LBP v CA, G.R. 221636
The
FACTS
The Dept. of Agrarian Reform subjected the land of the private respondents
to the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. Private
respondents rejected the valuation of the petitioner but the later still
deposited the amount of the valuation in their favor. Private respondents
filed before Branch 23 of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, sitting as a
Special Agrarian Court (SAC), a case for determination of just compensation.
The SAC ordered the petitioner to re-value the property, which it did, but
the new valuation was still rejected by the private respondent. A notice of
appeal under Rule 41 was filed by the private respondent. Petitioner filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that private respondents availed a wrong
mode of appeal. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss
on grounds of liberality in the construction of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: WON the CA committed Grave Abuse of Discretion
HELD
Yes, the CA committed grave abuse of discretion. The proper mode of appeal
from the decisions of RTCs sitting as SACs is by petition for review under
Rule 42 of the Rules of Court and not through an ordinary appeal under Rule
41.
Section 60 of R.A. No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
clearly and categorically states that said mode of appeal should be adopted.
While it is true that the Court have applied a liberal application of the rules
of procedure in a number of cases, the Court have stressed that this can be
invoked only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances.
LBP v Kho, G.R. 205839
FACTS
Narciso L. Kho purchased a Manager’s check from Land Bank of the
Philippines worth P25M, paid using the money from his savings account in
the same bank. The check was purchased in order to negotiate a deal with
Red Orange. LBP gave Kho the check, as well as a photocopy thereof.
photocopy was given to Red Orange. The deal between Kho and Red Orange
did not push through. Rudy Medel, representing Red Orange, went to LBP
to negotiate the check, LBP cleared the check and notified Kho of the
transaction. Kho was surprised as the original check was still with him. It
turns out the check negotiated by Medel with LBP is spurious. Kho tried to
recover the P25M from the LBP, but the latter claims that the former was
negligent for giving Medel the photocopy of the check which was used to
make the spurious check and thus they cannot be held liable for the lost
amount.
ISSUE: WON the LBP should pay for the P25M
HELD
The genuine check remained with Kho the entire time, and LBP admits that
the check it cleared was fake. When LBP’s CCD forwarded the deposited
check to its branch for inspection, its officers had every opportunity to
recognize the forgery of their signatures or the falsity of the check. Whether
by error or neglect, the bank failed to do so, which led to the withdrawal
and eventual loss of P25M. This is the proximate cause of the loss. LBP
breached its duty of diligence and assumed the risk of incurring a loss on
account of a forged or counterfeit check. Hence, it should suffer the
resulting damage.
We cannot agree with LBP and the RTC’s positions that Kho is precluded
from invoking the forgery. A drawer or depositor of the bank is precluded
from asserting the forgery if the drawee bank can prove his failure to
exercise ordinary care and if this negligence substantially contributed to the
forgery of the perpetration of the fraud.
The business of banking is imbued with public interest it is an industry where
the general public’s trust and confidence in the system is of paramount
importance. Consequently, banks are expected to exert the highest degree
of, if not the utmost, diligence. They are obligated to treat their depositors’
accounts with meticulous care, always keeping in mind the fiduciary nature
of their relationship.
Limkaichong v LBP, G.R. 158464
FACTS
Petitioner, as registered owner of 19.6843 hectares agricultural land in
Guihulngan, Negros Oriental, filed in the RTC of Dumaguete City a complaint
for the fixing of just compensation for her lands and prayed that the DARAB
valuation be set aside and declared null and void.
She assailed the November 22, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals
dismissing the petitioner's petition for certiorari for not being the proper
remedy, thereby affirming the dismissal of Civil Case No. 12558 by the trial
court on the ground of the valuation by the Department of Agrarian Reform
having already become final due to her failure to· bring her action for judicial
determination of just compensation within 15 days from notice of such
valuation, and the June 2, 2003 resolution denying her motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE: WON the Petitioner was prevented from assailing the dismissal by
petition for certiorari
HELD
No, petitioner should not be prevented from assailing the dismissal by
petition for certiorari provided her resort complied with the requirements
of the Rules of Court (ROC) for the bringing of the petition for certiorari.
