1.

Title: People v Temblor Name of Digester: Parayno

No. L-66884 Date: May 28, 1988 Ponente: GRINO-AQUINO, J.:

Subject / Syllabus Topic: II. A. Felonies & Crimes a. Nature, Concept, Definition, & Elements
Plaintiff-Appellee: People of the Philippines Defendant-Appellant: Vincent Temblor
Facts:
• December 30, 1980- The Accused and Anecito Ellevera killed Julius Cagampang
• June 8, 1982 The accused entered plea of not guilty, he was sentenced to reclusion perpetua with
accessory penalties thereof under RPC 41 (reclusion perpetua) and 42 (prison mayor), indemnify the
heirs of the victim the amount of 12k w/o subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
• The accused took the .38 caliber revolver from wife showing his identity to her
• In 1981, months after the incident, the victim’s wife identified the accused man
• The accused defense was an alibi – he alleged that from 4:00 pm of dec 30, 1980 until 8:00 am of dec 31
he was with Silverio Perol
• The accused and companion admittedly with the NPA, they were not apprehended earlier because they
hid in the mountains of Malapong
• August of 1981- The accused surrendered to Mayor Dick Carmone of Nasipit
• November 26, 1981- He was arrested by Buenavista police at public market
• The victim’s wife (Victorina) did not know him by name which allegedly renders of her husband’s killing
insufficient
• Testimony was corroborated by another prosecution witness, a tricycle driver: Claudio Sabanal, longtime
acquaintance of the accused and knew him as Ronald.
• Claudio saw Ronald at bout 730 in the evening of Dec. 30,1980 which he fled after hearing gunshots.
• Dr. Alfredo Salanga who issued the post-mortem examination report certified that the victim sustained
three (3) gunshot wounds.
• Rebutting the accused’s alibi, the prosecution presented a Certification of the Nasipit Lumber Company’s
Personnel Officer, Jose F. Tinga (Exh. D), and the NALCO Daily Time Record of Silverio Perol (Exh. D),
showing that Perol was not at home drinking with the accused and his father, but was at work on
December 30, 1980 from 10:50 o’clock in the evening up to 7:00 o’clock in the morning of December 31,
1980.
• In this appeal, the appellant alleges that the court a quo erred:
-in finding that he was positively identified by the prosecution witness as the killer of the deceased Julius
Cagampang;and
-in rejecting his defense of alibi.
Issue/s: Ruling:
• If Vincent Tremblor is guilty of murder • Yes
• WHEREFORE, the judge merit appealed from
is affirmed in all respects, except as to the
civil indemnity payable to the heirs of the
deceased Julius Cagampang which is
increased to P30.000.00.

• SO ORDERED.
Holding:
• The appeal deserves no merit.
• The minor inconsistencies in the testimony of the eyewitness Victorina Vda. de Cagampang did not
diminish her credibility, especially because she had positively identified the accused as her husbandÊs
assailant, and her testimony is corroborated by the other witnesses. Her testimony is credible, probable
and entirely in accord with human experience.
• Appellant’s self-serving and uncorroborated alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification made by
the prosecution witnesses who had no base motives to falsely accuse him of the crime.
• Furthermore, the rule is that in order for an alibi to be acceptable as a defense, it is not enough that the
appellant was somewhere else when the crime was committed; it must be demonstrated beyond doubt
that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.
• Appellant’s alleged lack of motive for killing Cagampang was rejected by the trial court which opined that
the defendant’s knowledge that Cagampang possessed a firearm was motive enough to kill him as killings
 perpetrated by members of the New People’s Army for the sole purpose of acquiring more arms and
ammunition for their group are prevalent not only in Agusan del Norte but elsewhere in the country.
• NPA’s “agaw armas” campaign.
• Article 248 of RPC “Murder”
Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder
and shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, if committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means
to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault
upon a streetcar or locomotive, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other
means involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake,
eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim or outraging or
scoffing at his person or corpse.

Note: Alibi cannot prevail against positive

identification by witnesses.
2.
Title: People v. Hassan Name of Digester: Jay Daniel T. Morales
G.R. No. L-68969 Date: January 22, Ponente: Sarmiento, J.
1988
Subject / Syllabus Topic: Persons responsible and conduct punished – Felonies and Crimes (Nature, Concept, Definition and
Elements)
Petitioner: People of the Philippines Respondent: Usman Hassan
Recit Summary: This is an appeal made by the accused Hassan before the court with regard to the decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City, which finds him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. The court
reversed the decision of the RTC on the ground that the defendant could still be a minor at the time he possibly committed the
crime and that there is unjust classification of the authorities with regard to their investigation of Hassan.
Facts:
● The respondent, Usman Hassan, was charged with the crime of murder for stabbing Ramon Pichel, Jr. in Zamboanga
City. Pichel was employed as a manager of the sand and gravel business of his father at the time of his death.
● Meanwhile, Hassan is just a 15-year old illiterate, poor and marginalized being, who works as a pushcart cargador.
● Hassan was convicted because of the testimony made by Jose Samson, who said that he was with the victim when he
died and claimed that he clearly remembered Hassan being the perpetrator along with the testimony of Police Corporal
Rogelio P. Carpio in their police investigation.
● Samson said that he was just selecting mangoes from a fruit stand when he saw Pichel being stabbed to his chest by
Hassan, who was alone at the scene of the crime according to him. After the gruesome incident, he responded by
quickly by bringing the victim to a nearby hospital but to no avail when the latter died minutes later.
Issue/s: Ruling:
1.) Whether or not the RTC erred in finding Hassan guilty 1. Yes
beyond reasonable doubt with the crime of murder?
WHEREFORE, the decision is hereby REVERSED, and
the accused Usman Hassan y Ayun is ACQUITTED of the
crime charged. His release from confinement is hereby
Ordered, unless he is held for another legal cause. With
costs de oficio.
Holding:
• Yes. The RTC committed an error in finding Hassan liable with the crime of murder since he was unjustly investigated
by the police and that his conviction mainly involves the testimony of Samson along with the Police’s report as testified
by Police Corporal Carpio on the matter. There is also no motive on the part of the accused to commit such crime
given his poor status.
• To support that, Hassan was just presented alone to Jose Samson by the police investigator and prosecution witness,
Police Corporal Carpio along with his police companions, at the office of the La Merced Funeral Homes in Zamboanga
City. This confrontation that was made by the People between Hassan and Samson is a clear violation of the right of
the latter to counsel in all stages of the investigation provided to him under the Constitution into the commission of a
crime specifically the part in which the accused is identified.
• Moreover, there are probable causes that Hassan would not be able to commit such a crime since he was not near in
the scene of the crime in him being 100 to 150 meters away, and that a man named Benhar Isa, was found to be the
more likely suspect in the murder of Pitchel. This is based on the resolution from a separate case made by Fiscal Murillo
of a similar stabbing incident that Isa clearly committed at a Plaza near the area where the victim was killed. In addition,
the medical expert from the NBI found that he was not just stabbed once in the chest but also in his left arm.
• The court also found that the knife that Hassan brought with him at the time where he was arrested was not tainted
with blood nor it involved any trace of the victim’s specimen so this is just another basis of the flawed procedure and
judgment that was rendered to the accused.
• Lastly, Hassan could just be between the ages of 14 to 21 at the time when he allegedly committed the crime based on
the dentist’s tests of his physical stature. In addition, the presumption of guilt rests with the prosecution on proving
such because every person is presumed innocent until proven otherwise in which the court did not find to be the case
with the accused herein.

Notes: Uncounseled confessions should be excluded from evidence. (People vs. Opida, 142 SCRA 295.) Convictions should be
based on actual commission of crimes not appearance of the accused who bore tattoos in his body. (People vs. Opida, 142 SCRA
295.)
3.
People vs. Delim Name of Digester: BIANCA

G.R. No. 142773 Date: January 28, 2003 Ponente: Callejo, Sr., J.

Subject / Syllabus Topic: Felonies & Crimes; Nature, Concept, Definition, & Elements

Petitioner: People of the Philippines Respondent: Marlon Delim, Leon Delim, Manuel
Delim

Doctrine:
1. Conspiracy: There is a conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to
commit it.
a. Conspiracy must be proven with the same quantum of evidence as the felony itself, more
specifically by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
b. To establish conspiracy, it is not essential that there be proof as to the existence of a previous
agreement to commit a crime. It is sufficient if, at the time of the commission of the crime, the
accused had the same purpose and were united with its execution.
“The act of one is deemed the act of all.”
2. Specific Intent:
a. It is used as a state of mind which exists where circumstances indicate that an offender actively
desired certain criminal consequences or objectively desire, a specific result to follow his act or
failure to act. Kidnapping and murder are specific intent crimes.
i. Murder: Specific intent is to kill the victim.
ii. Kidnapping: Specific intent is to deprive the victim of his/her liberty.
b. Specific intent is not synonymous with motive.
i. Motive is not an essential element of a crime and hence the prosecution need not prove the
same.

Facts:
Marlon, Manuel and Robert Delim are brothers. They are the uncles of Leon and Ronald. Modesto took the
surname Delim after he was adopted by the father of Marlon, Manuel and Robert. Modesto’s wife, Rita and 16-year
old son, Randy, continued using Bantas as their surname. Modesto and his family resided in Barangay Bila, Sison,
Pangasinan.
The three accused, Manuel and Robert, all surnamed Delim, were charged with the crime of MURDER of Modesto
Delim committed on January 23, 1999.
6:30PM of January 23, 1999
Modesto and his family were about to have dinner when Marlon, Robert and Ronald suddenly barged into
the house armed. Marlon poked his gun at Modesto while Robert and Ronald grabbed and hog-tied the
victim. A piece of cloth was placed in the mouth of Modesto. Marlon, Robert and Ronald herded Modesto
out of the house on their way towards the direction of Paldit, Pangasinan. Rita and Randy were warned by
the intruders not to leave the house. They were guarded by Leon and Manuel, who were also armed. Leon
and Manuel then left the house of Modesto at around 7:00AM the next day.
Right after they left, Randy rushed to the house of his uncle and informed him of the incident. They searched the
premises for Modesto but they were not successful in doing so. On January 26, 1999, Randy reported the incident
to the police.
January 27, 1999 at 3:00PM; Randy and his relatives searched the area of Paldit, Pangasinan and they were
successful in finding Modesto. However, he was found under the thick bushes in a grassy area and he was already
dead.
Rita and Randy cooperated with the police investigators. They mentioned the names and addresses of Marlon,
Ronald, Robert, Leon and Manuel. Stating that they are the people who are responsible for the death of Modesto.
All of the accused had their alibis. However, the Regional Trial Court found them all guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of murder.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the crime charged in the
Information is murder or kidnapping.
2. Whether or not the prosecution mustered the
requisite quantum of evidence to prove that
Marlon, Ronald and Leon are guilty of murder.
Ruling:
1. Murder, not Kidnapping
2. Yes.
APPELLANTS ARE GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE FELONY OF HOMICIDE (THE
DECISION OF THE LOWER COURTS WERE MODIFIED
TO LOWER THE CRIME FROM MURDER TO
HOMICIDE)

Holding:
1. They were charged with murder for the reason that it is evident that they all had specific intent to do the
act. In addition to that, under specific intent are murder and kidnapping. For murder, the specific intent is
to kill the victim. While for kidnapping, the specific intent is to deprive the victim of his/her liberty. With
what happened to Modesto, he was killed. Thus, murder is the crime to be charged for the accused.
2. Yes. The prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accused, but only for the crime of Homicide because
the prosecution failed to prove the element of treachery to make the crime murder. Also, the Court found
that Leon is a principal by direct participation, even if he did not participate in the killing of Modesto.
4.
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan Name of Digester: Khaila Palabrica
G.R. No. 148560 Date: November 19, 2001 Ponente: Bellosillo, J.

Subject / Syllabus Topic: II. A. Felonies & Crimes a. Nature, Concept, Definition, & Elements

Petitioner: Joseph Ejercito Estrada Respondent: Sandiganbayan (Third Division) and People of the
Philippines
Doctrine (if applicable):
- Statutes - The whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is predicated on the
basic principle that a legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony with the Constitution.
- Void-for-vagueness doctrine
o The void-for-vagueness doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly
stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with
sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is
prohibited by the statute - it can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly
vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction.
o A statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first
essential of due process of law.
- Overbreadth Doctrine; Facial Challenges; The allegations that the Plunder Law is vague and overbroad do
not justify a facial review of its validity.
o decrees that “a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.”
Facts:
- ESTRADA, the highest ranking official is being prosecuted under RA 7080.
- ESTRADA questions the constitutionality of RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder)
as amended by RA 7659 is constitutional, on the ground that it suffers from the vice of vagueness.
- Provisions that the petitioner claimed to have transgressed constitutional boundaries [Secs. 1, par. (d), 2
and 4]
o Section 1. x x x x (d)„Ill-gotten wealth‰ means any asset, property, business, enterprise or material
possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or
indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any
combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
o (1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the
public treasury;
o (2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any
other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any government
contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public office concerned;
o (3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or government owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
o (4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other
form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business
enterprise or undertaking;
o (5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or
implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests;
or
o (6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to
unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the
Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
o Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate
amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50.000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of
plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with
the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall
 likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation
and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances as provided by the Revised Penal
Code shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and
their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived
from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State (italics supplied).
o Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be
necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme
or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish
beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy (italics supplied).
Issue/s: Ruling:
- Whether or not the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague. - No.

Holding:
- The Court states that the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is
predicated on the basic principle that a legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony with the
Constitution.
- As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to
it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently
guide the judge in its application; the counsel, in defending one charged with its violation; and more
importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be understood
with little difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing or
accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts
enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the Plunder Law.
- We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous - as there is obviously none - that will
confuse petitioner in his defense. Although subject to proof, the factual assertions that ESTRADA clearly
committed acts of PLUNDER clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily understood and provide
adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions,
petitioner is completely informed of the accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for an
intelligent defense.
- There is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and every
word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so
define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law
so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly
expressed in the Plunder Law.
- Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in
their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the legislature
intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words. The intention of the lawmakers - who are,
ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers - to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is
always presumed.
- In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law, so
tenaciously claimed and argued at length by petitioner, is more imagined than real.

- PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended
by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
5.
People vs. Pabiona Pascual, Dawn
G.R. No. 145803 June 30, 2004 Ponente: Carpio-Morales, J.

