132 IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, Vol. 14, No.

1, January 1999

SEQUENTIAL TRIPPING
AM TURBINE GENERATORS

Working Group 54 of the Rotating Machinery Protection Subcommittee, Power System Relaying
Committee
Everett Fennell, Chairperson; Kevin Kozminski, Vice Chairperson; Members: Munnu Bajpai, Steve
Easterday-McPadden, Walt Elmore, Charles Fromen, Jon Gardell, Wayne Hartmann, Joe Hurley, Patrick
Kerrigan, Kumul Khunkhun, Chuck Mozina, George Nail, Subhash Patel, Gary Pence, A1 Pierce, Don
Smaha, Sahib Usman, Phil Waudby, Murty Yalla

Abstract - The practice of tripping the generator
breakers immediately following a boilerhrbine trip
exposes a steam turbine generator to a potentially
damaging overspeed operating condition. This paper
describes the use of the sequential trip mode as a
means of minimizing the exposure to possible unit
damage following a boiler/turbine trip. Included is a
comparison of the application of devices used by
several major steam turbine generator manufacturers
in accomplishing sequential tripping of the unit. This
paper also discusses the differences in the devices used
in implementing the tripping scheme and those applied
as backup motoring protection. Additionally, the paper
provides guidance in the selection of which functions
should and should not be used to initiate sequential
tripping.
As power plant unit sizes increased and feedwaterheam
cycles became complicated, the shutdown process for
steam turbine generating units became more critical.
These issues made a more orderly shutdown of the
turbine-generator desirable, if not a requirement. The
traditional practice of tripping the main unit breakers
immediately following a boiledturbine trip could
needlessly expose the unit to a potentially catastrophic
overspeed condition and other unnecessary stresses.
PE-584-PWRD-2-03-1998 A paper recommended and approved by
the IEEE Power System Relaying Committee of the IEEE Power
Engineering Society for publication in the IEEE Transactions on Power
Delivery. Manuscript submitted August 13, 1996, made available for
printing March 9, 1998.
There are several reasons for the increase in importance
of the shutdown process. Most unit trips are the result of
boiler and turbine mechanical problems rather than
problems in the generator and associated high-voltage
equipment. The introduction of refmed turbine blading
designs which, while more efficient, are not as rugged as
earlier, simpler blade designs and are not able to withstand
overspeeds much higher than 120% of rated speed.
Finally, given the added complexity of multiple steam
admission paths with the associated stop and control
valves, it is more difficult to insure the complete shutoff
of steam flow to the various turbine sections.
Given these concerns, turbine-generator manufacturers
became increasingly concerned about the normal
operating practices of the electric utilities, and in the
1970’s manufacturers sent recommendations to their
customers that strongly suggested that the utility should
develop sequential tripping schemes for taking units off-
line. These schemes would allow an automatic, orderly
shutdown and isolation of the turbine-generator unit
following a turbine trip. While these notices did not give
any detailed design information, their prime focus
appeared to be associated with the normal, controlled
shutdown of the unit.
These recommendations had many interpretations which
resulted in substantially different sequential trip scheme
designs being implemented from utility to utility. Some
utilities had part or all of the normal protective relaying
initiating sequential tripping. There were, however,
attempts to develop some standard practices for control
and protection functions initiating sequential tripping on
these larger units. [ 11

The purpose of sequentially tripping a turbine generator is

Reprinted from 1 / 3 3 Transacfions on lndustry Applications, vol. to minimize the possibility of damaging the unit as the
34, no 6, pp. 1411-1418, NovembedDecember 1998. result of an overspeed condition following the opening of