Section 1, Rule 45 of the ROC provides that the following requisites must
concur for certiorari to prosper: 1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a
board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; 2) such
tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
and 3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
The Court held that the availability of an appeal as a remedy is a bar to the
bringing of the petition for certiorari ONLY where such appeal is in itself a
sufficient and adequate remedy, in that it will promptly relieve the
petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment or final order
complained of. considering that the petition plainly alleges grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the RTC by violating petitioner's right to due
process or equal protection, the same should be fully heard if only to
ascertain and determine if the very serious allegations are true.
Gargallo v Dohle Seafront Crewing (Manila) Inc., G.R. 215551
FACTS
On July 20, 2012, petitioner filed a complaint for permanent total disability
benefits against respondents before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC). The complaint stemmed from his claim that: (a) he
accidentally fell on deck while lifting heavy loads of lube oil drum, with his
left arm hitting the floor first, bearing his full body weight; (b) he has
remained permanently unfit for further sea service despite major surgery
and further treatment by the company-designated physicians; and (c) his
permanent total unfitness to work was duly certified by his chosen physician
whose certification must prevail over the palpably self-serving and biased
assessment of the company-designated physicians.
For their part, respondents countered that the fit-to-work findings of the
company-designated physicians must prevail over that of petitioner's
independent doctor, considering that: (a) they were the ones who
continuously treated and monitored petitioner's medical condition; and (b)
petitioner failed to comply with the conflict-resolution procedure under the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment
Contract (POEA-SEC). Respondents further averred that the filing of the
disability claim was premature since petitioner was still undergoing medical
treatment within the allowable 240-day period at the time the complaint
was filed.
ISSUE: WON Padiz should be absolved from joint and several liabilities with
Dchle Seafront and Dohle Manning
HELD
Applicable laws form part of, and are read into, contracts without need for
any express reference thereto; more so, when it pertains to a labor contract
which is imbued with public interest. Each contract thus contains not only
what was explicitly stipulated therein, but also the statutory provisions that
have any bearing on the matter." As applied herein, Section 10 of RA 8042,
as amended, and the pertinent POEA Rules are deemed incorporated in
petitioner's employment contract with respondents. These provisions are in
line with the State's policy of affording protection to labor and alleviating
the workers' plight, and are meant to assure OFWs immediate and sufficient
payment of what is due them. Thus, as the law provides, corporate directors
and officers are themselves solidarily liable with the recruitment/placement
agency for all money claims or damages that may be awarded to OFWs.
Based on the foregoing premises, the Court, therefore, finds Padiz jointly
and solidarily liable with Dohle Seafront and Dohle Manning for the payment
of the income benefit arising from petitioner's temporary total disability,
and, to such extent, grants petitioner's motion for reconsideration, and, in
consequence, modifies the September 16, 2015 Decision accordingly.
Social Security System v COA, G.R. 210940
FACTS
On May 14, 1997, the SSC of the Social Security System (SSS) approved
Resolution No. 3604 granting a new compensation package for its members,
including medical benefits, rice allowance, and a provident fund. These
benefits were incorporated in the SSS Manual on Personnel Policies, Rules
and Regulations or commonly known as the "Blue Book." On September 22,
1999, the SSC issued Resolution No. 7906 granting EME (Extraordinary
Miscellaneous Expenses) to its members at similar rates then given to
members of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). It was not
limited to, expenses incurred for meetings, seminars, conferences, official
entertainment, and public relations P4.49M to cover the payment of EME.
It also covered the increase in EME of its Chairman to P750K per year, which
was the rate being given to his counterpart in the GSIS.
On July 4, 2007, the Legal and Adjudication Office-Corporate Government
Sector (LAO-CGS) of the COA issued ND No. SSS-2007-02(2004) disallowing
the total amount of P4,314,683.99, broken down as follows:
P3,877,199.96 – EME; P70,992.03 – Medical Benefits; P 106,992.00 – Rice
Benefits; P259,500.00 – Provident Fund.
In its August 10, 2009 Decision, the COA-Legal Services Sector (COA-LSS)
denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the SSS. Aggrieved, the SSS
appealed before the COA. In its January 30, 2013 decision, the COA upheld
the disallowance of the disbursements in question.
