Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 199082 July 23, 2013

JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO, Petitioner,

vs.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; HON. LEILA DE LIMA, in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Justice; HON. SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., in his capacity as Chairperson of the Commission on Elections; and the JOINT DOJ-COMELEC
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE and FACT-FINDING TEAM, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 199085

BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., Petitioner,

vs.
HON. LEILA DE LIMA, in capacity as Secretary of Justice; HON. SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., in his capacity as COMELEC Chairperson;
RENE V. SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO V. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM AND AUGUSTO C.
LAGMAN, in their capacity as COMELEC COMMISSIONERS; CLARO A. ARELLANO, GEORGE C. DEE, JACINTO G. ANG, ROMEO B.
FORTES AND MICHAEL D. VILLARET, in their capacity as CHAIRPERSON AND MEMBERS, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE JOINT DOJ-
COMELEC PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE ON THE 2004 AND 2007 ELECTION FRAUD,Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 199118

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairperson Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr., DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, represented by Secretary
Leila M. De Lima, JOINT DOJ-COMELEC PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE, SENATOR AQUILINO M. PIMENTEL III, and DOJ-
COMELEC FACT FINDING TEAM,Respondents.

RESOLUTION

PERALTA, J.:

For resolution are the separate motions for reconsideration filed by movants Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (GMA) 1 in G.R. No. 199118 and Jose Miguel
T. Arroyo (Mike Arroyo )2 in G.R. No. 199082 praying that the Court take a second look at our September 18, 2012 Decision 3 dismissing their
petitions and supplemental petitions against respondents Commission on Elections (Comelec), the Department of Justice (DOJ), Senator Aquilino M.
Pimentel III (Senator Pimentel), Joint DOJ-Comelec Preliminary Investigation Committee (Joint Committee) and DOJ-Comelec Fact-Finding Team
(Fact-Finding Team), et al.

For a better perspective, we briefly state the relevant factual and procedural antecedents as found by the Court in the assailed decision, to wit:

On August 15, 2011, the Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating and constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team
(referred to as Joint Panel) on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases. The Joint Committee was mandated to
conduct the necessary preliminary investigation on the basis of the evidence gathered and the charges recommended by the Fact-Finding Team.
The Fact-Finding Team, on the other hand, was created for the purpose of gathering real, documentary, and testimonial evidence which can be
utilized in the preliminary investigation to be conducted by the Joint Committee. Pursuant to Section 7 4 of the Joint Order, on August 23, 2011, the
Joint Committee promulgated its Rules of Procedure.

In its Initial Report5 dated October 20, 2011, the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the results in the May 14, 2007 senatorial
elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato, and Maguindanao was indeed perpetrated. 6 The Fact-Finding Team recommended, among
others, that petitioner Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. (Abalos) be subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage for conspiring to manipulate
the election results in North and South Cotabato; that GMA and Abalos be subjected to another preliminary investigation for manipulating the
election results in Maguindanao;7 and, that Mike Arroyo be subjected to further investigation.8 The case was docketed as DOJ-Comelec Case No.
001-2011.

Meanwhile, on October 17, 2011, Senator Pimentel filed a ComplaintAffidavit9 for Electoral Sabotage against petitioners and twelve others, and
several John Does and Jane Does. The case was docketed as DOJ-Comelec Case No. 002-2011.

On October 24, 2011, the Joint Committee issued two subpoenas against petitioners in DOJ-Comelec Case Nos. 001-2011 and 002-2011.10 On
November 3, 2011, petitioners, through counsel, appeared before the Joint Committee11 and respondents therein were ordered to submit their
Counter-Affidavits by November 14, 2011.12

Thereafter, petitioners filed before the Court separate Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction assailing the creation of the Joint Panel. 13 The petitions were eventually consolidated.

On November 14, 2011, Mike Arroyo filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings14 before the Joint Committee, in view of the pendency of his petition before
the Court. On the same day, GMA filed before the Joint Committee an Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam15 to require Senator Pimentel to furnish her
with documents referred to in his complaint-affidavit and for the production of election documents as basis for the charge of electoral sabotage. GMA
prayed that she be allowed to file her counter-affidavit within ten (10) days from receipt of the requested documents.16Petitioner Abalos, for his part,
filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings (Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam),17 in view of the pendency of his petition brought before the Court.

In an Order18 dated November 15, 2011, the Joint Committee denied the aforesaid motions of petitioners. GMA, subsequently, filed a motion for
reconsideration.19

On November 16, 2011, the Joint Committee promulgated a Joint Resolution which was later indorsed to the Comelec.20 On November 18, 2011, the
Comelec en banc issued a Resolution21 approving and adopting the Joint Resolution subject to modifications. The Comelec resolved, among others,
that an information for electoral sabotage be filed against GMA and Abalos, while the charges against Mike Arroyo be dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence.

On even date, pursuant to the above Resolution, the Comelec’s Law Department filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasay City, an
Information against petitioner GMA, Governor Andal Ampatuan, Sr., and Atty. Lintang H. Bedol, for violation of Section 42(b)(3) of Republic Act (RA)
No. 9369, amending Section 27 (b) of RA 6646, docketed as Criminal Case No. RPSY-11-04432-CR.22 The case was raffled to Branch 112 and the
corresponding Warrant of Arrest was issued which was served on GMA on the same day. 23

On November 18, 2011, GMA filed with the RTC an Urgent Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam24 with leave to allow the Joint Committee to resolve the
motion for reconsideration filed by GMA, to defer issuance of a warrant of arrest and a hold departure order, and to proceed to judicial determination
of probable cause. She, likewise, filed with the Comelec a Motion to Vacate Ad Cautelam25 praying that its Resolution be vacated for being null and
void. The RTC, nonetheless, issued a Warrant for her arrest which was duly served. GMA was later arraigned and she entered a plea of "not guilty."
She was, for some time, on hospital arrest but was able to obtain temporary liberty when her motion for bail was granted. At present, she is again on
hospital arrest by virtue of a warrant issued in another criminal case.

On September 18, 2012, the Court rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions and supplemental petitions are DISMISSED. Comelec Resolution No. 9266 dated August 2, 2011,
Joint Order No. 001-2011 dated August 15, 2011, and the Fact- Finding Team’s Initial Report dated October 20, 2011, are declared VALID.
However, the Rules of Procedure on the Conduct of Preliminary Investigation on the Alleged Election Fraud in the 2004 and 2007 National Elections
is declared INEFFECTIVE for lack of publication.