Criminal law 1 / Felonies & Crimes: Nature, Concept, Definition, and Elements

Petitioner: People of the Philippines Respondent: Benjie Pabiona, Rosela Basalatan,

Antonio Silarca, Roberto Metano, and Christopher
Delos Reyes (still at large)
Recit Summary: The appellants in this case were charged with murder. They were alleged to have beaten up the
victim, causing physical injuries, which would lead to his death. Witnesses put out testimonies putting suspicion
onto the appellants of their actions that night. Appellants argue that the victim merely fell into a well by accident
causing his death. RTC convicted appellants. Appellants’ petition that they were not convicted beyond reasonable
doubt since the circumstantial was not strong to prove that. The Court would reverse and set aside the RTC
decision, acquitting the appellants, since there is still reasonable doubt. (circumstantial evidence not strong and
certain enough to prosecute them and they were lacking any motive)
Facts: On appeal is the decision of the Iloilo City RTC convicting Benjie Pabiona, Rosela Basalatan, Roberto Metano,
and Antonio Silarca of the crime of murder. It is alleged that the above-named accused conspired and mutually
helped each other to attack and assault Robert Pagayon with fist and kick blows and bamboo poles. The result of
which said victim suffered multiple physical injuries which caused his death afterwards. Appellants pleaded not
guilty to the offense charged.

Allegedy Pabiona asked for the labor of Pagayon to fix his well. The next morning they would find the victim’s body
which fell unto the said well. Pabiona would also be the one to bring the body of the victim to the victim’s mother,
with clean clothes and all and offering to pay for the funeral services. After suspicion from relatives, an autopsy was
done on the body which showed that the victim’s cause of death was cardiorespiratory arrest due to shock and
hemorrhage as a result of multiple traumatic injuries to the body. The main witnesses to the crime, cousins and
other close neighbors/relatives, said that they someone shout for help and one witness even claimed seeing
appellants beating up someone, presumed as Pagayon. The RTC convicted the appellants based on the
circumstantial evidence provided by the witnesses. Thus, this petition now by appellants to reverse such decision
since they weren’t convicted based on evidence beyond reasonable doubt.

Issue/s: Whether or not there is sufficient circumstantial Ruling: NO. WHEREFORE, the decision of the
evidence to sustain the trial court’s judgement finding RTC is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt Appellants Benjie Pabiona, Rosela Basalatan, and
Antonio Silarca are ACQUITTED of the charge of
murder on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Holding: Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue
may be established by inference. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if the following requisites are
complied with (1) there is more than one circumstance (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven (3) the combination of all circumstances warrant a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

The 3rd requisite is lacking in this case. The evidence does not rule out the possibility that there had only been an
accidental death. Hitting one’s head on a heard object such as an iron bar or shovel accidently slipping could
account for the fracture, blood clot and scalp hematoma found on the back of the victim’ head which, in turn, could
have cause hi death soon thereafter.

The basis of acquittal in this case is reasonable doubt, the evidence for the prosecution not being sufficient to
sustain and prove the guilt of appellants with moral certainty. By reasonable doubt is not meant that which of
possibility may arise but it is that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after
such an investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt. An acquittal based on reasonable doubt
will prosper even though the appellants’ innocence may be doubted, for a criminal conviction rests on the strength
of the evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the evidence of the defense.
6.
Title: People vs Carmen Name of Digester: Padillo
G.R. No 137268 Date: March 26, 2001 Ponente: Mendoza, J
Subject / Syllabus Topic: II. A. Felonies & Crimes b. Culpa and Dolo
Petitioner: People Respondent: Carmen
Doctrine (if applicable): Reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an
act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
Art. 365 of RPC - reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malic, doing or failing to do an act from
which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution.
United States vs. Divino - the accused, who was not an licensed physician, in an attempt to cure the victim of ulcers
in her feet, lighting her feet on fire, thereby causing injuries to the victim. The Court held the accused liable for
reckless imprudence resulting to injuries
Recit Summary: Eutiquia Carmen, Isabel Fabie, Delia Sibonga, Nonoy Sibonga, and Rey Nunez are found guilty of
murder to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua ruled by the trial court. The RTC on January 27, 1997 the
accused, conniving, and confederating together and mutually helping one another did then and inflict fatal
physical injuries on Randy Luntayao, which caused his death. Accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the
charged. The accused-appellants allege that trial court erred in convicting them of murder. SC affirms the ruling
of the RTC with modification that the accused-appellants are declared guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide.
Facts:
● Honey Fe’s testament: Saw Randy’s head being immersed in water, Sibonga banged the boy’s head against
the bench to which the boy was tied down. Carmen, Fabie, took turns pounding the boy’s chest. Carmen
then slowly plunged a knife on the side of the boy’s body. She saw all the accused carry the boy into the
house.
● Eddie Luntayao, father of the victim Randy who was 13 years old. According to Eddie, his son started
talking to himself and laughing. On Jan 26, 1997, upon the suggestion of Rey Nunez, Eddie and his wife
with their children went to Nunez in cebu. They went to the accused-appellant Carmen regarding his
son’s condition. Eddie was told his son was possessed by a “bad spirit” which Carmen claimed she could
exorcise. Eddie and his wife were locked inside a room in the house.
● A few hours later, accused-appellants carried Randy into the prayer room, Randy’s face was bluish and
contused with his tongue sticking out of his mouth. It was clear to Eddie his son was dead. He wanted to
see the body but was stopped from doing so by Carmen. Carmen asked her group to call the funeral
parlor since the child was dead.
● Dr Mendez, NBI medico-legal who conducted an autopsy on Randy, together with Eddie, exhumed the
body from Tangke Cemetery. Dr. Mendez testified victim’s contusion was caused by a hard blunt
instrument. He admitted he did not find a stab wound, but it could be due to the fact the cadaver was in
an advanced state of decomposition.
Issue/s: W/n petitioners are guilty of reckless imprudence Ruling: Yes, they are guilty of reckless
resulting in homicide and not of murder imprudence instead of homicide

Holding:
Art 365 of RPC as amended, states that reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or
failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution. The elements
of reckless imprudence are apparent in the acts done by the accused-appellants, which because of their lack of
medical skill in treating the victim of his alleged ailment, resulted in the latter’s death. Reckless imprudence
consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by
reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person. The facts of the case indubitably show the
absence of intent to kill of the accused-appellants. Treachery cannot be appreciated for in the absence of intent
to kill. The decision of the RTC is Affirmed with modification that accused-appellants are hereby declared guilty
of reckless imprudence.
Title: People vs Buan Name of Digester: Martin

G.R. No. L-25366 Date: March 29, 1968 Ponente: Reyes, J.B.L., Actg.
C.J.:
Subject / Syllabus Topic: Crim1/Culpa and Dolo

Petitioner: People of the Philippines Respondent: Jose Buan

Doctrine (if applicable):
- Criminal law and procedure; Double jeopardy; Quasi of-fense; Subsequent prosecution for the
same act.
- Acquittal from the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, a bar to
subsequent prosecution for serious physical injuries and damage to property through reckless
imprudence.
Recit Summary: The accused was driving a bus and collided with a passenger jeep due to bus driver’s
negligence and recklessness, injuring the passengers. A charge was filed for slight physical injuries in the
Justice of the Peace Court, where he was tried and acquitted. Accused was again charged with serious
physical injuries by the Court of First Instance. Accused moved to quash on the ground of he had already
been acquitted for the same offense. The motion was denied but was reversed in the ruling.
Facts:
- The accused was driving a passenger bus of the La Mallorca Company on July 23, 1962, along the
MacArthur Highway in Guiguinto, Bulacan. Allegedly because of his negligence and recklessness,
the vehicle driven by him collided with the passenger jeep of Sergio Lumidao, damaging said jeep
and causing it to turn turtle, and injuring its passengers. Six of the latter suffered slight physical
injuries requiring medical attendance for 5 to 9 days: three other riders came out with serious bodily
injuries that needed medical attention for 30 to 45 days; while the jeep was damaged to the extent
of P1,395.00.
- A charge was filed against the accused-appellant one for slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, in the Justice of the Peace Court, which he was tried and acquitted, and the Provincial
Fiscal of Bulacan filed in the Court of First Instance the information in the case now before us,
for serious physical injuries, and damage to property through reckless imprudence for the same
highway collision. Accused moved to quash the charges on the ground that he had already been
acquitted of the same offense by the Justice of the Peace Court but was denied by the Court.
Issue/s: Whether or not the second case placed the appellant twice in Ruling: WHEREFORE, the
jeopardy for the same offense, and is barred by the previous acquittal. order appealed from is reversed,
and the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan is directed to quash and
dismiss the charge in its Criminal
Case No. 5243. No costs. So
ordered.
Holding:
- Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless
imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the
quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the
execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a
felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of
the consequence is only considered to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of
the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person
or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same and cannot be split
into different crimes and prosecutions.
8.
Reodica vs. Court of Appeals Name of Digester: Sison
G.R. No: 125066 Date: July 8, 1998 Ponente: Davide, Jr., J.

Subject / Syllabus Topic: Felonies & Crimes: Culpa and Dolo

Petitioner: Isabelita Reodica Respondent: Court of Appeals, and People of the

Philippines
Facts:
1. [October 17, 1987] petitioner, who was driving a van, hit the car of complainant Norberto Bonsol.
Complainant sustained physical injuries and his car was damaged.
2. Three days later, complainant filed an affidavit of Complaint against petitioner with the Fiscal’s
Office.
3. [January 13, 1988] information was filed before Makati RTC charging petitioner with “Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight Physical Injury.”
4. [January 31, 1991] RTC convicted the petitioner of the quasi offense of reckless imprudence resulting
in damage to property with slight physical injuries.
5. Petitioner appealed to the CA, which affirmed the appealed decision.
6. After filing a Motion for Reconsideration on several supposed errors (see holding) and having it
denied, we have the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Relevant Issue/s: Ruling:

a. Are the quasi-offenses of reckless - Petition granted, CA decision is set aside as the
imprudence resulting in damage to RTC who issued the affirmed decision had no
property / reckless imprudence jurisdiction.
resulting in slight physical injuries light - Criminal case is ordered dismissed.
felonies?
Holding:
- Petitioner avers that the courts below should have pronounced that there were two separate light
felonies involved, namely:
(1) reckless imprudence with slight physical injuries; and
(2) reckless imprudence with damage to property, instead of considering them a complex crime.

- Reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is punishable by public censure only. Article
9, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code defines light felonies as infractions of law carrying the
penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200.00, or both. Since public censure is classified
under Article 25 of the Code as a light penalty, and is considered under Article 71 of the RPC as a
penalty lower than arresto menor, it follows that the offense of reckless imprudence resulting in
slight physical injuries is a light felony.

On the other hand, reckless imprudence also resulting in damage to property is, as earlier discussed,
penalized with arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Since arresto mayor is a
correctional penalty under Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code, the quasi offense in question is a less
grave felony - not a light felony as claimed by petitioner.

Note:
- The issue here in the context of the topic is how culpa (in specific a wrongful act resulting in
imprudence) can result in different effects and different punishments. The same act of imprudence
resulted in a light felony and also a less grave felony (with different punishments)
9.
Title: Lontok, Jr. v. Gorgonio Name of Digester: Sabayle
G.R. No L-37396 Date: April 30, 1979 Ponente: Aquino, J

Subject / Syllabus Topic: Culpa and Dolo – Felonies and Crimes

Petitioner: Marcelino Lontok, Jr. Respondent: Gorgonio

Doctrine (if applicable):

Complex Crime – when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies or when a grave or less grave
offense is a means of committing another grave or less grave offense

Article 48 of the RPC – if one offense is light, there is no complex crime.

Lesiones leves – light injuries

Facts:
This case is about the propriety of an information containing the charge of “reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property and multiple physical injuries.” On November 14, 1972, it was alleged that while Lontok was
recklessly driving his Mercedes Benz car, he bumped a passenger jeep and caused damage to it in the sum of P780
and that the juries to three passengers who were incapacitated from performing their customary labor for a
period of less than ten days. Lontok filed a motion to quash contending that the offense of lesiones leves through
reckless imprudence prescribes in two months and it had already prescribed. The municipal trial court, however,
denied the motion but the Solicitor General agrees with Lontok’s view that the light offense had already
prescribed and that two informations should have been filed.
Issue/s: Ruling:
Whether Lontok, over his objection, can be tried by the No. He can only be charged with damage to
municipal court on an information charging the complex crime property through reckless imprudence.
of damage to property in the sum of P780 and lesiones leves
through reckless imprudence
Holding:
Lontok can only be tried for damage to property through reckless imprudence, which, being punished by a
maximum fine of P2340, a correctional penalty, a less grave felony. As such, it cannot be complexed with the light
offense of lesiones leves through reckless imprudence since it had already prescribed. Commonwealth Act No.
4000 amended Article 48 of the RPC by substituting the words “grave or less grave felonies” for the word “crimes”.
Meaning, it now eliminates a light felony as a component part of a complex crime. Under Article 48, if one offense
is light, there is no complex crime.
10.
Title: People of the Philippines v. Guillermo Name of Digester: Celina Gonzales
Nepomuceno
G.R. No. 127818 Date: November 11, 1998 Ponente: MELO, J.

Subject / Syllabus Topic: Criminal Law 1/Felonies and Crimes: Culpa and Dolo

Plaintiff-Appellee: People of the Philippines Defendant-Appellee: Guillermo Nepomuceno, Jr.

Doctrine:
Article 3. Definitions. - Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos).
Felonies are committed not only be means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa).
There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent and there is fault when the wrongful act results
from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
Facts:
• Guillermo assaulted his wife Grace Nepomuceno, whom he eventually fatally shot. Upon arraignment,
Guillermo pleaded not guilty.
• Eden Otong, the housemaid, stated that Guillermo Nepomuceno arrived drunk and went to the bedroom
where she and the couple’s one-year old son were sleeping. She was awakened by the spouses who were
arguing. She saw Guillermo get a gun from a drawer. Moments later, she heard a gunshot.
• Mary Ann T. Aranas declared that Grace’s hands were negative of nitrates but found that Guillermo’s right
hand was positive. Thus, she opined that Guillermo indeed fired a gun.
• Dr. Floresto Arizala, Jr. found that the victim died due to a gunshot wound. He declared that the muzzle of
the gun could not have been less than one foot drom the victim.
• Monserrat de Leon declared that Grace would confide to her that Guillermo was jobless and had problems
with her low income in her store. Furthermore, he would force sex on Grace especially when he was drunk.
• However, the defense’s lone witness testified that the couple argued about their financial issues and that
Guillermo intended to end his life.
Issue/s: Ruling:
Did Guillermo intend to kill Grace? 1. YES
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision convicting accused-
appellant Guillermo Nepomuceno, Jr. of the crime of
Parricide and is hereby AFFIRMED with slight
modification that his sentence shall be simply reclusion
perpetua, not “imprisonment of 40 years of reclusion
perpetua.”
Holding:
• The fact that the victim was not shot in any vital body part of her body does not negate intent to kill. The
extent of the physical injuries inflicted on Grace manifested intent his intent to kill her.
• The fact that Grace did not use harsh language upon Guillermo does not negate intent to kill. The utterance
of a victim made immediately after sustaining serious injuries may be considered as pure emanations of
the incident speaking through the victim.
• The act of bringing Grace to the hospital was an indication of repentance on his part.
11.
Title: U.S. v. Ah Chong Name of Digester: Barcelon
G.R. No. 5272 Date: March 19, 1910 Ponente: Carson, J.
Subject / Syllabus Topic: CRIM 1/ Effect of Mistake of Fact on Liability
Petitioner: United States Respondent: : Ah Chong
Doctrine: No criminal liability shall be incurred if the ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or
bad faith.
Recit Summary:
• A man accidentally kills his roommate after mistaking him for an intruder. He now faces murder charges.