ISSUE: WON the SSC are entitled to the assailed EME, medical benefits, rice
allowance and provident fund
HELD
This Court has been very consistent in characterizing the funds being
administered by SSS as a trust fund for the welfare and benefit of workers
and employees in the private sector. Thus, the provisions of the SS Law
empowering the SSC to allocate its funds to pay for the salaries and benefits
of its officials and employees are not absolute and unrestricted because the
SSS is a mere trustee of the said funds. In other words, the salaries and
benefits to be endowed by the SSS must always be reasonable so that the
funds, which it holds in trust will be devoted to its primary purpose of
servicing workers and employees from the private sector. Section 3(a) of the
SS Law was passed with the purpose of providing reasonable compensation
to appointive members of the SSC. It was crafted in such a manner that the
specific benefits be laid out so that there would be no need for Congress to
later pass a law providing for additional benefits.
Following the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which means the
express mention of one person, thing, act or consequence excludes all
others, the COA was correct in disallowing the disbursements in question as
they were not among those enumerated in Section 3(a) of the SS Law.
Verily, the SSS cannot grant additional benefits to SSC members other than
the reasonable allowances specified by the law. To do so would be contrary
to the intentions of Congress for the SS Law to categorically enumerate the
benefits to be received by SSC members. Notwithstanding the disallowance
of the questioned disbursements, the Court rules that the responsible
officers under the ND need not refund the same on the basis of good faith.
The Court upholds the position of the COA.
Villamor v Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC), G.R. 204422
FACTS
In 1978, petitioner Jesus Villamor was a member of the SSS, employed in
Valle Verde Country Club Inc (VVCCI). On November 3, 2006, he was brought
to Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital Manila, due to dizziness associated with
numbness and weakness on his left arm and leg. His CT scan revealed that
he had an "acute non-hemorrhage infarct on the right pons/basal ganglia.”
After more than a week of confinement, petitioner was discharged from the
said hospital with diagnoses of Hypertension Stage 1; Cerebro-Vascular
Disease (CVD) Acute, Non-Hemorrhagic Infarct Right Pons and Right Basal
Ganglia; Dyslipidemia (abnormal levels of lipids [cholesterol triglycerides, or
both] carried by lipoproteins in the blood).
On March 9, 2007, petitioner filed before respondent SSS claims for sickness
benefits and the EC TID benefits for his stroke. SSS granted his claim for
sickness benefits, but denied his claim for EC TID benefits on the ground that
there is no causal relationship between his illness and working conditions.
Upon further evaluation, the SSS noted petitioner’s smoking history and
alcoholic drinking habits increased his risk of developing his illness. The ECC
likewise denied his appeal citing the same reasons. Petitioner’s appeal to
the CA was likewise denied.
ISSUE: WON the ECC and CA erred in denying his claim for EC TTD
HELD
It is clear that contrary to the findings of the respondents SSS and ECC,
petitioner's job is not a mere clerk issuing vouchers or receipts. His duties
and responsibilities as Sports Area In-Charge are obviously laborious and
stressful since he is tasked to cater to the needs of all club members and
their guests, and to coordinate with the other departments of the club
regarding their needs. Petitioner is also the President of the VVCCI
Employees Union since 1984, except for the period 2000-2004. As the
president of the union, he was subjected to harassment and unfair labor
tactics of the management of the club.
The Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation provides that for an
illness or disease to be compensable, "it must be a result of occupational
disease listed under Annex 'A' of these Rules with the conditions set therein
satisfied, otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the
disease is increased by the working conditions." In the case of stroke and
hypertension, both are compensable since they are listed as occupational
diseases under Annex "A" of the said rules. What the law requires is a
reasonable work-connection and not direct causal relation. Probability, not
the ultimate degree of certainty, is the test of proof in compensation
proceedings. Petitioner was also able to show that his work and position in
the union caused him physical and mental strain as he had to deal with the
demands of various types of people. Thus, there is a probability that his work
and position in the union increased his risk of suffering a stroke, which
affected his brain, caused cerebral infarctions, paralysis of the left side of his
body, difficulty in speaking, and loss of muscular coordination. Petition
Granted.
