained from the World Bank (WB) an Economic
Recovery Loan (ERL) in the amount of 310 Million US
Dollars.The ERL was intended to support the recovery of
the Philippine economy, at the time suffering severely
from the financial crisis that hit the country during the
latter part of the Marcos regime.
As a condition for granting the loan, the World
Bank required the Philippine government to rehabilitate
the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) which
was then saddled with huge non-performing loans.The
government’s commitment was embodied in the Policy
Statement ofthe DBP which, among others, provided that
the mentioned bank will now be required to have aprivate
external auditor.
On November 28, 1986, the Monetary Board
adopted Resolution No. 1079 amending theCentral Bank’s
Manual of Regulation for Banks and other Financial
Intermediaries.Thus, on December 5, 1986, the Central
Bank Governor issued Central Bank Circular No. 1124
which substantially provides that “the requirements for
an annual financial audit by an external independent
auditor shall extend to specialized and unique banks such
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as the Land Bank of thePhilippines and the DBP.”On
December 12, 1986, pursuant to CB Circular No. 1124
and the government’s commitment to the WB, DBP
Chairman Jesus Estanislao wrote the Commission on
Audit (COA) seeking the approval of the DBP’s
engagement of a private external auditor in addition to
the COA.
On January 20, 1987, the COA Chairman
Teofisto Guingona, Jr. replied to the December 12, 1986
letter of the DBP Chairman with a statement that “the
COA will interpose no objection to your engagement of a
private external auditor as required by the Economic
Recovery Program Loan Agrrement of 1987 provided that
the terms for said audit are first reviewed and approved
by the Commission.”Cosequently, the Board of Directors
of the DBP approve the hiring of Joaquin Cunanan & Co.
as the DBP’s private external auditor for calendar year
1986.
However, a change in the leadership of the COA
reversed the course of events. On April27, 1987, the new
COA Chairman, Eufemio Doningo, wrote the CB Governor
protesting the issuance of Circular No. 1124 which
allegedly encroached upon the COA’s constitutional and
statutory power to audit government agencies.On May 13,
1987, after learning that DBP had signed a contract with
above-mentioned auditing firm, the new COA Chairman
wrote the DBP Chairman that the COA resident auditors
were under instruction to disallow any payment to the
private auditor whose services were unconstitutional,
illegal and unnecessary.
On July 1, 1987, the DBP Chairman sent to the
COA Chairman a copy of the DBP’scontract with Joaquin
Cunanan & Co., signed four months earlier on March 5,
1987.The DBPChairman’s covering hand-written note
sought the COA’s concurrence to the contract.During
thependency of COA’s concurrence to the contract, DBP
paid the billings of the private auditor in the total amount
of Php 487,321.14 despite the former’s objection to the
same.Thereafter, the COA chairman issued a intentionally omitted the word “exclusive” in the first
memorandum disallowing the payments.On January 19,
1988, the DBP Chairman moved for a reconsideration of
the memorandum issued by the COA which the latter also
denied ratiocinating that the said Commission has the
“power, authority and duty to examine, audit and settle
all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of,
and expenditures of uses of funds and property
pertaining to the government.” (Sec. 2, Art. IX-D, 1987
Philippine Constitution)
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the constitutional power of the COA
to examine and audit the DBP is exclusive and
precludes the concurrent audit of the DBP by a private
external auditor.
(2)Whether or not there is a necessity of hiring a
private auditor and the reasonableness of their fees.
Ruling:
(1) NO.The resolution of the issue herein
requires an interpretation of Section 2, Article IX-D of the
1987 Constituition, which provides:
“Sec. 2 (1)
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The Commission on Audit shall have the power,
authority, and duty toexamine, audit, and settle all
accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of,
andexpenditures or uses of funds and property, owned
and held in trust by, or pertaining to, theGovernment, or
any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities,
including government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters.
(2) The Commission shall have the exclusive
authority, subject to thelimitations in this Article, to
define the scope of its audit and examination, establish
the techniquesand methods required therefore, and
promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations,
including those for the prevention and disallowance of
irregular, unnecessary, excessive,extravagant, or
unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government
funds and properties.”
The bare language of Section 2 shows that the
COA’s power under the first paragraph is not declared
exclusive, while its authority under the second paragraph
is declared “exclusive.”The framers of the Constitution, in
deleting the word “exclusive” in the first paragraph,
deemed that the inclusion of such word would constitute
a disincentive or obstacle to private investment. There
are government institutions with private investments in
them, and some of these investors—Filipinos, as well as
in some cases, foreigners—require the presence of
private auditing firms, not exclusively but concurrently.
The qualifying word “exclusive” in the second
paragraph of Section 2 cannot be applied to the first
paragraph which is another sub-section of Section 2. A
qualifying word is intended to refer only to the phrase to
which it is immediately associated.Thus, the first
paragraph of Section2 must be read the way it appears,
without the word “exclusive,” signifying that non-COA
auditors can also examine and audit government
agencies. Besides, the framers of the Constitution
paragraph of Section 2 precisely to allow concurrent audit
by private external auditors.
The clear and unmistakable conclusion from the
reading of the entire Section 2 is that the COA’s power to
examine and audit is non-exclusive.On the other hand,
the COA’s authority to define the scope of its audit,
promulgate auditing rules and regulations, and disallow
unnecessary expenditures is exclusive.
Further, the mere fact that private auditors may
audit government agencies does not divest COA of its
power to examine and audit the same government
agencies.The COA is neither by-passed nor ignored since
even with a private audit the COA will still conduct its
usual examination and audit, and its findings and
conclusions will still bind the government agencies and its
officials.A concurrent private audit poses no danger
whatsoever of public funds or assets escaping the usual
scrutiny of a COA audit.
(2)YES.The hiring of a private auditor being an
express condition for the grant of the US $310 Million
Economic Recovery Loan, a major objective of which was
DBP’s rehabilitation, the same was a necessary corporate
act on the part of the DBP. The national government,
represented by the Central Bank Governor, as well as the
Ministers of Finance, Trade, and Economic Planning, had
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already committed to the hiring by all government banks
for private auditors in addition to the COA. For the DBP to
refuse to hire a private auditor would have aborted the
vital loan and derailed the national economic recovery,
resulting in grave consequences to the entire nation.The
hiring of a private auditor was not only necessary based
on the government’s loan covenant with the World Bank,
it was also necessary because it was mandated by
Central Bank No. 1124 under pain administrative and
penal sanctions.
The hiring of a private auditor by the DBP being
a condition of the loan, the fees of suchprivate auditors
are in reality part of the government’s cost of borrowing
from the World Bank.Anannual private audit fee of about
half a million pesos added to the interest on a US $310
Millionloan would hardly make the cost of borrowing
excessive, extravagant or unconscionable.Besides, the
condition imposed by a lender, whose money is at risk,
requiring the borrower tosubmit to audit by an
independent public accountant, is a reasonable and
normal business practice.
MA. J. ANGELINA G. MATIBAG vs. ALFREDO L.
BENIPAYO, et al. [G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002]
Facts:
On February 2, 1999, the COMELEC appointed
petitioner as "Acting Director IV" of the EID.On February
15, 2000, then Chairperson Harriet O. Demetriou
renewed the appointment of petitioner as Director IV of
EID in a "Temporary" capacity. On February 15, 2001,
Commissioner Rufino S. B. Javier renewed again the
appointment of petitioner to the same position in a
"Temporary" capacity.
On March 22, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo appointed, ad interim, Benipayo as COMELEC
Chairman, and Borra and Tuason as COMELEC
Commissioners, each for a term of seven years and all
expiring on February 2, 2008. Benipayo took his oath of
office and assumed the position of COMELEC Chairman;
and Borra and Tuason likewise took their oaths ofoffice
and assumed their positions as COMELEC Commissioners.
The Office of the President submitted to the Commission
on Appointments on May 22, 2001 the ad interim
appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason for
confirmations. However, the Commission on
Appointments did not act on said appointments. This
process was repeated twice.
On April 11, 2001, COMELEC Chairman Benipayo
issued a Memorandum whereby here aasigned petitioner
to the Law Department. Petitioner requested Benipayo to
reconsider her reassignment to the Law Department but
to no avail.Upon denial, petitioner filed an administrative
and criminal complaint with the Law Department against
Benipayo, alleging that her reassignment violated
Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC Resolution No. 3258,
Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 07 and other
pertinent administratve and civil service laws, rules and
regulations.
During the pendency of her complaint before the
Law Department, petitioner filed the instant petition
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questioning the appointment and the right to remain in
office of Benipayo, Borraand Tuason, as Chairman and
Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively.
Issues:
(1)Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo,
Borra and Tuason on the basis of thead interim
appointments issued by the President amounts to a
temporary appointmentprohibited by Section 1 (2),
Article IX-C of the Constitution.
(2)Whether or not the renewal of their ad interim
appointments and subsequent assumption
of office to the same positions violate the prohibition on
reappointment under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the
Constitution.
(3)Whether or not Benipayo's removal of petitioner from
her position as Director IV of the EIDand her
reassignment to the Law Department is illegal and
without authority, having been done without the approval
of the COMELEC as a collegial body.
Ruling:
(1) NO. An ad interim appointment is a
permanent appointment because it takes effect
immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the
President once the appointee has qualified into office. The
fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments does not alter its permanent character.
The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment
permanent in character by making it effective until
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until
the next adjournment of Congress. The second paragraph
of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution provides as
follows:
"The President shall have the power to make
appointments during the recess of theCongress, whether
voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be
effective only until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress."
Thus, the ad interim appointment remains
effective until such disapproval or next adjournment,
signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked
by the President. The fear that the President can
withdraw or revoke at any time and for any reason an ad
interim appointment is utterly without basis.
Hence the ad interim appointments extended by
the President to Benipayo, Borra andTuason, as
COMELEC Chairman and Commissioners, respectively, do
not constitute temporary or acting appointments
prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the
Constitution.
(2) NO. There is no dispute that an ad interim
appointee disapproved by the Commission on
Appointments can no longer be extended a new
appointment. The disapproval is a final decision of the
Commission on Appointments in the exercise of its
checking power on the appointingauthority of the
President. The disapproval is a decision on the merits,
being a refusal by the Commission on Appointments to
give its consent after deliberating on the qualifications of
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the appointee. Since the Constitution does not provide for
any appeal from such decision, the disapproval is final
and binding on the appointee as well as on the appointing
power.In this instance, the President can no longer renew
the appointment not because of the constitutional
prohibition on reappointment, but because of a final
decision by the Commission onAppointments to withhold
its consent to the appointment.
An ad interim appointment that is by-passed
because of lack of time or failure of the Commission on
Appointments to organize is another matter.A by-passed
appointment is one that has not been finally acted upon
on the merits by the Commission on Appointments at
theclose of the session of Congress. There is no final
decision by the Commission on Appointments to give or
withhold its consent to the appointment as required by
the Constitution. Absent such decision, the President is
free to renew the ad interim appointment of a by-passed
appointee.
(3) NO. The Chairman, as the Chief Executive of
the COMELEC, is expressly empowered on his own
authority to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel in
accordance with the Civil Service Law. In the exercise of
this power, the Chairman is not required by law to secure
the approval of the COMELEC en banc.
Petitioner's appointment papers dated February
2, 1999, February 15, 2000 andFebruary 15, 2001,
indisputably show that she held her Director IV position
in the EID only in anacting or temporary capacity.
Petitioner is not a Career Executive Service (CES) officer,
and neither does she hold Career Executive Service
Eligibility, which are necessary qualifications for holding
the position of Director IV as prescribed in the
Qualifications Standards (Revised 1987) issued by the
Civil Service Commission. Obviously, petitioner does not
enjoy security of tenure as Director IV.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ACELO
VERRA, G.R. No. 134732 - May 29, 2002
Facts:
A day in court is the touchstone of the right to
due process in criminal justice. It is an aspect of the duty
of the government to follow a fair process of decision-
making when it acts to deprive a person of his
liberty.1 But just as an accused is accorded this
constitutional protection, so is the State entitled to due
process in criminal prosecutions.2 It must similarly be
given the chance to present its evidence in support of a
charge.
Petitioner, People of the Philippines, claims that
it was denied its day in court and its due process right
was breached. Filing this Petition under Rule 45, it seeks
to set aside, on pure questions of law, the April 6, 1998
Decision of the Court of Appeals.
On November 14, 1988, respondent Acelo Verra
was charged with the crime of murder for killing a certain
Elias Cortezo. A warrant of arrest was issued by the
Regional Trial Court against him on November 21, 1988.
He remained at-large until May 24, 1996 when he
voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
court accompanied by his counsel. Immediately,
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arraignment proceeded during which he entered a plea of
"Not Guilty."
On the same day, the prosecution called to the
witness stand the wife of the victim, private complainant
Damiana Cortezo. She testified that: (1) she has
executed an affidavit of desistance;3 (2) she is no longer
interested in prosecuting the case; and (3) other
witnesses of the shooting incident have turned hostile
and have similarly lost concern in pursuing the same.
Thereafter, the prosecution, joined by the counsel for the
accused, moved for the dismissal of the case. In light of
these developments, the trial judge issued an Order
dated May 24, 1996 granting the motion, thus the Court
dismissed the case.
Subsequently, two other witnesses of the
shooting incident appeared after learning of the dismissal
of the case and manifested their willingness to testify.
Further, two sisters of the victim assailed the allegation
of lack of interest. Consequently, the prosecution filed a
Motion to Set Aside the Order of Dismissal on July 22,
1996 asserting that Damiana and the accused misled the
trial court and deprived the plaintiff, People of the
Philippines, its day in court. For which reason, it argued,
the Order dismissing the case should be voided.
The Court of Appeals set aside the decision of
the Regional Trial Court and reinstated the case. Hence,
the present course of action.
Issues:
Whether or not the court of appeals committed a grave
abuse of decision on reinstating the case.
Ruling:
Petitioner cannot complain that it was denied its
day in court. It was, in the first place, represented by a
public prosecutor who was personally present in every
stage of the proceeding -- from the arraignment to the
promulgation of the dismissal order -- to protect its
interests. It was given the chance to submit its evidence
as it in fact called to the stand its own witness, Damiana
(who incidentally was the only witness presented here),
during the day of the hearing. Then, the prosecutor was
able to conduct her direct examination. More importantly,
petitioner was the one who jointly moved with accused's
counsel for the dismissal of this case due to lack of
evidence. The Order of Dismissal was given in open court
by the presiding judge without any remonstrance from
the prosecution.
In the case at bar, we find all the above-cited
requisites present. First, there was a valid information,
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction,
filed on November 14, 1988 duly signed by 4th Assistant
Provincial Fiscal Cesar M. Merin.16Second, the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 10 of Tacloban City clearly had
jurisdiction to hear and try the murder charge against the
respondent. Third, he was arraigned in open court on
May 24, 1996 with the assistance of a counsel de
officio.17 Fourth, during the arraignment, he entered a
plea of not guilty.18 Finally, there was a valid termination
of this case on the basis of the trial judge's Order to
Dismiss the case. While it is true that the respondent
joined the prosecution in praying for its dismissal, double
jeopardy will still attach since the basis for the ruling was
the insufficiency of evidence of the prosecution. In view
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of private complainant's desistance and her testimony
that other witnesses have turned hostile and are also no
longer interested in prosecuting this case, petitioner
clearly lacks the evidence to support the charge.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
JOEL GONZALES, JOSEPH BERNALDEZ, and ROMEO
BERNALDEZ, G.R. No. 142932 May 29, 2002
Facts:
This is an appeal from the decision,1
dated
February 10, 2000, of the Regional Trial Court, 11th
Judicial Region, Branch 6, Mati, Davao Oriental, insofar
as it finds accused-appellants Joel Gonzales and Romeo
Bernaldez guilty as principals of the complex crime of
robbery with homicide and sentences each of them to
suffer the penalty ofreclusion perpetua, with the
accessory penalties provided by law, and to indemnify
jointly and severally the heirs of the victim Nicanor
Suralta in the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity
and P2,425.00, plus the costs of the proceedings.
When arraigned on December 1, 1992, the three
entered a plea of not guilty, whereupon they were tried.
Trial Court adjudged them to be guilty beyond reasonable
doubt. Counsel for accused-appellant Joel Gonzales
appealed contending that the evidence adduced by the
prosecution during the trial are inadmissible in law.
Accused-appellant Gonzales contends that during the
interrogation and investigation, he and his co-appellant
Romeo Bernaldez were not informed of their rights to
remain silent and to secure the services of counsel, in
violation of §§2 and 12, Art. III of the Constitution.
Hence, their admission of the commission of the crime is
inadmissible in evidence against them.
Issues:
Whether or not the appellant was corrent in his claim
that the evidence be inadmissible in trial.
Ruling:
This contention lacks merit.
Accused-appellants were already under
custodial investigation when they made their admissions
to the police. At that point, the investigation had ceased
to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and had
began to focus on the guilt of a suspect and for this
reason the latter were taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of freedom in a substantial way.40 Hence, the
admissions made by accused-appellants are inadmissible
in evidence pursuant to Art. III, § 2(1) and (3) of the
Constitution. However, the defense failed to raise its
objections to the admissibility of these statements
immediately, as required by Rule 132, §36, when
Inspector Malintad was presented as a witness for the
prosecution or when specific questions concerning the
confession were asked of him. Consequently, accused-
appellants are deemed to have waived their right to
object to the admissibility of Inspector Malintad's
testimony.41 Indeed, it was even the defense counsel who
provided the opportunity for Inspector Malintad to
elaborate on the circumstances of accused-appellant
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Gonzales' admission in the course of his cross-
examination of the said witness.
JOEY POTOT y SURIO vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and LOLITO DAPULAGG.R. No.
143547, June 26, 2002
Facts:
After the accused has filed with the trial court a
manifestation that he is not appealing its Decision
convicting him of homicide and that he is ready to serve
his sentence, can the same court, upon motion by the
private complainant with the conformity of the public
prosecutor, set aside the said judgment and remand the
records of the case to the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor for re-evaluation of the evidence and the filing
of the corresponding charge? This is the issue raised in
the instant petition for review on certiorari.1âwphi1.nêt
Joey S. Potot, petitioner, was charged with
homicide in Criminal Case No. 2739 before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, Catarman, Northern Samar.
Upon arraignment on February 1, 2000, wherein
the information was read to him in his own dialect,
petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded guilty to the
charge.2 Forthwith, he invoked not only the mitigating
circumstance of plea of guilty, but also the circumstance
of voluntary surrender since, as shown in the records, he
surrendered voluntarily to the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Headquarters immediately after the commission of
the crime. The public prosecutor did not raise any
objection. Instead, he manifested that there is no
aggravating circumstance which attended the commission
of the crime.
Thereupon, the trial court, after being satisfied
that petitioner understood the meaning and
consequences of his plea of guilty, rendered and
promulgated its Decision in open court convicting him of
3
homicide, with the mitigating circumstances of plea of
guilty and voluntary surrender appreciated in his favor.
On February 3, 2000, petitioner, through
counsel, filed a manifestation with motion5 informing the
trial court that he is not appealing from the Decision and
praying that a commitment order be issued so he could
immediately serve his sentence. Attached to the motion
is petitioner's letter to the court stating that he does not
intend to appeal from its Decision.6
However, on February 11, 2000, the private
complainant, Rosalie Dapulag (wife of the victim), filed
through counsel, a motion for
reconsideration/retrial7 praying that the Decision be set
aside and that the case be heard again because "there
were irregularities committed before and during the trial
which caused miscarriage of justice." The motion, which
bears the conformity of the public prosecutor, alleges,
among others, that:
Petitioner opposed8 the motion, asserting that
there was no irregularity in the preliminary investigation
of the case and in the proceedings before the trial court;
and that the decision can no longer be modified or set
aside because it became final when he formally waived
his right to appeal.
The trial court, in its order dated May 3,
2000,9 granted private complainant's motion and set
aside its February 1, 2000 Decision "as proceeding from a
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rigged, hence, sham hearing." It likewise ordered that
the records of the case be remanded to the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor "for re-evaluation of the evidence
and to file the corresponding charge,"
Issues:
Whether or not the Trial Court was correct in its
decision to reopen the case because of the
irregularities in the previous proceedings.
Ruling:
It is thus clear that only the accused may ask
for a modification or setting aside of a judgment
of conviction. And this he must do before the said
judgment becomes final or before he perfects his appeal.
Such judgment becomes final in any of the following
ways: (a) when no appeal is seasonably filed by the
accused, except in case of automatic review of the
decision imposing the capital penalty;13 (b) when he has
partially or totally served his sentence; (c) when he
expressly waives his right to appeal the judgment, except
when the death penalty is imposed; or (d) when he
applies for probation. When one of these circumstances is
present, the trial court which rendered the judgment of
conviction loses jurisdiction to alter, modify or revoke
it.14
It is an undisputed fact that on February 3, 2000,
or three days after the promulgation of the judgment of
conviction, petitioner filed a manifestation expressly
waiving his right to appeal therefrom. His intention not to
appeal is further indicated by his prayer in the same
manifestation for the immediate issuance of a
commitment order so he could serve his sentence. Such
waiver has the effect of causing the judgment to become
final and unalterable.15 Thus, it was beyond the authority
of the trial court to issue the order of May 3, 2000 setting
aside its February 3, 2000 Decision which had attained
finality.
In Calalang vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon
City16 and in a long line of cases, this Court (En
Banc) held that a judgment which has acquired the status
of finality becomes immutable. Any error, assuming one
was committed in the judgment, will not justify its
amendment except only to correct clerical errors or
mistakes.
Finally, we agree with the petitioner that the
assailed orders would violate his constitutional right
against double jeopardy.19 Such right prohibits any
subsequent prosecution of any person for a crime of
which he has previously been acquitted or convicted. The
objective is to set the effects of the first prosecution
forever at rest, assuring the accused that he shall not
thereafter be subjected to the peril and anxiety of a
second charge against him for the same offense.
To invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the
following requisites must be present: (1) a valid
complaint or information; (2) the court has jurisdiction to
try the case; (3) the accused has pleaded to the charge;
and (4) he has been convicted or acquitted, or the case
against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent.
These requisites have been established. Records
show that petitioner was charged with homicide in
Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!
Criminal Case No. 2739 under a valid information before
the trial court which has jurisdiction over it. He was
arraigned and pleaded guilty to the charge. On the basis
of his plea, petitioner was convicted and meted the
corresponding penalty. As petitioner has been placed in
jeopardy for the crime of homicide, he cannot be
prosecuted anew for the same offense, or any offense
which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in
the first offense charged.
SALVADOR H. LAUREL vs. HON. ANIANO A.
DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, G.R. No.
145368 July 1, 2002
Facts:
Petitioner Salvador H. Laurel moves for a
reconsideration of this Court's decision declaring him, as
Chair of the National Centennial Commission (NCC), a
public officer. Petitioner also prays that the case be
referred to the Court En Banc.
First, petitioner points out that the decision has
"serious constitutional repercussions"1 because the
composition of the NCC included members of the Cabinet,
the Senate, the House of Representatives and the
Supreme Court,2who are prohibited by the Constitution
from holding any other office during their term or tenure.
In connection, the Court, in its decision,
allegedly disregarded the pronouncement in Manila
Electric Co. vs. Panay Transportation Co.4 that the
"Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot
be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust
or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected
with the administering of judicial functions."
Issues:
Where or not the petitioner as Chair of the NCC is a
public officer under the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman.
Ruling:
Assuming, as petitioner proposes, that the
designation of other members to the NCC runs counter to
the Constitution, it does not make petitioner, as NCC
Chair, less a public officer. Such "serious constitutional
repercussions" do not reduce the force of the rationale
behind this Court's decision.
Second, petitioner invokes estoppel. He claims
that the official acts of the President, the Senate
President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
and the Supreme Court, in designating Cabinet members,
Senators, Congressmen and Justices to the NCC, led him
to believe that the NCC is not a public office.6
The contention has no merit. In estoppel, the
party representing material facts must have the intention
that the other party would act upon the
representation.7 It is preposterous to suppose that the
President, the Senate President, the Speaker and the
Supreme Court, by the designation of such officials to the
NCC, intended to mislead petitioner just so he would
accept the position of NCC Chair. Estoppel must be
unequivocal and intentional.8 Moreover, petitioner himself
admits that the principle of estoppel does not operate
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against the Government in the exercise of its sovereign
powers.9
Third, as ground for the referral of the case to
the Court En Banc, petitioner submits that our decision in
this case modified or reversed doctrines rendered by this
Court, which can only be done by the Court En Banc.
It is argued that by designating three of its then
incumbent members to the NCC, the Court took the
position that the NCC was not a public office.10 The
argument is a bit of a stretch. Section 4 (3), Article VIII
of the Constitution provides that "no doctrine or principle
of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en
banc or in division may be modified or reversed except
by the court sitting en banc." In designating three of its
incumbent members to the NCC, the Court did not render
a "decision," in the context of said constitutional
provision, which contemplates an actual case. Much less
did the Court, by such designation, articulate any
"doctrine or principle of law."
Invoking the same provision, petitioner
asserts11 that the decision in this case reversed or
modified Macalino vs. Sandiganbayan,12 holding that the
Assistant Manager of the Treasury Division and the Head
of the Loans Administration & Insurance Section of the
Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) is
not a public officer under Republic Act No. 3019. This
contention also has no merit. The rationale for the ruling
in Macalino is that "the PNCC has no original charter as it
was incorporated under the general law on corporations."
However, as we pointed out in our decision, a conclusion
that EXPOCORP is a government-owned or controlled
corporation would not alter the outcome of this case
because petitioner's position and functions as Chief
Executive Officer of EXPOCORP are by virtue of his being
Chairman of the NCC. The other issues raised by
petitioner are mere reiterations of his earlier arguments.
The Court, however, remains unswayed thereby
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESvs. KER AND
COMPANY LIMITED, G.R. No. 136171 July 2, 2002
Facts:
Before us is a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by
petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Department of Public Works and Highways, assailing the
decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV
No. 54256 entitled, "Republic of the Philippines v. Ker
and Company Limited." The decision in question affirmed
the trial court in ordering petitioner to pay herein
respondent Ker Company Limited the sum of Six
Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) per square meter as just
compensation for the 1,186 square meter lot (Site I)
which was expropriated by the government.
Petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Davao City a petition for expropriation of
portions of two (2) parcels of land owned by respondent
described as follows:
Petitioner needed the parcels of land for the
widening of the road component of J.P. Laurel-Buhangin
Interchange in Davao City. The provisional value of the
properties sought to be expropriated was fixed at the
aggregate sum of Two Million Two Hundred Twenty One
Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!
Thousand Pesos (P2,221,000.00) or One Thousand Pesos
(P1,000.00) per square meter. Respondent claimed that
the value of the properties subject for expropriation is
Lot No. TCT No. Total Area Affected Area
Site I 2-D-1-A- T-212616 29.583 sq. 1,186 sq. m.
2 m.
Site II 2-D-1-B- T-212617 2,902 sq. m. 1,035 sq. m.
1
more than Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00) per square
meter. While petitioner found the valuation of
respondent’s property in Site II reasonable, petitioner, in
its comment on the Report of the Appraisers found the
estimate for Site I excessive, stating that:
1) the provincial Appraisal Committee in a joint
Appraisal Report dated January 14, 1993 recommended
the market value of Ker and Company’s property at
P1,000.00 per square meter;
2) the highest valuation of lots within the JP
Laurel-Buhangin area adjudicated by the RTC, Davao City
in a decision rendered on December 23, 1993 is at
P4,000.00 per sq. meter; and,
3) the appraisers did not take into account that
the areas in the proceedings are being expropriated for
use in a government project vested with public interest.
On September 27, 1996, the RTC rendered a
decision declaring plaintiff to have a lawful right to
acquire possession of and title to tne two lots ordering to
pay just and fair compensation.
The appellate court affirmed the decision of the
lower court in toto, ruling that just compensation cannot
be measured by the assessed value of the property as
stated in the tax declaration and schedule of market
values approved by the Provincial Appraisal Committee
and that for the purpose of appraisal, the fair market
value of the property is taken into account and such
value refers to the highest price in terms of money which
a property will bring if exposed for sale in the public
market.
Issues:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in
affirming the decision of the lower court.
Ruling:
The appellate court did not err in not upholding
petitioner’s claim that the valuation for the lot in Site I is
excessive and unreasonable since the tax declaration of
the property indicated its assessed value at only Four
Hundred Twenty-Five Pesos (P425.00) per square meter
while its market value was only Eight Hundred Forty-Nine
Pesos (P849.00) per square meter based on the revised
1993 schedule of market values. We have declared
in Manotok v. National Housing Authority3, that the
statements made in tax documents by the assessor may
serve as one of the factors to be considered but they
cannot exclude or prevail over a court determination
after expert commissioners have examined the property
and all pertinent circumstances are taken into account
and after all the parties have had the opportunity to fully
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plead their cases before a competent and unbiased
tribunal.
That the tax declaration of the property in Site I
indicated a much lower assessed or market value
therefore does not make commissioners’ valuation of just
compensation for the property excessive or unreasonable.
The duly appointed commissioners of both parties made a
careful study of the properties subject of expropriation.
They considered factors such as the location, the most
profitable likely use of the remaining area, size, shape,
accessibility as well as listings of other properties within
the vicinity to arrive at a reasonable estimate of just
compensation for both lots due the respondent. Petitioner,
in fact, does not question the commissioners’ appraisal
value as just compensation for the area affected in Site II.
Petitioner maintains that the assessment of just
compensation for the lot in Site I is excessive since the
highest valuation made for the properties within the
vicinity of J.P. Laurel-Buhangin Road was pegged at Four
Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00) in a decision rendered by
Branch 17 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao in
December 1993. This contention is not plausible. In
computing just compensation for expropriation
proceedings, it is the value of the land at the time of the
taking or at the time of the filing of the complaint not at
the time of the rendition of judgment which should be
taken into consideration.4 Section 4, Rule 67 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that just compensation
is to be determined as of the date of the taking or the
filing of the complaint whichever came first. On this
matter, the appellate court is correct in disregarding
petitioner’s claim.
Nonetheless, we find merit in petitioner’s
contention that there are no substantial distinctions
between the lot in Site I and the lot in Site II to warrant
different valuations.
The lots subject of expropriation are adjacent to
each other. The Appraisal Report even indicated that the
remaining area of the lot in Site II has the same problem
as in Site I with respect to access. The construction of
the service road has created a problem pertaining to
ingress or egress to the remaining portions of both
Sites.5Considering that there is no evidence showing
substantial distinctions between the lots affected by Site I
and Site II and no explanation was given by the
commissioners as to why Site I had been given a higher
valuation than Site II, we find it just and reasonable that
the undisputed sum of Five Thousand Four Hundred
Twenty-Three Pesos and Forty-Eight Centavos
(P5,423.48) per square meter as just compensation for
Site II should likewise apply to Site I.
REGALADO P. SAMARTINO vs. LEONOR B. RAON,
AGUSTIN G. CRISOSTOMO, THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL
COURT OF NOVELETA, CAVITE, HON. MANUEL A.
MAYO, and THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No.
131482 July 3, 2002
Facts:
Respondents Leonor Bernardo-Raon and Agustin
G. Crisostomo are the surviving sister and spouse,
respectively, of the late Filomena Bernardo-Crisostomo,
who passed away on May 17, 1994. Among the
properties left by the deceased was her one-half share in
a parcel of land in Noveleta, Cavite, registered under
Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T- 131898 in the name of
co-owners Lido Beach Corporation and Filomena
Bernardo.
On January 25, 1996, respondents instituted
against petitioner Regalado P. Samartino a complaint for
ejectment, docketed as Civil Case No. 744 of the
Municipal Trial Court of Noveleta, Cavite.1 They alleged
that during the lifetime of Filomena Bernardo, she leased
her share in the property to petitioner for a period of five
years counted from 1986; that the said lease expired and
was not extended thereafter; and that petitioner refused
to vacate the property despite demands therefor.
The trial court, despite the written certification
from NBI-TRC, granted respondents’ motion to declare
petitioner in default and ordered them to present
evidence ex-parte. On March 21, 1996, the trial court
rendered judgment in favor of respondents.
After learning of the adverse decision against
him, petitioner’s counsel filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Cavite City, Branch 16, a motion to set aside
judgment. The motion was treated as an appeal and
docketed as Civil Case No. N-6281. On July 18, 1996, the
RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC.5
Certificate of Title No. T-283572, was levied and
sold at public auction to respondents in full satisfaction of
the monetary award.7
On November 25, 1996, petitioner filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, a petition for relief
from judgment, docketed as Civil Case No. N-6393.8 In
support thereof, petitioner submitted an affidavit of
merit,9alleging in fine that the parcel of land from which
he was being evicted had been sold to him by Filomena
Bernardo-Crisostomo, as evidenced by the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated December 13, 1988.10
The following day, November 26, 1996, the RTC
issued an Order dismissing the petition for relief from
judgment.11Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was
denied on December 12, 1996. A second Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied on January 14,
1997.12 On the same day, a writ of demolition was issued
commanding the sheriff to remove the building and
improvements made by petitioner on the subject
premises and to deliver the possession thereof to
respondents.13
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
432O2.14 On August 29, 1997, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition.15 Petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration was denied on November 14,
1997. Hence this petition for review.
16
Issues:
Whether or not the petition of Regalado Samartino is with
merits.
Ruling:
The petition is impressed with merit.
In actions in personam, summons on the
defendant must be served by handing a copy thereof to
the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive it, by
tendering it to him. If efforts to serve the summons
personally to defendant is impossible, service may be
effected by leaving copies of the summons at the
defendant’s dwelling house or residence with some
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person of suitable age and discretion residing therein, or
by leaving the copies at the defendant’s office or regular
place of business with some competent person in charge
thereof. Otherwise stated, service of summons upon the
defendant shall be by personal service first and only
when the defendant cannot be promptly served in person
will substituted service be availed of.
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. PUBLIC ESTATES
AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, G.R. No. 133250July
9, 2002
Facts:
This is an original Petition for Mandamus with
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and a
temporary restraining order. The petition seeks to compel
the Public Estates Authority ("PEA" for brevity) to disclose
all facts on PEA's then on-going renegotiations with
Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation
("AMARI" for brevity) to reclaim portions of Manila Bay.
The petition further seeks to enjoin PEA from signing a
new agreement with AMARI involving such reclamation.
On November 20, 1973, the government,
through the Commissioner of Public Highways, signed a
contract with the Construction and Development
Corporation of the Philippines ("CDCP" for brevity) to
reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila
Bay. The contract also included the construction of
Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP
obligated itself to carry out all the works in consideration
of fifty percent of the total reclaimed land.
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand
E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating
PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim land, including
foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop,
improve, acquire, x x x lease and sell any and all kinds of
lands."1 On the same date, then President Marcos issued
Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the
"lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the
Manila Bay"2 under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and
Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).
On December 29, 1981, then President Marcos
issued a memorandum directing PEA to amend its
contract with CDCP, so that "[A]ll future works in
MCCRRP x x x shall be funded and owned by PEA."
On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C.
Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting and
transferring to PEA "the parcels of land so reclaimed
under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation
Project (MCCRRP) containing a total area of one million
nine hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety four
(1,915,894) square meters." Subsequently, on April 9,
1988, the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of
Parañaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 7309,
7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering the three
reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom Islands"
located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite
Coastal Road, Parañaque City. The Freedom Islands have
a total land area of One Million Five Hundred Seventy
Eight Thousand Four Hundred and Forty One (1,578,441)
square meters or 157.841 hectares.
On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint
Venture Agreement ("JVA" for brevity) with AMARI, a
private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands. The
Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!
JVA also required the reclamation of an additional 250
hectares of submerged areas surrounding these islands
to complete the configuration in the Master Development
Plan of the Southern Reclamation Project-MCCRRP. PEA
and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation
without public bidding.4 On April 28, 1995, the Board of
Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245, confirmed
the JVA.5On June 8, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos,
through then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres,
approved the JVA.6
On November 29, 1996, then Senate President
Ernesto Maceda delivered a privilege speech in the
Senate and denounced the JVA as the "grandmother of
all scams." As a result, the Senate Committee on
Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations, conducted a joint investigation. The
Senate Committees reported the results of their
investigation in Senate Committee Report No. 560 dated
September 16, 1997.7 Among the conclusions of their
report are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer
to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain
which the government has not classified as alienable
lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2)
the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are
thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal.
On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V.
Ramos issued Presidential Administrative Order No. 365
creating a Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the
legality of the JVA in view of Senate Committee Report
No. 560. The members of the Legal Task Force were the
Secretary of Justice,8 the Chief Presidential Legal
Counsel,9 and the Government Corporate Counsel.10 The
Legal Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary
to the conclusions reached by the Senate Committees.11
On April 4 and 5, 1998, the Philippine Daily
Inquirer and Today published reports that there were on-
going renegotiations between PEA and AMARI under an
order issued by then President Fidel V. Ramos. According
to these reports, PEA Director Nestor Kalaw, PEA
Chairman Arsenio Yulo and retired Navy Officer Sergio
Cruz composed the negotiating panel of PEA.
On April 13, 1998, Antonio M. Zulueta filed
before the Court a Petition for Prohibition with Application
for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction docketed as G.R. No. 132994
seeking to nullify the JVA. The Court dismissed the
petition "for unwarranted disregard of judicial hierarchy,
without prejudice to the refiling of the case before the
proper court."12
On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez
("Petitioner" for brevity) as a taxpayer, filed the
instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner contends the
government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by
PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays
that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation
of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and Section 7,
Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the
people to information on matters of public concern.
Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public
domain as a blatant violation of Section 3, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable
lands of the public domain to private corporations. Finally,
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petitioner asserts that he seeks to enjoin the loss of
billions of pesos in properties of the State that are of
public dominion.
After several motions for extension of
time,13 PEA and AMARI filed their Comments on October
19, 1998 and June 25, 1998, respectively. Meanwhile, on
December 28, 1998, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion:
(a) to require PEA to submit the terms of the
renegotiated PEA-AMARI contract; (b) for issuance of a
temporary restraining order; and (c) to set the case for
hearing on oral argument. Petitioner filed a Reiterative
Motion for Issuance of a TRO dated May 26, 1999, which
the Court denied in a Resolution dated June 22, 1999.
In a Resolution dated March 23, 1999, the Court
gave due course to the petition and required the parties
to file their respective memoranda.
On March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the
Amended Joint Venture Agreement ("Amended JVA," for
brevity). On May 28, 1999, the Office of the President
under the administration of then President Joseph E.
Estrada approved the Amended JVA.
Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the
Office of the President, petitioner now prays that on
"constitutional and statutory grounds the renegotiated
contract be declared null and void."
Issues:
Whether or not the constitutional right to information
includes official information on on-going negotiations
before a final agreement.
Ruling:
Section 7, Article III of the Constitution explains
the people's right to information on matters of public
concern in this manner:
"Sec. 7. The right of the people to information
on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access
to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject
to such limitations as may be provided by law."
(Emphasis supplied)
The State policy of full transparency in all
transactions involving public interest reinforces the
people's right to information on matters of public concern.
This State policy is expressed in Section 28, Article II of
the Constitution, thus:
"Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements
a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest." (Emphasis supplied)
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to
promote transparency in policy-making and in the
operations of the government, as well as provide the
people sufficient information to exercise effectively other
constitutional rights. These twin provisions are essential
to the exercise of freedom of expression. If the
government does not disclose its official acts,
transactions and decisions to citizens, whatever citizens
say, even if expressed without any restraint, will be
speculative and amount to nothing. These twin provisions
are also essential to hold public officials "at all times x x
x accountable to the people,"29 for unless citizens have
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the proper information, they cannot hold public officials
accountable for anything. Armed with the right
information, citizens can participate in public discussions
leading to the formulation of government policies and
their effective implementation. An informed citizenry is
essential to the existence and proper functioning of any
democracy.
AMARI argues there must first be a
consummated contract before petitioner can invoke the
right. Requiring government officials to reveal their
deliberations at the pre-decisional stage will degrade the
quality of decision-making in government agencies.
Government officials will hesitate to express their real
sentiments during deliberations if there is immediate
public dissemination of their discussions, putting them
under all kinds of pressure before they decide.
The right covers three categories of information
which are "matters of public concern," namely: (1)
official records; (2) documents and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions and decisions; and (3)
government research data used in formulating policies.
The first category refers to any document that is part of
the public records in the custody of government agencies
or officials. The second category refers to documents and
papers recording, evidencing, establishing, confirming,
supporting, justifying or explaining official acts,
transactions or decisions of government agencies or
officials. The third category refers to research data,
whether raw, collated or processed, owned by the
government and used in formulating government policies.
The information that petitioner may access on
the renegotiation of the JVA includes evaluation reports,
recommendations, legal and expert opinions, minutes of
meetings, terms of reference and other documents
attached to such reports or minutes, all relating to the
JVA. However, the right to information does not compel
PEA to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like
relating to the renegotiation of the JVA.34 The right only
affords access to records, documents and papers, which
means the opportunity to inspect and copy them. One
who exercises the right must copy the records,
documents and papers at his expense. The exercise of
the right is also subject to reasonable regulations to
protect the integrity of the public records and to minimize
disruption to government operations, like rules specifying
when and how to conduct the inspection and copying.35
The right to information, however, does not
extend to matters recognized as privileged information
under the separation of powers.36 The right does not also
apply to information on military and diplomatic secrets,
information affecting national security, and information
on investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies
before the prosecution of the accused, which courts have
long recognized as confidential.37 The right may also be
subject to other limitations that Congress may impose by
law.
There is no claim by PEA that the information
demanded by petitioner is privileged information rooted
in the separation of powers. The information does not
cover Presidential conversations, correspondences, or
discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings which,
like internal deliberations of the Supreme Court and other
collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either house of
Congress,38 are recognized as confidential. This kind of
information cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of
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government. A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and
assessments, free from the glare of publicity and
pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the
independence of decision-making of those tasked to
exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial
power.39 This is not the situation in the instant case.
We rule, therefore, that the constitutional right
to information includes official information on on-going
negotiations before a final contract. The information,
however, must constitute definite propositions by the
government and should not cover recognized exceptions
like privileged information, military and diplomatic
secrets and similar matters affecting national security
and public order.40 Congress has also prescribed other
limitations on the right to information in several
legislations.
ANTONIETTE V.C. MONTESCLAROS, MARICEL
CARANZO, JOSEPHINE ATANGAN, RONALD
ATANGAN and CLARIZA DECENA, and OTHER
YOUTH OF THE LAND SIMILARLY SITUATED vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DEPARTMENT OF
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, DEPARTMENT
OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY of the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
SENATOR FRANKLIN, THE PRESIDENT OF THE
PAMBANSANG KATIPUNAN NG MGA SANGGUNIANG
KABATAAN, AND ALL THEIR AGENTS AND
REPRESENTATIVES, G.R. No. 152295 July 9, 2002
Facts:
Before us is a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with prayer for a temporary restraining
order or preliminary injunction. The petition seeks to
prevent the postponement of the Sangguniang
Kabataan ("SK" for brevity) elections originally scheduled
last May 6, 2002. The petition also seeks to prevent the
reduction of the age requirement for membership in the
SK.
Petitioners, who are all 20 years old, filed this
petition as a taxpayer's and class suit, on their own
behalf and on behalf of other youths similarly situated.
Petitioners claim that they are in danger of being
disqualified to vote and be voted for in the SK elections
should the SK elections on May 6, 2002 be postponed to
a later date. Under the Local Government Code of 1991
(R.A. No. 7160), membership in the SK is limited to
youths at least 15 but not more than 21 years old.
Petitioners allege that public respondents
"connived, confederated and conspired" to postpone the
May 6, 2002 SK elections and to lower the membership
age in the SK to at least 15 but less than 18 years of age.
Petitioners assail the alleged conspiracy because youths
at least 18 but not more than 21 years old will be
"summarily and unduly dismembered, unfairly
discriminated, unnecessarily disenfranchised, unjustly
disassociated and obnoxiously disqualified from the SK
organization." Petitioners pray for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction .
Issues:
Whether or not the bill to abolish SK may be under the
Judicial Review powers of the Supreme Court.
Ruling:
Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!
The petition is bereft of merit.
The Court's power of judicial review may be
exercised in constitutional cases only if all the following
requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of
an actual and appropriate case or controversy; (2) a
personal and substantial interest of the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review
is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.21
In the instant case, there is no actual
controversy requiring the exercise of the power of judicial
review. While seeking to prevent a postponement of the
May 6, 2002 SK elections, petitioners are nevertheless
amenable to a resetting of the SK elections to any date
not later than July 15, 2002. RA No. 9164 has reset the
SK elections to July 15, 2002, a date acceptable to
petitioners. With respect to the date of the SK elections,
there is therefore no actual controversy requiring judicial
intervention.
Petitioners' prayer to prevent Congress from
enacting into law a proposed bill lowering the
membership age in the SK does not present an actual
justiciable controversy. A proposed bill is not subject to
judicial review because it is not a law. A proposed bill
creates no right and imposes no duty legally enforceable
by the Court. A proposed bill, having no legal effect,
violates no constitutional right or duty. The Court has no
power to declare a proposed bill constitutional or
unconstitutional because that would be in the nature of
rendering an advisory opinion on a proposed act of
Congress.
Under the separation of powers, the Court
cannot restrain Congress from passing any law, or from
setting into motion the legislative mill according to its
internal rules. Thus, the following acts of Congress in the
exercise of its legislative powers are not subject to
judicial restraint: the filing of bills by members of
Congress, the approval of bills by each chamber of
Congress, the reconciliation by the Bicameral Committee
of approved bills, and the eventual approval into law of
the reconciled bills by each chamber of Congress. Absent
a clear violation of specific constitutional limitations or of
constitutional rights of private parties, the Court cannot
exercise its power of judicial review over the internal
processes or procedures of Congress.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. BASHER
BONGCARAWAN y MACARAMBON, G.R. No.
143944 July 11, 2002
Facts:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated
December 27, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan
City, Branch 06, in Criminal Case No. 06-7542, finding
accused Basher Bongcarawan y Macarambon guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 16,
Article III of Republic Act No. 64252 as amended, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P500,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.
Accused Basher Bongcarawan y Macarambon
was charged in an Information which reads, thus:
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"That on or about March 13, 1999, in the City of
Iligan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, without authority of
law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, custody and control
eight (8) packs of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a
regulated drug commonly known as Shabu, weighing
approximately 400 grams, without the corresponding
license or prescription.
Contrary to and in violation of Section 16, Article
III of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972, as amended by RA 7659."3
During the arraignment, the accused pleaded
not guilty. Trial ensued.
The accused-appellant contends that the
Samsonite suitcase containing the methamphetamine
hydrochloride or "shabu" was forcibly opened and
searched without his consent, and hence, in violation of
his constitutional right against unreasonable search and
seizure. Any evidence acquired pursuant to such unlawful
search and seizure, he claims, is inadmissible in evidence
against him. He also contends thatPeople v. Marti15 is not
applicable in this case because a vessel security
personnel is deemed to perform the duties of a policeman.
Issues:
Whether or not the court erred in holding the drug
admissible in evidence against accused.
Ruling:
The contentions are devoid of merit.
The right against unreasonable search and
seizure is a fundamental right protected by the
Constitution.16Evidence acquired in violation of this right
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.17 Whenever this right is challenged, an
individual may choose between invoking the
constitutional protection or waiving his right by giving
consent to the search and seizure. It should be stressed,
however, that protection is against transgression
committed by the government or its agent. As held by
this Court in the case of People v. Marti,18 "[i]n the
absence of governmental interference, liberties
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked
against the State."19 The constitutional proscription
against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a
restraint directed only against the government and its
agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it
could only be invoked against the State to whom the
restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of
power is imposed.20
In the case before us, the baggage of the
accused-appellant was searched by the vessel security
personnel. It was only after they found "shabu" inside the
suitcase that they called the Philippine Coast Guard for
assistance. The search and seizure of the suitcase and
the contraband items was therefore carried out without
government intervention, and hence, the constitutional
protection against unreasonable search and seizure does
not apply.
There is no merit in the contention of the
accused-appellant that the search and seizure performed
by the vessel security personnel should be considered as
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one conducted by the police authorities for like the latter,
the former are armed and tasked to maintain peace and
order. The vessel security officer in the case at bar is a
private employee and does not discharge any
governmental function. In contrast, police officers are
agents of the state tasked with the sovereign function of
enforcement of the law. Historically and until now, it is
against them and other agents of the state that the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
may be invoked.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs. CRISPIN VELARDE y BANDOJO, G.R. No. 139333
July 18, 2002
Facts:
A municipal mayor cannot be considered a
competent and independent counsel qualified to assist a
person under custodial investigation. Hence, the
extrajudicial confession taken from the accused with His
Honor as counsel is inadmissible in evidence. Without this
confession, the remaining evidence, which is
circumstantial, fails the test of moral certainty. Hence,
acquittal is inevitable.
For automatic review by this Court is the
Decision1 dated February 12, 1999, issued by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan (Branch
11), finding Crispin Velarde y Bandojo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of rape with homicide in Criminal Case
No. 773-M-97. The decretal portion of the Decision reads
as follows:
"WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused
CRISPIN B. VELARDE GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
Rape with Homicide and hereby sentences him to suffer
the supreme penalty of Death and to indemnify the heirs
of the victim the amount of P100,000.00 as actual
damages."2
"Accused declared on June 19, 1998 that he has
been detained since May 12, 1997 or more than one (1)
year already because he was told that he was the one
who committed a crime against his cousin Brenda
Candelaria. According to him, on the night of May 11,
1997 he was arrested while selling balot in Tikay, Malolos,
Bulacan, by four (4) Barangay Officials. When said
Barangay Officials asked him where he brought the child
Brenda Candelaria, he told them he 'don't know' [sic]. He
did not insist answering them 'because I don't know what
they were asking about the child'. He just went with them
because if he will not go with them 'di nila lulubayan and
pamilya ko'. He was brought to the Barangay Hall of
Barangay Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan. He was kicked and
mauled by the father and brothers of Brenda. The father
of Brenda is his uncle and was the one who hurted [sic]
him. He was boxed several times, hitting him in all parts
of his body. While he was being boxed, he told them to
stop because he did not know about the incident.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The RTC found the existence of enough
circumstantial evidence pointing to appellant as the
culprit in the crime. It also found his written extrajudicial
confession admissible in evidence. As a consequence, it
convicted him of rape with homicide and imposed upon
him the supreme penalty of death.
Hence, this automatic review.9
Assignment of Errors
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In his Brief, appellant faults the court a quo for
the following alleged errors:10
"FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The trial court erred in relying merely on the
weight and sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence
adduced by the prosecution and the admissibility of the
extra-judicial confession of the accused contained in his
Sworn Statement made before the police authorities of
Malolos, Bulacan.
Issue/s:
Whether the extrajudicial confession of appellant is
admissible in evidence, The Court's Ruling
Ruling:
The appeal is meritorious.
Barangay tanods and officials of Barangay Tikay,
Municipality of Malolos arrested appellant while he was
sellingbalut on the night of May 11, 1997.11 He was
subsequently brought to the Malolos Police Station,
where he was initially incarcerated and allegedly
mauled.12 On May 14, 1997, his case was referred by the
Malolos police to the incumbent mayor of Malolos,
Bulacan, Atty. Danilo Domingo, who asked that appellant
be brought to him.13 Upon the advice of the mayor,
Velarde's written extrajudicial confession was taken.
During the investigation, appellant was assisted by the
mayor as counsel.14 Armed police officers were also
present during the investigation.15
Article III Section 12 (1) of the Constitution
provides:
"Any person under custodial investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel,
he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel."
The dead body of Brenda Candelaria was found
in the Municipality of Guiguinto, Bulacan. But appellant, a
resident of Barangay Tikay, Municipality of Malolos was
brought to and detained in the Malolos Police Station,
where he was investigated by the Malolos police.
Under the circumstances, Atty. Domingo cannot
be considered as an independent counsel. He was the
mayor of Malolos at the time. As such, he exercised
"operational supervision and control"18 over the PNP unit
in that municipality. His powers included the utilization of
the elements thereof for the maintenance of peace and
order, the prevention of crimes, the arrest of criminal
offenders and the bringing of offenders to justice.19
As mayor of Malolos, his duties were
inconsistent with those of his responsibilities to appellant,
who was already incarcerated and tagged as the main
suspect in the rape-slay case. Serving as counsel of
appellant placed him in direct conflict with his duty of
"operational supervision and control" over the police.
"What the Constitution requires in Article III Section 12
(1) is the presence of competent and independent
counsel, one who will effectively undertake his client's
defense without any intervening conflict of
interest."20 Evidently Atty. Domingo, being the mayor of
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the place where the investigation was taken, could not
act as counsel, independent or otherwise, of appellant.
During the investigation, Atty. Domingo failed to
act as the independent and competent counsel
envisioned by the Constitution. He failed to give any
meaningful advice to protect the rights of appellant. The
former did not even bother to inform the latter of the
consequences of an extrajudicial confession.
People vs. Dy G.R. Nos. 115236-37 (395 SCRA 256)
Facts:
This is a consolidated resolution of two motions
for reconsideration filed by the accused in the decision by
the Supreme Court to affirm judgment rendered by the
RTC of Baguio City. In the said decision, the accused
were found to be guilty of rape and acts of lasciviousness.
The accused contented, among others, that the
1st division has no jurisdiction over “all criminal cases in
which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or
higher,” as it is Supreme Court en banc shall take
cognizance of the case.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the accused are correct in pointing out
that it should be en banc that should take the case.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the contention is
misleading. Under Article VIII, Section 4 (1) of the
Constitution, the Supreme Court may sit en banc or, in
its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven
Members. At present, it is made up of three divisions.
However, the divisions of the Supreme Court are not to
be considered as separate and distinct courts. Actions
considered in any of these divisions and decisions
rendered therein are, in effect, by the same Tribunal. The
divisions are not to be considered as separate and
distinct courts, but as divisions of one and the same
court.
The Motions for Reconsideration filed by
accused-appellants Bryan Ferdinand Dy and Giovan
Bernardino are DENIED WITH FINALITY.
People vs. Libnao GR No. 136860 (395 SCRA 407)
Facts:
In November 19, 1988, the RTC Branch 65 of
Tarlac City convicted the accused for violation of Article II,
Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425 (Dangerous Drug Act of 1972)
and was sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion
perpetua and to pay two million pesos in fine.
The accused were arrested in a tricycle flagged
down by an officer. Basing on the intelligence report from
surveillance conducted, two drug pushers will be making
a delivery of dangerous drugs riding in a tricycle. They
were brought to Kabayan Center where they were asked
on the ownership and content of the black bag they were
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carrying with them witnessed by the Barangay Captain,
during which they were not represented with a counsel.
The bag turned out to contain bricks of marijuana.
Issue/s:
(1) Whether or not the arrest without warrant was
valid.
(2) Whether or not their constitutional rights were
violated when they were not represented by a
counsel during the custodial investigation.
Ruling:
The requirement that a judicial warrant must be
obtained prior to the carrying out of a search and seizure
is not absolute. There are certain familiar exceptions to
the rule, one of which relates to search of moving
vehicles. Warrantless search and seizure of moving
vehicles are allowed in recognition of the impracticability
of securing a warrant under said circumstances as the
vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought.
The warrantless search in the case at bench is
not bereft of a probable cause. The Tarlac Police
Intelligence Division had been conducting surveillance
operation for three months in the area. The surveillance
yielded the information that once a month, appellant and
her co-accused Rosita Nunga transport drugs in big bulks.
The two were riding a tricycle and carrying a suspicious-
looking black bag, which possibly contained the drugs in
bulk. When they were asked who owned it and what its
content was, both became uneasy. Under these
circumstances, the warrantless search and seizure of
appellant’s bag was not illegal.
It is also clear that at the time she was
apprehended, she was committing a criminal offense.
She was making a delivery or transporting prohibited
drugs in violation of Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425.
Under the Rules of Court, one of the instances a police
officer is permitted to carry out a warrantless arrest is
when the person to be arrested is caught committing a
crime in flagrante delicto. Thus the warrentless arrest
was valid.
The High Court also ruled that there was no
extra judicial confession used, during the custodial
investigation, for the conviction thus no infringement of
constitutional rights happened.
People vs. Tee GR No. 140546-47 (395 SCRA 419)
Facts:
Thereafter, a search warrant was issued to look
for more prohibited drugs within the residence of the
accused-appellant which yielded more marijuana. Thus,
he was charged with 2 counts of violations of RA 6425 or
the Dangerous Drug Act of 1972.
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He moved to quash the search warrant on the
ground that it was too general because the amount of
marijuana was not specified, and that the NBI had not
complied with the requirements for the issuance of a
valid search warrant.
During the trial, the case was put into rest
because of the failure of the witness to appear and testify
on several occasions despite postponements of the
hearing. However, after some time, the witness agreed to
finally testify and the trial court ordered the reopening of
the case.
The trial court dismissed the motion to quash
search warrant and convicted the accused for the
violation of RA 6425 with regard to items found at the
residence of the appellant but acquitted for the charge
filed as regards the items found on the leased place. The
penalty provided was that of death penalty thus, resulted
to this automatic review, with issues in question on
validity of search warrant and violation of constitutional
rights of the accused-appellant.
Issue/s:
1) Whether or not the search warrant is illegal on the
ground of defects in securing it and the generality of
description of items being searched;
(2) Whether or not there was a violation of constitutional
rights of the accused-appellant.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that what the
Constitution seeks to avoid are search warrants of broad
or general characterization or sweeping descriptions,
which will authorize police officers to undertake a fishing
expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of
evidence or articles relating to an offense. However, it is
not required that technical precision of description be
required, particularly, where by the nature of the goods
to be seized, their description must be rather general,
since the requirement of a technical description would
mean that no warrant could issue.
The description "an undetermined amount of
marijuana or Indian hemp" must be held to satisfy the
requirement for particularity in a search warrant.
Noteworthy, what is to be seized in the instant case is
property of a specified character, i.e., marijuana, an illicit
drug. By reason of its character and the circumstances
under which it would be found, said article is illegal. A
further description would be unnecessary and ordinarily
impossible, except as to such character, the place, and
the circumstances. \
The specified description has satisfied the
Constitution’s requirements on particularity of description.
The description therein is: (1) as specific as the
circumstances will ordinarily allow; (2) expresses a
conclusion of fact - not of law - by which the peace
officers may be guided in making the search and seizure;
and (3) limits the things to be seized to those which bear
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direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is
being issued.
The High Court also ruled, contrary to the claim
of the accused-appellant, is not a general warrant
because even if the warrant did not specify provision of
the law violated, it was nevertheless, specific on the
offense committed.
It further ruled that the operatives, although
they themselves cannot be eyewitnesses to the crime,
relied on a witness with personal knowledge of the
offense, thus it is not hearsay information was used to
secure evidence, notwithstanding the failure to attach the
disposition of the said witness.
The address stated in the warrant was held as
specific as can be, supported by a detailed sketch of the
premises. It was ruled that a description of the place to
be searched is sufficient if the officer serving the warrant
can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the
place intended and distinguish it from other places in the
community. A designation or description that points out
the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others,
and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it,
satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness.
There was also no violation of right to speedy
trial, rejecting view that there was unjustified and willful
delay of resolution of the case due to failure or willful
refusal of the witness to testify against him. This was
proven, among others, by issuance of warrants of arrest
against the witness and even punishing NBI supposedly
having custody over the witness for contempt due to
failure to produce the witness.
Finding neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances in the present case, appellant’s possession
of dangerous drugs, no matter how enormous, does not
merit capital punishment but only the lesser penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
Pe People vs. Macalaba G.R. Nos. 146284-86 (395
SCRA 461)
Facts
Accused was charged of Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Ammunition, Possession of Forged Money
and Possession of Dangerous Drugs.
On the order for search of a carnapped car
allegedly perpetrated by the accused, police officers
made a search of the accused and luckily were able to
tag down the accused. There they saw a gun. When
pressed on the papers of the gun, they saw the forged
money and the sachet of shabu from the clutch bag of
the accused.
The lower court convicted the accused of
possession of dangerous drugs and acquitted him of
other charges for lack of evidence.
Issue/s:
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Whether or not the warrantless arrest is valid.
Ruling:
The warrantless arrest of, or warrantless search
and seizure conducted on, ABDUL constitute a valid
exemption from the warrant requirement. The evidence
clearly shows that on the basis of an intelligence
information that a carnapped vehicle was driven by
ABDUL, who was also a suspect of drug pushing, the
members of the CIDG of Laguna went around looking for
the carnapped car. They spotted the suspected
carnapped car, which was indeed driven by ABDUL. While
ABDUL was fumbling about in his clutch bag for the
registration papers of the car the CIDG agents saw four
transparent sachets of shabu.[ These sachets of shabu
were therefore in "plain view" of the law enforcers.
Under the "plain view" doctrine, unlawful objects
within the plain view of an officer who has the right to be
in the position to have that view are subject to seizure
and may be presented in evidence. Nonetheless, the
seizure of evidence in plain view must comply with the
following requirements: (a) a prior valid intrusion in
which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their
official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently
discovered by the police who had the right to be where
they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent;
and (d) the plain view justified mere seizure of evidence
without further search.
We are convinced beyond any shadow of doubt
under the circumstances above discussed that all the
elements of seizure in plain view exist in the case at bar.
Thus, the warrantless search and seizure conducted on
ABDUL, as well as his warrantless arrest, did not
transgress his constitutional rights.
Supreme court affirmed in toto the decision of
the lower court.
Reyes vs. National Housing Authority
Facts:
An expropriation proceeding, separate from the
current, transpired between petitioners and respondents.
The ruling ordered the respondent to pay the petitioner
the defined just compensation and cost of proceedings.
After sometime the petitioner came before the
court praying for forfeiture of the expropriation rights
because of the failure of the respondents to effectuate
the “public use” requirement in eminent domain.
Furthermore, the petitioner argued that the respondent
failed to implement the relocation proceedings which is
the purpose sought by the taking.
The trial court dismissed the petition prayed for
by the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals affirmed such
dismissal.
Issue/s:
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Whether or not petitioner has the right to ask for
forfeiture of expropriation rights.
Ruling:
The constitutional restraints in the exercise of
the power of eminent domain over private properties
upon just compensation, are public use and just
compensation.
Petitioners cannot insist on a restrictive view of
the eminent domain provision of the Constitution by
contending that the contract for low cost housing is a
deviation from the stated public use. It is now settled
doctrine that the concept of public use is no longer
limited to traditional purposes. Here, as elsewhere, the
idea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of
"use by the public" has been abandoned. The term
"public use" has now been held to be synonymous with
"public interest," "public benefit," "public welfare," and
"public convenience.”
The act of respondent NHA in entering into a
contract with a real estate developer for the construction
of low cost housing on the expropriated lots to be sold to
qualified low income beneficiaries cannot be taken to
mean as a deviation from the stated public purpose of
their taking.
The Supreme Court likewise do not subscribe to
petitioners’ contention that the stated public purpose was
abandoned when respondent NHA failed to occupy the
expropriated lots by relocating squatters from the Metro
Manila area. The expropriation judgment declared that
respondent NHA has a lawful right to take petitioners
properties "for the public use or purpose of expanding
the Dasmariñas Resettlement Project." The taking here is
absolute, without any condition, restriction or
qualification.
When land has been acquired for public use in
fee simple unconditionally, either by the exercise of
eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner
retains no rights in the land, and the public use may be
abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use,
without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or
any reversion to the former owner.
The Court ruled that non-payment of just
compensation does not entitle the private landowners to
recover possession of their expropriated lots.
Vda. De Danao vs Ginete A.M. No. MTJ–03–1474
(395 SCRA 542)
Facts:
Merlita Dapadap Vda. de Danao charged Judge
Manuel V. Ginete with gross ignorance of the law, grave
abuse of authority, delay in rendering judgments and
serious misconduct for (1) issuing a writ of seizure a 6 x
6 truck despite being informed by police officers that the
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said truck was in custodia legis; and (2) for ordering her
arrest solely on the basis of the purported affidavits of
witnesses. These affidavits turned out to be “non-
existing,” as indicated by a Certification by the Clerk of
Court.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the respondent judge is guilty as
charged for issuing the warrant of arrest basing on
non-existing affidavits.
Ruling:
Respondent judge also gravely erred in ordering
the arrest of complainant based on non-existing
witnesses. In his order, he ruled that probable cause
was established on the basis of witnesses’ affidavits
allegedly submitted together with the Complaint.
However, a Certification issued by Clerk of Court attested
to the fact that there were no affidavits of the witnesses
in a separate case against petitioner.
The assumption of office by respondent judge
placed upon him duties and restrictions peculiar to his
exalted position. While the determination of probable
cause that would warrant the arrest of a person is subject
to “judicial discretion,” he should not have carelessly
used or abused such discretion. Also, while the lone
affidavit of a complainant might have been sufficient to
determine probable cause, respondent should have
nevertheless clearly indicated such fact in his Order of
Arrest. Instead, he made it appear that Atty. Serra had
submitted the affidavits of the latter’s witnesses’ along
with the Complaint. Further, respondent pretended that
he had personally examined these Affidavits to show that
he had ample basis to order Danao’s arrest. As a
member of the judiciary, he must be beyond suspicion.
He must be perceived, not as a repository of arbitrary
power, but as one who dispenses justice under the
sanction of the rule of law.
Issuing a patently erroneous order and undue
delay in rendering a ruling constitute serious and less
serious charges under Sections 8 and 9, respectively,
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.
Thus, Supreme Court fined the respondent judge
and warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts
shall be dealt with more severely in the future.
People vs. Estella G.R. Nos. 138539-40 (395 SCRA
553)
Facts:
A search warrant was issued in search for
dangerous drugs in a particular house allegedly owned by
the appellant. Appellant was outside the said house when
the search was performed and the searching officer found
firearms, ammunition and dangerous drugs. The search
was continued despite the appellant pointing to a
different house as his and not the one they are searching.
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The trial court convicted the appellant of the crime
possession of dangerous drugs but was acquitted with
other crimes.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the search was valid.
Ruling:
The Constitution bars the admission of evidence
gathered in violation of the right against unreasonable
search and seizure. In the present case, the illegal drug
was searched for and found in a hut that has not been
proven to be owned, controlled, or used by appellant for
residential or any other purpose. Hence, he cannot be
held guilty of illegal possession of the illegal drug found
therein.
The OSG argues that appellant is deemed to
have waived his right to object to the legality of the
search and the admissibility of the evidence seized
through that search because, during the trial, he did not
raise these issues.
On the contrary, during the trial, appellant
constantly questioned the legality of the search. This was
manifested by his objection of admittance of evidence,
testimony concerning the evident and the Demurrer To
Evidence filed.
All told, without sufficient admissible evidence
against appellant, the prosecution failed to establish his
guilt with moral certainty. Not only did its evidence fall
short of the quantum of proof required for a conviction, it
has also failed to present any evidence at all. Under our
Bill of Rights, among the fundamental rights of the
accused is to be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved. To overcome such presumption, the prosecution
must establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Our
criminal justice system dictates that if the prosecution
fails to do so, it becomes not only the right of the
accused to be set free, but also the constitutional duty of
the court to set them free. This principle leaves this Court
no option but to acquit Appellant Antonio C. Estella for
insufficiency of evidence.
The appealed decision was set aside.
Edna Collado, et.al, vs. Court of Appeals and
Republic of The Philippines, thru the Director of
Lands , G. R. No. 107764. October 4, 2002
Facts:
This Petition seeks to set aside the Decision of
the Court of Appeals, dated June 22, 1992, in CA-G.R. SP
No. 25597, which declared null and void the Decision
dated January 30, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71, in LRC No. 269-A, LRC Rec.
No. N-59179, confirming the imperfect title of petitioners
over a parcel of land.
On April 25, 1985, petitioner Edna T. Collado
filed with the land registration court an application for
registration of a parcel of land with an approximate area
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of 1,200,766 square meters or 120.0766 hectares (“Lot”
for brevity). The Lot is situated in Barangay San Isidro
(formerly known as Boso-boso), Antipolo, Rizal, and
covered by Survey Plan Psu-162620. Attached to the
application was the technical description of the Lot as Lot
Psu-162620 signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-
Charge of the Survey Division, Bureau of Lands, which
stated, “[t]his survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina
Watershed.” On March 24, 1986, petitioner Edna T.
Collado filed an Amended Application to include additional
co-applicants. Subsequently, more applicants joined
(collectively referred to as “petitioners” for brevity).
The Republic of the Philippines, through the
Solicitor General, and the Municipality of Antipolo,
through its Municipal Attorney and the Provincial Fiscal of
Rizal, filed oppositions to petitioners’ application. In due
course, the land registration court issued an order of
general default against the whole world with the
exception of the oppositors.
Petitioners alleged that they have occupied the
Lot since time immemorial. Their possession has been
open, public, notorious and in the concept of owners.
The Lot was surveyed in the name of Sesinando Leyva,
one of their predecessors-in-interest, as early as March
22, 1902. Petitioners declared the Lot for taxation
purposes and paid all the corresponding real estate taxes.
The land registration court held that petitioners
had adduced sufficient evidence to establish their
registrable rights over the Lot. Accordingly, the court
rendered a decision confirming the imperfect title of
petitioners. The Solicitor General filed with the Court of
Appeals a Petition for Annulment of Judgment pursuant
to Section 9(2) of BP Blg. 129 on the ground that there
had been no clear showing that the Lot had been
previously classified as alienable and disposable making it
subject to private appropriation. In a decision dated June
22, 1992, the Court of Appeals granted the petition and
declared null and void the decision dated January 30,
1991 of the land registration court on the ground that the
private respondents failed to present any evidence
whatsoever that the land applied for as described in Psu-
162620 has been segregated from the bulk of the public
domain and declared by competent authority to be
alienable and disposable. And worse, the technical
description of Psu-162620 signed by Robert C.
Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge, Survey Division, Bureau
of Lands, which was attached to the application of private
respondents, categorically stated that "This survey is
inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed”.
Issues:
Whether the petitioners have registrable rights over
the subject lot.
Ruling:
Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not
otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. The
1987 Constitution reaffirmed the Regalian doctrine in
Section 2 of Article XII [25] on “National Economy and
Patrimony”. Indeed, all lands of the public domain as well
as all natural resources enumerated in the Philippine
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Constitution belong to the State. And Watershed
Reservation is a Natural Resource.
In Municipality of Santiago, Isabela vs. Court of
Appeals, the Court declared that inalienable public lands -
“x x x cannot be acquired by acquisitive
prescription. Prescription, both acquisitive and extinctive,
does not run against the State.
‘The possession of public land, however long the
period may have extended, never confers title thereto
upon the possessor because the statute of limitations
with regard to public land does not operate against the
State, unless the occupant can prove possession and
occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the
required number of years to constitute a grant from the
State.’ ”
The evidence of record thus appears
unsatisfactory and insufficient to show clearly and
positively that the Lot had been officially released from
the Marikina Watershed Reservation to form part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
Supreme Court pronounced that once a parcel of land is
included within a watershed reservation duly established
by Executive Proclamation, as in the instant case, a
presumption arises that the land continues to be part of
such Reservation until clear and convincing evidence of
subsequent declassification is shown.
It is obvious, based on the facts on record that
neither petitioners nor their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the Lot for at least thirty
years immediately preceding the filing of the application
for confirmation of title. Even if they submitted sufficient
proof that the Lot had been excluded from the MWR upon
the issuance of Proclamation No. 1283 on June 21, 1974,
petitioners’ possession as of the filing of their application
on April 25, 1985 would have been only eleven years
counted from the issuance of the proclamation in 1974.
The result will not change even if we tack in the two
years Sesinando Leyva allegedly possessed the Lot from
1902 until the issuance of EO 33 in 1904. Petitioners’
case falters even more because of the issuance of
Proclamation No. 1637 on April 18, 1977. According to
then DENR Secretary Victor Ramos, Proclamation No.
1637 reverted Lot A or the townsite reservation, where
petitioners' Lot is supposedly situated, back to the MWR.
Pedro Cupcupin v. People of the Philippines, G.R.
No. 132389. November 19, 2002
Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking
to set aside the November 27, 1997 decision of the Court
of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR No. 17334, which affirmed with
modification the November 18, 1994 decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Branch 170, wherein
petitioner Pedro Cupcupin was found guilty of the crimes
of violation of Section 16, Article III, Republic Act 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended, and of violation of Section 1, Presidential
Decree 1866, otherwise known as the Unlawful
Possession of Firearms and Ammunition, in Criminal Case
No. 13374-MN and Criminal Case No.13375-MN. 5784,
respectively.
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Version of the Prosecution. Based on a
confidential information that petitioner, Pedro Cupcupin is
engaged in selling methamphetamine hydrochloride
(shabu), and in possession of firearms and ammunitions
without the necessary license, NBI Agent Timoteo Rejano
of the National Capital Region, conducted a surveillance
on the vicinity of petitioners residence at Int. David
Santos, C. Arellano Streets, Malabon, Metro Manila.After
confirming said confidential information, Agent Rejano
applied for the issuance of search warrants before Judge
Romeo J. Callejo, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 49.
Contention of the Accused. Petitioner contends
that the items allegedly seized from his residence are
inadmissible as evidence because the search warrants
issuedagainst him failed to comply with the constitutional
and statutory requirements for the issuance of a valid
search warrant. Specifically, petitioner claims that said
warrants were defective on the grounds that: (1) NBI
Agent Timoteo Rejano who applied for the issuance
thereof had no personal knowledge of the facts on which
the warrants were based; and (2) subject warrants failed
to particularly describe the place to be searched because
there are two houses (the residential house and the nipa
hut which is the workshop room) located in the address
stated in the said warrants.
Issues:
1. Whether the NBI agent who applied the
issuance of the search warrants has personal
knowledge of the facts on which the warrants
were based.
2. Whether the subject warrants are able to
particularly describe the place to be searched.
Ruling:
Yes, the NBI agent who applied the issuance of
the search warrants has personal knowledge of the facts
on which the warrants were based. In the case at bar,
NBI Agent Timoteo Rejano who applied for the issuance
of Search Warrant Nos. 56-93 and 57-93, had personal
knowledge ofthe circumstances on which the warrants
were based. Admittedly, Rejanos knowledge of
petitioners illegal possession of firearms and prohibited
drugs came from a confidential informant, and therefore,
initially hearsay. Nevertheless, the surveillance and
investigation he conducted on the basis of said
confidential information enabled him to gain personal
knowledge of the illegal activities of petitioner. Hence, his
testimony was sufficient justification for the examining
judge to conclude that there was probable cause for the
issuance of a search warrant.
Yes, the subject warrants are able to
particularly describe the place to be searched. It is clear
that the workshop room where the packs of shabu were
found is actually an integral part of petitioner’s residence.
Hence, it cannot be argued that there are two houses in
the address stated in the warrants and that the same
failed to particularly describe the place to be searched.
The rule is that a description of the place to be searched
is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with
reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place
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intended to be searched. Tested against the foregoing
rule, the Court finds that the residence of petitioner
stated in the warrants as Int. David Santos, C. Arellano
Street, Malabon, Metro Manila, can with reasonable effort
be ascertained and identified by the NBI agents who were
ordered to search the above address, including the rooms
located therein.
Supreme Court found the contention of the
petitioner not meritorious.
Fredesminda Dayawon v. Judge Zeida Aurora B.
Garfin, Mtcc, Branch 2, Iriga City, A.M. NO. MTJ-01-
1367. SEPTEMBER 5, 2002
Facts:
In a verified letter-complaint dated June 25,
1999, complainant Fredesminda Dayawon charged Judge
Zeida Aurora B. Garfin of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
of Iriga City, Branch II, with ignorance of the law and
serious misconduct relative to Criminal Case Nos. 20420,
20424, 20426 and 20428, all entitled People of the
Philippines v. Fredesminda Dayawon. Judge Garfin
allegedly convicted complainant, who was the accused in
said cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22,
without conducting a trial on the merits. As a result,
complainant was deprived of her day in court and was
found guilty of the crime charged without due process of
law. After arraignment and in the course of proceedings
in the criminal cases, complainant’s counsel filed a
motion to dismiss (or a motion to quash) the
informations on the ground that the amount of the four
bouncing checks she issued have already been paid. On
December 2, 1996, Judge Garfin issued an order setting
the hearing on complainant’s motion to dismiss on
January 21, 1997. Pursuant to the trial courts directive,
complainant presented evidence in support of her motion
to dismiss. Thereafter, the prosecution presented
evidence in support of its opposition. On August 24, 1998,
the motion was submitted for resolution. On March 19,
1999, Judge Garfin rendered a joint judgment in the
criminal cases denying the Motion to Dismiss and
convicting the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the offense charged. Apparently, Judge Garfin
simultaneously resolved complainant’s motion to dismiss
and the criminal cases on the merits without setting the
cases for trial.
Arguments of the Respondent. In view of
complainant’s admission and the presentation of evidence
for both parties at the hearing of the motion to dismiss,
Judge Garfin maintained that the proceedings were
converted into a full-dress hearing on the merits with the
consent of both parties, who actively participated therein.
Judge Garfin further emphasized that with the admission
made by complainant that she issued the bad checks, the
burden of proving that she did not violate Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 shifted to her. Since there is no
specific provision in the Rules of Court governing such a
remedial situation, she applied Section 6, Rule 135, to
wit:
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“Section 6. Means to carry jurisdiction into effect.
When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or
judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other
means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed
by such court or officer; and if the procedure to be
followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not
specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any
suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted
which appears conformable to the spirit of said law or
rules”
Arguments of the Complainant. Complainant
denied that she consented to the conversion of the
hearing on the motion to dismiss into a trial on the merits
of the criminal cases. According to complainant, there
was no order to this effect. Judge Garfin merely adopted
her own rules of procedure to the prejudice of
complainant’s constitutional right to due process. Had
she known that the proceedings were already on the
merits; complainant stated she would have endeavored
to present other evidence in her defense. She reiterated
that the evidence presented in the criminal cases
pertained only to the motion to dismiss.
Issues:
Whether complainant is deprived of her constitutional
right to due process.
Ruling:
Yes, complainant is deprived of her
constitutional right to due process. Supreme Court
pronounced that conformably, a modified order of trial is
authorized whenever an accused admits the charge but
interposes a lawful defense. This does not mean,
however, that in such a case, trial could be dispensed
with altogether. A judge must nonetheless ascertain
whether the defense put up by the accused could
withstand judicial scrutiny. In other words, while the
burden of evidence is shifted to the accused to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that he is entitled to an
extenuating circumstance, the trial court is still duty-
bound to establish that the accused, in fact, did not incur
any liability relative to his admission. Needless to say, a
regular trial on the merits is necessary for this purpose.
Furthermore, it was not for respondent judge to
unilaterally determine that the entire case was submitted
for decision without giving complainant the opportunity to
submit or at the very least, manifest if she had additional
evidence to prove her innocence. Granting that
complainant was accorded the chance to offer proof as to
the alleged payment in support of her motion to dismiss,
it remained incumbent upon respondent judge to notify
complainant that the case will be decided on the merits.
An accused in a criminal case must not be precluded from
availing of every option allowed by the rules to adduce
evidence in his defense. In this case, respondent judge
deprived complainant of this opportunity when she
adopted procedural shortcuts and decided the criminal
cases without conducting a trial on the merits. Contrary
to respondent judge’s claim, there is no showing that
complainant consented to submit the cases for decision
without a trial. Neither could such consent be inferred
from the active participation of complainant in the
hearing of the motion to dismiss because,
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understandably, she participated therein under the
supposition that what was being heard at that time was
only her motion. The rules likewise do not sanction the
automatic conversion of a hearing on a motion to dismiss
to a hearing on the merits of a case, in the absence of
any clear waiver by the accused of his right to a regular
trial. Consequently, respondent judge has no valid excuse
for her error, which resulted in a violation of
complainant’s right to be properly heard on her defenses.
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
vs. Hon. GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN, Morales, and
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 42; and MARK B. JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARIO
BATACAN CRESPO, G.R. No. 148571. September 24,
2002
Facts:
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, seeking to void and set aside the
Orders dated May 23, 2001 and July 3, 2001 issued by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42.The
first assailed Order set for hearing petitioner’s application
for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Respondent
Mark B. Jimenez.
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition
Treaty, the United States Government, through
diplomatic channels, sent to the Philippine Government
Note Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16, 1999,
supplemented by Note Nos. 0597, 0720 and 0809 and
accompanied by duly authenticated documents
requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also
known as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of the
Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs
(SFA) transmitted them to the secretary of justice (SOJ)
for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1069, also known as the
Extradition Law.
Upon learning of the request for his extradition,
Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) by the RTC of Manila, Branch 25.
The TRO prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from
filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition. The
validity of the TRO was, however, assailed by the SOJ in
a Petition before this Court in the said GR No. 139465.
Initially, the Court -- by a vote of 9-6 -- dismissed the
Petition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish private
respondent copies of the extradition request and its
supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable
period within which to file a comment and supporting
evidence. Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed
by the SOJ, this Court issued its October 17, 2000
Resolution. By an identical vote of 9-6 -- after three
justices changed their votes -- it reconsidered and
reversed its earlier Decision. It held that private
respondent was bereft of the right to notice and hearing
during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
This Resolution has become final and executory.
Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government
of the United States of America, represented by the
Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC on May 18, 2001, the
appropriate Petition for Extradition docketed as
Extradition Case No. 01192061. The Petition alleged,
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inter alia, that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest
warrant issued by the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida on April 15, 1999. The
warrant had been issued in connection with the following
charges in Indictment No. 99-00281 CR-SEITZ: (1)
conspiracy to defraud the United States and to commit
certain offenses in violation of Title 18 US Code Section
371; (2) tax evasion, in violation of Title 26 US Code
Section 7201; (3) wire fraud, in violation of Title 18 US
Code Sections 1343 and 2; (4) false statements, in
violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1001 and 2; and (5)
illegal campaign contributions, in violation of Title 2 US
Code Sections 441b, 441f and 437g(d) and Title 18 US
Code Section 2. In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez,
the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his
“immediate arrest” pursuant to Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
Before the RTC could act on the Petition,
Respondent Jimenez filed before it an “Urgent
Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion,” which prayed that
petitioner’s application for an arrest warrant be set for
hearing. In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC
granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for
hearing on June 5, 2001. In that hearing, petitioner
manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by
the trial court allowing the accused in an extradition case
to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to
submit their respective memoranda. In his Memorandum,
Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a
warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the
amount of P100,000. The alternative prayer of Jimenez
was also set for hearing on June 15, 2001. Thereafter,
the court below issued its questioned July 3, 2001 Order,
directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and
fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in
cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted
the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional
liberty via the challenged Order dated July 4, 2001.
Issues:
1. Whether respondent is entitled to notice and
hearing before the issuance of a warrant of
arrest.
2. Whether is respondent entitled to bail?
3. Whether due process is violated in the
immediate deprivation of appellant’s liberty prior
to his being heard.
Ruling:
No, respondent is not entitled to notice and
hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
Section 2 of Article III of the Constitution does not
require a notice or a hearing before the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. It provides:
“Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
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particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.”
To determine probable cause for the issuance of
arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the
examination -- under oath or affirmation -- of
complainants and the witnesses they may produce.
There is no requirement to notify and hear the accused
before the issuance of warrants of arrest. In Ho v. People
and in all the cases cited therein, never was a judge
required to go to the extent of conducting a hearing just
for the purpose of personally determining probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. All we required
was that the “judge must have sufficient supporting
documents upon which to make his independent
judgment, or at the very least, upon which to verify the
findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable
cause.” In Webb v. De Leon, the Court categorically
stated that a judge was not supposed to conduct a
hearing before issuing a warrant of arrest:
“Again, we stress that before issuing warrants of
arrest, judges merely determine personally the
probability, not the certainty of guilt of an accused. In
doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to
determine the existence of probable cause. They just
personally review the initial determination of the
prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is
supported by substantial evidence.”
That the case under consideration is an
extradition and not a criminal action is not sufficient to
justify the adoption of a set of procedures more
protective of the accused. If a different procedure were
called for at all, a more restrictive one -- not the opposite
-- would be justified in view of respondent’s
demonstrated predisposition to flee. Since this is a
matter of first impression, we deem it wise to restate the
proper procedure: Upon receipt of a petition for
extradition and its supporting documents, the judge must
study them and make, as soon as possible, a prima facie
finding whether (a) they are sufficient in form and
substance, (b) they show compliance with the Extradition
Treaty and Law, and (c) the person sought is extraditable.
At his discretion, the judge may require the submission of
further documentation or may personally examine the
affiants and witnesses of the petitioner. If, in spite of
this study and examination, no prima facie finding is
possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion
of the judge. On the other hand, if the presence of a
prima facie case is determined, then the magistrate must
immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of the
extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to answer
the petition and to appear at scheduled summary
hearings. Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge
must not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the
pendency of the petition, lest the latter be given the
opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings. In
our opinion, the foregoing procedure will “best serve the
ends of justice” in extradition cases.
No, the respondent is not entitled to enjoy the
constitutional right to bail. As suggested by the use of
the word “conviction,” the constitutional provision (Article
III, Section 13 of the Constitution), as well as Section 4
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of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a
person has been arrested and detained for violation of
Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition
proceedings, because extradition courts do not render
judgments of conviction or acquittal. Moreover, the
constitutional right to bail “flows from the presumption of
innocence in favor of every accused who should not be
subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would
be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond
reasonable doubt.” It follows that the constitutional
provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition,
where the presumption of innocence is not at issue. The
provision in the Constitution stating that the “right to bail
shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is suspended” does not detract from the
rule that the constitutional right to bail is available only in
criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
finds application “only to persons judicially charged for
rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected
with invasion.” Hence, the second sentence in the
constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the
right to bail in criminal proceedings for the
aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean
that the right is available even in extradition proceedings
that are not criminal in nature.
No, his detention prior to the conclusion of the
extradition proceedings does not amount to a violation of
his right to due process. The essence of due process is
the opportunity to be heard but, at the same time, point
it does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard.
Where the circumstances -- such as those present in an
extradition case -- call for it, a subsequent opportunity
to be heard is enough. In the present case, respondent
will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently,
when the extradition court hears the Petition for
Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of his right to
due process and fundamental fairness.There is no
arbitrariness, either, in the immediate deprivation of his
liberty prior to his being heard. That his arrest and
detention will not be arbitrary is sufficiently ensured by
(1) the DOJ’s filing in court the Petition with its
supporting documents after a determination that the
extradition request meets the requirements of the law
and the relevant treaty; (2) the extradition judge’s
independent prima facie determination that his arrest will
best serve the ends of justice before the issuance of a
warrant for his arrest; and (3) his opportunity, once he is
under the court’s custody, to apply for bail as an
exception to the no-initial-bail rule.
People of the Philippines vs. Susan Canton, G.R. No.
148825. December 27, 2002
Facts:
Susan Canton (hereafter SUSAN) was charged
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City with the
violation of Section 16 of Article III of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425. On February
12, 1998 at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, was
found possessing nine hundred ninety eight point two
eight hundred zero nine (998.2809) GRAMS of
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methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug,
without the corresponding prescription or license.
Version of the Prosecution. Susan was at the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), being a
departing passenger bound for Saigon, Vietnam. When
she passed through the metal detector booth, a beeping
sound was emitted. Upon frisking SUSAN, a civilian
employee of the National Action Committee on Hijacking
and Terrorism (NACHT) named Mylene felt something
bulging at her abdominal area. Mylene inserted her hand
under the skirt of SUSAN, pinched the package several
times and noticed that the package contained what felt
like rice granules. When Mylene passed her hand, she felt
similar packages in front of SUSAN’s genital area and
thighs. She asked SUSAN to bring out the packages, but
the latter refused and said that was money only. Mylene
forthwith reported the matter to SPO4 Victorio de los
Reyes, her supervisor on duty who in turn instructed
Mylene to call Customs Examiner Lorna Jalac and bring
SUSAN to a comfort room for a thorough physical
examination. Upon further frisking in the ladies’ room,
Mylene touched something in front of SUSAN’s sex organ.
She directed SUSAN to remove her skirt, girdles and
panty. SUSAN obliged. Mylene and Lorna discovered
three packages individually wrapped and sealed in gray
colored packing tape, which SUSAN voluntarily handed to
them. Together with SUSAN, they brought the gray
plastic packs to the customs examination table, opened
the same and found that they contained white crystalline
substances which, when submitted for laboratory
examination, yielded positive results for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated
drug. SUSAN signed a receipt of the articles seized from
her. For the defense, SPO2 Jerome Cause, an
investigator of the First Regional Aviation Office, testified
that he informed SUSAN of her constitutional rights but
admitted that she did not have a counsel when she
signed the receipt. Yet he told her that she had the
option to sign or not to sign the receipt.
Version of the Accused. After the trial court
rendered a decision finding SUSAN guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the alleged offense, SUSAN filed a
Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial, alleging
therein that the trial judge erred in upholding the
presumption of regularity in the performance of duty of
police officers, since lady frisker Mylene Cabunoc is not
even a police officer. SUSAN also assailed the propriety
of the search and seizure without warrant on the ground
that the seized items were not in plain view.
Issues:
1. Whether the warrantless search against Susan
was legal.
2. Whether the arrest of Susan was legal.
3. Whether the constitutional right to counsel
afforded an accused under custodial
investigation was violated.
Ruling:
Yes, the warrantless search against Susan
was legal. Supreme Court pronounced that the
Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!
warrantless search and subsequent seizure of the
regulated drugs, as well as the arrest of SUSAN, were not
violative of her constitutional rights. Sections 2 and 3(2)
of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized. XXX
Sec. 3…. (2) Any evidence obtained in violation
of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding.
The rule is that the Constitution bars State
intrusions to a person's body, personal effects or
residence except if conducted by virtue of a valid search
warrant issued in compliance with the procedure outlined
in the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court.
The interdiction against warrantless searches and
seizures is not absolute. The recognized exceptions
established by jurisprudence are (1) search of moving
vehicles; (2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs searches;
(4) waiver or consented searches; (5) stop and frisk
situations (Terry search); and (6) search incidental to a
lawful arrest.
In the present case, the search was made
pursuant to routine airport security procedure, which is
allowed under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235 reading
as follows:
SEC. 9. Every ticket issued to a passenger by
the airline or air carrier concerned shall contain among
others the following condition printed thereon: “Holder
hereof and his hand-carried luggage(s) are subject to
search for , and seizure of, prohibited materials or
substances. Holder refusing to be searched shall not be
allowed to board the aircraft,” which shall constitute a
part of the contract between the passenger and the air
carrier.
This constitutes another exception to the
proscription against warrantless searches and seizures.
In the case of People v. Johnson, which involves
similar facts and issues, The Court held in this wise:
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure
clause by exposure of their persons or property to the
public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective
expectation of privacy, which expectation society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is
implicit in airport security procedures. With increased
concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come
increased security at the nation’s airports. Passengers
attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through
metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as
checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans.
Should these procedures suggest the presence of
suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to
determine what the objects are. There is little question
that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal
intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved,
and the reduced privacy expectations associated with
airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified
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through airport public address systems, signs, and
notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to
search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are
found, such would be subject to seizure. These
announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary
constitutional protections against warrantless searches
and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.
Yes, the appellant, having been caught
flagrante delicto, was lawfully arrested without a
warrant. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, provides:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. --
A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
When, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;
When an offense has just been committed and
he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and
When the person to be arrested is a prisoner
who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
The present case falls under paragraph (a) of
the afore-quoted Section. The search conducted on
SUSAN resulted in the discovery and recovery of three
packages containing white crystalline substances, which
upon examination yielded positive results for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. As discussed
earlier, such warrantless search and seizure were legal.
Armed with the knowledge that SUSAN was committing a
crime, the airport security personnel and police
authorities were duty-bound to arrest her. As held in
People v. Johnson, her subsequent arrest without a
warrant was justified, since it was effected upon the
discovery and recovery of shabu in her person flagrante
delicto.
No, the constitutional right to counsel
afforded an accused under custodial investigation
was not violated. Entrenched is the rule that the rights
provided in Section 12, Article III of the Constitution may
be invoked only when a person is under “custodial
investigation” or is “in custody interrogation.” Custodial
investigation refers to the “questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way.” This presupposes that he is
suspected of having committed a crime and that the
investigator is trying to elicit information or a confession
from him. And the right to counsel attaches upon the
start of such investigation. The objective is to prohibit
“incommunicado” interrogation of individuals in a police-
dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating
statements without full warnings of constitutional rights.
In this case, as testified to by the lone witness
for the defense, SPO2 Jerome Cause, no custodial
investigation was conducted after SUSAN’s arrest. She
affixed her signature to the receipt of the articles seized
from her, but before she did so, she was told that she
had the option to sign or not to sign it. In any event, her
signature to the packages was not relied upon by the
prosecution to prove its case. Moreover, no statement
Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!
was taken from her during her detention and used in
evidence against her. Hence, her claim of violation of her
right to counsel has no leg to stand on.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANILO ASIS y
FONPERADA and GILBERT FORMENTO y
SARICONGR 142531, 15 October 2002
Facts:
Danilo Asis y Fonperada and Gilbert Formento y
Saricon were charged in an Information dated 18
February 1998; the information stating “That on or about
February 10, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping each other, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain and by
means of force and violence upon person, to wit: by then
and there stabbing one YU HING GUAN @ ROY CHING
with a bladed instrument on the different parts of the
body thereafter take, rob and carry away the following,
to wit: Cash money in the amount of P20,000.00; one (1)
wristwatch’ one (1) gold necklace; and undetermined
items; or all in the total amount of P20,000.00 more or
less, belonging to said YU HING GUAN @ ROY CHING
against his will, to the damage and prejudice of the said
owner in the aforesaid amount more or less of
P20,000.00, Philippine Currency, and as a result thereof,
he sustained mortal stab wounds which were the direct
and immediate cause of his death.” When arraigned on 9
July 1998, both accused pleaded not guilty. Found to be
deaf-mutes, they were assisted, not only by a counsel de
oficio, but also by an interpreter from the Calvary Baptist
Church. The prosecution presented 9 witnesses. Although
none of them had actually seen the crime committed,
strong and substantial circumstantial evidence presented
by them attempted to link both accused to the crime.
After due trial, both accused were found guilty and
sentenced to death. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila (Branch 54; Criminal Case 98-163090), on 8
March 2000, held that the “crime charged and proved is
robbery with homicide under Article 294, No. 1 of the
Revised Penal Code,” ruled that “although no witnesses
to the actual killing and robbery were presented, the
circumstantial evidence including the recovery of
bloodstained clothing from both accused definitely proved
that the two (2) x x x committed the crime,” and
appreciated the aggravating circumstances of abuse of
confidence, superior strength and treachery and thus
sentenced both accused to the supreme penalty of death.
Hence, the automatic review before the Supreme Court.
Both the accused do not question the legality of their
arrest, as they made no objection thereto before the
arraignment, but object to the introduction of the
bloodstained pair of shorts allegedly recovered from the
bag of Formento; arguing that the search was illegally
done, making the obtainment of the pair of shorts illegal
and taints them as inadmissible. The prosecution, on the
other hand, contends that it was Formento’s wife who
voluntarily surrendered the bag that contained the
bloodstained trousers of the victim, and thus claims that
her act constituted a valid consent to the search without
a warrant.
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Issues:
Whether the voluntarily surrender by Formento’s wife of
the bag that contained the bloodstained trousers of the
victim constitutes a valid consent to the search without a
warrant on the part of Formento.
Ruling:
NO, the voluntarily surrender by Formento’s
wife of the bag that contained the bloodstained trousers
of the victim does not constitute a valid consent to the
search without a warrant on the part of Formento.
Primarily, the constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizures, being a personal one, cannot be
waived by anyone except the person whose rights are
invaded or who is expressly authorized to do so on his or
her behalf. In the present case, the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses show that at the time the
bloodstained pair of shorts was recovered, Formento,
together with his wife and mother, was present. Being
the very subject of the search, necessarily, he himself
should have given consent. Since he was physically
present, the waiver could not have come from any other
person. Lopez vs. Commissioner of Customs does not
apply as the accused therein was not present when the
search was made. Further, to constitute a valid waiver, it
must be shown that first, the right exists; second, the
person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of
the existence of such a right; and third, the person had
an actual intention to relinquish the right. Herein,
Formento could not have consented to a warrantless
search when, in the first place, he did not understand
what was happening at that moment. There was no
interpreter to assist him — a deaf-mute — during the
arrest, search and seizure. The point in the case Pasion
vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, i.e. “as the constitutional
guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of
the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the
position of either contesting an officer’s authority by force,
or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold
that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a
consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a
demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law,”
becomes even more pronounced in the present case, in
which Formento is a deaf-mute, and there was no
interpreter to explain to him what was happening. His
seeming acquiescence to the search without a warrant
may be attributed to plain and simple confusion and
ignorance. The bloodstained pair of shorts was a piece of
evidence seized on the occasion of an unlawful search
and seizure. Thus, it is tainted and should thus be
excluded for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous
tree. In the language of the fundamental law, it shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any
proceeding. Lastly, as to evidence vis-a-is the case in its
totality, circumstantial evidence that merely arouses
suspicions or gives room for conjecture is not sufficient to
convict. It must do more than just raise the possibility, or
even the probability, of guilt. It must engender moral
certainty. Otherwise, the constitutional presumption of
innocence prevails, and the accused deserves acquittal.
Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GUILLERMO
SAMUS, G.R. Nos. 135957-58. September 17, 2002
Facts:
This is for automatic review of the Decision
dated October 8, 1998, issued by the Regional Trial Court
of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 36, in Criminal Case Nos.
5015-96-C and 5016-96-C. The trial court found
Guillermo Samus guilty beyond reasonable of two counts
of murder.
Samus, appellant, was a farmer, tilling and
living in the land of Miguel Completo at Barangay Niugan,
Cabuyao, Laguna. The victims, sixty two (62) year old
Dedicacion Balisi and her grandson, six (6) year old John
Ardee Balisi, were the neighbors of appellant’s father at
San Ramon de Canlubang, Brgy. Canlubang, Calamba,
Laguna.
Version of the Prosecution. On September 2,
1996, 4th PNP Criminal Investigation Group Regional
Office at Camp Vicente Lim in Calamba, Laguna received
a telephone call from a local barangay official informing
them of the victims’ deaths. Arriving at the victims’
residence at Block 8, Lot 6 at San Ramon, Brgy.
Canlubang, Calamba, Senior Police (SP) Inspector Rizaldy
H. Garcia the team found a pair of maong pants, a white
T-shirt, a handkerchief and dirty slippers in the bathroom
and roof of the house. A pair of earrings worn by
Dedicacion Balisi was reported missing from her body. On
September 10, 1996, Major Jose Pante of the Criminal
Investigation Group received information that appellant
was the principal suspect in the killing of the two (2)
victims and that he was sighted inside the residence of
spouses Rolly and Josie Vallejo at Barangay Macabling,
Sta. Rosa, Laguna. His team, accompanied by local
barangay authorities, went to Vallejo spouses’ house and
shortly thereafter, they heard loud footsteps on the roof.
Rushing outside, they saw appellant crawling on the roof.
They ordered him to stop, but he suddenly jumped from
the roof and landed hard on the ground, sustaining an
injury on his ankle and bruises on his left and right
forearm. At that point, the police team closed in on
appellant who, while trembling and shaking, admitted the
killings upon a query from Rolly Vallejo. Appellant was
brought to the Camp Vicente Lim PNP Investigation Office
where he was informed of his constitutional rights by
SPO3 Alex Malabanan. In the morning of September 11,
1996, appellant, assisted by Atty. Arturo Juliano, gave his
statement admitting the killings. Later that day, SPO3
Mario Bitos was able to recover the pawned earrings from
Ponciano, to whom appellant allegedly pawned the same,
who turned them over to SPO3 Malabanan.
Version of the Defense. Alleging denial and alibi
as defenses, appellant presents his version of the
incident. He alleged that he was brought to Camp Vicente
Lim where he was tortured until he lost his consciousness.
On the same night, he was brought to a hospital, was
given medicine, then brought back to the cell where he
was handcuffed at the door of the cell. The CIS got hold
of the medical certificate. He was forced by the CIS to
admit the killing of the victims and the sale of jewelry by
means of torture and threat. He also testified that he was
forced to execute a document admitting the killing. He
was forced to sign said document. He did not know Atty.
Juliano and did not talk to him. According to witness
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University of Cebu College of Law UCLASS Bar Operations: Political Law Society
Vallejo, appellant Guillermo Samus was in their house at
about 6:00 p.m. of September 10, 1996. It was then
that CIS operative together with their Brgy. Captain
entered their house, arrested and handcuffed appellant.
It was not true that accused Guillermo Samus hid himself
on the roof of her house. When the accused was
arrested by the CIS men, together with the barangay
officials, the other persons present were the witness and
her 3 children. The police were not armed with a warrant
of arrest or search warrant. On cross-examination, he
testified that media interviewed him 2 days after his
arrest. He and his relatives in Laguna did not have the
capacity to hire/secure the services of a lawyer.
Issues:
1. Whether the arrest of appellant is
lawful.
2. Whether the confession made by
appellant to the media while in police
custody be admissible as evidence.
3. Whether the testimony of Pontaños
and the picture of a pair of earrings
together with the turnover receipt,
which appellant identified during his
testimony, be considered inadmissible
as the fruit of the poisonous tree and
hence be disregarded at this stage of
appeal.
Ruling:
No, the arrest was unlawful. The police officers’
version of the arrest is incredible. Supreme Court finds it
hard to believe that anyone would jump from the roof of
a two-story house to escape and, after landing on the
ground without any broken bones, make a complete
turnaround and just meekly surrender without further
ado. Even if this story were true, jumping from a roof is
not a crime that would justify the warrantless arrest of
appellant. It is undisputed that when the CIS team went
to the Vallejo residence on the evening of September 10,
1996, it had no warrant of arrest against appellant. Yet,
they arrested him. Under the Rules, peace officers may,
without a warrant, arrest a person under any of these
circumstances: (a) when, in their presence, the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit, an offense; (b) when an offense
has just been committed, and they have probable cause
to believe, based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances, that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and (c) when the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another, or from a penal
establishment where he or she is serving final judgment
or is temporarily confined while the case is pending. None
of these circumstances was present when members of
the Criminal Investigation Group (CIG) arrested appellant.
He was not a prisoner. The killing of Dedicacion and John
Ardee Balisi was not done in the presence of the arresting
officers. Since it took place on September 2, 1996, it
could not have been considered as “having just been
Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!
committed.” Evidently, they unlawfully arrested appellant
on September 10, 1996.
Yes, the confession made by appellant to the
media while in police custody is admissible as evidence.
Supreme Court clarified that after being illegally arrested,
appellant was not informed of his constitutional rights to
remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel. Hence, any admission elicited from him by the
law enforcers during custodial investigation is normally
inadmissible in evidence. Nonetheless, even if the
uncounselled admission per se may be inadmissible,
under the present circumstances Supreme Court cannot
rule it out because of appellant’s failure to make timely
objections. Indeed, the admission is inadmissible in
evidence under Article III, Section 12(1) and (3) of the
Constitution, because it was given under custodial
investigation and was made without the assistance of
counsel. However, the defense failed to object to its
presentation during the trial, with the result that the
defense is deemed to have waived objection to its
admissibility.
No, the testimony of Pontaños and the picture
of a pair of earrings together with the turnover receipt,
which appellant identified during his testimony, cannot be
considered inadmissible as the fruit of the poisonous tree.
Upon examination of the records, we find that during the
entire examination in court of Prosecution Witness
Pontaños, appellant did not question or object to the
admissibility of the former’s testimony. Worse, the
latter’s counsel even freely cross-examined the witness
without any reservations. Having made no objection
before the trial court, appellant cannot raise this question
for the first time on appeal.i[21] The evidence having been
admitted without objection, we are not inclined to reject
it. If only appellant had made a timely objection to the
admissibility of the said testimony, the prosecution could
have been warned of the need to present additional
evidence to support its case. To disregard
unceremoniously a major portion of its case at this late
stage when it can no longer present additional evidence
as substitute for that which is now claimed to be
inadmissible goes against fundamental fairness. Be that
as it may, and even if Supreme Court affirmed
appellant’s conviction for murder, the Court does not
agree with the trial court’s imposition of the death
sentence, because the proven aggravating circumstance
of dwelling was not alleged in the Information.
Pimentel, et al. vs. House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal , GR 141489, 29 November 2002;
Facts:
On 11 May 1998, in accordance with the Party-
List System Act which took effect on 3 March 1995,
national elections were held which included, for the first
time, the election through popular vote of party-list
groups and organizations whose nominees would become
members of the House. Proclaimed winners were 14
party-list representatives from 13 organizations,
including Melvyn D. Eballe, Leonardo Q. Montemayor,
Cresente C. Paez, Loretta Ann P. Rosales and Patricia M.
Sarenas from party-list groups Association of Philippine
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Electric Cooperatives (APEC), Alyansang Bayanihan ng
mga Magsasaka, Manggagawang Bukid at Mangingisda
(ABA), NATCO Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Akbayan!
Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN), and Abanse! Pinay
(ABANSE). APEC was able to send 2 representatives to
the House, while the 12 other party-list groups had one
representative each. District representatives belonging to
various political parties were also elected. Subsequently,
the House constituted its HRET and CA contingent by
electing its representatives to these two constitutional
bodies which was done through nomination by the
political parties of House members who are to occupy
seats in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) and the Commission on Appointments (CA).
From available records, it does not appear that
after the 11 May 1998 elections the party-list groups in
the House nominated any of their representatives to the
HRET or the CA. As of the date of filing of the present
petitions for prohibition and mandamus with prayer for
writ of preliminary injunction, the House contingents to
the HRET and the CA were composed solely of district
representatives belonging to the different political parties.
On 18 January 2000, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr.
wrote two letters addressed to then Senate President
Blas F. Ople, as Chairman of the CA, and to Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court Jose A. R. Melo (now
retired), as Chairman of the HRET. The letters requested
Senate President Ople and Justice Melo to cause the
restructuring of the CA and the HRET, respectively, to
include party-list representatives to conform to Sections
17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In its
meeting of 20 January 2000, the HRET resolved to direct
the Secretary of the Tribunal to refer Senator Pimentel’s
letter to the Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives. On the same day, HRET Secretary Daisy
B. Panga-Vega, in an Indorsement of even date, referred
the letter to House of Representatives Secretary General
Roberto P. Nazareno.
On 2 February 2000, Eballe, et al. filed with this
Court their Petitions for Prohibition, Mandamus and
Preliminary Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order) against the HRET, its Chairman and
Members, and against the CA, its Chairman and Members.
They contend that, under the Constitution and the Party-
List System Act, party-list representatives should have
1.2 or at least 1 seat in the HRET, and 2.4 seats in the
CA. They charge that the HRET, CA, et al. committed
grave abuse of discretion in refusing to act positively on
the letter of Senator Pimentel. In its Resolution of 8
February 2000, the Court en banc directed the
consolidation of GR 141490 with GR 141489. On 11
February 2000, Eballe et al. filed in both cases a motion
to amend their petitions to implead then Speaker Manuel
B. Villar, Jr. as an additional respondent, in his capacity
as Speaker of the House and as one of the members of
the CA. The Court granted both motions and admitted
the amended petitions. Senator Pimentel filed the present
petitions on the strength of his oath to protect, defend
and uphold the Constitution and in his capacity as
taxpayer ‘and as a member of the CA. He was joined by 5
party-list representatives from APEC, ABA, ABANSE,
AKBAYAN and COOP-NATCCO as co-petitioners.
Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!
Issues:
1. Whether the present composition of the House
Electoral Tribunal violates the constitutional
requirement of proportional representation
because there are no party-list representatives
in the HRET.
2. Whether the refusal of the HRET and the CA to
reconstitute themselves to include party-list
representatives constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.
Ruling:
1. NO. The Constitution expressly grants to the
House of Representatives the prerogative, within
constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its
district and party-list representatives those who may
occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and
the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution explicitly
confers on the Senate and on the House the authority to
elect among their members those who would fill the 12
seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members in
the Commission on Appointments. Under Section 17,
Article VI of the Constitution, each chamber of Congress
exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally
defined limits, who among their members would occupy
the allotted 6 seats of each chamber’s respective
electoral tribunal. These constitutional provisions are
reiterated in Rules 3 and 4 (a) of the 1998 Rules of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The
discretion of the House to choose its members to the
HRET and the CA is not absolute, being subject to the
mandatory constitutional rule on proportional
representation.[26] However, under the doctrine of
separation of powers, the Court may not interfere with
the exercise by the House of this constitutionally
mandated duty, absent a clear violation of the
Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.[27] Otherwise, ‘the doctrine
of separation of powers calls for each branch of
government to be left alone to discharge its duties as it
sees fit.[28] Neither can the Court speculate on what
action the House may take if party-list representatives
are duly nominated for membership in the HRET and the
CA. The petitions are bereft of any allegation that
respondents prevented the party-list groups in the House
from participating in the election of members of the HRET
and the CA. Neither does it appear that after the 11 May
1998 elections, the House barred the party-list
representatives from seeking membership in the HRET or
the CA. Rather, it appears from the available facts that
the party-list groups in the House at that time simply
refrained from participating in the election process. The
party-list representatives did not designate their
nominees even up to the time they filed the petitions,
with the predictable result that the House did not
consider any party-list representative for election to the
HRET or the CA. As the primary recourse of the party-list
representatives lies with the House of Representatives,
‘the Court cannot resolve the issues presented by
petitioners at this time.
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2. There is no grave abuse in the action or lack
of action by the HRET and the CA in response to the
letters of Senator Pimentel. Under Sections 17 and 18 of
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and their internal rules,
the HRET and the CA are bereft of any power to
reconstitute themselves.
Republic of the Philippines, Represented by Energy
Regulatory Board vs. Manila Electric Company, G.R.
No. 141314. November 15, 2002
Facts:
On December 23, 1993, MERALCO filed with the
Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) an application for the
revision of its rate schedules. The application reflected an
average increase of 21 centavos per kilowatt/hour (kwh)
in its distribution charge. The application also included a
prayer for provisional approval of the increase pursuant
to Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act and Section 8 of
Executive Order No. 172.
On January 28, 1994, the ERB issued an Order
granting a provisional increase of P0.184 per kwh,
subject to the condition that in the event the Board finds
that the applicant is entitled to a lesser increase in rates,
all excess amounts collected from the applicant’s
customers shall either be refunded to them or
correspondingly credited in their favor for application to
electric bills covering future consumptions.
On February 11, 1997, the COA submitted its
Audit Report SAO No. 95-07 (the COA Report) which
contained, among others, the recommendation not to
include income taxes paid by MERALCO as part of its
operating expenses for purposes of rate determination
and the use of the net average investment method for
the computation of the proportionate value of the
properties used by MERALCO during the test year for the
determination of the rate base.
Subsequently, the ERB rendered its decision
adopting the above recommendations and authorized
MERALCO to implement a rate adjustment in the average
amount of P0.017 per kwh, effective with respect to
MERALCOs billing cycles beginning February 1994. The
ERB further ordered that the provisional relief in the
amount of P0.184 per kilowatt/hour granted under the
Boards Order dated January 28, 1994 is hereby
superseded and modified and the excess average amount
of P0.167 per kilowatt/hour starting with [MERALCOs]
billing cycles beginning February 1994 until its billing
cycles beginning February 1998, be refunded to
[MERALCOs] customers or correspondingly credited in
their favor for future consumption. The ERB held that
income tax should not be treated as operating expense
as this should be borne by the stockholders who are
recipients of the income or profits realized from the
operation of their business hence, should not be passed
on to the consumers.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals set aside the
ERB decision insofar as it directed the reduction of the
MERALCO rates by an average of P0.167 per kwh and the
refund of such amount to MERALCOs customers
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beginning February 1994 and until its billing cycle
beginning February 1998. Separate Motions for
Reconsideration filed by the petitioners were denied by
the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners seek before the Court a reversal of
the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Issues:
1. Whether the private property used for a public
purpose is subjected to regulation under the police
power of the State.
2. Whether there is a proper delegation of
legislative power to Energy regulation Board with
regard to the fixing of the rate of energy watts.
3. Whether the issue on fixing the energy watt rate
can be subjected for judicial review.
Ruling:
1. Yes, the private property used for a
public purpose be subjected to regulation under the
police power of the State. The regulation of rates to be
charged by public utilities is founded upon the police
powers of the State and statutes prescribing rules for the
control and regulation of public utilities are a valid
exercise thereof. When private property is used for a
public purpose and is affected with public interest, it
ceases to be juris privati only and becomes subject to
regulation. The regulation is to promote the common
good. Submission to regulation may be withdrawn by the
owner by discontinuing use; but as long as use of the
property is continued, the same is subject to public
regulation. In regulating rates charged by public utilities,
the State protects the public against arbitrary and
excessive rates while maintaining the efficiency and
quality of services rendered. However, the power to
regulate rates does not give the State the right to
prescribe rates which are so low as to deprive the public
utility of a reasonable return on investment. Thus, the
rates prescribed by the State must be one that yields a
fair return on the public utility upon the value of the
property performing the service and one that is
reasonable to the public for the services rendered.[10
The fixing of just and reasonable rates involves a
balancing of the investor and the consumer interests. In
his famous dissenting opinion in the 1923 case of
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Service Commission,
Mr. Justice Brandeis wrote:
The thing devoted by the investor to the public
use is not specific property, tangible and intangible, but
capital embarked in an enterprise. Upon the capital so
invested, the Federal Constitution guarantees to the
utility the opportunity to earn a fair return. However, the
Constitution does not guarantee to the utility the
opportunity to earn a return on the value of all items of
property used by the utility, or of any of them. The
investor agrees, by embarking capital in a utility, that its
charges to the public shall be reasonable. His company is
the substitute for the State in the performance of the
public service, thus becoming a public servant. The
compensation which the Constitution guarantees an
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opportunity to earn is the reasonable cost of conducting
the business.
2. Yes, there was a proper delegation
of legislative power to Energy regulation Board
with regard to the fixing of the rate of energy watts.
The ERB was created under Executive Order No. 172 to
regulate, among others, the distribution of energy
resources and to fix rates to be charged by public utilities
involved in the distribution of electricity. In the fixing of
rates, the only standard which the legislature is required
to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative
authority is that the rate be reasonable and just. It has
been held that even in the absence of an express
requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be
implied. What is a just and reasonable rate is a question
of fact calling for the exercise of discretion, good sense,
and a fair, enlightened and independent judgment. The
requirement of reasonableness comprehends such rates
which must not be so low as to be confiscatory, or too
high as to be oppressive. In determining whether a rate
is confiscatory, it is essential also to consider the given
situation, requirements and opportunities of the utility.
Settled jurisprudence holds that factual findings of
administrative bodies on technical matters within their
area of expertise should be accorded not only respect but
even finality if they are supported by substantial evidence
even if not overwhelming or preponderant. In one case,
we cautioned that courts should "refrain from substituting
their discretion on the weight of the evidence for the
discretion of the Public Service Commission on questions
of fact and will only reverse or modify such orders of the
Public Service Commission when it really appears that
the evidence is insufficient to support their conclusions."
3. Yes, the issue on fixing of energy
watt rate can be subjected for judicial review to
determine whether the administrative body is
acting within the limit of its power and discretion.
While the power to fix rates is a legislative function,
whether exercised by the legislature itself or delegated
through an administrative agency, a determination of
whether the rates so fixed are reasonable and just is a
purely judicial question and is subject to the review of
the courts. In the cases at bar, findings and conclusions
of the ERB on the rate that can be charged by MERALCO
to the public should be respected. The function of the
court, in exercising its power of judicial review, is to
determine whether under the facts and circumstances,
the final order entered by the administrative agency is
unlawful or unreasonable. Thus, to the extent that the
administrative agency has not been arbitrary or
capricious in the exercise of its power, the time-honored
principle is that courts should not interfere. The principle
of separation of powers dictates that courts should
hesitate to review the acts of administrative officers
except in clear cases of grave abuse of discretion. In
determining the just and reasonable rates to be charged
by a public utility, three major factors are considered by
the regulating agency: a) rate of return; b) rate base and
c) the return itself or the computed revenue to be earned
by the public utility based on the rate of return and rate
base. The rate of return is a judgment percentage which,
if multiplied with the rate base, provides a fair return on
the public utility for the use of its property for service to
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the public. The rate of return of a public utility is not
prescribed by statute but by administrative and judicial
pronouncements. This Court has consistently adopted a
12% rate of return for public utilities. The rate base, on
the other hand, is an evaluation of the property devoted
by the utility to the public service or the value of invested
capital or property which the utility is entitled to a return.
Joel M. Sanvicente vs. People of the Philippines ,
G.R. No. 132081. November 26, 2002
Facts:
Petitioner was charged with homicide for the
killing of one Dennis Wong y Chua. Petitioner fatally shot
the victim outside the Far East Bank along Katipunan
Avenue, Loyola Heights, Quezon City after the latter
allegedly attempted to rob him of a large amount of cash
which he had just withdrawn from the automatic teller
machine.
Responding policemen found the lifeless body of
the victim at the parking space in front of the Far East
Bank and Trust Company Branch along Katipunan Road,
Loyola Heights, Quezon City. Recovered at the scene
were five empty caliber .45 shells, two live caliber .45
bullets and an ATM card in the name of Violeta
Sanvicente. Petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Leonardo A.
Valmonte, turned over to Police Station 9 petitioner’s .45
caliber Mark IV pistol bearing Serial No. 5504095. He
also wrote a letter addressed to P/Major Antonio Diaz,
Station Commander of PNP Station 9, CPDC, Anonas
Road, Quezon City which serves as a voluntary surrender
of his client, however, without admission of guilt. At his
arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty.
The prosecution filed its Formal Offer of Exhibits,
which included the above-quoted letter of petitioner’s
counsel to P/Maj. Antonio Diaz, marked as Exhibit LL
which the trial court. Meanwhile, petitioner begged leave
to file a demurrer to evidence, which was granted by the
trial court. Hence, on August 29, 1996, petitioner filed a
Motion To Dismiss (On Demurrer to Evidence), based on
the following grounds: (1) the lack of positive
identification of the accused is a fatal omission
warranting dismissal; (2) prosecution’s evidence are
totally hearsay/incompetent, hence, inadmissible and the
guilt of the accused was not proven by positive evidence
beyond reasonable doubt.
On October 7, 1996, the trial court issued an
Order dismissing the case together with the civil aspect
thereof for insufficiency of evidence. The prosecution filed
a motion for reconsideration, which was denied on the
ground, among others, that with the dismissal of the case
double jeopardy had set in. Prosecution filed a petition
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which was granted
by the appellate court and nullified the October 7, 1996
Order of the trial court. Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied.
Issues:
Whether the Court of Appeals’ nullification of trial
court’s order dismissing the case is repugnant to the
right against double jeopardy of the petitioner.
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Ruling:

Yes, the Court of Appeals’ nullification of trial

court’s order dismissing the case is repugnant to the right
against double jeopardy of the petitioner.
Under Rule 119, Section 23 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, as amended, the trial court may
dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence upon a demurrer to evidence filed by the
accused with or without leave of court. In resolving
accused’s demurrer to evidence, the court is merely
required to ascertain whether there is competent or
sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or support a
verdict of guilt.
The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is
left to the sound discretion of the trial court and its ruling
on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a
grave abuse of discretion. Significantly, once the court
grants the demurrer, such order amounts to an acquittal
and any further prosecution of the accused would violate
the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. This
constitutes an exception to the rule that the dismissal of
a criminal case made with the express consent of the
accused or upon his own motion bars a plea of double
jeopardy. The finality-of-acquittal rule was stressed thus
in People v. Velasco:
The fundamental philosophy highlighting the
finality of an acquittal by the trial court cuts deep into the
“humanity of the laws and in jealous watchfulness over
the rights of the citizens, when brought in unequal
contest with the State xxx.”
Given the far-reaching scope of an accused’s
right against double jeopardy, even an appeal based on
an alleged misappreciation of evidence will not lie. The
only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is
when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where
the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its
case, or where the trial was a sham.