Facts:
• Defendant was a cook and the deceased was a house boy, and both were employed in the same place and
usually slept in the same room.
• One night, after the defendant had gone to bed, he was awakened by some one trying to open the door,
and called out twice, "Who is there?"
• He received no answer, and fearing that the intruder was a robber, leaped from the bed and again called
out: "If you enter the room I will kill you."
• At that moment he was struck by a chair which had been placed against the door. Believing that he was
being attacked, he seized a kitchen knife and struck and fatally wounded the intruder, who turned out to
be his roommate.
• Thereupon he called to his employers and rushed back into the room to secure bandages to bind up the
wound.
• Defendant was charged with murder.
Issue/s: Ruling:
• Can a person can be held criminally responsible • No
when, by reason of a mistake of facts, he does an
act for which he would be exempt if the facts
were as he supposed them to be, but would
constitute murder if he had known the true state
of facts at the time
Holding:
• There is no criminal liability, provided that the ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or
bad faith.
• If such ignorance or mistake of facts is sufficient to negative a particular intent which, under the law, is a
necessary ingredient of the offense charged it destroys the presumption of intent and works an acquittal;
except in those cases where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions governing
negligence, and in cases where, under the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code, a person voluntarily
committing an act incurs criminal liability even though the act be different from that which he intended to
commit.
Opinion/s:
TORRES, J., dissenting: While the act was done without malice or criminal intent it was, however, executed with
real negligence. The acts committed by the deceased could not warrant the aggression by the defendant under
the erroneous belief on the part of the accused that the person who assaulted him was a malefactor; the
defendant therefore incurred responsibility in attacking with a knife the person who was accustomed to enter
said room, without any justifiable motive.
12.
Title: People v. Oanis Name of Digester: Nieto
G.R. No L-47722 Date: July 27,1943 Ponente: Moran, J.:

Subject / Syllabus Topic: Criminal Law I / II. A. Felonies & Crimes b. Culpa and Dolo 5. Effect of
Mistake of Fact on Liability
Petitioner: People of the Philippines Respondent: Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto
Galanta
Doctrine (if applicable):
If there is an innocent mistake of fact committed without any fault or carelessness because the accused,
having no time or opportunity to make a further inquiry, and being pressed by circumstances to act
immediately, had no alternative but to take the facts as they then appeared to him, and such facts
justified his act of killing.
Facts:
• Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija,
received from Major Guido a telegram of the following tenor: "Information received escaped
convict Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get him dead or alive." Captain
Monsod accordingly called for his first sergeant and asked that he be given four men.
• They were instructed to arrest Balagtas and, if overpowered, to follow the instruction contained
in the telegram. The same instruction was given to the chief of police Oanis who was likewise
called by the Provincial Inspector.
• The Provincial Inspector divided the party into two groups with defendants Oanis and Galanta
taking the route leading to the house of a bailarina named Irene, where Balagtas was believed to
be staying.
• Upon arrival at the place where Irene could be found, Oanis approached and asked Brigada
Mallare where Irene's room was. Brigada indicated the room and said that Irene was sleeping
with her paramour.
• Defendants Oanis and Galanta then went to the room of Irene, and an seeing a man sleeping
with his back towards the door where they were, simultaneously or successively fired at him
with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers. Awakened by the gunshots, Irene saw her paramour
already wounded, and looking at the door where the shots came, she saw the defendants still
firing at him. Shocked by the entire scene. Irene fainted; it turned out later that the person shot
and killed was not the notorious criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a peaceful and innocent citizen
named Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour.
Issue/s: Ruling:
-Whether or not the defendants are criminally liable for -Yes.
the death of Serapio Tecson
Holding:
If a person acted in innocent mistake of fact in the honest performance of his official duties, then he
incurs no criminal liability. Nonetheless, the maxim ignorantia facti excusat, applies only when the
mistake is committed without fault or carelessness. In the instant case, the defendants found no
circumstances whatsoever which would press them to immediate action, as the person in the room
being then asleep would give them ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity. Moreover, they
were instructed not to kill Balagtas at sight but to arrest him, and to get him dead or alive only if
resistance or aggression is offered by him. Thus, the crime committed by defendants was not merely
criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and not accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury
caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed without
malice.
Two (2) requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying one:
1. Offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right (Present)
2. Injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty
or the lawful exercise of such right or office. (Not present)
Separate Opinions:
Paras,J. dissenting
In view of said order and the danger faced by the appellants in carrying it out, they cannot be said to
have acted feloniously in shooting the person honestly believed by them to be the wanted man.
Conscious of the fact that Balagtas would rather kill than be captured, the appellants did not want to
take chances and should not be penalized for such prudence. On the contrary, they should be
commended for their bravery and courage bordering on recklessness because, without knowing or
ascertaining whether the wanted man was in fact asleep in his room, they proceeded thereto without
hesitation and thereby exposed their lives to danger.
Hontiveros,J. dissenting
According to the opinion of the majority, it is proper to follow the rule that a notorious criminal "must
be taken by storm without regard to his life which he has, by his conduct, already forfeited," whenever
said criminal offers resistance or does something which places his captors in danger of imminent attack.
Precisely, the situation which confronted the accused-appellants Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta
in the afternoon of December 24, 1938, was very similar to this.
It was unfortunate, however, that an innocent man was actually killed. But taking into consideration
the facts of the case, it is, according to my humble opinion, proper to apply herein the doctrine laid down
in the case of U. S. vs. Ah Chong (15 Phil., 488). In the instant case we have, as in the case supra, an
innocent mistake of fact committed without any fault or carelessness on the part of the accused, who,
having no time to make a further inquiry, had no alternative but to take the facts as they appeared to
them and act immediately.
13.
Title: People v. Nunag Name of Digester: Geronilla
G.R. No. 54445 Date: May 12, Ponente: Padilla, J.
1989
Subject / Syllabus Topic: Persons Criminally Liable: Direct Participation

Plaintiff-Appellee: People of The Philippines Accused-Appellants: Mario Nunag, Arnel Mandap, alias “Bubot”,
Efren Salangsang, Danilo Carpio, and Diosdado Manalili
Facts:
• Accused-appellants Nunag, Mandap, Salangsang, Carpio, and Manalili were charged before the CFI of
Pampanga with the crime of Rape. All contrary to law, and with aggravating circumstances that the said
offense was committed at night time.
• The complainant, Lorenza Lopez, then about fifteen (15) years old, declared that on May 1978, she was
watching a television program in the house of her neighbor when she saw the accused Mario Nunag
coming towards her to go with him. She refused to go with Nunag, but he held her by the hand and poked
a knife at her stomach and threatened to kill her. Thereafter, they were joined by the other accused who
held her feet and forced her on the ground. She struggled to free herself from them, but the accused held
her tightly.
• Mario Nunag then undressed her and had sexual intercourse with her, at the same time fondling her
breasts. She felt pain in her vagina. After Mario Nunag had finished, Arnel Mandap followed. After Arnel
Mandap had finished, she lost consciousness and regained it while Diosdado Manalili was abusing her.
• The five accused warned her not to report the incident to anybody, otherwise, they would kill her, her
parents and brothers. After the incident, the complainant missed her menstruation when it became due
and noticed that her stomach was getting bigger which her mother noticed but she did not tell anybody
at first. She then gave birth prematurely to female twins who both died after a few hours.
• Upon investigation, the accused-appellant Mario Nunag and two others accused admitted having sexual
intercourse with the complainant on three separate instances, however, they denied the charge of rape.
They also alleged that it was the complainant who came to them asking for money in return of the “favor”.
The accused-appellants, Carpio and Mandap denied having sexual intercourse with her at any time.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the accused should be guilty of 5 counts of rape by virtue of conspiracy existing among them.
Holding:
• The Solicitor General recommends that each accused be found guilty of five distinct crimes of rape,
because each accused is responsible, not only for the act of rape committed individually by him, but also
for the act of rape committed by the others, all accused having conspired together.
• However, that there is no conclusive evidence that the accused-appellants Carpio and Salangsang had
sexual intercourse with the complainant, since the complainant said that she lost consciousness after the
second man had sexually abused her.
• Each of the five (5) accused-appellants must be found guilty of three (3) district and separate crimes of
rape, the first three, namely, Mario Nunag, Arnel Mandap and Diosdado Manalili, by direct act and
participation and the other two, namely Danilo Carpio and Efren Salangsang, by indispensable
cooperation.
• Accused-appellants Mario Nunag, Arnel Mandap, and Efren Salangsang are each sentenced to suffer three
penalties of reclusion perpetua.
• Accused-appellants Diosdado Manalili and Danilo Carpio, both being above sixteen years and below
eighteen years at the time of the commission of the offenses, are each sentenced to suffer three (3)
indeterminate penalties of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, and seventeen (17) years and four
(4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
14.
Title: PEOPLE v. DE LA CERNA Name of Digester: YDP
No. L-20911 Date: October 30, 1967 Ponente: Bengzon, J.P., J.

Subject / Syllabus Topic: Criminal/Persons Criminally Liable: By Direct Participation

Petitioner: The People of the Philippines Respondent: Sulpicio de la Cerna, Serapio Maquiling,
Teodoro Libumfacil, Godofredo Rotor, Severino
Mochoco and Antonio Bautista
Doctrine:
The presence and actual participation of some of the appellants in the meeting for the plan of murdering the victim
held them liable as principals even though they were not the one who killed the victim. In addition to this, they
were present and zealously helped in the execution of the criminal design when they carried and supplied carbine
magazines to other appellants and gave encouragement to Sulpicio to kill the Rafael.

Facts:
• Appellants were indicted by the provincial fiscal of Cotabato for double murder for the fatal shooting of
father and son Rafael and Casiano Cabizares. All pleaded not guilty.
• Convicted for the murder of Rafael Cabizares were Sulpicio de la Cerna and Serapio Maquiling, as
principals, and Godofredo Rotor, Antonio Bautista, Severino Matchoca and Teodoro Libumfacil, as
accomplices.
• For the murder of Casiano Cabizares, the court convicted Sulpicio de la Cerna and Serapio Maquiling as
principals, and Ramon Alquizar as accessory.
• The accused appealed. They assailed the lower court for relying on the prosecution witnesses whom gave
the following narration:
Ø Rafael Cabizares, together with his two brothers and son(Gumercindo) carried sacks of corn to a
hill. On top of that hill is Sulpicio de la Cerna’s house. When Rafael reached the top of the hill,
Sulpicio shot Rafael. Sulpicio then ordered to burn his house so that there would be an excuse.
Rafael was brought to his father’s house which was 100m away from Sulpicio’s house. Sulpicio
together with his people arrived at the premises and shot the house. Serapio Maquiling went inside
the house through a window and shot Casiano Cabizares while Sulpicio went to Rafael and once
again shot him. Their bodies were put in Sulpicio’s burning house.
Ø A land dispute arose between Rafael and some of the accused that may be the reason of the murder.
• Sulpicio’s version of what happened:
Ø Rafael Cabizares, who was heavily armed together with this people went to Sulpicio’s house and
demanded a confrontation with Sulpicio. Rafael threw a cane at Sulpicio and ordered to burn
Sulpicio’s house. Sulpicio ordered Guillermo Eseranza to fire at Rafael and his people for self-
defense. Rafael and Casiano was shot. Rafael fled. When Rafael saw the policemen, he surrendered
himself.
• Sulpicio’s version cannot be used because it contradicts the autopsy. There was also no cane or signs of
aggression found in Sulpicio’s house.
• Witness Maximo Caña testified that he was in the meeting of February 2, 1958, in the house of Andres Abapo
for the plan to kill Rafael Cabizares. He said that both Rafael Cabizares and Serapio Maquiling signified their
willingness to execute it.
• One year and ten months later Maximo retracted from his testimony, explaining that he was paid to lie.
Issue/s: Ruling:
Are all the appellants liable for the death of Rafael and Sulpicio de la Cerna, Godofredo Rotor, Antonio
Casiano Cabizares? Bautista, Severino Matchoca, and Teodoro Libumfacil
are found guilty as principals for the murder of Rafael
Cabizares.

Appellant Sulpicio de la Cerna is hereby acquitted for

the murder of Casiano Cabizares.
Holding:
• Cana’s first testimony withstood a long and thorough cross-examination which could not have been so, if
the story were merely fabricated. On the other hand, in his subsequent testimony, Cana was evasive and
most of his answers were: “I don’t remember” or “I don’t know”. Cana’s second testimony with not be used.
• Appellant Sulpicio contends that the first shot, fired by him, was not attended with treachery since there
is evidence that Rafael was warned by his son Gumercindo, just before he was hit in the lower abdomen.
The second shot, by Serapio Maquiling, was definitely treacherously fired since Rafael was then in the third
room of Demetrio’s house, wounded and defenseless. And the third shot, fired by Sulpicio, was
treacherously done. Rafael was then flat on the floor and although still alive, was completely defenseless,
having been shot twice already. The Court concludes that the killing of Rafael Cabizares was attended by
treachery.
• Shooting Rafael three times overtly show appellant’s determination to end Rafael’s life. The killing,
therefore, was properly qualified as murder
• In addition, there being a previous direct conspiracy one day before the killing, evident premeditation is
duly established.

• However, appellant Sulpicio cannot be held liable for the killing of Casiano Cabizares. That co-conspirators
are liable only for acts done pursuant to the conspiracy. There is no evidence at all that Sulpicio was aware
Serapio would use the rifle to kill Casiano. Sulpicio, therefore, must be acquitted for the killing of Casiano
Cabizares.
• Appellants Godofredo Rotor, Antonio Bautista, Severino Matchoca and Teodoro Libumfacil all put up alibi
as their defense. The trial court rejected the alibi.
• Their presence and active participation in the meeting in Abapo’s house made them actual conspirators
in the killing of Rafael. They were also present and zealously participating in the execution of their criminal
design, giving a carbine magazine and instructions to appellant Rotor, threatening Rafael and giving
encouragement to Sulpicio to shoot at the latter. They were among those who laid siege to Demetrio’s
house and left together with the others after finally accomplishing their criminal deeds as agreed upon.
• The aggravating circumstance of treachery, applicable against appellant Sulpicio de la Cerna only, is offset
by his voluntary surrender after the incident. This does not benefit the remaining appellants who did not
voluntarily surrendered.
15.
Title: People v. Doria Name of Digester: PRE
G.R. No 221067 Date: January 22, 1999 Ponente: Puno, J.