Philippine Health Insurance Corporation v COA, G.R. 213453
(see image)
GSIS v Pauig, G.R. 210328
FACTS
Respondent Apolinario C. Pauig was the Municipal Agriculturist of the
Municipality of San Pablo, lsabela. He started in the government service on
February 12, 1964 as Emergency Laborer on casual status. Later, he became
a temporary employee from July 5, 1972 to July 18, 1977. On July 19, 1977,
he became a permanent employee, and on August 1, 1977, he became a
GSIS member. On November 3, 2004, he retired from the service upon
reaching the mandatory retirement age of 65 years old. But when he filed
his retirement papers with the GSIS-Cauayan, the latter processed his claim
based on a Record of Creditable Service and a Total Length of Service of only
twenty-seven (27) years. Disagreeing with the computation, Pauig wrote a
letter-complaint to the GSIS, arguing that his first 14 years in the
government service had been erroneously omitted. The GSIS ratiocinated
that Pauig's first 14 years in the government were excluded in the
computation of his retirement benefits because during those years, no
premium payments were remitted to it. Aggrieved, Pauig filed a case before
the RTC. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Pauig. GSIS then filed a
motion for reconsideration, which was later denied. Thus, the instant
petition.
ISSUE: WON the GSIS should include Pauig's first 14 years in government
service for the calculation of the latter's retirement benefits claim
HELD
No. Retirement benefits are given to government employees to reward
them for giving the best years of their lives to the service of their country.
This is especially true with those in government service occupying positions
of leadership or positions requiring management skills because the years
they devote to government service could be spent more profitably
elsewhere, such as in lucrative appointments in the private sector.
The doctrine of liberal construction cannot be applied in this case, where
the law invoked is clear, unequivocal and leaves no room for interpretation
or construction. To uphold Pauig's position will contravene the very words
of the law, and will defeat the ends which it seeks to attain. Compulsory
coverage under the GSIS had previously and consistently included regular
and permanent employees, and expressly excluded casual, substitute or
temporary employees from its retirement insurance plan.
The Court notes that it was not until 1997 that the compulsory membership
in the GSIS was extended to employees other than those on permanent
status. Petition Granted.
Barsolo v SSS, G.R. 187950
FACTS
Cristina Barsolo’s deceased husband, Manuel, was employed as a seaman
by various companies from 1988 to 2002. From July to December 2002,
Manuel served as Able Seaman onboard MT Polaris Star with Vela
International Marine Ltd., which was his last employer before he died in
2006. After his separation from employment with Vela, he was diagnosed
with hypertensive cardiovascular disease, coronary artery disease, and
osteoarthritis. He was treated at the Philippine Heart Center as an
outpatient from April 2003 to October 2004. When he died September 2006,
the autopsy reported listed myocardial infarction as his cause of death.
Believing that his husband’s cause of death was work-related, Cristina filed
a death benefits claim pursuant to PD 626, with the SSS.
The SSS denied her claim saying that there no longer was an employer-
employee relationship at the time of death and that him being a smoker
increased his risk of illness. Cristina then appealed to the ECC. The ECC also
denied her appeal saying that she was unable to establish that her husband’s
case fell under any of the circumstances covered, and likewise highlighting
that her husband was a smoker. Cristina then filed an appeal with the CA.
The CA also denied her petition for lack of merit. The CA said that although
Myocardial Infarction is a compensable disease, Cristina failed to prove a
causal relationship between Manuel’s work and the said illness. The CA also
agreed that the fact that Manuel as a smoker since 1973 contributed to the
development of his heart ailment. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: WON Cristina is entitled to compensation for the death of her
husband
HELD
The SC held that for Myocardial Infarction to be compensable, any of the
three conditions must be proven by substantial evidence. For a claim under
this condition to prosper, there must be proof that: First, the person was
asymptomatic before beginning employment, and Second, had displayed
symptoms during the performance of his duties, such symptoms should
have persisted long enough to establish that his work caused his heart
problem, which Cristina failed to do.
Moreover, as the CA pointed out, Manuel died 4 years after he disembarked
from the vessel. Other factors have already played a role in aggravating his
illness. Due to the considerable lapse of time, more convincing evidence
must be presented in order to attribute the cause of death to Manuel’s
work. Furthermore, Manuel was a smoker. The presence of a different major
causative factor, which could explain his illness and eventual death, defeats
Cristina’s claim. Petition Denied.