0885-8977/99/$10.00 0 1998 IEEE


the main generator breaker@). This method is also
commonly used as the normal shutdown mode for many
units with different types of prime movers. This method
of isolating the unit from the power system is used for
operating conditions where delayed tripping of the
generator will not result in increased damage to electrical
equipment. Sequential tripping is accomplished by first
tripping the prime mover (turbine) followed by tripping
the generator and field breakers after a brief period of
deliberate motoring to ensure that all residual driving
power is drained off of the turbine.
Equipment manufacturers have indicated that the
overspeeding of a turbine generator is a more damaging
operating condition than a brief motoring of the unit. A
brief period of deliberate motoring to reduce the
likelihood of excessive overspeed will not cause damage
to the turbine. Manufacturers have incorporated this
philosophy into their sequential tripping
recommendations.
In addition to sequential tripping, there are three other
methods of grouping electrical and mechanical protection
devices for activating a triphhutdown of a steam
generator. These four (4) common trip/shutdown modes
of isolating the generator from service following the
detection of an unacceptable abnormal operating condition
or electrical fault are described below.
Simultaneous Tripping - Provides the fastest means of
isolating the generator. This tripping mode is used for all
internal generator faults and severe abnormalities in the
generator protection zone. Isolation is accomplished by
simultaneously tripping the generator breakers and field
breaker, shutting down the prime mover by closing the
turbine valves and transferring unit auxiliary loads to
standby power.
Generator Tripping - This mode of isolation usually trips
the main generator and field breakers. The scheme does
not shut down the prime mover and is used where it may
be possible to quickly correct the abnormality, thereby
permitting the reconnection of the machine to the system
in a short period of time. This protection trips the
generator for a power system disturbance, rather than an
intemal generator fault/abnormality. This mode can be
used if permitted by the type of prime mover, boiler and
govemor control systems and requires that the unit be
capable of quick response following a load rejection.
Unit Separation Tripping - A variation of the Generator
Tripping scheme is one where only the main generator
breaker@)is opened. It is recommended for applications
133
where it is desirable to maintain the unit auxiliary loads
connected to the generator. The advantage of this scheme
is that the unit can be reconnected to the system with
minimum delay. As with the Generator Tripping scheme,
the unit must be capable of a quick response following a
load rejection.
Sequential Tripping - This mode is primarily used when
delayed tripping of the breakers has no detrimental effect
on the generating unit. It is generally used for normal unit
shutdowns and tripping for prime mover problems, where
high speed tripping is not a requirement. When the
turbine control system indicates that the turbine has been
tripped, tripping of the generator breakers followed by
the field breaker is initiated. Inclusion of a reverse power
relay in series with the mechanical signal indicating that
the turbine has been tripped provides security against
possible overspeed of the turbine by ensuring that steam
flows have been reduced below the amount necessary to
produce an overspeed condition when the generator
breakers are opened. Thus, by using the sequential
tripping mode of isolating the unit from the power system
for non-critical operating conditions, it is possible to
provide a safe, orderly shutdown without exposing the
equipment to an unnecessary risk of overspeed. For
turbine problems this is the preferred mode.
A survey conducted by the Rotating Machinery Protection
Subcommittee of the Power System Relaying Committee
(PSRC) found that sequential tripping is being initiated by
a variety of protective relays, some of which clearly
require immediate tripping of the generator and field
breakers. While there are some instances where sequential
tripping could possibly be initiated by generator
protection relays, generally the recommended practice is
to initiate simultaneous tripping of the unit.
Several concerns have arisen recently regarding the
application of devices and the logic behind sequential
tripping schemes and unit motoring protection. These
concerns are:
0 the level of misunderstanding in the industry as to
what electrical and mechanical protective devices
should or should not initiate sequential tripping;
0 the differentiation between the control logic in a
sequential tripping scheme and the protective logic
for motoring protection; and
the inability of certain devices to correctly activate
under certain operating conditions.
Designers and operators of power plants today must be
concerned with the failure of control and protective
134