Subject / Syllabus Topic: Persons Criminally Liable a) i) (1) By Direct Participation

Petitioner: People of the Philippines Respondent: Florencio Doria y Bolado and Violeta
Gaddao y Catama
Facts:
- Florencio Doria Bolado (Jun) and Violeta Gaddao Catama (Neneth) were charged in violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 after they were found “willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously selling,
administering, delivering and giving away 11 plastic bags of marijuana fruiting tops weighing 7,641.08
grams.”
- The police, however, provided a different statement of the arrest compared to Jun and Neneth’s.
- Police: Jun sold them a kilo of marijuana for P1,000. But upon arrest, the marked money was not in his
possession. Claiming that he left the money with his associate (Neneth), Jun led them to her house. They
found the house open. Standing by the door, a police officer noticed a carton box under the dining table.
He saw one of the flaps open and inside the box was something wrapped in plastic similar to the marijuana
sold by Jun. He then proceeded to enter the house, peeked inside the boxed, and confirmed his suspicion
that the box, in fact, contains marijuana leaves. Simultaneous to the discovery, a different police officer
recovered the marked bills from Neneth.
- Accused statement: Police knocked on Jun’s house looking for “Totoy.” Following his denial, the police
went inside his house and accused him of being a pusher. Eventually, Jun agreed to point them to Totoy’s
house. A police officer opened the door and his companions entered and looked around for three minutes.
Neneth then came in carrying a pail of water from the well. She also denied knowing where her husband
Totoy is. The police them claimed that they have found a box inside then Neneth saw that there was, in
fact, an opened box on top of the table. The police then ordered Jun and Neneth to go with them to the
police station where they were investigated.
Issue/s: Ruling:
- Are both Jun and Neneth guilty in violation of the - No. Only Jun was sentenced to reclusion perpetua
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972? while Neneth was acquitted.

Holding:
- The crime is mala prohibita as it condemns behavior directed not against particular individual but against
public order. Violation is wrong against society as a whole and is generally unattended with any particular
harm to a definite person.
- Sorrels v US: Entrapment is the conception and planning of an offense by an officer and his procurement
of its commission by one who would not have perpetrated it except for the trickery, persuasion or fraud of
an officer. It has two elements: (a) persuasion, trickery of fraud by officers and (b) origin of criminal design
in the minds of officials rather than innocent defendant. Entrapment is not contrary to public policy
- Instigation, on the other hand, happens when an officer practically induces the would-be accused in to the
commission of the offense and himself becomes a co-principal. Initially, an accused has the burden of
providing sufficient evidence that the government induced him to commit the offense. Once established,
the burden shifts to the government to show otherwise.
- To determine whether there is entrapment or instigation, our courts mainly examined the conduct of the
apprehending officers, not only the predisposition of the accused to commit crime. However, examining
the conduct of the police should not disable the courts into ignoring the accused’s predisposition to
commit crime (habitual delinquency, recidivism, plain criminal proclivity)
- The warrantless arrest of Doria is not unlawful. Warrantless arrests are allowed if: (a) person is actually
committing or attempting to commit an offense; (b) offense has just been committed and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; (c) when the person to be
arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment where he is serving final judgment or
where he is temporarily confined or if he escaped while being transferred
- When an accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation, the police are not
only authorized but also duty-bound to arrest him even without warrant.
- Neneth, however, was not caught red-handed during the buy bust operation. She was not committing any
crime that would justify her arrest in “hot pursuit” as she was merely doing her daily chores when the
policemen pounced on her. She can only be arrested on the basis of personal knowledge of facts in arrests
 with warrant based upon “probable cause” which means an “actual belief or reasonable grounds of
suspicion.” The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting
officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense based on
actual facts. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause coupled with good faith
on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.
- Jun did not point to Neneth as an associate in the drug business but rather as a person with whom he left
the marked bills. This identification does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Jun and Neneth
conspired to push drugs.
- Since Neneth’s arrest is illegal, it follows that the search of her home, and subsequent seizure of marked
bills and marijuana cannot be deemed legal as an incident to arrest.
- The fact that the box containing 6 kilos of marijuana was found in Neneth’s house does not justify a finding
that she herself is guilty of the crime charged, doing so will be a blatant violation of her rights.
- What is material is the submission of proof that the sale took place between the poseur-buyer and the
seller thereof and the presentation of the drug as evidence in court. The prosecution has clearly
established that in consideration of P1,600 which he received, Jun sold and delivered 970 grams of
marijuana to police poseur buyer. The prosecution however failed to prove that Neneth conspired with Jun
in the sale of the drug. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the lower penalty of
reclusion perpetua must be imposed.
- Jun is to serve reclusion perpetua plus a fine of P500,000 while Neneth is acquitted.
Notes:
RA 6425 Dangerous Drug Act amended by Section 14 or RA 7659 punishes the sale, administration, delivery,
distribution, and transportation of prohibited drug with penalty of reclusion perpetua to death fine from P5000 to
P10 million.
16.
Title: People vs. Yanson-Dumancas Name of Digester: Fred Bucu
G.R. No 133527-28 Date: December 13, 1999. Ponente:
Subject / Syllabus Topic: II. D. Persons Criminally Liable a) i) (1) By Inducement

Petitioner: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Respondent: JEANETTE YANSON-DUMANCAS

ET AL.
Doctrine (if applicable): RPC ART 17

Recit Summary: Acting upon the alleged inducement of spouses Jeanette and Charles Dumancas, under the direction
cooperation and undue influence, exerted by P/Col. Nicolas Torres, taking advantage of his position as the Station
Commander of the PNP, with the direct participation and cooperation of other Police Inspectors, concurring and affirming
in the said criminal design, with the use of motor vehicle abduct, kidnap and detain Danilo Lumangyao and Rufino Gargar
Jr. Afterbwhich, shot and killed the said victims, while being handcuffed and blindfolded. One of the accused, namely Pecha,
did then and there secretly buried the corpse in a shallow grave. Trial Court affirmed their convictions. The accused-
appellants then filed for their appeal. Supreme Court decides that Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas, Adonis Abeto, and Nicolas
Torres not guilty. Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas is not guilty on the grounds that the record is entirely bereft of any evidence
to show that Jeanette directly forced the participants of the said meeting to come up with such plan, by either using
irresistible force or causing uncontrollable fear. Abeto was never part of the conspiracy to abduct and liquidate the two
victims. Torres passed away during the pendency of the appeal. The Court acquits Yanson-Dumancas, Abeto, and Torress,
but the other accused-appellants are given the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Facts:

After Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas was swindled in a fake gold bar transaction by Danilo Lumangyao and Rufino
Gargas, Jr. on February 1992, Mario Lamis brought out the plan to abduct Lumangyao and Gargar on August 5, 1992.
Acting upon the alleged inducement of spouses Jeanette and Charles Dumancas, under the direction cooperation and undue
influence, exerted by P/Col. Nicolas Torres, taking advantage of his position as the Station Commander of the PNP, with
the direct participation and cooperation of other Police Inspectors, concurring and affirming in the said criminal design,
with the use of motor vehicle abduct, kidnap and detain Rufino Gargar Jr., with evident premeditation and treachery,
nocturnity, and the use of motor vehicle, did then and there shot and kill the said victim, while being handcuffed and
blindfolded; that accused did then and there secretly bury the corpse in a shallow grave or the purpose of concealing the
crime of murder in order to prevent its discovery.

1. In CRIMINAL CASE NO. 94-15562, each of the Accused charged as principal is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua, with all the accessories of the law; to indemnify, jointly and severally, the Heirs of Rufino Gargar
Jr.

2. In CRIMINAL CASE NO. 94-15563, each of the Accused charged as principal is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua, with all the accessories of the law, indemnify jointly and severally, the Heirs of Danilo Lumangyao.
Issue/s: Ruling:
- W/N sufficient evidence was adduced by the prosecution to - Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas and Adonis Abeto are
prove beyond reasonable doubt that Jeanette indeed performed ACQUITTED and released from detention. Case and
any of the ff. acts a) directly forcing the killers to commit the crime, appeal of Nicolas Torres is DISMISSED by reason of
or b) directly inducing them to commit the crime his death. The convictions of all other accused-
appellants are AFFIRMED by means of
RECLUSION PERPETUA. Cesar Pecha’s conviction
is MODIFIED to an indeterminate prison term.
Holding:
1. Article 17, Revised Penal Code, provides: The following are considered principals: (i) Those who take a direct part
in the execution of the act; (ii) Those who directly force or induce others to commit it; and (iii) Those who cooperate
in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have been accomplished.
2. What the Court now has to examine is whether or not sufficient evidence was adduced by the prosecution to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that Jeanette indeed performed any of the following acts: (a) directly forcing the killers to
commit the crime, or (b) directly inducing them to commit the crime.
3. There are 2 ways of directly forcing another to commit a crime, namely: (i) by using irresistible force, or (ii) by
causing uncontrollable fear. Upon review of the testimony of all the witnesses of the prosecution, we find nothing to
conclude that Jeanette used irresistible force or caused uncontrollable fear upon the other accused-appellants.
4. The record is entirely bereft of any evidence to show that Jeanette directly forced the participants of the said meeting
to come up with such plan, by either using irresistible force or causing uncontrollable fear. The only basis relied
upon by the trial court in arriving at its conclusion that Jeanette is guilty of the crime as principal by inducement,
is the supposed “commands” or order given by her to accused-appellant Geroche.
5. Likewise, there are 2 ways of directly inducing another to commit a crime, namely: (i) by giving a price, or
offering reward or promise, and (ii) by using words of command. The Court finds no evidence, as did the trial court, to
show that Jeanette offered any price, reward, or promise to the rest of accused-appellants should they abduct and
later kill the victims in this case.
6. By the foregoing standards, the remark of Jeanette to “take care of the two” does not constitute the
command required by law to justify a finding that she is guilty as a principal by inducement.
7. In the case at bar, the abduction, which is an essential element of the crime charged (kidnapping for ransom with
murder) has already taken place when Jeanette allegedly told accused-appellant Geroche to “take care of the two.”
Said utterance could, therefore, not have been the inducement to commit the crime charged in this case.
17.
Title: PEOPLE vs. BOLIVAR Name of Digester: Michael Castillo
G.R. No. 108174 Date: October 28, 1999 Ponente: GONZAGA-REYES, J.

Subject / Syllabus Topic: Principals: By Inducement

Petitioner: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Respondent: CRESENCIANO CANAGURAN, GRACIANO BOLIVAR,
JOEL SOBERANO, RENATO BALBON and DIOSDADO BARRION
Doctrine (if applicable):
RPC, Art. 17
Facts:
• Cresenciano Canaguran (CANAGURAN), Graciano Bolivar (BOLIVAR), Joel Soberano (SOBERANO), Renato
Balbon (BALBON) and Diosdado Barrion (BARRION) were charged with the complex crime of murder and
frustrated murder against victim, Hugo Callao (CALLAO)
• On February 14, 1987, at around 9:00 o’clock in the evening, Damaso Suelan, Jr., along with a friend, Rolly
Brendia by the store of Rodney Balaito. Inside the store, present were Rodney Balaito, the storeowner, and
the victim, CALLAO, and the other persons already drinking inside, namely, accused BALBON, BOLIVAR,
SOBERANO, and CANAGURAN. A certain Quirino arrived carrying with him a .12 gauge pistolized firearm
which he handed to accused CANAGURAN, after which, Quirino went home. A little later, the accused
SOBERANO, BOLIVAR, BALBON and CANAGURAN asked permission to go home first. The said accused
then left, leaving CALLAO, Damaso, Jr. and Rolly behind. Since there were no more customers at the store,
Rodney Balaito and his wife, Gloria, later joined the group inside, composed of CALLAO, Damaso, Jr., and
Rolly. Then, at around 11:30 P.M., the incident happened. Rodney’s wife, Gloria, prompted Damaso, Jr. about
a person she has seen outside the bamboo slat-fence. Rolly Brendia stood up and also looked at the
direction of the man outside the fence. At this juncture, a shot burst and a spray of pellets hit Damaso, Jr.
on the shoulder and on the right forearm, while four of the said pellets found its mark on the different parts
of the body of CALLAO causing massive hemorrhage resulting to the instantaneous death of the latter. In
the process, Damaso, Jr. passed through the main gate of Rodney Balaito’s premises, but while still there,
he sat down and hid beside the fence when he saw four persons running away from the place where the
shot came from. Damaso, Jr. identified the four to be the accused SOBERANO, BALBON, CANAGURAN and
BOLIVAR.
• A niece of the accused BARRION by the name of Milan Barrion was impregnated by the son of the deceased,
CALLAO by the name of Henry Callao, who, however, refused to marry Milan Barrion according to the
terms of BARRION apparently prompting the latter to negotiate for a way to exact vengeance against the
Callao family, hence, the motive to kill CALLAO.
• Pinpointing BARRION as the mastermind
• At the outset, we resolve to dismiss the criminal case against BOLIVAR who died of cardio-respiratory
arrest on June 8, 1993. The Court ruled that the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon.
• We also note that accused CANAGURAN is not included in this appeal since he jumped bail before
promulgation of the lower court’s decision and lost his right to appeal
• Accused-appellants claim that the following circumstances are not sufficient to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that a conspiracy existed among them due to the ff:
o None of the prosecution witnesses identified them as the assailants of Hugo Callao
o BARRION had no reason to kill CALLAO since the person involved with his niece was CALLAO’s son,
Henry, and the killing of CALLAO would not assuage the purported anger of BARRION in putting
off the marriage of Henry to Milan.
o BARRION and CANAGURAN claim that no one would talk openly about a plan to murder someone
in a public place contrary to the claim of PANAGA
Issue/s: Ruling:
- Whether or not the testimony of Rodolfo - WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo
Panaga proves beyond reasonable doubt City, Branch 36 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-
that Diosdado Barrion induced appellants Joel Soberano, Renato Balbon and Diosdado Barrion
Cresenciano Canaguran to murder Hugo are hereby ACQUITTED based on reasonable doubt and are
Callao ordered released immediately from confinement unless they
are held for some other lawful cause. The criminal case against
Graciano Bolivar is hereby DISMISSED.
Holding:
- BARRION’s conviction is based on the testimony of PANAGA implicating him as the mastermind of the plot
to kill CALLAO. He allegedly induced CANAGURAN to kill CALLAO although he did not directly participate
in the commission of the crime and neither was he present at the store on the night of the shooting.
- We do not believe however that his testimony is conclusive to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
BARRION was a principal by inducement of the crime.
- His testimonies were ambiguous and do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that he plotted to kill
CALLAO and claims he made were inconclusive.
- Even assuming that CANAGURAN agreed to kill CALLAO, the evidence of record is still insufficient to
convict BARRION as a principal by inducement. Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code provides that principals
are those who “directly force or induce others” to commit an offense. “One is induced to commit a crime
either by a command (precepto) or for a consideration (pacto), or by any other similar act which constitutes
the real and moving cause of the crime and which was done for the purpose of inducing such criminal act
and was sufficient for that purpose. Where the circumstances of force, fear, price, promise or reward are
not present, the question that may arise is whether the command given by a person to the author of the
crime amounts to a criminal inducement. The inducement exists whenever the act performed by the
physical author of the crime is determined by the influence of the inducer over the mind of him who
commits the act whatever the source of such influence.” Thus, the inciting words must have great
dominance and influence over the person who acts; they ought to be direct and as efficacious, or powerful
as physical or moral coercion or violence itself.
- In the case at bar, the only evidence adduced by the prosecution linking BARRION to the crime was
PANAGA’s testimony that he overheard BARRION telling CANAGURAN to try to kill CALLAO. No evidence
of force, fear, price, promise or reward exerted over or offered to CANAGURAN by BARRION that impelled
him to kill CALLAO was presented by the prosecution
18. People vs. Ong Chiat Lay Name of Digester: Pauline Pua Phee

No. 39086 Date: October 26, 1934 Ponente: Justice Abad Santos
Subject / Syllabus Topic: Criminal Law 1/ II. D. Persons Criminally Liable a) i) (1) By Inducement

Plaintiff and Appellee: The People of the Philippine Islands Defendant and Appellant: Ong Chiat Lay et al.

