J Bus Ethics
DOI 10.1007/s10551-016-3397-y
COMMENTARY
‘‘Apple: Good Business, Poor Citizen’’: A Practitioner’s Response
David Newkirk1
Received: 12 October 2016 / Accepted: 15 November 2016
 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016
Abstract This paper was written in response to Etzioni’s
‘‘Apple: Good Business Poor Citizen’’ (J Bus Ethics, 2016,
doi:10.1007/s10551-016-3233-4). It argues that Etzioni is
correct in seeing the recent conflict between Apple and the
FBI over cracking the San Bernardino shooter’s iPhone as
requiring that considerations of national security be bal-
anced against the rights of those it might impact. There are
nonetheless critical questions about one must still ask:
whose rights are curbed, to what degree, and how does a
society decide which side to favor? More attention needs to
be paid to the privacy of other iPhone users and, impor-
tantly, the burden that hacking the phone might impose on
Apple, either impairing its brand value or compromising its
business potential. Finally, by asking ‘who judges the
balance?’, it questions whether labeling Apple a poor cit-
izen is premature, as they had only begun challenging the
FBI’s judgment through the judicial process.
Keywords Communitarian ethics
Corporate rights

National security
Privacy
Stakeholder theory
Amatai
Etzioni
The author did not receive any support or funding from any
institution in the preparation of this paper, nor does he hold
shares of the Apple Corporation.
In his paper, Prof. Etzioni makes the case, using liberal
communitarian ethics, ‘‘that each community, each nation,
This comment refers to the article available at doi:10.1007/s10551-
016-3233-4.
& David Newkirk
david@thenewkirks.com
1
University of Virginia’s Darden School of Business,
Charlottesville, VA, USA
faces two fully legitimate ethical claims—national security
and individual rights—and that neither can be maximized
nor fully reconciled, as there is an inevitable tension
between these two claims’’ (Etzioni 2016, p. 3). Further, he
argues that, in contesting the FBI’s request backed by a
federal court order to create software to bypass the San
Diego shooter’s password protection, Apple fails to meet
its legal and ethical obligations.
In this brief response, I will argue that more was
involved than ‘‘the tension between two core values:
national security and individual rights’’ (Etzioni 2016,
p. 1). All iPhone users’ rights and interests may have been
at risk, as were Apple’s own. Given the magnitude of the
possible impact, it was reasonable for Apple to take the
issue to court, the traditional venue for resolving a conflict
between rights. To declare Apple a ‘poor citizen’ before
this legitimate, appeal was complete in premature.
Etzioni makes the case that no right is absolute and that
the challenge for ethics is to resolve the potential conflicts
between them or, where that is not possible, to strike the
appropriate balance. And the range of considerations,
particularly in this case, is broad. ‘‘Nobody on either side
disagrees with the observation that the way this issue will
be resolved will have major implications for national
security (especially terrorism), public safety (especially
crime), privacy, personal security (e.g. protection from
identity theft) and the business interests of the corporations
involved’’ (Etzioni 2016, p. 3).
The guiding principle he cites is one of relative impact,
with national security prevailing when the risk is great and
the intrusion limited: ‘‘There are ample precedents to hold
that when the common good, in particular public safety and
national security are concerned, individual rights can be
curbed, especially if the intrusion is small and the gain to
the public interest is significant’’ (Etzioni 2016, p. 4).
123

