THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 155339 : March 3, 2008]

ROSE AOAS, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals, dated February 22, 2002,
in CA-G.R. CR No. 22439 affirming the conviction of petitioner of the crime of theft, and the
Resolution2 dated September 3, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.

The Information reads as follows:

That on or about the 15th day of October, 1992 in the City of Baguio, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one
another, with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away, eighteen (18) sacks of red and white beans,
all valued at P24,720.00 belonging to NATY MADON-EP, to the damage and prejudice of the owner thereof in
the aforementioned amount of TWENTY-FOUR THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY PESOS (P24,720.00),
Philippine Currency.

When arraigned, petitioner pleaded not guilty.

The prosecution presented two witnesses: private complainant and barangay tanod Gregorio Garcia. As
summarized by the Court of Appeals, the evidence for the prosecution are as follows:

Private complainant Naty Madon-ep testified that she is a businesswoman engaged in the buy and sell of
assorted seeds such as white beans, red beans, black beans, mongo beans, peas, peanuts and malagkit rice.
She owns four (4) stalls in the city market of Baguio. One of these stalls is located at no.1, mongo section.
The other three stalls namely: Stalls, A, B, and C are located at the muslim section of the said city market.
Stalls A and B with mezzanines are adjacent to each other. Upon the other hand, stall C which has also a
second floor is located at the back of the stall owned by Laila Saguid. She uses the mezzanines of stalls A, B
and C as storeroom/bodega for sacks of beans. The ground floor of stall B was being occupied/rented by
Henry Saguid. As to stall A, she occupied a portion of the ground floor thereof together with Miling and Janet
Gavino who were engaged in the buy and sell of gold and broken jewelry. Adjacent to her stall is the stall of
the accused-appellant which has also a mezzanine, and used by the accused-appellant as her business store
for selling and buying gold and broken jewelry. Sometime in 1992, the accused-appellant removed the
partition wall separating the mezzanines without her consent, claiming that she would convert her own
mezzanine floor to a restaurant. Despite demand to restore the said partition wall, the accused-appellant
refused. On October 16, 1992, when she arrived at her stall at the mongo section, she noticed that there
were red and white beans scattered in front of the stall of the accused-appellant and at the parking space of
the rice section. When she reported the matter to the authorities, it was discovered that there were also
scattered beans inside the ground floor and mezzanine of the stall of the accused-appellant. Later, she found
out that her 18 sacks of beans stored at the mezzanine of her stall A, worth P24,000.00, more or less, were
missing. Upon inquiry from the persons in the city market she was informed by a certain Gregorio Garcia
that the accused-appellant was the culprit.

Gregorio Garcia testified that he is a barangay tanod assigned at the rice section of the city market of
Baguio. On October 2, 1992, at around 8:30-9:00 in the evening, he saw the accused-appellant together
with her two daughters at the end of the rice section leading towards the buko section. The accused-
appellant told him that they were going to fix their stall. Thereafter, he saw the accused-appellant open the
door of her stall and bring out one sack of beans and loaded the same inside the jeep with the help of its
driver. On October 12, 1992, at around 8:00 in the evening, while he was 10 meters away behind the jeep,
he again saw the accused-appellant, together with Brenda Sabado, bringing out five sacks of beans from her
stall and likewise loaded them in a vehicle with the assistance of a male driver. Thereafter, the accused-
appellant and Sabado boarded the jeep and left, but before leaving, Sabado gave him P15.00 for his coffee.
On October 15, 1992 at about 8:30-9:00 in the evening, he again met the accused-appellant in front of the
Dimalanta Grocery, which is located at the right side of the rice section of the city market. The accused-
appellant asked him if he saw a jeepney, to which he answered "no." He then went and stayed at the side of
the Dimalanta Grocery and took a cup of coffee, while the accused-appellant walked towards the direction of
Tiong San Bazaar. After he finished his coffee and while walking towards the rice section opposite the
bakery, he saw a jeep leaving loaded with sacks of beans. Inside the said jeep he saw the accused-appellant
seated at the back thereof and another female companion seated in front with the driver. He knew that the
sacks loaded in the jeep were sacks of beans because he was just thirty (30) meters away and the place
was heavily lighted. He knew the size of the beans sacks.3

For the defense, petitioner and witness Imelda Bautista presented their evidence, as follows:

[Rose Aoas] testified that she is a businesswoman engaged in the buy and sell of gold and broken jewelry.
She was occupying stall No. 9 at the muslim section of the city market of Baguio adjacent to the stalls of
Anita Fermin and Janet Gavino. The second floor of her stall was being used as storage for empty bottles by
her friend Imelda Bautista who was engaged in selling mongo beans and peanut butter. While the ground
floor thereof was sometimes used by said Imelda Bautista in the afternoon for storing her goods, she
removes the same in the morning and sells them at her own stall. She admitted that the private
complainant Naty Madon-ep has a stall adjacent to her own stall and that she removed the partition wall
dividing their mezzanines thereof but with the consent of the private complainant. She removed the said
partition because she intended to convert her mezzanine/second floor to a canteen but the same did not
materialize. She admitted to have seen prosecution witness Gregorio Garcia thrice. First was on October 2,
1992, when she and her son dropped by the city market to check on her stall. Second, on October 12, 1992,
while she was at the city market because she helped her friends Ronda Sabado and Noli Chamos transport
the sacks of mongo and peanuts which the latter bought from Imelda Bautista. The third time she saw
witness Gregorio Garcia was on October 15, 1992 at around 8:00 in the evening along Dimalanta,
Magsaysay Avenue, while she was on her way to Helen's Restaurant located at Abanao Street to meet some
of her friends.

Defense witness Imelda Bautista narrated that she was engaged in the business of selling mongo beans and
peanut butter. Every afternoon she kept her goods at the ground floor of the stall of the accused-appellant
located at the muslim section of the city market of Baguio. She was the one occupying the second
floor/mezzanine of the stall of the accused-appellant and uses the same as her storage/storeroom for empty
bottles of peanut butter. On October 12, 1992, she (witness) sold beans to Ronda Sabado, covered by an
ordinary handwritten receipt.4

On November 10, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered convicting accused Aoas of theft and
hereby sentences her, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to suffer imprisonment from 4 years,
9 months and 10 days of prision correctional medium, as minimum, to 8 years, 8 months and 1 day of
prision mayor, medium, as maximum, and to return to the complainant Madon-ep the 18 sacks of beans
stolen, or to pay the value of said sacks of beans in the amount of P24,720.00 if the same can no longer be
returned.

Costs against the accused.5

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision in toto.

Hence, this Petition for Review raising the following assignment of errors:

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF

CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE SAID
DECISION OF CONVICTION BY THE TRIAL COURT;

II. THE TRIAL COURT AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESS FOR THE PROSECUTION THAN THE TESTIMONY OF THE ACCUSED AND HER
WITNESS.6
Under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, the essential elements of the crime of theft are the following:
(1) that there be a taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the
taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5)
that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons or force upon
things.7 Petitioner contends that these elements of the crime of theft were not proven and, therefore, she
deserves to be acquitted.

We agree.

Considering that there is no direct evidence pointing to petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime, the trial
court relied solely on circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact
or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be established by inference. It is founded on experience,
observed facts and coincidences establishing a connection between the known and proven facts and the
facts sought to be proved. In order that conviction be had, the following must concur:

1. There is more than one circumstance;

2. The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;

3. The combination of the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

To uphold a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is essential that the circumstantial evidence
presented must constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to
the accused, to the exclusion of the others, as the guilty person. The test to determine whether or not the
circumstantial evidence on record is sufficient to convict the accused is that the series of circumstances duly
proved must be consistent with one other and that each and every circumstance must be consistent with
accused's guilt and inconsistent with his innocence.8 The circumstances must be proved, and not themselves
presumed.9 The circumstantial evidence must exclude the possibility that some other person has committed
the offense.

To the appellate court, the following make up the web of circumstantial evidence against petitioner:

First, it was established that at around 8:30-9:00 in the evening of October 15, 1992, the accused-
appellant was seen within the vicinity or in front of the Dimalanta Grocery located at the right side of the
rice section of the city market. The stall of the accused-appellant, as well as that of the private complainant,
are within the vicinity of the city market and near the rice section. Second, the accused-appellant asked the
prosecution witness Garcia regarding the whereabouts of a certain jeepney. Thereafter, the accused-
appellant was seen seated inside the back portion of a jeepney which was loaded with sacks of beans
leaving the said city market. Third, at about 5:00 in the morning of October 16, 1992, it was found that
beans were scattered not only in front of the stall of the accused-appellant but likewise inside its ground
floor and mezzanine. Scattered beans which were similar to the beans owned and stolen from the private
complainant were likewise discovered at the parking space of the city market. Fourth, on two previous
occasions the accused-appellant was seen within the vicinity of the city market at around 8:00-9:00 in the
evening taking out sacks of beans. Finally, the prosecution witness positively identified accused-appellant
during the trial as the person bringing out, with the assistance of somebody, sacks of beans on three (3)
evenings, and while seated at the back portion of the jeepney loaded with sacks of beans. It need not be
stressed that the presence of prosecution witness Garcia in the vicinity and her having seen him were
admitted by the accused-appellant. She also admitted having removed the partition between her stall and
that of the private complainant at the mezzanine floor.10

After a careful review, we find that the aforesaid circumstantial evidence does not pass this test of moral
certainty as to warrant petitioner's conviction. Complainant testified that 18 sacks of beans which she stored
in the mezzanine of her stall were missing. She discovered the loss in the morning of October 16, 1992
when she saw red and white beans scattered on the floor in front of her stall and that of petitioner.11 She
accused herein petitioner as the culprit after being informed by barangay tanodGregorio Garcia that he saw
petitioner in the evening of October 15 riding in a jeepney loaded with sacks of beans.12 Garcia alleged that
he was only 30 meters away from the jeepney and the place was sufficiently lighted, enough for him to
recognize that the sacks loaded in the jeepney contained beans.13
It behooves the Court to see how petitioner's guilt was logically inferred from Garcia's testimony which was
not corroborated. Whether the sacks loaded in the jeepney contained beans, and if so, whether these beans
belonged to private complainant were not proven. Where the sacks of beans came from was not explained
since Garcia admitted that he did not actually see petitioner load the sacks of beans into the jeepney.14 He
stated that he merely met petitioner in the evening of October 15 in front of the Dimalanta Grocery, when
petitioner asked him for the whereabouts of the jeepney. Thereafter, he saw petitioner seated inside the
jeepney as it was leaving the market vicinity. In pointing to petitioner, Garcia cited the two previous
occasions, October 2 and 12, 1992, when he encountered petitioner loading sacks of beans in the jeepney.
We do not agree with the appellate court that this circumstance should form part of the "unbroken chain"
and incriminate petitioner of the crime. Complainant testified that she bought her 18 sacks of beans from a
provincemate from Bontoc. The goods arrived on October 14 and were stored in the mezzanine, and
complainant noticed the loss 2 days thereafter or on October 16.15Obviously, the sacks of beans brought out
by petitioner on October 2 and 12 were not the objects of the alleged crime.

The defense proffered an explanation which, unfortunately, was not given credence. Defense witness Imelda
Bautista testified that she was also engaged in the buying and selling of beans. Her goods were also kept at
the second floor/mezzanine of petitioner's stall. Petitioner testified that she brought out sacks of beans from
her stall because one Ronda Sabado bought them from Imelda Bautista.16 There being no direct evidence of
petitioner's culpability, this explanation could have sufficiently created reasonable doubt about petitioner's
guilt.

The fact that beans were scattered on the floor inside and in front of the stall of petitioner and in the parking
lot does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that petitioner is the perpetrator of the crime. This cannot be
equated with the principle of law that a person in possession or control of stolen goods is presumed to be
the author of the larceny.17 Absent proof of any stolen property in the possession of a person, as in the case
at bar, no presumption of guilt can arise. Instead, the constitutional presumption of innocence should prevail
in petitioner's favor.18 As to who caused those beans to be scattered inside and in front of the stall of
petitioner was not proven. Furthermore, it is not farfetched that those scattered beans could have belonged
to Imelda Bautista who also stored beans in the stall of petitioner. It must be noted that the place is a
market, a public place where people come and go. Presumably, the complainant is not the only vendor in
the market selling beans.

The removal of the partition wall in the mezzanine is also of no moment. Petitioner admitted that she
removed the partition wall in September 1992 because she intended to use the space to sell
coffee.19Notably, the partition was removed much earlier than the date of the alleged commission of the
crime in October 1992, and it would simply be conjectural to suppose that this was part of petitioner's
alleged scheme to stash away the sacks of beans. There should be more proof presented to show
petitioner's alleged complicity in the crime. Conviction must rest on the strength of the evidence for the
prosecution and not on the weakness of the evidence for the defense.20

The prosecution has failed to show that the circumstances invoked completely discount the possibility that
persons other than petitioner could have perpetrated the crime. Thus, where the proven facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with innocence and the
other with guilt, the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to convict the
accused.21

We find that the conviction of petitioner does not pass the test of moral certainty. When inadequate and
uncorroborated, circumstantial evidence cannot sustain a conviction.22

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming that of the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 7, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner is
hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of theft.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-6486 March 2, 1911

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RAFAEL B. CATOLICO, defendant-appellant.

B. Pobre for appellant.

Acting Attorney-General Harvey for appellee.

MORELAND, J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Cagayan, Hon.
Charles A. Low presiding, convicting the defendant of the crime of malversation of public funds and
sentencing him to two months' imprisonment, to perpetual disqualification to hold public office or
public employment of any kind, and to the payment of the costs.

It appears from the proofs of the prosecution that the accused as justice of the peace of Baggao,
Province of Cagayan, on the 2d day of October, 1909, had before him sixteen separate civil cases
commenced by Juan Canillas against sixteen distinct individuals, each one for damages resulting
from a breach of contract; that said cases were all decided by the appellant in favor of the plaintiff;
that each one of the defendant in said cases appealed from the decision of the justice of the peace
and deposited P16 as required by law, at the same time giving a bond of P50, each one of which
was approved by the court; that on the 12th day of said month the plaintiff in said cases presented a
writing to the appellant as said justice of the peace, alleging that the sureties on the said bonds were
insolvent and later demonstrated this to the satisfaction of the appellant; that thereupon the latter
ordered the cancellation of the said bonds and, in the same order, required each of the appellants to
file another bond within fifteen days, that, inasmuch as none of the appellants in said causes
presented new bonds within the time fixed, the plaintiff in said causes applied to the appellant, as
said court, for an order declaring final the judgment entered in each of the said sixteen cases and
commanding the execution of the same, at the same time asking that the sums deposited by the
defendants in said actions be attached (so called in the record) and delivered to him in satisfaction of
said judgments; that the accused acceded to the petition of the plaintiff, ordered said sums attached
and delivered same to the plaintiff, at the same time requiring of the plaintiff a bond of P50 for each
attachment, conditioned that he would respond for the damages which should result from such
attachment.

