STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

PART 3 CASES
I.

1. ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs. THE HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES
G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003.

FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,
sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which
directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid
of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund
(JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and
seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The
complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo
B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the
House Committee. The House Committee on Justice ruled on October
13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form,"
but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient
in substance. To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet
been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section
3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and three weeks
since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23,
2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it,
the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary
General of the House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and
Felix William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by
above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment
complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all
the Members of the House of Representatives.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of
Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the
Constitution.
2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question – has resulted
in a political crisis.

HELD:
1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of
the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on
Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of
Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been
initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the
same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of
the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment
complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court,
on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on
August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella
against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the
constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment
proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year
period.

2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986

Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a
power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere
specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief
Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article
VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political questions." From
this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political
questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not
truly political questions." Truly political questions are thus beyond
judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of
powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which are
not truly political in nature.

2. SARMIENTO VS MISON
FACTS:

Respondent Salvador Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of

the Bureau of Customs by then President (Corazon) Aquino. The
said appointment made by the President is being questioned by
petitioner Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcilla who are both
taxpayers, members of the bar, and both Constitutional law
professors, stating that the said appointment is not valid since the
appointment was not submitted to the Commission On
Appointment (COA) for approval. Under the Constitution, the
appointments made for the "Heads of Bureau" requires the
confirmation from COA.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT the appointment made by the President

without the confirmation from COA is valid.

HELD:

Yes, under the 1987 Constitution, Heads of Bureau are removed

from the list of officers that needed confirmation from the
Commission On Appointment. It enumerated the four (4) groups
whom the President shall appoint:

 Heads of the Executive Departments, Ambassadors, other

public minister or consuls, Officers of the Armed Forces from the
rank of Colonel or Naval Captain, and Other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in him in this Constitution;
The above-mentioned circumstance is the only instance where the
appointment made by the President that requires approval from
the COA and the following instances are those which does not
require approval from COA:
 All other Officers of the Government whose appointments are
not otherwise provided by law;
 Those whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint; and
 Officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may
by law vest in the President alone.

3. Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997

DECISION
 (En Banc)

BELLOSILLO, J.:

I. THE FACTS

Pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine

Government, the GSIS sold in public auction its stake in Manila Hotel
Corporation (MHC). Only 2 bidders participated: petitioner Manila
Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy
51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong
Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator,
which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42
more than the bid of petitioner.

Petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme Court to compel the

GSIS to allow it to match the bid of Renong Berhad. It invoked
the Filipino First Policy enshrined in §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution, which provides that “in the grant of rights, privileges,
and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.”

II. THE ISSUES

1. Whether §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987

Constitution is a self-executing provision and does not need
implementing legislation to carry it into effect;
2. Assuming §10, paragraph 2, Article XII is self-executing,
whether the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation form part of our patrimony as a nation;
3. Whether GSIS is included in the term “State,” hence,
mandated to implement §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the
Constitution; and
4. Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it should give
preference to the petitioner, a Filipino corporation, over
Renong Berhad, a foreign corporation, in the sale of the
controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation.

III. THE RULING

[The Court, voting 11-4, DISMISSED the petition.]

 1. YES, §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution is a self-executing provision and does not need
implementing legislation to carry it into effect.

Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to
make it appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of
style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting
further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the
contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor details may
be left to the legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of
constitutional provisions.

xxx xxx xxx

Respondents . . . argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec.

10, second par., of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the first and third
paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not
self-executing. The argument is flawed. If the first and third
paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact
measures to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully
owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs
legislation to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments
within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori,
by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it
does not by its language require any legislation in order to give
preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. A
constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and
non-self-executing in another.

xxx. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which
needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any
legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially
enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of
rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means
just that - qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our
Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified
circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject;
consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such
constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent
potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their
bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi
remedium.

2. YES, the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel

Corporation form part of our patrimony as a nation.

In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains

to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it
refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the
Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but
also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.

xxx xxx xxx

For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute
witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the
Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own
historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence
and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national
economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC
comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises
the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or
owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the
hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from
the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently,
we cannot sustain respondents’ claim that the Filipino First
Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of
the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the
land upon which the building stands.

3. YES, GSIS is included in the term “State,” hence, it is

mandated to implement §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the
Constitution.

