G.R. No.

198780 October 16, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules t of Court assailing the September 29, 2011
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which affirmed the April 25, 2008Decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC). declaring the marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer) and respondent Liberty
Albios (A/bios) as void from the beginning.

The facts

On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage with Register
No. 2004-1588.3

On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity 4 of her marriage with Fringer. She
alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never
really had any intention of entering into a married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She
described their marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio .

Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed a motion to set case
for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an
investigation and determine the existence of a collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor complied and
reported that she could not make a determination for failure of both parties to appear at the scheduled investigation.

At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the hearing despite being
duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits ensued.

Ruling of the RTC

In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of Liberty Albios and Daniel
Lee Fringer as void from the very beginning. As a necessary consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner shall cease
using the surname of respondent as she never acquired any right over it and so as to avoid a misimpression that she
remains the wife of respondent.

xxxx

SO ORDERED.6

The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only. Giving credence to the testimony of
Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in
consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their
separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United States and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she
did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled that when
marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and
should not be recognized from its inception.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for
reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated February 5, 2009, denying the motion for want of merit. It explained
that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no
intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of
$2,000.00.

Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.

Ruling of the CA

In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the essential
requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of
getting married and that their case was similar to a marriage in jest. It further explained that the parties never intended to
enter into the marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family. It concluded that their
purpose was primarily for personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and for Fringer, the consideration
of $2,000.00.

Hence, this petition.

Assignment of Error

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT HELD THAT A MARRIAGE CONTRACTED
FOR THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS DONEIN JEST, HENCE, LACKING IN THE
ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OFCONSENT.8

The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship and for Fringer to be paid
$2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to the marriage, as they knowingly and willingly entered into that
marriage and knew the benefits and consequences of being bound by it. According to the OSG, consent should be
distinguished from motive, the latter being inconsequential to the validity of marriage.

The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest. The parties here
intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire
American citizenship would be rendered futile.

On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the petition, reiterating her stand that her marriage was similar to a
marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void from the beginning.

On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating its arguments in its petition for review on certiorari.

Ruling of the Court

The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring
American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?

The Court resolves in the negative.

Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon of marriage fraud for the purposes of
immigration.

Marriage Fraud in Immigration

The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the development of marriage fraud for the
sole purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the United States, marriages where a couple marries only to achieve a
particular purpose or acquire specific benefits, have been referred to as "limited purpose" marriages.11 A common limited
purpose marriage is one entered into solely for the legitimization of a child. 12 Another, which is the subject of the present
case, is for immigration purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned with the intention of the couple at the time of their
marriage,13 and it attempts to filter out those who use marriage solely to achieve immigration status. 14

In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 15 established the principal test for
determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a "marriage is a sham if the bride and
groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time they were married. "This standard was modified with the
passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead
demonstrate that the marriage was not "entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United
States." The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to establish a life together, to determining the intention of
evading immigration laws.16 It must be noted, however, that this standard is used purely for immigration purposes and,
therefore, does not purport to rule on the legal validity or existence of a marriage.

The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent for the limited purpose of
immigration is also legally void and in existent. The early cases on limited purpose marriages in the United States made
no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable case of

United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien to stay in the country, the parties had
agreed to marry but not to live together and to obtain a divorce within six months. The Court, through Judge Learned
Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert temporary into permanent permission to stay in the country was not a marriage,
there being no consent, to wit:

x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent is necessary to every contract; and no
matter what forms or ceremonies the parties may go through indicating the contrary, they do not contract if they do not in
fact assent, which may always be proved. x x x Marriage is no exception to this rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage at
all. x x x It is quite true that a marriage without subsequent consummation will be valid; but if the spouses agree to a
marriage only for the sake of representing it as such to the outside world and with the understanding that they will put an
end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive, they have never really agreed to be married at all. They must
assent to enter into the relation as it is ordinarily understood, and it is not ordinarily understood as merely a pretence, or
cover, to deceive others.18

(Italics supplied)

On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, 19 which declared as valid a marriage
entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to the United States, stating that a valid marriage could not be avoided
"merely because the marriage was entered into for a limited purpose."20 The 1980 immigration case of Matter of
McKee,21 further recognized that a fraudulent or sham marriage was intrinsically different from a non subsisting one.

Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been recognized as problematic. The
problem being that in order to obtain an immigration benefit, a legal marriage is first necessary. 22 At present, United
States courts have generally denied annulments involving" limited purpose" marriages where a couple married only to
achieve a particular purpose, and have upheld such marriages as valid.23

The Court now turns to the case at hand.

Respondent’s marriage not void

In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered into for a purpose other
than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception. In
its resolution denying the OSG’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the marriage was declared
void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by
it and used it only as a means for the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled
that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and
consequence of getting married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest
considering that the parties only entered into the marriage for the acquisition of American citizenship in exchange of
$2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build
a family.

The CA’s assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties’ supposed lack of consent. Under Article 2 of the
Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same Code provides that the absence of any
essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio.

Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing
officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage.
Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under
Articles45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. 24 Consent must also be
conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the
beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act.25 Their understanding should not be affected by insanity, intoxication,
drugs, or hypnotism.26

Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it was
not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they
understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their
ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American
citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage.
There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an
application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between
them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.

In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to a marriage by way of
jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with no real intention of entering
into the actual marriage status, and with a clear understanding that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not
followed by any conduct indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation. 27 It is a pretended marriage not intended to be
real and with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine consent. Marriages in
jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent. There is
no genuine consent because the parties have absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.

The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest.1âwphi1 Albios and Fringer had an undeniable
intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the respondent to acquire American citizenship.
Only a genuine consent to be married would allow them to further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage
can properly support an application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage
status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.

The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish a conjugal and family
life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real intention to establish a life together is, however,
insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature,
consequences, and incidents of marriage are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only
be declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is
entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship.
Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable
under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.28

Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictate on the kind of life that
a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would
raise serious constitutional questions.29 The right to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in
almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and
so on.30 Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship,
money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites, 31 are equally valid. Love, though the ideal
consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law,
may validly support a marriage.

Although the Court views with disdain the respondent’s attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest purposes, It cannot
declare the marriage void. Hence, though the respondent’s marriage may be considered a sham or fraudulent for the
purposes of immigration, it is not void ab initio and continues to be valid and subsisting.

Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of the Family Code. Only the
circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code may constitute fraud, namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous
conv1ctwn involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a
sexually transmitted disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other
misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a marriage. Entering into a marriage
for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not qualify under any of the listed circumstances. Furthermore,
under Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent party. In the present case, there is
no injured party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham marriage.

Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage with Fringer to be declared
void would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the
parties fail to qualify for immigration benefits, after they have availed of its benefits, or simply have no further use for it.
These unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios
already misused a judicial institution to enter into a marriage of convenience; she should not be allowed to again abuse it
to get herself out of an inconvenient situation.

No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State.32 It must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting
parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the
parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer needed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-57062 January 24, 1992

MARIA DEL ROSARIO MARIATEGUI, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JACINTO MARIATEGUI, JULIAN MARIATEGUI and PAULINA
MARIATEGUI, respondents.

Montesa, Albon & Associates for petitioners.

Parmenio B. Patacsil, Patacsil Twins Law Office for the heirs of the late Maria del Rosario Mariategui.

Tinga, Fuentes & Tagle Firm for private respondents.

BIDIN, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of the Court of Appeals dated December 24, 1980 in CA-G.R.
No. 61841, entitled "Jacinto Mariategui, et al. v. Maria del Rosario Mariategui, et al.," reversing the judgment of the then
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VIII ** at Pasig, Metro Manila.

The undisputed facts are as follows:

Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 (Brief for respondents, Rollo, pp. 116; 8). During his lifetime, Lupo
Mariategui contracted three (3) marriages. With his first wife, Eusebia Montellano, who died on November 8, 1904, he
begot four (4) children, namely: Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbana and Ireneo. Baldomera died and was survived by
her children named Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina. Ireneo also
died and left a son named Ruperto. With his second wife, Flaviana Montellano, he begot a daughter named Cresenciana
who was born on May 8, 1910 (Rollo, Annex "A", p. 36).

Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco (Lupo's third wife) got married sometime in 1930. They had three children, namely:
Jacinto, born on July 3, 1929, Julian, born on February 16, 1931 and Paulina, born on April 19, 1938. Felipa Velasco
Mariategui died in 1941 (Rollo, Ibid).

At the time of his death, Lupo Mariategui left certain properties which he acquired when he was still unmarried (Brief for
respondents, Rollo, pp. 116; 4). These properties are described in the complaint as Lots Nos. 163, 66, 1346 and 156 of
the Muntinglupa Estate (Rollo, Annex "A", p. 39).

On December 2, 1967, Lupo's descendants by his first and second marriages, namely, Maria del Rosario, Urbana,
Ruperto, Cresencia, all surnamed Mariategui and Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all
surnamed Espina, executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated unto themselves Lot No. 163 of the
Muntinglupa Estate. Thereafter, Lot No. 163 was the subject of a voluntary registration proceedings filed by the
adjudicatees under Act No. 496, and the land registration court issued a decree ordering the registration of the lot. Thus,
on April 1, 1971, OCT No. 8828 was issued in the name of the above-mentioned heirs. Subsequently, the registered
owners caused the subdivision of the said lot into Lots Nos. 163-A to 163-H, for which separate transfer certificates of title
were issued to the respective parties (Rollo, ibid).

On April 23, 1973, Lupo's children by his third marriage with Felipa Velasco (Jacinto, Julian and Paulina) filed with the
lower court an amended complaint claiming that Lot No. 163 together with Lots Nos. 669, 1346 and 154 were owned by
their common father, Lupo Mariategui, and that, with the adjudication of Lot No. 163 to their co-heirs, they (children of the
third marriage) were deprived of their respective shares in the lots. Plaintiffs pray for partition of the estate of their
deceased father and annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition dated December 2, 1967 (Petition, Rollo, p. 10).
Cresencia Mariategui Abas, Flaviana Mariategui Cabrera and Isabel Santos were impleaded in the complaint as unwilling
defendants as they would not like to join the suit as plaintiffs although they acknowledged the status and rights of the
plaintiffs and agreed to the partition of the parcels of land as well as the accounting of their fruits (Ibid., Rollo, p. 8; Record
on Appeal, p. 4).

The defendants (now petitioners) filed an answer with counterclaim (Amended Record on Appeal, p. 13). Thereafter, they
filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and prescription. They specifically contended that the
complaint was one for recognition of natural children. On August 14, 1974, the motion to dismiss was denied by the trial
court, in an order the dispositive portion of which reads:

It is therefore the opinion of the Court that Articles 278 and 285 of the Civil Code cited by counsel for the
defendants are of erroneous application to this case. The motion to dismiss is therefore denied for lack of
merit.

SO ORDERED. (Ibid, p. 37).

However, on February 16, 1977, the complaint as well as petitioners' counterclaim were dismissed by the trial court, in its
decision stating thus:

The plaintiffs' right to inherit depends upon the acknowledgment or recognition of their continuous
enjoyment and possession of status of children of their supposed father. The evidence fails to sustain
either premise, and it is clear that this action cannot be sustained. (Ibid, Rollo, pp. 67-68)

The plaintiffs elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on the ground that the trial court committed an error ". . . in not
finding that the parents of the appellants, Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco (were) lawfully married, and in holding
(that) they (appellants) are not legitimate children of their said parents, thereby divesting them of their inheritance . . . "
(Rollo, pp. 14-15).

On December 24, 1980, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision declaring all the children and descendants of Lupo
Mariategui, including appellants Jacinto, Julian and Paulina (children of the third marriage) as entitled to equal shares in
the estate of Lupo Mariategui; directing the adjudicatees in the extrajudicial partition of real properties who eventually
acquired transfer certificates of title thereto, to execute deeds of reconveyance in favor, and for the shares, of Jacinto,
Julian and Paulina provided rights of innocent third persons are not prejudiced otherwise the said adjudicatees shall
reimburse the said heirs the fair market value of their shares; and directing all the parties to submit to the lower court a
project of partition in the net estate of Lupo Mariategui after payment of taxes, other government charges and outstanding
legal obligations.

The defendants-appellees filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision but it was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this
petition which was given due course by the court on December 7, 1981.

The petitioners submit to the Court the following issues: (a) whether or not prescription barred private respondents' right to
demand the partition of the estate of Lupo Mariategui, and (b) whether or not the private respondents, who belatedly filed
the action for recognition, were able to prove their successional rights over said estate. The resolution of these issues
hinges, however, on the resolution of the preliminary matter, i.e., the nature of the complaint filed by the private
respondents.

The complaint alleged, among other things, that "plaintiffs are the children of the deceased spouses Lupo Mariategui . . .
and Felipa Velasco"; that "during his lifetime, Lupo Mariategui had repeatedly acknowledged and confirmed plaintiffs as
his children and the latter, in turn, have continuously enjoyed such status since their birth"; and "on the basis of their
relationship to the deceased Lupo Mariategui and in accordance with the law on intestate succession, plaintiffs are
entitled to inherit shares in the foregoing estate (Record on Appeal, pp. 5 & 6). It prayed, among others, that plaintiffs be
declared as children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and adjudication in favor of plaintiffs their lawful shares in the estate of
the decedent (Ibid, p. 10).

A perusal of the entire allegations of the complaint, however, shows that the action is principally one of partition. The
allegation with respect to the status of the private respondents was raised only collaterally to assert their rights in the
estate of the deceased. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly adopted the settled rule that the nature of an action filed in
court is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint constituting the cause of action (Republic vs. Estenzo, 158 SCRA
282 [1988]).

It has been held that, if the relief demanded is not the proper one which may be granted under the law, it does not
characterize or determine the nature of plaintiffs' action, and the relief to which plaintiff is entitled based on the facts
alleged by him in his complaint, although it is not the relief demanded, is what determines the nature of the action (1
Moran, p. 127, 1979 ed., citing Baguioro vs. Barrios, et al., 77 Phil. 120).

With respect to the legal basis of private respondents' demand for partition of the estate of Lupo Mariategui, the Court of
Appeals aptly held that the private respondents are legitimate children of the deceased.
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were alleged to have been lawfully married in or about 1930. This fact is based on
the declaration communicated by Lupo Mariategui to Jacinto who testified that "when (his) father was still living, he was
able to mention to (him) that he and (his) mother were able to get married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig, Rizal."
The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such. Although no
marriage certificate was introduced to this effect, no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover,
the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity
are present (People vs. Borromeo, 133 SCRA 106 [1984]).

Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and Felipa. The laws
presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and
that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life (Section 5 (z), (bb),
(cc), Rule 131, Rules of Court; Corpus v. Corpus, 85 SCRA 567 [1978]; Saurnaba v. Workmen's Compensation, 85 SCRA
502 [1978]; Alavado v. City Gov't. of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230 [1985]; Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439 [1985]).