devices to operate, the failure of a breaker to trip, High shaft vibration

protective devices out of service and operator error. For
these reasons, backup protection and supervisory devices Thrust bearing wear
are critical for any sequential tripping scheme.
Low condenser vacuum
This paper provides guidance in the application of the trip
h c t i o n s for electrical and mechanical devices that detect Loss of boiler fans
abnormal conditions and initiate sequential tripping.
Special attention is given to the interaction and differences Loss of generator coolant
between devices used in the control logic of a sequential
tripping scheme and the devices used in motoring The order of events in a sequential shutdown of a turbine
protection. generator is shown in Figure 1. Also shown in Figure 1
are those devices which indicate that a particular
Critical concems regarding the use of this type of tripping shutdown event has occurred. As steam flow through the
scheme are identified in this paper. Additionally, turbine stops, the unit begins to motor, dr
recommendations are made that will ensure that a frst- from the electrical system to keep the shaft spinning at
order contingency, such as the failure of a device to synchronous speed.
operate or the failure of a breaker to trip, will not prevent
generator isolation from the power system. Refer to
ANSUIEEE C37.102-1995 (Reference 4) and the
equipment manufacturers' publications for additional Sequential Trip Initiated
information on the appropriate applications for the J,
simultaneous, generator, unit separation and sequential Turbine Valve Oil System Depressurizes
tripping modes. (Oil System Pressure Switches)
J
Turbine Valves Close
PI. GENE ISCUSSION OF SEQUENTIAL (Valve Limit Switches)
TRIPPING .1
Turbine Steam FlowE'ressure Drops
Sequential tripping of a unit can be initiated by either a @P Turbine Differential Steam Pressure)
plant operator, boiler/reactor trip or turbine-generator (Exhaust Hood Temperature)
mechanical problem. Normal unit shutdowns can be J
accomplished safely and automatically simply by an Unit Experiences Electrical Reverse Power Flow
operator initiating a boiler/turbine trip. This additional (Reverse Power Relay)
tripping mode provides another choice of action between &
an "alarm-only'' indication and a simultaneous tripping Main Generator Breaker(s) Tripped
mode. &
Field Breaker Tripped
Abnormal operating conditions, which do not require
immediate generator shutdown, could be set to initiate a Figure 1: Order of Events in Sequential Tripping Scheme
sequential trip. These include most abnormal mechanical and Devices Used for Control and Protection
conditions, but they could also include some electrical
conditions. Examples of some of these mechanical
problems are: Four major manufacturers of steam turbine generators
were surveyed on their recommendations re
Loss of fuel to the boiler sequential tripping control logic and the devices used in
that logic. Table 1 rizes the responses from the
Boiler flame out four manufacturers. manufacturers surveyed
recommend a similar control logic in their sequential
Low lubricating oil pressure tripping schemes ( ure 2): a mechanical device
indicating a "turbine tripped" condition, supervised by an
High lubricating oil pressure electrical reverse power relay, initiates the shutdown of
 135

the generator and the transfer of unit auxiliary busses to a
standby power source. It is important to remember that
these devices are part of the control logic and are not
performing a protective function. Refer to Section IV for
discussion of protective devices.
using indications from multiple limit or pressure switches
in a series-parallel arrangement to indicate that the turbine
is tripped. By using an appropriate series-parallel
arrangement of these limit switches, the failure of one
switch will not disable the control logic or initiate a
nuisance trip.

Turbine Steam Flow/Pressure Switch - Steam flow less

Table 1
Survey of Manufacturer Recommendations
for Typical Sequential Tripping and Control Schemes
Manufacturer
Code
I A ~B I
Trip by Stop Valve Limit Switches
Trip by Oil System Pressure Switches
Supervision by Reverse Power Relay:
Auxiliaries
than the synchronous-speed, no-load steam flow is an
indication that the unit is being motored. Generally, a
differential pressure switch which measures the pressure
drop across the high-pressure (HP) turbine element is used
to detect a low steam flow condition.
CI DI Exhaust Hood Temperature - Steam flow through a
turbine not only powers the unit, but it also removes the
windage losses developed by the rotating blades. With
little, or no, steam flow through a rotating turbine, the
losses result in a significant temperature increase, which is
generally most severe at the exhaust ends of the turbine.
A temperature sensing device located in the turbine
exhaust hood can detect this low steam flowhigh
temperature condition. Measurement of the exhaust hood
temperature to indicate low turbine steam flow is a
common method of alarming.