After this attachment (so called) the attorney for the defendants in the said sixteen cases presented
a complaint against the appellant to the Court of First Instance, by virtue of which said court ordered
that the plaintiff, Juan Canillas, deliver to the clerk of the Court of First Instance the sums deposited
by the defendants in said actions. Canillas obeyed the order of the court and made the delivery as
required.
Upon these facts the Acting Attorney-General recommends the acquittal of the accused. We are in
entire accord with that recommendation. The case made against the appellant lacks many of the
essential elements required by law to be present in the crime of malversation of public funds. The
accused did not convert the money to his own use or to the use of any other person; neither did he
feloniously permit anybody else to convert it. Everything he did was done in good faith under the
belief that he was acting judicially and correctly. The fact that he ordered the sums, deposited in his
hands by the defendants — appellants in the sixteen actions referred to, attached for the benefit of
the plaintiff in those actions, after the appeals had been dismissed and the judgments in his court
had become final, and that he delivered the said sums to the plaintiff in satisfaction of the judgment
which he held in those cases, can not be considered an appropriation or a taking of said sums within
the meaning of Act No. 1740. He believed that, as presiding officer of the court of justice of the
peace, he had a perfect right under the law to cancel the bonds when it was clearly shown to him
that the sureties thereon were insolvent, to require the filing of new undertakings, giving the parties
ample time within which to do so, to dismiss the appeals in case said undertakings were not filed,
and to declare the judgment final. He believed that after said appeals had been dismissed and said
judgment had become final, the sums deposited were subject to be applied in payment of the
judgments in the actions in which said sums had been deposited and that he was acting judicially
and legally in making such applications.

To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made such by statute, be accompanied
by a criminal intent, or by such negligence or indifference to duty or to consequences, as, in law, is
equivalent to criminal intent. The maxim is, actus non facit reum, nisi mens rea — a crime is not
committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of be innocent.

In the case at bar the appellant was engaged in exercising the functions of a court of justice of the
peace. He had jurisdictions of the actions before him. He had a right and it was his duty to require
the payment by each appellant of P16, as well as the giving of a proper undertaking with solvent
sureties. While, in dismissing the appeals and delivering the P256 to the plaintiff in the said cases,
he may have exceeded his authority as such court and passed beyond the limits of his jurisdiction
and power, a question we do not now discuss or decide, it was, so far as appears from the record, at
most a pure mistake of judgment, an error of the mind operating upon a state of facts. Giving the act
complained of the signification most detrimental to the appellant, it, nevertheless, was simply the
result of the erroneous exercise of the judicial function, and not an intention to deprive any person of
his property feloniously. His act had back of it the purpose to do justice to litigants and not to
embezzle property. He acted that honest debts might be paid to those to whom they were legally
and justly due, and not to enrich himself or another by criminalmisappropriation. It was an error
committed by a court, not an act done by a criminal-minded man. It was a mistake, not a crime.

It is true that a presumption of criminal intention may arise from proof of the commission of a criminal
act; and the general rule is that, if it is proved that the accused committed the criminal act charged, it
will be presumed that the act was done with criminal intention, and that it is for the accused to rebut
this presumption. But it must be borne in mind that the act from which such presumption springs
must be a criminal act. In the case before us the act was not criminal. It may have been an error; it
may have been wrong and illegal in the sense that it would have been declared erroneous and set
aside on appeal or other proceeding in the superior court. It may well be that his conduct was
arbitrary to a high degree, to such a degree in fact as properly to subject him to reprimand or even
suspension or removal from office. But, from the facts of record, it was not criminal. As a necessary
result no presumption of criminal intention arises from the act.

Neither can the presumption of a criminal intention arise from the act complained of, even though it
be admitted that the crime, if any, is that of malversation of public funds as defined and penalized in
Act No. 1740. It is true that that Act provides that "In all prosecutions for violations of the preceding
section, the absence of any of the public funds or property of which any person described in said
section has charge, and any failure or inability of such person to produce all the funds and property
properly in his charge on the demand of any officer authorized to examine or inspect such person,
office, treasury, or depositary shall be deemed to be prima facie evidence that such missing funds or
property have been put to personal uses or used for personal ends by such person within the
meaning of the preceding section." Nevertheless, that presumption is a rebuttable one and
constitutes only a prima facie case against the person accused. If he present evidence showing that,
in fact, he has not put said funds or property to personal uses, then that presumption is at an end
and the prima facie case destroyed. In the case at bar it was necessary for the accused to offer any
such evidence, for the reason that the people's own pleading alleged, and its own proofs presented,
along with the criminal charge, facts which showed, of themselves, that said money had not been
put to personal uses or used for personal ends. In other words, the prosecution demonstrated, both
by the allegations in its information filed against the accused and by its proofs on the trial, that the
absence of the funds in question was not due to the personal use thereof by the accused, thus
affirmatively and completely negativing the presumption which, under the act quoted, arises from the
absence of the funds. The presumption was never born. It never existed. The facts which were
presented for the purpose of creating such presumption were accompanied by other facts which
absolutely prevented its creation.

On the other hand, if it be admitted that the crime, if any, is that of estafa, as defined in paragraph 5
of article 535 of the Penal Code, then the presumption just referred to does not arise. Mere absence
of the funds is not sufficient proof of conversion. Neither is the mere failure of the accused to turn
over the funds at any given time sufficient to make even a prima facie case. (U. S. vs. Morales, 15
Phil. Rep., 236; U. S. vs. Dominguez, 2 Phil. Rep., 580.) Conversion must be affirmatively proved,
either by direct evidence or by the production of facts from which conversion necessarily follows. (U.
S. vs. Morales, supra.)

The judgment of conviction is reversed and the defendant ordered discharged from custody
forthwith.

Arellano, C. J., Mapa and Trent, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

CARSON, J., concurring:

I am strongly inclined to doubt the bona fides of the defendant in the transactions herein set out, but
in the absence of proof beyond a reasonable doubt upon this point I concur in the judgment of
acquittal of the crime charged in the information.
 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 168217 June 27, 2006

JOY LEE RECUERDO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Joint Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 25983, affirming with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan in Criminal Cases Nos. 2750-M-94, 2751-M-94 and 2807-M-94 for estafa.

As synthesized by the appellate court, the antecedents are as follows:

In September 1994, three separate Criminal Informations charging Joy Lee Recuerdo of Estafa
under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code involving 18 worthless bank checks
were simultaneously filed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan, the accusatory
portions of which read, thus:

A. Six (6) Unitrust Checks

Crim. Case No. 2750-M-94

"That sometime in the second week of December, 1993, in the municipality of Meycauayan, province
of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Joy Lee
Recuerdo, with intent to gain and by means of deceit, false pretenses and fraudulent manifestations,
and pretending to have sufficient funds with the Unitrust, Makati Commercial Center Branch, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously prepare, draw, make and issue the following
postdated checks, to wit:

Check No Date Amount

014355 April 5, 1994 ₱22,000.00

014356 May 5, 1994 22,000.00

014357 June 5, 1994 22,000.00

014358 July 5, 1994 22,000.00

014359 August 5, 1994 22,000.00

014360 September 5, 1994 22,000.00

with the total amount of P132,000.00 drawn against the said bank, and deliver the said checks to the
complaining witness Yolanda G. Floro as payment for pieces of jewelry she obtained from the said
complainant, knowing fully well at the time the checks were issued that her representations were
false for she had no sufficient funds in the said bank, so much that upon presentment of the said
checks with the said bank for encashment, the same were dishonored and refused payment for
having been drawn against an "Account Closed", and inspite of repeated demands to deposit with
the said bank the amount of P132,000.00, the said accused failed and refused to do so, to the
damage and prejudice of the said Yolanda G. Floro in the said amount of P132,000.00.

Contrary to law."

B. Six (6) PCI Bank Checks

Crim. Case No. 2807-M-94

"That sometime in the second week of December 1993, in the municipality of Meycauayan, province
of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Joy Lee
Recuerdo, with intent of gain and by means of deceit, false pretenses and fraudulent manifestations,
and pretending to have sufficient funds with the PCI Bank, Makati-De La Rosa Branch, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously prepare, draw, make and issue the following postdated
checks, to wit:

Check No. Date Amount

053051982A March 28, 1994 ₱13,000.00

053051983A April 28, 1994 13,000.00

053051984A May 28, 1994 13,000.00

053051985A June 28, 1994 13,000.00

053051986A July 28, 1994 13,000.00
053051987A August 28, 1994 13,000.00

with the total amount of P78,000.00 drawn against the said bank, and deliver the said checks to the
complaining witness Yolanda G. Floro as payment for pieces of jewelry she obtained from the said
complainant, knowing fully well at the time the checks were issued that her representations were
false for she had no sufficient funds in the said bank, so much that upon presentment of the said
checks with the said bank for encashment, the same were dishonored and refused payment for
having been drawn against an "Account Closed", and inspite of repeated demands to deposit with
the said bank the amount of P78,000.00, the said accused failed and refused to do so, to the
damage and prejudice of the said Yolanda G. Floro in the said amount of P78,000.00.

Contrary to law.

C. Six (6) Prudential Bank Checks

Criminal Case No. 2751-M-94

That on or about the 7th day of February, 1994, in the municipality of Meycauayan, province of
Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Joy Lee
Recuerdo, with intent of gain and by means of deceit, false pretenses and fraudulent manifestations,
and pretending to have sufficient funds with the Prudential Bank, Legaspi Village Branch, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously prepare, draw, make and issue the following postdated
checks, to wit:

Check No. Date Amount

0011783 March 13, 1994 P100,000.00

0011784 April 13, 1994 100,000.00

0011785 May 13, 1994 100,000.00
0011786 June 13, 1994 100,000.00

0011787 July 13, 1994 100,000.00

0011788 August 13, 1994 100,000.00

with the total amount of P600,000.00 drawn against the said bank, and deliver the said checks to the
complainant witness Yolanda G. Floro as payment for pieces of jewelry she obtained from the said
complainant, knowing fully well at the time the checks were issued that her representations were
false for she had no sufficient funds in the said bank, so much that upon presentment of the said
checks with the said bank for encashment, the same were dishonored and refused payment for
having been drawn against an "Account Closed", and inspite of repeated demands to deposit with
the said bank the amount of P600,000.00, the said accused failed and refused to do so, to the
damage and prejudice of the said Yolanda G. Floro in the said amount of P600,000.00

Contrary to law."

Evidence adduced by the Prosecution tend to establish that herein private respondent Yolanda G.
Floro is engaged in the business of buying and selling of jewelry since 1985. She regularly conducts
business at her residence located at No. 51 Interior, Poblacion, Meycauayan, Bulacan. Sometimes,
though, it was Floro who would personally visit her customers to show and offer them the pieces of
jewelry. Herein accused-appellant/petitioner Joy Lee Recuerdo, on the other hand, a dentist by
profession, who was introduced to Floro by the latter’s cousin Aimee Aoro in the first week of
December 1993, became her customer. Sometime in the second week of December 1993, at around
7:30 in the evening, Recuerdo went to the house of Floro in Meycauayan, Bulacan and purchased
from her two pieces of jewelry, to wit: a 2.19 carat diamond round stone in white gold setting
worth P220,000.00 pesos, and one piece of loose 1.55 karat marquez diamond with a value
of P130,000.00 pesos.

For the 2.19 carat diamond stone, accused issued and delivered to the complainant then and there
ten post-dated checks each in the amount of P22,000.00 drawn against Unitrust Development Bank,
Makati Commercial Center Branch. Only six (6) postdated checks, to wit: Checks Nos. 014356,
014357, 014358, 014359 and 014360 are subject of Criminal Case No. 2750-M-94. For the 1.55
carat marquez loose diamond, accused issued and delivered to complainant then and there ten (10)
postdated checks, each in the amount of P13,000.00 drawn against PCI Bank, Makati, Dela Rosa
Branch. Six of those checks are subject of Criminal Case No. 2807-M-94, to wit: Checks Nos.
053051983A, 053051984A, 053051985A, 053051986A and 053051987A, subject matter of Crim.
Case No. 2751-M-94.

In yet another transaction that transpired in the early evening of February 7, 1994, Recuerdo once
again proceeded at Floro’s house in Meycauayan, Bulacan and bought another set of jewelry, this
time a pair of diamond earrings worth P768,000.00 pesos. She was given seven (7) postdated
checks one for P168,000.00 as downpayment and another six (6) postdated checks drawn against
Prudential Bank, Legaspi Village, Makati Branch, each for P100,000.00 representing the balance in
the aggregate amount of P600,000.00 pesos (Checks Nos. 100783, 01184, 01185, 011786, 011787
and 011788, Record, Criminal Case No. 2750-M-94, pp. 138-150) subject matter of Crim. Case No.
2751-M-94.

Floro deposited the aforementioned checks at Liberty Savings & Loan Association, Meyc[a]uayan,
Bulacan. Upon presentment for encashment by said depositary bank with the different drawee banks
on their respective maturity dates, the six (6) Prudential Bank checks were all dishonored for having
been drawn against closed accounts. With her pieces of jewelry still unpaid, Floro, through counsel,
made formal demands requiring Requerdo to pay the amounts represented by the dishonored
checks (Record, supra, pp. 123, 138, and 151). Floro’s efforts to obtain payment, though, only
proved futile as Requerdo continuously refused to pay the value of the purchased pieces of jewelry.

Upon her arraignment on March 1, 1995 in Criminal Case No. 2807-M-94, and on April 4, 1995 in
Criminal Case Nos. 2750-M-94 and 2751-M-94, Recuerdo, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded
not guilty. (Record, Criminal Case No. 2807-M-94, p. 40; Criminal Case No. 2750-M-94, p. 58).
Considering the identity of the parties concerned, and the nature of the transactions from which the
charges of Estafa trace its roots, the three criminal cases were consolidated. Joint trial then ensured.
Recuerdo, on separate dates, posted three Personal Bail Bonds to obtain provisional liberty (Record,
Criminal Case No. 2750-M-94, p. 21; 2807-M-94, p. 27; 2751-M-94, p. 17).