Courts look upon the presumption of marriage with great favor as it is founded on the following rationale:

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction
is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is
deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons
dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or
evidence special to that case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of
society and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in
the constant violation of decency and of
law . . . (Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 56 [1922] quoted in Alavado vs. City Government of
Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230 [1985]).

So much so that once a man and a woman have lived as husband and wife and such relationship is not denied nor
contradicted, the presumption of their being married must be admitted as a fact (Alavado v. City Gov't. of
Tacloban, supra).

The Civil Code provides for the manner under which legitimate filiation may be proven. However, considering the
effectivity of the Family Code of the Philippines, the case at bar must be decided under a new if not entirely dissimilar set
of rules because the parties have been overtaken by events, to use the popular phrase (Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 76873, October 26, 1989). Thus, under Title VI of the Family Code, there are only two classes of children —
legitimate and illegitimate. The fine distinctions among various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated (Castro
vs. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 656 [1989]).

Article 172 of the said Code provides that the filiation of legitimate children may be established by the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment or by the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child.

Evidence on record proves the legitimate filiation of the private respondents. Jacinto's birth certificate is a record of birth
referred to in the said article. Again, no evidence which tends to disprove facts contained therein was adduced before the
lower court. In the case of the two other private respondents, Julian and Paulina, they may not have presented in
evidence any of the documents required by Article 172 but they continuously enjoyed the status of children of Lupo
Mariategui in the same manner as their brother Jacinto.

While the trial court found Jacinto's testimonies to be inconsequential and lacking in substance as to certain dates and
names of relatives with whom their family resided, these are but minor details. The nagging fact is that for a considerable
length of time and despite the death of Felipa in 1941, the private respondents and Lupo lived together until Lupo's death
in 1953. It should be noted that even the trial court mentioned in its decision the admission made in the affidavit of
Cresenciana Mariategui Abas, one of the petitioners herein, that " . . . Jacinto, Julian and Paulina Mariategui ay pawang
mga kapatid ko sa
ama . . ." (Exh. M, Record on Appeal, pp. 65-66).

In view of the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that private respondents are legitimate children and heirs
of Lupo Mariategui and therefore, the time limitation prescribed in Article 285 for filing an action for recognition is
inapplicable to this case. Corollarily, prescription does not run against private respondents with respect to the filing of the
action for partition so long as the heirs for whose benefit prescription is invoked, have not expressly or impliedly
repudiated the co-ownership. In other words, prescription of an action for partition does not lie except when the co-
ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner (Del Banco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 156 SCRA 55 [1987] citing
Jardin vs. Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532 [1982]).

Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners absent a clear repudiation
of co-ownership duly communicated to the other co-owners (Mariano vs. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342 [1987]). Furthermore,
an action to demand partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches (Del Banco vs. IAC, 156 SCRA 55 [1987]).
On the other hand, an action for partition may be seen to be at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for
segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property involved (Roque vs. IAC, 165 SCRA 118 [1988]).

Petitioners contend that they have repudiated the co-ownership when they executed the extrajudicial partition excluding
the private respondents and registered the properties in their own names (Petition, p. 16; Rollo, p. 20). However, no valid
repudiation was made by petitioners to the prejudice of private respondents. Assuming petitioners' registration of the
subject lot in 1971 was an act of repudiation of the co-ownership, prescription had not yet set in when private respondents
filed in 1973 the present action for partition (Ceniza vs. C.A., 181 SCRA 552 [1990]).

In their complaint, private respondents averred that in spite of their demands, petitioners, except the unwilling defendants
in the lower court, failed and refused to acknowledge and convey their lawful shares in the estate of their father (Record
on Appeal, p. 6). This allegation, though denied by the petitioners in their answer (Ibid, p. 14), was never successfully
refuted by them. Put differently, in spite of petitioners' undisputed knowledge of their relationship to private respondents
who are therefore their co-heirs, petitioners fraudulently withheld private respondent's share in the estate of Lupo
Mariategui. According to respondent Jacinto, since 1962, he had been inquiring from petitioner Maria del Rosario about
their (respondents) share in the property left by their deceased father and had been assured by the latter (Maria del
Rosario) not to worry because they will get some shares. As a matter of fact, sometime in 1969, Jacinto constructed a
house where he now resides on Lot No. 163 without any complaint from petitioners.

Petitioners' registration of the properties in their names in 1971 did not operate as a valid repudiation of the co-ownership.
In Adille vs. Court of Appeals (157 SCRA 455, 461-462 [1988]), the Court held:

Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must have been preceded by

repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of repudiation, in turn, is subject to certain conditions: (1) a co-
owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-
owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession through
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property for the period required by law.

xxx xxx xxx

It is true that registration under the Torrens system is constructive notice of title, but it has likewise been
our holding that the Torrens title does not furnish shield for fraud. It is therefore no argument to say that
the act of registration is equivalent to notice of repudiation, assuming there was one, notwithstanding the
long-standing rule that registration operates as a universal notice of title.

Inasmuch as petitioners registered the properties in their names in fraud of their co-heirs prescription can only be deemed
to have commenced from the time private respondents discovered the petitioners' act of defraudation (Adille vs. Court of
Appeals, supra). Hence, prescription definitely may not be invoked by petitioners because private respondents
commenced the instant action barely two months after learning that petitioners had registered in their names the lots
involved.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 24, 1980 is
Affirmed.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 173540 January 22, 2014

PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO, Petitioner,

vs.
TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.ofthe Rules of Court, assailing the 31 August 2005 Decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 79444, which reversed the 25 March 2003 Decision2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 8 of Davao City, in a complaint for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage· docketed as Civil
Case No. 26, 908-98.

The Facts

This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to have been validly married to the same man, now
deceased.

Respondent Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11 November 1998, a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage against Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido (Peregrina) on the ground that she (Tecla), is the lawful wife of the
deceased Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio). In her complaint, Tecla alleged that her marriage to Eustaquio was solemnized
on 30 September 1942 in Talibon, Bohol in rites officiated by the Parish Priest of the said town. According to her, the fact
of their marriage is evidenced by a Marriage Certificate recorded with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar (LCR) of
Talibon, Bohol. However, due to World War II, records were destroyed. Thus, only a Certification 3 was issued by the LCR.

During the existence of Tecla and Eustaquio’s union, they begot four (4) children, namely: Climaco H. Avenido, born on
30 March 1943; Apolinario H. Avenido, born on 23 August 1948; Editha A. Ausa, born on 26 July 1950, and Eustaquio H.
Avenido, Jr., born on 15 December 1952. Sometime in 1954, Eustaquio left his family and his whereabouts was not
known. In 1958, Tecla and her children were informed that Eustaquio was in Davao City living with another woman by the
name of Buenaventura Sayson who later died in 1977 without any issue.

In 1979, Tecla learned that her husband Eustaquio got married to another woman by the name of Peregrina, which
marriage she claims must be declared null and void for being bigamous – an action she sought to protect the rights of her
children over the properties acquired by Eustaquio.

On 12 April 1999, Peregrina filed her answer to the complaint with counterclaim, 4 essentially averring that she is the legal
surviving spouse of Eustaquio who died on 22 September 1989 in Davao City, their marriage having been celebrated on
30 March 1979 at St. Jude Parish in Davao City. She also contended that the case was instituted to deprive her of the
properties she owns in her own right and as an heir of Eustaquio.

Trial ensued.

Tecla presented testimonial and documentary evidence consisting of:

1) Testimonies of Adelina Avenido-Ceno (Adelina), Climaco Avenido (Climaco) and Tecla herself to substantiate
her alleged prior existing and valid marriage with (sic) Eustaquio;

2) Documentary evidence such as the following:

a. Certification of Loss/Destruction of Record of Marriage from 1900 to 1944 issued by the Office of the
Civil Registrar, Municipality of Talibon, Bohol;5

b. Certification of Submission of a copy of Certificate of Marriage to the Office of the Civil Registrar
General, National Statistics Office (NSO), R. Magsaysay Blvd., Sta Mesa, Manila; 6
 c. Certification that Civil Registry records of births, deaths and marriages that were actually filed in the
Office of the Civil Registrar General, NSO Manila, started only in 1932; 7

d. Certification that Civil Registry records submitted to the Office of the Civil Registrar General, NSO, from
1932 to the early part of 1945, were totally destroyed during the liberation of Manila; 8

e. Certification of Birth of Apolinario Avenido;9

f. Certification of Birth of Eustaquio Avenido, Jr.;10

g. Certification of Birth of Editha Avenido;11

h. Certification of Marriage between Eustaquio Sr., and Tecla issued by the Parish Priest of Talibon,
Bohol on 30 September 1942;12

i. Certification that record of birth from 1900 to 1944 were destroyed by Second World War issued by the
Office of the Municipal Registrar of Talibon, Bohol, that they cannot furnish as requested a true
transcription from the Register of Birth of Climaco Avenido;13

j. Certificate of Baptism of Climaco indicating that he was born on 30 March 1943 to spouses Eustaquio
and Tecla;14

k. Electronic copy of the Marriage Contract between Eustaquio and Peregrina. 15

On the other hand, Peregrina testified on, among others, her marriage to Eustaquio that took place in Davao City on 3
March 1979; her life as a wife and how she took care of Eustaquio when he already had poor health, as well as her
knowledge that Tecla is not the legal wife, but was once a common law wife of Eustaquio. 16 Peregrina likewise set forth
documentary evidence to substantiate her allegations and to prove her claim for damages, to wit:

1) Marriage Contract17 between Pregrina and the late Eustaquio showing the date of marriage on 3 March 1979;

2) Affidavit of Eustaquio executed on 22 March 1985 declaring himself as single when he contracted marriage
with the petitioner although he had a common law relation with one Tecla Hoybia with whom he had four (4)
children namely: Climaco, Tiburcio, Editha and Eustaquio, Jr., all surnamed Avenido;18

3) Letter of Atty. Edgardo T. Mata dated 15 April 2002, addressed to the Civil Registrar of the Municipality of
Alegria, Surigao del Norte;19 and

4) Certification dated 25 April 2002 issued by Colita P. Umipig, in her capacity as the Civil Registrar of Alegria,
Surigao del Norte.20

In addition, as basis for the counterclaim, Peregrina averred that the case was initiated in bad faith so as to deprive her of
the properties she owns in her own right and as an heir of Eustaquio; hence, her entitlement to damages and attorney’s
fees.

On 25 March 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision21 denying Tecla’s petition, as well as Peregrina’s counter-claim. The
dispositive portion thereof reads:

For The Foregoing, the petition for the "DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE" filed by petitioner TECLA HOYBIA
AVENIDO against respondent PEREGRINA MACUA is hereby DENIED.

The "COUNTERCLAIM" filed by respondent PEREGRINA MACUA against petitioner TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO is
hereby DISMISSED.22

Not convinced, Tecla appealed to the CA raising as error the trial court’s alleged disregard of the evidence on the
existence of her marriage to Eustaquio.
In its 31 August 2005 Decision,23 the CA ruled in favor of Tecla by declaring the validity of her marriage to Eustaquio,
while pronouncing on the other hand, the marriage between Peregrina and Eustaquio to be bigamous, and thus, null and
void. The CA ruled:

The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the testimonies of [Adelina], the sister of
EUSTAQUIO who testified that she personally witnessed the wedding celebration of her older brother EUSTAQUIO and
[Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco], the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that
his mother [Tecla] was married to his father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary evidence
mentioned at the outset. It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both
constituting the condition sine qua non, for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very
evidence the trial court has disregarded.24

Peregrina now questions the said ruling assigning as error, among others, the failure of the CA to appreciate the validity of
her marriage to Eustaquio. For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Memorandum25 dated 5 June 2008,
raises the following legal issues:

1. Whether or not the court can validly rely on the "presumption of marriage" to overturn the validity of a
subsequent marriage;

2. Whether or not secondary evidence may be considered and/or taken cognizance of, without proof of the
execution or existence and the cause of the unavailability of the best evidence, the original document;

and

3. Whether or not a Certificate of Marriage issued by the church has a probative value to prove the existence of a
valid marriage without the priest who issued the same being presented to the witness stand. 26

Our Ruling

Essentially, the question before us is whether or not the evidence presented during the trial proves the existence of the
marriage of Tecla to Eustaquio.

The trial court, in ruling against Tecla’s claim of her prior valid marriage to Eustaquio relied on Tecla’s failure to present
her certificate of marriage to Eustaquio. Without such certificate, the trial court considered as useless the certification of
the Office of the Civil Registrar of Talibon, Bohol, that it has no more records of marriages during the period 1900 to 1944.
The same thing was said as regards the Certification issued by the National Statistics Office of Manila. The trial court
observed:

Upon verification from the NSO, Office of the Civil Registrar General, Manila, it, likewise, issued a Certification (Exhibit
"B") stating that:

records from 1932 up to early part of 1945 were totally destroyed during the liberation of Manila on February 4, 1945.
What are presently filed in this office are records from the latter part of 1945 to date, except for the city of Manila which
starts from 1952. Hence, this office has no way of verifying and could not issue as requested, certified true copy of the
records of marriage between [Eustaquio] and [Tecla], alleged to have been married on 30th September 1942, in Talibon,
Bohol.27

In the absence of the marriage contract, the trial court did not give credence to the testimony of Tecla and her witnesses
as it considered the same as mere self-serving assertions. Superior significance was given to the fact that Tecla could not
even produce her own copy of the said proof of marriage. Relying on Section 3 (a) and Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, the trial court declared that Tecla failed to prove the existence of the first marriage.

The CA, on the other hand, concluded that there was a presumption of lawful marriage between Tecla and Eustaquio as
they deported themselves as husband and wife and begot four (4) children. Such presumption, supported by documentary
evidence consisting of the same Certifications disregarded by the trial court, as well as the testimonial evidence especially
that of Adelina Avenido-Ceno, created, according to the CA, sufficient proof of the fact of marriage. Contrary to the trial
court’s ruling, the CA found that its appreciation of the evidence presented by Tecla is well in accord with Section 5, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court.
We uphold the reversal by the CA of the decision of the trial court. Quite recently, in Añonuevo v. Intestate Estate of
Rodolfo G. Jalandoni,28 we said, citing precedents, that:

While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and
exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence
other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of
the marriage between his parents.

The error of the trial court in ruling that without the marriage certificate, no other proof of the fact can be accepted, has
been aptly delineated in Vda de Jacob v. Court of Appeals.29 Thus:

It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the conditio sine qua
non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence they have disregarded.
They have thus confused the evidence to show due execution and loss as "secondary" evidence of the marriage. In
Hernaez v. Mcgrath, the Court clarified this misconception thus:

x x x [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence of the execution of the instrument was barred.
The court confounded the execution and the contents of the document. It is the contents, x x x which may not be proven
by secondary evidence when the

instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the execution are not dependent on the existence or non-existence of the
document, and, as a matter of fact, such proofs of the contents: due execution, besides the loss, has to be shown as
foundation for the inroduction of secondary evidence of the contents.

xxxx

Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily collateral or primary. It generally consists of
parol testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the document is actually produced, its authencity is not necessarily, if at
all, determined from its face or recital of its contents but by parol evidence. At the most, failure to produce the document,
when available, to establish its execution may effect the weight of the evidence presented but not the admissibility of such
evidence.