Reverse Power Relay - By definition, a generating unit is

Trip Generator motoring when real power flows into the generator from
Mechanical Devices- - Breaker@) the power system. The generator performs as a motor,
“TurbineTripped”
- AND - Lockout -- driving the turbine. Power required to motor depends
upon the friction and windage losses of the steam turbine
1
- or Trip Field

-L generator, typically in the range of 0.5 to 3% of rated

Aux Breaker
Relay generator power output. A sensitive electrical relay which
Reverse Power
Gen Bkrs(s)
Relay can detect reverse power flow into the unit is the best
means of detecting a motoring condition.
Time
Delay Pickup Initiated
(1 to 3 sec) All manufacturers surveyed recommend that an electrical
reverse power relay supervise the mechanical device(s),
see Figure 2, since it may not be possible to set the
Figure 2: Sequential Tripping Control Logic mechanical devices to accurately measure the point where
reverse power flows into the machine. The reverse power
relay must exhibit the necessary sensitivity to detect a
The following is a brief description of devices reverse power condition and incorporate sufficient time
recommended for use in implementing a sequential delay to avoid nuisance tripping. It is typically set to
tripping scheme. pickup below machine rated motoring power, by a
margin, to insure that there is not sufficient steam flow
Valve Limit Switches - A limit or position switch on each into the turbine to cause an overspeed when the generator
turbine valve provides an indication that steam flow breakers are opened.
through that path has been shut off or reduced to
harmlessly low levels. Given the complexity of steam Some older steam turbine generators are not equipped
flow circuits in modem steam turbines, concem has been with stop valve limit switches. For those units, a reverse
raised about the susceptibility of this method to the failure power relay should be used at a minimum as the method
of one switch. Generally, the manufacturers recommend of detecting a motoring condition.
136

A time delay is also used in the logic circuit to provide
maximum security against a possible overspeed condition.
Since permissible motoring times for most units are on the
order of minutes, the additional time delay (typically one
to three seconds is recommended) will not increase the
likelihood of equipment damage.
An ideal reverse power relay set to detect motoring should
pick up at a real power level independent of the VAR
output of the machine. Figure 3 shows the ideal operating
characteristic of the reverse power relay. The real power
pickup current component I, is in-phase with the terminal
voltage and is given as:

Should a main generator breaker fail to open in the I, =1C0se

sequential trip shutdown process, the generator will
operate as an induction motor after the field breaker trips. where
This type of operation can result in a severe local system I is the machine armature current
voltage depression, and damaging currents can be induced I, is the real power component of the armature
in the generator rotor winding and body. To protect current and used to operate the relay
against this possibility, one can supervise the field breaker V, is the machine terminal voltage
trip by using auxiliary “b” contacts from the generator 8 is the angle between machine terminal voltage
breaker(s). Delayed tripping of the field breaker will not and armature current
result in any additional damage to the unit. Breaker failure
should be initiated by the sequential tripping scheme
lockout as shown in Figure 2.
I I
111. PERFORMANCE OF REVERSE POWER
RELAYS WHEN SUPERVISING SEQUENTIAL
TRIPPING

The performance of a reverse power relay is affected by

the reactive power flow of the turbine generator during a
motoring condition. Real power consumed by the
motoring unit is extremely small compared to the unit’s
continuous rating. The magnitude of VAR flow and
resultant operating power factor for the motoring
condition are determined by the level of generator
excitation when the turbine is tripped.

Reactive Power
Into System
1‘
Figure 4: Deviation in Reverse Power Relay Pickup

If the reverse power relay characteristic deviates Erom the

Realwer
into Machine ideal characteristic by an angle 6, as shown Figure 4, then
the magnitude of the real power current at the same power
factor angle 8 must increase in order for the reverse power
relay to pickup. The magnitude of the new pickup value of
real power current for angle 6 deviation from ideal is
given by:
Figure 3: Ideal Reverse Power Relay Pickup I,, =I,, * Cos (e) * Cos(6)
cos (0 +6)

