RIGHT AGAINST CRUEL, DEGRADING, AND INHUMAN PUNISHMENT

People vs. Echegaray, February 7, 1997

FACTS: The Supreme Court rendered a decision in the instant case affirming the
conviction of the accused-appellant for the crime of raping his ten-year old
daughter. The crime having been committed sometime in April, 1994, during which
time Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was
already in effect, accused-appellant was inevitably meted out the supreme penalty
of death. The accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration which
focused on the sinister motive of the victim's grandmother that precipitated the
filing of the alleged false accusation of rape against the accused. This was
dismissed.

On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense counsel, Atty. Julian

R. Vitug, and retained the services of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free
Legal Assistance Group of the Philippines. A supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration prepared by the FLAG on behalf of accused-appellant. In sum, the
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises three (3) main issues: (1) mixed
factual and legal matters relating to the trial proceedings and findings; (2) alleged
incompetence of accused-appellant's former counsel; and (3) purely legal question
of the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659.

ISSUE: Whether or not Article III, Section 19 (1) absolutely abolished the death
penalty.

HELD: The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took the form of a
constitutional question of whether or not the death penalty is a cruel, unjust,
excessive or unusual punishment in violation of the constitutional proscription
against cruel and unusual punishments.

Harden- "The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-
parte Kemmler, 136 U.S., 436, the United States Supreme Court said that
'punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death, but the
punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the
constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more
than the mere extinguishment of life.

Section 19 (1) of Article III will readily show that there is really nothing therein
which expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty. The provision merely
says that the death penalty shall not be imposed unless for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter provides for it and, if already
imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The language, while rather
awkward, is still plain enough Nothing is more defining of the true content of Article
III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution than the form in which the legislature
took the initiative in re-imposing the death penalty.

It is immaterial and irrelevant that R.A. No. 7659 cites that there has been an
"alarming upsurge of such crimes", for the same was never intended by said law to
be the yardstick to determine the existence of compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes. Fittingly, thus, what R.A. No. 7659 states is that "the Congress, in
the interest of justice, public order and rule of law, and the need to rationalize and
harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons to
impose the death penalty for said crimes."
People of the Philippines vs Mercado, November 29, 2000

FACTS: Twelve-year-old Florencio Villareal testified that at around 9 oclock in the

evening of February 9, 1994, he and Richard Buama were picked up by accused-
appellant Elpidio Mercado near Mercados house in Sto. Tomas, Bukid, Pasig,
Metro Manila. Mercado arrived in a car, together with Eric Ona. Mercado
suspected Florencio Villareal and Richard Buama of being the ones who had
broken into his store and stolen money. Florencios friend, Rex Bugayong, was able
to run from Mercado. Florencio and Richard were pushed into Mercados car.
Florencio said Mercado poked a gun at Richard. Mercado drove the car to Tanay,
Rizal.

Upon reaching Tanay at around 11 o’clock in the evening Mercado took the
three of them (Florencio, Richard, and Eric) to an apartment. Florencio was led
inside the apartment while Richard was held outside by Mercado. When Florencio
looked through the window, he saw Mercado slap and box Richard. Then he was
brought inside. Mercado later went upstairs. According to Florencio, Richard
asked if they could leave the place as he held his stomach in pain, but Florencio
replied that the door was padlocked. Mercado thereafter ordered Richard to take
off all his clothes and lie face down on the kitchen floor. Mercado asked his aide
Jeff to get a rope. Jeff brought a piece of rattan rope and tied Richards hands,
while Mercado tied Richards feet. This happened at about 11:30 in the evening.
Mercado also ordered Jeff to get rags with which to blindfold and gag Richard and
then asked Acebron to get a bolo or a big knife. After getting a bolo, Acebron and
Jeff put Richard into the luggage compartment of Mercado's car. They then drove
away, leaving behind Florencio and Eric in the apartment. After two hours,
Mercado and Acebron came back. Florencio saw Acebron washing the bloodstains
off the bolo. He asked Mercado where Richard was, to which Mercado replied,
"Wala na. Pinatahimik ko na." The trial court found both accused guilty and
sentenced them to death.

ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No.7659 violates the constitutional ban against
infliction of cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.

HELD: Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a
cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment. In the oft-cited case of Harden v.
Director of Prisons, this Court held that punishments are cruel when they involve
torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the
meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something
inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life. It
is an exercise of the state's power to "secure society against the threatened and
actual evil". Procedural and substantial safeguards to insure its correct application
are established.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY

EDUARDO CUISON, vs. COURT OF APPEALS ,G.R. No. 128540 April 15, 1998

FACTS: On February 7, 1989, respondent Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial

Court of Pangasinan (Branch 39) rendered a Joint Decision in Criminal Cases Nos.
L-3553 and L-3554.

Judgment was rendered finding accused Eduardo Cuison guilty of the crime of
double homicide, beyond reasonable doubt and therefore sentences him to suffer
imprisonment from 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years
and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum, for each offense, with the
accessories provided by law and to pay the costs. Accused is also ordered to
indemnify the heirs of Rafael Sapigao the amount of P30,000.00 and the heirs of
Rulo Castro also the amount of P30,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the said decision was affirmed with the
modification that the civil indemnity was increased to P50,000.00.

The accused elevated the decision on a petition for review docketed as G.R. Nos.
108985-86 but the Supreme Court denied the said petition on December 1, 1993.

The case was remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan (Br. 39) for
promulgation of the decision. However, respondent Judge promulgated on April
4, 1995 the decision of the Court of Appeals only with respect to the modified civil
liability of the accused but did not commit the accused to jail to commence
service of his sentence.

Asst. City Prosecutor Abraham L. Ramos II reported the matter to the Solicitor
General and requested that a motion for clarification be filed with this Court to
clarify the decision

ISSUE: Whether or Not to pursue the promulgation will violate the accused's
constitutional right against jeopardy.

HELD: As a rule, a criminal prosecution includes a civil action for the recovery of
indemnity. Hence, a decision in such case disposes of both the criminal as well as
the civil liabilities of an accused. Here, trial court promulgated only the civil aspect
of the case, but not the criminal.

As earlier observed, the promulgation of the CA Decision was not complete. In

fact and in truth, the promulgation was not merely incomplete; it was also void. In
excess of its jurisdiction, the trial judge rendered a substantially incomplete
promulgation on April 4, 1995, and he repeated his mistake in his April 12, 1996
Order. We emphasize that grave abuse of discretion rendered the
aforementioned act of the trial court void. 28 Since the criminal cases have not
yet been terminated, the first jeopardy has not yet attached. Hence, double
jeopardy cannot prosper as a defense.
Almario v. Court of Appeals, 355 SCRA 1

Facts: The informations were filed on October 22, 1992. After petitioner’s
arraignment on March 18, 1992, pre-trial was held, which was terminated on
October 21, 1994. Thereafter, the cases were scheduled for continuous trial in
December 1994, and in January and February 1995, but the hearings were
cancelled because the Presiding Judge of the court was elevated to this Court and
no trial judge was immediately appointed/detailed thereto. The hearing set for
June 21, 1995, was postponed for lack of proof of notice to all the accused and
their counsel. The hearing on July 17, 1995, upon request of private prosecutor,
and without objection on the part of petitioner’s counsel, postponed to July 24,
1995. However, for lack of proof of service of notice upon petitioner’s three co-
accused, the hearing set for July 24, 1995, was likewise cancelled and the cases
were reset for trial on September 8 and 25, 1995.

On September 8, 1995, private complainant failed to appear despite due notice.

Hence, upon motion of petitioner’s counsel, respondent court issued the
following order: When this case was called for hearing, private complainant is not
in Court despite notice. Atty. Alabastro, counsel for accused Roberto Almario,
moved that the case against the latter be dismissed for failure to prosecute and
considering that accused is entitled to a speedy trial.

Upon motion of the private prosecutor and despite the opposition of petitioner,
respondent court in its Order dated October 25, 1995, reconsidered the Order of
September 8, 1995. The pertinent portion of said order reads as follows: In
Hipolito vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 108478-79, Feb. 21, 1993) the Supreme
Court held that the right of the accused to a speedy trial is deemed violated only
when the proceedings is attended by vexations, capricious and oppressive delays,
or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or
when without cause or unjustifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to (e)
lapse without the party having his case tried. At least this right is relative, taking
into (the) account the circumstances of each case.