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2003 Certificate of Canvass and to proclaim Tabaloc, instead

Bagaoisan vs Nat'l Tobacco Administration (2003)
Facts:
1. The petitioner was terminated from there
position in the national tobacco administration as a result
of the executive order issued by president Estrada which
mandates for the stream lining of the national tobacco
administration, a government agency under the
department of agriculture.
2. The petitioners filed a letter of appeal to the
civil service commission to recall the Organization
Structure and Staffing Pattern (OSSP)
3. Petitioner all file a petition for certiorari with
prohibition an mandamus with prayer for preliminary
mandatory injunction and a temporary restraining
order with the regional trial court of Batak to prevent the
respondent from enforcing the notice of termination and
from ousting the petitioners in their respective offices.
4. The regional trial court issued an order
ordering the national tobacco administration to appoint
the petitioner to the OSSP to position similar to the one
that they hold before.
5. The national tobacco administration appealed
to the court of appeals who reversed the decision of the
RTC.
of Barot, as the 10th winning candidate for Councilor,
by errors committed by the Board of Canvassers. The
COMELEC considered the Memorandum as a petition,
and after notice and hearing, granted the request.
Tabaloc was proclaimed the 10th winning Councilor.
Barot filed with the Supreme Court a petition for and
prohibition.
Ruling:
1. Rule 27, Sec.5, par (b) of the COMELEC Rules provides
that a petition for correction must be filed not later than
five (5) days following the date of proclamation,
impleading the candidates who may be adversely
affected thereby. Rule 1, Sec.4 of the COMELEC Rules
also provides that “in the interest of justice and in the
order to obtain speedy disposition of all matters pending
before the Commission, these rules or any option thereof
may be suspended by the Commission.” The filing of the
petition beyond the 5- day period was upheld in the
interest of justice, it having been clearly shown that it
was Tabaloc and not Barot who was the 10th winning
candidate for councilor.
2. The COMELEC had the authority to consider the
Memorandum of the Chairman of the Board of
Canvassers, after notice and hearing, may even motu
propio correct errors committed by in the tabulation of
the votes.
CHAVEZ V. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY (2003)

6. Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court. Facts:

Issues: President Marcos through a presidential decr

ee created PEA, which was
Whether or not, the reorganization of the national tasked with the development, improvement, and acq
tobacco administration is valid true issuance of uisition, lease, and sale of all kinds of lands. The then
executive order by the president. president also transferred to PEA the foreshore and
offshore lands of Manila Bay under the Manila-Cavite
Coastal
Ruling: Road and Reclamation Project.

According to the supreme court, the President Thereafter, PEA was granted patent to the reclaimed
has the power to reorganized an office to achieve areas of land and then, years later, PEA entered into
simplicity ,economy and efficiency as provided under EO a JVA with AMARI for the development
292 sec. 31 and section 48 of RA 7645 which provides of the Freedom Islands. These two entered into a
that activities of executive agencies may be scaled down joint venture in the absence of any public bidding.
if it is no longer essential for the delivery of public service.
Later, a privilege speech was given by Senator
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Admit Petition for En Banc President Maceda denouncing the JVA as the
resolution and the Petition for an En Banc Resolution are grandmother of all scams. An investigation was
DENIED for lack of merit. Let entry of judgment be made conducted and it was concluded that the lands that PEA
in due course. No costs. was conveying to
AMARI were lands of the public domain; the certific
BAROT VS. COMELEC (2003) ates of title over the
Freedom Islands were void; and the JVA itself was
Facts: illegal. This prompted Ramos to form an investigatory
committee on the legality of the JVA.
In the May 14, 2001 elections Barot was proclaimed Formatted: issue_1
the 10th winning candidate for councilor of Tanjay City, Petitioner now comes and contends that the govern
Negros Oriental. On May 29, 2001 the Chairman of the ment stands to lose
Board of Canvassers sent a Memorandum to the billions by the conveyance or sale of the reclaimed
COMELEC requesting for authority to correct the

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areas to AMARI. He also asked for the full disclosure ruling on the validity of the termination of her
of the renegotiations happening between the parties. employment. In Resolution 00-1265 dated 24 May 2000
the CSC upheld her dismissal for lack of attestation and
Issues: prolonged absence without official leave from the time
she was removed from her post in September 1998 as a
W/N stipulations in the amended JVA for the tran result of Special Order 477-P. Gania moved for
sfer to AMARI of the lands, reclaimed or to be reconsideration. In Resolution 01-0558 dated 8 March
reclaimed, violate the Constitution. 2001 the CSC found merit in her motion, declared her
removal from office as illegal, exonerated her from the
Ruling: charge of being on absence without official leave and
ordered her reinstatement as Director II and Manila
The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore Information and Liaisoning Officer of MSU but disallowed
and submerged areas is rooted in the Regalian doctrine, the payment of back salaries for the period she was not
which holds that the State owns all lands and waters of working as a result of the illegal dismissal. The CSC
the public domain. explained the non-payment of her back wages, i.e. "the
incumbency of Dr. Gania is governed by the principle of
The 1987 Constitution recognizes the Regalian 'quantum meruit' (as you work so shall you earn). In
doctrine. It declares that all other words, her entitlement to compensation depends
natural resources are owned by the State and excep on her actual performance of work. Short of approval by
t for alienable the Commission, the appointment while already effective,
agricultural lands of the public domain, natural resou by itself is not a basis for payment of salary but the
rces cannot be alienated. assumption of duties of her office x x x x Such being the
case, Dr. Gania is not entitled to compensation for the
The Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 period that she was not reporting to work." MSU moved
hectares. Only 157.84 hectares of the 750 hectare for reconsideration of CSC Resolution 01-0558 dated 8
reclamation project have been reclaimed, and the rest of March 2001, while Gania moved for its early execution.
the area are still submerged areas forming part of Manila In Resolution 01-1225 dated 19 July 2001, the CSC
Bay. Further, it is provided that AMARI will reimburs denied MSU’s motion for reconsideration and ordered its
e the actual costs in reclaiming the areas of land and it President to allow Gania to assume and exercise the
will shoulder the other reclamation costs to be incurred. functions of Manila Information and Liaisoning Officer.
MSU appealed from the denial of its motion for
The foreshore and submerged areas of Manila Bay are reconsideration under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
part of the lands of Procedure (CA-GR SP-66188), to the Court of Appeals,
the public domain, waters and other natural resourc but the appellate court did not issue any restraining order
es and consequently owned by the State. As such, or injunction to prevent the execution of the resolution
foreshore and submerged areas shall not be on appeal. Gania did not seek a review of any of the
alienable unless they are classified as agricultural la resolutions of the CSC including the order denying back
nds of the public domain. The mere reclamation of salaries and other benefits for the period she was out of
these areas by the PEA doesn’t convert work. She instead pursued her prayer for reinstatement
these inalienable natural resources of the State into but MSU refused to employ her back. Hence, she was
alienable and disposable lands of the public compelled to file a second motion for the execution of
domain. There must be a law or presidential CSC Resolution 01-0558 dated 8 March 2001, citing Sec.
proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed land 82 of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases
s as alienable and in the Civil Service, which states that “[t]he filing and
disposable if the law has reserved them for some p pendency of petition for review with the Court of Appeals
ublic or quasi-public use. or certiorari with the Supreme Court shall not stop the
execution of the final decision of the Commission unless
Constantino-David vs. Pangandaman-Gania (GR the Court issues a restraining order or an injunction.” In
156039, 14 August 2003) Resolution 01-1616 dated 4 October 2001 the CSC
granted Gania’s motion and held that “CSC Resolution
Facts: 01-0558 dated 8 March 2001 has attained finality and
must be immediately implemented,” as it again ordered
Zenaida D. Pangandaman-Gania is a Director II the MSU President to reinstate Gania. On 8 October 2001
and Manila Information and Liaisoning Officer of the Gania for the first time questioned the portion of CSC
Mindanao State University (MSU). She has been holding Resolution 01-0558 dated 8 March 2001 prohibiting the
this position after the confirmation of her appointment by payment of back wages and other benefits to her for the
the MSU Board of Regents on 1 June 1995. On 2 October period that her employment was terminated, and moved
1998 Gania received a copy of Special Order 477-P dated for the modification of the resolution by granting her the
28 September 1998 designating a certain Agnes relief prayed for. On 29 October 2001 the Court of
Mangondato as Acting Director in her place in view of the Appeals dismissed MSU’s petition for review on the
alleged expiration of her term and was no longer allowed ground that the certificate of non-forum shopping was
to report for work. She verified the status of her not personally signed by pertinent officers of the
appointment and found out that her appointment was not university but by its counsel of record. MSU moved for
submitted to the Civil Service Commission for attestation. reconsideration of the dismissal. On 12 December 2001,
Gania immediately brought the matter to the CSC for a there being still no action on her request to be paid her

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back salaries and other benefits, Gania moved for an
immediate ruling thereon. On 21 February 2002 the
Court of Appeals denied MSU’s motion for reconsideration
of the dismissal of its petition for review for lack of merit.
On 28 February 2002 the CSC in Resolution No. 02-0321
denied Gania’s motion. Without the aid of an attorney,
Gania appealed CSC Resolution 02-0321 dated 28
February 2002 to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (CA-GR SP 69668). In
her petition for review, she did not mention that she did
not seek a review of CSC Resolution 01-0558 dated 8
March 2001 which was the real object of her appeal. In
addition, she impleaded only Chairperson Karina
Constantino-David and Commissioners Jose F. Erestain Jr.
and Waldemar V. Valmores of the CSC, but did not name
as the Mindanao State University or any of its officers. On
28 October 2002 the Court of Appeals partially found
merit in Gania’s petition for review. The Court of Appeals
ruled that back wages should be paid to Gania from the
time of her illegal dismissal until she was ordered
reinstated by the CSC as Director II of MSU on 8 March
2001, but excluded the period after the CSC had ordered
MSU to admit Gania back to work since the damages she
suffered for that period were chargeable in the proper
forum against the MSU President who in bad faith refused
to abide by the relevant CSC resolutions. On 3 January
2003 the OSG filed the present petition for review under
Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, allegedly in behalf
of the Chairman and Commissioners of the CSC.
Issues:
Whether the Court can still take jurisdiction of the
issue of backwages even if Gania had lost the right to
ask for the modification of CSC Resolution 01-0558
dated 8 March 2001 and to demand compensation for
her back salaries and other benefits.
Whether Gania is entitled to receive back salaries and
other benefits for the period that she was illegally
dismissed.
Ruling:
There are special circumstances in accordance
with the tenets of justice and fair play that warrant such
liberal attitude on the part of the CSC and a
compassionate like-minded discernment by this Court. To
begin with, Gania was consistently denied reinstatement
by the responsible officers of MSU and vehemently barred
from resuming her previous position. The first order for
her return to work was issued on 8 March 2001 which
was followed by repeated personal appeals for the
immediate execution of the CSC resolution. Thereafter,
when Gania was still forced out of work, the CSC issued
its second and third orders on 19 July 2001 and 4
October 2001, respectively, for the President of MSU to
restore her to the item from which she was illegally
dismissed. As these private requests and official
directives were cruelly rejected by her employer and the
period of her unemployment was unduly prolonged,
Gania had no choice and was compelled to ask for back
salaries and other benefits to offset the callous
repudiation of what was due her. To prevent Gania from
claiming back wages would leave incomplete the redress
Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!
of the illegal dismissal that had been done to her and
amount to endorsing the wrongful refusal of her
employer or whoever was accountable to reinstate her. A
too-rigid application of the pertinent provisions of the
Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service as well as the Rules of Court will not be
given premium where it would obstruct rather than serve
the broader interests of justice in the light of the
prevailing circumstances in the case under consideration.
There is more than substantial evidence
in the record consisting of the general payroll and
attendance sheets to prove that Gadia assumed and
exercised the functions of Director II and Manila
Information and Liaisoning Officer at MSU as early as
June 1995 after the MSU Board of Regents approved her
permanent appointment which was issued earlier on 10
April 1995. It cannot be refuted that in September 1998
she was terminated from the service on the alleged
ground of expiration of her term and stopped from
performing the functions of her position, and
subsequently reinstated to her job upon the declaration
of the CSC that her dismissal from the service was illegal.
Clearly, the CSC gravely erred when thereafter it ruled
that Gania did not actually assume and perform the
duties of her position so as to deprive her of back wages
and other benefits. As held in Gabriel v. Domingo, an
illegally dismissed government employee who is later
ordered reinstated is entitled to back wages and other
monetary benefits from the time of his illegal dismissal
up to his reinstatement. This is only fair and sensible
because an employee who is reinstated after having been
illegally dismissed is considered as not having left his
office and should be given a comparable compensation at
the time of his reinstatement. Gania cannot be faulted for
her inability to work or to render any service from the
time she was illegally dismissed up to the time of her
reinstatement. The policy of “no work, no pay” cannot be
applied to her, for such distressing state of affairs was
not of her own making or liking even as her family
suffered tremendously as a consequence of her removal
and while she was jobless. Verily, to withhold her back
salaries and other benefits during her illegal dismissal
would put to naught the constitutional guarantee of
security of tenure for those in the civil service. However,
MSU cannot be made to pay all accruing back salaries
and other benefits in favor of Gania. MSU as a
government institution must compensate Gania with back
salaries and other benefits only from the time of her
illegal dismissal, which according to the case record
began sometime in October 1998, until the motion for
reconsideration of the MSU was denied and a writ of
execution for Gania’s reinstatement as Director II and
Manila Information and Liaisoning Officer was issued. The
reckoning period is not 8 March 2001 as determined by
the appellate court but 19 July 2001 when CSC
Resolution 01-1225 was promulgated wherein the motion
for reconsideration of the MSU was denied with finality
and the latter was explicitly commanded to allow Gania
to assume and exercise the functions of Director II and
Manila Information and Liaisoning Officer. For, a final
decision of the CSC is immediately executory unless a
motion for reconsideration is filed in the meantime. The
back wages and other benefits accruing after 19 July
2001 are to be treated separately since they must be
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collected in the proper forum wherein the assertions of
malice and ill will in the failure to reinstate Gania to her
post are threshed out and the concerned parties given
the full opportunity to be heard. Until such separate
proceeding has been instituted and decided, it is
premature to fix the liability for this portion of Gania’s
back wages and other benefits upon either the
government as represented by MSU or the accountable
officers thereof.
ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC (IDCP) vs. Office of the Executive Secretary, et
al (2003)
Facts:
Petitioner IDCP, a corporation that operates
under DSWD, is a non-governmental organization that
extends voluntary services to the Filipino people,
especially to Muslim communities. Among the functions
petitioner carries out is to conduct seminars, orient
manufacturers on halal food and issue halal certifications
to qualified products and manufacturers. On October 26,
2001, respondent Office of the Executive Secretary
issued EO 46 5 creating the Philippine Halal Certification
Scheme and designating respondent Office on Muslim
Affairs (OMA) to oversee its implementation. Under the
EO, respondent OMA has the exclusive authority to issue
halal certificates and perform other related regulatory
activities. Petitioner contends that the subject EO violates
the constitutional provision on the separation of Church
and State and that it is unconstitutional for the
government to formulate policies and guidelines on the
halal certification scheme because said scheme is a
function only religious organizations, entity or scholars
can lawfully and validly perform for the Muslims.
Issues:
Whether the EO is violates the constitutional provision
as to freedom of religion
Ruling:
The Court grants the petition. OMA deals with
the societal, legal, political and economic concerns of the
Muslim community as a "national cultural community"
and not as a religious group. Thus, bearing in mind the
constitutional barrier between the Church and State, the
latter must make sure that OMA does not intrude into
purely religious matters lest it violate the non-
establishment clause and the "free exercise of religion"
provision found in Article III, Section 5 of the 1987
Constitution. Freedom of religion was accorded preferred
status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this
Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well
aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest
possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to
believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs,
and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent
with the liberty of others and with the common good."
Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a
religious function because the standards used are drawn
from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the
exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46
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encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim
organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino
Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim
consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of
issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect forced
Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an
and Sunnah on halal food. Only the prevention of an
immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare
of the community can justify the infringement of religious
freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness
and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is
constitutionally unacceptable. In a society with a
democratic framework like ours, the State must minimize
its interference with the affairs of its citizens and instead
allow them to exercise reasonable freedom of personal
and religious activity. There is no compelling justification
for the government to deprive Muslim organizations, like
herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a
product as halal, even on the premise that the health of
Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning
to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certifications.
The protection and promotion of the Muslim Filipinos'
right to health are already provided for in existing laws
and ministered to by government agencies charged with
ensuring that food products released in the market are fit
for human consumption, properly labeled and safe. Unlike
EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the religious
freedom of Muslims. With these regulatory bodies given
detailed functions on how to screen and check the quality
and safety of food products, the perceived danger against
the health of Muslim and non-Muslim Filipinos alike is
totally avoided. The halal certifications issued by
petitioner and similar organizations come forward as the
official religious approval of a food product fit for Muslim
consumption. The petition is GRANTED. Executive Order
46, s. 2000, is hereby declared NULL AND VOID.
JUDGE MARIANO JOAQUIN S. MACIAS vs. MARGIE
CORPUS MACIAS (2003)
Facts:
Judge Mariano Joaquin S. Macias (herein
petitioner)filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch
11,Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, a petition
fordeclaration of nullity of marriage against MargieCorpus
Macias-service of summons thyough publication
innewspapers in Dapitan and Dipolog. Instead of
ananswer respondent, through counsel, on April 10,2001,
filed a motion to dismiss the petition. On April19, 2001,
the trial court issued an Order denyingrespondent’s
motion to dismiss. Incidentally, in thesame Order, the
trial court granted respondent’srequest (via long distance
telephone call) to set thehearing on April 30, 2001-April
30 hearing was cancelled and moved to May 2and 3,2001.
but petitioner received notice only onMay 8.. Thus, when
the case was called for hearingas scheduled, respondent
and counsel, not beingduly notified, did not appear.
Surprisingly, the trialcourt allowed the petitioner to
present his evidence
ex parte-On May 5, 2001, respondent still
unaware that thecase had been submitted for decision,
filed a motionfor reconsideration of the Order dated April
19, 2001denying her motion to dismiss. The trial
court merely noted the motion for reconsideration in
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hisOrder dated May 16, 2001.-May 18, 2001, respondent filed
with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with
prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or awrit of preliminary injunction challenging the
trialcourt’s Order dated April 19, 2001 which denied
her motion to dismiss; and Order dated April 30,
2001cancelling the April 30, 2001 hearing and resetting
it on May 2 and 3, 2001.-Acting thereon, the Court of
Appeals, in a Resolutiondated May 23, 2001, enjoined the
trial court fromconducting further proceedings in Civil
Case No. S-695.Meanwhile, on May 15, 2001 the trial court
rendered its Decision declaring the nullity of the marriage
between the parties on the ground of
psychologicalincapacity on the part of herein respondent
-July 13, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered a
Decision granting respondent’s petition for
certioraristating: “Petitioner had until April 16, 2001
within which to file a ‘Motion to Dismiss’ under Section
1,Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure or file an
Answer to the complaint. However, she opted to file on
April 10, 2001, a ‘Motion to Dismiss,’ instead of filing an
Answer to the complaint. The filing of said motion
suspended the period for her to file herAnswer to the
complaint. Until said motion isr esolved by the
Respondent Court with finality, itbehooved the
Respondent Court to suspend thehearings of the case on
the merits… What is so triteis that the Respondent Court
violated its own Orderdated February 27, 2001, declaring
that the hearing of the case on its merits will ensue only
after thePetitioner shall have filed her ‘Answer’ to
thecomplaint”
Issues:
WON the CA erred in nullifying the orders of the trial
court.
Ruling:
No.
-the trial court did not observe the rudimentary
principle of due process enshrined in our Constitution.
Neither did it comply with pertinent procedural rules.-the
trial court, without even waiting for respondent’s motion
for reconsideration of the April 19, 2001Order denying
her motion to dismiss, hurriedly setthe case for hearing.
Also, without allowing therespondent to file her answer to
the petition and
knowing there was no joinder of issues as yet,
thetrial court hastily authorized petitioner to present
hisevidence
ex-parte
-Pursuant to Section 3 (e), Rule 9 of the 1997
Rulesof Civil Procedure, as amended, where the
defendingparty fails to file his or her answer to the
petition, thetrial court should order the prosecutor to
intervenefor the State by conducting an investigation
todetermine whether or not there was collusionbetween
the parties. Here, the trial courtdisregarded such
procedure-As stated at the outset, respondent received
thenotice of hearing only on May 8, 2001. So how
couldshe be present in court on May 2 and 3-
In Uy vs. Court of Appeals
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, we ruled that “(a)decision is void for lack of
due process if, as a result,a party (as in this case) is
deprived of theopportunity of being heard-Indeed, in
depriving respondent her constitutionaland procedural
right to due process, the trial courtgravely abused its
discretion. It is, therefore,imperative that the instant
case for declaration of nullity of marriage be litigated
anew in accordance with the Rules.
MACALINTAL VS. COMELEC, ROMULO, and
BONCODIN (2003)
Facts:
Petitioner Macalintal files a petition for certiorari
and prohibition, seeking a declaration that certain
provisions of R.A. No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003) are unconstitutional. The Court
upholds petitioner’s right to file the instant petition,
stating in essence that the petitioner has seriously and
convincingly presented an issue of transcendental
significance to the Filipino people, considering that public
funds are to be used and appropriated for the
implementation of said law.
(1) That Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 ing the
registration of voters who are immigrants or permanent
residents in other countries, by their mere act of
executing an affidavit expressing their intention to return
to the Philippines, violates the residency requirement in
Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution;
(2) That Section 18.5 of the same law
empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning
candidates for national offices and party list
representatives, including the President and the Vice-
President, violates the constitutional mandate under Art.
VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution that the winningcandidates
for President and Vice-President shall be proclaimed as
winners only by Congress; and
(3) That Section 25 of the same law, allowing
Congress (through the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee created in the same section) to exercise the
power to review, revise, amend, and approve the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) that the
COMELEC shall promulgate, violates the independence of
the COMELEC under Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
Issues:
1) Whether or not Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 is
violative of Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
2) Whether or not Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is
violative of Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution.
3) Whether or not Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189 is
violative of Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
Ruling:
1) NO. Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 is not
violative of Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
2) YES. Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189, with
respect only to the votes of the President and Vice-
President, and not to the votes of the Senators and
party-list representatives, is violative of Art. VII, Sec. 4
of the Constitution.
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3) YES. Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189, with
respect only to the second sentence in its second
paragraph allowing Congress to exercise the power to
review, revise, amend, and approve the IRR that the
COMELEC shall promulgate, is violative of Art. IX-A, Sec.
1 of the Constitution.
PCIB v. CA (G. R. Nos. 121413 and 121479 & G. R.
No. 128604)
Facts:
This case is composed of three consolidated
petitions involving several checks, payable to the Bureau
of Internal Revenue, but was embezzled allegedly by an
organized syndicate.
I. G. R. Nos. 121413 and 121479
On October 19, 1977, plaintiff Ford issued a
Citibank check amounting to P4,746,114.41 in favor of
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for the payment of
manufacturer’s taxes. The check was deposited with
defendant IBAA (now PCIB), subsequently cleared the the
Central Bank, and paid by Citibank to IBAA. The proceeds
never reached BIR, so plaintiff was compelled to make a
second payment. Defendant refused to reimburse plaintiff,
and so the latter filed a complaint. An investigation
revealed that the check was recalled by Godofredo Rivera,
the general ledger accountant of Ford, and was replaced
by a manager’s check. Alleged members of a syndicate
deposited the two manager’s checks with Pacific Banking
Corporation. Ford filed a third party complaint against
Rivera and PBC. The case against PBC was dismissed.
The case against Rivera was likewise dismissed because
summons could not be served. The trial court held
Citibank and PCIB jointly and severally liable to Ford, but
the Court of Appeals only held PCIB liable.
II. G. R. No. 128604
Ford drew two checks in favor of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, amounting to
P5,851,706.37 and P6,311,591.73. Both are crossed
checks payable to payee’s account only. The checks
never reached BIR, so plaintiff was compelled to make
second payments. Plaintiff instituted an action for
recovery against PCIB and Citibank.
On investigation of NBI, the modus operandi
was discovered. Gorofredo Rivera made the checks but
instead of delivering them to BIR, passed it to Castro,
who was the manager of PCIB San Andres. Castro
opened a checking account in the name of a fictitious
person “Reynaldo Reyes”. Castro deposited a worthless
Bank of America check with the same amount as that
issued by Ford. While being routed to the Central Bank
for clearing, the worthless check was replaced by the
genuine one from Ford.
The trial court absolved PCIB and held Citibank
liable, which decision was affirmed in toto by the Court of
Appeals.
Issues:
(1) Whether there is contributory negligence on the
part of Ford
(2) Has petitioner Ford the right to recover from the
collecting bank (PCIBank) and the drawee bank
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(Citibank) the value of the checks intended as payment
to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue?
Ruling:
(1) The general rule is that if the master is
injured by the negligence of a third person and by the
concuring contributory negligence of his own servant or
agent, the latter's negligence is imputed to his superior
and will defeat the superior's action against the third
person, asuming, of course that the contributory
negligence was the proximate cause of the injury of
which complaint is made. As defined, proximate cause is
that which, in the natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause produces
the injury and without the result would not have occurred.
It appears that although the employees of Ford initiated
the transactions attributable to an organized syndicate, in
our view, their actions were not the proximate cause of
encashing the checks payable to the CIR. The degree of
Ford's negligence, if any, could not be characterized as
the proximate cause of the injury to the parties. The
mere fact that the forgery was committed by a drawer-
payor's confidential employee or agent, who by virtue of
his position had unusual facilities for perpertrating the
fraud and imposing the forged paper upon the bank, does
notentitle the bank toshift the loss to the drawer-payor,
in the absence of some circumstance raising estoppel
against the drawer. This rule likewise applies to the
checks fraudulently negotiated or diverted by the
confidential employees who hold them in their possession.
(2) We have to scrutinize, separately, PCIBank's
share of negligence when the syndicate achieved its
ultimate agenda of stealing the proceeds of these checks.
a. G. R. Nos. 121413 and 121479
On record, PCIBank failed to verify the authority
of Mr. Rivera to negotiate the checks. The neglect of
PCIBank employees to verify whether his letter
requesting for the replacement of the Citibank Check No.
SN-04867 was duly authorized, showed lack of care and
prudence required in the circumstances. Furthermore, it
was admitted that PCIBank is authorized to collect the
payment of taxpayers in behalf of the BIR. As an agent of
BIR, PCIBank is duty bound to consult its principal
regarding the unwarranted instructions given by the
payor or its agent. It is a well-settled rule that the
relationship between the payee or holder of commercial
paper and the bank to which it is sent for collection is, in
the absence of an argreement to the contrary, that of
principal and agent. A bank which receives such paper for
collection is the agent of the payee or holder.
Indeed, the crossing of the check with the
phrase "Payee's Account Only," is a warning that the
check should be deposited only in the account of the CIR.
Thus, it is the duty of the collecting bank PCIBank to
ascertain that the check be deposited in payee's account
only. Therefore, it is the collecting bank (PCIBank) which
is bound to scrutinize the check and to know its
depositors before it could make the clearing indorsement
"all prior indorsements and/or lack of indorsement
guaranteed".
Lastly, banking business requires that the one
who first cashes and negotiates the check must take
some precautions to learn whether or not it is genuine.
And if the one cashing the check through indifference or
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other circumstance assists the forger in committing the
fraud, he should not be permitted to retain the proceeds
of the check from the drawee whose sole fault was that it
did not discover the forgery or the defect in the title of
the person negotiating the instrument before paying the
check. For this reason, a bank which cashes a check
drawn upon another bank, without requiring proof as to
the identity of persons presenting it, or making inquiries
with regard to them, cannot hold the proceeds against
the drawee when the proceeds of the checks were
afterwards diverted to the hands of a third party. In such
cases the drawee bank has a right to believe that the
cashing bank (or the collecting bank) had, by the usual
proper investigation, satisfied itself of the authenticity of
the negotiation of the checks. Thus, one who encashed a
check which had been forged or diverted and in turn
received payment thereon from the drawee, is guilty of
negligence which proximately contributed to the success
of the fraud practiced on the drawee bank. The latter
may recover from the holder the money paid on the
check.
b. G. R. No. 128604
In this case, there was no evidence presented
confirming the conscious participation of PCIBank in the
embezzlement. As a general rule, however, a banking
corporation is liable for the wrongful or tortuous acts and
declarations of its officers or agents within the course and
scope of their employment. A bank will be held liable for
the negligence of its officers or agents when acting within
the course and scope of their employment. It may be
liable for the tortuous acts of its officers even as regards
that species of tort of which malice is an essential
element. In this case, we find a situation where the
PCIBank appears also to be the victim of the scheme
hatched by a syndicate in which its own management
employees had participated. But in this case,
responsibility for negligence does not lie on PCIBank's
shoulders alone.
Citibank failed to notice and verify the absence
of the clearing stamps. For this reason, Citibank had
indeed failed to perform what was incumbent upon it,
which is to ensure that the amount of the checks should
be paid only to its designated payee. The point is that as
a business affected with public interest and because of
the nature of its functions, the bank is under obligation to
treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care,
always having in mind the fiduciary nature of their
relationship. Thus, invoking the doctrine of comparative
negligence, we are of the view that both PCIBank and
Citibank failed in their respective obligations and both
were negligent in the selection and supervision of their
employees resulting in the encashment of Citibank Check
Nos. SN 10597 AND 16508. Thus, we are constrained to
hold them equally liable for the loss of the proceeds of
said checks issued by Ford in favor of the CIR.
PEOPLE VS. FERRER [48 SCRA 382; NOS.L-32613-
14; 27 DEC 1972]
Facts:
Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge
that declared RA1700 or the Anti-Subversive Act of 1957
as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of
subversion against the following: 1.) Feliciano Co for
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being an officer/leader of the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP) aggravated by circumstances of
contempt and insult to public officers, subversion by a
band and aid of armed men to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo
Tayag and 5 others, for being members/leaders of the
NPA, inciting, instigating people to unite and overthrow
the Philippine Government. Attended by Aggravating
Circumstances of Aid or Armed Men, Craft, and Fraud.
The trial court is of opinion that 1.) The Congress
usurped the powers of the judge 2.) Assumed judicial
magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without
any forms of safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a
presumption of organizational guilt by being members of
the CPP regardless of voluntariness.
The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved
20June1957. It is an act to outlaw the CPP and similar
associations penalizing membership therein, and for
other purposes. It defined the Communist Party being
although a political party is in fact an organized
conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not only by
force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and
other illegal means. It declares that the CPP is a clear
and present danger to the security of the Philippines.
Section 4 provided that affiliation with full knowledge of
the illegal acts of the CPP is punishable. Section 5 states
that due investigation by a designated prosecutor by the
Secretary of Justice be made prior to filing of information
in court. Section 6 provides for penalty for furnishing
false evidence. Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses in open
court for acts penalized by prision mayor to death.
Section 8 allows the renunciation of membership to the
CCP through writing under oath. Section 9 declares the
constitutionality of the statute and its valid exercise
under freedom if thought, assembly and association.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex
post facto law.
(2) Whether or Not RA1700 violates freedom of
expression.
Ruling:
The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-
Subversion Act of 1957.
A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes
without the benefit of the trial. It is the substitution of
judicial determination to a legislative determination of
guilt. In order for a statute be measured as a bill of
attainder, the following requisites must be present: 1.)
The statute specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute is
applied retroactively and reach past conduct. (A bill of
attainder relatively is also an ex post facto law.)
In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as
an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the
Government for purposes of example of SECTION 4 of
the Act. The Act applies not only to the CPP but also to
other organizations having the same purpose and their
successors. The Act’s focus is on the conduct not person.
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Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it
must be shown that membership was acquired with the
intent to further the goals of the organization by overt
acts. This is the element of MEMBERSHIP with
KNOWLEDGE that is punishable. This is the required
proof of a member’s direct participation. Why is
membership punished. Membership renders aid and
encouragement to the organization. Membership makes
himself party to its unlawful acts.
Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature.
Section 4 prohibits acts committed after approval of the
act. The members of the subversive organizations before
the passing of this Act is given an opportunity to escape
liability by renouncing membership in accordance with
Section 8. The statute applies the principle of mutatis
mutandis or that the necessary changes having been
made.
The declaration of that the CPP is an organized
conspiracy to overthrow the Philippine Government
should not be the basis of guilt. This declaration is only a
basis of Section 4 of the Act. The EXISTENCE OF
SUBSTANTIVE EVIL justifies the limitation to the exercise
of “Freedom of Expression and Association” in this matter.
Before the enactment of the statute and statements in
the preamble, careful investigations by the Congress
were done. The court further stresses that whatever
interest in freedom of speech and association is excluded
in the prohibition of membership in the CPP are weak
considering NATIONAL SECURITY and PRESERVATION of
DEMOCRACY.
The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the
prosecution under RA1700. In addition to proving
circumstances/ evidences of subversion, the following
elements must also be established:
1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be
proven that the organization purpose is to overthrow the
present Government of the Philippines and establish a
domination of a FOREIGN POWER. Membership is willfully
and knowingly done by overt acts.
2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its
subversive purpose. Membership is willfully and
knowingly done by overt acts.
The court did not make any judgment on the crimes of
the accused under the Act. The Supreme Court set aside
the resolution of the TRIAL COURT.
SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. ET AL. V.
NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
(NTC) (2003)
Facts:
The NTC issued Billing Circular 13-6-2000 which
promulgated rules and regulations on the billing of
telecommunications services. Petitioners filed with the
RTC a petition to declare the circular as unconstitutional.
A motion to dismiss was filed by the NTC on the ground
of petitioner’s to exhaust administrative remedies. The
RTC denied the motion to dismiss but on certiorari, the
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CA reversed RTC.
Ruling:
1. Administrative bodies had (a) quasi-
legislative or rule-making powers and (b) quasi-judicial
or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative
or rule-making power is the power to make rules and
regulations which results in delegated legislation that is
within the confines of the granting statute and the
doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.
To be valid, such rules and regulations must conform to,
and be consistent with, the provisions of enabling statute.
Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the
power to hear and determine questions of fact to which
the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in
accordance with the standards laid down by law itself in
enforcing and administering the same law. In carrying
out their quasi-judicial functions, the administrative
officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh
evidence, and draw conclusions from them for their
official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial.
2. The determination of whether a specific rule
or set of rules issued by an administrative body
contravenes the law or the constitution is within the
judicial power as defined by the Constitution which is
“ the duty of the Courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there haw been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.” The
NTC circular was issued pursuant to its quasi-legislative
or rule-making power. Hence, the action must be filed
directly with the regular courts without requiring
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
3. Where the act of administrative agency was
performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function,
exhaustion of administrative remedy is required, before
going to court.
4. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies
only where the administrative agency exercises its quasi-
judicial or adjudicatory function. Thus, in cases involving
specialized disputes, the same must be referred to an
administrative agency of special competence pursuant to
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. This doctrine of
primary jurisdiction applies where the claim requires the
resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme,
has been placed within the special competence of an
administrative body. In such case, the judicial process is
suspended pending referral of such issues to the
administrative body for its view.
Central Pangasinan Electric Cooperative, Inc vs.
Macaraeg G.R. No. 145800 (395 SCRA 720)
Facts:
Respondents are employees of the cooperative
who were dismissed for serious misconduct, and breach
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of trust and confidence reposed on them by management.
The dismissal was due to the misappropriation by
respondents through encashing private checks with funds
from the company. The dismissal was brought before the
labor arbiter who ruled in favor of the respondents,
reinstating the petitioner, in light of the CBA requirement
that dismissal case must go through grievance committee.
The decision of the arbiter was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. Thus, this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the arbiter was correct in ordering the
reinstatement of the respondents.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the issue raised in
the petition pertaining to the alleged violation of the CBA
grievance procedure is moot and academic. The parties’
active participation in the voluntary arbitration
proceedings, and their failure to insist that the case be
remanded to the grievance machinery, shows a clear
intention on their part to have the issue of respondents’
illegal dismissal directly resolved by the voluntary
arbitrator. We therefore find it unnecessary to rule on the
matter in light of their preference to bring the illegal
dismissal dispute to voluntary arbitration without passing
through the grievance machinery.
This leads us to the next issue of whether
respondents were validly dismissed. To constitute a valid
dismissal from employment, two requisites must be met,
namely: (1) it must be for a just or authorized cause,
and (2) the employee must be afforded due process.
We hold that there exist a valid reason to
dismiss both employees. Article 282(c) of the Labor Code
allows an employer to dismiss employees for willful
breach of trust or loss of confidence. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt of their misconduct is not required, it
being sufficient that there is some basis for the same or
that the employer has reasonable ground to believe that
they are responsible for the misconduct and their
participation therein rendered them unworthy of the trust
and confidence demanded of their position. The acts of
the respondents were clearly inimical to the financial
interest of the petitioner.
Nor is there any doubt that petitioner observed
procedural due process in dismissing the respondents.
The respondents were both appraised of the particular
acts or omissions constituting the charges against them.
They gave their own "answer/explanation" to the charges.
They participated in the investigation conducted at
petitioner’s board. They were represented by counsel
during the investigation. Finally, notices were sent to
them, informing them of the basis of their termination. In
fine, private respondents were given due process before
they were dismissed. Time and again, we have stressed
that due process is simply an opportunity to be heard.
Alauya, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections G.R. Nos.
152151-52 (395 SCRA 742)
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Facts:
Petitioner and private respondents are
candidates of the ARMM election for the post of regional
assemblyman. COMELEC declared failure of election for 1
municipality, while respondent Tamano prayed for the
declaration of failure of election on 5 provinces and also
the suspension of the proclamation of winners. Petitioner
filed a motion to dismiss and private respondent
Sarangani filed an answer and opposition to the
suspension. COMELEC issued an order to suspend
proclamation. Thus, a certiorari and prohibition is filed
before the Supreme Court alleging among others
violation of due process for failure of notice of the
suspension of proclamation as required in Section 242 of
the Omnibus Election Code
Issue/s:
Whether or not there was a violation of due process.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that aparty cannot
successfully invoke deprivation of due process if he was
accorded the opportunity of a hearing, through either oral
arguments or pleadings. There is no denial of due
process when a party is given an opportunity through his
pleadings.
We find no breach of Alauya’s right to due
process. Contrary to Alauya’s claim, it appears that
notices were given to all concerned parties requiring
them to file their answer to the petition and setting the
case for. The COMELEC noted that Alauya did not appear
during the hearing. Subsequently, Alauya filed his
Answer with Motion to Dismiss to the petitions. Verily,
Alauya was given an opportunity to be heard during the
hearing held which he failed to attend and was in fact
heard through the pleadings he filed with the COMELEC.
The petition is DISMISSED.
People vs. Ostia G.R. Nos. 131804 (398 SCRA 132)
Facts:
Accused was initially charged of rape with
homicide which he pleaded not guilty. However, after he
was assigned a new counsel, the accused retracted his
previous plea and instead signified intention to plea guilty
for murder. The lower court allowed his change of plea
and informed him that the penalty for murder was
reclusion perpetua to death, two indivisible penalties, and
that the court may impose the death penalty on him
depending on the circumstances found by the trial court.
Indeed the trial court convicted the accused of
murder characterized by three aggravating circumstances.
Issue/s:
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Whether or not the court was correct in convicting the

accused despite the improvident plea of the accused.

Ruling:

The Court is convinced that the trial court failed

to comply with its duties under Section 3, Rule 116 of the
Rules of Court. It bears stressing that accused-appellant
did not even know how to read and write.

The trial court failed to explain to accused-

appellant:
(a) the nature of murder and the elements
thereof;
(b) that killing a four-year old girl, constituted
treachery, a qualifying circumstance; accused-appellant
being unlettered could not be presumed to understand
the requisites of treachery, a highly technical legal term;
(c) the nature and effect of a qualifying
aggravating circumstance in the killing of Beverly and its
effect on the penalty that may be imposed on him;
(d) what heinous crimes are and the meaning
and import of indivisible penalties;
(e) the specific circumstances which may be
considered by the court in the imposition of reclusion
perpetua or death penalty;
(f) whether his plea of guilty after the
prosecution had commenced presenting its evidence may
still be considered by the trial court as a mitigating
circumstance; the nature of civil liabilities that he may be
ordered to pay and the amounts thereof.

The trial court even failed to probe into the

reasons for accused-appellant’s change of plea from "not
guilty" of rape with homicide to "guilty" of murder and for
his failure to adduce evidence during the reinvestigation
of the case despite having been granted the right to do
so by the trial court. The trial court did not even bother
inquiring from accused-appellant whether he sought the
advice of his counsel before pleading guilty to murder
and whether he wanted to adduce evidence in his behalf
to prove any mitigating circumstances in the commission
of the crime to warrant the imposition of the lesser
penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Notwithstanding the improvident plea of guilty of

accused-appellant, this Court finds it unnecessary to
remand the case to the trial court. This is so because
independent of accused-appellant’s plea of guilty and his
testimony admitting liability for Beverly’s death, the
evidence adduced by the prosecution, albeit
circumstantial, established the guilt of accused-appellant
for murder beyond reasonable doubt.

The Supreme Court modified the decision of the

lower court removing the appreciation of qualifying
circumstances as they were not alleged in the information.

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2004
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CHULE Y. LIM,
G.R. No. 153883 January 13, 2004
Facts:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court stemmed from a petition for
correction of entries under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
filed by respondent Chule Y. Lim with the Regional Trial
Court of Lanao del Norte, Branch 4, docketed as Sp. Proc.
No. 4933.
Respondent claimed that she was born on
October 29, 1954 in Buru-an, Iligan City. Her birth was
registered in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte but the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Kauswagan transferred her
record of birth to Iligan City. She alleged that both her
Kauswagan and Iligan City records of birth have four
erroneous entries, and prays that they be corrected.
First, she claims that her surname "Yu" was
misspelled as "Yo". She has been using "Yu" in all her
school records and in her marriage certificate. She
presented a clearance from the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI)3 to further show the consistency in
her use of the surname "Yu".Second, she claims that her
father’s name in her birth record was written as "Yo Diu
To (Co Tian)" when it should have been "Yu Dio To (Co
Tian)."Third, her nationality was entered as Chinese
when it should have been Filipino considering that her
father and mother never got married. Only her deceased
father was Chinese, while her mother is Filipina. She
claims that her being a registered voter attests to the
fact that she is a Filipino citizen.
The trial court granted respondent’s petition.
The Republic of the Philippines appealed the decision to
the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court’s
decision.
Issue/s:
1.) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
ordering the correction of the citizenship of
respondent from “Chinese” to “Filipino” despite
the fact that respondent never demonstrated
any compliance with the legal requirements for
election of citizenship.
2.) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
allowing respondent to continue using her
father’s surname despite its finding that
respondent is an illegitimate child.
Ruling:
It cites Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935
Constitution, which provides that the citizenship of a
legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien
father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon
reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine
citizenship. Likewise, the Republic invokes the provision
in Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625, that
legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect
Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention "in a
Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!
statement to be signed and sworn to by the party
concerned before any officer authorized to administer
oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry.
The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement
with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the
Government of the Philippines." Plainly, the above
constitutional and statutory requirements of electing
Filipino citizenship apply only to legitimate children. As
such, she was not required to comply with said
constitutional and statutory requirements to become a
Filipino citizen. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino
mother, respondent automatically became a Filipino upon
birth.
This notwithstanding, the records show that
respondent elected Filipino citizenship when she reached
the age of majority. She registered as a voter in Misamis
Oriental when she was 18 years old.14 The exercise of
the right of suffrage and the participation in election
exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship.
The Court of Appeals did not allow respondent to
use her father’s surname. What it did allow was the
correction of her father’s misspelled surname which she
has been using ever since she can remember. In this
regard, respondent does not need a court
pronouncement for her to use her father’s surname.To
bar her at this time from using her father’s surname
which she has used for four decades without any known
objection from anybody, would only sow confusion.
Concededly, one of the reasons allowed for changing
one’s name or surname is to avoid confusion.
The instant petition for review is DENIED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68893
dated May 29, 2002, is AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the Civil
Registrar of Iligan City is DIRECTED to make the
following corrections in the birth record of respondent
Chule Y. Lim.
SENATOR ROBERT S. JAWORSKI vs. PHILIPPINE
AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION and
SPORTS AND GAMES ENTERTAINMENT
CORPORATION, G.R. No. 144463 January 14, 2004
Facts:
The instant petition for certiorari and prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to nullify the
"Grant of Authority and Agreement for the Operation of
Sports Betting and Internet Gaming," executed by
respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (hereinafter referred to as PAGCOR) in favor
of respondent Sports and Games and Entertainment
Corporation (also referred to as SAGE).
On March 31, 1998, PAGCOR’s board of directors
approved an instrument denominated as "Grant of
Authority and Agreement for the Operation of Sports
Betting and Internet Gaming", which granted SAGE the
authority to operate and maintain Sports Betting station
in PAGCOR’s casino locations, and Internet Gaming
facilities to service local and international bettors,
provided that to the satisfaction of PAGCOR, appropriate
safeguards and procedures are established to ensure the
integrity and fairness of the games. Pursuant to the
authority granted by PAGCOR, SAGE commenced its
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operations by conducting gambling on the Internet on a
trial-run basis, making pre-paid cards and redemption of
winnings available at various Bingo Bonanza outlets.
Petitioner, in his capacity as member of the
Senate and Chairman of the Senate Committee on
Games, Amusement and Sports, files the instant petition,
praying that the grant of authority by PAGCOR in favor of
SAGE be nullified. He maintains that PAGCOR committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it authorized SAGE to operate gambling
on the internet. He contends that PAGCOR is not
authorized under its legislative franchise, P.D. 1869, to
operate gambling on the internet for the simple reason
that the said decree could not have possibly
contemplated internet gambling since at the time of its
enactment on July 11, 1983 the internet was yet
inexistent and gambling activities were confined
exclusively to real-space.
Issue/s:
1.) Whether or not respondent PAGCOR is
authorized under P.D. 1869 to operate
gambling activities on the internet
2.) Whether PAGCOR acted without or in excess of
its jurisdiction, or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, when it authorized
respondent SAGE to operate internet gambling
on the basis of its right “to operate and
maintain gambling casinos, clubs and other
amusement places under Section 10 of P.D.
1869
Ruling:
Considering that the instant petition involves
legal questions that may have serious implications on
public interests, we rule that petitioner has the requisite
legal standing to file this petition.
A legislative franchise is a special privilege
granted by the state to corporations. It is a privilege of
public concern which cannot be exercised at will and
pleasure, but should be reserved for public control and
administration, either by the government directly, or by
public agents, under such conditions and regulations as
the government may impose on them in the interest of
the public. After a circumspect consideration of the
foregoing discussion and the contending positions of the
parties, we hold that PAGCOR has acted beyond the
limits of its authority when it passed on or shared its
franchise to SAGE.
In the case at bar, PAGCOR executed an
agreement with SAGE whereby the former grants the
latter the authority to operate and maintain sports
betting stations and Internet gaming operations. In
essence, the grant of authority gives SAGE the privilege
to actively participate, partake and share PAGCOR’s
franchise to operate a gambling activity. The grant of
franchise is a special privilege that constitutes a right and
a duty to be performed by the grantee. The grantee must
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not perform its activities arbitrarily and whimsically but
must abide by the limits set by its franchise and strictly
adhere to its terms and conditionalities.
While PAGCOR is allowed under its charter to
enter into operator’s and/or management contracts, it is
not allowed under the same charter to relinquish or share
its franchise, much less grant a veritable franchise to
another entity such as SAGE. PAGCOR can not delegate
its power in view of the legal principle of delegata
potestas delegare non potest, inasmuch as there is
nothing in the charter to show that it has been expressly
authorized to do so.
The instant petition is GRANTED. The "Grant of
Authority and Agreement to Operate Sports Betting and
Internet Gaming" executed by PAGCOR in favor of SAGE
is declared NULL and VOID.
DORCAS G. PETALLAR vs. JUDGE JUANILLO M.
PULLOS, MCTC, SAN FRANCISCO, SURIGAO DEL NORTE,
[A.M. No. MTJ-03-1484. January 15, 2004]
Facts:
In a complaint-affidavit dated February 7, 2002,
Judge Juanillo M. Pullos, former presiding judge of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of San Francisco, Surigao del
Norte, stands charged by complainant Dorcas G. Petallar
of violating Canon 1, Rule 1.02 and Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct; as well as Rule 140, Section
4 and Rule 70, Sections 10 and 11 of the Rules of Court;
for undue delay in rendering a decision in Case No. 137
for Forcible Entry.
For his part, respondent judge in his comment,
by way of 2nd Indorsement dated August 6, 2002, stated
that he handed down his decision in Case No. 137 on
June 2, 2002. He pointed out that said decision is, in fact,
the subject of an appeal. Respondent submitted that the
charges against him had become moot.
The Office of the Court Administrator observed
that said decision was rendered out of time, in breach of
Rule 70, Section 11 of the Rules of Court, which
mandates that judgment must be rendered within thirty
(30) days after receipt of the affidavits and position
papers or the expiration of the period for filing the same.
On March 30, 2003, respondent retired from the
judiciary
Issue/s:
Whether or not respondent violated Rule 70, Sec. 11 of
the Rules of Court for undue delay in rendering
judgment.
Ruling:
Respondent indeed violated Rule 70, Section 11
of the Rules of Court for undue delay in rendering
judgment. The records show that the parties in Special
Civil Action Case No. 137 had filed their respective
position papers as early as February 2, 2000. Thus,
respondent had until March 4, 2000 to render judgment.
Had there been circumstances which prevented him from
handing down his decision within the prescribed period,
respondent should have at least requested from this
Court for an extension of time within which to render
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judgment. As respondent himself admitted, Case No. 137
was decided only on June 2, 2002 or two (2) years and
some three (3) months beyond the reglementary period.
Moreover, he could not even come up with an
explanation for the delay.
We cannot overemphasize the Court’s policy on
prompt resolution of disputes. Justice delayed is justice
denied. Failure to resolve cases submitted for decision
within the period fixed by law constitutes a serious
violation of Article III, Section 16 of the Constitution.
Respondent Judge Juanillo M. Pullos, former
presiding judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of San
Francisco, Surigao del Norte, is found LIABLE for undue
delay in rendering a decision in Case No. 137,
tantamount to GROSS INEFFICIENCY. He is hereby
ORDERED to pay a FINE of P10,000.00 to be deducted
from his retirement pay and benefits.
SHOPPES MANILA, INC., vs. THE HON. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER
ERMITA ABRASALDO-CUYUCA and LORIE TORNO,
G.R. No. 147125 January 14, 2004
Facts:
The petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged
in garments manufacturing using the brand name
"KAMISETA." On May 6, 1994, the petitioner employed
private respondent Lorie Torno as trimmer. Sometime
thereafter, the petitioner started to receive information
from the head of its production department that,
according to other employees, Buan and the private
respondent had been stealing "KAMISETA" items from the
factory. The petitioner had the witnesses interviewed.
Susan Paligamba and Loly dela Cruz, co-employees of
Buan and the private respondent, executed unverified
statements implicating the latter. During the said
inspection, the representatives found the following items:
KAMISETA fabrics (approx. 1¼ yds), 2 pcs. shirts made
out of KAMISETA excess cuttings, NAUTICAL SHOP wall
paper.
The private respondent failed to appear during
the scheduled hearing. Consequently, the petitioner
decided to dismiss the private respondent from her
employment. When notified of the petitioner’s decision,
the private respondent filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal with prayer for reinstatement and payment of
backwages, non-payment of service incentive leave pay
and 13th-month pay against the petitioner before the
National Capital Regional Arbitration Branch of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The
petitioner filed a motion for the labor arbiter to conduct a
formal investigation on its claim. Acting on the motion,
LA Tumanong granted the same and set the case for
hearing. In the meantime, LA Tumanong was replaced by
Labor Arbiter Ermita Abrasaldo-Cuyuca (LA Cuyuca for
brevity) who issued an order declaring that the case was
submitted for decision. The petitioner filed a As stated by the CA, the petitioner had failed to
manifestation and motion informing LA Cuyuca that a
formal hearing had been set by LA Tumanong and
requested that the case be set for hearing anew.
However, no action was taken by LA Cuyuca on the said
motion.
Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!
LA Cuyuca rendered a decision holding that the
respondent was illegally dismissed and directed the
petitioner to pay P62,530 as backwages and P19,240 as
separation pay to the private respondent. LA Cuyuca
declared that the private respondent was denied of her
right to due process before she was dismissed from her
employment and that the petitioner failed to show that it
notified the private respondent of the charges against her.
Aggrieved, the petitioner appealed the decision
to the NLRC, alleging that it was deprived of its right to a
formal hearing before the labor arbiter rendered her
decision. The NLRC issued a resolution dismissing the
appeal. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals. The
CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the NLRC.
The petitioner forthwith filed the instant petition.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
finding that the absence of a formal hearing did
not amount to a denial of petitioner’s right to
due process
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the illegality of private respondent’s
dismissal despite the existence of just causes in
support thereof
Ruling:
The petition is barren of merit. Petitioner did not
have a vested right to a formal hearing simply and
merely because Labor Arbiter Tumanong granted its
motion and set the case for hearing. Pursuant to Section
5, Rule V of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC,the
labor arbiter has the authority to determine whether or
not there is a necessity to conduct formal hearings in
cases brought before him for adjudication. The holding of
a formal hearing or trial is discretionary with the labor
arbiter and is something that the parties cannot demand
as a matter of right. It is entirely within his authority to
decide a labor case before him, based on the position
papers and supporting documents of the parties, without
a trial or formal hearing. The requirements of due
process are satisfied when the parties are given the
opportunity to submit position papers wherein they are
supposed to attach all the documents that would prove
their claim in case it be decided that no hearing should
be conducted or was necessary.
Similarly, we affirm the finding of the CA that
the private respondent was illegally dismissed. In order
to effect a valid dismissal, the law requires that (a) there
be just and valid cause as provided under Article 282 of
the Labor Code; and (b) the employee be afforded an
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.
show that it had complied with the two-notice
requirement: (a) a written notice containing a statement
of the cause for the termination to afford the employee
ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself with
the assistance of his representative, if he so desires; (b)
if the employer decides to terminate the services of the
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employee, the employer must notify him in writing of the
decision to dismiss him, stating clearly the reason
therefore.
The petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FRANCO
BALLESTER, [G.R. No. 152279. January 20, 2004]
Facts:
Appellant Franco Ballester was charged with
Rape before the Regional Trial Court of Ligao, Albay,
Branch 13, in Criminal Case No. 4038. That on the third
week of January, 1999, at noontime, at Barangay
Catumag, Municipality of Guinobatan, Province of Albay,
Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable court,
the above-named accused, with lewd and unchaste
design, by means of force, threat and intimidation and
while armed with a knife did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with
(sic) MARICEL ODOÑO, 12 years of age, against her will
and consent, to her damage and prejudice. On
arraignment, appellant pleaded “not guilty” to the crime
charged.
On December 14, 2001, the trial court rendered
judgment finding appellant guilty as charged and
sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death
there being no mitigating circumstance but with the
presence of one aggravating circumstance of dwelling. In
his Brief, appellant assails his conviction.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the Trial Court erred in giving full
weight to the testimony of the offended party and in
not giving full weight and credence to the denial and
alibi of the accused and his witnesses
Ruling:
A truth-telling witness is not always expected to
give an error-free testimony, considering the lapse of
time and the treachery of human memory. Thus we have
followed the rule in accord with human nature and
experience that honest inconsistencies on minor and
trivial matters serve to strengthen, rather than destroy,
the credibility of a witness, especially of witnesses to
crimes which shock the conscience and numb the senses.
More importantly, the alleged inconsistencies referred to
by the defense pertain to matters extraneous to the
crime of rape that do not detract from the fact that the
offended party had indeed been sexually defiled.
The defense of alibi and denial interposed by
appellant must likewise fail. For alibi to serve as a basis
of acquittal it must be established with clear and
convincing evidence, with the requisites of time and place
strictly observed. Where the accused fails to convincingly
show that it was physically impossible for him to be at
the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, as
in the instant case, alibi must altogether be rejected.
In imposing the maximum penalty of death, the
trial court took into account the absence of a mitigating
circumstance and the presence of one aggravating
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circumstance of dwelling. This is clearly erroneous. Not
being alleged in the Information, dwelling cannot be
properly considered in determining the imposable
penalty. Indeed, it would be a denial of appellant’s right
to be informed of the charges against him which would
amount to a denial of due process if he were to be meted
the death penalty on the basis of a qualifying
circumstance not alleged in the information. Rule 110,
Section 8 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended, provides that the complaint or information
shall state the designation of the offense given in the
statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the
offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstance.
When, as in this case, neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstance attended the commission of
the crime, the minimum penalty, i.e. reclusion perpetua,
should be the penalty imposable pursuant to Article 63 of
the Revised Penal Code.
Franco Ballester is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. As modified, appellant is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and is further
ordered to INDEMNIFY the victim the reduced sum of
P50,00.00 as civil indemnity, in addition to P50,000.00 as
moral damages.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS (FOURTH DIVISION), CLAUDIO
FRANCISCO, JR. and RUDY PACAO, G.R. No.
142051 February 24, 2004
Facts:
Claudio Francisco, Rudy Pacao, Capt. Rodolfo
Malbarosa, Pfc. Catalino Bonganay, Sgt. Roberto Cana,
Sgt. Virgilio Azucena, Sgt. Nathaniel Interino, Pat. David
Valenciano, Pat. Cesar Quiambao, Joseph Pellas, and
Gabriel Alosan were charged with Murder for the fatal
shooting of one Marcial "Boyet" Azada.
That on or about 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon of
December 2, 1989, inside the Le Janni Restaurantthe
above named accused conniving, confederating and
helping one another, moved by one common interest and
design to kill, did then and there with Pat. Pacao, using
his service pistol caliber .38 TM Squire Bingham and
accused Claudio "Danny" Francisco, Jr. likewise using a
gun TM Smith and Wesson, caliber .38 revolver with
Serial No. 11327, with treachery shot one Marcial "Boyet"
Azada y Garza while the latter had both arms raised and
his back was turned against accused Pat. Rudy Pacao a
means employed and consciously adopted by both
accused to ensure the death of said Marcial "Boyet"
Azada without danger to their persons and thereafter
with criminal intent and design to conceal his (Pacao)
criminal act did knowingly and willfully altered, tampered
and/or attempted to destroy his service pistol, while
accused Francisco did knowingly and deliberately planted
the gun he used in shooting his victim on the latter’s
(Azada) body, all of said acts of the herein accused were
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done with the sole aim and purpose to conceal and
mislead the authorities as to the authorship of the crime.
In a decision dated February 7, 1994, the court
a quo exonerated accused Pellas and Alosan and
convicted respondents Francisco Jr. and Pacao for
homicide and attempted murder. On appeal, the trial
court’s decision was reversed and respondents Francisco
and Pacao were acquitted of the crime charged.
In absolving respondent Pacao of any culpability,
the Court of Appeals found that Azada, instead of
surrendering peacefully to the apprehending police
officers, resisted arrest and fired his gun towards their
direction. Respondent Pacao was therefore acting in self-
defense and in fulfillment of his duty as a police officer
when he returned fire at the victim.
The prosecution, represented by the Office of
the Solicitor General, vehemently challenges the acquittal
in a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, arguing that the Court of Appeals committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
exonerating the private respondents notwithstanding the
overwhelming evidence of their guilt.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court is the
proper legal recourse for the reversal of the
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
2. Whether or not an appeal of the judgment of
acquittal by the Court of Appeals violates the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution
Ruling:
The special civil action for certiorari is intended
for the correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. As observed in Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Court of Appeals, et al. "the special civil action for
certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of
errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. The
raison d’etre for the rule is when a court exercises its
jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does
not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the
error is committed.
While petitioner in the case at bar ostensibly
alleges grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, the discussions therein however
ascribe to the Court of Appeals errors of judgment, not
errors of jurisdiction. Specifically, petitioner delves on,
among others, the testimonies relative to the positions of
the victim vis-à-vis the accused, and the opinions of the
expert witnesses in respect to certain physical evidence.
Obviously, these are errors that goes deeply into the
appellate court’s appreciation and assessment of the
evidence proffered by the parties. On this score alone,
the dismissal of the instant petition is called for.
As earlier mentioned the circumstances of the
case at bar call for a judicial inquiry on the permissibility
of appeal after a verdict of acquittal in view of the
constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. In our
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jurisdiction, the finality-of-acquittal doctrine as a
safeguard against double jeopardy faithfully adheres to
the principle first enunciated in Kepner v. United States.
In this case, verdicts of acquittal are to be regarded as
absolutely final and irreviewable.
Noteworthy is the case of People v. Velasco
where the Court likewise dismissed a similar petition not
only on the ground that the acquittal of the defendant by
the lower court was not reviewable via the extraordinary
writ of certiorari, but more importantly, the grant of said
petition would constitute a violation of the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution. In Velasco, we
clarified that in the absence of a finding of mistrial, i.e.
the criminal trial was a sham, as in Galman v.
Sandiganbayan, a judgment of acquittal is final and
unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy, whether
it happens at the trial court level or at the Court of
Appeals.18
Respondents Francisco and Pacao, after having
been found not guilty by a court of competent jurisdiction,
must be afforded rest and tranquility from repeated
attempts by the State at conviction and their anxiety
finally laid to rest. Their acquittal must therefore be
accorded finality in faithful adherence to the rule against
double jeopardy. Petition is DISMISSED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARIEL MACARANG,
G.R. Nos. 151249-50 February 26, 2004
Facts:
On or about November 8, 1999, in San Juan,
Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused, being the father of Armie Christine
Macarang y Amboy, with lewd designs, by means of force
and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have sexual intercourse with said Armie
Christine Macarang y Amboy, 13 years old, against her
will and consent. In Criminal Case No. 116969-H, the
accused is convicted of the crime of rape and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by lethal
injection and the accessory penalty provided by law and
to pay the costs.
Appellee, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General, filed its brief, entitled "Brief For The
Appellee With Recommendation To Remand The Cases To
The Court A Quo For Further Proceedings", calling our
attention to the fact that the trial court had considered
appellant to have waived his right to present his evidence
without any showing that the latter was fully aware of the
consequences of such waiver.
When the case was called supposedly for the
initial presentation of defense evidence, the defense
counsel manifested that the accused had intimated to
him that he was not prepared to testify, the reason being
that he was just recuperating from an illness. Considering
that the trial of this case had been repeatedly postponed
and that Defense Counsel had been the subject at least
two (2) show cause orders, reset for the last time to
August 28 and September 18, 2001 at 8:30 o’clock in the
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morning, with a warning that if on the next scheduled
hearing accused would not still be ready to present
evidence, he would be deemed to have waived his right
to do so.
Record shows that such presentation had been
repeatedly postponed mostly at the instance of the
accused and/or his lawyer. Thus, as prayed for by the
Public Prosecutor and pursuant to the order of August 28,
2001, accused is now deemed to have waived his right to
present evidence. As further prayed for, this case is now
deemed submitted for decision.
Based on the prosecution evidence, the trial
court, on November 13, 2001 promulgated its Decision
dated October 17, 2001, convicting appellant of the crime
of qualified rape and sentencing him to suffer the
ultimate penalty of death in each of the criminal cases.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the appellant was deprived of his right
to due process when the trial court had considered
appellant to have waived his right to present his
evidence without any showing that the latter was fully
aware of the consequences of such waiver.
Ruling:
In criminal cases where the imposable penalty
may be death, as in the present cases, the presiding
judge is called upon to see to it that the accused is made
aware of the consequences of not heeding the warning
given by the trial court. It must be noted that the waiver
of the right to present defense evidence in the present
cases was not even voluntary nor upon the instance of
the appellant but imposed by the trial court, apparently
to penalize appellant, after he and his counsel repeatedly
moved for the postponements of the scheduled hearings.
Thus, a simple forewarning to the appellant that
the next time that he would not be ready with his
defense evidence, he would be deemed to have waived
his right to present it, did not satisfy appellant’s
constitutional right to due process. The trial court should
have first apprised appellant or explained to him in clear
terms the exact nature and consequences of a waiver.
Moreover, in the same Order declaring appellant
to have waived his right to present evidence, the trial
court granted the motion of appellant’s counsel to
withdraw his appearance. Appellant, therefore, had no
more counsel. The trial court did not ask him if he would
wish to solicit the services of another counsel de parte or
want the court to designate a de oficio counsel for him.
It is obvious then that the appellant was
deprived of his right to due process.
In the light of the foregoing, we have no other
recourse but to set aside the judgment of the trial court
convicting appellant and order the remand of the records
of the case to the trial court to conduct further
proceedings.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PRISCILLA DEL
NORTE, G.R. No. 149462 March 29, 2004
Facts:
SPO1 Lumabas testified that on August 1, 1997,
their group was tasked to serve a search warrant against
a certain Ising Gutierrez Diwa residing at No. 275 North
Service Road corner Cruzada St., Bagong Barrio,
Caloocan City, for alleged violation of Republic Act No.
6425. They were ordered to "forthwith seize and take
possession of an undetermined quantity of shabu and
marijuana leaves." They coordinated with the barangay
officials and proceeded to the house pointed out to them
by the local officials. Upon reaching the house, its door
was opened by a woman. SPO3 De Leon introduced
themselves as policemen to the woman who opened the
door, whom they later identified in court as the appellant.
They informed her they had a search warrant, but
appellant suddenly closed and locked the door. It was
only after some prodding by the barangay officials that
she reopened the door. The authorities then conducted
the search. They found a bundle of marijuana wrapped in
Manila paper under the bed and inside the room. They
asked appellant who owned the marijuana. She cried and
said she had no means of livelihood. Appellant was
brought to the police headquarters for further
investigation. Both SPO1 Lumabas and SPO3 De Leon
identified the confiscated five (5) bundles of marijuana in
court.
Appellant assailed the validity of the search
warrant against her. She contended that she lived at 376
Dama de Noche, Barangay Baesa, Caloocan City, and
that on August 1, 1997, she was merely visiting a friend,
Marlyn, who lived at 275 North Service Road corner
Cruzada St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. She went to
Marlyn's house to borrow money. Marlyn was out and she
waited. While appellant was seated near the door, several
people introduced themselves as policemen, made her
sign a white paper and entered the house.
The trial court convicted appellant. In this
appeal, she raises the lone error that "the lower court
erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime
charged, when her guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt."
Appellant contends that the prosecution failed to
establish who owned the house where the search was
conducted, and avers that her mere presence therein did
not automatically make her the owner of the marijuana
found therein. She likewise argues that the search
warrant specified the name of Ising Gutierrez as the
owner of the house to be searched, and that since she is
not Ising Gutierrez, the lower court erred in admitting the
confiscated drugs as evidence against her.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the lower court erred in convicting the
accused-appellant of the crime charged, when her guilt
has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt
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Ruling:
We reverse the trial court's decision. The
prosecution failed to establish the guilt of appellant
beyond reasonable doubt. In a prosecution for illegal
possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts must
be proven with moral certainty: (1) that the accused is in
possession of the object identified as a prohibited or
regulated drug; (2) that such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) that the accused freely and
consciously possessed the said drug.
We cannot countenance the irregularity of the
search warrant. The authorities did not have personal
knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the search.
They did not conduct surveillance before obtaining the
warrant. It was only when they implemented the warrant
that they coordinated with the barangay officials. One of
the barangay officials informed SPO3 De Leon that Ising
Gutierrez Diwa and Priscilla Del Norte are one and the
same person, but said barangay official was not
presented in court. The authorities based their knowledge
on pure hearsay.
On the merits, we believe the prosecution failed
to discharge its burden of proving appellant's guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution's witnesses
failed to establish appellant's ownership of the house
where the prohibited drugs were discovered. Except for
their bare testimonies, no other proof was presented
The prosecution likewise failed to prove that
appellant was in actual possession of the prohibited
articles at the time of her arrest. In fact, it seems that
the authorities had difficulty looking for the drugs which
were not in plain view. In all criminal cases, it is
appellant's constitutional right to be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt. In
the case at bar, we hold that the prosecution's evidence
treads on shaky ground.
The decision of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City is reversed. Appellant is acquitted
based on reasonable doubt.
REV. ELLY CHAVEZ PAMATONG, ESQUIRE vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No.
161872 April 13, 2004
Facts:
Petitioner Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his
Certificate of Candidacy for President on December 17,
2003. Respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
refused to give due course to petitioner’s Certificate of
Candidacy in its Resolution No. 6558 dated January 17,
2004.
On January 15, 2004, petitioner moved for
reconsideration of Resolution No. 6558. Petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration was docketed as SPP (MP) No.
04-001. The COMELEC, acting on petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration and on similar motions filed by other
aspirants for national elective positions, denied the same
under the aegis of Omnibus Resolution No. 6604 dated
February 11, 2004. The COMELEC declared petitioner and
thirty-five (35) others nuisance candidates who could not
wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated
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by a political party or are not supported by a registered
political party with a national constituency.
In this Petition For Writ of Certiorari, petitioner
seeks to reverse the resolutions which were allegedly
rendered in violation of his right to "equal access to
opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article
II of the 1987 Constitution,1 by limiting the number of
qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage
a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political
parties. In so doing, petitioner argues that the COMELEC
indirectly amended the constitutional provisions on the
electoral process and limited the power of the sovereign
people to choose their leaders. The COMELEC supposedly
erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified
among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses
all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office
of the president, he is capable of waging a national
campaign since he has numerous national organizations
under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an
international campaign since he has practiced law in
other countries, and he has a platform of government.
Petitioner likewise attacks the validity of the form for the
Certificate of Candidacy prepared by the COMELEC.
Petitioner claims that the form does not provide clear and
reasonable guidelines for determining the qualifications of
candidates since it does not ask for the candidate’s bio-
data and his program of government.
Issue/s:
Whether or not petitioner’s right to “equal access to
opportunities for public service” is violated upon
COMELEC’s refusal to give due course to petitioner’s
Certificate of Candidacy
Ruling:
Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither
bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the
level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain
language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or
justifies an interpretation of the sort. The "equal access"
provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the
Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles and State
Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally
considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible
reason for according a different treatment to the "equal
access" provision. Like the rest of the policies
enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain
any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely
specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action.
The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any
cause of action before the courts.
The privilege of equal access to opportunities to
public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid
limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective
office are found in the provisions9 of the Omnibus
Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates" and COMELEC
Resolution No. 645210 dated December 10, 2002 outlining
the instances wherein the COMELEC may motu proprio
refuse to give due course to or cancel a Certificate of
Candidacy. As long as the limitations apply to everybody
equally without discrimination, however, the equal access
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clause is not violated. The rationale behind the
prohibition against nuisance candidates and the
disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a
bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The
State has a compelling interest to ensure that its
electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly.
The assailed resolutions of the COMELEC do not
direct the Court to the evidence which it considered in
determining that petitioner was a nuisance candidate.
This precludes the Court from reviewing at this instance
whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in disqualifying petitioner, since such a review
would necessarily take into account the matters which
the COMELEC considered in arriving at its decisions.
The question of whether a candidate is a
nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The
basis of the factual determination is not before this Court.
Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further
evidence is in order. As to petitioner’s attacks on the
validity of the form for the certificate of candidacy, suffice
it to say that the form strictly complies with Section 74 of
the Omnibus Election Code.
COMELEC Case No. SPP (MP) No. 04-001 is
hereby remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of
further evidence, to determine the question on whether
petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance
candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
The COMELEC is directed to hold and complete
the reception of evidence and report its findings to this
Court with deliberate dispatch.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FREDDIE
MURILLO, G.R. No. 134583 July 14, 2004
Facts:
That on or about the 6th day of June, 1997, in
the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with intent to kill and with
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
stab one Paz Abiera with a bladed weapon on her chest,
thereby inflicting upon her serious and mortal wounds
which directly caused her death after the latter slapped,
scolded him and uttered hurful words. With the
aggravating circumstances of cruelty and abuse of
superior strength.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the accused be prosecuted of the
severest penalty on account of his improvident
plea of guilty.
Ruling:
Rule 116 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides:
SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense;
reception of evidence.--- When the accused pleads guilty
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to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching
inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of
the consequences of his plea and shall require the
prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of
culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his
behalf.
The reason for this rule is that courts must
necessarily proceed with more care where the possible
punishment is in its severest form – death – for the
reason that the execution of such sentence is irrevocable.
Experience has shown that innocent persons have at
times pleaded guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment,
or upon bad advice or because of promises of the
authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit
guilt or express remorse. An accused might be admitting
his guilt before the court and thus forfeit his life and
liberty without having fully understood the meaning,
significance and consequences of his plea. The judge
therefore has the duty to ensure that the accused does
not suffer by reason of mistaken impressions. Requiring
the trial court to take further evidence would also aid this
Court on appellate review in evaluating the propriety or
impropriety of the plea.
It is well established that the due process
requirement is part of a person's basic rights and is not a
mere formality that may be dispensed with or performed
perfunctorily. An accused needs the aid of counsel lest he
be the victim of overzealous prosecutors, of the law's
complexity or of his own ignorance and bewilderment.
Indeed, the right to counsel springs from the
fundamental principle of due process. The right to
counsel, however, means more than just the presence of
a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding of
standard questions and objections. The right to counsel
means that the accused is sufficiently accorded legal
assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to
the cause for the defense and acts accordingly. This right
necessitates an active involvement by the lawyer in the
proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his
bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the
accused, his being well-versed on the case and his
knowing the fundamental procedures, essential laws and
existing jurisprudence. Indeed, the right of an accused to
counsel finds meaning only in the performance by the
lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his client and an
efficient and truly decisive legal assistance which is not
just a simple perfunctory representation.
While our jurisdiction does not subscribe to a per
se rule that once a plea of guilty is found improvidently
he is at once entitled to a remand, the circumstances of
this case warrant that a remand to the trial court be
made. To warrant a remand of the criminal case, the
Court has held that it must be shown that as a result of
such irregularity there was inadequate representation of
facts by either the prosecution or the defense during the
trial. Where the improvident plea of guilty was followed
by an abbreviated proceeding with practically no role at
all played by the defense, we have ruled that this
procedure was just too meager to accept as being the
standard constitutional due process at work enough to
forfeit a human life. What justifies the remand of the
criminal case to the trial court is the unfairness or
complete miscarriage of justice in the handling of the
proceedings a quo as occasioned by the improvident plea
of guilt. In this case, apart from the testimony of
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appellant, the prosecution does not have any other
evidence to hold him liable for the crime charged.
In view of the foregoing, we find that it is
imperative to remand the case for the proper
arraignment and trial of the accused, considering not
only the accused's improvident plea of guilt but also his
lawyer's neglect in representing his cause.
AIDA POBLETE and HON. REUBEN P. DE LA CRUZ vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and WILLIAM LU , G.R. No.
128859 June 29, 2004
Facts:
Sometime in 1995, upon complaint of private
respondent William Lu, filed an Information against the
petitioner Aida Poblete, for Estafa.
The Information alleged that the petitioner committed
the crime of estafa in relation to P.D. 818 by willfully and
unlawfully making, drawing and issuing to William Lu,
with deliberate intent to defraud and by means of deceit,
false pretenses and fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneous with, checks amounting to P2,318,047.60.
The Information did not recommend bail.
On December 18, 1995, counsel for the
petitioner, accused Aida Poblete, filed a Motion for
Reinvestigation. She prayed therein that execution of the
warrant of arrest be held in abeyance pending the
reinvestigation of the case.
The lower court issued an Order denying
accused’s Motion for Reinvestigation and directing the
issuance of a warrant of arrest, with the bail for her
provisional liberty fixed at P40,000.00. The Order stated
that the accused is entitled to bail as a matter of right
since the offense charged is not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
In his Motion for Reconsideration dated February
9, 1996, private respondent sought the setting aside of
the Order, stressing that the imposable penalty upon the
accused in view of the amount involved would exceed 30
years and that applying section 1 of P.D. 818 in relation
to section 3 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, bail would
not be a matter of right. That being the case, hearing on
any application for bail would be mandatory, he urged.
On March 31, 1997 the Court of Appeals
reversed the Order of the presiding judge and required
him to conduct hearing on the bail issue. The appellate
court ruled that P.D. 818 needs no further interpretation
or construction, pointing out that the trial judge’s
pronouncement that the penalty for the crime charged at
bar should be termed reclusion perpetua only in
connection with the accessory penalties imposed under
the Revised Penal Code is erroneous. In making the
pronouncement and in granting bail ex parte, the Court
of Appeals stressed, the trial judge committed grave
abuse of discretion.
Hence, the petitioner elevated the Court of
Appeals’ D E C I S I O N to this Court by a Petition for
Review on Certiorari.
Issue/s:
Whether or not bail would still be required when the
accused was already acquitted.
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Ruling:
Before deciding the case, the Court asked for
the complete records of the case from the lower court.
The Court for the first time learned that the
criminal case subject of this case was dismissed as early
as October 15, 1999, when the lower court, acting upon
the accused’sDemurrer to Evidence, issued an Order
acquitting the accused. With the acquittal of the accused,
the instant case which involves the issue of bail for the
provisional liberty of the accused has become moot and
academic. This Court has no alternative but to dismiss
the Petition.
GEORGE VINCOY vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 156558
June 14, 2004
Facts:
On or about March 14, 1996, the accused, by
means of deceit defraud Lizah C. Cimafranca and Rolando
Flores, in the following manner, to wit: the said accused
represented that he could mobilize 30 dump trucks and 2
payloaders for use of the complainants subject to the
payment ofP600,000.00 mobilization fund and, believing
this representation to be true, the said complainants paid
and delivered the said amount to the accused at Banco
de Oro Bank, Pasig City Branch, which representation
accused knew well to be false and fraudulent and were
only made to induce the complainants to give and deliver
as in fact they gave and delivered the said amount
of P600,000.00 to the respondent, and accused once in
possession of said amount, misappropriated, misapplied
and converted the same to his own personal use and
benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the complainants,
Lizah C. Cimafranca and Rolando Flores, in the amount
ofP600,000.00.
In May 1996, Lizah Cimafranca filed a complaint
for estafa against petitioner with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Pasay City. It was, however, dismissed on
the ground that petitioner’s obligation was purely civil in
nature and for complainant’s failure to attend the
hearings.4 On October 8, 1996, Lizah Cimafranca, joined
by Rolando Flores, re-filed the complaint charging the
same offense against petitioner with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Pasig City which filed the corresponding
information in court, root of the present petition.
The trial court sustained the version of the
prosecution. The trial judge found incredible petitioner’s
averment that he failed to notice that the check in
question was not issued in his name. A judgment of
conviction was rendered on February 23, 2000.
Accused appealed to the Court of Appeals to no
avail. Hence, this petition for review.
He points out that the dismissal of the previous
complaint for estafa filed by Lizah Cimafranca by the City
Prosecutor’s Office of Pasay City supports his acquittal.
Issue/s:
Whether or not dismissal during preliminary
investigation constitute double jeopardy?
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Ruling:
The dismissal of a similar complaint
for estafa filed by Lizah Cimafranca before the City
Prosecutor’s Office of Pasay City will not exculpate the
petitioner. The case cannot bar petitioner’s prosecution.
It is settled that the dismissal of a case during its
preliminary investigation does not constitute double
jeopardy9 since a preliminary investigation is not part of
the trial and is not the occasion for the full and
exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence but only such
as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense
has been committed and accused is probably guilty
thereof.10 For this reason, it cannot be considered
equivalent to a judicial pronouncement of acquittal.
Hence, petitioner was properly charged before the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City which is not bound by
the determination made by the Pasay City Prosecutor
who may have had before him a different or incomplete
set of evidence than that subsequently presented before
the Pasig City Prosecutor.
BENITO ASTORGA vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 154130 August 20, 2004
Facts:
Private offended parties Elpidio Simon, Moises
de la Cruz, Wenefredo Maniscan, Renato Militante and
Crisanto Pelias are members of the Regional Special
Operations Group (RSOG) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, Tacloban City. On
September 1, 1997, they, together with SPO3 Andres B.
Cinco, Jr. and SPO1 Rufo Capoquian of the Philippine
National Police Regional Intelligence Group, were sent to
the Island of Daram, Western Samar to conduct
intelligence operations on possible illegal logging
activities. At around 4:30-5:00 p.m., the team found two
boats measuring 18 meters in length and 5 meters in
breadth being constructed at Barangay Locob-Locob.
There they met petitioner Benito Astorga, the Mayor of
Daram, who turned out to be the owner of the boats. A
heated altercation ensued between petitioner and the
DENR team. Petitioner called for reinforcements and,
moments later, a boat bearing ten armed men, some
wearing fatigues, arrived at the scene. The DENR team
was then brought to petitioner’s house in Daram, where
they had dinner and drinks. The team left at 2:00 a.m.
Issue/s:
Whether or not there petitioner is entitled to
presumption of innocence when all the elements of
arbitrary detention are not attendant.
Ruling:
The quoted portions of SPO1 Capoquian’s
testimony negate the element of detention. More
importantly, fear is a state of mind and is necessarily
subjective. Addressed to the mind of the victim, its
presence cannot be tested by any hard-and-fast rule but
must instead be viewed in the light of the perception and
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judgment of the victim at the time of the crime. As such,
SPO1 Capoquian and SPO3 Cinco, not being victims, were
not competent to testify on whether or not fear existed in
the minds of the private offended parties herein. It was
thus error for the Sandiganbayan to have relied on their
testimonies in convicting petitioner.
Verily, the circumstances brought out by SPO1
Capoquian created a reasonable doubt as to whether
petitioner detained the DENR Team against their consent.
The events that transpired are, to be sure, capable to two
interpretations. While it may support the proposition that
the private offended parties were taken to petitioner’s
house and prevented from leaving until 2:00 a.m. the
next morning, it is equally plausible, if not more so, that
petitioner extended his hospitality and served dinner and
drinks to the team at his house. He could have advised
them to stay on the island inasmuch as sea travel was
rendered unsafe by the heavy rains. He ate together with
the private offended parties and even laughed with them
while conversing over dinner. This scenario is
inconsistent with a hostile confrontation between the
parties. Moreover, considering that the Mayor also served
alcoholic drinks, it is not at all unusual that his guests left
the house at 2:00 a.m. the following morning.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. He is
entitled to an acquittal unless his guilt is shown beyond
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does
not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility
of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only
is required, or that degree of proof which produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
As held in several cases, when the guilt of the
accused has not been proven with moral certainty, the
presumption of innocence of the accused must be
sustained and his exoneration be granted as a matter of
right. For the prosecution’s evidence must stand or fall on
its own merit and cannot be allowed to draw strength
from the weakness of the evidence for the
defense. Furthermore, where the evidence for the
prosecution is concededly weak, even if the evidence for
defense is also weak, the accused must be duly accorded
the benefit of the doubt in view of the constitutional
presumption of innocence that an accused enjoys. When
the circumstances are capable of two or more inferences,
as in this case, one of which is consistent with the
presumption of innocence while the other is compatible
with guilt, the presumption of innocence must prevail and
the court must acquit. It is better to acquit a guilty man
than to convict an innocent man.
JORDAN P. OKTUBRE vs. JUDGE RAMON P.
VELASCO, Municipal Trial Court, Maasin, Southern
Leyte, A.M. No. MTJ -02-1444 July 22, 2004
Facts:
Complainant is the attorney-in-fact of one Peggy
Louise D'Arcy vda. De Paler ("D'Arcy"), a non-resident
American. D'Arcy is the widow of Abraham Paler
("Abraham"), a resident of Maasin City, Southern Leyte.
Respondent Judge is Abraham's nephew.
During his lifetime, Abraham built a four-storey
commercial and residential building ("Paler building") in
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Maasin city. D'Arcy, through complainant, administered
the Paler building.
Shortly after his appointment to the MTC Maasin
in March 1998, respondent Judge, with D'Arcy's
permission, stayed in the Paler building for a few days.
He sought an extension of his stay but D'Arcy turned
down his request since during her next visit to the
country she would use the room respondent Judge then
occupied. Nevertheless, respondent Judge was able to
continue staying in the Paler building by transferring to a
room reserved for a sister of Abraham.
Complainant filed a complaint with the
respondent Judge for changing the lock of his room.
Complainant also charged respondent Judge for taking
the jeep out of the garage of the Paler building.
Complainant and respondent Judge met at the Office
of Punong Barangay of Abgao for mediation but there
was no settlement as respondent Judge questioned
complainant's residency in Abgao.
Complainant Mr. Jordan Oktubre was arrested
and detained pursuant to a Warrant of Arrest and a
Commitment Order issued by the respondent Judge, the
basis for which is a Criminal Complaint for Robbery
supported by an affidavit executed by the respondent
Judge Ramon Velasco himself. Also, in Criminal Case for
"Malicious Mischief", records show that the complaint is
supported by the lone affidavit of the same..
Aggrieved by the issuance of respondent Judge
of the warrant of arrest, herein complainant elevated the
matter to the Regional Trial Court, via "Certiorari and/or
Prohibition with Application for Temporary Restraining
Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction". The RTC in its
Order dated December 7, 2000 ruled that "respondent
Judge in issuing a warrant of arrest violative of Rule 112,
Sec. 6, par. 2 of the Rules of Court may not only be
committing grave abuse of discretion but gross ignorance
of the law.
Complainant sought to annul the warrant of
arrest which was consequently granted by the RTC.
Because of these events, complainant prays that
the Court discipline respondent Judge for using his sala's
letterhead, for his failure to inhibit himself from his own
criminal complaints, and for his issuance of the warrant
of arrest.
Issue/s:
Whether or not respondent Judge committed grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the warrant of arrest
upon the complainant. And W/N failure to comply with
this mandatory procedure would result to his dismissal
from service.
Ruling:
The Office of the Court Administrator ("OCA")
recommends that respondent Judge be fined P10, 000 for
Grave Misconduct, Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave
Abuse of Authority is well-taken. However, the Court
finds the recommended penalty disproportionate to
respondent Judge's offenses and instead imposes on him
the penalty of dismissal from service.
Here, although he is the complainant in the
three criminal complaints, respondent Judge did not
disqualify himself from the cases. Worse, he even issued
Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!
a warrant of arrest in Criminal Case No. 5485, resulting
in the arrest and detention of complainant. By doing so,
respondent Judge violated Rule 3.12 and, by implication
Section 1 of Rule 137, which covers the preliminary
stages of criminal prosecution. To be sure, the situation
in this case does not fall under any of the instances
enumerated in Rule 3.12. Nevertheless, as the provision
itself states, such enumeration is not exclusive. More
importantly, paragraph (d) prohibits a judge from sitting
in a case where he is related to a party or to counsel
within the sixth and fourth degree of consanguinity or
affinity, respectively. Thus, there is more reason to
prohibit a judge from doing so in cases where he is a
party. Indeed, the idea that a judge can preside over his
own case is anathema to the notion of impartiality that
such was no longer included in the enumeration in Rule
3.12 nor covered by Section 1 of Rule 137.
Respondent Judge's subsequent inhibition from
the three cases does not detract from his culpability for
he should not have taken cognizance of the cases in the
first place. The evil that the rule on disqualification seeks
to prevent is the denial of a party of his right to due
process. This became fait accompli when respondent
Judge refused to abide by such rule. Equally damaging
was the effect of respondent Judge's conduct on the
image of the judiciary, which without a doubt,
immeasurably suffered from it.
Respondent Judge aggravated his liability when
he proceeded to issue the warrant of arrest. Section 6 of
Rule 112 provides:
When warrant of arrest may issue. — x x x (b)
By the Municipal Trial Court. — If the municipal trial court
judge conducting the preliminary investigation is
satisfied after an examination in writing and under oath
of the complainant and his witnesses in the form of
searching questions and answers, that a probable cause
exists and that there is a necessity of placing the
respondent under immediate custody in order not to
frustrate the ends of justice, he shall issue a warrant of
arrest.
This is the same procedure prescribed in Section
2, Article III of the Constitution and in Section 5, Rule
126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. A judge
who issues a warrant of arrest without first complying
with such mandatory procedure is liable for gross
ignorance of the law.
We have held, in a number of cases before this
Court, that the procedure described in Section 6 of Rule
112 is mandatory because failure to follow the same
would amount to a denial of due process. With respect
to the issuance by inferior courts of warrants of
arrest, it is necessary that the judge be satisfied that
probable cause exists: 1) through an examination under
oath and in writing of the complainant and his witnesses,
which examination should be 2) in the form of searching
questions and answers. This rule is not merely a
procedural but a substantive rule because it gives flesh to
two of the most sacrosanct guarantees found in the
fundamental law: the guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures and the due process requirement.
The only instance where the judge may dispense
with such procedure is when the application for the
warrant of arrest is filed before a Regional Trial Court
judge. In such a case, the RTC judge can rely on the
report of the prosecutor on the finding of probable cause.
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R TRANSPORT CORPORATION vs. ROGELIO
EJANDRA, G.R. No. 148508 May 20, 2004
Facts:
Private respondent Rogelio Ejandra worked as a
bus driver of petitioner R Transport Corporation for
almost six years, from July 15, 1990 to January 31, 1996
until he was apprehended by an Officer of the Land
Transportation Office for obstruction of traffic for which
his license was confiscated. He was able to retrieve his
license only a week thereafter. This led the respondent
to indefinite suspension. He was likewise accused of
causing damage to the bus he used to drive. He denied
the charge, considering that the damage was sustained
during the week that he did not drive the bus.
Petitioner denied private respondent’s
allegations and claimed that private respondent, a
habitual absentee, abandoned his job. Had it been true,
he should have presented an apprehension report and
informed petitioner of his problems with the LTO. But he
did not. Petitioner further argued that private respondent
was not an employee because theirs was a contract of
lease and not of employment, with petitioner being paid
on commission basis.
Labor arbiter Rogelio Yulo rendered his decision
in favor of private respondent. That the dismissal of
Rogelio Ejandra was without cause, therefore, illegal and
ORDERING R-Transport REINSTATE him to his former
position without loss of seniority and other benefits and
to pay him backwages from the time of his dismissal until
actual reinstatement.
Labor arbiter Yulo gave no weight to petitioner’s
claim that private respondent abandoned his work. His
one-week absence did not constitute abandonment of
work considering that it took him the whole week to
reclaim his license. Private respondent could not retrieve
it unless and until the apprehending officer first
transmitted it to their office. His inability to drive for
petitioner that whole week was therefore not his fault
and petitioner could be held liable for illegal dismissal.
Due process was not accorded to private respondent who
was never given the opportunity to contest the charge of
abandonment. Moreover, assuming actual abandonment,
petitioner should have reported such fact to the nearest
employment office of the Department of Labor and
Employment. But no such report was ever made.
The NLRC rendered a decision affirming the
decision of the labor arbiter. It is very clear that from no
less than appellants’ admission, that complainant was not
afforded his right to due process prior to the severance of
his employment with respondents. Appellants’ defense of
denying the existence of employer-employee relationship
with the complainant based on the manner by which
complainant was being paid his salary, cannot hold water.
Petitioner filed in the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari on the ground that the NLRC committed
grave abuse of discretion in affirming the decision of the
labor arbiter. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision.
Categorizing the issues raised by petitioner as factual,
the appellate court held that the findings of fact of the
labor arbiter (affirmed by the NLRC) were entitled to
great respect because they were supported by substantial
Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!
evidence. The Court of Appeals also ruled that petitioner
was barred from denying the existence of an employer-
employee relationship because petitioner invoked its
rights under the law and jurisprudence as an employer in
dismissing private respondent.
Issue/s:
Whether or not petitioner can validly sever their
employment with respondent without following the
procedural requirement of due process due to the non-
existence of employee-employer relationship.
Ruling:
In the case at bar, the labor arbiter, the NLRC
and the Court of Appeals were unanimous in finding that
private respondent worked as a driver of one of the
buses of petitioner and was paid on a 10% commission
basis. After he was apprehended for a traffic violation, his
license was confiscated. When he informed petitioner’s
general manager of such fact, the latter gave him money
to redeem his license. He went to the LTO office everyday
but it was only after a week that he was able to get back
his license. When he reported back to work, petitioner’s
manager told him to wait until his services were needed
again. Considering himself dismissed, private respondent
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner.
We have no reason to disturb all these factual
findings because they are amply supported by substantial
evidence.
In addition to the fact that petitioner had no
valid cause to terminate private respondent from work, it
violated the latter’s right to procedural due process by
not giving him the required notice and hearing. Section 2,
Rule XXIII, Book V of Department Order No. 9 provides
for the procedure for dismissal for just or authorized
cause. SEC.2. Standards of due process;
requirement of notice xxx.
ATTY. REYNALDO P. DIMAYACYAC vs. HON. COURT
OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 136264 May 28, 2004
Facts:
The Assistant City Prosecutor accuses Lourdes
Angeles, Estrella Mapa, Atty. Ponciano R. Gupit, and
ATTY. Reynaldo P. Dinayacyac of the crime of
Falsificartion of Public Document.
Before his arraignment, petitioner Dimayacyac
moved to quash the information on 2 grounds. First, that
the officer who filed the information had no legal
authority to do so, and second, that more than one
offense was charged in the information.
Pending resolution of the motion to quash,
petitioner was arraigned.
By Order of August 23, 1991, Judge Benigno T.
Dayaw was holding that the "grant or denial of Motion to
Dismiss whether the accused is arraigned or not is
discretionary on the part of the court, thus granted the
petitioner’s motion to quash upon the second ground.
Accordingly, the information was quashed.
More than 2 years after the quashal of the
information, the Quezon City Prosecutor filed against the
same accused including petitioner 2 informations for
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falsification of public documents. The Informations arose
from the questioned acts of falsification subject of the
earlier quashed information.
Petitioner later filed with a motion for the
quashal thereof on the ground of double jeopardy. He
argued he would be placed in double jeopardy as he was
indicted before for the same offenses and the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.
By the assailed Order of December 18, 1996,
public respondent, Judge Vicente Q. Roxas to which the 2
informations against petitioner, et al, were eventually
lodged, held that the information in Criminal Case No. Q-
93-49988 involved a different document as that involved
in the first one which had already been quashed.
Resolution of the motion to quash the information in the
second one was stayed pending the submission by
petitioner of the documents required by the court a quo.
Public respondent thus denied the motion to quash the
information and ordered petitioner’s arraignment, he
holding that said case did not place petitioner in double
jeopardy.
Herein petitioner then filed a petition for
certiorari before the CA which denied his petition stating
in its Decision that since the Information in the first
Criminal Case, on petitioner’s motion, was quashed on
the ground that more than one offense was charged, he
is not placed in double jeopardy by the filing of another
Information for an offense included in the charge subject
of the first Information.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner
under the second Information would constitute
double jeopardy, considering that when the first
Information in Criminal was previously quashed,
he had already been arraigned; and
2. Whether or not petitioner’s constitutional right
to a speedy disposition of his case has been
violated.
Ruling:
With regard to the first issue, we are in accord
with the ruling of the CA that not all the elements for
double jeopardy exist in the case at bench. To raise the
defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be
present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to
the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly
terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the
same offense as that in the first.
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid
indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after
arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and
(e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the accused.
The duplicitous information was a valid
indictment. We ruled in the long line of cases that when
an appellant fails to file a motion to quash within the time
prescribed, he is thus deemed to have waived the defect
in the Information. The accused who fails to object prior
to arraignment to a duplicitous information, may be
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found guilty of any or all of the crimes alleged therein
and duly proven during the trial, for the allegation of the
elements of such component crimes in the said
information has satisfied the constitutional guarantee
that an accused be informed of the nature of the offense
with which he or she is being charged. Verily, a
duplicitous information is valid since such defect may be
waived and the accused, because of such waiver, could
be convicted of as many offenses as those charged in the
information and proved during trial.
It should be noted that the termination of the
first Information was upon motion of petitioner who, on
April 1, 1991, filed with the court an Urgent Motion to
Quash which was granted by Resolution dated August 23,
1991. The reinstatement of criminal case against the
accused did not violate his right against double jeopardy
since the dismissal of the information by the trial court
had been effected at his own instance when the accused
filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense and that the RTC
had no jurisdiction over the case. In this case,
considering that since the dismissal of the previous
criminal case against petitioner was by reason of his
motion for the quashal of the information, petitioner is
thus deemed to have expressly given his consent to such
dismissal. There could then be no double jeopardy in this
case since one of the requisites therefore, i.e., that the
dismissal be without accused’s express consent, is not
present.
As to whether the subsequent filing of the two
informations constitutes a violation of petitioner’s
constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases, we
rule in the negative. There is no showing that petitioner
was made to endure any vexatious process during the
two-year period before the filing of the proper
informations.
We emphasize our ruling in Ty-Dazo vs.
Sandiganbayan14 where we held that:
The right to a speedy disposition of cases, like
the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated only when
the proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of
the trial are asked for and secured, or when without
cause or unjustifiable motive, a long period of time is
allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.
In the determination of whether or not that right has
been violated, the factors that may be considered and
balanced are: the length of the delay the reasons for
such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by
the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay.
A mere mathematical reckoning of the time
involved, therefore, would not be sufficient. In the
application of the constitutional guarantee of the right to
speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must also
be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each
case.
What the records clearly show is that petitioner
never asserted his right to a speedy disposition of his
case. The only ground he raised in assailing the
subsequent filing of the two informations is that he will
be subjected to double jeopardy. Petitioner did not raise
the issue of his right to a speedy disposition of his case.
We are not convinced that the filing of the informations
against petitioner after two years was an unreasonable
delay.
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1. Whether or not respondent Judge should be

punished from resorting to insulting and
MERIAM BALAGTAS vs. OLEGARIO R. SARMIENTO, offensive language.
JR., Judge, MTCC, Branch 2 Cebu City, A.M. No. 2. Whether or not the respondent judge can be
MTJ-01-1377 June 17, 2004 punished for gross ignorance of the law because
of violation of the basic and fundamental rights,
due process.
Facts:
Ruling:
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
received the sworn Letter-Complaint1 of Ms. Meriam
On the first issue, the respondent judge
Balagtas accusing Judge Olegario R. Sarmiento, Jr.,
deserves the sternest reproof for making these remarks.
MTCC, Branch 2, Cebu City, of knowingly rendering an
Judges should refrain from expressing irrelevant opinions
unjust interlocutory order, gross ignorance of the law and
in their decisions which may only reflect unfavorably
serious irregularities in the performance of judicial duties
upon their competence and the propriety of their judicial
in connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 82863-R and
actuations. Moreover, intemperate speech detracts from
83186-R, entitled "People of the Philippines versus
the equanimity and judiciousness that should be the
Hermann Peith," for violation of B.P. 22.
constant hallmarks of a dispenser of justice.
Balagtas was the private complainant in the
On the second issue, the Rules of Court is
aforementioned criminal cases.
explicit on this point. A motion without notice of hearing
She alleges that accused Hermann Peith filed
is pro forma, a mere scrap of paper. It presents no
an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Leave for Abroad which was
question which the court could decide. The court has no
granted by the respondent judge on the same day it was
reason to consider it and the clerk has no right to receive
filed without notice to her or the prosecution.
it. The rationale behind the rule is plain: unless the
Balagtas then filed a Motion for the Inhibition of
movant sets the time and place of hearing, the court will
Judge Olegario Sarmiento on grounds of bias and
be unable to determine whether the adverse party agrees
partiality. She claimed therein that she filed a Motion for
or objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear him
the Issuance of a Hold Departure Order against Peith
on his objection. The objective of the rule is to avoid a
which the respondent judge did not act upon. However,
capricious change of mind in order to provide due process
in a move evincing bias in favor of Peith, the respondent
to both parties and to ensure impartiality in the trial.
judge granted his Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Leave for
The essence of due process is the right to be
Abroad.
heard. Therefore, every motion which may prejudice the
The respondent judge granted the motion for
rights of a party should be set for hearing. The
inhibition. He remarked that "Herein judge is responsibly
intendment of the law will never be achieved if notice is
informed that the herein parties have had a special
not served, such as in this case.
personal relationship only that accused married another
In granting Peith’s Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to
woman. This Court does not want to be an instrument of
Leave for Abroad, the respondent judge violated a basic
the misgivings, sourgrapings and importunings of
and fundamental constitutional principle, due process.
complainant." And that Balagtas "can push through with
When the law is elementary, not to be aware of it
her personal agenda of vendetta without unnecessarily
constitutes gross ignorance thereof. After all, judges are
dragging" him into it once Peith sets foot on Philippine
expected to have more than just a modicum of
soil. He further states that he "cannot act as
acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules.
‘Berdugo’ for complainant’s personal ill motive and selfish
Hence, the respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance
interest."
of the law.
Balagtas now asserts that the respondent
judge’s Orders are unjust and amount to gross ignorance
of the law. She also claims that the respondent judge
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR THE
committed serious irregularities in the performance of his
ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
duties.
RICHARD BRIAN HORNTON for and in behalf of the
The Court referred the complaint to another
minor child SEQUEIRA JENNIFER DELLE FRANCISCO
Judge for investigation, during its pendency another
THORNTON vs. ADELFA FRANCISCO THORNTON,
Judge took over.
G.R. No. 154598 August 16, 2004
The OCA sustains with modification the findings
and recommendation of the investigating judges. The
OCA, therefore, recommends the dismissal of the case
Facts:
against the respondent judge but admonishes him to
refrain from resorting to insulting and offensive language
Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a
in his future judicial actions.
Filipino, were married. A year later, respondent gave
birth to a baby girl whom they named Sequeira Jennifer
Delle Francisco Thornton.
Issue/s:
However, after three years, respondent grew
restless and bored as a plain housewife. She wanted to
return to her old job as a "guest relations officer" in a
nightclub, with the freedom to go out with her friends. In
fact, whenever petitioner was out of the country,

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respondent was also often out with her friends, leaving
her daughter in the care of the househelp.
On December 7, 2001, respondent left the
family home with her daughter Sequiera without notifying
her husband. She told the servants that she was bringing
Sequiera to Purok Marikit, Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan
Province.
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in
the designated Family Court in Makati City but this was
dismissed, presumably because of the allegation that the
child was in Basilan. Petitioner then went to Basilan to
ascertain the whereabouts of respondent and their
daughter. However, he did not find them there and the
barangay office of Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan issued a
certification3 that respondent was no longer residing
there.
Petitioner gave up his search when he got hold
of respondent’s cellular phone bills showing calls from
different places such as Cavite, Nueva Ecija, Metro Manila
and other provinces. Petitioner then filed another petition
for habeas corpus, this time in the Court of Appeals
which could issue a writ of habeas corpus enforceable in
the entire country.
However, the petition was denied by the Court
of Appeals on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction
over the case. It ruled that since RA 8369 (The Family
Courts Act of 1997) gave family courts exclusive original
jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly
repealed RA 7902 (An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals) and Batas Pambansa 129 (The
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980).
Issue/s:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases
involving custody of minors in the light of the provision in
RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive original
jurisdiction over such petitions.
Ruling:
In his comment, the Solicitor General points out
that Section 20 of the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ
of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors has
rendered the issue moot. Section 20 of the rule provides
that a petition for habeas corpus may be filed in the
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its
members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable
anywhere in the Philippines.
The petition is granted.
The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of
the case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked
its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving
the custody of minors.
We disagree with the CA’s reasoning because it
will result in an iniquitous situation, leaving individuals
like petitioner without legal recourse in obtaining custody
of their children. Individuals who do not know the
whereabouts of minors they are looking for would be
helpless since they cannot seek redress from family
courts whose writs are enforceable only in their
respective territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is
Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!
being transferred from one place to another, which
seems to be the case here, the petitioner in a habeas
corpus case will be left without legal remedy. This lack of
recourse could not have been the intention of the
lawmakers when they passed the Family Courts Act of
1997. As observed by the Solicitor General:
The primordial consideration is the welfare and
best interests of the child. We rule therefore that RA
8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus
cases involving the custody of minors. Again, to quote
the Solicitor General:
To allow the Court of Appeals to exercise
jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus involving
a minor child whose whereabouts are uncertain and
transient will not result in one of the situations that the
legislature seeks to avoid. First, the welfare of the child is
paramount. Second, the ex parte nature of habeas
corpus proceedings will not result in disruption of the
child’s privacy and emotional well-being; whereas to
deprive the appellate court of jurisdiction will result in the
evil sought to be avoided by the legislature: the child’s
welfare and well being will be prejudiced.
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the
Court of Appeals and Supreme Court have concurrent
jurisdiction with family courts in habeas corpus cases
where the custody of minors is involved.
One final note. Requiring the serving officer to
search for the child all over the country is not an
unreasonable availment of a remedy which the Court of
Appeals cited as a ground for dismissing the petition. As
explained by the Solicitor General:
That the serving officer will have to "search for
the child all over the country" does not represent an
insurmountable or unreasonable obstacle, since such a
task is no more different from or difficult than the duty of
the peace officer in effecting a warrant of arrest, since
the latter is likewise enforceable anywhere within the
Philippines.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MAXIMO
IBARRIENTOS y PERICO, G.R. Nos. 148063-64
June 17, 2004
Facts:
On August 1996 the accused who is the Uncle of
the victim, LORILIE a.k.a. LORELIE I. BRILLO, then an 8
years old minor while in their house, did then and there,
with lewd design willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie
and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of said Lorelie
I. Brillo, who afterwards reported the incident to her
Aunt, Imelda Ibarrientos, the wife of the accused, to her
damage and prejudice.
On February 1998, in Barangay Sagurong,
Municipality of Pili, Camarines Sur, the above-named
accused, being the father of and having parental
authority, influence and moral ascendancy over victim
JOAN IBARRIENTOS, his 7 year old daughter, while the
latter was sick and sleeping in their bedroom, did then
and there, with lewd design, willfully, unlawfully and
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feloniously lie on top of her and succeeded in having
carnal knowledge of her which she reported immediately
to her mother, Imelda, to her damage and prejudice.
The trial court found that the appellant was
guilty beyond reasonable doubt on both counts of rape,
and sentenced him to death.
Issue/s:
Whether or not accused is sentenced to the
severest penalty when the qualifying circumstance was
not specifically alleged in the information.
Ruling:
We agree with the OSG. The Aquino case settled
already the issue on the proper allegation of
circumstances. What properly informs the accused of the
nature of the crime charged is the specific allegation of
the circumstances mentioned in the law that raise the
crime to a higher category.
The new Rules on Criminal Procedure require the
qualifying circumstances to be specifically alleged in the
information, in order to comply with the constitutional
right of the accused to be properly informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him. The purpose is
to allow the accused to prepare fully for his defense to
prevent surprises during the trial. This requirement is
satisfied as long as the circumstances are alleged in the
information, even if these are not specified as
aggravating or qualifying circumstances.
In the present two cases of rape, however, the
death penalty imposed on appellant is improper and
erroneous.
Circumstances that qualify a crime and increase
its penalty to death cannot be the subject of speculation.
The appellant cannot be condemned to suffer the
extreme penalty of death on the basis of stipulations or
admissions. This strict rule is warranted by the gravity
and irreversibility of capital punishment. Proof of the age
of the victim cannot consist merely of testimony. Neither
can a stipulation of the parties with respect to the
victim’s age be considered sufficient proof of minority.
In the instant case, no authentic document was
presented as evidence of the victim’s age other than a
poor photocopy of what is claimed to be Lorelie’s birth
certificate. The prosecution failed to present an original
or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth.
Neither was it shown that these were lost, destroyed or
unavailable at the time of trial. Thus, secondary evidence
is inadmissible to prove the age of the victim in Crim.
Case No. P-2696. The testimonies tending to prove the
victim’s age cannot be accepted as adequate proof
thereof.
Much as we abhor child abuse, nevertheless, we
are constrained to hold that capital punishment cannot be
imposed on appellant in these two cases. Even if we
agree that the victims are indeed minors below 12 years
old, at most, appellant is liable only for statutory rape.
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Gregorio Amante vs Bibiano Serwelas 471 SCRA
348
Facts:
Danilo Bicomong, a plant supervisor of Amante
Motors, was the registered owner of a 1990 Isuzu Jitney.
In 1992, he sold the vehicle to respondent Bibiano
Serwelas for P200,000 in a deed of absolute sale. The
respondent had the vehicle registered in his name, which
was later used as a common carrier, on a boundary
system.
On December 9, 1993, the vehicle was seized by the
police highway patrol group in General Mariano Alvarez,
Cavite without a warrant, upon the request of petitioner
Gregorio Amante, the manager of Amante Motors. The
vehicle was brought to Camp Vicente Lim in Laguna and,
after being subjected to macro-etching examination by
SPO1 Elfin B. Rico of the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory Service, was later released to petitioner
Gregorio Amante.
Despite respondent's demand, Gregorio Amante refused
to return the vehicle. Hence, respondent instituted a
replevin suit with the trial court. Asserting ownership of
the vehicle, petitioner Vicente Amante, the proprietor of
Amante Motors, intervened in the suit. But the trial court
rendered a decision stating that respondent Serwelas is
the lawful owner of the vehicle. The court also awarded
damages to respondent for lost earnings as premium for
the replevin bond of respondent.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision holding respondent as the rightful owner of the
vehicle. It ruled that respondent had established
ownership of the vehicle to the exclusion of the whole
world. It also affirmed the award of damages as
unrealized earnings but deleted the award for replevin
bond premium since no claim for it was made in the
complaint.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied.
Issue/s:
Is there a violation of the right against unreasonable
seizure of a moving vehicle in this case?
Ruling:
The resolution of San Pablo City Assistant
Prosecutor Esperidion Gajitos could not but strengthen
respondent's claim of good faith. Petitioner Gregorio
Amante's criminal complaint for violation of RA 6539 and
the Anti-Fencing Law was filed in court only against
Bicomong. Respondent was exonerated of any liability
whatsoever.
As to the issue of damages, we concur with the Court of
Appeals that only petitioner Gregorio Amante should be
held liable for the unrealized rentals of respondent during
the period he was deprived of the vehicle's possession.
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Petitioner Vicente Amante was not privy to the unlawful

seizure and detention of the vehicle.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the

Court of Appeals dated December 28, 1999 is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Respondent Bibiano
Serwelas is hereby declared the owner of the disputed
vehicle. Petitioner Gregorio Amante is hereby ordered to
pay respondent the amount of P103,200 as unrealized
rentals plus P37,963 as premium for the replevin bond.