It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be

carried out with the prior approval of the State acting through
respondent Committee on Privatization. [T]his fact alone makes the
sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a “state action.” In
constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the
government are considered “state action” covered by the Constitution (1)
when the activity it engages in is a “public function;” (2) when the
government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make
the government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the
government has approved or authorized the action. It is evident that
the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent
MHC comes under the second and third categories of “state
action.” Without doubt therefore the transaction, although entered into
by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore
subject to the constitutional command.

When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to

the people but also to the government as elements of the State. After all,
government is composed of three (3) divisions of power - legislative,
executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed
to the State is correspondingly directed to the three (3) branches of
government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject
constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the Executive
Department and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality
deriving its authority from the State.

4. YES, GSIS should give preference to the petitioner in

the sale of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation.

It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the

higher bid it is not yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly
provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning
bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts,
and secured the requisite approvals. Since the Filipino First
Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference
on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an
assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the winning
bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the award yet,
nor are they under obligation to enter into one with the highest
bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to
abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which
are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested
parties.

xxx xxx xxx

Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any

reason the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS
may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids
provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest
bid in terms of price per share. Certainly, the constitutional mandate
itself is reason enough not to award the block of shares immediately to
the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even
the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than
the constitutional injunction itself.
 In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid
in a public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby
exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will
have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the
Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the
Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino
First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may
neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the
constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it
would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.

4. Oposa vs. Factoran Case Digest (G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993)
FACTS:

The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by
their parents. The first complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at
the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial Court,
National capital Judicial Region against defendant (respondent)
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Reasources
(DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit, use
and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's
virgin tropical forests. They further asseverate that they represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn and asserted that
continued deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of
the ecological balance and have resulted in a host of environmental
tragedies.聽

Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent,

his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to
cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and
to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new TLAs.聽

Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground

that the complaint had no cause of action against him and that it raises
a political question.

The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that
granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of
contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution.
Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for
certiorari and asked the court to rescind and set aside the dismissal
order on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his
discretion in dismissing the action.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.

(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the
impairment of contracts.

RULING:

First Issue: Cause of Action.

Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint

a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any
relief is provided by law. The Court did not agree with this. The
complaint focuses on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology which is incorporated in Section 16
Article II of the Constitution. The said right carries with it the duty to
refrain from impairing the environment and implies, among many other
things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's
forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the
primary government agency responsible for the governing and
supervising the exploration, utilization, development and conservation
of the country's natural resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is
also substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative
Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code of 1987 have set
the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formation, and
have defined the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the
petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful
ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative
duty or obligation to respect or protect or respect the same gives rise to
a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA,
which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their
right to a balance and healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection
thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds
it to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of
their rights.

Second Issue: Political Issue.

Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides

for the expanded jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows
the Court to rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of the
Executive and Legislature and to declare their acts as invalid for lack or
excess of jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.

Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.

The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by

which the state regulates the utilization and disposition of forest
resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. It is not a contract
within the purview of the due process clause thus, the non-impairment
clause cannot be invoked. It can be validly withdraw whenever dictated
by public interest or public welfare as in this case. The granting of
license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or
property rights.聽

Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations

of contract is limit by the exercise by the police power of the State, in the
interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare. In short, the
non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the State.

The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED

and the RTC decision is SET ASIDE.
II.

1. MANAHAN VS EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION

2. Tantuico Jr. Vs Domingo

FACTS:
Petitioner applied for clearance from all money, property and other
accountabilities in preparation for his retirement. He obtained the
clearance applied for. The clearance had all the required signatures and
bore a certification that petitioner was “cleared from money, property
and/or other accountabilities by this Commission”. Petitioner argues
that notwithstanding the clearances previously issued (by COA), and
respondent Chairman’s certification that petitioner had been cleared of
money and property accountability, respondent Chairman still refuses
to release the remaining half of his retirement benefits — a purely
ministerial act.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the withholding of one-half of petitioner’s retirement
benefits is valid.
HELD:
NO. Petition was granted insofar as it seeks to compel respondent
Chairman of the COA to pay petitioner’s retirement benefits in full and
his monthly pensions.
RATIO:
Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 1568 (An Act to Provide Life Pension to the
Auditor General and the Chairman or Any Member of the Commission
of Elections), the benefits granted by said law to the Auditor General
and the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Elections shall
not be subject to garnishment, levy or execution. Likewise, under
Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146, as amended, the benefits granted
thereunder “shall not be subject, among others, to attachment,
garnishment, levy or other processes.”
Well settled is the rule that retirement laws are liberally interpreted in
favor of the retiree because the intention is to provide for the retiree’s
sustenance and comfort, when he is no longer capable of earning his
livelihood.