Doctrine (if applicable):

When a defendant is prosecuted on the theory that he induced his codefendants to set fire to a building, the
acquittal of the latter must necessarily result in his own acquittal; for one can not be held guilty of having instigated
the commission of a crime without its first being shown that the crime has been actually committed by another.
Facts:
• Appellant and two others, Ong Ban Hua and Kua Sing, were jointly informed against by the provincial fiscal
of Zamboanga, charging them with having feloniously burned a building in which was located a store
belonging to the appellant. Upon a plea of "not guilty," appellant and his codefendants were tried jointly
upon said information; and, after trial, while Ong Ban Hua and Kua Sing were acquitted, appellant was
found guilty of the crime of arson and sentenced to suffer sixteen years and one day of reclusión temporal,
with the accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify Francisco Barrios and Mariano Atienza in the
sums of P16,000 and P5,000, respectively, and to pay one third of the costs.
• Errors of the lower court according to the appellant:
• "First. The lower court erred in holding that the evidence presented against the accused Ong Chiat Lay is
sufficient to establish the corpus delicti, namely, that the crime of arson had been committed.
• "Second. The lower court erred in holding that the evidence presented against the accused Ong Chiat Lay
is sufficient to establish his guilt of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt."
Issue/s: Ruling:
-WON the appellant, Ong Chiat Lay is criminally liable as a - No.
principal?

Holding:
• In order to convict a defendant as principal in the commission of a crime, it must be shown either (1) that
he took a direct part in the execution of the criminal act; (2) that he directly forced or induced another or
others to commit it; or (3) that he cooperated in the commission of the offense by an act without which it
would not have been accomplished. (Revised Penal Code, article 17.) They take direct part in the execution
of a criminal act who, participating in the criminal design, proceed to carry out their plan and personally
take part in its execution by acts which directly tend to the same end. (Viada, Codigo Penal, 5th ed., vol. 1,
p. 341; Albert's Revised Penal Code Ann., 144.)
• In the instant case, it is not claimed that appellant had taken a direct part in the burning of the building. In
fact, the prosecution lays stress on appellant's absence from the scene of the fire as one of the suspicious
circumstances indicating his guilt.
• While the facts proved in the present case are sufficient to raise grave suspicions against the appellant,
they fall far short of establishing his guilt clearly and satisfactorily, as required by the well-settled rules of
evidence.
• The chain of circumstances which would have pointed to the appellant as the guilty person was broken by
the acquittal of Ong Ban Hua and Kua Sing. As already explained, the acquittal of his said codefendants is
not only consistent with the hypothesis that the appellant is innocent, but is inconsistent with the
hypothesis that he is guilty.
• It results that the judgment appealed from must be reversed and the appellant acquitted, with costs de
oficio. So ordered.
Title: People vs De La Cruz Name of Digester: Martin
G.R. No. L-30912 Date: April 30, 1980 Ponente: Melencia-Herrera, J.
Subject / Syllabus Topic: Crim1/ Persons Criminally Liable by inducement
Petitioner: People of the Philippines Respondent: Agapito De La
Cruz
Doctrine (if applicable):
Recit Summary: On or about March 6, 1968, Agapito De La Cruz, by inducement and his co-accused as
co-principal by direct participation, armed with carbine and garand rifles, they being all private persons,
conspiring and confederating together, aiding and assisting one with the other, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, and for the purpose of extorting money for ransom, kidnap and deprive the
liberty of one Yu Chi Chong and demand the amount of P50,000.00 as a consideration for the release of
Yu Chi Chong and when Yu Chi Chong was already in the custody of the accused and taking advantage of
their superior force, take and steal a wrist watch (Rado) worth P150.00 and cash money in the amount of
P400.00, all worth the total amount of P550.00, Philippine Currency, belonging to said Yu Chi Chong and
on the way from Basilan to Sulu, the said accused with treachery and evident premeditation, assault, attack
and shoot Yu Chi Chong, which caused his death and thereafter dumped the body into the sea.
Facts:
- Agapito organized a group to kill Antonio Yu and kidnap Yu Chi Chong and demand ransom of
P50,000. Of the eleven charged, only Agapito De La Cruz, Jamas Jumaidi and Oyong Asidin were
apprehended. City Fiscal discharged Jamas and Oyong to be utilized as state witnesses and pointed
Agapito as the mastermind in the kidnapping of Yu Chi Chong.
- The truck that Yu Chi Chong was using was ambushed by the group. While Yu Chi Chong was
held captive, he attempted to escape struck Angih with a piece of wood and tried to grab the gun
of the latter but failed. Angih, in anger, fired at Yu Chi Chong several times, killing him. Two
Muslims checked the body but as soon as they left the group tossed the body to the sea.
- Antonio Yu, the older brother of Yu Chi Chong testified as to the possible motive of Agapito. He
manifested that he hired Agapito in 1957 as an overseer in his farm in Lantawan. In 1964, the
management and administration of the farm was transferred to Agapito when Yu moved to
Zamboanga to look after his hardware business there. In 1967, Yu returned to Basilan and took
over the management of his farm. AGAPITOÊs job became that of a mere supervisor. When
Antonio Yu took over the farm, he noticed a significant increase in the farm’s production as
compared to the yield during Agapito’s administration. He also noticed that some of his cows were
missing. This led him to be strict with Agapito and practically stripped the latter of all his powers.
- Agapito claimed that Oyong Asidin, Jamas Jumaidi as well as the other witnesses who testified
against him were paid by Antonio Yu. He actually saw some witnesses being paid. He maintained
that he does not know any of the co-accused except Alih Itum Asmad. The court rendered him
guilty.
Issue/s: Ruling: WHEREFORE, the
- Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the accused accused-appellant, Agapito de la
as mastermind by inducement in the absence of the elements Cruz, is hereby sentenced to
of conspiracy to the crime. suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua; to indemnify the heirs
of the deceased Yu Chi Chong in
the sum of P12,000.00; and to pay
the costs.
Holding:
- Records show that James Jumaidi had executed two Affidavits before the NBI, wherein the 2nd
affidavit was true wherein while waiting for the tide to rise, Angih shot the Chinese and dumped
the body into the sea. Additionally, appellant claims that Oyong Asidin also admitted not having
told the truth to the NBI when placed under cross-examination, 8 for which reason, his testimony
is neither deserving of credence. But as far as this witness is concerned, he was similarly situated
as Jamas Jumaidi. He had executed two Affidavits of the same tenor as Jumaidi’s. In the first he
negated knowing what had happened to their Chinese victim, but in the second, narrated it in full
detail In both Affidavits, however, he too, consistently pointed to Agapito as the mastermind in
whose house the criminal scheme was hatched and plotted.
- The Appellate Court finds no error on the part of the trial Court, therefore, when it gave credence
to the testimonies of the two state witnesses. The rule “falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus” is not
mandatory. It does not apply where the declarants are motivated by a desire to exculpate
themselves and not really to pervert the truth as we find to be the case with respect to the two
state witnesses.
- Agapito assails the conclusion of the trial Court finding him guilty as a principal by inducement
reasoning that “since he did not take part in the commission of the crime, conspiracy does not
exist,” and consequently he incurs no criminal liability. This contention is untenable. The requisites
necessary in order that a person may be convicted as a principal by inducement are: “That the
inducement be made directly with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime;” and
“That such inducement be the determining cause of the commission of the crime by the material
executor”.
- Agapito told the strategy for the killing and kidnapping for ransom. It was his idea when the truck
to be ambushed and the positive resolution to procure the crime. He also presented the strongest
temptation, a gain for ransom, which was a determining factor of the commission of the accused.
Without him the crime would not have been conceived, much less committed. Clearly, he was a
principal by induction, with collective criminal responsibility with the material executors, his co-
accused.
20.
United States vs. Indanan Name of Digester: G. Sison
G.R. No: L-8187 Date: January 29, 1913 Ponente: Moreland, J.
Subject / Syllabus Topic: Persons Criminally Liable By Inducement
Petitioner: The United States (People) Respondent: Panglima Indanan
Recit Summary: This case is an appeal from a judgment convicting the appellant (Indanan) of the crime of murder,
sentencing him to hang.
Facts:
- Respondent was a headman (position of influence) of Parang, who is alleged to have committed a murder by
inducement.
1. He ordered an Induk to bring to his house a person named Sariol.
2. The next day, after he was brought to the house, two others were ordered to tie up Sariol.
3. After some time, respondent ordered Sariol to be taken to a cemetery and killed, asserting at the time
that he had an order to that effect from the governor.
4. He gave strict orders that he should be present at the time of death, and that he should aid in killing. He
also ordered a person to take his bolo, with which to assist in the killing.
5. After the crime was committed, and the persons ordered reported back, the accused said it was all right
and appeared to be pleased.
Issue/s: Ruling:
a. Is Panglima Indanan guilty of murder by inducement? Affirmed.

Holding:
- Court as of the opinion that domination of the accused over the persons who, at his orders, killed the
deceased made him responsible for whatever they did in obedience to such orders.
a. Article 13, paragraph 2 of the Penal Code declares those to be principals in a crime “who directly force
or induce others to commit it.”
b. In a decision of the 9th of April, 1882, the court held "that the inducement referred to in paragraph 2,
article 13, of the Penal Code exists whenever the act performed by the physical author of the crime is
determined by the influence of the inducer over the mind of him who commits the act, whatever be
the source of such influence."
- In the case at bar, the words and acts of the accused had the effect of a command. There does not seem
to have existed, however, any official relation between the accused and the persons whom he induced to
kill Sariol. While he appears to have been the headman of Parang, those whom he induced held no official
position under him and owed him, legally speaking, no obedience. According to tradition and custom,
however, the headman seems to have been a person whose word was law and whose commands were to
be obeyed.
- Moreover, the accused represented to those who physically committed the crime that he had a warrant
from the governor authorizing, if not requiring, the acts committed, and urged upon them, in effect, that
all must obey the commands of the Government. This representation was false, but it produced the same
effect as if it had been true.
Viada comments:
They force another to commit a crime who physically by actual force or grave fear, for example, with a pistol in hand or by
any other threatening means, oblige another to commit the crime. In our commentary on paragraph 9 of article 8 (page
28), we have already said that he who suffers violence acts without will and against his will, is no more than an instrument,
and therefore is guilty of no wrong. The real culprits in such case, the only guilty persons, are those who use the violence,
those who force the other to commit the crime.

One is induced directly to commit a crime either by command, or for a consideration, or by any other similar act which
constitutes the real and moving cause of the crime and which was done for the purpose of inducing such criminal act and
was sufficient for that purpose.

The pacto by virtue of which one purchases for a consideration the hand which commits the crime makes him who gives,
promises, or offers the consideration the principal in the crime by direct inducement, because without such offer or
promise the criminal act would never have been committed. But this does not mean that the one who actually commits
the crime by reason of such promise, remuneration or reward is exempted from criminal responsibility; on the contrary,
we have already seen in our comments on paragraph 3 of article 10 that such circumstance constitutes an aggravation of
his crime.
21.
Title: People v. Kiichi Omine Name of Digester: Jay Daniel T. Morales
G.R. No. 42476 Date: July 24, 1935 Ponente: Vickers, J.

Subject / Syllabus Topic: Persons Responsible and Conduct Punished – Persons Criminally Liable (In Grave and
Less Grave Felonies: Principals)
Plaintiff/Appellee: The People of the Philippine Defendant/Appellant: Kiichi Omine, Eduardo Autor, Luis
Islands Ladion and Agapito Cortesano
Doctrine (if applicable): RPC, Art. 17, Par. 2 – Those who directly force or induce others to commit a crime are
considered Principals.

Recit Summary: This is an appeal made by the defendants from the ruling made by the Court of First Instance (CFI)
of Davao, finding them guilty of frustrated homicide with the use of superior strength as an aggravating
circumstance of their crime. The court found CFI to have erred in the conviction of the Appellants and in not
acquitting them along with the costs they shouldered.

Facts:
● The defendants Eduardo Autor, Luis Ladion and Agapito Cortesiano were all working under the supervision
of their co-defendant Kiichi Omine in a hemp plant owned by Angel Pulido. These appellants all lived
together in a house on the plantation.
● Then Omine asked Pulido if he can open a new road through the plantation to which the latter disagreed
because there was already an unfinished road therein.
● To the dismay of Omine, he destroyed some hemp plants of Pulido in order to open a new road through
the plantation.
● As a result of such act commited by the defendant, Pulido was so angry that he immediately brought his
party which comprises of his son, Hilario Pulido, their relative, Saito Paton and a moro named, Barabadan,
to the house of the defendants in which the appellants just had their supper in which a commotion ensued.
● Both parties had varying testimonies presented before the court as witnesses.
● According to the prosecution, the offended party is alleging that while Omine was talking to them, Autor
attempted to intervene but was stopped by Pulido’s son which in turn, made Autor attack Pulido’s son with
a bolo that wounded his left thumb in the process. The Pulidos testimony also included Angel Pulido being
tied in his arms by Ladion and Cortesiano in which Omine shouted a word in front of him which induced
Autor into strucking him in his breast by his bolo.
● As expected, the defendants offered their own version disproving the earlier claim of the Pulidos. They
contend that the offended party were actually the ones who started the commotion by going to their
residence first. Then, it was started by Hilario who aggressively attacked Omine with brass knuckles that
strucked his breast and before Autor can follow suit, he said to have been hit by the Pulidos with their fists
and that Ladion and Cortesiono both ran away before Autor wounded Pulido.
Issue/s: Ruling:
1.) Whether or not the inducement made by the 1. No. For the foregoing reasons, the decision appealed from
defendant Omine is enough for him to be a principal is
to the crime committed by his co-defendant Autor reversed as to Kiichi Omine, Luis Ladion, and Agapito
and also make other co-defendants liable as Cortesano, and they are acquitted with the proportionate
conspirators? part of the costs de oficio.
2.) Whether or not Autor intended to kill the Pulidos?
2. No. As to the appellant Eduardo
Autor, the 'decision of the lower court is modified, and he
is
convicted of lesiones graves and sentenced to suffer one
year, eight months, and twenty-one days of prisión
correccional
Holding:
1. No. The court ruled that there is no conspiracy that happened among the defendants. The fact that the
defendants Ladion and Cortesiano both ran away when Autor wounded Pulido, does not affirm their
participation in the said act. There is also no inducement that was done by Omine which made Autor struck
Pulido’s breast when he shouted. This is because Autor had other reasons in doing the act just like the way
he defended himself against further attacks from the Pulidos without Omine’s order for him to do such.
Therefore, the co-defendants of Autor should not be held liable to the injury inflicted by the him to Pulido.