Even accepting this framework (which I do), one must
still ask: whose rights are curbed, to what degree, and how
does a society decide which side to favor? The shooter’s
right to privacy is not at issue here. The phone belonged to
his employer, the County of San Bernardino, and they had
already waived any privacy right they might have had.1
The bulk of the public discussion, as well as Apple’s
response and much of the paper at hand, can be seen as a
debate about whether the creation of software to allow
‘cracking’ of passwords puts many iPhone users’2 privacy
at risk and whether this small risk to many people out-
weighs the potential value of the information it might yield.
As Apple’s CEO, Tim Cook, described
their considerations:
We knew the positioning on the outside would not be
public safety. It would be security vs. privacy—se-
curity should win. But we went through the deep,
deep, deep discussions on that. It became clear that
the trade-off, so to speak, was essentially putting
hundreds of millions of people at risk for a phone
that may or may not have anything on it, and that
likely didn’t, because of other things that we knew
about. We thought this actually is a clear decision. A
hard one, but a clear one (McGregor 2016) (emphasis
added).
All the discussants share the understanding that the
software key, if developed, could in theory be used to
‘crack’ the many iPhones using the particular iOS encryp-
tion tools. And because this is software, not a physical tool,
it could potentially be replicated and applied both widely
and quickly.
The debate centers on whether this constitutes a material
risk to their owner’s privacy. Etzioni believes not. Both in
this paper and in his article ‘‘Liberal Communitarian
Approach to Privacy and Security’’, he suggests that the
software key could be created, but kept secure ‘‘like the
formula for Coca Cola’’ (Etzioni 2014, p. 15). The recently
reported NSA data breach suggests that such security may
be difficult to maintain.3
1
The issue of whether a right to privacy extends to the dead is not
settled. See, for example, Chu (2015).
2
An important question is whether Apple has an obligation to all
iPhone users, or just American’s. In the discussion of corporate social
responsibility which concludes the paper, Etzioni offers several
arguments which would lead to differing conclusions. The social
contract view, which corporations exist within a society and a state,
might entail an obligation only to American users. The stakeholder
view would make Apple responsible to all customers (as well as
employees, suppliers, communities, funders, et al.)
3
‘‘The release on websites this week of what appears to be top-secret
computer code that the National Security Agency has used to break
into the networks of foreign governments and other espionage targets
has caused deep concern inside American intelligence agencies,
123
D. Newkirk
The discussion of international precedents touches on
the same concern. However, I read it slightly differently
than the author. The concern is not whether ‘‘the Chinese
may use it as a talking point’’ (Etzioni 2016, p. 12). Instead,
if the key exists and Apple has let the US government use it
in the US, could Apple reject an equally valid claim from
another government?
The point here is not to reject outright the claim of
national security interest. Rather it is to suggest that all
iPhone users may be affected, and the questions of the
degree of risk and potential value of the information merit
close consideration. (On the second point, there is a sig-
nificant difference between the situations in San Bernar-
dino and Paris. In the former, the assailants were dead, and
there was no evidence of active co-conspirators. In the
latter case, some assailants had escaped, and there was
stronger evidence of collaborators, so the information had
potentially more, and more urgent, value.)
Apple’s Standing
The preceding discussion addressed the tension between
national security and the privacy of iPhone users. Apple’s
role can be seen as speaking for its users, a position which
their CEO articulated:
Customers should have an expectation that they
shouldn’t need a PhD in computer science to protect
themselves. So I think they depend on us to do some
things on their behalf. So with that responsibility
comes an obligation to stand up (McGregor 2016).
This view, that Apple had a special responsibility to its
customers, may help account for the lack of protest when a
third party, with no relationship to the Apple customers,
cracked the iPhone.
The courts’ judgment in earlier cases under the All
Writs Act, ‘‘that an undue burden may not be imposed’’
(quoted in Etzioni 2016, p. 16) makes the impact on Apple
a valid consideration and invites us to assess what the
burden might be4. Etzioni uses a narrow understanding of
‘burden,’ quoting Gordon Crovitz’s calculation of costs on
the order of $200,000. By virtually any measure, this would
not be a burden on a company with cash reserves in excess
Footnote 3 continued
raising the question of whether America’s own elite operatives have
been hacked and their methods revealed. Sanger (2016).
4
It is probably not necessary in this paper to discuss whether
companies have rights. Those of us who are not fans of the US
Supreme Court’s Citizens United ruling can simply understand a
burden on Apple to be shorthand for a burden on Apple’s
shareholders—or the human beings who are the ultimate beneficiaries
of Apple’s returns.
‘‘Apple: Good Business, Poor Citizen’’: A Practitioner’s Response