By way of defense, Recuerdo posited the theory that the trial court of Malolos, Bulacan is devoid of
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the criminal cases against her, insisting that all the essential
elements of the crime of Estafa involving the bad checks occurred at the City of Makati, in that, all
her business transactions with Floro, to wit; the purchase of the pieces of jewelry and the
subsequent issuance of and delivery of the subject bank checks in payment thereof which eventually
bounced, all took place and were executed at her Dental Clinic located at the Medical Towers at
Suite 306, Herrera corner Ormaza Streets Legaspi Village Makati City. Furthermore, Recuerdo
argued that her act of issuing the dishonored checks does not constitute the offense of Estafa
considering that the subject checks were not issued and delivered to Floro simultaneous to the
purchase of the pieces of jewelry, but only several days thereafter, when she had already thoroughly
examined the jewelry and is fully satisfied of its fine quality (TSN, Joy Lee Recuerdo, January 16,
1996, pp. 3-18).2

On July 28, 1997, the trial court rendered a Joint Decision convicting petitioner Joy Lee Recuerdo of
two counts of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code. The fallo of the
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused JOY LEE RECUERDO GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of two (2) counts of estafa, defined and penalized under Article 315, par. 2[b] (sic) of the
Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences her as follows:

1. In Criminal Case Nos. 2750-M-94 and 2807-M-94, to suffer an indeterminate penalty of

imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day of prison correccional as minimum
to twelve (12) years and one (1) day reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay Yolanda
Floro by way of civil indemnity the amount of P210,000.00 pesos plus interest from the filing
of the information until fully paid; and

2. In Criminal Case No. 2751-M-94, to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment

ranging from six (6) minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
 maximum and to pay Yolanda Floro by way of civil indemnity the amount of P600,000.00
pesos plus interest from the filing of the information until fully paid.

In both cases, accused shall pay the costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED.3

Petitioner appealed the decision to the CA on the following assignment of errors:

I.

The Regional Trial Court erred in finding that the Municipal Trial Court, Meycauayan,
Bulacan, Branch I did not pass upon the merits of the criminal cases filed against the
petitioner by confining and limiting itself merely to the dispositive portion of the Joint Decision
dated 28 January 1998 rendered by the latter court, instead of reading the Joint Decision as
a whole to get its true meaning and intent.

II.

The Regional Trial Court erred in affirming the judgment of conviction rendered by the
Municipal Trial Court, Meycauayan, Bulacan, Branch II which is in derogation of the
petitioner’s right against double jeopardy considering that the latter was previously acquitted
of the same criminal cases by the Municipal Trial Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, Branch I.

III.

The Regional Trial Court erred in finding that all proceedings in the court a quo have been
made in the presence and with the authority of the public prosecutor, in the face of the
undisputed fact that the appeal initiated by the private respondent is fatally defective
because it was filed without the concurrence, permission and authority of the public
prosecutor, in this case, the provincial prosecutor of Bulacan.4

Petitioner averred that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the offenses charged because the
crimes were committed in Makati City and not in Malolos, Bulacan where the Informations were filed.
The prosecution failed to prove the essential element of deceit because she drew and delivered the
postdated checks to the private complainant after the jewelries had been delivered. Moreover, she
was denied the right to due process.

On August 23, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming with modification the decision of the RTC
as to the penalty meted on the appellant. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration insisting that
based on the evidence on record, out of the 17 subject checks, nine were honored by the drawee
banks. Moreover, she made partial payments of the amounts of the subject checks while the case
was pending in the CA. Contrary to the finding of the trial court and the appellate courts that she
acted with deceit when she drew and delivered the checks in payment of the pieces of jewelry she
purchased from the private complainant, she in fact acted in good faith; hence, should be acquitted
based on the decision of this Court in People v. Ojeda.5 The CA denied the motion on May 20, 2005.

Petitioner filed the instant petition contending that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED THE CASE CONVICTING THE PETITIONER IN A
WAY PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH –
A. THE BENEFICENT RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT ENUNCIATED IN PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES V. CORA ABELLA OJEDA (G.R. NOS. 104238-58, JUNE 3, 2004) WHERE IT HELD
THAT A DEBTOR’S OFFER TO ARRANGE A PAYMENT SCHEME WITH HIS CREDITOR AND
PAYMENT OF THE OBLIGATION INDICATE GOOD FAITH THAT SUCCESSFULLY REBUTS THE
PRESUMPTION OF DECEIT.

B. WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT ENUNCIATED IN

BORROMEO V. COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE V. CLORES, ET AL., PEOPLE V. BAUTISTA
AND PEOPLE V. BENITO GO BIONG, JR. DIRECTING THAT IN CRIMINAL CASES, ALL
CIRCUMSTANCES AGAINST GUILT AND IN FAVOR OF INNOCENCE MUST BE TAKEN INTO
ACCOUNT.

C. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE

ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE WHICH HOLDS THAT WHEN FACED WITH TWO
PROBABILITIES, ONE CONSISTENT WITH GUILT AND THE OTHER WITH INNOCENCE, THE
SCALES OF JUSTICE SHOULD TILT IN FAVOR OF INNOCENCE.

D. THE APPLICABLE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT WHICH DIRECTS THAT IN ESTAFA
CASES, IT IS OF PRIMORDIAL SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE
EXACT DATE OF THE TRANSACTION AND THE EXACT DATE OF THE ISSUANCE OF THE
CHECKS.6

Petitioner avers that she acted in good faith and exerted her utmost efforts to confer with the private
complainant to settle her obligations. She points out that she made monthly cash payments to
lessen her civil liability and later on, for convenience, deposited the monthly payments at the private
complainant’s bank account with the Bank of the Philippine Islands. She continued to make
payments even during the pendency of the case in the CA, and continues to make deposits to
private complainant’s bank account.

Petitioner asserts that her efforts to settle her civil obligations to the private complainant indicate that
she has no intention of duping the latter, as well as the absence of deceit on her part. That she failed
to comply with her obligations by failing to make good the checks as they fell due does not suggest
deceit, but at best only financial hardship in fulfilling her civil obligations. Thus, there is no factual
and legal basis to convict her of estafa. Petitioner insists that criminal intent in embezzlement is not
based on technical mistakes as to the legal effect of a transaction honestly entered into, and there
can be no embezzlement if the mind of the person doing the act is innocent or if there is no wrongful
purpose.

Petitioner further avers that she should be benefited by the Court’s ruling in People v.
Ojeda,7 considering that the facts therein are parallel if not almost identical to this case, the only
difference being that, in the Ojeda case, the accused-appellant was able to fully settle her civil
obligations. Petitioner points out that she is still paying her obligations to the private complainant and
further argues that:

[i]n Criminal Case No. 2750-M-94, the petitioner issued ten (10) postdated Unitrust Development
Bank checks to the private complainant for the purchase of a 2.19 carat diamond stone in white gold
setting. Out of the ten (10) checks, four checks were duly funded when presented for acceptance
and payment. In Criminal Case No. 2807-M-94, the petitioner issued ten (10) post-dated PCI Bank
checks to the private complaint for the purchase of a 1.55 carat marquez loose diamond. The first
four (4) checks were duly funded when presented for acceptance and payment. In Criminal Case
No. 2751-M-94, the petitioner issued seven (7) post-dated Prudential Bank checks to the private
complainant for the purchase of a pair of diamond earrings. The amount covered by the first check
was paid and settled. The rest bounced.

The petitioner respectfully submits that the act of the petitioner --- OF DULY FUNDING SOME OF
THE POST-DATED CHECKS WHICH SHE ISSUED, SPECIFICALLY THOSE WHICH BECAME
DUE FIRST OR EARLIER – is and should be considered in law as, a CIRCUMSTANCE
INDICATING GOOD FAITH AND ABSENCE OF DECEIT.8

For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General asserts:

In the case of Ojeda, the prosecution failed to prove deceit. Ojeda never assured Chua the checks
were funded. Chua knew that the checks were issued to guarantee future payments. Furthermore,
Ojeda did not only make arrangements for payment but she fully paid the entire amount of the
dishonored checks.

In the instant case, the elements of deceit and damage were established by convincing evidence.
Petitioner Recuerdo issued the subject bank checks as payment for the pieces of jewelry
simultaneous to the transactions, that is, on the very same occasion when the pieces of jewelry were
bought. The issuance of the check by Recuerdo was the principal inducement to private complainant
to part with the subject jewelries (CA Decision, pp. 12-13). In addition, petitioner only promised to
replace the dishonored checks but she did not settle her obligations with private complainant.
Assuming that there was an offer to settle her obligations, this will not overturn the findings of the
trial court and the Court of Appeals as to the presence of deceit.

The guilt of petitioner was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

The crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code has the following
basic elements:

Postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted simultaneously at the time

the check was issued;

The postdating or issuance was done when the offender had no funds in the bank, or that his funds
deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check; and

Damage to the payee thereof (Justice Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Thirteenth Edition
1993, Book Two, p. 693; People v. Panganiban, 335 SCRA 354).

The existence of the foregoing elements of the crime was concretely established by the prosecution
through convincing evidence, warranting petitioner’s conviction of the offense of Estafa.

The trial court found private complainant Floro’s testimony that petitioner issued the subject checks
as payment for the purchase of pieces of jewelry simultaneous to their transactions to be categorical
and credible. There was sufficient evidence established by the prosecution that the checks were
issued by the accused to the complainant in exchange of the pieces of jewelry given to her on two
separate occasions.

The issue of deceit raised by petitioner is a factual issue and must be proved by evidence. The
finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the issuance of petitioner was tainted with
fraud or deceit is a factual finding that binds this Honorable Court (Jose R. Guevarra vs. The Hon.
Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 100894, prom. January 26, 1993).9
In reply, petitioner avers that she is a dentist/orthodontist with a fairly established practice at the
Medical Towers, Ibarra St., Legaspi Village, Makati City. She did not move out of her office because
she had no intention to renege on her obligations to the private complainant.

The petition is denied for lack of merit.

Estafa through false pretense or fraudulent act under Paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885, is committed as follows:

By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no
funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the
check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check
within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said check
has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit
constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.

The essential elements of the felony are: (1) a check is postdated or issued in payment of an
obligation contracted at the time it is issued; (2) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and
(3) damage to the payee thereof.10 It is criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check which is
made punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and not the non-payment of a debt.11 Deceit is the
false representation of a matter of fact whether by words or conduct by false or misleading
allegations or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed which deceives or is
intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury.12 Concealment which the
law denotes as fraudulent implies a purpose or design to hide facts which the other party ought to
have.13 The postdating or issuing of a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no
funds in the bank or his funds deposited therein are not sufficient to cover the amount of the check is
a false pretense or a fraudulent act.14

There is no false pretense or fraudulent act if a postdated check is issued in payment of a pre-
existing obligation.15As the Court emphasized in Timbal v. Court of Appeals:16

x x x In order to constitute Estafa under the statutory provisions, the act of postdating or of issuing a
check in payment of an obligation must be the efficient cause of the defraudation; accordingly, it
should be either prior to or simultaneous with the act of fraud. In fine, the offender must be able to
obtain money or property from the offended party by reason of the issuance, whether postdated or
not, of the check. It must be shown that the person to whom the check is delivered would not have
parted with his money or property were it not for the issuance of the check by the other party.

Estafa is a felony committed by dolo (with malice). For one to be criminally liable for estafa under
paragraph (2)(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, malice and specific intent to defraud are
required.

General criminal intent is an element of all crimes but malice is properly applied only to deliberate
acts done on purpose and with design. Evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to be a
felony. A deliberate and unlawful act gives rise to a presumption of malice by intent. On the other
hand, specific intent is a definite and actual purpose to accomplish some particular thing.

The general criminal intent is presumed from the criminal act and in the absence of any general
intent is relied upon as a defense, such absence must be proved by the accused. Generally, a
specific intent is not presumed. Its existence, as a matter of fact, must be proved by the State just as
any other essential element. This may be shown, however, by the nature of the act, the
circumstances under which it was committed, the means employed and the motive of the accused.17
The law provides that, in estafa, prima facie evidence of deceit is established upon proof that the
drawer of the check failed to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days
from receipt of the notice of dishonor for lack or insufficiency of funds. A prima facie evidence need
not be rebutted by a preponderance of evidence, nor by evidence of greater weight. The evidence of
the accused which equalizes the weight of the People’s evidence or puts the case in equipoise is
sufficient. As a result, the People will have to go forward with the proof. Should it happen that, at the
trial the weight of evidence is equally balanced or at equilibrium and the presumption operates
against the People who has the burden of proof, it cannot prevail.18

There can be no estafa if the accused acted in good faith because good faith negates malice and
deceit.19 Good faith is an intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning or statutory
definition, and it encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the absence of malice and the
absence of design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage. An individual’s personal
good faith is a concept of his own mind, therefore, may not conclusively be determined by his
protestations alone. It implies honesty of intention and freedom from knowledge of circumstances
which ought to put the holder upon inquiry. The essence of good faith lies in an honest belief in the
validity of one’s right, ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of intention to overreach
another.20 In People v. Gulion,21 the Court held that:

Good faith is a defense to a charge of Estafa by postdating a check. This may be manifested by the
accused’s offering to make arrangements with his creditor as to the manner of payment or, as in the
present case, averring that his placing his signature on the questioned checks was purely a result of
his gullibility and inadvertence, with the unfortunate result that he himself became a victim of the
trickery and manipulations of accused-at-large.22

In the present case, the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the
petitioner of the crime charged. The trial court gave credence and probative weight to the evidence
of the People and disbelieved that proferred by the petitioner.

Petitioner’s insistence of her good faith and her reliance on the ruling of this Court in the Ojeda case
were raised as a mere afterthought in a last ditch effort to secure her acquittal, as these arguments
were invoked only in her motion for reconsideration of the CA decision. In Pascual v. Ramos,23 this
Court held that if an issue is raised only in the motion for reconsideration of the appellate court’s
decision, it is as if it was never raised in that court at all.