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2005
Pimentel, et al. vs. Ermita, et al. GR 164978, 13
October 2005
Facts:
The Senate and the House of Representatives
(“Congress”) commenced their regular session on 26 July
2004. The Commission on Appointments, composed of
Senators and Representatives, was constituted on 25
August 2004. Meanwhile, President Arroyo issued
appointments to Arthur C. Yap (Department of
Agriculture, 15 August 2004), Alberto G. Romulo
(Department of Foreign Affairs, 23 August 2004), Raul M.
Gonzalez (Department of Justice, 23 August 2004),
Florencio B. Abad (Department of Education, 23 August
2004), Avelino J. Cruz, Jr. (Department of National
Defense, 23 August 2004), Rene C. Villa (Department of
Agrarian Reform, 23 August 2004), Joseph H. Durano
(Department of Tourism, 23 August 2004), and Michael T.
Defensor (Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, 23 August 2004) as acting secretaries of their
respective departments. Defensor, et al., took their oath
of office and assumed duties as acting secretaries. On 8
September 2004, Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. (“Senator
Pimentel”), Edgardo J. Angara (“Senator Angara”), Juan
Ponce Enrile (“Senator Enrile”), Luisa P. Ejercito-Estrada
(“Senator Ejercito-Estrada”), Jinggoy E. Estrada
(“Senator Estrada”), Panfilo M. Lacson (“Senator Lacson”),
Alfredo S. Lim (“Senator Lim”), Jamby A.S. Madrigal
(“Senator Madrigal”), and Sergio R. Osmeña, III
(“Senator Osmeña”) filed the petition for certiorari and
prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction as Senators of the Republic of the
Philippines, to declare unconstitutional the appointments
issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (“President
Arroyo”) through Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita
(“Secretary Ermita”). The petition also sought to prohibit
respondents from performing the duties of department
secretaries.
Issue/s:
Whether President Arroyo’s appointment of
Defensor et al. as acting secretaries was constitutional,
even without the consent of the Commission on
Appointments while Congress is in session
Ruling:
The essence of an appointment in an acting
capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure
intended to fill an office for a limited time until the
appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In
case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of
the President, such as the office of a department
secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter
ego of her choice as acting secretary before the
permanent appointee of her choice could assume office.
Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President
the obligation to appoint automatically the
undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego,
whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of
great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of
prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on
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the President who her alter ego should be. The office of a
department secretary may become vacant while
Congress is in session. Since a department secretary is
the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the
office must necessarily have the President’s confidence.
Thus, by the very nature of the office of a department
secretary, the President must appoint in an acting
capacity a person of her choice even while Congress is in
session. That person may or may not be the permanent
appointee, but practical reasons may make it expedient
that the acting appointee will also be the permanent
appointee. The law expressly allows the President to
make such acting appointment. Section 17, Chapter 5,
Title I, Book III of EO 292 states that “[t]he President
may temporarily designate an officer already in the
government service or any other competent person to
perform the functions of an office in the executive
branch.” Thus, the President may even appoint in an
acting capacity a person not yet in the government
service, as long as the President deems that person
competent. Pimentel, et al. assert that Section 17 does
not apply to appointments vested in the President by the
Constitution, because it only applies to appointments
vested in the President by law. Petitioners forget that
Congress is not the only source of law. “Law” refers to
the Constitution, statutes or acts of Congress, municipal
ordinances, implementing rules issued pursuant to law,
and judicial decisions. Finally, Pimentel, et al., claim that
the issuance of appointments in an acting capacity is
susceptible to abuse. They, however, fail to consider that
acting appointments cannot exceed one year as expressly
provided in Section 17(3), Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of
EO 292. The law has incorporated this safeguard to
prevent abuses, like the use of acting appointments as a
way to circumvent confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. In distinguishing ad interim appointments
from appointments in an acting capacity, a noted
textbook writer on constitutional law has observed that
"Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from
appointments in an acting capacity. Both of them are
effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments
are extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas
acting appointments may be extended any time there is a
vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments are
submitted to the Commission on Appointments for
confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not
submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting
appointments are a way of temporarily filling important
offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of
circumventing the need for confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments." The Court find no abuse
in the present case. The absence of abuse is readily
apparent from President Arroyo’s issuance of ad interim
appointments to Defensor et al. immediately upon the
recess of Congress, way before the lapse of
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2006
ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR vs. HONORABLE
OMBUDSMAN, EULOGIO M. MARIANO, JOSE D.
JIMENEZ, JR., TORIBIO E. ILAO, JR. and ERNESTO R.
SALENGA G.R. No. 136433 (December 6, 2006)
Facts:
Pending resolution on an agrarian case, the
instant case was instituted by the petitioner Antonio
Baltazar, an alleged nephew of Faustino Mercado, the
attorney-in-fact of the lot owner.
This was filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman, charging private respondents of conspiracy
through the issuance of the TRO in allowing respondent
Salenga to retain possession of the subject property.
Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion on
public respondent Ombudsman for allowing respondent
Ilao, Jr. to submit his Counter-Affidavit when the
preliminary investigation was already concluded and an
Information filed with the Sandiganbayan which assumed
jurisdiction over the criminal case. This contention is
utterly erroneous.
Issue/s:
a. Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing
b. Whether or not the ombudsman committed grave
abuse of discretion for allowing respondent Ilao, Jr. to
submit his Counter-Affidavit when the preliminary
investigation was already concluded
c. Whether or not the ombudsman committed grave
abuse of discretion in reversing his finding of probable
cause
Ruling:
a. Locus standi is defined as "a right of
appearance in a court of justice x x x on a given
question." In private suits, standing is governed by the
"real-parties-in interest" rule. Accordingly, the "real-
party-in interest" is "the party who stands to be benefited
or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit."
The records show that petitioner is a non-lawyer
appearing for himself and conducting litigation in person.
Petitioner instituted the instant case before the
Ombudsman in his own name. In so far as the
Complaint-Affidavit filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman is concerned, there is no question on his
authority and legal standing. The Ombudsman can act
on anonymous complaints and motu proprioinquire into
alleged improper official acts or omissions from whatever
source, e.g., a newspaper. Thus, any complainant may
be entertained by the Ombudsman for the latter to
initiate an inquiry and investigation for alleged
irregularities.
However, filing the petition in person before the
Supreme Court is another matter. The Rules allow a non-
lawyer to conduct litigation in person and appear for
oneself only when he is a party to a legal controversy.
In the case at bar which involves a criminal
proceeding stemming from a civil (agrarian) case, it is
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clear that petitioner is not a real party in interest. Except
being the complainant, and not being an agent of the
parties in the agrarian case, the petitioner is a stranger
to the agrarian case. Hence, the instant petition must be
dismissed on that score.
b. The graft court cannot be faulted in granting
the prayed for re-investigation as it can readily be seen
from the antecedent facts that respondent Ilao, Jr. was
not given the opportunity to file his Counter-Affidavit.
Courts are given wide latitude to accord the
accused ample opportunity to present controverting
evidence even before trial as demanded by due process.
Thus, we held inVillaflor v. Vivar that "[a] component
part of due process in criminal justice, preliminary
investigation is a statutory and substantive right
accorded to the accused before trial. To deny their claim
to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive them
of the full measure of their right to due process.
c. The Court will not delve into the merits of the
Ombudsman’s reversal of its initial finding of probable
cause or cause to bring respondents to trial. Petitioner
has not shown that the Ombudsman committed grave
abuse of discretion in rendering such reversal. The
function of determining the existence of probable cause is
proper for the Ombudsman in this case and the Court will
not tread on the realm of this executive function to
examine and assess evidence supplied by the parties,
which is supposed to be exercised at the start of criminal
proceedings. It cannot pass upon the sufficiency or
insufficiency of evidence to determine the existence of
probable cause.
ESTRADA VS. ESCRITOR [492 SCRA 1 ; AM NO P-02-
1651; 22 JUN 2006]
Facts:
Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the
RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living with Quilapio,
a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five
years and had a son with him as well. Respondent’s
husband died a year before she entered into the judiciary
while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman.
Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to
investigate respondent. According to complainant,
respondent should not be allowed to remain employed
therein for it will appear as if the court allows such act.
Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is
permitted by her religion—the Jehovah’s Witnesses and
the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They
allegedly have a ‘Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness’
under the approval of their congregation. Such a
declaration is effective when legal impediments render it
impossible for a couple to legalize their union.
Issues:
Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for
such conjugal arrangement.
Ruling:
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No. The State could not penalize respondent for
she is exercising her right to freedom of religion. The free
exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the
fundamental rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put it,
it is the most inalienable and sacred of human rights. The
State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be
merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently
compelling to outweigh a freeexercise claim. In the case
at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in
enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against
respondent or her partner. Thus the State’s interest only
amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced
prohibition.
Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular
morality and religious morality should be kept in mind.
The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and
secular morality.
The Court further states that our Constitution adheres
the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for
accommodation of religious exercises as required by the
Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could
allow for accommodation of morality based on religion,
provided it does not offend compelling state interests.
Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a
compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate
that the state has used the least intrusive means possible
so that the freeexercise is not infringed any more than
necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state.
Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it
constitutes an exemption to the law based on her right to
freedom of religion.
OSCAR Z. BENARES vs. JOSEPHINE LIM, G.R. No.
173421 (December 14, 2006)
Facts:
Petitioner Oscar Beñares was accused of estafa.
Trial thereafter ensued. After the prosecution
presented its last witness, it was given 15 days to
formally offer its evidence. However, the prosecution did
not make any formal offer of evidence, hence petitioner
filed a motion praying that the prosecution's submission
of formal offer of evidence be deemed waived and the
case dismissed for lack of evidence. The motion was
granted; the case was dismissed.
Respondent moved to reconsider the order of
dismissal claiming that she had difficulty securing
documents from the court which were marked during trial;
Motion for Reconsideration was granted.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the
RTC. In granting the petition, the RTC noted that the
MeTC Order dismissing the case for failure to prosecute
"had the effect of an acquittal" which is "a bar to another
prosecution for the offense charged.”
The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC's
Resolution.
Issue/s:
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a. Whether or not the right of the petitioner to speedy
trial was violated
b. Whether or not the petitioner has the right to
invoke double jeopardy
Ruling:
a. Double jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a
valid indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3) after
arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered,
and (5) when the defendant was convicted or acquitted,
or the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused.
In the instant case, there is no question as to
the presence of the first four elements. As to the last
element, there was yet no conviction, nor an acquittal on
the ground that petitioner's guilt has not been proven
beyond reasonable doubt, but the dismissal of the case
was based on failure to prosecute.
A dismissal with the express consent or upon
motion of the accused does not result in double jeopardy,
except in two instances, to wit: (1) the dismissal is based
on insufficiency of evidence or (2) the case is dismissed
for violation of the accused's right to speedy
trial. However,..
b. Petitioner's claim that the prosecution's delay
in filing its formal offer of evidence violated his right to
speedy trial is not well taken.
It appears that there was justifiable reason for
the prosecution's failure to formally offer its evidence on
time, i.e., the documents which were previously marked
in court were misplaced. There is no showing that the
criminal case was unreasonably prolonged nor there was
deliberate intent on the part of the petitioner to cause
delay in the proceedings resulting to serious and great
prejudice affecting the substantial rights of the accused.
Delay is not a mere mathematical computation of the
time involved. Each case must be decided upon the facts
peculiar to it. Since the delay was not vexatious or
oppressive, it follows that petitioner's right to speedy trial
was not violated, consequently he cannot properly invoke
his right against double jeopardy. Petition is DENIED.
AMELIA CABRERA vs. MANUEL LAPID, FERNANDO
BALTAZAR, REYNALDO F. CABRERA and DIONY
VENTURA, G.R. No. 129098 (December 6, 2006)
Facts:
Petitioner Amelia M. Cabrera accused
respondents of violating Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act and Article 324 of the Revised
Penal Code.
In her Complaint-Affidavit, petitioner stated that
she entered into a lease agreement with the Municipality
of Sasmuan over a tract of land for the purpose of
devoting it to fishpond operations. A month later,
petitioner learned from newspaper reports of the
impending demolition of her fishpond as it was
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purportedly illegal and blocked the flow of the Pasak
River. Despite pleas from petitioner, respondents
ordered the destruction of petitioner's fishpond.
At the preliminary investigation, respondents,
except Senior Superintendent Ventura, submitted
counter-affidavits, denying the accusations against them.
In the counter-affidavit jointly filed by Mayor Baltazar
and Vice-Mayor Cabrera, they insisted that contrary to
petitioner's claim, the fishpond was an illegal structure
because it was erected on the seashore, at the mouth of
the Pasak River, and sat on an inalienable land. They
claimed that the demolition was done by the Task
Force Bilis Daloy upon the directive of then President
Fidel V. Ramos.
On 13 May 1996, the Ombudsman issued the
assailed Resolution, dismissing petitioner's complaint.
The dismissal was based on the declaration that the
fishpond was a nuisance per se and, thus, may be abated
by respondents in the exercise of the police power of the
State.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the Supreme Court can review the
exercise of discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting
or dismissing a complaint filed before it.
Ruling:
Clearly, this is an appeal from the questioned
issuances of the Ombudsman. However, such direct
resort to this Court from a resolution or order of the
Ombudsman is not sanctioned by any rule of procedure.
Neither can petitioner avail of Sec. 27 of R.A. No.
6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989.
The provision allowed direct appeals in administrative
disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to
the Supreme Court. The right to appeal is granted only in
respect to orders or decisions of the Ombudsman in
administrative cases. The provision does not cover
resolutions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases. More
importantly, Sec. 27 of R.A. No. 6770 insofar as it
allowed a direct appeal to this Court was declared
unconstitutional in Fabian v. Hon. Desierto
However, an aggrieved party in criminal actions
is not without any recourse. Where grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
taints the findings of the Ombudsman on the existence of
probable cause, the aggrieved party may file a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not
enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so
patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
Grave abuse of discretion should be
differentiated from an error in judgment. An error of
judgment is one which the court may commit in the
exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reversible
only by an appeal. As long as the court acts within its
jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise
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of its discretion will amount to nothing more than mere
errors of judgment, correctible by an appeal or a petition
for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. An error
of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was
issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction
and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary
writ of certiorari.
Absent any grave abuse of discretion tainting it,
the courts will not interfere with the Ombudsman's
supervision and control over the preliminary investigation
conducted by him. It is beyond the ambit of this Court to
review the exercise of discretion of the Ombudsman in
prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before it. The
rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory
and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to
the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as
well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be
grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing
the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by
the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints
filed before it, in much the same way that the courts
would be extremely swamped if they would be compelled
to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the
fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to
file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a
private complainant.
Petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.
CATERPILLAR, INC. vs. MANOLO P. SAMSON, G.R.
No. 164605 (October 27, 2006)
Facts:
Petitioner Caterpillar, Inc. is a foreign
corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing
shoes, clothing items, among others. Upon the request of
petitioner, the Regional Intelligence Investigation
Division-National Capital Region Police Office (RIID-
NCRPO) filed search warrant applications against
respondent Manolo P. Samson for violations of unfair
competition, provided under the Intellectual Property
Code. On the same day, the trial court issued five search
warrants against respondent and his business
establishments.
Respondent filed a Consolidated Motion to Quash
the search warrants. Pending the resolution thereof,
RIID-NCRPO filed five complaints against the respondent
and his affiliate entities before the Department of Justice
(DOJ). Later, the trial court issued an order denying the
respondent’s motion to quash, but nevertheless directed
the release of the articles seized on the ground that no
criminal action had been commenced against respondent.
The Court of Appeals denied the Petition for lack
of merit ruling that there was no arbitrariness in the way
the trial court exercised its discretionary power to release
the items seized in the absence of a criminal action filed
in court. It also noted that the criminal complaints filed
before the DOJ that underwent preliminary investigation
were all dismissed by the investigating prosecutor.
Issue/s:
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Whether or not the facts that no criminal complaint had
been filed against the private respondent and the
subsequent dismissal by the investigating state
prosecutor justify the immediate return of the seized
items.
Ruling:
The petitioner asserts that the seized articles
can only be returned when a criminal case can no longer
possibly materialize since the seized articles are crucial to
the eventual prosecution of the respondent.
The petitioner’s assertion is incongruent with the
peculiar circumstances of this case. The articles seized –
the thousands of articles of clothing, footwear, and
accessories, among others - had little, if any, evidentiary
value for the criminal action for unfair competition, which
the petitioner expected to file.
There exists a constitutional safeguard against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The Constitution,
however, does not provide a blanket prohibition against
all searches and seizures, rather the fundamental
protection accorded by the search and seizure clause is
that between persons and the police, there must stand
the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with the
power to issue or refuse such search warrant. Yet, the
responsibilities of the magistrate do not end with the
granting of the warrant, but extends to the custody of
the articles seized. In exercising custody over these
articles, the property rights of the owner should be
balanced with the social need to preserve evidence,
which will be used in the prosecution of a case.
In the instant case, no criminal action had been
prosecuted for almost a year. Thus, the court had been
left with the custody of highly depreciable merchandise.
More importantly, these highly depreciable articles would
have been superfluous if presented as evidence for the
following reasons: (1) the respondent had already
admitted that he is the owner of the merchandise seized,
which made use of the trademarks in dispute; (2) the
court required the respondent to execute an undertaking
to produce the articles seized when the court requires
and had already in its possession a complete inventory of
the items seized as secondary evidence; (3) actual
samples of the respondent’s merchandise are in the
possession of the police officers who had applied for the
search warrant, and photographs thereof had been made
part of the records, and respondent did not dispute that
these were obtained from his stores. Where the purpose
of presenting as evidence the articles seized is no longer
served, there is no justification for severely curtailing the
rights of a person to his property.
In ordering the return of the articles seized, the
trial court had reasonably exercised its discretion in
determining from the circumstances of the case what
constitutes a reasonable and unreasonable search and
seizure.
Petition denied.
LECA REALTY CORPORATION vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Represented by the Department of
Public Works and Highways, G.R. No. 155605
(September 27, 2006)
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Facts:
On 18 March 1996, the Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH), filed a complaint for
eminent domain for the taking of some portions of the
properties of the private respondents.
On October 7, 1997, the court a quo appointed
three (3) competent and disinterested persons; as
commissioners to ascertain and report the just
compensation of the properties sought to be taken.
On January 9, 1998, the commissioners
submitted their report dated January 8, 1998, and
recommended the fair market value of the subject
properties.
In arriving at the said Report, the
Commissioners took into consideration the following
factors: property location, identification[,] neighborhood
data, community facilities and utilities, highest and best
use, valuation and reasonable indication of land values
within the vicinity.
"On March 30, 1998, the court rendered the
decision whereby the Commissioners' Report was
adopted."7
The CA affirmed the lower court's judgment. The
appellate court likewise debunked the contention of the
Republic of the Philippines that the commissioners had
erred in fixing the fair market values of the properties,
because the appraisals exceeded the zonal values
determined in Department of Finance Order No. 71-96.
The CA held that the zonal valuation was made for
taxation purposes only and was not necessarily reflective
of the actual market values of the properties in the area.
Issue/s:
Whether or not just compensation was properly
determined.
Ruling:
Just compensation, is the full and fair equivalent
of a property taken from its owner by the expropriator.
The measure is not the taker's gain, but the owner's loss.
Note must be taken that the word "just" is used to stress
the meaning of the word "compensation," in order to
convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for
the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full
and ample.
Necessarily, just compensation must not be
arrived at arbitrarily, but determined after an evaluation
of different factors. In the present case, the
Commissioners' Report made use of the so-called
market-data approach in arriving at the valuation of the
properties. In this method, the value of the land is based
on sales and listings of comparable property registered
within the vicinity.
Well-settled is the rule that in expropriation
proceedings, the value of a property must be determined
either as of the date of the taking of the property or the
filing of the complaint, whichever comes first. In this case,
the Complaint was filed on March 18, 1996, and the trial
court issued the Writ of Possession on June 19, 1997.
The offers cited in the Commissioners' Report, though,
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were made between May 1996 to February 1997, a
period after the filing of the Complaint on March 18, 1996.
Thus, there is no evidence on record of the fair market
value of the property as of March 1996.
Moreover, the offers for sale were good for
properties inside the Ortigas Center.41 Thus, those offers
cannot be used as bases for the values of properties
along EDSA, where the property of Petitioner Leca is
situated. In fact, no listing or evidence of concluded sales
was submitted for properties in areas outside the Ortigas
Center. While it is true that adjoining properties may be
valued differently, competent evidence still has to be
presented to establish the differences in market values.
The Republic is incorrect, however, in alleging
that the values were exorbitant, merely because they
exceeded the maximum zonal value of real properties in
the same location where the subject properties were
located. The zonal value may be one, but not necessarily
the sole, index of the value of a realty.
Petition of Leca Realty Corporation is remanded
to the trial court for the proper determination of the
amount of just compensation.
RUPERTO LUCERO, JR., PABLO LUCERO and
ANTONIO TENORIO, vs. CITY GOVERNMENT OF
PASIG, as represented by the Market
Administrator, G.R. No. 132834 (November 24,
2006)
Facts:
Petitioners were granted lease contracts to
occupy and operate stalls in the public market of Pasig by
virtue of Municipal Ordinance No. 25, series of 1983.
Later, the municipal government of Pasig
renovated the market facilities and constructed annex
buildings to the old public market. The Sangguniang
Bayan of Pasig then enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 56,
series of 1993, entitled "An Ordinance Prescribing the
Rules and Regulations in Occupying and Using Market
Stalls and Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof."
Pursuant to the new ordinance, municipal
officials urged all stall occupants to fill up and submit the
necessary application forms which would serve as the
lease contract.
Petitioners, however, refused to apply for a new
lease on their market stalls. Hence, the city government
of Pasig filed a complaint for ejectment against
petitioners for failing to pay the required P10,000
performance bond and their rental fees since January
1994 as required by the municipal ordinance.
Petitioners mainly assail the non-renewal of their
lease contracts on stalls in the public market when they
did not comply with the requirements of the new
ordinance. They claim to have a vested right to the
possession, use and enjoyment of the market stalls
based on their 1983 lease contracts. This, they assert,
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could not be impaired by the enactment of Municipal
Ordinance No. 56 in 1993.
The MTC ruled in favor of petitioners and
dismissed the complaint; The RTC reversed the MTC
decision and decided in favor of the city government.
The appeal by the petitioners was denied by the CA.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the petitioners can are covered by
Municipal Ordinance No. 56 in 1993
Ruling:
Contrary to petitioners’ contention that they
were no longer covered by the 1993 ordinance their 1983
lease contracts did not grant them irrefutable rights to
the market stalls. They were mere grantees of a privilege
to occupy and operate such booths.
What petitioners had was a license to occupy
and operate particular stalls over a period of time. Their
possession and use of these facilities could not be
characterized as fixed and absolute.
It was within the ambit of the Sanggunian’s
authority in the exercise of police power to regulate the
enjoyment of the privilege to lease the market stalls. The
enactment of the Municipal Ordinance No. 56, series of
1993 repealing Municipal Ordinance No. 25, series of
1983 (the basis of petitioners’ lease) was a valid exercise
of such governmental authority to regulate the
possession and use of the public market and its facilities.
The lease (and occupation) of a stall in a public
market is not a right but a purely statutory privilege
governed by laws and ordinances. The operation of a
market stall by virtue of a license is always subject to the
police power of the city government. An application for
this privilege may be granted or refused for reasons of
public policy and sound public administration. The city
government, through its market administrator, is not
duty-bound to grant lease privileges to any applicant,
least of all those who refuse to obey the new ordinance
prescribing the rules and regulations for the market stalls.
Moreover, a public market is one dedicated to
the service of the general public and operated under
government control and supervision as a public utility.
Hence, the operation of a public market and its facilities
is imbued with public interest. Petitioners’ 1983 lease
contracts contained an implied reservation of the police
power as a postulate of the existing legal order. This
power could be exercised any time to change the
provisions of the contracts or even abrogate them
entirely, for the protection of the general welfare. Such
an act did not violate the non-impairment clause which is
anyway subject to and limited by the paramount police
power.
Petition denied.
NS TRANSPORT EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (NSTEA),
et. al., vs. NS TRANSPORT SERVICES, INC.(NSTS),
NICANOR SORIANO, JAIME MENDOZA, and
TERESITA MENDOZA, G.R. No. 164049 (October 30,
2006)
Facts:
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In a proceeding before the NLRC for compulsory
arbitration to settle a dispute between the NSTEA (the
Union) and the NSTS (the Company), the labor arbiter
ruled in favour of the Union, holding that the strike
staged by the Union was legal.
The company sought reconsideration of the
resolution, claiming that it was denied due process when
they were not allowed to adduce evidence on the
illegality of the strike and the violation of the Return-to-
Work Order. The NLRC dismissed the motion without
resolving the company’s protest on the lack of notice of
the hearings.
The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the
company and remanded the case to the NLRC for further
proceedings. Petitioners claim that the NLRC did not
violate the company’s right to due process since its
resolutions were based on the parties’ respective
pleadings and on the records of the case.
Respondents maintain that the company was
deprived of its constitutional right to due process when
the NLRC disallowed it to present its evidence due to the
conceived "failure to attend" the three (3) scheduled
hearings, when in fact the company and its counsel were
not notified of the hearings since the NLRC sent the
notice of said hearings to a wrong address
Issue/s:
Whether or not the Company was deprived of its
constitutional right to due process
Ruling:
In labor cases, it has been held that due process
is simply an opportunity to be heard and not that an
actual hearing should always and indispensably be held
since a formal type or trial-type hearing is not at all times
and in all instances essential to due process the
requirements of which are satisfied where the parties are
afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their
side of controversy.
The holding of an adversarial trial is
discretionary on the labor arbiter and the parties cannot
demand it as a matter of right. However, when such a
formal hearing is allowed but a party is not informed
thereof, as a consequence of which he is unable to attend
the same, such failure to attend should not be taken
against him. As the labor arbiter allowed the holding of a
formal hearing, he must accord the parties the
opportunity to participate therein and allow the formal
hearing to proceed its natural course, if due process and
the elements of fair play are to be observed.
In the instant case, the labor arbiter has granted
his imprimatur on the holding of a formal hearing, as
agreed upon by the parties. However, the company was
not given the chance to exercise the same privilege,
since the case was submitted for decision even before it
was able to adduce its evidence during the formal
hearing.
While the speedy and inexpensive disposition of
cases is much desired and should be pursued, the swift
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resolution of labor disputes is counterproductive if it is
achieved through a lop-sided hearing and at the expense
of the employer’s rights. Thus, it has been held that while
labor laws mandate the speedy disposition of cases with
the least attention to technicalities, the fundamental
requisites of due process must not be sacrificed.
Petition denied.
RUBEN S. SIA and JOSEPHINE SIA vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES and TERESITA LEE, G.R. No.
159659 (October 12, 2006)
Facts:
Petitioners were charged with three counts of
violation of Section 17 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
957, otherwise known as The Subdivision and
Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree.
The trial court appointed a counsel de oficio for
petitioner Ruben S. Sia and proceeded with the
arraignment. Petitioners asserted that petitioner Ruben
was denied his right to counsel when the trial court
forced him to enter a plea with only a counsel de oficio.
The appellate court ruled that the trial court did
not transgress petitioner Ruben S. Sia's right to counsel
since the preference in the choice of counsel expressed in
Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution does not
necessarily mean that such choice by a person under
investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally
competent and independent lawyers from handling the
defense.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the petitioner Ruben S. Sia deprived of
his right to counsel when only a counsel de
oficio assisted him during his arraignment despite his
insistence to be assisted by their newly hired
counsel de parte
Ruling:
We agree with the herein respondent Lee when
she said that petitioners were given ample time by the
trial court to get a counsel of their choice, but did not.
Through the course of the proceedings, the petitioners
filed several motions. In its Orders dated November 21,
2001, the trial court noted that although the informations
were filed on August 7, 2000, the petitioners have not
yet been arraigned as of that day. The delay could no
longer be countenanced.
Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
assuring an accused of counsel of his choice pertains
specifically to a person under investigation. Even if we
were to extend the choice of a counsel to an accused in a
criminal prosecution, the matter of the accused getting a
lawyer of his preference cannot be so absolute and
arbitrary as would make the choice of counsel refer
exclusively to the predilection of the accused. In Amion v.
Chiongson this Court stated:
Withal, the word "preferably" under Section
12(1), Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution does not convey
the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person
under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other
equally competent and independent attorneys from
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handling his defense. If the rule were otherwise, then,
the tempo of a custodial investigation, will be solely in
the hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct
the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a
lawyer, who for one reason or another, is not available to
protect his interest. This absurd scenario could not have
been contemplated by the framers of the charter.
SIME DARBY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, GR
148021 (December 6, 2006)
Facts:
Due to a deadlock in the negotiations regarding
the Collective Bargaining Agreement of the Union and the
Company resulting to a lockout and dismissal of some
employees, the dispute was brought before the NLRC.
Labor arbiter ruled in favour of the Company,
dismissing for lack of merit the petitioner’s complaints.
Petitioner appealed the arbiter’s decision to the
NLRC. It was dismissed for lack of merit. The Court of
Appeals denied the appeal.
Petitioner argued that had the labor arbiter
allowed them to present evidence during a formal trial,
the decision would have been different.
Respondents maintains that the decisions of the
labor arbiter and the NLRC and the Court of Appeals are
supported by substantial evidence.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the labor arbiter erred in not holding a
formal hearing.
Ruling:
Petitioners’ argument that had the labor arbiter
allowed respondents to present their evidence during the
formal trial, the Decision would have been different,
cannot be sustained. As previously stated, the labor
arbiter enjoys wide discretion in determining whether
there is a need for a formal hearing in a given case, and
he or she may use all reasonable means to ascertain the
facts of each case without regard to technicalities. With
or without a formal hearing, the labor arbiter may still
adequately decide the case since he can resolve the
issues on the basis of the pleadings and other
documentary evidence previously submitted. When the
parties submitted their position papers and other
pertinent pleadings to the labor arbiter, it is
understood/given/deemed that they have included
therein all the pieces of evidence needed to establish
their respective cases. The rationale for this rule is
explained by the Court in one case, thus:
(P)etitioner believes that had there been a
formal hearing, the arbiter’s alleged mistaken reliance on
some of the documentary evidence submitted by parties
would have been cured and remedied by them,
presumably through the presentation of controverting
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evidence. Evidently, this postulate is not in consonance
with the need for speedy disposition of labor cases, for
the parties may then willfully withhold their evidence and
disclose the same only during the formal hearing, thus
creating surprises which could merely complicate the
issues and prolong the trial. There is a dire need to
lessen technicalities in the process of settling labor
disputes."
SKECHERS, U.S.A., INC. vs. INTER PACIFIC
INDUSTRIAL TRADING CORP., et al. G.R. No.
164321 (November 30, 2006)
Facts:
Petitioner is a foreign corporation existing under
the laws of the State of California, United States of
America and engaged in the manufacture of footwear.
Petitioner is not doing business in the Philippines and is
suing before the trial court only to protect its intellectual
property rights.
Petitioner engaged the services of a private
investigative firm, to conduct an investigation on Inter
Pacific Industrial Trading Corporation (Inter Pacific) in
coordination with the NBI to confirm if Inter Pacific is
indeed engaged in the importation, distribution and sale
of unauthorized products bearing counterfeit or
unauthorized trademarks owned by petitioner.
Special Investigator Borromeo of the NBI, with a
witness, applied for warrants against the warehouse and
outlet store being operated and managed by respondent
for infringement of trademark.
After personally examining the search warrant
applicant and his witness, the court a quo found probable
cause to issue the search warrants applied for and thus
issued on the same day. That same afternoon, the
search warrants were simultaneously served by the
operatives of the Intellectual Property Rights Division of
the NBI.
After concluding that there are glaring
differences that an ordinary prudent purchaser would not
likely be mislead or confused in purchasing the wrong
article, the lower court issued the assailed Order
quashing Search Warrant and directing the NBI to return
to respondents the items seized by virtue of said search
warrant.
Issue/s:
Whether or not that the trial court may be faulted for
quashing the search warrants.
Ruling:
The power to issue search warrants is
exclusively vested with the trial judges in the exercise of
their judicial function. And inherent in the courts’ power
to issue search warrants is the power to quash warrants
already issued. After the judge has issued a warrant, he
is not precluded to subsequently quash the same, if he
finds upon re-evaluation of the evidence that no probable
cause exists.
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In the determination of probable cause, the

court must necessarily resolve whether or not an offense
exists to justify the issuance or quashal of the search
warrant. In the case at bar, the subject search warrant
was issued allegedly in connection with trademark
infringement, particularly the unauthorized use of the "S"
logo by respondent in their Strong rubber shoes. After
conducting the hearing on the application for a search
warrant, the court a quo was initially convinced that
there was sufficient reason to justify the issuance of the
search warrant. However, upon motion of respondent to
quash the search warrant, the lower court changed its
position and declared that there was no probable cause
to issue the search warrant as there was no colorable
imitation between respondent’s trademark and that of
petitioner.
In ruling that there was no colorable imitation of
petitioner’s trademark in light of the factual milieu
prevalent in the instant case, the trial court may not be
faulted for reversing its initial finding that there was
probable cause. Based on the courts’ inherent power to
issue search warrants and to quash the same, the courts
must be provided with the opportunity to correct itself of
an error inadvertently committed. After reevaluating the
evidence presented before it, the trial court may reverse
its initial finding of probable cause in order that its
conclusion may be made to conform to the facts
prevailing in the instant case.

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2007
ROMONAFE CORP. vs NATIONAL POWER CORP.
(NPC) GR No. 168122, January 30, 2007
Facts:
Respondent National Power Corporation is a government
owned and controlled corporation which filed a complaint
on July 12, 1995 for eminent domain with the Regional
Trial Court of Imus, Cavite against Romonafe Corporation
and Vine Development Corporation. The trial court
designated commissioners to determine just
compensation for the properties involved in this case.
NPC filed an opposition to the commissioner’s valuation
on the ground that the valuation used as basis the
present (1997) market value of the property instead of
the market value on July 12, 1995, the time of the filing
of the complaint. The trial court rendered judgment
ordering plaintiff to pay defendant based on the value
starting from the time the plaintiff took possession of the
property up to the time the full amount have been paid.
NPC thus filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals.
During the pendency of the appeal, the appellate court
received the Compromise Agreement between NPC and
Romonafe. The Office of the Solicitor General questioned
such compromise agreement on the ground that the
attorneys of the NPC who signed the agreement were not
authorized to sign in its behalf. The appellate court
nullified the compromise agreement for being
disadvantageous to the government as it is against public
policy. It further ruled that the market value of the
expropriated parcel of land is fixed at P1,500 per square
meter.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the payment of just
compensation is based upon the filing of the
complaint
2. Whether or not the compromise agreement
entered into by NPC and Romonafe is valid
Ruling:
On the first issue, the court held in the
affirmative. Just compensation is to be determined as of
the date of the taking of the of the property or the filing
of the complaint whichever comes first. In the case at bar,
just compensation should thus be determined as of July
12, 1995 when the expropriation case was filed before
the trial court.
On the second issue, the court
remanded the to the appellate court.
PEOPLE vs ANONAS,GR No. 156847, January 31,
2007
Facts:
SPO4 Emiliano Anonas, respondent, assigned at
the Western Police District, was apprehended by his
colleagues during a raid in Sta. Cruz, Manila. The
apprehending police officers claimed that he and four
other persons were sniffing methamphetamine
Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!
hydrochloride, more popularly known as shabu, a
regulated drug; and that he was in possession of an
unlicensed .38 caliber revolver.
City Prosecutor of Manila filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) two separate Informations against
respondent, one for illegal possession of
methamphetamine hydrochloride and another for illegal
possession of firearm.
Respondent filed with the trial court a motion for
reinvestigation on ground that he was apprehended
without a warrant of arrest and that no preliminary
investigation was conducted. trial court granted
respondent’s motion.However, Prosecutor Virgilio Patag,
designated to conduct the reinvestigation, was appointed
judge of the RTC in Iloilo. Apparently, he did not inform
the prosecutor who took his place about the pending
reinvestigation. Meanwhile, respondent has remained in
detention.
Respondent filed with the trial court a motion to
dismiss the Informations, contending that the delay in
the reinvestigation violated his right to due process. The
trial court issued an order denying respondent’s motion
to dismiss the Informations. Respondent then filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. Court of
Appeals granted the petition, dismissed the criminal
charges against respondent and ordered that respondent
be released from custody. The Government, represented
by the Solicitor General, moved for reconsideration but
was denied.
Issue/s:
Wether the appellate court erred in holding that
respondent’s right to due process has been violated
Ruling:
No. Section 16, Article III of the 1987
Constitution provides that “All persons shall have the
right to speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.” There
can be no question that respondent was prejudiced by
the delay, having to be confined for more than four
oppressive years for failure of the investigating
prosecutors to comply with the law on preliminary
investigation. As aptly held by the Court of Appeals,
respondent’s right to due process had been violated.
UNITED BF HOMEOWNER’S ASSOC. INC. vs THE
(MUNICIPAL) CITY MAYOR,GR No. 141010,
February 7, 2007
Facts:
BF Homes Parañaque Subdivision with a land
area straddling the cities of Parañaque, Las Piñas, and
Muntinlupa, is the largest subdivision in the country.
Municipal Council of Parañaque enacted Municipal
Ordinance reclassifying El Grande and Aguirre Avenues in
BF Homes Parañaque from residential to commercial
areas.
Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of
the Municipal Ordinance alleging that the reclassification
of certain portions of BF Homes Parañaque from
residential to commercial zone is unconstitutional
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because it amounts to impairment of the contracts
between the developer of BF Homes Parañaque and the
lot buyers.
Public respondents alleged that the passage of
the Municipal Ordinance is a valid exercise of police
power by the Municipal Council of Parañaque and that
such ordinance can nullify or supersede the contractual
obligations entered into by the petitioners and the
developer.
El Grande Aguirre Commerce and Trade
Organization (EL ACTO), a non-stock, non-profit
corporation, intervened as respondent EL ACTO asserted
that the Municipal Ordinance is a valid exercise of police
power and that petitioners are guilty of estoppel since
petitioners endorsed the opening of many of these
commercial establishments in BF Homes Parañaque.
Court of Appeals held that the enactment of
Municipal Ordinance was a valid exercise of police power
by the Municipality of Parañaque.
Issue/s:
Whether the Municipal Ordinance is
unconstitutional considering that it impairs a
contractual obligation annotated in homeowners’ titles
and violates the doctrine of separation of powers
Ruling:
Under Section 447 of RA 7160, the Sangguniang
Bayan or the Municipal Council, as the legislative body of
the municipality, has the power to enact ordinances for
the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants.
There was no sufficient evidence disputing the regularity
of the enactment of the Municipal Ordinance. Before the
Municipal Council of Parañaque passed the Municipal
Ordinance, it has been the subject of barangay
consultations and committee hearings in accordance with
Executive Order No. 72 and is found to be reasonable and
not discriminating or oppressive with respect to BF
Homes Parañaque. Moreover, several homeowners along
El Grande and Aguirre Avenues already converted their
residences into business establishments. As found by the
Court of Appeals, El Grande and Aguirre Avenues are
main thoroughfares in BF Homes Parañaque which have
long been commercialized.
The Court has upheld in several cases the
superiority of police power over the non-impairment
clause. The constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of
contracts is limited by the exercise of the police power of
the State, in the interest of public health, safety, morals
and general welfare. The Municipal Ordinance is a
legitimate exercise of police power and the
reclassification of El Grande and Aguirre Avenues in BF
Homes Parañaque is not arbitrary or unreasonable.
PEST MGT. ASSOC. OF PHILS. (PMAP) vs
FERTILIZER AND PESTICIDE AUTHORITY (FPA), GR
No. 156041, February 21, 2007
Facts:
Petitioner, a non-stock corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines,
is an association of pesticide handlers duly licensed by
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respondent Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA). It
questioned the validity of Section 3.12 of the 1987
Pesticide Regulatory Policies and Implementing
Guidelines. Petitioner argued that the specific provision
on the protection of the proprietary data in FPA’s
Pesticide Regulatory Policies and Implementing
Guidelines is unlawful for going counter to the objectives
of Presidential Decree No. 1144 (P.D. No. 1144); for
exceeding the limits of delegated authority; and for
encroaching on the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Intellectual Property Office.
Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that
the provision on the protection of proprietary data in the
FPA's Pesticide Regulatory Policies and Implementing
Guidelines is valid and legal as it does not violate the
objectives of P.D. No. 1144; the proprietary data are a
substantial asset which must be protected; the protection
for a limited number of years does not constitute
unlawful restraint of free trade; and such provision does
not encroach upon the jurisdiction of the Intellectual
Property Office.
Respondents expound that since under P.D. No.
1144, the FPA is mandated to regulate, control and
develop the pesticide industry, it was necessary to
provide for such protection of proprietary data, otherwise,
pesticide handlers will proliferate to the the detriment of
the industry and the public since the inherent toxicity of
pesticides are hazardous and are potential environmental
contaminants respondents emphasize that the provision
on protection of proprietary data does not usurp the
functions of the Intellectual Property Office (IPO) since a
patent and data protection are two different matters.
Issue/s:
Did the FPA go beyond its delegated power and
undermine the objectives of P.D. No. 1144 by issuing
regulations that provide for protection of proprietary
data?
Ruling:
The answer is in the negative As stated in the
Preamble of said decree, “there is an urgent need to
create a technically-oriented government authority
equipped with the required expertise to regulate, control
and develop both the fertilizer and the pesticide
industries.”
Under P.D. No. 1144, the FPA is given the broad
power to issue rules and regulations to implement and
carry out the purposes and provisions of said decree, i.e.,
to regulate, control and develop the pesticide industry. In
furtherance of such ends, the FPA sees the protection of
proprietary data as one way of fulfilling its mandate.
PEOPLE vs. NUEVAS, GR No. 170233, February 22,
2007
Facts:
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Jesus Nuevas was charged before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City with illegal possession
of marijuana. Reynaldo Din and Fernando Inocencio were
likewise charged with the same crime. RTC rendered a
Decision finding all accused in the above-entitled cases
guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the warrantless searches and seizure
made by the police officers is valid and the evidence
obtained by virture thereof is admissible
Ruling:
First, the Court holds that the searches and
seizures conducted do not fall under the first exception,
warrantless searches incidental to lawful arrests. Arrest
must precede the search; the process cannot be reversed
as in this case where the search preceded the arrest.
Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous
with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have
probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the
search.
In this case, Nuevas, Din and Inocencio
were not committing a crime in the presence of the police
officers. Moreover, police officers Fami and Cabling did
not have personal knowledge of the facts indicating that
the persons to be arrested had committed an offense.
The searches conducted on the plastic bag then cannot
be said to be merely incidental to a lawful arrest.
Secondly, neither could the searches be justified
under the plain view doctrine. If the package is such that
an experienced observer could infer from its appearance
that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is
deemed in plain view. It must be immediately apparent
to the police that the items that they observe may be
evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to
seizure.
Records show that the dried marijuana
leaves were inside the plastic bags that Nuevas and Din
were carrying and were not readily apparent or
transparent to the police officers. In Nuevas’s case, the
dried marijuana leaves found inside the plastic bag were
wrapped inside a blue cloth. In Din’s case, the marijuana
found upon inspection of the plastic bag was “packed in
newspaper and wrapped therein.” It cannot be therefore
said the items were in plain view which could have
justified mere seizure of the articles without further
search.
On the other hand, the Court finds that the
search conducted in Nuevas’s case was made with his
consent. The Court is convinced that he indeed
voluntarily surrendered the incriminating bag to the
police officers. However, with respect to the search
conducted in the case of Din, the Court finds that no such
consent had actually been given. Thus the Court modified
the judgment. Appellants Reynaldo Din and Fernando
are ACQUITTED.
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GARCIA vs J.G. SUMMIT PETROCHEMICAL CORP. GR
No. 127925, February 23, 2007
Facts:
Respondent J.G. Summit Petrochemical
Corporation was registered by the BOI as a new domestic
producer of polyethylene and polypropylene resins, for
which it was issued on May 24, 1994 BOI Certificate of
Registration. Respondent informed the BOI that its plant
would be located in barangay Alangilanan, Manjuyod,
Negros Oriental. On January 29, 1996, however, it
advised the Board in writing that its plant site would be
located in barangay Simlong, Batangas City, instead of
Negros Oriental. BOI caused the publication of
respondent’s amended application for registration in a
newspaper of general publication to enable interested
persons to file their sworn objections within one (1) week
from said publication.
In due time, petitioner and concerned residents
of barangay Simlong, Batangas submitted separate
letters of opposition Petitioner objected to the Batangas
plant site, citing as basis the 1990 decision of this Court
in G.R. No. 92024, which annulled the Board’s approval
of the change of plant site from Bataan to Batangas, and
of feedstock from naphtha only to naphtha and/or
liquefied petroleum gas (LPG). He argued that by the
said decision, this Court declared the Bataan
petrochemical zone as the only possible site for
petrochemical plants as provided for under P.D. Nos. 949
and 1803.
Issue/s:
Whether Presidential Decree (P.D.) Nos. 949 and
1803, the laws creating a petrochemical complex in
Limay, Bataan, prohibit the establishment of a
petrochemical facility outside of it.
Whether or not petitioners were denied due
process and access to information of national concern
Ruling:
The Court ruled “that the establishment of a
petrochemical plant in Batangas does not violate P.D.
949 and P.D. 1803.” What is clear then is that the law
reserved an area for a petrochemical industrial zone in
Bataan and that PNOC was to operate, manage and
develop it. There is, however, nothing further in the law
to indicate that the choice of Limay, Bataan as a
petrochemical zone was exclusive. On the contrary, the
use of the word “may” in the proviso of Section 2 runs
counter to the exclusivity of the Bataan site because it
makes it merely directory, rather than mandatory, for the
PNOC to lease, sell and/or convey portions of the
petrochemical industrial zone to private entities or
persons locating their plants therein. When the law
makes no distinction, the Court should not distinguish.
As for petitioner’s claim that he was denied due
process and access to information of national concern
because of the Board’s omission to make the SRI report
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known before and during the hearings of respondent’s
amended application, it is bereft of merit. Petitioner has
not denied having actively participated in the August 23,
1995 meeting of the ad hoc committee on the
petrochemical industry in which the report was
discussed. But even granting that the report was not
mentioned during the hearings, petitioner could have
easily moved for a reconsideration of the BOI Decision,
reserving his right to refute the SRI findings upon actual
receipt of a copy thereof.
Finally, it is not for this Court to rule on whether
the national interest would be served by allowing
respondent to locate its plant in Batangas, instead of
Bataan. As the first Garcia case held, “this Court is not
concerned with the economic, social, and political aspects
of this case for it does not possess the necessary
technology and scientific expertise to determine whether
the transfer of the proposed BPC petrochemical complex
from Bataan to Batangas and the change of fuel from
naphtha only to ‘naphtha and/or LPG will be best for the
project and for our country. This Court is not about to
delve into the economics and politics of this case . . . .”
DIMACUHA vs PEOPLE, GR No. 143705, February 23,
2007
Facts:
Petitioner Ruby E. Dimacuha
seeks her acquittal by a reversal of the October 22,
1999 decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
No. 20720 which affirmed her earlier conviction by the
Regional Trial Court of Marikina, Metro Manila, Branch
273, for violations of Sections 15 and 16 of Article III
of Republic Act (RA) No. 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Dimacuha’s motion for
reconsideration of said decision was denied by the CA in
its June 19, 2000 resolution. After due assessment of the
evidence presented, the trial court gave full faith and
credit to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and
upheld the presumption applied in cases involving
violation of Dangerous Drug Acts of regularity in the
performance of duty by public officers conducting anti-
narcotics operations when the police officers have no
motive in testifying falsely against an accused. It found
that the evidence for the prosecution convincingly
established petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Unable to accept the trial court’s judgment of conviction,
petitioner went on appeal to the CA.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the prosecution witnesses and
their testimonies is credible; and, the the arrest and
search conducted on the person and belongings of the
petitioner without a warrant is valid.
Ruling:
Petitioner questions the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses and their testimonies by giving
stress over the non-presentation in court of Benito
Marcelo, the professed police asset. She argues that the
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non-presentation of Marcelo was a denial of her
constitutional right to meet and confront her accuser.
The right of the petitioner to confront the
witnesses against her is not affected by the failure of the
prosecution to present the informant. The matter of
presentation of witnesses is not for accused nor even for
the trial court to decide. Discretion belongs to the
prosecutor as to how the State should present its
case. The prosecutor has the right to choose whom he
would present as witnesses. Moreover, in illegal drugs
cases, the presentation of an informant is not essential
for conviction nor is it indispensable for a successful
prosecution because his testimony would be merely
corroborative and cumulative
As stated earlier, the testimony of the police officers
carried with it the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official function. Absent any persuasive
evidence showing why these officers would falsely
testify against the petitioner, the logical conclusion is that
no improper motive exists, and that their testimonies are
worthy of full faith and credit.
Finally, petitioner contends that the arrest and
the search conducted incidental to her arrest were illegal
as the surrounding circumstances of the arrest were not
within the purview of the allowable warrantless arrests
under Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.
Here, the petitioner was caught in flagrante
delicto while in the act of delivering 1.15 grams and in
actual possession of another 10.78 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) as a result of
an entrapment operation conducted by the police on the
basis of information received from Benito Marcelo
regarding petitioner's illegal drug trade. Petitioner's
arrest, therefore, was lawful and the subsequent seizure
of a bag of shabu inserted inside the cover
of her checkbook was justified and legal in light of the
prevailing rule that an officer making an arrest may take
from the person arrested any property found upon his
person in order to find and seize things connected with
the crime. The seized regulated drug is, therefore,
admissible in evidence, being the fruit of the crime. The
Court finds the penalty imposed by the trial court as
affirmed by the CA to be correct
TAYABAN vs PEOPLE, GR No. 150194, March 6,
2007
Facts:
Petitioner Robert Tayaban was the Municipal
Mayor of Tinoc, Ifugao Sometime in 1988, then Mayor
Tayaban submitted a project proposal to provincial
governor Benjamin Cappleman for the construction of the
Tinoc Public Market. Subsequently, Tayaban was
informed by the Governor that his proposal was approved
and that the project shall be funded by the Cordillera
Executive Board (CEB). Subsequently, a bidding was
conducted and private complainant Lopez Pugong
(Pugong) won the contract for the construction of the
said public market. On March 1, 1989, a formal contract
was executed by and between Pugong, as the contractor,
and the CEB, as the project owner. Actual construction
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of the public market was commenced in June 1989
Tayaban and his co-petitioners, together with some men,
proceeded to the construction site and demolished the
structures and improvements introduced thereon. As a
result, Pugong filed an Affidavit-Complaint against herein
petitioners.
Issue/s:
Whether or not there is undue injury committed by the
officials for which they should be held liable
Ruling:
The following indispensable elements must be
established to constitute a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019, as amended:
1. The accused is a public officer discharging
administrative or official functions or private persons
charged in conspiracy with them;
2. The public officer committed the prohibited
act during the performance of his official duty in relation
to his public position;
3. The public officer acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence; and
4. His action caused undue injury to the
government or any private party, or gave any party any
unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to such
parties.
The Court agrees with the findings of the
Sandiganbayan that petitioners were guilty of bad faith in
causing the demolition.
First, petitioner Tayaban admitted that when he
submitted the project proposal for the construction of the
Tinoc Public Market, he did not indicate the exact location
where the market should be put up saying that he shall
specify the location when the budget for the project shall
have been approved. However, despite meeting the
Governor twice in 1989, and being informed by the latter
that the project had already been approved and funded,
Tayaban still did not suggest to the Governor nor
mention to him the specific place where he and the
Sangguniang Bayan desire to have the public market
erected. Worse, when the construction was commenced
and petitioners discovered that the public market was
being built allegedly in a place where it should not be,
petitioner Tayaban even admits that he still did not
inform the Governor of such fact. The Court agrees with
the Sandiganbayan that petitioners are liable to
reimburse the said amount lost by the Government.
CAMARA vs PAGAYATAN,GR No. 176563, March 6,
2007
Facts:
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This resolves the petition for the issuance of the
writ of habeas corpus filed by Mark Darwin Camara
(petitioner) for the release from detention of Leticia
Lourdes A. Camara (Camara), Assistant Vice-President
and Head of the Land Compensation Division of the Land
Bank of the Philippines (LBP). Complying with the Order,
LBP, on 14 February 2007, deposited P71,634,027.30 in
its head office in cash under its account in trust for, and
in bond payable to, the trial court’s clerk of court. Seven
days after such deposit, during which Camara remained
in detention, respondent judge issued the 21 February
2007 Order finding LBP’s deposit insufficient because LBP
should have “placed [the deposit] in the name of Josefina
S. Lubrica as payee, in a form that is readily
withdrawable.” Thus, respondent judge ordered Camara
to remain in detention until LBP complies with such order.
What petitioner assails is respondent judge’s refusal to
release Camara from detention despite LBP’s deposit with
its head office on 14 February 2007 of the full amount of
the preliminary compensation provided in respondent
judge’s 4 March 2005 Order
Issue/s:
Whether respondent judge acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
his jurisdiction.
Ruling:
The facts of this case highlight respondent
judge’s failure to appreciate, in full measure, the nature
of his power to cite litigants in contempt of court. It is a
drastic and extraordinary attribute of courts, to be
exercised in the interest of justice and only when there is
clear and contumacious refusal to obey orders. If a bona
fide misunderstanding of the terms of an order does not
justify the immediate institution of contempt proceedings,
with more reason that it should not serve as basis to
prolong a litigant’s detention under a prior contempt
citation when, as here, there has been an attempt to
comply with the order.
Thus, we find the detention of Camara
unlawful. To ensure that Camara will not be detained
again for the same cause, we deem it necessary to order
respondent judge to desist from doing so, irrespective of
the outcome of CA G.R. SP No. 98032 in the Court of
Appeals. This ruling is without prejudice to Camara’s
availment of administrative reliefs.
CELSO VERDE vs. VICTOR E. MACAPAGAL, AIDA
MACAPAGAL, RECTOR E. MACAPAGAL, HECTOR
MACAPAGAL, FLORIDA M. GUIRIBA, REDENTOR E.
MACAPAGAL, NESTOR E. MACAPAGAL and ZENAIDA
E. MACAPAGAL
Facts:
Vicente F. Macapagal and Irenea R. Estrella were
the owners of 2.5 hectares of agricultural land, subject of
this dispute, denominated as Lot No. 4714, Cad-320-D,
Case 1, situated in Palapala, San Ildefonso, Bulacan.
After their demise, said piece of land passed on to their
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children (respondents herein) who are now the pro-
indiviso owners of the same.
On the other hand, petitioner is the leasehold
tenant of the subject land having succeeded his father,
Francisco Verde, in the tenancy thereof.
On 14 July 1995, respondents initiated an action
for ejectment against petitioner before the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board in Malolos, Bulacan.
In a decision dated 07 February 1996, Provincial
Adjudicator Erasmo SP. Cruz dismissed the case for lack
of merit. Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration
which was denied by the provincial adjudicator.
Respondents then filed an appeal before the Department
of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) which,
however, affirmed the earlier ruling of the provincial
adjudicator.
Undaunted by these setbacks, respondents filed
an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In the decision now
assailed before us, the appellate court reversed and set
aside the decision of the DARAB. According to the Court
of Appeals, Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 1199[11] prohibits
a share-tenant from employing a subtenant to work or
furnish labor on the land subject of a tenancy agreement.
Hence, this petition.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in declaring
that petitioner did not personally cultivate the subject
land thereby justifying his ejectment there from.
Ruling:
Under Section 5(a) of Rep. Act No. 1199, a
'share tenant is defined as a person who himself and with
the aid available from within his immediate farm
household cultivates the land belonging to or possessed
by another, with the latter's consent, for purposes of
production, sharing the produce with the landholder
under the share tenancy system, or paying to the
landholder a price-certain or ascertainable in produce or
in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system.
In the present case, it is not disputed that dela
Cruz is not a member of petitioner's immediate
household. The question thus posed is whether by
petitioner's hiring his services and that of his carabao,
the agricultural lease relationship between the parties in
this case ceased to exist. We rule that it did not.
We cannot, however, sustain petitioner's stance
that the appellate court erred in giving credence to the
joint sworn statement of Sanciangco and Cruz in
contravention of the pertinent provision of the Rules of
Court. The DARAB New Rules of Procedures explicitly
ordains that technical rules of procedure which bind the
regular courts find no application in proceedings before
said board and its Regional and Provincial Adjudicators.
To give effect to this rule, the DARAB New Rules of
Procedure commands that all agrarian cases, disputes or
controversies should be resolved 'in a most expeditious
manner, employing all reasonable means to ascertain the
facts of every case in accordance with justice and equity.
But what makes petitioner's stance on this
matter even more unavailing is the fact that the
provincial adjudicator, acceding to petitioner's prayer in
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his motion for reconsideration that a hearing be
conducted for the purpose of asking clarificatory
questions, set the date for the parties' oral argument on
10 July 1996. Despite notice, however, petitioner failed
to show up during said date prompting provincial
adjudicator to submit for resolution petitioner's motion
for reconsideration. In an order dated 06 December 1996,
the provincial adjudicator recalled his 10 July 1996 order
and instead scheduled another hearing on 14 January
1997 for the purpose of asking clarificatory questions.[29]
Yet again, petitioner failed to attend this hearing, thus,
respondents moved that petitioner's motion for
reconsideration be resolved.[30] Given this series of
events, petitioner cannot now be heard to complain that
the Court of Appeals erred in putting premium on the
joint sworn statement of Sanciangco and Cruz as he was
given ample opportunity to challenge its contents.
Notwithstanding this finding, we still find merit in the
instant petition and resolve to grant the same.
ESTANISLAO V. ALVIOLA, COMPLAINANT, VS.
JUDGE HENRY B. AVELINO, MCTC, PONTEVEDRA-
PANAY,CAPIZ,RESPONDENT.
Facts:
This is an administrative complaint against
respondent Judge Henry B. Avelino of the 2nd Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Pontevedra-Panay, Pontevedra,
Capiz for gross neglect of duty relative to a civil case for
unlawful detainer and damages, docketed as Civil Case
No. 405 and entitled “Spouses Estanislao V. Alviola
and Carmen L. Alviola v. Spouses Dullano and Theresa
Suplido.
In a Resolution dated 21 June 2006, the Court noted the
OCA’s report and directed the parties to manifest their
willingness to submit the case for resolution on the basis
of the pleadings filed. Complainant, in his Manifestation
dated 30 August 2005, informed the Court of his
willingness to submit the case for resolution on the basis
of the pleadings/records already filed and submitted.
Respondent judge likewise manifested the same
willingness in his Manifestation dated 23 March 2007.
Paragraph 8, Title I (A) of A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC entitled
Guidelines to be Observed by Trial Court Judges and
Clerks of Court in the Conduct of Pre-Trial and Use of
Deposition-Discovery Measures states that:
The judge shall issue the required Pre-Trial
Order within ten (10) days after the termination of the
pre-trial. Said Order shall bind the parties, limit the trial
to matters not disposed of and control the course of the
action during the trial x x x
Issue/s:
Whether or not Judge Henry B. Avelino of the 2nd
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Pontevedra-Panay,
Pontevedra, Capiz for gross neglect of his duty
Ruling:
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Evidently, respondent judge violated the above-

quoted provision by issuing the pre-trial order only on 2
January 2005 or more than four (4) months after the
termination of the pre-trial conference. It should likewise
be underscored that since the civil case is an unlawful
detainer case falling within the ambit of the Rules on
Summary Procedure, respondent judge should have
handled the same with promptness and haste. The
reason for the adoption of the Rules on Summary
Procedure is precisely to prevent undue delays in the
disposition of cases. It is therefore not encouraging when,
as in the case at bar, it is the judge himself who
occasions the delay sought to be prevented by the rule.
By no means is the aim of speedy disposition of cases
served by respondent judges inaction.

Section 9 (1), Rule 140, as amended, of the Revised

Rules of Court provides that undue delay in rendering an
order is classified as a less serious charge punishable by
suspension from office without salary and other benefits
for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months;
or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding
P20,000.00.

For the record, respondent judge was fined P20,000.00 in

A.M. No. MTJ-05-1583, entitled Arcenas v. Avelino[21] for
gross inefficiency. In addition, respondent Judge was
fined P20,000.00 in A.M. No. MTJ-05-1606, Office of the
Court Administrator v. Avelino,[22] likewise for gross
inefficiency. As such, the Court agrees with the OCA that
a sterner penalty is in order.

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2008
REPUBLIC V. JUDGE EUGENIO G.R. NO. 174629, 14
FEBRUARY 2008
Facts:
After the Agan v. PIATCO ruling, a series of
investigations concerning the award of the NAIA 3
contracts to PIATCO were undertaken by the
Ombudsman and the Compliance and Investigation Staff
(“CIS”) of the Anti-Money Laundering Council (“AMLC”).
The OSG wrote AMLC requesting AMLC’s assistance “in
obtaining more evidence to completely reveal the
financial trail of corruption surrounding the NAIA 3
Project,” and also noting that the Republic was presently
defending itself in two international arbitration cases. The
CIS conducted an intelligence database search on the
financial transactions of certain individuals involved in the
award, including Alvarez (Chairman of the Pre-
Qualification Bids and Awards Technical Committee). By
this time, Alvarez had already been charged by the
Ombudsman with violation of Section 3(J) of the Anti
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The search revealed that Alvarez maintained 8
bank accounts with 6 different banks. The AMLC issued a
resolution authorizing its Executive Director to sign and
verify an application to inquire into the deposits or
investments of Alvarez et al. and to authorize the AMLC
Secretariat to conduct an inquiry once the RTC grants the
application. The rationale for the resolution was founded
on the findings of the CIS that amounts were transferred
from a Hong Kong bank account to bank accounts in the
Philippines maintained by respondents. The Resolution
also noted that by awarding the contract to PIATCO
(despite its lack of financial capacity) Alvarez violated
Section 3(E) of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The MAKATI RTC rendered an Order granting the
AMLC the authority to inquire and examine the subject
bank accounts of Alvarez et al. In response to a letter of
Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio, AMLC issued a
Resolution authorizing its Executive Director to inquire
into and examine the accounts of Alvarez, PIATCO, and
several other entities involved in the nullified contract.
AMLC filed an application before the MANILA RTC to
inquire into the accounts alleged as Sec 3 Corrupt
practices of public officers. In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing
law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any
public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(j) Knowingly approving or granting any license,
permit, privilege or benefit in favor of any person not
qualified for or not legally entitled to such license, permit,
privilege or advantage, or of a mere representative or
dummy of one who is not so qualified or entitled.
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party,
including the Government, or giving any private party
any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence.
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This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged
with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions
having been used to facilitate corruption in the NAIA 3
Project. The ex parte application was granted and the
MANILA RTC issued a bank inquiry order. Alvarez alleged
that he fortuitously learned of the bank inquiry order,
which was issued following an ex parte application, and
he argued that nothing in the Anti- Money Laundering Act
(“AMLA”) authorized the AMLC to seek the authority to
inquire into bank accounts ex parte. After several
motions, manifestations, orders and resolutions the case
went up to the SC. Alvarez et al.’s position: The AMLA,
being a substantive penal statute, has no retroactive
effect and the bank inquiry order could not apply to
deposits or investments opened prior to the affectivity of
the AMLA (17 October 2001). The subject bank accounts,
opened in 1989 to 1990, could not be the subject of the
bank inquiry order without violating the constitutional
prohibition against ex post facto laws.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the proscription against ex post facto
laws applies to Section 11 of the AMLA (a provision
which does not provide a penal sanction BUT which
merely authorizes the inspection of suspect accounts
and deposits).
Ruling:
YES. It is clear that no person may be
prosecuted under the PENAL provisions of the AMLA for
acts committed prior to the enactment of the law (17
October 2001). With respect to the AUTHORITY TO
INSPECT, it should be noted that an ex post facto law is
one that (among others) deprives a person accused of a
crime of some lawful protection to which he has become
entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or
acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.
PRIOR to the AMLA:
(1) The fact that bank accounts were involved in
activities later on enumerated in the law did not, by itself,
remove such accounts from the shelter of absolute
confidentiality.
(2) In order that bank accounts could be
examined, there was need to secure either the written
permission of the depositor OR a court order authorizing
such examination, assuming that they were involved in
cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials,
or in a case where the money deposited or invested was
itself the subject matter of the litigation.
(3)Please read the original for the other issues
aside from Art. 3, section 22.
(4) Section 11. Authority to inquire into Bank
Deposits.–
Notwithstanding the provisions of Republic Act
No. 1405, as amended; Republic Act No. 6426, as
amended; Republic Act No. 8791, and other laws, the
AMLC may inquire into or examine any particular deposit
or investment with any banking institution or non-bank
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financial institution upon order of any competent court in
cases of violation of this Act when it has been established
that there is probable cause that the deposits or
investments involved are in any way related to a money
laundering offense: Provided, That this provision shall not
apply to deposits and investments made prior to the
effectivity of this Act.
The passage of the AMLA stripped another layer
off the rule on absolute confidentiality that provided a
measure of lawful protection to the account holder. The
application of the bank inquiry order as a means of
inquiring into transactions entered into prior to the
passage of the AMLA would be constitutionally infirm,
offensive as to the ex post facto clause.
NEVERTHELESS, the argument that the
prohibition against ex post facto laws goes as far as to
prohibit any inquiry into deposits in bank accounts
OPENED prior to the effectivity of the AMLA even if the
TRANSACTIONS were entered into when the law had
already taken effect cannot be sustained. This argument
will create a loophole in the AMLA that would result to
further money laundering. It is hard to presume that
Congress intended to enact a self-defeating law in the
first place, and the courts are inhibited from such a
construction by the cardinal rule that “a law should be
interpreted with a view to upholding rather than
destroying it.”
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF HABEAS
CORPUS OF EUFEMIA E. RODRIGUEZ, filed by
EDGARDO E. VELUZ, vs. LUISA R. VILLANUEVA and
TERESITA R. PABELLO, G.R. No. 169482 January
29, 2008
Facts:
This is a petition for review1 of the resolutions2
dated February 2, 2005 and September 2, 2005 of the
Court of Appeals3 in CA-G.R. SP No. 88180 denying the
petition for habeas corpus of Eufemia E. Rodriguez, filed
by petitioner Edgardo Veluz, as well as his motion for
reconsideration, respectively.
Eufemia E. Rodriguez was a 94-year old widow,
allegedly suffering from a poor state of mental health and
deteriorating cognitive abilities.4 She was living with
petitioner, her nephew, since 2000. He acted as her
guardian.
In the morning of January 11, 2005,
respondents Luisa R. Villanueva and Teresita R. Pabello
took Eufemia from petitioner Veluz’ house. He made
repeated demands for the return of Eufemia but these
proved futile. Claiming that respondents were restraining
Eufemia of her liberty, he filed a petition for habeas
corpus5 in the Court of Appeals on January 13, 2005.
The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed
to present any convincing proof that respondents (the
legally adopted children of Eufemia) were unlawfully
restraining their mother of her liberty. He also failed to
establish his legal right to the custody of Eufemia as he
was not her legal guardian. Thus, in a resolution dated
February 2, 2005,6 the Court of Appeals denied his
petition.
Issue/s:
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Whether or not petitioner failed to present any
convincing proof that respondents were unlawfully
restraining their mother of her liberty and failed to
establish his legal right to the custody of Eufemia as
legal guardian.
Ruling:
We rule for the respondents.
The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of
illegal confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty or by which the rightful custody of
a person is being withheld from the one entitled
thereto.10 It is issued when one is either deprived of
liberty or is wrongfully being prevented from exercising
legal custody over another person.11 Thus, it
contemplates two instances: (1) deprivation of a person’s
liberty either through illegal confinement or through
detention and (2) withholding of the custody of any
person from someone entitled to such custody.
In this case, the issue is not whether the
custody of Eufemia is being rightfully withheld from
petitioner but whether Eufemia is being restrained of her
liberty. Significantly, although petitioner admits that he
did not have legal custody of Eufemia, he nonetheless
insists that respondents themselves have no right to her
custody. Thus, for him, the issue of legal custody is
irrelevant. What is important is Eufemia’s personal
freedom.
Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of
the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be
in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of
freedom of action.12
In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas
corpus is to determine whether or not a particular
person is legally held. A prime specification of an
application for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an
actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral,
illegal restraint of liberty. "The writ of habeas corpus was
devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best
and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. A prime
specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus
is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of
the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and
to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.
Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is
sufficient."13 (emphasis supplied)
In this case, the Court of Appeals made an
inquiry into whether Eufemia was being restrained of her
liberty. It found that she was not:
There is no proof that Eufemia is being
detained and restrained of her liberty by
respondents. Nothing on record reveals that she
was forcibly taken by respondents. On the contrary,
respondents, being Eufemia’s adopted children, are
taking care of her.21 (emphasis supplied)
The Court finds no cogent or compelling reason
to disturb this finding.
Facts:
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On October 24, 1991, an Information for double
murder was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Dagupan City, Branch 40, docketed as Crim. Case No. D-
10678, against Manolo Salcedo, Romulo Salcedo, Ricardo
Samuco, Rolando Pingol and one Joel Doe for the death
of the brothers Mario and Tito Untalan on October 21,
1991.
Respondent denied the motion for
reconsideration on January 10, 1992.
On March 15, 1992, respondent issued an Order
denying the motion, stating:
Considering that time is of the essence because
all the accused except Joel Doe have been under
detention at the City Jail since October 21, 1991 and
considering that the City Prosecutor has not yet resolved
the matter of reinvestigation on December 23, 1991 as
ordered by the Court, and considering further that Asst.
City Prosecutor Rosita Castro interposed no objection to
the granting of bail in the amount of P40,000.00 which
she considered reasonable, without determining whether
or not the proper charge could be double homicide, the
Court granted bail for the provisional liberty of each
accused in the amount of P40,000.00.
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds no legal
and factual basis for the Motion to Inhibit.1
On April 13, 1992, complainant moved for the
reconsideration of the Order of March 15, 1992.
Respondent denied the motion in an Order dated June 8,
1992.
Issue/s:
Whether or not respondent committed gross ignorance
of the law when he granted bail to the accused in Crim.
Case No. D-10678.
Ruling:
The Court agrees with the recommendation of
the OCA. Respondent clearly failed to accord the
prosecution the basic and elementary entitlements of due
process, such as timely notice and opportunity to be
heard. Such failure equally clearly resulted either from
ignorance of the law or, worse, partiality in favor of the
accused. The recommendation is thus in order.
The Court notes that respondent has been
dismissed from the service in A.M. No. 99-731-RTJ
entitled Hilario De Guzman, Jr. v. Judge Deodoro J.
Sison,5 promulgated on March 26, 2001. However, the
dismissal of respondent in 2001 does not prevent the
Court from imposing a sanction against him for gross
ignorance of the law while in office.
LORNA A. MEDINA, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
(COA), represented by the Audit Team of
EUFROCINIA MAWAK, SUSAN PALLERNA, and MA.
DOLORES TEPORA, G.R. No. 176478 February 4,
2008
Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeking the
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reversal of the Decision2 and Resolution3 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89539. The Court of Appeals'
decision affirmed the two joint orders issued by the Office
of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon finding herein
petitioner Lorna A. Medina guilty of grave misconduct and
dishonesty. The Resolution of the same court denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said
decision.
In a Decision7 dated 8 November 2004, Deputy
Ombudsman Victor C. Fernandez approved the
recommendation of the Graft Investigation and
Prosecution Officer to dismiss petitioner from service
based on the existence of substantial evidence of a
discrepancy in petitioner's account totaling
P4,080,631.36. The said decision noted petitioner's
supposed failure to file a counter-affidavit and position
paper despite due notice.
On 29 November 2004, petitioner filed an urgent
motion8 stating that she complied with the directive to
file a counter-affidavit and position paper and praying
that the defenses therein be considered in reversing the
8 November 2004 decision. The motion was treated as a
motion for reconsideration of the said decision.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition in
the assailed Decision dated 23 October 2006.15 It held
that petitioner was not entitled to a formal investigation
and it affirmed the deputy ombudsman's factual finding
that petitioner was guilty of grave misconduct and
dishonesty. The appellate court also denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated 30
January 2007.
Issue/s:
Whether or not petitioner was deprived of her right to
due process, whether the penalty of dismissal is proper
and whether petitioner's guilt for grave misconduct and
dishonesty is supported by substantial evidence.
Ruling:
Petitioner's theory is erroneous.
As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the denial
of petitioner's request for a formal investigation is not
tantamount to a denial of her right to due process.
Petitioner was required to file a counter-affidavit and
position paper and later on, was given a chance to file
two motions for reconsideration of the decision of the
deputy ombudsman. The essence of due process in
administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain
one's side or seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. As long as the parties are given the
opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the
demands of due process are sufficiently met.28
Petitioner's assertion that the Court of Appeals
refused to reopen and review the case and ignored
material issues and arguments in her motion for
reconsideration of the 23 October 2006 Decision in
violation of her right to due process, is quite hollow.
To end, it must be stressed that dishonesty and
grave misconduct have always been and should remain
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anathema in the civil service. They inevitably reflect on
the fitness of a civil servant to continue in office. When
an officer or employee is disciplined, the object sought is
not the punishment of such officer or employee but the
improvement of the public service and the preservation
of the public's faith and confidence in the government.
JEFFREY T. GO, vs. LEYTE II ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVE, INC., G.R. No. 176909 February 18,
2008
Facts:
This petition for review on certiorari1 assails the
November 30, 2006 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 02010 setting aside the April 4,
2006 and May 2, 2006 Orders of Branch 6 of the Regional
Trial Court of Tacloban City in Special Civil Case No.
2006-03-24, which ordered the issuance of a writ of
injunction against respondent Leyte II Electric
Cooperative, Inc. (LEYECO II). Also assailed is the
February 27, 2007 Resolution3 denying the motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner Jeffrey T. Go is a resident of Block 16,
Lot 14, Imelda Village, Tacloban City. He bought the
property from Rosita Mancera, who is the registered
consumer and member of respondent LEYECO II.
At about 10:20 a.m. of February 13, 2006,
respondent’s inspection team went to petitioner’s
residence to inspect his electric meter. They requested
the occupant of the house to witness the inspection but
were told that the owner was out of town.
Petitioner immediately filed a "Petition for
Injunction and Damages with Preliminary Injunction with
a Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order"6 before the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City.
He claimed that the inspection was irregular and illegal,
and that respondent had no legal basis to cause the
disconnection of his electric service.
Respondent filed a petition for certiorari before
the Court of Appeals, which reversed and set aside the
orders of the Regional Trial Court in its November 30,
2006 Decision.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was
denied, hence this petition.
Issue/s:
1) whether the inspection of petitioner’s electric meter
was in accordance with R.A. No. 7832; 2) whether
petitioner was caught in flagrante delicto; and 3)
whether the writ of preliminary injunction was properly
issued against respondent LEYECO II.
Ruling:
We find merit in the petition.
The inspection was conducted in accordance
with Section 4 of R.A. No. 7832, While it is not disputed
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that petitioner’s electric meter had a broken seal and
shunting wire, petitioner claims that the foregoing
circumstances cannot be considered prima facie evidence
of illegal use of electricity because the inspection was not
conducted in the presence of an "officer of the law" as
contemplated under R.A. No. 7832. He argues that only a
barangay chairman witnessed the inspection, and that his
presence failed to satisfy the requirements of the law
which specifies the police or the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) as competent authority to verify the
findings of a private electric utility or rural electric
cooperative.
However, under Section 1 of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7832, an officer of the
law is defined as one "who by direct provision of the law
or by election or by appointment of competent authority,
is charged with the maintenance of public order and the
protection and security of life and property." Contrary to
petitioner’s claim, the definition is not limited to
members of the police force or the NBI. The rules
specifically state that a barangay chairman is considered
an officer of the law. Thus, his presence during the
inspection satisfies the requirements of the law.
We now come to the issue whether petitioner
was caught in flagrante delicto.
In flagrante delicto means "[i]n the very act of
committing the crime." To be caught in flagrante delicto,
therefore, necessarily implies positive identification by
the eyewitness or eyewitnesses. Such is a "direct
evidence" of culpability, or "that which proves the fact in
dispute without the aid of any inference or presumption."
In the instant case, it was impossible for
petitioner to have been caught in the act of committing
an offense considering that he was not present during the
inspection. Nor were any of his representatives at hand.
The presence of a broken seal and a shunting wire in
petitioner’s electric meter will not suffice to support a
finding that petitioner was in flagrante delicto. Such
circumstances merely operate as prima facie evidence of
illegal use of electricity under Section 4 of R.A. No. 7832.
Absent a finding of in flagrante delicto, there is
no basis for the immediate disconnection of petitioner’s
electric service under Section 6 of R.A. No. 7832.
Respondent’s reliance on the said provision is clearly
misplaced.
As to whether the writ of preliminary injunction
was properly issued against respondent LEYECO II, we
rule in the affirmative.
Section 9 of R.A. No. 7832 provides that unless
there is prima facie evidence that the disconnection of
electric service was made with evident bad faith or grave
abuse of authority, a writ of injunction or restraining
order may not issue against any private electric utility or
rural electric cooperative exercising the right and
authority to disconnect such service. However, the
second paragraph of the same provision provides for
another instance when a writ of injunction or restraining
order may be issued. Consistent with the foregoing
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provision, Rule VIII of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R.A. No. 7832.
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the
only instance where the court can issue a restraining
order or injunction is when there is prima facie evidence
of bad faith or grave abuse of authority.16 As the law
stands, there are two exceptions to the restriction on the
issuance of restraining orders or writs of injunction, to wit:
1) when there is prima facie evidence that the
disconnection was made with evident bad faith or grave
abuse of authority; and 2) when, even in the absence of
bad faith or grave abuse of authority, the electric
consumer deposits a bond with the court in the form of
cash or a cashier’s check equivalent to the differential
billing.
In the instant case, petitioner filed a bond in the
form of a cashier’s check in the amount of One Hundred
One Thousand Five Hundred Ninety Seven and 99/100
(P101,597.99), the equivalent of the differential billing
charged against him by respondent in compliance with
Section 9 of R.A. No. 7832 and Rule VIII of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7832.
R.B. Michael Press and Annalene Reyes Escobia,
petitioners, vs Nicasio C. Galit
Facts:
Respondent was employed by petitioner R.B.
Michael Press as an offset machine operator, Duringhis
employment, Galit was tardy for a total of 190 times and
was absent without leave for a totalof nine and a half
days. Respondent was ordered to render overtime service
in order to comply with a job order deadline,but he
refused to do so. The following day respondent reported
for work but petitioner Escobiatold him not to work, and
to return later in the afternoon for a hearing. When he
returned, a copyof an Office Memorandum was served on
him. Petitioners aver that Galit was dismissed due to the
following offenses: (1) tardiness constitutingneglect of
duty; (2) serious misconduct; and (3) insubordination or
willful disobedience. Respondent was terminated from
employment, gave him his two-day salary and a
terminationletter. Respondent subsequently filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims before
theNational Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
The CA found that it was not the tardiness and
absences committed by respondent, but his refusalto
render overtime work which caused the termination of his
employment. It ruled that the timeframe in which
respondent was afforded procedural due process is
dubitable; he could not havebeen afforded ample
opportunity to explain his side and to adduce evidence on
his behalf. Itfurther ruled that the basis for computing his
backwages should be his daily salary at the time of his
dismissal which was PhP 230, and that his backwages
should be computed from the time of his dismissal up to
the finality of the CA’s decision.
Issue/s:
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1. whether there was just cause to terminate the
employment of respondent
2. whether due process was observed in the dismissal
process
3. whether respondent is entitled to backwages and other
benefits despite his refusal to be reinstated.
Ruling:
The Court’s Ruling Respondent’s tardiness
cannot be considered condoned by petitioners
In the case at bar, respondent did not adduce
any evidence to show waiver or condonation on the part
of petitioners. Thus. the findings of the CA that
petitioners cannot use the previous absences and
tardiness because respondent was not subjected to any
penalty is bereft of legal basis. The petitioners did not
impose any punishment for the numerous absences and
tardiness of respondent. Thus, said infractions can be
used collectively by petitioners as a ground for dismissal.
Respondent is admittedly a daily wage earner and hence
is paid based on such arrangement. For said daily paid
workers, the principle of "a day’s pay for a day’s work" is
squarely applicable. Hence it cannot be construed in any
wise that such nonpayment of the daily wage on the days
he was absent constitutes a penalty.
For willful disobedience to be a valid cause for
dismissal, these two elements must concur:(1) the
employee’s assailed conduct must have been willful, that
is, characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude(2)
the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful,
made known to the employee, and must pertain to the
duties which he had been engaged to discharge. The
issue now is, whether respondent’s refusal or failure to
render overtime work was willful; that is, whether such
refusal or failure was characterized by a wrongful and
perverse attitude. The fact that respondent refused to
provide overtime work despite his knowledge that there
is a production deadline that needs to be met, and that
without him, the offset machine operator, no further
printing can be had, shows his wrongful and perverse
mental attitude; thus, there is willfulness. The Court rule
that respondent unjustifiably refused to render overtime
work despite a valid order to do so. The totality of his
offenses against petitioner R.B. Michael Press shows that
he was a difficult employee.
Under the twin notice requirement, the
employees must be given two (2) notices before his
employment could be terminated: (1) a first notice to
apprise the employees of their fault, and (2) a second
notice to communicate to the employees that their
employment is being terminated. On the surface, it would
seem that petitioners observed due process (twin notice
and hearing requirement ): On February 23, 1999
petitioner notified respondent of the hearing to be
conducted later that day. On the same day before the
hearing, respondent was furnished a copy of an office
memorandum which contained a list of his offenses, and
a notice of a scheduled hearing in the afternoon of the
same day. The next day, February 24, 1999, he was
notified that his employment with petitioner R.B. Michael
Press had been terminated. The hearing was immediately
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set in the afternoon of February 23, 1999—the day
respondent received the first notice. Therefore, he was
not given any opportunity at all to consult a union official
or lawyer, and, worse, to prepare for his defense.
Regarding the February 23, 1999 afternoon hearing, it
can be inferred that respondent, without any lawyer or
friend to counsel him, was not given any chance at all to
adduce evidence in his defense. In the February 24, 1999
notice of dismissal, petitioners simply justified
respondent’s dismissal by citing his admission of the
offenses charged. It did not specify the details
surrounding the offenses and the specific company rule
or Labor Code provision upon which the dismissal was
grounded. The Court concludes that termination of
respondent was railroaded in serious breach of his right
to due process. Therefore, the CA decision is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Court declares respondent’s dismissal
from employment VALID and LEGAL. Petitioners are,
however, ordered jointly and solidarily to pay respondent
nominal damages in the amount of PhP 30,000 for
violation of respondent’s right to due process.
PADILLA MACHINE SHOP, RODOLFO PADILLA and
LEONARDO PADILLA, vs. Petitioners,
RUFINOA.JAVILGAS, G.R.No.175960 February19,
2008
Facts:
This petition for review assails the Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated August 29, 2006 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 89164 which reinstated the decision of the Labor
Arbiter finding respondent Rufino A. Javilgas to have
been illegally dismissed. Also assailed is the Resolution
of December 21, 2006 denying the motion for
reconsideration.
On December 10, 2002, Javilgas filed a
Complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of 13th
month pay, separation pay and non-remittance of SSS
contributions against petitioners Padilla Machine Shop,
Rodolfo Padilla and Leonardo Padilla.
Javilgas alleged that in January 1998, he was
hired by Padilla Machine Shop, located at Commonwealth
Avenue, Quezon City. Javilgas further alleged that in
April 2002, Rodolfo Padilla called him by telephone and
told him to stop working, but without giving any reason
therefore. He stopped reporting for work and sued
petitioners for illegal dismissal, with a prayer for the
payment of backwages, pro rated 13th month pay,
separation pay, and moral and exemplary damages.
On the other hand, petitioner Rodolfo Padilla
(Rodolfo), proprietor of Padilla Machine Shop, alleged
that in 1999, SSS and Medicare contributions were
deducted from Javilgas salary and remitted to the SSS;
that in 2000, they (petitioners) submitted a report to the
SSS that Javilgas had voluntarily left and abandoned his
work, and transferred to another shop, Raymond Machine
Shop, located within the same vicinity as Padilla Machine
Shop; that some months after, Javilgas returned and
pleaded to be re-employed with them; that Rodolfo
Padilla took Javilgas back to work, but their customers
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were not satisfied with the quality of his work; hence
Javilgas was assigned to the Novaliches branch; that
Javilgas incurred numerous absences in the Novaliches
branch; that Javilgas had opened his own machine shop
and even pirated the clients of petitioners; and finally,
Javilgas again voluntarily left Padilla Machine Shop
without prior notice.
On March 31, 2004, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision
that Javilgas was illegally dismissed.
Petitioners appealed the decision to the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which reversed the
decision of the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC found no
sufficient evidence to show that Javilgas was dismissed or
prevented from reporting for work; that Javilgas could
not categorically state when he was dismissed. In fine,
the NLRC held that Javilgas voluntarily resigned, and not
illegally dismissed.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC and
reinstated the Decision of the Labor Arbiter. It held that
the burden of proof is on the petitioners, to show that
Javilgas was dismissed for a valid and just cause.
The appellate court did not lend credence to petitioners
claim that respondent voluntarily resigned since the issue
was only raised for the first before the NLRC. Petitioners
motion for reconsideration was denied hence, the instant
petition.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
holding that the said consistent position adopted
by petitioners “ that they never dismissed
Javilgas “ is not sufficient to negate the charge
of illegal dismissal;
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
awarding attorney’s fees to the respondent who
was being represented pro bono by the Office of
Legal Aid of the U.P. College of Law.
Ruling:
In the instant case, petitioners failed to adduce
evidence to rebut Javilgas claim of dismissal and satisfy
the burden of proof required. As regards the eight-month
hiatus before Javilgas instituted the illegal dismissal case,
we sustain the Court of Appeals ruling that Javilgas filed
the complaint within a reasonable period during the
three-year period provided under Article 291 of the Labor
Code.
Finally, there is no merit in petitioners’ claim that
attorney’s fees may not be awarded to the respondent
since his case was being handled pro bono by the U.P.
Office of Legal Aid, which provides free legal assistance
to indigent litigants. In this jurisdiction, there are two
concepts of attorney’s fees. In the ordinary sense,
attorney’s fees represent the reasonable compensation
paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has
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rendered to the latter. On the other hand, in its
extraordinary concept, attorney’s fees may be awarded
by the court as indemnity for damages to be paid by the
losing party to the prevailing party,and not counsel. In
its extraordinary sense, attorney’s fees as part of
damages is awarded only in the instances specified in
Article 2208 of the Civil Code, among which are the
following which obtain in the instant case:
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of
household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's
compensation and employer's liability laws;
MA. LOURDES T. DOMINGO vs. ROGELIO I. RAYALA
Facts:
On November 16, 1998, Ma. Lourdes T.
Domingo (Domingo), then Stenographic Reporter III at
the NLRC, filed a Complaint for sexual harassment
against Rayala before Secretary Bienvenido Laguesma of
the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). The
committee constituted found Rayala guilty of the
offense charged. Secretary Laguesma submitted a copy
of the Committee Report and Recommendation to the
OP, but with there recommendation that the
penalty should be suspension for six (6) months and
one (1) day, in accordance with AO 250.
It was ordered that Rayala be dismissed from
service for being found guilty of grave offense of
disgraceful and immoral conduct. Rayala filed Motions for
Reconsideration until the case was finally referred to the
Court of Appeals for appropriate action. The CA found
Reyala guilty and imposed the penalty of suspension of
service for the maximum period of one (1) year.
Domingo filed a Petition for Review before the SC.
Rayala likewise filed a Petition for Review19 with this
Court essentially arguing that he is not guilty of any act
of sexual harassment. The Republic then filed its own
Petition for Review. On June 28, 2004, the Court directed
the consolidation of the three (3)petitions.
G.R. No. 155831 ± Domingo Petition -
1. The President has the power to remove
presidential appointees; and
2. AO No. 250 does not cover presidential
appointees.
G.R. No. 155840 ± Rayala Petition
In his petition, Rayala raises the following
issues:
1. He‘s act does not constitute sexual
harassment;
a. demand, request, or requirement of a sexual
favor;
b. the same is made a pre-condition to hiring,
re- employment, or continued employment; or
c. the denial thereof results in discrimination
against the employee.
2. Intent is an element of sexual harassment; and
3. Misapplication of the expanded definition of sexual
harassment in RA 7877 by applying DOLE AO 250.
Issue/s:
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(1) Whether or not Rayala committed sexual
harassment?
(2) what is the applicable penalty?
Ruling:
CA and OP were unanimous in holding that
RAYALA is guilty of sexual harassment. They only differ in
the appropriate imposable penalty. That Rayala
committed the acts complained of ± and was guilty of
sexual harassment ± is, therefore, the common factual
finding of not
just one, but three independent bodies: the Committee,
the OP and the CA. It should be remembered that when
supported by substantial evidence, factual findings made
by quasi-judicial and administrative bodies are accorded
great respect and even finality by the courts.39 The
principle, therefore, dictates that such findings should
bind us. He insists, however, that these acts do not
constitute sexual harassment, because Domingo did not
allege in her complaint that there was a demand, request,
or requirement of a sexual favor as a condition for her
continued employment or for her promotion to a higher
position.41 Rayala urges us to apply to his case our
ruling inA quino v. Acosta. We find respondent’s
insistence unconvincing.
Basic in the law of public officers is the three-
fold liability rule, which states that the wrongful acts or
omissions of a public officer may give rise to civil,
criminal and administrative liability. An action for each
can proceed independently of the others.43 This rule
applies with full force
to sexual harassment. The law penalizing sexual
harassment in our jurisdiction is RA 7877.
The CA, thus, correctly ruled that Rayala’s
culpability is not to be determined solely on the basis of
Section 3, RA 7877, because he is charged with the
administrative offense, not the criminal infraction, of
sexual harassment.44 It should be enough that the CA,
along with the
Investigating Committee and the Office of the President,
found substantial evidence to support the administrative
charge.
Rayala alleges that the CA erred in holding that
sexual harassment is an offense malum prohibitum. He
argues that intent is an essential element in sexual
harassment, and since the acts imputed to him were
done allegedly without malice, he should be absolved of
the charges
against him. The SC reiterated that what is
before us is an administrative case for sexual harassment.
Thus, whether the crime of sexual harassment is malum
in se or malum prohibitum is immaterial. The SC also
rejected Rayala’s allegations that the charges were filed
because of a conspiracy to get him out of office and thus
constitute merely political harassment.
The SC held that Rayala was properly accorded
due process. Thus, when the President found that Rayala
was indeed guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct, the
Chief Executive did not have unfettered discretion to
impose a penalty other than the penalty provided by law
for such offense. As cited above, the imposable penalty
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for the first offense of either the administrative offense of

sexual harassment or for disgraceful and immoral
conduct is suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day
to one (1) year. Accordingly, it was error for the Office of
the President to impose upon Rayala the penalty of
dismissal from the service, a penalty which can
only be imposed upon commission of a second offense.

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2009
Ama computer College – East Rizal Vs. Ignacio 590
SCRA (2009)
Facts:
Allan Ignacio was a supervisor of AMA Computer
College. He was dismissed by the said school on the
ground that he committed a gross misconduct for
destroying the school property and for the loss of school
records. The event happened during the renovation of
the school. The respondent facilitated in the demolition of
the concrete partition wall of the computer laboratory
without any approval of the concerned department of the
school. The petitioner wrote a written notice to the
respondent regarding his conduct and let him explain
why he committed such act, His contention was that,
there’s no need for such approval because Ignacio was
already informed of the problem in the building which
needs to be renovated based on the copy of the building
plan provided by the owner. Seeing that the renovation
plan was signed by the VP for Education and the School
Director, so he decided to start with the demolition of the
partition taking into serious consideration that he was
given only a few days to comply with the deadline, and
after the respondent explained on his side, the petitioner
send back a written notice of dismissal.
The Department of labor and the NLRC
decided that there was no illegal dismissal since the
grounds for gross negligence was substantial and the
petitioner followed the procedural due process of
dismissing their employee. However, the CA reversed the
decision in favour with the respondent and affirmed that
there was an illegal dismissal
Issue/s:
Whether or not the respondent was accorded
with procedural due process?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the chance
afforded to respondent, although limited, is a clear
opportunity to be heard on the issue at hand. What the
law abhors and prohibits is the absolute absence of the
opportunity to be heard. However, affirmed the decision
of the CA that there is an illegal dismissal for the lack of
substantive evidence of proving gross misconduct on the
part of the respondent.
Lozano vs. Nograles 589 SCRA (2009)
Facts:
The two petitions, filed by their respective
petitioners in their capacities as concerned citizens and
taxpayers, prayed for the nullification of House
Resolution No. 1109 entitled "A Resolution Calling upon
the Members of Congress to Convene for the Purpose of
Considering Proposals to Amend or Revise the
Constitution, Upon a Three-fourths Vote of All the
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Members of Congress." In essence, both petitions seek to
trigger a justiciable controversy that would warrant a
definitive interpretation by this Court of Section 1, Article
XVII, which provides for the procedure for amending or
revising the Constitution.
Issue/s:
WON the court has the power to review such
controversy?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that in determining
whether such case is subject to judicial review, there
must be an actual controversy, there must be a proper
party, the case must be raised at an earliest opportunity,
and there must be a necessity of deciding the
constitutional question.
In the case at bar, the petitioner failed
to establish these elements for the house resolution
no.1109 was not yet enacted, hence, neither the case
has an actual controversy nor is the petitioner the injured
party. House resolution number 1109 may happen or
may not happen, hence, the SC dismissed the petition for
lack of actual controversy.
People vs Nunez 591 SCRA (2009)
Facts:
This petition for certiorari seeks the reversal of
the Decision dated January 19, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. CR. H.C. No. 02420. The appellate
court affirmed the Decision dated February 11, 2002 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calamba, Laguna,
Branch 36, which convicted appellant in Criminal Case No.
8614-01-C for violation of Section 16, Article III of
Republic Act No. 6425, also known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659.
At 6:00 a.m. on April 26, 2001, operatives of
the Sta. Cruz, Laguna Police Detectives in coordination
with the Los Baños Police Station (LBPS) and IID Mobile
Force conducted a search in the house of Raul R. Nuñez
based on reports of drug possession. The group, led by
Commanding Officer Arwin Pagkalinawan, included SPO1
Odelon Ilagan, SPO3 Eduardo Paz, PO1 Ronnie Orfano,
PO2 Gerry Crisostomo, PO2 Alexander Camantigue, PO2
Joseph Ortega and Senior Inspector Uriquia.
Before proceeding to appellant’s residence in
Barangay San Antonio, the group summoned Barangay
Captain Mario Mundin and Chief Tanod Alfredo Joaquin to
assist them in serving the search warrant. Upon arriving
at appellant’s house, Mundin called on appellant to come
out. Thereafter, Commanding Officer Pagkalinawan
showed Nuñez the warrant. SPO1 Ilagan and PO2
Crisostomo then surveyed appellant’s room in his
presence while his family, PO2 Ortega and the two
barangay officials remained in the living room. SPO1
Ilagan found thirty-one (31) packets of shabu, lighters,
improvised burners, tooters, and aluminum foil with
shabu residue and a lady’s wallet containing P4,610
inside appellant’s dresser. The group also confiscated a
component, camera, electric planer, grinder, drill, jigsaw,
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electric tester, and assorted carpentry tools on suspicion
that they were acquired in exchange for shabu. Following
the search, SPO1 Ilagan issued a Receipt for Property
Seized and a Certification of Orderly Search which
appellant signed.
The trial court rendered the decision and
convicted Nunez for a sentence of Reclusion perpetua.
The accused appeal to the CA contending that such
evidence were planted against him, and the appellant
assails the validity of the search warrant as it did not
indicate his exact address but only the barangay and
street of his residence. He maintains that none of the
occupants witnessed the search as they were all kept in
the living room. Finally, appellant questions why the
prosecution did not call the barangay officials as
witnesses to shed light on the details of the search.
Despite his contention, the CA affirmed the decision of
the trial court. And the appellant elevate the case to the
SC.
Issue/s:
1. WON the search warrant is valid?
2. WON the seizure of the property were valid?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the question of
the validity of the search warrant was deemed waive
since the appellant failed to raise such question to the
trial court and the appellant signed the receipt of the
property seized and the certification of orderly search.
The right to be secure from unreasonable searches and
seizures, like any other right, can be waived and the
waiver may be made expressly or impliedly.
The SC affirmed and modified the
decision of the lower court and ruled that the seizure of
personal things not subject for seizure was invalidated.
LBC vs Mateo 589 SCRA (2009)
Facts:
Respondent James Mateo, designated as a
customer associate, was a regular employee of petitioner
LBC Express – Metro Manila, Inc. (LBC). His job was to
deliver and pick-up packages to and from LBC and its
customers. For this purpose, Mateo was assigned the use
of a Kawasaki motorcycle.
On April 30, 2001 at about 6:10 p.m., Mateo
arrived at LBC’s Escolta office, along Burke Street, to
drop off packages coming from various LBC airposts. He
parked his motorcycle directly in front of the LBC office,
switched off the engine and took the key with him.
However, he did not lock the steering wheel because he
allegedly was primarily concerned with the packages,
including a huge sum of money that needed to be
immediately secured inside the LBC office. He returned
promptly within three to five minutes but the motorcycle
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was gone. He immediately reported the loss to his
superiors at LBC and to the nearest police station.
LBC, through its vice-president petitioner,
Lorenzo A. Niño, directed Mateo to appear in his office to
explain his side and for formal investigation. As directed,
Mateo appeared and presented his side. After
investigation, he received a notice of termination from
LBC dated May 30, 2001. He was barred from reporting
for work.
The Department of Labor and the NLRC
dismissed the complaint of the respondent for the
petitioner has followed the due process of terminating
their employee with the sufficient ground of gross
negligence on the part of the respondent. The respondent
appealed to the CA and reversed the decision of NLRC.
The petitioner elevates the case to the Supreme Court
contending that they terminate their employee with
sufficient ground of gross negligence and followed due
process.
Issue/s:
Did the petitioner violate the procedural due process in
dismissing their employee?
Ruling:
The SC ruled that in applying the procedural due
process in terminating an employee, requires that the
employee be informed of the particular acts or omissions
for which his dismissal is sought. The memorandum did
just that. Mateo was thereafter given the opportunity to
explain his side and was handed the requisite second
notice (of termination). Procedural due process was
therefore complied with. The substantive loss of a
property of the company is sufficient evidence that the
employee committed a gross negligence on his part. The
petition was granted.
Triumph international vs. Apostol 589 SCRA (2009)
Facts:
This a petition for a certiorari on the decision
rendered by the CA. The respondent was an assistant
manager hired by the petitioner, wherein the respondent
was terminated by the petitioner on the ground that the
latter has loss his trust and confidence with the former.
The respondent was given a memorandum to explain why
there is a huge discrepancy of the inventory in the
warehouse and permitted to leave with pay by the
petitioner since the investigation was still ongoing. After
the respondent explained his side, he was given a notice
of termination of his employment.
The respondent goes to the Department
of Labor and NLRC and assailed that they are illegally
dismissed by the petitioner. The Department of labor and
NLRC ruled that their dismissal was legal and the
petitioner followed the procedural due process in
terminating the respondent. The CA reversed the decision
of the NLRC and the petitioner went to the SC contending
that their ground for termination was sufficient.
Issue/s:
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Did the petitioner follow the procedural due process in
terminating the respondent?
Ruling:
The SC held that the petition have merit. The
mere fact that the petitioner gave notice to the
respondent and gave him an opportunity to explain on
his part why such discrepancies occurred, and complying
the second requisite of notice of termination is a
sufficient requirement on applying the procedural due
process. Managerial position does not need proof beyond
reasonable doubt because his employment is base on
trust and confidence compared to the rank and file
employees. In the case at bar, the respondent was not a
rank and file employee, he has a position wherein the
company gives his trust and confidence to the
respondent, hence, the petitioner has a legal grounds for
terminating the respondent. The petition was granted.
Republic vs Libunao 594 SCRA (2009)
Facts:
The respondents were the owners of the land
which was taken by the petitioners the Republic of the
Philippines represented by NAPOCOR through eminent
domain. The RTC rendered their decision by approving
such taking by paying just compensation of the value of
whole lot area. The petitioners move their case to the CA
but they affirmed the decision with modification that the
petitioner should pay the interest of 6% of the value of
the land from the time of taking until the full payment of
the Value of the land.
The petitioners contend that they are
only allowed to pay the 10% value of the land since they
are only using a portion of the land as a means of right of
way.
Issue/s:
Is the contention of the petitioners meritorious?
Ruling:
The SC ruled in affirming the decision of the CA.
The Court held that the nature and effect of the
installation of power lines and the limitations on the use
of the land for an indefinite period should be considered,
as the owners of the properties would be deprived of the
normal use of their properties. For this reason, the
property owners are entitled to the payment of just
compensation based on the full market value of the
affected properties.
Abelita III vs Doria 596 SCRA (2009)
Facts:
Judge Felimon Abelita III (petitioner) filed a
complaint for Damages under Articles 32(4) and (9) of
the Civil Code against P/Supt. German B. Doria (P/Supt.
Doria) and SPO3 Cesar Ramirez (SPO3 Ramirez).
Petitioner alleged in his complaint that on 24 March 1996,
at around 12 noon, he and his wife were on their way to
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their house in Bagumbayan, Masbate, Masbate when
P/Supt. Doria and SPO3 Ramirez (respondents),
accompanied by 10 unidentified police officers, requested
them to proceed to the Provincial PNP Headquarters at
Camp Boni Serrano, Masbate, Masbate. Petitioner was
suspicious of the request and told respondents that he
would proceed to the PNP Headquarters after he had
brought his wife home. Petitioner alleged that when he
parked his car in front of their house, SPO3 Ramirez
grabbed him, forcibly took the key to his Totoya Lite Ace
van, barged into the vehicle, and conducted a search
without a warrant. The search resulted to the seizure of a
licensed shotgun. Petitioner presented the shotgun’s
license to respondents. Thereafter, SPO3 Ramirez
continued his search and then produced a .45 caliber
pistol which he allegedly found inside the vehicle.
Respondents arrested petitioner and detained him,
without any appropriate charge, at the PNP special
detention cell.
P/Supt. Doria alleged that his office received a
telephone call from a relative of Rosa Sia about a
shooting incident in Barangay Nursery. He dispatched a
team headed by SPO3 Ramirez to investigate the incident.
SPO3 Ramirez later reported that a certain William Sia
was wounded while petitioner, who was implicated in the
incident, and his wife just left the place of the incident.
P/Supt. Doria looked for petitioner and when he found
him, he informed him of the incident report. P/Supt.
Doria requested petitioner to go with him to the police
headquarters as he was reported to be involved in the
incident. Petitioner agreed but suddenly sped up his
vehicle and proceeded to his residence. P/Supt. Doria and
his companions chased petitioner. Upon reaching
petitioner’s residence, they caught up with petitioner as
he was about to run towards his house. The police
officers saw a gun in the front seat of the vehicle beside
the driver’s seat as petitioner opened the door. They also
saw a shotgun at the back of the driver’s seat. The police
officers confiscated the firearms and arrested petitioner.
P/Supt. Doria alleged that his men also arrested other
persons who were identified to be with petitioner during
the shooting incident. Petitioner was charged with illegal
possession of firearms and frustrated murder. An
administrative case was also filed against petitioner
before this Court.
The trial court ruled that petitioner’s warrantless
arrest and the warrantless seizure of the firearms were
valid and legal. The trial court gave more credence to the
testimonies of respondents who were presumed to have
performed their duties in accordance with law. The trial
court rejected petitioner’s claim of frame-up as weak and
insufficient to overthrow the positive testimonies of the
police officers who conducted the arrest and the
incidental search.
Issue/s:
Whether the warrantless arrest and warrantless search
and seizure were illegal.
Ruling:
The SC ruled that for the warrantless arrest
under this Rule to be valid, two requisites must concur:
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(1) the offender has just committed an offense; and (2)
the arresting peace officer or private person has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it. Personal knowledge should be
based on probable cause. SPO3 Ramirez investigated the
report and learned from witnesses that petitioner was
involved in the incident. They were able to track down
petitioner, but when invited to the police headquarters to
shed light on the incident, petitioner initially agreed then
sped up his vehicle, prompting the police authorities to
give chase. Petitioner’s act of trying to get away, coupled
with the incident report which they investigated, is
enough to raise a reasonable suspicion on the part of the
police authorities as to the existence of probable cause.
The seizure of the firearms was justified under the plain
view doctrine. The plain view doctrine applies when the
following requisites concur: (1) the law enforcement
officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification
for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view
a particular area; (2) the discovery of the evidence in
plain view is inadvertent; and (3) it is immediately
apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be
evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to
seizure.
In this case, the police authorities were in the
area because that was where they caught up with
petitioner after the chase. They saw the firearms inside
the vehicle when petitioner opened the door. Since a
shooting incident just took place and it was reported that
petitioner was involved in the incident, it was apparent to
the police officers that the firearms may be evidence of a
crime. Hence, they were justified in seizing the firearms.
Hence the warrantless search and seizure were
justified. The petition was denied.
UNILAB, INC. vs. ERNESTO ISIP and/or SHALIMAR
PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 163858.
Facts:
UNILAB hired a private investigator to
investigate a place purported to be manufacturing fake
UNILAB products, especially Revicon multivitamins. The
agent took some photographs where the clandestine
manufacturing operation was taking place. UNILAB then
sought the help of the NBI, which thereafter filed an
application for the issuance of search warrant in the RTC
of Manila. After finding probable cause, the court issued a
search warrant directing the police to seize “finished or
unfinished products of UNILAB, particularly REVICON
multivitamins.” No fake Revicon was however found;
instead, sealed boxes where seized, which, when opened
contained 60 ml bottles of Disudrin and 200mg tablets of
Inoflox, both were brands used by UNILAB. NBI prayed
that some of the sized items be turned over to the
custody of the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) for
examination. The court granted the motion. The
respondents then filed a motion to quash the search
warrant or to suppress evidence, alleging that the seized
items are considered to be fruit of a poisonous tree, and
therefore inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding,
which the petitioners opposed alleging that the boxes of
Disudrin and Inoflox were seized under the plain view
doctrine. The court, however, granted the motion of the
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respondents.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the seizure of the sealed boxes which,
when opened, contained Disudrin syrup and Inoflox,
were valid under the plain view doctrine.
Ruling:
It is true that things not described in the
warrant may be seized under the plain view doctrine.
However, seized things not described in the warrant
cannot be presumed as plain view. The State must
adduce evidence to prove that the elements for the
doctrine to apply are present, namely: (a) the executing
law enforcement officer has a prior justification for an
initial intrusion or otherwise properly in a position from
which he can view a particular order; (b) the officer must
discover incriminating evidence inadvertently; and (c) it
must be immediately apparent to the police that the
items they observe may be evidence of a crime,
contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure
It was thus incumbent on the NBI and the petitioner to
prove that the items were seized on plain view. It is not
enough that the sealed boxes were in the plain view of
the NBI agents. However, the NBI failed to present any of
officers who were present when the warrant was enforced
to prove that the the sealed boxes was discovered
inadvertently, and that such boxes and their contents
were incriminating and immediately apparent. It must be
stressed that only the enforcing officers had personal
knowledge whether the sealed boxes and their contents
thereof were incriminating and that they were
immediately apparent. There is even no showing that the
NBI agents knew the contents of the sealed boxes before
they were opened. In sum then, the petitioner and the
NBI failed to prove that the plain view doctrine applies to
the seized items.
PEOPLE’S JOURNAL et. al. vs. FRANCIS THOENEN,
G.R. No. 143372
Facts:
On 30 September 1990, a news item appeared
in the People’s Journal claiming that a certain Francis
Thoenen, a Swiss national who allegedly shoots wayward
neighbors’ pets that he finds in his domain. It also
claimed that BF Homes residents, in a letter through
lawyer Atty. Efren Angara, requested for the deportation
of Thoenen to prevent the recurrence of such incident in
the future. Thoenen claimed that the article destroyed
the respect and admiration he enjoyed in the community.
He is seeking for damages.
The petitioners admitted publication of the news item,
ostensibly out of a “social and moral duty to inform the
public on matters of general interest, promote the public
good and protect the moral public (sic) of the people,”
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and that the story was published in good faith and raising the constitutional protection against double
without malice. jeopardy.

Issue/s: Issue/s:

Whether or not the news report fall under privileged Whether or not double jeopardy attaches.
communication and therefore protected by the
constitutional provision on freedom of speech. Ruling:

Ruling: To invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the

The right of free speech is not absolute. Libel is
not protected speech. In the instant case, even if we
assume that the letter written by Atty. Angara is
privileged communication, it lost its character when the
matter was published in the newspaper and circulated
among the general population, especially since the
individual alleged to be defamed is neither a public
official nor a public figure.
Moreover, the news item contained falsehoods on two
levels. First, the BF Homes residents did not ask for the
deportation of Thoenen, more so because the letter of
the Atty. Anagara was a mere request for verification of
Thoenen’s status as a foreign resident. The article is also
untrue because the events she reported never happened.
Worse, the main source of information, Atty. Efren
Angara, apparently either does not exist, or is not a
lawyer.
There is no constitutional value in false
statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the
careless error materially advances society’s interest in
‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ debate. Calculated
falsehood falls into that class of utterances which “are no
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality… The knowingly false
statement and the false statement made with reckless
disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional
protection”
following requisites must be present: (1) a valid
complaint or information; (2) the court has jurisdiction to
try the case; (3) the accused has pleaded to the charge;
and (4) he has been convicted or acquitted or the case
against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent.
An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the
statutory designation of the offense and the acts or
omissions constitutive thereof. In other words, if the
offense is stated in such a way that a person of ordinary
intelligence may immediately know what is meant, and
the court can decide the matter according to law, the
inevitable conclusion is that the information is valid. The
inescapable conclusion, then, is that the first information
is valid inasmuch as it sufficiently alleges the manner by
which the crime was committed. Verily the purpose of the
law, that is, to apprise the accused of the nature of the
charge against them, is reasonably complied with.
Moreover, an administrative order of the Supreme Court
designated Regional Trial Courts to exclusively try and
decide cases of … violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, as amended, regardless of the quantity of the
drugs involved. (PP. vs. Velasco)
Therefore, the requisites of double jeopardy being
present, the defense attaches.

MARCELO LASOY and FELIX BANISA, vs. HON.

MONINA A. ZENAROSA, G.R. No. 129472.