There has been no vexations, capricious and oppressive delays, or unjustified

postponements of the trial, or a long time is allowed to (e) lapse without the party
having his case tried which would constitute, according to the above case,
violation of the right of the accused to speedy trial. After arraignment of the
accused, the pre-trial was set and the same was ordered terminated on October
25, 1994. On June 21, 1995, the case was set for initial presentation of evidence
of the proof of service of the notices to the accused and their respective counsels.
On July 17, 1995, counsel for the accused did not interpose objection to private
prosecutor’s motion to postpone due to absence of witnesses. On July 24, 1995,
the trial could not proceed as, being a joint trial of three criminal cases, the three
other accused were not present. There were only three settings from the date of
termination of the pre-trial for the prosecution to present evidence and the same
were postponed with valid reasons.

The dismissal in the Order dated September 8, 1995, did not result in the acquittal
of the accused since the right of the accused to speedy trial has not been violated,
and its dismissal having been made upon the motion of the accused there is no
double jeopardy.

Issue: Whether petitioner invoke the right against double jeopardy.

Held: It follows that petitioner cannot invoke the constitutional right against
double jeopardy when that order was reconsidered seasonably. For as
petitioner’s right to speedy trial was not transgressed, this exception to the fifth
element of double jeopardy – that the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or
the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of
the accused – was not met. The trial court’s initial order of dismissal was upon
motion of petitioner’s counsel, hence made with the express consent of
petitioner. That being the case, despite the reconsideration of said order, double
jeopardy did not attach. As this Court had occasion to rule in People vs. Tampal,
(244 SCRA 202) reiterated in People vs. Leviste, where we overturned an order of
dismissal by the trial court predicated on the right to speedy trial –

It is true that in an unbroken line of cases, we have held that the dismissal of
cases on the ground of failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that
would bar further prosecution of the accused for the same offense. It must be
stressed, however, that these dismissals were predicated on the clear right of the
accused to speedy trial. These cases are not applicable to the petition at bench
considering that the right of the private respondents to speedy trial has not been
violated by the State. For this reason, private respondents cannot invoke their
right against double jeopardy.
Manantan vs. Court of Appeals, 350 SCRA 387

FACTS: On June 1, 1983, the Provincial Fiscal of Isabela filed an information

charging petitioner Manantan with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide,
allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 25th day of September 1982, in the municipality of Santiago,
province of Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, being then the driver and person-in-charge of an automobile
bearing Plate No. NGA-816, willfully and unlawfully drove and operated the same
while along the DaangMaharlika at Barangay Malvar, in said municipality, in a
negligent, careless and imprudent manner, without due regard to traffic laws,
regulations and ordinances and without taking the necessary precaution to prevent
accident to person and damage to property, causing by such negligence,
carelessness and imprudence said automobile driven and operated by him to
sideswipe a passenger jeep bearing plate No. 918-7F driven by Charles Codamon,
thereby causing the said automobile to turn down resulting to the death of Ruben
Nicolas a passenger of said automobile.

Petitioner George Manantan was acquitted by the trial court of homicide through
reckless imprudence without a ruling on his civil liability. On appeal from the civil
aspect of the judgment in Criminal Case No. 066, the appellate court found
petitioner Manantancivilly liable and ordered him to indemnify private
respondents Marcelino Nicolas and Maria Nicolas P104,400.00 representing loss of
support, P50,000.00 as death indemnity, and moral damages of P20,000.00 or a
total of P174,400.00 for the death of their son, Ruben Nicolas.

Issue:

Whether or not the court a quo erred in finding that petitioners acquittal did not
extinguish his civil liability.

Ruling:

The lower courts decision in Criminal Case No. 066 supports the conclusion of the
appellate court that the acquittal was based on reasonable doubt; hence,
petitioners civil liability was not extinguished by his discharge. We note the trial
courts declaration that did not discount the possibility that the accused was really
negligent. However, it found that a hypothesis inconsistent with the negligence of
the accused presented itself before the Court and since said hypothesis is
consistent with the recordthe Courts mind cannot rest on a verdict of conviction.