Petitioner’s defense of good faith is even belied by the evidence of the prosecution and her own
evidence. When the postdated checks issued by petitioner were dishonored by the drawee banks
and the private complainant made demands for her to pay the amounts of the checks, she
intransigently refused to pay; she insisted that she issued and delivered the postdated checks to the
private complainant after the subject pieces of jewelry had been delivered to her. Petitioner never
offered to pay the amounts of the checks after she was informed by the private complainant that they
had been dishonored by the drawee banks, the private complainant thus charged her with estafa
before the RTC. It was only during the period of January 4, 2005 to June 27, 2005, after the CA
promulgated its decision affirming the decision of the trial court, that petitioner made several
payments to the private complainant. While petitioner appended the deposit slips24 to her motion for
reconsideration in the CA and her petition in this Court, there is no showing as to which checks they
were made in payment for. In fine, it was the spectre of a long prison term which jolted petitioner into
making remittances to the private complainant, after the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court
and increased the penalty meted on her, and not because she had acted in good faith in her
transactions with the private complainant. To reiterate, petitioner rejected the demands of the private
complainant to pay the amounts of the dishonored checks.
While it is true that nine of the 17 postdated checks petitioner issued and delivered to the private
complainant were honored by the drawee banks, such a circumstance is not a justification for her
acquittal of the charges relative to the dishonored checks. The reimbursement or restitution to the
offended party of the sums swindled by the petitioner does not extinguish the criminal liability of the
latter. It only extinguishes pro tanto the civil liability.25Moreover, estafa is a public offense which must
be prosecuted and punished by the State on its own motion even though complete reparation had
been made for the loss or damage suffered by the offended party.26 The consent of the private
complainant to petitioner’s payment of her civil liability pendente lite does not entitle the latter to an
acquittal. Subsequent payments does not obliterate the criminal liability already incurred.27 Criminal
liability for estafa is not affected by a compromise between petitioner and the private complainant on
the former’s civil liability.28

Petitioner cannot find solace in the Court’s ruling in the Ojeda case. The CA correctly refuted the
submission of the petitioner in its decision, thus:

This Court is in full agreement with the position advanced by the Office of the Solicitor General that
on account of the glaring dissimilarities between the factual backdrop of the case of Ojeda, on one
hand, and the material facts obtaining in the case at bench, on the other, the doctrine in the former
case may not be applied to benefit accused-appellant. Indeed, even accused-appellant herself was
quick to admit that the facts of her case are not entirely on all fours with those that obtained in the
case of Ojeda. At the outset, emphasis must be made of the fact that the acquittal of the accused in
the Ojeda case was brought about by a combination of reasons not obtaining in the present case.
First, the Supreme Court ruled out the existence of deceit and intent to defraud in the case of Ojeda
in view of the fact that the accused therein performed extraordinary efforts to gradually pay and
settle her monetary obligations with the private complainant, and this convinced the High Court that
the acts of the accused were not tainted with malice, bad faith and criminal intent. Verily, the
accused in the Ojeda case not only made determined and honest arrangements to pay the private
complainant, but was likewise able to actually satisfy with completeness the sums she owed the
latter, and this was evidenced by an affidavit of desistance where the private complainant
categorically declared that the accused already paid in full her monetary obligations. The facts in the
instant case, however, are totally different. Contrary to the contention of accused-appellant, she
never made a determined and earnest effort to arrange and settle with Floro with the end in view of
paying her monetary obligations. In truth, accused-appellant simply promised to pay Floro the value
of the dishonored checks that were issued in payment for the pieces of jewelry. However, that was
all there was to it, and lamentably said promise turned out to be an empty one as accused-appellant
never made good her commitment to pay for the value of the dishonored checks. Accused-appellant
never arranged a payment scheme with Floro, and as the facts of the case would disclose she never
made any gradual payment to Floro as shown by the fact that the value of the dishonored checks
remained unpaid, in direct contrast with the facts of the Ojeda case where the accused was able to
pay in full. Suffice it to say that accused-appellant failed to perform any concrete act to show that
she had the intention of paying Floro for the value of the purchased pieces of jewelry, in order to
somehow rebut the fact duly established by the prosecution that deceit attended her business
dealings with Floro. It must be reiterated that We have found that accused-appellant issued the
subject bank checks as payment for the pieces of jewelry simultaneous with her transactions with
Floro, and that was, on the very same occasion when the pieces of jewelry were purchased, first, on
the second week of December 1993, and subsequently, on February 7, 1994. It being clear that the
subject bank checks were issued simultaneous with said transactions, it likewise became evident
that deceit attended accused-appellants’ dealings with Floro for the same only goes to show that the
bum checks were issued to Floro in order to induce her to part with the pieces of jewelry in favor of
accused-appellant.

In addition to the foregoing, the High Court likewise found in the Ojeda case that the prosecution
miserably failed to adduce evidence to establish that the indispensable element of notice of dishonor
was sent to and was received by the accused therein. In the case at bench, however, it is
undisputed that after the dishonor of the subject bank checks Floro, through counsel, made repeated
formal demands requiring accused-appellant to pay for the value of the bum checks, perforce the
notice of dishonor which is required to properly prosecute and eventually convict an accused of the
crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code has been sufficiently
met.29

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

This position finds support in the case of Borromeo vs. Court of Appeals, 131 SCRA 318, 327, where
the Supreme Court, citing the cases of People vs. Clores, et al., 125 SCRA 67 and People vs.
Bautista, 81 Phil. 78, held that –

Finally, EVERY CIRCUMSTANCES AGAINST GUILT AND IN FAVOR OF INNOCENCE MUST BE

TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT and suspicion no matter how strong should not sway judgment. Where the
evidence, as here, gives rise to TWO PROBABILITIES, one consistent with the defendant’s
innocence and another indicative of his guilt, THAT WHICH IS FAVORABLE to the accused should
be CONSIDERED. The constitutional presumption of innocence continues until overthrown by proof
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, which requires moral certainty which convinces and satisfies the
reason and conscience of those who are to act upon it.

C. In criminal cases, where there are two probabilities or where the court is faced with two conflicting
statements, one consistent with guilt and the other with innocence, that which is favorable to the
accused should be considered.
The petitioner has in her favor the presumption of innocence. Under this presumption, it is required
that where the court is confronted with two probabilities, one consistent with guilt and the other with
innocence, the later (sic) should prevail. It is thus required that every circumstance against guilt and
in favor of her innocence be duly taken into account. The proof against her must survive the test of
reason." This presumption of innocence is a "conclusion of law in favor of the accused, whereby his
innocence is not ONLY ESTABLISHED BUT CONTINUES until sufficient evidence is introduced to
overcome the proof which the law has created – that is, his INNOCENCE…."

In the case at bar, the parties gave two versions as to the circumstances surrounding their
transactions. The version of the prosecution is that the checks were issued at the time that she
parted with her pieces of jewelry. This claim is supported by the lone and uncorroborated testimony
of the private complainant.

The version of the petitioner is different. She claims that the private complainant left the pieces of
jewelry to her at her office and that she issued the checks about a week thereafter. Her claim is that
the checks were issued a few days after the private complainant had already parted with the pieces
of jewelry. The transactions were not simultaneous. This claim is in a way corroborated by the
testimony of another witness, a dental aide, who affirmed the petitioner’s testimony that in fact, it
was the private complainant who went to petitioner’s office in Makati City, and who belied private
complainant’s claim that the petitioner went to her house in Meycauayan, Bulacan.

Conformably with the constitutional presumption of innocence, the version of the petitioner, as
testified by her and corroborated by her dental aide, and which excludes the presence of deceit,
should have received more weight than the uncorroborated version of the private complainant. When
the testimonies are conflicting, the scales should tip in favor of the accused.

D. In estafa, it is of primordial significance for the prosecution to prove the exact date of transaction
and the exact date of the issuance of the checks

In Crim. Case Nos. 275-M-94 and 2807-M-94, the prosecution could not even place the specific
dates when the pieces of jewelry were delivered to the petitioner and the checks were issued to the
private complainant, save for saying that the offense happened in the second week of December
1993. In the prosecution for estafa under Art. 315, par. 2(b) of the Revised Penal Code, the date
when the reciprocated receipt of benefits took place is crucial.

When the law and jurisprudence require as one of the elements for estafa that the check should
have been issued as the "IMMEDIATE CONSIDERATION for the RECIPROCATED RECEIPT of
benefits", said checks should have been issued "CONCURRENTLY WITH" and "IN EX[C]HANGE"
for the material gain derived. If the checks were issued a day or two after the receipt of benefits,
there will no longer be a case of estafa since the obligation would already be pre-existing. Therefore,
it is of primordial significance for the prosecution to prove the EXACT DATE OF THE
TRANSACTION and the EXACT DATE of the issuance of the checks. Otherwise, any conviction for
estafa would be impermissibly premised on conjectures, suppositions, and conclusions of facts. Any
such conviction would fail to meet the beyond-reasonable-doubt standard required in criminal cases.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.

Gibb & Gale, for appellant.

Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.

CARSON, J.:

The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is limited to the testimony of the
accused himself, because from the very nature of these facts and from the circumstances
surrounding the incident upon which these proceedings rest, no other evidence as to these facts was
available either to the prosecution or to the defense. We think, however, that, giving the accused the
benefit of the doubt as to the weight of the evidence touching those details of the incident as to
which there can be said to be any doubt, the following statement of the material facts disclose by the
record may be taken to be substantially correct:

The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc Kinley,
Rizal Province, and at the same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was employed as a house boy
or muchacho. "Officers' quarters No. 27" as a detached house situates some 40 meters from the
nearest building, and in August, 19087, was occupied solely as an officers' mess or club. No one
slept in the house except the two servants, who jointly occupied a small room toward the rear of the
building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch running along the side of the building, by
which communication was had with the other part of the house. This porch was covered by a heavy
growth of vines for its entire length and height. The door of the room was not furnished with a
permanent bolt or lock, and occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a small hook or catch
on the inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of
fastening the door by placing against it a chair. In the room there was but one small window, which,
like the door, opened on the porch. Aside from the door and window, there were no other openings
of any kind in the room.

On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had received for the night,
was suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and
called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door
that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. Due to the
heavy growth of vines along the front of the porch, the room was very dark, and the defendant,
fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the
room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair
which had been placed against the door. In the darkness and confusion the defendant thought that
the blow had been inflicted by the person who had forced the door open, whom he supposed to be a
burglar, though in the light of after events, it is probable that the chair was merely thrown back into
the room by the sudden opening of the door against which it rested. Seizing a common kitchen knife
which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards
turned out, was his roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell down on the steps
in a desperately wounded condition, followed by the defendant, who immediately recognized him in
the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers who slept in the next
house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.

There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident just
described, one of which took place in a house in which the defendant was employed as cook; and as
defendant alleges, it was because of these repeated robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his
personal protection.

The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have on friendly and
amicable terms prior to the fatal incident, had an understanding that when either returned at night,
he should knock at the door and acquiant his companion with his identity. Pascual had left the house
early in the evening and gone for a walk with his friends, Celestino Quiambao and Mariano Ibañez,
servants employed at officers' quarters No. 28, the nearest house to the mess hall. The three
returned from their walk at about 10 o'clock, and Celestino and Mariano stopped at their room at No.
28, Pascual going on to his room at No. 27. A few moments after the party separated, Celestino and
Mariano heard cries for assistance and upon returning to No. 27 found Pascual sitting on the back
steps fatally wounded in the stomach, whereupon one of them ran back to No. 28 and called
Liuetenants Jacobs and Healy, who immediately went to the aid of the wounded man.

The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said that he did it
under the impression that Pascual was "a ladron" because he forced open the door of their sleeping
room, despite defendant's warnings.

No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of Pascuals suggests itself, unless
it be that the boy in a spirit of mischief was playing a trick on his Chinese roommate, and sought to
frightened him by forcing his way into the room, refusing to give his name or say who he was, in
order to make Ah Chong believe that he was being attacked by a robber.

Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the military hospital,
where he died from the effects of the wound on the following day.

The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the trial court
of simple homicide, with extenuating circumstances, and sentenced to six years and one
day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed by law.

At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate, Pascual Gualberto,
but insisted that he struck the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his
lawful right of self-defense.

Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that —

The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal liability:

xxx xxx xxx

 4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the following attendant
circumstances:

(1) Illegal aggression.

(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.

(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant would be entitle to
complete exception from criminal liability for the death of the victim of his fatal blow, if the intruder
who forced open the door of his room had been in fact a dangerous thief or "ladron," as the
defendant believed him to be. No one, under such circumstances, would doubt the right of the
defendant to resist and repel such an intrusion, and the thief having forced open the door
notwithstanding defendant's thrice-repeated warning to desist, and his threat that he would kill the
intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned that in the darkness of the night, in a
small room, with no means of escape, with the thief advancing upon him despite his warnings
defendant would have been wholly justified in using any available weapon to defend himself from
such an assault, and in striking promptly, without waiting for the thief to discover his whereabouts
and deliver the first blow.

But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a "ladron." That neither the
defendant nor his property nor any of the property under his charge was in real danger at the time
when he struck the fatal blow. That there was no such "unlawful aggression" on the part of a thief or
"ladron" as defendant believed he was repelling and resisting, and that there was no real "necessity"
for the use of the knife to defend his person or his property or the property under his charge.

The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally
responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt
from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the
crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when
he committed the act. To this question we think there can be but one answer, and we hold that under
such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or
mistake or fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.

In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to
negative a particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged
(e.g., in larcerny, animus furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes intent) "cancels the presumption of
intent," and works an acquittal; except in those cases where the circumstances demand a conviction
under the penal provisions touching criminal negligence; and in cases where, under the provisions of
article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or misdeamor incurs criminal liability
for any wrongful act committed by him, even though it be different from that which he intended to
commit. (Wharton's Criminal Law, sec. 87 and cases cited; McClain's Crim. Law, sec. 133 and cases
cited; Pettit vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240; Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met., 596; Yates vs. People, 32
N.Y., 509; Isham vs. State, 38 Ala., 213; Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met., 500.)

The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion, and the only question worthy of
consideration is whether malice or criminal intent is an essential element or ingredient of the crimes
of homicide and assassination as defined and penalized in the Penal Code. It has been said that
since the definitions there given of these as well as most other crimes and offense therein defined,
do not specifically and expressly declare that the acts constituting the crime or offense must be
committed with malice or with criminal intent in order that the actor may be held criminally liable, the
commission of the acts set out in the various definitions subjects the actor to the penalties described
therein, unless it appears that he is exempted from liability under one or other of the express
provisions of article 8 of the code, which treats of exemption. But while it is true that contrary to the
general rule of legislative enactment in the United States, the definitions of crimes and offenses as
set out in the Penal Code rarely contain provisions expressly declaring that malice or criminal intent
is an essential ingredient of the crime, nevertheless, the general provisions of article 1 of the code
clearly indicate that malice, or criminal intent in some form, is an essential requisite of all crimes and
offense therein defined, in the absence of express provisions modifying the general rule, such as are
those touching liability resulting from acts negligently or imprudently committed, and acts done by
one voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor, where the act committed is different from that
which he intended to commit. And it is to be observed that even these exceptions are more apparent
than real, for "There is little distinction, except in degree, between a will to do a wrongful thing and
indifference whether it is done or not. Therefore carelessness is criminal, and within limits supplies
the place of the affirmative criminal intent" (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, s. 313); and, again,
"There is so little difference between a disposition to do a great harm and a disposition to do harm
that one of them may very well be looked upon as the measure of the other. Since, therefore, the
guilt of a crime consists in the disposition to do harm, which the criminal shows by committing it, and
since this disposition is greater or less in proportion to the harm which is done by the crime, the
consequence is that the guilt of the crime follows the same proportion; it is greater or less according
as the crime in its own nature does greater or less harm" (Ruth. Ints. C. 18, p. 11); or, as it has been
otherwise stated, the thing done, having proceeded from a corrupt mid, is to be viewed the same
whether the corruption was of one particular form or another.

Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:

Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.

Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily unless the
contrary shall appear.

An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even
though the wrongful act committed be different from that which he had intended to commit.

The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the word "voluntary" as used in
this article, say that a voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and intentional act, and roundly asserts that
without intention (intention to do wrong or criminal intention) there can be no crime; and that the
word "voluntary" implies and includes the words "con malicia," which were expressly set out in the
definition of the word "crime" in the code of 1822, but omitted from the code of 1870, because, as
Pacheco insists, their use in the former code was redundant, being implied and included in the word
"voluntary." (Pacheco, Codigo Penal, vol. 1, p. 74.)

Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime can only be said to exempt
from criminal responsibility when the act which was actually intended to be done was in itself a lawful
one, and in the absence of negligence or imprudence, nevertheless admits and recognizes in his
discussion of the provisions of this article of the code that in general without intention there can be
no crime. (Viada, vol. 1, p. 16.) And, as we have shown above, the exceptions insisted upon by
Viada are more apparent than real.

Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:

In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which declared that where there is no
intention there is no crime . . . in order to affirm, without fear of mistake, that under our code
 there can be no crime if there is no act, an act which must fall within the sphere of ethics if
there is no moral injury. (Vol. 2, the Criminal Law, folio 169.)

And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, as, for example in its
sentence of May 31, 1882, in which it made use of the following language:

It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime, involve all the malice which is
supposed from the operation of the will and an intent to cause the injury which may be the
object of the crime.

And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that "considering that, whatever may be
the civil effects of the inscription of his three sons, made by the appellant in the civil registry and in
the parochial church, there can be no crime because of the lack of the necessary element or criminal
intention, which characterizes every action or ommission punished by law; nor is he guilty of criminal
negligence."

And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it made use of the following language:

. . . Considering that the moral element of the crime, that is, intent or malice or their absence
in the commission of an act defined and punished by law as criminal, is not a necessary
question of fact submitted to the exclusive judgment and decision of the trial court.

That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an essential element of the
various crimes and misdemeanors therein defined becomes clear also from an examination of the
provisions of article 568, which are as follows:

He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if done with malice, would
constitute a grave crime, shall be punished with the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
degree, to prision correccional in its minimum degrees if it shall constitute a less grave crime.

He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime through simple imprudence or
negligence shall incur the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum degrees.

In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed according to their discretion,
without being subject to the rules prescribed in article 81.

The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty prescribed for the crime is
equal to or less than those contained in the first paragraph thereof, in which case the courts
shall apply the next one thereto in the degree which they may consider proper.

The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the words "criminal intent,"
and the direct inference from its provisions is that the commission of the acts contemplated therein,
in the absence of malice (criminal intent), negligence, and imprudence, does not impose any criminal
liability on the actor.

The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to approximate in meaning
the word "willful" as used in English and American statute to designate a form of criminal intent. It
has been said that while the word "willful" sometimes means little more than intentionally or
designedly, yet it is more frequently understood to extent a little further and approximate the idea of
the milder kind of legal malice; that is, it signifies an evil intent without justifiable excuse. In one case
it was said to mean, as employed in a statute in contemplation, "wantonly" or "causelessly;" in
another, "without reasonable grounds to believe the thing lawful." And Shaw, C. J., once said that
ordinarily in a statute it means "not merely `voluntarily' but with a bad purpose; in other words,
corruptly." In English and the American statutes defining crimes "malice," "malicious," "maliciously,"
and "malice aforethought" are words indicating intent, more purely technical than "willful" or willfully,"
but "the difference between them is not great;" the word "malice" not often being understood to
require general malevolence toward a particular individual, and signifying rather the intent from our
legal justification. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 428 and 429, and cases cited.)

But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a condition in the definition of a
crime that it be committed "voluntarily," willfully," "maliciously" "with malice aforethought," or in one of
the various modes generally construed to imply a criminal intent, we think that reasoning from
general principles it will always be found that with the rare exceptions hereinafter mentioned, to
constitute a crime evil intent must combine with an act. Mr. Bishop, who supports his position with
numerous citations from the decided cases, thus forcely present this doctrine:

In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from civil than in the rule as to the
intent. In controversies between private parties the quo animo with which a thing was done is
sometimes important, not always; but crime proceeds only from a criminal mind. So that —

There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words, punishment is
the sentence of wickedness, without which it can not be. And neither in philosophical
speculation nor in religious or mortal sentiment would any people in any age allow that a
man should be deemed guilty unless his mind was so. It is therefore a principle of our legal
system, as probably it is of every other, that the essence of an offense is the wrongful intent,
without which it can not exists. We find this doctrine confirmed by —

Legal maxims. — The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the modern, is distinct on this
subject. It consequently has supplied to us such maxims as Actus non facit reum nisi mens
sit rea, "the act itself does not make man guilty unless his intention were so;" Actus me incito
factus non est meus actus, "an act done by me against my will is not my act;" and others of
the like sort. In this, as just said, criminal jurisprudence differs from civil. So also —

Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing. "By reference to the intention, we
inculpate or exculpate others or ourselves without any respect to the happiness or misery
actually produced. Let the result of an action be what it may, we hold a man guilty simply on
the ground of intention; or, on the dame ground, we hold him innocent." The calm judgment
of mankind keeps this doctrine among its jewels. In times of excitement, when vengeance
takes the place of justice, every guard around the innocent is cast down. But with the return
of reason comes the public voice that where the mind is pure, he who differs in act from his
neighbors does not offend. And —

In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature given by God to man, no one
deems another to deserve punishment for what he did from an upright mind, destitute of
every form of evil. And whenever a person is made to suffer a punishment which the
community deems not his due, so far from its placing an evil mark upon him, it elevates him
to the seat of the martyr. Even infancy itself spontaneously pleads the want of bad intent in
justification of what has the appearance of wrong, with the utmost confidence that the plea, if
its truth is credited, will be accepted as good. Now these facts are only the voice of nature
uttering one of her immutable truths. It is, then, the doctrine of the law, superior to all other
doctrines, because first in nature from which the law itself proceeds, that no man is to be
punished as a criminal unless his intent is wrong. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs.
286 to 290.)
Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent departure from this doctrine of
abstract justice result from the adoption of the arbitrary rule that Ignorantia juris non
excusat ("Ignorance of the law excuses no man"), without which justice could not be administered in
our tribunals; and compelled also by the same doctrine of necessity, the courts have recognized the
power of the legislature to forbid, in a limited class of cases, the doing of certain acts, and to make
their commission criminal without regard to the intent of the doer. Without discussing these
exceptional cases at length, it is sufficient here to say that the courts have always held that unless
the intention of the lawmaker to make the commission of certain acts criminal without regard to the
intent of the doer is clear and beyond question the statute will not be so construed (cases cited in
Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158, notes 76 and 77); and the rule that ignorance of the law excuses no man has
been said not to be a real departure from the law's fundamental principle that crime exists only
where the mind is at fault, because "the evil purpose need not be to break the law, and if suffices if it
is simply to do the thing which the law in fact forbids." (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 300, and
cases cited.)

But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing necessity therefore, requiring
mistake in fact to be dealt with otherwise that in strict accord with the principles of abstract justice.
On the contrary, the maxim here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is,
in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse"). (Brown's Leg. Max., 2d ed., 190.)

Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as
shows the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the
actor from criminal liability provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part; and as laid
down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear
to him." (Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1 Den. C., 387; P. vs. Anderson, 44 Cal.., 65; P. vs. Lamb, 54 Barb.,
342; Yates vs. P., 32 N. Y., 509; Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb., 625; Reg. vs. Cohen, 8 Cox C. C., 41;
P. vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207, 209; Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.) That is to say, the question as to
whether he honestly, in good faith, and without fault or negligence fell into the mistake is to be
determined by the circumstances as they appeared to him at the time when the mistake was made,
and the effect which the surrounding circumstances might reasonably be expected to have on his
mind, in forming the intent, criminal or other wise, upon which he acted.

If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the
existence of facts which will justify a killing — or, in terms more nicely in accord with the
principles on which the rule is founded, if without fault or carelessness he does believe them
— he is legally guiltless of the homicide; though he mistook the facts, and so the life of an
innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and with reference to the right
of self-defense and the not quite harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine of reason and
sufficiently sustained in adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions apparently
adverse, whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he is justified in acting on the facts as
they appear to him. If, without fault or carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and
defends himself correctly according to what he thus supposes the facts to be the law will not
punish him though they are in truth otherwise, and he was really no occassion for the
extreme measures. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 305, and large array of cases there
cited.)

The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the application of this rule is the
case where a man, masked and disguised as a footpad, at night and on a lonely road, "holds up" his
friends in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled pistol demands his money or his life, but is killed by
his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack is a real one, that the pistol leveled at his head is
loaded, and that his life and property are in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. No one
will doubt that if the facts were such as the slayer believed them to be he would be innocent of the
commission of any crime and wholly exempt from criminal liability, although if he knew the real state
of the facts when he took the life of his friend he would undoubtedly be guilty of the crime of
homicide or assassination. Under such circumstances, proof of his innocent mistake of the facts
overcomes the presumption of malice or criminal intent, and (since malice or criminal intent is a
necessary ingredient of the "act punished by law" in cases of homicide or assassination) overcomes
at the same time the presumption established in article 1 of the code, that the "act punished by law"
was committed "voluntarily."

Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said:

If the party killing had reasonable grounds for believing that the person slain had a felonious
design against him, and under that supposition killed him, although it should afterwards
appear that there was no such design, it will not be murder, but it will be either manslaughter
or excusable homicide, according to the degree of caution used and the probable grounds of
such belief. (Charge to the grand jury in Selfridge's case, Whart, Hom., 417, 418, Lloyd's
report of the case, p.7.)

In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the doctrine as follows:

A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing rapidly toward him, with an
outstretched arms and a pistol in his hand, and using violent menaces against his life as he
advances. Having approached near enough in the same attitude, A, who has a club in his
hand, strikes B over the head before or at the instant the pistol is discharged; and of the
wound B dies. It turns out the pistol was loaded with powder only, and that the real design of
B was only to terrify A. Will any reasonable man say that A is more criminal that he would
have been if there had been a bullet in the pistol? Those who hold such doctrine must
require that a man so attacked must, before he strikes the assailant, stop and ascertain how
the pistol is loaded — a doctrine which would entirely take away the essential right of self-
defense. And when it is considered that the jury who try the cause, and not the party killing,
are to judge of the reasonable grounds of his apprehension, no danger can be supposed to
flow from this principle. (Lloyd's Rep., p. 160.)

To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, cited by Viada, a few of
which are here set out in full because the facts are somewhat analogous to those in the case at bar.

QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused was sitting at his hearth, at night, in
company only of his wife, without other light than reflected from the fire, and that the man
with his back to the door was attending to the fire, there suddenly entered a person whom he
did not see or know, who struck him one or two blows, producing a contusion on the
shoulder, because of which he turned, seized the person and took from his the stick with
which he had undoubtedly been struck, and gave the unknown person a blow, knocking him
to the floor, and afterwards striking him another blow on the head, leaving the unknown lying
on the floor, and left the house. It turned out the unknown person was his father-in-law, to
whom he rendered assistance as soon as he learned his identity, and who died in about six
days in consequence of cerebral congestion resulting from the blow. The accused, who
confessed the facts, had always sustained pleasant relations with his father-in-law, whom he
visited during his sickness, demonstrating great grief over the occurrence. Shall he be
considered free from criminal responsibility, as having acted in self-defense, with all the
circumstances related in paragraph 4, article 8, of the Penal Code? The criminal branch of
the Audiencia of Valladolid found that he was an illegal aggressor, without sufficient
provocation, and that there did not exists rational necessity for the employment of the force
used, and in accordance with articles 419 and 87 of the Penal Code condemned him to
twenty months of imprisonment, with accessory penalty and costs. Upon appeal by the
accused, he was acquitted by the supreme court, under the following sentence:
"Considering, from the facts found by the sentence to have been proven, that the accused
was surprised from behind, at night, in his house beside his wife who was nursing her child,
was attacked, struck, and beaten, without being able to distinguish with which they might
have executed their criminal intent, because of the there was no other than fire light in the
room, and considering that in such a situation and when the acts executed demonstrated
that they might endanger his existence, and possibly that of his wife and child, more
especially because his assailant was unknown, he should have defended himself, and in
doing so with the same stick with which he was attacked, he did not exceed the limits of self-
defense, nor did he use means which were not rationally necessary, particularly because the
instrument with which he killed was the one which he took from his assailant, and was
capable of producing death, and in the darkness of the house and the consteration which
naturally resulted from such strong aggression, it was not given him to known or distinguish
whether there was one or more assailants, nor the arms which they might bear, not that
which they might accomplish, and considering that the lower court did not find from the
accepted facts that there existed rational necessity for the means employed, and that it did
not apply paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code, it erred, etc." (Sentence of supreme
court of Spain, February 28, 1876.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 266.) .

QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house, which was situated in a retired
part of the city, upon arriving at a point where there was no light, heard the voice of a man, at
a distance of some 8 paces, saying: "Face down, hand over you money!" because of which,
and almost at the same money, he fired two shots from his pistol, distinguishing immediately
the voice of one of his friends (who had before simulated a different voice) saying, "Oh! they
have killed me," and hastening to his assistance, finding the body lying upon the ground, he
cried, "Miguel, Miguel, speak, for God's sake, or I am ruined," realizing that he had been the
victim of a joke, and not receiving a reply, and observing that his friend was a corpse, he
retired from the place. Shall he be declared exempt in toto from responsibility as the author
of this homicide, as having acted in just self-defense under the circumstances defined in
paragraph 4, article 8, Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Malaga did not
so find, but only found in favor of the accused two of the requisites of said article, but not that
of the reasonableness of the means employed to repel the attack, and, therefore,
condemned the accused to eight years and one day of prison mayor, etc. The supreme court
acquitted the accused on his appeal from this sentence, holding that the accused was acting
under a justifiable and excusable mistake of fact as to the identity of the person calling to
him, and that under the circumstances, the darkness and remoteness, etc., the means
employed were rational and the shooting justifiable. (Sentence supreme court, March 17,
1885.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 136.)

QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote spot, is awakened, at night, by a
large stone thrown against his window — at this, he puts his head out of the window and
inquires what is wanted, and is answered "the delivery of all of his money, otherwise his
house would be burned" — because of which, and observing in an alley adjacent to the mill
four individuals, one of whom addressed him with blasphemy, he fired his pistol at one the
men, who, on the next morning was found dead on the same spot. Shall this man be
declared exempt from criminal responsibility as having acted in just self-defense with all of
the requisites of law? The criminal branch of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of
the Audiencia of Zaragoza finds that there existed in favor of the accused a majority of the
requisites to exempt him from criminal responsibility, but not that of reasonable necessity for
the means, employed, and condemned the accused to twelve months of prision
correctional for the homicide committed. Upon appeal, the supreme court acquitted the
condemned, finding that the accused, in firing at the malefactors, who attack his mill at night
 in a remote spot by threatening robbery and incendiarism, was acting in just self-defense of
his person, property, and family. (Sentence of May 23, 1877). (I Viada, p. 128.)

A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the defendant
Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief that the intruder who
forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril,
both of his life and of his property and of the property committed to his charge; that in view of all the
circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in
good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than exercising
his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be he would have
been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he can not be said to have
been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the
facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believe
threatened his person and his property and the property under his charge.

The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be reversed, and the
defendant acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and his bail bond exonerated, with the
costs of both instance de oficio. So ordered.

Johnson Moreland and Elliott, JJ., concur.

Arellano, C.J., and Mapa, J., dissent
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 97471 February 17, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ISABELO PUNO y GUEVARRA, alias "Beloy," and ENRIQUE AMURAO y PUNO, alias
"Enry," accused-appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Edward C. Castañeda for accused-appellants.

REGALADO, J.:

The primal issue for resolution in this case is whether accused-appellants committed the felony of
kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in the information;
or a violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974),
as contended by the Solicitor General and found by the trial court; or the offense of simple robbery
punished by Paragraph 5, Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as claimed by the defense.

In an information dated and filed on May 31, 1989 in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
103, as Criminal Case No. Q-57404 thereof, appellants were charged with kidnapping for ransom
allegedly committed in the following manner:

That on or about the 13th day of January, 1988 in Quezon City, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then private
individuals, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each other,
did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and carry away one
MARIA DEL SOCORRO SARMIENTO y MUTUC * for the purpose of extorting ransom, to the
damage and prejudice of the said offended party in such amount as may be awarded to her under the provisions of the
Civil Code.1

On a plea of not guilty when arraigned,2 appellants went to trial which ultimately resulted in a
judgment promulgated on September 26, 1990 finding them guilty of robbery with extortion
committed on a highway, punishable under Presidential Decree No. 532, with this disposition in
the fallo thereof:

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused ISABELO PUNO

and ENRIQUE AMURAO GUILTY as principals of robbery with extortion committed
on a highway and, in accordance with P.D. 532, they are both sentenced to a jail
term of reclusion perpetua.
 The two accused are likewise ordered to pay jointly and severally the offended
private victim Ma. Socorro M. Sarmiento the sum of P7,000.00 as actual damages
and P3,000.00 as temperate damages.3

Before us now in this appeal, appellants contend that the court a quo erred (1) in convicting them
under Presidential Decree No. 532 since they were not expressly charged with a crime therein; (2) in
applying Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court since the charge under said presidential
decree is not the offense proved and cannot rightly be used as the offense proved which is
necessarily included in the offense charged.4

For the material antecedents of this case, we quote with approval the following counter-statement of
facts in the People's brief5 which adopted the established findings of the court a quo, documenting
the same with page references to the transcripts of the proceedings, and which we note are without
any substantial divergence in the version proffered by the defense.

This is a prosecution for kidnapping for ransom allegedly done on January 13, 1988
by the two accused (tsn, Jan. 8, 1990, p. 7).

Mrs. Maria Socorro Mutuc-Sarmiento owns a bakeshop in Araneta Avenue, Quezon

City called Nika Cakes and Pastries. She has a driver of her own just as her husband
does (Ibid., pp. 4-6).

At around 5:00 in the afternoon of January 13, 1988, the accused Isabelo Puno, who
is the personal driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband (who was then away in Davao
purportedly on account of local election there) arrived at the bakeshop. He told Mrs.
Socorro that her own driver Fred had to go to Pampanga on an emergency
(something bad befell a child), so Isabelo will temporary (sic) take his place (Id., pp.
8-9).

Mrs. Socorro's time to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig came and so she got into the
Mercedes Benz of her husband with Isabelo on (sic) the wheel. After the car turned
right in (sic) a corner of Araneta Avenue, it stopped. A young man, accused Enrique
Amurao, boarded the car beside the driver (Id., pp. 9-10).

Once inside, Enrique clambered on top of the back side of the front seat and went
onto where Ma. Socorro was seated at the rear. He poke (sic) a gun at her (Id., p.
10).

Isabelo, who earlier told her that Enrique is his nephew announced, "ma'm, you
know, I want to get money from you." She said she has money inside her bag and
they may get it just so they will let her go. The bag contained P7,000.00 and was
taken (Id., pp. 11-14).

Further on, the two told her they wanted P100,000.00 more. Ma. Socorro agreed to
give them that but would they drop her at her gas station in Kamagong St., Makati
where the money is? The car went about the Sta. Mesa area. Meanwhile, Ma.
Socorro clutched her Rosary and prayed. Enrique's gun was menacingly storing (sic)
at her soft bread (sic) brown, perfumed neck. He said he is an NPA and threatened
her (Id., p.15).

The car sped off north towards the North superhighway. There Isabelo, Beloy as he
is called, asked Ma. Socorro to issue a check for P100,000.00. Ma. Socorro
 complied. She drafted 3 checks in denominations of two for P30 thousand and one
for P40 thousand. Enrique ordered her to swallow a pill but she refused (Id., pp. 17-
23).

Beloy turned the car around towards Metro Manila. Later, he changed his mind and
turned the car again towards Pampanga. Ma. Socorro, according to her, jumped out
of the car then, crossed to the other side of the superhighway and, after some
vehicles ignored her, she was finally able to flag down a fish vendors van. Her dress
had blood because, according to Ma. Socorro, she fell down on the ground and was
injured when she jumped out of the car. Her dress was torn too (Id., pp. 23-26).

On reaching Balintawak, Ma. Socorro reported the matter to CAPCOM (Id., p. 27).

Both accused were, day after, arrested. Enrique was arrested trying to encash Ma.
Socorro's P40,000.00 check at PCI Bank, Makati. (tsn, Oct. 18, 1989, pp. 10-13)6

As observed by the court below, the defense does not dispute said narrative of complainant, except
that, according to appellant Puno, he stopped the car at North Diversion and freely allowed
complainant to step out of the car. He even slowed the car down as he drove away, until he saw that
his employer had gotten a ride, and he claimed that she fell down when she stubbed her toe while
running across the highway.7

Appellants further testified that they brought the Mercedez Benz car to Dolores, San Fernando,
Pampanga and parked it near a barangay or police outpost. They thereafter ate at a restaurant and
divided their loot.8 Much later, when he took the stand at the trial of this case, appellant Puno tried to
mitigate his liability by explaining that he was in dire need of money for the medication of his ulcers.9

On these relatively simple facts, and as noted at the start of this opinion, three theories have been
advanced as to what crime was committed by appellants. The trial court cohered with the
submission of the defense that the crime could not be kidnapping for ransom as charged in the
information. We likewise agree.

Prefatorily, it is worth recalling an accepted tenet in criminal law that in the determination of the
crime for which the accused should be held liable in those instances where his acts partake of the
nature of variant offenses, and the same holds true with regard to the modifying or qualifying
circumstances thereof, his motive and specific intent in perpetrating the acts complained of are
invaluable aids in arriving at a correct appreciation and accurate conclusion thereon.

Thus, to illustrate, the motive of the accused has been held to be relevant or essential to determine
the specific nature of the crime as, for instance, whether a murder was committed in the furtherance
of rebellion in which case the latter absorbs the former, or whether the accused had his own
personal motives for committing the murder independent of his membership in the rebellious
movement in which case rebellion and murder would constitute separate offenses. 10 Also, where
injuries were inflicted on a person in authority who was not then in the actual performance of his
official duties, the motive of the offender assumes importance because if the attack was by reason of
the previous performance of official duties by the person in authority, the crime would be direct
assault; otherwise, it would only be physical injuries. 11

In the case at bar, there is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive, nurtured prior to
or at the time they committed the wrongful acts against complainant, other than the extortion of
money from her under the compulsion of threats or intimidation. This much is admitted by both
appellants, without any other esoteric qualification or dubious justification. Appellant Puno, as
already stated, candidly laid the blame for his predicament on his need for funds for, in his own
testimony, "(w)hile we were along the way Mam (sic) Corina was telling me "Beloy, I know your
family very well and I know that your (sic) not (a) bad person, why are you doing this?" I told her
"Mam, (sic), because I need money and I had an ulcer and that I have been getting an (sic)
advances from our office but they refused to give me any bale (sic). . . ." 12

With respect to the specific intent of appellants vis-a-vis the charge that they had kidnapped the
victim, we can rely on the proverbial rule of ancient respectability that for this crime to exist, there
must be indubitable proof that
the actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive the offended party of her liberty, 13 and not where
such restraint of her freedom of action was merely an incident in the commission of another offense
primarily intended by the offenders. Hence, as early as United States vs. Ancheta, 14 and consistently
reiterated thereafter, 15 it has been held that the detention and/or forcible taking away of the victims
by the accused, even for an appreciable period of time but for the primary and ultimate purpose of
killing them, holds the offenders liable for taking their lives or such other offenses they committed in
relation thereto, but the incidental deprivation of the victims' liberty does not constitute kidnapping or
serious illegal detention.

That appellants in this case had no intention whatsoever to kidnap or deprive the complainant of her
personal liberty is clearly demonstrated in the veritably confessional testimony of appellant Puno:

Q At what point did Mrs. Sarmiento handed (sic) the bag containing
the P7,000.00 to your nephew?

A Santo Domingo Exit.

Q And how about the checks, where were you already when the
checks was (sic) being handed to you?

A Also at the Sto. Domingo exit when she signed the checks.

Q If your intention was just to robbed (sic) her, why is it that you still
did not allow her to stay at Sto. Domingo, after all you already
received the money and the checks?

A Because we had an agreement with her that when she signed the
checks we will take her to her house at Villa (sic) Verde.

Q And why did you not bring her back to her house at Valle Verde
when she is (sic) already given you the checks?

A Because while we were on the way back I (sic) came to my mind

that if we reach Balintawak or some other place along the way we
might be apprehended by the police. So when we reached Santa Rita
exit I told her "Mam (sic) we will already stop and allow you to get out
of the car." 16

Neither can we consider the amounts given to appellants as equivalent to or in the nature of ransom,
considering the immediacy of their obtention thereof from the complainant personally. Ransom, in
municipal criminal law, is the money, price or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a
captured person or persons, a payment that releases from captivity. 17 It can hardly be assumed that
when complainant readily gave the cash and checks demanded from her at gun point, what she
gave under the circumstances of this case can be equated with or was in the concept of ransom in
the law of kidnapping. These were merely amounts involuntarily surrendered by the victim upon the
occasion of a robbery or of which she was summarily divested by appellants. Accordingly, while we
hold that the crime committed is robbery as defined in Article 293 of the Code, we, however, reject
the theory of the trial court that the same constitutes the highway robbery contemplated in and
punished by Presidential Decree No. 532.

The lower court, in support of its theory, offers this ratiocination:

The court agrees that the crime is robbery. But it is also clear from the allegation in
the information that the victim was carried away and extorted for more money. The
accused admitted that the robbery was carried on from Araneta Avenue up to the
North Superhighway. They likewise admitted that along the way they intimidated Ma.
Socorro to produce more money that she had with her at the time for which reason
Ma. Socorro, not having more cash, drew out three checks. . . .

In view of the foregoing the court is of the opinion that the crimes committed is that
punishable under P.D. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974)
under which where robbery on the highway is accompanied by extortion the penalty
is reclusion perpetua.18

The Solicitor General concurs, with the observation that pursuant to the repealing clause in Section
5 of said decree, "P.D. No- 532 is a modification of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code,
particularly Article 267 which
are inconsistent with it." 19 Such opinion and complementary submission consequently necessitate an
evaluation of the correct interplay between and the legal effects of Presidential Decree No. 532 on
the pertinent Provisions of the Revised Penal Code, on which matter we are not aware that any
definitive pronouncement has as yet been made.

Contrary to the postulation of the Solicitor General, Presidential Decree No. 532 is not a modification
of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code on kidnapping and serious illegal detention, but of Articles
306 and 307 on brigandage. This is evident from the fact that the relevant portion thereof which
treats of "highway robbery" invariably uses this term in the alternative and synonymously with
brigandage, that is, as "highway robbery/brigandage." This is but in line with our previous ruling, and
which still holds sway in criminal law, that highway robbers (ladrones) and brigands are
synonymous. 20

Harking back to the origin of our law on brigandage (bandolerismo) in order to put our discussion
thereon in the proper context and perspective, we find that a band of brigands, also known as
highwaymen or freebooters, is more than a gang of ordinary robbers. Jurisprudence on the matter
reveals that during the early part of the American occupation of our country, roving bands were
organized for robbery and pillage and since the then existing law against robbery was inadequate to
cope with such moving bands of outlaws, the Brigandage Law was passed. 21

The following salient distinctions between brigandage and robbery are succinctly explained in a
treatise on the subject and are of continuing validity:

The main object of the Brigandage Law is to prevent the formation of bands of
robbers. The heart of the offense consists in the formation of a band by more than
three armed persons for the purpose indicated in art. 306. Such formation is
sufficient to constitute a violation of art. 306. It would not be necessary to show, in a
 prosecution under it, that a member or members of the band actually committed
robbery or kidnapping or any other purpose attainable by violent means. The crime is
proven when the organization and purpose of the band are shown to be such as are
contemplated by art 306. On the other hand, if robbery is committed by a band,
whose members were not primarily organized for the purpose of committing robbery
or kidnapping, etc., the crime would not be brigandage, but only robbery. Simply
because robbery was committed by a band of more than three armed persons, it
would not follow that it was committed by a band of brigands. In the Spanish text of
art. 306, it is required that the band "sala a los campos para dedicarse a
robar." 22 (Emphasis supplied).