where
I, is the machine armature current with no
deviation from ideal (6 = 0 ")
I, is the equivalent machine armature current with a
deviation from ideal of 6
V, is the machine terminal voltage
8 is the angle between machine terminal voltage
and armature current
6 is the deviation of relay characteristic from ideal
I,, is the real power component of the armature
current required to pick up the relay with no
deviation from ideal (6 = 0 O)
I,, is the equivalent real power component of the
armature current required to pick up the relay
with a deviation form ideal of 6.'
Assume that a machine is running at rated MVA with a
lagging power factor of 0.85 (8=31.79') and the reverse
power relay is set to pickup at machine motoring losses of
1.5% of rated MVA. On a loss of prime mover, the real
power will decrease in magnitude and reverse in direction.
If the reactive power does not change following the loss of
prime mover, the power factor angle (0) will increase
from 31.79' to 88.37". For a deviation of 6 = +lo from
the ideal characteristic, the relay pickup would be 260%
of the setting. However, the relay would operate at 62%
of the pickup value for a deviation of 6 = - 1'.
Depending on the relay applied, the actual quantities may
be single or three phase. The relay may be an
electromechanical relay with appropriate angle of
maximum torque, a static analog relay or a digital relay
calculating power based on derived phasor quantities or
other techniques.
It is apparent that unless the relay has an ideal
characteristic, the real power required to pickup the relay
when the power factor is low can be substantially higher
than that required at unity power factor. Any practical
relay will have some inherent error. In addition, errors
may be introduced by the instrument transformers.
If there is a small deviation from an ideal characteristic of
the relay, it would not be unusual for a reverse power
relay to fail to pickup under conditions of high machine
VAR flow [2,3]. As part of the sequential tripping
procedure, it is recommended that the VAR output of the
machine be reduced by control or operator action. In
addition, operators should be alerted to the possibility of
reverse power relays not operating and be trained in
procedures to manually open the generator breaker after
carefully checking that power flow is into the machine.
137
IV. PROTECTIVE RELAYS INITIATING
SEQUENTIAL TRIPPING
As stated earlier, manufacturers do not generally
recommend initiating a sequential trip with most generator
protective relays. The reason is that the sequential
shutdown process typically requires over 3 seconds to
complete. Usually only devices protecting the unit from
an abnormal mechanical operating condition (such as high
vibration, thrust bearing wear or loss of generator coolant
flow, etc.) will initiate a sequential trip.
That is not to say that a generator protective relay cannot
sequentially trip the unit, it is just a question of having
sufficient time to progress through the shutdown process
without causing further damage to the unit. The effect of a
delayed electrical trip on power plant and system
equipment must be analyzed and equipment
manufacturers consulted prior to the use of any sequential
tripping scheme.
The list of generator protective relays which can initiate
sequential tripping has changed over the years. This is
due to changing power plant designs, increasing size and
complexity of generating units and more detailed
knowledge about potential abnormal power system and
unit operating conditions.
From the PSRC survey, it appears that sequential tripping
is being used improperly in some instances. The following
is a discussion of those protection functions which are
associated with abnormal electrical conditions that may
not necessarily involve a fault in the generator and have
been considered by some users as candidates for initiating
a sequential trip of the unit.
Loss of Field (40) - When excitation is lost on a
synchronous generating unit, it continues to supply
real power to the system as an induction generator.
Its speed increases above rated as it obtains its
excitation from the system. The unit becomes a large
reactive drain on the system. This large reactive drain
causes problems in the machine, adjacent machines
and the power system.
Operation as an induction generator causes induced
currents to flow in the field winding and the rotor
body (rotor teeth, wedges, retaining rings, etc.). The
high reactive component of the armature current can
also overload the stator winding. The permissible
time before damage can occur depends on the type of
machine, type of excitation loss, turbine governor
138
characteristics and system conditions. This time can
be as short as seconds. Of course, should the loss of
field condition be caused by a short-circuit in the
excitation system, tripping should occur as soon as
possible to minimize damage at the point of the fault.
Additionally, a large reactive drain on the system can
cause low system voltages which, if excessive or
prolonged, can cause system instability or problems
of reactive supply on other portions of the system.
Due to the immediacy of the effects of the
abnormality on the generator, the unit should be
tripped from the power system by means of a
simultaneous trip or a generator trip. Especially
important is that all excitation power be removed,
since it is possible that the exciter power is feeding an
internal fault.
0 Unbalanced Currents (46) - The ultimate problem
associated with unbalanced-current conditions is the
temperature rise in the surface parts of the generator
rotor. This condition is caused by the negative-
sequence current in the stator winding which in turn
creates a magnetic flux wave in the air gap which
rotates in the direction opposite that of the rotor at
synchronous speed, inducing double-frequency
currents in the rotor surface. With sustained
negative-sequence armature current, the temperature
of the rotor slot wedges, for example, can reach a
point where the wedges lose their mechanical strength
and fail. Surface currents, crowding around the
transverse flexibility slots and the retaining ring-rotor
body interface can also cause severe mechanical
distress.
It becomes important to analyze the effects of
different types of abnormal conditions resulting in
unbalanced currents flowing in the machine and the
maximum time the unit can operate without any type
of damage. The tripping time for a negative-sequence
condition varies based on the magnitude of the
unbalanced current. Generally the cause of these
currents is an unbalance in the system. To adequately
protect the machine, it should be removed from the
system as quickly as possible. A unit separation trip
allows for a quick re-synchronization if the system
abnormality has been eliminated.
0 Loss of Synchronism (78) - During an out-of-step
condition as the swing angle between the generator
voltage of a machine changes with respect to that of
other units in the system, the armature current in the
unit varies in magnitude. The current surges that
result are cyclical in nature, with the frequency being
a function of the relative rate of slip of the poles in
the machine.
The resulting peak currents and off-frequency
operation can cause generator stator winding stresses
and transient torques, which can excite mechanical
resonances that can be potentially damaging to the
turbine-generator shafts. It is recommended that the
generator be removed from the system quickly,
preferably during the fust slip cycle. A unit
separation trip can be used if it is desirable to quickly
re-synchronize the unit after the system retums to a
stable condition.
0 Overexcitation (24) - Overexcitation of a generator
or transformers connected to the generator terminals
will occur whenever the rated volts/Hz ratios are
exceeded. Saturation of the generator and
transformer magnetic cores can occur, and stray flux
can be induced in nonlaminated components which
were not designed to carry flux. This can cause severe
overheating in the generator or transformers with
eventual breakdown in insulation. For a generator
which is operating near full load, the field current
during the overexcitation can also be excessive.
In addition to voltage regulator failure, overexcitation
can also occur during a complete load rejection which
leaves transmission lines connected to the generating
unit. Under this condition, the volts/Hz ratio may
exceed 1.25 pu. With the excitation system control in
the automatic mode of operation, the overexcitation
will generally be reduced to safe limits in a few
seconds. With control in the manual mode, the
overexcitation may be sustained and equipment
damage can occur.
Excessive volts/Hz will result in equipment failure
and should be treated as a severe electrical problem.
The generator and transformer should be removed
from service as quickly as possible using a
simultaneous or generator trip. If the condition
occurs when the unit is off-line, the field breaker
should be immediately tripped. Generator and
transformer manufacturers will generally provide
overexcitation capability limits for this equipment.
0 Abnormal Frequency (81) - Departure from rated
speed under load will bring stimulus frequencies
closer to one or more of the natural frequencies of the
various stages of turbine blades and result in vibratory
stresses appearing in these elements. As vibratory