The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this issue by relying on Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete.
But even there, we said that "marriage may be prove[n] by other competent evidence.

Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing officer, by witnesses who
saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to whom the parties have previously narrated the
execution thereof. The Court has also held that "[t]he loss may be shown by any person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or
by any one who ha[s] made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the
document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has
been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument
[has] indeed [been] lost."

In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was present during the
marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony
and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana, as relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due
execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence–
testimonial and documentary–may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.30

As correctly stated by the appellate court:

In the case at bench, the celebration of marriage between [Tecla] and EUSTAQUIO was established by the testimonial
evidence furnished by [Adelina] who appears to be present during the marriage ceremony, and by [Tecla] herself as a
living witness to the event. The loss was shown by the certifications issued by the NSO and LCR of Talibon, Bohol. These
are relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were
clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence – testimonial and documentary – may be admitted to prove
the fact of marriage. In PUGEDA v. TRIAS, the
Supreme Court held that "marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. The testimony by one of the
parties to the marriage or by one of the witnesses to the marriage has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of
marriage. The person who officiated at the solemnization is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of
marriage."

xxxx

The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the testimonies of [Adelina], the sister of
EUSTAQUIO who testified that she personally witnessed the wedding celebration of her older brother EUSTAQUIO and
[Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco], the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that
his mother [Tecla] was married to his father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary evidence
mentioned at the outset. It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both
constituting the condition sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very
evidence the trial court has disregarded.31

The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage.

As early as the case of Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 32 this Court has elucidated on the rationale behind the presumption:

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage.1âwphi1 Marriage in this jurisdiction is not
only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact
married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established
by our Code of Civil Procedure is that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage. (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper – praesumitur pro matrimonio – Always presume marriage.

In the case at bar, the establishment of the fact of marriage was completed by the testimonies of Adelina, Climaco and
Tecla; the unrebutted the certifications of marriage issued by the parish priest of the Most Holy Trinity Cathedral of
Talibon, Bohol.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79444 is
AFFIRMED. The marriage between petitioner Peregrina Macua Avenido and the deceased Eustaquio Avenido is hereby
declared NULL and VOID. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 105540 July 5, 1993

IRENEO G. GERONIMO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO ESMAN, respondents.

Benjamin M. Dacanay for the petitioner.

Alfredo G. Ablaza for respondent.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 338501 which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 68, Pasig, Metro Manila in Special
Proceeding No. 10036 declaring valid the marriage between Graciana Geronimo and Antonio A. Esman and appointing
the latter as the administrator of the estate of the deceased Graciana Geronimo.

The findings of fact of the trial court, adopted by the public respondent Court of Appeals, are as follows:

This will resolve Ireneo Geronimo's petition for letter of administration of the estate of Graciana
Geronimo-Esman.

On June 29, 1987, a petition was filed by petitioner naming as one of the heirs oppositor Antonio A.
Esman and describing the latter as "husband of the deceased". On April 4, 1988, an amended petition
was filed by petitioner naming as one of the surviving heirs Antonio A. Esman and now describing the
latter as the "live-in partner of the deceased" after finding out that the marriage between oppositor and the
decedent was a "nullity for want of a marriage license".

It is undisputed that the decedent died on June 2, 1987 without a will leaving no descendants nor ascendants. She was
survived by her two brothers Tomas and Ireneo, her nephew Salvador and her husband-oppositor Antonio A. Esman. . . .
However, the husband's capacity to inherit and administer the property of the decedent is now being questioned in view of
the discovery by the petitioner that the marriage between oppositor and the decedent was celebrated without a marriage
license.

The principal issue now which has to be resolved by this Court before it can appoint a judicial administrator is whether or
not the marriage between Graciana Geronimo and Antonio A. Esman was valid.

Petitioner contends that the marriage between her (sic) deceased sister and oppositor Antonio A. Esman
was null and void since there was no marriage license issued to the parties at the time the marriage was
celebrated. In fact, petitioner contends that a certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar of Pateros
shows that the marriage license number was not stated in the marriage contract (Exh. "I"); and that the
marriage contract itself does now (sic) show the number of the marriage license issued (Exh. "J").
Moreover, marriage license number 5038770 which was issued to the deceased and the oppositor by the
Civil Registrar of Pateros, Rizal was not really issued to Pateros before the marriage was celebrated but
to Pasig in October 1959.

On the other hand, oppositor contends that the arguments raised by petitioner are mere concoctions; that
a close scrutiny of the aforementioned documents (Exh. "I" and "J") would show that except for the
phrases "not stated" and "not recorded" the two certified copies of the marriage contract issued by the
Civil Registrar of Pateros, Rizal (now Metro Manila) and the Parish Church of San Roque were the same
as the certified copy of the marriage contract which was attached to the original petition which named the
oppositor as the husband of the deceased; that petitioner simply asked that these phrases be
incorporated to suit his ulterior motive; that even the omission of the marriage license number on the
Registry of Marriages in the Local Civil Registrar is not fatal in itself and is not conclusive proof that no
marriage license was actually signed on January 7, 1955 to Graciana Geronimo and Antonio A. Esman;
and that the marriage license form issued to the Municipality of Pateros are printed by the Bureau of
Printing with serialized numbers and distributed to various provinces or municipalities thru proper
 requisitions which serial numbers even if already used in the printing of the marriage license forms in the
past years are used again in the printing of the same forms in the succeeding years.

Various witnesses were presented by oppositor to prove that indeed the deceased and oppositor were
married. David Montenegro, an employee of the National Archives & Records Section, testified that a
copy of the marriage contract between Antonio A. Esman and Graciana Geronimo celebrated on January
7, 1955, is on file with their office.

Msgr. Moises Andrade, parish priest of Barasoain, Malolos, Bulacan, testified that he was asked to come
over to teach in Guadalupe seminary and stayed in Pasig as assistant priest of the parish of Immaculate
Concepcion from 1975 to 1983. Here, he came to know the spouses Graciana Geronimo and Antonio A.
Esman whom he attended to spirituality, conducted mass for, gave communion, and visited them socially.
He had occasions to go to the couple's garment business, Gragero Lingerie, and observed that the
couple were quite close with each other and with the people working in their business.

Marciana Cuevas, assistant supervisor of the couple's garment business testified that she was aware of
the marriage which took place between Graciana Geronimo and Antonio A. Esman; that they lived
together as husband and wife in Bambang, Pasig, after the wedding; and that is the oppositor who has
been successfully supervising the lingerie business after the death of Graciana Geronimo.

Julie Reyes, supply officer of the governor's office testified that she is in charge of all accountable forms
being taken in the fourteen (14) municipalities of the province of Rizal which include marriage licenses;
and pad no. 83 covering marriage licenses nos. 5038751 to 5038800 was taken by the Municipality of
Pateros way back in October 9, 1953.

Florenciana Santos, assistant local civil registrar of Pateros, Metro Manila, testified that in the entry of
marriage book of Pateros, particularly page no. 23 of book no. 2 and reg. no. 51, there is no column for
the marriage license; that they started putting the marriage license only in 1980; that they have a copy of
the questioned marriage contract in which the marriage license number is recorded; and that the records
of 1959 were lost during a typhoon, but they sent a copy of the marriage contract to the archives section.

Oppositor Antonio A. Esman testified that he was married to Graciana Geronimo on January 7, 1955 in
Pateros and were (sic) issued marriage license no. 5038770; and that he was introduced by the
deceased to the public as her lawful husband. (Decision, pp. 1-3)2

In affirming the judgment of the trial court, the public respondent stated:

It may be conceded that [Exhibits "I" and "J"] of the petitioner-appellant do not bear the number of the
marriage license relative to the marriage of Graciana Geronimo and the herein oppositor-appellee. But at
best, such non-indication of the number could only serve to prove that the number was not recorded. It
could not be accepted as convincing proof of non-issuance of the required marriage license. On the other
hand, the marriage license number (No. 5038776, [sic] dated January 7, 1955) does appear in the
certified archives copy of the marriage contract (Exhibit 7 and sub-markings). The non-indication of the
license number in the certified copies presented by the petitioner-appellant could not be deemed as
fatal vis-a-vis the issue of the validity of the marriage in question because there is nothing in the law
which requires that the marriage license number would (sic) be indicated in the marriage contract itself.3

Unfazed by his successive defeats, and maintaining his adamantine stand that the marriage between Graciana Geronimo
and Antonio Esman is void, and, perforce, the latter had no right to be appointed as the administrator of the estate of the
former, the petitioner artfully seeks to avoid any factual issue by now posing the following question in this petition: "Can
there be a valid marriage where one of the essential requisites — license — is absent?" Doubtless, the query has been
framed so as to apparently present a question of law. In reality, however, the question assumes that there was no
marriage license, which is, of course, a factual contention. Both the trial court and the public respondent found and ruled
otherwise.

In BPI Credit Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,4 which collated representative cases on the rule of conclusiveness of the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals and the exceptions thereto, we stated:

Settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. The jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to
 reviewing and revising errors of law imputed to it, its findings of fact being conclusive. It is not the function
of this Court to analyze or weigh such evidence all over again, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing
errors of law that might have been committed by the lower court. Barring, therefore, a showing that the
findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the record, or that they are so glaringly erroneous
as to constitute serious abuse of discretion, they must stand.

There are, however, exceptions to this rule, namely:

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures; (2)
When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) When there is a grave abuse
of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of
facts are conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the
case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) When the findings of
the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the findings of endings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in
the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and
(10) When the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and is contradicted by the evidence on record.

Petitioner fails to convince us that the instant case falls under any of the above exceptions.

On this score alone, the petition must inevitably fail. However, if only to disabuse the mind of the petitioner, we shall
proceed to discuss the issue regarding the alleged absence of a marriage license.

Petitioner contends that there was no marriage license obtained by the spouses Esman because the copies of the
marriage contract he presented (Exhibits "I" and "J") did not state the marriage license number. The flaw in such
reasoning is all too obvious. Moreover, this was refuted by the respondent when he presented a copy of the marriage
contract on file with the National Archives and Records Section (Exhibit "7") where the marriage license number (No.
5038770, dated 7 January 1955) does appear. Petitioner tried to assail this piece of evidence by presenting Exhibit "V," a
certification of the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City that Marriage License No. 5038770 was issued on 1
October 1976 in favor of Edwin G. Tolentino and Evangelina Guadiz. This was sufficiently explained by the Court of
Appeals thus:

It is a known fact, and it is of judicial notice, that all printed accountable forms of the Government like the
Marriage License (Municipal Form 95-A) come from the National Printing Office and are printed with serial
numbers. These forms are distributed upon proper requisition by the city/municipal treasurers concerned.
But the serial numbers printed or used in a particular year are the same numbers used in the succeeding
years when the same forms are again printed for distribution. However, the distribution of the serially-
numbered forms do not follow the same pattern.

This is exactly what happened to Marriage License No. 5038770 which the appellant refused to
acknowledge. Thus, it appears that while marriage License No. 5038770 was requisitioned and received
by the Municipality of Pateros on October 09, 1953 thru the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Rizal (as
explained by Mrs. Julita Reyes and borne out by Exhibits "1" and "2") and later used by Antonio A. Esman
and Graciana Geronimo in their marriage on January 07, 1955, another, marriage license bearing the
same number (No. 5038770) was also issued to the municipality of Pasig in October, 1959 (Exhibit "L-1").
Subsequently, still another marriage license bearing No. 503877() was also issued to the Treasurer of
Pasay City on June 29, 1976 (Exhibit "U-1") that was used by a certain Edwin G. Tolentino and
Evangelina Guadiz (Exhibit "V"). (Appellee's Brief, pp. 31-32)5

At most, the evidence adduced by the petitioner could only serve to prove the non-recording of the marriage license
number but certainly not the non-issuance of the license itself.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 204494 July 27, 2016

JO-ANN DIAZ-SALGADO and husband DR. GERARD C. SALGADO, Petitioners

vs.
LUIS G. ANSON, Respondent

DECISION

REYES, J.:

Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari1under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision2 dated
August 6, 2012 and the Resolution3 dated November 26, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 92989.
The CA affirmed the Decision4 dated July 23, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 155, in Civil
Case No. 69611.

The Facts

On September 5, 2003, Luis Anson (Luis) filed a Complaint5 docketed as Civil Case No. 69611 against Jo-Ann Diaz-
Salgado (Jo-Ann) and Gerard Salgado (Gerard) (Spouses Salgado) along with Maria Luisa Anson-Maya (Maria Luisa)
and Gaston Maya (Spouses Maya), seeking the annulment of the three Unilateral Deeds of Sale 6 dated January 23, 2002
and the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of the Deceased Severina De Asis dated October 25, 2002.7

Luis alleged in his complaint that he is the surv1vmg spouse of the late Severina de Asis-Anson (Severina). They were
married in a civil ceremony on December 28, 1966. Prior to the celebration of their marriage, Severina gave birth to their
daughter, Maria Luisa on December 30, 1965 while Jo-Ann is Severina's daughter from a previous relationship.8

During his marital union with Severina, they acquired several real properties located in San Juan, Metro Manila, covered
by the following Transfer Certificate of Title/s (TCT/s):

1. TCT No. 20618/T-104 (now TCT No. 11105-R),

2. TCTNo. 60069/T-301(nowTCTNo. 11106-R),

3. TCTNo. 5109/T-26 (nowTCTNo. 11107),

4. TCT No. 8478-R/T-43 (now TCT No. 11076-R),

5. TCT No. 44637/T-224-II (now TCT No. 11078-R), and

6. TCT No. 8003/T-41 (now TCT No. 11077-R).9

According to Luis, because there was no marriage settlement between him and Severina, the above-listed properties
pertain to their conjugal partnership. But without his knowledge and consent, Severina executed three separate Unilateral
Deeds of Sale on January 23, 2002 transferring the properties covered by TCT Nos. 20618, 60069 and 5109 in favor of
Jo-Ann, who secured new certificates of title over the said properties. 10 When Severina died on September 21,
2002,11 Maria Luisa executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Severina de Asis on October 25,
2002, adjudicating herself as Severina's sole heir. She secured new TCTs over the properties covered by TCT Nos. 8478-
R, 44637 and 8003.12

Luis claimed that because of the preceding acts, he was divested of his lawful share in the conjugal properties and of his
inheritance as a compulsory heir of Severina.13

In Jo-Ann's Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,14 which the trial court considered as the Answer of her husband,
Gerard,15 Jo-Ann countered that she was unaware of any marriage contracted by her mother with Luis. She knew
however that Luis and Severina had a common-law relationship which they both acknowledged and formally terminated
through a Partition Agreement16 executed in November 1980. This was implemented through another Partition
Agreement17 executed in April 1981. Thus, Luis had already received the properties apportioned to him by virtue of the
said agreement while the properties subject of the Unilateral Deeds of Sale were acquired exclusively by Severina. The
TCTs covering Severina's properties were under Severina's name only and she was described therein as single without
reference to any husband.18

