The Prabhakaran Saga: The Rise and Fall of an

Eelam Warrior
Operation Watershed

Contributors: By: S. Murari

Book Title: The Prabhakaran Saga: The Rise and Fall of an Eelam Warrior
Chapter Title: "Operation Watershed"
Pub. Date: 2012
Access Date: September 19, 2019
Publishing Company: SAGE Publications India Pvt Ltd
City: New Delhi
Print ISBN: 9788132107019
Online ISBN: 9788132113980
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9788132113980.n53
Print pages: 280-285
© 2012 SAGE Publications India Pvt Ltd All Rights Reserved.
This PDF has been generated from SAGE Knowledge. Please note that the pagination of the online
version will vary from the pagination of the print book.
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Operation Watershed
The battle for control of Mavil Aru in eastern Trincomalee district between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan forces
marked a watershed in the Eelam struggle as it set off a sustained operation by the army to flush out the
rebels from the east and then advance on the north in full strength. The confrontation began on 26 July, six
days after the LTTE closed the sluice gates, and continued well after 8 August when it opened them after
failing to put up any more resistance in the face of a massive air and ground attack.

Mavil Aru had always been a bone of contention between the two sides not merely because of its strategic
location but because it was conceived to cater to the irrigation and drinking water needs of Sinhalese settled
in what had been traditional Tamil areas in Trincomalee as part of state-sponsored colonization. Such being
the case, Sinhala, Muslim and Tamil villages abut one another in the region. Mavil Aru is south of Mutur bulge
which dominates the entry into Koddiyar Bay, the inlet for Trincomalee port and the naval base. The LTTE
presence in the area had always posed a threat to the Sri Lankan navy's domination of the seas and free
movement in and out of the base. The LTTE had always ensured its presence in this region particularly along
Mutur East, Ichchilampattai and Verugal ferry. In the past it has been the scene of all conflicts with LTTE.

In the 1991 conflict, the LTTE failed to capture the reservoir but blew up the sluice gates. The Sri Lankan
forces lost it in 1997. After the 2002 ceasefire, Mavil Aru remained in the LTTE-held area, but continued to
water the fields in government-controlled villages.

The crisis started when the government announced an Asian Development Bank (ADB) project to supply
drinking water from Mavil Aru to villages in government-controlled areas. This drew vehement protest from
people in areas under the LTTE control from Mutur east and Ichchilampattai division. The ADB then agreed
to extend the project to the two areas.

According to Colonel (Retd) R. Hariharan, who has been a Sri Lanka watcher ever since he did a stint with
the IPKF, the issue would have been resolved in normal course through negotiations. But the area was far
from normal after 25 April 2006 when an abortive attempt was made on the life of Army Chief Sarath Fonseka
and in response the air force stepped up operations against LTTE. Since then, the LTTE strongholds in this
area had come under frequent air and artillery attacks, putting the local population under great stress. Their
movement to other areas was restricted by the continuing strife. Thousands had fled their homes and were
put up in camps as refugees with inadequate food supplies.

Therefore, when the government went ahead with the drinking water project in areas under its control, people
in the LTTE-controlled area closed the sluice gate on 20 July to cut off water supply to Sinhala villages and to
press their demand for security to life and property and supply of essential rations for refugees, in addition to
the extension of the water supply scheme to their area.

The Government Peace Secretariat said in a statement that Elilan, head of LTTE's political wing in Trincoma-
lee, sent a letter to SLMM on 25 July, referring to the need for a water supply tower in Paddalipuram in the
LTTE-controlled area. The government promptly agreed to build a water tower to resolve the situation and
sent a letter to the LTTE conveying this decision. But there was no response. The government was, therefore,
left with no choice but ‘to restore water supply through other means’.

Elilan had a different story. He said that on Thursday, 20 July, (Tamil civilian) protesters closed the sluice gate
and cut water supply to government areas. They also sent a letter to the government, putting three conditions
for reopening the sluice gate: ensure security of civilians who travel between the government and LTTE con-
trolled areas; remove the ban on items imposed by the army; and include their areas in the proposed drinking
water supply scheme. ‘No response was received from the government by the protesting people.’