stresses increase, fatigue damage is accumulated in
the blades which may lead to cracking in the turbine
blading structure.
Underfrequency operation of a synchronous generator
is certain to be accompanied by high values of load
currents. This could result in exceeding the short-
time thermal capability of the generator. Since the
short-time thermal capability of the generator is less
restrictive than the possible vibratory damage
associated with the turbine, the unit tripping mode
will be based on the protection of the turbine
elements.
The primary concem associated with abnormal
fiequency operating conditions occur, after system
disturbances which produce system separation and
severe overloading on remaining system generators.
Since it is difficult to define every possible system
configuration during this abnormal condition, the
recommended tripping mode must balance system
needs versus the undue risk to which untripped
generators are exposed. For extreme cases of higher
or lower frequencies, the turbine is only allowed
seconds of operation. A unit separation trip is the
safest means of protection against extreme frequency
excursions. The turbine manufacturer should be
contacted for further protection recommendations.
-
Field Ground (64F) The field circuit of a generator
is an ungrounded dc system. A single ground in the
field circuit will not result in immediate damage, but
it indicates the presence of weakened insulation or
mechanical failure. If a second ground fault occurs, a
portion of the field winding will be short-circuited,
thereby producing unbalanced air gap fluxes in the
machine and resultant vibration. A sequential trip
may be used as long as the operator is willing to
assume the associated risks.
I DEVICE
From a protection viewpoint, the safest step to take
after detection of a field ground is to initiate a unit
trip. Many utilities alarm when a field ground has
been detected and provide instructions for operators
to shutdown the machine as soon as system
conditions permit.
High-Impedance Stator Ground Faults (59GN) -
I I
Historically, the ground fault is the most common
type of fault to which a generator is subjected. A
single ground on a high impedance-grounded stator
indicates the presence of weakened insulation or
mechanical failure. If a second ground fault occurs, it
139
could result in a potentially damaging stator multi-
phase or tum-to-turn short-circuit. Additionally,
severe mechanical torsional shocks to shafts and
couplings can occur.
The minimum isolation time of the unit from the
power system for this condition should be such that
the machine is exposed to minimum damage if a
second ground occurs. There is further consideration
that a large percentage of stator ground faults will
occur at a location at which the shorting of the
complete winding by a second ground is not possible.
The fault of greatest destructive potential involves a
ground at the neutral, simultaneous with a ground at
the line terminals.
Taking into consideration the severity of damage due
to a second ground fault and the elevated dielectric
stresses imposed on the machine, it is recommended
to trip the unit without significant delay after a
ground fault has been detected.
While there are some instances where sequential tripping
could possibly be initiated by generator protection relays,
generally the recommended practice is to initiate one of
the other triphhutdown modes for isolation of the unit.
The field ground protection function is the only candidate
discussed above which could be considered for sequential
tripping of the unit. See Table 2 for the recommended
tripping practices, per ANSIIIEEE C37.102-1995, for
these protection functions. Final decision on the
trippinghhutdown mode of a particular protection
function should be based on the recommended practices of
the turbine-generatormanufacturer.
Table 2
Recommended Tripping for Protection Devices (2)
TRIP TABLE
I GEN I FLD I PRIME I TRANSF I ALARM I
I BKR I BKR I MOVER I AUX I ONLY
24 l x l x l X I X I
I
I I I
Note: (1) May be connected to trip, per generator
manufacturer
(2) See ANSIAEEE C37.102-1995 Table 6-1 for
complete details
140
V. TURBINE TRIP BACKUP PROTECTION
The main function of backup protection is to ensure that in
the event of a failure of the sequential tripping scheme,
the unit will be isolated from the power system. Backup
protection should be, as far as possible, applied
independent of the primary tripping scheme, with as few
common components as possible. Manufacturers use
various electrical and mechanical protective devices to
detect the failure to isolate the steam turbine generator
from the power system following a turbine trip. Most
turbine trip backup h c t i o n s are performed by measuring,
or other means of determining when power is drawn from
the power system and motoring the generator.
As shown in Table 3, three of the manufacturers surveyed
(Manufacturers A, C and D) recommend a reverse power
relay as backup protection for excessive motoring of the