In supporting that argument, the court cited the Viada case in which Viada says that: “in order for an act
be considered as a direct inducement, it is necessary that such advice or words have great dominance and
great influence over the person who acts, that that it is necessary that they be as direct, as efficacious, as
powerful as physical or moral coercion or as violence itself.”

2. No. The defendant Autor only struck Pulido once and it only happened at the onset of the commotion he
had with the offended party. Second, the fact that Pulido was left conscious when he was wounded by
Autor and ask for help, as confirmed in Saito’s affidavit, only shows that the injury he had is not that serious
and as life-threatening that Autor would have wanted to kill him so bad.

Notes: In the leading case of the United States vs. Indanan (24 Phil., 203), it was held that in order that a person
may be convicted of a crime by inducement it is necessary that the inducement be made directly with the intention
of procuring the commission of the crime and that such inducement be the determining cause of the commission
of the crime.

Intention may only be deduced from the external acts performed by the agent, and when these acts have
naturally given a definite result, the courts cannot, without clear and conclusive proof, hold that some other result
was intended." (U. S. vs. Mendoza, 38 Phil., 691.)
22.
People v. Maluenda Name of Digester: Khaila Palabrica
G.R. No. 115351 Date: March 27, 1998 Ponente: Panganiban, J.

Subject / Syllabus Topic: II. D. Persons Criminally Liable a) i) (1) By Indispensable Cooperation
Petitioner: People of the Respondent: Daniel Maluenda (Dongkoy), Gil Bueno; Raul Mondaga
Philippines (Bobong) and Rodrigo Legarto, accused, Daniel Maluenda and Rodrigo
Legarto, accused-appellants
Doctrine (if applicable):
- Principals by Indispensable Cooperation - An accused cannot be convicted as a principal by
indispensable cooperation in a kidnapping where the prosecution failed to allege, much less
prove, any overt act on his part showing direct participation in the kidnapping itself, his
participation in the incident being limited to acts committed after the abduction was already
consummated.
- ART. 17. Principals. - The following are considered principals:
o 3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it
would not have been accomplished.
- Conspiracy must be shown to exist as clearly as the commission of the offense itself, although
direct proof is not essential
Recit Summary: MONDAGA, LEGARTO and MALUENDA are charged of kidnapping and sentenced to
RECLUSION PERPETUA. LEGARTO contends that the Court must re-assess whether his participation
can be deemed as a co-principal by indispensable cooperation in the crime. The Court finds that
LEGARTO was liable only as an accessory, on the ground that Legarto cannot be convicted under this
definition because the prosecution failed to allege, much less prove, any overt act on his part showing
direct participation in the kidnapping itself, his participation in the incident being limited to acts
committed after the abduction was already consummated. In short, the prosecution failed to piece
together a clear story as to how Legarto figured in the kidnapping caper.
Facts:
- This is an appeal from the RTC’s decision of charging MONDAGA, LEGARTO and MALUENDA of
kidnapping and sentencing them to RECLUSION PERPETUA.
- What’s stated in the Information:
o August 19, 1992 (9PM) ENGR. MIGUEL RESUS was kidnapped and detained (for 4 days) for
the purpose of extorting money from Engr. and Mrs. Resus, to the damage and prejudice
of the victim in the amount of P200,000.00; In violation of Art. 267, RPC; corresponding to
the aggregate of the money in cash and medicines extorted as per the demand of the
accused and given by the kidnap victim’s wife, including the subject motorcycle which has
been paid for by the victim’s ransom money; with the down payment as per agreement
advanced by the couple Resus for a total cost price of P46,895.00, and to pay the costs.
- In view of the penalty imposed, Legarto, and Maluenda interposed this appeal directly before this
Court. (Mondaga withdrew his appeal)
- Detailed facts:
o August 19, 1992, 9:45PM, ENGR. RESUS and DR. RESUS, coming from their novena, arrived
at their residence or clinic at Diatagon and 3 men who identified themselves as
Commander Bobong Gonzaga (who is actually Mondaga), Commander Bongkoy
(Maluenda) and alias “Alex” were at their clinic.
o MONDAGA declared that they came upon orders of a certain Father Simon, an alleged NPA
Commander, with his directive to solicit money and medicines needed for the victims of
the recent military-NPA encounter at Melale, Agusan del Sur.
o The trio demanded for medicines and money, the latter gave the amount of P500 +
assorted medicines worth P800, after which, the trio demanded that they be driven by the
ENGR. in his Volkswagen to San Roque, though the ENGR. said that there was no sufficient
gasoline and that the car was not in good running condition to travel that night; then
MONDAGA demanded to be driven in the very early morning instead.
o The trio left the clinic with a threat not to tell anybody about their coming, otherwise, they
would kill all the members of their family and blow-up the clinic.
o August 20, 1992, 5AM, MONDAGA arrived at the residence of the RESUS couple and
hurried the ENGR. in preparing the car, as he would meet his companions who were
ferried by Legarto, ENGR. then drove to Andanan.
o MONDAGA stating also that they would be going to San Francisco, instead of San Roque
o They stopped at Alegria, MONDAGA stating that the ENGR. had to go with them, against
his will, he went with the three.
o They went to the mountain hiking for almost 2 HRS between the boundary of Cardon and
Alegria.
o Upon reaching a hut, Mondaga told him that he had forgotten something and had to go
back and that the ENGR. had to stay there. So Engr. Resus, Maluenda, Alex and Gil Bueno
passed the night in the farm hut.
o Meanwhile at the house of the Resus couple, Mondaga demanded from Dr. Resus the
amount of P300,000.00 for the release of Engr. Resus. Dr. Resus told Mondaga that she
[could] only produce P10,000.00. Mondaga told Dr. Resus to reserve the amount for he
[would] get it the following morning.
o Dr. Resus also looked for the firearm of her husband, as demanded by MONDAGA.
o MONDAGA demanded for the use of Engr. ResusÊ motorcycle, but Dr. Resus told him that
the motorcycle was out of order. So Mondaga instructed Dr. Resus to get the motorcycle
of Legarto, which Dr. Resus did.
o August 21, 1992, at around 4:45 a.m. Mondaga arrived at Dr. ResusÊ clinic. Shortly
thereafter, Legarto also arrived in his motorcycle. Mondaga demanded that Dr. Resus go
with them but Dr. Resus asked that her helper Maria Abne go instead to which Mondaga
agreed.
o As they returned to the farm hut, Mondaga lowered his demand to P200,000.00. Engr.
Resus then signed the note stating, Mommy, it is up to you to produce this amount. With
the note, Mondaga and Legarto went back to Alegria, while Abne was left with Engr. Resus.
o LEGARTO who was driving Engr. Resus car, went to the house of Nora Gubantes where
Dr. Resus was at that time and informed her that Mondaga [was] waiting [for] her at SSIFA,
St. Christine. Dr. Resus went with Legarto at SSIFA, St. Christine where they met Mondaga,
who joined them at the car after which the three proceeded to a deserted place.
o MONDAGA handed to DR. RESUS the written note, the DR. says that she could only
produce P100,000, where MONDAGA agreed to accept with the additional condition that
he would no longer return the motorcycle of LEGARTO and instead to give LEGARTO the
amount of P50,000 as payment for the motorcycle.
o MONDAGA also instructed LEGARTO to deliver the amount of P100,000 and the original
license of the motorcycle.
o DR RESUS and LEGARTO then went back to the clinic.
o DR RESUS, together with Nora Gubantes, went to Lianga to secure money from the
relatives of Dr. Resus. Since Dr. Resus’ cousins were out of town, the two proceeded to
San Francisco, Agusan del Sur to see Dr. Presentacion Manatad, the mayor of San
Francisco. Dr. Resus informed Mayor Manatad about the incident and asked the mayor to
give her an amount of P150,000.00 in return for a PNB Check Dr. Resus would issue. Mayor
Manatad gave her the amount after Dr. Resus issued PNB Check No. 621330-AJ in the
amount of P150,000.00
o Dr. Resus gave the money to Nora Gubantes with the instruction to give the same to
Legarto. Upon reaching Diatogon, Nora Gubantes gave the money to her husband with the
instruction to give the money to LEGARTO.
o LEGARTO acknowledged receiving the money from MR. GUBANTES on August 22, 1992.
o August 22, 1992, Mondaga arrived at the hut where Engr. Resus was and told that the latter
that he would be released but that he would come back to get the balance of the
P300,000.00 in three months.
 o In the afternoon of August 22, 1992, Engr. Resus and Maria Abne were released. The two
were driven by Legarto in Engr. Resus’ car.
o Mondaga, Maluenda and Legarto were later arrested by the police.

Issue/s: Ruling:
- Whether or not LEGARTO’s participation can - No. The Court holds that LEGARTO was
be deemed as a co-principal by indispensable liable only as an accessory.
cooperation in the crime. - No.
- Whether or not the Court erred in finding
MALUENDA guilty of the crime charged
despite the fact that his guilt was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt.
Holding:
- Legarto’s contention merits consideration. A principal by indispensable cooperation is defined by
Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code (see notes).
- Legarto cannot be convicted under this definition because the prosecution failed to allege, much
less prove, any overt act on his part showing direct participation in the kidnapping itself, his
participation in the incident being limited to acts committed after the abduction was already
consummated. He was not with the kidnappers
o (1) when they forcibly solicited money and medicine from the Resus couple
o (2) when they brought the kidnap victim to Alegria
o (3) when Mondaga demanded ransom for the victim’s release. Together with the Resus
housemaid, he accompanied Mondaga to the hideout in Alegria only upon Dr. Resus’
request.
- In short, the prosecution failed to piece together a clear story as to how Legarto figured in the
kidnapping caper.
- Despite its belief that Legarto was not a co-principal or a co-conspirator, this Court cannot
completely free him from criminal liability. Established by the prosecution are the following:
(1) he reported the loss of the motorcycle to the police authorities despite the fact that it
had been given to Mondaga as part of the ransom;
(2) he had received P36,000 for it;
(3) he paid the balance of the purchase price of the motorcycle with the said money; and
(4) he claimed, regained and retained its possession.
- Legarto may not have had a direct hand in the kidnapping, but he received part of the ransom
and used it to pay off his arrears in his motorcycle loan. Thus, having knowledge of the kidnapping
for ransom and without having directly participated therein, he took part in the crime subsequent
to its commission by profiting from its effects. He may not be the devil with the face of an angel
that the trial court described, but he is definitely not a saint.
- He is criminally liable as an accessory to the crime of kidnapping for ransom. It must be also noted
that the elements of Art. 19 of the RPC are present and proven in Legarto’s case.

- Beyond reasonable doubt, Maluenda’s actions exhibited a community of interest and a

concurrence of sentiment with Mondaga.
- It must be noted that Maluenda was one of the men who had, on the night of August 19, 1992,
extorted money and medicine from him and his wife who corroborated this story.

- WHEREFORE, the appeal is partially granted. The assailed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED as
regards Maluenda, but MODIFIED as regards Legarto. Legarto is hereby found GUILTY as an
ACCESSORY only and is ORDERED to serve the indeterminate sentence of two (2) years, four (4)
months and one day of prisin correccional , as minimum, to eight (8) years and one day of prisin
 mayor , as maximum. He is further ordered to RETURN to Engineer and Dr. Miguel E. Resus the
amount of thirty-six thousand pesos (P36,000) corresponding to the amount he used to pay his
loan arrears. The amount which the trial court ordered to be restituted by Mondaga and
Maluenda is accordingly reduced by said amount.
Notes:
- Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. — Any private individual who shall kidnap or
detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than five days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, female or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-
mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
- Art. 19. Accessories. — Accessories are those who, having knowledge of the commission of the
crime, and without having participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part
subsequent to its commission in any of the following manners:
1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime.
2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof,
in order to prevent its discovery.
3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principals of the crime,
provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or whenever the author of
the crime is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief
Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime.

- In order to be liable either as a principal by indispensable cooperation, or as an accomplice, the

accused must unite with the criminal design of the principal by direct participation.
- Where one accused merely introduced the other co- accused to the principal by inducement, the
Court cannot conscientiously declare that the first accused was a co- conspirator or a principal
by inducement or indispensable cooperation in the crime of robbery with homicide.
23.
People v. Montealegre Name of Digester: BIANCA

G.R. No. L-67948 Date: May 31, 1988 Ponente: Cruz, J.

Subject / Syllabus Topic: Persons Criminally Liable; By Indispensable Cooperation

Petitioner: People of the Philippines Respondent: Napoleon Montealegre

Doctrine:
1. Article 17, Paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code
a. The requisites of this provision are:
i. Participating in the criminal resolution, that is, there is either anterior conspiracy or unity
of criminal purpose and intention immediately before the commission of the crime
charged; and
ii. Cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing another act without which
it would not have been accomplished.

Facts:
About 11:30PM of March 11, 1983, while Edmundo Abadilla was eating at the Meding’s Restaurant in Cavite City, he
started to smell marijuana smoke coming from a nearby table. He wanted to call a policeman. That is why, he
went outside and there he saw Pfc. Renato Camantigue in his car to whom he reported the matter. Camantigue
joined Abadilla in the restaurant and there he also smelled marijuana smoke coming from the table occupied by
Vicente Capalad and the accused-appellant. Camantigue then grabbed both men’s collars and said,
“Nagmamarijuana kayo, ano?” While Camantigue was holding the two, Capalad suddenly pulled out a knife and
started stabbing Camantigue in the back. Camantigue let loose of Capalad in order for him to reach for his holster
but Montealegre restrained Camantigue’s hand to prevent him from reaching his gun and to defend himself. The
three of them fell to the ground and Camantigue fired and tried to chase them. However, he abandoned the chase
and asked if he can be sent to the hospital. Capalad was later found in the alley with a bullet wound in his chest.
Neither Camantigue nor Capalad survived.