LBP v Musni, G.R. 206343
FACTS
Respondent Lorenzo Musni was the compulsory heir of Jovita Musni (Jovita),
who was the owner of a lot in Comillas, La Paz, Tarlac. Musni filed before the
RTC of Tarlac City a complaint for reconveyance of land and cancellation of
TCT against Spouses Nenita Sonza Santos and Ireneo Santos, Eduardo Sonza,
and Land Bank of the Philippines. Musni alleged that Nenita falsified a Deed
of Sale, and caused the transfer of title of the lot in her and her brother
Eduardo's name. Then the spouses Santos and Eduardo mortgaged the lot
to Land Bank as security for their loan. Musni said that he was dispossessed
of the lot when Land Bank foreclosed the property upon Nenita and
Eduardo's failure to pay their loan. Later, the titles of the lot and another
foreclosed land were consolidated in another TCT, under the name of Land
Bank. Musni also claimed that Nenita and Eduardo was convicted for
falsification of a public document which he filed against them before the
MTC of Tarlac.
Land Bank filed its Amended Answer to the RTC with Counterclaim and
Crossclaim. It asserted that the transfer of the title in its name was because
of a decision rendered by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board, Region III. It countered that its transaction with the Spouses Santos
and Eduardo was legitimate, and that it verified the authenticity of the title
with the Register of Deeds. Further, the bank loan was secured by another
lot owned by the Spouses Santos, and not solely by the lot being claimed by
Musni. Land Bank prayed that it be paid the value of the property and the
expenses it incurred, should the trial court order the reconveyance of the
property to Musni.
On June 2008, the RTC ruled in favor of Musni, relying on the fact that Nenita
was convicted of falsification of the Deed of Sale. The RTC found that Musni
did not agree to sell the property to the Spouses Santos and Eduardo. In
addition, the amount of Musni's indebtedness was an insufficient
consideration for the market value of the property. Lastly, the sale was
executed before the loan's maturity. The RTC also found that Land Bank was
not an innocent purchaser for value. The institution of the criminal case
against Nenita should have alerted the bank to ascertain the ownership of
the lot before it foreclosed the same. Land Bank and Nenita separately
moved for reconsideration, which were both denied by the RTC. Land Bank
and Spouses Santos separately appealed to the CA. In its appeal, Land Bank
reiterated that "it has demonstrated, by a preponderance of evidence, that
it is a mortgagee in good faith and a subsequent innocent purchaser for
value; as such, its rights as the new owner of the subject property must be
respected and protected by the courts. However, the CA ruled in favor of
Musni. Land Bank moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied.
ISSUE: WON LBP is a mortgagee in good faith and an innocent purchaser for
value; and is entitled to damages
HELD
No. Petitioner is neither a mortgagee in good faith nor an innocent
purchaser for value. Petitioner's defense that it could not have known the
criminal action since it was not a party to the case and that there was no
notice of lis pendens filed by respondent Musni, is unavailing. Had petitioner
exercised the degree of diligence required of banks, it would have
ascertained the ownership of one of the properties mortgaged to it. Where
"the findings of fact of the trial courts are affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
the same are accorded the highest degree of respect and, generally, will not
be disturbed on appeal. Such findings are binding and conclusive on this
Court."
Accordingly, this Court finds no reason to disturb the findings of the Court
of Appeals, which affirmed the findings of the trial court, that petitioner is
neither a mortgagee in good faith nor an innocent purchaser for value.

Likewise, the petitioner is not entitled to the award of damages. In its

Decision, the trial court ordered respondents Nenita and Eduardo to pay
petitioner damages in the amount equivalent to the appraised value of the
property being claimed by respondent Musni. The Court of Appeals deleted
the award. It considered the grant of award as a partial extinguishment of
the real estate mortgage, which is not allowed. Since the mortgage is
indivisible, the Court of Appeals nullified the real estate mortgage involving
the two properties, and deleted the award.

Although the Court of Appeals' basis for deleting the award is erroneous,
this Court affirms the removal on a different ground since petitioner did not
seek relief from the Court with clean hands. Petitioner may have incurred
losses when it entered into the mortgage transaction with respondents
Spouses Santos and Eduardo, and the corresponding foreclosure sale.
However, the losses could have been avoided if only petitioner exercised
the required due diligence.