The foregoing clearly shows that petitioners acquittal was predicated on the
conclusion that his guilt had not been established with moral certainty. Stated
differently, it is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt and a suit to enforce civil
liability for the same act or omission lies.The foregoing were the applicable
provisions of the Rules of Criminal Procedure at the time private respondents
appealed the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 066 to the court a quo in 1989. Being
in the nature of a curative statute, the amendment applies retroactively and affects
pending actions as in this case.
People of the PH vs. Carlos Feliciano, G.R. No. 136258. October 10, 2001

FACTS: From being the subject of moral condemnation, the Kiss of Judas appears
to attain a different dimension in criminal procedure. That the State should agree
to become a party to setting up a premium on "treachery," and that it should
reward conduct from which an honorable man would ordinarily recoil with
aversion, paradoxically illustrates the perceived necessity of such kind of an
arrangement in criminal procedure. Pending resolution by the trial court on the
motion, Carlos Feliciano and Rodel de la Cruz were arraigned on 08 February
1996. The two accused entered a plea of not guilty. On 18 June 1996, the court a
quo granted the motion of the prosecution and the name of Rodel de la Cruz, an
accused turned state witness, was forthwith stricken off from the Information.
When the trial concluded, the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, found for the
prosecution and pronounced accused Carlos Feliciano guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentenced him to suffer the
extreme penalty of death.

ISSUE: Whether or not the discharging of the accused as state witness is

tantamount to violation of his right against double jeopardy.

HELD: It is widely accepted that the discharge of an accused to become a state

witness has the same effect as an acquittal. The impropriety of the discharge
would not have any effect on the competency and quality of the testimony, nor
would it have the consequence of withdrawing his immunity from prosecution. A
discharge, if granted at the stage where jeopardy has already attached, is
equivalent to an acquittal, such that further prosecution would be tantamount to
the state reneging on its part of the agreement and unconstitutionally placing the
state witness in double jeopardy. The rule, of course, is not always irreversible. In
an instance where the discharged accused fails to fulfill his part of the bargain and
refuses to testify against his co-accused, the benefit of his discharge can be
withdrawn and he can again be prosecuted for the same offense.

Despite an obvious attempt to downgrade his own participation in the crime,

state witness de la Cruz, nevertheless, did not renege from his agreement to give
a good account of the crime, enough to indeed substantiate the conviction of his
co-accused, now appellant Carlos Feliciano, by the trial court. On significant
points, the damaging testimony of de la Cruz against appellant was corroborated
by Ruben Barte and Ramon Yael.
Merciales vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124171. March 18, 2002.

FACTS: The public prosecutor filed a motion for the discharge of the accused
Nuada so that he could be a state witness but the prosecution contended that it
was not required to present evidence to warrant the discharge of Nuada because
he was already under the Witness Protection Program. But this motion was
denied for failure of prosecutor to present evidence. Prosecution then filed
petition for certiorari before the SC questioning such denial.

The private respondents then filed a motion to set the case for hearing
based on their constitutional right to speedy trial which was granted. The
prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration, instead of presenting further
evidence. The hearing was postponed and was set for another schedule. On the
date of hearing, the prosecution again filed for MR and invoked its pending
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court but the respondents objected to
reset the hearing again. The judge called for recess to allow the prosecution to
present the NBI agent would be presented to prove the extrajudicial confession of
the accused Nuada.

However, after recess the public prosecutor declined to present the NBI
agent and manifested that it would not present any further evidence. The defense
then moved to that the cases be deemed submitted for decision and asked leave
of court to file a demurrer of evidence. In the decision of RTC, It dismissed the
charge of rape with homicide based on demurrer to evidence filed by private
respondents/accused.

ISSUE: Whether or not there be an acquittal by demurrer to evidence.