of $230B.5 (The EU’s recent decision that Apple owed the history of data breaches in government and the private
Ireland $14.5B may be a burden.) sector, the latter will be a tough task.
The cost to Apple’s reputation could be well beyond
this. To a greater degree than many other tech companies,
Apple has made privacy an explicit part of its consumer Who Weighs the Balance?
promise and business model.6 In a recent letter to con-
sumers, posted on their website, they write: Both in his title and in Part III of his paper, ‘‘A Matter of
Social Responsibility,’’ Etzioni implies that Apple some-
Our business model is very straightforward: We sell
how shirked its legal and ethical responsibilities by not
great products. We don’t build a profile based on your
creating the key. As the arguments above suggest, the
email content or web browsing habits to sell to
balance between the potential value of the information in
advertisers. We don’t ‘monetize’ the information you
the phone and the cost to individuals as well as the degree
store on your iPhone or in iCloud. And we don’t read
of burden on Apple is not obvious. And the precedents
your email or your messages to get information to
under the All Writs Act are not immediately compelling.
market to you. Our software and services are
Apple’s own statements acknowledge the tension
designed to make our devices better.7
between national security and privacy, and their practices
Privacy is an essential feature of the Apple brand.8 respect the rights of the government to access data in
Compromising its customers’ data security, or even being Apple’s possession:
seen as not defending it vigorously, could diminish the
We regularly receive requests for information about
value of that brand, estimated at $229b. by Millward
our customers and their Apple devices from law
Brown.9 This would be a significant burden, far beyond
enforcement….When we receive information
Apple’s out of pocket costs.
requests, we require that it be accompanied by the
The perception of privacy also influences what con-
appropriate legal documents such as a subpoena or
sumers are willing to do with their phones. (As an example,
search warrant…. We carefully review any request to
look at millennials’ shift from Facebook to SnapChat.)
ensure that there’s a valid legal basis for it. And we
Were Apple’s devices and services to be seen as less
limit our response to only the data law enforcement is
secure, its potential business growth would be diminished.
legally entitled to for the specific investigation. 10
Apple’s business model, making money by selling products
and services, could be put at risk. This would, in turn, The request in question lies well outside established
impact its market value. practice. Moreover, laws compelling companies to create
There’s an important difference between the argument a ‘back door’ to encryption products have failed to gain
for users’ interest and that for Apple’s interest. In the traction in either the US Congress or foreign legislatures.
former, the question is whether the actual risk to user’s Even President Obama tilted the balance back from
privacy outweighs the value to national security. However, security toward privacy. In describing the USA Freedom
for Apple, even a wrong belief on the part of consumers Act, which renewed much of the Patriot Act with some
that their privacy is at risk could impact its brand and modest retrenchment, the NY Times wrote:
consumers’ usage, imposing a substantial burden on Apple.
The president is trying to balance national security
In judging Etzioni’s proposal to create the key then lock it
and civil liberties to put into practice the kind of
up, we can judge its value for users on whether we believe
equilibrium he has talked about since he was in the
we could lock it up, but for Apple we would need to judge
Senate, when he expressed support for surveillance
whether the market would believe the key was safe. Given
programs but also vowed to rein in what he called
government overreach. (Shear 2016)
5
Kanter and Mark (2016). In a situation like this, can the FBI make the final
6
Apple’s practice of not monetizing customers’ information, and its judgment? Or can a federal district judge make it without a
saliency to Apples brand, was confirmed by senior tech executives in hearing? At the time the FBI found another solution and
private conversations with the author. dropped its action against Apple, both sides had filed their
7
Apple Website www.apple.com/privacy/, retrieved 8/29/16. briefs and a hearing was scheduled. It seems premature to
8
’’Apple has hitched its brand wagon to privacy, because the firm label Apple a poor citizen for challenging the order—both
believes that (a) customers care enough about privacy to vote with
their dollars and (b) as the steward of people’s most personal,
sensitive data, Apple has an obligation to serve their best interests‘‘ 10
Apple Website, Privacy—Government Information Requests,
Khatibloo (2016). Retrieved August 29, 2016 from http://www.apple.com/privacy/
9
Daneshkhu (2016). government-information-requests/.

123

in the courts and in the court of public opinion. Certainly,
the FBI’s and NSA’s history of overreaching in the name
of national security would suggest a review of their
understandings of their boundaries would be prudent.
Funding No funding was received for the preparation of this article
or the research underlying it.
Compliance with Ethical Standards
Ethical approval This article does not contain any studies with
human participants or animals performed by the author.
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