Meanwhile, the Spouses Maya corroborated the Spouses Salgado's stance in their Answer,19 stating that Maria Luisa is
also not aware that Luis and Severina were married. She is cognizant of the fact that Luis and Severina lived together as
common-law husband and wife - a relationship which was terminated upon execution of a Partition Agreement. In the
Partition Agreement, Luis and Severina were described as single and they acknowledged that they were living together as
common-law spouses. They also mutually agreed to the partition of the properties they owned in common. Hence, Luis
already received his share in the properties20 and is estopped from denying the same.21 After the termination of their
cohabitation in 1980, Luis went to United States of America (USA), married one Teresita Anson and had a son with her;
while Maria Luisa was left under the guardianship and custody of Severina. 22 It was after the death of Severina that Maria
Luisa executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Severina de Asis on October 25, 2002.
The Spouses Maya were also able to obtain a Certificate of No Record of Marriage 23 (between Luis and Severina) from
the Office the Civil Registrar General of the National Statistics Office. 24

Trial ensued thereafter. After Luis gave his testimony and presented documentary evidence which included a certified true
copy of his marriage contract with Severina, 25 the Spouses Salgado and Spouses Maya filed their respective Demurrers
to Evidence.26 The Spouses Salgado disputed the validity of Luis and Severina's marriage on the ground of lack of
marriage license as borne out by the marriage contract. They further claimed that Luis himself disclosed on cross-
examination that he did not procure a marriage license prior to the alleged marriage. 27 Luis had also admitted the
existence, due execution and authenticity of the Partition Agreement. 28 The logical conclusion therefore is that the
properties disposed in favor of Jo-Ann were owned by Severina as her own, separate and exclusive properties, which she
had all the right to dispose of, without the conformity of Luis.29

On February 16, 2006, the trial court denied both demurrers, explaining that the sufficiency of evidence presented by Luis
is evidentiary in nature and may only be controverted by evidence to the contrary.30 The Spouses Salgado and Spouses
Maya filed their separate motions for reconsideration,31 which the trial court denied.32 Consequently, both the Spouses
Salgado and Spouses ·Maya filed their respective petitions for certiorari with the CA.33 Meanwhile, the Spouses Salgado
were deemed to have waived their presentation of evidence when they failed to attend the scheduled hearings before the
trial court.34

Resolving the petition for certiorari on the demurrer to evidence filed by the Spouses Salgado, the CA Second Division
directed the trial court "to properly resolve with deliberate dispatch the demurrer to evidence in accordance with Section 3,
Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure by stating clearly and distinctly the reason therefor on the basis of [the
Spouses Salgado's] proffered evidence[,]"35 whereas the CA Ninth Division dismissed the petition of the Spouses Maya
and ordered the trial court to decide the case with deliberate dispatch. 36

In an Order37 dated July 16, 2007, the RTC, in compliance with the order of the CA to resolve the demurrer to evidence in
more specific terms, denied the twin demurrers to evidence for lack of merit and held that the totality of evidence
presented by Luis has sufficiently established his right to obtain the reliefs prayed for in his complaint.

Ruling of the RTC

On July 23, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision38 in favor of Luis, holding that the marriage between Luis and Severina
was valid. It noted that the marriage contract, being a public document, enjoys the presumption of regularity in its
execution and is conclusive as to the fact of marriage.39 The trial court also based its ruling in Geronimo v. CA40where the
validity of marriage was upheld despite the absence of the marriage license number on the marriage contract.41 The trial
court thus declared that the properties covered by the Unilateral Deeds of Sale were considered conjugal which cannot be
disposed of by Severina without the consent of her husband, Luis.42

The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of [Luis] and against [the Spouses Salgado]
ordering as follows:

1. ANNULMENT, VOIDING, SETTING ASIDE and DECLARING OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT of the three (3) Unilateral
Deeds of Sale, all dated January 23, 2002 executed by [Severina] in favor of [Jo-Ann];
2. ANNULMENT, VOIDING, SETTING ASIDE and DECLARING OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT of the three (3) [TCT]
Nos. 11107-R, 11105-R and 11106-R covering the subject properties, all issued in the name of [Jo-Ann] by the Registry of
Deeds for San Juan, Metro Manila;

3. RESTITUTION of all properties covered by TCT Nos. 11107-R, 11105-R and 11106-R (formerly TCT Nos. 5109, 20618
and 60069, respectively) to the conjugal community of properties between [Luis] and [Severina].

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.43

On November 17, 2008, the RTC rendered another Decision 44 which ordered the "ANNULMENT, VOIDING, SETTING
ASIDE and DECLARING OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of the Deceased
Severina De Asis executed by [Maria Luisa] dated October 25, 2002 x x x."45 The RTC also ordered the cancellation of
new TCTs issued by virtue of the said Deeds.46

The Spouses Salgado and the Spouses Maya filed their respective motions for reconsideration on September 11,
200747 and August 28, 2007,48 respectively, which the RTC denied in the Omnibus Order 49 dated October 30, 2007 for
lack of merit. This prompted the Spouses Salgado and Spouses Maya to file their separate notices of appeal before the
CA on December 13, 200750 and April 24, 2009,51 respectively.

Ruling of the CA

The Spouses Maya and Luis thereafter entered into a Compromise Agreement 52 which was approved by the CA in its
Decision53 dated October 26, 2011. This resulted in the termination of the Spouses Maya's appeal.54

On August 6, 2012, the CA rendered a Decision,55 dismissing the appeal of the Spouses Salgado. The fallo reads as
follows:

WHEREFORE, the appeal interposed by [the Spouses Salgado] is DISMISSED. The Decision dated July 23, 2007 of the
[RTC] of Pasig is AFFIRMED IN TOTO.

SO ORDERED.56

The CA sustained the ruling of the RTC for the simple reason that the Spouses Salgado did not present and formally offer
any testimonial and documentary evidence to controvert the evidence presented by Luis.57 The CA further explained that
"the best evidence to establish the absence of a marriage license is a certification from the Local Civil Registrar that the
parties to the Marriage Contract did not secure a marriage license or at the very least a certification from the said office
that despite diligent search, no record of application for or a marriage license was issued on or before December 28, 1966
in favor of Luis and Severina. Again, Spouses Salgado failed to prove the same by their failure to secure the said
certification and present evidence during the trial."58

The Spouses Salgado and Spouses Maya filed a motion for reconsideration 59 which the CA denied through its
Resolution60 dated November 26, 2012.

The Spouses Salgado elevated the matter before the Court raising the core issue of whether the CA committed reversible
error in affirming the RTC decision which declared the marriage between Luis and Severina valid and the subject lands as
conjugal properties.

Ruling of the Court

The Spouses Salgado argue that the marriage between Luis and Severina is null and void for want of marriage license
based on the Marriage Contract61 presented by Luis which has adequately established its absence. 62

Luis, in his Comment,63 opposes the filing of the present petition on the ground that it raises a question of fact, which
cannot be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. He also countered that the Spouses Salgado did not present any
evidence to support their theory.64 If the existence of the marriage license is in issue, it is incumbent upon the Spouses
Salgado to show the lack of marriage license by clear and convincing evidence. 65
Before proceeding to the substantive issues brought in this petition, the Court shall first tackle the procedural issue raised
by Luis which pertains to the propriety of the filing of this petition for review on certiorari.

Contrary to Luis' contention, the present petition raises a question of law, mainly, whether the absence of a marriage
license may be proven on the basis of a marriage contract which states that no marriage license was exhibited to the
solemnizing officer on account of the marriage being of an exceptional character.

In any event, while the jurisdiction of the Court in cases brought before it from the appellate court is, as a general rule,
limited to reviewing errors of law, there are exceptions66 recognized by the Court, such as when the CA manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.67

Since the marriage between Luis and Severina was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable
law to determine its validity is the Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of its celebration68 on December 28, 1966.

A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 5369 of the Civil Code, and the absence thereof, save for
marriages of exceptional character,70 renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3 ). It sets forth:

Art. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxxx

(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character;

x x x x. (Emphasis ours)

"Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79.
To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in
remote places, (3) consular marriages, (4) ratification of marital cohabitation, (5) religious ratification of a civil marriage,
(6) Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (7) mixed marriages."71 To reiterate, in any of the aforementioned marriages
of exceptional character, the requirement of a valid marriage license is dispensed with.

The marriage is not of an

exceptional character

A cursory examination of the marriage contract of Luis and Severina reveals that no marriage license number was
indicated therein. It also appears therein that no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer with Article 77
of Republic Act No. 386 (Civil Code) being cited as the reason therefor. The pertinent portion of the marriage contract is
quoted as follows:

[A]nd I further certify that Marriage License No. x x x issued at x x x on x x x, 19 x x x in favor of, said parties, was
exhibited to me or no marriage license was exhibited to me, this marriage being of an exceptional character performed
under Art. 77 of Rep. Act 386; x x x.72

The reference to Article 77 of the Civil Code in the marriage contract is not dismissible. Being a public document, the
marriage contract is not only a prima facie proof of marriage, but is also a prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
This is pursuant to Section 44, Rule 130 of the 1997 Rules of Court, which reads:

Sec. 44. Entries in official records. - Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the
Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated.

Consequently, the entries made in Luis and Severina's marriage contract are prima facie proof that at the time of their
marriage, no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer for the reason that their marriage is of an
exceptional character under Article 77 of the Civil Code.

Article 77 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 77. In case two persons married in accordance with law desire to ratify their union in conformity with the regulations,
rites, or practices of any church, sect, or religion, it shall no longer be necessary to comply with the requirements of
Chapter 1 of this Title and any ratification made shall merely be considered as a purely religious ceremony.

The foregoing provision pertains to a religious ceremony performed with the purpose of ratifying a marriage which was
solemnized civilly. In the eyes of the law, the marriage already exists; the subsequent ceremony is undertaken merely to
conform to religious practices. Thus, the parties are exempted from complying with the required issuance of marriage
license insofar as the subsequent religious ceremony is concerned. For this exemption to be applicable, it is sine qua
non that: (1) the parties to the religious ceremony must already be married to each other in accordance with law (civil
marriage); and (2) the ratifying ceremony is purely religious in nature.

Applied to the present case however, it is clear that Luis and Severina were not married to each other prior to the civil
ceremony officiated on December 28, 1966 - the only date of marriage appearing on the records. This was also
consistently affirmed by Luis in open court:

Atty. Francisco:

Q- You testified that you have a Marriage Contract marked as Exhibit A certifying that you were married to the late
[Severina].

A- Yes, sir.

Q- Do you recall when this marriage took place?

A- As far as I can recall it was sometime two (2) days before my daughter get (sic) one (1) year old. That was 1966
December something like 28, because she was born December 30, the death of Jose Rizal. I can remember 1965. So,
before she turned one (1) year old two (2) days before we got married here in San Juan.

Q- So, when was she born if you can recall?

A- Maria Luisa was born on December 30, 1965.

Q- If it is two (2) days before, it should be 1966?

A- Yes, sir.

Q- If you can recall who solemnized the marriage?

A- It was the late Mayor Ebona of San Juan.73

xxxx

[Atty. Valenton:] x x x You alleged during your direct examination that you were married to [Severina]?

A: Yes sir.

Q: When do you say you marr[ied] her?

A: Two (2) days before our daughter turned one year old, so that is December 28, 1966. 74 (Emphasis ours)

Being that the ceremony held on December 28, 1966 was the only marriage ceremony between the parties and this was
not solemnized pursuant to any ratifying religious rite, practice or regulation but a civil one officiated by the mayor, this
marriage does not fall under the purview of Article 77 of the Civil Code. It is evident that the twin requirements of the
provision, which are: prior civil marriage between the parties and a ratifying religious ceremony, were not complied with.
There is no prior ceremony to ratify. Thus, this marriage is not of an exceptional character and a marriage license is
required for Luis and Severina's marriage to be valid.

Absence of marriage license

The next issue to be resolved is: who has the burden of proving the existence or non-existence of the marriage license?

Since there was an unequivocal declaration on the marriage contract itself that no marriage license was exhibited to the
solemnizing officer at the time of marriage owing to Article 77 of the Civil Code, when in truth, the said exception does not
obtain in their case, it is the burden of Luis to prove that they secured the required marriage license.

However, instead of proving that a marriage license was indeed issued to them at the time of their marriage, Luis relied
mainly on the presumption of validity of marriage. This presumption does not hold water vis-a-vis a prima facie evidence
(marriage contract), which on its face has established that no marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer. If
there was a marriage license issued to Luis and Severina, its absence on the marriage contract was not explained at all.
Neither the original nor a copy of the marriage license was presented. No other witness also testified to prove its
existence, whereas Luis is not the best witness to testify regarding its issuance. He admitted that he did not apply for one,
and is uncertain about the documents they purportedly submitted in the Municipal Hall. As he revealed in his testimony:

ATTY. VALENTON:

Q- How did you prepare for the alleged wedding that took place between you and [Severina]?

A TTY. FRANCISCO: May I know the materiality, Your Honor?

ATTY. VALENTON: We are exploring as to whether there was really a wedding that took place, Your Honor.

COURT: Answer.

What preparations were done?

A- There was no preparation because we were just visitors of the Mayor during that time and the Mayor is a close
friend of ours.1âwphi1 So, when he knew that we are traveling, we are going to Thailand with the invitation of a
friend to work with him in Thailand, he told us you better get married first before you travel because your
daughter will be illegitimate.75

xxxx

ATTY. VALENTON:

Q- Do you remember having applied for a marriage license?

A- We did not.

Q- So, you are telling us that there is no marriage license?

A- No.

CLARIFICATORY QUESTIONS BY THE COURT TO THE WITNESS

[Q-] There was no marriage license?

A- Well, when you get married you have to get a marriage license.

COURT:

Not necessarily.

A- But, I don't know whether there was an application for the license because it was at the house of the Mayor.

COURT:
But in this particular case before you went to the house of the Mayor for the solemnization of your marriage, did
you apply for a marriage license?

A- No. 76

x x xx

RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION OF

[LUIS]:

Q- Mr. Anson, a while ago during your cross-examination you were asked by counsel as well as a question was
raised by the Honorable Court whether or not you applied for a marriage license when you got married on
December 28, 1966 allegedly with [Severina]. Can you tell the Court what you meant by that?

COURT:

By what?

ATTY. FRANCISCO:

When he was asked, Your Honor, by the Honorable Court.

COURT:

Whether he applied?

ATTY. FRANCISCO:

Whether he applied for a marriage license prior to the solemnization of the marriage, you answered No.

WITNESS:

I did not apply for such, all what I know is to sign something affidavit or application before we went to the house
of the Mayor to get marry (sic) but that was about - - I cannot recall if that past (sic) a week or 2 days or 3 days
ago.

ATTY. FRANCISCO:

Q- You mentioned, we signed an affidavit or application, when you used we, whom are you referring to?

A- [Severina].

Q- And, yourself?

A- Yes.

Q- In your recollection, where did you file those affidavits with [Severina] before the solemnization of the
marriage?