In fine, the purpose of brigandage is, inter alia, indiscriminate highway robbery. If the purpose is only
a particular robbery, the crime is only robbery, or robbery in band if there are at least four armed
participants. 23 The martial law legislator, in creating and promulgating Presidential Decree No. 532
for the objectives announced therein, could not have been unaware of that distinction and is
presumed to have adopted the same, there being no indication to the contrary. This conclusion is
buttressed by the rule on contemporaneous construction, since it is one drawn from the time when
and the circumstances under which the decree to be construed originated. Contemporaneous
exposition or construction is the best and strongest in the law. 24

Further, that Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway robbery or brigandage only acts of
robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any person or persons on Philippine
highways as defined therein, and not acts of robbery committed against only a predetermined or
particular victim, is evident from the preambular clauses thereof, to wit:

WHEREAS, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that lawless elements are
still committing acts of depredation upon the persons and properties of innocent and
defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another, thereby disturbing the
peace, order and tranquility of the nation and stunting the economic and social
progress of the people:

WHEREAS, such acts of depredations constitute . . . highway robbery/brigandage

which are among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes
of all countries;

WHEREAS, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged from

perpetrating such acts of depredaions by imposing heavy penalty on the offenders,
with the end in view of eliminating all obstacles to the economic, social, educational
and community progress of the people. (Emphasis supplied).

Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single act of robbery against a particular person chosen by
the accused as their specific victim could be considered as committed on the "innocent and
defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another," and which single act of depredation
would be capable of "stunting the economic and social progress of the people" as to be considered
"among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries," and
would accordingly constitute an obstacle "to the economic, social, educational and community
progress of the people, " such that said isolated act would constitute the highway robbery or
brigandage contemplated and punished in said decree. This would be an exaggeration bordering on
the ridiculous.

True, Presidential Decree No. 532 did introduce amendments to Articles 306 and 307 of the Revised
Penal Code by increasing the penalties, albeit limiting its applicability to the offenses stated therein
when committed on the highways and without prejudice to the liability for such acts if committed.
Furthermore, the decree does not require that there be at least four armed persons forming a band
of robbers; and the presumption in the Code that said accused are brigands if they use unlicensed
firearms no longer obtains under the decree. But, and this we broadly underline, the essence of
brigandage under the Code as a crime of depredation wherein the unlawful acts are directed not
only against specific, intended or preconceived victims, but against any and all prospective victims
anywhere on the highway and whosoever they may potentially be, is the same as the concept of
brigandage which is maintained in Presidential Decree No. 532, in the same manner as it was under
its aforementioned precursor in the Code and, for that matter, under the old Brigandage Law. 25

Erroneous advertence is nevertheless made by the court below to the fact that the crime of robbery
committed by appellants should be covered by the said amendatory decree just because it was
committed on a highway. Aside from what has already been stressed regarding the absence of the
requisite elements which thereby necessarily puts the offense charged outside the purview and
intendment of that presidential issuance, it would be absurd to adopt a literal interpretation that any
unlawful taking of property committed on our highways would be covered thereby. It is an
elementary rule of statutory construction that the spirit or intent of the law should not be
subordinated to the letter thereof. Trite as it may appear, we have perforce to stress the elementary
caveat that he who considers merely the letter of an instrument goes but skin deep into its
meaning, 26 and the fundamental rule that criminal justice inclines in favor of the milder form of
liability in case of doubt.

If the mere fact that the offense charged was committed on a highway would be the determinant for
the application of Presidential Decree No. 532, it would not be farfetched to expect mischievous, if
not absurd, effects on the corpus of our substantive criminal law. While we eschew resort to
a reductio ad absurdum line of reasoning, we apprehend that the aforestated theory adopted by the
trial court falls far short of the desideratum in the interpretation of laws, that is, to avoid absurdities
and conflicts. For, if a motor vehicle, either stationary or moving on a highway, is forcibly taken at
gun point by the accused who happened to take a fancy thereto, would the location of the vehicle at
the time of the unlawful taking necessarily put the offense within the ambit of Presidential Decree
No. 532, thus rendering nugatory the categorical provisions of the Anti-Carnapping Act of
1972? 27 And, if the scenario is one where the subject matter of the unlawful asportation is large
cattle which are incidentally being herded along and traversing the same highway and are
impulsively set upon by the accused, should we apply Presidential Decree No. 532 and completely
disregard the explicit prescriptions in the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974? 28

We do not entertain any doubt, therefore, that the coincidental fact that the robbery in the present
case was committed inside a car which, in the natural course of things, was casually operating on a
highway, is not within the situation envisaged by Section 2(e) of the decree in its definition of terms.
Besides, that particular provision precisely defines "highway robbery/brigandage" and, as we have
amply demonstrated, the single act of robbery conceived and committed by appellants in this case
does not constitute highway robbery or brigandage.

Accordingly, we hold that the offense committed by appellants is simple robbery defined in Article
293 and punished under Paragraph 5 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code with prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period. Appellants have
indisputably acted in conspiracy as shown by their concerted acts evidentiary of a unity of thought
and community of purpose. In the determination of their respective liabilities, the aggravating
circumstances of craft 29 shall be appreciated against both appellants and that of abuse of confidence
shall be further applied against appellant Puno, with no mitigating circumstance in favor of either of
them. At any rate, the intimidation having been made with the use of a firearm, the penalty shall be
imposed in the maximum period as decreed by Article 295 of the Code.
We further hold that there is no procedural obstacle to the conviction of appellants of the crime of
simple robbery upon an information charging them with kidnapping for ransom, since the former
offense which has been proved is necessarily included in the latter offense with which they are
charged. 30 For the former offense, it is sufficient that the elements of unlawful taking, with intent to
gain, of personal property through intimidation of the owner or possessor thereof shall be, as it has
been, proved in the case at bar. Intent to gain (animus lucrandi) is presumed to be alleged in an
information where it is charged that there was unlawful taking (apoderamiento) and appropriation by
the offender of the things subject of the robbery. 31

These foregoing elements are necessarily included in the information filed against appellants which,
as formulated, allege that they wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnapped and extorted ransom
from the complainant. Such allegations, if not expressly but at the very least by necessary
implication, clearly convey that the taking of complainant's money and checks (inaccurately termed
as ransom) was unlawful, with intent to gain, and through intimidation. It cannot be logically argued
that such a charge of kidnapping for ransom does not include but could negate the presence of any
of the elements of robbery through intimidation of persons. 32

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the trial court is hereby SET ASIDE and another one is
rendered CONVICTING accused-appellants Isabelo Puno y Guevarra and Enrique Amurao y Puno
of robbery as Punished in Paragraph 5 of Article 294, in relation to Article 295, of the Revised Penal
Code and IMPOSING on each of them an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum, and
jointly and severally pay the offended party, Maria del Socorro M. Sarmiento, the amounts of
P7,000.00 as actual damages and P20,000.00 as moral damages, with costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Nocon and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-68969 January 22, 1988

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
USMAN HASSAN y AYUN, respondent.

SARMIENTO, J.:

This is a pauper's appeal of the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Ninth Judicial Region Branch XIII, dated January
25, 1984, which "finds the accused USMAN HASSAN y AYUN guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the Crime of MURDER, and
there being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance attending the commission of the crime, and pursuant to Paragraph No. 1 of
Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby imposes upon the said accused the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and all its accessory
penalties; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased victim Ramon Pichel, Jr. y Uro the amount of P12,000.00 and to pay the costs." 2

Usman Hassan was accused of murder for stabbing to death Ramon Pichel, Jr. y Uro, 24, single,
and a resident of Zamboanga City. 3 At the time of his death on July 23,1981, the deceased was
employed as manager of the sand and gravel business of his father. On the other hand, Hassan was
an illiterate, 15-year-old pushcart cargador. 4

The quality of justice and the majesty of the law shine ever brightest when they are applied with
more jealousy to the poor, the marginalized, and the disadvantaged. Usman Hassan, the herein
accused-appellant, belongs to this class. At the time of the alleged commission of the crime, he was
poor, marginalized, and disadvantaged. He was a flotsam in a sea of violence, following the odyssey
of his widowed mother from one poverty-stricken area to another in order to escape the ravages of
internicine war and rebellion in Zamboanga del Sur. In the 15 years of Hassan's existence, he and
his family had to evacuate to other places for fear of their lives, six times. His existence in this world
has not even been officially recorded; his birth has not been registered in the Registry of Births
because the Samal tribe, to which he belongs, does not see the importance of registering births and
deaths.

Usman was convicted on the bases of the testimony of a lone eyewitness for the prosecution and
the sloppiness of the investigation conducted by the police investigator, Police Corporal Rogelio
Carpio of the Homicide and Arson Section of the Zamboanga City Police Station, who also testified
for the prosecution.

We rule that Usman Hassan's guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt and that Usman
Hassan must, therefore, be set free.

The lone eyewitness for the prosecution is Jose Samson, 24 years old when he testified, married,
and a resident of Zamboanga City. On the day of the killing, he was employed at the sand and
gravel business of the father of the deceased but was jobless at the time of his examination-in-chief
on February 3, 1982.

He testified that he was with Ramon Pichel, Jr. at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening of July 23, 1981;
that he was a backrider in the motorcycle of Ramon when they went to buy mangoes at Fruit
Paradise near the Barter Trade Zone in Zamboanga City that while he was selecting mangoes, he
saw a person stab Ramon who was seated at his red Honda motorcycle which was parked about
two or three meters from the fruit stand where he Samson) was selecting mangoes; that he saw the
assailant stab Ramon "only once" and that after the stabbing, the assailant ran towards the PNB
Building. When asked at the cross-examination if he knew the assailant, Samson said, "I know him
by face but I do not know his name." 5

This sole eyewitness recounted the stabbing thus: "While Ramoncito Pichel, Jr. was holding the
motorcycle with both of his hands, the assailant come from behind, held his left hand and stabbed
him from behind on his chest while the victim was sitting on the motorcycle." He claimed that he was
able to see the assailant because it was very bright there that Ramon was facing the light of a
petromax lamp, and that all these happened in front of the fruit stand a — distance of about 6 to 7
meters from the side of the road.

Samson described the assailant as wearing a white, short-sleeved t-shirt and maong pants, but "he
did not see if the aggressor was wearing shoes," that the assailant stabbed Ramon with a knife but
"he did not exactly see what kind of knife it was, and he did not see how long the knife was He said
he brought the wounded Ramon to the Zamboanga City General Hospital in a tricycle.

On cross-examination, Samson testified:

xxx xxx xxx

Q When you rushed Ramon Pichel, Jr. to the hospital you came to
know that he was already dead, is that correct?

A Yes, sir, I learned that he was already dead.

Q In the hospital, were you investigated by the police?

A They just asked the description of that person as to his attire and
his appearance.

Q And it was while in the hospital that you told them the description of
the one who stabbed Ramon Pichel, Jr.?

A Yes, Sir.

Q And the body of Ramon Pichel, Jr., was brought to the Funeraria La Merced?

A Yes, sir,

Q Can you recall what time was that?

A I do not know what time was that.

Q And it was all La Merced Funeraria that the police brought to you the accused?

A...
 Q For Identification?

A Yes, sir.

Q And he was alone when you Identified him?

A Yes he was alone.

Q Aside from working with the Pichel family in their sand and gravel business, do you
have any blood relationship with them?

A Yes. sir. 6

(Emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

What comes as a surprise is that Samson's statement 7 which was taken only on July 25, 1981, two
days after the stabbing, and sworn to only on July 27, 1981, also two days after it was taken, or four
days after the killing, was never presented or mentioned by the prosecution at all. The information
was practically forced out of Police Corporal Rogelio P. Carpio, a witness for the People, during his
cross-examination. 8 The sworn statement contained the following questions and answers:

xxx xxx xxx

Q-14. What and please narrate it to me briefly in your own words, the
incident you are referring?

A-14. While I was busy selecting some mangoes, I saw unidentified

person whom I can recognize by face if seen again embraced my
companion Ramon Pitcher Jr. while the latter was aboard his
motorcycle parked within the area. That this person without much
ado, and armed with a knife suddenly stabbed him (Ramon). That by
coincidence to this incident, our eye met each other and immediately
thereafter, he fled the area toward the Philippine National Bank
(PNB). That this unidentified person was sporting a semi-long hair,
dressed in White Polo-Shirt (Short sleeve), maong pants height to
more or less 5'5, Dark Complexion. That as this unidentified person
fled the area I immediately came to aid my companion, Ramon
Pitcher, Jr., and rushed him to Zamboanga General Hospital, on
board a Tricycle. That may companion (Ramon) did not whispered
(sic) any words to me for he was in serious condition and few minutes
later, he expired.

Q-15. Was tills unidentified person was with companion when he

attack (sic) Ramon Pitcher Jr.?

A-15. He was alone Sir.

 Q-16. Can you really Identified (sic) this person who attacked and
stabbed your companion, Ramon Pitcher, Jr., that evening in
question?

A-16. Yes, Sir,

Q-17. Do you still remember that confrontation we made at the Office

of La Merced Funeral Homes, wherein you were confronted with one
Usman Hassan, whom this Officer brought along?

A-17. Yes, Sir.

Q-18. Was he the very person, who attacked and stabbed your
companion, Ramon Pitcher, Jr.?

A-18. Yes, Sir, he was the very person who attacked and stabbed my
companion, Ramon Pitcher, Jr., that evening in question.

Q-19. Why?

A-19. Because his face and other physical appearance were fully
noted by me and this I cannot forget for the rest of my life.

Q-20. Before this incident, was there any altercation that had ensued
while in the process of buying some mangoes in that area?

A-20. None Sir.

Q-21. Were you able to note what kind of knife used by said Usman
Hassan in stabbing your companion, Ramon Pitcher Jr.?

A-21: None Sir,

Q-22. Well, I have nothing more to ask of you, do you have anything
more to say, add or alter in this statement?

A-22. No more Sir.

Q-23. Are you willing to give a supplemental statement if needed in

the future?