Facts:

On July 2, 1996 the accused were arrested fro

possession and transport of marijuana leaves (in bricks).
They were charged with the violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, with the information containing the
fact that they were in possession of and were
transporting, selling or offering to sell 42.410 grams of
dried marijuana fruiting tops. The accused was then
arraigned, pleaded guilty and convicted. Subsequently
they applied for probation. Thereafter the prosecutor’s
office filed two motions to admit amended information
(claiming that the marijuana recovered was 42.410 kilos,
not grams) and to set aside the arraignment of the
accused; the accused then moved to quash the motion

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2010
ALFREDO T. ROMUALDEZ vs. THE HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) and THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 161602
(July 13, 2010)
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition,
seeking to annul the Sandiganbayan's rulings and
prevent it from further proceeding with Civil Case 0167
until another preliminary investigation is conducted in
their case.
On March 6, 1996 respondent Republic of the
Philippines (Republic) filed an action for the forfeiture of
alleged unlawfully acquired property with the
Sandiganbayan in Civil Case 0167 against petitioner
Alfredo T. Romualdez and his wife Agnes Sison
Romualdez as well as against Romson Realty, Inc., R & S
Transport, Inc., Fidelity Management, Inc., and Dio
Island Resort, Inc. (collectively, the Romualdezes)
pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) 1379.
On January 16, 2000 the Romualdezes filed a
motion to dismiss the action on grounds of a) violation of
their right to a speedy disposition of their case; b) lack of
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the action; c)
prematurity; d) prescription; and e) litis pendentia. On
September 11, 2002 the Sandiganbayan denied the
motion. It also denied on March 10, 2003 their
subsequent motion for reconsideration.
On March 31, 2003 the Romualdezes next filed a
motion for preliminary investigation and to suspend
proceedings. They claim that since Civil Case 0167 was a
forfeiture proceeding filed under R.A. 1379, the
Ombudsman should have first conducted a "previous
inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal
cases" before the filing of the case pursuant to Section 2
of the law.
In its Comment on the motion, the Republic
pointed out that the Office of the Ombudsman in fact
conducted such a preliminary investigation in 1991 in
OMB-0-91-0820law and issued on January 22, 1992 a
resolution, recommending the endorsement of the matter
to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for the filing
of the forfeiture case.
On August 13, 2003 the Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution, law denying the Romualdezes' March 31, 2003
motion. It also denied by resolution on December 3, 2003
their subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the preliminary investigation that the
Ombudsman conducted in OMB-0-91-0820 in 1991
satisfied the requirement of the law in forfeiture cases.
Ruling:
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As the Sandiganbayan correctly pointed out,
quoting Republic v. Sandiganbayan, the Ombudsman has
under its general investigatory powers the authority to
investigate forfeiture cases where the alleged ill-gotten
wealth had been amassed before February 25, 1986.
Thus:
While we do not discount the authority of the
Ombudsman, we believe and so hold that the exercise of
his correlative powers to both investigate and initiate the
proper action for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or
unexplained wealth is restricted only to cases for the
recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth which
were amassed after February 25, 1986. Prior to said date,
the Ombudsman is without authority to initiate such
forfeiture proceedings. We, however, uphold his authority
to investigate cases for the forfeiture or recovery of such
ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed even
before the aforementioned date, pursuant to his general
investigatory power under Section 15(1) of Republic Act
No. 6770.
The Court cannot also subscribe to the
Romualdezes' claim that they are entitled to a new
preliminary investigation since they had no opportunity to
take part in the one held in 1991, in OMB-0-91-0820.
They admit that the subpoena for that investigation had
been sent to their last known residence at the time it was
conducted.cracralaw The Republic categorically insists
that the appropriate subpoena had been served on the
Romualdezes.
The Ombudsman could not be faulted for
proceeding with the investigation of the Romualdezes'
cases when they did not show up despite notice being
sent to them at their last known residence. As the Court
held in a case:
The New Rules on Criminal Procedure "does not
require as a condition sine qua non to the validity of the
proceedings [in the preliminary investigation] the
presence of the accused for as long as efforts to reach
him were made, and an opportunity to controvert the
evidence of the complainant is accorded him. The obvious
purpose of the rule is to block attempts of unscrupulous
respondents to thwart the prosecution of offenses by
hiding themselves or by employing dilatory tactics."
In sum, no reason exists for suspending or
interrupting the conduct of the forfeiture proceedings
before the Sandiganbayan.
NEW PUERTO COMMERCIAL AND RICHARD LIM vs.
RODEL LOPEZ AND FELIX GAVAN, G.R. No. 169999
(July 26, 2010)
Facts:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to
reverse and set aside the Court of Appeal's (CA's) June 2,
2005 Decisioncralaw in CA-G.R. SP. No. 83577, which
affirmed with modification the October 28, 2003
Decisioncralaw of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) in NCR CA No. 034421-03, and the
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September 23, 2005 Resolutionralaw denying petitioners'
motion for partial reconsideration.
Petitioners contend that the investigation of
respondents was not an afterthought. They stress the
following peculiar circumstances of this case: First, when
the labor complaint was filed on November 3, 2000,
respondents had not yet been dismissed by petitioners.
Rather, it was respondents who were guilty of not
reporting for work; Lopez starting on October 23, 2000
and Gavan on October 28, 2000. Second, at this time
also, petitioners were still in the process of collecting
evidence on the alleged misappropriation of company
funds after they received reports of respondents'
fraudulent acts. Considering the distance between the
towns serviced by respondents and Puerto Princesa City,
it took a couple of weeks for petitioners' representative,
Armel Bagasala (Bagasala), to unearth the anomalies
committed by respondents. Thus, it was only on
November 18, 2000 when Bagasala finished the
investigation and submitted to petitioners the evidence
establishing that respondents indeed misappropriated
company funds. Naturally, this was the only time when
they could begin the formal investigation of respondents
wherein they followed the twin-notice rule and which led
to the termination of respondents on December 18, 2000
for gross misconduct and absence without leave for more
than a month.
Petitioners lament that the filing of the labor
complaint on November 3, 2000 was purposely sought by
respondents to pre-empt the results of the then ongoing
investigation after respondents got wind that petitioners
were conducting said investigation because respondents
were reassigned to a different sales area during the
period of investigation.
Respondents counter that their abandonment of
employment was a concocted story. No evidence was
presented, like the daily time record, to establish this
claim. Further, the filing of the illegal dismissal complaint
negates abandonment. Assuming arguendo that
respondents abandoned their work, no proof was
presented that petitioners' served a notice of
abandonment at respondents' last known addresses as
required by Section 2, Rule XVI, Book V of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing the Labor Code. According to
respondents, on November 3, 2000, petitioners verbally
advised them to look for another job because the
company was allegedly suffering from heavy losses. For
this reason, they sought help from the Palawan labor
office which recommended that they file a labor
complaint.
Respondents also contest the finding that they
misappropriated company funds. They claim that the
evidence is insufficient to prove that they did not remit
their sales collections to petitioners. Neither were the
minutes of the proceedings before the labor officer
presented to prove that they admitted misappropriating
the company funds. Respondents add that they did not
hold a position of trust and confidence. They claim that
the criminal cases for estafa against respondents were
belatedly filed in order to further justify their dismissal
Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!
from employment and act as leverage relative to the
subject labor case they filed against petitioners.
Issue/s:
1. Whether x x x the Court of Appeals erred in
construing that the investigation held by
petitioners is an afterthought; and
2. Whether x x x the Court of Appeals erred in
awarding the sum of P30,000.00 each to the
respondents as nominal damages.cra
Ruling:
The petition is meritorious.
When the requirements of procedural due
process are satisfied, the award of nominal damages is
improper.
An employee's right to be heard in termination
cases under Article 277 (b) as implemented by Section 2
(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the
Labor Code should be interpreted in broad strokes. It is
satisfied not only by a formal face to face confrontation
but by any meaningful opportunity to controvert the
charges against him and to submit evidence in support
thereof.
In the instant case, the appellate court ruled
that there are two conflicting versions of the events and
that, in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, the courts are precluded from resolving factual
issues. Consequently, the factual findings of the Labor
Arbiter, as affirmed by the NLRC, that petitioners stopped
reporting from work and misappropriated their sales
collection are binding on the courts. However, the CA
found that respondents were denied their right to
procedural due process because the investigation held by
petitioners was an afterthought considering that it was
called after they had notice of the complaint filed before
the labor office in Palawan.
Indeed, appellate courts accord the factual
findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC not only
respect but also finality when supported by substantial
evidence. The Court does not substitute its own judgment
for that of the tribunal in determining where the weight
of evidence lies or what evidence is credible. It is not for
the Court to re-examine conflicting evidence, re-evaluate
the credibility of the witnesses nor substitute the findings
of fact of an administrative tribunal which has gained
expertise in its specialized field.cra19
However, while we agree with the CA that the
labor tribunal's factual determinations can no longer be
disturbed for failure of respondents to show grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the Labor Arbiter and NLRC,
as in fact respondents effectively accepted these findings
by their failure to appeal from the decision of the CA, we
find that the appellate court misapprehended the import
of these factual findings. For if it was duly established, as
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affirmed by the appellate court itself, that respondents
failed to report for work starting from October 22, 2000
for respondent Lopez and October 28, 2000 for
respondent Gavan, then at the time of the filing of the
complaint with the labor office on November 3, 2000,
respondents were not yet dismissed from employment.
Prior to this point in time, there was, thus, no necessity
to comply with the twin requirements of notice and
hearing.
As can be seen, under the peculiar
circumstances of this case, it cannot be concluded that
the sending of the notices and setting of hearings were a
mere afterthought because petitioners were still awaiting
the report from Bagasala when respondents pre-empted
the results of the ongoing investigation by filing the
subject labor complaint. For this reason, there was
sufficient compliance with the twin requirements of notice
and hearing even if the notices were sent and the hearing
conducted after the filing of the labor complaint. Thus,
the award of nominal damages by the appellate court is
improper.
SALVADOR V. REBELLION vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 175700 (July 5, 2010)
Facts:
This petition for review assails the September 26,
2006 Decision1cralaw of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR No. 29248 which affirmed with modification the
December 8, 2004 Decision2cralaw of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City, Branch 209, finding
petitioner guilty of violation of Section 16, Article III of
Republic Act (RA) No. 6425, as amended (otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended).
On July 31, 2000, an Information was filed
charging petitioner Salvador V. Rebellion with violation of
Section 16, Article III of RA 6425, as amended, the
accusatory portion thereof reads:
That on or about the 27th day of July 2000, in
the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, not having been lawfully authorized to possess
or otherwise use any regulated drug, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession
and under his custody and control one (1) heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet containing 0.03 gram of white
crystalline substance and one (1) piece of aluminum foil
strip with trace of white crystalline substance, which were
found positive [for] Methamphetamine Hydrochloride,
commonly known as "shabu", a regulated drug, without
the corresponding license and prescription, in violation of
the above cited law.
Contrary to law.
When arraigned on September 6, 2000,
petitioner entered a plea of not guilty. After pre-trial, trial
on the merits forthwith commenced.
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At about 4:40 in the afternoon of July 27, 2000,
PO3 George Garcia (PO3 Garcia) and PO3 Romeo
Sotomayor, Jr. (PO3 Sotomayor), together with Michael
Fermin and Joseph Apologista, all members of the
Mayor's Action Command (MAC) of Mandaluyong City,
were on routine patrol along M. Cruz St., Barangay
Mauway, when they chanced upon two individuals
chanting and in the act of exchanging something. The
police officers introduced themselves and then inquired
from petitioner what he was holding. Petitioner took out
from his possession three strips of aluminum foil which
PO3 Garcia confiscated. PO3 Sotomayor also found on
petitioner a plastic sachet which contained white
crystalline substance which looked like tawas. Suspecting
that the substance was "shabu", he confiscated the
plastic sachet. Petitioner and his companion, who was
later identified as Clarito Yanson (Clarito), were brought
to the MAC station at the Criminal Investigation Division
(CID) for investigation. After laboratory examination, the
contents of the plastic sachet weighing 0.03 gram were
found positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or
shabu, a regulated drug. The test on the three strips of
aluminum foil also yielded positive for traces of shabu.
On the basis thereof, petitioner was
correspondingly charged with illegal possession of
dangerous drugs. Clarito, on the other hand, was further
investigated by the City Prosecutor's Office.
Petitioner denied the charge against him. He
claimed that he was merely standing in front of a store
waiting for the change of his P500.00 bill when he was
suddenly accosted by the MAC team.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming
the decision of the Rigional Trial Court finding the
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged.
Ruling:
The court sustained the appellate court in
affirming petitioner's conviction by the trial court.
A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made
by a peace officer or a private individual under any of the
following circumstances:7cralaw
Sec 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful - A
peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed
and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner
who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
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confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b)
hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail
and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with
Section 7, Rule 112.
Our own review discloses sufficient evidence
that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was effected
under Section 5(a), or the arrest of a suspect in flagrante
delicto. The MAC team witnessed petitioner handing a
piece of plastic sachet to Clarito. Arousing their suspicion
that the sachet contains shabu, team members PO3
Garcia and PO3 Sotomayor alighted from their
motorcycles and approached them. Clarito was not able
to completely get hold of the plastic sachet because of
their arrival. At the first opportunity, the team members
introduced themselves. Upon inquiry by PO3 Garcia what
petitioner was holding, the latter presented three strips
of aluminum foil which the former confiscated. At a
distance, PO3 Sotomayor saw petitioner in possession of
the plastic sachet which contains white crystalline
substance. There and then, petitioner and Clarito were
apprehended and brought to the CID for investigation.
After laboratory examination, the white crystalline
substance placed inside the plastic sachet was found
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a
regulated drug.
Under these circumstances, we entertain no
doubt that petitioner was arrested in flagrante delicto as
he was then committing a crime, violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act, within the view of the arresting
team. Thus, his case comes under the exception to the
rule requiring a warrant before effecting an arrest.
Consequently, the results of the attendant search and
seizure were admissible in evidence to prove his guilt of
the offense charged. As correctly pointed out by the
appellate court in addressing the matter of the
purportedly invalid warrantless arrest:
In any event, the warrantless arrest of accused-
appellant was lawful because he was caught by the police
officers in flagrante delicto or while he was in the act of
handing to Clarito Yanson a plastic sachet of "shabu".
Upon seeing the exchange, PO3 Sotomayor and PO3
Garcia approached accused-appellant and Clarito Yanson
and introduced themselves as members of the MAC. PO3
Sotomayor confiscated from accused-appellant the plastic
sachet of "shabu" while PO3 Garcia confiscated the
aluminum foil strips which accused-appellant was also
holding in his other hand.
Jurisprudence is settled that the arresting officer
in a legitimate warrantless arrest has the authority to
search on the belongings of the offender and confiscate
those that may be used to prove the commission of the
offense. x x x
RA 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, increased
the penalty for illegal possession of less than five grams
of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu to an
imprisonment of 12 years and one day to 20 years and a
fine ranging from P300,000.00 to P400,000.00. Said law,
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however, not being favorable to the petitioner, cannot be
given retroactive application in this case.
ALAN F. PAGUIA vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, and HON.
HILARIO DAVIDE, JR., in his capacity as Permanent
Representative of the Philippines to the United
Nations, G.R. No. 176278 (June 25, 2010)
Facts:
Petitioner Alan F. Paguia (petitioner), as citizen
and taxpayer, filed this original action for the writ of
certiorari to invalidate President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo's nomination of respondent former Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (respondent Davide) as Permanent
Representative to the United Nations (UN) for violation of
Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7157 (RA 7157), the
Philippine Foreign Service Act of 1991. Petitioner argues
that respondent Davide's age at that time of his
nomination in March 2006, 70, disqualifies him from
holding his post. Petitioner grounds his argument on
Section 23 of RA 7157 pegging the mandatory retirement
age of all officers and employees of the Department of
Foreign Affairs (DFA) at 65. Petitioner theorizes that
Section 23 imposes an absolute rule for all DFA
employees, career or non-career; thus, respondent
Davide's entry into the DFA ranks discriminates against
the rest of the DFA officials and employees.
In their separate Comments, respondent Davide,
the Office of the President, and the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs (respondents) raise threshold issues against the
petition. First, they question petitioner's standing to bring
this suit because of his indefinite suspension from the
practice of law. Second, the Office of the President and
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs (public respondents)
argue that neither petitioner's citizenship nor his
taxpayer status vests him with standing to question
respondent Davide's appointment because petitioner
remains without personal and substantial interest in the
outcome of a suit which does not involve the taxing
power of the state or the illegal disbursement of public
funds. Third, public respondents question the propriety of
this petition, contending that this suit is in truth a
petition for quo warranto which can only be filed by a
contender for the office in question.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Congress has the power to limit
the president’s prerogative to nominate ambassadors
by legislating age qualifications despite the
constitutional rule limiting Congress' role in the
appointment of ambassadors to the Commission on
Appointments' confirmation of nominees.
Ruling:
The petition presents no case or controversy for
petitioner's lack of capacity to sue and mootness.
Taxpayers' contributions to the state's coffers
entitle them to question appropriations for expenditures
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which are claimed to be unconstitutional or illegal.
However, the salaries and benefits respondent Davide
received commensurate to his diplomatic rank are fixed
by law and other executive issuances, the funding for
which was included in the appropriations for the DFA's
total expenditures contained in the annual budgets
Congress passed since respondent Davide's nomination.
Having assumed office under color of authority
(appointment), respondent Davide is at least a de facto
officer entitled to draw salary, negating petitioner's claim
of 'illegal expenditure of scarce public funds.'
An incapacity to bring legal actions peculiar to
petitioner also obtains. Petitioner's suspension from the
practice of law bars him from performing 'any activity, in
or out of court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.'
Certainly, preparing a petition raising carefully crafted
arguments on equal protection grounds and employing
highly legalistic rules of statutory construction to parse
Section 23 of RA 7157 falls within the proscribed conduct.
A supervening event has rendered this case
academic and the relief prayed for moot. Respondent
Davide resigned his post at the UN on 1 April 2010.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FORTUNE
SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC.,
represented by PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION, G.R. No. 177511 (June 29, 2010)
Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari.
Respondent Fortune Savings and Loan
Association, Inc. (Fortune Savings) owned a 4,230-
square meter agricultural land in San Gregorio, Malvar,
Batangas,[1] that it acquired for P80,000.00 after
foreclosing on the mortgage constituted on the land by
one of its borrowers who defaulted on a P71,500.00 loan.
Fortune Savings offered to sell the property for
P100,000.00 to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
for inclusion in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP). But petitioner Land Bank of the
Philippines (Land Bank), the financial intermediary for the
CARP,[2] fixed the land's value at only
P6,796.00. Rejecting this amount, Fortune Savings filed
a summary administrative proceeding for the
determination of just compensation with the DAR
Adjudication Board (DARAB).
On April 7, 2000 or four months after the RTC
dismissed Agrarian Case 99-0214, Land Bank filed
another petition for the determination of just
compensation for the subject land in Agrarian Case 2000-
0155. Because Fortune Savings failed to file a responsive
pleading, the RTC declared it in default. Land Bank
presented its evidence ex parte and on May 30, 2002 the
RTC rendered a decision, upholding Land Bank's valuation
of the property at P6,796.00 based on a technical
formula adopted by the DAR.
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Fortune Savings appealed to the Court of
Appeals (CA),[4] arguing that the DARAB decision had
already become final and executory and that the Land
Bank valuation of P6,796.00, adopted by the RTC was
erroneous. On August 29, 2006, the CA rendered
judgment, reinstating the March 3, 1999 DARAB decision
and its P93,060.00 valuation.[5] The CA ruled that Land
Bank incurred delay in filing only on April 5, 1999 its
petition for the determination of just compensation in
Agrarian Case 99-0214 and that, consequently, the
DARAB decision became final and executory on April 1,
1999.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in holding that, since
Land Bank filed its original judicial action in Agrarian
Case 99-0214 beyond the 15-day period set under Rule
XIII, Section 11 of the DARAB Rules, the DARAB
determination of just compensation became final and
executory; and
2. Whether or not the CA erred in adopting the
valuation fixed by DARAB for the property at P93,060.00
instead of the P6,796.00 established by Land Bank.
Ruling:
Although the DAR is vested with primary
jurisdiction under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law of 1988 or CARL to determine in a preliminary
manner the reasonable compensation for lands taken
under the CARP, such determination is subject to
challenge in the courts.[6] The CARL vests in the RTCs,
sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation.[7] This means that the RTCs do not
exercise mere appellate jurisdiction over just
compensation disputes.[8]
The RTC's jurisdiction is not any less 'original
and exclusive' because the question is first passed upon
by the DAR. The proceedings before the RTC are not a
continuation of the administrative determination. Indeed,
although the law may provide that the decision of the
DAR is final and unappealable, still a resort to the courts
cannot be foreclosed on the theory that courts are the
guarantors of the legality of administrative action.[9]
Consequently, Land Bank's filing of Agrarian
Case 2000-0155 after the dismissal without prejudice of
Agrarian Case 99-0214 cannot be regarded as barred by
the filing of the latter case beyond the 15-day period
prescribed under Rule XIII, Section 11 of the DARAB
Rules. The procedural soundness of Agrarian Case 2000-
0155 could not be made dependent on the DARAB case,
for these two proceedings are separate and independent.
The CA adopted the DARAB valuation of
P93,060.00 for the subject land for a technical
reason. But, since DARAB fixed the amount based on its
expertise and since that amount is not quite far from the
price for which Fortune Savings bought the same at a
public auction, the Court is inclined to accept such
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valuation. Considering the relatively small amount
involved, this would be a far better alternative than
remanding the case and incurring further delay in its
resolution.
IN RE: PETITION FOR CANCELLATION AND
CORRECTION OF ENTRIES IN THE RECORD OF
BIRTH, EMMA K. LEE vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RITA
K. LEE, LEONCIO K. LEE, LUCIA K. LEE-ONG, JULIAN
K. LEE, MARTIN K. LEE, ROSA LEE-VANDERLEK,
MELODY LEE-CHIN, HENRY K. LEE, NATIVIDAD LEE-
MIGUEL, VICTORIANO K. LEE, and THOMAS K. LEE,
represented by RITA K. LEE, as Attorney-in-Fact,
G.R. No. 177861 (July 13, 2010)
Facts:
This case is about the grounds for quashing a
subpoena ad testificandum and a parent's right not to
testify in a case against his children.
Spouses Lee Tek Sheng (Lee) and Keh Shiok
Cheng (Keh) entered the Philippines in the 1930s as
immigrants from China. They had 11 children, namely,
Rita K. Lee, Leoncio K. Lee, Lucia K. Lee-Ong, Julian K.
Lee, Martin K. Lee, Rosa Lee-Vanderlek, Melody Lee-
Chin, Henry K. Lee, Natividad Lee-Miguel, Victoriano K.
Lee, and Thomas K. Lee (collectively, the Lee-Keh
children).
In 1948, Lee brought from China a young
woman named Tiu Chuan (Tiu), supposedly to serve as
housemaid. The respondent Lee-Keh children believe that
Tiu left the Lee-Keh household, moved into another
property of Lee nearby, and had a relation with him.
Shortly after Keh died in 1989, the Lee-Keh
children learned that Tiu's children with Lee (collectively,
the Lee's other children) claimed that they, too, were
children of Lee and Keh.
April 2005 the Lee-Keh children filed with the
RTC an ex parte request for the issuance of a subpoena
ad testificandum to compel Tiu, Emma Lee's presumed
mother, to testify in the case. The RTC granted the
motion but Tiu moved to quash the subpoena, claiming
that it was oppressive and violated Section 25, Rule 130
of the Rules of Court, the rule on parental privilege, she
being Emma Lee's stepmother.cra3cralaw On August 5,
2005 the RTC quashed the subpoena it issued for being
unreasonable and oppressive considering that Tiu was
already very old and that the obvious object of the
subpoena was to badger her into admitting that she was
Emma Lee's mother.
Because the RTC denied the Lee-Keh children's
motion for reconsideration, they filed a special civil action
of certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP 92555. On December 29, 2006 the CA rendered a
decision,4cralaw setting aside the RTC's August 5, 2005
Order. The CA ruled that only a subpoena duces tecum,
not a subpoena ad testificandum, may be quashed for
being oppressive or unreasonable under Section 4, Rule
21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The CA also held that
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Tiu's advanced age alone does not render her incapable
of testifying. The party seeking to quash the subpoena
for that reason must prove that she would be unable to
withstand the rigors of trial, something that petitioner
Emma Lee failed to do.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the
trial court may compel Tiu to testify in the correction of
entry case that respondent Lee-Keh children filed for
the correction of the certificate of birth of petitioner
Emma Lee to show that she is not Keh's daughter.
Ruling:
Petitioner Emma Lee claims that the RTC
correctly quashed the subpoena ad testificandum it
issued against Tiu on the ground that it was
unreasonable and oppressive, given the likelihood that
the latter would be badgered on oral examination
concerning the Lee-Keh children's theory that she had
illicit relation with Lee and gave birth to the other Lee
children.
But, as the CA correctly ruled, the grounds
cited-unreasonable and oppressive-are proper for
subpoena ad duces tecum or for the production of
documents and things in the possession of the witness, a
command that has a tendency to infringe on the right
against invasion of privacy. Section 4, Rule 21 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, thus provides:chan robles virtual
law library
SECTION 4. Quashing a subpoena. - The court
may quash a subpoena duces tecum upon motion
promptly made and, in any event, at or before the time
specified therein if it is unreasonable and oppressive, or
the relevancy of the books, documents or things does not
appear, or if the person in whose behalf the subpoena is
issued fails to advance the reasonable cost of the
production thereof.
Taking in mind the ultimate purpose of the Lee-
Keh children's action, obviously, they would want Tiu to
testify or admit that she is the mother of Lee's other
children, including petitioner Emma Lee. Keh had died
and so could not give testimony that Lee's other children
were not hers. The Lee-Keh children have, therefore, a
legitimate reason for seeking Tiu's testimony and,
normally, the RTC cannot deprive them of their right to
compel the attendance of such a material witness.
But petitioner Emma Lee raises two other
objections to requiring Tiu to come to court and testify: a)
considering her advance age, testifying in court would
subject her to harsh physical and emotional stresses; and
b) it would violate her parental right not to be compelled
to testify against her stepdaughter.
Regarding the physical and emotional
punishment that would be inflicted on Tiu if she were
compelled at her age and condition to come to court to
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testify, petitioner Emma Lee must establish this claim to
the satisfaction of the trial court. About five years have
passed from the time the Lee-Keh children sought the
issuance of a subpoena for Tiu to appear before the trial
court. The RTC would have to update itself and determine
if Tiu's current physical condition makes her fit to
undergo the ordeal of coming to court and being
questioned. If she is fit, she must obey the subpoena
issued to her.
Tiu has no need to worry that the oral
examination might subject her to badgering by adverse
counsel. The trial court's duty is to protect every witness
against oppressive behavior of an examiner and this is
especially true where the witness is of advanced age.
2. Tiu claimed before the trial court the right not
to testify against her stepdaughter, petitioner Emma Lee,
invoking Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence,
which reads:
SECTION 25. Parental and filial privilege.- No
person may be compelled to testify against his parents,
other direct ascendants, children or other direct
descendants.
The above is an adaptation from a similar
provision in Article 315 of the Civil Code that applies only
in criminal cases. But those who revised the Rules of Civil
Procedure chose to extend the prohibition to all kinds of
actions, whether civil, criminal, or administrative, filed
against parents and other direct ascendants or
descendants.
But here Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege,
claims that she is the stepmother of petitioner Emma Lee.
The privilege cannot apply to them because the rule
applies only to "direct" ascendants and descendants, a
family tie connected by a common ancestry. A
stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her
stepmother. Article 965 thus provides:
Art. 965. The direct line is either descending or
ascending. The former unites the head of the family with
those who descend from him. The latter binds a person
with those from whom he descends.
Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify
against petitioner Emma Lee.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ELIZABETH
MARCELINO y REYES, G.R. No. 189278 (July 26,
2010)
Facts:
This is an appeal from the June 29, 2009
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 03153 entitled People of the Philippines v. Elizabeth
Marcelino y Reyes, which affirmed the Decision in
Criminal Case Nos. 3048-M-2002 and 3049-M-2002 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 76 in Malolos City,
Bulacan. The RTC found accused-appellant Elizabeth
Marcelino guilty of violating Sections 5 and 11 of Republic
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Act No. (RA) 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred
in ruling that a search warrant was not
necessary.
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred
in ruling that the integrity and identity of
the shabu was preserved.
Ruling:
Search warrant and warrant of arrest not
needed
In People v. Villamin, involving an accused
arrested after he sold drugs during a buy-bust operation,
the Court ruled that it was a circumstance where a
warrantless arrest is justified under Rule 113, Sec. 5(a)
of the Rules of Court. The same ruling applies to the
instant case. When carried out with due regard for
constitutional and legal safeguards, it is a judicially
sanctioned method of apprehending those involved in
illegal drug activities. It is a valid form of entrapment, as
the idea to commit a crime comes not from the police
officers but from the accused himself. The accused is
caught in the act and must be apprehended on the spot.
From the very nature of a buy-bust operation, the
absence of a warrant does not make the arrest illegal.
illegal drug seized was not the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" as the defense would like this Court to
believe. The seizure made by the buy-bust team falls
under a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Rule
126, Sec. 13 of the Rules of Court, which pertinently
provides:
A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may have been
used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense
without a search warrant.
Since the buy-bust operation was established as
legitimate, it follows that the search was also valid, and a
warrant was likewise not needed to conduct it.
Chain of custody
The prosecution's failure to submit in evidence
the required physical inventory and photograph of the
evidence confiscated will not result in accused-appellant's
acquittal of the crimes charged. Non-compliance with the
provisions of RA 9165 on the custody and disposition of
dangerous drugs is not necessarily fatal to the
prosecution's case. Neither will it render the arrest of an
accused illegal nor the items seized from her inadmissible.
We discussed in People v. Pagkalinawan both
what the law provides and the level of compliance it
requires:
Sec. 21 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of RA 9165 provides:
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SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of
Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors
and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia
and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take
charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia
and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized
and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the
following manner:
The apprehending officer/team having initial
custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where the
search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station
or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures;
Provided, further, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team,
shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and
custody over said items. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
As can be gleaned from the language of Sec. 21
of the Implementing Rules, it is clear that the failure of
the law enforcers to comply strictly with it is not fatal. It
does not render appellant's arrest illegal nor the evidence
adduced against him inadmissible. What is essential is
"the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized
in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused."
Here, the chain of custody was established
through the following links: (1) SPO1 Dela Cruz marked
the seized sachet with "MDC-1" for the sachet that was
the subject of the buy-bust, and "MDC-2" for the sachet
found on accused-appellant's person; (2) a request for
laboratory examination of the seized items "MDC-1" and
"MDC-2" was signed by Police Senior Inspector Arthur
Felix Asis; (3) the request and the marked items seized
were received by the Bulacan Provincial Crime Laboratory;
(4) Chemistry Report No. D-628-02 confirmed that the
marked items seized from accused-appellant were shabu;
and (5) the marked items were offered in evidence as
Exhibits "C-1" and "C-2."
As there is no proof to support the claim that
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
shabu have been compromised at some stage, we find no
reason to overturn the finding of the trial court that what
were seized from Elizabeth were the same illegal drugs
presented in the trial court. As it is, there was substantial
compliance with the requirements under RA 9165, and
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the prosecution adequately established that there was an
unbroken chain of custody over the shabu seized from
Elizabeth.
Also working against Elizabeth's cause is the
presumption of regularity accorded those involved in the
buy-bust operation. It is a settled rule that in cases
involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence
is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers,
for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a
regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary.
Accused-appellant failed to overcome this presumption
by showing clear and convincing evidence that the police
officers did not properly perform their duty or that they
were inspired by an improper motive.
DR. EDILBERTO ESTAMPA, JR. vs. CITY
GOVERNMENT OF DAVAO, G.R. No. 190681 (June 21,
2010)
Facts:
On February 1, 2001 the City Government of
Davao appointed petitioner Dr. Edilberto Estampa, Jr. as
Medical Officer VI at its City Health Office. The position
made him head of a Task Force Unit assigned to deal with
any untoward event taking place in the city and Disaster
Coordinator for the Davao City Health Office under the
Davao City Disaster Coordinating Council.
On March 4, 2003, at around 6 p.m., a powerful
bomb exploded at the passengers' terminal of the Davao
International Airport, killing 22 persons and injuring 113
others. Dr. Estampa had just arrived home at that time
and was taking care of his one-year-old daughter. He
learned of the bombing incident between 7 to 8 p.m. His
wife arrived at 9 p.m. from her work at the Davao
Medical Center where most of the bombing victims were
brought for treatment. She prevailed on Dr. Estampa to
stay home and he did.
On March 6, 2003 Dr. Roberto V. Alcantara,
Officer-in-Charge of the Davao City Health Office,
required Dr. Estampa to explain in writing why he failed
to respond to the bombing incident. Dr. Estampa
submitted his explanation. Apparently satisfied with the
explanation and believing that Dr. Estampa's presence in
the aftermath of the bombing was not indispensable
considering the presence of other medical practitioners,
Dr. Alcantara considered the case closed. The latter did
not, however, bother to endorse the case to a superior
officer or to the City Legal Office with his
recommendation.
At the pre-trial, Dr. Estampa waived his right to
counsel. The parties agreed to dispense with a formal
hearing and to just submit their position papers or
memoranda. On November 12, 2004 the City Legal
Officer found Dr. Estampa guilty of "grave" neglect of
duty and recommended his dismissal. On February 8,
2005 the city mayor approved the recommendation and
dismissed Dr. Estampa. The latter moved for
reconsideration but this was denied, prompting him to
appeal to the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
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On June 2, 2006 the CSC denied Dr. Estampa's
appeal, corrected the denomination of his offense to
gross neglect of duty, and affirmed his dismissal. The
CSC also denied Dr. Estampa's motion for reconsideration
for lack of merit.
Dr. Estampa appealed to the Court of Appeals
(CA) by petition for review under Rule 43. The CA denied
his application for issuance of a TRO and writ of
preliminary injunction and eventually rendered a decision
on March 30, 2009, denying his petition and affirming the
resolutions of the CSC. The CA also found no merit in his
motion for reconsideration.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the rulings of
the City Legal Officer and the CSC that found Dr.
Estampa guilty of gross neglect of duty for failing to
respond to the March 4, 2003 Davao City bombing.
Ruling:
In his letter-explanation, Dr. Estampa justified
his absence from the emergency rooms of the hospitals
to attend to the bombing victims with the claim that he
needed to attend to his family first. Initially, he could not
leave his one-year-old daughter because they had no
house help. When his wife arrived from work shortly, he
also could not leave because she was six months
pregnant. Further, a bomb was found some meters from
their apartment a few weeks earlier. Dr. Estampa said in
his letter that he was unable from the beginning to give
full commitment to his job since he gave priority to his
family. He simply was not the right person for the job of
disaster coordinator.
Dr. Estampa's defense is not acceptable. A
person's duty to his family is not incompatible with his
job-related commitment to come to the rescue of victims
of disasters. Disasters do not strike every day. Besides,
knowing that his job as senior medical health officer
entailed the commitment to make a measure of personal
sacrifice, he had the choice to resign from it when he
realized that he did not have the will and the heart to
respond.
Assuming that he had a one-year-old daughter
in the house, he could have taken her to relatives
temporarily while his wife was still on her way from work.
But he did not. And when his wife arrived shortly at 9
p.m., he still did not leave under the pretext that his wife
was six months pregnant. Yet, he had in fact permitted
her to work away from home up to the evening. What
marked his gross irresponsibility was that he did not even
care to call up his superior or associates to inform them
of his inability to respond to the emergency. As a result,
the city health office failed to provide the needed
coordination of all efforts intended to cope with the
disaster. Who knows? Better coordination and dispatch of
victims to the right emergency rooms could have saved
more lives.
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The Court finds no excuse for reinstating Dr.
Estampa to the position he abandoned when it needed
him.
HENRY "JUN" DUEÑAS, JR., vs. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and
ANGELITO "JETT" P. REYES, G.R. No. 191550 (May
4, 2010)
Facts:
This resolves the Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court praying that the Decision of
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
dated February 25, 2010 and its Resolution2cralaw dated
March 18, 2010 be declared null and void ab initio.
Petitioner was proclaimed as the Congressman
for the Second Legislative District of Taguig City. Private
respondent filed an election protest with the HRET. After
revision of ballots in 100% of the protested precincts and
25% of the counter-protested precincts, the case was
submitted for resolution upon the parties' submission of
memoranda. However, in its Order dated September 25,
2008, the HRET directed the continuation of the revision
and appreciation of ballots for the remaining 75% of the
counter-protested precincts. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of said Order was denied in a HRET
Resolution dated October 21, 2008 which reiterated the
Order to continue revision in the remaining 75% of the
counter-protested precincts. Petitioner then filed a
petition for certiorari with this Court docketed as G.R. No.
185401, seeking the nullification of said order of revision,
alleging that it was issued with grave abuse of discretion.
On July 21, 2009, the Court promulgated a Decision
dismissing the petition. Said Decision became final and
executory and the HRET continued the proceeding in the
electoral protest case.
On February 25, 2010, the HRET promulgated
its Decision which declared private respondent as the
winner with a margin of 37 votes.
Issue/s:
Whether or not HRET committed grave abuse of
discretion in its decision.
Ruling:
The Court resolves to dismiss the petition for
lack of merit.
The Court has long declared in Dueñas, Jr. v.
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, that the
HRET was acting well within the rules when it ordered the
continuation of revision of ballots. Petitioner cannot
resurrect his claims, which had been finally adjudged
unmeritorious by this Court, through the present petition.
Thus, the fact that the HRET went on with the revision of
ballots in 75% of the counter-protested precincts cannot
be considered as grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the electoral tribunal.
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Likewise, the circumstance that none of the
three Supreme Court Justices took part in the Decision,
cannot be taken as proof of grave abuse of discretion.
Rule 89 of the 2004 Rules of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal provides that "[f]or
rendition of decisions and the adoption of formal
resolutions, the concurrence of at least five (5) Members
shall be necessary." The HRET Decision dated February
25, 2010 had the concurrence of six of its members.
Verily, the HRET was acting in accordance with its rules
and cannot be said to have committed any abuse of its
discretion.
SELECTED SUPREME COURT DECISIONS POLITICAL
LAW FEBRUARY 2009-APRIL 2010
FEBRUARY 2009 CASES
Administrative Law
ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY.
It is a fundamental principle in the law on public officers
that administrative liability is separate from and
independent of criminal liability. A simple act or omission
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can give rise to criminal, civil or administrative liability,
each independently of the others. This is known as the
“threefold liability rule.” Thus, absolution from a criminal
charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution, and
vice-versa. The dismissal of the administrative cases
against the petitioners will not necessarily result in the
dismissal of the criminal complaints filed against
them. Eleno T. Regidor, Jr. et al. Vs. People of the
Philippines, et al. G.R. No. 166086-92, February 13,
2009.
REORGANIZATION.
A reorganization “involves the reduction of personnel,
consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of
economy or redundancy of functions.” It alters the
existing structure of government offices or units therein,
including the lines of control, authority and responsibility
between them to make the bureaucracy more responsive
to the needs of the public clientele as authorized by law.
It could result in the loss of one’s position through
removal or abolition of an office. For a reorganization for
the purpose of economy or to make the bureaucracy
more efficient to be valid, however, it must pass the test
of good faith, otherwise it is void ab initio. In the case at
bar, petitioner claims that there has been a drastic
reduction of plantilla positions in the new staffing pattern
in order to address the local government unit’s gaping
budgetary deficit. Thus, he states that in the municipal
treasurer’s office and waterworks operations unit where
respondents were previously assigned, only 11 new
positions were created out of the previous 35 which had
been abolished; and that the new staffing pattern had 98
positions only, as compared with the old which had 129.
The CSC, however, highlighted the recreation of six (6)
casual positions for clerk II and utility worker I, which
positions were previously held by respondents Marivic,
Cantor, Asor and Enciso. Petitioner inexplicably never
disputed this finding nor proferred any proof that the new
positions do not perform the same or substantially the
same functions as those of the abolished. Nowhere in the
records does it appear that these recreated positions
were first offered to respondents. The appointment of
casuals to these recreated positions violates R.A.
6656. Pan vs. Pena, G.R. No. 174244, February 13,
2009.
Constitutional Law
EXPROPRIATION.
The National Power Corporation (NPC) filed a complaint
for the acquisition of easement right of way over lots of
Co in connection with the construction of NPC’s
transmission lines. The Supreme Court held that: (a)
Republic Act No. 8974 applies to properties expropriated
for the installation of NPC’s power transmission lines; (b)
NPC is liable to pay the full amount of the fair market
value and not merely a 10 percent easement fee for the
expropriated property; (c) the value of the property
should be reckoned as of 27 June 2001, the date of the
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filing of the complaint in compliance with Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court. National Power Corporation vs. Co, GR
No. 166973, February 10, 2009.
POLITICAL QUESTION.
The challenge to the jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee to hear the so called Moscow
incident effectively asks the Court to inquire into a matter
that is within the full discretion of the Senate. The issue
partakes of the nature of a political question that, in
Tañada v. Cuenco, was characterized as a question
which, under the Constitution, is to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which
full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government.
Pursuant to this constitutional grant of virtually
unrestricted authority to determine its own rules, the
Senate is at liberty to alter or modify these rules at any
time it may see fit, subject only to the imperatives of
quorum, voting and publication. It is not for the Supreme
Court to intervene in what is clearly a question of policy,
an issue dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of
the Senate’s action. Sps. PNP Director Eliseo D. Dela
Paz, et al. Vs. Senate Committee., G.R. No. 184849,
February 13, 2009.
DUAL CITIZENSHIP.
Dual citizenship is not a ground for disqualification from
running for any elective local position. Cordora vs.
Comelec, et al..R. No. 176947, February 19, 2009.
Miscellaneous Laws
WITNESS.
The Supreme Court held that “for an allegation of
tampering to be the basis for the disconnection of a
customer’s electric supply, the discovery of such must be
personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the
law or an ERB representative. This requirement can not
be dispensed with. In the present case, it is admitted
that no police officer or ERB representative was present
during the inspection, removal and subsequent
replacement of the electric meters alleged to have been
tampered with, hence, the requirement of the law was
not complied with – a lapse fatal to MERALCO’s
cause. Manila Electric Company Vs. Hsing Nan Tannery
Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 178913, February 12, 2009
MARCH 2009 DECISIONS
Administrative law
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BIDDING.
During the preliminary examination stage, the Bids and
Awards Committee (BAC) checks whether all the required
documents were submitted by the eligible bidders. Note
should be taken of the fact that the technical
specifications of the product bidded out is among the
documentary requirements evaluated by
the BAC during the preliminary examination stage. At this
point, therefore, the BAC should have already discovered
that the technical specifications of Audio Visual’s
document camera differed from the bid specifications in
at least three (3) respects, namely: the 15
frames/second frame rate, the weight specification, and
the power supply requirement. Using the non-
discretionary criteria laid out in R.A. No. 9184 and IRR-A,
therefore, the BAC should have rated Audio Visual’s bid
as “failed” instead of “passed.” Commission on Audit, etc.
vs. Link Worth International Inc., G.R. No. 184173,
March 13, 2009.
BURDEN OF PROOF.
It is settled that in administrative proceedings, the
burden of proof that the respondent committed the acts
complained of rests on the complainant. In fact, if the
complainant upon whom rests the burden of proving his
cause of action fails to show in a satisfactory manner the
facts upon which he bases his claim, the respondent is
under no obligation to prove his exception or defense.
Even in administrative cases, if a court employee or
magistrate is to be disciplined for a grave offense, the
evidence against him should be competent and should be
derived from direct knowledge. In the absence of
evidence to the contrary, the presumption that the
respondent has regularly performed his duties will
prevail.
In the present case, complainant failed to substantiate
his imputations of impropriety and partiality against
respondent Justice. Aside from his naked allegations,
conjecture and speculations, he failed to present any
other evidence to prove his charges. Hence, the
presumption that respondent regularly performed his
duties prevails. On the other hand, respondent Justice
adequately explained that since his voluntary inhibition
from the case, he no longer participated in the case and
his perceived participation in the issuance of the assailed
Resolution was a result of a typographical mistake. The
Law Firm of Chavez Miranda Aseoche, etc. vs. Justice
Isaias P. Dicdican, A.M. No. CA-09-48-J, March 13,
2009., see also Rodolfo B. Baygar, Sr. vs. Judge Lilian D.
Panontongan, et al., A.M. No. MTJ-08-1699, March 17,
2009.
Agrarian law
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BREACH BY AGRICULTURAL LESSEE.
R.A. No. 3844 does not operate to take away completely
every landowner’s rights to his land. Nor does it authorize
the agricultural lessee to act in an abusive or excessive
manner in derogation of the landowner’s rights. After all,
he is just an agricultural lessee. Although the agrarian
laws afford the opportunity for the landless to break
away from the vicious cycle of having to perpetually rely
on the kindness of others, a becoming modesty demands
that this kindness should at least be reciprocated, in
whatever small way, by those benefited by them. Here,
the Supreme Court held that the construction of the
reservoir by the leseee constitutes a violation of Section
36 of R.A. No. 3844, an unauthorized use of the
landholding for a purpose other than what had been
agreed upon, and a violation of the leasehold contract
between the lessee and lessor, for which the former was
penalized with permanent dispossession of his
leasehold. P’Carlo A. Castillo vs. Manuel Tolentino, G.R.
No. 181525, March 4, 2009.
JUST COMPENSATION; WHEN DETERMINED.
As to the legal basis of just compensation for land taken
by the Department of Agrarian Reform for distribution to
farmer-beneficiaries, the Supreme Court held that the
applicable law is R.A. No. 6657. In Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Pacita Agricultural Multi-Purpose
Cooperative, Inc., etc., et al., the Court made a
comparative analysis of cases that confronted the issue
of whether properties covered by P.D. No. 27 and E.O.
No. 228, for which the landowners had yet to be paid,
would be compensated under P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No.
228 or under the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 6657.
The Court observed that in Gabatin v. Land Bank of the
Philippines – a case which LBP invokes in this controversy
– the Court declared that the reckoning period for the
determination of just compensation should be the time
when the land was taken, i.e., in 1972, applying P.D. No.
27 and E.O. No. 228. However, the Court also noted that
after Gabatin, the Court had decided several cases in
which it found it more equitable to determine just
compensation based on the value of the property at the
time of payment. Land Bank of the Philippines
vs. Hernando T. Chico, et al., G.R. No. 168453. March
13, 2009
JUST COMPENSATION; MARKET DATA APPROACH.
In the instant case, the regional trial court (RTC) did not
consider Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 as well as
Department Administrative Order (DAO) DAO No. 6 in
determining just compensation for agrarian reform
cases. Instead, it adopted, hook, line and sinker, the
market data approach introduced by the commissioner
nominated by Allied. This undoubtedly constitutes a
glaring departure from the established tenet on the
mandatory nature of Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657
and DAO No. 6, as amended. It is worthy to note that
Allied did not provide any evidence that the market data
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approach, which based the value of the land in question
on sales and listings of similar properties situated within
the area, conformed to the subject administrative order,
and it is not also clear if same approach took into
consideration the said administrative order. Such being
the case, the market data approach espoused by Allied
cannot be a valuation that complies with the
requirements under the agrarian law. Besides, this Court
has once refused to accept the market data approach as
a method of valuation compliant with the agrarian law
and enforced by the DAR. Allied Banking Corp. vs. The
Land Bank of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 175422,
March 13, 2009
Constitutional Law.
COMELEC POWERS.
Under Sec. 2, Article IV-C of the 1987 Constitution, the
COMELEC exercises original jurisdiction over all contests,
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of all
elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and
appellate jurisdiction over election contests involving
elective municipal and barangay officials, and has
supervision and control over the board of canvassers.
The COMELEC sitting en banc, however, does not have
the authority to hear and decide election cases, including
pre-proclamation controversies in the first instance, as
the COMELEC in division has such authority. The
COMELEC en banc can exercise jurisdiction only on
motions for reconsideration of the resolution or decision
of the COMELEC in division. Petitioners’ contention that
the COMELEC’s choice of officials to substitute the
members of the Board of Canvassers is limited only to
those enumerated under Sec. 21 of Republic Act. No.
6646 is untenable. Contrary to petitioners’ assertion, the
enumeration above is not exclusive. Members of Board of
Canvassers can be filled up by the COMELEC not only
from those expressly mentioned in the above-quoted
provision, but from others outside if the former are not
available. Arturo F. Pacificador and Jovito C. Plameras,
Jr. vs. Comelec, etc., et al., G.R. No. 178259, March 13,
2009.
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
Prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with
fixed-term employment who were illegally discharged
were treated alike in terms of the computation of their
money claims: they were uniformly entitled to their
salaries for the entire unexpired portions of their
contracts. But with the enactment of R.A. No. 8042,
illegally dismissed overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) with
an unexpired portion of one year or more in their
employment contract have since been differently treated
in that their money claims are subject to a 3-month cap,
whereas no such limitation is imposed on local workers
with fixed-term employment. The Court concludes that
the subject clause contains a suspect classification in
that, in the computation of the monetary benefits of
fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged, it
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imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an
unexpired portion of one year or more in their contracts,
but none on the claims of other OFWs or local workers
with fixed-term employment. The subject clause singles
out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a
peculiar disadvantage. There being a suspect
classification involving a vulnerable sector protected by
the Constitution, the Court now subjects the classification
to a strict judicial scrutiny, and determines whether it
serves a compelling state interest through the least
restrictive means. What constitutes compelling state
interest is measured by the scale of rights and powers
arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history. It is
akin to the paramount interest of the state for which
some individual liberties must give way, such as the
public interest in safeguarding health or maintaining
medical standards, or in maintaining access to
information on matters of public concern. In the present
case, the Court dug deep into the records but found no
compelling state interest that the subject clause may
possibly serve. Antonio M. Serrano vs. Gallant Maritime
Services, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 167614, March 24, 2009.
IMMUNITY FROM SUIT.
The Commission on Audit (COA) is an unincorporated
government agency which does not enjoy a separate
juridical personality of its own. Hence, even in the
exercise of proprietary functions incidental to its primarily
governmental functions, COA cannot be sued without its
consent. Assuming that the contract it entered into with
Audio Visual can be taken as an implied consent to be
sued, and further that incidental reliefs such as damages
may be awarded in certiorari proceedings, Link Worth did
not appeal the Court of Appeals’ Decision deleting the
award of damages against COA. Consequently, Link
Worth is bound by the findings of fact and conclusions of
law of the Court of Appeals, including the deletion of the
award of exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs.
Commission on Audit, etc. Vs. Link Worth International
Inc., G.R. No. 182559, March 13, 2009.
OMBUDSMAN.
The scope of the authority of the Ombudsman in
administrative cases as defined under the Constitution
and R.A. No. 6770 is broad enough to include the direct
imposition of the penalty of removal, suspension,
demotion, fine or censure on an erring public official or
employee.
RIGHT TO COUNSEL.
Under Section 12(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution,
an accused is entitled to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. The
phrase “preferably of his own choice” does not convey
the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person
under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other
equally competent and independent attorneys from
handling the defense. Otherwise, the tempo of custodial
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investigation would be solely in the hands of the accused
who can impede, nay, obstruct, the progress of the
interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer who, for one
reason or another, is not available to protect his interest.
While the choice of a lawyer in cases where the person
under custodial interrogation cannot afford the services
of counsel – or where the preferred lawyer is not
available – is naturally lodged in the police investigators,
the suspect has the final choice, as he may reject the
counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer
provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the
accused when he does not raise any objection to the
counsel’s appointment during the course of the
investigation, and the accused thereafter subscribes to
the veracity of the statement before the swearing
officer. Appellants Arnaldo and Flores did not object to
the appointment of Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous as their
lawyers, respectively, during their custodial investigation.
Prior to their questioning, appellants Arnaldo and Flores
conferred with Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous. Appellant
Arnaldo manifested that he would be assisted by Atty.
Uminga, while appellant Flores agreed to be counseled by
Atty. Rous. Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous countersigned
the written extra-judicial confessions of appellants
Arnaldo and Flores, respectively. Hence, appellants
Arnaldo and Flores are deemed to have engaged the
services of Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous,
respectively. Since the prosecution has sufficiently
established that the respective extra-judicial confessions
of appellant Arnaldo and appellant Flores were obtained
in accordance with the constitutional guarantees, these
confessions are admissible. They are evidence of a high
order because of the strong presumption that no person
of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess
to a crime, unless prompted by truth and
conscience. People of the Philippines vs. Domingo Reyes
Y Paje, et al., G.R. No. 178300, March 17, 2009.
TERM LIMITS.
The three-term limit for elective local officials is
contained in Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. The
Constitution did not expressly prohibit Congress from
fixing any term of office for barangay officials, thereby
leaving to the lawmakers full discretion to fix such term
in accordance with the exigencies of public service. The
discussions in the Constitutional Commission showed that
the term of office of barangay officials would be “[a]s
may be determined by law,” and more precisely, “[a]s
provided for in the Local Government Code.” Section
43(b) of the Local Government Code provides that
barangay officials are covered by the three-term limit,
while Section 43(c) thereof states that the term of office
of barangay officials shall be five (5) years. The rule on
the three-term limit, embodied in the Constitution and
the Local Government Code, has two parts.
The first part provides that an elective local official
cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The
clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in
determining the three-term limit rule. The second part
states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length
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of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The
clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for
any length of time interrupts continuity of service and
prevents the service before and after the interruption
from being joined together to form a continuous service
or consecutive terms. After three consecutive terms, an
elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for
a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next
regular election for the same office following the end of
the third consecutive term.
The second part of the rule on the three-term limit shows
the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution to bar
any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a
voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time
respect the people’s choice and grant their elected official
full service of a term. The Court held that two conditions
for the application of the disqualification must concur: (1)
that the official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same government post; and (2)
that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
In this case, it is undisputed that petitioner was elected
as Punong Barangay for three consecutive terms,
satisfying the first condition for disqualification. Indeed,
petitioner was serving his third term as Punong Barangay
when he ran for Sangguniang Bayan member and, upon
winning, assumed the position of Sangguniang Bayan
member, thus, voluntarily relinquishing his office as
Punong Barangay which the Court deems as a voluntary
renunciation of said office. Nicasio Bolos, Jr. vs. The
Commission on Election, et al., G.R. No. 184082, March
17, 2009.
Election Law
APPRECIATION OF BALLOTS.
The object of the appreciation of ballots is to ascertain
and carry into effect the intention of the voter, if it can be
determined with reasonable certainty. When placed in
issue, the appreciation of contested ballots and election
documents, which involves a question of fact, is best left
to the determination of the COMELEC. The Supreme
Court did not find grave abuse of discretion when the
COMELEC credited to respondent the vote for “Mantete,”
following the idem sonans rule. Aldo B. Cordia Vs. Joel
G. Monforte and Comelec, G.R. No. 174620, March 4,
2009.
PRE-PROCLAMATION CASES.
The COMELEC should rule on pre-proclamation cases
individually, even if the ruling is simply couched in a
minute resolution. This will dispel qualms about lack of
adequate notice to party litigants, and obviate the
confusion that generally results from the issuance of
omnibus resolutions. In all, such a practice would be
consistent with the constitutional principle of
transparency, and lend itself to greater public confidence
Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!
in our electoral system. In the case at bar, the petitioner
may have been equally confused on the remedies
available to him vis-à-vis Resolution No. 8212. We do not
fault him for this, but we nonetheless dismiss his petition
because we find no grave abuse of discretion in the
assailed COMELEC Resolution and Order. Elpidio B.
Valino vs. Alvin P. Vergara, Tomas N. Joson III, et
al., G.R. No. 180492, March 13, 2009.
A DEBATE OVER A REGIME OF ISLANDS
On March 10, 2009, the President signed into law
Republic Act No. 9522, entitled “An Act to Amend Certain
Provisions of Republic Act No. 3046, as Amended by
Republic Act No. 5446, to Define the Archipelagic
Baselines of the Philippines, and for Other Purposes. “
Congress passed the law in order to comply with a May
13, 2009 deadline of the United Nations for countries to
define the boundaries of its continental shelf under the
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
Section 1 of the law defined the baselines of the
Philippine archipelago. The geographic coordinates
mentioned in Section 1 do not include the Kalayaan
Island Group (KIG), or better known as the Spratly
Islands (which are also being claimed by such countries
as China, Vietnam and Malaysia). Congress chose to
deal with the KIG (and Scarborough Shoal) in Section 2,
which provides:
The baselines in the following areas over which the
Philippines likes (sic) exercises sovereignty and
jurisdiction shall be determined as “Regime of Islands”
under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with
Article 121 of the United Nations Convention of the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS):
a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under
Presidential Decree No. 1596; and
b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough
Shoal.
Prior to the passage of the law, it appears that four
options were being considered in defining the territorial
baselines of the country:
1. The main archipelago and Scarborough Shoal are
enclosed by the baselines while KIG is classified as
regime of islands. . .
2. Only the main archipelago is enclosed by the
baselines while KIG and Scarborough Shoal are classified
as regime of islands. . .
3. The main archipelago and KIG are enclosed by the
baselines while Scarborough Shoal is classified as regime
of islands.
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4. The main archipelago, KIG and Scarborough Shoal
are enclosed by the baselines. . .
(see Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV, The territorial
baseline issue, Malaya, March 14, 2009)
According to reports, the House of Representatives
version of the bill includes the Scarborough Shoal and
KIG within the baselines (see option 4) while the Senate
version classified the disputed territory as a “regime of
islands” (see option 2). The Senate position prevailed
during the bicameral conference committee deliberations
held for the purpose of reconciling the two bills.
(see Congress set to ratify baselines bill, Inquirer.net)
In her sponsorship speech on her version of the 2009
baselines bill, Senator Miram Defensor-Santiago explains
the adoption of the “regime of island” principle.
There are three important reasons why the bill adopts the
“regime of islands” principle:
First, it has the advantage of avoiding conflicting
basepoints with other claimants to the Spratlys.
Conflicting basepoints is the reason why your Committee
decided not to adopt other bills. The Committee takes the
view that if a modern baselines bill includes conflicting
basepoints with other claimant states, this would
certainly be a source of diplomatic strain with such states
as China , Vietnam , Malaysia , and Taiwan .
Second, the “regime of islands” principle increases the
size of our archipelagic waters and EEZ by about 76,518
nautical miles over existing laws.
Third, the pending bill does not deviate from the natural
shape of our archipelago, thus complying with Unclos,
Article 47, para. 3, which provides that “the drawing of
such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent
from the general configuration of the archipelago.” (see
Sponsorship Speech, The 2009 Baseline Bill)
Not everyone agrees that KIG and Scarborough Shoal
should be excluded from the baselines. For example:
. . . former Ambassador to the United Nations Lauro Baja
says the baseline bill is seriously flawed because it
excludes the disputed Kalayaan islands from Philippine
territory.
Baja says the exclusion of the Kalayaan islands, which is
part of the province of Palawan, runs counter to national
interest.
That’s because Kalayaan is part of the Spratly Group of
Islands, a disputed atoll in the South China Sea that is
claimed not just by the Philippines but by China,
Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, and Taiwan.
Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!
Baja says these countries have included the Spratlys in
their own baselines, and that by excluding it from our
own baseline law, the Philippines is effectively
undermining our claim to Kalayaan. (see Baja: Baselines
bill weakens RP claim to Kalayaan, ABS-CBN News) ,
On the other hand, while Senator Trillanes does not have
objections to the exlcusion of the KIG from the baselines,
he disagrees with the exclusion of the Scarborough Shoal
from the baselines. In his version of the baselines bill
(Senate Bill No. 1467), he included the Scarborough
Shoal in the baselines. He says:
. . . there are some misconceptions regarding the label
“regime of islands” that it supposedly weakens our claim
or reduces our sovereignty over the areas labeled as
such. On the contrary, “regime of islands” is defined in
Art. 121 [of the UNCLOS] as: 1) island/s that is naturally
formed, surrounded by water and is above water at high
tide; and 2) it shall have its own 12nm territorial sea,
24nm contiguous zone, 200nm EEZ and continental shelf.
In other words, islands classified as regime of islands are
treated the same way as other land territory. The only
possible reason that coastal states would be forced to
classify their territory as a regime of islands is because
such territory is impossible to enclose within the
baselines without violating other UNCLOS provisions. The
Falkland island group is one example. Since the UK is at
the other end of the Atlantic which made it impossible to
include Falkland in its own baseline, it has no choice but
to classify Falkland as a regime of islands.
The Scarborough Shoal was included in the baselines [of
Senate Bill No. 1467] primarily because its distance from
Luzon is less than the 125nm limit. With this, our country
stands to gain approximately 14,500sq nm of EEZ and
continental shelf. Another reason for its inclusion is that
Scarborough Shoal is basically a rock and according to
Paragraph 3 of Art. 121, the regime of islands definition
has an exception and that is: “Rocks which cannot
sustain human habitation or economic life of their own
shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental
shelf.” Therefore, while it is advantageous for us to
designate KIG as a regime of islands, we would be
depriving ourselves of the EEZ and continental shelf of
Scarborough Shoal if it would be designated as a regime
of islands. (see Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV, The
territorial baseline issue, Malaya, March 14, 2009)
ABS-CBN News has learned that some lawyers are
considering questioning the baseline bill before the
Supreme Court. (see Baja: Baselines bill weakens RP
claim to Kalayaan, ABS-CBN News) .
RELIGIOUS SPEECH OR INDECENT SPEECH?
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner
Eliseo Soriano, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan,
aired on UNTV 37, made the following remarks:
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Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling;
Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang babae
o di ba. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon
yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas,
o di ba! O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola
ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang
kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito.
Two days later, several members of the Iglesia Ni Cristo
(INC) filed affidavit complaints with the MTCRB. The
MTRCB sent petitioner a notice of the hearing on August
16, 2004 in relation to the alleged use of some cuss
words in the August 10, 2004 episode of Ang Dating
Daan.
After a preliminary conference in which petitioner
appeared, the MTRCB, by Order of August 16, 2004,
preventively suspended the showing of Ang Dating Daan
program for 20 days. The same order also set the case
for preliminary investigation.
The following day, petitioner sought reconsideration of
the preventive suspension order, praying that
Chairperson Consoliza P. Laguardia and two other
members of the adjudication board recuse themselves
from hearing the case. Two days after, however,
petitioner sought to withdraw his motion for
reconsideration, followed by the filing with the Supreme
Court of a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed
as G.R. No. 164785, to nullify the preventive suspension
order thus issued.
On September 27, 2004, in Adm. Case No. 01-04, the
MTRCB issued a decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, a Decision is
hereby rendered, finding respondent Soriano liable for his
utterances and thereby imposing on him a penalty of
three (3) months suspension from his program, “Ang
Dating Daan”.
In resolving the petition for certiorari and prohibition, the
Supreme Court ruled that: (1) the MTCRB has the power
to issue a preventive suspension against the petitioner;
(2) the preventive suspension order did not violate
petitioner’s right to equal protection, his freedom of
religion and his freedom of speech.
PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION
Petitioner argued that the preventive suspension imposed
against him and the relevant IRR provision authorizing it
are invalid inasmuch as PD 1986 does not expressly
authorize the MTRCB to issue preventive suspension. The
Supreme Court rejected this argument and ruled:
A perusal of the MTRCB’s basic mandate under PD 1986
reveals the possession by the agency of the authority,
Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!
albeit impliedly, to issue the challenged order of
preventive suspension. This authority stems naturally
from, and is necessary for the exercise of, its power of
regulation and supervision. . . The issuance of a
preventive suspension comes well within the scope of the
MTRCB’s authority and functions expressly set forth in PD
1986, more particularly under its Sec. 3(d), as quoted
above, which empowers the MTRCB to “supervise,
regulate, and grant, deny or cancel, permits for the x x x
exhibition, and/or television broadcast of all motion
pictures, television programs and publicity materials, to
the end that no such pictures, programs and materials as
are determined by the BOARD to be objectionable in
accordance with paragraph (c) hereof shall be x x x
exhibited and/or broadcast by television.
EQUAL PROTECTION
Petitioner also argued that the MTRCB denied him his
right to the equal protection of the law, arguing that,
owing to the preventive suspension order, he was unable
to answer the criticisms coming from the INC ministers.
The Supreme Court rejected this argument and ruled:
Petitioner’s position does not persuade. The equal
protection clause demands that “all persons subject to
legislation should be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both in the privileges
conferred and liabilities imposed.” It guards against
undue favor and individual privilege as well as hostile
discrimination. Surely, petitioner cannot, under the
premises, place himself in the same shoes as the INC
ministers, who, for one, are not facing administrative
complaints before the MTRCB. For another, he offers no
proof that the said ministers, in their TV programs, use
language similar to that which he used in his own,
necessitating the MTRCB’s disciplinary action. If the
immediate result of the preventive suspension order is
that petitioner remains temporarily gagged and is unable
to answer his critics, this does not become a deprivation
of the equal protection guarantee. The Court need not
belabor the fact that the circumstances of petitioner, as
host of Ang Dating Daan, on one hand, and the INC
ministers, as hosts of Ang Tamang Daan, on the other,
are, within the purview of this case, simply too different
to even consider whether or not there is a prima facie
indication of oppressive inequality.
FREEDOM OF RELIGION
Petitioner next injects the notion of religious freedom,
submitting that what he uttered was religious speech,
adding that words like “putang babae” were said in
exercise of his religious freedom.
The Court is at a loss to understand how petitioner’s
utterances in question can come within the pale of Sec.
5, Article III of the 1987 Constitution on religious
freedom. . . There is nothing in petitioner’s statements
subject of the complaints expressing any particular
religious belief, nothing furthering his avowed evangelical
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mission. The fact that he came out with his statements in
a televised bible exposition program does not
automatically accord them the character of a religious
discourse. Plain and simple insults directed at another
person cannot be elevated to the status of religious
speech. Even petitioner’s attempts to place his words in
context show that he was moved by anger and the need
to seek retribution, not by any religious conviction. His
claim, assuming its veracity, that some INC ministers
distorted his statements respecting amounts Ang Dating
Daan owed to a TV station does not convert the foul
language used in retaliation as religious speech. We
cannot accept that petitioner made his statements in
defense of his reputation and religion, as they constitute
no intelligible defense or refutation of the alleged lies
being spread by a rival religious group. They simply
illustrate that petitioner had descended to the level of
name-calling and foul-language discourse. Petitioner
could have chosen to contradict and disprove his
detractors, but opted for the low road.
FREEDOM OF SPEECH
Petitioner urges the striking down of the decision
suspending him from hosting Ang Dating Daan for three
months on the main ground that the decision violates,
apart from his religious freedom, his freedom of speech
and expression.
The Court rules otherwise. It has been established in this
jurisdiction that unprotected speech or low-value
expression refers to libelous statements, obscenity or
pornography, false or misleading advertisement, insulting
or “fighting words”, i.e., those which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of peace and expression endangering national
security.
The Court finds that petitioner’s statement can be treated
as obscene, at least with respect to the average child.
Hence, it is, in that context, unprotected speech. . .
Even if we concede that petitioner’s remarks are not
obscene but merely indecent speech, still the Court rules
that petitioner cannot avail himself of the constitutional
protection of free speech. Said statements were made in
a medium easily accessible to children. With respect to
the young minds, said utterances are to be treated as
unprotected speech.
No doubt what petitioner said constitutes indecent or
offensive utterances. . .
After a careful examination of the factual milieu and the
arguments raised by petitioner in support of his claim to
free speech, the Court rules that the government’s
interest to protect and promote the interests and welfare
of the children adequately buttresses the reasonable
curtailment and valid restraint on petitioner’s prayer to
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continue as program host of Ang Dating Daan during the
suspension period . . .
Eliseo F. Soriano vs. Ma. Consoliza P. Laguardia
etc., G.R. No. 164785/G.R. No. 165636, April 29, 2009.
Constitutional Law
ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION; VOID.
Executive Order No. 566, which grants the CHED the
power to regulate review center, is unconstitutional as it
expands Republic Act No. 7722,. The CHED’s coverage
under RA 7722 is limited to public and private institutions
of higher education and degree-granting programs in all
public and private post-secondary educational
institutions. EO 566 directed the CHED to formulate a
framework for the regulation of review centers and
similar entities. A review center is not an institution of
higher learning as contemplated by RA 7722. It does not
offer a degree-granting program that would put it under
the jurisdiction of the CHED. Review Center Associations
of the Philippines vs. Executive Secretatry Eduardo
Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 180046, April 2, 2009.
AGRARIAN REFORM; COVERAGE.
For the parcels of land subject of this petition to come
within the coverage of P.D. No. 27, it is necessary to
determine whether the land is agricultural. Here, the
subject parcels of land cannot be considered as within the
ambit of P.D. No. 27 considering that the subject lots
were reclassified by the DAR Secretary as suited for
residential, commercial, industrial or other urban
purposes way before petitioner filed a petition for
emancipation under P.D. No. 27. Laureano V. Hermoso,
et al. vs. Heirs of Antonio Francia and Petra Francia, G.R.
No. 166748, April 24, 2009.
COMPENSATION.
Officers who in good faith have discharged the duties
pertaining to their office are legally entitled to the
compensation attached to the office for the services they
actually rendered. Although the present petition must
inevitably be dismissed on a technicality that serves as
penalty for the pernicious practice of forum shopping, the
Court nevertheless cannot countenance the refund of the
compensation differential corresponding to petitioner’s
tenure as HEDF head with the upgraded rank of Director
III, since she had actually rendered services in the office
with the elevated grade for that period. Alicia D. Tagaro
vs. Ester A. Garcia, etc.,G.R. No. 173931, April 2, 2009.
COMELEC; VOTING.
Section 5 (a)of Rule 3 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure
and Section 7 of Article IX-A of the Constitution require
that a majority vote of all the members of the Comelec,
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and not only those who participated and took part in the
deliberations, is necessary for the pronouncement of a
decision, resolution, order or ruling. Rodante Marcoleta,
et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al./ Alagad Party-
list represented by Diogenes S. Osabel, President vs.
Commission on Elections, et al.,G.R. No. 181377, April
24, 2009.
DEPORTATION; POWER.
The settled rule is that the entry or stay of aliens in the
Philippines is merely a privilege and a matter of grace;
such privilege is not absolute or permanent and may be
revoked. However, aliens may be expelled or deported
from the Philippines only on grounds and in the manner
provided for by the Constitution, the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, and
administrative issuances pursuant thereto.
It must be remembered that aliens seeking entry in the
Philippines do not acquire the right to be admitted into
the country by the simple passage of time. When an
alien, such as respondent, has already physically gained
entry in the country, but such entry is later found
unlawful or devoid of legal basis, the alien can be
excluded anytime after it is found that he was not
lawfully admissible at the time of his entry. Every
sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude aliens
from its territory upon such grounds as it may deem
proper for its self-preservation or public interest. The
power to deport aliens is an act of State, an act done by
or under the authority of the sovereign power. It is a
police measure against undesirable aliens whose
continued presence in the country is found to be injurious
to the public good and the domestic tranquility of the
people. The Secretary of Justice, et al. vs. Christopher
Koruga, G.R. No. 166199, April 24, 2009.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
The elements of double jeopardy are (1) the complaint or
information was sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction; (2) the court had jurisdiction; (3)
the accused had been arraigned and had pleaded;
and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted or the
case was dismissed without his express consent. These
elements are present here: (1) the Information filed in
Criminal Case No. 96-413 against Postanes was sufficient
in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the
MeTC had jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 96-413;
(3) Postanes was arraigned and entered a non-guilty
plea; and (4) the MeTC dismissed Criminal Case No. 96-
413 on the ground of insufficiency of evidence amounting
to an acquittal from which no appeal can be had. Clearly,
for this Court to grant the petition and order the MeTC to
reconsider its decision, just what the RTC ordered the
MeTC to do, is to transgress the Constitutional
proscription not to put any person “twice x x x in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.”David Tiu
vs. Court of Appeals and Edgardo Postanes, G.R. No.
162370, April 21, 2009.
Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!
DUE PROCESS; COURT DECISIONS.
Faithful adherence to Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution is indisputably a paramount component of
due process and fair play. The parties to a litigation
should be informed of how it was decided, with an
explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to
the conclusions of the court.
In the assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals reiterates
the rule that a notarized and authenticated deed of sale
enjoys the presumption of regularity, and is admissible
without further proof of due execution. On the basis
thereof, it declared Antonio a buyer in good faith and for
value, despite petitioner’s contention that the sale
violates public policy. While it is a part of the right of
appellant to urge that the decision should directly meet
the issues presented for resolution, mere failure by the
appellate court to specify in its decision all contentious
issues raised by the appellant and the reasons for
refusing to believe appellant’s contentions is not
sufficient to hold the appellate court’s decision contrary
to the requirements of the law and the Constitution. So
long as the decision of the Court of Appeals contains the
necessary findings of facts to warrant its conclusions, we
cannot declare said court in error if it withheld “any
specific findings of fact with respect to the evidence for
the defense.” We will abide by the legal presumption
that official duty has been regularly performed,and all
matters within an issue in a case were laid down before
the court and were passed upon by it. Marissa R.
Unchuan vs. Antonio J.P. Lozada, Anita Lozada and the
Register of Deeds of Cebu City, G.R. No. 172671, April
16, 2009.
Ecozone. R.A. No. 7903 does not authorize the
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate and/or license
games of chance/gambling. Philippine Amusement and
Gaming Corporation, etc. vs. Philippine EGaming
Jurisdiction, Incorporated (PEJI) Zamboanga City Special
Economic Zone Authority (ZAMBOECOZONE), et al., G.R.
No. 177333, April 24, 2009.
ELECTION CONTESTS; JURISDICTION.
The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s
(HRET’s) sole and exclusive jurisdiction over contests
relative to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the House of Representatives “begins only
after a candidate has become a member of the House of
Representatives.” Thus, once a winning candidate has
been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a
Member of the House of Representatives, COMELEC’s
jurisdiction over elections relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own
jurisdiction begins.
Señeres filed this petition before this Court on July 23,
2007, the right of the nominees as party-list
representatives had been recognized and declared in the
July 19, 2007 Resolution and the nominees had taken
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their oath and already assumed their offices in the House
of Representatives. As such, the proper recourse would
have been to file a petition for quo warranto before the
HRET within ten (10) days from receipt of the July 19,
2007 Resolution and not a petition for certiorari before
this Court. Dr. Hans Christian M. Señeres vs. Commission
on Elections and Melquiades A. Robles,G.R. No.
178678, April 16, 2009.
Lorenzo H. Jamora, wrote petitioner’s manager, Armando
H. Paredes, a letter dated 28 February 2005 authorizing
petitioner to file the expropriation case “against the
owner of the five-square meter portion of Lot No. 921-A
covered by TCT No. 168805, pursuant to Section 25 of
P.D. No. 198, as amended.” Metropolitan Cebu Water
District vs. J. King and Sons Company, Inc., G.R. No.
175983. April 16, 2009

EMINENT DOMAIN; PROCEEDINGS. EMINENT DOMAIN; WRIT OF POSSESSION.

In an expropriation proceeding there are two Section 4 of R.A. No. 8974 is emphatic to the effect that
stages: first, the determination of the validity of the “upon compliance with the guidelines…the court shall
expropriation, and second, the determination of just immediately issue to the implementing agency an order
compensation. In Tan v. Republic, the Supreme Court to take possession of the property and start the
explained the two (2) stages in an expropriation implementation of the project.” Under this statutory
proceeding, to wit: provision, when the government, its agencies or
government-owned and controlled corporations, make
the required provisional payment, the trial court has a
(1) Determination of the authority of the
ministerial duty to issue a writ of possession.Metropolitan
plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the
Cebu Water District vs. J. King and Sons Company, Inc.,
propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts
G.R. No. 175983, April 16, 2009.
involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of
dismissal of the action, with condemnation declaring that
the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought EMINENT DOMAIN; JUST COMPENSATION.
to be condemned for the public use or purpose described
in the complaint, upon payment of just compensation. An
Under the factual circumstances of the case, the agrarian
order of expropriation is final. An order of dismissal, if
reform process is still incomplete as the just
this be ordained, would be a final one, as it finally
compensation to be paid respondents has yet to be
disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be
settled. Considering the passage RA 6657 before the
done by the courts on the merits. The order of
completion of this process, the just compensation should
expropriation would also be a final one for after its
be determined and the process concluded under the said
issuance, no objection to the right of condemnation shall
law.
be heard. The order of expropriation may be appealed by
any party aggrieved thereby by filing a record on appeal.
Excise tax. Section 145 of the Tax Code, as amended by
RA 9334: (1) does not violate the equal protection and
(2) Determination by the court of the just
unformity of taxation clauses; (2) does not violate the
compensation for the property sought to be taken with
constitutional prohibition on unfair competition; and
the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners.
(3) does not vilate the constitutional prohibition on
The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of
regresssive and inequitable taxation. British American
the evidence before the court and findings of the
Tobacco vs. Jose Isidro N. Camacho, et al. G.R. No.
commissioners would likewise be a final one, as it would
163583, April 15, 2009.
leave nothing more to be done by the court regarding the
issue. A second and separate appeal may be taken from
this order fixing the just compensation. Metropolitan FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION.
Cebu Water District vs. J. King and Sons Company, Inc.,
G.R. No. 175983, April 16, 2009. Jurisprudence distinguishes between a content-neutral
regulation, i.e., merely concerned with the incidents of
EMINENT DOMAIN; POWER. the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or
manner, and under well defined standards; and a
content-based restraint or censorship, i.e., the
For Metropolitan Cebu Water District to exercise its
restriction is based on the subject matter of the utterance
power of eminent domain, two requirements should be
or speech. Content-based laws are generally treated as
met, namely: first, its board of directors passed a
more suspect than content-neutral laws because of
resolution authorizing the expropriation, and; second, the
judicial concern with discrimination in the regulation of
exercise of the power of eminent domain was subjected
expression. Content-neutral regulations of speech or of
to review by the LWUA. In this case, petitioner’s board of
conduct that may amount to speech, are subject to lesser
directors approved on 27 February 2004, Board
but still heightened scrutiny. Ostensibly, the act of an
Resolution No. 015-2004 authorizing its general manager
LGU requiring a business of proof that the property from
to file expropriation and other cases. Moreover, the
which it operates has been zoned for commercial use can
LWUA did review and gave its stamp of approval to the
be argued, when applied to a radio station, as content-
filing of a complaint for the expropriation of respondent’s
neutral since such a regulation would presumably apply
lot. Specifically, the LWUA through its Administrator,

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to any other radio station or business enterprise within
the LGU.
However, the circumstances of this case dictate that we
view the action of the respondents as a content-based
restraint.
The Court is of the position that the actions of the
respondents warrant heightened or strict scrutiny from
the Court, the test which we have deemed appropriate in
assessing content-based restrictions on free speech, as
well as for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or
restricting the political process, of laws dealing with the
regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other
fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier
applications to equal protection. The immediate
implication of the application of the “strict scrutiny” test
is that the burden falls upon respondents as agents of
government to prove that their actions do not infringe
upon petitioners’ constitutional rights. As content
regulation cannot be done in the absence of any
compelling reason, the burden lies with the government
to establish such compelling reason to infringe the right
to free expression. Newsounds Broadcasting Network,
Inc., et al. vs. Hon. Ceasar G. Dy, et al., G.R. No.
170270/G.R. No. 179411, April 2, 2009.
IMMUNITY FROM SUIT.
GTZ consistently has been unable to establish with
satisfaction that it enjoys the immunity from suit
generally enjoyed by its parent country, the Federal
Republic of Germany. Consequently, both the Labor
Arbiter and the Court of Appeals acted within proper
bounds when they refused to acknowledge that GTZ is so
immune by dismissing the complaint against it. Our
finding has additional ramifications on the failure of GTZ
to properly appeal the Labor Arbiter’s decision to the
NLRC. As pointed out by the OSG, the direct recourse to
the Court of Appeals while bypassing the NLRC could
have been sanctioned had the Labor Arbiter’s decision
been a “patent nullity.” Since the Labor Arbiter acted
properly in deciding the complaint, notwithstanding GTZ’s
claim of immunity, we cannot see how the decision could
have translated into a “patent nullity.” Deutsche
Gesellschaft fur Techniche Vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et
al., G.R. No. 152318, April 16, 2009.
INQUIRY IN AID OF LEGISLATION.
A legislative investigation in aid of legislation and court
proceedings has different purposes. On one hand, courts
conduct hearings or like adjudicative procedures to
settle, through the application of a law, actual
controversies arising between adverse litigants and
involving demandable rights. On the other hand, inquiries
in aid of legislation are, inter alia, undertaken as tools to
enable the legislative body to gather information and,
thus, legislate wisely and effectively; and to determine
whether there is a need to improve existing laws or enact
new or remedial legislation, albeit the inquiry need not
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result in any potential legislation. On-going judicial
proceedings do not preclude congressional hearings in aid
of legislation.
While Sabio and Standard Chartered Bank advert only to
pending criminal and administrative cases before lower
courts as not posing a bar to the continuation of a
legislative inquiry, there is no rhyme or reason that these
cases’ doctrinal pronouncement and their rationale
cannot be extended to appealed cases and special civil
actions awaiting final disposition before this Court. . .
When the Committee issued invitations and subpoenas to
petitioners to appear before it in connection with its
investigation of the aforementioned investments, it did so
pursuant to its authority to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation. This is clearly provided in Art. VI, Sec. 21 of
the Constitution, which was quoted at the outset. And the
Court has no authority to prohibit a Senate committee
from requiring persons to appear and testify before it in
connection with an inquiry in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. Sabio emphasizes the importance of the duty
of those subpoenaed to appear before the legislature,
even if incidentally incriminating questions are expected
to be asked. Reghis M. Romero II, Edmond Q. Sese,
Leopoldo T. Sanchez, Reghis M. Romero III, Michael L.
Romero, Nathaniel L. Romero and Jerome R. Canals vs.
Sen. Jinggoy E. Estrada and Senate Committee on Labor,
Employment and Human Resources Development, G.R.
No. 174105, April 2, 2009.
JUDICIAL REVIEW.
It is beyond cavil that the BI has the exclusive authority
and jurisdiction to try and hear cases against an alleged
alien, and that the BOC has jurisdiction over deportation
proceedings. Nonetheless, Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution has vested power of judicial review in the
Supreme Court and the lower courts such as the CA, as
established by law. Although the courts are without
power to directly decide matters over which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government and are
not empowered to execute absolutely their own judgment
from that of Congress or of the President, the Court may
look into and resolve questions of whether or not such
judgment has been made with grave abuse of discretion,
when the act of the legislative or executive department is
contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence, or
when executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out
of malice, ill will or personal bias. The Secretary of
Justice, et al. vs. Christopher Koruga, G.R. No.
166199, April 24, 2009.
JUDICIAL REVIEW; POLITICAL QUESTION.
In asking the Supreme Court to declare Section 19 of
the Oil Deregulation Law as unconstitutional for
contravening Section 19, Article XII of the Constitution,
petitioner invokes the exercise by the Supreme Court of
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its power of judicial review, which power is expressly
recognized under Section 4(2), Article VIII of the
Constitution. The power of judicial review is the power of
the courts to test the validity of executive and legislative
acts for their conformity with the Constitution. Through
such power, the judiciary enforces and upholds the
supremacy of the Constitution. For a court to exercise
this power, certain requirements must first be met,
namely:
(1) an actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power;
(2) the person challenging the act must have
“standing” to challenge; he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at
the earliest possible opportunity; and
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis
mota of the case.
The Supreme Court ruled that that the issues petitioner
presented to thee Supreme Court are non-justiciable
matters that preclude the Supreme Court from exercising
its power of judicial review. The immediate
implementation of full deregulation of the local
downstream oil industry is a policy determination by
Congress which the Supreme Court cannot overturn
without offending the Constitution and the principle of
separation of powers. Congressman Enrique T. Garcia
Vs. The Executive Secretary, et al. G.R. No. 157584, April
2, 2009.
JUST COMPENSATION.
The Special Agrarian Court and the Court of Appeals
committed no reversible error when it ruled that it is the
provisions of RA 6657 that is applicable to the present
case. The SAC arrived at the just compensation for
respondents’ property after taking into consideration the
commissioners’ report on the nature of the subject
landholding, its proximity from the city proper, its use,
average gross production, and the prevailing value of the
lands in the vicinity. The SAC correctly determined the
amount of just compensation due to respondents in
accordance with, and guided by, RA 6657 and existing
jurisprudence. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Carolina
vda. de Abello, et al., G.R. No. 168631, April 7, 2009.
PARTISAN POLITICAL ACTIVITY.
Robles’ act of submitting a nomination list for BUHAY
cannot, without more, be considered electioneering or
partisan political activity within the context of the
Election Code. The twin acts of signing and filing a
Certificate of Nomination are purely internal processes of
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the party or organization and are not designed to enable
or ensure the victory of the candidate in the
elections. The act of Robles of submitting the certificate
nominating Velarde and others was merely in compliance
with the COMELEC requirements for nomination of party-
list representatives and, hence, cannot be treated as
electioneering or partisan political activity proscribed
under by Sec. 2(4) of Art. IX(B) of the Constitution for
civil servants. Dr. Hans Christian M. Señeres vs.
Commission on Elections and Melquiades A. Robles, G.R.
No. 178678, April 16, 2009.
PARTY LIST.
In determining the allocation of seats for party-list
representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the
following procedure shall be observed:
(1) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be
ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.
(2) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving
at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat
each.
(3) Those garnering sufficient number of votes,
according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled
to additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
(4) Each party, organization, or coalition shall be
entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats
shall no longer be included because they have already
been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-
percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for
allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum seats
reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed
seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of
a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of
fractional seats. Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) vs. Commission
on Elections/ Bayan Muna, et al. vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 179271/G.R. No. 179295, April 21,
2009.
POLICE POWER.
Police power to prescribe regulations to promote the
health, morals, education, good order or safety, and the
general welfare of the people flows from the recognition
that salus populi est suprema lex – the welfare of the
people is the supreme law. Police power primarily rests
with the legislature although it may be exercised by the
President and administrative boards by virtue of a valid
delegation. Here, no delegation of police power exists
under RA 7722 authorizing the President to regulate the
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operations of non-degree granting review al. vs. Jose Esquivel, Jr., et al.,G.R. No. 168734/G.R. No.
centers. Review Center Associations of the Philippines vs. 170621, April 24, 2009.
Executive Secretatry Eduardo Ermita, et al.,G.R. No.
180046, April 2, 2009.
Small scale mining permits. Petitioners’ small-scale
mining permits are legally questionable. Under
PUBLIC DOMAIN; CLASSIFICATION. Presidential Decree No. 1899, applications of small-scale
miners are processed with the Director of the Mines and
Geo-Sciences Bureau. Pursuant to Republic Act No.
The classification of lands of the public domain is of two
7076, which took effect on 18 July 1991, approval of the
types, i.e., primary classification and secondary
applications for mining permits and for mining contracts
classification. The primary classification comprises
are vested in the Provincial/City Mining Regulatory
agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national
Board. Composed of the DENR representative, a
parks. These are lands specifically mentioned in Section
representative from the small-scale mining sector, a
3, Article XII of the Constitution. The same provision of
representative from the big-scale mining industry and a
the Constitution, however, also states that agricultural
representative from an environmental group, this body is
lands of the public domain may further be classified by
tasked to approve small-scale mining permits and
law according to the uses to which they may be devoted.
contracts.
This further classification of agricultural lands is referred
to as secondary classification.
In the case under consideration, petitioners filed their
small-scale mining permits on 23 August 1991, making
Under existing laws, Congress has granted authority to a
them bound by the procedures provided for under the
number of government agencies to effect the secondary
applicable and prevailing statute, Republic Act No.
classification of agricultural lands to residential,
7076. Instead of processing and obtaining their permits
commercial or industrial or other urban uses. Laureano V.
from the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board, petitioners
Hermoso, et al. vs. Heirs of Antonio Francia and Petra
were able to get the same from the governor of Davao
Francia, G.R. No. 166748, April 24, 2009.
del Norte. Considering that the governor is without legal
authority to issue said mining permits, the same permits
Public Land Act; encumbrance. Section 118 of the Public are null and void. Leonora P. Calanza, et al. vs. Paper
Land Act, as amended, prohibits any encumbrance or Industries Corp., et al., G.R. No. 146622, April 24, 2009.
alienation of lands acquired under homestead provisions
from the date of the approval of application and for a
SPEEDY TRIAL.
term of five years from and after the date of issuance of
the patent or grant. The same provision provides that no
alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any homestead Under the circumstances of the cases, the right to the
after five years and before 25 years after issuance of title accused to a speedy tril was not violated. Dante Tan vs.
shall be valid without the approval of the Secretary of People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 173637, April 21,
Agriculture and Natural Resources, which approval shall 2009.
not be denied except on constitutional and legal grounds.
SUBPOENA; CONGRESS.
A homestead patent is one of the modes to acquire title
to public lands suitable for agricultural purposes. Under
PS Resolution Nos. 537 and 543 were passed in 2006 and
the Public Land Act, as amended, a homestead patent is
the letter-invitations and subpoenas directing the
one issued to any citizen of this country, over the age of
petitioners to appear and testify in connection with the
18 years or the head of a family, and who is not the
twin resolutions were sent out in the month of August
owner of more than 24 hectares of land in the
2006 or in the past Congress. On the postulate that the
country. To be qualified, the applicant must show that
Senate of each Congress acts separately and
he has resided continuously for at least one year in the
independently of the Senate before and after it, the
municipality where the land is situated and must have
aforesaid invitations and subpoenas are considered
cultivated at least one-fifth of the land applied for.
functos oficio and the related legislative inquiry
conducted is, for all intents and purposes,
The Court also cannot consider the subject property to terminated. Reghis M. Romero II, Edmond Q. Sese,
have been held in trust by Hermogenes for and on behalf Leopoldo T. Sanchez, Reghis M. Romero III, Michael L.
of Hizon. Settled is the rule that a homestead applicant Romero, Nathaniel L. Romero and Jerome R. Canals vs.
must personally comply with the legal requirements for a Sen. Jinggoy E. Estrada and Senate Committee on Labor,
homestead grant. The homestead applicant himself must Employment and Human Resources Development, G.R.
possess the necessary qualifications, cultivate the land, No. 174105, April 2, 2009.
and reside thereon. It would be a circumvention of the
law if an individual were permitted to apply “in behalf of
USURPATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
another,” as the latter may be disqualified or might not
comply with the residency and cultivation
requirements. Marcelino Lopez, et al. vs. Hon. Court of EO 566 in this case is not supported by any enabling
Appeals, et al./ Noel Rubber and Development Corp, et law. Since EO 566 is an invalid exercise of legislative

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power, the RIRR is also an invalid exercise of the CHED’s
quasi-legislative power. Review Center Associations of
the Philippines vs. Executive Secretatry Eduardo Ermita,
et al. G.R. No. 180046, April 2, 2009.
WARRANTLESS SEARCH.
There is no question that the police officers went to the
house of petitioner because of the information relayed by
Sunit that petitioner had in his possession illegally cut
lumber. When the police officers arrived at the house of
petitioner, the lumber were lying around the vicinity of
petitioner’s house. The lumber were in plain view. Under
the plain view doctrine, objects falling in “plain view” of
an officer who has a right to be in the position to have
that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as
evidence. When asked whether he had the necessary
permit to possess the lumber, petitioner failed to produce
one. Petitioner merely replied that the lumber in his
possession was intended for the repair of his house and
for his furniture shop. There was thus probable cause for
the police officers to confiscate the lumber. There was,
therefore, no necessity for a search warrant. The seizure
of the lumber from petitioner who did not have the
required permit to possess the forest products cut is
sanctioned by Section 68 of the Forestry Code. Olympio
Revaldo vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
170589, April 16, 2009.
WARRANTLESS ARREST.
On whether the police officers had the authority to arrest
petitioner, even without a warrant, Section 80 of the
Forestry Code authorizes the forestry officer or employee
of the DENR or any personnel of the PNP to arrest, even
without a warrant, any person who has committed or is
committing in his presence any of the offenses defined by
the Forestry Code and to seize and confiscate the tools
and equipment used in committing the offense or the
forest products gathered or taken by the
offender. Petitioner was in possession of the lumber
without the necessary documents when the police officers
accosted him. In open court, petitioner categorically
admitted the possession and ownership of the confiscated
lumber as well as the fact that he did not have any legal
documents therefor and that he merely intended to use
the lumber for the repair of his dilapidated house. Mere
possession of forest products without the proper
documentation consummates the crime. Dura lex sed lex.
The law may be harsh but that is the law. Olympio
Revaldo vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 170589,
April 16, 2009.
Election Law
ELECTION CONTESTS.
Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his
oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of
Representatives, the jurisdiction of the House of
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Representatives Electoral Tribunal begins over election
contests relating to his election, returns, and
qualifications, and mere allegation as to the invalidity of
her proclamation does not divest the Electoral Tribunal of
its jurisdiction. Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong vs.
COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 178831-32/G.R. No. 179120/G.R.
Nos. 179132-33/G.R. Nos. 179240-41, April 1, 2009.
ELECTION PROTESTS.
Jurisprudence makes it clear that the mere filing of a
petition denominated as a pre-proclamation case or one
seeking the annulment of a proclamation will not suspend
the ten-day period for filing an election protest. It is
required that the issues raised in such a petition be
restricted to those that may be properly included therein.
in the absence of any clear showing or proof that the
election returns canvassed are incomplete or contain
material defects; appear to have been tampered with,
falsified or prepared under duress; and/or contain
discrepancies in the votes credited to any candidate,
which would affect the result of the election, a petition
cannot be properly considered as a pre-proclamation
controversy. The purpose of a pre-proclamation
controversy is to ascertain the winner or winners in the
election on the basis of the election returns duly
authenticated by the board of inspectors and admitted by
the board of canvassers. It is a well-entrenched rule that
the Board of Canvassers and the COMELEC are not to
look beyond or behind electoral returns. A pre-
proclamation controversy is summary in nature. It is the
policy of the election law that pre-proclamation
controversies be summarily decided, consistent with the
law’s desire that the canvass and proclamation be
delayed as little as possible. There is no room for the
presentation of evidence aliunde, the inspection of
voluminous documents, and for meticulous technical
examination. That is why such questions as those
involving the appreciation of votes and the conduct of the
campaign and balloting, which require more deliberate
and necessarily longer consideration, are left for
examination in the corresponding election protest. Harlin
Castillo Abayon Vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R.
No. 181295, April 2, 2009.
Administrative Law
DISHONESTY.
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees enunciates the State’s policy of
promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost
responsibility in the public service. And no other office in
the government service exacts a greater demand for
moral righteousness and uprightness from an employee
than in the judiciary. Persons involved in the dispensation
of justice, from the highest official to the lowest clerk,
must live up to the strictest standards of integrity,
probity, uprightness and diligence in the public service.
As the assumption of public office is impressed with
paramount public interest, which requires the highest
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standards of ethical standards, persons aspiring for public
office must observe honesty, candor and faithful
compliance with the law.
While dishonesty is considered a grave offense
punishable by dismissal even at the first instance,
jurisprudence is replete with cases where the Court
lowered the penalty of dismissal to suspension taking into
account the presence of mitigating circumstances such as
length of service in the government and being a first time
offender. Office of the Court Administrator Vs. Ma. Celia
A. Flores, A.M. No. P-07-2366, April 16, 2009.
RE-ASSIGNMENT; DETAIL.
A reassignment is a movement of an employee from one
organizational unit to another in the same department or
agency which does not involve a reduction in rank, status
or salary and does not require the issuance of an
appointment. A detail, on the other hand, is a movement
from one agency to another. National Transmission
Corp. Vs. Venusto
JUNE 2009 DECISIONS
Constitutional Law
IMMUNITY FROM SUIT.
The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent
is embodied in Section 3, Article XVI of the
1987 Constitution and has been an established principle
that antedates the Constitution. It is a universally
recognized principle of international law that exempts a
state and its organs from the jurisdiction of another
state. The principle is based on the very essence of
sovereignty, and on the practical ground that there can
be no legal right as against the authority that makes the
law on which the right depends. It also rests on reasons
of public policy — that public service would be hindered,
and the public endangered, if the sovereign authority
could be subjected to law suits at the instance of every
citizen and, consequently, controlled in the uses
and dispositions of the means required for the
proper administration of the government.
The proscribed suit that the state immunity principle
covers takes on various forms, namely: a suit against
the Republic by name; a suit against
an unincorporated government agency; a suit against a
government agency covered by a charter with respect to
the agency’s performance of governmental functions; and
a suit that on its face is against a government officer, but
where the ultimate liability will fall on the government. In
the present case, the writ of attachment was issued
against a government agency covered by its own charter.
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The TESDA performs governmental functions, and the
issuance of certifications is a task within its function of
developing and establishing a system of
skills standardization, testing, and certification in the
country. From the perspective of this function, the core
reason for the existence of state immunity applies – i.e.,
the public policy reason that the performance
of governmental function cannot be hindered or delayed
by suits, nor can these suits control the use and
disposition of the means for the performance
of governmental functions.
Even assuming that TESDA entered into a proprietary
contract with PROVI and thereby gave its implied consent
to be sued, TESDA’s funds are still public in nature and,
thus, cannot be the valid subject of a writ of garnishment
or attachment. Professional Video, Inc. vs. Technical
Education and Skills Development Authority, G.R. No.
155504, June 26, 2009.
JUST COMPENSATION; EASEMENT RIGHT OF WAY.
Easement of right of way falls within the purview of the
power of eminent domain. In installing the
230 KV Talisay-Compostela transmission lines which
traverse respondent’s lands, a permanent limitation is
imposed by petitioner National Power Corporation against
the use of the lands for an indefinite period. This deprives
respondent of the normal use of the lands. In fact, not
only are the affected areas of the lands traversed by
petitioner’s transmission lines but a portion is used as the
site of its transmission tower. Because of the danger to
life and limbs that may be caused beneath the high-
tension live wires, the landowner will not be able to use
the lands for farming or any agricultural purposes.
Thus, there is no reason to disturb the findings of the
trial and appellate courts. Respondent is entitled to
just compensation or the just and complete equivalent of
the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to
suffer by reason of the expropriation.
Since the determination of
just compensation in expropriation proceedings is
essentially a judicial function, the Supreme Court held
that the amount of P450 per square meter to be just and
reasonable compensation for the expropriated lands of
respondent. National Power Corporation vs.
Carlos Villamor, G.R. No. 160080, June 19, 2009.
OMBUDSMAN; PROSECUTORIAL POWERS.
Giving prosecutorial powers to the Ombudsman is in
accordance with the Constitution as paragraph 8, Section
13, Article XI provides that the Ombudsman shall
“exercise such other functions or duties as may be
provided by law.”
The constitutionality of Section 3 of R.A. No. 6770, which
subsumed the OSP under the Office of the Ombudsman,
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was likewise upheld by the Court in Acop. The foregoing
ruling of the Court has been reiterated in Camanag v.
Guerrero. More recently, in Office of the Ombudsman v.
Valera, the Supreme Court, basing its ratio decidendi on
its ruling in Acop and Camanag, declared that the OSP is
“merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman
and may only act under the supervision and control, and
upon authority of the Ombudsman” and ruled that under
R.A. No. 6770, the power to preventively suspend is
lodged only with the Ombudsman and Deputy
Ombudsman. The Court’s ruling in Acop that the
authority of the Ombudsman to prosecute based on R.A.
No. 6770 was authorized by the Constitution was also
made the foundation for the decision in Perez
v. Sandiganbayan, where it was held that the power to
prosecute carries with it the power to authorize the filing
of informations, which power had not been delegated to
the OSP. It is, therefore, beyond cavil that under
the Constitution, Congress was not proscribed from
legislating the grant of additional powers to the
Ombudsman or placing the OSP under the Office of the
Ombudsman. Carmelo Lazatin, et al. vs.
Hon. Aniano A. Disierto, et al., G.R. No. 147097, June 5,
2009.
OMBUDSMAN; REMOVAL POWERS.
The Office of the Ombudsman, in the exercise of its
administrative disciplinary authority, is vested by the
Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 with the power to impose
the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine,
censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee
found to be at fault. Office of the Ombudsman vs.
Fernando J. Beltran, G.R. No. 168039, June 5, 2009.
JUDICIAL REVIEW; ACTUAL CASE.
This Supreme Court’s power of review may be awesome,
but it is limited to actual cases and controversies dealing
with parties having adversely legal claims, to be
exercised after full opportunity of argument by the
parties, and limited further to the constitutional question
raised or the very lis mota presented. The “case-or-
controversy” requirement bans this court from deciding
“abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions,” lest the
court give opinions in the nature of advice concerning
legislative or executive action. Atty. Oliver O. Lozano and
Atty. Evangeline J. Lozano-Endriano vs. Speaker Prospero
C. Nograles, Representative, Majority, House of
Representatives / Louis “Barok” C. Biraogo vs. Speaker
Prospero C. Nograles, Representative, Congress of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 187883, June 16, 2009.
JUDICIAL REVIEW; RIPENESS FOR ADJUDICATION.
An aspect of the “case-or-controversy” requirement is the
requisite of “ripeness.” In the United States, courts are
centrally concerned with whether a case involves
uncertain contingent future events that may not occur as
anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. Another
approach is the evaluation of the twofold aspect of
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ripeness: first, the fitness of the issues for judicial
decision; and second, the hardship to the parties entailed
by withholding court consideration. In our jurisdiction,
the issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of
actual injury to the plaintiff. Hence, a question is ripe
for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a
direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. An
alternative road to review similarly taken would be to
determine whether an action has already
been accomplished or performed by a branch of
government before the courts may step in. Atty. Oliver
O. Lozano and Atty. Evangeline J. Lozano-Endriano vs.
Speaker Prospero C. Nograles, Representative, Majority,
House of Representatives / Louis “Barok” C. Biraogo vs.
Speaker Prospero C. Nograles, Representative, Congress
of the Philippines, G.R. No. 187883, June 16, 2009.
JUDICIAL REVIEW; STANDING TO SUE.
Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when he
can demonstrate that (1) he has personally suffered
some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly
illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is
likely to be redressed by the remedy being sought. In the
cases at bar, petitioners have not shown the elemental
injury in fact that would endow them with the standing to
sue. Locus standi requires a personal stake in the
outcome of a controversy for significant reasons. It
assures adverseness and sharpens the presentation of
issues for the illumination of the Court in resolving
difficult constitutional questions. The lack of petitioners’
personal stake in this case is no more evident than in
Lozano’sthree-page petition that is devoid of any legal or
jurisprudential basis.
Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the claim
of petitioners that they are instituting the cases at bar as
taxpayers and concerned citizens. A taxpayer’s suit
requires that the act complained of directly involves the
illegal disbursement of public funds derived from
taxation. It is undisputed that there has been no
allocation or disbursement of public funds in this case as
of yet. To be sure, standing as a citizen has been upheld
by this Court in cases where a petitioner is able to craft
an issue of transcendental importance or when
paramount public interest is involved. While the Court
recognizes the potential far-reaching implications of the
issue at hand, the possible consequence of House
Resolution No. 1109 is yet unrealized and does not infuse
petitioners with locus standi under the “transcendental
importance” doctrine.
The rule on locus standi is not a plain procedural rule but
a constitutional requirement derived from Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution, which mandates courts of
justice to settle only “actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable.
Moreover, while the Court has taken an increasingly
liberal approach to the rule of locus standi, evolving from
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the stringent requirements of “personal injury” to the
broader “transcendental importance” doctrine, such
liberality is not to be abused. It is not an open invitation
for the ignorant and the ignoble to file petitions that
prove nothing but their cerebral deficit. Atty. Oliver O.
Lozano and Atty. Evangeline J. Lozano-Endriano vs.
Speaker Prospero C. Nograles, Representative, Majority,
House of Representatives/Louis “Barok” C. Biraogo vs.
Speaker Prospero C. Nograles, Representative, Congress
of the Philippines, G.R. No. 187883, June 16, 2009.
SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES.
In ascertaining whether the right to speedy disposition of
cases has been violated, the following factors must be
considered: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for
the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right
by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the
delay. The right to a speedy disposition of cases is
considered violated only when the proceedings are
attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays.
A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is
not sufficient. In the application of
the constitutional guarantee of the right to a speedy
disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken
of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.
In Bernat v. Sandiganbayan, the Court denied petitioner’s
claim of denial of his right to a speedy disposition of
cases considering that the petitioner in that case chose to
remain silent for eight years before complaining of the
delay in the disposition of his case. The Court ruled that
petitioner failed to seasonably assert his right and he
merely sat and waited from the time his case was
submitted for resolution. In this case, petitioner similarly
failed to assert his right to a speedy disposition of his
case. He did not take any step to accelerate the
disposition of his case. He only invoked his right to a
speedy disposition of cases after
the Sandiganbayan promulgated its decision convicting
him for malversation of public funds. Petitioner’s silence
may be considered as a waiver of his right. Raul S. Tello
vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 165781, June 5,
2009
UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
Revenue Regulations Nos. 9-2003, 22-2003, and
Revenue Memorandum Order No. 6-2003, as pertinent to
cigarettes packed by machine, are invalid insofar as they
grant the BIR the power to reclassify or update the
classification of new brands every two years or earlier.
Hon. Secretary of Finance, et al. vs. La Suerte Cigar and
Cigarette Factory, et al., G.R. No. 166498. June 11,
2009.
Local Government Code
BOUNDARY DISPUTES BETWEEN CITIES.
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Now that Makati is already a highly urbanized city, the
parties should follow Section 118(d) of the Local
Government Code (LGC) and should opt to amicably
settle this dispute by joint referral to the
respective sanggunians of the parties. This has become
imperative because, after all, no attempt had been made
earlier to settle the dispute amicably under the aegis of
the LGC. The specific provision of the LGC, now made
applicable because of the altered status of Makati, must
be complied with. In the event that no amicable
settlement is reached, as envisioned under Section
118(e) of the LGC, a certification shall be issued to that
effect, and the dispute shall be formally tried by
the Sanggunian concerned within sixty (60) days from
the date of the aforementioned certification. In this
regard, Rule III of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the LGC shall govern.
Municipality of Pateros vs.The Honorable Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 157714, June 16, 2009
Administrative and Civil Service Law
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.
The petitioners failed to appeal the decision of
the Adjudication and Settlement Board (ASB) of the
Commission on Audit to the Commission on Audit proper
before filing the petition for certiorari with the Supreme
Court, in derogation of the principle of exhaustion
of administrative remedies. The general rule is that
before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he
should first avail himself of all the means afforded him
by administrative processes. The issues
which administrative agencies are authorized to decide
should not be summarily taken from them and submitted
to the court without first giving
such administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of
the same after due deliberation. It is, therefore,
imperative that the Commission Proper be first given the
opportunity to review the decision of the ASB. Only after
the Commission shall have acted thereon may a petition
for certiorari be brought to the Supreme Court by the
aggrieved party. While the principle of exhaustion
of administrative remedies admits of exceptions, the
Supreme Court did not find any cogent reason to apply
the cited exceptions to the instant case. The non-
observance of the doctrine results in the petition having
no cause of action, thus, justifying its dismissal. Joseph
Peter Sison, et al. vs. Rogelio Tablang, G.R. No. 177011,
June 5, 2009.
PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION.
There are two kinds of preventive suspension of
government employees charged with offenses punishable
by removal or suspension, viz: (1) preventive suspension
pending investigation; and (2) preventive suspension
pending appeal if the penalty imposed by
the disciplining authority is suspension or dismissal and,
after review, the respondent is exonerated. Preventive
suspension pending investigation is not a penalty. It is a
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measure intended to enable the disciplining authority to
investigate charges against respondent by preventing the
latter from intimidating or in any way influencing
witnesses against him. If the investigation is not finished
and a decision is not rendered within that period, the
suspension will be lifted and the respondent
will automatically be reinstated. If after investigation,
respondent is found innocent of the charges and is
exonerated, he should be reinstated. Civil Service
Commission, Anicia De Lima, in her capacity as Regional
Director of CSC-NCR vs. Larry M. Alfonso, G.R. No.
179452, June 11, 2009.
mandatory, and not merely directory. Thus, in this case,
petitioners should have first waited for the rules and
guidelines of the DBM before payment of the honoraria.
As the rules and guidelines were still forthcoming,
petitioners could not just award themselves the straight
amount of 25% of their monthly basic salaries
as honoraria. This is not the intendment of the
law. Joseph Peter Sison, et al. vs. Rogelio Tablang, G.R.
No. 177011, June 5, 2009.
Election law

DISQUALIFICATION FOR PUBLIC OFFICE.

PUBLIC OFFICERS; POWER OF APPOINTMENT.

R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow re-acquisition and

Well-settled is the rule that an oath of office is a
retention of Philippine citizenship for: 1) natural-born
qualifying requirement for a public office,
citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by
a prerequisite to the full investiture of the office. Since
reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
petitioner petitioner took his oath and assumed office
country; and 2) natural-born citizens of the Philippines
only on February 26, it was only then that his right to
who, after the effectivity of the law, become citizens of a
enter into the position became plenary and complete.
foreign country. The law provides that they are deemed
Prior to such oath, Gasgonia still had the right to exercise
to have re-acquired or retained their Philippine citizenship
the functions of her office. It is also well to note that
upon taking the oath of allegiance.
per certification issued by Raymond C. Santiago,
Accountant of PCUP, Gasgonia received her last salary for
the period covering February 1-25, 2001; and petitioner In the instant case, petitioner’s Oath of Allegiance and
received his first salary for the period covering February Certificate of Candidacy did not comply with Section 5(2)
26 to March 7, 2001. of R.A. No. 9225 which further requires those seeking
elective public office in the Philippines to make a personal
and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship. Petitioner
Clearly, at the time of respondent’s appointment on
failed to renounce his American citizenship; as such, he
February 23, Gasgonia still was the rightful occupant of
is disqualified from running for vice-mayor
the position and was, therefore, authorized to extend a
of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007
valid promotional appointment. Chairman Percival C.
elections. Roseller De Guzman vs. Commission on
Chavez, Chair and Chief Executive
Elections, et al., G.R. No. 180048, June 19, 2009.
Officer, Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor vs.
Lourdes R. Ronidel and Honorable Court of Appeals
9th Division, G.R. No. 180941, June 11, 2009. ELECTION CASE; MOOT.

PUBLIC OFFICERS; HONORARIUM. A case becomes moot when there is no more actual
controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can
be served in passing upon the merits. Courts will not
An honorarium is defined as something given not as a
determine a moot question in a case in which no practical
matter of obligation but in appreciation for services
relief can be granted. It is unnecessary to indulge in
rendered, a voluntary donation in consideration of
academic discussion of a case presenting a moot
services which admit of no compensation in money.
question, as a judgment thereon cannot have any
Section 15 of R.A. No. 9184 uses the word “may” which
practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, cannot be
signifies that the honorarium cannot be demanded as a
enforced.
matter of right.

Since the present Petition is grounded on

The government is not unmindful of the tasks that may
petitioner Baldo’s specific objections to the 26 ERs in the
be required of government employees outside of their
previous local elections, no practical or useful purpose
regular functions. It agrees that they ought to be
would be served by still passing on the merits thereof.
compensated; thus, honoraria are given as a recompense
Even if the Court sets aside the
for their efforts and performance of substantially similar
assailed COMELEC Resolutions and orders the exclusion
duties, with substantially similar degrees
of the disputed ERs from the canvass of votes, and as a
of responsibility and accountability. However, the
result thereof, petitioner Baldo would emerge as the
payment of honoraria to the members of the BAC and
winning candidate for municipal mayor of Camalig, Albay,
the TWG must be circumscribed by applicable rules and
in the 10 May 2004 local elections, it would be an empty
guidelines prescribed by the DBM, as provided by law.
victory. It is already impossible for petitioner Baldo to
Section 15 of R.A. No. 9185 is explicit as it states: “For
still assume office as municipal mayor of Camalig, Albay,
this purpose, the DBM shall promulgate the necessary
elected in the 10 May 2004 local elections, since his
guidelines.” The word “shall” has always been deemed

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tenure as such had ended on 30 June 2007.
Petitioner Baldo himself is currently occupying the very
same office as the winning candidate in the 14 May 2007
local elections. Irrefragably, the Court can no longer
grant to petitioner Baldo any practical relief capable of
enforcement. Consequently, the Court is left with no
other recourse than to dismiss the instant Petition on the
ground of mootness. Carlos Irwin G. Baldo vs.
Commission on Elections. et al., G.R. No. 176135, June
16, 2009.
Agrarian law
JURISIDICTION; DAR.
Under Section 50 of Rep. Act No. 6657, the DAR is vested
with “primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction over all matters involving
the implementation of agrarian reform.” An agrarian
dispute refers to any controversy relating to, inter alia,
tenancy over lands devoted to agriculture. Under Section
3(d) of Rep. Act No. 6657, an agrarian dispute refers to
any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements,
whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise,
over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes
concerning farmworkers’ associations or representation of
persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or
seeking to arrange terms or conditions of
such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy
relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act
and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership
from landowner to farmworkers, tenants and other
agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants
stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and
beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.
It refers to any controversy relating to, inter alia, tenancy
over lands devoted to agriculture. Zosimo Octavio and
Jesus Albona (substituted by his wife, Violeta Albona) vs.
Enrico R. Perovano, G.R. No. 172400, June 23, 2009.
JURISDICTION;
DAR. DAR has primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive
original jurisdiction over all matters involving
the implementation of agrarian reform, except those
falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the DA and
the DENR. Further exception to the DAR’s original and
exclusive jurisdiction are all petitions for
the determination of just compensation to landowners
and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under RA No.
6657, which are within the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting
as a Special Agrarian Court. Thus, jurisdiction on
just compensation cases for the taking of lands under RA
No. 6657 is vested in the courts. Land Bank of the
Philippines vs. Rene Ralla Belista, G.R. No. 164631. June
26, 2009.
JUST COMPENSATION; DETERMINATION.
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The procedure for
the determination of compensation cases under Republic
Act No. 6657, as devised by this Court, commences with
the valuation by the LBP of the lands taken by the State
from private owners under the land reform program.
Based on the valuation of the land by the LBP, the DAR
makes an offer to the landowner through a written
notice. In case the landowner rejects the offer, a
summary administrative proceeding is held and,
afterwards, depending on the value of the land, the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), the
Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD), or
the DARAB, fixes the price to be paid for the said land. If
the landowner still does not agree with the price so fixed,
he may bring the matter to the RTC, acting as Special
Agrarian Court.
In the process of determining the just compensation due
to landowners, it is a necessity that the RTC takes into
account several factors enumerated in Section 17 of
Republic Act No. 6657. Land Bank of the Philippines vs.
Kumassie Plantation
Company Incorporated/Kumassie Plantation
Company Incorporated vs. Land Bank of the Philippines
and the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform
G.R. No. 177404/G.R. No. 178097, June 25, 2009.
TENANTS.
Tenants are defined as persons who — in themselves and
with the aid available from within their immediate farm
households — cultivate the land belonging to or
possessed by another, with the latter’s consent, for
purposes of production, sharing the produce with the
landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to
the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce
or money or both under the leasehold tenancy system.
Based on the foregoing definition of a tenant, entrenched
in jurisprudence are the following essential elements of
tenancy: 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant
or agricultural lessee; 2) the subject matter of
the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) there is
consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) the
purpose of the relationship is to bring
about agricultural production; 5) there is personal
cultivation on the part of the tenant
or agricultural lessee; and 6) the harvest is shared
between landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee. The
presence of all these elements must be proved by
substantial evidence. Unless a person has established his
status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of
tenure and is not covered by the Land Reform Program of
the Government under existing tenancy laws.
Tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. Claims that
one is a tenant do not automatically give rise to security
of tenure. Joaquin Soliman, et al., vs. Pampanga Sugar
Development Company (PASUDECO), Inc., and Gerry
Rodriguez, G.R. No. 169589, June 16, 2009.
TENANTS.
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The CA held that there is no tenancy relationship
between the private respondents and petitioners
Apolonia, Carlos, Lourdes and Rogelio Tarona due to the
absence of personal cultivation of the subject landholding
by the latter
In arriving at such a finding, the appellate court gave full
credence to the evidence proffered by private
respondents showing that the aforementioned petitioners
are not residents of the locality where the subject
landholding is and neither are they tenants of any lot
thereat. The evidence, among others, consists of
the Certification dated October 9, 2003 issued by
the Barangay Captain of Mauban,
now Nagbalayong, Morong, Bataan, stating that Apolonia,
Carlos, Lourdes and Rogelio Tarona are not residents
therein and that they do not personally cultivate the
subject property; and the Certification of the election
officer of Caloocan City showing that said persons are
residents and registered voters of Caloocan City.
We find no reason to disturb the aforesaid finding of the
CA. Clearly, private respondents’ evidence,
which significantly the petitioners failed to refute, more
than substantially proved the impossibility of personal
cultivation. Petitioners (intervenors) have already left the
place where the subject land lies in Morong, Bataan, and
now live in another locality which is in Caloocan City.
Since Bataan is of a considerable distance from Caloocan
City, it would undeniably be physically impossible for the
petitioners to personally cultivate the
landholding. Leonardo Tarona, et al. vs. Court of
Appeals, et al. G.R. No. 170182. June 18, 2009
PRIVATE LANDS; DISBARMENT FOR GROSS
IGNORANCE OF THE LAW
One of the fundamental principles of Philippine
constitutional law is that ownership of land is generally
reserved only to Filipinos. Article XII, Section 7 of the
Constitution provides: ”Save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private lands shall be transferred or
conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain.” On the other hand, Article XII, Section 8
provides: ”Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of
this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who
has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of
private lands, subject to limitations provided by law.” To
summarize:
Under the Constitution, private lands may be transferred
or conveyed to the following:
(a) Filipino citizens;
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(b) Corporations and associations at least 60% of the
capital of which is owned by Filipino citizens, since they
have the capacity to hold lands of the public domain;
(c) Aliens but only in cases of hereditary
succession; and
(d) Natural born citizens who have lost their Philippine
citizenship subject to limitations provided by law. (see 2
Philippine Constitutional Law, p. 917 [2004])
One would think that all Philippine lawyers know this
fundamental principle but that does not appear to be the
case. In Keld Stemmerik, represented by Attys.
Herminio. Liwanag and Winston P.L. Esguerra vs. Atty.
Leonuel N. Mas, A.C. No. 8010, June 16, 2009, Keld
Stemmerik, a Danish national, expressed interest in
buying land in the Philippines and Atty. Mas advised him
that he can legally acquire and own land in the
Philippines.
Keld gave Atty. Mas PhP3.8 million as purchase price of
the property and returned to Denmark. Atty. Mas then
prepared a contract to sell between Keld (with Atty. Mas
as representative) and a certain Bonifacio de Mesa, who
allegedly owns the property. Atty. Mas then prepared
and notarized a deed of sale in which de Mesa sold the
property to a certain Ailyn Gonzales for PhP3.8
million. Atty. Mas also drafted an agreement between
Keld and Gonzales stating that it was Keld who provided
the funds for the purchase of the property.
After the various agreements were signed, Keld tried to
get in touch with Atty. Mas, who never replied to Keld’s
calls and email messages. When Keld returned to the
Philippines, he learned that he could not own land in the
Philippines. In addition, a verification made at the
Community Environment & Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources in Olongapo City revealed that the property
was inalienable as it was situated within the former US
Military Reservation.
Keld tried to locate Atty. Mas but never found him. It
appears that Atty. Mas abandoned his law practice in
Olongapo City. Keld then filed a complaint for
disbarment against Atty. Mas with the Committee on Bar
Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP). The CBD and the IBP Board of Governors
recommended the disbarment of Atty. Mas. The
Supreme Court agreed that Atty. Mas should be
disbarred. According to the Supreme Court:
This Court has interpreted [Article XII, Section 7], as
early as the 1947 case Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, to
mean that “under the Constitution, aliens may not
acquire private or agricultural lands, including residential
lands.” The provision is a declaration of imperative
constitutional policy.
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Respondent, in giving advice that directly contradicted a
fundamental constitutional policy, showed disrespect for
the Constitution and gross ignorance of basic law. Worse,
he prepared spurious documents that he knew were void
and illegal.
By making it appear that de Mesa undertook to sell the
property to complainant and that de Mesa thereafter sold
the property to Gonzales who made the purchase for and
in behalf of complainant, he falsified public documents
and knowingly violated the Anti-Dummy Law.
Respondent’s misconduct did not end there. By advising
complainant that a foreigner could legally and validly
acquire real estate in the Philippines and by assuring
complainant that the property was alienable, respondent
deliberately foisted a falsehood on his client. He did not
give due regard to the trust and confidence reposed in
him by complainant. Instead, he deceived complainant
and misled him into parting with P400,000 for services
that were both illegal and unprofessional. Moreover, by
pocketing and misappropriating the P3.8 million given by
complainant for the purchase of the property, respondent
committed a fraudulent act that was criminal in nature.
The Supreme Court stated that Atty. Mas showed “gross
ignorance of the law.” Based solely on the facts
recounted in the ruling, it is likely that Atty. Mas knew
that aliens could not own land, and for that reason, the
deed of sale he prepared was between de Mesa and
Gonzales. If Atty. Mas was not aware of the
constitutional prohibition against alien ownership, then he
would have likely placed Keld as the purchaser in the
deed of sale. In asking Gonzales to acknowledge that
the funds for the purchase of the property came from
Keld, it seems that Atty. Mas was using Gonzales as a
“dummy” for Keld.
JULY 2009 DECISIONS
Constitutional Law
DOUBLE POSITIONS.
The office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red
Cross is not a government office or an office in a
government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes
of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, which provides: “No Senator or Member of
the House of Representatives may hold any other office
or employment in the Government, or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat.
Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may
have been created or the emoluments thereof increased
during the term for which he was elected.” Dante Liban,
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et al. vs. Richard J. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, July 15,
2009.
ILLEGAL SEARCH.
Even assuming that petitioner or any lawful occupant of
the house was not present when the search was
conducted, the search was done in the presence of at
least two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion
residing in the same locality. Manalo was the barangay
chairman of the place while Velasco was petitioner’s
employee. Petitioner herself signed the certification of
orderly search when she arrived at her residence. Clearly,
the requirements of Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court were complied with by the police authorities who
conducted the search. Further, petitioner failed to
substantiate her allegation that she was just forced to
sign the search warrant, inventory receipt, and the
certificate of orderly search. In fact, the records show
that she signed these documents together with three
other persons, including the barangay chairman who
could have duly noted if petitioner was really forced to
sign the documents against her will.
Articles which are the product of unreasonable searches
and seizures are inadmissible as evidence pursuant to
Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution. However, in
this case, the Supreme Court sustained the validity of the
search conducted in petitioner’s residence and, thus, the
articles seized during the search are admissible in
evidence against petitioner. Rosario Panuncio vs. People
of the Philippines, G.R. No. 165678, July 17, 2009.
JUST COMPENSATION.
Section 17 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6657 applies only if
the amount of just compensation of lands acquired
through Presidential Decree No. 27 remains unresolved
despite the passage of RA No. 6657. It is only in such a
case, and to such extent only, that this provision on the
determination of just compensation in the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988 is
made to apply retrospectively. Land Bank of the
Philippines vs. Josefina R. Dumlao, et al., G.R. No.
167809, July 23, 2009.
LANDHOLDING LIMITATION.
Section 11 of Article XIV of the governing 1973
Constitution states that “no private corporation or
association may hold by lease, concession, license, or
permit, timber or forest lands and other timber or forest
resources in excess of one hundred thousand hectares.”
Complementing this provision was Chapter I, No. 3(e) of
Forestry Administrative Order (FAO) No. 11 prohibiting
any individual, corporation, partnership, or association
from acquiring a timber license or license agreement
covering an area in excess of 100,000 hectares. Likewise,
Chapter I, No. 3(d) of FAO No. 11 states that no
individual corporation, partnership, or association who is
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already a holder of an ordinary timber license or license
agreement nor any member of the family, incorporator,
director, stockholder, or member of such individual,
corporation, partnership, or association shall be allowed
to acquire a new timber license or license agreement or
any interest or participation in it.
The constitutional and statutory limitations on allowable
area leases and concessions were obviously meant to
prevent the concentration of large tracts of public land in
the hands of a single individual. Republic of the
Philippines vs. Estate of Alfonso Lim, Sr., et al., G.R. No.
164800, July 22, 2009.
Party List. There are four parameters in a Philippine-
style party-list election system:
1. Twenty percent of the total number of the
membership of the House of Representatives is the
maximum number of seats available to party-list
organizations, such that there is automatically one party-
list seat for every four existing legislative districts.
2. Garnering two percent of the total votes cast in the
party-list elections guarantees a party-list organization
one seat. The guaranteed seats shall be distributed in a
first round of seat allocation to parties receiving at least
two percent of the total party-list votes.
3. The additional seats, that is, the remaining seats
after allocation of the guaranteed seats, shall be
distributed to the party-list organizations including those
that received less than two percent of the total votes.
The continued operation of the two percent threshold as
it applies to the allocation of the additional seats is now
unconstitutional because this threshold mathematically
and physically prevents the filling up of the available
party-list seats. The additional seats shall be distributed
to the parties in a second round of seat allocation
according to the two-step procedure laid down in the
Supreme Court’s Decision of 21 April 2009 as clarified in
this Resolution.
4. The three-seat cap is constitutional. The three-seat
cap is intended by the Legislature to prevent any party
from dominating the party-list system. There is no
violation of the Constitution because the 1987
Constitution does not require absolute proportionality for
the party-list system. The well-settled rule is that courts
will not question the wisdom of the Legislature as long as
it is not violative of the Constitution. BANAT vs.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271/G.R. No. 179295, July 8,
2009.
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS.
Congress cannot enact a law creating a private
corporation with a special charter. Such legislation would
be unconstitutional. Private corporations may exist only
under a general law. If the corporation is private, it must
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necessarily exist under a general law. Stated differently,
only corporations created under a general law can qualify
as private corporations. Under existing laws, the general
law is the Corporation Code, except that the Cooperative
Code governs the incorporation of cooperatives. The
Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is
void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private
corporation. The PNRC should incorporate under the
Corporation Code and register with the Securities and
Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private
corporation. Dante Liban, et al. vs. Richard J.
Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009.
RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF NATURE AND CAUSE OF
ACCUSATION.
It is settled that it is the allegations in the Information
that determine the nature of the offense, not the
technical name given by the public prosecutor in the
preamble of the Information. From a legal point of view,
and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the
accused what is the technical name of the crime of which
he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on
the merits. That to which his attention should be
directed, and in which he, above all things else, should
be most interested, are the facts alleged. The real
question is not did he commit a crime given in the law
some technical and specific name, but did he perform the
acts alleged in the body of the information in the manner
therein set forth.
Gauging such standard against the wording of the
Information in this case, the Supreme Court held that
there was no violation of petitioner’s rights. The recital of
facts and circumstances in the Information sufficiently
constitutes the crime of qualified theft. Sheala P. Matrido
vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 179061, July 13,
2009.
SEARCH WARRANTS.
Under Section 12, Chapter V of the Guidelines on the
Selection and Appointment of Executive Judges and
Defining their Powers, Prerogatives and Duties, as
embodied in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC,The Executive Judges
and, whenever they are on official leave of absence or
are not physically present in the station, the Vice-
Executive Judges of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City
shall have authority to act on applications filed by the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Philippine
National Police (PNP) and the Anti-Crime Task Force
(ACTAF), for search warrants involving heinous crimes,
illegal gambling, illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions as well as violations of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the Intellectual Property
Code, the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, the Tariff
and Customs Code, as amended, and other relevant laws
that may hereafter be enacted by Congress, and included
herein by the Supreme Court.
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The applications shall be endorsed by the heads of such
agencies or their respective duly authorized officials and
shall particularly describe therein the places to be
searched and/or the property or things to be seized as
prescribed in the Rules of Court. The Executive Judges
and Vice-Executive Judges concerned shall issue the
warrants, if justified, which may be served outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the said courts. Re: Request of
the Police Director General Avelino I. Razon for authority
to delegate the endorsement of application for search
warrant, A.M. No. 08-4-4-SC, July 7, 2009.
SECURITY OF TENURE.
Article IX (B), Section 2(3) of the 1987 Constitution
expressly provides that “[n]o officer or employee of the
civil service shall be removed or suspended except for
cause provided by law.” The aforementioned
constitutional provision does not distinguish between a
regular employee and a probationary employee.
The constitutional guaranty of security of tenure in the
civil service has two legal ramifications. In Tria v.
Chairman Patricia Sto. Tomas, et al., the Supreme Court
held that the prohibition against suspension or dismissal
of an officer or employee of the Civil Service “except for
cause provided by law” is “a guaranty of both procedural
and substantive due process.” “Not only must removal or
suspension be in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by law, but also they can only be made on the
basis of a valid cause provided by law.”
Procedural due process basically requires that suspension
or dismissal comes only after notice and hearing. Thus,
the minimum requirements of due process are: (1) that
the employees or officers must be informed of the
charges preferred against them, and the formal way by
which the employees or officers are informed is by
furnishing them with a copy of the charges made against
them; and (2) that they must have a reasonable
opportunity to present their side of the matter, that is to
say, their defenses against the charges and to present
evidence in support of their defenses
Here, the ground the petitioner invoked is not sufficient
basis for the respondent’s dismissal, and her dismissal
was effected without the observance of both procedural
and substantive due process. Land Bank of the
Philippines vs. Rowena O. Paden, G.R. No. 157607, July
7, 2009.
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.
The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to
relieve a person from unlawful restraint. The writ exists
as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from
unlawful restraint and as an effective defense of personal
freedom.
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Where the restraint of liberty is allegedly authored by the
State, the very entity tasked to ensure the liberty of all
persons (citizens and aliens alike) within its jurisdiction,
courts must be vigilant in extending the habeas corpus
remedy to one who invokes it. To strictly restrict the
great writ of liberty to technicalities not only defeats the
spirit that animates the writ but also waters down the
precious right that the writ seeks to protect, the right to
liberty. To dilute the remedy that guarantees protection
to the right is to negate the right itself. Thus, the Court
will not unduly confine the writ of habeas corpus in the
prison walls of technicality. Otherwise, it will betray its
constitutional mandate to promulgate rules concerning
the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights.
Here, petitioner’s continued imprisonment is by virtue of
a valid judgment and court process. Martin Gibbs
Fletcher vs. The Director of Bureau of Corrections or his
representative, UDK-14071, July 17, 2009.
Election Law
APPEAL FEE; ELECTION CASES.
Considering that a year has elapsed after the issuance on
July 15, 2008 of Comelec Resolution No. 8486, and to
further affirm the discretion granted to the Comelec
which it precisely articulated through the specific
guidelines contained in said Resolution, the Supreme
Court declared that for notices of appeal filed after the
promulgation of its decision, errors in the matter of non-
payment or incomplete payment of the two appeal fees in
election cases are no longer excusable. Salvador
Divinagracia, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections and Alex
A. Centena, G.R. Nos. 186007 & G.R. No. 186016, July
27, 2009.
APPRECIATION OF BALLOTS.
Appreciation of the contested ballots and election
documents involves a question of fact best left to the
determination of the COMRLEC, a specialized agency
tasked with the supervision of elections all over the
country. In the absence of grave abuse of discretion or
any jurisdictional infirmity or error of law, the factual
findings, conclusions, rulings and decisions rendered by
the Comelec on matters falling within its competence
shall not be interfered with by this Court. Salvador
Divinagracia, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections and Alex
A. Centena, G.R. Nos. 186007 & G.R. No. 186016, July
27, 2009.
COMELEC; INTERLOCUTORY ORDER.
Since the COMELEC’s Division issued the interlocutory
Order, the same COMELEC Division should resolve the
motion for reconsideration of the Order. The remedy of
the aggrieved party is neither to file a motion for
reconsideration for certification to the COMELEC En Banc
nor to elevate the issue to this Court via a petition for
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certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall; its power of
Procedure. Eddie T. Panlilio vs. Commission on Elections supervision and control over boards of election inspectors
and Lilia G. Pineda, G.R. No. 181478, July 15, 2009. and boards of canvassers; the concomitant need to do
everything in its power to secure a fair and honest
canvass of the votes cast in the elections; the grant to it
COMELEC; CANCELLATION OF COC.
of broad and flexible powers to effectively perform its
duties and to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and
Under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), a credible elections; and its role as the guardian of the
false representation of material fact in the Certificate of people’s sacred right of suffrage.
Candidacy (COC) is a ground for the denial or
cancellation of the COC. The false representation must
In particular, the statutory power of supervision and
pertain to a material fact that affects the right of the
control by the COMELEC over the boards of canvassers
candidate to run for the election for which he filed his
includes the power to revise or reverse the action of the
COC. Such material fact refers to a candidate’s eligibility
boards, as well as to do what the boards should have
or qualification for elective office like citizenship,
done. Such power includes the authority to initiate motu
residence or status as a registered voter. Aside from the
propio such steps or actions as may be required pursuant
requirement of materiality, the false representation must
to law, like reviewing the actions of the board;
consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or
conducting an inquiry affecting the genuineness of
hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate
election returns beyond the election records of the polling
ineligible. In other words, it must be made with the
places involved; annulling canvass or proclamations
intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be
based on incomplete returns or on incorrect or tampered
candidate’s qualifications for public office.
returns; invalidating a canvass or proclamation made in
an unauthorized meeting of the board of canvassers
It is settled that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over a either because it lacked a quorum or because the board
petition filed under Section 78 of the OEC. In the exercise did not meet at all; or requiring the board to
of such jurisdiction, it is within the competence of the convene. Rafael Flauta, Jr., et al. vs. Commission on
COMELEC to determine whether false representation as Elections, et al., G.R. No. 184586, July 22, 2009.
to material facts was made in the COC.
COMELEC; PROTESTS.
If the candidate states a material representation in the
COC that is false, the COMELEC is empowered to deny
Under Section 2(2), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution,
due course to or cancel the COC. The person whose COC
the COMELEC exercises exclusive original jurisdiction
is denied due course or cancelled under Section 78 of the
over all contests relating to the elections of all elective
OEC is not treated as a candidate at all, as if such person
regional, provincial, and city officials. Since the COMELEC
never filed a COC. Jamela Salic Maruhom vs. Commssion
has jurisdiction over petitioner’s election protest, it has
on Elections and Mohammad Ali “Mericano” A.
the authority to issue the assailed Orders. Eddie T.
Abinal, G.R. No. 179430, July 27, 2009.
Panlilio vs. Commission on Elections and Lilia G.
Pineda, G.R. No. 181478, July 15, 2009.
COMELEC; ORDERS OF DIVISION.
DOUBLE REGISTRATION.
Only final orders of the COMELEC in Division may be
raised before the COMELEC en banc. Section 3, Article
Maruhom, at the time she filed her COC, could not have
IX-C of the 1987 Constitution mandates that only
honestly declared therein that she was a registered voter
motions for reconsideration of final decisions shall be
of Marantao and an eligible candidate for mayor of the
decided by the COMELEC en banc. It is clear from the
said municipality. It is incumbent upon Maruhom to
foregoing constitutional provision that the COMELEC en
truthfully state her eligibility in her COC, especially so
banc shall decide motions for reconsideration only of
because the COC is filled up under oath. An elective office
“decisions” of a Division, meaning those acts having a
is a public trust. He who aspires for elective office should
final character. Here, the assailed Second Division order
not make a mockery of the electoral process by falsely
did not completely dispose of the case, as there was
representing himself. Jamela Salic Maruhom vs.
something more to be done, which was to decide the
Commssion on Elections and Mohammad Ali “Mericano”
election protest. Being interlocutory, the assailed Second
A. Abinal, G.R. No. 179430, July 27, 2009.
Division orders may not be resolved by the COMELEC en
banc. Eddie T. Panlilio vs. Commission on Elections and
Lilia G. Pineda, G.R. No. 181478, July 15, 2009. ESTOPPEL BY LACHES.