unit. This reverse power relay will initiate either a
simultaneous or generator trip, and it is set to be less
sensitive or set at the same sensitivity with a longer time
delay than the reverse power relay used in the sequential
tripping control logic. Generally, this relay will be
supervised by a "Generator Breakers Closed" signal.
Table 3
Survey of Manufacturer Recommendations
for Motoring Protection Schemes
Devices Used to Detect Motoring Manufacturer
Condition : Code
*Note: Manufacturer B recommends that the motoring protection
initiate sequential tripping, rather than the simultaneous or
generator trip. Also note that the reverse power relays used for
motoring protection are separate relays than those used for
sequential tripping control logic.
One manufacturer (Manufacturer B) recommends
monitoring HP turbine differential steam pressure as a
means of providing backup protection for a motoring
condition. The detection of a low differential steam
pressure condition initiates a sequential trip after a time
delay. A sequential trip initiated by the €€P turbine
differential steam pressure, as recommended by
manufacturer B, will not take a unit off-line.
Manufacturer B does not provide independent backup
protection for failure of the sequential tripping control
logic. For this reason, manufacturer B recommends
redundant control logic circuits by using multiple reverse
power relays to reduce the probability that device failure
will prevent breaker tripping.
The application of reverse power detection for backup
protection should utilize a time delay. Typically 30
seconds can be used to prevent operation during power
swings caused by system disturbances or when
synchronizingthe turbine generator to the system.
VI. CONTROL AND PROTECTION ISSUES
Users must be aware of the limitations inherent in their
control and protection schemes. It is important that the
user recognize where automatic systems provide backup
and where manual action by plant operators is required.
The following issues should be considered when applying
sequential tripping schemes and motoring protection: 1)
the failure of the sequential tripping control logic to
function and 2) inability of reverse power relays to detect
certain motoring conditions.
-
Issue # 1 When a turbine trips, it is possible that there
could be a failure of a device used in the sequential
tripping scheme, thus disabling the sequential tripping
control logic. Again, by combining multiple devices in
an appropriate series-parallel arrangement, the
probability of device failure rendering the control logic
inoperable is sharply reduced. Motoring protection
which initiates a generator or simultaneous trip (for
Manufacturers A, C and D) functions as a backup to the
sequential tripping control logic and will trip the
generator breakers, preventing excessive motoring.
Issue # 2 - The four manufacturer schemes for both
sequential tripping and motoring protection are
rendered inoperable for any operating condition where
reverse power relays may not operate. It has been
documented that reverse power relays may not detect
motoring conditions when the machine VAR flow is
high.
All four manufacturers recommend that alarm circuits
alert plant operators to a motoring condition. Operators
need to be aware of the consequences of excessive
motoring and the responses required should the sequential
tripping control logic or the motoring protection fail to
operate. Each user needs to evaluate the degree to which
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automatic or manual actions will provide backup to the
unit’s control and protection schemes.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In general, it is recommended that generator protective
relays initiate non sequential trip modes for unit isolation.
However, sequential tripping provides a useful means of
taking a steam turbine generator off-line for a limited
number of abnormal operating conditions, where delayed
tripping of the generator will not result in increased
damage to the turbine-generator or other electrical
equipment. The reason for sequentially tripping a steam
turbine generator is to avoid the overspeed condition that
results when the generator’s main breaker@) is tripped
while steam is applied to the turbine.
Proper control logic is critical to the design of a sequential
possibility of turbine-generator overspeed during
shutdown and its potential for causing catastrophic
damage. However, the final decision on the
tripping/shutdown mode of a particular protection
function should be based upon the recommended
practices of the turbine-generator manufacturer.
WI. REFERENCES
1. Steam Station Protection Working Group.
“Minimum Recommended Protection, Interlocking
and Control for Fossil-Fuel Unit-Connected Steam
Station, Part I: Overall Protection”. IEEE
Transactions on Power Aptmatus and Systems.
Vol. 92, No. 1. Jan/Feb. 1973. Pages 374-380.
2. McGrath, R.V., Izquierdo, N.A. and Wirth, G.J.
“ Reverse-power Relay Response Under High-VAR