In view of the constitutionality of the Joint Panel and the proceedings having been conducted in accordance with Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure and Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, the conduct of the preliminary investigation is hereby declared VALID.

Let the proceedings in the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 112, where the criminal cases for electoral sabotage against petitioners GMA
and Abalos are pending, proceed with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.26

Hence, these motions for reconsideration.

Issues

Mike Arroyo reiterates his arguments on the independence of the Comelec as basis in nullifying the subject joint DOJ-Comelec resolutions. Echoing
Justice Arturo Brion in his Dissenting and Concurring Opinion,27 Mike Arroyo insists that the creation of the Joint Panel undermines the decisional
independence of the Comelec.28

Mike Arroyo also maintains that the DOJ should conduct preliminary investigation only when deputized by the Comelec but not exercise concurrent
jurisdiction.29 Finally, as has been repeatedly pointed out in his earlier pleadings before the Court, Mike Arroyo claims that the proceedings involving
the electoral sabotage case were rushed because of pressures from the executive branch of the government. 30

For her part, GMA claims that in availing of the procedural remedies available, she merely exercised her earnest efforts to defend herself and should
not have been deemed by the Court as acts which purportedly tend to demonstrate that she either waived or forfeited her right to submit her counter-
affidavit and countervailing evidence.31 Citing several cases decided by the Court, she likewise faults the Court in not upholding her right to ask for
additional time within which to submit her counter-affidavit and countervailing evidence.32 GMA highlights that the subject Comelec Resolution
creating the Joint Panel is different from the previous Comelec resolutions requesting the DOJ Secretary to assign prosecutors to assist the
Comelec, as the latter emphasize the role of the DOJ as deputized agency in the conduct of preliminary investigation. She maintains that it is the
Comelec and not the Joint Committee that has the primary, if not exclusive, authority to conduct preliminary investigation of election cases.33

In their Consolidated Comment,34 respondents defend the creation of the Joint Committee and argue that it does not undermine the independence of
the Comelec as a constitutional body because it is still the Comelec that ultimately determines probable cause. 35 As to the conduct of the preliminary
investigation, respondents maintain that no rights were violated as GMA was afforded the opportunity to defend herself, submit her counter-affidavit
and other countervailing evidence.36 They, thus, consider GMA’s claim of availing of the remedial measures as "delaying tactics" employed to thwart
the investigation of charges against her by the Joint Committee.37

The Court’s Ruling

Clearly from the above discussion, movants raise issues that have been thoroughly explained by the Court in the assailed decision. The issues were
all addressed and the explanation was exhaustive, thus, we find no reason to disturb the Court’s conclusions.

At any rate, if only to address the motions of the movants herein and to put an end to the questions attached to the creation of the Joint Panel and,
consequently, to the performance of their assigned tasks, we hereby reiterate our findings and conclusions made in the assailed decision.
This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with the issue of whether the Comelec has the exclusive power to investigate and prosecute
cases of violations of election laws. In Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) Party-List v. Commission on
Elections,38 the constitutionality of Section 4339 of RA 936940 had already been raised by petitioners therein and addressed by the Court. While
recognizing the Comelec’s exclusive power to investigate and prosecute cases under Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 or the Omnibus Election Code,
the Court pointed out that the framers of the 1987 Constitution did not have such intention. This exclusivity is thus a legislative enactment that can
very well be amended by Section 43 of RA 9369. Therefore, under the present law, the Comelec and other prosecuting arms of the government,
such as the DOJ, now exercise concurrent jurisdiction in the investigation and prosecution of election offenses.

Indeed, as aptly pointed out by GMA, there is a discrepancy between Comelec Resolution No. 346741 dated January 12, 2001 and Joint Order No.
001-2011, dated August 15, 2011, creating and constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections
electoral fraud and manipulation cases. However, GMA seemed to miss the date when these two resolutions were promulgated by the Comelec. It is
noteworthy that Comelec Resolution No. 3467 was issued when Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code was still effective, while Joint Order No.
001-2011 as well as Comelec Resolution Nos. 873342 and 905743 mentioned in the assailed decision but missed out by GMA in her motion, were
issued during the effectivity of Section 43 of RA 9369, giving the Comelec and other prosecuting arms of the government the concurrent jurisdiction
to investigate and prosecute election offenses. This amendment paved the way for the discrepancy. In Comelec Resolution No. 3467, the Comelec
maintained the continuing deputation of prosecutors and the Comelec Law Department was tasked to supervise the investigatory and prosecutory
functions of the task force pursuant to the mandate of the Omnibus Election Code. However, with the amendment, the Comelec likewise changed
the tenor of the later resolutions to reflect the new mandate of the Comelec and other prosecuting arms of the government now exercising concurrent
jurisdiction. Thus, the Comelec Law Department and the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor of the DOJ were tasked to jointly supervise the
investigatory and prosecutory functions of the Comelec-DOJ Task Force. Considering, therefore, that the later resolutions, including Joint Order No.
001-2011, were issued pursuant to Section 43 of RA 9369 amending Section 265 of BP 881 which was declared "constitutional" in Banat, there is no
reason for us to declare otherwise. To maintain the previous role of other prosecuting arms of the government as mere deputies despite the
amendment would mean challenging Section 43 of RA 9369 anew which has already been settled in Banat.

To be sure, the creation of a Joint Committee is not repugnant to the concept of "concurrent jurisdiction" authorized by the amendatory law. As we
explained in our September 18, 2012 Decision:

x x x The doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal with the same subject matter. Contrary to the contention of the
petitioners, there is no prohibition on simultaneous exercise of power between two coordinate bodies. What is prohibited is the situation where one
files a complaint against a respondent initially with one office (such as the Comelec) for preliminary investigation which was immediately acted upon
by said office and the re-filing of substantially the same complaint with another office (such as the DOJ). The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction
by the second office over the cases filed will not be allowed. Indeed, it is a settled rule that the body or agency that first takes cognizance of the
complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.

xxxx

None of these problems would likely arise in the present case. The Comelec and the DOJ themselves agreed that they would exercise their
concurrent jurisdiction jointly. Although the preliminary investigation was conducted on the basis of two complaints – the initial report of the Fact-
Finding Team and the complaint of Senator Pimentel – both complaints were filed with the Joint Committee. Consequently, the complaints were filed
with and the preliminary investigation was conducted by only one investigative body. Thus, we find no reason to disallow the exercise of concurrent
jurisdiction jointly by those given such authority. This is especially true in this case given the magnitude of the crimes allegedly committed by
petitioners. The joint preliminary investigation also serves to maximize the resources and manpower of both the Comelec and the DOJ for the prompt
disposition of the cases.44

Notwithstanding the grant of concurrent jurisdiction, the Comelec and the DOJ nevertheless included a provision in the assailed Joint Order whereby
the resolutions of the Joint Committee finding probable cause for election offenses shall still be approved by the Comelec in accordance with the
Comelec Rules of Procedure.45 With more reason, therefore, that we cannot consider the creation of the Joint Committee as an abdication of the
Comelec’s independence enshrined in the 1987 Constitution.