COMELEC; POWERS. The doctrine of estoppel by laches is not new in election

cases. It has been applied in at least two cases involving
the payment of filing fees. Salvador Divinagracia, Jr. vs.
The COMELEC has broad power, derived from our
Commission on Elections and Alex A. Centena, G.R. Nos.
fundamental law, to enforce and administer all laws and
186007 & G.R. No. 186016, July 27, 2009.
regulations relative to the conduct of an election,

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL (HRET).
The Constitution mandates that the HRET “shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications” of its members. By employing the
word “sole,” the Constitution is emphatic that the
jurisdiction of the HRET in the adjudication of election
contests involving its members is exclusive and
exhaustive. Its exercise of power is intended to be its
own — full, complete and unimpaired.
Due regard and respect for the authority of the HRET as
an independent constitutional body require that any
finding of grave abuse of discretion against that body
should be based on firm and convincing proof, not on
shaky assumptions. Any accusation of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the HRET must be established by
a clear showing of arbitrariness and improvidence. The
Supreme Court did not find evidence of such grave abuse
of discretion by the HRET.
At the risk of unduly encroaching on the exclusive
prerogative of the HRET as the sole judge of election
contests involving its members, the Supreme Court
cannot substitute its own sense or judgment for that of
the HRET on the issues of whether the evidence
presented during the initial revision could affect the
officially proclaimed results and whether the continuation
of the revision proceedings could lead to a determination
of the true will of the electorate. That is what petitioner
actually wants the Supreme Court to do. But in the
exercise of its checking function, the Supreme Court
should merely test whether or not the governmental
branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional
limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or had a
different view. Henry “June” Dueñas, Jr. vs. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Angelito “Jett” P.
Reyes, G.R. No. 185401, July 21, 2009.
FORFEITURE OF SENATE SEAT FOR HOLDING
ANOTHER GOVERNMENT OFFICE
In Dante Liban, et al. vs. Richard J. Gordon, G.R. No.
175352, July 15, 2009, the petitioners filed with the
Supreme Court a “Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon
as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate.”
During Gordon’s incumbency as a member of the Senate
of the Philippines, he was elected Chairman of the
Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) during the 23
February 2006 meeting of the PNRC Board of Governors.
Petitioners allege that by accepting the chairmanship of
the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has ceased to
be a member of the Senate as provided in Section 13,
Article VI of the Constitution, which reads:
SEC. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may hold any other office or
employment in the Government, or any subdivision,
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agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat.
Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may
have been created or the emoluments thereof increased
during the term for which he was elected.
Petitioners cite Camporedondo vs. NLRC, which held that
the PNRC is a government-owned or controlled
corporation. Petitioners claim that in accepting and
holding the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of
Governors, respondent automatically forfeited his seat in
the Senate, pursuant to Flores vs. Drilon, which held that
incumbent national legislators lose their elective posts
upon their appointment to another government office.
The Supreme Court addressed the preliminary issue of
whether the petitioners have standing to file the
petition. The Supreme Court answered in the negative:
. . . petitioners are alleging that by
accepting the position of Chairman of
the PNRC Board of Governors,
respondent has automatically forfeited
his seat in the Senate. In short,
petitioners filed an action for usurpation
of public office against respondent, a
public officer who allegedly committed
an act which constitutes a ground for
the forfeiture of his public office. Clearly,
such an action is for quo warranto,
specifically under Section 1(b), Rule 66
of the Rules of Court.
Quo warranto is generally commenced by the
Government as the proper party plaintiff. However, under
Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, an individual
may commence such an action if he claims to be entitled
to the public office allegedly usurped by another, in which
case he can bring the action in his own name. The person
instituting quo warranto proceedings in his own behalf
must claim and be able to show that he is entitled to the
office in dispute, otherwise the action may be dismissed
at any stage. In the present case, petitioners do not
claim to be entitled to the Senate office of respondent.
Clearly, petitioners have no standing to file the present
petition.
On the merits, the Supreme Court ruled that PNPRC is a
private organization performing public functions:
“The PNRC is not government-owned but privately
owned. The vast majority of the thousands of PNRC
members are private individuals, including students.
Under the PNRC Charter, those who contribute to the
annual fund campaign of the PNRC are entitled to
membership in the PNRC for one year. Thus, any one
between 6 and 65 years of age can be a PNRC member
for one year upon contributing P35, P100, P300, P500 or
P1,000 for the year. Even foreigners, whether residents
or not, can be members of the PNRC. . .
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. . . the PNRC is a privately owned, privately funded, and
privately run charitable organization. The PNRC is not a
government-owned or controlled corporation.
Petitioners anchor their petition on the 1999 case of
Camporedondo v. NLRC, which ruled that the PNRC is a
government-owned or controlled corporation. In ruling
that the PNRC is a government-owned or controlled
corporation, the simple test used was whether the
corporation was created by its own special charter for the
exercise of a public function or by incorporation under the
general corporation law. Since the PNRC was created
under a special charter, the Court then ruled that it is a
government corporation. However, the Camporedondo
ruling failed to consider the definition of a government-
owned or controlled corporation as provided under
Section 2(13) of the Introductory Provisions of the
Administrative Code of 1987. . .
A government-owned or controlled corporation must be
owned by the government, and in the case of a stock
corporation, at least a majority of its capital stock must
be owned by the government. In the case of a non-stock
corporation, by analogy at least a majority of the
members must be government officials holding such
membership by appointment or designation by the
government. Under this criterion, and as discussed
earlier, the government does not own or control PNRC.
Finally, the Supreme Court held that the PNRC Charter is
violative of the constitutional proscription against the
creation of private corporations by special law, as
provided in Article XII, Section 16 of the Constitution:
Congress cannot enact a law creating a private
corporation with a special charter. Such legislation would
be unconstitutional. Private corporations may exist only
under a general law. If the corporation is private, it must
necessarily exist under a general law. Stated differently,
only corporations created under a general law can qualify
as private corporations. Under existing laws, the general
law is the Corporation Code, except that the Cooperative
Code governs the incorporation of cooperatives.
The Constitution authorizes Congress to create
government-owned or controlled corporations through
special charters. Since private corporations cannot have
special charters, it follows that Congress can create
corporations with special charters only if such
corporations are government-owned or controlled. . .
. . . although the PNRC is created by a special charter, it
cannot be considered a government-owned or controlled
corporation in the absence of the essential elements of
ownership and control by the government. In creating
the PNRC as a corporate entity, Congress was in fact
creating a private corporation. However, the
constitutional prohibition against the creation of private
corporations by special charters provides no exception
even for non-profit or charitable corporations.
Consequently, the PNRC Charter, insofar as it creates the
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PNRC as a private corporation and grants it corporate
powers, is void for being unconstitutional. Thus, Sections
1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the
PNRC Charter, as amended, are void.
AUGUST 2009 DECISIONS
Constitutional law
CONGRESS; LEGISLATIVE IMMUNITY.
The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted
primarily on the provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the
Constitution.
As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative
privilege is founded upon long experience and arises as a
means of perpetuating inviolate the functioning process
of the legislative department. Without parliamentary
immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would
degenerate into a polite and ineffective debating forum.
Legislators are immune from deterrents to the
uninhibited discharge of their legislative duties, not for
their private indulgence, but for the public good. The
privilege would be of little value if they could be
subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions
of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the
hazard of a judgment against them based upon a judge’s
speculation as to the motives.
This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in
the forefront in upholding the institution of parliamentary
immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the
Court lost sight of the importance of the legislative and
oversight functions of the Congress that enable this
representative body to look diligently into every affair of
government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and
talk about how the country and its citizens are being
served. Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its
members in the manner they perform their functions in
the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of
an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of
the statement uttered by the member of the Congress
does not destroy the privilege. The disciplinary authority
of the assembly and the voters, not the courts, can
properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in
the name of parliamentary immunity.
For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for
the dismissal of the complaint for disbarment or
disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege
speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary
proceeding under the Rules of Court. It is felt, however,
that this could not be the last word on the
matter. Antero J. Pobre vs. Sen. Miriam Defensor-
Santiago, A.C. No. 7399. August 25, 2009.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY; JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL.
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Double jeopardy exists when the following requisites are
present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second;
(2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and
(3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the
first. A first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid
indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after
arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered;
and (e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or
the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent.
A judgment of acquittal is final and is no longer
reviewable. It is also immediately executory and the
State may not seek its review without placing the
accused in double jeopardy. The Constitution has
expressly adopted the double jeopardy policy and thus
bars multiple criminal trials, thereby conclusively
presuming that a second trial would be unfair if the
innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a
previous final judgment. Further prosecution via an
appeal from a judgment of acquittal is likewise barred
because the government has already been afforded a
complete opportunity to prove the criminal defendant’s
culpability; after failing to persuade the court to enter a
final judgment of conviction, the underlying reasons
supporting the constitutional ban on multiple trials
applies and becomes compelling. The reason is not only
the defendant’s already established innocence at the first
trial where he had been placed in peril of conviction, but
also the same untoward and prejudicial consequences of
a second trial initiated by a government who has at its
disposal all the powers and resources of the
State. Unfairness and prejudice would necessarily result,
as the government would then be allowed another
opportunity to persuade a second trier of the defendant’s
guilt while strengthening any weaknesses that had
attended the first trial, all in a process where the
government’s power and resources are once again
employed against the defendant’s individual means. That
the second opportunity comes via an appeal does not
make the effects any less prejudicial by the standards of
reason, justice and conscience.
Thus, the absolute and inflexible rule is that the State is
proscribed from appealing the judgment of acquittal
through either a regular appeal under Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court, or an appeal by certiorari on pure
questions of law under Rule 45 of the same
Rules. People of the Philippines vs. Dir. Cesar
P. Nazareno, Dir. Evelino Nartatez, Dir. Nicasio Ma.
S. Custodio and The Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 168982,
August 5, 2009.
EMINENT DOMAIN; JUST COMPEMSATION.
Eminent domain is the authority and right of the State,
as sovereign, to take private property for public use upon
observance of due process of law and payment of
just compensation.
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Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the
property sought to be expropriated. Among the factors to
be considered in arriving at the fair market value of the
property are the cost of acquisition, the current value of
like properties, its actual or potential uses, and in the
particular case of lands, their size, shape, location, and
the tax declarations thereon. The measure is not the
taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. To be just, the
compensation must be fair not only to the owner but also
to the taker.
Just compensation is based on the price or value of the
property at the time it was taken from the owner and
appropriated by the government. However, if the
government takes possession before the institution of
expropriation proceedings, the value should be fixed as of
the time of the taking of said possession, not of the filing
of the complaint. The value at the time of the filing of the
complaint should be the basis for the determination of
the value when the taking of the property involved
coincides with or is subsequent to the commencement of
the proceedings.
The procedure for determining just compensation is set
forth in Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Section 5 of Rule 67 partly states that “[u]pon the
rendition of the order of expropriation, the court shall
appoint not more than three (3) competent and
disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and
report to the court the just compensation for the property
sought to be taken.” However, we held in Republic v.
Court of Appeals that Rule 67 presupposes a prior filing
of complaint for eminent domain with the appropriate
court by the expropriator. If no such complaint is filed,
the expropriator is considered to have violated procedural
requirements, and hence, waived the usual procedure
prescribed in Rule 67, including the appointment of
commissioners to ascertain just compensation. In
National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we
clarified that when there is no action for expropriation
and the case involves only a complaint for damages or
just compensation, the provisions of the Rules of Court
on ascertainment of just compensation (i.e., provisions of
Rule 67) are no longer applicable, and a trial before
commissioners is dispensable. Republic of the Philippines
through the Department of Public Works and Highways
vs. Court of Appeals and Rosario Rodriguez Reyes, G.R.
No. 160379, August 14, 2009.
EMINENT DOMAIN; JUST COMPENSATION.
PD 27 and RA 6657 provide different factors for the
computation of just compensation. The former uses
average crop harvest as a consideration, whereas, the
latter uses the current value of like properties, its nature,
actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the
owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made
by government assessors as factors for consideration in
determining just compensation.
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In the case at bar, it is undisputed by the parties that the
lands were acquired under PD 27. Moreover, it is also
undisputed that just compensation has not yet been
settled prior to the passage of RA 6657. Thus, the issue
to be determined is what law shall govern in the
determination of just compensation.
If just compensation was not settled prior to the passage
of RA 6657, it should be computed in accordance with the
said law, although the property was acquired under PD
27. Department of Agrarian Reform (etc.) vs. Carmen
S. Tongson, G.R. No. 171674, August 4, 2009.
EMINENT DOMAIN; TAKING.
It is the date of the issuance of emancipation patents
that should serve as the reckoning point for purposes of
computation of just compensation. Copies of the
emancipation patents issued to the farmer-beneficiaries,
however, have not been attached to the records of the
case. Department of Agrarian Reform (etc.) vs. Carmen
S. Tongson, G.R. No. 171674, August 4, 2009.
FREE ACCESS CLAUSE; COURT FILING FEES.
The basis for the exemption from legal and filing fees is
the free access clause, embodied in Sec. 11, Art. III of
the 1987 Constitution.
The importance of the right to free access to the courts
and quasi judicial bodies and to adequate legal assistance
cannot be denied. A move to remove the provision on
free access from the Constitution on the ground that it
was already covered by the equal protection clause was
defeated by the desire to give constitutional stature to
such specific protection of the poor.
In implementation of the right of free access under the
Constitution, the Supreme Court promulgated rules,
specifically, Sec. 21, Rule 3, Rules of Court, and Sec. 19,
Rule 141, Rules of Court.
The clear intent and precise language of
the aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court indicate
that only a natural party litigant may be regarded as an
indigent litigant. The Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc.,
being a corporation invested by the State with a juridical
personality separate and distinct from that of its
members, is a juridical person. Among others, it has the
power to acquire and possess property of all kinds as well
as incur obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in
conformity with the laws and regulations of their
organization. As a juridical person, therefore, it cannot be
accorded the exemption from legal and filing fees granted
to indigent litigants. Query of Mr. Roger C. Prioreschi re
exemption from legal and filing fees of the Good
Shepherd Foundation, Inc., A.M. No. 09-6-9-SC, August
19, 2009.
LAWS; PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY.
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Every statute is presumed to be constitutional. The
presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a
valid, sensible and just law. Those who petition the court
to declare a law unconstitutional must show thta there is
a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not
merely a doubtful, speculative or argumentative
one. Barangay Association for National Advancement
and Transparency (BANAT) Partylist represented by
Salvador B. Britanico vs. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 177508, August 7, 2009.
LAWS; TITLE.
Petitioner alleges that the title of RA 9369 is misleading
because it speaks of poll automation but contains
substantial provisions dealing with the manual
canvassing of election returns. Petitioner also alleges that
Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43 are neither embraced in the
title nor germane to the subject matter of RA 9369.
The constitutional requirement that “every bill passed by
the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall
be expressed in the title thereof” has always been given
a practical rather than a technical construction. The
requirement is satisfied if the title is comprehensive
enough to include subjects related to the general purpose
which the statute seeks to achieve. The title of a law
does not have to be an index of its contents and will
suffice if the matters embodied in the text are relevant to
each other and may be inferred from the title. Moreover,
a title which declares a statute to be an act to amend a
specified code is sufficient and the precise nature of
the amendatory act need not be further stated.
RA 9369 is an amendatory act entitled “An Act Amending
Republic Act No. 8436, Entitled ‘An Act Authorizing the
Commission on Elections to Use an Automated Election
System in the May 11, 1998 National or Local Elections
and in Subsequent National and Local Electoral Exercises,
to Encourage Transparency, Credibility, Fairness and
Accuracy of Elections, Amending for the
Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as Amended, Republic
Act No. 7166 and Other Related Election Laws, Providing
Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes.’” Clearly, the
subject matter of RA 9369 covers the amendments to RA
8436, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (BP 881), Republic Act
No. 7166 (RA 7166), and other related election laws to
achieve its purpose of promoting transparency,
credibility, fairness, and accuracy in the elections. The
provisions of RA 9369 assailed by petitioner deal with
amendments to specific provisions of RA 7166
and BP 881, specifically: (1) Sections 34, 37 and 38
amend Sections 26, 30 and 15 of RA 7166, respectively;
and (2) Section 43 of RA 9369 amends Section 265
of BP 881. Therefore, the assailed provisions are
germane to the subject matter of RA 9369 which is to
amend RA 7166 and BP 881, among
others. Barangay Association for National Advancement
and Transparency (BANAT) Partylist represented by
Salvador B. Britanico vs. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 177508, August 7, 2009.
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NON-IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACT. hand, under Section 37, Congress and

the COMELEC en banc shall determine only the
authenticity and due execution of the certificates of
Petitioner assails the constitutionality of the provision
canvass. Congress and the COMELEC en banc shall
which fixes the per diem of poll watchers of the dominant
exercise this power before the proclamation of the
majority and dominant minority parties at poll election
winning presidential, vice presidential, and senatorial
day. Petitioner argues that this violates the freedom of
candidates. Barangay Association for National
the parties to contract and their right to fix the terms and
Advancement and Transparency
conditions of the contract they see as fair, equitable and
(BANAT) Partylist represented by Salvador
just. Petitioner adds that this is a purely private contract
B. Britanico vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
using private funds which cannot be regulated by law.
177508, August 7, 2009.

There is no violation of the non-impairment clause. First, STRIKE; ILLEGAL STRIKE.

the non- impairment clause is limited in application to
laws that derogate from prior acts or contracts by
It is hornbook principle that the exercise of the right of
enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the
private sector employees to strike is not absolute (see
intention of the parties. There is impairment if a
Section 3 of Article XIII of the
subsequent law changes the terms of a contract between
Constitution). A. Soriano Aviation vs. Employees
the parties, imposes new conditions, dispenses with
Association of A. Soriano Aviation, et al., G.R. No.
those agreed upon or withdraws remedies for the
166879, August 14, 2009.
enforcement of the rights of the parties.

TAXATION; DOUBLE TAXATION.

As observed by the OSG, there is no existing contract yet
and, therefore, no enforceable right or demandable
obligation will be impaired. RA 9369 was enacted more
than three months prior to the 14 May 2007 elections.
Hence, when the dominant majority and minority parties
hired their respective poll watchers for the 14 May 2007
elections, they were deemed to have incorporated in their
contracts all the provisions of RA 9369.
Second, it is settled that police power is superior to the
non-impairment clause. The constitutional guaranty of
non-impairment of contracts is limited by the exercise of
the police power of the State, in the interest of public
health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the
community. Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) Partylist
represented by Salvador B. Britanico vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 177508, August 7, 2009.
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL.
Petitioner argues that Sections 37 and 38 of RA 9369
violate Section 17, Article VI and Paragraph 7, Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution for encroaching upon
the jurisdiciton of the PET and the SET.
Congress and the COMELEC en banc do not encroach
upon the jurisdiction of the PET and the SET. There is no
conflict of jurisdiction since the powers of Congress and
the COMELEC en banc, on one hand, and the PET and the
SET, on the other, are exercised on different occasions
and for different purposes. The PET is the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the President or Vice President. The SET
is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of members of the Senate. The
jurisdiction of the PET and the SET can only be invoked
once the winning presidential, vice presidential or
senatorial candidates have been proclaimed. On the other
Double taxation means taxing the same property twice
when it should be taxed only once; that is, “taxing the
same person twice by the same jurisdiction for the same
thing.” It is obnoxious when the taxpayer is taxed twice,
when it should be but once. Otherwise described as
“direct duplicate taxation,” the two taxes must be
imposed on the same subject matter, for the same
purpose, by the same taxing authority, within the same
jurisdiction, during the same taxing period; and the taxes
must be of the same kind or character.
Using the aforementioned test, the Court finds that there
is indeed double taxation if respondent is subjected to
the taxes under both Sections 14 and 21 of Tax
Ordinance No. 7794, since these are being imposed: (1)
on the same subject matter – the privilege of doing
business in the City of Manila; (2) for the same purpose –
to make persons conducting business within the City of
Manila contribute to city revenues; (3) by the same
taxing authority – petitioner City of Manila; (4) within the
same taxing jurisdiction – within the territorial
jurisdiction of the City of Manila; (5) for the same taxing
periods – per calendar year; and (6) of the same kind or
character – a local business tax imposed on gross sales
or receipts of the business. The City of Manila, Liberty M.
Toledo in her capacity as the Treasurer of Manila, et al.
vs. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 181845,
August 4, 2009.
WARRANTLESS SEARCH; PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE.
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain
view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to
have that view are subject to seizure and may be
presented as evidence. The plain view doctrine applies
when the following requisites concur: (1) the law
enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior
justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which

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he can view a particular area; (2) the discovery of the
evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (3) it is
immediately apparent to the officer that the item he
observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or
otherwise subject to seizure.
In this case, the police authorities were in the area
because that was where they caught up with petitioner
after the chase. They saw the firearms inside the vehicle
when petitioner opened the door. Since a shooting
incident just took place and it was reported that
petitioner was involved in the incident, it was apparent to
the police officers that the firearms may be evidence of a
crime. Hence, they were justified in seizing the
firearms. Judge Felimon Abelita, III vs. P/Supt. German
Doria and SPO3 Cesar Ramirez, G.R. No. 170672, August
14, 2009.
Public Officers
PRACTICE OF PROFESSION.
Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713 generally provides for the
prohibited acts and transactions of public officials and
employees. Subsection (b)(2) prohibits them from
engaging in the private practice of their profession during
their incumbency. As an exception, a public official or
employee can engage in the practice of his or her
profession under the following conditions: first, the
private practice is authorized by the Constitution or by
the law; and second, the practice will not conflict, or tend
to conflict, with his or her official functions.
The Section 7 prohibitions continue to apply for a period
of one year after the public official or employee’s
resignation, retirement, or separation from public office,
except for the private practice of profession under
subsection (b)(2), which can already be undertaken even
within the one-year prohibition period. As an exception to
this exception, the one-year prohibited period applies
with respect to any matter before the office the public
officer or employee used to work with.
The Section 7 prohibitions are predicated on the principle
that public office is a public trust; and serve to remove
any impropriety, real or imagined, which may occur in
government transactions between a former government
official or employee and his or her former colleagues,
subordinates or superiors. The prohibitions also promote
the observance and the efficient use of every moment of
the prescribed office hours to serve the public.
Parenthetically, in the case of court employees, Section
7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 is not the only prohibition to
contend with; Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct
for Court Personnel also applies.
A clerk of court can already engage in the practice of law
immediately after her separation from the service and
without any period limitation that applies to other
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prohibitions under Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713. The clerk
of court’s limitation is that she cannot practice her
profession within one year before the office where he or
she used to work with. Query of Atty. Karen M. Silverio-
Buffe, former Clerk of Court, Branch
81, Romblon, Romblon, on the prohibition from engaging
in the private practice of law, A.M. No. 08-6-352-RTC,
August 19, 2009.
Agrarian law
TENANTS.
To qualify for protection under PD 1517 and avail of the
rights and privileges granted by the said decree, the
claimant must be: (1) a legitimate tenant of the land for
ten (10) years or more; (2) must have built his home on
the land by contract; and, (3) has resided continuously
for the last ten (10) years. The “tenant” covered by PD
1517 is, as defined under Section 3(f) thereof, “the
rightful occupant of land and its structures, but does not
include those whose presence on the land is merely
tolerated and without the benefit of contract, those who
enter the land by force or deceit, or those whose
possession is under litigation.”
Stated differently, those whose possession or occupation
of land is devoid of any legal authority or those whose
contracts of lease are already terminated, or had already
expired, or whose possession is under litigation are not
considered “tenants” under the decree. Conversely, a
legitimate tenant is one who is not a usurper or an
occupant by tolerance. The petitioners-defendants whose
occupation has been merely by the owner’s tolerance
obviously fall outside the coverage of PD 1517 and
cannot seek its protection. Francisco Madrid and Edgardo
Bernardo vs.
Spouses Bonifacio Mapoy and Felicidad Martinez, G.R.
No. 150887, August 14, 2009.
Election Law
COMELEC; POWERS.
We do not agree with petitioner and the COMELEC that
the Constitution gave the COMELEC the “exclusive power”
to investigate and prosecute cases of violations of
election laws.
Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution vests in
the COMELEC the power to “investigate and, where
appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election
laws, including acts or omissions constituting election
frauds, offenses, and malpractices.” This was an
important innovation introduced by the Constitution
because this provision was not in the 1935 or 1973]
Constitutions. The phrase “[w]here appropriate” leaves to
the legislature the power to determine the kind of
election offenses that the COMELEC shall prosecute
exclusively or concurrently with other prosecuting arms
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of the government. Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency
(BANAT) Partylist represented by Salvador
B. Britanico vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
177508, August 7, 2009.
PURCHASE OF LAND DURING THE ELECTION BAN
The Omnibus Election Code prohibits the construction of
public works and the issuance of treasury warrants
during a period of 45 days prior to a regular election and
30 days prior to a special election. Section 261 (w)
reads:
(w) Prohibition against construction of public works,
delivery of materials for public works and issuance of
treasury warrants and similar devices.- During the period
of forty five days preceding a regular election and thirty
days before a special election, any person who: (a)
undertakes the construction of any public works, except
for projects or works exempted in the preceding
paragraph; or (b) issues, uses or avails of treasury
warrants or any device undertaking future delivery of
money, goods or other things of value chargeable against
public funds.
In Robert P. Guzman vs. Commission on Elections, Mayor
Randolph S. Ting and Salvacion Garcia, G.R. No. 182380,
August 28, 2009, the issue that arose is whether the
purchase by the city mayor of land for use as a public
cemetery and the issuance of a treasury warrant
as payment for the land violate the Omnibus Election
Code.
On March 31, 2004,
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Tuguegarao City passed
Resolution No. 048-2004 to authorize City Mayor Ting to
acquire two parcels of land for use as a public cemetery
of the City. Pursuant to the resolution, City Mayor Ting
purchased the two parcels of land. As payment, City
Treasurer Garcia issued and released Treasury Warrant
No. 0001534514 dated April 20, 2004 in the sum of
P8,486,027.00. On May 5, 2004, the City Government
of Tuguegarao caused the registration of the sale and the
issuance of new certificates in its name.
Based on the transaction, the petitioner filed a complaint
in the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor
of Cagayan Province against City Mayor Ting and City
Treasurer Garcia, charging them with a violation of
Section 261, paragraphs (v) and (w), of the Omnibus
Election Code, for having undertaken to construct a
public cemetery and for having released, disbursed and
expended public funds within 45 days prior to the May 9,
2004 election, in disregard of the prohibitions under said
provisions due to the election ban period having
commenced on March 26, 2004 and ended on May 9,
2004.
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After investigation, the Acting Provincial Election
Supervisor of Cagayan recommended the dismissal of the
complaint.
The COMELEC en banc adopted the foregoing
recommendation in its own resolution dated February 18,
2008 issued in E.O. Case No. 06-14 and dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit, holding that the acquisition of
the two parcels of land for a public cemetery was not
considered as within the term public works; and that,
consequently, the issuance of Treasury Warrant No.
0001534514 was not for public works and was thus in
violation of Section 261 (w) of the Omnibus Election
Code.
The Supreme Court ruled that the purchase of the lots for
use as a public cemetery does not constitute construction
of a public work within the context of the prohibition
under the Omnibus Election Code. According to the
Supreme Court:
We first construe the term public works − which the
Omnibus Election Code does not define − with the aid of
extrinsic sources.
The Local Government Code of 1991 considers public
works to be the fixed infrastructures and facilities owned
and operated by the government for public use and
enjoyment. According to the Code, cities have the
responsibility of providing infrastructure facilities
intended primarily to service the needs of their residents
and funded out of city funds, such as, among others,
roads and bridges; school buildings and other facilities for
public elementary and secondary schools; and clinics,
health centers and other health facilities necessary to
carry out health services.
Likewise, the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH), the engineering and construction arm of the
government, associates public works with fixed
infrastructures for the public. . .
The enumeration in Sec. 1, supra − “infrastructure
facilities, especially national highways, flood control and
water resources development systems, and other public
works in accordance with national development
objectives” − means that only the fixed public
infrastructures for use of the public are regarded as
public works. This construction conforms to the rule
of ejusdem generis . . .
Accordingly, absent an indication of any contrary
legislative intention, the term public works as used in
Section 261 (v) of the Omnibus Election Code is properly
construed to refer to any building or structure on land or
to structures (such as roads or dams) built by the
Government for public use and paid for by public funds.
Public works are clearly works, whether of construction or
adaptation undertaken and carried out by the national,
state, or municipal authorities, designed
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to subserve some purpose of public necessity, use or
convenience, such as public buildings, roads, aqueducts,
parks, etc.; or, in other words, all fixed works
constructed for public use.
It becomes inevitable to conclude, therefore, that the
petitioner’s insistence − that the acquisition of Lots 5860
and 5881 for use as a public cemetery be considered a
disbursement of the public funds for public works in
violation of Section 261(v) of the Omnibus Election Code
− was unfounded and unwarranted.
However, the Supreme Court ruled that the issuance of
the treasury warrant violated the Omnibus Election Code:
The OSG posits that [Section 261(w)] is violated in either
of two ways: (a) by any person who, within 45 days
preceding a regular election and 30 days before a special
election, undertakes the construction of any public works
except those enumerated in the preceding paragraph; or
(b) by any person who issues, uses or avails of treasury
warrants or any device undertaking future delivery of
money, goods or other things of value chargeable against
public funds within 45 days preceding a regular election
and 30 days before a special election.
We concur with the OSG’s position.
Section 261 (w) covers not only one act but two, i.e., the
act under subparagraph (a) above and that
under subparagraph (b) above. For purposes of the
prohibition, the acts are separate and distinct,
considering that Section 261(w) uses the disjunctive or to
separate subparagraphs (a) and (b). In legal
hermeneutics, or is a disjunctive that expresses an
alternative or gives a choice of one among two or more
things. The word signifies disassociation and
independence of one thing from another thing in an
enumeration. It should be construed, as a rule, in the
sense that it ordinarily implies as a disjunctive word.
According to Black, too, the word and can never be read
as or, or vice versa, in criminal and penal statutes, where
the rule of strict construction prevails. Consequently,
whether or not the treasury warrant in question was
intended for public works was even of no moment in
determining if the legal provision was violated.
There was a probable cause to believe that Section
261(w), subparagraph (b), of the Omnibus Election Code
was violated when City Mayor Ting and City Treasurer
Garcia issued Treasury Warrant No. 0001534514 during
the election ban period. For this reason, our conclusion
that the COMELEC en banc gravely abused its discretion
in dismissing E.O. Case No. 06-14 for lack of merit is
inevitable and irrefragable.
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“SUPREME COURT OF IDIOTS”
After Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago was not
considered for the position of Chief Justice by the Judicial
and Bar Council, she delivered a speech on the Senate
floor and was quoted as saying:
I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I
am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased,
degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up
to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I
am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am
no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I
was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in
another environment but not in the Supreme Court of
idiots. . .
In a sworn letter complaint dated December 22, 2006, a
certain Antero J. Pobre asked the Supreme Court to
undertake disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary
action against Senator Santiago on the ground that her
statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the
speaker towards then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban
and the other members of the Court and constituted
direct contempt of court.
In her comment, Senator Santiago, through counsel, did
not deny making the statements. However, she explained
that those statements were covered by the constitutional
provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a
speech she delivered in the discharge of her duty as
member of Congress. The purpose of her speech,
according to her, was to bring out in the open
controversial anomalies in governance with a view to
future remedial legislation.
The Supreme Court agreed with Senator Santiago.
In Antero J. Pobre vs. Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago,
A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009, it ruled:
The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily
on the provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the
Constitution, which provides: “A Senator or Member of
the House of Representative shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session.
No member shall be questioned nor be held liable
in any other place for any speech or debate in the
Congress or in any committee thereof.” Explaining
the import of the underscored portion of the provision,
the Court, in Osmeña, Jr. v. Pendatun, said: Our
Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a
fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative
assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English
Parliament, its purpose “is to enable and encourage a
representative of the public to discharge his public trust
with firmness and success” for “it is indispensably
necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of
speech and that he should be protected from resentment
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of every one, however, powerful, to whom the exercise of
that liberty may occasion offense.”
As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative
privilege is founded upon long experience and arises as a
means of perpetuating inviolate the functioning process
of the legislative department. Without parliamentary
immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would
degenerate into a polite and ineffective debating forum.
Legislators are immune from deterrents to the
uninhibited discharge of their legislative duties, not for
their private indulgence, but for the public good. The
privilege would be of little value if they could be
subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions
of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the
hazard of a judgment against them based upon a judge’s
speculation as to the motives.
This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in
the forefront in upholding the institution of parliamentary
immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the
Court lost sight of the importance of the legislative and
oversight functions of the Congress that enable this
representative body to look diligently into every affair of
government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and
talk about how the country and its citizens are being
served. Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its
members in the manner they perform their functions in
the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of
an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of
the statement uttered by the member of the Congress
does not destroy the privilege. The disciplinary authority
of the assembly and the voters, not the courts, can
properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in
the name of parliamentary immunity.
For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for
the dismissal of the complaint for disbarment or
disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege
speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary
proceeding under the Rules of Court. It is felt, however,
that this could not be the last word on the matter.
While the Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, it felt
that such should not be the last word on the matter. It
added:
The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the
language Senator Santiago, a member of the Bar, used in
her speech and its effect on the administration of justice.
To the Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly crossed
the limits of decency and good professional conduct. It is
at once apparent that her statements in question were
intemperate and highly improper in substance. To
reiterate, she was quoted as stating that she wanted “to
spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and
his cohorts in the Supreme Court,” and calling the Court
a “Supreme Court of idiots”. . .
The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of
disciplinary sanctions on Senator/Atty. Santiago for what
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otherwise would have constituted an act of utter
disrespect on her part towards the Court and its
members. The factual and legal circumstances of this
case, however, deter the Court from doing so, even
without any sign of remorse from her. Basic
constitutional consideration dictates this kind of
disposition.
We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the
Senator’s offensive and disrespectful language that
definitely tended to denigrate the institution pass by. It is
imperative on our part to re-instill in Senator/Atty.
Santiago her duty to respect courts of justice, especially
this Tribunal, and remind her anew that the
parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to
members of Congress is not to protect them against
prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as
the people’s representatives, to perform the functions of
their office without fear of being made responsible before
the courts or other forums outside the congressional hall.
It is intended to protect members of Congress against
government pressure and intimidation aimed at
influencing the decision-making prerogatives of Congress
and its members.
The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision on
Unparliamentary Acts and Language that enjoins a
Senator from using, under any circumstance, “offensive
or improper language against another Senator or against
any public institution.” But as to Senator Santiago’s
unparliamentary remarks, the Senate President had not
apparently called her to order, let alone referred the
matter to the Senate Ethics Committee for appropriate
disciplinary action, as the Rules dictates under such
circumstance. The lady senator clearly violated the rules
of her own chamber. It is unfortunate that her peers bent
backwards and avoided imposing their own rules on her.”
SEPTEMBER 2009 DECISIONS
Constitutional Law
CITIZENSHIP; ELECTION.
Com. Act No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section
1(4), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the
procedure that should be followed in order to make a
valid election of Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1
thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may
elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention
“in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party
concerned before any officer authorized to administer
oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry.
The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement
with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the
Government of the Philippines.”
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However, the 1935 Constitution and Com. Act No. 625
did not prescribe a time period within which the election
of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935
Charter only provides that the election should be made
“upon reaching the age of majority.” The age of majority
then commenced upon reaching 21 years. In the opinions
of the then Secretary of Justice on cases involving the
validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma
was resolved by basing the time period on the decisions
of the Supreme Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for
electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the
pronouncements of the Department of State of the
United States Government to the effect that the election
should be made within a “reasonable time” after attaining
the age of majority. The phrase “reasonable time” has
been interpreted to mean that the election should be
made within three (3) years from reaching the age of
majority.
It is true that we said that the 3-year period for electing
Philippine citizenship may be extended as when the
person has always regarded himself as a Filipino. In hits
case, not a single circumstance was sufficiently shown
meriting the extension of the 3-year period. The fact that
Carlos exercised his right of suffrage in 1952 and 1955
does not demonstrate such belief, considering that the
acts were done after he elected Philippine citizenship. On
the other hand, the mere fact that he was able to vote
does not validate his irregular election of Philippine
citizenship. At most, his registration as a voter indicates
his desire to exercise a right appertaining exclusively to
Filipino citizens but does not alter his real citizenship,
which, in this jurisdiction, is determined by blood
(jus sanguinis). The exercise of the rights and privileges
granted only to Filipinos is not conclusive proof of
citizenship, because a person may misrepresent himself
to be a Filipino and thus enjoy the rights and privileges of
citizens of this country.
It is incumbent upon one who claims Philippine
citizenship to prove to the satisfaction of the court that
he is really a Filipino. No presumption can be indulged in
favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship, and any
doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of
the state. Carlos T. Go., Sr., vs. Luis T. Ramos/Jimmy T.
Go vs. Luis T. Ramos/Hon. Alipio F. Fernandez,
etc., et al. vs. Jimmy T. Go a.k.a. Jaime T. Gaisano, G.R.
No. 167569/G.R. No. 167570/G.R. No. 171946,
September 4, 2009.
CITIZENSHIP; JUS SOLI.
The doctrine of jus soli was for a time the prevailing rule
in the acquisition of one’s citizenship. However, the
Supreme Court abandoned the principle of jus soli in the
case of Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor. Since then, said
doctrine only benefited those who were individually
declared to be citizens of the Philippines by a final court
decision on the mistaken application of jus soli.
Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!
Neither will the Philippine Bill of 1902 nor the Jones Law
of 1916 make Carlos a citizen of the Philippines. His bare
claim that his father, Go Yin An, was a resident of the
Philippines at the time of the passage of the said laws,
without any supporting evidence whatsoever will not
suffice.
It is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the
citizenship of the father and that illegitimate children are
under the parental authority of the mother and follow her
nationality. Moreover, we have also ruled that an
illegitimate child of a Filipina need not perform any act to
confer upon him all the rights and privileges attached to
citizens of the Philippines; he automatically becomes a
citizen himself. However, it is our considered view that
absent any evidence proving that Carlos is indeed an
illegitimate son of a Filipina, the aforestated established
rule could not be applied to him. Carlos T. Go., Sr., vs.
Luis T. Ramos/Jimmy T. Go vs. Luis T.
Ramos/Hon. Alipio F. Fernandez, etc., et al. vs. Jimmy T.
Go a.k.a. Jaime T. Gaisano, G.R. No. 167569/G.R. No.
167570/G.R. No. 171946, September 4, 2009.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION; JURISDICTION.
The CSC is the constitutional body charged with the
establishment and administration of a career civil service
which embraces all branches and agencies of the
government. In the recent case of Civil Service
Commission v. Alfonso, the Court held that special laws
such as R.A. 4670 did not divest the CSC of its inherent
power to supervise and discipline all members of the civil
service, including public school teachers. This Court has
also previously held in Civil Service Commission
v. Albao that the CSC has the authority to directly
institute proceedings to discipline a government
employee in order to protect the integrity of the civil
service. Civil Service Commission vs. Fatima A. Macud,
G.R. No. 177531. September 10, 2009
COMELEC: POLL AUTOMATION CONTRACT.
Assayed against the provisions of the Constitution, the
enabling automation law, RA 8436, as amended by RA
9369, the RFP and even the Anti-Dummy Law, which
petitioners invoked as an afterthought, the Court finds
the project award to have complied with legal
prescriptions, and the terms and conditions of the
corresponding automation contract in question to be
valid. No grave abuse of discretion, therefore, can be laid
on the doorsteps of respondent Comelec. And surely, the
winning joint venture should not be faulted for having a
foreign company as partner.
The Comelec is an independent constitutional body with a
distinct and pivotal role in our scheme of government. In
the discharge of its awesome functions as overseer of fair
elections, administrator and lead implementor of laws
relative to the conduct of elections, it should not be
stymied with restrictions that would perhaps be justified
in the case of an organization of lesser responsibility. It
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should be afforded ample elbow room and enough
wherewithal in devising means and initiatives that would
enable it to accomplish the great objective for which it
was created––to promote free, orderly, honest and
peaceful elections. This is as it should be for, too
often, Comelec has to make decisions under difficult
conditions to address unforeseen events to preserve the
integrity of the election and in the process the voice of
the people. Thus, in the past, the Court has steered away
from interfering with the Comelec’s exercise of its power
which, by law and by the nature of its office properly
pertain to it. Absent, therefore, a clear showing of grave
abuse of discretion on Comelec’s part, as here, the Court
should refrain from utilizing the corrective hand of
certiorari to review, let alone nullify, the acts of that
body. Harry L. Roque, et al. vs. COMELEC, et al., G.R.
No. 188456, September 10, 2009.
EMINENT DOMAIN; JUST COMPENSATION.
Section 18 of the CARL mandates that petitioner shall
compensate the landowner in such amount as may be
agreed upon by the landowner, DAR, and petitioner, or as
may be finally determined by the court, as the just
compensation for the land. In determining just
compensation, Section 17 of the CARL enumerates the
factors to be considered in the determination of just
compensation, namely, the cost of acquisition of the
land; the current value of like properties; its nature,
actual use and income; the sworn valuation by the
owner; the tax declarations; and the assessment made
by government assessors. The social and economic
benefits contributed by the farmers and the farm workers
and by the government to the property, as well as the
non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any
government financing institution on the said land, shall
be considered as additional factors to determine its
value.
In the case at bar, the SAC arrived at the just
compensation due respondents for their subject property
by taking into account the market value of the subject
property, the tax declaration of respondents, the actual
use of and income from the subject property, the
assessor’s valuation, and the volume and value of its
produce; and factors specifically mentioned under Section
17 of the CARL. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the
determination of just compensation by the SAC. There
being no allegation or evidence that the determination of
just compensation for the subject property by the SAC,
as affirmed by the appellate court, was not in conformity
with or was in violation of the provisions of the CARL, the
applicable law, then we have no reason to disturb the
same. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Heirs of
Asuncion Anonuevo Vda. Santos, et al., G.R. No. 179862,
September 3, 2009.
PCGG; POWER.
The PCGG’s power to sequester alleged ill-gotten
properties is likened to the provisional remedies of
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preliminary attachment or receivership which are always
subject to the control of the court.”
The PCGG, therefore, as the “receiver” of sequestered
assets and in consonance with its duty under EO 1,
Series of 1986, to protect and preserve them, has the
power to exercise acts of dominion provided that those
acts are approved by the proper court.
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that it is
the PCGG—not COCOFED or the CIIF companies—that
has the right and/or authority during sequestration to
seek this Court’s approval for the proposed conversion.
Consequently, the terms and conditions sought
by COCOFED for the conversion are not material to the
proposed conversion. At most, COCOFED’s prayer for
approval of the conversion reflects its conformity to said
transfiguration.
After a circumspect evaluation of the incident at bar, we
resolve to approve the conversion. The Court holds that
respondent Republic has satisfactorily hurdled the onus of
showing that the conversion is advantageous to the
public interest or will result in clear and material benefit
to the eventually declared stock owners, be they the
coconut farmers or the government itself. Philippine
Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED), Manuel
V. Del Rosario, Domingo P. Espina, et al. vs. Republic of
the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 177857-58, September 17,
2009.
SEARCH; PLAIN VIEW.
The “plain view doctrine” may not be used to launch
unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures or to
extend a general exploratory search made solely to find
evidence of defendant’s guilt. The doctrine is usually
applied where a police officer is not searching for
evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. Sr.
Inspector Jerry Valeroso vs. Court of Appeals and People
of the Philippines, G.R. No. 164815, September 3, 2009.
SEARCH; WARRANTLESS ARREST.
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting
officer to search the person arrested in order to remove
any weapon that the latter might use in order to resist
arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer’s safety
might well be endangered, and the arrest itself
frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the
arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on
the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment
or destruction.
Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and
the right of the apprehending officers to conduct
a warrantless search not only on the person of the
suspect, but also in the permissible area within
the latter’s reach. Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows
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the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on
the person of the one arrested or within the area of his
immediate control. The phrase “within the area of his
immediate control” means the area from within which he
might gain possession of a weapon or destructible
evidence. A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one
who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting
officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person
arrested. Sr. Inspector Jerry Valeroso vs. Court of
Appeals and People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 164815,
September 3, 2009.
STATUTES; CONSTITUTIONALITY.
Article 202(2) of the RPC, which penalizes any person
found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or
places or tramping or wandering about the country or the
streets without visible means of support, is
constitutional. The provision is not vague and does not
violate the equal protection clause. People of the
Philippines vs. Evangeline Siton y sacil, et al., G.R. No.
169364, September 18, 2009.
Administrative Law
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS; LIABILITY.
An administrative proceeding is different from a criminal
case and may proceed independently thereof. Even if
respondents would subsequently be found guilty of a
crime based on the same set of facts obtaining in the
present administrative complaint, the same will not
automatically mean that they are also administratively
liable.
A finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily
result in a finding of liability in the administrative case.
Conversely, respondents’ acquittal will not necessarily
exculpate them administratively. The basic premise is
that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from
administrative matters, such that the disposition in the
first two will not inevitably govern the third and
vice versa.
It must be stressed that the basis of administrative
liability differs from criminal liability. The purpose of
administrative proceedings is mainly to protect the public
service, based on the time-honored principle that a public
office is a public trust. On the other hand, the purpose of
criminal prosecution is the punishment of crime. To state
it simply, petitioner erroneously equated criminal liability
to administrative liability. Dr. Castor C. De Jesus
vs. Rafael D. Guerrero
III, Cesario R. Pagdilao and Fortuna B. Aquino, G.R .No.
171491, September 4, 2009.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS; QUANTUM OF
PROOF.
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In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof
necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence,
i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Further, the complainant has the burden of proving by
substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint. The
basic rule is that mere allegation is not evidence and is
not equivalent to proof. Charges based on mere suspicion
and speculation likewise cannot be given credence.
Hence, when the complainant relies on mere conjectures
and suppositions, and fails to substantiate his allegations,
the administrative complaint must be dismissed for lack
of merit. Dr. Castor C. De Jesus vs. Rafael D. Guerrero
III, Cesario R. Pagdilao and Fortuna B. Aquino, G.R .No.
171491, September 4, 2009.
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; EXHAUSTION.
The doctrine of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies requires that resort be first made with the
administrative authorities in the resolution of a
controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the
controversy may be elevated to a court of justice for
review. A premature invocation of a court’s intervention
renders the complaint without cause of action and
dismissible.
EO 149 transferred LLDA from the Office of the President
to the DENR “for policy and program coordination and/or
administrative supervision x x x.”
Under EO 149, DENR only has administrative power
over LLDA. Administrative power is concerned with the
work of applying policies and enforcing orders as
determined by proper governmental organs.
However, Executive Order No. 192 (EO 192), which
reorganized the DENR, mandates the DENR to
“promulgate rules and regulations for the control of
water, air and land pollution” and to “promulgate ambient
and effluent standards for water and air quality including
the allowable levels of other pollutants and
radiations.” EO 192 created the Pollution Adjudication
Board under the Office of the DENR Secretary which
assumed the powers and functions of the NPCC with
respect to the adjudication of pollution cases,
including NPCC’s function to “[s]erve as arbitrator for the
determination of reparation, or restitution of the
damages and losses resulting from pollution.”
Hence, TACC has an administrative recourse before
the DENR Secretary which it should have first pursued
before filing a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals. The Alexandra Condominium Corporation vs.
Laguna Lake Development Authority, G.R. No. 169228.
September 11, 2009.
DISMISSAL; GROSS MISCONDUCT.
Pursuant to Section 52, Rule IV of the Civil Service Rules,
gross misconduct is a grave offense punishable with
dismissal for the first offense, without prejudice to the
Ombudsman’s right to file the appropriate criminal case
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against the petitioner or other responsible individuals. We
are, of course, aware that in several administrative
cases, this Court has refrained from strictly imposing the
penalties provided by the law, in light of mitigating
factors such as the offending employee’s length of
service, acknowledgment of his or her infractions and
feeling of remorse, family circumstances, advanced age,
and other equitable considerations. However, we find
that petitioner’s recalcitrant refusal to explain the use (or
misuse) of the more than P700,000.00 in cash placed in
her possession makes her unworthy of such humanitarian
consideration, and merits the most serious penalty
provided by law. Gloria G. Hallasgo, Municipal Treasurer
of Damulong, Bukidnon vs. Commission on Audit (COA),
Regional Office No. X, G.R. No. 171340, September 11,
2009.
PUBLIC OFFICER; PRIVATE SECTOR
REPRESENTATIVE.
A private sector representative appointed to the National
Book Development Board is a public officer for purposes
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the
Revised Penal Code. Carolina R. Javier vs.
Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. Nos. 147026-27, September
11, 2009.
Election law
BALLOTS; APPRECIATION.
The neighborhood rule is a settled rule stating that where
the name of a candidate is not written in the proper
space in the ballot, but is preceded by the name of the
office for which he is a candidate, the vote should be
counted as valid for said candidate. Such rule is usually
applied in consonance with the intent rule which stems
from the principle that in the appreciation of the ballot,
the object should be to ascertain and carry into effect the
intention of the voter, if it could be determined with
reasonable certainty. Ernesto Batalla vs. Commission on
Elections and Teodoro Bataller, G.R. No. 184268,
September 15, 2009.
CANDIDATES; DOMICILE.
In Japzon v. Commission on Elections, it was held that
the term “residence” is to be understood not in its
common acceptation as referring to “dwelling” or
“habitation,” but rather to “domicile” or legal residence,
that is, “the place where a party actually or constructively
has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he
may be found at any given time, eventually intends to
return and remain (animus manendi).”
In Domino v. Commission on Elections, the Court
explained that domicile denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which, whenever absent for business,
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pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return.
It is a question of intention and circumstances. In the
consideration of circumstances, three rules must be
borne in mind, namely: (1) that a man must have a
residence or domicile somewhere; (2) when once
established it remains until a new one is acquired; and
(3) a man can have but one residence or domicile at a
time.
If one wishes to successfully effect a change of domicile,
he must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual
change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning
the former place of residence and establishing a new one,
and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.
Without clear and positive proof of the concurrence of
these three requirements, the domicile of origin
continues. Makil U. Pundaodaya vs. Commission on
Elections, et al., G.R. No. 179313. September 17, 2009
CANDIDATES; PREMATURE CAMPAIGNING.
The conduct of a motorcade is a form of election
campaign or partisan political activity, falling squarely
within the ambit of Section 79(b)(2) of the Omnibus
Election Code, on “[h]olding political caucuses,
conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar
assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or
undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a
candidate[.]” A motorcade is a procession or parade of
automobiles or other motor vehicles.[31] The conduct
thereof during election periods by the candidates and
their supporters is a fact that need not be belabored due
to its widespread and pervasive practice. The obvious
purpose of the conduct of motorcades is to introduce the
candidates and the positions, to which they seek to be
elected, to the voting public; or to make them more
visible so as to facilitate the recognition and recollection
of their names in the minds of the voters come election
time. Unmistakably, motorcades are undertaken for no
other purpose than to promote the election of a particular
candidate or candidates.
In the instant Petition, Penera never denied that she took
part in the conduct of the motorcade after she filed
her COC on the day before the start of the campaign
period.
For violating Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code,
proscribing election campaign or partisan political activity
outside the campaign period, Penera must be disqualified
from holding the office of Mayor of Sta.
Monica. Rosalinda A. Penera vs. Commission on Elections
and Edgar T. Andanar, G.R. No. 181613, September 11,
2009.
CANDIDATES; PREMATURE CAMPAIGNING.
The Dissenting Opinion ultimately concludes that because
of Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, the
prohibited act of premature campaigning in Section 80 of
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the Omnibus Election Code, is practically impossible to
commit at any time.
We disagree. Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code
remains relevant and applicable despite Section 15 of
Republic Act No. 8436, as amended.
A close reading of the entire Republic Act No. 9369,
which amended Republic Act No. 8436, would readily
reveal that that it did not contain an express repeal of
Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. An express
repeal is one wherein a statute declares, usually in its
repealing clause, that a particular and specific
law,identified by its number or title, is repealed.[35]
Absent this specific requirement, an express repeal may
not be presumed.
To our mind, there is no absolute and irreconcilable
incompatibility between Section 15 of Republic Act No.
8436, as amended, and Section 80 of the Omnibus
Election Code, which defines the prohibited act of
premature campaigning. It is possible to harmonize and
reconcile these two provisions and, thus, give effect to
both. Rosalinda A. Penera vs. Commission on Elections
and Edgar T. Andanar, G.R. No. 181613, September 11,
2009.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LAW
PENALIZING LOITERING
Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes any
person found loitering about public or semi-public
buildings or places or tramping or wandering about the
country or the streets without visible means of support.
It provides:
Art. 202. Vagrants and prostitutes; penalty. — The
following are vagrants:
1. Any person having no apparent means of
subsistence, who has the physical ability to work and who
neglects to apply himself or herself to some lawful
calling;
2. Any person found loitering about public or semi-
public buildings or places or tramping or wandering about
the country or the streets without visible means of
support;
3. Any idle or dissolute person who lodges in houses of
ill fame; ruffians or pimps and those who habitually
associate with prostitutes;
4. Any person who, not being included in the
provisions of other articles of this Code, shall be found
loitering in any inhabited or uninhabited place belonging
to another without any lawful or justifiable purpose;
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5. Prostitutes.
For the purposes of this article, women who, for money
or profit, habitually indulge in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct, are deemed to be prostitutes.
Any person found guilty of any of the offenses covered by
this articles shall be punished by arresto menor or a fine
not exceeding 200 pesos, and in case of recidivism, by
arresto mayor in its medium period to prision
correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from
200 to 2,000 pesos, or both, in the discretion of the
court.
Evangeline Siton and Krystel Kate Sagarano were
charged with vagrancy under Article 202 (2) of the
Revised Penal Code. Instead of submitting their counter-
affidavits as directed, they filed separate Motions to
Quash on the ground that Article 202 (2) is
unconstitutional for being vague and overbroad.
The municipal trial court declared Article 202(2)
constitutional. Evangeline and Krystel filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City, directly challenging the constitutionality of
the anti-vagrancy law. They claimed that the definition
of the crime of vagrancy under Article 202 (2), apart
from being vague, results in an arbitrary identification of
violators, since the definition of the crime includes in its
coverage persons who are otherwise performing ordinary
peaceful acts. They likewise claimed that Article 202 (2)
violated the equal protection clause under the
Constitution because it discriminates against the poor
and unemployed, thus permitting an arbitrary and
unreasonable classification.
The Regional Trial Court agreed with Evangeline and
Krystel. In declaring Article 202 (2) unconstitutional, the
Regional Trial Court opined that the law is vague and
violated the equal protection clause. It held that the
“void for vagueness” doctrine is equally applicable in
testing the validity of penal statutes.
The Supreme Court reversed the Regional Trial Court and
ruled that Article 202(2) is not vague:
The power to define crimes and prescribe their
corresponding penalties is legislative in nature and
inherent in the sovereign power of the state to maintain
social order as an aspect of police power. The legislature
may even forbid and penalize acts formerly considered
innocent and lawful provided that no constitutional rights
have been abridged. However, in exercising its power to
declare what acts constitute a crime, the legislature must
inform the citizen with reasonable precision what acts it
intends to prohibit so that he may have a certain
understandable rule of conduct and know what acts it is
his duty to avoid. This requirement has come to be
known as the void-for-vagueness doctrine which states
that “a statute which either forbids or requires the doing
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of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application, violates the first essential of
due process of law. . . ”
The Regional Trial Court, in asserting the
unconstitutionality of Article 202 (2), take support mainly
from the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in the
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville . . .
The underlying principles in Papachristou are that: 1) the
assailed Jacksonville ordinance “fails to give a person of
ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated
conduct is forbidden by the statute;” and 2) it
encourages or promotes opportunities for the application
of discriminatory law enforcement.
The said underlying principle in Papachristou that the
Jacksonville ordinance, or Article 202 (2) in this case,
fails to give fair notice of what constitutes forbidden
conduct, finds no application here because under our
legal system, ignorance of the law excuses no one from
compliance therewith. This principle is of Spanish origin,
and we adopted it to govern and limit legal conduct in
this jurisdiction. Under American law, ignorance of the
law is merely a traditional rule that admits of exceptions.
Moreover, the Jacksonville ordinance was declared
unconstitutional on account of specific provisions thereof,
which are not found in Article 202 (2). . .
Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court in Jacksonville declared
the ordinance unconstitutional, because such activities or
habits as nightwalking, wandering or strolling around
without any lawful purpose or object, habitual loafing,
habitual spending of time at places where alcoholic
beverages are sold or served, and living upon the
earnings of wives or minor children, which are otherwise
common and normal, were declared illegal. But these are
specific acts or activities not found in Article 202 (2). The
closest to Article 202 (2) – “any person found loitering
about public or semi-public buildings or places, or
tramping or wandering about the country or the streets
without visible means of support” – from the Jacksonville
ordinance, would be “persons wandering or strolling
around from place to place without any lawful purpose or
object.” But these two acts are still not the same: Article
202 (2) is qualified by “without visible means of support”
while the Jacksonville ordinance prohibits wandering or
strolling “without any lawful purpose or object,” which
was held by the U.S. Supreme Court to constitute a “trap
for innocent acts.”
The Supreme Court also ruled that Article 202(2) does
not violate the equal protection clause:
Article 202 (2) does not violate the equal protection
clause; neither does it discriminate against the poor and
the unemployed. Offenders of public order laws are
punished not for their status, as for being poor or
Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!
unemployed, but for conducting themselves under such
circumstances as to endanger the public peace or cause
alarm and apprehension in the community. Being poor or
unemployed is not a license or a justification to act
indecently or to engage in immoral conduct.
Vagrancy must not be so lightly treated as to be
considered constitutionally offensive. It is a public order
crime which punishes persons for conducting themselves,
at a certain place and time which orderly society finds
unusual, under such conditions that are repugnant and
outrageous to the common standards and norms of
decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered
society, as would engender a justifiable concern for the
safety and well-being of members of the community.
Finally, the Supreme Court also emphasized the rule the
statues are presumed constitutional:
. . . we agree with the position of the State that first and
foremost, Article 202 (2) should be presumed valid and
constitutional. When confronted with a constitutional
question, it is elementary that every court must approach
it with grave care and considerable caution bearing in
mind that every statute is presumed valid and every
reasonable doubt should be resolved in favor of its
constitutionality. The policy of our courts is to avoid
ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that
the acts of the political departments are valid in the
absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the
contrary. To doubt is to sustain, this presumption is
based on the doctrine of separation of powers which
enjoins upon each department a becoming respect for
the acts of the other departments. The theory is that as
the joint act of Congress and the President of the
Philippines, a law has been carefully studied, crafted and
determined to be in accordance with the fundamental law
before it was finally enacted.
It must not be forgotten that police power is an inherent
attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the power
vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make,
ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and
reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with
penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution,
as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. The
power is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive,
reaching and justifying measures for public health, public
safety, public morals, and the general welfare. As an
obvious police power measure, Article 202 (2) must
therefore be viewed in a constitutional light.
PRIVATE SECTOR REPRESENTATIVE AS
PUBLIC OFFICER
Various laws provide for the appointment of a private
sector representative in governmental bodies. For
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example, the Renewable Energy Act of 2008 creates the
National Renewable Energy Board and provides for the
appointment of private sector representatives to the
board.
Is a private sector representative to the board a public
officer?
In Carolina R. Javier vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. Nos.
147026-27, September 11, 2009, Javier was charged
with malversation of public funds. Javier was the private
sector representative in the National Book Development
Board (NBDB), which was created by Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 8047, otherwise known as the “Book Publishing
Industry Development Act”. R.A. No. 8047 provided for
the creation of the NBDB, which was placed under the
administration and supervision of the Office of the
President. The NBDB is composed of eleven (11)
members who are appointed by the President, five (5) of
whom come from the government, while the remaining
six (6) are chosen from the nominees of organizations of
private book publishers, printers, writers, book industry
related activities, students and the private education
sector.
The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict Javier for
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and
recommended the filing of the corresponding information.
In an Information dated February 18, 2000, Javier was
charged with violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan.
The Commission on Audit also charged Javier with
malversation of public funds, as defined and penalized
under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, an
Information dated February 29, 2000 was filed before the
Sandiganbayan.
On October 10, 2000, Javier filed a Motion to Quash
Information, averring that the Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction to hear the case as the information did not
allege that she is a public official who is classified as
Grade “27” or higher. Neither did the information charge
her as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory to a public
officer committing an offense under the Sandiganbayan’s
jurisdiction. She also averred that she is not a public
officer or employee and that she belongs to the NBDB
only as a private sector representative under R.A. No.
8047, hence, she may not be charged under the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the
Sandiganbayan or under any statute which covers public
officials. Moreover, she claimed that she does not
perform public functions and is without any
administrative or political power to speak of – that she is
serving the private book publishing industry by advancing
their interest as participant in the government’s book
development policy.
On January 17, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution denying Javier’s motion. Javier filed a petition
for certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!
Javier hinges her petition on the ground that the
Sandiganbayan has committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction for not quashing the two
informations charging her with violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act and the Revised Penal Code on
malversation of public funds. She advanced the following
arguments in support of her petition, to wit: first, she is
not a public officer, and second, she was being charged
under two (2) informations, which is in violation of her
right against double jeopardy.
The Supreme Court ruled that Javier was a public officer:
To substantiate her claim, petitioner maintained that she
is not a public officer and only a private sector
representative, stressing that her only function among
the eleven (11) basic purposes and objectives provided
for in Section 4, R.A. No. 8047, is to obtain priority status
for the book publishing industry. At the time of her
appointment to the NDBD Board, she was the President
of the BSAP, a book publishers association. As such, she
could not be held liable for the crimes imputed against
her, and in turn, she is outside the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
The NBDB is the government agency mandated to
develop and support the Philippine book publishing
industry. It is a statutory government agency created by
R.A. No. 8047, which was enacted into law to ensure the
full development of the book publishing industry as well
as for the creation of organization structures to
implement the said policy. To achieve this end, the
Governing Board of the NBDB was created to supervise
the implementation. . .
A perusal of the above powers and functions leads us to
conclude that they partake of the nature of public
functions. A public office is the right, authority and duty,
created and conferred by law, by which, for a given
period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of
the creating power, an individual is invested with some
portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to
be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The
individual so invested is a public officer.
Notwithstanding that petitioner came from the private
sector to sit as a member of the NBDB, the law invested
her with some portion of the sovereign functions of the
government, so that the purpose of the government is
achieved. In this case, the government aimed to enhance
the book publishing industry as it has a significant role in
the national development. Hence, the fact that she was
appointed from the public sector and not from the other
branches or agencies of the government does not take
her position outside the meaning of a public office. She
was appointed to the Governing Board in order to see to
it that the purposes for which the law was enacted are
achieved. The Governing Board acts collectively and
carries out its mandate as one body. The purpose of the
law for appointing members from the private sector is to
ensure that they are also properly represented in the
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implementation of government objectives to cultivate the
book publishing industry.
Moreover, the Court is not unmindful of the definition of a
public officer pursuant to the Anti-Graft Law, which
provides that a public officer includes elective and
appointive officials and employees, permanent or
temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or
exempt service receiving compensation, even nominal,
from the government.
Thus, pursuant to the Anti-Graft Law, one is a public
officer if one has been elected or appointed to a public
office. Petitioner was appointed by the President to the
Governing Board of the NDBD. Though her term is only
for a year that does not make her private person
exercising a public function. The fact that she is not
receiving a monthly salary is also of no moment. Section
7, R.A. No. 8047 provides that members of the
Governing Board shall receive per diem and such
allowances as may be authorized for every meeting
actually attended and subject to pertinent laws, rules and
regulations. Also, under the Anti-Graft Law, the nature of
one’s appointment, and whether the compensation one
receives from the government is only nominal, is
immaterial because the person so elected or appointed is
still considered a public officer.
On the other hand, the Revised Penal Code defines a
public officer as any person who, by direct provision of
the law, popular election, popular election or
appointment by competent authority, shall take part in
the performance of public functions in the Government of
the Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said
Government or in any of its branches public duties as an
employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or
classes, shall be deemed to be a public officer.
Where, as in this case, petitioner performs public
functions in pursuance of the objectives of R.A. No. 8047,
verily, she is a public officer who takes part in the
performance of public functions in the government
whether as an employee, agent, subordinate official, of
any rank or classes. In fact, during her tenure, petitioner
took part in the drafting and promulgation of several
rules and regulations implementing R.A. No. 8047. She
was supposed to represent the country in the canceled
book fair in Spain.
In fine, We hold that petitioner is a public officer.
On the issue of double jeopardy, the Supreme Court
ruled that there was no double jeopardy.
Records show that the Informations in Criminal Case Nos.
25867 and 25898 refer to offenses penalized by different
statues, R.A. No. 3019 and RPC, respectively. It is
elementary that for double jeopardy to attach, the case
against the accused must have been dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent by a
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court of competent jurisdiction, upon valid information
sufficient in form and substance and the accused pleaded
to the charge. In the instant case, petitioner pleaded not
guilty to the Information for violation of the Anti-Graft
Law. She was not yet arraigned in the criminal case for
malversation of public funds because she had filed a
motion to quash the latter information. Double jeopardy
could not, therefore, attach considering that the two
cases remain pending before the Sandiganbayan and that
herein petitioner had pleaded to only one in the criminal
cases against her.
It is well settled that for a claim of double jeopardy to
prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) there is
a complaint or information or other formal charge
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction;
(2) the same is filed before a court of competent
jurisdiction; (3) there is a valid arraignment or plea to
the charges; and (4) the accused is convicted or
acquitted or the case is otherwise dismissed or
terminated without his express consent.[38] The third
and fourth requisites are not present in the case at bar.
OCTOBER 2009 DECISIONS
Constitutional Law
BAIL.
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that
“All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt
is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as
may be provided by law.”
Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as
amended, thus provides that all persons in custody shall,
before conviction by a regional trial court of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right.
The exercise by the trial court of its discretionary power
to grant bail to an accused charged with a capital offense
thus depends on whether the evidence of guilt is
strong. The People of the Philippines vs. Luis Plaza y
Bucalon, G.R. No. 176933, October 2, 2009.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION; POWERS.
The Commission, as the central personnel agency of the
government, has statutory authority to establish rules
and regulations to promote efficiency and professionalism
in the civil service. Presidential Decree No. 807, or the
Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, provides for the
powers of the Commission, including the power to issue
rules and regulations and to review appointments. Leah
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M. Nazareno, et al. vs. City of Dumaguete, et al., G.R. C. Barror vs. The Commission on Elections, et al., G.R.
No. 181559, October 2, 2009. No. 186201, October 9, 2009.

COMMISSION ON AUDIT; POWERS. COMELEC; POWERS.

Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by P.D. The COMELEC under our governmental structure is a
No. 1445, the COA, as one of the three independent constitutional administrative agency and its powers are
constitutional commissions, is specifically vested with the essentially executive in nature (i.e., to enforce and
power, authority and duty to examine, audit and settle all administer election laws), quasi-judicial (to exercise
accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and original jurisdiction over election contests of regional,
expenditures or uses of funds and property owned or provincial and city officials and appellate jurisdiction over
held in trust by the government, or any of its election contests of other lower ranking officials), and
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including quasi-legislative (rulemaking on all questions affecting
government-owned and controlled corporations. To elections and the promulgation of its rules of procedure).
ensure the effective discharge of its functions, it is vested
with ample powers, subject to constitutional limitations,
Historically, the COMELEC has always been an
to define the scope of its audit and examination and
administrative agency whose powers have been
establish the techniques and methods required therefor,
increased from the 1935 Constitution to the present one,
to promulgate accounting and auditing rules and
to reflect the country’s awareness of the need to provide
regulations, including those for the prevention and
greater regulation and protection to our electoral
disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
processes to ensure their integrity.
extravagant or unconscionable expenditures or uses of
government funds and properties.
The COMELEC’s adjudicative function is quasi-judicial
since it is a constitutional body, other than a court,
Clearly, the matter of allowing or disallowing a money
vested with authority to decide election contests, and in
claim against petitioner is within the primary power of
the course of the exercise of its jurisdiction, to hold
the COA to decide. This no doubt includes money claims
hearings and exercise discretion of a judicial nature; it
arising from the implementation of R.A. No. 6758.
receives evidence, ascertain the facts from these
Respondents’ claim against petitioner, although it has
submissions, determine the law and the legal rights of
already been validated by the trial court’s final decision,
the parties, and on the basis of all these decides on the
likewise belongs to that class of claims; hence, it must
merits of the case and renders judgment. Despite the
first be filed with the COA before execution could
exercise of discretion that is essentially judicial in
proceed. And from the decision therein, the aggrieved
character, particularly with respect to election contests,
party is afforded a remedy by elevating the matter to this
COMELEC is not a tribunal within the judicial branch of
Court via a petition for certiorari in accordance with
government and is not a court exercising judicial power
Section 1 Rule XI, of the COA Rules of
in the constitutional sense; hence, its adjudicative
Procedure. National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
function, exercised as it is in the course of administration
vs. Mario Abayari, et al., G.R. No. 166508, October 2,
and enforcement, is quasi-judicial.
2009.

The 1973 Constitution used the unique wording that the

COMELEC; CERTIORARI.
It is settled that under Section 7, Article IX-A of the
Constitution, what may be brought to this Court on
certiorari is the decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC
en banc. However, this rule should not apply when a
division of the COMELEC arrogates unto itself and
deprives the en banc of the authority to rule on a motion
for reconsideration, like in this case.
In this case, the First Division of the COMELEC violated
the cited provisions of the Constitution and the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure when it resolved petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration of its final Order dated November 25,
2008, which dismissed petitioner’s appeal. By arrogating
unto itself a power constitutionally lodged in the
Commission en banc, the First Division of the COMELEC
exercised judgment in excess of, or without, jurisdiction.
Hence, the Order issued by the First Division of the
COMELEC dated January 9, 2009, denying petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration, is null and void. Carmelinda
COMELEC shall “be the sole judge of all contests,” thus
giving the appearance that judicial power had been
conferred. This phraseology, however, was changed in
the 1987 Constitution to give the COMELEC “exclusive
jurisdiction over all contests,” thus removing any vestige
of exercising its adjudicatory power as a court and
correctly aligning it with what it is – a quasi-judicial
body.Consistent with the characterization of its
adjudicatory power as quasi-judicial, the judicial review
of COMELEC en banc decisions (together with the review
of Civil Service Commission decisions) is via the
prerogative writ of certiorari, not through an appeal, as
the traditional mode of review of quasi-judicial decisions
of administrative tribunals in the exercise the Court’s
supervisory authority. This means that the Court will not
supplant the decision of the COMELEC as a quasi-judicial
body except where a grave abuse of discretion or any
other jurisdictional error exists. Joselito R. Mendoza vs.
Commission on Elections and Roberto M.
Pagdanganan, G.R. No. 188308, October 15, 2009.

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COMELEC; DECISIONS.
Petitioners argue that the February 28, 2003 resolution of
the COMELEC violates Article VIII, Section 14 of the
Constitution, which states that “no decision shall be
rendered by any court without expressing clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.” The
COMELEC allegedly made generalizations without
detailing the basis for its findings.
The assailed resolution substantially complied with the
constitutional mandate of Article VIII, Section 14 of the
Constitution. The resolution detailed the evidence
presented by the parties. Thereafter, it weighed the
respective pieces of evidence submitted by the
prosecution and the defense and chose the one that
deserved credence. It contained findings of facts as well
as an application of case law.
The purpose of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution
is to inform the person reading the decision, especially
the parties, of how it was reached by the court after a
consideration of the pertinent facts and an examination
of the applicable laws. The losing party is entitled to
know why he lost, so he may appeal to a higher court, if
permitted, if he believes that the decision should be
reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly
state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves
the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is
especially prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to
pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a
higher tribunal. Thus, a decision is adequate if a party
desiring to appeal therefrom can assign errors to
it. Roberto Albaña, et al. vs. Pio Jude Belo, et al., G.R.
No. 158734, October 2, 2009.
COMELEC; DUE PROCESS.
Based on the pleadings filed, there is no factual and
legal basis for the petitioner to complain of denial of his
hearing stage rights. In the first place, he does not
dispute that he fully participated in the proceedings of
the election protest until the case was deemed submitted
for resolution; he had representation at the revision of
the ballots, duly presented his evidence, and summed up
his case through a memorandum. These various phases
of the proceedings constitute the hearing proper of the
election contest and the COMELEC has more than
satisfied the opportunity to be heard that the Ang Tibay
hearing stage rights require. In these proceedings, the
petitioner stood head-to-head with the respondent in an
adversarial contest where both sides were given their
respective rights to speak, make their presentations, and
controvert each other’s submission, subject only to
established COMELEC rules of procedures. Under these
undisputed facts, both parties had their day in court, so
to speak, and neither one can complain of any denial of
notice or of the right to be heard. Joselito R. Mendoza vs.
Commission on Elections and Roberto M.
Pagdanganan, G.R. No. 188308, October 15, 2009.
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EMINENT DOMAIN; DAMAGES.
In taking respondents’ property without the benefit of
expropriation proceedings and without payment of just
compensation, the City of Pasig clearly acted in utter
disregard of respondents’ proprietary rights. Such
conduct cannot be countenanced by the Court. For said
illegal taking, the City of Pasig should definitely be held
liable for damages to respondents. Again, in Manila
International Airport Authority v. Rodriguez, the Court
held that the government agency’s illegal occupation of
the owner’s property for a very long period of time surely
resulted in pecuniary loss to the owner. Hon. Vicente P.
Eusebio, et al. vs.. Jovito M. Luis, et al. G.R. No.
162474, October 13, 2009
EMINENT DOMAIN; ESTOPPEL.
Just like in the Forfom case, herein respondents also
failed to question the taking of their property for a long
period of time (from 1980 until the early 1990’s) and,
when asked during trial what action they took after their
property was taken, witness Jovito Luis, one of the
respondents, testified that “when we have an occasion to
talk to Mayor Caruncho we always asked for
compensation.” It is likewise undisputed that what was
constructed by the city government on respondents’
property was a road for public use, namely, A. Sandoval
Avenue in Pasig City. Clearly, as in Forfom, herein
respondents are also estopped from recovering
possession of their land, but are entitled to just
compensation. Hon. Vicente P. Eusebio, et al. vs. Jovito
M. Luis, et al., G.R. No. 162474, October 13, 2009.
EMINENT DOMAIN; JUST COMPENSATION.
In fixing the just compensation in the present case, the
trial court, adopting the market data approach on which
Commissioner Chua relied, merely put premium on the
location of the property and the crops planted thereon
which are not among the factors enumerated in Section
17 of RA 6657. And the trial court did not apply the
formula provided in DAR AO 6-92, as amended. This is a
clear departure from the settled doctrine regarding the
mandatory nature of Section 17 of RA 6657 and the DAR
issuances implementing it.
Not only did Commissioner Chua not consider Section 17
of RA 6657 and DAR AO 6-92, as amended, in his
appraisal of the property. His conclusion that the market
data approach conformed with statutory and regulatory
requirements is bereft of basis. Department of Agrarian
Reform, rep. OIC-Secretary Nasser C. Pangandaman vs.
Jose Marie Rufino, et al., G.R. No. 175644/G.R. No.
175702, October 2, 2009.
EMINENT DOMAIN; JUST COMPENSATION.
With regard to the time as to when just compensation
should be fixed, it is settled jurisprudence that where
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property was taken without the benefit of expropriation
proceedings, and its owner files an action for recovery of
possession thereof before the commencement of
expropriation proceedings, it is the value of the property
at the time of taking that is controlling. Hon. Vicente P.
Eusebio, et al. vs. Jovito M. Luis, et al., G.R. No. 162474,
October 13, 2009.
EMINENT DOMAIN; JUST COMPENSATION.
Petitioner’s interpretation is flawed. In the recent case of
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Chico, the Court declared
in no uncertain terms that R.A. No. 6657 is the relevant
law for determining just compensation after noting
several decided cases where the Court found it more
equitable to determine just compensation based on the
value of the property at the time of payment. This was a
clear departure from the Court’s earlier stance in Gabatin
v. Land Bank of the Philippines where it declared that the
reckoning period for the determination of just
compensation is the time when the land was taken
applying P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228.
P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228 vis a vis R.A. No. 6657 was
applied to cases involving lands placed under the
coverage of P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228 where payment of
just compensation had not been completed. When in the
interim R.A. No. 6657 was passed before the full
payment of just compensation, as in the case at bar, the
provisions of R.A. No. 6657 on just compensation
control. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. J. L. Jocson and
Sons, G.R. No. 180803, October 23, 2009.
EMINENT DOMAIN; PRESCRIPTION.
Where private property is taken by the Government for
public use without first acquiring title thereto either
through expropriation or negotiated sale, the owner’s
action to recover the land or the value thereof does not
prescribe. Hon. Vicente P. Eusebio, et al. vs. Jovito M.
Luis, et al., G.R. No. 162474, October 13, 2009.
RIGHT TO BE INFORMED.
Under the Constitution, a person who stands charged of a
criminal offense has the right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. The
Rules of Court, in implementing the right, specifically
require that the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense, including the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances, must be stated in ordinary
and concise language, not necessarily in the language
used in the statute, but in terms sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to know what offense
is being charged and the attendant qualifying and
aggravating circumstances present, so that the accused
can properly defend himself and the court can pronounce
judgment. To broaden the scope of the right, the Rules
authorize the quashal, upon motion of the accused, of an
Information that fails to allege the acts constituting the
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offense. Jurisprudence has laid down the fundamental
test in appreciating a motion to quash an Information
grounded on the insufficiency of the facts alleged
therein. Jose C. Go vs. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R.
No. 178429, October 23, 2009.
Public Officers
MASS APPOINTMENTS.
It is not difficult to see the reasons behind the prohibition
on mass appointments before and after the elections.
Appointments are banned prior to the elections to ensure
that partisan loyalties will not be a factor in the
appointment process, and to prevent incumbents from
gaining any undue advantage during the elections. To
this end, appointments within a certain period of time are
proscribed by the Omnibus Election Code and related
issuances. After the elections, appointments by defeated
candidates are prohibited, except under the
circumstances mentioned in CSC Resolution No. 010988,
to avoid animosities between outgoing and incoming
officials, to allow the incoming administration a free hand
in implementing its policies, and to ensure that
appointments and promotions are not used as a tool for
political patronage or as a reward for services rendered
to the outgoing local officials.
Indeed, not all appointments issued after the elections by
defeated officials are invalid. CSC Resolution No. 010988
does not purport to nullify all “mass appointments.”
However, it must be shown that the appointments have
undergone the regular screening process, that the
appointee is qualified, that there is a need to fill up the
vacancy immediately, and that the appointments are not
in bulk. Leah M. Nazareno, et al. vs. City of Dumaguete,
et al., G.R. No. 181559, October 2, 2009.
Administrative Law
CARDINAL RIGHTS; ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS.
The first of the enumerated rights pertain to the
substantive rights of a party at hearing stage of the
proceedings. The essence of this aspect of due process is
simply the opportunity to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain
one’s side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type
hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential;
in the case of COMELEC, Rule 17 of its Rules of Procedure
defines the requirements for a hearing and these serve
as the standards in the determination of the presence or
denial of due process.
The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth aspects of the
Ang Tibay requirements are reinforcements of the right
to a hearing and are the inviolable rights applicable at
the deliberative stage, as the decision-maker decides on
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the evidence presented during the hearing. These
standards set forth the guiding considerations in
deliberating on the case and are the material and
substantial components of decision-making. Briefly, the
tribunal must consider the totality of the evidence
presented which must all be found in the records of the
case (i.e., those presented or submitted by the parties);
the conclusion, reached by the decision-maker himself
and not by a subordinate, must be based on substantial
evidence.
Finally, the last requirement, relating to the form and
substance of the decision of a quasi-judicial body, further
complements the hearing and decision-making due
process rights and is similar in substance to the
constitutional requirement that a decision of a court must
state distinctly the facts and the law upon which it is
based. As a component of the rule of fairness that
underlies due process, this is the “duty to give reason” to
enable the affected person to understand how the rule of
fairness has been administered in his case, to expose the
reason to public scrutiny and criticism, and to ensure that
the decision will be thought through by the decision-
maker. R. Mendoza vs. Commission on Elections and
Roberto M. Pagdanganan, G.R. No. 188308, October 15,
2009.
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.
It is true that the general rule is that before a party is
allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or she
should have availed himself or herself of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if
resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery
can still be made by giving the administrative officer
concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that
comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy
should be exhausted first before the court’s judicial
power can be sought. The premature invocation of the
intervention of the court is fatal to one’s cause of action.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is
based on practical and legal reasons. The availment of
administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and
provides for a speedier disposition of controversies.
Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity
and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the
system of administrative redress has been completed and
complied with, so as to give the administrative agency
concerned every opportunity to correct its error and
dispose of the case. However, there are several
exceptions to this rule.
The rule on the exhaustion of administrative remedies is
intended to preclude a court from arrogating unto itself
the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction
over which is initially lodged with an administrative body
of special competence. Thus, a case where the issue
raised is a purely legal question, well within the
competence; and the jurisdiction of the court and not the
administrative agency, would clearly constitute an
exception. Resolving questions of law, which involve the
interpretation and application of laws, constitutes
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essentially an exercise of judicial power that is
exclusively allocated to the Supreme Court and such
lower courts the Legislature may establish. Evelyn
Ongsuco and Antonia Salaya vs. Hon. Mariano M.
Malones, etc., G.R. No. 182065, October 27, 2009.
Election Law
PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY.
Section 243 of the Omnibus Election Code limits a pre-
proclamation controversy to the questions enumerated
therein. The enumeration is restrictive and exclusive.
Resultantly, the petition for a pre-proclamation
controversy must fail in the absence of any clear showing
or proof that the election returns canvassed are
incomplete or contain material defects (Section 234,
Omnibus Election Code); or appear to have been
tampered with, falsified or prepared under duress
(Section 235, Omnibus Election Code); or contain
discrepancies in the votes credited to any candidate, the
difference of which affects the result of the election
(Section 236, Omnibus Election Code).
To be noted, too, is that in a pre-proclamation
controversy, the COMELEC is restricted to an examination
of the election returns and is without jurisdiction to go
beyond or behind the election returns and to investigate
election irregularities. For as long as the election returns
appear to be authentic and duly accomplished on their
faces, the Board of Canvassers cannot look beyond or
behind the election returns in order to verify allegations
of irregularities in the casting or counting of
votes. Ismunlatip H. Suhuri vs. The Honorable
Commssion on Elections (En Banc), The Municipal Board
of Canvassers of Patikul, Sulu and Kabir E. Hayundini,
G.R. No. 181869, October 2, 2009.
RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT.
The issue of petitioner’s disqualification for failure to
comply with the one-year residency requirement has
been resolved by this Court in Norlainie Mitmug Limbona
v. Commission on Elections and Malik “Bobby” T. Alingan.
This case stemmed from the first disqualification case
filed by herein respondent against petitioner, docketed as
SPA No. 07-611. Although the petitioner had withdrawn
the Certificate of Candidacy subject of the disqualification
case, the Comelec resolved the petition and found that
petitioner failed to comply with the one-year residency
requirement, and was, therefore, disqualified from
running as mayor of Pantar. Norlainie Mitmug Limbona
vs. Commssion on Elections and Malik “Bobby” T.
Alingan, G.R. No. 186006, October 16, 2009.
STATISTICAL IMPROBABILITY DOCTRINE.
Under Lagumbay, the doctrine of statistical improbability
is applied only where the unique uniformity of tally of all
the votes cast in favor of all the candidates belonging to
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one party and the systematic blanking of all the
candidates of all the opposing parties appear in the
election return. The doctrine has no application where
there is neither uniformity of tallies nor systematic
blanking of the candidates of one party. Thus, the bare
fact that a candidate for public office received no votes in
one or two precincts, standing alone and without more,
cannot adequately support a finding that the subject
election returns are statistically improbable. Verily, a zero
vote for a particular candidate in the election returns is
but one strand in the web of circumstantial evidence that
the electoral returns were prepared under duress, force
and intimidation.
The Court has thus warned that the doctrine of statistical
improbability must be restrictively viewed, with the
utmost care being taken lest in penalizing fraudulent and
corrupt practices – which is truly called for – innocent
voters become disenfranchised, a result that hardly
commends itself. Such prudential approach makes us
dismiss Suhuri’s urging that some of the electoral results
had been infected with the taint of statistical
improbability as to warrant their exclusion from the
canvass in a pre-proclamation controversy. Specifically,
his petition and the records nowhere show that his party-
mates received a similar number of votes (or lack of any)
by which to conclude that there were a unique uniformity
of tally and a systematic blanking of other candidates
belonging to one party. Ismunlatip H. Suhuri vs. The
Honorable Commssion on Elections (En Banc), The
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Patikul, Sulu and Kabir
E. Hayundini, G.R. No. 181869, October 2, 2009.
NOVEMBER 2009 CASES
Constitutional Law
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION; JURISDICTION.
The Civil Service Commission (CSC) Caraga has
jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation of a
possible administrative case of dishonesty against PO1
Capablanca for alleged CSP examination irregularity.
The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the
Government, is mandated to establish a career service,
to strengthen the merit and rewards system, and to
adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency and
integrity in the civil service. The civil service embraces all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of
the government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters. Specifically,
Section 91 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6975 (1990) or the
“Department of Interior and Local Government Act of
1990” provides that the “Civil Service Law and its
implementing rules and regulations shall apply to all
personnel of the Department,” to which herein petitioner
belongs.
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Section 12 of Executive Order (EO) No. 292 or the
“Administrative Code of 1987,” enumerates the powers
and functions of the CSC. In addition, Section 28, Rule
XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations
specifically confers upon the CSC the authority to take
cognizance over any irregularities or anomalies
connected with the examinations. To carry out this
mandate, the CSC issued Resolution No. 991936, or the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, empowering its Regional Offices to take
cognizance of cases involving CSC examination
anomalies.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the CSC acted
within its jurisdiction when it initiated the conduct of a
preliminary investigation on the alleged civil service
examination irregularity committed by the
petitioner. Eugenio S. Capablanca vs. Civil Service
Commission, G.R. No. 179370, November 18, 2009.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION; JURISDICTION.
It has already been settled in Cruz v. Civil Service
Commission that the appellate power of the CSC will only
apply when the subject of the administrative cases filed
against erring employees is in connection with the duties
and functions of their office, and not in cases where the
acts of complainant arose from cheating in the civil
service examinations. Eugenio S. Capablanca vs. Civil
Service Commission, G.R. No. 179370, November 18,
2009.
CONSTITUTIONALITY; EQUAL PROTECTION.
The equal protection guarantee under the Constitution is
found under its Section 2, Article III, which provides:
“Nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
the laws.” Essentially, the equality guaranteed under this
clause is equality under the same conditions and among
persons similarly situated. It is equality among equals,
not similarity of treatment of persons who are different
from one another on the basis of substantial distinctions
related to the objective of the law; when things or
persons are different in facts or circumstances, they may
be treated differently in law.
Appreciation of how the constitutional equality provision
applies inevitably leads to the conclusion that no basis
exists in the present case for an equal protection
challenge. The law can treat barangay officials differently
from other local elective officials because the Constitution
itself provides a significant distinction between these
elective officials with respect to length of term and term
limitation. The clear distinction, expressed in the
Constitution itself, is that while the Constitution provides
for a three-year term and three-term limit for local
elective officials, it left the length of term and the
application of the three-term limit or any form of term
limitation for determination by Congress through
legislation. Not only does this disparate treatment
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recognize substantial distinctions, it recognizes as well
that the Constitution itself allows a non-uniform
treatment. No equal protection violation can exist under
these conditions.
From another perspective, we see no reason to apply the
equal protection clause as a standard because the
challenged proviso did not result in any differential
treatment between barangay officials and all other
elective officials. This conclusion proceeds from our ruling
on the retroactivity issue that the challenged proviso
does not involve any retroactive application. Commission
on Elections vs. Conrado Cruz, et al., G.R. No. 186616,
November 20, 2009.
CONSTITUTIONALITY; LIS MOTA.
In its last-ditch effort to salvage its case, SEM contends
that Proclamation No. 297, issued by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo and declaring the Diwalwal Gold Rush
Area as a mineral reservation, is invalid on the ground
that it lacks the concurrence of Congress as mandated by
Section 4, Article XII of the Constitution; Section 1 of
Republic Act No. 3092; Section 14 of Executive Order No.
292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of
1987; Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 7586, and Section
4(a) of Republic Act No. 6657.
It is well-settled that when questions of constitutionality
are raised, the court can exercise its power of judicial
review only if the following requisites are present: (1) an
actual and appropriate case exists; (2) there is a
personal and substantial interest of the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review
is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.
Taking into consideration the foregoing requisites of
judicial review, it is readily clear that the third requisite is
absent. The general rule is that the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity, so that if it is not raised in the pleadings,
ordinarily it may not be raised at the trial; and if not
raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on
appeal. Apex Mining Co. Inc. Vs. Southeast Mindanao
Gold Mining Corp., et al., G.R. No. 152613/G.R. No.
152628, November 20, 2009.
CONSTITUTIONALITY; ONE SUBJECT ONE TITLE
RULE.
Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
We find, under these settled parameters, that the
challenged proviso does not violate the one subject-one
title rule.
First, the title of RA No. 9164, “An Act Providing for
Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataang
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Elections, amending Republic Act No. 7160, as amended,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
1991,” states the law’s general subject matter – the
amendment of the LGC to synchronize the barangay and
SK elections and for other purposes. To achieve
synchronization of the barangay and SK elections, the
reconciliation of the varying lengths of the terms of office
of barangay officials and SK officials is necessary. Closely
related with length of term is term limitation which
defines the total number of terms for which a
barangayofficial may run for and hold office. This natural
linkage demonstrates that term limitation is not foreign
to the general subject expressed in the title of the law.
Second, the congressional debates we cited above show
that the legislators and the public they represent were
fully informed of the purposes, nature and scope of the
law’s provisions. Term limitation therefore received the
notice, consideration, and action from both the legislators
and the public.
Finally, to require the inclusion of term limitation in the
title of RA No. 9164 is to make the title an index of all the
subject matters dealt with by law; this is not what the
constitutional requirement contemplates. Commission on
Elections vs. Conrado Cruz, et al., G.R. No. 186616,
November 20, 2009.
CONSTITUTIONALITY; POLITICAL QUESTION.
Congress has plenary authority under the Constitution to
determine by legislation not only the duration of the term
of barangay officials, but also the application to them of a
consecutive term limit. Congress invariably exercised this
authority when it enacted no less than six (6) barangay-
related laws since 1987.
Through all these statutory changes, Congress had
determined at its discretion both the length of the term
of office of barangay officials and their term limitation.
Given the textually demonstrable commitment by the
1987 Constitution to Congress of the authority to
determine the term duration and limition of barangay
officials under the Constitution, we consider it established
that whatever Congress, in its wisdom, decides on these
matters are political questions beyond the pale of judicial
scrutiny, subject only to the certiorari jurisdiction of the
courts provided under Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution and to the judicial authority to invalidate any
law contrary to the Constitution.
Political questions refer “to those questions which, under
the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government; it is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality of a particular measure.” These questions,
previously impervious to judicial scrutiny can now be
inquired into under the limited window provided by
Section 1, Article VIII.
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Other than the Section 1, Article VIII route, courts can
declare a law invalid when it is contrary to any provision
of the Constitution. This requires the appraisal of the
challenged law against the legal standards provided by
the Constitution, not on the basis of the wisdom of the
enactment. To justify its nullification, the breach of the
Constitution must be clear and unequivocal, not a
doubtful or equivocal one, as every law enjoys a strong
presumption of constitutionality. These are the hurdles
that those challenging the constitutional validity of a law
must overcome. Commission on Elections vs. Conrado
Cruz, et al., G.R. No. 186616, November 20, 2009.
CONSTITUTIONALITY; RETROACTIVITY.
The constitutional challenge must fail for a more
fundamental reason – the respondents’ retroactivity
objection does not involve a violation of any
constitutional standard.
Retroactivity of laws is a matter of civil law, not of a
constitutional law, as its governing law is the Civil Code,
not the Constitution. Article 4 of the Civil Code provides
that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the
contrary is provided. The application of the Civil Code is
of course self-explanatory – laws enacted by Congress
may permissibly provide that they shall have retroactive
effect. The Civil Code established a statutory norm, not a
constitutional standard.
The closest the issue of retroactivity of laws can get to a
genuine constitutional issue is if a law’s retroactive
application will impair vested rights. Otherwise stated, if
a right has already vested in an individual and a
subsequent law effectively takes it away, a genuine due
process issue may arise. What should be involved,
however, is a vested right to life, liberty or property, as
these are the ones that may be considered protected by
the due process clause of the Constitution.
In the present case, the respondents never raised due
process as an issue. But even assuming that they did, the
respondents themselves concede that there is no vested
right to public office. As the COMELEC correctly pointed
out, too, there is no vested right to an elective post in
view of the uncertainty inherent in electoral
exercises. Commission on Elections vs. Conrado Cruz,
et al., G.R. No. 186616, November 20, 2009.
Election law
BALLOTS; APPRECIATION.
Although as a rule, the appreciation of contested ballots
and election documents involves a question of fact best
left to the determination of the COMELEC, still when it
can be shown that, as in this case, it grossly misread
evidence of such nature that compels a different
conclusion, the Court will not hesitate to reverse that
body’s factual findings.
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It is by now a settled truth that no two persons write
alike. Even if two handwritings have a common general
outlook, they are apt to be at variance in some basic
characteristics that set them apart. Every person uses his
own style for forming letters, technically called personal
characteristics. Whatever features two specimens of
handwriting may have in common, they cannot be
regarded as written by one person if they show even but
one consistent dissimilarity in any feature which is
fundamental to the structure of the handwriting.
Here, the Court did not find, after examining 93 of the
excluded ballots pertaining to petitioner Torres, any two
or more of ballots that were filled in by a single hand. Of
the 47 pairs of ballots that the En Banc excluded, only
two pairs were correctly excluded because they were
written by one person for each pair. 45 pairs turned out
to have been filled up by different hands. While the
general outlook of the handwritings on each of the two
ballots in any given pair is the same, such handwritings
have distinct personal characteristics. In the same way,
the three ballots that were supposedly written on by one
person turned out to have been the work of three
different hands. Ramon P. Torres vs. Commission on
Elections and Josephine “Joy” H. Gaviola, G.R. No.
187956, November 19, 2009.
CANDIDATES; LIABILITY FOR ELECTION
OFFENSES.
Congress has laid down the law — a candidate is liable
for election offenses only upon the start of the campaign
period. This Court has no power to ignore the clear and
express mandate of the law that “any person who files
his certificate of candidacy within [the filing] period shall
only be considered a candidate at the start of the
campaign period for which he filed his certificate of
candidacy.” Neither can this Court turn a blind eye to the
express and clear language of the law that “any unlawful
act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect
only upon the start of the campaign period.” Rosalinda A.
Penera vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 181613,
November 25, 2009. Note: The Supreme Court reversed
its earlier decision dated September 11, 2009.
PRESIDENT’S REFUSAL TO REVIEW DOJ DECISIONS
Can the President legally refuse to review the decisions of
the Secretary of Justice except under certain
circumstances? Does that diminish the power of control
of the President and bestow upon the Secretary of
Justice, a subordinate officer, unfettered power?
In Judge Adoracion G. Angeles vs. Hon. Manuel B. Gaite,
et al., G.R. No. 165276, November 25, 2009, the
Provincial Prosecutor denied the recommendation of the
Investigating Prosecutor that Michael Vistan be indicted
for violation RA 7610. He also approved the
recommendation for the dismissal of the charge of
violation of PD 1829. The petitioner filed a petition for
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review with the Department of Justice, which eventually
dismissed the petition.
The petitioner then filed a Petition for Review before the
Office of President. The Office of the President dismissed
the petition, citing Memorandum Circular No. 58 which
bars an appeal or a petition for review of decisions,
orders, and resolutions of the Secretary of Justice except
those involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
or death.
The petitioner then appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which dismissed the petition.
The petitioner argued before the Supreme Court that
Memorandum Circular No. 58 is an invalid regulation
because it diminishes the power of control of the
President and bestows upon the Secretary of Justice, a
subordinate officer, almost unfettered power.
The Supreme Court rejected this argument. It ruled:
This argument is absurd. The President’s act of
delegating authority to the Secretary of Justice by virtue
of said Memorandum Circular is well within the purview of
the doctrine of qualified political agency, long been
established in our jurisdiction.
Under this doctrine, which primarily recognizes the
establishment of a single executive, “all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive Department; the heads of the various
executive departments are assistants and agents of the
Chief Executive; and, except in cases where the Chief
Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in
person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he
act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are
performed by and through the executive departments,
and the acts of the secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of
business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the
Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive.” The CA cannot be deemed to have committed
any error in upholding the Office of the President’s
reliance on the Memorandum Circular as it merely
interpreted and applied the law as it should be.”
. . . the President himself set the limits of his power to
review decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of
Justice in order to expedite the disposition of cases.
Petitioner’s argument that the Memorandum Circular
unduly expands the power of the Secretary of Justice to
the extent of rendering even the Chief Executive helpless
to rectify whatever errors or abuses the former may
commit in the exercise of his discretion is purely
speculative to say the least. Petitioner cannot second-
guess the President’s power and the President’s own
judgment to delegate whatever it is he deems necessary
to delegate in order to achieve proper and speedy
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administration of justice, especially that such delegation
is upon a cabinet secretary – his own alter ego.
The Supreme Court observed that the President cannot
delegate certain of her powers:
. . . the power of the President to
delegate is not without limits. No less
than the Constitution provides for
restrictions. . .
These restrictions hold true to this day
as they remain embodied in our
fundamental law. There are certain
presidential powers which arise out of
exceptional circumstances, and if
exercised, would involve the suspension
of fundamental freedoms, or at least call
for the supersedence of executive
prerogatives over those exercised by co-
equal branches of government. The
declaration of martial law, the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus,
and the exercise of the pardoning
power, notwithstanding the judicial
determination of guilt of the accused, all
fall within this special class that
demands the exclusive exercise by the
President of the constitutionally vested
power. The list is by no means
exclusive, but there must be a showing
that the executive power in question is
of similar gravitas and exceptional
import.
In the case at bar, the power of the
President to review the Decision of the
Secretary of Justice dealing with the
preliminary investigation of cases cannot
be considered as falling within the same
exceptional class which cannot be
delegated. Besides, the President has
not fully abdicated his power of control
as Memorandum Circular No. 58 allows
an appeal if the imposable penalty is
reclusion perpetua or higher. Certainly,
it would be unreasonable to impose
upon the President the task of reviewing
all preliminary investigations decided by
the Secretary of Justice. To do so will
unduly hamper the other important
duties of the President by having to
scrutinize each and every decision of the
Secretary of Justice notwithstanding the
latter’s expertise in said matter.
Finally, the Court ruled that the memorandum circular do
not deprive the President of her power of control:
Petitioner’s contention that
Memorandum Circular No. 58 violates
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both the Constitution and Section 1, creditors. Upon completion of payments to government
Chapter 1, Book III of EO No. 292, for and employee accounts, the petitioner’s cash flow
depriving the President of his power of available for debt service shall be used until the
control over the executive departments obligations are fully paid.
deserves scant consideration. In the first
place, Memorandum Circular No. 58 was
b) One half (1/2) of the principal of the petitioner’s
promulgated by the Office of the
unsecured loan obligations to other creditors shall be
President and it is settled that the acts
settled through non-cash offsetting arrangements, with
of the secretaries of such departments,
the balance payable semi-annually over a period of 10
performed and promulgated in the
years, with 3-year grace period, with interest at the rate
regular course of business are, unless
of 2% p.a. for the first 5 years and 5% p.a. from the 6th
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
year onwards until the obligations are settled in full.
Executive, presumptively the acts of the
Accrued interest and penalties shall be
Chief Executive. Memorandum Circular
condoned. (underscoring supplied)
No. 58 has not been reprobated by the
President; therefore, it goes without
saying that the said Memorandum One of the lenders, Export and Industry Bank (EIB), filed
Circular has the approval of the with the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for review under
President. Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. The CA affirmed the
decision of the rehabilitation court.
REHABILITATION PROCEEDINGS AND THE NON-
IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE In its petition before the Supreme Court, EIB argues that
the rehabilitation plan was unreasonable and in violation
of the non-impairment clause. The Supreme Court
Can a rehabilitation court compel a lender to accept a
disagreed. The court first explained the nature of
50% reduction in the borrower’s principal
rehabilitation proceedings:
obligation? Would that violate the non-impairment of
contracts clause of the Constitution?
Rehabilitation contemplates a continuance of corporate
life and activities in an effort to restore and reinstate the
In Pacific Wide Realty and Development Corporation vs.
corporation to its former position of successful operation
Puerto Azul Land, Inc./Pacific Wide Realty and
and solvency. The purpose of rehabilitation proceedings
Development Corporation Vs. Puerto Azul Land, Inc., G.R.
is to enable the company to gain a new lease on life and
No. 178768/G.R. No. 180893, November 25, 2009, the
thereby allow creditors to be paid their claims from its
borrower, Puerto Azul Land, Inc. (PALI) is the owner and
earnings. The rehabilitation of a financially distressed
developer of the Puerto Azul Complex situated in Ternate,
corporation benefits its employees, creditors,
Cavite. Its business involves the development of Puerto
stockholders and, in a larger sense, the general public.
Azul into a satellite city with residential areas, resort,
tourism and retail commercial centers with recreational
areas. In order to finance its operations, it obtained loans Under the Rules of Procedure on Corporate
from various banks, the principal amount of which Rehabilitation, “rehabilitation” is defined as the
amounted to aroundPhP640 million. restoration of the debtor to a position of successful
operation and solvency, if it is shown that its continuance
of operation is economically feasible and its creditors can
Because of financial difficulties, PALI subsequently filed a
recover by way of the present value of payments
petition for rehabilitation. After trial, the rehabilitation
projected in the plan, more if the corporation continues
court issued a decision which reads, in part:
as a going concern than if it is immediately liquidated.

The rehabilitation of the petitioner, therefore, shall

An indispensable requirement in the rehabilitation of a
proceed as follows. . .
distressed corporation is the rehabilitation plan . . .

2. Creditors who will not opt for dacion shall be paid

On EIB’s argument that the rehabilitation plan violates
in accordance with the restructuring of the obligations as
the non-impairment clause, the court ruled:
recommended by the Receiver as follows:

In G.R. No. 180893, the rehabilitation plan is contested

a) The obligations to secured creditors will be subject
on the ground that the same is unreasonable and results
to a 50% haircut of the principal, and repayment shall be
in the impairment of the obligations of contract.PWRDC
semi-annually over a period of 10 years, with 3-year
contests the following stipulations in PALI’s rehabilitation
grace period. Accrued interests and penalties shall be
plan: fifty percent (50%) reduction of the principal
condoned. Interest shall be paid at the rate of 2% p.a.
obligation; condonation of the accrued and substantial
for the first 5 years and 5% p.a. thereafter until the
interests and penalty charges; repayment over a period
obligations are fully paid. The petitioner shall allot 50%
of ten years, with minimal interest of two percent (2%)
of its cash flow available for debt service for secured
for the first five years and five percent (5%) for the next

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five years until fully paid, and only upon availability of
cash flow for debt service.
We find nothing onerous in the terms of PALI’s
rehabilitation plan. The Interim Rules on Corporate
Rehabilitation provides for means of execution of the
rehabilitation plan, which may include, among others, the
conversion of the debts or any portion thereof to equity,
restructuring of the debts, dacion en pago, or sale of
assets or of the controlling interest.
The restructuring of the debts of PALI is part and parcel
of its rehabilitation. Moreover, per findings of fact of the
RTC and as affirmed by the CA, the restructuring of the
debts of PALI would not be prejudicial to the interest of
PWRDC as a secured creditor. Enlightening is the
observation of the CA in this regard,viz.:
There is nothing unreasonable or onerous about the 50%
reduction of the principal amount when, as found by the
court a quo, a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) acquired the
credits of PALI from its creditors at deep discounts of as
much as 85%. Meaning, PALI’s creditors accepted only
15% of their credit’s value. Stated otherwise, if PALI’s
creditors are in a position to accept 15% of their credit’s
value, with more reason that they should be able to
accept 50% thereof as full settlement by their debtor. x x
x.
We also find no merit in PWRDC’s contention that there is
a violation of the impairment clause. Section 10, Article
III of the Constitution mandates that no law impairing
the obligations of contract shall be passed. This case
does not involve a law or an executive issuance declaring
the modification of the contract among debtorPALI, its
creditors and its accommodation mortgagors. Thus, the
non-impairment clause may not be invoked.
Furthermore, as held in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. even
assuming that the same may be invoked, the non-
impairment clause must yield to the police power of the
State. Property rights and contractual rights are not
absolute. The constitutional guaranty of non-impairment
of obligations is limited by the exercise of the police
power of the State for the common good of the general
public.
Successful rehabilitation of a distressed corporation will
benefit its debtors, creditors, employees, and the
economy in general. The court may approve a
rehabilitation plan even over the opposition of creditors
holding a majority of the total liabilities of the debtor if,
in its judgment, the rehabilitation of the debtor is feasible
and the opposition of the creditors is manifestly
unreasonable. The rehabilitation plan, once approved, is
binding upon the debtor and all persons who may be
affected by it, including the creditors, whether or not
such persons have participated in the proceedings or
have opposed the plan or whether or not their claims
have been scheduled.”
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DECEMBER 2009 CASES
Constitutional Law
BILL OF RIGHTS; EMINENT DOMAIN.
Expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real
property with a corresponding transfer of title or
possession. The right-of-way easement resulting in a
restriction or limitation on property rights over the land
traversed by transmission lines also falls within the ambit
of the term expropriation. National Power Corporation
vs. Hon. Amer Ibrahim, etc., et al., G.R. No. 183297,
December 23, 2009.
BILL OF RIGHTS; EMINENT DOMAIN.
In computing for the value of the land subject to
acquisition, the formula provided in DAO No. 6, Series of
1992, as amended, requires that figures pertaining to the
Capitalized Net Income (CNI) and Market Value (MV) of
the property be used as inputs in arriving at the correct
land valuation. Thus, the applicable formula, as correctly
used by the LBP in its valuation, is LV (Land Value) =
(CNI x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1).
To arrive at the figure for the CNI of lands planted to a
combination of crops, Item II B.5 of the said
administrative order provides that the same should be
computed based on the combination of actual crops
produced on the covered land. Land Bank of the
Philippines vs. Kumassie Plantation Company
Incorporated/Kumassie Plantation Company Incorporated
vs. Land Bank of the Philippines, et al. G.R. No.
177404/G.R. No. 178097. December 4, 2009.
BILL OF RIGHTS; EMINENT DOMAIN; INTEREST.
The taking of property under CARL is an exercise by the
State of the power of eminent domain. A basic limitation
on the State’s power of eminent domain is the
constitutional directive that private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation. Just
compensation refers to the sum equivalent to the market
value of the property, broadly described to be the price
fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and
ordinary course of legal action and competition, or the
fair value of the property as between one who receives
and one who desires to sell. It is fixed at the time of the
actual taking by the State. Thus, if property is taken for
public use before compensation is deposited with the
court having jurisdiction over the case, the final
compensation must include interests on its just value, to
be computed from the time the property is taken up to
the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited
with the court. National Power Corporation vs. Hon.
Amer Ibrahim, etc., et al., G.R. No. 183297, December
23, 2009.
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BILL OF RIGHTS; EMINENT DOMAIN; INTEREST.
In Philippine Railway Company v. Solon, decided in 1909,
the Court treated interest as part of just compensation
when the payment to the owner was delayed. Apo Fruits
Corporation and Hijo Plantation, Inc. vs. The Hon. Court
of Appeals, and Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No.
164195. December 4, 2009.
BILL OF RIGHTS; EMINENT DOMAIN; JUST
COMPENSATION.
The term just compensation had been defined as the full
and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner
by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker’s gain,
but the owner’s loss. The word just is used to intensify
the meaning of the word compensation and to convey
thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for
the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full,
and ample.
In Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals and National Power Corporation v. Manubay
Agro-Industrial Development Corporation, the Court
sustained the award of just compensation equivalent to
the fair and full value of the property even if petitioners
only sought the continuation of the exercise of their
right-of-way easement and not the ownership over the
land. There is simply no basis for NPC to claim that the
payment of fair market value without the concomitant
transfer of title constitutes an unjust enrichment.
BILL OF RIGHTS; EQUAL PROTECTION.
In order that there can be valid classification so that a
discriminatory governmental act may pass the
constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary
that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be
complied with, namely:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
The first requirement means that there must be real and
substantial differences between the classes treated
differently. As illustrated in the fairly recent Mirasol v.
Department of Public Works and Highways, a real and
substantial distinction exists between a motorcycle and
other motor vehicles sufficient to justify its classification
among those prohibited from plying the toll ways. Not all
motorized vehicles are created equal—a two-wheeled
vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than a
four-wheel vehicle.
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Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it
does not comply with the second requirement—if it is not
germane to the purpose of the law.
The third requirement means that the classification must
be enforced not only for the present but as long as the
problem sought to be corrected continues to exist. And,
under the last requirement, the classification would be
regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not
treated similarly, both as to rights conferred and
obligations imposed.
Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court
finds that the differential treatment of persons holding
appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective
ones is not germane to the purposes of the law. Eleazar
P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 189698, December 1, 2009.
BILL OF RIGHTS; EQUAL PROTECTION.
To the petitioners, the cityhood laws, by granting special
treatment to respondent municipalities/LGUs by way of
exemption from the standard PhP 100 million minimum
income requirement, violate Sec.1, Art. III of the
Constitution, which in part provides that no person shall
“be denied the equal protection of the laws.”
The equal protection guarantee is embraced in the
broader and elastic concept of due process, every unfair
discrimination being an offense against the requirements
of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless come as a
separate clause in Sec. 1, Art. III of the Constitution to
provide for a more specific protection against any undue
discrimination or antagonism from government.
Arbitrariness in general may be assailed on the basis of
the due process clause. But if a particular challenged act
partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the
sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection
clause. This constitutional protection extends to all
persons, natural or artificial, within the territorial
jurisdiction. Artificial persons, as the respondent LGUs
herein, are, however, entitled to protection only insofar
as their property is concerned.
In the proceedings at bar, petitioner LCP and the
intervenors cannot plausibly invoke the equal protection
clause, precisely because no deprivation of property
results by virtue of the enactment of the cityhood laws.
The LCP’s claim that the IRA of its member-cities will be
substantially reduced on account of the conversion into
cities of the respondent LGUs would not suffice to bring it
within the ambit of the constitutional guarantee. Indeed,
it is presumptuous on the part of the LCP member-cities
to already stake a claim on the IRA, as if it were their
property, as the IRA is yet to be allocated. For the same
reason, the municipalities that are not covered by the
uniform exemption clause in the cityhood laws cannot
validly invoke constitutional protection. For, at this point,
the conversion of a municipality into a city will only affect
its status as a political unit, but not its property as such.
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As a matter of settled legal principle, the fundamental
right of equal protection does not require absolute
equality. It is enough that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights or
privileges conferred and responsibilities or obligations
imposed. The equal protection clause does not preclude
the state from recognizing and acting upon factual
differences between individuals and classes. It recognizes
that inherent in the right to legislate is the right to
classify,necessarily implying that the equality guaranteed
is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable
classification. Classification, to be reasonable, must (1)
rest on substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) not be limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) apply equally to all members of
the same class. The Court finds that all these requisites
have been met by the laws challenged as arbitrary and
discriminatory under the equal protection clause. League
of Cities of the Philippines, et al. vs. COMELEC, G.R. No.
176951/G.R. No. 177499 & G.R. No. 178056. December
21, 2009.
BILL OF RIGHTS; NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE.
PICOP’c cause of action consists in the allegation that the
DENR Secretary, in not issuing an IFMA, violated its
constitutional right against non-impairment of contracts.
The 1969 document signed by President Marcos is not a
contract recognized under the non-impairment clause.
The conclusion that the 1969 Document is not a contract
recognized under the non-impairment clause has even
been disposed of in another case decided by another
division of this Court, PICOP Resources, Inc. v. Base
Metals Mineral Resources Corporation, the Decision in
which case has become final and executory. Hon.
Heherson T. Alvarez vs. PICOP Resources, Inc./PICOP
Resources, Inc. vs. Hon. Heherson T. Alavarez/Hon.
Angelo T. Reyes vs. Paper Industries Corporation of the
Philippines (PICOP), G.R. No. 162243/G.R. No.
164516/G.R. No. 171875. December 3, 2009
BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL.
The time limits set by the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 do not
preclude justifiable postponements and delays when so
warranted by the situation. The reasons for the
postponements and delays attendant to the present case
reflected above are not unreasonable. While the records
indicate that neither petitioner nor his counsel was
notified of the resetting of the pre-trial to October 23,
2003, the same appears to have been occasioned by
oversight or simple negligence which, standing alone,
does not prove fatal to the prosecution’s case. The faux
pas was acknowledged and corrected when the MeTC
recalled the arrest warrant it had issued against
petitioner under the mistaken belief that petitioner had
been duly notified of the October 23, 2003 pre-trial
setting.
Reiterating the Court’s pronouncement in Solar Team
Entertainment, Inc. that “speedy trial” is a relative and
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flexible term, Lumanlaw v. Peralta, Jr. summons the
courts to maintain a delicate balance between the
demands of due process and the strictures of speedy trial
on the one hand, and the right of the State to prosecute
crimes and rid society of criminals on the other.
Applying the balancing test for determining whether an
accused has been denied his constitutional right to a
speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of his case, taking
into account several factors such as the length and
reason of the delay, the accused’s assertion or non-
assertion of his right, and the prejudice to the accused
resulting from the delay, the Court does not find
petitioner to have been unduly and excessively
prejudiced by the “delay” in the proceedings, especially
given that he had posted bail. Federico Miguel Olbes vs.
Hon. Danilo A. Buemio, etc. et al., G.R. No. 173319.
December 4, 2009.
BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO TRAVEL.
Petitioner invokes the extraordinary remedy of the writ of
amparo for the protection of his right to travel. He
insists that he is entitled to the protection covered by the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo because the Hold Departure
Order is a continuing actual restraint on his right to
travel. The Court is thus called upon to rule whether or
not the right to travel is covered by the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo.
The rights that fall within the protective mantle of the
Writ of Amparo under Section 1 of the Rules thereon are
the following: (1) right to life; (2) right to liberty; and (3)
right to security.
The right to travel refers to the right to move from one
place to another. As stated in Marcos v. Sandiganbayan,
“xxx a person’s right to travel is subject to the usual
constraints imposed by the very necessity of
safeguarding the system of justice. In such cases,
whether the accused should be permitted to leave the
jurisdiction for humanitarian reasons is a matter of the
court’s sound discretion.”
Here, the restriction on petitioner’s right to travel as a
consequence of the pendency of the criminal case filed
against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed
to establish that his right to travel was impaired in the
manner and to the extent that it amounted to a serious
violation of his right to life, liberty and security, for which
there exists no readily available legal recourse or
remedy. Rev. Father Robert P. Reyes vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 182161, December 3, 2009.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION; JURISDICTION
OVER COURT PERSONNEL.
The CSC’s authority and power to hear and decide
administrative disciplinary cases are not in dispute. The
question is whether the CSC’s disciplinary jurisdiction
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extends to court personnel in view of Section 6, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
In the Julaton and Sta. Ana cases, the CSC recognized
the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over
court personnel. This is consonant with Section 6, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution vesting in the Supreme
Court administrative supervision over all courts and the
personnel thereof.
By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that
can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s
administrative compliance with all laws, rules and
regulations. No other branch of government may intrude
into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of
separation of powers. This we have ruled in Maceda v.
Vasquez and have reiterated in the case of Ampong v.
Civil Service Commission. In Ampong, we also
emphasized that in case of violation of the Civil Service
Law by a court personnel, the standard procedure is for
the CSC to bring its complaint against a judicial employee
before the Office of the Court Administrator of the
Supreme Court. Civil Service Commission vs.
Herminigildo L. Andal, G.R. No. 185749, December 16,
2009.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION; JURISDICTION.
The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the
Government, has jurisdiction over disputes involving the
removal and separation of all employees of government
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies,
including government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters. Simply put, it is the sole arbiter of
controversies relating to the civil service.
In this case, petitioners are former local government
employees whose services were terminated due to the
reorganization of the municipal government under
Resolution Nos. 27 and 80 of the Sangguniang Bayan of
San Isidro, Nueva Ecija. Considering that they belong to
the civil service, the CSC has jurisdiction over their
separation from office. Evelyn S. Cabungcal, et al. vs.
Sonia R. Lorenzo, et al., G.R. No. 160367, December 18,
2009.
COMELEC; CONTEMPT.
The main thrust of petitioner’s argument is that the
COMELEC exceeded its jurisdiction in initiating the
contempt proceedings when it was performing its
administrative and not its quasi-judicial functions as the
National Board of Canvassers for the election of
senators. According to petitioner, the COMELEC may
only punish contemptuous acts while exercising its quasi-
judicial functions.
The COMELEC, through the Task Force Maguindanao, was
exercising its quasi-judicial power in pursuit of the truth
behind the allegations of massive fraud during the
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elections in Maguindanao. To achieve its objective, the
Task Force conducted hearings and required the
attendance of the parties concerned and their counsels to
give them the opportunity to argue and support their
respective positions.
To withhold from the COMELEC the power to punish
individuals who refuse to appear during a fact-finding
investigation, despite a previous notice and order to
attend, would render nugatory the COMELEC’s
investigative power, which is an essential incident to its
constitutional mandate to secure the conduct of honest
and credible elections. In this case, the purpose of the
investigation was however derailed when petitioner
obstinately refused to appear during said hearings and to
answer questions regarding the various election
documents which, he claimed, were stolen while they
were in his possession and custody. Undoubtedly, the
COMELEC could punish petitioner for such contumacious
refusal to attend the Task Force hearings. Lintang Bedol
vs. Commssion on Elections, G.R. No. 179830, December
3, 2009.
CONSTITUTIONALITY; LOCUS STANDI.
Central to the determination of locus standi is the
question of whether a party has alleged such a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions. In this
case, petitioners allege that they will be directly affected
by COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 for they intend, and
they all have the qualifications, to run in the 2010
elections. The OSG, for its part, contends that since
petitioners have not yet filed their CoCs, they are not yet
candidates; hence, they are not yet directly affected by
the assailed provision in the COMELEC resolution.
The Court, nevertheless, finds that, while petitioners are
not yet candidates, they have the standing to raise the
constitutional challenge, simply because they are
qualified voters. A restriction on candidacy, such as the
challenged measure herein, affects the rights of voters to
choose their public officials. The rights of voters and the
rights of candidates do not lend themselves to neat
separation; laws that affect candidates always have at
least some theoretical, correlative effect on voters. The
Court believes that both candidates and voters may
challenge, on grounds of equal protection, the assailed
measure because of its impact on voting rights.
In any event, in recent cases, this Court has relaxed the
stringent direct injury test and has observed a liberal
policy allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress,
and civil organizations to prosecute actions involving the
constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and
rulings. Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. vs.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189698, December 1,
2009.
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CONSTITUTIONALITY; LOCUS STANDI. In filing the instant case before the RTC, petitioners seek
to restrain public respondents from implementing the
bond flotation and to declare null and void all contracts
A taxpayer is allowed to sue where there is a claim that
related to the bond flotation and construction of the town
public funds are illegally disbursed, or that the public
center. In the petition before the RTC, they alleged grave
money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or
abuse of discretion and clear violations of law by public
that there is wastage of public funds through the
respondents. They put in issue the overpriced
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. A
construction of the town center; the grossly
person suing as a taxpayer, however, must show that the
disadvantageous bond flotation; the irrevocable
act complained of directly involves the illegal
assignment of the provincial government’s annual regular
disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. He
income, including the IRA, to respondent RCBC to cover
must also prove that he has sufficient interest in
and secure the payment of the bonds floated; and the
preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by
lack of consultation and discussion with the community
taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury because
regarding the proposed project, as well as a proper and
of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract.
legitimate bidding for the construction of the town center.
In other words, for a taxpayer’s suit to prosper, two
requisites must be met: (1) public funds derived from
taxation are disbursed by a political subdivision or Obviously, the issues raised in the petition do not refer to
instrumentality and in doing so, a law is violated or some the wisdom but to the legality of the acts complained of.
irregularity is committed and (2) the petitioner is directly Thus, we find the instant controversy within the ambit of
affected by the alleged act. judicial review. Besides, even if the issues were political
in nature, it would still come within our powers of review
under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us by
In light of the foregoing, it is apparent that contrary to
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which includes
the view of the RTC, a taxpayer need not be a party to
the authority to determine whether grave abuse of
the contract to challenge its validity. As long as taxes are
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has
involved, people have a right to question contracts
been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the
entered into by the government.
government. Manuel Mamba, et al. vs. Edgar R. Lara, et
al., G.R. No. 165109, December 14, 2009.
In this case, although the construction of the town center
would be primarily sourced from the proceeds of the
CONSTITUTIONALITY; OVERBROAD.
bonds, which respondents insist are not taxpayer’s
money, a government support in the amount of P187
million would still be spent for paying the interest of the The challenged provision also suffers from the infirmity
bonds. In fact, a Deed of Assignment was executed by of being overbroad.
the governor in favor of respondent RCBC over the
Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) and other revenues of
First, the provision pertains to all civil servants holding
the provincial government as payment and/or security for
appointive posts without distinction as to whether they
the obligations of the provincial government under the
occupy high positions in government or not. Certainly, a
Trust Indenture Agreement dated September 17, 2003.
utility worker in the government will also be considered
Records also show that on March 4, 2004, the governor
as ipso facto resigned once he files his CoC for the 2010
requested the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to appropriate
elections. This scenario is absurd for, indeed, it is
an amount of P25 million for the interest of the bond.
unimaginable how he can use his position in the
Clearly, the first requisite has been met.
government to wield influence in the political world.