tripping scheme and requires some sort of mechanical Unit Conditions.” Proceedings of the American
“Turbine Tripped” indication (i.e., steam stop valve limit Power Conference, April 1991.
switches, trip oil system pressure switches, etc.) which is
supervised by an electrical reverse power relay. This 3. Julka, A.K. and Aiken, T.P. “Antimotoring Relay
relay is normally set to detect very low power levels and (32) Susceptibility to VARs .” Niagara Mohawk
incorporates a brief time delay on the order of several Power report.
seconds for added security.
4. ANSUIEEE C37.102-1995. Guide for AC Generator
The performance of reverse power relays was explored in Protection.
some detail relative to several documented cases of the
relays’ failure to operate for legitimate motoring
conditions. This is primarily due to the difficulty of
measuring very low levels of real (reverse) power when
accompanied by high levels of reactive power (leading or
h%ing).

It has been recommended that generator protective relays

initiate one of the other trippinglshutdown modes for
isolation of the unit due to electrical faults. Only devices
protecting the unit from an abnormal mechanical
operating condition or an abnormal (as opposed to
faulted) electrical condition or a normal shutdown should
initiate a sequential trip.

A survey of four turbine-generator manufacturers

indicated that turbine trip backup protection should also
be included as part of an overall generator protection
package. Such protection, according to the survey, can be
provided by electrical or mechanical means, with an
electrical reverse power relay being the means more
broadly supported by the survey.

As stated earlier, the main objective of implementing

sequential tripping control logic is to eliminate the