A- It was in the Municipal Hall. I do not know whether that was the Registrar, Office of the [M]ayor or Office of the
Chief of Police.1awp++i1 I cannot recall. It is inside the Munisipyo of San Juan.

Q- Who made you sign that Affidavit?

A- The Chief of Police whom we get (sic) to be (sic) witness for our marriage. They let us signed (sic) an application or
affidavit. I cannot recall what it is.77 (Emphasis ours)
In upholding the supposed validity of the marriage, the RTC and the CA failed to consider the glaring statements in the
marriage contract that no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer and that the marriage is of an
exceptional character under Article 77 of the Civil Code, the latter statement being fallacious. Both the RTC and CA
upheld the fact of marriage based on the marriage contract but simply glossed over the part stating that the marriage is of
an exceptional character. It is inevitable to deduce that this is not a case of mere non-recording of the marriage license
number on the marriage contract, as was in Geronimo.78

The factual antecedents in Geronimo are not on all fours with the case under review, hence, inapplicable.
In Geronimo, despite the absence of the marriage license number on the marriage contract presented by therein petitioner
(brother of the deceased), there was no statement therein that the marriage is of an exceptional character. Various
witnesses also testified that the deceased and her husband were indeed married. More importantly, the husband of the
deceased was able to produce a copy of the marriage contract on file with the National Archives and Records Section
where the marriage license number appears.

"[T]o be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such
marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the
local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties." 79 Considering that the absence of the
marriage license is apparent on the marriage contract itself, with a false statement therein that the marriage is of an
exceptional character, and no proof to the contrary was presented, there is no other plausible conclusion other than that
the marriage between Luis and Severina was celebrated without a valid marriage license and is thus, void ab initio.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Dayot,80the Court similarly declared that a marriage solemnized without a marriage
license based on a fabricated claim of exceptional character, is void. In lieu of a marriage license, therein parties to the
marriage executed a false affidavit of marital cohabitation. In declaring the marriage void, the Court rejected the notion
that all the formal and essential requisites of marriage were complied with. The Court held that to permit a false affidavit to
take the place of a marriage license is to allow an abject circumvention of the law. It was further explained:

We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties' affidavit will not affect the
validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were complied with. The argument deserves scant merit.
Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite of a
marriage license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the requirement of a marriage license.

xxxx

Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by
the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the
parties have cohabited for at least five years as required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to
an irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license at all.
Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisa's cohabitation,
which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere
irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties
under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and
effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.81

The Court cannot turn a blind eye to the statements made in the marriage contract because these refer to the absence of
a formal requisite of marriage. "The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement
and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no
exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception."82 "The
requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State's demonstration of its involvement and participation in every
marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested. This interest proceeds from the constitutional
mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic
'autonomous social institution."'83

Partition Agreement is Valid

Relative to the properties they amassed during the period of their cohabitation, Luis and Severina executed a notarized
Partition Agreement84 in November 1980, which divided their properties between them without court intervention. Luis
sought to annul such agreement on the ground that "the separation of property is not effected by the mere execution of
the contract or agreement of the parties, but by the decree of the court approving the same. It, therefore, becomes
effective only upon judicial approval, without which it is void."85

The Court does not subscribe to Luis' posture.

In Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City,86the Court held that "[i]n a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article
148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code x x x."87 It
provides:

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be
owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have
been obtained by their .ioint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes
of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be
deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during
cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their
cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership
shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or
their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of
descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of
the cohabitation.88 (Emphasis ours)

As there is no showing that Luis and Severina were incapacitated to marry each other at the time of their cohabitation and
considering that their marriage is void from the beginning for lack of a valid marriage license, Article 144 of the Civil
Code,89 in relation to Article 147 of the Family Code, are the pertinent provisions of law governing their property relations.
Article 147 of the Family Code "applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment
to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like absence of a marriage
license."90 "Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be
governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have
been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be
considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's 'efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
household."'91

Accordingly, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code shall apply in the partition of the properties co-owned by
Luis and Severina. It is stated under Article 1079 of the Civil Code that "partition, in general, is the separation, division and
assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it may belong. The thing itself may be divided, or its value."
As to how partition may be validly done, Article 496 of the Civil Code is precise that "partition may be made by agreement
between the parties or by judicial proceedings x x x." The law does not impose a judicial approval for the agreement to
be valid. Hence, even without the same, the partition was validly done by Luis and Severina through the execution of the
Partition Agreement.

Moreover, Luis admitted the existence, due execution and authenticity of the Partition Agreement.92 It also remains
uncontroverted that he already received his share as stipulated in the Partition Agreement. As such, the Court finds no
reason to have the said agreement declared null and void or annulled, in the absence of any circumstance which renders
such contract invalid or at least, voidable.

All things considered, the Court holds that although a certification of no record of marriage license or certification of "due
search and inability to find" a record or entry issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of the
license,93 such certification is not the only proof that could validate the absence of a marriage license.
In this case, the categorical statement on Luis and Severina's marriage contract that no marriage license was exhibited to
the solemnizing officer, coupled with a contrived averment therein that the marriage is of an exceptional character under
Article 77 of the Civil Code, are circumstances which cannot be disregarded. Incidentally, it may be well to note that Luis'
failure to assert his marriage to Severina during the latter's lifetime is suspect. Luis left for the USA in 1981, and until
Severina' s death in 2002, he never saw, much less reconciled with her. 94 All those years, he never presented himself to
be the husband of Severina. Not even their daughter, Maria Luisa, knew of the marriage. During trial, he never presented
any other witness to the marriage. He contends that his marriage to Severina was valid and subsisting, yet he knowingly
contracted a subsequent marriage abroad. Verily, Luis failed to prove the validity of their marriage based on the evidence
he himself had presented.

"The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at
least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to
prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid marriage. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution
requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well." 95

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 6, 2012 and the Resolution dated November 26,
2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 92989 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint filed in
Civil Case No. 69611 is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY, respondent.

ROMERO, J.:p

The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro. He
has submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge
Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the
law.

First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F.
Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife.

Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del
Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent
judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta.
Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.

In his letter-comment to the office of the Court Administrator, respondent judge avers that the office and name of the
Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been used by someone else, who, as the mayor's "lackey," is overly concerned with his
actuations both as judge and as a private person. The same person had earlier filed Administrative Matter No 94-980-
MTC, which was dismissed for lack of merit on September 15, 1994, and Administrative Matter No. OCA-IPI-95-16,
"Antonio Adapon v. Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy," which is still pending.

In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having solemnized the marriage
between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on
the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife
have not seen each other for almost seven years. 1 With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing
the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code which states
that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;" and that
article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.

The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the pleadings submitted were considered sufficient for
a resolution of the case. 2

Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of complainant have not been sufficiently proven, they
will not be dwelt upon. The acts complained of and respondent judge's answer thereto will suffice and can be objectively
assessed by themselves to prove the latter's malfeasance.

The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga states that Tagadan's civil
status is "separated." Despite this declaration, the wedding ceremony was solemnized by respondent judge. He presented
in evidence a joint affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and sworn to before Judge
Demosthenes C. Duquilla, Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar. 3 The affidavit was not issued by the latter judge, as
claimed by respondent judge, but merely acknowledged before him. In their affidavit, the affiants stated that they knew
Gaspar Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D. Peñaranda in September 1983; that after thirteen years of
cohabitation and having borne five children, Ida Peñaranda left the conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she
has not returned nor been heard of for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the presumption that she is already
dead.

In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is sufficient proof of Ida Peñaranda's
presumptive death, and ample reason for him to proceed with the marriage ceremony. We do not agree.

Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:

A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and
void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
 consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis
added.)

There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law is clear and simple. Even if the
spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement
which has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven
that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in accordance with
pertinent provisions of law.

In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wife's
presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Peñaranda. Whether wittingly or unwittingly,
it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such
neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family
Code, " The following marriage shall be void from the beginning: (4) Those bigamous . . . marriages not falling under
Article 41."

The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the court's jurisdiction, covered by Articles 7
and 8 of the Family Code, thus:

Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by :

(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;

xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied.)

Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers the judge or in open court, in the
church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may
be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places
in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing
in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn
statement to that effect.

Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justification for his having solemnized the marriage
between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states,
a marriage can be held outside of the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of
death, (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn
statement to this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in the remote
place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma
del Rosario. 4

More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the solemnizing judge. Under Article
3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be
solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a
directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the
solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage.

A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to do so only within the
area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction
over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are
complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said
areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may
subject the officiating official to administrative liability. 5
Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was not clothed with
authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions
therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of
understanding of the basic principles of civil law.

Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The legal principles applicable in the
cases brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to
apply them is due to a lack of comprehension of the law.

The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law they are sworn to
apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law. It is
imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in instant case. 6 It is not too much to
expect them to know and apply the law intelligently. 7 Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a shaky foundation indeed,
compounded by the errors committed by those not learned in the law. While magistrates may at times make mistakes in
judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in
an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons.

The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void, there being a subsisting
marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Peñaranda.

The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, a six-month suspension and a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Considering that one of the
marriages in question resulted in a bigamous union and therefore void, and the other lacked the necessary authority of
respondent judge, the Court adopts said recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more circumspect in applying the
law and to cultivate a deeper understanding of the law.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6)
months and given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Regalado, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,

vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD
GEILING, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute divorce, only to be followed by a
criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former, provides Us the opportunity to lay down a decisional rule on what
hitherto appears to be an unresolved jurisdictional question.

On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Ekkehard
Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the
Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in
Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. 1

Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a separation de facto
between them.

After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private respondent initiating a
divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed that
there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April, 1982. 2

Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the same is still pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3

On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of
divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner. The
records show that under German law said court was locally and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and
that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign
jurisdiction. 4

On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two
complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had
an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983".
Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the
cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal approved a
resolution, dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against the petitioner. 6 The
complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The
case entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and William Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435,
was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the respondent judge; while the other case, "People of the Philippines vs.
Imelda Pilapil and James Chua", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz,
Branch XXV, of the same court. 7

On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaid resolution of
respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed. 8 A similar petition was filed by James Chua, her
co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary of Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due
course to both petitions and directed the respondent city fiscal to inform the Department of Justice "if the accused have
already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings" and to elevate the entire records of
both cases to his office for review. 9

Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend further proceedings
thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the
other hand, respondent judge merely reset the date of the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April 6, 1987.
Before such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the cancellation of the arraignment and for the suspension of
proceedings in said Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the petition for review then pending before the
Secretary of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the same case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, 12 which
motion was denied by the respondent judge in an order dated September 8, 1987. The same order also directed the
arraignment of both accused therein, that is, petitioner and William Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty while the
petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner being considered by respondent judge as direct contempt,
she and her counsel were fined and the former was ordered detained until she submitted herself for arraignment. 13 Later,
private respondent entered a plea of not guilty. 14

On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary
restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash. The petition is
anchored on the main ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a
private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as
an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal
complaint." 15

On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from implementing the
aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with Criminal Case No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on
March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez acted on the aforesaid petitions for review and, upholding
petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing the respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the
complaints against the petitioner. 16

We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.

Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot
be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been established,
with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal,
requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law,
the requirement for a sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint which starts the
prosecutory proceeding 19 and without which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.

Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally file the
complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents,
grandparents or guardian of the offended party. The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of the first
four offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that while the State, as parens
patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action for a
deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in
default of her parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not include the crimes of adultery and
concubinage. In other words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.

Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such
initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is
a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil
cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.

The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that the same requirement
and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been found necessary since criminal actions are generally
and fundamentally commenced by the State, through the People of the Philippines, the offended party being merely the
complaining witness therein. However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio,
and the present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended spouse assumes a more predominant role since
the right to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and option.

This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence
rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised
Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal
action for, adultery. This is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be absent where
the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal
case. 21
In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to commence the action be
definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he
initiates the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the action would be determined by his
status before or subsequent to the commencement thereof, where such capacity or status existed prior to but ceased
before, or was acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We would thereby have
the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is without the legal capacity to do so.

To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue as to when precisely the
status of a complainant as an offended spouse must exist where a criminal prosecution can be commenced only by one
who in law can be categorized as possessed of such status. Stated differently and with reference to the present case, the
inquiry ;would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds
between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the
former against the latter.

American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari materia with ours, yields the rule
that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings against the
offenders where the statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for
adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have no
legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion. 22

In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that —

'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the husband or wife.' Section
4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant when the offense is said to have been committed,
he had ceased to be such when the prosecution was begun; and appellant insists that his status was not
such as to entitle him to make the complaint. We have repeatedly said that the offense is against the
unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in explaining the reason for this provision in the statute; and we
are of the opinion that the unoffending spouse must be such when the prosecution is commenced.
(Emphasis supplied.)

We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction, considering our
statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of the complainant
vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the
adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time
of the filing of the complaint.

In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of
Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private
respondent is concerned 23 in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.

Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was granted by a United States court
between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed a civil case in a trial court here alleging that
her business concern was conjugal property and praying that she be ordered to render an accounting and that the plaintiff
be granted the right to manage the business. Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously demonstrated the error
of such stance, thus:

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United
States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private
respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. ...

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. ...

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would
have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. ... 25
Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal
standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree of divorce for lack of
knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case. When said respondent initiated the
divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a
dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family, which
is said to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on adultery, 26 since there would thenceforth be no
spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from
each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.

The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private respondent. In applying
Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333 of the Revised Penal Code, which punished
adultery "although the marriage be afterwards declared void", the Court merely stated that "the lawmakers intended to
declare adulterous the infidelity of a married woman to her marital vows, even though it should be made to appear that
she is entitled to have her marriage contract declared null and void, until and unless she actually secures a formal judicial
declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred therefrom that the complaint can still be filed after the
declaration of nullity because such declaration that the marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to stating that it never
existed. There being no marriage from the beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after said declaration of nullity would
no longer have a leg to stand on. Moreover, what was consequently contemplated and within the purview of the decision
in said case is the situation where the criminal action for adultery was filed before the termination of the marriage by a
judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same rule and requisite would necessarily apply where the termination of the
marriage was effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce.

Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore cited, 27 must suffer the same fate of
inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals that the offended spouse therein had duly and seasonably filed a
complaint for adultery, although an issue was raised as to its sufficiency but which was resolved in favor of the
complainant. Said case did not involve a factual situation akin to the one at bar or any issue determinative of the
controversy herein.

WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another one
entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order
issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

-SEE SEPARATE OPINION

G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998

FE D. QUITA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN, * respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18 May 1941. They were not
however blessed with children. Somewhere along the way their relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce
in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. She submitted in the divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19 July 1950
evidencing their agreement to live separately from each other and a settlement of their conjugal properties. On 23 July
1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same
locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a certain
Wernimont.