As to the second requisite, the court, in recent cases, has

While it may be admitted that most appointive officials
relaxed the stringent “direct injury test” bearing in mind
who seek public elective office are those who occupy
that locus standi is a procedural technicality. By invoking
relatively high positions in government, laws cannot be
“transcendental importance”, “paramount public
legislated for them alone, or with them alone in mind. For
interest”, or “far-reaching implications”, ordinary citizens
the right to seek public elective office is universal, open
and taxpayers were allowed to sue even if they failed to
and unrestrained, subject only to the qualification
show direct injury. In cases where serious legal issues
standards prescribed in the Constitution and in the laws.
were raised or where public expenditures of millions of
These qualifications are, as we all know, general and
pesos were involved, the court did not hesitate to give
basic so as to allow the widest participation of the
standing to taxpayers. Manuel Mamba, et al. vs. Edgar
citizenry and to give free rein for the pursuit of one’s
R. Lara, et al., G.R. No. 165109, December 14, 2009.
highest aspirations to public office. Such is the essence of
democracy.
CONSTITUTIONALITY; JUSTICIABILITY.
Second, the provision is directed to the activity of
A political question is a question of policy, which is to be seeking any and all public offices, whether they be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or by partisan or nonpartisan in character, whether they be in
the legislative or the executive branch of the government the national, municipal or barangay level. Congress has
to which full discretionary authority has been delegated.

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not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the
fundamental right involved on such a sweeping scale.
Specific evils require specific treatments, not through
overly broad measures that unduly restrict guaranteed
freedoms of the citizenry. After all, sovereignty resides in
the people, and all governmental power emanates from
them. Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. vs.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189698, December 1,
2009.
HRET; JURISDICTION.
The 1987 Constitution explicitly provides under Article VI,
Section 17 thereof that the HRET and the Senate
Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective members. The authority
conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and
complete. The use of the word sole emphasizes the
exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals, which is
conferred upon the HRET and the SET after elections and
the proclamation of the winning candidates. A candidate
who has not been proclaimed and who has not taken his
oath of office cannot be said to be a member of the
House of Representatives.
Thus, private respondent correctly pointed out that a
petition for quo warranto is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the HRET, and cannot be considered forum
shopping even if, as in this case, the COMELEC had
already passed upon in administrative or quasi-judicial
proceedings the issue of the qualification of the Member
of the House of Representatives while the latter was still
a candidate. Representative Danila Ramon S. Fernandez
vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Jesus
L. Vicente, G.R. No. 187478, December 21, 2009.
NATURAL RESOURCES; LAND OWNERSHIP.
Radstock is a private corporation incorporated in the
British Virgin Islands. Its office address is at Suite 14021
Duddell Street, Central Hongkong. As a foreign
corporation, with unknown owners whose nationalities
are also unknown, Radstock is not qualified to own land
in the Philippines pursuant to Section 7, in relation to
Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution.
Consequently, Radstock is also disqualified to own the
rights to ownership of lands in the Philippines. Contrary
to the OGCC’s claim, Radstock cannot own the rights to
ownership of any land in the Philippines because
Radstock cannot lawfully own the land itself. Otherwise,
there will be a blatant circumvention of the Constitution,
which prohibits a foreign private corporation from owning
land in the Philippines. In addition, Radstock cannot
transfer the rights to ownership of land in the Philippines
if it cannot own the land itself. It is basic that an assignor
or seller cannot assign or sell something he does not own
at the time the ownership, or the rights to the ownership,
Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!
are to be transferred to the assignee or buyer. Strategic
Alliance Development Corporation vs. Radstock
Securities Limited and Philippine National Construction
Corporation, G.R. No. 178158/G.R. No. 180428,
December 4, 2009.
POLICE POWER; MMDA.
MMDA simply had no power on its own to dismantle,
remove, or destroy the billboards, signages and other
advertising media installed on the MRT3 structure by
Trackworks. In Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority v. Viron Transportation
Co., Inc., and Metropolitan Manila Development Authority
v. Garin, the Court had the occasion to rule that MMDA’s
powers were limited to the formulation, coordination,
regulation, implementation, preparation, management,
monitoring, setting of policies, installing a system, and
administration. Nothing in Republic Act No. 7924 granted
MMDA police power, let alone legislative
power. Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs..
Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending and
Promotions, Inc., G.R. No. 179554, December 16, 2009.
PUBLIC FUNDS; APPROPRIATION.
Applying Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution, as
implanted in Sections 84 and 85 of the Government
Auditing Code, a law must first be enacted by Congress
appropriating P6.185 billion as compromise money before
payment to Radstock can be made. Otherwise, such
payment violates a prohibitory law and thus void under
Article 5 of the Civil Code which states that “[a]cts
executed against the provisions of mandatory or
prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself
authorizes their validity.”
Indisputably, without an appropriation law, PNCC cannot
lawfully pay P6.185 billion to Radstock. Any contract
allowing such payment, like the Compromise Agreement,
“shall be void” as provided in Section 87 of the
Government Auditing Code.
PNCC cannot use public funds, like toll fees that
indisputably form part of the General Fund, to pay a
private debt of CDCP Mining to Radstock. Such payment
cannot qualify as expenditure for a public purpose. The
toll fees are merely held in trust by PNCC for the National
Government, which is the owner of the toll fees.
Considering that there is no appropriation law passed by
Congress for the P6.185 billion compromise amount, the
Compromise Agreement is void for being contrary to law,
specifically Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution
and Section 87 of PD 1445. And since the payment of the
P6.185 billion pertains to CDCP Mining’s private debt to
Radstock, the Compromise Agreement is also void for
being contrary to the fundamental public policy that
government funds or property shall be spent or used
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Political Law Jurisprudence
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solely for public purposes, as provided in Section 4(2) of
the Government Auditing Code. Strategic Alliance
Development Corporation vs. Radstock Securities
Limited and Philippine National Construction
Corporation, G.R. No. 178158/G.R. No. 180428,
December 4, 2009.
SUFFRAGE; EXTENSION OF VOTER REGISTRATION.
Section 8 of RA 8189 decrees that voters be allowed to
register daily during regular offices hours, except during
the period starting 120 days before a regular election and
90 days before a special election.
By the above provision, Congress itself has determined
that the period of 120 days before a regular election and
90 days before a special election is enough time for the
COMELEC to make ALL the necessary preparations with
respect to the coming elections. The COMELEC’s rule-
making power should be exercised in accordance with the
prevailing law.
Respecting the authority of the COMELEC under RA 6646
and RA 8436 to fix other dates for pre-election acts, the
same is not in conflict with the mandate of continuing
voter registration under RA 8189. Both R.A. No. 6646,
Section 29 and R.A. No. 8436, Section 28 grant the
COMELEC the power to fix other periods and dates for
pre-election activities only if the same cannot be
reasonably held within the period provided by law. This
grant of power, however, is for the purpose of enabling
the people to exercise the right of suffrage – the common
underlying policy of RA 8189, RA 6646 and RA 8436.
In the present case, the Court finds no ground to hold
that the mandate of continuing voter registration cannot
be reasonably held within the period provided by RA
8189, Sec. 8 – daily during office hours, except during
the period starting 120 days before the May 10, 2010
regular elections. There is thus no occasion for the
COMELEC to exercise its power to fix other dates or
deadlines therefor.
The present case differs significantly from Akbayan-Youth
v. COMELEC. In said case, the Court held that the
COMELEC did not commit abuse of discretion in denying
the request of the therein petitioners for an extension of
the December 27, 2000 deadline of voter registration for
the May 14, 2001 elections. For the therein petitioners
filed their petition with the Court within the 120-day
prohibitive period for the conduct of voter registration
under Section 8 of RA 8189, and sought the conduct of a
two-day registration on February 17 and 18, 2001,
clearly within the 120-day prohibitive period.
In the present case, as reflected earlier, both the dates of
filing of the petition (October 30, 2009) and the
extension sought (until January 9, 2010) are prior to the
120-day prohibitive period. The Court, therefore, finds no
legal impediment to the extension prayed for. Kabataan
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Party List vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189868, December 15,
2009.
Administrative Law
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS; DUE PROCESS.
It is settled that in administrative proceedings, a fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain one’s side suffices to
meet the requirements of due process. The essence of
procedural due process is embodied in the basic
requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard.
In the present case, since PCMC was properly informed of
the supposed discrepancy in its import and export
liquidations, that it was given ample opportunity by the
PEZA management to be heard or to explain its side in
relation to its unaccounted imported materials and that it
was subsequently informed of the decision of the PEZA
Board to cancel its registration on the basis of its
assessment of the evidence presented or lack thereof,
petitioners cannot claim that they were denied their right
to due process of law. Philippine Economic Zone
Authority (PEZA), et al. Vs. Pearl City Manufacturing
Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 168668, December 16,
2009.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS; DUE PROCESS.
The CA correctly concluded that petitioner’s right to due
process was not violated. Due process, as a constitutional
precept, does not always, and in all situations, require a
trial-type proceeding. Litigants may be heard through
pleadings, written explanations, position papers,
memoranda or oral arguments. Due process is satisfied
when a person is notified of the charge against him and
given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In
administrative proceedings, filing charges against the
person and giving reasonable opportunity to the person
so charged to answer the accusations against him
constitute the minimum requirements of due process.
The essence of due process is simply to be heard; or as
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to
explain one’s side, or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
Petitioner actively participated in the proceedings before
the Office of the Ombudsman. She was given every
opportunity to submit various pleadings and documents
in support of her claim, which she, in fact, did through
her counter-affidavit and documentary evidence,
manifestation and motion, memorandum on appeal, etc.
In her Manifestation and Motion, petitioner moved and
submitted the case for resolution based on the
arguments and evidentiary records that were submitted
before the Ombudsman. These were all duly acted upon
by the Ombudsman. Petitioner was given all the
opportunity to present her side. Due process was,
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therefore, properly observed. Lily O. Orbase Vs. Office of
the Ombudsman and Adoracion Mendoza-Bolos, G.R. No.
175115. December 23, 2009
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS; EXHAUSTION OF
REMEDIES.
The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies
provides that a party must exhaust all administrative
remedies to give the administrative agency an
opportunity to decide the matter and to prevent
unnecessary and premature resort to the courts. This,
however, is not an ironclad rule as it admits of
exceptions, viz:
1. when there is a violation of due process;
2. when the issue involved is purely a legal question;
3. when the administrative action is patently illegal
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
4. when there is estoppel on the part of the
administrative agency concerned;
5. when there is irreparable injury;
6. when the respondent is a department secretary
whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the
implied and assumed approval of the latter;
7. when to require exhaustion of administrative
remedies would be unreasonable;
8. when it would amount to a nullification of a claim;
9. when the subject matter is a private land in land
case proceedings;
10. when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy; and
11. when there are circumstances indicating the
urgency of judicial intervention.
The instant case does not fall under any of the
exceptions. Petitioners’ filing of a petition for mandamus
and prohibition with the CA was premature. It bears
stressing that the remedies of mandamus and prohibition
may be availed of only when there is no appeal or any
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. Moreover, being extraordinary remedies,
resort may be had only in cases of extreme necessity
where the ordinary forms of procedure are powerless to
afford relief.
Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!
Thus, instead of immediately filing a petition with the CA,
petitioners should have first brought the matter to the
CSC which has primary jurisdiction over the case. Evelyn
S. Cabungcal, et al. vs. Sonia R. Lorenzo, et al., G.R. No.
160367, December 18, 2009.
EO 259; LACK OF IMPLEMENTING RULES.
Carabeo impugns the validity of EO 259 for lack of
implementing rules and regulations. Indeed, EO 259
lacks any implementing guidelines. However, such fact is
immaterial and does not affect, in any manner, the
validity of the criminal and administrative charges against
Carabeo. While the DOF-RIPS derived from EO 259 its
power and authority to gather evidence against DOF
officials and employees suspected of graft and corruption,
the DOF-RIPS need not be vested with such power in
order to validly file criminal and administrative charges
against Carabeo. In fact, any concerned ordinary citizen
can file criminal and administrative charges against any
corrupt government official or employee if there exists
sufficient evidence of culpability. Hence, the DOF-RIPS,
even without EO 259 and whether as subordinates of the
Secretary of Finance or as private citizens, can validly file
criminal and administrative charges against Carabeo.
At any rate, the Court finds that EO 259 is basically
internal in nature needing no implementing rules and
regulations in order to be enforceable. Principally aimed
at curbing graft and corruption in the DOF and its
attached agencies,[14] EO 259 covers only officers and
employees. Liberato M. Carabeo vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., G.R. No. 178000 & G.R. No. 178003, December 4,
2009.
LLDA; FINES.
The Laguna Lake Development Authority has the power
to impose fines. Pacific Steam Laundry, Inc. vs. Laguna
Lake Development Authority G.R. No. 165299. December
18, 2009
Ombudsman; jurisdiction. At the time of the filing of the
case against petitioner, she was the Assistant Director of
the National Library; as such, as an appointive employee
of the government, the jurisdiction of the Office of the
Ombudsman to take cognizance of the action against the
petitioner was beyond contestation.
Moreover, petitioner’s claim that the Ombudsman does
not have jurisdiction over the action, since the act
complained of was committed before her entering
government service, cannot be sustained. Under Section
46 (18), Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of
198, even if the dishonest act was committed by the
employee prior to entering government service, such act
is still a ground for disciplinary action. Lily O. Orbase vs.
Office of the Ombudsman and Adoracion Mendoza-
Bolos, G.R. No. 175115. December 23, 2009
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Political Law Jurisprudence
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OMBUDSMAN; PRESCRIPTION.
Petitioner insists that Section 20 (5) of R.A. No. 6770
proscribes the investigation of any administrative act or
omission if the complaint was filed one year after the
occurrence of the act or omission complained of.
In Office of the Ombudsman v. De Sahagun, the Court
held that the period stated in Section 20 (5) of R.A. No.
6770 does not refer to the prescription of the offense, but
to the discretion given to the Office of the Ombudsman
on whether it would investigate a particular
administrative offense. The use of the word “may” in the
provision is construed as permissive and operating to
confer discretion. Where the words of a statute are clear,
plain and free from ambiguity, they must be given their
literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation.
It is, therefore, discretionary upon the Ombudsman
whether or not to conduct an investigation of a complaint
filed before it even if it was filed one year after the
occurrence of the act or omission complained of. Thus,
while the complaint herein was filed three years after the
occurrence of the act imputed to petitioner, it was within
the authority of the Office of the Ombudsman to act, to
proceed with and conduct an investigation of the subject
complaint. Lily O. Orbase vs. Office of the Ombudsman
and Adoracion Mendoza-Bolos, G.R. No. 175115.
December 23, 2009
OSG. Only the OSG can bring or defend actions on behalf
of the Republic or represent the People or the State in
criminal proceedings pending in this Court and the CA.
While there may be rare occasions when the offended
party may be allowed to pursue the criminal action on his
own behalf, as when there is a denial of due process, this
exceptional circumstance does not obtain in the instant
case. Elvira O. Ong vs. Jose Casim Genio, G.R. No.
182336, December 23, 2009.
Election Law
APPOINTIVE OFFICIALS; RESIGNATION.
In considering persons holding appointive positions as
ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of
their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil
servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly
discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that
there is substantial distinction between those who hold
appointive positions and those occupying elective posts,
does not justify such differential treatment. Eleazar P.
Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 189698, December 1, 2009.
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CANDIDATES; RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT.
The qualifications of a member of the House of
Representatives are found in Article VI, Section 6 of the
Constitution.
The evidence presented by private respondent before the
HRET hardly suffices to prove that petitioner failed to
comply with the one-year residency requirement under
the Constitution. Private respondent’s documentary
evidence to disqualify petitioner mainly consisted of (a)
petitioner’s certificates of candidacy (COCs) for various
positions in 1998, 2001 and 2004, which all indicated his
residence as Pagsanjan, Laguna within the Fourth District
of said province; (b) his application for a driver’s license
in August 2005 that indicated Pagsanjan, Laguna as his
residence; and (c) the statement in his COCs including
his 2007 COC for Congressman for the First District of
Laguna that his place of birth was Pagsanjan, Laguna.
The HRET puts undue emphasis on the fact that
petitioner is only leasing a townhouse in Sta. Rosa while
he owns houses in Pagsanjan and Cabuyao. His
ownership of properties in other places has been taken to
mean that petitioner did not intend to make Sta. Rosa his
permanent residence or that he had not abandoned his
domicile of origin.
Although it is true that the latest acquired abode is not
necessarily the domicile of choice of a candidate, there is
nothing in the Constitution or our election laws which
require a congressional candidate to sell a previously
acquired home in one district and buy a new one in the
place where he seeks to run in order to qualify for a
congressional seat in that other district. Neither do we
see the fact that petitioner was only leasing a residence
in Sta. Rosa at the time of his candidacy as a barrier for
him to run in that district. Certainly, the Constitution
does not require a congressional candidate to be a
property owner in the district where he seeks to run but
only that he resides in that district for at least a year
prior to election day. To use ownership of property in the
district as the determinative indicium of permanence of
domicile or residence implies that only the landed can
establish compliance with the residency requirement.
This Court would be, in effect, imposing a property
requirement to the right to hold public office, which
property requirement would be unconstitutional.
This case must be distinguished from Aquino v. COMELEC
and Domino v. COMELEC, where the disqualified
candidate was shown to be merely leasing a residence in
the place where he sought to run for office. In Aquino
and Domino, there appeared to be no other material
reason for the candidate to lease residential property in
the place where he filed his COC, except to fulfill the
residency requirement under election laws.
In the case at bar, there are real and substantial reasons
for petitioner to establish Sta. Rosa as his domicile of
choice and abandon his domicile of origin and/or any
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Political Law Jurisprudence
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other previous domicile. Representative Danila Ramon S.
Fernandez vs. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal and Jesus L. Vicente, G.R. No. 187478,
December 21, 2009.
TERM LIMIT; PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION.
The preventive suspension of an elected public official
does not interrupt of his term of office for purposes of the
three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution and Section 43(b) of Republic Act No.
7160. Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller and
Ferdinand N. Talabong vs. Commission on Elections and
Wilfredo F. Asilo, G.R. No. 184836, December 23, 2009.
Local Government Code
CREATION OF CITIES.
application for IFMA conversion. This cannot be deemed
sufficient compliance with the foregoing provision.
Surigao del Sur is not the only province affected by the
area covered by the proposed IFMA. Hon. Heherson T.
Alvarez vs. PICOP Resources, Inc./PICOP Resources, Inc.
vs. Hon. Heherson T. Alavarez/Hon. Angelo T. Reyes vs.
Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines
(PICOP), G.R. No. 162243/G.R. No. 164516/G.R. No.
171875. December 3, 2009
Other laws
PUBLIC BIDDING; DACION EN PAGO.
Under Section 79 of the Government Auditing Code, the
disposition of government lands to private parties
requires public bidding. COA Circular No. 89-926, issued
on 27 January 1989, sets forth the guidelines on the
disposal of property and other assets of the government.

When Article X, Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution

Under the Compromise Agreement, PNCC shall dispose of
speaks of the LGC, the reference cannot be to any
substantial parcels of land, by way of dacion en pago, in
specific statute or codification of laws, let alone the LGC
favor of Radstock. Citing Uy v. Sandiganbayan, PNCC
of 1991. At the time of the adoption of the 1987
argues that a dacion en pago is an exception to the
Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 337, the then
requirement of a public bidding.
LGC, was still in effect. Accordingly, had the framers of
the 1987 Constitution intended to isolate the embodiment
of the criteria only in the LGC, then they would have PNCC’s reliance on Uy is misplaced. There is nothing in
actually referred to BP 337. Also, they would then not Uy declaring that public bidding is dispensed with in a
have provided for the enactment by Congress of a new dacion en pago transaction.
LGC, as they did in Art. X, Sec. 3 of the Constitution.
Suffice it to state that in Uy, neither PIEDRAS nor the
Consistent with its plenary legislative power on the government suffered any loss in the dacion en pago
matter, Congress can, via either a consolidated set of transactions, unlike here where the government stands
laws or a much simpler, single-subject enactment, to lose at least P6.185 billion worth of assets.
impose the said verifiable criteria of viability. These
criteria need not be embodied in the local government
Besides, a dacion en pago is in essence a form of sale,
code, albeit this code is the ideal repository to ensure, as
which basically involves a disposition of a
much as possible, the element of uniformity. Congress
property. Strategic Alliance Development
can even, after making a codification, enact an
Corporation vs. Radstock Securities Limited and
amendatory law, adding to the existing layers of
Philippine National Construction Corporation, G.R. No.
indicators earlier codified, just as efficaciously as it may
178158/G.R. No. 180428, December 4, 2009.
reduce the same. In this case, the amendatory RA 9009
upped the already codified income requirement from PhP
20 million toPhP 100 million. At the end of the day, the
passage of amendatory laws is no different from the
enactment of laws, i.e., the cityhood laws specifically JANUARY 2010 CASES
exempting a particular political subdivision from the
criteria earlier mentioned. Congress, in enacting the
Constitutional Law
exempting law/s, effectively decreased the already
codified indicators. League of Cities of the Philippines, et
al. vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499 & EMINENT DOMAIN; PROMPT PAYMENT OF JUST
G.R. No. 178056. December 21, 2009. COMPENSATION.

SANGGUNIAN APPROVAL. The concept of just compensation contemplates just and

timely payment; it embraces not only the correct
determination of the amount to be paid to the landowner,
PICOP had claimed that it complied with Sections 2(c), 26
but also the payment of the land within a reasonable
and 27 of the Local Government Code (which requires the
time from its taking. Without prompt payment,
prior approval of the Sanggunian concerned) by
compensation cannot, as Land Bank of the Philippines v.
submitting a purported resolution of the Province of
Court of Appeals instructs, be considered “just,” for the
Surigao del Sur indorsing the approval of PICOP’s

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owner is made to suffer the consequence of being Aldaba, et al. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
immediately deprived of his land while being made to 188078, January 25, 2010.
wait for years before actually receiving the amount
necessary to cope with his loss. Land Bank of the
Philippines vs. Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board and Heirs of Vicente Adaza, Heirs of
Administrative Law
Romeo Adaza, Heirs of Cesar Adaza, represented by
Russel Adaza, G.R. No. 183279, January 25, 2010.
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES; FINDINGS OF FACT.
JUDICIAL REVIEW; CREATION OF CITY.
The findings of fact of administrative bodies, such as the
SEC, will not be interfered with by the courts in the
On the OSG’s contention that Congress’ choice of means
absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of said
to comply with the population requirement in the creation
agencies, or unless the aforementioned findings are not
of a legislative district is non-justiciable, suffice it to say
supported by substantial evidence. These factual findings
that questions calling for judicial determination of
carry even more weight when affirmed by the CA. They
compliance with constitutional standards by other
are accorded not only great respect but even finality, and
branches of the government are fundamentally
are binding upon this Court, unless it is shown that the
justiciable. The resolution of such questions falls within
administrative body had arbitrarily disregarded or
the checking function of this Court under the 1987
misapprehended evidence before it to such an extent as
Constitution to determine whether there has been a
to compel a contrary conclusion had such evidence been
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
properly appreciated. By reason of the special knowledge
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
and expertise of administrative agencies over matters
of the Government.
falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a better
position to pass judgment thereon.
Even under the 1935 Constitution, this Court had already
ruled, “The overwhelming weight of authority is that
A review of the petition does not show any reversible
district apportionment laws are subject to review by the
error committed by the appellate court; hence, the
courts.” Compliance with constitutional standards on the
petition must be denied. Petitioner failed to present any
creation of legislative districts is important because the
argument that would convince the Court that the SEC
“aim of legislative apportionment is ‘to equalize
and the CA made any misappreciation of the facts and
population and voting power among districts.’” Victorino
the applicable laws such that their decisions should be
Aldaba, et al. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
overturned. Catmon Sales International Corporation vs.
188078, January 25, 2010.
Atty. Manuel D. Yngson, Jr. as Liquidator of Catmon Sales
International Corporation, G.R. No. 179761, January 15,
2010.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT; CREATION OF CITY.

Election Law

RA 9591 is unconstitutional for being violative of Section

5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of
the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.
The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a
legislative district, the city must have “a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand.” The only issue here is
whether the City of Malolos has a population of at least
250,000, whether actual or projected, for the purpose of
creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos in
time for the 10 May 2010 elections. If not, then RA 9591
creating a legislative district in the City of Malolos is
unconstitutional.
There is no official record that the population of the City
of Malolos will be at least 250,000, actual or projected,
prior to the 10 May 2010 elections, the immediately
following election after the supposed attainment of such
population. Thus, the City of Malolos is not qualified to
have a legislative district of its own under Section 5(3),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution. Victorino
BALLOTS; NUISANCE CANDIDATES.
Ensconced in our jurisprudence is the well-founded rule
that laws and statutes governing election contests
especially appreciation of ballots must be liberally
construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the
choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical
infirmities. An election protest is imbued with public
interest so much so that the need to dispel uncertainties
which becloud the real choice of the people is imperative.
The prohibition against nuisance candidates is aimed
precisely at preventing uncertainty and confusion in
ascertaining the true will of the electorate. Thus, in
certain situations as in the case at bar, final judgments
declaring a nuisance candidate should effectively cancel
the certificate of candidacy filed by such candidate as of
election day. Otherwise, potential nuisance candidates
will continue to put the electoral process into mockery by
filing certificates of candidacy at the last minute and
delaying resolution of any petition to declare them as
nuisance candidates until elections are held and the votes
counted and canvassed.

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We therefore hold that ballots indicating only the similar
surname of two (2) candidates for the same position
may, in appropriate cases, be counted in favor of the
bona fide candidate and not considered stray, even if the
other candidate was declared a nuisance candidate by
final judgment after the elections. Accordingly, the 5,401
votes for “MARTINEZ” or “C. MARTINEZ” should be
credited to petitioner giving him a total of 72,056 votes
as against 67,108 total votes of private respondent.
Petitioner thus garnered more votes than private
respondent with a winning margin of 4,948
votes. Celestino A. Martinez III vs. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Benhur L.
Salimbangon, G.R. No. 189034, January 11, 2010.
ELECTION CONTEST; APPEAL.
For the sake of laying down clearly the rules regarding
the payment of the appeal fee, a discussion of the
application of the recent Divinagracia v. COMELEC to
election contests involving elective municipal and
barangay officials is necessary. Divinagracia explained
the purpose of Resolution No. 8486 which, as earlier
stated, the COMELEC issued to clarify existing rules and
address the resulting confusion caused by the two appeal
fees required, for the perfection of appeals, by the two
different jurisdictions: the court and COMELEC.
Divinagracia stressed that if the appellants had already
paid the amount of PhP 1,000 to the lower courts within
the five-day reglementary period, they are further
required to pay the COMELEC, through its Cash Division,
the appeal fee of PhP 3,200 within fifteen (15) days from
the time of the filing of the notice of appeal with the
lower court. If the appellants failed to pay the PhP 3,200
within the prescribed period, then the appeal should be
dismissed. The Court went on to state in Divinagracia
that Aguilar did not “dilute the force of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8486 on the matter of compliance with the
COMELEC-required appeal fees.” The resolution, to
reiterate, was mainly issued to clarify the confusion
caused by the requirement of payment of two appeal
fees.
Divinagracia, however, contained the following final
caveat: that “for notice of appeal filed after the
promulgation of this decision, errors in the matter ofnon-
payment or incomplete payment of the two appeal fees in
election cases are no longer excusable.” Mateo R. Nollen,
Jr. vs. Commission on Elections and Susana M.
Caballes, G.R. No. 187635, January 11, 2010.
ELECTION PROTEST; NUISANCE CANDIDATES.
The purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether
the candidate proclaimed by the board of canvassers is
the lawful choice of the people. What is sought is the
correction of the canvass of votes, which was the basis of
proclamation of the winning candidate. Election contests,
therefore, involve the adjudication not only of private and
pecuniary interests of rival candidates, but also of
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paramount public interest considering the need to dispel
uncertainty over the real choice of the electorate.
In controversies pertaining to nuisance candidates as in
the case at bar, the law contemplates the likelihood of
confusion which the similarity of surnames of two (2)
candidates may generate. A nuisance candidate is thus
defined as one who, based on the attendant
circumstances, has no bona fide intention to run for the
office for which the certificate of candidacy has been
filed, his sole purpose being the reduction of the votes of
a strong candidate, upon the expectation that ballots with
only the surname of such candidate will be considered
stray and not counted for either of them.
In elections for national positions such as President, Vice-
President and Senator, the sheer logistical challenge
posed by nuisance candidates gives compelling reason for
the Commission to exercise its authority to eliminate
nuisance candidates who obviously have no financial
capacity or serious intention to mount a nationwide
campaign. Celestino A. Martinez III vs. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Benhur L.
Salimbangon, G.R. No. 189034, January 11, 2010.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL; JUDICIAL REVIEW.
The judgments of the Electoral Tribunals are beyond
judicial interference, unless rendered without or in excess
of their jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The
power of judicial review may be invoked in exceptional
cases upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and
improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as
constitutes a clear denial of due process of law, or upon a
demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error,
manifestly constituting such grave abuse of direction that
there has to be a remedy for such abuse. Grave abuse of
discretion implies capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or arbitrary
and despotic exercise of power because of passion or
personal hostility. The grave abuse of discretion must be
so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law.
Respondent HRET gravely abused its discretion in
affirming the proclamation of respondent Salimbangon as
the duly elected Representative of the Fourth Legislative
District of Cebu despite the final outcome of revision
showing 5,401 ballots with only “MARTINEZ” or “C.
“MARTINEZ” written on the line for Representative, votes
which should have been properly counted in favor of
petitioner and not nullified as stray votes, after
considering all relevant circumstances clearly establishing
that such votes could not have been intended for “Edilito
C. Martinez” who was declared a nuisance candidate in a
final judgment. Celestino A. Martinez III vs. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Benhur L.
Salimbangon, G.R. No. 189034, January 11, 2010.
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FEBRUARY 2010 CASES
Constitutional Law
EQUAL PROTECTION; REQUISITES.
The equal protection clause does not require the
universal application of the laws to all persons or things
without distinction. What it simply requires is equality
among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. The test developed by jurisprudence here
and yonder is that of reasonableness, which has four
requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
The assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these
deemed-resigned provisions satisfy the first, third and
fourth requisites of reasonableness. It, however, proffers
the dubious conclusion that the differential treatment of
appointive officials vis-à-vis elected officials is not
germane to the purpose of the law. Eleazar P. Quinto
and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010.
EXPROPRIATION; PRIVATE USE.
It is well settled that the taking of private property by the
Government’s power of eminent domain is subject to two
mandatory requirements: (1) that it is for a particular
public purpose; and (2) that just compensation be paid to
the property owner. These requirements partake of the
nature of implied conditions that should be complied with
to enable the condemnor to keep the property
expropriated.
More particularly, with respect to the element of public
use, the expropriator should commit to use the property
pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for
expropriation filed, failing which, it should file another
petition for the new purpose. If not, it is then incumbent
upon the expropriator to return the said property to its
private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the same.
Otherwise, the judgment of expropriation suffers an
intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one indispensable element
for the proper exercise of the power of eminent domain,
namely, the particular public purpose for which the
property will be devoted. Accordingly, the private
property owner would be denied due process of law, and
the judgment would violate the property owner’s right to
justice, fairness, and equity.
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In light of these premises, we now expressly hold that
the taking of private property, consequent to the
Government’s exercise of its power of eminent domain, is
always subject to the condition that the property be
devoted to the specific public purpose for which it was
taken. Corollarily, if this particular purpose or intent is
not initiated or not at all pursued, and is peremptorily
abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire,
may seek the reversion of the property, subject to the
return of the amount of just compensation received. In
such a case, the exercise of the power of eminent domain
has become improper for lack of the required factual
justification. Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority
(MCIAA) and Air Transportation Office (ATO) vs. Bernardo
Lozada, et al., G.R. No. 176625, February 25, 2010.
GERRYMANDERING; MEANING.
“Gerrymandering” is a term employed to describe an
apportionment of representative districts so contrived as
to give an unfair advantage to the party in power. Fr.
Joaquin G. Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, defined “gerrymandering” as the formation
of one legislative district out of separate territories for
the purpose of favoring a candidate or a party. The
Constitution proscribes gerrymandering, as it mandates
each legislative district to comprise, as far as practicable,
a contiguous, compact and adjacent territory.
As stated by the Office of the Solicitor General, the
Province of Dinagat Islands consists of one island and
about 47 islets closely situated together, without the
inclusion of separate territories. It is an unsubstantiated
allegation that the province was created to favor
Congresswoman Glenda Ecleo-Villaroman. Rodolfo G.
Navarro, et al. vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita,
et al., G.R. No. 180050, February 10, 2010.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
(HRET); JURISDICTION.
The HRET has jurisdiction over the question of
qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan as
nominees of Aangat Tayo and Bantay party-list
organizations, respectively, who took the seats at the
House of Representatives that such organizations won in
the 2007 elections.
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that
the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to, among other things, the qualifications of the members
of the House of Representatives. Since party-list
nominees are “elected members” of the House of
Representatives no less than the district representatives
are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon
their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district
representatives, once the party or organization of the
party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee
has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the
House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction
over election contests relating to his qualifications ends
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and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. Electoral
Tribunal, et al. /Congressman Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. vs.
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), et
al., G.R. No. 189466/G.R. No. 189506,. February 11,
2010.
JUDICIAL REVIEW; REQUISITES.
The courts’ power of judicial review, like almost all other
powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to
several limitations, namely: (1) there must be an actual
case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power; (2) the person challenging the act must have
“standing” to challenge; he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case, such that he has
sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must
be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the
issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case. Respondents assert that the second requisite is
absent in this case.
Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when
(1) he can show that he has personally suffered some
actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly
illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is
likely to be redressed by a favorable action. The question
on standing is whether such parties have “alleged such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.”
In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, summarizing the rules
culled from jurisprudence, the Supreme Court held that
taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators
may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the
following requirements are met:
(1) cases involve constitutional issues;
(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal
disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is
unconstitutional;
(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious
interest in the validity of the election law in question;
(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that
the issues raised are of transcendental importance which
must be settled early; and
(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official
action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as
legislators.
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Petitioner having alleged a grave violation of the
constitutional prohibition against Members of the Cabinet,
their deputies and assistants holding two (2) or more
positions in government, the fact that he filed this suit as
a concerned citizen sufficiently confers him with standing
to sue for redress of such illegal act by public
officials. Dennis B. Funa vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo
R. Ermita, Office of the President, G.R. No. 184740,
February 11, 2010.
JUDICIAL REVIEW; STANDING TO SUE.
In her Memorandum, respondent Governor Geraldine B.
Ecleo-Villaroman of the Province of Dinagat Islands raises
procedural issues. She contends that petitioners do not
have the legal standing to question the constitutionality
of the creation of the Province of Dinagat, since they
have not been directly injured by its creation and are
without substantial interest over the matter in
controversy. Moreover, she alleges that the petition is
moot and academic because the existence of the Province
of Dinagat Islands has already commenced; hence, the
petition should be dismissed.
The contention is without merit.
In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres, the
Court held that in cases of paramount importance where
serious constitutional questions are involved, the
standing requirements may be relaxed and a suit may be
allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to
the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the
same vein, with respect to other alleged procedural
flaws, even assuming the existence of such defects, the
Court, in the exercise of its discretion, brushes aside
these technicalities and takes cognizance of the petition
considering its importance and in keeping with the duty
to determine whether the other branches of the
government have kept themselves within the limits of the
Constitution.
Further, supervening events, whether intended or
accidental, cannot prevent the Court from rendering a
decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution.
The courts will decide a question otherwise moot and
academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading
review. Rodolfo G. Navarro, et al. vs. Executive
Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 180050,
February 10, 2010.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT; CREATION OF PROVINCE.
The Constitution clearly mandates that the creation of
local government units must follow the criteria
established in the Local Government Code. Any
derogation of or deviation from the criteria prescribed in
the Local Government Code violates Sec. 10, Art. X of the
Constitution.
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R.A. No. 9355 (creating the province of Dinagat Islands)
is unconstitutional for its failure to comply with the
criteria for the creation of a province prescribed in Sec.
461 of the Local Government Code. The provision in
Article 9 (2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
the Local Government Code of 1991 stating, “The land
area requirement shall not apply where the proposed
province is composed of one (1) or more islands,” is null
and void. Rodolfo G. Navarro, et al. vs. Executive
Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 180050,
February 10, 2010.
PRESIDENT; IMMUNITY FROM SUIT.
Petitioners first take issue on the President’s purported
lack of immunity from suit during her term of office. The
1987 Constitution, so they claim, has removed such
immunity heretofore enjoyed by the chief executive
under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.
Petitioners are mistaken. The presidential immunity from
suit remains preserved under our system of government,
albeit not expressly reserved in the present constitution.
Addressing a concern of his co-members in the 1986
Constitutional Commission on the absence of an express
provision on the matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J.
observed that it was already understood in jurisprudence
that the President may not be sued during his or her
tenure. The Court subsequently made it abundantly clear
in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, a case likewise resolved
under the umbrella of the 1987 Constitution, that indeed
the President enjoys immunity during her incumbency.
And lest it be overlooked, the petition is simply bereft of
any allegation as to what specific presidential act or
omission violated or threatened to violate petitioners’
protected rights. Lourdes D. Rubrico, et al. vs. Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, et al., G.R. No. 183871, February 18,
2010.
OVERBREADTH.
In the United States, claims of facial overbreadth have
been entertained only where, in the judgment of the
court, the possibility that protected speech of others may
be muted and perceived grievances left to fester (due to
the possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes)
outweighs the possible harm to society in allowing some
unprotected speech or conduct to go unpunished. Facial
overbreadth has likewise not been invoked where a
limiting construction could be placed on the challenged
statute, and where there are readily apparent
constructions that would cure, or at least substantially
reduce, the alleged overbreadth of the statute.
In the case at bar, the probable harm to society in
permitting incumbent appointive officials to remain in
office, even as they actively pursue elective posts, far
outweighs the less likely evil of having arguably
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protected candidacies blocked by the possible inhibitory
effect of a potentially overly broad statute.
In this light, the conceivably impermissible applications of
the challenged statutes – which are, at best, bold
predictions – cannot justify invalidating these statutes in
toto and prohibiting the State from enforcing them
against conduct that is, and has for more than 100 years
been, unquestionably within its power and interest to
proscribe. Instead, the more prudent approach would be
to deal with these conceivably impermissible applications
through case-by-case adjudication rather than through a
total invalidation of the statute itself. Eleazar P. Quinto
and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010.
PUBLIC ASSEMBLY; MODIFICATION OF PERMIT.
In modifying the permit outright, respondent Mayor of
Manila gravely abused his discretion when he did not
immediately inform the IBP who should have been heard
first on the matter of his perceived imminent and grave
danger of a substantive evil that may warrant the
changing of the venue. The opportunity to be heard
precedes the action on the permit, since the applicant
may directly go to court after an unfavorable action on
the permit.
Respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at
modifying the terms of the permit against the standard of
a clear and present danger test which, it bears repeating,
is an indispensable condition to such modification.
Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an imminent and
grave danger of a substantive evil, which “blank” denial
or modification would, when granted imprimatur as the
appellate court would have it, render illusory any judicial
scrutiny thereof. Intergrated Bar of the Philippines,
represented by its National President Jose Anselmo I.
Cadiz, H. Harry L. Roque, et al. vs. Honorable Manila
Mayor Jose “Lito” Atienza, G.R. No. 175241, February 24,
2010.
PUBLIC OFFICIALS; MULTIPLE OFFICE.
The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or
employment under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution was held inapplicable to posts occupied by
the Executive officials specified therein, without
additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as
provided by law and as required by the primary functions
of said office. The reason is that these posts do not
comprise “any other office” within the contemplation of
the constitutional prohibition but are properly an
imposition of additional duties and functions on said
officials. Apart from their bare assertion that respondent
Bautista did not receive any compensation when she was
OIC of MARINA, respondents failed to demonstrate
clearly that her designation as such OIC was in an ex-
officio capacity as required by the primary functions of
her office as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime
Transport.
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Given the vast responsibilities and scope of
administration of the MARINA, we are hardly persuaded
by respondents’ submission that respondent Bautista’s
designation as OIC of MARINA was merely an imposition
of additional duties related to her primary position as
DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport. It appears
that the DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport is
not even a member of the Maritime Industry Board,
which includes the DOTC Secretary as Chairman, the
MARINA Administrator as Vice-Chairman, and the
following as members: Executive Secretary (Office of the
President), Philippine Ports Authority General Manager,
Department of National Defense Secretary, Development
Bank of the Philippines General Manager, and the
Department of Trade and Industry Secretary.
It must be stressed though that while the designation
was in the nature of an acting and temporary capacity,
the words “hold the office” were employed. Such holding
of office pertains to both appointment and designation
because the appointee or designate performs the duties
and functions of the office. The 1987 Constitution in
prohibiting dual or multiple offices, as well as
incompatible offices, refers to the holding of the office,
and not to the nature of the appointment or designation,
words which were not even found in Section 13, Article
VII nor in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B. To “hold”
an office means to “possess or occupy” the same, or “to
be in possession and administration,” which implies
nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions
and duties of the office.
The disqualification laid down in Section 13, Article VII is
aimed at preventing the concentration of powers in the
Executive Department officials, specifically the President,
Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet and their
deputies and assistants. Civil Liberties Union traced the
history of the times and the conditions under which the
Constitution was framed, and construed the Constitution
consistent with the object sought to be accomplished by
adoption of such provision, and the evils sought to be
avoided or remedied. We recalled the practice, during the
Marcos regime, of designating members of the Cabinet,
their deputies and assistants as members of the
governing bodies or boards of various government
agencies and instrumentalities, including government-
owned or controlled corporations. This practice of holding
multiple offices or positions in the government led to
abuses by unscrupulous public officials, who took
advantage of this scheme for purposes of self-
enrichment. The blatant betrayal of public trust evolved
into one of the serious causes of discontent with the
Marcos regime. It was therefore quite inevitable and in
consonance with the overwhelming sentiment of the
people that the 1986 Constitutional Commission would
draft into the proposed Constitution the provisions under
consideration, which were envisioned to remedy, if not
correct, the evils that flow from the holding of multiple
governmental offices and employment. Dennis B. Funa
vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, Office of the
President, G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010.
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Administrative Law
PROCEEDINGS; EVIDENCE.
In administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings, the
quantum of proof required for a finding of guilt is only
substantial evidence, “that amount of relevant evidence
that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally
reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise.”
In the present case, petitioner’s Order of May 18, 2004
finding respondent administratively liable for neglect of
duty, which “implies the failure to give proper attention
to a task expected of an employee arising from either
carelessness or indifference,” was adequately established
by substantial evidence. Office of the Ombudsman
(Mindanao) vs. Asteria E. Cruzabra, G.R. No. 183507,
February 24, 2010.
Election Law
APPOINTIVE OFFICIALS; FILING OF CERTIFICATE
OF CANDIDACY.
Under Section 13 of RA 9369, which reiterates Section 66
of the Omnibus Election Code, any person holding a
public appointive office or position, including active
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and
officers and employees in government-owned or -
controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy. On the other hand, pursuant to Section 14 of
RA 9006 or the Fair Election Act, which repealed Section
67 of the Omnibus Election Code and rendered ineffective
Section 11 of R.A. 8436 insofar as it considered an
elected official as resigned only upon the start of the
campaign period corresponding to the positions for which
they are running, an elected official is not deemed to
have resigned from his office upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elected
office or position. In fine, an elected official may run for
another position without forfeiting his seat.
Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code, and the second proviso in the
third paragraph of Section 13 of RA 9369 are not
violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution
and does not suffer from overbreadth. Eleazar P. Quinto
and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010. (Note: The
Supreme Court reconsidered its earlier decision of
December 1, 2009.)
AUTOMATION PROJECT; VALIDITY.
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The contract-award of the 2010 Election Automation
Project to the joint venture of Total Information
Management Corporation (TIM) and Smartmatic
International Corporation (Smartmatic) is valid. H. Harry
L. Roque, Jr., Joel R. Butuyan, Romel R. Bagares, et al.
vs. Commission on Elections, represented by Hon.
Chaiman Jose Melo, et al., Pete Quirino-Qaudra
(Petitioner-in-intervention) Senate of the Philippines,
represented by its President Juan Ponce Enrili (Movant-
Intervenor), G.R. No. 188456, February 10,
2010. (Note: The Supreme Court denied the motion to
reconsider its earlier decision of September 10, 2009.)
BALLOT; TAMPERING.
The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in declaring
Peñano, based on the results of the revision of ballots,
the winner in the mayoralty contest for the Municipality
of Alfonso, Cavite. The ballots, after proof of tampering,
cannot be considered reflective of the will of the people of
Alfonso. Mayor Virgilio P. Varias vs. Commission on
Elections, et al., G.R. No. 189078, February 11, 2010.
COMELEC; BALLOT APPRECIATION.
The records of the case indicate that the COMELEC en
banc proceeded to conduct a fresh appreciation of the
contested ballots without first ascertaining whether the
ballots to be recounted had been kept inviolate. The
COMELEC cannot proceed to conduct a fresh appreciation
of ballots without first ascertaining the integrity
thereof. Sandra Y Eriguel vs. Commission on Elections
and Ma. Theresa Dumpit-Michelena, G.R. No. 190526,
February 26, 2010.
COMELEC; ELEVATION TO EN BANC WITHOUT
DIVISION DECISION.
The COMELEC, in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions, is bound to follow the provision set forth in
Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, which
reads: “SEC. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en
banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of
procedure in order to expedite disposition of election
cases, including pre-proclamation controversies.All such
election cases shall be heard and decided in division,
provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions
shall be decided by the Commission en banc.”
It therefore follows that when the COMELEC is exercising
its quasi-judicial powers such as in the present case, the
Commission is constitutionally mandated to decide the
case first in division, and en banc only upon motion for
reconsideration.
Indeed, it is a basic doctrine in procedural law that the
jurisdiction of a court or an agency exercising quasi-
judicial functions (such as the COMELEC) over the
subject-matter of an action is conferred only by the
Constitution or by law. Jurisdiction cannot be fixed by the
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agreement of the parties; it cannot be acquired through,
or waived, enlarged or diminished by, any act or
omission of the parties. Neither can it be conferred by the
acquiescence of the court, more particularly so in election
cases where the interest involved transcends those of the
contending parties.
This being so, the Special Second Division of the
COMELEC clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion
when it immediately transferred to the Commission en
banc a case that ought to be heard and decided by a
division. Such action cannot be done without running
afoul of Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution.
Instead of peremptorily transferring the case to the
Commission en banc, the Special Second Division of
COMELEC, should have instead assigned another
Commissioner as additional member of its Special Second
Division, not only to fill in the seat temporarily vacated
by Commissioner Ferrer, but more importantly so that
the required quorum may be attained. Sandra Y Eriguel
vs. Commission on Elections and Ma. Theresa Dumpit-
Michelena, G.R. No. 190526, February 26, 2010.
COMELEC; FAILURE OF ELECTIONS.
The 1987 Constitution vests in the COMELEC the broad
power to enforce all the laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of elections, as well as the plenary authority
to decide all questions affecting elections except the
question as to the right to vote.
Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code provides for the
instances when the COMELEC may declare failure of
elections. The COMELEC en banc based its decision to
declare a failure of elections in Precinct No. 6A/7A on the
second instance stated in Section 6 of the Omnibus
Election Code, that is, the election in any polling place
had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the
closing of the voting on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes.
The COMELEC en banc ruled that since both parties
agreed that the elections were suspended before the
hour fixed by law due to violence caused by
undetermined persons, there was obviously a failure of
elections in the aforementioned precinct.
The findings of fact of the COMELEC en banc are binding
on this Court. The grounds for failure of election (i.e.,
force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous cases) involve questions of fact, which can
only be determined by the COMELEC en banc after due
notice to and hearing of the parties. An application for
certiorari against actions of the COMELEC is confined to
instances of grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. TheCOMELEC, as the
administrative agency and specialized constitutional body
charged with the enforcement and administration of all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall, has
the expertise in its field so that its findings and
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conclusions are generally respected by and conclusive on
the Court.
Petitioner’s allegation of grave abuse of discretion by
public respondent COMELEC en banc implies such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, the
exercise of the power in an arbitrary manner by reason of
passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and it must be
so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. It is not
present in this case, as public respondent issued the
COMELEC Resolution dated October 17, 2005 based on
the evidence on record and the law on the matter. Abdul
Gaffar P.M. Dibaratun vs. Commission on Elections, et al.,
G.R. No. 170365, February 2, 2010.
COMELEC; INJUNCTION.
If instead of issuing a preliminary injunction in place of a
TRO, a court opts to decide the case on its merits with
the result that it also enjoins the same acts covered by
its TRO, it stands to reason that the decision amounts to
a grant of preliminary injunction. Such injunction should
be deemed in force pending any appeal from the
decision. The view of petitioner Panlilio—that execution
pending appeal should still continue notwithstanding a
decision of the higher court enjoining such execution—
does not make sense. It will render quite inutile the
proceedings before such court. Mayor Jose Marquez
Lisboa Panlilio vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R.
No. 184286. February 26, 2010
COMELEC JURISDICTION OVER INTRA-PARTY
LEADERSHIP DISPUTES.
The COMELEC’s jurisdiction over intra-party leadership
disputes has already been settled by the Court. The Court
ruled in Kalaw v. Commission on Elections that the
COMELEC’s powers and functions under Section 2, Article
IX-C of the Constitution, “include the ascertainment of
the identity of the political party and its legitimate
officers responsible for its acts.” The Court also declared
in another case that the COMELEC’s power to register
political parties necessarily involved the determination of
the persons who must act on its behalf. Thus, the
COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute,
in a proper case brought before it, as an incident of its
power to register political parties.
The validity of respondent Roxas’ election as LP president
is a leadership issue that the COMELEC had to settle.
Under the amended LP Constitution, the LP president is
the issuing authority for certificates of nomination of
party candidates for all national elective positions. It is
also the LP president who can authorize other LP officers
to issue certificates of nomination for candidates to local
elective posts. In simple terms, it is the LP president who
certifies the official standard bearer of the party. Jose L.
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Atienza, Jr., et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al.,
G.R. No. 188920, February 16, 2010.
COMELEC; TAMPERED VOTES.
We find the manner in which the COMELEC excluded the
subject returns to be fatally flawed. In the absence of
clearly convincing evidence, the validity of election
returns must be upheld. A conclusion that an election
return is obviously manufactured or false and
consequently should be disregarded in the canvass must
be approached with extreme caution and only upon the
most convincing proof. Corrolarily, any plausible
explanation, one which is acceptable to a reasonable man
in the light of experience and of the probabilities of the
situation, should suffice to avoid outright nullification,
which results in disenfranchisement of those who
exercised their right of suffrage. As will be discussed
shortly, there is a patent lack of basis for the COMELEC’s
findings that the subject returns were tampered. In
disregard of the principle requiring “extreme caution”
before rejecting election returns, the COMELEC
proceeded with undue haste in concluding that the
subject returns were tampered. This is grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In sum, it was highly irregular for the COMELEC to
outrightly exclude the subject returns resulting in the
disenfranchisement of some 1,127 voters as per the
records of this case. The proper procedure in case of
discrepancy in the other authentic copies of the election
returns is clearly spelled out in Section 236 of the OEC.
For contravening this legal provision, the COMELEC acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Rose Marie D. Doromal vs. Hernan
G. Biron and Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 181809,
February 17, 2010.
DISQUALIFICATION; VOTER
INCLUSION/EXCLUSION PROCEEDINGS.
Voters’ inclusion/exclusion proceedings, on the one hand,
essentially involve the issue of whether a petitioner shall
be included in or excluded from the list of voters based
on the qualifications required by law and the facts
presented to show possession of these qualifications.
On the other hand, COC denial/cancellation proceedings
involve the issue of whether there is a false
representation of a material fact. The false representation
must necessarily pertain not to a mere innocuous
mistake but to a material fact or those that refer to a
candidate’s qualifications for elective office. Apart from
the requirement of materiality, the false representation
must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible or, otherwise stated, with the
intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be
candidate’s qualifications for public office.
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In Velasco, the Court rejected Velasco’s contention that
the Comelec improperly ruled on the right to vote when it
cancelled his COC. The Court stated that the Comelec
merely relied on or recognized the RTC’s final and
executory decision on the matter of the right to vote in
the precinct within its territorial jurisdiction.
In the present petition, it is Panlaqui’s turn to proffer the
novel interpretation that the RTC properly cancelled
Velasco’s COC when it ruled on his right to vote. The
Court rejects the same.
It is not within the province of the RTC in a voter’s
inclusion/exclusion proceedings to take cognizance of and
determine the presence of a false representation of a
material fact. It has no jurisdiction to try the issues of
whether the misrepresentation relates to material fact
and whether there was an intention to deceive the
electorate in terms of one’s qualifications for public office.
The finding that Velasco was not qualified to vote due to
lack of residency requirement does not translate into a
finding of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or
hide a fact which would otherwise render him
ineligible. Mozart P. Panlaqui vs. Commission on
Elections and Nardo M. Velasco, G.R. No. 188671,
February 24, 2010.
PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY; CONTESTED
RETURNS.
It is settled that a pre-proclamation controversy is
summary in character; indeed, it is the policy of the law
that pre-proclamation controversies be promptly decided,
so as not to delay canvass and proclamation. The Board
of Canvassers (BOC) will not look into allegations of
irregularity that are not apparent on the face of ERs that
appear otherwise authentic and duly accomplished.
Consistent with the summary character and limited scope
of a pre-proclamation controversy, Section 20 of RA 7166
lays down the procedure to be followed when ERs are
contested before the BOC. Compliance with this
procedure is mandatory, so as to permit the BOC to
resolve the objections as quickly as possible.
Section 20 of RA 7166 and Section 36 of COMELEC
Resolution 2962 provide that any candidate may contest
the inclusion of an ER by making an oral objection at the
time the questioned return is submitted for canvass; the
objecting party shall also submit his objections in writing
simultaneously with the oral objections. The BOC shall
consider the written objections and opposition, if any,
and summarily rule on the petition for exclusion. Any
party adversely affected by such ruling must immediately
inform the BOC if he intends to appeal such ruling.
After the BOC rules on the contested returns and
canvasses all the uncontested returns, it shall suspend
the canvass. Any party adversely affected by the ruling
has 48 hours to file a Notice of Appeal; the appeal shall
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be filed within five days. Upon receipt of the notice of
appeal, the BOC will make its report to the COMELEC,
and elevate the records and evidence.
Moreover, pursuant to Section 235 of the Omnibus
Election Code, in cases where the ERs appear to have
been tampered with, altered or falsified, the COMELEC
shall examine the other copies of the questioned returns
and, if the other copies are likewise tampered with,
altered, falsified, or otherwise spurious, after having
given notice to all candidates and satisfied itself that the
integrity of the ballot box and of the ballots therein have
been duly preserved, shall order a recount of the votes
cast, prepare a new return which shall be used by the
BOC as basis for the canvass, and direct the proclamation
of the winner accordingly.
Based on the records of this case, we find that petitioner
failed to timely make his objections to the contested
ERs. Themistocles A. Saño, Jr. vs. Commission on
Elections, et al., G.R. No. 182221, February 3, 2010.
Local Government
SUCCESSION; SANNGGUNIAN.
Sec. 45(b) of RA 7160 provides for the rule on succession
in cases of permanent vacancies in the Sanggunian. The
law provides for conditions for the rule of succession to
apply: First, the appointee shall come from the same
political party as that of the Sanggunian member who
caused the vacancy. Second, the appointee must have a
nomination and a Certificate of Membership from the
highest official of the political party concerned. Atty.
Lucky M. Damasen vs. Oscar G. Tumamao, G.R. No.
173165, February 17, 2010.
Public officers
APPOINTMENT; SUBMISSION TO CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION.
The deliberate failure of the appointing authority (or
other responsible officials) to submit respondent’s
appointment paper to the CSC within 30 days from its
issuance did not make her appointment ineffective and
incomplete.
Under Article 1186 of the Civil Code, “[t]he condition
shall be deemed fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily
prevents its fulfillment.” Applying this to the appointment
process in the civil service, unless the appointee himself
is negligent in following up the submission of his
appointment to the CSC for approval, he should not be
prejudiced by any willful act done in bad faith by the
appointing authority to prevent the timely submission of
his appointment to the CSC. While it may be argued that
the submission of respondent’s appointment to the CSC
within 30 days was one of the conditions for the approval
of respondent’s appointment, however, deliberately and
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with bad faith, the officials responsible for the submission
of respondent’s appointment to the CSC prevented the
fulfillment of the said condition. Thus, the said condition
should be deemed fulfilled.
The Court has already had the occasion to rule that an
appointment remains valid in certain instances despite
non-compliance of the proper officials with the pertinent
CSC rules. Arlin B. Obiasca vs. Jeane O. Basallote, G.R.
No. 176707, February 17, 2010.
COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY FOR CRIMINAL ACTS
OF SUBORDINATES
Can a military commander be held liable for the criminal
acts of his subordinates?
The Supreme Court touched on that issue in Lourdes D.
Rubrico, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al., G.R.
No. 183871, February 18, 2010. However, that case did
not provide a venue for the Supreme Court to provide a
definitive ruling on the matter.
The case involved a petition for a writ of amparo filed
against the President, the Chief of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP), and the Chief of the Philippine
National Police (PNP), among others. The petition was
originally filed with the Supreme Court, which referred
the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
eventually dropped the President as a respondent (based
on presidential immunity from suit during her term).
The Court of Appeals also ordered the dismissal of the
case against the AFP Chief and the PNP Chief. According
to the Court of Appeals, AFP Chief Gen. Esperon and PNP
Chief P/Dir. Gen. Razon were included as respondents on
the theory that they, as commanders, were responsible
for the unlawful acts allegedly committed by their
subordinates against petitioners. According to the Court
of Appeals, “the privilege of the writ of amparo must be
denied as against Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon for
the simple reason that petitioners have not presented
evidence showing that those who allegedly abducted and
illegally detained Lourdes and later threatened her and
her family were, in fact, members of the military or the
police force.” The Court of Appeals hinted that the two
generals would have been accountable for the abduction
and threats if the actual malefactors were members of
the AFP or PNP.
The Supreme Court discussed the current status of
Philippine law regarding command responsibility for
criminal acts of subordinates:
The evolution of the command
responsibility doctrine finds its context
in the development of laws of war and
armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas,
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“command responsibility,” in its simplest
terms, means the “responsibility of
commanders for crimes committed by
subordinate members of the armed
forces or other persons subject to their
control in international wars or domestic
conflict.” In this sense, command
responsibility is properly a form of
criminal complicity. The Hague
Conventions of 1907 adopted the
doctrine of command responsibility,
foreshadowing the present-day precept
of holding a superior accountable for the
atrocities committed by his subordinates
should he be remiss in his duty of
control over them. As then formulated,
command responsibility is “an omission
mode of individual criminal liability,”
whereby the superior is made
responsible for crimes committed by his
subordinates for failing to prevent or
punish the perpetrators (as opposed to
crimes he ordered).
The doctrine has recently been codified
in the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court (ICC) to which the
Philippines is signatory. Sec. 28 of the
Statute imposes individual responsibility
on military commanders for crimes
committed by forces under their control.
The country is, however, not yet
formally bound by the terms and
provisions embodied in this treaty-
statute, since the Senate has yet to
extend concurrence in its ratification.
While there are several pending bills on
command responsibility, there is still no
Philippine law that provides for criminal
liability under that doctrine.
It may plausibly be contended that
command responsibility, as legal basis
to hold military/police commanders
liable for extra-legal killings, enforced
disappearances, or threats, may be
made applicable to this jurisdiction on
the theory that the command
responsibility doctrine now constitutes a
principle of international law or
customary international law in
accordance with the incorporation clause
of the Constitution.
While the Supreme Court left open the possibility that
command responsibility for criminal acts is part of
international law and is deemed incorporated into
Philippine law pursuant to the “incorporation” clause of
the Constitution, the Supreme Court held that command
responsibility “as a concept defined, developed, and
applied under international law, has little, if at all,
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bearing in amparo proceedings.” According to
Supreme Court:
Still, it would be inappropriate to apply
to these proceedings the doctrine of
command responsibility, as the CA
seemed to have done, as a form of
criminal complicity through omission,
for individual respondents’ criminal
liability, if there be any, is beyond the
reach of amparo. In other words, the
Court does not rule in such proceedings
on any issue of criminal culpability,
even if incidentally a crime or an
infraction of an administrative rule may
have been committed. As the Court
stressed in Secretary of National
Defense v. Manalo, the writ of amparo
was conceived to provide expeditious
and effective procedural relief against
violations or threats of violation of the
basic rights to life, liberty, and security
of persons; the corresponding amparo
suit, however, “is not an action to
determine criminal guilt requiring proof
beyond reasonable doubt x x x or
administrative liability requiring
substantial evidence that will require
full and exhaustive proceedings.” . . .
If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied
to these proceedings, it should, at most, be only to
determine the author who, at the first instance, is
accountable for, and has the duty to address, the
disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to
enable the Court to devise remedial measures that may
be appropriate under the premises to protect rights
covered by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier,
however, the determination should not be pursued to fix
criminal liability on respondents preparatory to criminal
prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative disciplinary
proceedings under existing administrative issuances, if
there be any.
MARCH 2010 CASES
Constitutional Law
CONSTITUTIONALITY; JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY
. interview of the candidates, the preparation of the short
Courts will not assume jurisdiction over a constitutional
question unless the following requisites are satisfied: (1)
there must be an actual case calling for the exercise of
judicial review; (2) the question before the court must be
ripe for adjudication; (3) the person challenging the
validity of the act must have standing to do so; (4) the
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the question of constitutionality must have been raised at the
earliest opportunity and (5) the issue of constitutionality
must be the very lis mota of the case.
Respondents aver that the first three requisites are
absent in this case. According to them, there is no actual
case calling for the exercise of judicial power and it is not
yet ripe for adjudication.
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal
rights or an assertion of opposite legal claims which is
susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a
hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. On the
other hand, a question is considered ripe for adjudication
when the act being challenged has a direct adverse effect
on the individual challenging it.
Contrary to respondents’ assertion, we do not have to
wait until petitioner’s members have shut down their
operations as a result of the MCIT or CWT. The assailed
provisions are already being implemented. As we stated
in Didipio Earth-Savers’ Multi-Purpose Association,
Incorporated (DESAMA) v. Gozun: “By the mere
enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the
challenged act, the dispute is said to have ripened into a
judicial controversy even without any other overt act.
Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution
and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.”
If the assailed provisions are indeed unconstitutional,
there is no better time than the present to settle such
question once and for all. Chamber of Real Estate and
Builders’ Associations, Inc. Vs. The Hon. Executive
Secretary Alberto Romulo, et al., G.R. No. 160756, March
9, 2010.
CONSTITUTIONALITY; JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY
.
We hold that the petitions set forth an actual case or
controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. The
reality is that the JBC already commenced the
proceedings for the selection of the nominees to be
included in a short list to be submitted to the President
for consideration of which of them will succeed Chief
Justice Puno as the next Chief Justice. Although the
position is not yet vacant, the fact that the JBC began the
process of nomination pursuant to its rules and practices,
although it has yet to decide whether to submit the list of
nominees to the incumbent outgoing President or to the
next President, makes the situation ripe for judicial
determination, because the next steps are the public
list of candidates, and the “interview of constitutional
experts, as may be needed.”
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is
whether the JBC properly initiated the process, there
being an insistence from some of the oppositors-
intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the
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vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010).
Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume
its process until the short list is prepared, in view of the
provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII,
which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one
from the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme
Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice)
within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
The ripeness of the controversy for judicial determination
may not be doubted. The challenges to the authority of
the JBC to open the process of nomination and to
continue the process until the submission of the list of
nominees; the insistence of some of the petitioners to
compel the JBC through mandamus to submit the short
list to the incumbent President; the counter-insistence of
the intervenors to prohibit the JBC from submitting the
short list to the incumbent President on the ground that
said list should be submitted instead to the next
President; the strong position that the incumbent
President is already prohibited under Section 15, Article
VII from making any appointments, including those to
the Judiciary, starting on May 10, 2010 until June 30,
2010; and the contrary position that the incumbent
President is not so prohibited are only some of the real
issues for determination. All such issues establish the
ripeness of the controversy, considering that for some
the short list must be submitted before the vacancy
actually occurs by May 17, 2010. The outcome will not be
an abstraction, or a merely hypothetical exercise. The
resolution of the controversy will surely settle – with
finality – the nagging questions that are preventing
the JBC from moving on with the process that it already
began, or that are reasons persuading the JBC to desist
from the rest of the process. Arturo M. De Castro vs.
Judicial and Bar Council, et al., G.R. No. 191002, G.R.
No. 191032, G.R. No. 191057, A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, G.R.
No. 191149, G.R. No. 191342, March 17, 2010.
CONSTITUTIONALITY; JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERS
Y.
It will not do for the COMELEC to insist that the reliability
and authoritativeness of the population indicators
Congress used in enacting RA 9591 are non-justiciable. If
laws creating legislative districts are unquestionably
within the ambit of this Court’s judicial review power,
then there is more reason to hold justiciable subsidiary
questions impacting on their constitutionality, such as
their compliance with a specific constitutional limitation
under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
that only cities with at least 250,000 constituents are
entitled to representation in Congress. To fulfill this
obligation, the Court, of necessity, must inquire into the
authoritativeness and reliability of the population
indicators Congress used to comply with the
constitutional limitation. Victorino B. Aldaba, et al. Vs.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 188078, March 15,
2010.
CONSTITUTIONALITY; STANDING TO SUE.
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The Court rules that the petitioners have each
demonstrated adequate interest in the outcome of the
controversy as to vest them with the requisite
locus standi.The issues before us are of transcendental
importance to the people as a whole, and to the
petitioners in particular. Indeed, the issues affect
everyone (including the petitioners), regardless of one’s
personal interest in life, because they concern that great
doubt about the authority of the incumbent President to
appoint not only the successor of the retiring incumbent
Chief Justice, but also others who may serve in the
Judiciary, which already suffers from a far too great
number of vacancies in the ranks of trial judges
throughout the country.
In any event, the Court retains the broad discretion to
waive the requirement of legal standing in favor of any
petitioner when the matter involved has transcendental
importance, or otherwise requires a liberalization of the
requirement.
Yet, if any doubt still lingers about the locus standi of any
petitioner, we dispel the doubt now in order to remove
any obstacle or obstruction to the resolution of the
essential issue squarely presented herein. We are not to
shirk from discharging our solemn duty by reason alone
of an obstacle more technical than otherwise. In Agan, Jr.
v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc., we
pointed out: “Standing is a peculiar concept in
constitutional law because in some cases, suits are not
brought by parties who have been personally injured by
the operation of a law or any other government act but
by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually
sue in the public interest.” But even if, strictly speaking,
the petitioners “are not covered by the definition, it is still
within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the
requirement and so remove the impediment to its
addressing and resolving the serious constitutional
questions raised.” Arturo M. De Castro vs. Judicial and
Bar Council, et al., G.R. No. 191002, G.R. No. 191032,
G.R. No. 191057, A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, G.R. No. 191149,
G.R. No. 191342, March 17, 2010.
CONSTITUTIONALITY; STANDING TO SUE.
Respondents next argue that petitioner has no legal
standing to sue: “Petitioner is an association of some of
the real estate developers and builders in the Philippines.
Petitioners did not allege that [it] itself is in the real
estate business. It did not allege any material interest or
any wrong that it may suffer from the enforcement of
[the assailed provisions].”
Legal standing or locus standi is a party’s personal and
substantial interest in a case such that it has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental
act being challenged. In Holy Spirit Homeowners
Association, Inc. v. Defensor, we held that the
association had legal standing because its members
stood to be injured by the enforcement of the assailed
provisions.
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In any event, this Court has the discretion to take
cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the
requirements of an actual case, ripeness or legal standing
when paramount public interest is involved. The
questioned MCIT and CWT affect not only petitioners but
practically all domestic corporate taxpayers in our
country. The transcendental importance of the issues
raised and their overreaching significance to society
make it proper for us to take cognizance of this
petition. Chamber of Real Estate and Builders’
Associations, Inc. Vs. The Hon. Executive Secretary
Alberto Romulo, et al., G.R. No. 160756, March 9, 2010.
DUE PROCESS; MINIMUM CORPORATE INCOME
TAX.
Petitioner claims that the MCIT under Section 27(E) of RA
8424 is unconstitutional because it is highly oppressive,
arbitrary and confiscatory which amounts to deprivation
of property without due process of law. It explains that
gross income as defined under said provision only
considers the cost of goods sold and other direct
expenses; other major expenditures, such as
administrative and interest expenses which are equally
necessary to produce gross income, were not taken into
account. Thus, pegging the tax base of the MCIT to a
corporation’s gross income is tantamount to a
confiscation of capital because gross income, unlike net
income, is not “realized gain.”
Petitioner failed to support, by any factual or legal basis,
its allegation that the MCIT is arbitrary and confiscatory.
The Court cannot strike down a law as unconstitutional
simply because of its yokes. Taxation is necessarily
burdensome because, by its nature, it adversely affects
property rights. The party alleging the law’s
unconstitutionality has the burden to demonstrate the
supposed violations in understandable terms. Chamber
of Real Estate and Builders’ Associations, Inc. Vs. The
Hon. Executive Secretary Alberto Romulo, et al., G.R. No.
160756, March 9, 2010.
EQUAL PROTECTION; CREDITABLE WITHHOLDING
TAX.
persons or other classes in the same place and in like
circumstances.” Stated differently, all persons belonging
to the same class shall be taxed alike. It follows that the
guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not
violated by legislation based on a reasonable
classification. Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the purpose of
the law; (3) not be limited to existing conditions only and
(4) apply equally to all members of the same class.
The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable
classifications for purposes of taxation. Inequalities which
result from a singling out of one particular class for
taxation, or exemption, infringe no constitutional
limitation. The real estate industry is, by itself, a class
and can be validly treated differently from other business
enterprises. Chamber of Real Estate and Builders’
Associations, Inc. Vs. The Hon. Executive Secretary
Alberto Romulo, et al., G.R. No. 160756, March 9, 2010.
EQUAL PROTECTION; NPC REGULATION.
The equal protection clause means that “no person or
class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection
of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other
classes in the same place and in like circumstances.” The
guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not
violated by a legislation based on a reasonable
classification. The equal protection clause, therefore,
does not preclude classification of individuals who may be
accorded different treatment under the law as long as the
classification is reasonable and not arbitrary.
Items 3 and 3.1 clearly did not infringe on the equal
protection clause as these were based on a reasonable
classification intended to protect, not the right of any
business or trade but the integrity of government
property, as well as promote the objectives of RA 7832.
Traders like Pinatubo could not claim similar treatment as
direct manufacturers/processors especially in the light of
their failure to negate the rationale behind the
distinction. National Power Corporation vs. Pinatubo
Commercial, represented by Alfredo A. Dy, G.R. No.
176006, March 26, 2010.

Petitioner claims that the revenue regulations FREEDOM OF SPEECH; PRIOR RESTRAINT.
are violative of the equal protection clause because the
CWT is being levied only on real estate enterprises.
Petitioner’s threshold posture that the suspension thus
Specifically, petitioner points out that manufacturing
imposed constitutes prior restraint and an abridgement of
enterprises are not similarly imposed a CWT on their
his exercise of religion and freedom of expression is a
sales, even if their manner of doing business is not much
mere rehash of the position he articulated in the
different from that of a real estate enterprise. Like a
underlying petitions for certiorari and expounded in his
manufacturing concern, a real estate business is involved
memorandum. So are the supportive arguments and
in a continuous process of production and it incurs costs
some of the citations of decisional law, Philippine and
and expenditures on a regular basis. The only difference
American, holding it together. They have been
is that “goods” produced by the real estate business are
considered, sufficiently discussed in some detail, and
house and lot units.
found to be without merit in our Decision. It would, thus,
make little sense to embark on another lengthy
The equal protection clause under the Constitution means discussion of the same issues and arguments.
that “no person or class of persons shall be deprived of
the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other

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Suffice it to reiterate that the sanction imposed on the TV
program in question does not, under the factual milieu of
the case, constitute prior restraint, but partakes of the
nature of subsequent punishment for past violation
committed by petitioner in the course of the broadcast of
the program on August 10, 2004. Eliseo F. Soriano Vs.
Ma. Consoliza P. Laguardia, etc. et al./Eliseo
F. Soriano Vs. Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board, et al., G.R. No. 164785/G.R. No.
165636, March 15, 2010.
HRET; PROCEDURE.
It is quite clear that the Tribunal acted in the best
interest of the electorate, ensuring the determination of
the latter’s will within a reasonable time. In sum, there is
absolutely nothing in this case that would justify a finding
that the HRET gravely abused its discretion by not
granting petitioner an extension of time to present
additional evidence and formally offer the
same. Representative Alvin S. Sandoval vs. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal Josephine Veronique
R. Lacson-Noel and Hon. Speaker Prospero Nograles,
G.R. No. 190067, March 9, 2010.
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS; CONTIGUOUS
REQUIREMENT.
Aside from failing to comply with Section 5(3), Article VI
of the Constitution on the population requirement, the
creation by RA 9591 of a legislative district
for Malolos City, carving the city from the former First
Legislative District, leaves the town of Bulacan isolated
from the rest of the geographic mass of that district. This
contravenes the requirement in Section 5(3), Article VI
that each legislative district shall “comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory.”
It is no argument to say, as the OSG does, that it was
impracticable for Congress to create a district with
contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory
because Malolos city lies at the center of the First
Legislative District. The geographic lay-out of the First
Legislative District is not an insuperable condition making
compliance with Section 5(3) impracticable. To adhere to
the constitutional mandate, and thus maintain fidelity to
its purpose of ensuring efficient representation, the
practicable alternative for Congress was to include the
municipality of Bulacan in Malolos City’s legislative
district. Although unorthodox, the resulting contiguous
and compact district fulfills the constitutional
requirements of geographic unity and population floor,
ensuring efficient representation of the minimum mass of
constituents. Victorino B. Aldaba, et al. Vs. Commission
on Elections, G.R. No. 188078, March 15, 2010.
PRESIDENT; POWER OF APPOINTMENT.
The incumbent President can appoint the successor of
Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement on May 17, 2010
as the prohibition against presidential appointments
under Section 15, Article VII does not extend to
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appointments in the Judiciary. Arturo M. De Castro vs.
Judicial and Bar Council, et al., G.R. No. 191002, G.R.
No. 191032, G.R. No. 191057, A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, G.R.
No. 191149, G.R. No. 191342, March 17, 2010.
SPEEDY TRIAL.
The constitutional right to a “speedy disposition of cases”
is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but
extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and
administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including
judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. Hence, under the
Constitution, any party to a case may demand
expeditious action by all officials who are tasked with the
administration of justice.
The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right
to a speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the
proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of
the trial are asked for and secured; or even without
cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is
allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.
Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine
whether a defendant has been denied his right to a
speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that
matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and
the defendant is weighed, and such factors as the length
of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or
failure to assert such right by the accused, and the
prejudice caused by the delay. The concept of a speedy
disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a
flexible concept.
Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of
whether that right has been violated, the factors that
may be considered and balanced are as follows: (1) the
length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the
assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused;
and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay.
Applying the doctrinal ruling vis-a-vis the factual milieu of
this case, the violation of the right to a speedy
disposition of the case against petitioner is clear for the
following reasons: (1) the delay of almost five (5) years
on the part of ADT in resolving the motion of petitioner,
which resolution petitioner reasonably found necessary
before he could present his defense; (2) the
unreasonableness of the delay; and (3) the timely
assertions by petitioner of the right to an early
disposition which he did through a motion to dismiss.
Over and above this, the delay was prejudicial to
petitioner’s cause as he was under preventive suspension
for ninety (90) days, and during the interregnum of
almost five years, the trial of the accusation against him
remained stagnant at the prosecution stage.
The Constitutional guarantee against unreasonable delay
in the disposition of cases was intended to stem the tide
of disenchantment among the people in the
administration of justice by our judicial and quasi-judicial
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tribunals. The adjudication of cases must not only be
done in an orderly manner that is in accord with the
established rules of procedure but must also be promptly
decided to better serve the ends of justice. Excessive
delay in the disposition of cases renders the rights of the
people guaranteed by the Constitution and by
various legislations inutile. Capt. Wilferdo G. Roquero vs.
The Chancellor of UP Manila, et al., G.R. No. 181851,
March 9, 2010.
UNFAIR COMPETITION; BIDDING.
Petitioner’s allegation of improper venue and the fact that
the complaint was not under oath are not sufficient
grounds for the dismissal of the complaint. Well to
remember, the case was an administrative case and as
such, technical rules of procedure are liberally applied. In
administrative cases, technical rules of procedure and
evidence are not strictly applied and administrative due
process cannot be fully equated with due process in its
strict judicial sense. The intention is to resolve disputes
brought before such bodies in the most expeditious and
inexpensive manner possible.

Petitioner was likewise amply afforded administrative due

The provision imposed the precondition that the
process the essence of which is an opportunity to explain
contracting parties should be eligible and qualified. It
one’s side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of
should be emphasized that the bidding process was not a
the action or ruling complained of. The records show that
“free-for-all” where any and all interested parties,
petitioner filed the following: (1) Compliance-Answer to
qualified or not, could take part. Section 5(e) of RA 9184
the Complaint; (2) Rejoinder; (3) Position paper; (4)
defines competitive bidding as a “method of procurement
Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of the Board
which is open to participation by any interested party and
of Professional Teachers finding him guilty as charged;
which consists of the following processes:
and (5) Motion for Reconsideration of the decision of the
advertisement, pre-bid conference, eligibility screening of
Court of Appeals. He attended the preliminary conference
prospective bidders, receipt and opening of bids,
and hearing where he was able to adduce his evidence.
evaluation of bids, post-qualification, and award of
With the opportunities he had, he cannot claim he was
contract x x x.” The law categorically mandates that
denied due
prospective bidders are subject to eligibility screening,
process. Rene Ventenilla Puse Vs. Ligaya delos Santos-
and as earlier stated, bidding rules may specify other
Puse, G.R. No. 183678, March 15, 2010
conditions or order that the bidding process be subjected
to certain reservations or qualifications. Thus, in its pre-
qualification guidelines issued for the sale of EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.
scrap ACSRs, the NPC reserved the right to pre-disqualify
any applicant who did not meet the requirements for pre-
Considering that the President has the power to review
qualification. Clearly, the competitiveness policy of a
on appeal the orders or acts of petitioner NEA, the failure
bidding process presupposes the eligibility and
of respondent to undertake such an appeal bars him from
qualification of a contestant; otherwise, it defeats the
resorting to a judicial suit. It is settled that under the
principle that only “responsible” and “qualified” bidders
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies,
can bid and be awarded government contracts. Our free
recourse through court action cannot prosper until after
enterprise system is not based on a market of pure and
all such administrative remedies have first been
unadulterated competition where the State pursues a
exhausted. If remedy is available within the
strict hands-off policy and follows the let-the-devil-
administrative machinery, this should be resorted to
devour-the-hindmost rule.
before recourse can be made to courts. The party with an
administrative remedy must not only initiate the
Moreover, the mere fact that incentives and privileges prescribed administrative procedure to obtain relief but
are granted to certain enterprises to the exclusion of also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking
others does not render the issuance unconstitutional for judicial intervention in order to give the administrative
espousing unfair competition. While the Constitution agency an opportunity to decide the matter itself
enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless correctly and prevent unnecessary and premature resort
reserves to the government the power to intervene to the court. The non-observance of the doctrine of
whenever necessary to promote the general welfare. In exhaustion of administrative remedies results in lack of
the present case, the unregulated disposal and sale of cause of action, which is one of the grounds in the Rules
scrap ACSR wires will hamper the government’s effort of of Court justifying the dismissal of the complaint.
curtailing the pernicious practice of trafficking stolen
government property. This is an evil sought to be
In the present case, respondent failed to exhaust his
prevented by RA 7832 and certainly, it was well within
administrative remedies when he filed a case with the
the authority of the NPC to prescribe conditions in order
RTC without appealing the decision of the NEA to the
to prevent it. National Power Corporation vs. Pinatubo
Office of the President. As such, his petition filed with the
Commercial, represented by Alfredo A. Dy, G.R. No.
RTC must necessarily fail. National Electrification
176006, March 26, 2010.
Administration vs. Val L. Villanueva, G.R. No. 168203,
March 9, 2010
Administrative Law
REGULATIONS; PUBLICATION.
ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS.

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NPC Circular No. 99-75 did not have to be published
since it was merely an internal rule or regulation. It did
not purport to enforce or implement an existing law but
was merely a directive issued by the NPC President to his
subordinates to regulate the proper and efficient disposal
of scrap ACSRs to qualified bidders. Thus, NPC Circular
No. 99-75 defined the responsibilities of the
different NPC personnel in the disposal, pre-qualification,
bidding and award of scrap ACSRS. It also provided for
the deposit of a proposal bond to be submitted by
bidders, the approval of the award, mode of payment and
release of awarded scrap ACSRs. All these guidelines
were addressed to the NPC personnel involved in the
bidding and award of scrap ACSRs. It did not, in any way,
affect the rights of the public in general or of any other
person not involved in the bidding process. Assuming it
affected individual rights, it did so only remotely,
indirectly and incidentally. National Power Corporation
vs. Pinatubo Commercial, represented by Alfredo A.
Dy, G.R. No. 176006, March 26, 2010.
Agrarian law
andNatalia, holding that the respondents’ landholdings
were non-agricultural, and, consequently, outside the
coverage of the CARL, was fully warranted. In fact, the
excerpt from the Comprehensive Development Plan of
Sorsogon, Sorsogon showed that Barangay Bibincahan
was within the Central Business District of the
municipality. Department of Agrarian Reform,
represented by Secretary Hernani A. Braganza vs.
Pablo Berenguer, et al., G.R. No. 154094, March 9, 2010.
CARP; COVERAGE.
Petitioner insists on exemption of
the Alangilan landholding from CARP coverage. It argues
that the subject landholding had already been converted
into non-agricultural use long before the advent of the
CARP. The passage of the 1982 Ordinance, classifying the
property as reserved for residential, it asserts, effectively
transformed the land into non-agricultural use, and thus,
outside the ambit of the CARL. It cites Natalia, wherein it
was ruled that lands intended for residential use are
outside the coverage of the CARL.

CARL; COVERAGE.
Indeed, lands devoted to non-agricultural activity are
outside the coverage of CARL. These include lands
Resolution No. 5, passed on March 12, 1981 by the previously converted into non-agricultural uses prior to
Sangguniang Bayan of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, showed that the effectivity of the CARL on June 15, 1988.
the limits of the poblacion area of the municipality Unfortunately, petitioner failed to convince us that
included Barangay Bibincahan, where the respondents’ the Alangilan landholding ceased to be agricultural at the
landholdings were situated. The significance of this fact time of the effectivity of the CARL.
cannot be overstated, for, thereby, the respondents’
landholdings were presumed to be industrial and
It is beyond cavil that the Alangilan landholding was
residential lands. Jurisprudence has been clear about the
classified as agricultural, reserved for residential in 1982,
presumption. In Hilario v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
and was reclassified as residential-1 in 1994. However,
the Court said: “The presumption assumed by the
contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the term reserved for
appellate court that a parcel of land which is located in a
residential does not change the nature of the land from
poblacion is not necessarily devoted to residential
agricultural to non-agricultural. As aptly explained by the
purposes is wrong. It should be the other way around. A
DAR Secretary,
lot inside the poblacion should be presumed residential,
the term reserved for residential simply reflects the
or commercial, or non-agricultural unless there is a
intended land use. It does not denote that the property
clearly preponderant evidence to show that it is
has already been reclassified as residential, because the
agricultural.”
phrase reserved for residential is not a land classification
category.
To the same effect was Natalia Realty Corporation v.
DAR, thus: “We now determine whether such lands are
Indubitably, at the time of the effectivity of the CARL in
covered by the CARL. Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides
1988, the subject landholding was still agricultural. This
that the CARL shall “cover, regardless of tenurial
was bolstered by the fact that
arrangement and commodity produced, all public and
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan had to pass an Ordinance
private agricultural lands.” As to what constitutes
in 1994, reclassifying the landholding as residential-1. If,
“agricultural land,” it is referred to as “land devoted to
indeed, the landholding had already been earmarked for
agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not
residential use in 1982, as petitioner claims, then there
classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or
would have been no necessity for the passage of the
industrial land.” The deliberations of the Constitutional
1994 Ordinance. Alangilan Realty & Development
Commission confirm this limitation. “Agricultural lands”
Corporation vs. Office of the President, represented by
are only those lands which are “arable and suitable
Alberto Romulo, as Executive Secretary and Arthur
agricultural lands” and “do not include commercial,
P. Autea, as Deputy Secretary and Department of
industrial and residential lands.”
Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 180471, March 26, 2010.

There is no dispute that as early as 1981, the

Election law
respondents’ landholdings have been part of the
poblacion of Sorsogon, Sorsogon. Consistent with Hilario

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COMELEC; FINDINGS. candidate, the best and most conclusive evidence is the
ballots themselves. However, this rule applies only if the
ballots are available and their integrity has been
The appreciation of election documents involves a
preserved from the day of elections until revision. When
question of fact best left to the determination of
the ballots are unavailable or cannot be produced, then
the COMELEC, a specialized agency tasked with the
recourse can be made to untampered and unaltered
supervision of elections all over the country. The findings
election returns or other election documents as
of fact of administrative bodies, when supported by
evidence. Bai Sandra S.A. Sema vs. House of
substantial evidence, are final and nonreviewable by
Representatives Electoral Tribunal
courts of justice. This principle is applied with greater
and Didagen P. Dilangalen, G.R. No. 190734, March 26,
force when the case concerns the COMELEC, because the
2010.
framers of the Constitution intended to place the poll
body—created and explicitly made independent by the
Constitution itself—on a level higher than statutory Local Government
administrative organs. Jesus O. Typoco vs. Commission
on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 186359. March 5, 2010.
CITY; POPULATION REQUIREMENT.

COMELEC; MAJORITY VOTE.

Under Executive Order No. 135 (EO 135), the population
indicators Congress used to measure Malolos City’s
The failure of the COMELEC En Banc to muster the compliance with the constitutional limitation are
required majority vote even after the 15 February 2010 unreliable and non-
re-hearing should have caused the dismissal of authoritative. Victorino B. Aldaba, et al. Vs. Commission
respondent’s Election Protest. Promulgated on 15 on Elections, G.R. No. 188078, March 15, 2010.
February 1993 pursuant to Section 6, Article IX-A and
Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution,
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is clear on this
Public officers
matter. Without any trace of ambiguity, Section 6, Rule
18 of said Rule categorically provides as follows: ”Sec. 6.
Procedure if Opinion is Equally Divided. – When the APPOINTMENT.
Commission en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the
necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be Section 27 (1), of the Civil Service Law provides: “(1)
reheard, and if on rehearing no decision is reached, the Permanent status. – A permanent appointment shall be
action or proceeding shall be dismissed if originally issued to a person who meets all the requirements for
commenced in the Commission; in appealed cases, the the position to which he is being appointed, including the
judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; appropriate eligibility prescribed, in accordance with the
and in all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall provisions of law, rules and standards promulgated in
be denied.” Joselito R. Mendoza vs. Commission on pursuance thereof. (emphasis and underscoring
Elections and Roberto M. Pagdanganan, G.R. No. 191084, supplied)”
March 25, 2010.

In the CES under which the position of PEZA Deputy

COMELEC; FIREARMS BAN.
The main issue is whether or not the COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion in including airsoft guns and their
replicas/imitations in the term “firearm” in Section 2 (b)
of R.A. No. 8714. The Court finds that the COMELEC did
not commit grave abuse of discretion in this
case. Atty. Reynante B. Orceo vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 190779, March 26, 2010.
HRET; VOTE COUNT.
Director General for Policy and Planning is classified, the
acquisition of security of tenure which presupposes a
permanent appointment is governed by the Rules and
Regulations promulgated by the CES Board.
Clearly, for an examinee or an incumbent to be a
member of the CES and be entitled to security of tenure,
she/he must pass the CES examinations, be
conferred CES eligibility, comply with the other
requirements prescribed by the CES Board, and be
appointed to a CES rank by the President.

What petitioner questions is the Tribunal’s reliance on
election returns and/or tally sheets and other election
documents to arrive at the number of votes for each of
the parties. However, jurisprudence has established that
such action of the HRET was well within its discretion and
jurisdiction.
Indeed, the general rule is, if what is being questioned is
the correctness of the number of votes for each
Admittedly, before and up to the time of the termination
of her appointment, respondent did not go through the
four stages of CES eligibility examinations.
The appellate court’s ruling that respondent
became CES eligible upon earning the MNSA degree,
purportedly in accordance with Executive Order No. 696,
as amended by Executive Order No. 771, does not lie.

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By respondent’s attainment of an MNSA degree, she was
not conferred automatic CES eligibility. It was, as above-
quoted portions of CESB Resolution No. 204 state, merely
accredited as “equivalent to passing the Management
Aptitude Test Battery.” For respondent to
acquire CES eligibility and CES rank, she could “proceed
to the second stage of the eligibility examination process
. . . and the other stages of the examination . . . in
accordance with existing policies and regulations”; and
that if respondent as MNSA degree holder passed the
three other stages of the CES eligibility examinations and
is conferred CES eligibility, she could “qualify for
appointment to CES ranks,” PROVIDED that she meets
and complies “with other requirements of the CES Board
and the Office of the President to qualify for rank
appointment.”
Since, it is admitted that respondent, who acquired
an MNSA degree in 1993, had not undergone the second,
third and fourth stages of the CES eligibility examinations
prior to her appointment or during her incumbency as
Deputy Director General up to the time her appointment
was terminated, she was not a CES eligible, as indeed
certified to by the CES Board. Not being a CES eligible,
she had no security of tenure, hence, the termination by
the PEZA Board on June 1, 2000 of her appointment, as
well as the appointment in her stead of CES eligible
by Ortaliz, were not illegal. PEZA Board of Directors and
Lilia D. De Lima vs. Gloria J. Mercado, G.R. No. 172144,
March 9, 2010.
LEAVE.
Section 49, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules on Leave
requires that an application for leave should be acted
upon within 5 working days from receipt, otherwise, such
application is deemed approved. The CSC interpreted
said provision in this wise” ”It is explicit from
the aforequoted rule that an application for leave of
absence which had not been acted upon – either by
approving or disapproving – by the head of agency or
his/her authorized representative within five (5) working
days from the date of its filing shall be deemed
approved.”
The CSC also ruled that “Section 49 calls for a specific
action to be done by the head of the agency or his duly
authorized representative on the application for leave
filed which is either to approve or to deny the same.”
Being the central agency mandated to “prescribe,
amend, and enforce rules and regulations for carrying
into effect the provisions of the Civil Service Law and
other pertinent laws,” the CSC has the power to interpret
its own rules and any phrase contained in them, with its
interpretation significantly becoming part of the rules
themselves. The Court has consistently yielded and
accorded great respect to the interpretation by
administrative agencies of their own rules unless there is
an error of law, abuse of power, lack of jurisdiction or
Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!
grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with the
letter and spirit of the law.
Clearly, Atty. Nghuatco’s memorandum did not cover the
action contemplated by Section 49. For one, it did not
bear the imprimatur of the Commission Chairman (or his
duly authorized representative) who was the proper party
to grant or deny the application, as dictated by Section
52 of the Omnibus Rules on Leave. For another, it only
submitted to the Commission Secretary
Atty. Nghuatco’s comments and/or recommendations
on Paler’s application. It was merely preliminary and did
not propose any definitive action (i.e., approval or
disapproval) on Paler’s application, and simply
recommended what action to take. It was obviously not
controlling and the Chairman could have agreed or
disagreed with the recommended action. In fact, the
memorandum clearly provided that Paler’s request was
still to be referred to the Legal Service for comment, and
that the application “(could) be acted upon depending on
the completion of his work load and submission of the
medical certificate.” These circumstances plainly meant
that further action was yet to be made on the application.
And since there was no final approval or disapproval
of Paler’s application within 5 working days from receipt
as required by Section 49, the application was deemed
approved. Paler, therefore, could not be considered on
AWOL. Commission on Appointments, represented
herein by its Secretary Hon. Arturo L. Tiu vs. Celso M.
Paler, G.R. No. 172623. March 3, 2010.
Misconduct. Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or
deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of
behavior. To constitute an administrative offense,
misconduct should relate to or be connected with the
performance of the official functions and duties of a
public officer. In grave misconduct, as distinguished from
simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear
intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of an
established rule must be manifest.
Respondent’s acts of grabbing petitioner and attempting
to kiss her were, no doubt, intentional. Worse, the
incident occurred months after he had made similar but
subtler overtures to De la Cruz, who made it clear that
his sexual advances were not welcome. Considering that
the acts respondent committed against petitioner were
much more aggressive, it was impossible that the
offensive nature of his actions could have escaped him. It
does not appear that petitioner and respondent were
carrying on an amorous relationship that might have
justified his attempt to kiss petitioner while they were
separated from their companions. Worse, as petitioner
and respondent were both married (to other persons),
respondent not only took his marital status lightly, he
also ignored petitioner’s married state, and good
character and reputation. Teresita G. Narvasa vs.
Benjamin A. Sanchez, Jr., G.R. No. 169449, March 26,
2010.
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CAN THE PRESIDENT LEGALLY APPOINT THE NEXT
CHIEF JUSTICE?
After months of heated debate all over the country, the
Supreme Court has finally spoken – President Arroyo is
not prohibited by the Constitution to appoint the next
Chief Justice of the Philippines (see Arturo M. De Castro
Vs. Judicial and Bar Council, et al., G.R. No. 191002, G.R.
No. 191032, G.R. No. 191057, A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, G.R.
No. 191149, G.R. No. 191342, March 17, 2010).
According to the Supreme Court, President Arroyo can
appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his
retirement on May 17, 2010 since the constitutional
prohibition against presidential appointments during the
two month period before a presidential election does not
extend to appointments in the Judiciary.
Many of our readers will likely be surprised with the
ruling. In the poll we conducted among Lexoterica
readers during the past several weeks, 78% believe that
the President cannot legally appoint the next Chief
Justice. Only 19% believe that the President can legally
do so. For the rest, they “don’t know”.
Have your views changed given the Supreme Court’s
ruling? Let us know by voting at our new poll. To help
you decide, here is a link to the majority opinion penned
by Justice Bersamin, the dissenting opinion of Justice
Carpio Morales, the separate opinion of Justice Brion and
the separate opinion of Justice Nachura.
APRIL 2010 CASES
Constitutional Law
COA; POWERS.
The 1987 Constitution has made the COA the guardian of
public funds, vesting it with broad powers over all
accounts pertaining to government revenue and
expenditures and the uses of public funds and property
including the exclusive authority to define the scope of its
audit and examination, establish the techniques and
methods for such review, and promulgate accounting and
auditing rules and regulations. Section 11, Chapter 4,
Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of
1987 echoes this constitutional mandate given to COA.
In light of these express provisions of law granting
respondent COA its power and authority, we have
previously ruled that its exercise of its general audit
power is among the constitutional mechanisms that give
life to the check and balance system inherent in our form
of government. Furthermore, we have also declared that
Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!
COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine,
prevent and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of
government funds.
Based on the foregoing discussion and due to the lack or
absence of any law or jurisprudence saying otherwise, we
rule that, in resolving cases brought before it on appeal,
respondent COA is not required to limit its review only to
the grounds relied upon by a government agency’s
auditor with respect to disallowing certain disbursements
of public funds. In consonance with its general audit
power, respondent COA is not merely legally permitted,
but is also duty-bound to make its own assessment of the
merits of the disallowed disbursement and not simply
restrict itself to reviewing the validity of the ground relied
upon by the auditor of the government agency
concerned. To hold otherwise would render COA’s vital
constitutional power unduly limited and thereby useless
and ineffective. Ramon R. Yap vs. Commission on
Audit, G.R. No. 158562, April 23, 2010.
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION; LGBT GROUP.
Under our system of laws, every group has the right to
promote its agenda and attempt to persuade society of
the validity of its position through normal democratic
means. It is in the public square that deeply held
convictions and differing opinions should be distilled and
deliberated upon.
The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior
restraint nor subsequent punishment imposed on Ang
Ladlad, and its members have not been deprived of their
right to voluntarily associate, then there has been no
restriction on their freedom of expression or association.
The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact,
established its qualifications to participate in the party-
list system, and – as advanced by the OSG itself – the
moral objection offered by the COMELEC was not a
limitation imposed by law. To the extent, therefore, that
the petitioner has been precluded, because of COMELEC’s
action, from publicly expressing its views as a political
party and participating on an equal basis in the political
process with other equally-qualified party-list candidates,
we find that there has, indeed, been a transgression of
petitioner’s fundamental rights. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party
vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April 8,
2010.
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT; POPULATION
REQUIREMENT.
Petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and
Mayor Jesse Robredo seek the nullification as
unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled “An
Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and
Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of
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Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative It bears stressing that our finding that COMELEC’s act of
District From Such Reapportionment.” differentiating LGBTs from heterosexuals insofar as the
party-list system is concerned does not imply that any
other law distinguishing between heterosexuals and
Petitioners contend, citing Section 5(3), Article VI of the
homosexuals under different circumstances would
1987 Constitution, that the reapportionment introduced
similarly fail. We disagree with the OSG’s position that
by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit
homosexuals are a class in themselves for the purposes
constitutional standard that requires a minimum
of the equal protection clause. We are not prepared to
population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for
single out homosexuals as a separate class meriting
the creation of a legislative district. The petitioners claim
special or differentiated treatment. We have not received
that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the
sufficient evidence to this effect, and it is simply
first and second districts of Camarines Sur is
unnecessary to make such a ruling today. Petitioner itself
unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will
has merely demanded that it be recognized under the
end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only
same basis as all other groups similarly situated, and that
176,383.
the COMELEC made “an unwarranted and impermissible
classification not justified by the circumstances of the
The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the case.” Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on
Constitution, succinctly provides: “Each city with a Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010.
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative.” The
PARTY LIST; SECTORS QUALIFIED.
provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the
entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the
entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad’s application for
while a province is entitled to at least a representative, registration on the ground that the LGBT sector is neither
with nothing mentioned about population, a city must enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it
first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to associated with or related to any of the sectors in the
be similarly entitled. Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the enumeration.
Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only
for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang
a province. Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and
Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only those
Mayor Jesse Robredo vs. Commission on Elections, G.R.
sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to
No. 189793, April 7, 2010.
said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped,
PARTY LIST; ACCREDITATION. women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals) may be registered under the party-list
system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance
Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, “the
with the legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed,
enumeration of marginalized and under-represented
aside from COMELEC’s moral objection and the belated
sectors is not exclusive”. The crucial element is not
allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has
whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether
the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not
a particular organization complies with the requirements
qualified to register as a party-list organization under any
of the Constitution and RA 7941. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party
of the requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang
vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April 8,
Bagong Bayani. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission
2010.
on Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010.

PRESIDENT; EXECUTIVE PREROGATIVE.

PARTY LIST; MORAL DISAPPROVAL AS GROUND
FOR ACCREDITATION.
The Executive Department did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in not espousing petitioners’ claims for official
Moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient
apology and other forms of reparations against
governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals
Japan. From a domestic law perspective, the Executive
from participation in the party-list system. The denial
Department has the exclusive prerogative to determine
of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds
whether to espouse petitioners’ claims against Japan.
amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval
Isabelita C. Vinuya, et al. vs. Hon. Executive Secretary,
of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any
et al., G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010.
substantial public interest. Respondent’s blanket
justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion that
the COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves as a PRESIDENT; POWER OF APPOINTMENT.
class, not because of any particular morally reprehensible
act. It is this selective targeting that implicates our equal
The incumbent President can appoint the successor of
protection clause.
Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement on May 17, 2010
as the prohibition against presidential appointments

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under Section 15, Article VII does not extend to
appointments in the Judiciary. Arturo M. De Castro vs.
Judicial and Bar Council, et al., G.R. No. 191002, April
20, 2010.
PRESIDENT; POWER TO REORGANIZE.
It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the
President has the power to reorganize the offices and
agencies in the executive department in line with the
President’s constitutionally granted power of control over
executive offices and by virtue of previous delegation of
the legislative power to reorganize executive offices
under existing statutes.
Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code of
1987 gives the President continuing authority to
reorganize and redefine the functions of the Office of the
President. Section 31, Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of
the said Code, is explicit.
It is undisputed that the NPO, as an agency that is part
of the Office of the Press Secretary (which in various
times has been an agency directly attached to the Office
of the Press Secretary or as an agency under the
Philippine Information Agency), is part of the Office of the
President.
Pertinent to the case at bar, Section 31 of the
Administrative Code of 1987 quoted above authorizes the
President (a) to restructure the internal organization of
the Office of the President Proper, including the
immediate Offices, the President Special
Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff
Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or merging
units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to
another, and (b) to transfer functions or offices from the
Office of the President to any other Department or
Agency in the Executive Branch, and vice versa.
There is a view that the reorganization actions that the
President may take with respect to agencies in the Office
of the President are strictly limited to transfer of
functions and offices as seemingly provided in Section 31
of the Administrative Code of 1987.
However, Section 20, Chapter 7, Title I, Book III of the
same Code significantly provides: ”Sec. 20. Residual
Powers. – Unless Congress provides otherwise, the
President shall exercise such other powers and functions
vested in the President which are provided for under the
laws and which are not specifically enumerated above, or
which are not delegated by the President in accordance
with law. “
Pursuant to Section 20, the power of the President to
reorganize the Executive Branch under Section 31
includes such powers and functions that may be provided
for under other laws. To be sure, an inclusive and broad
interpretation of the President’s power to reorganize
Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!
executive offices has been consistently supported by
specific provisions in general appropriations laws. Atty.
Sylvia Banda, et al. vs.. Eduardo R. Ermita etc., et
al. G.R. No. 166620, April 20, 2010.
PUBLIC FUNDS; DISBURSEMENT.
Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1445 lays out the
basic guidelines that government entities must follow in
disbursing public funds. Any disbursement of public
funds, which includes payment of salaries and benefits to
government employees and officials, must (a) be
authorized by law, and (b) serve a public purpose.
In this regard, it is necessary for this Court to elaborate
on the nature and meaning of the term “public purpose,”
in relation to disbursement of public funds. As
understood in the traditional sense, public purpose or
public use means any purpose or use directly available to
the general public as a matter of right. Thus, it has also
been defined as “an activity as will serve as benefit to
[the] community as a body and which at the same time is
directly related function of government.” However, the
concept of public use is not limited to traditional
purposes. Here as elsewhere, the idea that “public use”
is strictly limited to clear cases of “use by the public” has
been discarded. In fact, this Court has already
categorically stated that the term “public purpose” is not
defined, since it is an elastic concept that can be
hammered to fit modern standards. It should be given a
broad interpretation; therefore, it does not only pertain
to those purposes that which are traditionally viewed as
essentially government functions, such as building roads
and delivery of basic services, but also includes those
purposes designed to promote social justice. Thus, public
money may now be used for the relocation of illegal
settlers, low-cost housing and urban or agrarian
reform. In short, public use is now equated with public
interest, and that it is not unconstitutional merely
because it incidentally benefits a limited number of
persons.
To our mind, in view of the public purpose requirement,
the disbursement of public funds, salaries and benefits of
government officers and employees should be granted to
compensate them for valuable public services rendered,
and the salaries or benefits paid to such officers or
employees must be commensurate with services
rendered. In the same vein, additional allowances and
benefits must be shown to be necessary or relevant to
the fulfillment of the official duties and functions of the
government officers and employees. We cannot accept
petitioner’s theory that the compensation and benefits of
public officers are intended purely for the personal
benefit of such officers, or that the mere payment of
salaries and benefits to a public officer satisfies the public
purpose requirement. That theory would lead to the
anomalous conclusion that government officers and
employees may be paid enormous sums without limit or
without any justification necessary other than that such
sums are being paid to someone employed by the
government. Public funds are the property of the people
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and must be used prudently at all times with a view to
prevent dissipation and waste. Ramon R. Yap vs.
Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 158562, April 23, 2010.
Administrative Law
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS; DUE PROCESS.
On the due process issue, we agree with the COMELEC
that PGBI’s right to due process was not violated for PGBI
was given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a
reconsideration of Resolution No. 8679. The essence of
due process, we have consistently held, is simply the
opportunity to be heard; as applied to administrative
proceedings, due process is the opportunity to explain
one’s side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type
hearing is not at all times and in all instances
essential. The requirement is satisfied where the parties
are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned
upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing x x x. We
find it obvious under the attendant circumstances that
PGBI was not denied due process. In any case, given the
result of this Resolution, PGBI has no longer any cause
for complaint on due process grounds. Philippine
Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI), etc. vs. Commission
on Elections, G.R. No. 190529. April 29, 2010
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS; REQUIREMENTS.
The Ang Tibay formulation was overlapping and
repetitious. Hence, in Air Manila, Inc. v. Balatbat, the
formulation was simplified into four basic rights, as
follows:
1. The right to notice, be it actual or constructive,
of the institution of the proceedings that may affect a
person’s legal right;
2. The right to a reasonable opportunity to appear and
defend his rights and to introduce witnesses and relevant
evidence in his favor;
3. The right to a tribunal so constituted as to give him
reasonable assurance of honesty and impartiality, and
one of competent jurisdiction; and
4. The right to a finding or decision of that tribunal
supported by substantial evidence presented at the
hearing or at least ascertained in the records or disclosed
to the parties.
Gauged upon the foregoing guidelines, Tolentino’s gripe
was unwarranted. He was not denied procedural due
process. The Division had required him to provide the
names of his revisors whose tasks included the raising of
objections, the claiming votes for him, or the contesting
of the votes in favor of his opponent. He has neither
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alleged being deprived of this opportunity, nor indicated
any situation in which his revisors were denied access to
the revision proceedings. He could not also insist that the
COMELEC did not consider his legal and factual
arguments; besides, he could still raise them in his
memorandum should he chose to. During the revision
stage, he should raise all objections, present his evidence
and witnesses, and file his memorandum before the case
would be submitted for resolution. Mayor Abraham N.
Tolentino vs. Commission on Elections, et al./Vice-Mayor
Celso P. De Castro vs. Commission on Elections, et
al., G.R. Nos. 187958, G.R. No. 187961 & 187962/G.R.
No. 187966, G.R. No. 187967 & 187968. April 7, 2010.
REORGANIZATION; GOOD FAITH.
The presidential power to reorganize agencies and
offices in the executive branch of government is subject
to the condition that such reorganization is carried out in
good faith.
If the reorganization is done in good faith, the abolition of
positions, which results in loss of security of tenure of
affected government employees, would be
valid. In Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora, we even
observed that there was no such thing as an absolute
right to hold office. Except those who hold constitutional
offices, which provide for special immunity as regards
salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested
right to an office or salary. Atty. Sylvia Banda, et al. vs..
Eduardo R. Ermita etc., et al. G.R. No. 166620, April 20,
2010.
Election Law
BALLOTS; REVISION.
The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion
when it order the revision of 44 ballots with the Senate
Electoral Tribunal without first reolsivng whether 16 of
those 44 ballots should be included in the revision.
In regular election contests, the general averment of
fraud or irregularities in the counting of votes justifies the
examination of the ballots and recounting of votes. This
process of examination is the revision of the ballots
pursuant to Section 6, Rule 20 of the 1993 COMELEC
Rules of Procedure.
The protests involved herein assailed the authenticity of
the election returns and the veracity of the counting of
the ballots. In that regard, the ballots themselves are the
best evidence. The only means to overcome the
presumption of legitimacy of the election returns is to
examine and determine first whether the ballot boxes
have been substantially preserved in the manner
mandated by law. Hence, the necessity to issue the order
of revision.
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No ruling could be handed down against the integrity of
the ballot boxes that would effectively render naught the
evidentiary value of the ballots they contained unless a
full blown trial on the merits was first conducted.
Tolentino should accept the legal impossibility for the
Division to rule on the issue of inclusion or exclusion of
the set-aside ballot boxes except after the revision
process. Mayor Abraham N. Tolentino vs. Commission on
Elections, et al./Vice-Mayor Celso P. De Castro vs.
Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. Nos. 187958, G.R.
No. 187961 & 187962/G.R. No. 187966, G.R. No. 187967
& 187968. April 7, 2010.
PARTY LIST; DELISTING.
Our Minero ruling is an erroneous application of Section
6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it cannot sustain PGBI’s delisting
from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral
parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list
system.
First, the law is clear – the COMELEC may motu proprio
or upon verified complaint of any interested party,
remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition if it: (a) fails to participate in the
last two (2) preceding elections; or (b) fails to obtain at
least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the
party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for
the constituency in which it has registered. The word
“or” is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and
independence of one thing from the other things
enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the
sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive
word. Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable language
of the law provides for two (2) separate reasons for
delisting.
Second, Minero is diametrically opposed to the legislative
intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941, as PGBI’s cited
congressional deliberations clearly show.
Minero therefore simply cannot stand. Its basic defect
lies in its characterization of the non-participation of a
party-list organization in an election as similar to a failure
to garner the 2% threshold party-list vote. What Minero
effectively holds is that a party list organization that does
not participate in an election necessarily gets, by default,
less than 2% of the party-list votes. To be sure, this is a
confused interpretation of the law, given the law’s clear
and categorical language and the legislative intent to
treat the two scenarios differently. A delisting based on a
mixture or fusion of these two different and separate
grounds for delisting is therefore a strained application of
the law – in jurisdictional terms, it is an interpretation
not within the contemplation of the framers of the law
and hence is a gravely abusive interpretation of the law.
What we say here should of course take into account our
ruling in Barangay Association for Advancement and
National Transparency v. COMELEC (Banat) where we
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partly invalidated the 2% party-list vote requirement
provided in RA 7941 as follows: ”We rule that, in
computing the allocation of additional seats, the
continued operation of the two percent threshold for the
distribution of the additional seats as found in the second
clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is
unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent
threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve
the maximum number of available party list seats when
the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The
continued operation of the two percent threshold in the
distribution of the additional seats frustrates the
attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the
members of the House of Representatives shall consist of
party-list representatives.”
The disqualification for failure to get 2% party-list votes
in two (2) preceding elections should therefore be
understood in light of the Banat ruling that party-list
groups or organizations garnering less than 2% of the
party-list votes may yet qualify for a seat in the
allocation of additional seats.
We need not extensively discuss Banat’s significance,
except to state that a party-list group or organization
which qualified in the second round of seat allocation
cannot now validly be delisted for the reason alone that it
garnered less than 2% in the last two elections. In other
words, the application of this disqualification should
henceforth be contingent on the percentage of party-list
votes garnered by the last party-list organization that
qualified for a seat in the House of Representatives, a
percentage that is less than the 2% threshold invalidated
in Banat. The disqualification should now necessarily be
read to apply to party-list groups or organizations that
did not qualify for a seat in the two preceding elections
for the constituency in which it registered.
To reiterate, (a) Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two
separate grounds for delisting; these grounds cannot be
mixed or combined to support delisting; and (b) the
disqualification for failure to garner 2% party-list votes in
two preceding elections should now be understood, in
light of the Banat ruling, to mean failure to qualify for a
party-list seat in two preceding elections for the
constituency in which it has registered. This, we declare,
is how Section 6(8) of RA 7941 should be understood and
applied. We do so under our authority to state what the
law is, and as an exception to the application of the
principle of stare decisis. Philippine Guardians
Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI), etc. vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 190529. April 29, 2010.
VOTER; RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT.
The the residency requirement of a voter is at least one
(1) year residence in the Philippines and at least six (6)
months in the place where the person proposes or
intends to vote. “Residence,” as used in the law
prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective
office, is doctrinally settled to mean “domicile,” importing
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not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention inferable from a person’s acts,
activities, and utterances. “Domicile” denotes a fixed
permanent residence where, when absent for business or
pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. In the
consideration of circumstances obtaining in each
particular case, three rules must be borne in mind,
namely: (1) that a person must have a residence or
domicile somewhere; (2) once established, it remains
until a new one is acquired; and (3) that a person can
have but one residence or domicile at a time.
Domicile is not easily lost. To successfully effect a
transfer thereof, one must demonstrate: (1) an actual
removal or change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention
of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one; and (3) acts which correspond
with that purpose. There must be animus manendi
coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to
remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an
indefinite period of time; the change of residence must
be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for
the new domicile must be actual.
Asistio has always been a resident of Caloocan City since
his birth or for more than 72 years. His family is known
to be among the prominent political families in Caloocan
City. In fact, Asistio served in public office as Caloocan
City Second District representative in the House of
Representatives, having been elected as such in the
1992, 1995, 1998, and 2004 elections. In 2007, he also
sought election as City Mayor. In all of these occasions,
Asistio cast his vote in the same city. Taking these
circumstances into consideration, gauged in the light of
the doctrines above enunciated, it cannot be denied that
Asistio has qualified, and continues to qualify, as a voter
of Caloocan City. There is no showing that he has
established domicile elsewhere, or that he had
consciously and voluntarily abandoned his residence in
Caloocan City. He should, therefore, remain in the list of
permanent registered voters of Precinct No.
1811A, Barangay 15, Caloocan City.
That Asistio allegedly indicated in his Certificate of
Candidacy for Mayor, both for the 2007 and 2010
elections, a non-existent or false address, or that he
could not be physically found in the address he indicated
when he registered as a voter, should not operate to
exclude him as a voter of Caloocan City. These purported
misrepresentations in Asistio’s COC, if true, might serve
as basis for an election offense under the Omnibus
Election Code (OEC), or an action to deny due course to
the COC. But to our mind, they do not serve as proof that
Asistio has abandoned his domicile in Caloocan City, or
that he has established residence outside of Caloocan
City. Luis A. Asistio vs. Hon. Thelma Canlas Trinidad-Pe
Aguirre, etc. et al., G.R. No. 191124. April 27, 2010.
International Law
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INTERNATIONAL LAW; BINDING EFFECT.
Although this Court stands willing to assume the
responsibility of giving effect to the Philippines’
international law obligations, the blanket invocation of
international law is not the panacea for all social ills. We
refer now to the petitioner’s invocation of the Yogyakarta
Principles (the Application of International Human Rights
Law In Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender
Identity), which petitioner declares to reflect binding
principles of international law.
At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these
Yogyakarta Principles contain norms that are obligatory
on the Philippines. There are declarations and obligations
outlined in said Principles which are not reflective of the
current state of international law, and do not find basis in
any of the sources of international law enumerated under
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice. Petitioner has not undertaken any objective and
rigorous analysis of these alleged principles of
international law to ascertain their true status. Ang
Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
190582, April 8, 2010.
Public Officers
CONDONATION DOCTRINE; APPLICABILITY TO
APPOINTIVE OFFICIALS.
Petitioners urge this Court to expand the settled doctrine
of condonation to cover coterminous appointive officials
who were administratively charged along with the
reelected official/appointing authority with infractions
allegedly committed during their preceding term.
The Court rejects petitioners’ thesis.
More than 60 years ago, the Court in Pascual v. Hon.
Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija issued the landmark
ruling that prohibits the disciplining of an elective official
for a wrongful act committed during his immediately
preceding term of office. The Court explained that “[t]he
underlying theory is that each term is separate from
other terms, and that the reelection to office operates as
a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to the
extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor.”
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts
done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise
would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their
officers. When the people elect[e]d a man to office, it
must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his
life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave
his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It
is not for the court, by reason of such faults or
misconduct[,] to practically overrule the will of the
people. (underscoring supplied)
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Lizares v. Hechanova, et al. replicated the doctrine. The
Court dismissed the petition in that case for being moot,
the therein petitioner “having been duly reelected, is no
longer amenable to administrative sanctions.”
Ingco v. Sanchez, et al. clarified that the condonation
doctrine does not apply to a criminal case. Luciano v.
The Provincial Governor, et al., Olivarez v. Judge Villaluz,
and Aguinaldo v. Santos echoed the qualified rule that
reelection of a public official does not bar prosecution for
crimes committed by him prior thereto.
Consistently, the Court has reiterated the doctrine in a
string of recent jurisprudence including two cases
involving a Senator and a Member of the House of
Representatives.
hold appointive positions, they cannot claim the mandate
of the electorate. The people cannot be charged with the
presumption of full knowledge of the life and character of
each and every probable appointee of the elective official
ahead of the latter’s actual reelection.
Moreover, the unwarranted expansion of the Pascual
doctrine would set a dangerous precedent as it would, as
respondents posit, provide civil servants, particularly
local government employees, with blanket immunity from
administrative liability that would spawn and breed abuse
in the bureaucracy. Atty. Vicente E. Salumbides, Jr., et
al. vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al., G.R. No. 180917,
April 23, 2010.
PUBLIC OFFICE; PUBLIC TRUST.