HELD: The RTC judge was ordered to complete presentation of all available
witnesses for the prosecution. There was grave abuse of discretion by the trial
court. The court required the public prosecutor to present evidence to justify
Nuada’s discharge as state witness but insisted there was no need to do so
because Nuada was already under the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ.
The trial court directed the public prosecutor the NBI agent who took Nuada’s
extrajudicial confession but the prosecutor declared that he was resting his case
knowing that the evidence he previously presented was not sufficient to convict
the accused. And due to that, a demurrer to evidence was filed by the accused
and was granted by the trial court. It was then clear that the public prosecutor
was guilty of serious nonfeasance. When grave abuse of discretion is present, an
order granting a demurrer to evidence becomes null and void.

Potot v People, GR No. 143547

FACTS: Joey S. Potot, petitioner, was charged with homicide in Criminal Case No.
2739 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, Catarman, Northern
Samar. The information against him, filed on December 12, 1999, alleges:

That on or about the 2nd day of November, 1999, at about 3:00 oclock in the
early morning in the public cemetery of the Municipality of Mondragon, Province
of Northern Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, armed with a knife locally called dipang, with
deliberate intent to kill and without justifiable cause, did then and there wifully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab RODOLFO DAPULAG @ PILI
with the use of said weapon which the accused had provided himself for the
purpose, thereby inflicting upon said Rodolfo Dapulag @ Pili a mortal wound
which caused the death of said victim.

On February 3, 2000, petitioner, through counsel, filed a manifestation with

motion informing the trial court that he is not appealing from the Decision and
praying that a commitment order be issued so he could immediately serve his
sentence. Attached to the motion is petitioner's letter to the court stating that he
does not intend to appeal from its Decision.
However, on February 11, 2000, the private complainant, Rosalie Dapulag (wife of
the victim), filed through counsel, a motion for reconsideration/retrial praying
that the Decision be set aside and that the case be heard again because there
were irregularities committed before and during the trial which caused
miscarriage of justice.

ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment has become final that the accused right
against double jeopardy will be violated upon re-trial of the same case.

HELD: YES. The February 1, 2000 order Decision had become final.

To invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must be

present: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2) the court has jurisdiction to try
the case; (3) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (4) he has been
convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent.

These requisites have been established. Records show that petitioner was
charged with homicide in Criminal Case No. 2739 under a valid information before
the trial court which has jurisdiction over it. He was arraigned and pleaded guilty
to the charge. On the basis of his plea, petitioner was convicted and meted the
corresponding penalty. As petitioner has been placed in jeopardy for the crime of
homicide, he cannot be prosecuted anew for the same offense, or any offense
which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first offense charged.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. CLARENCE ASTUDILLO, CRISANTO ASTUDILLO,
alias ANTENG or ENTENG, HILARIO ASTUDILLO, alias BODA, appellant, G.R. No.
141518. April 29, 2003

FACTS: On November 21, 1995, the accused-appellant was arraigned and the
accused pleaded not guilty. On March 16, 1998, the accused-appellant was
convicted of murder qualified by abuse of superior strength. The accused-
appellant appealed and, upon review of the case, the Court of Appeal revised the
decision, modified, and replaced the qualifying circumstance into treachery, thus
increasing the accused-appellant’s civil liability. Hence this appeal by accused-
appellant on the grounds that the actions of the Court of Appeals violated his
right against double jeopardy.

ISSUE: Whether or not the modification of the charge from murder qualified by
abuse of superior strength to murder qualified by treachery violates the accused’s
right against double jeopardy

RULING: When the accused himself files or consents to the filing of a motion for
reconsideration or modification, double jeopardy cannot be invoked because the
accused waived his right not to be placed therein by filing such motion. His
motion gives the court an opportunity to rectify its errors or to reevaluate its
assessment of facts and conclusions of law and make them conformable with the
statute applicable to the case in the new judgment it has to render. The raison
detre is to afford the court a chance to correct its own mistakes and to avoid
unnecessary appeals from being taken. In effect, a motion for reconsideration or
modification filed by or with consent of the accused renders the entire evidence
open for the review of the trial court without, however, conducting further
proceedings, such as the taking of additional proof. Let it be known that appellate
courts are triers of law, and not triers of facts.
RIGHT AGAINST EX POST FACTO LAW AND BILL OF ATTAINDER

Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan, March 23, 1984

FACTS: Bayot is one of the several persons who was accused in more than 100
counts of estafa thru falsification of Public documents before the Sandiganbayan.
The said charges started from his alleged involvement as a government auditor of
the commission on audit assigned to the Ministry of education and culture, with
some other employees from the said ministry. The bureau of treasury and the
teacher’s camp in Baguio City for the preparation and encashment of fictitious
TCAA checks for the nom-existent obligations of the teacher’s camp resulting in
damage to the government of several millions. The 1st 32 cases were filed on july
25, 1987, while Bayot ran for municipal mayor of Amadeo Cavite and was elected
on January 1980. but on May 1980 Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision
convicting the accused together with his other co-accused in all but one of the
thirty two cases filed against them.

On Mach 16, 1982 Batas Pambansa Blg 195 was passed amending RA 3019.

ISSUE: Whether or Not it would be violative of the constitutional guarantee

against an ex post facto law.

HELD: The court finds no merit in the petitioner’s contention that RA 3019 as
amended by Batas Pambansa Blg 195, which includes the crime of estafa through
falsification of Public Documents as among crimes subjecting the public officer
charged therewith with suspension from public office pending action in court, is a
penal provision which violates the constitutional prohibition against the
enactment of ex post facto law. Accdg to the RPC suspension from employment
and public office during trial shall not be considered as a penalty. It is not a
penalty because it is not a result of a judicial proceeding. In fact, if acquitted the
official who is suspended shall be entitled to reinstatement and the salaries and
benefits which he failed to receive during suspension. And does not violate the
constitutional provision against ex post facto law.

The claim of the petitioner that he cannot be suspended because he is currently

occupying a position different from that under which he is charged is untenable.
The amendatory provision clearly states that any incumbent public officer against
whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under RA 3019 for any
offense involving fraud upon the government or public funds or property or
whatever stage of execution and mode of participation shall be suspended from
office. The use of the word “office” applies to any office which the officer charged
may be holding and not only the particular office under which he was charged.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. HON. SIMEON FERRER, G.R. Nos. L-32613-14

FACTS: Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared
RA1700 or the Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing
the information of subversion against the following: 1.) Feliciano Co for being an
officer/leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)aggravated by
circumstances of contempt and insult to public officers, subversion by a band and
aid of armed men to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo Tayag and 5 others, for being
members/leaders of the NPA, inciting, instigating people to unite and overthrow
the Philippine Government. Attended by Aggravating Circumstances of Aid or
Armed Men, Craft, and Fraud. The trial court is of opinion that 1.) The Congress
usurped the powers of the judge 2.) Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing
the guilt of the CPP without any forms of safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created
a presumption of organizational guilt by being members of the CPP regardless of
voluntariness. The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20June1957. It is an
act to outlaw the CPP and similar associations penalizing membership therein,
and for other purposes. It defined the Communist Party being although a political
party is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not only by
force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means. It
declares that the CPP is a clear and present danger to the security of the
Philippines. Section 4 provided that affiliation with full knowledge of the illegal
acts of the CPP is punishable. Section 5 states that due investigation by a
designated prosecutor by the Secretary of Justice be made prior to filing of
information in court. Section 6provides for penalty for furnishing false evidence.
Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses in open court for acts penalized by prision
mayor to death. Section 8 allows the renunciation of membership to the CCP
through writing under oath. Section 9 declares the constitutionality of the statute
and its valid exercise under freedom if thought, assembly and association.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto law.

(2) Whether or Not RA1700 violates freedom of expression.

HELD:

The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957. A bill of
attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is
the substitution of judicial determination to a legislative determination of guilt. In
order for a statute be measured as a bill of attainder, the following requisites
must be present: 1.) The statute specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute is
applied retroactively and reach past conduct. (A bill of attainder relatively is also
an ex post facto law.)In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an
organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for purposes of
example of SECTION 4 of the Act.