On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine
Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan (also referred to as Blandina Padlan), claiming to be the surviving spouse
of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the
children of Arturo Padlan opposed the petition and prayed for the appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo Casaba, which
was resolved in favor of the latter. Upon motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later replaced by Higino
Castillon. On 30 April 1973 the oppositors (Blandina and Padlan children) submitted certified photocopies of the 19 July
1950 private writing and the final judgment of divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to
be the sole surviving brother of the deceased Arturo, intervened.

On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent and the distribution of his
estate. At the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987, private respondent as well as the six (6) Padlan children and
Ruperto failed to appear despite due notice. On the same day, the trial court required the submission of the records of
birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the issue
on the declaration of heirs would be considered submitted for resolution. The prescribed period lapsed without the
required documents being submitted.

The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escaño 1 which held that "a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens sought
and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386) was not entitled to recognition as valid in
this jurisdiction," 2 disregarded the divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Consecuently, it expressed the view
that their marriage subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972. Neither did it consider valid their extrajudicial
settlement of conjugal properties due to lack of judicial approval. 3 On the other hand, it opined that there was no
showing that marriage existed between private respondent and Arturo, much less was it shown that the alleged
Padlan children had been acknowledged by the deceased as his children with her. As regards Ruperto, it found
that he was a brother of Arturo. On 27 November 1987 4 only petitioner and Ruperto were declared the intestate
heirs of Arturo. Accordingly, equal adjudication of the net hereditary estate was ordered in favor of the two
intestate heirs. 5

On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children were allowed to present proofs that the
recognition of the children by the deceased as his legitimate children, except Alexis who was recognized as his
illegitimate child, had been made in their respective records of birth. Thus on 15 February 1988 6 partial
reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan children, with the exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half of
the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and petitioner to the other half. 7 Private respondent was not
declared an heir. Although it was stated in the aforementioned records of birth that she and Arturo were married
on 22 April 1947, their marriage was clearly void since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous
marriage to petitioner.

In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her children assigned as one of the errors allegedly
committed by the trial court the circumstance that the case was decided without a hearing, in violation of Sec. 1,
Rule 90, of the Rules of Court, which provides that if there is a controversy before the court as to who are the
lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the
law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
Respondent appellate court found this ground alone sufficient to sustain the appeal; hence, on 11 September
1995 it declared null and void the 27 November 1987 decision and 15 February 1988 order of the trial court, and
directed the remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings. 8 On 18 April 1996 it denied
reconsideration. 9

Should this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings? Petitioner insists that there is no need
because, first, no legal or factual issue obtains for resolution either as to the heirship of the Padlan children or as
to the decedent; and, second, the issue as to who between petitioner and private respondent is the proper hier of
the decedent is one of law which can be resolved in the present petition based on establish facts and admissions
of the parties.

We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by respondent court is clear: If there is
a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive
shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary
cases.

We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the right of the six (6) Padlan children to inherit from
the decedent because there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even
recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan; 10 nor as to their respective hereditary shares. But controversy
remains as to who is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo. The trial court, after the parties other than
petitioner failed to appear during the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987 of the motion for immediate
declaration of heirs and distribution of estate, simply issued an order requiring the submission of the records of
birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the documents,
the issue on declaration of heirs would be deemed submitted for resolution.

We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion private respondent raised, among others, the issue as to
whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent considering that she had secured a divorce in
the U.S.A. and in fact had twice remarried. She also invoked the above quoted procedural rule. 11 To this,
petitioner replied that Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained legally married to her in spite of the divorce
they obtained. 12 Reading between the lines, the implication is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at
the time of her divorce from Arturo. This should have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish
her citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid of
documentary and testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing the
evidence. Instead, the lower court perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by merely applying the ruling
in Tenchavez v. Escaño.

Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower court's decision she stressed that
the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. 13 that aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. She prayed therefore that the case be set for hearing. 14 Petitioner opposed the motion but failed to
squarely address the issue on her citizenship. 15 The trial court did not grant private respondent's prayer for a
hearing but proceeded to resolve her motion with the finding that both petitioner and Arturo were "Filipino
citizens and were married in the Philippines." 16 It maintained that their divorce obtained in 1954 in San
Francisco, California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction. We deduce that the finding on their
citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage as the trial court was not supplied with a basis to
determine petitioner's citizenship at the time of their divorce. The doubt persisted as to whether she was still a
Filipino citizen when their divorce was decreed. The trial court must have overlooked the materiality of this
aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would
become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.

Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on petitioner's citizenship; 17 it did not merit enlightenment
however from petitioner. 18 In the present proceeding, petitioner's citizenship is brought anew to the fore by
private respondent. She even furnishes the Court with the transcript of stenographic notes taken on 5 May 1995
during the hearing for the reconstitution of the original of a certain transfer certificate title as well as the issuance
of new owner's duplicate copy thereof before another trial court. When asked whether she was an American
citizen petitioner answered that she was since 1954. 19 Significantly, the decree of divorce of petitioner and
Arturo was obtained in the same year. Petitioner however did not bother to file a reply memorandum to erase the
uncertainty about her citizenship at the time of their divorce, a factual issue requiring hearings to be conducted
by the trial court. Consequently, respondent appellate court did not err in ordering the case returned to the trial
court for further proceedings.
We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial court should be limited only to the right of
petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse. Private respondent's claim to heirship was already
resolved by the trial court. She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner
and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning under
Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this
status presupposes a legitimate relationship. 20

As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and a her counsel to be declared in contempt of court
and that the present petition be dismissed for forum shopping, 21 the same lacks merit. For forum shopping to
exist the actions must involve the same transactions and same essential facts and circumstances. There must
also be identical causes of action, subject matter and issue. 22 The present petition deals with declaration of
heirship while the subsequent petitions filed before the three (3) trial courts concern the issuance of new owner's
duplicate copies of titles of certain properties belonging to the estate of Arturo. Obviously, there is no reason to
declare the existence of forum shopping.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the
case to the court of origin for further proceedings and declaring null and void its decision holding petitioner Fe
D. Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The order of the appellate court modifying its
previous decision by granting one-half (1/2) of the net hereditary estate to the Padlan children, namely, Claro,
Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's
brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED. The Court however emphasizes that the reception of evidence by
the trial court should he limited to the hereditary rights of petitioner as the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.

The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to dismiss the present petition for
forum shopping is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Mendoza and Martinez, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 182438 July 2, 2014

RENE RONULO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Fr. Rene Ronulo challenging the April 3, 2008
decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
(RTC) Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte.

The Factual Antecedents

The presented evidence showed that3 Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry each other on March
29, 2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. However, on the day of the wedding, the
supposed officiating priest, Fr. Mario Ragaza, refused to solemnize the marriage upon learning that the couple failed to
secure a marriage license. As a recourse, Joey, who was then dressed in barong tagalong,and Claire, clad in a wedding
gown, together with their parents, sponsors and guests, proceeded to the Independent Church of Filipino Christians, also
known as the Aglipayan Church. They requested the petitioner, an Aglipayan priest, to perform a ceremony to which the
latter agreed despite having been informed by the couple that they had no marriage certificate.

The petitioner prepared his choir and scheduled a mass for the couple on the same date. He conducted the ceremony in
the presence of the groom, the bride, their parents, the principal and secondary sponsors and the rest of their invited
guests.4

An information for violation of Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, was filed against the petitioner
before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Batac, Ilocos Norte for allegedly performing an illegal marriage ceremony. 5

The petitioner entered the plea of "not guilty" to the crime charged on arraignment.

The prosecution’s witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne Yere, testified on the incidents of the ceremony. Joseph was the veil
sponsor while Mary Anne was the cord sponsor in the wedding. Mary Anne testified that she saw the bride walk down the
aisle. She also saw the couple exchange their wedding rings, kiss each other, and sign a document. 6 She heard the
petitioner instructing the principal sponsors to sign the marriage contract. Thereafter, they went to the reception, had lunch
and took pictures. She saw the petitioner there. She also identified the wedding invitation given to her by Joey. 7

Florida Umadac, the mother of Joey, testified that she heard the couple declare during the ceremony that they take each
other as husband and wife.8 Days after the wedding, she went to the municipal local civil registrar of San Nicolas, Ilocos
Norte with Atty. Mariano R. Nalupta Jr. where she was given a certificate that no marriage license was issued to the
couple.9

The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony, denied that his act of blessing the couple was tantamount
to a solemnization of the marriage as contemplated by law.10

The MTC Judgment

The MTC found the petitioner guilty of violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, and imposed on him a ₱200.00
fine pursuant to Section 44 of Act No. 3613. It held that the petitioner’s act of giving a blessing constitutes a marriage
ceremony as he made an official church recognition of the cohabitation of the couple as husband and wife. 11 It further
ruled that in performing a marriage ceremony without the couple’s marriage license, the petitioner violated Article 352 of
the RPC which imposes the penalty provided under Act No. 3613 or the Marriage Law. The MTC applied Section 44 of the
Marriage Law which pertinently states that a violation of any of its provisions that is not specifically penalized or of the
regulations to be promulgated, shall be punished by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment of not
more than one month, or both, in the discretion of the court.
The RPC is a law subsequent to the Marriage Law, and provides the penalty for violation of the latter law. Applying these
laws, the MTC imposed the penalty of a fine in the amount of ₱200.00. 12

The RTC Ruling

The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC and added that the circumstances surrounding the act of the petitioner in
"blessing" the couple unmistakably show that a marriage ceremony had transpired. It further ruled that the positive
declarations of the prosecution witnesses deserve more credence than the petitioner’s negative statements. 13 The RTC,
however, ruled that the basis of the fine should be Section 39, instead of Section 44, of the Marriage Law.

The CA Decision

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling. The CA observed that although there is no prescribed form or religious rite
for the solemnization of marriage, the law provides minimum standards in determining whether a marriage ceremony has
been conducted, viz.: (1) the contracting parties must appear personally before the solemnizing officer; and (2) they
should declare that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of at least two witnesses of legal
age.14 According to the CA, the prosecution duly proved these requirements. It added that the presence of a marriage
certificate is not a requirement in a marriage ceremony.15

The CA additionally ruled that the petitioner’s criminal liability under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, is not dependent
on whether Joey or Claire were charged or found guilty under Article 350 of the same Code. 16

The CA agreed with the MTC that the legal basis for the imposition of the fine is Section 44 of the Marriage Law since it
covers violation of regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities such as the RPC.

The Petition

The petitioner argues that the CA erred on the following grounds: First, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, is vague and
does not define what constitutes "an illegal marriage ceremony." Assuming that a marriage ceremony principally
constitutes those enunciated in Article 55 of the Civil Code and Article 6 of the Family Code, these provisions require the
verbal declaration that the couple take each other as husband and wife, and a marriage certificate containing the
declaration in writing which is duly signed by the contracting parties and attested to by the solemnizing officer. 17 The
petitioner likewise maintains that the prosecution failed to prove that the contracting parties personally declared that they
take each other as husband and wife.18 Second, under the principle of separation of church and State, the State cannot
interfere in ecclesiastical affairs such as the administration of matrimony. Therefore, the State cannot convert the
"blessing" into a "marriage ceremony."19

Third, the petitioner had no criminal intent as he conducted the "blessing" in good faith for purposes of giving moral
guidance to the couple.20

Fourth, the non-filing of a criminal case against the couple in violating Article 350 of the RPC, as amended, should
preclude the filing of the present case against him.21

Finally, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not provide for a penalty. The present case is not covered by Section
44 of the Marriage Law as the petitioner was not found violating its provisions nor a regulation promulgated thereafter. 22

THE COURT’S RULING:

We find the petition unmeritorious.

The elements of the crime punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, were proven by the prosecution

Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall perform or authorize any
illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are as follows: (1) authority of the solemnizing officer; and (2) his
performance of an illegal marriage ceremony. In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he has authority to
solemnize a marriage. Hence, the only issue to be resolved is whether the alleged "blessing" by the petitioner is
tantamount to the performance of an "illegal marriage ceremony" which is punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended.
While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not specifically define a "marriage ceremony" and what constitutes its
"illegal" performance, Articles 3(3) and 6 of the Family Code are clear on these matters. These provisions were taken from
Article 5523 of the New Civil Code which, in turn, was copied from Section 3 24 of the Marriage Law with no substantial
amendments. Article 625 of the Family Code provides that "[n]o prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the
marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear personally before the
solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as
husband and wife."26 Pertinently, Article 3(3)27 mirrors Article 6 of the Family Code and particularly defines a marriage
ceremony as that which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their
personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal
age.

Even prior to the date of the enactment of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, the rule was clear that no prescribed form
of religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. However, as correctly found by the CA, the law sets the
minimum requirements constituting a marriage ceremony: first, there should be the personal appearance of the
contracting parties before a solemnizing officer; and second, heir declaration in the presence of not less than two
witnesses that they take each other as husband and wife.

As to the first requirement, the petitioner admitted that the parties appeared before him and this fact was testified to by
witnesses. On the second requirement, we find that, contrary to the petitioner’s allegation, the prosecution has proven,
through the testimony of Florida, that the contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as husband
and wife.

The petitioner’s allegation that the court asked insinuating and leading questions to Florida fails to persuadeus. A judge
may examine or cross-examine a witness. He may propound clarificatory questions to test the credibility of the witness
and to extract the truth. He may seek to draw out relevant and material testimony though that testimony may tend to
support or rebut the position taken by one or the other party. It cannot be taken against him if the clarificatory questions he
propounds happen to reveal certain truths that tend to destroy the theory of one party. 28

At any rate, if the defense found the line of questioning of the judge objectionable, its failure to timely register this bars it
from belatedly invoking any irregularity.

In addition, the testimonies of Joseph and Mary Anne, and even the petitioner’s admission regarding the circumstances of
the ceremony, support Florida’s testimony that there had indeed been the declaration by the couple that they take each
other as husband and wife. The testimony of Joey disowning their declaration as husband and wife cannot overcome
these clear and convincing pieces of evidence. Notably, the defense failed to show that the prosecution witnesses,
Joseph and Mary Anne, had any ill-motive to testify against the petitioner.

We also do not agree with the petitioner that the principle of separation of church and State precludes the State from
qualifying the church "blessing" into a marriage ceremony. Contrary to the petitioner’s allegation, this principle has been
duly preserved by Article 6 of the Family Code when it provides that no prescribed form or religious rite for the
solemnization of marriage is required. This pronouncement gives any religion or sect the freedom or latitude in conducting
its respective marital rites, subject only to the requirement that the core requirements of law be observed.

We emphasize at this point that Article 1529 of the Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and
that our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is
vitally interested. The State has paramount interest in the enforcement of its constitutional policies and the preservation of
the sanctity of marriage. To this end, it is within its power to enact laws and regulations, such as Article 352 of the RPC,
as amended, which penalize the commission of acts resulting in the disintegration and mockery of marriage.

From these perspectives, we find it clear that what the petitioner conducted was a marriage ceremony, as the minimum
requirements set by law were complied with. While the petitioner may view this merely as a "blessing," the presence of the
requirements of the law constitutive of a marriage ceremony qualified this "blessing" into a "marriage ceremony" as
contemplated by Article 3(3) of the Family Code and Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.