Salalima v. Guingona, Jr. and Mayor Garcia v. Hon.
Mojica reinforced the doctrine. The condonation rule was
applied even if the administrative complaint was not filed
before the reelection of the public official, and even if the
alleged misconduct occurred four days before the
elections, respectively. Salalima did not distinguish as to
the date of filing of the administrative complaint, as long
as the alleged misconduct was committed during the
prior term, the precise timing or period of which Garcia
did not further distinguish, as long as the wrongdoing
that gave rise to the public official’s culpability was
committed prior to the date of reelection.
Petitioners’ theory is not novel.
A parallel question was involved in Civil Service
Commission v. Sojor where the Court found no basis to
broaden the scope of the doctrine of condonation.
Unlike private offices which are held largely on the
dictates of market forces, public offices are public trust.
Public officers are tasked to serve the public interest,
thus the excessive burden for their retention in the form
of numerous prohibitions. The liberal evidentiary
standard of substantial evidence and the freedom of
administrative proceedings from technical niceties
effectuate the fiduciary nature of public office: they are
procedural mechanisms assuring ease in maintaining an
efficient bureaucracy, free of rent-seeking officials who
exploit government processes to raise easy money.
Respondent’s hold on his item at the Mandaue City
revenue office, which, like our customs offices, is a
common situs for corrupt activities, is no more lasting
than his fidelity to his trust. Although no criminal verdict
deprives respondent of his liberty, adequate evidence
justifies his removal from the bureaucracy for forfeiting
the public trust. Hon. Primo C. Miro, etc. vs. Reynaldo M.
Dosono, G.R. No. 170697, April 30, 2010.

Contrary to petitioners’ asseveration, the non-application

of the condonation doctrine to appointive officials does
not violate the right to equal protection of the law.

In the recent case of Quinto v. Commission on Elections,

the Court applied the four-fold test in an equal protection
challenge against the resign-to-run provision, wherein it
discussed the material and substantive distinctions
between elective and appointive officials that could well
apply to the doctrine of condonation.

The electorate’s condonation of the previous

administrative infractions of the reelected official cannot
be extended to that of the reappointed coterminous
employees, the underlying basis of the rule being to
uphold the will of the people expressed through the
ballot. In other words, there is neither subversion of the
sovereign will nor disenfranchisement of the electorate to
speak of, in the case of reappointed coterminous
employees.

It is the will of the populace, not the whim of one person

who happens to be the appointing authority, that could
extinguish an administrative liability. Since petitioners

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SELECTED SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON
POLITICAL LAW*
APRIL 2010-MARCH 2011
APRIL 2010 CASES
Constitutional Law
COA; powers.
The 1987 Constitution has made the COA the guardian of
public funds, vesting it with broad powers over all
accounts pertaining to government revenue and
expenditures and the uses of public funds and property
including the exclusive authority to define the scope of its
audit and examination, establish the techniques and
methods for such review, and promulgate accounting and
auditing rules and regulations. Section 11, Chapter 4,
Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of
1987 echoes this constitutional mandate given to COA.
In light of these express provisions of law granting
respondent COA its power and authority, we have
previously ruled that its exercise of its general audit
power is among the constitutional mechanisms that give
life to the check and balance system inherent in our form
of government. Furthermore, we have also declared that
COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine,
prevent and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of
government funds.
Based on the foregoing discussion and due to the lack or
absence of any law or jurisprudence saying otherwise, we
rule that, in resolving cases brought before it on appeal,
respondent COA is not required to limit its review only to
the grounds relied upon by a government agency’s
auditor with respect to disallowing certain disbursements
of public funds. In consonance with its general audit
power, respondent COA is not merely legally permitted,
but is also duty-bound to make its own assessment of the
merits of the disallowed disbursement and not simply
restrict itself to reviewing the validity of the ground relied
upon by the auditor of the government agency
concerned. To hold otherwise would render COA’s vital
constitutional power unduly limited and thereby useless
and ineffective. Ramon R. Yap vs. Commission on
Audit, G.R. No. 158562, April 23, 2010.
________________
* Sourced from http://lexoterica.wordpress.com by
Vicente D. Gerochi IV
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Freedom of expression; LGBT group.
Under our system of laws, every group has the right to
promote its agenda and attempt to persuade society of
the validity of its position through normal democratic
means. It is in the public square that deeply held
convictions and differing opinions should be distilled and
deliberated upon.
The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior
restraint nor subsequent punishment imposed on Ang
Ladlad, and its members have not been deprived of their
right to voluntarily associate, then there has been no
restriction on their freedom of expression or association.
The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact,
established its qualifications to participate in the party-
list system, and – as advanced by the OSG itself – the
moral objection offered by the COMELEC was not a
limitation imposed by law. To the extent, therefore, that
the petitioner has been precluded, because of COMELEC’s
action, from publicly expressing its views as a political
party and participating on an equal basis in the political
process with other equally-qualified party-list candidates,
we find that there has, indeed, been a transgression of
petitioner’s fundamental rights. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party
vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April 8,
2010.
Legislative district; population requirement.
Petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and
Mayor Jesse Robredo seek the nullification as
unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled “An
Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and
Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of
Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative
District From Such Reapportionment.”
Petitioners contend, citing Section 5(3), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution, that the reapportionment introduced
by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit
constitutional standard that requires a minimum
population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for
the creation of a legislative district. The petitioners claim
that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the
first and second districts of Camarines Sur is
unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will
end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only
176,383.
The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the
Constitution, succinctly provides: “Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative.” The
provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the
entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the
entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For
while a province is entitled to at least a representative,
with nothing mentioned about population, a city must
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first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to associated with or related to any of the sectors in the
be similarly entitled. Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the enumeration.
Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only
for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang
a province. Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and
Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only those
Mayor Jesse Robredo vs. Commission on Elections, G.R.
sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to
No. 189793, April 7, 2010.
said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped,
Party list; accreditation. women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals) may be registered under the party-list
system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance
Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, “the
with the legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed,
enumeration of marginalized and under-represented
aside from COMELEC’s moral objection and the belated
sectors is not exclusive”. The crucial element is not
allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has
whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether
the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not
a particular organization complies with the requirements
qualified to register as a party-list organization under any
of the Constitution and RA 7941. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party
of the requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang
vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April 8,
Bagong Bayani. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission
2010.
on Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010.

President; executive prerogative.

Party list; moral disapproval as ground for
accreditation.
Moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient
governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals
from participation in the party-list system. The denial
of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds
amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval
of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any
substantial public interest. Respondent’s blanket
justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion that
the COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves as a
class, not because of any particular morally reprehensible
act. It is this selective targeting that implicates our equal
protection clause.
It bears stressing that our finding that COMELEC’s act of
differentiating LGBTs from heterosexuals insofar as the
party-list system is concerned does not imply that any
other law distinguishing between heterosexuals and
homosexuals under different circumstances would
similarly fail. We disagree with the OSG’s position that
homosexuals are a class in themselves for the purposes
of the equal protection clause. We are not prepared to
single out homosexuals as a separate class meriting
special or differentiated treatment. We have not received
sufficient evidence to this effect, and it is simply
unnecessary to make such a ruling today. Petitioner itself
has merely demanded that it be recognized under the
same basis as all other groups similarly situated, and that
the COMELEC made “an unwarranted and impermissible
classification not justified by the circumstances of the
case.” Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010.
Party list; sectors qualified.
The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad’s application for
registration on the ground that the LGBT sector is neither
enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it
The Executive Department did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in not espousing petitioners’ claims for official
apology and other forms of reparations against
Japan. From a domestic law perspective, the Executive
Department has the exclusive prerogative to determine
whether to espouse petitioners’ claims against Japan.
Isabelita C. Vinuya, et al. vs. Hon. Executive Secretary,
et al., G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010.
President; power of appointment.
The incumbent President can appoint the successor of
Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement on May 17, 2010
as the prohibition against presidential appointments
under Section 15, Article VII does not extend to
appointments in the Judiciary. Arturo M. De Castro vs.
Judicial and Bar Council, et al., G.R. No. 191002, April
20, 2010.
President; power to reorganize.
It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the
President has the power to reorganize the offices and
agencies in the executive department in line with the
President’s constitutionally granted power of control over
executive offices and by virtue of previous delegation of
the legislative power to reorganize executive offices
under existing statutes.
Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code of
1987 gives the President continuing authority to
reorganize and redefine the functions of the Office of the
President. Section 31, Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of
the said Code, is explicit.
It is undisputed that the NPO, as an agency that is part
of the Office of the Press Secretary (which in various
times has been an agency directly attached to the Office

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of the Press Secretary or as an agency under the
Philippine Information Agency), is part of the Office of the
President.
Pertinent to the case at bar, Section 31 of the
Administrative Code of 1987 quoted above authorizes the
President (a) to restructure the internal organization of
the Office of the President Proper, including the
immediate Offices, the President Special
Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff
Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or merging
units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to
another, and (b) to transfer functions or offices from the
Office of the President to any other Department or
Agency in the Executive Branch, and vice versa.
There is a view that the reorganization actions that the
President may take with respect to agencies in the Office
of the President are strictly limited to transfer of
functions and offices as seemingly provided in Section 31
of the Administrative Code of 1987.
However, Section 20, Chapter 7, Title I, Book III of the
same Code significantly provides: ”Sec. 20. Residual
Powers. – Unless Congress provides otherwise, the
President shall exercise such other powers and functions
vested in the President which are provided for under the
laws and which are not specifically enumerated above, or
which are not delegated by the President in accordance
with law. “
Pursuant to Section 20, the power of the President to
reorganize the Executive Branch under Section 31
includes such powers and functions that may be provided
for under other laws. To be sure, an inclusive and broad
interpretation of the President’s power to reorganize
executive offices has been consistently supported by
specific provisions in general appropriations laws. Atty.
Sylvia Banda, et al. vs.. Eduardo R. Ermita etc., et
al. G.R. No. 166620, April 20, 2010.
Public funds; disbursement.
Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1445 lays out the
basic guidelines that government entities must follow in
disbursing public funds. Any disbursement of public
funds, which includes payment of salaries and benefits to
government employees and officials, must (a) be
authorized by law, and (b) serve a public purpose.
In this regard, it is necessary for this Court to elaborate
on the nature and meaning of the term “public purpose,”
in relation to disbursement of public funds. As
understood in the traditional sense, public purpose or
public use means any purpose or use directly available to
the general public as a matter of right. Thus, it has also
been defined as “an activity as will serve as benefit to
[the] community as a body and which at the same time is
directly related function of government.” However, the
concept of public use is not limited to traditional
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purposes. Here as elsewhere, the idea that “public use”
is strictly limited to clear cases of “use by the public” has
been discarded. In fact, this Court has already
categorically stated that the term “public purpose” is not
defined, since it is an elastic concept that can be
hammered to fit modern standards. It should be given a
broad interpretation; therefore, it does not only pertain
to those purposes that which are traditionally viewed as
essentially government functions, such as building roads
and delivery of basic services, but also includes those
purposes designed to promote social justice. Thus, public
money may now be used for the relocation of illegal
settlers, low-cost housing and urban or agrarian
reform. In short, public use is now equated with public
interest, and that it is not unconstitutional merely
because it incidentally benefits a limited number of
persons.
To our mind, in view of the public purpose requirement,
the disbursement of public funds, salaries and benefits of
government officers and employees should be granted to
compensate them for valuable public services rendered,
and the salaries or benefits paid to such officers or
employees must be commensurate with services
rendered. In the same vein, additional allowances and
benefits must be shown to be necessary or relevant to
the fulfillment of the official duties and functions of the
government officers and employees. We cannot accept
petitioner’s theory that the compensation and benefits of
public officers are intended purely for the personal
benefit of such officers, or that the mere payment of
salaries and benefits to a public officer satisfies the public
purpose requirement. That theory would lead to the
anomalous conclusion that government officers and
employees may be paid enormous sums without limit or
without any justification necessary other than that such
sums are being paid to someone employed by the
government. Public funds are the property of the people
and must be used prudently at all times with a view to
prevent dissipation and waste. Ramon R. Yap vs.
Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 158562, April 23, 2010.
Administrative Law
Administrative proceedings; due process.
On the due process issue, we agree with the COMELEC
that PGBI’s right to due process was not violated for PGBI
was given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a
reconsideration of Resolution No. 8679. The essence of
due process, we have consistently held, is simply the
opportunity to be heard; as applied to administrative
proceedings, due process is the opportunity to explain
one’s side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type
hearing is not at all times and in all instances
essential. The requirement is satisfied where the parties
are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned
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upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing x x x. We
find it obvious under the attendant circumstances that
PGBI was not denied due process. In any case, given the
result of this Resolution, PGBI has no longer any cause
for complaint on due process grounds. Philippine
Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI), etc. vs. Commission
on Elections, G.R. No. 190529. April 29, 2010
Procedural due process; requirements.
The Ang Tibay formulation was overlapping and
repetitious. Hence, in Air Manila, Inc. v. Balatbat, the
formulation was simplified into four basic rights, as
follows:
1. The right to notice, be it actual or constructive,
of the institution of the proceedings that may affect a
person’s legal right;
2. The right to a reasonable opportunity to appear and
defend his rights and to introduce witnesses and relevant
evidence in his favor;
3. The right to a tribunal so constituted as to give him
reasonable assurance of honesty and impartiality, and
one of competent jurisdiction; and
4. The right to a finding or decision of that tribunal
supported by substantial evidence presented at the
hearing or at least ascertained in the records or disclosed
to the parties.
Gauged upon the foregoing guidelines, Tolentino’s gripe
was unwarranted. He was not denied procedural due
process. The Division had required him to provide the
names of his revisors whose tasks included the raising of
objections, the claiming votes for him, or the contesting
of the votes in favor of his opponent. He has neither
alleged being deprived of this opportunity, nor indicated
any situation in which his revisors were denied access to
the revision proceedings. He could not also insist that the
COMELEC did not consider his legal and factual
arguments; besides, he could still raise them in his
memorandum should he chose to. During the revision
stage, he should raise all objections, present his evidence
and witnesses, and file his memorandum before the case
would be submitted for resolution. Mayor Abraham N.
Tolentino vs. Commission on Elections, et al./Vice-Mayor
Celso P. De Castro vs. Commission on Elections, et
al., G.R. Nos. 187958, G.R. No. 187961 & 187962/G.R.
No. 187966, G.R. No. 187967 & 187968. April 7, 2010.
Reorganization; good faith.
The presidential power to reorganize agencies and
offices in the executive branch of government is subject
to the condition that such reorganization is carried out in
good faith.
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If the reorganization is done in good faith, the abolition of
positions, which results in loss of security of tenure of
affected government employees, would be
valid. In Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora, we even
observed that there was no such thing as an absolute
right to hold office. Except those who hold constitutional
offices, which provide for special immunity as regards
salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested
right to an office or salary. Atty. Sylvia Banda, et al. vs..
Eduardo R. Ermita etc., et al. G.R. No. 166620, April 20,
2010.
Election Law
Ballots; revision.
The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion
when it order the revision of 44 ballots with the Senate
Electoral Tribunal without first reolsivng whether 16 of
those 44 ballots should be included in the revision.
In regular election contests, the general averment of
fraud or irregularities in the counting of votes justifies the
examination of the ballots and recounting of votes. This
process of examination is the revision of the ballots
pursuant to Section 6, Rule 20 of the 1993 COMELEC
Rules of Procedure.
The protests involved herein assailed the authenticity of
the election returns and the veracity of the counting of
the ballots. In that regard, the ballots themselves are the
best evidence. The only means to overcome the
presumption of legitimacy of the election returns is to
examine and determine first whether the ballot boxes
have been substantially preserved in the manner
mandated by law. Hence, the necessity to issue the order
of revision.
No ruling could be handed down against the integrity of
the ballot boxes that would effectively render naught the
evidentiary value of the ballots they contained unless a
full blown trial on the merits was first conducted.
Tolentino should accept the legal impossibility for the
Division to rule on the issue of inclusion or exclusion of
the set-aside ballot boxes except after the revision
process. Mayor Abraham N. Tolentino vs. Commission on
Elections, et al./Vice-Mayor Celso P. De Castro vs.
Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. Nos. 187958, G.R.
No. 187961 & 187962/G.R. No. 187966, G.R. No. 187967
& 187968. April 7, 2010.
Party list; delisting.
Our Minero ruling is an erroneous application of Section
6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it cannot sustain PGBI’s delisting
from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral
parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list
system.
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First, the law is clear – the COMELEC may motu proprio
or upon verified complaint of any interested party,
remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition if it: (a) fails to participate in the
last two (2) preceding elections; or (b) fails to obtain at
least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the
party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for
the constituency in which it has registered. The word
“or” is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and
independence of one thing from the other things
enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the
sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive
word. Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable language
of the law provides for two (2) separate reasons for
delisting.
Second, Minero is diametrically opposed to the legislative
intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941, as PGBI’s cited
congressional deliberations clearly show.
Minero therefore simply cannot stand. Its basic defect
lies in its characterization of the non-participation of a
party-list organization in an election as similar to a failure
to garner the 2% threshold party-list vote. What Minero
effectively holds is that a party list organization that does
not participate in an election necessarily gets, by default,
less than 2% of the party-list votes. To be sure, this is a
confused interpretation of the law, given the law’s clear
and categorical language and the legislative intent to
treat the two scenarios differently. A delisting based on a
mixture or fusion of these two different and separate
grounds for delisting is therefore a strained application of
the law – in jurisdictional terms, it is an interpretation
not within the contemplation of the framers of the law
and hence is a gravely abusive interpretation of the law.
What we say here should of course take into account our
ruling in Barangay Association for Advancement and
National Transparency v. COMELEC (Banat) where we
partly invalidated the 2% party-list vote requirement
provided in RA 7941 as follows: ”We rule that, in
computing the allocation of additional seats, the
continued operation of the two percent threshold for the
distribution of the additional seats as found in the second
clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is
unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent
threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve
the maximum number of available party list seats when
the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The
continued operation of the two percent threshold in the
distribution of the additional seats frustrates the
attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the
members of the House of Representatives shall consist of
party-list representatives.”
The disqualification for failure to get 2% party-list votes
in two (2) preceding elections should therefore be
understood in light of the Banat ruling that party-list
groups or organizations garnering less than 2% of the
party-list votes may yet qualify for a seat in the
allocation of additional seats.
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We need not extensively discuss Banat’s significance,
except to state that a party-list group or organization
which qualified in the second round of seat allocation
cannot now validly be delisted for the reason alone that it
garnered less than 2% in the last two elections. In other
words, the application of this disqualification should
henceforth be contingent on the percentage of party-list
votes garnered by the last party-list organization that
qualified for a seat in the House of Representatives, a
percentage that is less than the 2% threshold invalidated
in Banat. The disqualification should now necessarily be
read to apply to party-list groups or organizations that
did not qualify for a seat in the two preceding elections
for the constituency in which it registered.
To reiterate, (a) Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two
separate grounds for delisting; these grounds cannot be
mixed or combined to support delisting; and (b) the
disqualification for failure to garner 2% party-list votes in
two preceding elections should now be understood, in
light of the Banat ruling, to mean failure to qualify for a
party-list seat in two preceding elections for the
constituency in which it has registered. This, we declare,
is how Section 6(8) of RA 7941 should be understood and
applied. We do so under our authority to state what the
law is, and as an exception to the application of the
principle of stare decisis. Philippine Guardians
Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI), etc. vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 190529. April 29, 2010.
Voter; residency requirement.
The the residency requirement of a voter is at least one
(1) year residence in the Philippines and at least six (6)
months in the place where the person proposes or
intends to vote. “Residence,” as used in the law
prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective
office, is doctrinally settled to mean “domicile,” importing
not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention inferable from a person’s acts,
activities, and utterances. “Domicile” denotes a fixed
permanent residence where, when absent for business or
pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. In the
consideration of circumstances obtaining in each
particular case, three rules must be borne in mind,
namely: (1) that a person must have a residence or
domicile somewhere; (2) once established, it remains
until a new one is acquired; and (3) that a person can
have but one residence or domicile at a time.
Domicile is not easily lost. To successfully effect a
transfer thereof, one must demonstrate: (1) an actual
removal or change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention
of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one; and (3) acts which correspond
with that purpose. There must be animus manendi
coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to
remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an
indefinite period of time; the change of residence must
be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for
the new domicile must be actual.
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Asistio has always been a resident of Caloocan City since
his birth or for more than 72 years. His family is known
to be among the prominent political families in Caloocan
City. In fact, Asistio served in public office as Caloocan
City Second District representative in the House of
Representatives, having been elected as such in the
1992, 1995, 1998, and 2004 elections. In 2007, he also
sought election as City Mayor. In all of these occasions,
Asistio cast his vote in the same city. Taking these
circumstances into consideration, gauged in the light of
the doctrines above enunciated, it cannot be denied that
Asistio has qualified, and continues to qualify, as a voter
of Caloocan City. There is no showing that he has
established domicile elsewhere, or that he had
consciously and voluntarily abandoned his residence in
Caloocan City. He should, therefore, remain in the list of
permanent registered voters of Precinct No.
1811A, Barangay 15, Caloocan City.
That Asistio allegedly indicated in his Certificate of
Candidacy for Mayor, both for the 2007 and 2010
elections, a non-existent or false address, or that he
could not be physically found in the address he indicated
when he registered as a voter, should not operate to
exclude him as a voter of Caloocan City. These purported
misrepresentations in Asistio’s COC, if true, might serve
as basis for an election offense under the Omnibus
Election Code (OEC), or an action to deny due course to
the COC. But to our mind, they do not serve as proof that
Asistio has abandoned his domicile in Caloocan City, or
that he has established residence outside of Caloocan
City. Luis A. Asistio vs. Hon. Thelma Canlas Trinidad-Pe
Aguirre, etc. et al., G.R. No. 191124. April 27, 2010.
International Law
International law; binding effect.
Although this Court stands willing to assume the
responsibility of giving effect to the Philippines’
international law obligations, the blanket invocation of
international law is not the panacea for all social ills. We
refer now to the petitioner’s invocation of the Yogyakarta
Principles (the Application of International Human Rights
Law In Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender
Identity), which petitioner declares to reflect binding
principles of international law.
At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these
Yogyakarta Principles contain norms that are obligatory
on the Philippines. There are declarations and obligations
outlined in said Principles which are not reflective of the
current state of international law, and do not find basis in
any of the sources of international law enumerated under
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice. Petitioner has not undertaken any objective and
rigorous analysis of these alleged principles of
international law to ascertain their true status. Ang
Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
190582, April 8, 2010.
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Public Officers
Condonation doctrine; applicability to appointive
officials.
Petitioners urge this Court to expand the settled doctrine
of condonation to cover coterminous appointive officials
who were administratively charged along with the
reelected official/appointing authority with infractions
allegedly committed during their preceding term.
The Court rejects petitioners’ thesis.
More than 60 years ago, the Court in Pascual v. Hon.
Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija issued the landmark
ruling that prohibits the disciplining of an elective official
for a wrongful act committed during his immediately
preceding term of office. The Court explained that “[t]he
underlying theory is that each term is separate from
other terms, and that the reelection to office operates as
a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to the
extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor.”
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts
done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise
would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their
officers. When the people elect[e]d a man to office, it
must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his
life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave
his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It
is not for the court, by reason of such faults or
misconduct[,] to practically overrule the will of the
people. (underscoring supplied)
Lizares v. Hechanova, et al. replicated the doctrine. The
Court dismissed the petition in that case for being moot,
the therein petitioner “having been duly reelected, is no
longer amenable to administrative sanctions.”
Ingco v. Sanchez, et al. clarified that the condonation
doctrine does not apply to a criminal case. Luciano v.
The Provincial Governor, et al., Olivarez v. Judge Villaluz,
and Aguinaldo v. Santos echoed the qualified rule that
reelection of a public official does not bar prosecution for
crimes committed by him prior thereto.
Consistently, the Court has reiterated the doctrine in a
string of recent jurisprudence including two cases
involving a Senator and a Member of the House of
Representatives.
Salalima v. Guingona, Jr. and Mayor Garcia v. Hon.
Mojica reinforced the doctrine. The condonation rule was
applied even if the administrative complaint was not filed
before the reelection of the public official, and even if the
alleged misconduct occurred four days before the
elections, respectively. Salalimadid not distinguish as to
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the date of filing of the administrative complaint, as long
as the alleged misconduct was committed during the
prior term, the precise timing or period of which Garcia
did not further distinguish, as long as the wrongdoing
that gave rise to the public official’s culpability was
committed prior to the date of reelection.
Petitioners’ theory is not novel.
A parallel question was involved in Civil Service
Commission v. Sojor where the Court found no basis to
broaden the scope of the doctrine of condonation.
Contrary to petitioners’ asseveration, the non-application
of the condonation doctrine to appointive officials does
not violate the right to equal protection of the law.
In the recent case of Quinto v. Commission on Elections,
the Court applied the four-fold test in an equal protection
challenge against the resign-to-run provision, wherein it
discussed the material and substantive distinctions
between elective and appointive officials that could well
apply to the doctrine of condonation.
The electorate’s condonation of the previous
administrative infractions of the reelected official cannot
be extended to that of the reappointed coterminous
employees, the underlying basis of the rule being to
uphold the will of the people expressed through the
ballot. In other words, there is neither subversion of the
sovereign will nor disenfranchisement of the electorate to
speak of, in the case of reappointed coterminous
employees.
It is the will of the populace, not the whim of one person
who happens to be the appointing authority, that could
extinguish an administrative liability. Since petitioners
hold appointive positions, they cannot claim the mandate
of the electorate. The people cannot be charged with the
presumption of full knowledge of the life and character of
each and every probable appointee of the elective official
ahead of the latter’s actual reelection.
Moreover, the unwarranted expansion of the Pascual
doctrine would set a dangerous precedent as it would, as
respondents posit, provide civil servants, particularly
local government employees, with blanket immunity from
administrative liability that would spawn and breed abuse
in the bureaucracy. Atty. Vicente E. Salumbides, Jr., et
al. vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al., G.R. No. 180917,
April 23, 2010.
Public office; public trust.
Unlike private offices which are held largely on the
dictates of market forces, public offices are public trust.
Public officers are tasked to serve the public interest,
thus the excessive burden for their retention in the form
of numerous prohibitions. The liberal evidentiary
standard of substantial evidence and the freedom of
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administrative proceedings from technical niceties
effectuate the fiduciary nature of public office: they are
procedural mechanisms assuring ease in maintaining an
efficient bureaucracy, free of rent-seeking officials who
exploit government processes to raise easy money.
Respondent’s hold on his item at the Mandaue City
revenue office, which, like our customs offices, is a
common situs for corrupt activities, is no more lasting
than his fidelity to his trust. Although no criminal verdict
deprives respondent of his liberty, adequate evidence
justifies his removal from the bureaucracy for forfeiting
the public trust. Hon. Primo C. Miro, etc. vs. Reynaldo M.
Dosono, G.R. No. 170697, April 30, 2010.
May 2010 CASES
Agrarian reform; coverage.
Lands acquired by the National Housing Authority for
resettlement purposes or housing development are
exempt from the coverage of agrarian reform laws. Such
acquisition converts the land by operation of law from
agricultural to residential. The National Housing
Authority is not bound to pay disturbance compensation
to any tenant in possession of the purchased
land. National Housing Authority vs. Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, et al., G.R. No.
175200, May 4, 2010.
Agrarian reform; just compensation.
In computing just compensation for rice lands tenanted
as of October 21, 1972, the grant of 6% yearly interest
under DAR Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994,
as amended, must be reckoned from October 21, 1972
up to the time of actual payment of the compensation,
and not only up to the time the Land Bank of the
Philippines approves payment of the compensation and
deposits the amount in the name of the landowner,
considering that release of such deposit is still subject to
compliance with documentary requirements. The concept
of just compensation embraces not only the correct
determination of the amount to be paid to the owner of
the land, but also payment within a reasonable time from
its taking. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Domingo and
Mamerto Soriano, G.R. No. 180772 & G.R. No. 180776,
May 6, 2010.
Commission on Elections; registration of party
coalition.
Comelec may not, through a resolution setting the
deadline for registration of political parties, differentiate
between political parties, on the one hand, and political
organizations and coalitions, on the other. There is no
substantial distinction among these entities germane to
the act of registration that would justify creating
distinctions among them in terms of deadlines. Thus,
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Comelec Resolution No. 8646, dated July 14, 2009, which
sets August 17, 2009 as the deadline for filing petitions
for registration of political parties, without mentioning
political organizations and coalitions, should be
understood as covering the latter entities as well. A
petition for registration as a political coalition filed
beyond that deadline is time-barred, and the Comelec
resolution granting that petition constitutes grave abuse
of discretion.
Political coalitions, even if composed of registered
political parties, need to register separately in accordance
with established norms and procedures, if they are to be
recognized as such and be given the benefits accorded by
law to registered coalitions. Registered political parties
carry a different legal personality from that of the
coalition they may wish to establish with other registered
parties. If parties want to coalesce with one another
without the formal registration of their coalition, they can
do so on their own in the exercise of their and their
members’ democratic freedom of choice, but they cannot
receive official recognition for their coalition. Liberal
Party, etc. et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R.
No. 191771, May 6, 2010.
Electoral tribunals; grave abuse of discretion.
The Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to review decisions and
orders of electoral tribunals is exercised only upon
showing of grave abuse of discretion committed by the
tribunal; otherwise, the Court will not interfere with the
tribunal’s exercise of its discretion and
jurisdiction. There was no grave abuse of discretion
when the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal ordered to continue the revision and
appreciation of ballots after the case had been submitted
for resolution and when it issued its decisions without the
participation of any of the Justices of the Court
who were members of that tribunal. Henry “Jun” Dueñas,
Jr. vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, et al.,
G.R. No. 191550, May 4, 2010.
Province; requirements for creation.
Section 10 of Article X of the Constitution mandates that
the criteria in the Local Government Code must be
followed in the creation of a province. Any derogation of
or deviation from those criteria violates the
Constitution. Thus, a law creating a province, which
failed to comply with either the population or territorial
requirement of the Local Government Code, is
unconstitutional. The Court can pass upon the validity of
such law even if the province it created has begun its
existence. Rodolfo G. Navarro, et al. vs. Executive
Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 180050, May
12, 2010.
Right to information; duty to disclose.
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Comelec has the duty and can be compelled to explain
fully its preparations for the May 10, 2010 elections
under Section 7 of Article III of the Constitution on the
people’s right to information and Section 28 of Article II
on the State’s corresponding duty of full public disclosure
of all transactions involving public interest. Any citizen
can file a petition for mandamus if the same is anchored
on the people’s right to information. Teofisto Guingona,
Jr. et al. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 191846,
May 6, 2010.
JUNE 2010 CASES
Administrative cases; quantum of evidence.
In administrative cases, the quantum of evidence
necessary to find an individual administratively liable is
substantial evidence. Substantial evidence does not
necessarily mean preponderant proof as required in
ordinary civil cases, but such kind of relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion or evidence commonly accepted by reasonably
prudent men in the conduct of their affairs. The evidence
upon which respondent’s administrative liability would be
anchored lacked that degree of certainty required in
administrative cases, because the two separate audits
conducted by the Commission on Audit yielded conflicting
results. Evidence of shortage in respondent’s cash and
accounts, as alleged in the first audit report, is
imperative to hold him liable. In this case, the evidence
against respondent could not be relied upon, because the
second audit report, which was favorable to him,
necessarily puts into question the reliability of the initial
audit findings. Whether the zero balance as appearing in
the second audit report was correct or inadvertently
indicated, the credibility and accuracy of the two audit
reports were already tarnished. Even in administrative
cases, a degree of moral certainty is necessary to support
a finding of liability. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas)
vs. Rodolfo Zaldarriaga, G.R. No. 175349, June 22, 2010.
Agrarian cases; just compensation.
The taking of property under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL) is a government exercise of the
power of eminent domain. Since the determination of
just compensation in eminent domain proceedings is a
judicial function, a court proceeding to fix just
compensation cannot be made to depend on the
existence of, and is considered separate and independent
from, an administrative case of a similar nature. Thus,
the filing by the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) of a
new petition for judicial determination of just
compensation after the dismissal without prejudice of
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another LBP-initiated court proceeding on the same issue
cannot be regarded as barred by the filing of the latter
proceeding beyond the 15-day period prescribed under
Rule XIII, Section 11 of the Rules of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). Although
the formula for fixing just compensation found in Section
17 of the CARL may be justly adopted in certain cases, it
is by no means the only formula that the court may
adopt in determining just compensation. Land Bank of
the Philippines vs. Fortune Savings and Loan Association,
Inc., represented by Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation, G.R. No. 177511, June 29, 2010.
Due process; local autonomy; police power.
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Administrative
Order No. 01-02, as amended, which sets out rules on
land use conversion, does not violate the due process
clause, because in providing administrative and criminal
penalties, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform simply
implements the provisions of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law and the Agriculture and Fisheries
Modernization Act, both of which provide penalties for
illegal land conversion. Contrary to petitioner’s
assertions, the penalties provided under DAR AO No. 01-
02 are imposed upon the illegal or premature conversion
of lands within DAR’s jurisdiction.
In providing that reclassification of agricultural lands by
local government units (LGUs) shall be subject to the
requirements of, and procedures for, land use
conversion, including DAR approval or clearance, DAR AO
No. 01-02 did not violate the autonomy of the LGUs. The
power of LGUs to reclassify agricultural lands is not
absolute, and the Local Government Code recognizes the
authority of DAR to approve conversion of agricultural
lands. DAR Memorandum No. 88, which temporarily
suspended the processing and approval of all land use
conversion applications, is a valid exercise of police
power, as it was issued upon the instruction of the
President in order to address the unabated conversion of
prime agricultural lands for real estate development
because of the worsening rice shortage in the country at
that time. Such measure was made in order to ensure
that there are enough agricultural lands in which rice
cultivation and production may be carried into. Chamber
of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. vs. The
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 183409, June 18,
2010.
Jurisdiction over election cases; administrative
regulation; substitution of party-list nominees.
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over a controversy in
which the petitioner is seeking to be seated as the
second nominee of a party-list group on the basis that
the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued
a resolution approving that group’s withdrawal of his
nomination and substitution by another nominee. Such
controversy is neither an election protest nor an action
for quo warranto, both of which are within the jurisdiction
of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.
Petitioner correctly brought before the Supreme Court
this special civil action for certiorari under Section 7 of
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Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the
proclamation of, and assumption of office by, the
substitute nominee.
The COMELEC exceeded its authority when it issued an
implementing regulation allowing a party-list nominee to
be substituted when his nomination is withdrawn by his
party, because the statutory provision (Section 8 of the
Party-List System Act) that such regulation seeks to
implement provides an exclusive list of instances in which
a party-list organization can substitute its nominees, and
the above ground for substitution is not one of those
instances. It is basic that implementing rules and
regulations should remain consistent with, and cannot
override or modify, the law they intend to carry out. Luis
K. Lokin, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, et al./Luis K.
Lokin, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, et al. G.R. Nos.
179431-32/G.R. No. 180443. June 22, 2010.
Party list; Qualifications of party-list nominees.
The provision in Section 9 of Republic Act No. 7941 (The
Party-List System Act) that a nominee of the youth sector
must be at least 25 but not more than 30 years of age on
the day of the election applies to all youth sector
nominees of any party-list group. Public respondent
erroneously interpreted that provision as applying only to
those nominated during the first three congressional
terms after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution or
until 1998, unless a sectoral party is thereafter registered
exclusively as representing the youth sector.
Section 15 of RA 7941 provides that a nominee of a
sectoral party who changes his sectoral affiliation within
the same party is not eligible for nomination under the
new sectoral affiliation unless such change occurred at
least six months before the elections. There is no textual
support in the law for public respondent’s argument that
Section 15 does not apply to private respondent’s shift of
affiliation from his party’s youth sector to its sector
representing overseas Filipino workers and their families
on the basis that there was no resultant change in party
affiliation. Section 15 clearly covers changes in both
political party and sectoral affiliation within the same
party. Milagros E. Amores vs. House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal and Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva. G.R.
No. 189600, June 29, 2010.
Philippine Economic Zone Authority; jurisdiction
over building and fencing permits.
By specific provision of law, it is the Philippine Economic
Zone Authority (PEZA), through its building officials,
which has authority to issue building permits for the
construction of structures within the areas owned or
administered by it, whether on public or private
lands. Corollary to this, PEZA, through its director
general, may require owners of structures built without
said permit to remove such structures within 60
days. Otherwise, PEZA may summarily remove them at
the expense of the owner of the houses, buildings or
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structures. Considering that, in this case, a fencing
permit is issued complementary to a building permit and
that, within its premises, PEZA may properly issue a
building permit, it is only fitting that fencing permits be
issued by PEZA within such premises. Philippine
Economic Zone Authority vs. Joseph Jude Carantes, et
al., G.R. No. 181274, June 23, 2010.
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation;
power to grant casino licenses in economic zones.
The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR) draws its authority and power to operate,
license and regulate casinos from its charter, Presidential
Decree No. 1869, and not from Section 5 of Executive
Order No. 80, dated April 3, 1993 (which extended to the
Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ) all applicable
incentives granted to the Subic Bay Special Economic
Zone), in relation to Section 13 of Republic Act No. 7227,
which created the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority and
empowered it to license tourism related activities except
casinos which shall continue to be licensed by
PAGCOR. Thus, PAGCOR did not lose its power to license
and regulate casinos when the Supreme Court nullified
Section 5 of EO 80. It incorrectly argued that such
nullification automatically invalidated its memorandum of
agreement with respondent for the operation of a casino
inside the CSEZ. It cannot therefore, on the basis of that
position, revoke such memorandum of agreement and
replace it with its new Standard Authority to Operate.
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation vs.
Fontana Development Corporation, G.R. No. 187972,
June 29, 2010.
Presidential Commission on Good Government;
power to grant immunity.
The scope of immunity that the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG) may offer to witnesses
under Section 5 of Executive Order No. 14 may vary. It
has discretion to grant appropriate levels of criminal
immunity depending on the situation of the witness and
his relative importance to the prosecution of ill-gotten
wealth cases. It can even agree to conditions expressed
by the witness as sufficient to induce cooperation. In
petitioner’s case, respondent Republic of the Philippines,
acting through the PCGG, offered him not only criminal
and civil immunity but also immunity against being
compelled to testify in any domestic or foreign
proceeding, other than the civil and arbitration cases
identified in the Immunity Agreement, just so he would
agree to testify. Trusting in the Government’s honesty
and fidelity, petitioner agreed and fulfilled his part of the
bargain. Surely, the principle of fair play, which is the
essence of due process, should hold the Republic on to its
promise. The immunity from criminal or civil prosecution
that Section 5 of EO 14 authorizes covers immunity from
giving evidence in a case before a court of law, because
in reality the guarantee given to a witness against being
compelled to testify constitutes a grant of immunity from
civil or criminal prosecution. Jesus P. Disini vs. The
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Honorable Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 180564, June
22, 2010.
Standing to sue.
Petitioner’s citizenship and taxpayer status do not
automatically clothe him with standing to bring suit. The
Supreme Court will grant access to citizen’s suits on the
narrowest of ground: when they raise issues of
transcendental importance calling for urgent
resolution. Three factors are relevant in the Court’s
determination to allow third party suits so it can resolve
the merits of the crucial issues raised – the character of
funds or assets involved in the controversy; a clear
disregard of constitutional or statutory prohibition; and
the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific
interest to bring the suit. Petitioner’s suspension from the
practice of law bars him from performing any activity, in
or out of court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. Preparing a petition raising carefully crafted
arguments on equal protection grounds and employing
highly legalistic rules of statutory construction falls within
the proscribed conduct. Allan F. Paguia vs. Office of the
President, et al., G.R. No. 176278, June 25, 2010.
Warrantless search; arrest without warrant.
The search of a moving vehicle is one of the doctrinally
accepted exceptions to the Constitutional mandate that
no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a
warrant issued by a judge after personally determining
the existence of probable cause. In the instances the
Supreme Court has recognized as exceptions to the
requirement of a judicial warrant, it is necessary that the
officer effecting the seizure must have been impelled to
do so because of probable cause. The essential requisite
of probable cause must be satisfied before a warrantless
search can be lawfully conducted. The vehicle that carried
the contraband or prohibited drugs was about to
leave. The searching officer had to make a quick decision
and act fast. It would be unreasonable to require him to
procure a warrant before conducting the search under
the circumstances. He only had enough time to board
the vehicle before the same left for its destination. Given
the above, and the fact that the officer had probable
cause to search the packages allegedly containing illegal
drugs, the search in this case was valid. A search
substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can
precede the arrest if the police has probable cause to
make the arrest at the outset of the search. Given that
the search was valid, appellant’s arrest based on that
search was also valid. People of the Philippines vs. Belen
Mariacos, G.R. No. 188611, June 16, 2010.
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JULY 2010 CASES
Agrarian reform; coverage.
Lands that are not directly, actually and exclusively used
for pasture nor devoted to commercial livestock raising
are not excluded from the coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. A.Z. Arnaiz
Realty, Inc. vs. Office of the President. G.R. No. 170623,
July 7, 2010.
Certificate of candidacy; residency requirement.
The Omnibus Election Code provides that a certificate of
candidacy may be denied due course or cancelled if there
is any false representation of a material fact. The critical
material facts are those that refer to a candidate’s
qualifications for elective office, such as his or her
citizenship and residence. The false representation must
be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a
fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.
Given the purpose of the requirement, it must be made
with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the
would-be candidate’s qualifications for public
office. Thus, the misrepresentation cannot be the result
of a mere innocuous mistake, and cannot exist in a
situation where the intent to deceive is patently absent,
or where no deception on the electorate results. The
foregoing are the legal standards by which the COMELEC
must act on a petition to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy. Thus, in considering the
residency of a candidate as stated in the certificate of
candidacy, the COMELEC must determine whether or not
the candidate deliberately attempted to mislead,
misinform or hide a fact about his or her residency that
would otherwise render him or her ineligible for the
position sought. The COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in this case when, in considering the residency
issue, it based its decision solely on very personal and
subjective assessment standards, such as the nature or
design and furnishings of the dwelling place in relation to
the stature of the candidate. Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra vs.
Commission on Elections, et al. G.R. No. 191938, July 2,
2010.
Citizenship; election and constructive registration.
The statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship
are the following: (1) a statement of election under oath;
(2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and
Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the
statement of election and of the oath with the nearest
civil registry. Here, petitioners complied with the first
and second requirements upon reaching the age of
majority. However, registration of the documents of
election with the civil registry was done belatedly. Under
the facts peculiar to the petitioners, the right to elect
Philippine citizenship has not been lost and they should
be allowed to complete the statutory requirements for
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such election. Their exercise of suffrage, being elected to
public office, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the
Philippines, and other similar acts showing exercise of
Philippine citizenship do not on their own take the place
of election of citizenship. But where, as here, the
election of citizenship has in fact been done and
documented within the constitutional and statutory
timeframe, registration of the documents of election
beyond the timeframe should be allowed if in the
meanwhile positive acts of citizenship have been done
publicly, consistently and continuously. These acts
constitute constructive registration. In other words, the
actual exercise of Philippine citizenship for over half a
century by the petitioners is actual notice to the
Philippine public, which is equivalent to formal
registration of the election of Philippine citizenship. It is
not the registration of the act of election, although a valid
requirement under Commonwealth Act No. 625, that will
confer Philippine citizenship on the petitioners. It is only
a means of confirming the fact that citizenship has been
claimed. Having a Filipino mother is permanent. It is the
basis of the right of the petitioners to elect Philippine
citizenship. Petitioners elected Philippine citizenship in
form and substance. The failure to register the election
in the civil registry should not defeat that election and
negate the permanent fact that petitioners have a Filipino
mother. The lacking requirements may still be complied
with subject to the imposition of appropriate
administrative penalties, if any. The documents
petitioners submitted supporting their allegations that
they have registered with the civil registry, although
belatedly, should be examined for validation purposes by
the appropriate agency, in this case the Bureau of
Immigration. Other requirements embodied in the
administrative orders and other issuances of the Bureau
of Immigration and the Department of Justice must be
complied with within a reasonable time. Balgamelo
Cabiling Ma, et al. vs. Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez,
Jr., et al. G.R. No. 183133, July 26, 2010.
Double jeopardy; elements.
Following are the elements of double jeopardy: (1) the
complaint or information was sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the court had
jurisdiction; (3) the accused had been arraigned and had
pleaded; and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted,
or the case was dismissed without his express
consent. These elements are present in this case. The
information filed in each of the criminal cases against
respondent was sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction. The regional trial court had
jurisdiction over these cases. The respondent was
arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty. The court
dismissed both cases on a demurrer to evidence on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence, which amounts to an
acquittal from which no appeal can be had as that would
place respondent in double jeopardy. People of the
Philippines vs. Dante Tan. G.R. No. 167526, July 26,
2010.
Double jeopardy; exceptions.
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The rule on double jeopardy is not without exceptions.
Double jeopardy will not attach when the trial court acted
with grave abuse of discretion, or when the prosecution
was denied due process. Here, the prosecution was
given more than ample opportunity to present its
case. No grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to
the trial court simply because it chose not to hold in
abeyance the resolution of the demurrer to evidence filed
by the accused. While it would have been ideal for the
trial court to hold in abeyance the resolution of the
demurrer to evidence, nowhere in the rules is it
mandated to do so. Furthermore, even if the Supreme
Court were to consider the same as an error on the part
of the trial court, the same would merely constitute an
error of procedure or of judgment and not an error of
jurisdiction. Errors or irregularities, which do not render
the proceedings a nullity, will not defeat a plea of double
jeopardy. People of the Philippines vs. Dante Tan. G.R.
No. 167526, July 26, 2010.
Due process; administrative proceedings.
Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not
always, and in all situations, require a trial-type
proceeding. Litigants may be heard through pleadings,
written explanations, position papers, memoranda or oral
arguments. The standard of due process that must be
met in administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of
latitude as long as fairness is not ignored. It is, therefore,
not legally objectionable for violating due process for an
administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on
position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence
submitted by the parties. Even if no formal hearing took
place, it is not sufficient ground for petitioner to claim
that due process was not afforded it. In this case,
petitioner was given all the opportunity to prove and
establish its claim that the properties were excluded from
the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program. Petitioner actively participated in the
proceedings by submitting various pleadings and
documentary evidence. It filed motions for
reconsideration of every unfavorable outcome in all tiers
of the administrative and judicial processes. The essence
of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or,
as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity
to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek for a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of. Any seeming defect in its observance is cured by the
filing of a motion for reconsideration. Denial of due
process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who
has had the opportunity to be heard on his motion for
reconsideration. A.Z. Arnaiz Realty, Inc. vs. Office of the
President. G.R. No. 170623, July 7, 2010.
Exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
requires that where a remedy before an administrative
agency is provided, the administrative agency concerned
must be given the opportunity to decide a matter within
its jurisdiction before an action is brought before the
courts. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is a
Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!
ground for dismissal of the action. In this case, however,
the doctrine does not apply because petitioners failed to
demonstrate that recourse to the Commission on Higher
Education is mandatory – or even possible – in an action
such as that brought by the respondent, which is
essentially one for mandamus and damages. The
doctrine admits of numerous exceptions, one of which is
where the issues are purely legal and well within the
jurisdiction of the trial court, as in the present
case. Petitioners’ liability, if any, for damages will have
to be decided by the courts, since any judgment
inevitably calls for the application and the interpretation
of the Civil Code. As such, exhaustion of administrative
remedies may be dispensed with. University of Santo
Tomas, et al. vs. Danes B. Sanchez. G.R. No. 165569.
July 29, 2010.
Freedom of speech.
Government workers, whatever their rank, have as much
right as any person in the land to voice out their protests
against what they believe to be a violation of their rights
and interests. Civil Service does not deprive them of
their freedom of expression. It would be unfair to hold
that by joining the government service, the members
thereof have renounced or waived this basic liberty. This
freedom can be reasonably regulated only but can never
be taken away. Thus, Section 5 of Civil Service
Commission Resolution No. 02-1316, which regulates the
political rights of those in the government service,
provides that the concerted activity or mass action
proscribed must be coupled with the “intent of effecting
work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize
their demands of force concession.” Such limitation or
qualification in the above rule is intended to temper and
focus the application of the prohibition, as not all
collective activity or mass undertaking of government
employees is prohibited. Otherwise, government
employees would be deprived of their constitutional right
to freedom of expression. Respondents’ act of wearing
similarly colored shirts, attending a public hearing for just
over an hour at the office of the GSIS Investigation Unit,
bringing with them recording gadgets, clenching their
fists, and some even badmouthing the GSIS guards and
GSIS President and General Manager Winston F. Garcia,
are not constitutive of an (i) intent to effect work
stoppage or service disruption and (ii) for the purpose of
realizing their demands of force concession. These
actuations did not amount to a prohibited concerted
activity or mass action. Government Service Insurance
System and Winston F. Garcia vs. Dinnah Villaviza, et al.
G.R. No. 180291, July 27, 2010.
Government agencies; reorganization.
Reorganization in a government agency is valid provided
that it is done in good faith. As a general rule, the test of
good faith is whether or not the purpose of the
reorganization is for economy or to make the
bureaucracy more efficient. Removal from office as a
result of reorganization must pass the test of good
faith. A demotion in office, i.e., the movement from one
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position to another involving the issuance of an
appointment with diminution in duties, responsibilities,
status or rank, which may or may not involve a reduction
in salary, is tantamount to removal, if no cause is shown
for it. Consequently, before a demotion may be effected
pursuant to reorganization, the observance of the rules
on bona fide abolition of public office is essential. There
was no demotion in this case because petitioner was
appointed to a position comparable to her former
position. In fact, her new position entailed an increase in
her salary grade from 20 to 24. There is, thus, no
evidence to suggest that the Development Bank of the
Philippines acted in bad faith. Virginia D. Bautista vs.
Civil Service Commission and Development Bank of the
Philippines. G.R. No. 185215, July 22, 2010.
Government contracts; perfection.
Contracts to which the government is a party are
generally subject to the same laws and regulations that
govern the validity and sufficiency of contracts between
private individuals. A government contract, however, is
perfected only upon approval of competent authority,
where such approval is required. With respect to
contracts of government-owned and controlled
corporations, the provisions of existing laws are clear in
requiring the governing board’s approval thereof. For the
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), its charter (Presidential
Decree 857) vests the general manager with power to
sign contracts and to perform such other duties as the
Board of Directors may assign. Therefore, unless the
Board validly authorizes the general manager, the latter
cannot bind PPA to a contract. The authority of
government officials to represent the government in any
contract must proceed from an express provision of law
or valid delegation of authority. Without such actual
authority being possessed by PPA’s general manager,
there could be no real consent, much less a perfected
contract, to speak of. A notice of award signed by the
general manager does not embody a perfected contract
without the PPA Board’s prior approval of the
contract. Sargasso Construction & Development
Corporation, et al. vs. Philippine Ports Authority. G.R. No.
170530, July 5, 2010.
Local governments; authority of local chief
executive.
Under Section 444(b)(1)(iv) of the Local Government
Code, a municipal mayor is required to secure the prior
authorization of the Sangguniang Bayan (municipal
council) before entering into a contract on behalf of the
municipality. In this case, the Sangguniang Bayan of
Tiwi unanimously passed Resolution No. 15-92
authorizing the Mayor to hire a lawyer of her choice to
represent the interest of Tiwi in the execution of this
Court’s Decision in another case. Such authority
necessarily carried with it the power to negotiate,
execute and sign on behalf of Tiwi the Contract of Legal
Services. That the authorization did not set the terms
and conditions of the compensation of the lawyer
signifies that the council empowered the Mayor to reach
Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!
a mutually agreeable arrangement with the lawyer of her
choice subject to the general limitation that the
contractual stipulations should not be contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy, and,
considering that this is a contract of legal services, to the
added restriction that the agreed attorney’s fees must
not be unreasonable and unconscionable. On its face,
and there is no allegation to the contrary, the prior
authorization given under Resolution No. 15-92 appears
to have been given by the council in good faith in order
to expeditiously safeguard the rights of Tiwi. Thus, there
is nothing objectionable to this manner of prior
authorization, and the Mayor was sufficiently authorized
to enter into said Contract of Legal Services. Such
contract need not be ratified first by the Sangguniang
Bayan to be enforceable against Tiwi. The law speaks of
prior authorization and not ratification with respect to the
power of the local chief executive to enter into a contract
on behalf of the local government unit. That authority
was granted by the Sangguniang Bayan to the Mayor
under Resolution No. 15-92. Municipality of Tiwi,
represented by Hon. Mayor Jiame C. Villanueva and
Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi Vs. Antonio B. Betito, G.R.
No. 171873, July 9, 2010.
Municipal ordinance; deed of restrictions.
While a zoning ordinance can override the deed of
restrictions on the use of a property on the basis of the
municipality’s exercise of police power, the Court will
reconcile seemingly opposing provisions in the deed of
restrictions and the zoning ordinance rather than nullify
one or the other, particularly where, as here, the
continued enforcement of the deed of restrictions is
reasonable and the municipality was not asserting any
interest or zoning purpose contrary to the interest of the
subdivision developer that is seeking to enforce the deed
of restrictions. The Learning Child, Inc., et al. vs. Ayala
Alabang Village Association, et al./Jose Marie V. Aquino,
minor and represented by his parents Dr. Errol Aquino
and Atty. Marilyn Aquino, et al. vs. Ayala Alabang Village
Association, et al./Ayala Alabang Village Association, et
al. vs. Municipality of Muntinlupa, et al. G.R. No.
134269/G.R. No. 134440/G.R. No. 144518, July 7, 2010.
Ombudsman; jurisdiction.
The primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate
any act or omission of a public officer or employee
applies only in cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan. In cases cognizable by regular courts,
the Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with other
investigative agencies of government. Republic Act No.
8249 (Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan) limits the cases that are cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan to public officials occupying positions
corresponding to salary grade 27 and higher. The
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over private
respondent who, as punong barangay, is occupying a
position corresponding to salary grade 14. Under the
Local Government Code, the sangguniang bayan has
disciplinary authority over any elective barangay
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official. Clearly, therefore, the Ombudsman has
concurrent jurisdiction with the sangguniang bayan over
administrative cases against elective barangay officials
occupying positions below salary grade 27, such as
private respondent in this case. In administrative cases
involving the concurrent jurisdiction of two or more
disciplining authorities, the body in which the complaint
is filed first, and which opts to take cognizance of the
case, acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of other
tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction. In this case,
since the complaint was filed first in the Ombudsman,
and the Ombudsman opted to assume jurisdiction over
the complaint, the Ombudsman’s exercise of jurisdiction
is to the exclusion of the sangguniang bayan exercising
concurrent jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is a matter of law.
Jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon the instance
of the parties but continues until the case is
terminated. When complainants first filed the complaint
in the Ombudsman, jurisdiction was already vested on
the latter. Jurisdiction could no longer be transferred to
the sangguniang bayan by virtue of a subsequent
complaint filed by the same complainants. As a final
note, under Section 60 of the Local Government Code,
the sangguniang bayan has no power to remove an
elective barangay official. Apart from the Ombudsman,
only a proper court may do so. Unlike the sangguniang
bayan, the Ombudsman’s powers are not merely
recommendatory. The Ombudsman is clothed with
authority to directly remove an erring public official other
than officials who may be removed only by
impeachment. Office of the Ombudsman vs. Rolson
Rodriquez. G.R. No. 172700, July 23, 2010.
Primary jurisdiction; Commission on Higher
Education.
The rule on primary jurisdiction applies only where the
administrative agency exercises quasi-judicial or
adjudicatory functions. Petitioners have not shown that
the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) has power
to “investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts,
hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw
conclusions.” Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7722 (the
Higher Education Act of 1994), which enumerates the
powers and functions of CHED) does not contain any
express grant to CHED of judicial or quasi-judicial power.
In any event, CHED has no authority to adjudicate an
action for damages. University of Santo Tomas, et al. vs.
Danes B. Sanchez. G.R. No. 165569. July 29, 2010.
Public lands; registration.
All lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion
presumptively belong to the State. Public lands not
shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable
agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the
State remain part of the inalienable public domain. The
onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the
presumption that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable or disposable rests with the
applicant. A notation on the advanced survey plan
stating in effect that the subject property is alienable and
Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!
disposable is not sufficient to establish the actual legal
classification of the disputed lot. It is not the kind of
evidence required by law to establish that the land is
alienable and disposable. The approved survey plan
merely identifies the property preparatory to a judicial
proceeding for adjudication of title. Republic of the
Philippines vs. Domingo Espinosa. G.R. No. 176885, July
5, 2010.
Public officers; demotion.
There is demotion when an employee is appointed to a
position resulting in diminution of duties, responsibilities,
status or rank, which may or may not involve a reduction
in salary. Where an employee is appointed to a position
with the same duties and responsibilities but with rank
and salary higher than those enjoyed in his previous
position, there is no demotion and the appointment is
valid. In this case, the appointment of petitioner to Bank
Executive Officer II did not constitute a demotion. Her
duties and responsibilities as Account Officer (her
previous position) and as BEO II are practically the
same. Rather than lowering her rank and salary,
petitioner’s appointment as BEO II had, in fact, resulted
in an increase thereof from salary grade 20 to
24. Further, her appointment to BEO II was done in
good faith and pursuant to a valid
reorganization. Virginia D. Bautista vs. Civil Service
Commission and Development Bank of the Philippines.
G.R. No. 185215, July 22, 2010.
Review of COMELEC Decision.
In light of the Supreme Court’s limited authority to
review findings of fact, it does not ordinarily review in a
certiorari case the COMELEC’s appreciation and
evaluation of evidence. Findings of fact of the COMELEC,
supported by substantial evidence, are final and non-
reviewable. Any misstep by the COMELEC in this regard
generally involves an error of judgment, not of
jurisdiction. In exceptional cases, however, when the
COMELEC’s action on the appreciation and evaluation of
evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point
of being grossly unreasonable, the Supreme Court is not
only obliged, but has the constitutional duty to
intervene. When grave abuse of discretion is present,
resulting errors arising from the grave abuse mutate
from error of judgment to one of jurisdiction. Abraham
Kahlil B. Mitra vs. Commission on Elections, et al. G.R.
No. 191938, July 2, 2010.
Right to information.
Like all constitutional guarantees, the right to
information is not absolute. The people’s right to
information is limited to matters of public concern, and is
further subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law. Similarly, the State’s policy of full disclosure is
limited to transactions involving public interest, and is
subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by
law. National board examinations, such as the certified
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public accountant board examinations, are matters of
public concern. The populace in general, and the
examinees in particular, would understandably be
interested in the fair and competent administration of
these examinations in order to ensure that only those
qualified are admitted into the accounting profession. And
as with all matters pedagogical, these examinations could
be not merely quantitative means of assessment, but
also means to further improve the teaching and learning
of the art and science of accounting. On the other hand,
there may be valid reasons to limit access to the
examination papers in order to properly administer the
tests. More than the mere convenience of the examiner,
it may well be that there exist inherent difficulties in the
preparation, generation, encoding, administration, and
checking of the multiple choice examinations that require
that the questions and answers remain confidential for a
limited duration. However, the Professional Regulation
Commission is not a party to the proceedings. It has not
been given an opportunity to explain the reasons behind
the regulations or articulate the justification for keeping
the examination documents confidential. In view of the
far-reaching implications of the cases, which may impact
on every board examination administered by the
Professional Regulation Commission, and in order that all
relevant issues may be ventilated, the Court remanded
the cases to the Regional Trial Court for further
proceedings. Hazel Ma. C. Antolin vs. Abelardo R.
Domondon, et al./Hazel Ma. C. Antolin vs. Antonieta
Fortuna-Ibe. G.R. No. 165036/G.R. No. 175705, July 5,
2010.
Sanggunian resolution; validity.
A municipal resolution correcting an alleged typographical
error in a zoning ordinance does not have to comply with
the requirements of notice and hearing, which are
required for the validity and effectiveness of zoning
ordinances. The Learning Child, Inc., et al. vs. Ayala
Alabang Village Association, et al./Jose Marie V. Aquino,
minor and represented by his parents Dr. Errol Aquino
and Atty. Marilyn Aquino, et al. vs. Ayala Alabang Village
Association, et al./Ayala Alabang Village Association, et
al. vs. Municipality of Muntinlupa, et al. G.R. No.
134269/G.R. No. 134440/G.R. No. 144518, July 7, 2010.
Standing to sue.
Legal standing refers to a party’s personal and
substantial interest in a case, arising from the direct
injury it has sustained or will sustain as a result of the
challenged governmental action. Legal standing calls for
more than just a generalized grievance. The term
“interest” means a material interest, an interest in issue
affected by the governmental action, as distinguished
from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere
incidental interest. Unless a person’s constitutional rights
are adversely affected by a statute or governmental
action, he has no legal standing to challenge the
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same. In this case, petitioner challenges the
constitutionality of Section 2.6 of the Distribution
Services and Open Access Rules (DSOAR) of the Energy
Regulatory Commission, which obligates residential end-
users to advance the cost of extending power distribution
lines and installing additional facilities. However,
petitioner’s members consist of developers, brokers,
appraisers, contractors, manufacturers, suppliers,
engineers, architects, and other persons or entities
engaged in the housing and real estate business. It does
not question the challenged DSOAR provision as a
residential end-user, and it cannot do so because the
challenged provision refers only to the rights and
obligations of distribution utilities and residential end-
users; neither the petitioner nor its members are
residential end-users. Thus, neither the petitioner nor its
members can claim any injury, as residential end-users,
arising from Section 2.6 of the DSOAR; neither can they
cite any benefit accruing to them as residential end-users
that would result from the invalidation of the assailed
provision. Chamber of Real Estate and Builders’
Association, Inc. Vs. Energy Regulatory Commission, et
al. G.R. No. 174697, July 8, 2010.
Waiver of locus standi rule.
The Court can waive the procedural rule on standing in
cases that raise issues of transcendental
importance. Following are the guidelines in determining
whether or not a matter is of transcendental importance:
(1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in
the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of
a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public
respondent agency or instrumentality of the government;
and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct
and specific interest in the questions being raised. In
this case, the three determinants are absent. Public
funds are not involved. The allegations of constitutional
and statutory violations of the public respondent agency
are unsubstantiated by facts and are mere challenges on
the wisdom of the rules. Parties with a more direct and
specific interest in the questions being raised – the
residential end-users – undoubtedly exist and are not
included as parties to the petition. Chamber of Real
Estate and Builders’ Association, Inc. Vs. Energy
Regulatory Commission, et al. G.R. No. 174697, July 8,
2010.
AUGUST 2010 CASES
Constitutional Law
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Civil Service Commission; jurisdiction. gain back possession. The landowner’s remedy in such
case is an action for the payment of just compensation,
not ejectment. Here, the Court of Appeals erred in
The civil service encompasses all branches and agencies
ordering the eviction of petitioner from the property that
of the Government, including government-owned or
it has held as government school site for more than 50
controlled corporations with original charters, like the
years. The evidence on record shows that the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), or those
respondents intended to cede the property to the City
created by special law. Thus, GSIS employees are part of
Government of Lipa permanently. In fact, they allowed
the civil service system and are subject to the law and to
the city to declare the property in its name for tax
the circulars, rules and regulations issued by the Civil
purposes. And when they sought to have the bigger lot
Service Commission (CSC) on discipline, attendance and
subdivided, the respondents earmarked a specific portion
general terms and conditions of employment. The CSC
for the City Government of Lipa. Under the
has jurisdiction to hear and decide disciplinary cases
circumstances, it may be assumed that the respondents
against erring employees. Winston F. Garcia vs. Mario I.
had agreed to transfer ownership of the land to the
Molina, et al./Winston F. Garcia vs. Mario I. Molina, et al.,
government, whether to the City Government of Lipa or
G.R. No. 157383/G.R. No. 174137, August 18, 2010.
to the Republic of the Philippines, but the parties never
formalized and documented such transfer. Consequently,
Double compensation. petitioner should be deemed entitled to possession
pending the respondents’ formal transfer of ownership to
Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitution provides that it upon payment of just compensation. Republic of the
no elective or appointive public officer or employee shall Philippines vs. Primo Mendoza and Maria Lucero, G.R. No.
receive additional, double or indirect compensation, 185091, August 8, 2010.
unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without
the consent of the Congress, any present emolument, Equal protection clause.
office or title of any kind from any foreign
government. Pensions and gratuities shall not be
There is no substantial distinction between municipalities
considered as additional, double or indirect
with pending cityhood bills in Congress and municipalities
compensation. This provision, however, does not apply to
that did not have similar pending bills for purposes of the
the present case as there was no double compensation to
income requirement for converting a municipality into a
the petitioners. The questioned resolutions of the
city under Republic Act No. 9009. The pendency of such
Monetary Board are valid corporate acts of petitioners
a bill does not affect or determine the level of income of
that became the bases for granting them additional
a municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills
monthly representation and transportation allowance
in Congress might even have lower annual income than
(RATA), as members of the Board of Directors of
municipalities that did not have pending cityhood
Philippine International Convention Center Inc. (PICCI), a
bills. Thus, the classification criterion − mere pendency
government corporation whose sole stockholder is the
of a cityhood bill in Congress − is not rationally related to
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). RATA is distinct from
the purpose of RA 9009, which is to prevent fiscally non-
salary as a form of compensation. Unlike salary which is
viable municipalities from converting into cities.
paid for services rendered, RATA is a form of allowance
Moreover, the fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in
intended to defray expenses deemed unavoidable in the
Congress limits the exemption (from the income
discharge of office. Hence, RATA is paid only to certain
requirement) to a specific condition existing at the time
officials who, by the nature of their offices, incur
of passage of RA 9009. That specific condition will never
representation and transportation expenses. Indeed,
happen again. This violates the requirement that a valid
aside from the RATA that they have been receiving from
classification must not be limited to existing conditions
the BSP, the grant of RATA to each of the petitioners for
only. Also, the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws
every board meeting they attended, in their capacity as
gives the 16 respondent municipalities a unique
members of the Board of Directors of PICCI, in addition
advantage based on an arbitrary date − the filing of
to their per diem, does not violate the constitutional
their cityhood bills before the end of the 11 th Congress –
proscription against double compensation. Gabriel C.
as against all other municipalities that may want to
Singson, et al. vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
convert into cities after the effectiveness of RA 9009.
159355, August 9, 2010.
Lastly, limiting the exemption only to the 16
municipalities violates the Constitutional requirement that
Eminent domain; voluntary agreement by the classification must apply to all those who are similarly
landowner. situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16
respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while
Where the landowner agrees voluntarily to the taking of those 16 municipalities can. Clearly, as worded, the
his property by the government for public use, he exemption found in the Cityhood Laws would be
thereby waives his right to the institution of a formal unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection
expropriation proceeding covering such property. Failure clause. League of Cities of the Philippines represented by
for a long time of the owner to question the lack of LCP National President Jerry P. Trenas, et al. vs.
expropriation proceedings covering a property that the Commission on Elections, et al. G.R. No. 176951/G.R.
government had taken constitutes a waiver of his right to No. 177499/G.R. No. 178056, August 24, 2010.

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Judicial review; justiciable controversy; moot case.
Private respondent was not elected President in the May
10, 2010 election. Since the issue on the proper
interpretation of the phrase “any reelection” in Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution will be premised on a
person’s second (whether immediate or not) election as
President, there is no case or controversy to be resolved
in this case. No live conflict of legal rights exists. There
is in this case no definite, concrete, real or substantial
controversy that touches on the legal relations of parties
having adverse legal interests. No specific relief may
conclusively be decreed upon by the Court in this case
that will benefit any of the parties. As such, one of the
essential requisites for the exercise of the power of
judicial review, the existence of an actual case or
controversy, is sorely lacking in this case. As a rule, the
Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies.
It is not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract
propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which
cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the
case before it. When a case is moot, it becomes non-
justiciable. An action is considered “moot” when it no
longer presents a justiciable controversy because the
issues involved have become academic or dead or when
the matter in dispute has already been resolved and
hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless
the issue is likely to be raised again between the parties.
There is nothing for the Court to resolve as the
determination thereof has been overtaken by subsequent
events. Assuming an actual case or controversy existed
prior to the proclamation of a President who has been
duly elected in the May 10, 2010 election, the same is no
longer true today. Following the results of that election,
private respondent was not elected President for the
second time. Thus, any discussion of his “reelection” will
simply be hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no
useful or practical purpose. Atty. Evillo C. Pormento vs.
Joseph “Erap” Ejercito Estrada and Commission on
Elections. G.R. No. 191988. August 31, 2010.
Operative fact doctrine.
Under the operative fact doctrine, the law is recognized
as unconstitutional but the effects of the unconstitutional
law, prior to its declaration of nullity, may be left
undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. However,
in this case, the minority’s novel theory, invoking the
operative fact doctrine, is that the enactment of the
Cityhood Laws and the functioning of the 16
municipalities as new cities with new sets of officials and
employees operate to constitutionalize the
unconstitutional Cityhood Laws. This novel theory
misapplies the operative fact doctrine and sets a gravely
dangerous precedent. Under the minority’s view, an
unconstitutional law, if already implemented prior to its
declaration of unconstitutionality by the Court, can no
longer be revoked and its implementation must be
continued despite being unconstitutional. This view will
open the floodgates to the wanton enactment of
unconstitutional laws and a mad rush for their immediate
implementation before the Court can declare them
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unconstitutional. This view is an open invitation to
serially violate the Constitution, and be quick about it,
lest the violation be stopped by the Court.
The operative fact doctrine is a rule of equity. As such, it
must be applied as an exception to the general rule that
an unconstitutional law produces no effects. It can never
be invoked to validate as constitutional an
unconstitutional act. The operative fact doctrine never
validates or constitutionalizes an unconstitutional
law. The unconstitutional law remains unconstitutional,
but its effects, prior to its judicial declaration of nullity,
may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair
play. The doctrine affects or modifies only the effects of
the unconstitutional law, not the unconstitutional law
itself. Applying the doctrine to this case, the Cityhood
Laws remain unconstitutional because they violate
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, the
effects of the implementation of the Cityhood Laws prior
to the declaration of their nullity, such as the payment of
salaries and supplies by the concerned local government
units or their issuance of licenses or execution of
contracts, may be recognized as valid and
effective. League of Cities of the Philippines represented
by LCP National President Jerry P. Trenas, et al. vs.
Commission on Elections, et al. G.R. No. 176951/G.R.
No. 177499/G.R. No. 178056, August 24, 2010.
Search warrant; requirements for validity.
The validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests
upon the following factors: (1) it must be issued upon
probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be
determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant
or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable
cause, the judge must examine, under oath or
affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the
latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must
particularly describe the place to be searched and
persons or things to be seized. On the first requisite, a
magistrate’s determination of probable cause for the
issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference by a
reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis
for that determination. Substantial basis means that the
questions of the examining judge brought out such facts
and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed, and the objects in connection with the
offense sought to be seized are in the place sought to be
searched. On the last requirement, a description of the
place to be searched is sufficient if the officer serving the
warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and
identify the place intended and distinguish it from other
places in the community. A designation or description
that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion
of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace
officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of
definiteness. People of the Philippines vs. Estela Tuan y
Baludda. G.R. No. 176066, August 11, 2010.
Warrantless arrest.
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Appellant was arrested during an entrapment operation
where he was caught in flagrante delicto selling
shabu. When an arrest is made during an entrapment
operation, it is not required that a warrant be secured in
line with Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules of
Court, which provides that a peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in
his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment
which in recent years has been accepted as a valid and
effective mode of apprehending drug pushers. If carried
out with due regard for constitutional and legal
safeguards, a buy-bust operation, such as the one
involving appellant, deserves judicial sanction.
Consequently, the warrantless arrest and warrantless
search and seizure conducted on the person of appellant
were allowed under the circumstances. The search,
incident to his lawful arrest, needed no warrant to sustain
its validity. Thus, there is no doubt that the sachets of
shabu recovered during the legitimate buy-bust operation
are admissible and were properly admitted in evidence
against him. People of the Philippines vs. Michael
Sembrano y Castro. G.R. No. 185848, August 16, 2010.
Administrative Law
Administrative agencies; findings.
Findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-
judicial bodies, like the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board, which have acquired expertise
because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters,
are generally accorded respect. In this case, there is no
ground to disturb the DARAB’s findings, which affirmed
those of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board after due hearing and appreciation of the evidence
submitted by both parties. Heirs of Jose M. Cervantes, et
al. vs. Jesus G. Miranda. G.R. No. 183352, August 9,
2010.
Administrative cases; preliminary investigation;
due process.
Section 45 of the Government Service Insurance System
Act of 1997 gives the President and General Manager of
GSIS the authority and responsibility to remove, suspend
or otherwise discipline GSIS personnel for cause.
However, this power is not without limitations for it must
be exercised in accordance with civil service rules. While
the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service (Civil Service Rules) do not specifically provide
that a formal charge issued against a government
employee without the requisite preliminary investigation
is null and void, it is required that, upon receipt of a
complaint which is sufficient in form and substance, the
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disciplining authority shall require the person complained
of to submit a counter-affidavit or comment under oath
within three days from receipt. The use of the word
“shall” quite obviously indicates that it is mandatory for
the disciplining authority to conduct a preliminary
investigation or at least give the respondent the
opportunity to comment and explain his side. This must
be done prior to the issuance of the formal charge, and
the comment required is different from the answer that
may later be filed by respondents. Contrary to
petitioner’s claim, no exception is provided for in the Civil
Service Rules, not even an indictment in flagranti as
claimed by petitioner.
The above rules apply even if the complainant is the
disciplining authority himself, as in this case. To comply
with such requirement, petitioner could have issued a
memorandum requiring respondents to explain why no
disciplinary action should be taken against them instead
of immediately issuing formal charges. With respondents’
comments, petitioner should have properly evaluated
both sides of the controversy before making a conclusion
that there was a prima facie case against respondents,
leading to the issuance of the questioned formal charges.
It is noteworthy that the very acts subject of the
administrative cases stemmed from an event that took
place the day before the formal charges were issued. It
appears, therefore, that the formal charges were issued
after the sole determination by the petitioner as the
disciplining authority that there was a prima facie case
against respondents. To condone this would give the
disciplining authority an unrestricted power to judge by
himself the nature of the act complained of as well as the
gravity of the charges. Thus, respondents here were
denied due process of law. Not even the fact that the
charges against them are serious and evidence of their
guilt is – in the opinion of their superior – strong can
compensate for the procedural shortcut taken by
petitioner. The filing by petitioner of formal charges
against the respondents without complying with the
mandated preliminary investigation or at least giving the
respondents the opportunity to comment violated their
right to due process. Accordingly, the formal charges are
void ab initio and may be assailed directly or indirectly at
anytime. Winston F. Garcia vs. Mario I. Molina, et
al./Winston F. Garcia vs. Mario I. Molina, et al. .G.R. No.
157383/G.R. No. 174137, August 18, 2010.
Administrative cases; decision rendered without
due process.
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of
basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted from their
jurisdiction. The violation of a party’s right to due process
raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be
glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of
the fundamental right to due process is apparent, a
decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for
lack of jurisdiction. This rule is equally true in quasi-
judicial and administrative proceedings, for the
constitutional guarantee that no man shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process is
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unqualified by the type of proceedings (whether judicial
or administrative) where he stands to lose the same.
Although administrative procedural rules are less
stringent and often applied more liberally, administrative
proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental
procedural principles, such as the right to due process in
investigations and hearings. Winston F. Garcia vs. Mario
I. Molina, et al./Winston F. Garcia vs. Mario I. Molina, et
al., G.R. No. 157383/G.R. No. 174137, August 18, 2010.
Administrative cases; quantum of evidence.
In administrative cases, the requisite proof is substantial
evidence, i.e., the amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion. In this case, substantial evidence consisted of
the uniform findings of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources, the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon and the Court of Appeals that petitioner connived
with his co-defendants to destroy the improvements
introduced by respondent on the subject property so they
could construct their own cottages thereon. Josephil C.
Bien vs. Pedro B. Bo, G.R. No. 179333, August 3, 2010.
Public officers; statement of assets and liabilities.
Even an asset that was acquired through chattel
mortgage must be declared and included in the Sworn
Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SSAL). The law
requires that the SSAL be accomplished truthfully and in
detail without distinction as to how the property was
acquired. Respondent, therefore, cannot escape liability
by arguing that the ownership of the vehicle has not yet
passed to him on the basis that it was acquired only on
installment basis. The requirement to file the SSAL not
later than the first 15 days of April at the close of every
calendar year must not be treated as a simple and trivial
routine, but as an obligation that is part and parcel of
every civil servant’s duty to the people. It serves as the
basis of the government and the people in monitoring the
income and lifestyle of officials and employees in the
government in compliance with the Constitutional policy
to eradicate corruption, promote transparency in
government, and ensure that all government employees
and officials lead just and modest lives. It is for this
reason that the SSAL must be sworn to and is made
accessible to the public, subject to reasonable
administrative regulations. Hon. Waldo Q. Flores, et al.
vs. Atty. Antonio F. Montemayor. G.R. No. 170146,
August 25, 2010.
Local Government
Abuse of authority.
Addressing the argument of petitioner, a barangay
official, that there was no abuse of authority because the
incident complained of occurred in another barangay over
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which he has no authority and jurisdiction, the Supreme
Court affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals that
petitioner is liable for abuse of authority on the basis that
he participated in the unlawful act as a higher authority
that gave a semblance of legality over that act and
influenced the actions of his co-defendants. Here,
petitioner was president of the organization of barangay
officials in his municipality and sat as ex-officio member
of the Sangguniang Bayan, which has power to review
barangay ordinances and authority to discipline barangay
officials. His co-defendants were officials in the barangay
where the incident occurred. Josephil C. Bien vs. Pedro B.
Bo, G.R. No. 179333, August 3, 2010.
Creation of local government unit.
The Constitution states that the creation of local
government units must follow the criteria established in
the Local Government Code and not in any other
law. There is only one Local Government Code. The
Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local
Government Code all the criteria necessary for the
creation of a city, including the conversion of a
municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such
criteria in any other law. The clear intent of the
Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and
other political units must follow the same uniform, non-
discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local
Government Code. Any derogation or deviation from the
criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
Republic Act No. 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local
Government Code to increase the income requirement
from Php20 million to Php100 million for the creation of a
city. This law took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence, from
that moment the Local Government Code required that
any municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy
the Php100 million income requirement. Section 450 of
the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009,
does not contain any exemption from this income
requirement. In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not
grant any exemption to respondent municipalities, even
though their cityhood bills were pending in Congress
when Congress passed RA 9009. The laws converting
these municipalities into cities, all enacted after the RA
9009 became effective, explicitly exempt respondent
municipalities from the increased income requirement in
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended
by RA 9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution and is thus patently
unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption must be
written in the Local Government Code and not in any
other law. League of Cities of the Philippines represented
by LCP National President Jerry P. Trenas, et al. vs.
Commission on Elections, et al. G.R. No. 176951/G.R.
No. 177499/G.R. No. 178056, August 24, 2010.
Special Laws
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Agrarian reform; deposit of provisional restriction ceased to be absolute. Land reform

compensation. beneficiaries were allowed to transfer ownership of their
lands provided that their amortizations with the Land
Bank of the Philippines have been paid in full. In this
The amount of provisional compensation that the Land
case, petitioners’ title categorically states that they have
Bank of the Philippines (LBP) is required to deposit in the
fully complied with the requirements for the final grant of
name of the landowner if the latter rejects the offer of
title under PD 27. This means that they have completed
compensation of the Department of Agrarian Reform
payment of their amortizations with Land
(DAR) under Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6657 should
Bank. Consequently, they could already legally transfer
be the LBP’s initial valuation of the land and not, as
their title to another. Heirs of Paulino Atienza vs.
respondent argues, the sum awarded by DAR’s
Domingo P. Espidol, G.R. No. 180665, August 11, 2010.
adjudication bodies as compensation in a summary
administrative proceeding. The deposit of such
provisional compensation must be made even before the Agricultural land; conversion.
summary administrative proceeding commences, or at
least simultaneously with it, once the landowner rejects
Conversion of the subject landholding under the 1980
the initial valuation of the LBP. Such deposit results from
Kasunduan is not the conversion of landholding that is
the landowner’s rejection of the DAR offer (based on the
contemplated by Section 36 of Republic Act No. 3844,
LBP’s initial valuation). Both the conduct of summary
which governs the dispossession of an agricultural lessee
administrative proceeding and deposit of provisional
and the termination of his rights to enjoy and possess the
compensation follow as a consequence of the landowner’s
landholding. Conversion here has been defined as the act
rejection. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Heir of
of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land
Trinidad S. Vda. De Arieta. G.R. No. 161834, August 11,
into some other use as approved by the Department of
2010.
Agrarian Reform. More to the point is that for conversion
to avail as a ground for dispossession, Section 36 implies
Agrarian reform; just compensation. the necessity of prior court proceedings in which the
issue of conversion has been determined and a final
order issued directing dispossession upon that ground. In
Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 is the principal basis
this case, however, respondent does not profess that
for computing just compensation, and the factors set
there had been at any tine such proceedings or that there
forth therein have been translated into a formula outlined
was such court order. Neither does he assert that the lot
in DAR Administrative Order No. 5, series of 1998 (DAR
in question had undergone conversion with authority
AO 5). While the determination of just compensation is
from the Department of Agrarian Reform. Emilia Micking
essentially a judicial function vested in the Regional Trial
Vda. De Coronel, et al. Vs. Miguel Tanjangco, Jr., G.R.
Court acting as a Special Agrarian Court, a judge cannot
No. 170693, August 8, 2010.
abuse his discretion by not taking into full consideration
the factors specifically identified by law and its
implementing rules. Special Agrarian Courts are not at Presidential Anti-Graft Commission; powers.
liberty to disregard the formula laid down in DAR AO 5,
because unless an administrative order is declared
The Court rejected respondent’s contention that he was
invalid, courts have no option but to apply it. Courts
deprived of his right to due process when the Presidential
cannot ignore, without violating the agrarian reform law,
Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) proceeded to investigate
the formula provided by the Department of Agrarian
him on the basis of an anonymous complaint in the
Reform (DAR) for determining just compensation. In this
absence of any documents supporting the complainant’s
case, the court adopted a different formula in
assertions. Section 4(c) of Executive Order No. 12 states
determining the land value by considering the average
that the PAGC has the power to give due course to
between the findings of DAR using the formula laid down
anonymous complaints against presidential appointees if
in Executive Order No. 228 and the market value of the
there appears on the face of the complaint or based on
property as stated in the tax declaration. This is
the supporting documents attached to the anonymous
obviously a departure from the mandate of the law and
complaint a probable cause to engender a belief that the
DAR AO 5. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Rizalina
allegations may be true. The use of the conjunctive word
Gustilo Barrido, et al., G.R. No. 183688, August 18,
“or” in the said provision is determinative since it
2010.
empowers the PAGC to exercise discretion in giving due
course to anonymous complaints. Because of the said
Agrarian reform; sale of land. provision, an anonymous complaint may be given due
course even if the same is without supporting documents,
so long as it appears from the face of the complaint that
Petitioners’ title shows on its face that the government
there is probable cause. Hon. Waldo Q. Flores, et al. vs.
granted title to them on January 9, 1990, by virtue of
Atty. Antonio F. Montemayor. G.R. No. 170146, August
Presidential Decree No. 27. This law explicitly prohibits
25, 2010.
any form of transfer of the land granted under it except
to the government or by hereditary succession to the
successors of the farmer beneficiary. Upon the enactment Water districts; government-owned and controlled
of Executive Order No. 228 in 1987, however, the corporations.

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A local water district is a government-owned and
controlled corporation with special charter since it is
created pursuant to a special law, Presidential Decree No.
198 (1973). PD 198 constitutes the special charter by
virtue of which local water districts exist. Unlike private
corporations that derive their legal existence and power
from the Corporation Code, water districts derive their
legal existence and power from P.D. No. 198. Section 6
of the decree in fact provides that water districts “shall
exercise the powers, rights and privileges given to
private corporations under existing laws, in addition to
the powers granted in, and subject to such restrictions
imposed under this Act.” Therefore, water districts would
not have corporate powers without PD 198. Engr. Ranulfo
C. Feliciano vs. Hon. Cornelio C. Gison. G.R. No. 165641,
August 25, 2010.
SEPTEMBER 2010 CASES
Constitutional Law
Constitutionality; Presidential Proclamation 310;
inalienable lands.
The Court declared as unconstitutional Presidential
Proclamation 310, which took 670 hectares from
petitioner’s registered lands for distribution to indigenous
peoples and cultural communities, on the basis that such
lands are inalienable, being part of the functions of an
educational institution. It did not matter that it was
President Arroyo who, in this case, attempted by
proclamation to appropriate the lands for distribution to
indigenous peoples and cultural communities. The lands
by their character have become inalienable from the
moment President Garcia dedicated them for petitioner’s
use in scientific and technological research in the field of
agriculture. They have ceased to be alienable public
lands. Central Mindanao University, etc. vs. The Hon.
Executive Secretary, et al. G.R. No. 184869, September
21, 2010.
Constitutionality; Retail Trade Liberalization Act of
2000.
The Court dismissed petitioners’ argument that Republic
Act No. 8762, known as the Retail Trade Liberalization
Act of 200, violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution
for the State to develop a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. The
provisions of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, the
declarations of principles and state policies, are not self-
executing. Legislative failure to pursue such policies
cannot give rise to a cause of action in the
courts. Further, while Section 19, Article II of the 1987
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Constitution requires the development of a self-reliant
and independent national economy effectively controlled
by Filipino entrepreneurs, it does not impose a policy of
Filipino monopoly of the economic environment. The
objective is simply to prohibit foreign powers or interests
from maneuvering our economic policies and ensure that
Filipinos are given preference in all areas of
development. The 1987 Constitution takes into account
the realities of the outside world as it requires the pursuit
of a trade policy that serves the general welfare and
utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the
basis of equality and reciprocity; and speaks of industries
which are competitive in both domestic and foreign
markets as well as of the protection of Filipino enterprises
against unfair foreign competition and trade
practices. Thus, while the Constitution mandates a bias
in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises,
it also recognizes the need for business exchange with
the rest of the world on the bases of equality and
reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises
only against foreign competition and trade practices that
are unfair. In other words, the 1987 Constitution does
not rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods, and
services. While it does not encourage their unlimited
entry into the country, it does not prohibit them
either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of
equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign
competition that is unfair. The key, as in all economies in
the world, is to strike a balance between protecting local
businesses and allowing the entry of foreign investments
and services. More important, Section 10, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution gives Congress the discretion to
reserve to Filipinos certain areas of investments upon the
recommendation of the National Economic and
Development Authority and when the national interest
requires. Thus, Congress can determine what policy to
pass and when to pass it depending on the economic
exigencies. It can enact laws allowing the entry of
foreigners into certain industries not reserved by the
Constitution to Filipino citizens. In this case, Congress
has decided to open certain areas of the retail trade
business to foreign investments instead of reserving
them exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The control and regulation of trade in the interest of the
public welfare is of course an exercise of the police power
of the State. A person’s right to property, whether he is
a Filipino citizen or foreign national, cannot be taken from
him without due process of law. In 1954, Congress
enacted the Retail Trade Nationalization Act (RA 1180)
that restricts the retail business to Filipino citizens. In
denying the petition assailing the validity of such Act for
violation of the foreigner’s right to substantive due
process of law, the Supreme Court held that the law
constituted a valid exercise of police power. The State
had an interest in preventing alien control of the retail
trade and R.A. 1180 was reasonably related to that
purpose. That law is not arbitrary. Here, to the extent
that RA 8762 lessens the restraint on the foreigners’ right
to property or to engage in an ordinarily lawful business,
it cannot be said that the law amounts to a denial of the
Filipinos’ right to property and to due process of
law. Filipinos continue to have the right to engage in the
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kinds of retail business to which the law in question has
permitted the entry of foreign investors. Certainly, it is
not within the province of the Court to inquire into the
wisdom of RA 8762 save when it blatantly violates the
Constitution. But as the Court has said, there is no
showing that the law has contravened any constitutional
mandate. The Court is not convinced that the
implementation of RA 8762 would eventually lead to alien
control of the retail trade business. Petitioners have not
mustered any concrete and strong argument to support
its thesis. The law itself has provided strict safeguards
on foreign participation in that business. Representatives
Gerardo S. Espina, et al. vs. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, Jr., et
al. G.R. No. 143855, September 21, 2010.
Constitutionality; standing to sue.
The long settled rule is that he who challenges the
validity of a law must have a standing to do so. Legal
standing or locus standi refers to the right of a party to
come to a court of justice and make such a challenge.
More particularly, standing refers to his personal and
substantial interest in that he has suffered or will suffer
direct injury as a result of the passage of that law. The
party must show that he has been or is about to be
denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully
entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some
burdens or penalties by reason of the law he complains
of. In this case, there is no clear showing that the
implementation of the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of
2000 prejudices petitioners or inflicts damages on them,
either as taxpayers or as legislators. Still the Court will
resolve the question they raise since the rule on standing
can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary
citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when, as here, the
public interest so requires or the matter is of
transcendental importance, of overarching significance to
society, or of paramount public interest. Representatives
Gerardo S. Espina, et al. vs. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, Jr., et
al. G.R. No. 143855, September 21, 2010.
Court decisions; statement of fact and law.
The Constitution commands that “[n]o decision shall be
rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly
and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based.” Judges are expected to make complete findings
of fact in their decisions and scrutinize closely the legal
aspects of the case in the light of the evidence
presented. They should avoid the tendency to generalize
and form conclusions without detailing the facts from
which such conclusions are deduced. The Court has
sustained decisions of lower courts as having
substantially or sufficiently complied with the
constitutional injunction, notwithstanding the laconic and
terse manner in which they were written; and even if
“there (was left) much to be desired in terms of (their)
clarity, coherence and comprehensibility,” provided that
they eventually set out the facts and the law on which
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they were based, as when they stated the legal
qualifications of the offense constituted by the facts
proved, the modifying circumstances, the participation of
the accused, the penalty imposed and the civil liability; or
discussed the facts comprising the elements of the
offense that was charged in the information, and
accordingly rendered a verdict and imposed the
corresponding penalty; or quoted the facts narrated in
the prosecution’s memorandum, but made their own
findings and assessment of evidence, before finally
agreeing with the prosecution’s evaluation of the case.
On the other hand, the Court has expressed concern over
the possible denial of due process when an appellate
court failed to provide the appeal the attention it
rightfully deserved, thus depriving the appellant of a fair
opportunity to be heard by a fair and responsible
magistrate. The parties to a litigation should be informed
of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual
and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the trial
court. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost,
so he may appeal to the higher court, if permitted,
should he believe that the decision should be reversed. A
decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the
facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties
in the dark as to how it was reached and is precisely
prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint
the possible errors of the court for review by a higher
tribunal.
The Court of Appeals (CA) decision in this case cannot be
deemed constitutionally infirm, as it clearly stated the
facts and law on which the ruling was based, and while it
did not specifically address each and every assigned error
raised by appellants, it cannot be said that the appellants
were left in the dark as to how the CA reached its ruling
affirming the trial court’s judgment of conviction. The
principal arguments raised in their Memorandum
submitted before the Supreme Court actually referred to
the main points of the CA rulings, such as the alleged
sufficiency of prosecution evidence, their common
defense of alibi, allegations of torture, probative value of
ballistic and fingerprint test results, circumstances
qualifying the offense and modification of penalty
imposed by the trial court. Lenido Lumanog, et al. vs.
People of the Philippines/Cesar Fortuna vs. People of the
Philippines/People of the Philippines vs. SPO2 Cesar
Fortuna y Abudo, et al. G.R. Nos. 182555/G.R. No.
185123/G.R. No. 187745, September 7, 2010.
Custodial investigation; right to counsel.
Custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage
when the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into
an unsolved crime, but has begun to focus on a particular
person as a suspect. The police officers here claimed that
upon arresting one of the accused and before questioning
him, they informed him of his constitutional rights to
remain silent, that any information he would give could
be used against him, and that he had the right to a
competent and independent counsel, preferably of his
own choice, and if he cannot afford the services of
counsel he will be provided with one. However, since
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these rights can only be waived in writing and with the to being that of a mere witness to the signing of a pre-
assistance of counsel, there could not have been such a prepared confession, even if it indicated compliance with
valid waiver by the accused, who was presented by the the constitutional rights of the accused. The accused is
police investigators to the lawyer of the IBP Office, entitled to effective, vigilant and independent
Quezon City Hall, for the taking of his formal statement counsel. Where the prosecution failed to discharge the
only the following day and stayed overnight at the police State’s burden of proving with clear and convincing
station before he was brought to said counsel. Thus, the evidence that the accused had enjoyed effective and
constitutional requirement had not been vigilant counsel before he extrajudicially admitted his
observed. Settled is the rule that the moment a police guilt, the extrajudicial confession cannot be given any
officer tries to elicit admissions or confessions or even probative value. Lenido Lumanog, et al. vs. People of the
plain information from a suspect, the latter should, at Philippines/Cesar Fortuna vs. People of the
that juncture, be assisted by counsel, unless he waives Philippines/People of the Philippines vs. SPO2 Cesar
this right in writing and in the presence of counsel. Fortuna y Abudo, et al., G.R. Nos. 182555/G.R. No.
185123/G.R. No. 187745, September 7, 2010.
However, the Court rejected the appellants’ contention
that the accused was not given a counsel of his own Immunity from suit.
choice, as he never objected to the IBP lawyer when the
latter was presented to him to be his counsel for the
Petitioner here claimed that it could not be sued pursuant
taking down of his statement. The phrase “preferably of
to the doctrine of state immunity without the consent of
his own choice” does not convey the message that the
the Republic of the Philippines, on the basis that under
choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is
Service Contract 38, it served merely as an agent of the
exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and
Philippine government in the development of the
independent attorneys from handling the defense;
Malampaya gas reserves. The Court ruled that petitioner
otherwise the tempo of custodial investigation would be
cannot claim immunity from suit because it is not an
solely in the hands of the accused who can impede or
agent of the Republic of the Philippines, but the latter’s
obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply
service contractor for the exploration and development of
selecting a lawyer who, for one reason or another, is not
one of the country’s natural gas reserves. While the
available to protect his interest. Thus, while the choice of
Republic of the Philippines appointed petitioner as the
a lawyer in cases where the person under custodial
exclusive party to conduct petroleum operations in the
interrogation cannot afford the services of counsel – or
Camago-Malampayo area under the State’s full control
where the preferred lawyer is not available – is naturally
and supervision, it does not follow that petitioner has
lodged in the police investigators, the suspect has the
become the State’s “agent” within the meaning of the
final choice, as he may reject the counsel chosen for him
law. An agent is a person who binds himself to render
and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the
some service or to do something in representation or on
investigators is deemed engaged by the accused when he
behalf of another, with the consent or authority of the
does not raise any objection against the counsel’s
latter. The essence of an agency is the agent’s ability to
appointment during the course of the investigation, and
represent his principal and bring about business relations
the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of the
between the latter and third persons. An agent’s
statement before the swearing officer.
ultimate undertaking is to execute juridical acts that
would create, modify or extinguish relations between his
The Constitution gives the person under custodial principal and third persons. It is this power to affect the
investigation the right to a competent and independent principal’s contractual relations with third persons that
counsel. The modifier “competent and independent” is differentiates the agent from a service contractor.
not an empty rhetoric. It stresses the need to accord the
accused, under the uniquely stressful conditions of a
Petitioner’s main undertaking under Service Contract 38
custodial investigation, an informed judgment on the
is to “[p]erform all petroleum operations and provide all
choices explained to him by a diligent and capable
necessary technology and finance” as well as other
lawyer. An effective and vigilant counsel necessarily and
connected services to the Philippine government. As
logically requires that the lawyer be present and able to
defined under the contract, petroleum operation means
advise and assist his client from the time the confessant
the “searching for and obtaining Petroleum within
answers the first question asked by the investigating
the Philippines”, including the “transportation, storage,
officer until the signing of the extrajudicial
handling and sale” of petroleum whether for export or
confession. Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain that
domestic consumption. Petitioner’s primary obligation
the confession is made voluntarily and that the person
under the contract is not to represent the Philippine
under investigation fully understands the nature and the
government for the purpose of transacting business with
consequence of his extrajudicial confession in relation to
third persons. Rather, its contractual commitment is to
his constitutional rights. A contrary rule would
develop and manage petroleum operations on behalf of
undoubtedly be antagonistic to the constitutional rights to
the State. Consequently, it is not an agent of the
remain silent, to counsel and to be presumed innocent.
Philippine government, but a provider of services,
The right to counsel has been written into the
technology and financing for the Malampaya Natural Gas
Constitution in order to prevent the use of duress and
Project. Notably, the Philippine government itself
other undue influence in extracting confessions from a
recognized that petitioner could be sued in relation to the
suspect in a crime. The lawyer’s role cannot be reduced

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project. This is evident in the stipulations agreed upon
by the parties under Service Contract 38. Shell
Philippines Exploration B. V. vs. Efren Jalos, et al., G.R.
No. 179918, September 8, 2010.
Judiciary; seniority in appointment of Court of
Appeals justices.
An appointment to a public office is the unequivocal act,
of one who has the authority, of designating or selecting
an individual to discharge and perform the duties and
functions of an office or trust. Where the power of
appointment is absolute and the appointee has been
determined upon, no further consent or approval is
necessary and the formal evidence of the appointment,
the commission, may issue at once. The appointment is
deemed complete once the last act required of the
appointing authority has been complied with. A written
memorial that can render title to public office indubitable
is required. This written memorial is known as the
commission. For purposes of completion of the
appointment process, the appointment is complete when
the commission is signed by the executive, and sealed if
necessary, and is ready to be delivered or transmitted to
the appointee. Thus, transmittal of the commission is an
act which is done after the appointment has already been
completed. It is not required to complete the
appointment but only to facilitate the effectiveness of the
appointment by the appointee’s receipt and acceptance
thereof.
For purposes of appointments to the judiciary, therefore,
the date the commission has been signed by the
President (which is the date appearing on the face of
such document) is the date of the appointment. Such
date will determine the seniority of the members of the
Court of Appeals in connection with Section 3, Chapter I
of BP 129, as amended by RA 8246. In other words, the
earlier the date of the commission of an appointee, the
more senior he is over the other subsequent
appointees. It is only when the appointments of two or
more appointees bear the same date that the order of
issuance of the appointments by the President becomes
material. This provision of statutory law (Section 3,
Chapter I of BP 129, as amended by RA 8246) controls
over the provisions of the 2009 Internal Rules of the
Court of Appeals, which gives premium to the order of
appointments as transmitted to this Court. Rules
implementing a particular law cannot override but must
give way to the law they seek to implement. Re:
Seniority among the four most recent appointments to
the position of Associate Justices of the Court of
Appeals. A.M. No. 10-4-22-SC, September 28, 2010.
Police power; taxation versus regulation.
other hand, if the purpose is primarily to regulate, then it
is deemed a regulation and an exercise of the police
power of the state, even though incidentally, revenue is
generated. In this case, the royalty fees were imposed
by the Clark Development Corporation (CDC) primarily
for regulatory purposes, and not for the generation of
income or profits as petitioner claims. These fees form
part of the regulatory mandate of CDC to ensure “free
flow or movement” of petroleum fuel to and from the
Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ). Being the
administrator of CSEZ, CDC is responsible for ensuring
the safe, efficient and orderly distribution of fuel products
within the CSEZ. Addressing specific concerns demanded
by the nature of goods or products involved is
encompassed in the range of services which respondent
CDC is expected to provide under the law, pursuant to its
general power of supervision and control over the
movement of all supplies and equipment into the
CSEZ. Chevron Philippines, Inc. vs. Bases conversion
Development Authority and Clark Development
Corporation. G.R. No. 173863, September 15, 2010.
Right to speedy disposition of cases.
Section 16, Article III of the Constitution provides that
“all persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of
their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies.” This protection extends to all
citizens and covers the periods before, during and after
trial, affording broader protection than Section 14(2),
which guarantees merely the right to a speedy
trial. However, just like the constitutional guarantee of
“speedy trial,” “speedy disposition of cases” is a flexible
concept. It is consistent with delays and depends upon
the circumstances. What the Constitution prohibits are
unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays, which
render rights nugatory. The determination of whether the
right to speedy disposition of cases has been violated,
particular regard must be taken of the facts and
circumstances peculiar to each case. A mere
mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not
be sufficient. Under the circumstances of this case, the
Court held that the delay of four years during which the
case remained pending with the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court was not unreasonable, arbitrary or
oppressive. Lenido Lumanog, et al. vs. People of the
Philippines/Cesar Fortuna vs. People of the
Philippines/People of the Philippines vs. SPO2 Cesar
Fortuna y Abudo, et al. G.R. Nos. 182555/G.R. No.
185123/G.R. No. 187745, September 7, 2010.
Administrative Law

In distinguishing tax and regulation as a form of police

power, the determining factor is the purpose of the
Administrative agencies; findings of fact.
implemented measure. If the purpose is primarily to
raise revenue, then it will be deemed a tax even though
the measure results in some form of regulation. On the

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Findings of facts and conclusions of law of the Securities
and Exchange Commission are controlling on the
reviewing authority. The rule is that findings of fact of
administrative bodies, if based on substantial evidence,
are controlling on the reviewing authority. It is not for
the appellate court to substitute its own judgment for
that of the administrative agency on the sufficiency of the
evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. It is not
the function of this Court to analyze or weigh all over
again the evidence and the credibility of witnesses
presented before the lower court, tribunal, or office, as
we are not a trier of facts. Our jurisdiction is limited to
reviewing and revising errors of law imputed to the lower
court, the latter’s findings of fact being conclusive and
not reviewable by this Court. The SEC Hearing Officer
had the optimum opportunity to review the pieces of
evidence presented before him and to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses. Administrative decisions on
matters within his jurisdiction are entitled to respect and
can only be set aside on proof of grave abuse of
discretion, fraud, or error of law, which has not been
shown by petitioner in this case. Queensland-Tokyo
Commodities, Inc., et al. vs. Thomas George. G.R. No.
172727, September 8, 2010.
Administrative investigation; right to counsel;
admission.
The right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of
Rights is meant to protect a suspect during custodial
investigation. The exclusionary rule under paragraph 2,
Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions
made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in
an administrative investigation. While investigations
conducted by an administrative body may at times be
akin to a criminal proceeding, the rule under existing
laws is that a party in an administrative inquiry may or
may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the
nature of the charges and of petitioner’s capacity to
represent herself, and no duty rests on such body to
furnish the person being investigated with counsel. The
right to counsel is not always imperative in administrative
investigations because such inquiries are conducted
merely to determine whether there are facts that merit
the imposition of disciplinary measures against erring
public officers and employees, with the purpose of
maintaining the dignity of government service. As such,
the admissions made by petitioner during the
investigation may be used as evidence to justify her
dismissal. Clarita J. Carbonel vs. Civil Service
Commission. G.R. No. 187689, September 7, 2010.
Administrative remedies; exhaustion.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
requires that when an administrative remedy is provided
by law, relief must be sought by exhausting this remedy
before judicial intervention may be availed of. No
recourse can be had until all such remedies have been
exhausted, and the special civil actions against
administrative officers should not be entertained if there
are superior administrative officers who could grant
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relief. This doctrine is a judicial recognition of certain
matters that are peculiarly within the competence of the
administrative agency to address. It operates as a shield
that prevents the overarching use of judicial power and
thus hinders courts from intervening in matters of policy
infused with administrative character. Dimson (Manila),
Inc. and Phesco, Inc. vs. Local Water Utilities
Administration. G.R. No. 168656, September 22, 2010.
Administrative remedies; exhaustion.
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, he or she should have availed
himself or herself of all the means of administrative
processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a
remedy within the administrative machinery can still be
made by giving the administrative officer concerned
every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes
within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be
exhausted first before the court’s judicial power can be
sought. The premature invocation of the intervention of
the court is fatal to one’s cause of action. The doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on
practical and legal reasons. Resort to administrative
remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a
speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore,
courts of justice, for reasons of comity and convenience,
will shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed and complied
with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned
every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the
case. While the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is subject to several exceptions, the Court finds
that the instant case does not fall under any of
them. Public Hearing Committee of the Laguna Lake
Development Authority, et al. vs. SM Prime Holdings, Inc.
G.R. No. 170599, September 22, 2010.
Laguna Lake Development Authority; powers.
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) has
power to impose fines in the exercise of its function as a
regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to
pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region. Adjudication
of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution
Adjudication Board (PAB), except where a special law,
such as the LLDA Charter, provides for another
forum. Although the PAB assumed the powers and
functions of the National Pollution Control Commission
with respect to adjudication of pollution cases, this does
not preclude the LLDA from assuming jurisdiction of
pollution cases within its area of responsibility and to
impose fines as penalty. Public Hearing Committee of the
Laguna Lake Development Authority, et al. vs. SM Prime
Holdings, Inc. G.R. No. 170599, September 22, 2010.
Election Law
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Automated election system; source code.
The pertinent portion of Section 12 of Republic Act No.
9369 is clear in that “once an [automated election
system] technology is selected for implementation, the
[COMELEC] shall promptly make the source code of that
technology available and open to any interested political
party or groups which may conduct their own review
thereof.” The COMELEC has offered no reason not to
comply with this requirement of the law. Indeed, its only
excuse for not disclosing the source code was that it was
not yet available when petitioner asked for it and,
subsequently, that the review had to be done, apparently
for security reason, under a controlled environment. The
elections had passed and that reason is already stale.
The Court here ruled on the petition notwithstanding the
fact that the elections for which the subject source code
was to be used had already been held. It accepted
petitioner’s claim that the source code remained
important and relevant not only for compliance with the
law, and the purpose thereof, but especially in the
backdrop of numerous admissions of errors and claims of
fraud in the May 2010 elections. Center for People
Empowerment in Governance vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 189546, September 21, 2010.
Local Government
Salary standardization; President’s power over
local governments.
The Court here reversed the ruling of the Commission on
Audit (COA), which disallowed the premium payment for
hospitalization and health care insurance benefits granted
by petitioner to its officials and employees. COA held that
such benefits disregarded Section 2 of Administrative
Order No. 103, series of 1994 (AO 103), which prohibits
all heads of government offices and agencies from
granting productivity incentive benefits or any and all
similar forms of allowances and benefits without the
President’s prior approval. The Court ruled that petitioner
did not violate the rule of prior Presidential approval since
Section 2 of AO 103 states that the prohibition applies
only to “government offices/agencies, including
government-owned and/or controlled corporations, as
well as their respective governing boards.” Nowhere is it
indicated in Section 2 that the prohibition also applies to
local government units. The approval requirement must
be observed by government offices under the President’s
control, i.e., departments, bureaus, offices and
government-owned and controlled corporations under the
Executive branch. Being an LGU, petitioner is merely
under the President’s general supervision pursuant to
Section 4, Article X of the Constitution.
The President’s power of general supervision means the
power of a superior officer to see to it that subordinates
perform their functions according to law. This is
distinguished from the President’s power of control which
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is the power to alter or modify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the President
over that of the subordinate officer. The power of control
gives the President the power to revise or reverse the
acts or decisions of a subordinate officer involving the
exercise of discretion. Since LGUs are subject only to the
power of general supervision of the President, the
President’s authority is limited to seeing to it that rules
are followed and laws are faithfully executed. The
President may only point out that rules have not been
followed but the President cannot lay down the rules,
neither does he have the discretion to modify or replace
the rules. Thus, the grant of additional compensation like
hospitalization and health care insurance benefits in this
case does not need the approval of the President to be
valid. The Province of Negros Occidental vs. The
Commissioners, Commission on Audit, et al. G.R. No.
182574, September 28, 2010.
Special Laws
Agrarian reform; just compensation.
The Supreme Court here reiterated its previous rulings
that the factors for determining just compensation under
Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 (the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law), which have been translated into a
formula through DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series
of 1992, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No.
11, series of 1994, are mandatory and should be strictly
complied with. In this case, Land Bank’s valuation
correctly reflected the actual use and produce of the
subject properties and did not factor in potential use as
what respondent’s appraiser did. (Note that DAR AO No.
6, as amended by DAR A.O. No. 11, has been superseded
by DAR Administrative Order No. 5, series of
1998.) Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Conrado O.
Colarina, G.R. No. 176410, September 1, 2010.
Agrarian reform; just compensation.
For purposes of just compensation, the fair market value
of an expropriated property is determined by its
character and its price at the time of taking. There are
three important concepts in this definition – the character
of the property, its price, and the time of actual
taking. The time of taking is the time when the
landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his
property, such as when title is transferred to the
Republic.
The property’s character refers to its actual use at the
time of taking, not its potential uses. Where, as here, it
has been conclusively decided by final judgment in the
earlier cases filed by respondent that his property was
validly acquired under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (RA 6657) and validly distributed to agrarian
reform beneficiaries, the property should be conclusively
treated as an agricultural land and valued as such. The
lower courts erred in ruling that the character or use of
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the property has changed from agricultural to residential,
because there is no allegation or proof that the property
was approved for conversion to other uses by the
Department of Agrarian Reform. In the absence of such
approval, it cannot be said that the character or use of
the property has changed from agricultural to
residential. Respondent’s property remains agricultural
and should be valued as such. Respondent’s evidence of
the value of his land as residential property (which the
lower courts found to be preponderant) could, at most,
refer to the potential use of the property. While the
potential use of an expropriated property is sometimes
considered in cases where there is a great improvement
in the general vicinity of the expropriated property, it
should never control the determination of just
compensation. The potential use of a property should
not be the principal criterion for determining just
compensation for this will be contrary to the well-settled
doctrine that the fair market value of an expropriated
property is determined by its character and its price at
the time of taking, not its potential uses. The proper
approach should have been to value respondent’s
property as an agricultural land, which value may be
adjusted in light of the improvements in the locality
where it is situated.
As to the price, the factors and requirements set out in
Section 17 of RA 6657 must be applied. Here, the Land
Bank’s authority to value the land is only preliminary and
the landowner who disagrees with petitioner’s valuation
may bring the matter to court for a judicial determination
of just compensation. The Regional Trial Courts,
organized as special agrarian courts, are the final
adjudicators on the issue of just compensation. Land
Bank must substantiate its valuation. It is not enough
that the landowner fails to prove a higher valuation for
the property; Land Bank must still prove the correctness
of its claims. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Enrique
Livioco, G.R. No. 170685, September 22, 2010.
Agrarian reform; retention rights.
The right of retention, as protected and enshrined in the
Constitution, balances the effect of compulsory land
acquisition by granting the landowner the right to choose
the area to be retained subject to legislative
standards. Thus, landowners who have not yet exercised
their retention rights under Presidential Decree No. 27
are entitled to new retention rights provided for by
Republic Act No. 6657. However, the limitations under
Letter of Instruction No. 474 still apply to a landowner
who filed an application for retention under RA
6657. LOI 474 amended PD 27 by removing any right of
retention from persons who own other agricultural lands
of more than 7 hectares, or lands used for residential,
commercial, industrial or other purpose from which they
derive adequate income to support themselves and their
families. Section 9 (d) of DAR Administrative Order No.
05 is inconsistent with PD No. 27, as amended by LOI
474, insofar as it removed the limitations to a
landowner’s retention rights. It is well-settled that
administrative officials are empowered to promulgate
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rules and regulations in order to implement a
statute. The power, however, is restricted such that an
administrative regulation cannot go beyond what is
provided in the legislative enactment. It must always be
in harmony with the provisions of the law; hence, any
resulting discrepancy between the two will always be
resolved in favor of the statute. Celestio Santiago
substituted by Lauro Santiago and Isidro Gutierrez
substituted by Rogelio Gutierez vs. Amada R. Ortiz-Luis
substituted by Juan Ortiz-Luiz, Jr. G.R. No. 186184 &
G.R. No. 186988, September 20, 2010.
Government Procurement Reform Act; jurisdiction;
appeal from decisions of bids and awards
committee.
Under Republic Act No. 9184, or the Government
Procurement Reform Act (GPRA), the proper recourse to
a court action from decisions of the Bids and Awards
Committee (BAC) is to file a certiorari not before the
Supreme Court but before the regional trial court, which
is vested by the GPRA with jurisdiction to entertain the
same. Compliance with the mandatory protest
mechanisms of the GPRA is jurisdictional in
character. Section 58 of that law requires that there be
exhaustion of the statutorily available remedies at the
administrative level as a precondition to the filing of a
certiorari petition. This requirement points to the
mechanisms for protest against decisions of the BAC in
all stages of the procurement process that are outlined in
both the provisions of Section 55 of the GPRA as well in
Section 55 of the implementing rules. Under these
relevant sections of the law and the rules, resort to the
judicial remedy of certiorari must be made only after the
filing of a motion for reconsideration of the BAC’s decision
before the said body. Subsequently, from the final denial
of the motion for reconsideration, the aggrieved party
must then lodge a protest before the head of the
procuring entity through a verified position paper that
formally complies with requirements in Section 55.2 of
the GPRA’s Implementing Rules and Regulations – Part
A. Only upon the final resolution of the protest can the
aggrieved party be said to have exhausted the available
remedies at the administrative level. In other words,
only then can he viably avail of the remedy of certiorari
before the proper courts. Non-compliance with this
statutory requirement, under Section 58 of the GPRA,
constitutes a ground for the dismissal of the action for
lack of jurisdiction. Dimson (Manila), Inc. and Phesco,
Inc. vs. Local Water Utilities Administration. G.R. No.
168656, September 22, 2010.
Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act; vested property
rights.
When Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights
Act (IPRA) or Republic Act 8371 in 1997, it provided in
Section 56 that “property rights within the ancestral
domains already existing and/or vested” upon its
effectiveness “shall be recognized and respected.” In this
case, ownership over the subject lands had been vested
in petitioner as early as 1958. Consequently, a
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Presidential proclamation transferring the lands in 2003
to the indigenous peoples around the area is not in
accord with the IPRA. Central Mindanao University, etc.
vs. The Hon. Executive Secretary, et al. G.R. No. 184869,
September 21, 2010.
Republic Act No. 8975; government ICT projects.
This is the first time that the Court is confronted with the
question of whether a government information and
communication technology project is covered by Republic
Act No. 8975, which prohibits trial courts from issuing a
temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or
mandatory injunction against the bidding or awarding of
a contract or project of the national government. The
term “national government projects” means (i) national
government infrastructure projects, engineering works
and service contracts, (ii) all projects covered by the
Build-Operate-and-Transfer (BOT) Law, and (iii) other
related and necessary activities, such as site acquisition,
supply and/or installation of equipment and materials,
implementation, construction, completion, operation,
maintenance, improvement repair and rehabilitation. The
purpose of RA 8975 is to ensure the expeditious
implementation and completion of government
infrastructure projects.
Undeniably, under the BOT Law, the entire information
technology project, including the civil works component
and the technological aspect thereof, is considered an
infrastructure or development project and treated
similarly as traditional infrastructure projects. Such
information technology project is therefore covered by RA
8975.
On the other hand, under Republic Act No. 9184 or the
Government Procurement Reform Act (GPRA), which
contemplates projects to be funded by public funds, the
term “infrastructure project” is limited to the “civil works
component” of information technology projects. The
non-civil works component of information technology
projects is treated as an acquisition of goods or
consulting services. Thus, the civil works component of
information technology projects are subject to the
provisions of the GPRA and its implementing regulations
on infrastructure projects, while the technological and
other components would be covered by the provisions on
procurement of goods or consulting services as the
circumstances may warrant. When Congress adopted a
limited definition of what is to be considered
“infrastructure” in relation to information technology
projects under the GPRA, legislators are presumed to
have taken into account previous laws concerning
infrastructure projects, including the BOT Law and RA
8975, and deliberately adopted the limited definition.
Taking into account the different treatment of information
technology projects under the BOT Law and the GPRA,
petitioners’ contention the trial court had no jurisdiction
to issue a writ of preliminary injunction (because of the
prohibition under RA 8975) would have been correct if
Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!
the e-Passport Project was pursued under the BOT Law.
However, petitioners presented no proof that the e-
Passport Project was a BOT project. On the contrary,
evidence adduced by both sides tended to show that the
e-Passport Project was a procurement contract under the
GPRA. Accordingly, only the civil works component of the
e-Passport Project would be considered an infrastructure
project that may not be the subject of a lower court-
issued writ of injunction under RA 8975.
Could the e-Passport Project be considered as
“engineering works or a service contract” or as “related
and necessary activities” under RA 8975. The Court ruled
in the negative. Under that law, a “service contract”
refers to “infrastructure contracts entered into by any
department, office or agency of the national government
with private entities and nongovernment organizations
for services related or incidental to the functions and
operations of the department, office or agency
concerned.” On the other hand, the phrase “other
related and necessary activities” refers to activities
related to a government infrastructure, engineering
works, service contract or project under the BOT Law. In
other words, to be considered a service contract or
related activity, petitioners must show that the e-
Passport Project is an infrastructure project or necessarily
related to an infrastructure project. This, petitioners
failed to do as they saw fit not to present any evidence
on the details of the e-Passport Project before the trial
court and this Court. There is nothing on record to
indicate that the e-Passport Project has a civil works
component or is necessarily related to an infrastructure
project. In fact, the BSP’s request for interest and to bid
confirms that the e-Passport Project is a procurement of
goods and not an infrastructure project. Thus, within the
context of the GPRA – which is the governing law for the
e-Passport Project – the said Project is not an
infrastructure project that is protected from lower court
issued injunctions. Department of Foreign Affairs and
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas vs. Hon. Franco T.
Falcon, G.R. No. 176657, September 1, 2010.
OCTOBER 2010 CASES
Constitutional Law
Bill of Rights; Presumption of Innocence.
In this case, the so-called frame-up was virtually pure
allegation bereft of credible proof. The narration of the
police officer who implemented the search warrant was
found, after trial and appellate review, as the true story.
It is on firmer ground than the self-serving statement of
the accused-appellant of frame-up.  The defense cannot
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solely rely upon the constitutional presumption of
innocence for, while it is constitutional, the presumption
is not conclusive.  Notably, the accused-appellant herself
stated in her brief that “no proof was proffered by the
accused-appellant of the police officers’ alleged ill
motive.” Stated otherwise, the narration of the incident
by law enforcers, buttressed by the presumption that
they have regularly performed their duties in the absence
of convincing proof to the contrary, must be given
weight. People of the Philippines vs. Olive
Rubio Mamaril. G.R. No. 171980, October 6, 2010.
Bill of Rights; Probable Cause.
There is no general formula or fixed rule for the
determination of probable cause since the same must be
decided in light of the conditions obtaining in given
situations and its existence depends to a large degree
upon the findings or opinion of the judge conducting the
examination. It is presumed that a judicial function has
been regularly performed, absent a showing to the
contrary. The defense’s reliance of the quoted testimony
of the police officer alone, without any other evidence to
show that there was indeed lack of personal knowledge,
is insufficient to overturn the finding of the trial court.  ripe for judicial review exists.  Verily, when an act of a
The accused-appellant, having failed to present
substantial rebuttal evidence to defeat the presumption
of regularity of duty of the issuing judge, cannot not be
sustained by the Court. People of the Philippines vs. Olive
Rubio Mamaril. G.R. No. 171980, October 6, 2010.
Constitutionality; Actual Controversy; Standing to
Sue.
The power of judicial review can only be exercised in
connection with a bona fide controversy involving a
statute, its implementation or a government
action.  Without such controversy, courts will decline to
pass upon constitutional issues through advisory
opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve
hypothetical or moot questions.  The limitation on the
power of judicial review to actual cases and
controversies defines the role assigned to the judiciary in
a tripartite allocation of power, to assure that the courts
will not intrude into areas committed to the other
branches of government. But even with the presence of
an actual case or controversy, the Court may refuse
judicial review unless the constitutional question or the
assailed illegal government act is brought before it by a
party who possesses locus standi or the standing to
challenge it.  To have standing, one must establish that
he has a “personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury
as a result of its enforcement.”  Particularly, he must
show that (1) he has suffered some actual or threatened
injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action.
Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!
Petitions for certiorari and prohibition are, as here,
appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to
review and/or prohibit or nullify, when proper, acts of
legislative and executive officials.  The present petitions
allege that then President Ramos had exercised vis-à-vis
an assignment of franchise, a function legislative in
character. As alleged, too, the Toll Regulatory Board
(TRB), in the guise of entering into contracts
or agreements
with the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PN
CC) and other juridical entities, virtually enlarged,
modified and/or extended the statutory franchise of
PNCC, thereby usurping a legislative prerogative. The
usurpation came in the form of executing the assailed
Supplemental Toll Operation Agreements and the
issuance of Toll Operation Certificates. Grave abuse of
discretion is also laid on the doorstep of the TRB for its
act of entering into these same contracts or agreements
without the required public bidding mandated by law. In
fine, the certiorari petitions impute on then President
Ramos and the TRB, the commission of acts that
translate inter alia into usurpation of the congressional
authority to grant franchises and violation of extant
statutes.  The petitions make a prima facie case for
certiorari and prohibition; an actual case or controversy
branch of government is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right
but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the
dispute.  In doing so, the judiciary merely defends the
sanctity of its duties and powers under the Constitution.
In any case, the rule on standing is a matter of
procedural technicality, which may be relaxed when the
subject in issue or the legal question to be resolved is of
transcendental importance to the public. Hence, even
absent any direct injury to the suitor, the Court can relax
the application of legal standing or altogether set it aside
for non-traditional plaintiffs, like ordinary citizens, when
the public interest so requires. There is no doubt that
individual petitioners, Marcos,et al., in G.R. No. 169917,
as then members of the House of Representatives,
possess the requisite legal standing since they assail acts
of the executive they perceive to injure the institution of
Congress. On the other hand, petitioners
Francisco, Hizon, and the other petitioning associations,
as taxpayers and/or users of the tollways or
representatives of such users, would ordinarily not be
clothed with the requisite standing. While this is so, the
Court is wont to presently relax the rule on locus standi
owing primarily to the transcendental importance and the
paramount public interest involved in the implementation
of the laws on the Luzon tollways, a roadway complex
used daily by hundreds of thousands of
motorists. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., et al. vs. Toll
Regulatory Board, et al./Hon. Imee R. Marcos, et al. vs.
The Republic of the Philippines, et
al./Gising Kabataan Movement, Inc., et al. vs. The
Republic of the Philippines, et al./The Republic of the
Philippines vs. Young Professionals and Entrepreneurs of
San Pedro, Laguna. G.R. No. 166910, 169917, 173630,
183599, October 19, 2010.
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Constitutionality; Locus Standi. Senator Wigberto Tañada and Senator