The Peace Secretariat statement was correct in a narrow sense. The LTTE media made no reference to the
closure of the sluice gate until the government began its ‘humanitarian operation’ by bombing the LTTE areas
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on 26 July. The LTTE's new ‘civilian’ demands surfaced only on 27 July, when it talked to the ‘civilian protest-
ers’,’, supposedly with a view to resolving the issue.

The government's hand was forced not only by the attempt on the life of Sarath Fonseka but also by strident
protests by the JVP and the JHU against the closing of the sluice gate. On 24 July, Jayantha Wijesekera,
JVP parliamentarian for the area, said he had raised the issue with Gothabaya Rajapaksa, defence secretary
and younger brother of the President. Two days later, the JVP-led Patriotic National Movement demanded
‘the government use its power to open the sluice gate’. The same day, the air force began bombing ‘identified
targets which had instigated the forcible closure of the anicut’.

On 28 July, JHU monks Venerable Athureliya Ratana Thera and Venerable Akmeemana Dayaratna Thera
made a dramatic appearance in Kallar, the army position nearest to the sluice gate. Prevented by the army
from leading a group of civilians to open the sluice gate, they began a fast to death.

When the LTTE closed down Mavil Aru, Fonseka was recovering from his wounds in Singapore and was
about to return to Colombo to take up the full command of the army. However, the government could not wait
till his return to carry out the mission to regain the control of Mavil Aru. The chief of staff of the army, Major
General Nanda Mallawarachchi, who was appointed as the Acting Commander after Lietenant General Fon-
seka flew to Singapore for treatment, was ordered by President Rajapaksa to launch the limited operation to
regain the control of the Mavil Aru dam.

The troops launched the operation on 28 July even as the air force pounded the LTTE positions in Trincoma-
lee, Batticaloa and Vavuniya in the first major full-scale confrontation since the 2002 ceasefire. Reinforcement
of 700 troops were sent by a naval carrier to Trincomalee from Kankesanthurai in Jaffna and it came under
attack as it was about to enter the Trincomalee harbour. However, the LTTE attack was foiled.

On 8 August, the LTTE announced it was restoring water supply. The government, however, continued the
military operation until it gained complete control of the sluice gate on 10 August and opened it. The fight-
ing continued for one more day as the government wanted to make the area fully secure. The government
claimed to have inflicted heavy casualties on the Tigers.

Nearly 200 civilians died in Operation Watershed and over 50,000 were uprooted from Mutur and surrounding
villages. A large number of Muslims were caught in the LTTE attack on Mutur and later in the counterattack
by the Sri Lankan forces. Seventeen aid workers of a French NGO Action Contre la Faim, all of them Tamils
engaged in tsunami relief work, were found murdered in Mutur. It was later established that the massacre was
carried out by the army. The LTTE was also accused of having pulled out 35 Muslims from a fleeing crowd in
Mutur and shot them dead.

The government's decision to use force to resolve the issue caught the LTTE by surprise. Though the LTTE
initially warded off the multi-pronged attack, it could not sustain the resistance, especially in the face of aerial
bombardment by Kfir jets. Similarly after infiltrating into Mutur, the LTTE failed to hold on and inflict casualties
when the forces responded in strength.

The government insisted all along that the water should be released unconditionally. The SLMM complained
on two occasions that its diplomatic efforts were thwarted by the government's resort to firing missiles near
places where the negotiators were present, first on 27 July and the second time on 6 August. Both the SLMM
head Ulf Henricsson and spokesman Thorfinnur Omarsson charged that the government had other agendas
in mind besides water. Norway complained that if the government wanted to solve the water problem by mili-
tary means, it should not ask them to solve it diplomatically at the same time.