We come now to the issue of whether the solemnization by the petitioner of this marriage ceremony was illegal.

Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of marriage is the presence of a valid marriage
certificate. In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he knew that the couple had no marriage license, yet he
conducted the "blessing" of their relationship.
Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite knowledge that the essential and formal
requirements of marriage set by law were lacking. The marriage ceremony, therefore, was illegal. The petitioner’s
knowledge of the absence of these requirements negates his defense of good faith.

We also do not agree with the petitioner that the lack of a marriage certificate negates his criminal liability in the present
case. For purposes of determining if a marriage ceremony has been conducted, a marriage certificate is not included in
the requirements provided by Article 3(3) of the Family Code, as discussed above.

Neither does the non-filing of a criminal complaint against the couple negate criminal liability of the petitioner. Article 352
of the RPC, as amended, does not make this an element of the crime. The penalty imposed is proper

On the issue on the penalty for violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, this provision clearly provides that it shall
be imposed in accordance with the provision of the Marriage Law. The penalty provisions of the Marriage Law are
Sections 39 and 44 which provide as follows: Section 39 of the Marriage Law provides that:

Section 39. Illegal Solemnization of Marriage – Any priest or minister solemnizing marriage without being authorized by
the Director of the Philippine National Library or who, upon solemnizing marriage, refuses to exhibit the authorization in
force when called upon to do so by the parties or parents, grandparents, guardians, or persons having charge and any
bishop or officer, priest, or minister of any church, religion or sect the regulations and practices whereof require banns or
publications previous to the solemnization of a marriage in accordance with section ten, who authorized the immediate
solemnization of a marriage that is subsequently declared illegal; or any officer, priest or minister solemnizing marriage in
violation of this act, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one month nor more than two years, or by a fine
of not less than two hundred pesos nor more than two thousand pesos. [emphasis ours]

On the other hand, Section 44 of the Marriage Law states that:

Section 44. General Penal Clause – Any violation of any provision of this Act not specifically penalized, or of the
regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities, shall be punished by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos
or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or both, in the discretion of the court. [emphasis ours]

From a reading of the provisions cited above, we find merit in the ruling of the CA and the MTC that the penalty imposable
in the present case is that covered under Section 44, and not Section 39, of the Marriage Law.

The penalized acts under Section 39 of Act No. 3613 do not include the present case.1âwphi1 As correctly found by the
MTC, the petitioner was not found violating the provisions of the Marriage Law but Article 352 of the RPC, as amended. It
is only the imposition of the penalty for the violation of this provision which is referred to the Marriage Law. On this point,
Article 352 falls squarely under the provision of Section 44 of Act No. 3613 which provides for the penalty for any violation
of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities; Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, which was enacted
after the Marriage Law, is one of such regulations.

Therefore, the CA did not err in imposing the penalty of fine of ₱200.00 pursuant to Section 44 of the Marriage Law.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 3, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR.
No. 31028.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000

ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE
NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., petitioners,
vs.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death?

Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners.
Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December
11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and
Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car
accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma
alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the
validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for
"annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.

Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition after
finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following issues:

(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the declaration of the nullity of
marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her specially so when at the time of the filing of this
instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is already dead;

(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with defendant is null and void ab initio;

(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second marriage after it was dissolved
due to their father's death. 1

Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void their father's marriage to
respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the
persons who could initiate an action for annulment of marriage. 2 Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded
on a pure question of law.

This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
and because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioner's averment that the allegations in the petition are "true
and correct"." It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the
1997 Rules. 3 However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for
review. 4

The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable
law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. 5 A valid
marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, 6 the absence of which renders the
marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) 7 in relation to Article 58. 8 The requirement and issuance of marriage
license is the State's demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the
general public is interested. 9 This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity
of family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social institution." 10 Specifically, the
Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of family life which shall be
protected by the State. 11 This is why the Family Code considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent
union" 12 and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime commitment." 13

However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of
which is that provided in Article 76, 14 referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the
marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication
of every applicant's name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such
persons from legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public
exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve
their privacy and exempt them from that requirement.

There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent Norma was celebrated without any marriage
license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being
unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry each
other." 16 The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76
of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a
marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each other during the entire
five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with
each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal
impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either disappeared or intervened sometime during
the cohabitation period?

Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years without the
benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where
the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law
cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had
it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the
marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity — meaning no third party was involved at
anytime within the 5 years and continuity — that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is
computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five
years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and
placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship
must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties
should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element
as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage
license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required
in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has
knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar. 17 The Civil Code
provides:

Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advice
the local civil registrar thereof. . . .

Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local civil registrar shall forthwith
make an investigation, examining persons under oath. . . .

This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:

Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the
marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. . . .

Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or brought to his attention, he
shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for a marriage license. . . .

This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages by
the same person during the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first
spouse shall be illegal and void, 18 subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was
dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the contracting of two or more marriages
and the having of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery. 19 The law
sanctions monogamy.

In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as
husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to
the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first
wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already
lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by
law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of
the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is
immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The
subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses
cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife".

Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a
marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.

The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their father's marriage void
after his death?

Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code 20 cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows
"the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at anytime before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains
to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The
Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not
identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab
initio is considered as having never to have taken place 21 and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally
ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot
be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently,
void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during
the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the
marriage had been perfectly valid. 22 That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable
marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested
party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the
properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution, 23 and its effect
on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51,
53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal
partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate.

Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father extinguished the alleged marital bond between him and
respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was
dissolved between the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all
and the death of either extinguished nothing.

Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a
marriage. 24 "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the
marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of
society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and
declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void
marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken
place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact
of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before
or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage
void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be
collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either,
the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. 26 But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides
that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a
second marriage 27 and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect. 28 For the same reason,
the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily,
if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be
considered imprescriptible.

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute
nullity.1âwphi1 For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a
child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the
validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination
of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be
obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59,
dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Pardo, J., on official business abroad.
G.R. No. 179922 December 16, 2008

JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, also known as FELICIDAD S. VDA. DE CARLOS or FELICIDAD SANDOVAL CARLOS or
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA. DE CARLOS, and TEOFILO CARLOS II, respondents.

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond for marriages solemnized during the effectivity of the
Family Code, except cases commenced prior to March 15, 2003. The nullity and annulment of a marriage cannot be
declared in a judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment.

We pronounce these principles as We review on certiorari the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed and
set aside the summary judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in an action for declaration of nullity of marriage,
status of a child, recovery of property, reconveyance, sum of money, and damages.

The Facts

The events that led to the institution of the instant suitare unveiled as follows:

Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six parcels of land to their compulsory heirs, Teofilo
Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. The lots are particularly described as follows:

Parcel No. 1

Lot No. 162 of the MUNTINLUPA ESTATE SUBDIVISION, Case No. 6137 of the Court of Land Registration.

Exemption from the provisions of Article 567 of the Civil Code is specifically reserved.

Area: 1 hectare, 06 ares, 07 centares.

Parcel No. 2

A parcel of land (Lot No. 159-B), being a portion of Lot 159, situated in the Bo. of Alabang, Municipality of
Muntinlupa, Province of Rizal, x x x containing an area of Thirteen Thousand Four Hundred Forty One (13,441)
square meters.

Parcel No. 3

A parcel of land (Lot 159-B-2 of the subd. plan [LRC] Psd-325903, approved as a non-subd. project), being a
portion of Lot 159-B [LRC] Psd- Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NE,
points 2 to 4 by Lot 155, Muntinlupa Estate; on the SE, point 4 to 5 by Lot 159-B-5; on the S, points 5 to 1 by Lot
159-B-3; on the W, points 1 to 2 by Lot 159-B-1 (Road widening) all of the subd. plan, containing an area of ONE
HUNDRED THIRTY (130) SQ. METERS, more or less.

PARCEL No. 4

A parcel of land (Lot 28-C of the subd. plan Psd-13-007090, being a portion of Lot 28, Muntinlupa Estate, L.R.C.
Rec. No. 6137), situated in the Bo. of Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. Bounded on the NE, along lines
1-2 by Lot 27, Muntinlupa Estate; on the East & SE, along lines 2 to 6 by Mangangata River; and on the West.,
along line 6-1, by Lot 28-B of the subd. plan x x x containing an area of ONE THUSAND AND SEVENTY-SIX
(1,076) SQUARE METERS.

PARCEL No. 5
 PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 50, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. de Solocan. Linda por el NW, con la parcela 49;
por el NE, con la parcela 36; por el SE, con la parcela 51; y por el SW, con la calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un
punto marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se halla a S. gds. 01'W, 72.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que
es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan y
Dos. Castillas, continiendo un extension superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.

PARCEL No. 6

PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 51, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. De Solocon. Linda por el NW, con la parcela 50;
por el NE, con la parcela 37; por el SE, con la parcela 52; por el SW, con la Calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un
punto Marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se halla at S. 43 gds. 01'E, 82.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana,
que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan
y Dos. Castillas, continiendo una extension superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.3

During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. The agreement was made in order to avoid
the payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in turn, undertook to deliver and turn over the share of the other legal heir,
petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos.

Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred and registered in the name of Teofilo. These three (3) lots
are now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 234824 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; TCT
No. 139061 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; and TCT No. 139058 issued by the Registry of Deeds of
Makati City.

Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner. The lot is now covered by TCT No. 160401 issued by the Registry
of Deeds of Makati City.

On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and their son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo
II). Upon Teofilo's death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were registered in the name of respondent Felicidad and co-respondent,
Teofilo II. The said two (2) parcels of land are covered by TCT Nos. 219877 and 210878, respectively, issued by the
Registry of Deeds of Manila.

In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents before the RTC in Muntinlupa City, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-
1964. In the said case, the parties submitted and caused the approval of a partial compromise agreement. Under the
compromise, the parties acknowledged their respective shares in the proceeds from the sale of a portion of the first parcel
of land. This includes the remaining 6,691-square-meter portion of said land.

On September 17, 1994, the parties executed a deed of extrajudicial partition, dividing the remaining land of the first
parcel between them.

Meanwhile, in a separate case entitled Rillo v. Carlos,4 2,331 square meters of the second parcel of land were adjudicated
in favor of plaintiffs Rillo. The remaining 10,000-square meter portion was later divided between petitioner and
respondents.

The division was incorporated in a supplemental compromise agreement executed on August 17, 1994, with respect to
Civil Case No. 94-1964. The parties submitted the supplemental compromise agreement, which was approved
accordingly.

Petitioner and respondents entered into two more contracts in August 1994. Under the contracts, the parties equally
divided between them the third and fourth parcels of land.

In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-135, against respondents before the
court a quo with the following causes of action: (a) declaration of nullity of marriage; (b) status of a child; (c) recovery of
property; (d) reconveyance; and (e) sum of money and damages. The complaint was raffled to Branch 256 of the RTC in
Muntinlupa.

In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late brother Teofilo and respondent Felicidad was a
nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was
neither the natural nor the adoptive father of respondent Teofilo Carlos II.
Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of the contracts he entered into with respondent Felicidad with respect to the
subject real properties. He also prayed for the cancellation of the certificates of title issued in the name of respondents. He
argued that the properties covered by such certificates of title, including the sums received by respondents as proceeds,
should be reconveyed to him.

Finally, petitioner claimed indemnification as and by way of moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses, and costs of suit.

On October 16, 1995, respondents submitted their answer. They denied the material averments of petitioner's complaint.
Respondents contended that the dearth of details regarding the requisite marriage license did not invalidate Felicidad's
marriage to Teofilo. Respondents declared that Teofilo II was the illegitimate child of the deceased Teofilo Carlos with
another woman.

On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, respondents prayed for the
dismissal of the case before the trial court. They also asked that their counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages, as
well as attorney's fees, be granted.

But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial, respondents moved for summary judgment. Attached to the motion
was the affidavit of the justice of the peace who solemnized the marriage. Respondents also submitted the Certificate of
Live Birth of respondent Teofilo II. In the certificate, the late Teofilo Carlos and respondent Felicidad were designated as
parents.

On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the motion for summary judgment on the ground of irregularity of the contract
evidencing the marriage. In the same breath, petitioner lodged his own motion for summary judgment. Petitioner
presented a certification from the Local Civil Registrar of Calumpit, Bulacan, certifying that there is no record of birth of
respondent Teofilo II.

Petitioner also incorporated in the counter-motion for summary judgment the testimony of respondent Felicidad in another
case. Said testimony was made in Civil Case No. 89-2384, entitled Carlos v. Gorospe, before the RTC Branch 255, Las
Piñas. In her testimony, respondent Felicidad narrated that co-respondent Teofilo II is her child with Teofilo. 5

Subsequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa submitted to the trial court its report and manifestation,
discounting the possibility of collusion between the parties.

RTC and CA Dispositions

On April 8, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant's (respondent's) Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby
denied. Plaintiff's (petitioner's) Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted and summary judgment
is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff as follows:

1. Declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad Sandoval and Teofilo Carlos solemnized at Silang, Cavite
on May 14, 1962, evidenced by the Marriage Certificate submitted in this case, null and void ab initio for lack of
the requisite marriage license;

2. Declaring that the defendant minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II, is not the natural, illegitimate, or legally adopted child of
the late Teofilo E. Carlos;

3. Ordering defendant Sandoval to pay and restitute to plaintiff the sum of P18,924,800.00 together with the
interest thereon at the legal rate from date of filing of the instant complaint until fully paid;

4. Declaring plaintiff as the sole and exclusive owner of the parcel of land, less the portion adjudicated to plaintiffs
in Civil Case No. 11975, covered by TCT No. 139061 of the Register of Deeds of Makati City, and ordering said
Register of Deeds to cancel said title and to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein;

5. Declaring the Contract, Annex "K" of complaint, between plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null and void, and
ordering the Register of Deeds of Makati City to cancel TCT No. 139058 in the name of Teofilo Carlos, and to
issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein;
 6. Declaring the Contract, Annex M of the complaint, between plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null and void;

7. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210877 in the names of defendant Sandoval and defendant minor Teofilo
S. Carlos II and ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in the exclusive name of plaintiff
herein;

8. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210878 in the name of defendant Sandoval and defendant Minor Teofilo
S. Carlos II and ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein.

Let this case be set for hearing for the reception of plaintiff's evidence on his claim for moral damages, exemplary
damages, attorney's fees, appearance fees, and litigation expenses on June 7, 1996 at 1:30 o'clock in the
afternoon.

SO ORDERED.6

Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the CA. In the appeal, respondents argued, inter alia, that the trial court acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering summary judgment annulling the marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad and
in declaring Teofilo II as not an illegitimate child of Teofilo, Sr.