Sergio Osmeña III, who cite their being respectively a
human rights advocate and an oppositor to the passage
A party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must
of RA 9372.  Outside these statements, no concrete injury
have a direct and personal interest. It must show not
to them has been pinpointed. Petitioners Southern
only that the law or any governmental act is invalid, but
Hemisphere Engagement
also that it sustained or is in immediate danger of
Network and Atty. Soliman Santos Jr. in G.R. No.
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
178552 also conveniently state that the issues they raise
enforcement, and not merely that it suffers thereby in
are of transcendental importance, “which must be settled
some indefinite way. Petitioners have not presented
early” and are of “far-reaching implications,” without
any personal stake in the outcome of the
mention of any specific provision of RA 9372 under which
controversy.  None of them faces any charge under RA
they have been charged, or may be charged.  Mere
9372. Petitioners in G.R. No. 178890, allege that they
invocation of human rights advocacy has nowhere been
have been subjected to “close security surveillance by
held sufficient to clothe litigants with locus standi.
state security forces,” their members followed by
 Petitioners must show an actual, or immediate danger of
“suspicious persons” and “vehicles with dark
sustaining, direct injury as a result of the law’s
windshields,” and their offices monitored by “men with
enforcement. To rule otherwise would be to corrupt the
military build.”  They likewise claim that they have been
settled doctrine of locus standi, as every worthy cause is
branded as “enemies of the State.” Even conceding such
an interest shared by the general public. Neither
allegations, petitioners have yet to show
can locus standi be conferred upon individual petitioners
any connection between the
as taxpayers and citizens.  A taxpayer suit is proper only
purported “surveillance” and the implementation of RA
when there is an exercise of the spending or taxing
9372. On the other hand, petitioner-organizations in G.R.
power of Congress, whereas citizen standing must rest on
No. 178581 would like the Court to take judicial notice of
direct and personal interest in the proceeding.  In sum, it
respondents’ alleged action of tagging them as militant
bears to stress that generalized interests, albeit
organizations fronting for the Communist Party of the
accompanied by the assertion of a public right, do not
Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the National
establish locus standi. Evidence of a direct and personal
People’s Army (NPA). The tagging, according to
interest is key. Southern Hemisphere Engagement
petitioners, is tantamount to the effects of proscription
Network, Inc., et al. vs. Anti-Terrorism Council, et
without following the procedure under the law.
al./Kilusang Mayo Uno, et al. Vs. Hon. Eduardo Ermita.,
Petitioners’ apprehension is insufficient to substantiate
et al./Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (Bayan), et al.  vs.
their plea. That no specific charge or proscription under
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al./Karapatan, et al. vs.
RA 9372 has been filed against them, three years after
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al./The Integrated Bar of the
its effectiveness, belies any claim of imminence of
Philippines, et al. vs. Executive Secretary
their perceived threat emanating from the so-
Eduardo Ermita, et al./Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-
called tagging. The same is true with petitioners in G.R.
Southern Tagalog, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et
No. 178554, who merely harp as well on their supposed
al. G.R. No. 178552, 178554, 178581, 178890, 179157,
“link” to the CPP and NPA.  They fail to particularize how
179461, October 5, 2010.
the implementation of specific provisions of RA 9372
would result in direct injury to their organization and
members. RA 9372 has been in effect for three years Constitutionality; Judicial Review; Actual Case or
now. From July 2007 up to the present, petitioner- Controversy.
organizations have conducted their activities fully and
freely without any threat of, much less an actual,
The Court is not unaware that a reasonable certainty of
prosecution or proscription under RA
the occurrence of a perceived threat to any constitutional
9372.  Petitioners IBP and CODAL in G.R. No. 179157, on
interest suffices to provide a basis for mounting a
the other hand, base their claim of locus standi on their
constitutional challenge. This, however, is qualified by the
sworn duty to uphold the Constitution. The IBP zeroes in
requirement that there must be sufficient facts to enable
on Section 21 of RA 9372 directing it to render assistance
the Court to intelligently adjudicate the issues. Prevailing
to those arrested or detained under the law. The mere
American jurisprudence allows adjudication on the merits
invocation of the duty to preserve the rule of law,
when an anticipatory petition clearly shows that the
however, does not suffice to clothe the IBP or any of its
challenged prohibition forbids the conduct or activity that
members with standing. The IBP failed to sufficiently
a petitioner seeks to do, as there would then be a
demonstrate how its mandate under the assailed statute
justiciable controversy. Unlike the plaintiffs in Holder,
revolts against its constitutional rights and duties. 
however, herein petitioners have failed to show that the
Moreover, both the IBP and CODAL have not pointed to
challenged provisions of RA 9372 forbid constitutionally
even a single arrest or detention effected under RA
protected conduct or activity that they seek to do.  No
9372. Former Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo Madrigal, who
demonstrable threat has been established, much less a
claims to have been the subject of “political surveillance,”
real and existing one. Petitioners’ obscure allegations of
also lacks locus standi.   Prescinding from the veracity, let
sporadic “surveillance” and supposedly being tagged as
alone legal basis, of the claim of “political surveillance,”
“communist fronts” in no way approximate a credible
the Court finds that she has not shown even the slightest
threat of prosecution.  From these allegations, the Court
threat of being charged under RA 9372.  Similarly lacking
is being lured to render an advisory opinion, which is not
in locus standi are former
its function. Without any justiciable controversy, the

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petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief, over
which the Court has no original jurisdiction.  Then again,
declaratory actions characterized by “double
contingency,” where both the activity the petitioners
intend to undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a
public official are merely theorized, lie beyond judicial
review for lack of ripeness. Allegations of abuse must be
anchored on real events before courts may step in to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable. Southern
Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc, et al. vs. Anti-
Terrorism Council, et al./Kilusang Mayo Uno etc., et al.
Vs. Hon. Eduardo Ermita., et
al./Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (Bayan), et al.  vs.
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al./Karapatan, et al. vs.
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al./The Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, et al. vs. Executive Secretary
Eduardo Ermita, et al./Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-
Southern Tagalog, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et
al. G.R. Nos. 178552, 178554, 178581, 178890, 179157,
179461, October 5, 2010.
Constitutionality; Void for Vagueness
and Overbreadth Doctrine.
A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free
speech cases, wherein certain rules of constitutional
litigation are rightly excepted. To be sure, the doctrine of
vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do not
operate on the same plane. A statute or act suffers from
the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application.  The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile,
decrees that a governmental purpose to control or
prevent activities constitutionally subject to state
regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms. As distinguished from the vagueness
doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes that
individuals will understand what a statute prohibits and
will accordingly refrain from that behavior, even though
some of it is protected. A “facial” challenge is likewise
different from an “as-applied” challenge. Distinguished
from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant
facts affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is an
examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and
defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to
the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that
its very existence may cause others not before the court
to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
activities. The vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as
grounds for a facial challenge, are not applicable
to penal laws. On the other hand, the allowance of a
facial challenge in free speech cases  is justified by the
aim to avert the “chilling effect” on protected speech, the
exercise of which should not at all times be
abridged.  This rationale is inapplicable to plain penal
statutes that generally bear an “in terrorem effect” in
deterring socially harmful conduct.  In fact, the legislature
Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!
may even forbid and penalize acts formerly considered
innocent and lawful, so long as it refrains from
diminishing or dissuading the exercise of constitutionally
protected rights. Under no case, therefore, may ordinary
penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge. The
rationale is obvious. If a facial challenge to a penal
statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be
hampered.  No prosecution would be possible. It is
settled, furthermore, that the application of
the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of
challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial
challenge, applicable only to free speech cases. By its
nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply
a facial type of invalidation in order to plot areas of
protected speech, inevitably almost always under
situations not before the court, that are impermissibly
swept by the substantially overbroad regulation. 
Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed
for being substantially overbroad if the court confines
itself only to facts as applied to the litigants. In this case,
since a penal statute may only be assailed for
being vague as applied to petitioners, a limited
vagueness analysis of the definition of “terrorism” in RA
9372 is legally impermissible absent an actual or
imminent charge against them. In fine, petitioners have
established neither an actual charge nor a credible threat
of prosecution under RA 9372.  Even a limited vagueness
analysis of the assailed definition of “terrorism” is thus
legally impermissible. Southern Hemisphere Engagement
Network, Inc., et al. vs. Anti-Terrorism Council, et
al./Kilusang Mayo Uno, et al. Vs. Hon. Eduardo Ermita.,
et al./Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (Bayan), et al.  vs.
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al./Karapatan, et al. vs.
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al./The Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, et al. vs. Executive Secretary
Eduardo Ermita, et al./Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-
Southern Tagalog, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et
al. G.R. Nos. 178552, 178554, 178581, 178890, 179157,
179461, October 5, 2010.
Eminent Domain; Just Compensation.
Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution requires
that in the exercise of the power of eminent domain,
compensation should be just. The public, through the
State, must balance the injury that the taking of property
causes through compensation for what is taken, value for
value.  The owner’s loss is not only his property but also
its income-generating potential. While the LBP
immediately paid the remaining balance on the just
compensation due to the petitioners after the
Supreme Court had fixed the value of the expropriated
properties, it overlooks one essential fact – from the time
that the State took the petitioners’ properties until the
time that the petitioners were fully paid, almost 12 long
years passed.  This is the rationale for imposing the 12%
interest – in order to compensate the petitioners for the
income they would have made had they been properly
compensated for their properties at the time of the
taking. Furthermore, while the SC has equitably reduced
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the amount of interest awarded in numerous cases in the
past, those cases involved interest that was essentially
consensual in nature, i.e., interest stipulated in signed
agreements between the contracting parties. In contrast,
the interest involved in the present case “runs as
a matter of law and follows as a matter of course from
the right of the landowner to be placed in as good a
position as money can accomplish, as of the date of
taking.” Thus, the interest due in the present case cannot
be reduced. Apo Fruits Corporation, et al. vs. Land Bank
of the Philippines. G.R. No. 164195, October 12, 2010.
Fiscal Autonomy of the Judiciary; GSIS; Exemption
from Legal Fees.
In In Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the
Government Service Insurance System from Payment of
Legal Fees, the Court ruled that the provision in the
Charter of the GSIS, i.e., Section 39 of Republic Act No.
8291, which exempts it from “all taxes, assessments,
fees, charges or duties of all kinds,” cannot operate to
exempt it from the payment of legal fees. This was
because, unlike the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, which
empowered Congress to repeal, alter or supplement the
rules of the Supreme Court concerning pleading, practice
and procedure, the 1987 Constitution removed this
power from Congress.  Hence, the Supreme Court now
has the sole authority to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts. Any
exemption from the payment of legal fees granted by
Congress to government-owned or controlled
corporations and local government units will necessarily
reduce the JDF and the SAJF. Undoubtedly, such situation
is constitutionally infirm for it impairs the Court’s
guaranteed fiscal autonomy and erodes its
independence. In the instant case, therefore, the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction to try and decide the
permissive counterclaim considering that petitioner is not
exempted from the payment of legal fees. Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) vs. Heirs of Fernando
P. Caballero, et al. G.R. No. 158090, October 4, 2010.
Ombudsman; Disciplinary Authority over Public
School Teachers.
The administrative disciplinary authority of the
Ombudsman over a public school teacher is not an
exclusive power but is concurrent with the proper
committee of the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports (DECS). However, while petitioner has such
concurrent authority, Section 23 of the Ombudsman Act
of 1989 provides that the Ombudsman may refer a
complaint to the proper disciplinary authority. Under the
circumstances obtaining in the case, it would have been
more prudent for petitioner to have referred the
complaint to the DECS given that it would have been in a
better position to serve the interest of justice considering
the nature of the controversy. Respondent is a public
school teacher and is covered by RA 4670, therefore, the
proceedings before the DECS would have been the more
appropriate venue to resolve the dispute. In any case,
the foregoing pronouncement does not automatically
Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!
mean that the Supreme Court is nullifying the
proceedings before the Ombudsman as estoppel has
already set in. Respondent actively participated in the
proceedings before the Ombudsman. He submitted his
counter-affidavit, an affidavit of his witness, and attached
annexes. Respondent even filed a Motion for
Reconsideration asking for affirmative relief from the
Ombudsman. Finally, as to the power to impose
administrative liability, the Office of the Ombudsman has
the authority to determine the administrative liability of
an erring public official or employee, and to direct and
compel the head of the concerned officer or agency to
implement the penalty imposed. This power to impose
administrative liability is not merely recommendatory but
actually mandatory. Office of the Ombudsman vs.
Pedro Delijero, Jr. G.R. No. 172635, October 20, 2010.
Office of the Ombudsman; Powers.
The Ombudsman’s decision imposing the penalty of
suspension for one year
is immediately executory pending appeal. It cannot be
stayed by the mere filing of an appeal to the Court of
Appeals (CA). Clearly, Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman supersedes
the discretion given to the CA in Section 12, Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court when a decision of the Ombudsman in
an administrative case is appealed to the CA. The
provision in the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman that a decision is immediately executory is a
special rule that prevails over the provisions of the Rules
of Court. Moreover, Section 13 (8), Article XI of the
Constitution authorizes the Office of the Ombudsman to
promulgate its own rules of procedure. In this
connection, Sections 18 and 27 of the Ombudsman Act of
1989 also provide that the Office of the Ombudsman has
the power to “promulgate its rules of procedure for the
effective exercise or performance of its powers, functions
and duties” and to amend or modify its rules as the
interest of justice may require. For the CA to issue a
preliminary injunction that will stay the penalty imposed
by the Ombudsman in an administrative case would be to
encroach on the rule-making powers of the Office of the
Ombudsman under the Constitution and RA 6770 as the
injunctive writ will render nugatory the provisions of
Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office
of the Ombudsman. Office of the Ombudsman vs. Joel
S. Samaniego. G.R. No. 175573, October 5, 2010.
Preliminary Investigation; Decision; Applicability of
Constitutional Requirements to DOJ.
A preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial
proceeding since “the prosecutor in a preliminary
investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of
the accused.”  Preliminary investigation is merely
inquisitorial. While the prosecutor makes that
determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-
court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment
on the accused, not the prosecutor. A preliminary
investigation thus partakes of
an investigative or inquisitorial power for the sole
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purpose of obtaining information on what future action of
a judicial nature may be taken. Balangauan v. Court of
Appeals in fact iterates that even the action of the
Secretary of Justice in reviewing a prosecutor’s order or
resolution via appeal or petition for review cannot be
considered a quasi-judicial proceeding since the “DOJ is
not a quasi-judicial body.”  Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution does not thus extend to resolutions issued
by the DOJ Secretary. Atty. Alice Odchique-Bondoc vs.
Tan Tiong Bio a.k.a. Henry Tan. G.R. No.
186652, October 6, 2010.
Validity of
Supplemental Toll Operation Agreements.
(a) Public Utility Franchise; Substitution of
Grantee.
The Court rejected petitioners’ contention that
contractual provisions on substitution of the franchise
holder violated the Constitution. Relying on Clause
17.4.1 of the
Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement (STOA) for the
North Luzon Expressway that the lenders have the
unrestricted right to appoint a substitute entity in case of
default of Manila North Tollways Corporation (MNTC) or
the occurrence of an event of default in respect
of MNTC’s loans, petitioners argue that since MNTC is the
assignee or transferee of the franchise of Philippine
National Construction Corporation (PNCC), then it steps
into the shoes of PNCC.  They contend that the act of
replacing MNTC as grantee is tantamount to an
amendment or alteration of PNCC’s original franchise and
hence unconstitutional, considering that the
constitutional power to appoint a new franchise holder is
reserved to Congress. The Court disagreed. Petitioners’
presupposition that only Congress has the power to
directly grant franchises is misplaced.  The Court has held
that administrative agencies may be empowered by the
Legislature by means of a law to grant franchises or
similar authorizations. In this case, the Court ruled that
the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) is empowered to grant a
franchise for toll road projects.
Petitioners also contend that substituting MNTC as the
grantee in case of default with respect to its loans is
tantamount to an amendment of PNCC’s original
franchise and is therefore unconstitutional.  The
Court also found this assertion to be without
merit.  Besides holding that the Legislature may properly
empower administrative agencies to grant franchises
pursuant to a law, the Court explained in this case that
Presidential Decree No. 1113 and the amendatory
Presidential Decree No. 1894 both vested the TRB with
the power to impose conditions on PNCC’s franchise in an
appropriate contract and may therefore amend or alter
the same when public interest so requires, save for the
conditions stated in Sections 1 and 2 of PD 1894, which
relate to the coverage area of the tollways and the
expiration of PNCC’s original
franchise.  Presidential Decree No. 1112 provided further
that the TRB has the power to amend or modify a Toll
Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!
Operation Certificate that it issued when public interest
so requires.  Accordingly, there is nothing infirm much
less questionable about the provision in the MNTC STOA
allowing the substitution of MNTC in case it defaults in its
loans.
Furthermore, the “unrestricted right” of the lender in
Clause 17.4.1 of the MNTC STOA to appoint a
substituted entity is never intended to afford such
lender the plenary power to do so. It is clear that the
lenders do not actually have an absolute or “unrestricted”
right to appoint the substituted entity in view of TRB’s
right to accept or reject the substitution within one
month from notice, and such right to appoint comes into
force only if and when the TRB decides to effectuate the
substitution of MNTC as allowed in Clause 17.2 of the
MNTC STOA.
(b) Public Utility Franchise; Extension.
The Court agreed with petitioners’ contention that the
option in the MNTC STOA to extend the concession for
the stated period is unconstitutional. Clause 17.5 of
the MNTC STOA grants MNTC’s lenders the power to
extend the concession in case the Grantor (Republic of
the Philippines) takes over the same, for a period not
exceeding 50 years, until full payment of the loans.  At
the outset, Clause 17.5 does not grant the lenders the
power to unilaterally extend the concession for a period
not exceeding 50 years. The afore-quoted provision
should be read in conjunction with Clause 20.12, which
expressly provides that the MNTC STOA is “made under
and shall be governed by and construed in accordance
with” the laws of the Philippines, and particularly, by the
provisions of PD 1112, PD 1113 and PD 1894.  Under the
applicable laws, the TRB may amend, modify, alter or
revoke the authority/franchise “whenever the public
interest so requires.”  In a word, the power to determine
whether or not to continue or extend the authority
granted to a concessionaire to operate and maintain
a tollway is vested in the TRB by the applicable laws.  The
necessity of whether or not to extend the concession or
the authority to construct, operate and maintain
a tollway rests, by operation of law, with the TRB.  As
such, the lenders cannot unilaterally extend the
concession period, or, with like effect, demand that the
TRB agree to extend the concession.
It must be noted, however, that while the TRB is vested
by law with the power to extend the administrative
franchise or authority that it granted, it cannot do so for
an accumulated period exceeding 50 years. Otherwise, it
would violate   the proscription under Article XII, Section
11 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that no
public utility franchise shall be for a longer period than 50
years.
In this case, the MNTC STOA has an original stipulated
period of 30 years.  Clause 17.5 allows the extension of
this period if necessary to fully repay the
loans of MNTC. If the maximum extension as provided in
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Clause 17.5, i.e., 50 years, is used, the accumulated
concession period granted in this case would effectively
be 80 years.  This is a clear violation of the 50-year
franchise threshold set by the Constitution.  It is on this
basis that the Court struck down the provision in Clause
17.5 allowing extension of the concession for up to 50
years.  However, the nullity is only with respect
to any extension beyond the 50-year constitutional limit.
(c) Government Guarantee.
The Court declared as unconstitutional and grossly
disadvantageous to the Government Clause 11.7 of the
MNTC STOA (and a similar provision in the STOA for the
South Luzon Expressway rehabilitation and extension
project), which guarantees the financial viability
of tollway project. Under Clause 11.7 of the MNTC STOA,
the TRB agreed to pay monthly the difference in the toll
fees actually collected by MNTC and that which it could
have realized under the STOA.  Article VI, Section 29(1)
of the Constitution mandates that “[n]o money shall be
paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.” In this case, the TRB, by
warranting to compensate MNTC for loss of revenue
resulting from the non-implementation of the periodic
and interim toll fee adjustments, violates the
constitutionally guaranteed and exclusive power of the
Legislature to appropriate money for public purpose from
the General Funds of the Government.
Further, Section 3(e)(5) of PD 1112 explicitly states that
no guarantee, Certificate of Indebtedness, collateral
securities, or bonds shall be issued by any government
agency or government-owned or controlled corporation
on any financing program of the toll operator in
connection with his undertaking under the Toll Operation
Certificate. What the law here seeks to prevent is the
eventuality that the Government, through any of its
agencies, could be obligated to pay or secure, whether
directly or indirectly, the financing by the private investor
of the project.    In this case, under Clause 11.7 of the
MNTC STOA, the Republic of the Philippines (through the
TRB) guaranteed the security of the project against
revenue losses that could result in case the TRB, based
on its determination of a just and reasonable toll fee,
decides not to effect a toll fee adjustment under the
STOA’s periodic/interim adjustment formula.
investors and negated the public hearing
requirement. The Court held that the requisite public
hearings under Section 3(d) of PD 1112 and Section 8(b)
of PD 1894 are not negated by the fixing of the initial toll
rates and the periodic adjustments under the STOAs.
A clear distinction must be made between the statutory
prescription on the fixing of initial toll rates, on the one
hand, and of periodic/interim or subsequent toll rates, on
the other.  First, the hearing required under the said
provisos refers to notice and hearing for the approval or
denial of petitions for toll rate adjustments – or the
subsequent toll rates, not to the fixing of initial toll
rates.  By express legal provision, the TRB is authorized to
approve the initial toll rates without the necessity of a
hearing.  It is only when a challenge on the initial toll
rates fixed ensues that public hearings are required.
In determining the reasonableness of subsequent toll rate
increases, the TRB must seek out the Commission on
Audit for assistance in examining and auditing the
financial books of the public utilities
concerned. Furthermore, while the periodic, interim and
other toll rate adjustment formulas are indicated in the
STOAs, it does not mean that the TRB should accept a
rate adjustment predicated on the economic data,
references or assumptions adopted by the toll
operator.  The final figures should be determined by the
TRB based on its appreciation of the relevant rate-
influencing data.  The TRB should exercise its rate-fixing
powers within the context of the agreed formula, but
always having in mind that the rates should be just and
reasonable.  Conversely, it is very well within the power of
the TRB under the law to approve a change in the current
toll fees.  Section 3(d) of PD 1112 grants the TRB the
power to “issue, modify and promulgate from time to
time the rates of toll that will be charged the direct users
of toll facilities.”  But the reasonableness of a possible
increase in the fees must first be clearly and convincingly
established by the petitioning entities, i.e., the toll
operators. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., et al. vs. Toll
Regulatory Board, et al./Hon. Imee R. Marcos, et al. vs.
The Republic of the Philippines, et
al./Gising Kabataan Movement, Inc., et al. vs. The
Republic of the Philippines, et al./The Republic of the
Philippines vs. Young Professionals and Entrepreneurs of
San Pedro, Laguna. G.R. No. 166910, 169917, 173630,
183599, October 19, 2010.

(d) Toll Rate Adjustments.

The Court rejected petitioners’ contention that the toll

Administrative Law
rate adjustment mechanisms in the STOAs violated the
Constitution. Petitioners argue that the STOAs for the
North Luzon Expressway, South Luzon Expressway and Administrative Agencies; Doctrine of Primary
South Metro Manila Skyway (SMMS) projects tie the Administrative Jurisdiction.
hands of the TRB, as it is bound by the stipulated periodic
and interim toll rate adjustments provided
Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction,
therein.  Petitioners contend that the provisions
courts will not determine a controversy where the issues
on initial toll rates and periodic/interim toll rate
for resolution demand the exercise of sound
adjustments, by using a built-in automatic toll rate
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
adjustment formula, guaranteed fixed returns for the
experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to

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determine technical and intricate matters of fact. The
objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to
guide the court in determining whether it should refrain
from exercising its jurisdiction until after an
administrative agency has determined some question or
some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding
before the court. Undeniably, supervening events have
substantially changed the factual backdrop of the case
while it was pending before the Court.  The Supreme
Court thus deferred to the competence and expertise of
the Securities and Exchange Commission to determine
whether, given the supervening events, the Second
Amendment to the Rehabilitation Plan is no longer
capable of implementation and whether the rehabilitation
case should be terminated as a consequence. Nestle
Philippines, Inc. et al. vs. Uniwide Sales, Inc., et al. G.R.
No. 174674, October 20, 2010.
Government Contracts; Public Bidding.
The Court held that public bidding is not required with
respect to the procurement of the South Metro Manila
Skyway, North Luzon Expressway and South Luzon
Expressway projects. Private petitioners maintain that
public bidding is required for these projects on the basis
that they are in the nature of a build-operate-
transfer infrastructure undertaking under the BOT
Law. The Court said that the BOT Law does not squarely
apply to Philippine National Construction Corporation
(PNCC), which exercised its prerogatives and obligations
under its franchise to pursue the construction,
rehabilitation and expansion of the above toll roads with
chosen partners. These tollway projects may very well
qualify as a build-operate-transfer undertaking.  However,
given that the projects have been undertaken by PNCC in
the exercise of its franchise under Presidential Decree No.
1113 and Presidential Decree No. 1894, in joint
venture with its chosen partners at the time when it was
held valid to do so by the Office of
the Government Corporate Counsel and the Department
of Justice, the public bidding provisions under the BOT
Law do not strictly apply.
The above projects are not ordinary contracts for the
construction of government infrastructure projects, which
require, under the Government Procurement Reform Act
or the now-repealed Presidential Decree No. 1594, public
bidding as the preferred mode of contract award.  Neither
are these contracts where financing or financial
guarantees for the project are obtained from the
government. Rather, the
Supplemental Toll Operating Agreements (pursuant to
which PNCC is undertaking the projects together with its
chosen partners) actually constitute a statutorily-
authorized transfer or assignment of usufruct of PNCC’s
existing franchise to construct, maintain and operate
expressways.
The conclusion would perhaps be different if
the tollway projects were to be prosecuted by an outfit
completely different from, and not related to, PNCC. In
such a scenario, the entity awarded the winning bid in a
Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!
BOT-scheme infrastructure project will have to construct,
operate and maintain the tollways through an automatic
grant of a franchise or TOC, in which case, public bidding
is required under the law. Where, as here, a
franchisee (PNCC) undertakes the construction,
rehabilitation and expansion of the tollways under its
franchise, there is no need for a public bidding.  In
pursuing the projects with the vast resource
requirements, the franchisee can partner with other
investors, which it may choose in the exercise of its
management prerogatives.  In this case, no public bidding
is required upon the franchisee in choosing
its partners, as such process was done in the exercise of
management prerogatives and in pursuit of its right
of delectus personae.  Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., et al. vs.
Toll Regulatory Board, et al./Hon. Imee R. Marcos, et al.
vs. The Republic of the Philippines, et
al./Gising Kabataan Movement, Inc., et al. vs. The
Republic of the Philippines, et al./The Republic of the
Philippines vs. Young Professionals and Entrepreneurs of
San Pedro, Laguna. G.R. No. 166910, 169917, 173630,
183599, October 19, 2010.
Election Laws
Candidate; Residency Requirement.
While it is undisputed that Mitra’s domicile of origin is
Puerto Princesa City, Mitra adequately proved by
substantial evidence that he transferred by incremental
process to Aborlan beginning 2008, and concluded his
transfer in early 2009.  Given this proof, the burden of
evidence lies with the private respondents to establish
the contrary, which the latter failed to do. On the other
hand, the COMELEC based its ruling that Mitra did not
take up residence in Aborlan largely on the photographs
of Mitra’s Aborlan premises; it concluded that the
photographed premises could not have been a residence
because of its assessment of the interior design and
furnishings of the room.  Thus, the COMELEC Second
Division’s Resolution (which the COMELEC en banc fully
supported) did not merely conclude that Mitra does not
live in the photographed premises; more than this, it
ruled that these premises cannot be considered a home
or a residence, for lack of the qualities of a home that the
Second Division wanted to see. The COMELEC not only
grossly misread the evidence but even used personal and
subjective standards in its assessment of Mitra’s dwelling
when, in fact, the law is replete with standards, i.e., the
dwelling must be where a person permanently intends to
return and to
remain. Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra vs. Commission on
Elections, Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon,
Jr. G.R. No. 191938, October 19, 2010.
Special Laws
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Agrarian Reform; Just Compensation. PPA formula in the exercise of its rate-making power over
them. Surigao del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc.
(SURNECO) vs. Energy Regulatory Commission. G.R. No.
Although the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is
183626, October 4, 2010.
vested with primary jurisdiction under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988 to
determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable PNCC; Authority After Expiration of Franchise.
compensation for lands taken under the CARP, such
determination is subject to challenge in the courts.  The
In this case, petitioners assume and harp on the lack of
CARL vests in the RTCs, sitting as Special Agrarian
authority of the Philippine National Construction
Courts, original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
Corporation (PNCC) to continue, in joint venture with
petitions for the determination of just
private investors, with its North Luzon Expressway
compensation.  The jurisdiction of the RTCs is not any
(NLEX), South Luzon Expressway (SLEX) and Metro
less “original and exclusive” because the question is first
Manila Expressway (MMEX) operations after the lapse of
passed upon by the DAR.  The proceedings before the
its franchise (granted under Presidential Decree No.
RTC are not a continuation of the administrative
1113) on May 1, 2007. However, this expiration did not
determination. Additionally, the administrative orders
carry with it the cancellation of PNCC’s authority and that
providing for the guidelines in determining just
of its joint venture partners granted under Presidential
compensation are mandatory and not mere guides that
Decree No. 1112 in relation to Section 1 of Presidential
the RTC may disregard. Finally, although in some
Decree No. 1894 to construct, operate and maintain
expropriation cases, the Court allowed the imposition of
“any and all such extensions, linkages or stretches,
said interest, the same was in the nature of damages for
together with the toll facilities appurtenant thereto, from
delay in payment which in effect makes the obligation on
any part of [NLEX], [SLEX] and/or [MMEX] and/or to
the part of the government one of forbearance. In this
divert the original route and change the original end-
case, respondents are not entitled to interest on the final
points of the [NLEX] and/or [SLEX] as may be approved
compensation considering that petitioner promptly
by the [TRB].” To highlight the point, Section 2 of PD
deposited the compensation for their lands after they
1894 specifically provides that the franchise for the
rejected petitioner’s initial valuation. Land Bank of the
extension and toll road projects constructed after the
Philippines vs. Glenn Y. Escandor, et al. G.R. No.
approval of PD 1894 shall be 30 years, counted from
171685, October 11, 2010.
project completion. Indeed, prior to the expiration of
PNCC’s original franchise in May 2007, the
Energy Regulatory Commission; Implementation of Toll Regulatory Board (TRB), in the exercise of its special
RA 7832. powers under PD 1112, signed Supplemental Toll
Operation Agreements (STOAs) with PNCC and its private
joint venture partners. These STOAs covered the
SURNECO cannot insist on using the multiplier scheme
expansion and rehabilitation of NLEX and SLEX, as the
even after the imposition of the system loss caps under
case may be, and/or the construction, operation and
Section 10 of R.A. No. 7832.  Indeed, under National
maintenance of toll road projects contemplated in PD
Electrification Administration Memorandum No. 1-A, the
1894. Further, corresponding Toll Operation Certificates
use of the multiplier scheme allows the recovery of
(TOCs) have been issued for the toll road projects. The
system losses even beyond the caps mandated in R.A.
STOAs TRB entered into with PNCC and its joint venture
No. 7832, which is intended to gradually phase out
partners had the effect of granting authorities to
pilferage losses as a component of the recoverable
construct, operate and maintain toll facilities, but with
system losses by the distributing utilities such as
the injection of additional private sector investments
SURNECO.  However, it is totally repugnant to and
consistent with the intent of PD 1112, PD 1113 and PD
incompatible with the system loss caps established in
1894.  The execution of these STOAs came in 1995, 1998
R.A. No. 7832, and is repealed by Section 16 of the law. 
and 2006, or before the expiration of PNCC’s original
As between NEA Memorandum No. 1-A, a mere
franchise on May 1, 2007.  Upon the expiration of PNCC’s
administrative issuance, and R.A. No. 7832, a legislative
legislative franchise on May 1, 2007, the new authorities
enactment, the latter must prevail. Additionally, the PPA
to construct, maintain and operate the
formula provided in the IRR of R.A. No. 7832 was only a
subject tollways and toll facilities granted by the TRB
model to be used as a guide by the electric cooperatives
pursuant to the validly executed STOAs and TOCs, shall
in proposing their own PPA formula for approval by the
begin to operate and be treated as administrative
then Energy Regulatory Board (ERB).  Sections 4 and 5,
franchises or authorities. After May 1, 2007, the
Rule IX of the IRR directed the electric cooperatives to
operation and maintenance of the NLEX and the other
apply for approval of such formula with the ERB so that
subject tollways are no longer be founded on PNCC’s
the system loss caps under the law would be
original franchise but on entirely new
incorporated in their computation of power cost
authorizations, i.e. the TOCs, granted by the TRB
adjustments.  The IRR did not provide for a specific
pursuant to its statutory franchising authority under
formula; therefore, there was nothing in the IRR that was
Sections 3(a) and (e) of PD 1112. Ernesto B. Francisco,
amended or could have been amended relative to the
Jr., et al. vs. Toll Regulatory Board, et al./Hon. Imee R.
PPA formula.  The IRR left to the ERB, now the Energy
Marcos, et al. vs. The Republic of the Philippines, et
Regulatory Commission, the authority to approve and
al./Gising Kabataan Movement, Inc., et al. vs. The
oversee the implementation of the electric cooperatives’
Republic of the Philippines, et al./The Republic of the

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Philippines vs. Young Professionals and Entrepreneurs of
San Pedro, Laguna. G.R. No. 166910, 169917, 173630,
183599, October 19, 2010.
President’s Power to Approve TRB Contracts.
Petitioners here assert that the grant to the President of
the power to peremptorily authorize the assignment by
Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), as
franchise holder, of its franchise or the usufruct in its
franchise is unconstitutional for being an encroachment
of legislative power. The Court rejected this
claim. Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree No. 1112
requires approval by the President of any
contract the Toll Regulatory Board may have entered into
or effected for the construction and operation of toll
facilities.  Complementing Section 3(a) is 3(e)(3) of PD
1112 enjoining the transfer of the usufruct of PNCC’s
franchise without the President’s prior approval. The
President’s approving authority is therefore of statutory
origin.  There is nothing illegal, let alone unconstitutional,
with the delegation to the President of the authority to
approve the assignment by PNCC of its rights and
interest in its franchise, the assignment and delegation
being circumscribed by restrictions in the delegating law
itself. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., et al. vs. Toll Regulatory
Board, et al./Hon. Imee R. Marcos, et al. vs. The Republic
of the Philippines, et al./Gising Kabataan Movement,
Inc., et al. vs. The Republic of the Philippines, et al./The
Republic of the Philippines vs. Young Professionals and
Entrepreneurs of San Pedro, Laguna. G.R. No. 166910,
169917, 173630, 183599, October 19, 2010.
Public Land; Alienability.
Unless a public land is shown to have been reclassified as
alienable or actually alienated by the State to a private
person, that piece of land remains part of the public
domain, and its occupation in the concept of owner, no
matter how long, cannot confer ownership or possessory
rights. It is only after the property has been declared
alienable and disposable that private persons can legally
claim possessory rights over it. This does not mean,
however, that neither of the parties has the right to
possess the property. While the Modestos claim to have
been in possession of Lot 356 for almost 33 years, this
occupation could not give rise to possessory rights while
the property being occupied remain government land that
had not yet been declared alienable and
disposable. It was the Modestos, however, who were the
actual possessors of the property when it was declared
alienable and disposable on October 16, 1987, and
continued to possess the property until the present time.
Pio Modesto and Cirila Rivera-Modesto vs. Carlos Urbina,
substituted by the heirs of Olympia
Miguel Vda. de Urbina, et al. G.R. No. 189859, October
18, 2010.
Public land; Foreshore.
Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!
To qualify as foreshore land, it must be shown that the
land lies between the high and low water marks and is
alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the
tide. The land’s proximity to the waters alone does not
automatically make it a foreshore land. Thus, in Republic
of the Philippines v. Lensico, the Court held that although
the two corners of the subject lot adjoins the sea, the lot
cannot be considered as foreshore land since it has not
been proven that the lot was covered by water during
high tide. Similarly in this case, it was clearly proven that
the disputed land remained dry even during high tide.
Indeed, all the evidence supports the conclusion that the
disputed portion of Lot No. 6278-M is not foreshore land
but remains private land owned by
respondents. Manuel Almagro, joined by his spouse,
Elizabeth Almagro vs. Salvacion C. Kwan, et al. /
Margarita Pachoro, et al. vs. William C. Kwan, et al. G.R.
Nos. 175806, 175810 and G.R. No. 175849. October 20,
2010.
Toll Regulatory Board; Franchising Powers.
The Court dismissed petitioners’ argument that only
Congress has, under the 1987 Constitution, the exclusive
prerogative to grant franchise to operate public
utilities. With respect to the Toll Regulatory Board
(TRB), Sections 3(a) and (e) of
Presidential Decree No. 1112 in relation to Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 1894 have invested the TRB with
sufficient power to grant a qualified person or entity with
authority to construct, maintain, and operate a toll facility
and to issue the corresponding toll operating permit or
Toll Operation Certificate.  By explicit provision of
law, therefore, the TRB was given the power to grant
administrative franchise for toll facility projects.
The power to authorize and control a public utility is
admittedly a prerogative that stems from the
Legislature.  Any suggestion, however, that only Congress
has the authority to grant a public utility franchise is less
than accurate.  As  stressed in Albano v. Reyes — a case
decided under the 1987 Constitution — there is nothing
in the Constitution remotely indicating the necessity of
a congressional franchise before each and every public
utility may operate. A special franchise directly
emanating from Congress is not necessary if the law
already specifically authorizes an administrative body to
grant a franchise or to award a contract. Under the 1987
Constitution, Congress has an explicit authority to grant a
public utility franchise.  However, it may validly delegate
its legislative authority, under the power of subordinate
legislation, to issue franchises of certain public utilities to
some administrative agencies. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr.,
et al. vs. Toll Regulatory Board, et al./Hon. Imee R.
Marcos, et al. vs. The Republic of the Philippines, et
al./Gising Kabataan Movement, Inc., et al. vs. The
Republic of the Philippines, et al./The Republic of the
Philippines vs. Young Professionals and Entrepreneurs of
San Pedro, Laguna. G.R. No. 166910, 169917, 173630,
183599, October 19, 2010.
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Toll Regulatory Board; Quasi-Legislative and Quasi- prosecutors to the case. Although the Revised Rules of
Judicial Functions. Criminal Procedure mandate commencement of trial
within 30 days from receipt of the pre-trial order, and the
continuous conduct thereof for a period not exceeding
Petitioners in the special civil actions cases would have
180 days, Section 3(a)(1) of Rule 119 provides that
the Court declare as invalid (i) Sections 3(a) and (d) of
delays resulting from extraordinary remedies against
Presidential Decree No. 1112 (which accord the
interlocutory orders shall be excluded in computing the
Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) the power to enter into
time within which trial must commence. In determining
contracts for the construction and operation of toll
the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts are
facilities, and, at the same time, grant it the power to
required to do more than a mathematical computation of
issue and promulgate toll rates) and (ii) Section 8(b) of
the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings
Presidential Decree No. 1894 (which grant the TRB
of the case and to give particular regard to the facts and
adjudicatory jurisdiction over matters involving toll rate
circumstances peculiar to each case. Based on the
movements). As submitted by petitioners, granting the
foregoing, the Court rejected petitioner Francisco’s claim
TRB the power to award toll contracts is inconsistent with
that the postponements of the pre-trial conferences
its quasi-judicial function of adjudicating petitions for
before the lower court violated his right to a speedy trial.
initial toll and periodic toll rate adjustments. There
Nelson Imperial, et al. vs. Maricel M. Joson, et al./Santos
cannot, so petitioners would postulate, be impartiality in
O. Francisco vs. Spouses Gerard and Maricel Joson
such a situation. The Court rejected these
Nelson/Imperial, et al. vs.. Hilarion C. Felix, et al., G.R.
arguments. It does not perceive an irreconcilable clash
No. 160067/G.R. Mo. 170410/G.R. No. 171622,
in the enumerated statutory powers of the TRB, such that
November 17, 2010.
the exercise of one negates the other. The ascription of
impartiality on the part of the TRB cannot, under the
premises, be accorded cogency. Petitioners have not Bill of Rights; Right to Speedy Trial.
shown that the TRB lacks the expertise, competence and
capacity to implement its mandate of balancing the
In determining whether the right of the accused to a
interests of the toll-paying motoring public and the
speedy trial was violated, any delay should be considered
imperative of allowing the concessionaires to recoup their
in relation to the entirety of the proceedings. Here, there
investment with reasonable profits. The fact that an
had been an undue and inordinate delay in the
administrative agency is exercising its administrative or
reinvestigation of the cases by the Office of the
executive functions (such as the granting of franchises or
Ombudsman, which failed to submit its reinvestigation
awarding of contracts) and at the same time exercising
report despite the lapse of the 60-day period set by the
its quasi-legislative (e.g., rule-making) and/or quasi-
Sandiganbayan, and did so only after more than a year
judicial functions (e.g., rate-fixing), does not support a
thereafter. However, while such reinvestigation delayed
finding of a violation of due process or the Constitution.
the proceedings, the Court held that said process could
Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., et al. vs. Toll Regulatory Board,
not have been dispensed with as it was undertaken for
et al./Hon. Imee R. Marcos, et al. vs. The Republic of the
the protection of the rights of petitioners and their co-
Philippines, et al./Gising Kabataan Movement, Inc., et al.
accused. These rights should not be compromised at the
vs. The Republic of the Philippines, et al./The Republic of
expense of expediency. Thus, even though the Court
the Philippines vs. Young Professionals and Entrepreneurs
acknowledged the delay in the criminal proceedings, as
of San Pedro, Laguna. G.R. No. 166910, 169917,
well as the prejudice suffered by petitioners and their co-
173630, 183599, October 19, 2010.
accused by reason thereof, the Court held that
petitioners’ right to speedy trial and disposition of the
cases involving them do not justify the dismissal of the
criminal cases. The Court further held that the State
should not be prejudiced and deprived of its right to
NOVEMBER 2010 CASES
prosecute the criminal cases simply because of the
ineptitude or nonchalance of the Office of the
Constitutional Law Ombudsman. Monico V. Jacob, et al. vs. Sandiganbayan,
et al., G.R. No. 162206, November 17, 2010.

Constitutionality; Legal Standing.

Bill of Rights; Right to Speedy Trial.
The right to speedy trial is considered violated only when
the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays. In this case, far from being
vexatious, capricious and oppressive, the delays entailed
by the postponements of the hearings were, to a great
extent, attributable to petitioner Francisco’s extraordinary
remedies against the interlocutory orders issued by the
lower court and the assignment of at least three public
Petitioner questioned the constitutionality of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET). The Court held that
he has no legal standing. The issue of legal standing is
derived from the following requisites of a judicial
inquiry: (1) There must be an actual case or
controversy; (2) The question of constitutionality must be
raised by the proper party; (3) The constitutional
question must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and (4) The decision of the constitutional
question must be necessary to the determination of the

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case itself. The Court said that even if the petitioner’s
claim that he is a proper party on the basis that the
creation and operation of the PET involves the use of
public funds and the issue he raised is of transcendental
importance, his standing was still imperiled by his
appearance as counsel to then presidential candidate
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the 2004 election protest filed
by her opponent before the PET. A constitutional
question must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity. That appearance would have been the first
opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of the PET’s
constitution. Instead, petitioner ubiquitously entered his
appearance before the PET and acknowledged its
jurisdiction. His failure to raise a seasonable
constitutional challenge at that time, coupled with his
unconditional acceptance of the PET’s authority, meant
that he did not meet the third condition and therefore
has no standing to file the petition. Atty. Romulo B.
Macalintal vs. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No.
191618, November 23, 2010.
Constitutionality; Presidential Electoral Tribunal;
Creation.
Petitioner here claimed that the creation of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) is unconstitutional as
it violates Section 4 of Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, which provides that “The Supreme Court,
sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules
for the purpose.” He contends that the provision, as
worded, does not authorize the constitution of the PET.
The Court said that, while the above provision does not
specify the establishment of the PET, neither does it
preclude, much less prohibit, the same. The Court further
said that its constitutional mandate to act as sole judge
of election contests involving the President or Vice-
President, and its rule-making authority in connection
therewith (granted by the provision of Section 4 that the
Court “may promulgate its rules for the purpose”), are
not restricted but include all necessary powers implicit in
the exercise of such mandate and authority. These
powers are plenary and the authority of the Court to
decide presidential and vice-presidential election contests
through the PET are derived from the unequivocal grant
of jurisdiction under Section 4 of Article VII of the 1987
Constitution. Accordingly, the creation of the PET
implements Section 4 and faithfully complies with the
constitutional directive. The discussions of the
Constitutional Commission clearly support the foregoing
conclusion. Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal vs. Presidential
Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010.
Constitutionality; Presidential Electoral Tribunal;
Exercise of Quasi-Judicial Function.
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The Court here rejected petitioner’s claim that the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) exercises quasi-
judicial functions contrary to Section 12, Article VIII of
the Constitution, which states that “The Members of the
Supreme Court and of other courts established by law
shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-
judicial or administrative functions.” The traditional grant
of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, which provides that the power “shall be
vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.” Consistent with the
presidential system of government, the function of
“dealing with the settlement of disputes, controversies or
conflicts involving rights, duties or prerogatives that are
legally demandable and enforceable” is apportioned to
courts of justice. With the advent of the 1987
Constitution, judicial power was expanded to include “the
duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.” Judicial power was
thus expanded, but it remained absolute.
The Court held that set up embodied in the 1987
Constitution characterizes the resolution of electoral
contests as essentially an exercise of judicial
power. When the Supreme Court, as the PET, resolves a
presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it
performs what is essentially a judicial power. The
present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court,
in conjunction with latter’s exercise of judicial power
inherent in all courts, the task of deciding presidential
and vice-presidential election contests, with full authority
in the exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a
derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to
courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution.
Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal vs. Presidential Electoral
Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010.
Eminent Domain; Interest.
If property is taken for public use before compensation is
paid or deposited with the court having jurisdiction over
the case, the final compensation must include interest on
its just value to be computed from the time the property
was taken to the time when compensation is actually paid
or deposited with the court. In fine, between the taking
of the property and the actual payment, legal interest
accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good
as (but not better than) that he was in before the taking
occurred. As in previous cases, the Supreme Court
affirmed the award of 12% interest on just compensation
payable to the landowner. Land Bank of the Philippines
vs. Esther Anson Rivera, et al., G.R. No. 182431,
November 17, 2010.
Administrative Law
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Due Process; Administrative Due Process.
Petitioners here assailed the credibility of a witness’s
statement because it was not made under oath and he
was not presented as witness during the hearing. The
Court rejected this claim. In administrative proceedings,
technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly
applied. Administrative due process cannot be fully
equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. In
administrative proceedings, due process is satisfied when
the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity
to explain their side of the controversy or given
opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. The measure of due process to be
observed by administrative tribunals allows a certain
degree of latitude as long as fairness is not compromised.
Irene K. Nacu, etc. vs. Civil Service Commission, et al.,
G.R. No. 187752, November 23, 2010.
Other Laws
Land Bank of the Philippines; Costs of Suit.
Since Land Bank of the Philippines is performing a
governmental function in agrarian reform proceedings, it
is exempt from the payment of costs of suit under Rule
142, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which provides that
“No costs shall be allowed against the Republic of the
Philippines, unless otherwise provided by law.” Land Bank
of the Philippines vs. Esther Anson Rivera, et al., G.R. No.
182431, November 17, 2010
DECEMBER 2010 CASES
Emancipation patent; issuance.
Following are the steps in transferring land to a tenant-
tiller under Presidential Decree No. 27: (a) identification
of tenant, landowner, and the land covered; (b) land
survey and sketching of portion actually cultivated by the
tenant to determine parcel size, boundaries, and possible
land use; (c) issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer; (d)
valuation of the land for purposes of computing the
amortization; (e) amortization payments of the tenant-
tiller over a 15-year period; and (f) issuance of
Emancipation Patent. In this case, there is no evidence
that these steps were followed. There are several
supporting documents that the tenant-farmer must
submit before he can receive the Emancipation Patent.
The Supreme Court found that majority of these
supporting documents is lacking. Hence, it was improper
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for the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board to order the issuance of the Emancipation Patent in
favor of respondent. There was also no sufficient
evidence to prove that respondent has fully paid the
value of the land. Full payment of just compensation is
required prior to issuance of Emancipation Patents.
Renato Reyes, represented by Ramon Reyes vs Leopoldo
Barrios, G.R. No. 172841, December 15, 2010.
Equal protection clause; concept.
The Court here struck down Executive Order No. 1 (which
created the Truth Commission) for violating the equal
protection clause. The clear mandate of the Truth
Commission is to investigate and find out the truth
“concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption
during the previous administration” only. The intent to
single out the previous administration was plain, patent
and manifest. According to the Court, the Arroyo
administration is a member of a class, that is, the class of
past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to
include in the Commission’s mandate past
administrations similarly situated constitutes
arbitrariness, which the equal protection clause cannot
sanction. Although Section 17 gives the President
discretion to expand the scope of investigations of the
Commission so as to include acts of graft and corruption
committed in other past administrations, it does not
guarantee that they would be covered in the future. This
expanded mandate of the Commission will still depend on
the discretion of the President. If he decides not to
include them, the provision would be meaningless. Louis
“Barok” C. Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission
of 2010 / Rep. Edcel C. Lagman, et al. vs. Exec. Sec.
Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 192935 & G.R. No.
19303, December 7, 2010.
Judicial review; requisites.
Judicial review requires the following: (1) an actual case
or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(2) the person challenging the act must have the
standing to question the validity of the act or issuance;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality
must be the very subject matter of the case. As to
standing, the Court here held that petitioners, who are
legislators, met the requirement as they are questioning
the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 creating the
Truth Commission on the basis that the latter’s mandate
constitutes usurpation of the power of the
Congress. However, with regard to the petitioner who is
questioning EO No. 1 as a taxpayer, the Court held that
he had no standing since he has not shown that he
sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and
direct injury attributable to the implementation of that
EO. The Court took cognizance of the case as the matter
involved was of transcendental importance. Louis
“Barok” C. Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission
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of 2010 / Rep. Edcel C. Lagman, et al. vs. Exec. Sec.
Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 192935 & G.R. No.
19303, December 7, 2010.
President; creation of Truth Commission; power to
reorganize.
The creation of the Truth Commission does not fall within
the President’s power to reorganize. Section 31 of the
Revised Administrative Code contemplates
“reorganization” as limited by the following functional and
structural lines: (1) restructuring the internal
organization of the Office of the President by abolishing,
consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring
functions from one unit to another; (2) transferring any
function under the Office of the President to any other
department or agency or vice versa; or (3) transferring
any agency under the Office of the President to any other
department or agency or vice versa. This provision,
according to the Court, refers to reduction of personnel,
consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of
economy or redundancy of functions. These refer to
situations where a body or an office is already existent
but a modification or alteration thereof has to be
effected. Louis “Barok” C. Biraogo vs. The Philippine
Truth Commission of 2010 / Rep. Edcel C. Lagman, et al.
vs. Exec. Sec. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No.
192935 & G.R. No. 19303, December 7, 2010.
President; creation of Truth Commission; power of
control.
The creation of the Commission is not justified by the
President’s power of control. Control is essentially the
power to alter, modify, nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with
that of the latter. Clearly, the power of control is entirely
different from the power to create public offices. The
former is inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds
basis from either a valid delegation from Congress, or the
Executive’s inherent duty to faithfully execute the
laws. Louis “Barok” C. Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010 / Rep. Edcel C. Lagman, et al. vs.
Exec. Sec. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 192935
& G.R. No. 19303, December 7, 2010.
President; creation of Truth Commission; power to
conduct investigations.
The President’s power to conduct investigations to aid
him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws – in this
case, fundamental laws on public accountability and
transparency – is inherent in the President’s powers as
the Chief Executive. It flows from the faithful-execution
clause of the Constitution under Article VII, Section 17
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thereof. One of the recognized powers of the President is
the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from
the need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have
been faithfully executed or guide the President in
performing his duties relative to the execution and
enforcement of laws. Contrary to petitioners’
apprehension, the Truth Commission will not supplant the
Ombudsman or the Department of Justice or erode their
respective powers. The investigative function of the
Commission will complement those of the two
offices. The recommendation to prosecute is but a
consequence of the overall task of the Commission to
conduct a fact-finding investigation. The actual
prosecution of suspected offenders, much less
adjudication on the merits of the charges against them, is
certainly not a function given to the Commission. Louis
“Barok” C. Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission
of 2010 / Rep. Edcel C. Lagman, et al. vs. Exec. Sec.
Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 192935 & G.R. No.
19303, December 7, 2010.
Tenancy relationship; elements.
For purposes of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law,
there is tenancy relationship between parties if the
following elements concur: (1) the parties are the
landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) the
subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land;
(3) there is consent between the parties to the
relationship; (4) the purpose of the relationship is to
bring about agricultural production; (5) there is personal
cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural
lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared between landowner
and tenant or agricultural lessee. All the foregoing
requisites must be proved by substantial evidence. In
this case, the continued stay of the purported tenant in
the premises of the company was the result of an
amicable settlement in a labor dispute and not because
there was a landlord-tenant relationship. The fact that
the stay was free of charge only proves the absence of
such a relationship. Even assuming that the employer
was receiving a share of the produce, the fact of receipt,
without an agreed system of sharing, does not ipso facto
create a tenancy. There was no evidence to indicate that
the parties agreed to any system of sharing. The
employee’s activities in the property cannot be classified
as one for agricultural production. There was no record
showed that he was engaged in any planting or other
agricultural activity. Heirs of Jose Barredo, namely,
Lolita Barredo, et al. vs. Lavoiser Besañes, G.R. No.
164695, December 13, 2010.
Warrantless arrest.
The Supreme Court here found that the prosecution failed
to prove the guilt of the accused, as (a) the evidence
against them is inadmissible and (b) granting the same
to be admissible, the chain of custody has not been duly
established. The police went to the house of one of the
accused based solely on the report of a concerned citizen
that a pot session was going on. Sole reliance on such a
tip does not constitute probable cause. The
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apprehending officers should have first conducted a
surveillance considering that the identity and address of
one of the accused had earlier been ascertained. After
conducting the surveillance and determining the
existence of probable cause, a search warrant should
have been secured prior to effecting the arrest and
seizure. The arrest being illegal, the ensuing search is
likewise illegal. The items seized during the illegal arrest
are thus inadmissible. People of the Philippines vs. Arnold
Martinez y Angeles, et al., G.R. No. 191366, December
13, 2010.
JANUARY 2011 CASES
Constitutional Law
Bill of Rights; Rights under custodial investigation.
As found by the Court of Appeals, (1) there is no
evidence of compulsion or duress or violence on the
person of Nagares; (2) Nagares did not complain to the
officers administering the oath during the taking of his
sworn statement; (3) he did not file any criminal or
administrative complaint against his alleged malefactors
for maltreatment; (4) no marks of violence were
observed on his body; and (5) he did not have himself
examined by a physician to support his claim. Moreover,
appellant’s confession is replete with details, which,
according to the SC, made it highly improbable that it
was not voluntarily given. Further, the records show that
Nagares was duly assisted by an effective and
independent counsel during the custodial investigation in
the NBI. As found by the Court of Appeals, after Nagares
was informed of his constitutional rights, he was asked
by Atty. Esmeralda E. Galang whether he accepts her as
counsel. During the trial, Atty. Galang testified on the
extent of her assistance. According to her, she
thoroughly explained to Nagares his constitutional rights,
advised him not to answer matters he did not know, and
if he did not want to answer any question, he may inform
Atty. Galang who would be the one to relay his refusal to
the NBI agents. She was also present during the entire
investigation. Thus, the SC held that there was no duress
or violence imposed on the person of Nagares during the
custodial investigation and that Nagares was duly
assisted by an independent counsel during such
investigation in the NBI. People of the Philippines vs.
Rodolfo Capitle and Arutor Nagares, G.R. No. 175330,
January 12, 2010.
Bill of Rights; Double jeopardy.
As a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered
because it places the accused under double jeopardy. On
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occasions, however, a motion for reconsideration after an
acquittal is possible. But the grounds are exceptional
and narrow as when the court that absolved the accused
gravely abused its discretion, resulting in loss of
jurisdiction, or when a mistrial has occurred. In any of
such cases, the State may assail the decision by special
civil action of certiorari under Rule 65. Here, although
complainant Vizconde invoked the exceptions, he was not
able to bring his pleas for reconsideration under such
exceptions. Complainant Vizconde cited the decision in
Galman v. Sandiganbayan as authority that the Court can
set aside the acquittal of the accused in the present
case. But the Court observed that the government
proved in Galman that the prosecution was deprived of
due process since the judgment of acquittal in that case
was “dictated, coerced and scripted.” It was a sham
trial. In this case, however, Vizconde does not allege
that the Court held a sham review of the decision of the
CA. He has made out no case that the Court held a
phony deliberation such that the seven Justices who
voted to acquit the accused, the four who dissented, and
the four who inhibited themselves did not really go
through the process. Antonio Lejano vs. People of the
Philippines / People of the Philippines vs. Hubert Jeffrey
P. Webb, et al., G.R. No. 176389/G.R. No. 176864.
January 18, 2011.
Bill of Rights; Unreasonable searches and seizures.
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the “plain
view” of an officer, who has a right to be in the position
to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be
presented as evidence. In this case, the SC found that
the seizure of the two receivers of the .45 caliber pistol
outside petitioner’s house falls within the purview of the
plain view doctrine. First, the presence of SPO2 Nava at
the back of the house and of the other law enforcers
around the premises was justified by the fact that
petitioner and Valerio were earlier seen respectively
holding .45 caliber pistols before they ran inside the
structure and sought refuge. The attendant
circumstances and the evasive actions of petitioner and
Valerio when the law enforcers arrived engendered a
reasonable ground for the latter to believe that a crime
was being committed. Secondly, from where he was
situated, SPO2 Nava clearly saw, on two different
instances, Valerio emerge on top of the subject dwelling
and throw suspicious objects. Lastly, considering the
earlier sighting of Valerio holding a pistol, SPO2 Nava had
reasonable ground to believe that the things thrown
might be contraband items, or evidence of the offense
they were then suspected of committing. The ensuing
recovery of the receivers may have been deliberate;
nonetheless, their initial discovery was indubitably
inadvertent. It is not crucial that at initial sighting the
seized contraband be identified and known to be so. The
law merely requires that the law enforcer observes that
the seized item may be evidence of a crime, contraband,
or otherwise subject to seizure. Hence, the two receivers
were admissible as evidence. Elenita C. Fajardo vs.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 190889, January 10,
2010.
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Bill of rights; Unreasonable searches and seizures. It is the nature and character of the land at the time of
its taking that is the principal criterion for determining
how much just compensation should be given to the
In this case, there was a valid warrantless arrest in
landowner. Prior to the NPC’s introduction of
flagrante delicto. The following are the circumstances
improvements in the area where the subject parcel of
immediately prior to and surrounding the arrest of
land is located, the properties therein, including the
accused-appellants: (1) the police officers received
disputed lot, remained agricultural and residential. The
information from an operative about an ongoing
SC found that it was only upon entry of the NPC in
shipment of contraband; (2) the police officers, with the
Barangay San Roque, and after constructing buildings
operative, proceeded to Villa Vicenta Resort in Barangay
and other facilities and bringing in various equipment for
Bignay II, Sariaya, Quezon; (3) they observed the
its multi-purpose project, that the lands in the said
goings-on at the resort from a distance of around 50
locality were later classified as commercial or industrial.
meters; and (4) they spotted the six accused-appellants
Moises Tinio, Jr. and Francis Tinio vs. National Power
loading transparent bags containing a white substance
Corporation/National Power Corporation vs. Moises Tinio,
into a white L-300 van. The crime was committed in the
Jr. and Francis Tinio, G.R. No. 160923/G.R. No. 161093,
presence of the police officers with the contraband, inside
January 24, 2011.
transparent plastic containers, in plain view and duly
observed by the arresting officers. Furthermore, accused-
appellants are deemed to have waived their objections to Government contracts; Payment based on quantum
their arrest for not raising the issue before entering their meruit for illegal contracts.
plea. People of the Philippines vs. Ng Yik bun, et al., G.R.
No. 180452. January 10, 2010.
The government project involved in this case, the
construction of a dike, was completed way back on 9 July
Constitutionality; Lis mota. 1992. For almost two decades, the public and the
government benefitted from the work done by
respondent. According to the SC, public interest and
The SC observed that the issue of constitutionality of R.A.
equity dictate that the contractor should be compensated
No. 95 (Philippine National Red Cross charter) was not
for services rendered and work done. To deny the
raised by the parties, and was not among the issues
payment to the contractor would be to allow the
defined in the body of the previous decision of the SC;
government to unjustly enrich itself at the expense of
thus, it was not the very lis mota of the case. The SC
another. Justice and equity demand compensation on the
reminded that it will not touch the issue of
basis of quantum meruit. Gregorio R. Vigilar, et al. vs.
unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis mota. A court
Arnulfo D. Aquino, G.R. No. 180388, January 18, 2011.
should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide
a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such
question is raised by the parties. Under this rule, the SC Philippine National Red Cross; Status.
held that it should not have declared void certain sections
of R.A. No. 95, as amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.)
The SC found merit in Philippine National Red Cross’s
Nos. 1264 and 1643, the PNRC Charter. Instead, the
contention that its structure is sui generis. National
Court should have exercised judicial restraint on the
Societies such as the PNRC act as auxiliaries to the public
matter, especially since there was some other ground
authorities of their own countries in the humanitarian
upon which the Court could have based its judgment.
field and provide a range of services including disaster
Dante V. Liban, et al. vs. Richard J. Gordon, G.R. No.
relief and health and social programmes. National
175352, January 18, 2011.
societies were held to be organizations that are directly
regulated by international humanitarian law, in contrast
Congress; Creation of private corporations. to other ordinary private entities, including NGOs. The
auxiliary status of a Red Cross Society means that it is at
one and the same time a private institution and a public
The SC observed that the purpose of the constitutional
service organization because the very nature of its work
provision prohibiting Congress from creating private
implies cooperation with the authorities, a link with the
corporations was to prevent the granting of special
State. The SC further noted that the creation of the PNRC
privileges to certain individuals, families, or groups,
was a result of the country’s adherence to the Geneva
which were denied to other groups. The SC found the
Convention which has the force and effect of law. Under
Philippine National Red Cross Charter is not covered by
the Constitution, the Philippines adopts the generally
the constitutional provision, as it does not grant special
accepted principles of international law as part of the law
privileges to a particular individual, family, or group, but
of the land. The PNRC, as a National Society of the
creates an entity that strives to serve the common good.
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, can
Dante V. Liban, et al. vs. Richard J. Gordon, G.R. No.
neither “be classified as an instrumentality of the State,
175352, January 18, 2011.
so as not to lose its character of neutrality” as well as its
independence, nor strictly as a private corporation since
it is regulated by international humanitarian law and is
treated as an auxiliary of the State. Dante V. Liban, et al.
Eminent domain; Just compensation. vs. Richard J. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, January 18,
2011.

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State; Immunity from suit.
The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot
serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a
citizen. It would be the apex of injustice and highly
inequitable to defeat respondent’s right to be duly
compensated for actual work performed and services
rendered, where both the government and the public
have for years received and accepted benefits from the
project and reaped the fruits of respondent’s honest toil
and labor. The rule, in any case, is not absolute for it
does not say that the state may not be sued under any
circumstance. Gregorio R. Vigilar, et al. vs. Arnulfo D.
Aquino, G.R. No. 180388, January 18, 2011.
Agrarian Law
Agrarian reform; Coverage.
The main issue for resolution by the Court is whether the
Lopez and Limot lands of SNLABC can be considered
grazing lands for its livestock business and are thus
exempted from the coverage of the CARL. In Luz Farms
v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, the
Court declared unconstitutional the CARL provisions that
included lands devoted to livestock under the coverage of
the CARP. The transcripts of the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the
word “agricultural” showed that it was never the intention
of the framers of the Constitution to include the livestock
and poultry industry in the coverage of the
constitutionally mandated agrarian reform program of the
government. Thus, lands devoted to the raising of
livestock, poultry and swine have been classified as
industrial, not agricultural, and thus exempt from
agrarian reform. In the instant case, the MARO in its
ocular inspection found on the Lopez lands several heads
of cattle, carabaos, horses, goats and pigs. There were
likewise structures on the Lopez lands used for its
livestock business. Hence, the Court found that the Lopez
lands were in fact actually, directly and exclusively being
used as industrial lands for livestock-raising. The Court
affirmed the findings of the DAR Regional Director and
the Court of Appeals that the Lopez lands were actually,
directly and exclusively being used for SNLABC’s livestock
business and, thus, are exempt from CARP coverage. In
contrast, however, the Limot lands were found to be
agricultural lands devoted to coconut trees and rubber
and as such, are thus not subject to exemption from
CARP coverage. Republic of the Philippines, rep. by Dept.
Agrarian Reform vs. Salvador N. Lopez Agri-Business
Corp./Agri-Business Corp. vs. Dept. Agrarian Reform,
G.R. No. 178895, January 10, 2011.
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Administrative Law
Administrative remedies; Exhaustion.
Respondent in this case filed a complaint for collection of
sum of money against petitioners since, according to
him, a large amount of money was still due him under
the “Contract of Agreement” involving the construction of
a dike, executed between him and petitioners. On the
other hand, petitioners aver that respondent should have
first filed a claim before the Commission on Audit (COA)
before going to the courts. The SC held that there was no
need to exhaust administrative remedies. The doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction are not ironclad rules. The exceptions
to these rules are the following: (a) where there is
estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine;
(b) where the challenged administrative act is patently
illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there
is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will
irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the
amount involved is relatively so small as to make the rule
impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question
involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be
decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial
intervention is urgent; (g) where the application of the
doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage; (h)
where the controverted acts violate due process; (i)
where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies has been rendered moot; (j) where there is no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) where
strong public interest is involved; and (l) in quo warranto
proceedings. In the present case, the SC found conditions
(c) and (e) as present. The government project
contracted out to respondent was completed almost two
decades ago. To delay the proceedings by remanding the
case to the relevant government office or agency will
definitely prejudice respondent. More importantly, the
issues in the present case involved the validity and the
enforceability of the “Contract of Agreement” entered into
by the parties. These, according to the SC, are questions
purely of law and clearly beyond the expertise of the
Commission on Audit or the DPWH. Gregorio R. Vigilar, et
al. vs. Arnulfo D. Aquino, G.R. No. 180388, January 18,
2011.
Career Executive Service; Coverage.
The Career Executive Service covers presidential
appointees only. Corollarily, as the position of
Department Manager II of the PEZA does not require
appointment by the President of the Philippines, it does
not fall under the CES. The Third Level of Career Service
covers only the positions in the CES as enumerated in the
Administrative Code of 1987 and those identified by the
Career Executive Service Board as of equivalent rank, all
of whom are appointed by the President of the
Philippines. Modesto Agyao, Jr. vs. Civil Service
Commission, G.R. No. 182591. January 18, 2011.
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Election Law
Candidate; Disqualification.
A petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be
premised on Section 12 or 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code, or Section 40 of the Local Government Code. On
the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel
a Certificate of Candidacy can only be grounded on a
statement of a material representation in the said
certificate that is false. The petitions also have different
effects. While a person who is disqualified under Section
68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the
person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due
course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at
all, as if he/she never filed a CoC. Thus, a candidate who
is disqualified under Section 68 can validly be substituted
under Section 77 of the OEC because he/she remains a
candidate until disqualified; but a person whose CoC has
been denied due course or cancelled under Section 78
cannot be substituted because he/she is never
considered a candidate. Apart from the qualifications
provided for in the Constitution, the power to prescribe
additional qualifications for elective office and grounds for
disqualification therefrom, consistent with the
constitutional provisions, is vested in Congress. However,
laws prescribing qualifications for and disqualifications
from office are liberally construed in favor of eligibility
since the privilege of holding an office is a valuable one.
Sergio G. Amora, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections and
Arnielo S. Olandria, G.R. No. 192280, January 25, 2011.
Certificate of Candidacy; Requirement of being
sworn.
According to the SC, it was grave abuse of discretion to
uphold Olandria’s claim that an improperly sworn COC is
equivalent to possession of a ground for disqualification.
This was held not to be a ground for disqualification
under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and
Section 40 of the Local Government Code. Nowhere
therein does it specify that a defective notarization is a
ground for the disqualification of a candidate. Sergio G.
Amora, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections and Arnielo S.
Olandria, G.R. No. 192280, January 25, 2011.
Local Government Code
Local government officials; Suspension pending
appeal.
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Respondent Barriga was held administratively liable by
the Office of the Ombudsman as a result of anomalous
transactions pertaining to the handling of the trust fund
of the Municipality of Carmen, Cebu in the Central
Visayas Water and Sanitation Project. This decision was
appealed to the CA but was not implemented
immediately. According to the SC, it is clear from Section
7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 7, as amended by
Administrative Order No. 17, that when a public official
has been found guilty of an administrative charge by the
Office of the Ombudsman and the penalty imposed is
suspension for more than a month, just like in the
present case, an appeal may be made to the CA.
However, such appeal shall not stop the decision from
being executory and the implementation of the decision
follows as a matter of course. The provision in the Rules
of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman is clear that
an appeal by a public official from a decision meted out
by the Ombudsman shall not stop the decision from being
executory. Office of the Ombudsman vs. Court of Appeals
and Dinah C. Barriga, G.R. No. 172224, January 26,
2011.
February 2011 CASES
Constitutional Law
Administrative cases; right to be presumed
innocent.
The trial court was correct in declaring that respondents
had the right to be presumed innocent until proven
guilty. This means that an employee who has a pending
administrative case filed against him is given the benefit
of the doubt and is considered innocent until the contrary
is proven. In this case, respondents were placed under
preventive suspension for 90 days from 23 May 2002 to
21 August 2002. After serving the period of their
preventive suspension and without the administrative
case being finally resolved, respondents should have
been reinstated and entitled to the grant of step
increment. The Board of Trustees of the Government
Service Insurance System, et al. v. Albert M. Velasco, et
al. G.R. No. 170463, February 2, 2011.
Equal Protection; valid classification.
Petitioners argue that there is no substantial distinction
between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the
11th Congress and municipalities that did not have
pending bills, such that the mere pendency of a cityhood
bill in the 11th Congress is not a material difference to
distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose
of the income requirement. The SC held that the purpose
of the enactment of R.A. No 9009 was merely to stop the
“mad rush of municipalities wanting to be converted into
cities” and the apprehension that before long the country
will be a country of cities and without municipalities. It
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found that the imposition of the P100 million average
annual income requirement for the creation of component
cities was arbitrarily made as there was no evidence or
empirical data, such as inflation rates, to support the
choice of this amount. The imposition of a very high
income requirement of P100 million, increased from P20
million, was simply to make it extremely difficult for
municipalities to become component cities. The SC also
found that substantial distinction lies in the capacity and
viability of respondent municipalities to become
component cities of their respective provinces. Congress,
by enacting the Cityhood Laws, recognized this capacity
and viability of respondent municipalities to become the
State’s partners in accelerating economic growth and
development in the provincial regions, which is the very
thrust of the LGC, manifested by the pendency of their
cityhood bills during the 11th Congress and their
relentless pursuit for cityhood up to the present. League
of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League
of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League
of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al. G.R.
No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R. No. 178056, February
15, 2011.
Expropriation; abandonment of public purpose.
In this case, the Mactan Cebu International Airport
Authority (MCIAA) and/or its predecessor agency had not
actually used the lots subject of the final decree of
expropriation in Civil Case No. R-1881 for the purpose
they were originally taken by the government, i.e., for
the expansion and development of Lahug Airport. In fact,
the Lahug Airport had been closed and abandoned. Also,
in this case, it was preponderantly established by
evidence that the National Airport Corporation, MCIAA’s
predecessor, through its team of negotiators, had given
assurance to the affected landowners that they would be
entitled to repurchase their respective lots in the event
they are no longer used for airport purposes. The SC held
that the government acquires only such rights in
expropriated parcels of land as may be allowed by the
character of its title over the properties. This means that
in the event the particular public use for which a parcel of
land is expropriated is abandoned, the owner shall not be
entitled to recover or repurchase it as a matter of right,
unless such recovery or repurchase is expressed in or
irresistibly deducible from the condemnation judgment.
The SC held that the decision in Civil Case No. R-1881
enjoined MCIAA, as a condition of approving
expropriation, to allow recovery or repurchase upon
abandonment of the Lahug airport project. In effect, the
government merely held the properties condemned in
trust until the proposed public use or purpose for which
the lots were condemned was actually consummated by
the government. Since the government failed to perform
the obligation that is the basis of the transfer of the
property, then the lot owners can demand the
reconveyance of their old properties after the payment of
the condemnation price. A condemnor should commit to
use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the
petition for expropriation, failing which it should file
another petition for the new purpose. If not, then it
behooves the condemnor to return the said property to
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its private owner, if the latter so desires. The government
cannot plausibly keep the property it expropriated in any
manner it pleases and, in the process, dishonor the
judgment of expropriation. Anunciacion Vda. De Ouano,
et al. v. Republic of the Philippines, et al./Mactan-Cebu
International Airport [MCIAA] v. Ricardo L. Inocian, in his
personal capacity and as Attorney-in-Fact of Olympia E.
Esteves, et al. and Aletha Suico Magat in her personal
capacity and as Attorney-in-Fact of Philip M. Suico, et al.
G.R. Nos. 168770 & 168812, February 9, 2011.
Expropriation; reconveyance of expropriated
property.
In accordance with Art. 1187 of the Civil Code on mutual
compensation, MCIAA may keep whatever income or
fruits it may have obtained from the parcels of land
expropriated. In turn, the landowners need not require
the accounting of interests earned by the amounts they
received as just compensation. Following Art. 1189 of the
Civil Code providing that if the thing is improved by its
nature, or by time, the improvement shall inure to the
benefit of the creditor, the landowners do not have to
settle the appreciation of the values of their respective
lots as part of the reconveyance process, since the value
increase is merely the natural effect of nature and time.
Anunciacion Vda. De Ouano, et al. v. Republic of the
Philippines, et al./Mactan-Cebu International Airport
[MCIAA] v. Ricardo L. Inocian, in his personal capacity
and as Attorney-in-Fact of Olympia E. Esteves, et al. and
Aletha Suico Magat in her personal capacity and as
Attorney-in-Fact of Philip M. Suico, et al. G.R. Nos.
168770 & 168812, February 9, 2011.
Impeachment; narration of facts.
Petitioner urged the Court to look into the narration of
facts constituting the offenses vis-à-vis her submissions
disclaiming the allegations in the complaints. The SC
denied this as that would require the Court to make a
determination of what constitutes an impeachable
offense. Such a determination is a purely political
question, which the Constitution has left to the sound
discretion of the legislature. Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez
v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et
al. G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011.
Impeachment; publication requirement.
Petitioner contended that she was deprived of due
process since the Impeachment Rules was published only
on September 2, 2010 a day after public respondent
ruled on the sufficiency of form of the complaints. She
likewise tacked her contention on Section 3(8), Article XI
of the Constitution which directs that “Congress shall
promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry
out the purpose of this section.” While “promulgation”
would seem synonymous to “publication,” there is a
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statutory difference in their usage. Promulgation must
thus be used in the context in which it is generally
understood, that is, to make known. What is generally
spoken shall be generally understood. Between the
restricted sense and the general meaning of a word, the
general must prevail unless it was clearly intended that
the restricted sense was to be used. Since the
Constitutional Commission did not restrict “promulgation”
to “publication,” the former should be understood to have
been used in its general sense. It is within the discretion
of Congress to determine on how to promulgate its
Impeachment Rules, in much the same way that the
Judiciary is permitted to determine that to promulgate a
decision means to deliver the decision to the clerk of
court for filing and publication. It is not for the Supreme
Court to tell a co-equal branch of government how to
promulgate when the Constitution itself has not
prescribed a specific method of promulgation. The SC
observed that it is in no position to dictate a mode of
promulgation beyond the dictates of the Constitution.
Had the Constitution intended to have the Impeachment
Rules published, it could have stated so as categorically
as it did in the case of the rules of procedure in
legislative inquiries. Even assuming that publication is
required, lack of it does not nullify the proceedings taken
prior to the effectiveness of the Impeachment Rules,
which faithfully comply with the relevant self-executing
provisions of the Constitution. Ma. Merceditas N.
Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on
Justice, et al. G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011.
Impeachment; One-Year Bar Rule.
Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution
reads: “No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated
against the same official more than once within a period
of one year.” Petitioner reckoned the start of the one-
year bar from the filing of the first impeachment
complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four days
before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th
Congress. She posited that within one year from July 22,
2010, no second impeachment complaint may be
accepted and referred to public respondent. Contrary to
petitioner’s claim, the SC found that the previous case of
Francisco v. House of Representatives was applicable to
this case. There the SC held that the term “initiate”
means to file the complaint and take initial action on it. It
refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled
with Congress’ taking initial action of said complaint. The
initial action taken by the House on the complaint is the
referral of the complaint to the Committee on
Justice. With a simultaneous referral of multiple
complaints filed, more than one lighted matchstick light
the candle at the same time. According to the SC, what
is important is that there should only be one candle that
is kindled in a year, such that once the candle starts
burning, subsequent matchsticks can no longer rekindle
the candle. Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez v. The House of
Representatives Committee on Justice, et al. G.R. No.
193459, February 15, 2011.
Impeachment; sufficiency of form and substance.
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Petitioner claimed that Congress failed to ascertain the
sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints on
the basis of the standards set by the Constitution and its
own Impeachment Rules. The SC found this claim to be
untenable. The determination of sufficiency of form and
substance of an impeachment complaint is an exponent
of the express constitutional grant of rule-making powers
of the House of Representatives which committed such
determinative function to public respondent. Contrary to
petitioner’s position that the Impeachment Rules do not
provide for comprehensible standards in determining the
sufficiency of form and substance, the Impeachment
Rules are clear in echoing the constitutional requirements
and providing that there must be a “verified complaint or
resolution,” and that the substance requirement is met if
there is “a recital of facts constituting the offense
charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the
committee.” Notatu dignum is the fact that it is only in
the Impeachment Rules where a determination of
sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment
complaint is made necessary. This requirement is not
explicitly found in the organic law, as Section 3(2), Article
XI of the Constitution basically merely requires a
“hearing.” Prudential considerations behooved the
Supreme Court to respect the compliance by the House
of its duty to effectively carry out the constitutional
purpose, absent any contravention of the minimum
constitutional guidelines. Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez v.
The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et
al. G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011.
Internal Revenue Allotment; just share.
Congress, who holds the power of the purse, in enacting
the Cityhood Laws, only sought the well-being of
respondent municipalities, having seen their respective
capacities to become component cities of their provinces,
temporarily stunted by the enactment of R.A. No.
9009. By allowing respondent municipalities to convert
into component cities, Congress desired only to uphold
the very purpose of the LGC, i.e., to make the local
government units “enjoy genuine and meaningful local
autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and make them
more effective partners in the attainment of national
goals,” which is the very mandate of the Constitution.
League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et
al./League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et
al./League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et
al. G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R. No.
178056, February 15, 2011.
International Agreements; limitations on
sovereignty.
The RP, by entering into the Agreement, does thereby
abdicate its sovereignty, abdication being done by its
waiving or abandoning its right to seek recourse through
the Rome Statute of the ICC for erring Americans
committing international crimes in the country. As it
were, the Agreement is but a form of affirmance and
confirmation of the Philippines’ national criminal
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jurisdiction. National criminal jurisdiction being primary,
it is always the responsibility and within the prerogative
of the RP either to prosecute criminal offenses equally
covered by the Rome Statute or to accede to the
jurisdiction of the ICC. Thus, the Philippines may decide
to try “persons” of the US, as the term is understood in
the Agreement, under our national criminal justice
system; or it may opt not to exercise its criminal
jurisdiction over its erring citizens or over US “persons”
committing high crimes in the country and defer to the
secondary criminal jurisdiction of the ICC over them. In
the same breath, the US must extend the same privilege
to the Philippines with respect to “persons” of the RP
committing high crimes within US territorial jurisdiction.
By their nature, treaties and international agreements
actually have a limiting effect on the otherwise
encompassing and absolute nature of sovereignty. By
their voluntary act, nations may decide to surrender or
waive some aspects of their state power or agree to limit
the exercise of their otherwise exclusive and absolute
jurisdiction. The usual underlying consideration in this
partial surrender may be the greater benefits derived
from a pact or a reciprocal undertaking of one contracting
party to grant the same privileges or immunities to the
other. Bayan Muna, as represented by Rep. Satur
Ocampo, et al. v. Alberto Romulo, in his capacity as
Executive Secretary, et al. G.R. No. 159618, February 1,
2011.
International Agreements; treaties and executive
agreements.
Under international law, there is no difference between
treaties and executive agreements in terms of their
binding effects on the contracting states concerned, as
long as the negotiating functionaries have remained
within their powers. However, a treaty has greater
“dignity” than an executive agreement, because its
constitutional efficacy is beyond doubt, a treaty having
behind it the authority of the President, the Senate, and
the people; a ratified treaty, unlike an executive
agreement, takes precedence over any prior statutory
enactment. Petitioner, in this case, argues that the Non-
Surrender Agreement between the Philippines and the US
is of dubious validity, partaking as it does of the nature of
a treaty; hence, it must be duly concurred in by the
Senate. Petitioner relies on the case, Commissioner of
Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading, in which the Court
stated: international agreements involving political issues
or changes of national policy and those involving
international arrangements of a permanent character
usually take the form of treaties; while those embodying
adjustments of detail carrying out well established
national policies and traditions and those involving
arrangements of a more or less temporary nature take
the form of executive agreements. According to
petitioner, the subject of the Agreement does not fall
under any of the subject-categories that are enumerated
in the Eastern Sea Trading case that may be covered by
an executive agreement, such as commercial/consular
relations, most-favored nation rights, patent rights,
trademark and copyright protection, postal and
navigation arrangements and settlement of claims. The
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Supreme Court held, however, that the categorization of
subject matters that may be covered by international
agreements mentioned in Eastern Sea Trading is not cast
in stone. There are no hard and fast rules on the
propriety of entering, on a given subject, into a treaty or
an executive agreement as an instrument of international
relations. The primary consideration in the choice of the
form of agreement is the parties’ intent and desire to
craft an international agreement in the form they so wish
to further their respective interests. The matter of form
takes a back seat when it comes to effectiveness and
binding effect of the enforcement of a treaty or an
executive agreement, as the parties in either
international agreement each labor under the pacta sunt
servanda principle. Bayan Muna, as represented by Rep.
Satur Ocampo, et al. v. Alberto Romulo, in his capacity
as Executive Secretary, et al. G.R. No. 159618, February
1, 2011.
Judicial Review; expanded certiorari jurisdiction.
Respondents raised the impropriety of the remedies of
certiorari and prohibition. They argued that public
respondent (the Congress) was not exercising any
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function in taking
cognizance of the two impeachment complaints as it was
exercising a political act that is discretionary in nature,
and that its function is inquisitorial that is akin to a
preliminary investigation. The case of Francisco v. House
of Representatives characterizes the power of judicial
review as a duty which, as the expanded certiorari
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court reflects, includes the
power to “determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government.” The SC found it well-within its power
to determine whether Congress committed a violation of
the Constitution or gravely abused its discretion in the
exercise of its functions and prerogatives that could
translate as lack or excess of jurisdiction, which would
require corrective measures from the Court. Ma.
Merceditas N. Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives
Committee on Justice, et al. G.R. No. 193459, February
15, 2011.
Judicial Review; ripeness.
An aspect of the “case-or-controversy” requirement is the
requisite of ripeness. The question of ripeness is
especially relevant in light of the direct, adverse effect on
an individual by the challenged conduct. In the present
petition, the SC found no doubt that questions on, inter
alia, the validity of the simultaneous referral of the two
complaints and on the need to publish as a mode of
promulgating the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings of the House (Impeachment Rules) present
constitutional vagaries which call for immediate
interpretation. The unusual act of simultaneously
referring to public respondent two impeachment
complaints presents a novel situation to invoke judicial
power. Petitioner was, therefore, found not to have
acted prematurely when she took the cue from the
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constitutional limitation that only one impeachment
proceeding should be initiated against an impeachable
officer within a period of one year. Ma. Merceditas N.
Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on
Justice, et al. G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011.
Legal Standing; requirements.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner
assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct
and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the
law or any government act is invalid, but also that he
sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some
direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not
merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. In
fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a
public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the
requirement of personal interest. In this case, as citizens,
petitioners’ interest in the subject matter of the petition
is direct and personal. At the very least, their assertions
questioning the Non-Surrender Agreement between the
Philippines and the US are made of a public right, i.e., to
ascertain that the Agreement did not go against
established national policies, practices, and obligations
bearing on the State’s obligation to the community of
nations. Bayan Muna, as represented by Rep. Satur
Ocampo, et al. v. Alberto Romulo, in his capacity as
Executive Secretary, et al. G.R. No. 159618, February 1,
2011.
Stare Decisis; nature.
The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower
courts to doctrinal rules established by the Supreme
Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle
that once a question of law has been examined and
decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to
further argument. Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to
relitigate the same issues, necessary for two simple
reasons: economy and stability. In our jurisdiction, the
principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code. The
previous case of Lubrica and the present case involve two
different issues. The relief prayed for in the previous case
of Lubrica is that the amount for deposit in favor of the
landowner be determined on the basis of the time of
payment and not of the time of taking. But in the present
case, the prayer of the LBP is for the deposit of the
valuation of the Land Bank of the Philippines and
Department of Agrarian Reform and not that of the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator. The principle of
stare decisis, therefore, does not apply. Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Hon. Ernesto P. Pagayatan, Presiding Judge
of RTC, Branch 46, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro; and
Josefina S. Lubrica, in her capacity as Assignee of
Federico Suntay, et al., G.R. No. 177190, February 23,
2011.
Sovereign Immunity; expropriation.
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The doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be
successfully invoked to defeat a valid claim for
compensation arising from the taking without just
compensation and without the proper expropriation
proceedings being first resorted to of the plaintiffs’
property. The SC cited the previous case of De los Santos
v. Intermediate Appellate Court where it ruled that the
doctrine of sovereign immunity was not an instrument for
perpetrating any injustice on a citizen. In exercising the
right of eminent domain, the State exercised its jus
imperii, as distinguished from its proprietary rights, or
jus gestionis; yet, even in that area, where private
property had been taken in expropriation without just
compensation being paid, the defense of immunity from
suit could not be set up by the State against an action for
payment by the owners. Air Transportation Office v.
Spouses David and Elisea Ramos, G.R. No.
159402, February 23, 2011.
Sovereign Immunity; sovereign function and
proprietary function.
The immunity from suit is based on the political truism
that the State, as a sovereign, can do no wrong. Practical
considerations dictate the establishment of immunity
from suit in favor of the State. Otherwise, and the State
is suable at the instance of every other individual,
government service may be severely obstructed and
public safety endangered because of the number of suits
that the State has to defend against. An unincorporated
government agency without any separate juridical
personality of its own enjoys immunity from suit because
it is invested with an inherent power of
sovereignty. Accordingly, a claim for damages against
the agency cannot prosper; otherwise, the doctrine of
sovereign immunity is violated. However, the need to
distinguish between an unincorporated government
agency performing governmental function and one
performing proprietary functions has arisen. The
immunity has been upheld in favor of the former because
its function is governmental or incidental to such
function; it has not been upheld in favor of the latter
whose function was not in pursuit of a necessary function
of government but was essentially a business. In this
case, the juridical character of the Air Transportation
Office (“ATO”) as an agency of the Government was not
performing a purely governmental or sovereign function,
but was instead involved in the management and
maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an activity that was
not the exclusive prerogative of the State in its sovereign
capacity. Hence, the ATO had no claim to the State’s
immunity from suit. Air Transportation Office v. Spouses
David and Elisea Ramos, G.R. No. 159402, February 23,
2011.
Supreme Court; modification of doctrines and
principles.
The doctrine of immutability of decisions applies only to
final and executory decisions. Since the present cases
may involve a modification or reversal of a Court-
ordained doctrine or principle, the judgment rendered by
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the Special Third Division may be considered
unconstitutional, hence, it can never become final. A
decision rendered by a Division of the SC in violation of
the constitutional provision, that only the SC En Banc
may modify or reverse a SC doctrine and principle, would
be in excess of jurisdiction and, therefore, invalid. Any
entry of judgment may thus be said to be “inefficacious”
since the decision is void for being unconstitutional. That
a judgment must become final at some definite point at
the risk of occasional error cannot be appreciated in a
case that embroils not only a general allegation of
“occasional error” but also a serious accusation of a
violation of the Constitution, viz., that doctrines or
principles of law were modified or reversed by the Court’s
Special Third Division August 4, 2009 Resolution. David
Lu v. Paterno Lu Ym, Sr., et al./Paterno Lu Ym, Sr., et al.
v. David Lu/John Lu Ym, et al. v. The Hon. Court of
Appeals of Ceby City, et al. G.R. No. 153690/G.R. No.
157381/G.R. No. 170889. February 15, 2011.
Administrative Law
Administrative Proceedings; findings of fact of
quasi-judicial agencies.
Petitioners argue that the Commission on Audit (COA)
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in declaring the prepayment stipulation in the
contract between Land Bank and Remad Livestock
Corporation (REMAD) proscribed by the State Audit Code
of the Philippines. The Supreme Court did not give merit
to petitioner’s argument. It emphasized that the COA
Auditor noted that “nowhere in the documents reviewed
disclosed about prepayment scheme with REMAD.” It is
well settled that findings of fact of quasi-judicial
agencies, such as the COA, are generally accorded
respect and even finality by this Court, if supported by
substantial evidence, in recognition of their expertise on
the specific matters under their jurisdiction. If the
prepayment scheme was in fact authorized, petitioners
should have produced the document to prove such fact
as alleged by them in the present petition. However, the
Supreme Court was at a loss as to whether the
prepayment scheme was authorized as its review of
“Annex I,” the document to which petitioners base their
authority to make advance payments, does not contain
such a stipulation or provision. In addition, the Supreme
Court noted that much reliance was made by petitioners
on their allegation that the terms of the Credit Facility
Proposal allowed for prepayments or advancement of the
payments prior to the delivery of the cattle by the
supplier REMAD. It appears, however, that a CFP, even if
admittedly a pro forma contract and emanating from the
Land Bank main office, is merely a facility proposal and
not the contract of loan between Land Bank and the
cooperatives. It is in the loan contract that the parties
embody the terms and conditions of a transaction. If
there is any agreement to release the loan in advance to
REMAD as a form of prepayment scheme, such a
stipulation should exist in the loan contract. There is,
nevertheless, no proof of such stipulation as petitioners
had failed to attach the CFPs or the loan contracts
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relating to the present petition. Based on the foregoing,
the COA was not faulted for finding that petitioners
facilitated the commission of the irregular transaction.
Ruben Reyna, et al. v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
167219, February 8, 2011.
Agrarian Law
Agrarian Reform; exclusion and exemption from
coverage.
The deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission
show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands
exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry-
raising from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program. Petitioner’s admission that, since 2001,
it leased another ranch for its own livestock is fatal to its
cause. The SC, in this case, accorded respect to the CA’s
observation that the assailed MARO reports and the
Investigating Team’s Report do not actually contradict
one another, finding that the 43 cows, while owned by
petitioner, were actually pastured outside the subject
property. Milestone Farms, Inc. v. Office of the President,
G.R. No. 182332, February 23, 2011.
Agrarian Reform; just compensation.
The issue in this case is whether or not the Court of
Appeals erred in ruling that RA 6657, rather than P.D.
No. 27/E.O. No. 228, is the law that should apply in the
determination of just compensation for the subject
agricultural land. The LBP and the DAR argue that P.D.
No. 27, as reaffirmed by E.O. No. 228, should be applied
in determining the just compensation for the subject
property of the case. They contend that P.D. No. 27 and
E.O. No. 228 prescribe the formula in determining the
just compensation of rice and corn lands tenanted as of
October 21, 1972. As the subject property was tenanted
and devoted to rice production in 1972, the just value
should be fixed at the prevailing rate at that time, when
the emancipation of the tenant-farmers from the
bondage of the soil was declared in P.D. No. 27. As to
R.A. No. 6657, both the LBP and the DAR insist that it
applies only to ricelands and cornlands not tenanted as of
October 21, 1972. According to them, the government’s
OLT program on tenanted privately-owned rice and corn
lands pursuant to P.D. No. 27 continues separately and
distinctly from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) acquisition and distribution program
under R.A. No. 6657. The SC held that RA 6657 is the
applicable law, with PD 27 and EO 228 having only
suppletory effect. This is so since the provisions of R.A.
No. 6657 are also applicable to the agrarian reform
process of lands placed under the coverage of P.D. No.
27/E.O. No. 228, which has not been completed upon the
effectivity of R.A. No. 6657. It would certainly be
inequitable to determine just compensation based on the
guideline provided by PD 27 and EO 228 considering the
DAR’s failure to determine the just compensation for a
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considerable length of time. Land Bank of the Philippines
v. Magin V. Ferrer, et al./Department of Agrarian Reform,
represented by Secretary Nasser C. Pangandaman v.
Antonio V. Ferrer and Ramon V. Ferrer. G.R. No.
172230, February 2, 2011.
Agrarian Reform; initial valuation and just
compensation.
It is the initial valuation made by the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the Land Bank of the
Philippines that must be released to the landowner in
order for DAR to take possession of the property.
Otherwise stated, Sec. 16 of RA 6657 does not authorize
the release of the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator’s determination of just compensation for the
land which has not yet become final and executory. Land
Bank of the Philippines v. Hon. Ernesto P. Pagayatan,
Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 46, San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro; and Josefina S. Lubrica, in her capacity as
Assignee of Federico Suntay, et al., G.R. No.
177190, February 23, 2011.
Civil Service Law
Regulations; Civil Service.
Not all rules and regulations adopted by every
government agency are to be filed with the UP Law
Center. Only those of general or of permanent character
are to be filed. Resolution No. 372 was about the new
GSIS salary structure, Resolution No. 306 was about the
authority to pay the 2002 Christmas Package, and
Resolution No. 197 was about the GSIS merit selection
and promotion plan. Clearly, the assailed resolutions
pertained only to internal rules meant to regulate the
personnel of the GSIS. There was no need for the
publication or filing of these resolutions with the UP Law
Center. The Board of Trustees of the Government Service
Insurance System, et al. v. Albert M. Velasco, et al. G.R.
No. 170463, February 2, 2011.
Local Government Code
Cityhood; criteria for conversion.
The cases involved here were initiated by the
consolidated petitions for prohibition filed by the League
of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), City of Iloilo, City of
Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas, assailing the
constitutionality of the sixteen (16) laws, each converting
the municipality covered thereby into a component city
(Cityhood Laws), and seeking to enjoin the Commission
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on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites
pursuant to the subject laws. In the Decision dated
November 18, 2008, the SC En Banc, by a 6-5 vote,
granted the petitions and struck down the Cityhood Laws
as unconstitutional for violating Sections 10 and 6, Article
X, and the equal protection clause. Then, in another
Decision dated December 21, 2009, the SC En Banc, by a
vote of 6-4, declared the Cityhood Laws as constitutional.
Thereafter, on August 24, 2010, the Court En Banc,
through a Resolution, by a vote of 7-6, reinstated the
November 18, 2008 Decision. The SC held that the
Cityhood laws were constitutional. Based on the
deliberations by Congress on R.A. No. 9009, Congress
intended that those with pending cityhood bills during the
11th Congress would not be covered by the new and
higher income requirement of P100 million imposed by
R.A. No. 9009. Notwithstanding that both the 11th and
12th Congress failed to act upon the pending cityhood
bills, both the letter and intent of Section 450 of the LGC,
as amended by R.A. No. 9009, were carried on until the
13th Congress, when the Cityhood Laws were enacted.
The exemption clauses found in the individual Cityhood
Laws are the express articulation of that intent to exempt
respondent municipalities from the coverage of R.A. No.
9009. League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v.
COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v.
COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v.
COMELEC, et al. G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R.
No. 178056, February 15, 2011.
Legislative power; amendment.
R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC. But the SC also held
that, in effect, the Cityhood Laws amended R.A. No. 9009
through the exemption clauses found therein. Since the
Cityhood Laws explicitly exempted the concerned
municipalities from the amendatory R.A. No. 9009, such
Cityhood Laws are, therefore, also amendments to the
LGC itself. League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v.
COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v.
COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v.
COMELEC, et al. G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R.
No. 178056, February 15, 2011.
MARCH 2011 CASE
Constitutional Law
COMELEC; House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal; Jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court held in this case that despite
recourse to it, it cannot rule on the issue of citizenship of
petitioner Gonzalez. Subsequent events showed that
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Gonzalez had not only been duly proclaimed, he had also
taken his oath of office and assumed office as Member of
the House of Representatives. Once a winning candidate
has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office
as a member of the House of Representatives,
COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to
the candidate’s election and qualifications ends, and the
HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. Fernando V. Gonzalez v.
Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 192856, March
8, 2011.
Equal Protection.
The main issue in this case is whether or not PAGCOR is
still exempt from corporate income tax and VAT with the
enactment of R.A. No. 9337. The Supreme Court held
that under Section 1 of R.A. No. 9337,
amending Section 27 (c) of the National Internal Revenue
Code of 1977, petitioner is no longer exempt from
corporate income tax as it has been effectively omitted
from the list of GOCCs that are exempt from it. The
burden of proof rests upon the party claiming exemption
to prove that it is, in fact, covered by the exemption so
claimed. In this case, PAGCOR failed to prove that it is
still exempt from the payment of corporate income tax,
considering that Section 1 of R.A. No. 9337 amended
Section 27 (c) of the National Internal Revenue Code of
1997 by omitting PAGCOR from the exemption. PAGCOR
cannot find support in the equal protection clause of the
Constitution, as the legislative records of the Bicameral
Conference Meeting dated October 27, 1997, of the
Committee on Ways and Means, show that PAGCOR’s
exemption from payment of corporate income tax, as
provided in Section 27 (c) of R.A. No. 8424, or the
National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, was not made
pursuant to a valid classification based on substantial
distinctions and the other requirements of a reasonable
classification by legislative bodies, so that the law may
operate only on some, and not all, without violating the
equal protection clause. The legislative records show
that the basis of the grant of exemption to PAGCOR from
corporate income tax was PAGCOR’s own request to be
exempted. Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, G.R. No.
172087, March 15, 2011.
Impeachment; Initiation.
The Supreme Court reiterated its previous ruling that the
term “initiate” as used in Section 3, Article XI of the
Constitution refers to the filing of the impeachment
complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial action on
said complaint. The initial action of the House of
Representatives on the complaint is the referral of the
same to the Committee on Justice. Ma. Merceditas C.
Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on
Justice, et al., G.R. No. 193459, March 8, 2011.
Impeachment; Promulgation of Rules.
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When the Constitution uses the word “promulgate,” it
does not necessarily mean to publish in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation. Promulgation, as used in Section 3(8), Article
XI of the Constitution, suitably takes the meaning of “to
make known” as it should be generally understood. Ma.
Merceditas C. Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives
Committee on Justice, et al., G.R. No. 193459, March 8,
2011.
Non-impairment Clause.
Petitioner PAGCOR, in this case, states that the private
parties/investors transacting with it considered the tax
exemptions, which inure to their benefit, as the main
consideration and inducement for their decision to
transact/invest with it. Petitioner argues that the
withdrawal of its exemption from corporate income tax
by R.A. No. 9337 has the effect of changing the main
consideration and inducement for the transactions of
private parties with it; thus, the amendatory provision is
violative of the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution. The SC held that a franchise partakes of the
nature of a grant which is beyond the purview of the non-
impairment clause of the Constitution. Under Section 11,
Article XII of the Constitution, PAGCOR’s franchise is
subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress
such as the amendment under Section 1 of R.A. No.
9377. Hence, the provision in Section 1 of R.A. No. 9337,
amending Section 27 (c) of R.A. No. 8424 by withdrawing
the exemption of PAGCOR from corporate income tax,
which may affect any benefits to PAGCOR’s transactions
with private parties, is not violative of the non-
impairment clause of the Constitution. Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Bureau of
Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 172087, March 15, 2011.
Senate Ethics Committee; Due Process.
This case refers to the ethics complaint filed against Sen.
Manny Villar on the alleged double insertion of Php200
million for the C-5 Road Extension Project in the 2008
General Appropriations Act. Petitioners allege that the
adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee by the
Senate Committee of the Whole is violative of Senator
Villar’s right to due process. The SC did not agree. The
Constitutional right of the Senate to promulgate its own
rules of proceedings has been recognized and affirmed by
this Court. The only limitation to the power of Congress
to promulgate its own rules is the observance of quorum,
voting, and publication when required. As long as these
requirements are complied with, according to the SC, the
Court will not interfere with the right of Congress to
amend its own rules. Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al. v.
Senate Committee of the Whole represented by Senate
President Juan Ponce Enrile, G.R. No. 187714, March 8,
2011.
Senate Ethics Committee; Equal Protection.
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Petitioners allege that the Senate Committee of the
Whole was constituted solely for the purpose of assuming
jurisdiction over the complaint against Senator Villar.
Petitioners further allege that the act was discriminatory
and removed Senator Villar’s recourse against any
adverse report of the Ethics Committee to the Senate as
a body. The SC did not agree with this. The Rules of the
Ethics Committee provide that “all matters relating to the
conduct, rights, privileges, safety, dignity, integrity and
reputation of the Senate and its Members shall be under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Senate Committee on
Ethics and Privileges.” However, in this case, the refusal
of the Minority to name its members to the Ethics
Committee stalled the investigation. In short, while
ordinarily an investigation about one of its members’
alleged irregular or unethical conduct is within the
jurisdiction of the Ethics Committee, the Minority
effectively prevented it from pursuing the investigation
when they refused to nominate their members to the
Ethics Committee. Even Senator Villar called the Ethics
Committee a kangaroo court and declared that he would
answer the accusations against him on the floor and not
before the Ethics Committee. Given the circumstances,
the referral of the investigation to the Committee of the
Whole was an extraordinary remedy undertaken by the
Ethics Committee and approved by a majority of the
members of the Senate. Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al.
v. Senate Committee of the Whole represented by Senate
President Juan Ponce Enrile, G.R. No. 187714, March 8,
2011.
Senate; Publication of Rules
Petitioners assail the non-publication of the Rules of the
Senate Committee of the Whole. Respondent counters
that publication is not necessary because the Senate
Committee of the Whole merely adopted the Rules of the
Ethics Committee which had been published in the Official
Gazette on 23 March 2009. Respondent alleges that there
is only one set of Rules that governs both the Ethics
Committee and the Senate Committee of the Whole. The
SC held that the Constitution does not require publication
of the internal rules of the House or Senate. Since rules
of the House or the Senate that affect only their
members are internal to the House or Senate, such rules
need not be published, unless such rules expressly
provide for their publication before the rules can take
effect. In this particular case, the Rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole itself provide that the Rules
must be published before the Rules can take effect. Thus,
even if publication is not required under the Constitution,
publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the
Whole is required because the Rules expressly mandate
their publication. To comply with due process
requirements, the Senate must follow its own internal
rules if the rights of its own members are affected.
Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al. v. Senate Committee of
the Whole represented by Senate President Juan Ponce
Enrile, G.R. No. 187714, March 8, 2011.
Senate; Quorum and Voting.
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If the Senate is constituted as a Committee of the Whole,
a majority of the Senate is required to constitute a
quorum to do business pursuant to Section 16(2), Article
VI of the Constitution. Otherwise, there will be a
circumvention of this express provision of the
Constitution on quorum requirement. Obviously, the
Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole require
modification to comply with requirements of quorum and
voting which the Senate must have overlooked in this
case. In any event, in case of conflict between the Rules
of the Senate Committee of the Whole and the
Constitution, the latter will of course prevail. . Aquilino Q.
Pimentel, Jr., et al. v. Senate Committee of the Whole
represented by Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile, G.R.
No. 187714, March 8, 2011.
Unlawful Expenditure for being Excessive; Factors.
Price is considered “excessive” if it is more than the 10%
allowable price variance between the price paid for the
item bought and the price of the same item per canvass
of the auditor. In determining whether or not the price is
excessive, the following factors may be considered: (a)
supply and demand forces in the market; (b) government
price quotations; (c) warranty of products or special
features; (d) brand of products. In this case, the issue
was whether the computer units bought by Cooperative
Development Authority (CDA) from Tetra were
overpriced. The records showed that while the
respondents found nothing wrong per se with the criteria
adopted by the CDA in the overall evaluation of the bids,
the technical aspect was seriously questioned. The final
technical evaluation report was apparently manipulated
to favor Tetra, which offered a Korean-made brand as
against Microcircuits which offered a US-made brand said
to be more durable, at a lower price. The SC concluded
that the price per item of the PC units, laptop and UPS
were overpriced by almost 50%. This comparison was
based on the initial purchase of 23 PC units with the bid
price by Tetra of Php1,269,630.00 (23 PC units, 1 unit
386 Tower and 1 unit 386 Notebook) under Disbursement
Voucher No. 01-92-12-2399. There was an additional
(repeat) purchase of 21 PC units for Php929,649.00
(same price per item of Php44,269.00) and one unit UPS
for Php86,000.00. The total contract price obtained by
Tetra was Php2,285,279.00, of which COA disallowed the
amount of Php881,819.00 representing the overprice per
the auditor’s findings. Candelario L. Verzosa, Jr. v.
Guillermo N. Carague, et al., G.R. No. 157838, March 8,
2011.
Unlawful Expenditure; Liability of Public Officers.
The SC held the petitioner liable personally and solidarily
for the disallowed amount of Php881,819.00. The
doctrine of separate personality of a corporation finds no
application because the Cooperative Development
Authority is not a private entity but a government agency
created by virtue of Republic Act No. 6939 in compliance
with the provisions of Section 15, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. Moreover, respondents satisfactorily
established that petitioner acted in bad faith when he
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prevailed upon the Development Academy of the
Philippines-Technical Evaluation Committee (DAP-TEC) to
modify the initial result of the technical evaluation of the
computers by imposing an irrelevant grading system that
was intended to favor one of the bidders, after the bids
had been opened. Candelario L. Verzosa, Jr. v. Guillermo
N. Carague, et al., G.R. No. 157838, March 8, 2011.
Administrative Law
Administrative Proceeding; Doctrine of Primary
Jurisdiction.
This case refers to the ethics complaint filed against Sen.
Manny Villar on the alleged double insertion of Php200
million for the C-5 Road Extension Project in the 2008
General Appropriations Act. Respondent avers that
primary recourse of petitioners should have been to the
Senate and that the Supreme Court must uphold the
separation of powers between the legislative and judicial
branches of the government. The SC held that the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply to this
case. The issues presented here do not require the
expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of respondent
for their resolution. On the contrary, the issues here are
purely legal questions which are within the competence
and jurisdiction of the Court, and not for an
administrative agency or the Senate to resolve. Aquilino
Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al. v. Senate Committee of the Whole
represented by Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile, G.R.
No. 187714, March 8, 2011.
Agrarian Law
Agrarian Reform; Qualifications of Beneficiary.
DAR Administrative Order No. 3, series of 1990,
enumerated the qualifications of a beneficiary: (1)
Landless; (2) Filipino citizen; (3) Actual occupant/tiller
who is at least 15 years of age or head of the family at
the time of filing application; and (4) Has the willingness,
ability and aptitude to cultivate and make the land
productive. The SC found that petitioner Lebrudo does
not qualify as a beneficiary because of (1) and (3). First,
Lebrudo is not landless. According to the records,
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer Amelia Sangalang
issued a certification dated 28 February 1996 attesting
that Lebrudo was awarded by the DAR with a home lot
consisting of an area of 236 square meters situated at
Japtinchay Estate, Bo. Milagrosa, Carmona, Cavite. Next,
Lebrudo is not the actual occupant or tiller of the lot at
the time of the filing of the application. Loyola and her
family were the actual occupants of the lot at the time
Loyola applied to be a beneficiary under the CARP. Julian
Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!
S. Lebrudo and Reynaldo L. Lebrudo v. Remedios Loyola,
G.R. No. 181370, March 9, 2011.
Agrarian Reform; Role of Land Bank of the
Philippines.
In this case, the issue was whether the Land Bank of the
Philippines has the personality to file a petition for
determination of just compensation before the Special
Agrarian Court. The SC held that LBP did. The LBP is an
agency created primarily to provide financial support in
all phases of agrarian reform pursuant to Section 74 of
RA 3844 or the Agricultural Reform Code and Section 64
of RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
of 1988. In the previous case of Heirs of Lorenzo and
Carmen Vidad v. Land Bank of the Philippines, the SC
held that LBP is not merely a nominal party in the
determination of just compensation, but an indispensable
participant in such proceedings. It is primarily responsible
for the valuation and determination of compensation for
all private lands. It has the discretion to approve or reject
the land valuation and just compensation for a private
agricultural land placed under the CARP. In case the LBP
disagrees with the valuation of land and determination of
just compensation by a party, the DAR, or even the
courts, the LBP not only has the right, but the duty, to
challenge the same, by appeal to the Court of Appeals or
to this Court, if appropriate. Davao Fruits Corporation v.
Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 181566 &
181570. March 9, 2011.
Agrarian Reform; Sale or Conveyance of Land.
It is clear from Section 27 of RA 6657 that lands awarded
to beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP) may not be sold, transferred or
conveyed for a period of 10 years. The law enumerated
four exceptions: (1) through hereditary succession; (2)
to the government; (3) to the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP); or (4) to other qualified beneficiaries.
In short, during the prohibitory 10-year period, any sale,
transfer or conveyance of land reform rights is void,
except as allowed by law, in order to prevent a
circumvention of agrarian reform laws. In this case,
petitioner Lebrudo insists that he is entitled to one-half
portion of the lot awarded to Loyola under the CARP as
payment for shouldering all the expenses for the transfer
of the title of the lot from respondent Loyola’s mother,
Cristina Hugo, to Loyola’s name. Lebrudo used the two
Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by Loyola alloting to him
the one-half portion of the lot as basis for his claim. In
other words, waiver of rights and interests over
landholdings awarded by the government is invalid for
being violative of agrarian reform laws. Julian S. Lebrudo
and Reynaldo L. Lebrudo v. Remedios Loyola, G.R. No.
181370, March 9, 2011.
Election Law
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Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy; office, such as citizenship, to be filed even beyond the
Disqualification of Candidate; Period for Filing period provided in Section 78 – was simply to remedy a
Petition. perceived “procedural gap” though not expressly stated
in Resolution No. 8696, the Court, in a previous case,
had already rejected such justification. Fernando V.
Petitioner Fernando V. Gonzalez and private respondent
Gonzalez v. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No.
Reno G. Lim both filed certificates of candidacy for the
192856, March 8, 2011.
position of Representative of the 3rd congressional
district of the Province of Albay in the May 10, 2010
elections. On March 30, 2010, a Petition for
Disqualification and Cancellation of Certificate of
Candidacy (COC) was filed by Stephen Bichara [SPA No.
10-074 (DC)] on the ground that Gonzalez is a Spanish
national, being the legitimate child of a Spanish father
and a Filipino mother, and that he failed to elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority in
accordance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act
(C.A.) No. 625. The SC explained the difference between
Cancellation under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code and Disqualification under Section 68 of the OEC. A
petition to cancel a candidate’s COC may be filed under
Section 78 of the OEC exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as required by
law is false. On the other hand, a petition for
disqualification of a candidate may also be filed pursuant
to Section 68 for committing prohibited acts referred to
in said section. As to the ground of false representation
in the COC under Section 78, the Court in a previous case
elaborated that the misrepresentation must be material,
i.e. misrepresentation regarding age, residence and
citizenship or non-possession of natural-born Filipino
status. In this case, the petition in SPA No. 10-074 (DC)
based on the allegation that Gonzalez was not a natural-
born Filipino which was filed before the elections is in the
nature of a petition filed under Section 78. The recitals in
the petition in said case, however, state that it was filed
pursuant to Section 4 (b) of COMELEC Resolution No.
8696 and Section 68 of the OEC to disqualify a candidate
for lack of qualifications or possessing some grounds for
disqualification. The COMELEC treated the petition as
one filed both for disqualification and cancellation of COC,
with the effect that Section 68, in relation to Section 3,
Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, is applicable
insofar as determining the period for filing the petition.
This Rule provides the prescriptive period of filing to be
not later than the date of proclamation. On the other
hand, the procedure for filing a petition for cancellation of
COC is covered by Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, which provides as the prescriptive period to
be within five (5) days following the last day for the filing
of certificate of candidacy. Section 4(B) of Resolution No.
8696 represents another attempt to modify by a mere
procedural rule the statutory period for filing a petition to
cancel COC on the ground of false representation therein
regarding a candidate’s qualifications. Section 4(B) of
Resolution No. 8696 would supplant the prescribed period
of filing of petition under Section 78 with that provided in
Section 68 even if the latter provision does not at all
cover the false representation regarding age, residence
and citizenship which may be raised in a petition under
Section 78. If the purpose behind this rule promulgated
by the COMELEC – allowing a petition to cancel COC
based on the candidate’s non-compliance with
constitutional and statutory requirements for elective

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