Overall, the Mavil Aru operation showed the LTTE's serious limitations in operations in the east, especially af-
ter the Karuna faction broke away. After gaining control of Mavil Aru, troops secured Sampur from the Tigers
on 4 September, marking the beginning of the operation to flush out the LTTE from the east, the last point of
confrontation being Vaharai in Batticaloa.

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The fall of Sampur was a tactical blow to the Tigers though they managed to withdraw with their long-range
artillery guns.

The attack on Sarath Fonseka provided the motivation and excuse for the forces to pound the LTTE positions
in Sampur area intermittently from air and ground since April 2006. Under General Fonseka, the army has a
better level of junior leadership which could take as well as inflict casualties and continue with the operations,
according to Colonel Hariharan.

The LTTE's political wing chief S. P. Tamilchelvan told Norway's ambassador Brattskar at Kilinochchi on 6
September that the Sri Lankan government had abrogated the ceasefire agreement by occupying Sampur.
But the undeclared war continued for another year and a half and the Sri Lankan government formally abro-
gated the ceasefire agreement only on 1 January 2008.

In fact, to avenge its losses in the east, the LTTE launched an operation in the Jaffna peninsula. On 11 August,
the Tigers breached the forward defence lines of the army in Muhamalai on the gateway to the peninsula. The
battle lasted five days and the Tigers made considerable advance, but eventually retreated. The Sri Lankan
government claimed that up to 700 rebels and 150 troops were killed and another 300 soldiers were wound-
ed.

On 14 August, Sri Lankan planes bombed an orphanage housing school-going girls in Chencholai in rebel-
held Mullaitivu district, killing 61 girls and wounding over 60 in one of the worst massacres. Pro-LTTE Tamilnet
said the school children were attending a two-day course on first aid at the Chencholai Children's Home when
the attack took place.

Spokesman of the truce monitors Thorfinnur Omarsson said those killed appeared to be ordinary young per-
sons around the ages of 17 and 20 who had been killed in two locations. The SLMM monitors who visited
the site said it was clearly a civilian location. But at the same time, the geography of the area was such that
it was ideal to conduct arms training. So the monitors were unable to clearly state if the location was purely
a school or rebel training facility. According to eyewitnesses, four Kfir jets bombed the area and the SLMM
found that 12 to 15 bombs were dropped and 19 bodies were either taken to nearby hospitals or to the homes
of relatives.

An unnamed community leader from Kilinochi was quoted as saying that the school girls were taken to the
camp and given arms training. They were not full-fledged soldiers. ‘They were, however, given arms training
like most civilians are in LTTE areas.’

However, the LTTE military wing spokesman Ilenthirayan told the Daily Mirror the area that came under air
force bombardment was selected by humanitarian groups for their projects as it was away from locations that
were usual targets. ‘The school was located in this area so the government cannot claim it was an area where
LTTE camps were being operated’, he said.

By a coincidence, a suicide bomber in an autorickshaw blew himself up as a car carrying Pakistan's High
Commissioner, Bashir Wali Mohammed, passed along a crowded road in Colombo hours after the Chen-
cholai bombing. At least seven persons were killed, including four army commandos guarding the envoy, the
government said. Another 10 persons were wounded in the bombing less than a mile from the residence of
President Mahinda Rajapaksa. But the diplomat escaped unhurt. The government blamed it on the LTTE, the
motive being that Pakistan was a major arms supplier.

On 28 October, the army launched an offensive against rebel territory in the Jaffna peninsula. The troops ad-
vanced a few hundred metres into the LTTE territory when they were hit by heavy fire. Within a day, the offen-
sive was broken. In the biggest loss for the military in four years, 129 soldiers were killed and 519 wounded.
The rebels claimed that they lost only 22 fighters. The army said it had killed 400 Tigers. It also accused the
LTTE of having massacred 74 soldiers it had taken captive. The LTTE denied it.

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In all, the government claimed that 700–1,000 LTTE fighters and 300 soldiers were killed during the period 11
August to 29 October. Regardless of the conflicting claims, independent reports said it was a major setback
for the army. However, the status quo continued with the army retaining control of the Jaffna peninsula right
till the end.

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