The accused-appellant escaped during the confusion. The Cavite police immediately organized a team to look for
him that night, but they failed to look for him. They eventually found him in the morning of March 12, 1983 on
board a vehicle bound for Baclaran. He gave a fake name at first, but later admitted that he was the fugitive being
sought.

The lower court convicted the defendant guilty of murder, as qualified by treachery, with assault upon a person
in authority.

Issue/s: Ruling:
1. Whether or not Montealegre was correctly considered 1. Yes.
a co-principal in the crime.
Holding:
1. Yes. Montealegre was correctly considered as a co-principal in the crime for corroborating with Capalad
in the killing of Camantigue. The two acted together, with Capalad stabbing the victim and Montealegre
holding the hand of the victim to prevent him from getting his gun. Although Montealegre did not do
exactly the killing, he still is guilty from preventing Camantigue to resist the attack against him. The
defendant was a principal by indispensable cooperation under Article 17, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal
Code;
a. The requisites of this provision are:
i. Participating in the criminal resolution, that is, there is either anterior conspiracy or unity
of criminal purpose and intention immediately before the commission of the crime
charged; and
ii. Cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing another act without which
it would not have been accomplished.
The defendant performed an act - holding the victim - without which crime could not have been
accomplished. That makes him a principal by indispensable cooperation.
24.
Title: US(People) v. Eguia Name of Digester: Nieto
G.R. No L-47722 Date: November Ponente: Elliott, J.:
19, 1909
Subject / Syllabus Topic: Criminal Law I / II. D. Persons Criminally Liable a) i) (1) By Indispensable
Cooperation
Petitioner: United States (People) Respondent: Lino Eguia Lim Buanco (alias Lim
Buanco) and Luciano De Los Reyes
Doctrine (if applicable):
Where a customer of a bank draws a check thereon when he has no funds to his credit, and through a
previous understanding with a clerk in the bank, the check is by said clerk marked as entitled to
payment, and is paid by the bank in reliance on said certification, the drawer of the check and the clerk
are guilty as principals of the crime of estafa.
Facts:
• On October 6, Lino Eguia Lim Buanco, drew and executed hi personal check to El Banco
Espanol-Filipino for the sum of P2000. However, his account had insufficient funds in his credit,
and that he owed the bank a sum of more than P300,000.
• Luciano de los Reyes was employed to the Banco Espanol-Filipino as a bookkeeper and check
registry clerk. He conspired with Lim Buanco by signing, inspecting and endorsing the checks
regardless of whether there were any credit funds left. Also, he fraudulently and illegally
manipulated the entries on the books of the bank as to make the books show an apparent credit
balance.
• Lim Buanco had no permission from any officer in authority that he may overdraw his account.
No part of the sum had been returned or paid back to the Banco Espanol-Filipino.
• They were convicted in the trial court of Manila with estafa. Lim Buanco and Reyes each had
voluntarily admitted the crime charged. Each man requested a separate trial, and both were
sentenced with 2-10-0 presidio correccional. The decision rendering their sentences was
pronounced in one joint decision
Issue/s: Ruling:
-Whether or not Luciano de los Reyes is guilty as -Yes. Judgment of Trial Court affirmed.
principal by indispensable cooperation in the
crime of Estafa?
Holding:
Each performed the part that was necessary to enable them to accomplish their criminal purpose.
Lim Buanco represented to the bank he had credit to which he was not entitled. Reyes falsified the
accounts of Buanco to make it appear he was a creditor (when he was in fact a debtor), and acted in
collusion with Lim Buanco, making him guilty of deceit.
By-laws of the bank imply the directors of the bank had the duty to ascertain the correctness
of entries but that does not relieve Reyes’ acts of their criminality. The bank was deceived by the
affirmative acts of Reyes, acting in conjunction with Buanco.
25.
Title: People v. Mandolado Name of Digester: ALCARAZ

G.R. No. L-51304-05 Date: June 28, 1983 Ponente: Guerrero, J.

Subject / Syllabus Topic: Accomplices

Petitioner: People of the Philippines Respondent: Martin Mandolado and Julian Ortillano

Doctrine (if applicable): being an accomplice is different to being an accessory to the crime. An accomplice
cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts, provided he has no direct participation
in its execution or does not force or induce other to commit it, or his cooperation is not indispensable to its
accomplishment (art. 18, RPC)

Recit Summary:
Mandolado and Ortillano came from a drinking session with two others when they rode a jeep going to their base.
Prior to riding the jeep, Mandolado is already drunk and started shooting at random people. When Mondolado,
Ortillano and two others rode the jeep wherein Tenorio is the driver and there is one other passenger who is
Mendoza, Mondolado started shooting at the previous because Tenorio mentioned that they would not be passing
where Mondolado and the others needed to go. While Mondolado was shooting at Tenorio and Mendoza, Ortillano
started shooting at the ground to make it sound that they were being attacked and were just implying self-defense.

Facts:
· On October 3, 1977, Julian Ortillano, Martin Mandolado, Conrado Erinada, and Anacleto Simon, draftees of
the AFP, were passengers of a bus bound for Midsayap, South Cotabato. In a bus terminal, they all met each other
and decided to drink rum. Mandolado got drunk and went inside a public market. When he returned, he grabbed
his .30 caliber machine gun and started firing. His companions tried to stop him, but he continued firing his gun.
· Conrado and Anacleto hailed and boarded a passing Ford Fiera. The others also followed and boarded, and
they forced the driver to being them to the crossing. Mandolado grabbed his knife and tried to attack the driver,
then he fired his gun at a speeding vehicle, hitting the right side of the back of the driver's sister who was onboard
the vehicle. At the crossing, a privately-owned jeep, driven by Herminigildo, passed by. Nolasco Mendoza was on
board that jeep bound for Cotabato City. Conrado and Anacleto boarded the jeep, while the others ran after it at
shouted at Herminigildo to stop the vehicle. Thereafter, Mandolado and Ortillano also boarded the jeep, but kept
firing their guns. Herminigildo said that if they did not stop firing their guns, he will "ram the jeep" into something.
· Upon learning that the jeep was bound of Cotabato City and not Pikit, North Cotabato, Mandolado got mad
and pointed his gun at Herminigildo. After alighting the vehicle, Mandolado fired his machine gun at the jeep and
hit Nolasco and Herminigildo. Mandolado and Ortillano were able to escape, and they even watched a movie. It
was only when they met a certain Sgt. Villanueva that they were informed of being suspects in the Herminigildo's
and Nolasco's deaths. As such, Mandolado purchased 2 passenger tickets for Manila. Before they could board the
ship, however, they were apprehended by a team led by Lt. Licas, and were brought to Pikit, North Cotabato for
investigation.

Issue/s: Ruling:
· Whether or not the trial court failed to · Yes
acknowledge the state of drunkenness of Mandolado · Yes
and Ortillano · No
· Whether or not the trial court correctly qualified · Yes
the crime as murder
· Whether or not the trial court correctly found
that the aggravating circumstances of: a) abuse of
being a draftee in the Philippine army and b) abuse of
confidence or obvious ungratefulness were present
in the commission of the crime
· Whether or not Ortillano is considered an
accomplice to the crime committed
Holding:
· The court was not able to point out that the appellants were both drunk when the incident took place, it was
taken as a mitigating circumstance and therefore their sentences were reduced.
· There was a qualifying circumstance of treachery making the offense, murder. There is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution. Mandolado started shooting at the jeep where Tenorio and
Mendoza are in.
· While it is true that they were draftees, there is no evidence that when they stopped the jeep, the accused
already intended to shoot the occupants of the vehicle. Simply stated, there was no proof that they intended to
take advantage of being a draftee in order to commit the crime. They also cannot be charged with the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of confidence because there was no proof that the victims had a "relation of trust and
confidence" with the accused. As stated in People vs. Comendador, in order for abuse of confidence to be
considered an aggravating circumstance, it is necessary that "there exists a relation of trust and confidence
between the accused and the one against whom the crime was committed and the accused made use of such
relationship to commit the crime."
· In People vs. Tamayo, “It is an essential condition to the existence of complicity, not only that there should
be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice, but
it is further necessary that the latter, with knowledge of the criminal intent, should cooperate with the intention
of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way.” Although Mandolado was
already threatening people, stayed. And when the shooting occurred, Ortillano did not leave, rather he also started
shooting not at the jeep but downwards to pretend that they were being attacked. In other words, Ortillano’s
simultaneous acts supplied, if not material, moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way.
26.
Title: People v Doble Name of Digester: Jul Yann A. Parayno
G.R. No L-30028 Date: May 31, 1982 Ponente: DE CASTRO, J.:

Subject / Syllabus Topic: II. D. Persons Criminally Liable a) ii) Accomplices

Plaintiff-appellee: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Defendants-appellants: CRESENCIO DOBLE, ET AL

defendants, CRESENCIO DOBLE, SIMEON DOBLE and
ANTONIO ROMAQUIN
Facts:
● Late in the night of June 13, 1966, 10 men, almost all heavily armed with pistols, carbines and Thompsons,
left the shores of Manila in a motor banca & proceeded to Navotas, Rizal to rob the beach-bank Prudential
Bank & Trust Co.
● Said bank had an unusual banking hours, open from midnight till 8AM. Once docked in Navotas and taking
advantage of the darkness of the night, 8 men disembarked from the banca and proceeded to their mission.
● Once inside, they started firing at the bank’s ceiling, walls & door of the vault.
● The 8 men then returned to the waiting motor banca with P10,439.95 & sped away.
● As a result of the shooting, many people got killed & injured. Among those who got killed were agents of
the law.
- Sgt. Alejandro Alcala of the Philippine Constabulary
- Sgt. Eugenio Aguilos and Cpl. Teoflo Evangelista of the Navotas Police Department.
- Dominador Estrella, a market collector
Injured
- Pat Armando Ocampo
- Exequiel Manalus
- Jose Fabian
- Rosalina Fuerten
- Pedro de la Cruz
● Only 5 of the 10 men were brought to trial, the rest still remain at large.
● 2 of the 5 accused were acquitted.
● It is only Cresencio Doble, Simeon Doble and Antonio Romaquin appealing in the charge of bank robbery
committed in band, with multiple homicide, multiple frustrated homicide and assault upon agents of
persons in authority.
Issue/s: Ruling:
- If the three accused can be considered as - Simeon Doble is entitled to acquittal with no
accomplices of the crime. sufficient evidence to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
- Wherefore, Cresencio & Romaquin are guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as accomplices for the crime of
robbery in band. The penalty imposable upon appellants
is prision mayor min. The commission of the crime was
aggravating by nighttime & the use of a motorized banca.
There being no MC, both appellants should be sentenced
to an indeterminate penalty of prision correccional from
5 years, 4 months, 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor as
maximum.
Holding:
- First, as to appellant Simeon, evidence shows that the malefactors met in his house to discuss the plan to rob the
bank. This circumstance alone doesn’t conclude his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The facts do not show that he
performed any act tending to the perpetration of the robbery, nor that he took a direct part therein or induced other
persons to commit, or that he cooperated in its consummation by some act without which it would not have been
committed. At most, his act amounted to joining in a conspiracy which is not punishable. Simeon then was not a
principal both by agreement and encouragement for his non-participation in the commission of the crime. Nor was
it clearly proven that he had received any part/fruits of the looted money as to make him an accessory. As
recommended by Solicitor Gen, Simeon Doble is entitled to acquittal with no sufficient evidence to establish his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
-Next, as regards Romaquin & Cresencio, the malefactors who waited in the banca, both contend that their extra-
judicial statements upon which their conviction was principally made to rest, are inadmissible for having been
allegedly obtained by force and intimidation, torture and maltreatment, and in violation of basic constitutional rights
to counsel and against self-incrimination. However, it must be noted that they didn’t present any medical cert to
attest to the injuries allegedly inflicted. More so that their testimonies match each other’s. And it should also be
noted that Celso Aquino’s testimony, as one of the accused, admitted that no violence was inflicted on him to procure
his statement. This is evidence enough that the appellants could not have been dealt with differently as their co-
accused Aquino who was allowed to give his statement freely.
-The extra-judicial statements of the appellants are convincing to show that their liability is less than that of a co-
principal by conspiracy or by actual participation. Cresencio was merely in-charge of the banca and had no
knowledge of the concrete plan and execution of the crime. The mastermind obviously did not extend confidence
in him as he was only asked to provide a banca just a few hours before the commission of the crime. Nor was
Romaquin considered a principle malefactor as there was a gun pointed at him by Cresencio to prevent him from
fleeing away from the scene, evident to show that he never joined in the criminal purpose and that his acts were not
voluntary.
- An accomplice is one who, not being principal as defined in Art 17 RPC, cooperates in the execution of the offense
by previous or simultaneous acts. There must be a community of unlawful purpose between the principal and
accomplice and assistance knowingly and intentionally given to supply material and moral aid in the consummation
of the offense. In this case, the appellants’ cooperation is like that of a driver of a car used for abduction which
makes the driver a mere accomplice.
But it isn’t established by evidence that in the meeting held in the house of Simeon that they all agreed to kill and
not just rob. The finding that appellants are liable as mere accomplices may appear too lenient but evidence fails to
establish their conspiracy with the real malefactors who actually robbed the bank and killed several people.

Notes:
-Entering a plea of guilty for the 3rd time constitutes already a carefully considered acceptance of
guilt by the accused. (People vs. Daeng, 109 SCRA 166).
- Knowledge by the accused of the plan to rob and participation in its commission by previous and
simultaneous acts proves conspiracy. (People vs. Garillo, 84 SCRA 537.)
-When homicide takes place as a consequence or on occasion of a robbery, all those who took part in the robbery
are guilty as principals of the crime of robbery with homicide, unless proof is presented that the accused tried to
prevent the killing. (People vs. Garillo, 84 SCRA 537.)
- Where robbery with homicide is committed by a band, the offense is still robbery with homicide aggravated by
band and not robbery in band with homicide. (People vs. Navasca, 76 SCRA 70.)
27.
Title: People vs Doctolero Name of Digester: Padillo
G.R. No: 34386 Date: February 7, 1991 Ponente: Regalado, J

Subject / Syllabus Topic:

Petitioner: People of the Philippines Respondent: Doctolero

Doctrine (if applicable): Credibility of Witnesses - the positive delcarations of the prosecution witness and the
negative statement of the accuesed, the former deserves more credence.
Recit Summary: Accused-appellants Doctolero and his brothers are charged with and convicted in the CFI
Pangasinan of the crime of multiple murder and unspecified physical injuries, appealed from the decision of the
court a quo which reads:the court finds the accused Ludovico guilty as principal and his co-accused Conrado and
Virgilio Dctolero guilty as accomplices in committing the crime of Murder, which caused the death of Epifania
Escosio. The SC modifies RTC decision in imposing different penalties for the accused.