On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the summary judgment appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and in lieu thereof, a new
one is entered REMANDING the case to the court of origin for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.7

The CA opined:

We find the rendition of the herein appealed summary judgment by the court a quo contrary to law and public
policy as ensconced in the aforesaid safeguards. The fact that it was appellants who first sought summary
judgment from the trial court, did not justify the grant thereof in favor of appellee. Not being an action "to recover
upon a claim" or "to obtain a declaratory relief," the rule on summary judgment apply (sic) to an action to annul a
marriage. The mere fact that no genuine issue was presented and the desire to expedite the disposition of the
case cannot justify a misinterpretation of the rule. The first paragraph of Article 88 and 101 of the Civil Code
expressly prohibit the rendition of decree of annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of
judgment. Yet, the affidavits annexed to the petition for summary judgment practically amount to these methods
explicitly proscribed by the law.

We are not unmindful of appellee's argument that the foregoing safeguards have traditionally been applied to
prevent collusion of spouses in the matter of dissolution of marriages and that the death of Teofilo Carlos on May
13, 1992 had effectively dissolved the marriage herein impugned. The fact, however, that appellee's own brother
and appellant Felicidad Sandoval lived together as husband and wife for thirty years and that the annulment of
their marriage is the very means by which the latter is sought to be deprived of her participation in the estate left
by the former call for a closer and more thorough inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the case. Rather that
the summary nature by which the court a quo resolved the issues in the case, the rule is to the effect that the
material facts alleged in the complaint for annulment of marriage should always be proved. Section 1, Rule 19 of
the Revised Rules of Court provides:

"Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits
the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct
judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the material
facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved." (Underscoring supplied)

Moreover, even if We were to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary judgment to the case at bench,
Our perusal of the record shows that the finding of the court a quo for appellee would still not be warranted. While
it may be readily conceded that a valid marriage license is among the formal requisites of marriage, the absence
of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58 of the Civil Code the
failure to reflect the serial number of the marriage license on the marriage contract evidencing the marriage
between Teofilo Carlos and appellant Felicidad Sandoval, although irregular, is not as fatal as appellee
 represents it to be. Aside from the dearth of evidence to the contrary, appellant Felicidad Sandoval's affirmation of
the existence of said marriage license is corroborated by the following statement in the affidavit executed by
Godofredo Fojas, then Justice of the Peace who officiated the impugned marriage, to wit:

"That as far as I could remember, there was a marriage license issued at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962
as basis of the said marriage contract executed by Teofilo Carlos and Felicidad Sandoval, but the number
of said marriage license was inadvertently not placed in the marriage contract for the reason that it was
the Office Clerk who filled up the blanks in the Marriage Contract who in turn, may have overlooked the
same."

Rather than the inferences merely drawn by the trial court, We are of the considered view that the veracity and
credibility of the foregoing statement as well as the motivations underlying the same should be properly threshed
out in a trial of the case on the merits.

If the non-presentation of the marriage contract - the primary evidence of marriage - is not proof that a marriage
did not take place, neither should appellants' non-presentation of the subject marriage license be taken as proof
that the same was not procured. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage, it must be emphasized,
rests upon the plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.

Considering that the burden of proof also rests on the party who disputes the legitimacy of a particular party, the
same may be said of the trial court's rejection of the relationship between appellant Teofilo Carlos II and his
putative father on the basis of the inconsistencies in appellant Felicidad Sandoval's statements. Although it had
effectively disavowed appellant's prior claims regarding the legitimacy of appellant Teofilo Carlos II, the averment
in the answer that he is the illegitimate son of appellee's brother, to Our mind, did not altogether foreclose the
possibility of the said appellant's illegitimate filiation, his right to prove the same or, for that matter, his entitlement
to inheritance rights as such.

Without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, We find appellee's bare allegation that appellant
Teofilo Carlos II was merely purchased from an indigent couple by appellant Felicidad Sandoval, on the whole,
insufficient to support what could well be a minor's total forfeiture of the rights arising from his putative filiation.
Inconsistent though it may be to her previous statements, appellant Felicidad Sandoval's declaration regarding
the illegitimate filiation of Teofilo Carlos II is more credible when considered in the light of the fact that, during the
last eight years of his life, Teofilo Carlos allowed said appellant the use of his name and the shelter of his
household. The least that the trial court could have done in the premises was to conduct a trial on the merits in
order to be able to thoroughly resolve the issues pertaining to the filiation of appellant Teofilo Carlos II.8

On November 22, 2006, petitioner moved for reconsideration and for the inhibition of the ponente, Justice Rebecca De
Guia-Salvador. The CA denied the twin motions.

Issues

In this petition under Rule 45, petitioner hoists the following issues:

1. That, in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment under the Decision, Annex A hereof, and in
denying petitioner's Motion for reconsideration under the Resolution, Annex F hereof, with respect to the nullity of
the impugned marriage, petitioner respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed a grave
reversible error in applying Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code, despite the fact that the circumstances of this
case are different from that contemplated and intended by law, or has otherwise decided a question of substance
not theretofore decided by the Supreme Court, or has decided it in a manner probably not in accord with law or
with the applicable decisions of this Honorable Court;

2. That in setting aside and reversing the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof, entering another remanding the
case to the court of origin for further proceedings, petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals
committed a serious reversible error in applying Section 1, Rule 19 (now Section 1, Rule 34) of the Rules of Court
providing for judgment on the pleadings, instead of Rule 35 governing Summary Judgments;

3. That in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof, entering another remanding the
case to the court of origin for further proceedings, petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court of
Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion, disregarded judicial admissions, made findings on ground of
 speculations, surmises, and conjectures, or otherwise committed misapplications of the laws and
misapprehension of the facts.9 (Underscoring supplied)

Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve whether a marriage may be declared void ab initio through a judgment on the
pleadings or a summary judgment and without the benefit of a trial. But there are other procedural issues, including the
capacity of one who is not a spouse in bringing the action for nullity of marriage.

Our Ruling

I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither judgment on the pleadings
nor summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment disallowed.

Petitioner faults the CA in applying Section 1, Rule 1910 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:

SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the
material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on
such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved.

He argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governing summary judgment, instead of the
rule on judgment on the pleadings.

Petitioner is misguided. The CA did not limit its finding solely within the provisions of the Rule on judgment on the
pleadings. In disagreeing with the trial court, the CA likewise considered the provisions on summary judgments, to wit:

Moreover, even if We are to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary judgment to the case at bench, Our
perusal of the record shows that the finding of the court a quo for appellee would still not be warranted. x x x11

But whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the CA was correct in reversing the summary
judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules on judgment on the pleadings and summary judgments have no place
in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and even in annulment of marriage.

With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as "Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages," the question on the application of summary judgments or even judgment on the
pleadings in cases of nullity or annulment of marriage has been stamped with clarity. The significant principle laid down by
the said Rule, which took effect on March 15, 2003 12 is found in Section 17, viz.:

SEC. 17. Trial. - (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial of the case. No delegation of evidence
to a commissioner shall be allowed except as to matters involving property relations of the spouses.

(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be proved. No judgment on the
pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment shall be allowed. (Underscoring supplied)

Likewise instructive is the Court's pronouncement in Republic v. Sandiganbayan.13 In that case, We excluded actions for
nullity or annulment of marriage from the application of summary judgments.

Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for annulment of marriage or declaration of its nullity or for legal
separation, summary judgment is applicable to all kinds of actions. 14 (Underscoring supplied)

By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the State of its lawful right and duty to intervene in the
case. The participation of the State is not terminated by the declaration of the public prosecutor that no collusion exists
between the parties. The State should have been given the opportunity to present controverting evidence before the
judgment was rendered.15

Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court should order the prosecuting attorney to appear and
intervene for the State. It is at this stage when the public prosecutor sees to it that there is no suppression of evidence.
Concomitantly, even if there is no suppression of evidence, the public prosecutor has to make sure that the evidence to
be presented or laid down before the court is not fabricated.
To further bolster its role towards the preservation of marriage, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages reiterates the duty of the public prosecutor, viz.:

SEC. 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. - (a) x x x

(b) x x x If there is no collusion, the court shall require the public prosecutor to intervene for the State during the
trial on the merits to prevent suppression or fabrication of evidence. (Underscoring supplied)

Truly, only the active participation of the public prosecutor or the Solicitor General will ensure that the interest of the State
is represented and protected in proceedings for declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing the fabrication or
suppression of evidence.16

II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife.
Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2)
Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code.

Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party outside of the marriage. The Rule
made it exclusively a right of the spouses by stating:

SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. -

(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband
or the wife. (Underscoring supplied)

Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriage. The rationale of the Rule is enlightening, viz.:

Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or
by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or
intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and, hence, can only question the
validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate
of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve
marriage and not to seek its dissolution.17 (Underscoring supplied)

The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the sole architects of a healthy, loving, peaceful marriage.
They are the only ones who can decide when and how to build the foundations of marriage. The spouses alone are the
engineers of their marital life. They are simultaneously the directors and actors of their matrimonial true-to-life play.
Hence, they alone can and should decide when to take a cut, but only in accordance with the grounds allowed by law.

The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a demarcation line between marriages covered by the
Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. The Rule extends only to marriages entered into during the
effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988. 18

The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks the beginning of the end of the right of
the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case against the surviving spouse. But the Rule never
intended to deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of their successional rights.

While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be filed solely by
the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law.
They can still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable
Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the
validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. 19

It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003 although the
marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became effective on
March 15, 200320 is prospective in its application. Thus, the Court held in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli,21 viz.:
 As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines, and
is prospective in its application.22 (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in controversy was
celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern depends upon when the marriage took place.23

The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code
which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration.24 But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to
declare the marriage void. Does this mean that any person can bring an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage?

We respond in the negative. The absence of a provision in the Civil Code cannot be construed as a license for any person
to institute a nullity of marriage case. Such person must appear to be the party who stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. 25 Elsewise stated, plaintiff must be the real party-in-
interest. For it is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-
in-interest.26

Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or
judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest. One
having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When plaintiff is
not the real party-in-interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action. 27

Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals,28 where the Court held:

True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were married, or even in the
Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however,
only a party who can demonstrate "proper interest" can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage,
like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest and must be
based on a cause of action. Thus, in Niñal v. Badayog, the Court held that the children have the personality to file
the petition to declare the nullity of marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their
successional rights.

xxxx

In fine, petitioner's personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained because
of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court
for reception of additional evidence is necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce
decree and whether the foreign law which granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a
valid divorce decree was obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlando's remarriage, then the trial
court should declare respondent's marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but reduced the amount of moral
damages from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and exemplary damages from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On the
contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial
court must dismiss the instant petition to declare nullity of marriage on the ground that petitioner Felicitas Amor-
Catalan lacks legal personality to file the same.29 (Underscoring supplied)

III. The case must be remanded to determine whether or not petitioner is a real-party-in-interest to seek the
declaration of nullity of the marriage in controversy.

In the case at bench, the records reveal that when Teofilo died intestate in 1992, his only surviving compulsory heirs are
respondent Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II. Under the law on succession, successional rights are transmitted from the
moment of death of the decedent and the compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law. 30

Upon Teofilo's death in 1992, all his property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance are
transmitted to his compulsory heirs. These heirs were respondents Felicidad and Teofilo II, as the surviving spouse and
child, respectively.

Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who are compulsory heirs, to wit:

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;
 (2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and
descendants;

(3) The widow or widower;

(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;

(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code. 31

Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as compulsory heirs. But although a collateral relative, such as a
brother, does not fall within the ambit of a compulsory heir, he still has a right to succeed to the estate. Articles 1001 and
1003 of the New Civil Code provide:

ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be
entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.

ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles.
(Underscoring supplied)

Indeed, only the presence of descendants, ascendants or illegitimate children excludes collateral relatives from
succeeding to the estate of the decedent. The presence of legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted child or children of the
deceased precludes succession by collateral relatives. 32 Conversely, if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate
children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the decedent.33

If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not to be the legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo,
petitioner would then have a personality to seek the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad.
This is so, considering that collateral relatives, like a brother and sister, acquire successional right over the estate if the
decedent dies without issue and without ascendants in the direct line.

The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his parents. He had no other siblings but petitioner. Thus, if Teofilo II
is finally found and proven to be not a legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner succeeds to the other
half of the estate of his brother, the first half being allotted to the widow pursuant to Article 1001 of the New Civil Code.
This makes petitioner a real-party-interest to seek the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of his deceased brother
with respondent Felicidad. If the subject marriage is found to be void ab initio, petitioner succeeds to the entire estate.

It bears stressing, however, that the legal personality of petitioner to bring the nullity of marriage case is contingent upon
the final declaration that Teofilo II is not a legitimate, adopted, or illegitimate son of Teofilo.

If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo, then petitioner has no legal
personality to ask for the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother and respondent Felicidad. This is based on the
ground that he has no successional right to be protected, hence, does not have proper interest. For although the marriage
in controversy may be found to be void from the beginning, still, petitioner would not inherit. This is because the presence
of descendant, illegitimate,34 or even an adopted child35 excludes the collateral relatives from inheriting from the decedent.

Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the merits to determine the validity or nullity of the subject
marriage is called for. But the RTC is strictly instructed to dismiss the nullity of marriage case for lack of cause of
action if it is proven by evidence that Teofilo II is a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo
Carlos, the deceased brother of petitioner.

IV. Remand of the case regarding the question of filiation of respondent Teofilo II is proper and in order. There is
a need to vacate the disposition of the trial court as to the other causes of action before it.

Petitioner did not assign as error or interpose as issue the ruling of the CA on the remand of the case concerning the
filiation of respondent Teofilo II. This notwithstanding, We should not leave the matter hanging in limbo.

This Court has the authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned as error by the parties, if their
consideration is necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the case. 36
We agree with the CA that without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, petitioner's bare allegation that
respondent Teofilo II was adopted from an indigent couple is insufficient to support a total forfeiture of rights arising from
his putative filiation. However, We are not inclined to support its pronouncement that the declaration of respondent
Felicidad as to the illegitimate filiation of respondent Teofilo II is more credible. For the guidance of the appellate court,
such declaration of respondent Felicidad should not be afforded credence. We remind the CA of the guaranty provided by
Article 167 of the Family Code to protect the status of legitimacy of a child, to wit:

ARTICLE 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. (Underscoring supplied)

It is stressed that Felicidad's declaration against the legitimate status of Teofilo II is the very act that is proscribed by
Article 167 of the Family Code. The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against the
legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a valid marriage. 37

Finally, the disposition of the trial court in favor of petitioner for causes of action concerning reconveyance, recovery of
property, and sum of money must be vacated. This has to be so, as said disposition was made on the basis of its finding
that the marriage in controversy was null and void ab initio.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows:

1. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court in regard to the action on the status and filiation of
respondent Teofilo Carlos II and the validity or nullity of marriage between respondent Felicidad Sandoval and the
late Teofilo Carlos;

2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the legitimate, or illegitimate, or legally adopted son of the late Teofilo Carlos,
the RTC is strictly INSTRUCTED to DISMISS the action for nullity of marriage for lack of cause of action;

3. The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8 of the fallo of its decision is VACATED AND SET ASIDE.

The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to conduct trial on the merits with dispatch and to give this case priority in its
calendar.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.