Finally, we focus on the validity of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Joint Committee.

The procedure in conducting the preliminary investigation is governed by Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure and Rule 34 of the
Comelec Rules of Procedure. Under both Rules,46 the respondent shall submit his counter-affidavit and that of his witnesses and other supporting
documents relied upon for his defense, within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena, with the complaint and supporting affidavits and
documents.47 Also in both Rules, respondent is given the right to examine evidence, but such right of examination is limited only to the documents or
evidence submitted by complainants which she may not have been furnished and to copy them at her expense.48

As to the alleged denial of GMA’s right to examine documents, we maintain that no right was violated in view of the limitation of such right as set
forth above. We reiterate our explanation in the assailed decision, to wit:

While it is true that Senator Pimentel referred to certain election documents which served as bases in the allegations of significant findings specific to
the protested municipalities involved, there were no annexes or attachments to the complaint filed. As stated in the Joint Committee’s Order dated
November 15, 2011 denying GMA’s Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam, Senator Pimentel was ordered to furnish petitioners with all the supporting
evidence. However, Senator Pimentel manifested that he was adopting all the affidavits attached to the Fact-Finding Team’s Initial Report.
Therefore, when GMA was furnished with the documents attached to the Initial Report, she was already granted the right to examine as guaranteed
by the Comelec Rules of Procedure and the Rules on Criminal Procedure. Those were the only documents submitted by the complainants to the
Committee. If there are other documents that were referred to in Senator Pimentel’s complaint but were not submitted to the Joint Committee, the
latter considered those documents unnecessary at that point (without foreclosing the relevance of other evidence that may later be presented during
the trial) as the evidence submitted before it were considered adequate to find probable cause against her. x x x491âwphi1

Neither was GMA’s right violated when her motion for extension of time within which to submit her counter-affidavit and countervailing evidence was
consequently denied. The Rules use the term "shall" in requiring the respondent to submit counter-affidavit and other countervailing evidence within
ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena. It is settled that the use of the word "shall" which is a word of command, underscores the mandatory
character of the rule.50 As in any other rule, though, liberality in the application may be allowed provided that the party is able to present a compelling
justification for the non-observance of the mandatory rules. In the 2008 Revised Manual for Prosecutors, investigating prosecutors allow or grant
motions or requests for extension of time to submit counter-affidavits when the interest of justice demands that respondent be given reasonable time
or sufficient opportunity to engage the services of counsel; examine voluminous records submitted in support of the complaint or undertake research
on novel, complicated or technical questions or issues of law and facts of the case.51

In this case, GMA claimed that she could not submit her counteraffidavit within the prescribed period because she needed to examine documents
mentioned in Senator Pimentel’s complaint-affidavit. It appeared, however, that said documents were not submitted to the Joint Committee and the
only supporting documents available were those attached to the Initial Report of the Fact-Finding Team. Admittedly, GMA was furnished those
documents. Thus, at the time she asked for the extension of time within which to file her counter-affidavit, she very well knew that the documents she
was asking were not in the record of the case. Obviously, she was not furnished those documents because they were not submitted to the Joint
Committee. Logically, she has no right to examine said documents. We cannot, therefore, fault the Joint Committee in consequently denying her
motion for extension to file counter-affidavit as there was no compelling justification for the non-observance of the period she was earlier required to
follow.

And as we held in the assailed decision:

There might have been overzealousness on the part of the Joint Committee in terminating the investigation, endorsing the Joint Resolution to the
Comelec for approval, and in filing the information in court.

However, speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasijudicial officer cannot per se be instantly attributed to an injudicious performance
of functions. The orderly administration of justice remains the paramount consideration with particular regard to the peculiar circumstances of each
case. To be sure, petitioners were given the opportunity to present countervailing evidence. Instead of complying with the Joint Committee’s
directive, several motions were filed but were denied by the Joint Committee. Consequently, petitioners’ right to submit counter-affidavit and
countervailing evidence was forfeited. Taking into account the constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases and following the procedures set
forth in the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the Comelec Rules of Procedure, the Joint Committee finally reached its conclusion and referred the
case to the Comelec. The latter, in turn, performed its task and filed the information in court. Indeed, petitioners were given the opportunity to be
heard. They even actively participated in the proceedings and in fact filed several motions before the Joint Committee. Consistent with the
constitutional mandate of speedy disposition of cases, unnecessary delays should be avoided. 52

Finally, in our assailed decision, we already took judicial notice that not only did GMA enter a plea of "not guilty," she also filed a Motion for Bail and
after due hearing, it was granted. Apparently, she benefited from the RTC Order giving her temporary liberty. In filing the motion before the RTC and
actively participating therein, she has chosen to seek judicial remedy before the RTC where the electoral sabotage case is pending instead of the
executive remedy of going back to the Joint Committee for the submission of her counter-affidavit and countervailing evidence. Besides, as
thoroughly discussed in the assailed decision, the irregularity or even the absence of preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the
information filed against her.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motions for Reconsideration are DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(Dissenting Opinion)
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

 Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 Rollo (G.R. No. 199118), pp. 845-867.

2 Rollo (G.R. No. 199082), pp. 1155-1174.

3 Id. at 1188-1247.

4 Section 7. Rules of Procedure. – Within forty-eight (48) hours from the issuance of this Joint Order, the Committee shall meet
and craft its rules of procedure as may be complementary to the respective rules of DOJ and Comelec, and submit the same to
the Secretary of Justice and the Comelec En Banc for approval within five (5) days from such initial meeting.