Facts:
● Ludovico Doctolero and his brothers, Conrado and Virgilio (Doctolero’s), charged with and convicted in the
CFI Pangasinan for the crime of multiple murder and unspecified physical injuries. The Court find Ludovico
guility as principal and his co-accussed guilty as accomplices, in committing the crime of murder, killing
Epifania Escosio, Lolita de Guzman Oviedo, and Marcelo Doctolero. Ludovico faces life imprisonment
(Cadena Perpetua) and the other two are sentenced to 10 years.
● Information charged against appellants: Nov 8 1970, accused armed with bolos, went to the house of Marcial
Sagun, conspiring together, mutually aiding, with intent to kill, and with evident premeditation and
treachery, did willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack hack stab Lolita, Epifania, Jonathan. And while
already on the road, hacked and stabbed Marcelo Doctolero which killed him.
● Appellants version: Ludovico greeted Marcial Sagun. Antonio Oviedo unsheathed his bolo and boled
Ludivico. Macrial Sagun unsheathed her bolo and attacked Ludovico as well, and Ludovico retaliated with
his bolo. Ludovico encountered Marcelo Doctolero, and Marcelo hit Ludovico. Marcelo tripped. While on
the ground, Ludovico boloed him many times.
● Appellant Conrado denies having participated in the commission of the crime, contending that he was not
at the place where the crimes were committed.
Issue/s: Ruling: Yes. He is liable as an accomplice to the
W/N Conrado Doctolero is liable for the crime of murder. crime.

Holding: While the testimony comes from a polluted source and must be scrutinized with great caution as it is
subject to grave suspicion. This uncorroborated denial of his participation cannot overthrow the positive and
categorical testimony of the principal witnesses of the prosecution. Between positive declarations of the
prosecution witness and the negative statements of the accused, the former deserves more credence. There is no
showing that the witnesses had any motive to testify falsely.
When there is nothing in the records which would show a motive or a reason on part of the witnesses to falsely
implicate the accused, identification should be given full credit.
Inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses cannot destroy the credibility of
the prosecution witnesses.
OSG - there is no question that the three appellants were stoning and hurling challenges at the house of Marcial.
All three appellants went up the house. It is impossible that both accomplices did not know or were not aware
when their brother was killing the two women.
Where one goes with the principals, and in staying outside of the house while the others went inside to rob and
kill them victim, the former effectively supplied material and moral, making him guilty as an accomplice.
28.
Title: People v. Elijorde Name of Digester: YDP
G.R. No. 126531 Date: April 21, 1999 Ponente: Bellocillo, J.

Subject / Syllabus Topic: Criminal/Persons Criminally Liable: Accomplices

Petitioner: The People of the Philippines Respondent: Gilbert Elijorde y De la Cruz and Reynaldo
Punzalan y Zacarias alias “Kirat”
Doctrine:
Requisites in order for a person to be considered an accomplice in the commission of the offense:
a) community of design, i.e., knowing that criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he
concurs with the latter in his purpose
b) cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts
c) there must be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person
charged as accomplice.

Facts:
• On May 21, 1995, Eric Hierro, Benjamin Visbal and Rodel Contemplado were drinking in the house of the
latter. Hierro and Visbal went out to buy mango at a nearby sari-sari store. Accused Gilbert Elijorde,
Reynaldo Punzalan and a certain Edwin Menes were at the time in front of the store. Menes approached
Hierro latter warned Menes, “Don’t touch me, my clothes will get dirty.” Menes punched Hierro followed
by Elijorde, then kicked by Punzalan.
• Hierro and Visbal ran to Contemplado’s house. After (3) three minutes, Hierro went out to go home together
with Visbal and Visbal’s wife. They noticed that the accused were waiting for them. The accused punched,
kicked, and stabbed Hierro in the chest that lead to Hierro’s death.
• Gilbert Elijorde, Reynaldo Punzalan and Edwin Menes alias Nonong were accordingly charged in an
Information for murder of Eric Hierro qualified by treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior
strength.
• Defense argues that Punzalan did not conspire with Elijorde because the only participation of Punzalan in
the commission of the offense was his kicking of Hierro twice. the acts of kicking Hierro were neither in
pursuance of the same criminal design of Elijorde nor done in concert aimed at the attainment of the same
objective of killing Hierro
Issue/s: Ruling:
W/N Punsalan can be considered an accomplice in the Accused Punsalan was not considered an accomplice
commission of the offense and was acquitted of the crime.
W/N Elijorde is guilty with murder Accused Elijorde was found GUILTY of MURDER and
was accordingly sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

Holding:
• With respect to accused Reynaldo Punzalan, the Court cannot assert with moral certainty that he is guilty
of murder. To convict him as a principal by direct participation in the instant case, it is necessary that
conspiracy between him and his co-accused Elijorde be proved.
• Conspiracy must be proved as indubitably as the crime itself through clear and convincing evidence, not
merely by conjecture. conspiracy exists in a situation where at the time the malefactors were committing
the crime, their actions impliedly showed unity of purpose among them, a concerted effort to bring about
the death of the victim.
• Based from the narration of the witness Visbal, Punzalan remained where he was and did not cooperate
with Elijorde in pursuing Hierro to ensure that the latter would be killed. His act of kicking Hierro prior to
the actual stabbing by Elijorde does not of itself demonstrate concurrence of wills or unity of purpose and
action.
• In order to be considered an accomplice in the commission of the offense, these requisites must be
complied with:
a. community of design, i.e., knowing that criminal design of the principal by direct participation,
he concurs with the latter in his purpose
b. cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts
 c. there must be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the
person charged as accomplice.
• There is nothing on record to show that accused Punzalan knew that Elijorde was going to stab Hierro.
accused Punzalan must be absolved from all responsibility for the killing of Hierro since there is nothing
on record to show that the kicking resulted in any injury on any part of the body of Hierro, therefore,
Punzalan cannot be considered an accomplice in the crime. The accused Reynaldo Punsalan should be
acquitted.

• With regard to the principal accused Gilbert Elijorde, the trial court correctly ruled that treachery attended
the killing of Hierro thus qualifying the crime to murder.
Ø Treachery exists when the offender commits any of the crimes against person, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make
• The Court likewise agree with the trial court when it disregarded the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength alleged in the Information. No sufficient evidence exists to
show that the requisites of evident premeditation were present.
a) the time when the offender decided to commit the crime
b) an act manifestly indicating that he had clung to his determination to commit it
c) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and the execution to allow him to reflect upon
the consequences of his act and for his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will had the
desired to hearken to its warnings
• The time interval of three (3) minutes between the first and the second assault on Hierro is too brief to
have enabled Elijorde to ponder over what he intended to do with Hierro.
• The crime by the accused Gilbert Elijorde although qualified by treachery was not attended by any generic
modifying circumstance; consequently, the penalty to be imposed upon him must be the indivisible penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
29.
Title: People of the Philippines v Edwin De Vera, Name of Digester: Celina Gonzales
et.al.
G.R. No. 128966 Date: August 18, 1999 Ponente: PANGANIBAN, J.

Subject / Syllabus Topic: Criminal Law 1/Persons Criminally Liable: Accomplices

Plaintiff-Appellee: People of the Philippines Defendant-Appellee: Edwin De Vera, et.al.

Doctrine:
An accomplice is one who knows the criminal design of the principal and cooperates knowingly or intentionally
therewith by an act which, even if not rendered, the crime would be committed just the same.
Facts:
• Edwin De Vera conspired and confederated and helped two other persons attack and assault Frederick
Capulong by shooting him with a .22 caliber firearm. Capulong was hit between his eyes and struck with a
baseball bat in the mouth, thereby inflicting upon serious injuries that caused his death.
• According to the prosecution, Bernardino Cacao saw a car driven by Frederick Capulong with four other
passengers, including Kenneth Florendo and Roderick Garcia. At first, he did not notice anything unusual
inside the car while it passed by him, but he heard unintelligible voices coming from the car. When the car
was parked, he saw Capulong dragged out of the car by Florendo and brought upon a grassy place. Florendo
was holding a gun, and aimed it at Capulong, hitting him between the eyes. After the shooting, Florendo
and Garcia fled in different directions. Upon investigation, the police discovered blood stains and damaged
grass. They also found a red sports car with engine still running and its doors opened which belonged to
Capulong. The policemen went around to look for suspects and came upon Edwin De Vera, a person in
muddied denim pants and white t-shirt standing and walking around near the clubhouse. When asked
about his muddied pants, De Vera declared that he was a victim of a hold-up. Thus, the police turned him
over for investigation. When he was asked about his participation, he was initially reluctant to talk, but
ultimately admitted being with the group which perpetrated the crime, and implicated Garcia. After
investigation, including paraffin testing, De Vera was declared positive in the test for gunpoweder nitrates,
while Roderick Garcia was tested negative for gunpowder nitrates.
• The defense, however, claimed that he did not take part in the killing, and it was Florendo who shot the
victim. He declared that he merely accompanied him and Garcia to Filinvest upon request. Hours after the
shooting, he was picked up by the police who tortured and coerced him into signing his Statement
regarding the incident.
• The Trial Court ruled that Kenneth Florendo was the one who actually shot Roderick Capulong. However,
it convicted De Vera as a principle because the scientific and forensic findings on the criminal incident
confirmed the existence of conspiracy among Florendo, Castro, De Vera, and Garcia.
Issue/s: Ruling:
Was Edwin De Vera a co-conspirator? 1. NO. De Vera is only an accomplice, not a principal.
Holding:
• In the case at bar, eyewitness Cacao failed to establish conspiracy. It contained nothing that could inculpate
De Vera. Aside from the fact that he was in the car, there was no other act imputed to him. Mere presence
does not amount to conspiracy.
• In this case, De Vera knew that Florendo had the intent to kill Capulong and cooperated with him. However,
he himself did not participate in the decision to kill Capulong
• According to the extrajudicial statement made by De Vera:
o He knew of Kenneth Florendo’s malevolent intentions;
o His companions were armed that day;
o He cooperated with the other accused by placing himself at a certain distance from Kenneth and
the Victim in order to act as lookout.
• As such, De Vera is an Accomplice, not a conspirator. His presence did not cause harm in the situation.
However, he knew that Florendo had the intent to kill Capulong when he acted as the lookout. He was not
an innocent spectator but was there to aid and abet the commission of the Crime.
• The Revised Penal Code provides that a conspiracy exists when “two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission and decide to commit it. To prove conspiracy, the prosecution must
establish the following requisites:
 o Two or more persons came into an agreement
o The agreement concerned the commission of a crime
o The execution of the felony was decided upon.
• Furthermore, it must be shown the accused performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, unless
the accused is a mastermind.
• The Revised Penal Code defines accomplices as “those persons who, not being included in Article 17,
cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.”
• For one to be considered as an accomplice, the following elements must be present:
o The community of criminal design; that is knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct
participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; and
o The performance of previous or simultaneous acts that are not indiscernible to the commission of
the crime
• Both conspirators and accomplices know and agree with the criminal design. However, accomplices come
to know of the criminal intention after the principals have reached the decision, and only do they agree to
cooperate. Furthermore, accomplices ae merely the conspirators’ instruments who perform acts that are
not essential to the perpetration of the offense.
30.
Title: People v. Cachola Name of Digester: Barcelon
G.R. No 148712-1 Date: January 21, 2004 Ponente:

Subject / Syllabus Topic: CRIM 1/ Accomplices

Appellee: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Appellant: DOMINADOR CACHOLA y SALAZAR,

ERNESTO AMAY y PASCUA, NESTOR MARQUEZ y
MANUEL, BENJAMIN LAEGEN y CAMADO,
RODOLFO SAGUN y JIMENEZ, RODEMIR
GUERZO y LATAOAN, MELLKE IGNACIO y
SALVADOR, and NELSON C. ECHABARIA
Doctrine (if applicable): To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two elements must concur:
(1) community of design, which means that the accomplice knows of, and concurs with, the criminal design of the principal by direct
participation; and
(2) the performance by the accomplice of previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the commission of the crime.
Recit Summary: Eight men were convicted for the massacre of the Barnachea family. The surviving son, who witnessed the killings, was
only able to identify two out of the eight. Thus, the six other men caught were charged as accomplices.
Facts:
• On December 28, 1999, two armed men suddenly entered Barnachea residence.
• The two ordered a 12-year old boy, Jessie E. Barnachea, to drop the floor by hitting him in the back with the butt of a long gun.
• They hurriedly proceeded to the living room and shot Jessie’s uncle, Victorino Lolarga, and continued shooting in the kitchen
hitting his mother Carmelita Barnachea, his brother Felix Barnachea, Jr., and his cousin Rubenson Abance. His eldest brother,
Robert E. Barnachea, who then was in his uncle’s house, noticed a stainless jeep, with blue rim and marking "fruits and vegetables
dealer," and with the description of the "El Shaddai" parked in front of the fence of theirhouse. Also, the jeep did not go unnoticed
by the neighbors, Russel Tamba and Francisco Andrada.
• The incident was immediately reported to the police and at around 7:45 p.m., thejeep was intercepted at a checkpoint set up in the
highway by the police force in Aringay, La Union.
• On board were the eight appellants. No firearms were found in the vehicle. The jeep and the eight appellants were thereafter
brought to the Aringay policestation and then turned over to the Bauang police.
• Jessie was able to identify two of the eight appellants by the name of Cachola and Amay as the two assailants who entered the
house.
• The next day a paraffin test was conducted on the appellants.
• The Death Certificates attest to the gruesome and merciless killings: Carmelita sustained one gunshot wound on her head and
three on her body; Felix, Jr., two gunshot wounds on his head and on his body, and stab wounds on his chest and arms; Victorino,
two gunshot wounds on his head, three on his body, and with his penis excised; Rubenson, one gunshot wound on his head and
a stab wound that lacerated his liver.
• RTC convicted all the eight appellants but the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) recommended the affirmance of the
conviction for murder of appellants Cachola and Amay, and the acquittal of the other appellants for failure of the prosecution to
establish their identity and participation beyond reasonable doubt
Issue/s: Ruling:
- Whether it was correct to acquit the 6 other appellants who were charged as -Yes
accomplices?

Holding:
• The only reason why they were implicated was that they were with Cachola and Amay on board the jeep that was intercepted in
Aringay, La Union, almost two hours after the killings. What constitute previous or simultaneous acts that would make them liable
as accomplices are not found in the decision or in any evidence on record.
• To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two elements must concur:
(1) community of design, which means that the accomplice knows of, and concurs with, the criminal design of the principal by
direct participation; and
(2) the performance by the accomplice of previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the commission of the
crime.
In the present case, neither element was proved. The mere presence of the six appellants in the company of appellants Cachola
and Amay on board a jeep is not evidence of their knowledge of, or assent to, the criminal design to perpetuate the massacre.