A-23. Yes, Sir. 9

(Emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

The version of the sole eyewitness appearing in his statement 10 is substantially the same as that
embodied in the "Case Report," Exhibit it "C", by Police Corporal Carpio, also admitted a s Exhibit
"2." This exhibit for the prosecution confirms the sworn statement of witness Samson that an
unidentified person, whom he recognized only by face, appeared and without any provocation, the
latter embraced the victim and stabbed the same allegedly with a knife." The rest of the Case
Report: is also significant in that it confirms the confrontation between the accused and Jose
Samson in the funeral parlor arranged by the police Investigator and prosecution witness, Corporal
Carpio.

xxx xxx xxx

From this end, a follow-up was made within the premises of the Old Barter Trade,
wherein the person of USMAN HASSAN Y AYUN, of Paso Bolong, this City, was
arrested in connection with the above stated incident. That this Officer and
companions arrested this person Usman due to his physical appearance, which was
fully described by victim's companion. Jose Samson. During his arrest, a knife,
measuring to more or less seven (7) inches in blade was confiscated in his
possession. The person of Usman Hassan was brought along at the La Merced
Funeral Homes for a confrontation with victims companion, Jose Samson and in this
confrontation, Jose Samson positively Identified said Usman Hassan as the very
person who stabbed the victim.

Usman Hassan, on the other hand, denied the charges levelled against hub and
admitted ownership of said knife; claiming among other things that he used said knife
for slicing mangoes. 11

xxx xxx xxx

We hold that the evidence for the prosecution in its entirety does not satisfy the quantum of proof —
beyond reasonable doubt — required by the Constitution, the law, and applicable jurisprudence to
convict an accused person. The said evidence denies us the moral certainty which would allow us to
pronounce, without uneasiness of conscience. Usman Hassan y Ayun guilty of the killing of the
deceased Ramon Pichel, Jr. y Uro, and condemn him to life imprisonment and in effect turning him
into a flotsam again in a sea of convicted felons in which he would be a very young stranger.

In evaluating the worth of the testimony of the lone eyewitness for the prosecution against the denial
and alibi of the accused, value judgment must not be separated from the constitutionally guaranteed
presumption of innocence.

When the evidence for the prosecution and the evidence for the accused are
weighed, the scales must be tipped in favor of the latter. This is because of the
constitutional presumtion of innocence the accused enjoys as a counter-foil to the
awesome authority of the State that is prosecuting him.

The element of doubt, if reasonable in this case, must operate against the inference
of guilt the prosecution would draw from its evidence. That evidence, as it happens,
consists only of the uncorroborated statement of the two policemen which, as
previously observed, is flawed and therefore suspect. 12

The testimony of Jose Samson, the lone eyewitness, is weak and unconvincing. And so with the
evidence sought to be introduced by Police Corporal Carpio. We discover, for example, that the
expert testimony of the medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, Dr. Valentin
Bernalez, presented by the prosecution, contradicted, on material points, the testimony of the one
eyewitness, Jose Samson. While Samson averred on the witness stand that he saw the assailant
stab the deceased "from behind on his chest" 13 only once, the NBI medico-legal officer Identified two
stab wounds, one at the front portion of the chest at the level and third rib, (sic) and another stab
wound located at the left arm posterior aspect." 14 The same medical expert also concluded from the
nature and location of the chest wound, which was the cause of death, that the same was inflicted
on the victim while the alleged accused was in front of him." 15

The investigation of this case by the Homicide/Arson Section of the Zamboanga Southern Police
Sector, 16 at Zamboanga City, particularly by Police Corporal Rogelio P. Carpio, leaves much to be
desired. For one, we are not satisfied with the procedure adopted by the police investigators in the
Identification of the accused as the assailant. We have no doubt that Usman Hassan was
"presented" alone 17 to Jose Samson by the police investigator and prosecution witness, Police
Corporal Carpio, and his police companions, at the office of the La Merced Funeral Homes in
Zamboanga City. As correctly termed by the very evidence 18 of the prosecution, the procedure
adopted by the police investigators was a confrontation" between Jose Samson, Jr. and Usman.
Earlier, on direct examination, Corporal Carpio testified that Usman was alone when he was brought
to Samson for confrontation in the funeral parlor. However, on cross-examination, Carpio made a
turnabout by saying that the accused was Identified by Samson in a "police line-up;" this
tergiversation we dare say, was an afterthought, more the result of an over or careless cross-
examination, augmented by the leading questions 19 of the trial judge rather than a fastidiousness if
not sincerity, on the part of the police investigator, to honestly correct erroneous statements in his
examination-in-chief. The fact remains that both Samson and the accused testified clearly and
unequivocably that Usman was alone when presented to Samson by Carpio. There was no such
police line-up as the police investigator, to honestly correct erreoneous statements in his
examination-in-chief. The fact remains that both Samson and the accused testified clearly and
unequivocably that Usman was alone when presented to Samson by Carpio. There was no such
police investigator claimed on second thought.

The manner by which Jose Samson, Jr. was made to confront and Identify the accused alone at the
funeral parlor, without being placed in the police line-up, was "pointedly suggsestive, generated
confidence where there was none, activated visual imagination, and, all told, subserted his reliability
as eyewitness. This unusual, coarse, and highly singular method of Identification, which revolts
against the accepted principles of scientific crime detection, alienates the esteem of every just man,
and commands neither our respect nor acceptance." 20

Moreover, the confrontation arranged by the police investigator between the self-proclaimed
eyewitness and the accused did violence to the right of the latter to counsel in all stages of the
investigation into the commission of a crime especially at its most crucial stage — the Identification
of the accused.

As it turned out, the method of Identification became just a confrontation. At that critical and decisive
moment, the scales of justice tipped unevenly against the young, poor, and disadvantaged accused.
The police procedure adopted in this case in which only the accused was presented to witness
Samson, in the funeral parlor, and in the presence of the grieving relatives of the victim, is as tainted
as an uncounselled confession and thus falls within the same ambit of the constitutionally
entrenched protection. For this infringement alone, the accused-appellant should be acquitted.

Moreover, aside from this slipshod Identification procedure, the rest of the investigation of the crime
and the preparation of the evidence for prosecution were done haphazardly, perfunctorily, and
superficially. Samson was not investigated thoroughly and immediately after the incident. As
previously mentioned, his statement was taken by the investigator only two days after the murder of
Ramon Pichel, Jr. and sworn only two days after it had been taken. Similarly, there is nothing in the
record to show that the fruit vendor—from whom Samson and the deceased were buying mangoes
that fateful evening and who certainly must have witnessed the fatal stabbing—was investigated, or
why he was not investigated. Nor is any explanation given as to why the companion 21 of the accused
at the time Corporal Carpio arrested him (accused) 'sitting on a pushcart " 22 at about 8:00 P.M.
(around 7:00 P.M., according to Usman) of that same evening near the scene of the crime, was not
also investigated when he could have been a material witness of the killing or of the innocence of the
accused. In addition, the knife and its scabbard, 23Confiscated by Carpio from Usman (tucked on the
right side of his waist") at the time of his arrest, were not even subjected to any testing at all to
determine the presence of human blood which could be typed and compared with the blood type of
the deceased. A crime laboratory test — had Carpio or the prosecuting fiscal, or even the trial judge,
insisted on it — would have revealed whether or not the knife in question (confiscated from the
accused by Carpio one hour after the alleged commission of the crime) had indeed been the weapon
used to kill Ramon. The police investigator instead nonchalantly dismissed this sin of omission by
saying that the knife could have been cleaned or the bloodstain could have been taken away. 24 This
presumption of the deadly weapon's having been "cleaned" of bloodstains is tantamount to
pronouncing the accused of being guilty.

Our doubt about the guilt of the accused is further deepened by a resolution, 25 in a separate
case, 26 of Assistant City Fiscal of Zamboanga City and deputized Tanod bayan Prosecutor Pablo
Murillo, which clearly reveals that on July 24, 1981, a day after the killing of Ramon Pichel, Jr., a
similar stabbing took place at Plaza Pershing near the place of the earlier incident, with the suspect
in that frustrated homicide case being a certain Benhar Isa, 'a notorious and a deadly police
character" in Zamboanga City, with a long record of arrests. In that resolution, Fiscal Murillo said the
same Benhar Isa was tagged as 'also a suspect in the stabbing of Ramon Pichel, Jr. to death and
the stabbing of Pastor Henry Villagracia at the Fruit Paradise, this City." The said resolution further
states that "with regards to this incident or witnesses ever testified for fear of possible reprisals." 27

The trial of Usman Hassan began on October 27, 1981. Benhar Isa himself was killed by a
policeman on August 28, 1981, while he (Isa) "was apparently under the influence of liquor armed
with a knife (was) molesting and extorting money from innocent civilians' and "making trouble." 28 The
records of the case at bar do not show any attempt on the part of Corporal Carpio, or any other
police officer, to investigate or question Benhar Isa in connection with the killing of Pichel, Jr. Was it
fear of the notorious police character that made the police officers disregard the possible connection
between the slaying of Ramon and that of the person (Harun Acan y Arang of the Ministry of
National Defense) 29 who was allegedly stabbed by Benhar Isa a day after the killing of Ramon Jr.?
And yet questioning Isa might have provided that vital link to the resolution of Usman's guilt or
innocence. But why should the police officers investigate Isa when Usman Hassan was already in
custody and could be an available fall guy? Usman Hassan, instead, became a victim of a grave
injustice. Indeed, Usman Hassan is too poor to wage a legal fight to prove his innocence. And he is
so marginalized as to claim and deserve an honest-to-goodness, thorough, and fair police
investigation with all angles and leads pursued to their logical, if not scientific, conclusions. Sadly
circumstanced as he is, the authority of the State was too awesome for him to counteract.

The appealed decision made much ado of the admission by Usman "that he was arrested at the
former barter trade, which is a place just across the place of the stabbing at the Fruit
Paradise." 30 The trial judge found it "therefore strange that on the very evening of the stabbing
incident he was still at the barter trade area by 8:00 o'clock in the evening when he usually comes to
the city proper at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning and goes home at past 5:00 o'clock and
sometimes 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon." 31 Usman's explanation — that, at around 7:00 o'clock
P.M., he was waiting for transportation to take him home — was found by the trial court as 'flimsy
and weak since he did not explain why he had to go home late that evening." 32 But the whole trouble
is nobody asked him. The trial judge did not propound any single question to the accused, and only
three to his mother on innocuous matters, by way of clarification, if only to put on record what the
mother and son could articulate with clarity. Taking into account their poverty and illiteracy, the
mother and son needed as much, if not more, help, than the trial judge extended to the prosecution
witnesses during their examination by asking them clarificatory and mostly leading questions. In that
sense and to that extent, the accused was disadvantaged.

A fact that looms large, though mutely to testify on the innocence of the accused but the importance
of which was brushed away by the trial judge was the presence of the accused near the scene
(about 100 to 150 meters away) soon after the stabbing (he testified at around 7:00 P.M. although
Police Corporal Carpio stated it was 8:00 P.M.) where he was found sitting on his pushcart with a
companion. If he were the assailant, he would have fled. But the trial court instead indulged in
conjecture, foisting the probability that the accused 'was lulled by a false sense of security in
returning to the place (of the stabbing), when no police officers immediately responded and
appeared at the scene of the crime," adding 'there are numerous cases in the past where criminals
return to the scene of their crimes, for reasons only psychologist can explain." 33 It must have
escaped the trial court's attention that Usman has no criminal record, and, therefore, he could not be
generally classed with criminals. In the second place, the trial court's rationalization ignores the
biblical truism recognized by human nature and endorsed with approval by this Court that "(T)he
wicked flee when no man pursueth but the righteous are as bold as a lion." 34

And now as a penultimate observation, we could not help but note the total absence of motive
ascribed to Usman for stabbing Ramon, a complete stranger to him. While, as a general rule, motive
is not essential in order to arrive at a conviction, because, after all, motive is a state of
mind, 35 procedurally, however, for purposes of complying with the requirement that a judgment of
guilty must stem from proof beyond reasonable doubt, the lack of motive on the part of the accused
plays a pivotal role towards his acquittal. This is especially true where there is doubt as to the
Identity of the culprit 36 as when 'the Identification is extremely tenuous," 37 as in this case.

We can not end this travail without adverting to the cavalier manner in which the trial court
disregarded the claimed young age of Usman Hassan.

The defense claims that the accused Usman Hassan is a minor, basing such claim
on the testimony of Lahunay Hassan, the mother of said accused, who declared that
her son Usman Hassan, who is one of her four (4) children, was born in the year
1967. She testified that she was just told by a person coming from their place about
the year of the birth of her son Usman. However on cross-examination, Lahunay
Hassan cannot even remember the date or year of birth of her other children. The
failure of Lahunay Hassan to remember the date or year of birth of her children is of
course understandable, considering that she is unschooled and she belongs to a
tribe that does not register births, deaths or marriages, however, it is strange that she
only took pains to find out the year of birth of her son Usman. For this reason, the
Court granted a motion of the defense on September 13, 1982, to have the herein
accused examined by a competent dentist to determine his age. However, the
findings of the dentist of Zamboanga General Hospital which is marked as Exhibit "5"
shows the following: "age cannot be determined accurately under present mouth
conditions. Approximately, he can be from 14 to 21 years of age." This simply means
that the herein accused could either be 14 years of age or 21 years of age, or any
age in between those aforestated years. From the observation of this court, the
accused Usman Hassan was about 18 years of age at the time he committed this
crime and this observation is based on his personal appearance, his size and facial
features and other personal characteristics, hence he can not be classified as a
youthful offender under Article. 189 of Presendential Decree No. 603, as ammended
by Presedential Decree No. 1179. In the case of U.S. vs. Mallari, 29 Phil. 13 and
People vs. Reyes and Panganiban, CA 48 O.G. 1022, cited in the Edition, Page 680,
it was ruled by the Supreme Court that "In cases where the age of the culprit is at
 issue as a basis for claiming an exempting mitigating circumstance, it is incumbent
upon the accused to establish that circumstance ad any other elements of defense. 38

Considering that the age of the accused could exempt him from punishment or cause the
suspension of his sentence under Articles 12 and 80, respectively of the Revised Penal Code, if
found guilty, more meticulousness and care should have been demanded of medical or scientific
sources, and less reliance on the observation of the judge as had happened in this case. The
preliminary findings of the dentist that the accused could be anywhere between fourteen to twenty
one years, despite the difficulty of arriving at an accurate determination due to Hassan's mouth
condition, would have placed the trial judge on notice that there is the probability that the accused
might be exempted from criminal liability due to his young age. All the foregoing indicates that the
accused had not been granted the concern and compassion with which the poor, marginalized, and
disadvantaged so critically deserve. It is when judicial and police processes and procedures are
thoughtlessly and haphazardly observed that cries of the law and justice being denied the poor are
heard. In any event, all this would not be of any moment now, considering the acquittal of the
accused herein ordered.

WHEREFORE, the decision is hereby REVERSED, and the accused Usman Hassan y Ayun is
ACQUITTED of the crime charged. His release from confinement is hereby Ordered, unless he is
held for another legal cause. With costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Yap (Chairman), Paras and Padilla, JJ., concur