5 Rollo (G.R. No. 199118), pp. 58-143.

6 Id. at 124.

7 Id. at 132-134.

8 Id. at 137.

9 Rollo (G.R. No. 199085), pp. 162-194.

10 Rollo (G.R. No. 199118), p. 316.

11 Id. at 17.

12 Rollo (G.R. No. 199082), p. 21.

13 Refers to the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team.

14 Rollo (G.R. No. 199082), pp. 158-161.

15 Rollo (G.R. No. 199118), pp. 250-259.

16 Id. at 257.

17 Rollo (G.R. No. 199085), pp. 302-306.

18 Rollo (G.R. No. 199118), pp. 260-264.

19 Id. at 224.

20 Id. at 318.

21 Id. at 265-273.

22 Id. at 321.

23 Id. at 226.

24 Id. at 274-280.

25 Id. at 439-451.

26 Id. at 756-757. (Emphasis in the original)

27 Rollo (G.R. No. 199082), pp. 1106-1146.

28 Id. at 1161.

29 Id. at 1162.

30 Id. at 1163

31 Rollo (G.R. No. 199118), pp. 850-854.

32 Id. at 854-857.

33 Id. at 860-862.

34 Id. at 902-932.

35 Id. at 906-911.

36 Id. at 911-913.

37 Id. at 913.

38 G.R. No. 177508, August 7, 2009, 595 SCRA 477.

39 Section 43. Section 265 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 is hereby amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 265. Prosecution. – The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the power, concurrent
with the other prosecuting arms of the government, to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses
punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same."

40An Act Amending Republic Act No. 8436, Entitled "An Act Authorizing the Commission on Elections to Use an Automated
Election System in the May 11, 1998 National or Local Elections and in Subsequent National and Local Electoral Exercises, to
Encourage Transparency, Credibility, Fairness and Accuracy of Elections, Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 881,
as Amended, Republic Act No. 7166 and Other Related Election Laws, Providing Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes."
Approved on 23 January 2007.

41"In the Matter of Requesting the Honorable Secretary of Justice to Assign Prosecutors as Members of a Special Task Force to
Assist the Commission in the Investigation and Prosecution of Election Offenses in the May 14, 2001 National and Local
Elections and Reiterating the Continuing Deputation of Prosecutors under Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure."

42"In the Matter of Requesting the Honorable Secretary of Justice to Assign Prosecutors as Members of a Special Task Force
Created by the Commission to Conduct the Investigation and Prosecution of Election Offenses in Connection with the May 10,
2010 National and Local Elections"

43"In the Matter of Requesting the Honorable Secretary of Justice to Assign Prosecutors as Members of a Special Task Force to
Assist the Commission in the Investigation and Prosecution of Elections Offenses in Connection with the October 25, 2010
Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections"

44 Rollo (G.R. No. 199118), pp. 734-736. (Citations omitted)

45 Id. at 733.

46 Section 3 (c), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

(c) Within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena with the complaint and supporting affidavits and documents, the
respondent shall submit his counter-affidavit and that of his witnesses and other supporting documents relied upon for
his defense. x x x

***

Section 6 (a), Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, on the other hand, provides:

(a) If on the basis of the complaint, affidavits and the supporting evidence, the investigating officer finds no ground to
continue with the inquiry, he shall recommend the dismissal of the complaint and shall follow the procedure prescribed
in Section 8 (c) of this Rule. Otherwise, he shall issue a subpoena to the respondent, attaching thereto a copy of the
complaint, affidavits and other supporting documents giving said respondent ten (10) days from receipt within which to
submit counter-affidavits and other supporting documents. The respondent shall have the right to examine all other
evidence submitted by the complainant.

47 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 112, Section 3 (c) and Comelec Rules of Procedure, Rule 34, Section 6 (a).

48 Rollo (G.R. No. 199118), p. 746.

49 Id. at 746-747. (Citations omitted)

50 Tan v. Link, G.R. No. 172849, December 10, 2008, 573 SCRA 479, 490.
 51 2008 Revised Manual for Prosecutors, p. 89.

52 Rollo (G.R. No. 199118), pp. 750-751. (Citations omitted)

DIGEST:

G.R. No. 199082 July 23, 2013 JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO vs. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

G.R. No. 199082 July 23, 2013

JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO, Petitioner,

vs.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; et al, Respondents.

PERALTA, J.:

NATURE:

These are separate motions for reconsideration filed by movants Gloria Macapagal Arroyo in G.R. No. 199118 and Jose Miguel T. Arroyo in G.R.
No. 199082 praying that the Court take a second look at our September 18, 2012 Decision 3 dismissing their petitions and supplemental petitions
against respondents Commission on Elections (Comelec), the Department of Justice (DOJ), Senator Aquilino M. Pimentel III (Senator Pimentel),
Joint DOJ-Comelec Preliminary Investigation Committee (Joint Committee) and DOJ-Comelec Fact-Finding Team (Fact-Finding Team), et al.

FACTS:

On August 15, 2011, the Comelec and the DOJ issued a Joint Order creating and constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004
and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases

In its Initial Report of the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the results in the May 14, 2007 senatorial elections in the provinces of
North and South Cotabato, and Maguindanao was indeed perpetrated. It recommended that Petitioner Benjamin S. Abalos, GMA, and Mike Arroyo
be subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage and manipulating the election results.

Thereafter, petitioners filed before the Court separate Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction assailing the creation of the Joint Panel.

On September 18, 2012, the Court rendered the assailed Decision. It ruled that:

1. Fact- Finding Team’s Initial Report dated October 20, 2011, are declared VALID. However, the Rules of Procedure on the Conduct of Preliminary
Investigation on the Alleged Election Fraud in the 2004 and 2007 National Elections is declared INEFFECTIVE for lack of publication.

2. The Joint Panel and the proceedings having been conducted in accordance with Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and Rule 34 of the
Comelec Rules of Procedure, the conduct of the preliminary investigation is hereby declared VALID.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the creation of the Joint Panel undermines the decisional independence of the Comelec.

2. Whether or not the DOJ should conduct preliminary investigation only when deputized by the Comelec but not exercise concurrent jurisdiction

HELD:

1. The grant of concurrent jurisdiction, the Comelec and the DOJ nevertheless included a provision in the assailed Joint Order whereby the resolutions
of the Joint Committee finding probable cause for election offenses shall still be approved by the Comelec in accordance with the Comelec Rules of
Procedure.45 With more reason, therefore, that we the the court cannot consider the creation of the Joint Committee as an abdication of the
Comelec’s independence enshrined in the 1987 Constitution

2. The creation of a Joint Committee is not repugnant to the concept of "concurrent jurisdiction" authorized by the amendatory law The doctrine of
concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal with the same subject matter. Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, there is no
prohibition on simultaneous exercise of power between two coordinate bodies. What is prohibited is the situation where one files a complaint against
a respondent initially with one office (such as the Comelec) for preliminary investigation which was immediately acted upon by said office and the re-
filing of substantially the same complaint with another office (such as the DOJ). The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the second office over
the cases filed will not be allowed. Indeed, it is a settled rule that the body or agency that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.