The Act applies not only to the CPP but also to other organizations having
the same purpose and their successors. The Act’s focus is on the conduct not
person. Membership to this organizations, to be unlawful, it must be shown that
membership was acquired with the intent to further the goals of the organization
by overt acts. This is the element of membership with knowledge that is
punishable. This is the required proof of a member’s direct participation. Section
4 prohibits acts committed after approval of the act. The members of the
subversive organizations before the passing of this Act is given an opportunity to
escape liability by renouncing membership in accordance with Section 8. The
statute applies the principle of mutatis mutandis or that the necessary changes
having been made.

The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the

Philippine Government should not be the basis of guilt. This declaration is only a
basis of Section 4 of the Act. The existence of Substantive Evil justifies the
limitation to the exercise of “Freedom of Expression and Association" in this
matter. Before the enactment of the statute and statements in the preamble,
careful investigations by the Congress were done. The court further stresses that
whatever interest in freedom of speech and association is excluded in the
prohibition of membership in the CPP are weak considering national security and
preservation of democracy. The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the
prosecution under RA1700.
ALEJANDRO KATIGBAK and MERCEDES K. KATIGBAK, vs. THE SOLICITOR
GENERAL, EPIFANIO VILLEGAS, ARTURO XAVIER, PONCIANO FERNANDO,
ROSENDO DOMINGO and LEONARDO LUCENA, G.R. No. L-19328 December 22,
1989

FACTS: This issue involved the constitutionality of R.A. 1379 “An Act Declaring
Forfeiture in favor of the State of the any Property found to have been unlawfully
acquired by any public officer or employee. The civil cases were instituted by the
spouses Alejandro and Mercedes Katigbak. In their complaint they praye: that the
solicitor general be enjoined from filing a complaint against them for forfeiture of
property under the said act; the said statute be declared unconstitutional in so far
as it authorizes forfeiture of properties acquired before its approval; properties
acquired by Alejandro when he was out of the government service be excluded
from forfeiture proceedings; and the NBI officers and the investigating prosecutor
be sentenced to pay damages. The second action commenced by petition filed by
the Republic of the Philippines against Alejandro Katigbak, his wife, Mercedes
Katigbak, and his son, Benedicto, seeking the forfeiture in favor of the State of the
properties of Alejandro allegedly gotten by him illegally, in accordance with RA
1379. Said properties were allegedly acquired while Katigbak was holding various
positions in the government, the last being that of an examiner of the Bureau of
Customs; and title to some of the properties were supposedly recorded in the
names of his wife and/or son. The cases were jointly tried.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 1379 unconstitutional for being an expost-facto law,

because it imposes the penalty of forfeiture on a public officer or employee
acquiring properties allegedly in violation of said R.A. No. 1379 at a time when
that law had not yet been enacted.

HELD: The forfeiture of property provided for in Republic Act No. 1379 being in
the nature of a penalty; and it being axiomatic that a law is ex-post facto which
inter alia "makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which
was innocent when done, and punishes such an act," or, "assuming to regulate
civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right
for something which when done was lawful," it follows that penalty of forfeiture
prescribed by R.A. No. 1379 cannot be applied to acquisitions made prior to its
passage without running afoul of the Constitutional provision condemning ex post
facto laws or bills of attainder.
 In the case, the trial court declared certain of their acquisitions in 1953,
1954 and 1955 to be illegal under R.A. No. 1379 although made prior to the
enactment of the law, and imposed a lien thereon. Such a disposition is, quite
obviously, constitutionally permissible. R.A. No. 1379 is not penal in nature, its
objective not being the enforcement of a penal liability but the recovery of
property held under an implied trust.

With respect to things acquired through delicts, prescription does not run
in favor of the offender. As to the issue of whether or not the Prosecuting Fiscal,
Leonardo Lucena, should be made answerable for damages because the filing of
the forfeiture proceedings, Civil Case No. 31080, resulted from a preliminary
investigation which was allegedly conducted by Fiscal Lucena in an arbitrary and
highhanded manner, suffice it to state that the trial court found no proof of any
intention to persecute or other ill motive underlying the institution of Civil Case
No. 31080.