FALLO: petition is denied

G.R. No. 192708

MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION (MPSTA), TEACHERS' DIGNITY COALITION (TDC), MELCHOR V. CAYABYAB, EVA
V. FERIA, ELCIRA A. PONFERRADA, AND NATIVIDAD P. TALASTAS, IN THEIR BEHALF AND IN BEHALF OF ALL GSIS MEMBERS AND
RETIREES SIMILARLY SITUATED, Petitioners
vs.
MR. WINSTON F. GARCIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MANAGER OF THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM (GSIS), GSIS BOARD OF TRUSTEES, AND SEC. ARMIN LUISTRO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, Respondents

DECISION

SERENO, CJ.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision2 rendered in CA-G.R. SP No. 105797. The CA issued a writ of
Prohibition against the immediate and retroactive application of the Premium-Based Policy (PBP), Automatic Policy Loan and Policy Lapse (APL)
and Claims and Loans Interdependency Policy (CLIP) to the teacher-petitioners' claims, without or prior to a complete determination and
reconciliation of the employer-share liabilities of the Department of Education (DepEd).3 The appellate court, however, did not grant the following
prayers, which petitioners reiterate before this Court:

a. Restore the creditable service of all GSIS members (not just teachers), reckoned simply from the date of their respective original appointments or
elections;

b. Compute and grant the creditable service, benefits, and claims of GSIS members based on their period of service, regardless of any deficiency in
the employer premium share contributions;

c. Account the automatic deduction of the employee premium share contributions from their salaries as conclusive compliance with their obligation of
premium share payments, and thus entitle them to their full benefits and claims, regardless of the remittance thereof by the agency-employer to the
GSIS;

d. Accept as proof of employee premium share payment and loan repayments the pay slips of the employees and/or remittance lists or certifications
from the agency-employer, or other proof of payment as may be provided by the employee and/or the agency, and to update the employee's service
records using these documents; and

e. Refund to the GSIS members those amounts that were deducted from their claims and benefits arising from the implementation of the PBP, APL,
and CLIP, with interest at the legal rate of 12% per annum from the time of withholding of each such amount.

3. Order DepEd to procure the appropriation in the national budget of the amounts needed to keep current its employer premium share contributions,
and to remit all payment deficiencies to the GSIS.4

FACTS

On 14 November 1936, a goven1ment service insurance system was created by virtue of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 186 in order to promote the
efficiency and welfare of the employees of the government of the Philippines. On 31 May 1977, then President Marcos approved Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1146 amending, expanding, increasing, and integrating the social security and insurance benefits of government employees and
facilitating the payment thereof under C.A. No. 186. More than 20 years later, P.D. 1146 was amended, and Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8291, or the
"The GSIS Act of 1997," took effect.

Under this Act, the employee-member and the employer-agency are required by law to pay monthly contributions to the system.5 The share of the
employer ("GS," or government share) is sourced from the national budget, while that of the employee ("PS," or personal share)
is automatically deducted by the former from the employee's salary.6 The employer is mandated to remit the GS and PS directly to the GSIS within
the first 10 days of the calendar month following the month to which the contributions apply.7

One of the changes made in R.A. 8291 was the increase in the employer's contribution from 9.5% to 12%. 8However, there was no concomitant
increase in the budget appropriation.9 As a result, DepEd was unable to pay GSIS the equivalent of the 2.5% increase in the employer's share.10

Based on the figures provided in the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) 11 executed by DBM, DepEd and GSIS on 11 September 2012, DepEd
incurred premium deficiencies totalling ₱6,923,369,633.15 from 1 July 1997 to 31 December 2010 pertaining to the GS.12 GSIS alleges that for the
same period, DepEd personnel incurred premium deficiencies totalling ₱4,511,907,486.98 pertaining to the PS.13

In the meantime, GSIS issued the assailed Resolutions, to wit:

1. Resolution No. 23814

- In 2002, the GSIS Board introduced CLIP, by which the arrears incurred by members from their overdue loans are deducted from the proceeds of
their new loan or retirement benefits. CLIP also involves the collective suspension of the loan privileges of the member when a loan account is in
default, except when its proceeds are used to pay for the arrearages.

2. Resolution No. 9015

- In 2003, the GSIS Board adopted the PBP whereby for the purpose of computing GSIS benefits, the creditable service of a member is determined
by the corresponding monthly premium contributions that were timely and correctly remitted or paid to GSIS.

Petitioners claim that the policy shifted the basis for the claims and benefits of GSIS members from the actual length of service to the creditable
years of service.16 Section 10 of R.A. 8291, which provided for the computation of service, states:

SECTION 10. Computation of Service. -

(a) The computation of service for the purpose of determining the amount of benefits payable under this Act shall be from the
date of original appointment/election, including periods of service at different times under one or more employers, those
performed overseas under the authority of the Republic of the Philippines, and those that may be prescribed by the GSIS in
coordination with the Civil Service Commission.

(b) All service credited for retirement, resignation or separation for which corresponding benefits have been awarded under this
Act or other laws shall be excluded in the computation of service in case of reinstatement in the service of an employer and
subsequent retirement or separation which is compensable under this Act.

For the purpose of this section the term service shall include full time service with compensation: Provided, That part time and other services with
compensation may be included under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the GSIS.

It must be noted that neither DepEd nor GSIS denies that there is a problem with the reconciliation of their records, such that the GSIS database
might reflect nonpayment of the PS despite its automatic deduction from the employee's salary and its remittance by DepEd. As for the GS, it is also
possible that the database might reflect nonpayment despite remittance. In fact, GSIS itself admitted that "it is public knowledge that previous
problems in the Information Technology infrastructure of GSIS have severely affected the efficient servicing of members['] claims."17 Further, instead
of denying that its nonposting may result in the nonpayment of benefits, GSIS merely offered an excuse:

x x x. The GSI S has around 1,500,000 member-employees. Continuous efforts to make its records accurate are being earnestly taken. The GSIS
does not claim perfection and one hundred percent fool-proof precision in its database recording. When millions of entries are involved, a few
mistakes due to human error cannot be avoided. What the GSIS assures this Honorable Court is that errors brought to its attention and shown to be
existing are promptly rectified. Where benefits are concerned. expeditious corrections of records and payments am done. 18

3. Resolution No. 17919 - In 2007, the GSIS Board approved the APL, which is "a feature of a GSIS life insurance policy that keeps the policy in force
in case of nonpayment of premiums by taking out a loan amount against the unrestricted portion of the policy's accumulated cash value (CV) or the
termination value (TV)"20 until the total APL and policy loan balances exceed the CV of the Life Endowment Policy or the TV of the Enhanced Life
Policy. A 6% interest per annum compounded monthly is imposed on the APL, which is independent of the 2% interest per month compounded
annually charged to the agency for delayed remittances.21

These Resolutions were not published in a newspaper of general circulation and were enforced before they were even filed with the Office of the
National Administrative Register.22

Petitioners seek to nullify the resolutions for being "intrinsically unconstitutional, illegal, unjust, oppressive, arbitrary, confiscatory, immoral, ultra
vires, and unconscionable."23 They make the following factual allegations to demonstrate how the policies were applied:

1. CLIP - Petitioners Eva Feria, Elcira Ponferrada, and Natividad Talastas obtained policy and/or emergency loans, which they have fully paid for.
The loan repayments have been automatically deducted from their salaries as certified by DepEd. Despite full payment, their vouchers indicate
underpayment of the loans.24

2. PBP - Petitioner Melchor Cayabyab is also a public school teacher.25 As of 11 June 2008, his Premium and Loan Accounts Balances Index
showed that he had the following arrearages:

PS ₱ 44,206.73

GS ₱ 61,327.67

EC ₱ 3,411.70

TOTAL ₱108,946.10

On the other hand, DepEd certified that the monthly contributions for the GS, PS and EC had been deducted from Cayabyab’s, salary from January
2001 to July 2006.26

Because of the PBP, Cayabyab's creditable service was reduced as follows:

 Total Length of Service 7.72678 years

Less: Equivalent Years of Service yet to be 4.15462 years

reconciled with Agency and Member's
Records

Provisional/Tentative Creditable Years of 3.57216 years

Service with Retirement Premium Payments

3. APL - As of 6 June 2005, before the APL was approved, the cash surrender value of petitioner Talastas' policy amounted to ₱51,252.53. In 2008,
she inquired about the cash surrender value of her policy and was apprised by GSIS that her policy had resulted in zero proceeds because of the
following deductions:27

Cash Value as of 6/6/2005 ₱51,252.53

Less: Underpayments

Personal Share ₱9,045.48

Interests ₱l1,737.88

Government Share ₱9,710.35

Interests ₱20,758.82

Policy Loan ₱0.00

Interests on Policy Loan ₱0.00

Net Proceeds ₱0.00

Another case in point is petitioner Ponferrada, whose Life Insurance Claim Voucher showed that the premium in arrears was deducted from the face
value of her policy despite DepEd's certification that she had paid the monthly contributions, including the GS and the EC, from January 2000 to
December 2006.28

On 7 July 2008, respondent Garcia, who was then the president of GSIS, wrote a letter 29 to DepEd alleging that the agency's unpaid premiums, as of
30 June 2008, had reached ₱21.3 billion, to wit:

Unpaid premiums (GS) ₱4,451,361,535.55

Unpaid premium (PS) ₱2,946,674,455.57

Interest ₱l3.926.610.685.47

Total Premium arrearages of DepEd ₱21,324,646,676.59

In its reply letter dated 15 July 2008,30 DepEd asked the GSIS to break down the ₱21.3 billion lump sum by naming each and every one of the
employees who supposedly had unpaid premiums and thereafter providing the Service Records indicating the months or years in which the PS or
the GS of these employees were not paid. DepEd also suggested that the official receipts issued to it by GSIS be reconciled with the latter's
records.31

Petitioners claim that while DepEd was still discussing its alleged arrearages with GSIS, the latter converted the entire ₱21,324,646,676.59 into
personal loans of the teachers through the APL, earning interest at 6% per annumcompounded monthly, while also effectively reducing the teachers'
creditable years of service through the PBP.32

In response to the alleged "chronic" non-remittance of premium contributions resulting in premium deficiencies based on the GSIS records of
creditable service, the DBM, DepEd, and the GSIS executed a MOA on 11 September 2012. 33 The following terms and conditions were agreed
upon:

1. The DBM will settle the government share in the premium arrearages of DepEd from 1 July 1997 to 31 December 2010 in the amount of
₱6,923,369,633.l 5, half of which shall be advanced upon submission by the GSIS of a billing statement, list of employees covered, and request
letter;

2. The GSIS will condone, in its entirety, the interests due on the aforesaid premium deficiencies amounting to 14,041,029,495.73; and

3. Upon release of the advance payment, the GSIS will lift the suspension of loan privileges and other benefits applicable to the covered DepEd
personnel and make the proportionate adjustment in their records of creditable service.
On 31 May 2013, respondents informed the Court of the developments in the reconciliation of membership records of DepEd personnel, the
execution of the MOA, and the national appropriation for the settlement of DepEd's GSIS premium arrearages.

Petitioners asserted that regardless of the execution of the MOA, the Resolutions must still be nullified, because "most of the initiatives described in
the GSIS Manifestation appeared to be merely operational x x x which do not amend, modify, or reverse any of the GSIS policies, and which are thus
still in place."34 Moreover, the MOA refers only to the DepEd, one of the many agency-employers in the government, without "similar reported
endeavours to address the internal arrangements between the GSIS and the rest of the agency-employers in the Government."35

In a Resolution dated 17 June 2015,36 the Court required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. All memoranda were received by 9
October 2015.

OUR RULING

The policies are invalid due to lack of publication.

As early as 1986, the Court in Tanada v. Tuvera37already laid down a definitive interpretation of Article 238 of the Civil Code:

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which
shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the
same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also
be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public,
need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules
or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.39

After Tanada, the Administrative Code of 198740 was enacted, with Section 3(1) of Chapter 2, Book VII, specifically providing that:

Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force
on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from the date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction
against any party or persons.

In Republic v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp., 41this Court held that the requirements of publication and filing must be strictly complied with, as these
were designed to safeguard against abuses on the part of lawmakers and to guarantee the constitutional right to due process and to information on
matters of public concern. Even in cases where the parties participated in the public consultation and submitted their respective comments, strict
compliance with the requirement of publication cannot be dispensed with.42

While GSIS filed copies of the subject resolutions with the Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR), it only did so after the claims of the
retirees and beneficiaries had already been lodged.43 The resolutions were not published in either the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general
circulation in the country.