The trial court further found that during the preliminary investigation by
Fiscal Lucena on September 13, 19, 24, 25 and 26, 1956, Alejandro Katigbak was
assisted by reputable and competent counsel, Atty. Estanislao A. Fernandez and
Atty. Antonio Carag. The mere fact that the preliminary investigation was
terminated against the objection of Katigbak's counsel, does not necessarily
signify that he was denied the right to such an investigation. What is more, the
Trial Court's factual conclusion that no malice or bad faith attended the acts of
public respondents complained of, and consequently no award of damages is
proper, cannot under established rule be reviewed by this Court absent any
showing of the existence of some recognized exception thereto.
WRIGHT v COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 113213, August 15, 1994.

FACTS: To suppress crimes, Australia and the Government of the Philippines

entered into a Treaty of Extradition on the 7th of March 1988. It was ratified in
accordance with the provisions of Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
in a Resolution adopted by the Senate on September 10, 1990. The Treaty adopts
a "non-list, double criminality approach" which provides for broader coverage of
extraditable offenses between the two countries and embraces crimes punishable
by imprisonment for at least 1 year. It also allows extradition for crimes
committed prior to the treaty's date of effectivity, provided that these crimes
were in the statute books of the requesting State at the time of their commission.

Under the Treaty, each contracting State agrees to extradite “persons

wanted for prosecution of the imposition or enforcement of a sentence in the
Requesting State for an extraditable offense." A request for extradition requires,
if the person is accused of an offense, the furnishing by the requesting State of
either a warrant for the arrest or a copy of the warrant of arrest of the person, or,
where appropriate, a copy of the relevant charge against the person sought to be
extradited.

On March 17, 1993, Assistant Secretary Sime D. Hidalgo of the DFA

indorsed to the DOJ Diplomatic Note No. 080/93 dated February 19, 1993 from
the Government of Australia to the DOJ through Attorney General Michael Duffy
seeking to indict Paul Joseph Wright, an Australian Citizen.

In accordance to Section 5 of PD No. 1069 (September 10, 1990), an

extradition proceeding was initiated on April 6, 1993 before the RTC of Makati. On
June 14, 1993 RTC granted the petition for extradition requested by the
Government of Australian concluding that the extradition could be granted
irrespective of when the offense was committed. The extradition proceeding
resulted in an order of his deportation. The decision was sustained and motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUES:

Whether or not such retroactive application is in violation of the Constitution for

being an ex post facto law
HELD:

The Supreme Court cited the case of Calder v. Bull where it concluded that the
concept of ex post facto laws in our Constitution was limited only to penal and
criminal statutes which affect the substantial rights of the accused. As concluded
by the Court of Appeals, the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a
criminal procedural statute. This being so, there is absolutely no merit in
petitioner’s contention that the ruling of the lower court sustaining the Treaty’s
retroactive application with respect to offenses committed prior to the Treaty’s
coming into force and effect, violates the Constitutional prohibition against ex
post facto laws. As the Court of Appeals correctly concluded, the Treaty is neither
a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute. "It merely
provides for the extradition of persons wanted for prosecution of an offense or a
crime which offense or crime was already committed or consummated at the
time the treaty was ratified." WHEREFORE, instant petition is DENIED for lack of
merit.
PANFILO M. LACSON vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et. al. G.R. NO. 128096

FACTS: Petitioner Lacson was involved in a criminal case that started when eleven
persons suspected to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang were killed by
the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Petitioner was one
of the heads of said group. In a media expose, it was said that what happened
was a rub-out and not a shoot-out. Among other issues, petitioner argues that
Republic Act 8249, enacted as his case was pending, had a retroactive effect; that
it was tailored-suit to match petitioner’s case, making the same an ex-post facto
law that would affect his right to procedural due process. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. 8249 is an ex post facto law that may affect the
petitioner’s right to due process.

HELD: Petitioner’s contention is incorrect. R.A. 8249 does not have the qualities of
an ex-post facto law. Generally, an ex post facto law exerts a retroactive effect on
penal laws. However, R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. As the Court defines, ‘Penal
laws are those acts of the legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish
penalties thereof; or those that defines crimes, treat of their nature, and provide
for their punishment’. Republic Act 8249 is a substantive law on jurisdiction which
is not penal in character and thus is not considered to be an ex post facto law.
Therefore, the argument of the petitioner that the law in question has retroactive
effect and may affect his right to due process is wrong.