GSIS maintains that the publication of the resolutions was unnecessary, because the policies were "just a mere reiteration of the timehonored
principles of insurance law."44 According to GSIS, the PBP is actually contained in R.A. 8291, which allegedly contemplates the actual payment of
premiums.45 It alludes to the records of the Senate, which was supposedly clearly in support of its position that the payment of premium contributions
is a precondition for the availment of benefits from the system.46 The cited excerpt reads:

Senator Romulo: As I understand it, Mr. President, after they have served in their respective offices for three years, or after they have paid their
contributions within a period of three years, they are entitled to the benefits under this proposed measure.

Senator Enrile: Yes, Mr. President, with certain limitations. My understanding is that there must be at least three years of service, which means three
years of contributions to the system.47

Regarding the APL Policy and CLIP, respondent GSIS made a general statement that those are "part and parcel of the business of insurance."48

The GSIS admits that the Certificate of Membership49 contains the following provision:

4.3. Creditable services

For purposes of determining his length of service, all services with compensation rendered by the members from the date of his original employment
whether full-time or part-time shall be credited.

However, the agency downplays its own words by adding that the certificate "does not discount Section 5 and 6 of R.A. 8291 which emphasize the
need for the correct and prompt payment and remittance of the premium contributions.''50

A reading of the resolutions convinces us that these cannot be viewed simply as a construction of R.A. 8291, as they, in fact, substantially increase
the burden of GSIS members. It must now be proven that the PS or GS for the PBP and the APL, and loan amortization payments for CLIP, have
been remitted by DepEd and posted by GSIS.

GSIS cannot deny that it has made posting a prerequisite for the crediting of the period of service and loan repayments. 51 Specifically, the PBP
guidelines provide:52

POLICIES:
 xxxx

4. For services in government where the corresponding premium contributions were not paid, or if the amounts remitted or paid were less than what
should be paid, such services can only be recognized as creditable services if the following conditions are observed:

Competent proof that the member actually rendered those services and received fixed basic compensation.

Actual payment or remittance of the unpaid premium balances, including the interest imposed above for their delayed payment, both for government
and/or personal share.

PROCEDURAL GUIDELINE:

xxxx

6. The Record of Creditable Services shall be the member's record of services in government where the corresponding premium contributions,
including interest, if any, have been duly paid or remitted to GSIS.

xxxx

9. The RCS shall be the basis for computing the GSIS benefits due the member x x x

In case of error in the Record of Creditable Service, GSIS says that the following documents are acceptable to correct the discrepancy:53

Conflict Documentary Proof

Statement of Account/Remittance List and

Monthly premium payments or Salary
Official Receipt

Statement of Account/Remittance List and

Years of Service
Official Receipt/Monthly Premiums Posted

GSIS does not consider the certifications issued by DepEd as substantial proof of payment, as these were "clearly self-serving."54

In its Comment, the GSIS admits that employees are "momentarily made to pay for the unremitted and/or unpasted government share in the
premium obligation."55 The agency views this occurrence acceptable and even boasts that because of the APL, the unpaid period is still credited to
employees. Note, however, that under the APL, any unpaid or unpasted government share is considered a loan by the employee, and interests
thereon will be charged to boththe government and the employee.

According to the Court in Veterans Federation of the Philippines v. Reyes, 56 interpretative regulations that do not add anything to the law or affect
substantial rights of any person do not entail publication. This is because "they give no real consequence more than what the law itself has already
prescribed."57 However, "when xxx an administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome
the implementation of the law but substantially adds to or increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to
those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law."58

In this case, the resolutions additionally obligate member-employees to ensure that their employer-agency includes the GS in the budget, deducts
the PS, as well as loan amortizations, and timely remits them; and that the GSIS receives, processes, and posts the payments. These processes are
beyond the control of the employees; yet they are being made to bear the consequences of any misstep or delay by either their agency or GSIS. As
aptly observed by the CA, "the fault lies with how the deficiencies in payment by the DepEd, real or imagined, are attributed to the employees-
members."59

The Court has invalidated administrative issuances as a consequence of their non-publication. In De Jesus v. COA,60 this Court declared DBM
Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 ineffective. It may be recalled that in implementing Section 12 of R.A. 6758, 61 the DBM ordered the
discontinuance of all allowances and fringe benefits granted on top of the basic salary beginning 1 November 1989. The circular was not published.
This Court pointed out that since it was more than a mere interpretative or internal regulation, the circular should have been published to be effective
and enforceable:

x x x And why not, when it tends to deprive government workers of their allowances and additional compensation sorely needed to keep body and
soul together.1âwphi1 At the very least, before the said circular under attack may be permitted to substantially reduce their income, the government
officials and employees concerned should be apprised and alerted by the publication of subject circular in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines - to the end that they be given amplest opportunity to voice out whatever opposition they may have, and to
ventilate their stance on the matter. This approach is more in keeping with democratic precepts and rudiments of fairness and transparency.

Similarly in the present case, the resolutions effectively diminish, and in some instances, even absolutely deprive retirees of their retirement benefits
- albeit "momentarily," as GSIS claims - when these were meant as their reward for giving the best years of their lives in the service of their country.
In GSIS v. Montesclaros, 62 this Court expounded on the nature of retirement benefits as property interest in this wise:

Under Section 5 of PD 1146, it is mandatory for the government employee to pay monthly contributions. PD 1146 mandates the government to
include in its annual appropriation the necessary amounts for its share of the contributions. It is compulsory on the government employer to take off
and withhold from the employees' monthly salaries their contributions and to remit the same to GSJS. The government employer must also remit its
corresponding share to GSIS. Considering the mandatory salary deductions from the government employee, the government pensions do not
constitute mere gratuity but form part of compensation.
In a pension plan where employee participation is mandatory, the prevailing view is that employees have contractual or vested rights in the pension
where the pension is part of the terms of employment. The reason for providing retirement benefits is to compensate service to the government.
Retirement benefits to government employees are part of emolument to encourage and retain qualified employees in the government service.
Retirement benefits to government employees reward them for giving the best years of their lives in the service of their country.

Thus, where the employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires a vested right to benefits that is protected by the due process
clause. Retirees enjoy a protected property interest whenever they acquire a right to immediate payment under pre-existing law. Thus, a pensioner
acquires a vested right to benefits that have become due as provided under the terms of the public employees' pension statute. No law can deprive
such person of his pension rights without due process of law, that is, without notice and opportunity to be heard. (Citations omitted, emphasis
supplied)

If presidential decrees that name a public place after a favored individual or exempt that individual from certain prohibitions or requirements must be
published,63 how much more these resolutions that involve vested property rights of public officers?

Aside from seeking the nullification of the Resolutions, petitioners are also praying that this Court order respondent GSIS to 1) restore the creditable
service of all GSIS members (not just teachers), reckoned simply from the date of their respective original appointments or elections; 2) compute and
grant the creditable service, benefits, and claims of GSIS members based on their periods of service and regardless of any deficiency in the GS; 3)
account the automatic deduction of the PS from their salaries as conclusive compliance with their obligation of premium share payments, and thus
entitle them to their full benefits and claims, regardless of the remittance thereof by the agency-employer to the GSIS; and 4) accept as proof of
employee premium share payment and loan repayment the pay slips of the employees and/or remittance lists or certifications from the agency-
employer, or other proof of payment as may be provided by the employee and/or the agency; and to update the employee's service records using
these documents. Petitioners are also asking us to order the refund to GSIS members of those amounts that were deducted from their claims and
benefits arising from the implementation of the PBP, APL, and CLIP, with interest at the legal rate of 12% per annum from the time of withholding of
each of those amounts.

Much as we commiserate with the plight of petitioners, this Court is not in a position to intrude into the operational processes of respondents, which
are under the control of the executive department. We are constrained to refrain from intruding upon purely executive and administrative matters,
which are properly within the purview of other branches of government.

Petitioners themselves accurately trace the root of this controversy to "the internal logistical and administrative problems of the GSIS and the
[DepEd], specifically, in their remittance, reconciliation, posting, and budgetary processes for premium payments, which are wreaking havoc upon
the GSIS members."64 On the other hand, respondents claim that they are in the process of updating and reconciling their records. It bears emphasis
that this Court is one of law and, as such, tasked with resolving legal controversies.

The prayer to order the department to procure the appropriation in the national budget of the amounts needed to keep the employer's premium share
contributions current must be denied on the ground of mootness. Petitioners do not dispute that DepEd executed a MOA with the DBM on 11
September 2012 for the settlement of premium deficiencies pertaining to the government share from 1 July 1997 to 31 December 2010.

On a last note, we forward the concerns of petitioners to Congress, which holds the power of the purse, for its consideration to fund the payment of
premium deficiencies pertaining to the PS for the same period, July 1997 to 31 December 2010. We refer to those amounts that had been deducted
from the salaries of the employees, but remain unremitted by their respective agencies.

We likewise forward a copy of this Decision to the Ombudsman for consideration to file the appropriate cases against the officials and persons
responsible for the non-remittance or delayed remittance of premiums and loan repayment.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. GSIS Resolutions Nos. 238, 90, and 179, which respectively embody the Claims and Loans
Interdependency Policy, Premium-Based Policy, and Automatic Policy Loan and Policy Lapse, are declared INVALID and OF NO FORCE AND
EFFECT.

Let a copy of this Decision be forwarded to the Senate, the House of Representatives, and the Department of Budget and Management for their
consideration on the matter of funding the payment of the portion pertaining to the personal share of the employees. A copy should likewise be
furnished the Office of the Ombudsman for its consideration on the matter of filing the appropriate cases against the officials and persons
responsible for the non-remittance or delayed remittance of premiums and loan repayment.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice, Chairperson

WE CONCUR:

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 9-68.

2Id. at 81-10 I; dated 18 June 20 10, renncd by Associate Justice Apolinario D. Bruse las, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Mario
L. Guarifia III and Rodil V. Zalameda.

3 Id. at 100.

4 Id. at 67-68.

5R.A. 8291, Sec. 5(a).

6 R.A. 8291, Secs. 5(b), 6(a).

7 R.A. 8291, Sec. 6(b ).

8 Rollo, p. 84.

9 Id.

10 Id. at 24.

11 Id. at 530-537.

12 Id. at 531.

13 Id.

14 Id. at 125-134.

15 Id. at 102-108.

16 Id. at 18.

17 Id. at 232.

18 Id. at 238.

19 Id. at 109-124.

20 Id. at 110.

21 Id. at 113-114.

22Id. at 170; copy of a Certification from the National Printing Office dated 10 October 2008 stating that the office had no record of the
receipt, estimate, payment and publication of the resolutions. Respondents do not dispute that the resolutions were not published.

23 Id. at 600-601.

24 Id. at 31-32.

25 Id. at 12.

26 Id. at 29

27 Id. at 30-31.

28 Id. at 30.

29 Id. at 136-137.

30 Id. at 139.
31 Id.

32 Id. at. 24

33 Id. at 530-537.

34 Id. at 599-605; Comment on the "Motion for Leave to File and to Admit Herein Manifestation of the GSIS" dated 31 May 2013.

35 Id. at 601

36 Id. at 611-614.

37 230 Phil. 528 (1986).

38 The provision reads:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.

39 Supra note 37, at 535.

40 Executive Order No. 292 (1987).

41 574 Phil. 134 (2008).

42 Id.

43 CA Decision, rollo, p. 98. Based on a copy of Resolution Nos. 90 and 238 attached to the Petition, it was received by the ONAR
ori 13 October 2003; rollc, pp. 102, 125. Based on a copy of Resolution No. 179 attached to the Petition, it was received by the ONAR on
15 February 2008; rollo, p. 109.

44 Rollo, p. 299.

45 Id. at 796.

46 Id. at 298-299.

47 Record of the Senate, Vol. IV No. 92. lnterpellations and deliberations on Senate Bill No. 2013, p. 622.

48 Rollo, p. 824.

49 Id. at 300.

50 Id.

51 ld.at815.

52 Id. at 105-107.

53 Id. at 807.

54 Id. at 294.

55 Id. at 810.

56 518 Phil. 668 (2006).

57 Association of Southern Tagalog Electric Cooperatives. Inc. v. Energy Regulatory Commission, 695 Phil. 243(2012) further
citing CIP v. CA, 329 Phil. 987 (1996).

58CIR v. CA, 329 Phil. 987 (1996) cited in Michel J. Lhuiller Pawnshop Inc., 453 Phil. 1043 (2003); further cited in Commissioner
q/Customs v. Hypermix Feeds Corp., 680 Phil. 681 (2012).

59 Rollo, p. 96

60 355 Phil. 584 (1998).

61 The "Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989."

62 478 Phil. 573 (2004).

63The following is an excerpt from Tanada v. Tuvera, 230 Phil. 528 (1986): Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published
notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory arn1 directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential
decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain
prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to
"fill in the details' of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.

64 Rollo, pp. 599-600.