III.

1. Philacor Credit Corporation vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,

G.R. No. 169899. February 6, 2013.
Facts:
Both courts held that petitioner Philacor Credit Corporation
(Philacor), as an assignee of promissory notes, isliable for deficiency
documentary stamp tax (DST) on (1) the issuance of promissory notes;
and (2) theassignment of promissory notes for the fiscal year ended
1993.Philacor is a domestic corporation engaged inthe business of
retail financing. A prospective buyer of a home appliance with neither
cash nor any creditcard may purchase appliances on installment basis
from an appliance dealer. After Philacor conducts a credit investigation
and approves the buyer’s application, the buyer executes a unilater
al promissory note infavor of the appliance dealer. Pursuant to Letter of
Authority No. 17107,Revenue Officer Celestino Mejiaexamined
Philacor’s books of accounts and other accounting records for the fiscal
year August 1, 1992 to July 31, 1993. Philacor received tentative
computations of deficiency taxes for this year. Philacor’s Finance
Manager, contested the tentative computations of deficiency taxes
(totaling P20,037,013.83) through a letterdated April 17, 1995.Philacor
protested the PANs, with a request for reconsideration and
reinvestigation. Italleged that the assessed deficiency income tax was
erroneously computed when it failed to take into accountthe reversing
entries of the revenue accounts and income adjustments, such as
repossessions, write-offs andlegal accounts. Similarly, the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) failed to take into account the reversingentries
of repossessions, legal accounts, and write-offs when it computed the
percentage tax; thus, the totalincome reported, that the BIR arrived at,
was not equal to the actual receipts of payment from the customers.As
for thedeficiency DST, Philacor claims that the accredited appliance
dealers were required by law to affixthe documentary stamps on all
promissory notes purchased until the enactment of Republic Act No.
7660,otherwise known as An Act Rationalizing Further the Structure
and Administration of the Documentary StampTax, which took effect
on January 15, 1994. In addition, Philacor filed, on the following day, a
supplemental protest, arguing that the assessments were void for
failure to state the law and the facts on which they werebased.CTA
Division rendered decision. It concluded that Philacor failed to declare
part of its income, making itliable for deficiency income tax and
percentage tax. However, it also found that the Commissioner of
InternalRevenue (CIR) erred in his analysis of the entries in Philacor’s
books thereby considerably reducing Philacor’s liability to a deficiency
income tax of P1,757,262.47 and a deficiency percentage tax of
P613,987.86. The CTAalso ruled that Philacor is liable for the DST on
the issuance of the promissory notes and their subsequenttransfer or
assignment. Noting that Philacor failed to prove that the DST on its
promissory notes had beenpaid for these two transactions, the CTA
held Philacor liable for deficiency DST of P673,633.88,
Issue:
WON Philacor is liable for the DST on the issuance of the PN.
Ruling:

Under Section 173 of the National Internal Revenue Code, the persons
primarily liable for the payment of DSTare the persons (1) making; (2)
signing; (3) issuing; (4) accepting; or (5) transferring the taxable
documents,instruments or papers. Should these parties be exempted
from paying tax, the other party who is not exemptwould then be liable.
In this case, petitioner Philacor is engaged in the business of retail
financing. Throughretail financing, a prospective buyer of home
appliance may purchase an appliance on installment byexecuting a
unilateral promissory note in favor of the appliance dealer, and the
same promissory note isassigned by the appliance dealer to Philacor.
Thus, under this arrangement, Philacor did not make, sign,
issue,accept or transfer the promissory notes. It is the buyer of the
appliances who made, signed and issued thedocuments subject to tax
while it is the appliance dealer who transferred these documents to
Philacor which
likewise indisputably received or “accepted” them. A
cceptance, however, is an act that is not even applicableto promissory
notes, but only to bills of exchange. Under the Negotiable Instruments
Law, the act ofacceptance refers solely to bills of exchange. In a ruling
adopted by the Bureau of Internal Revenue as early as
1995, “acceptance” has been defined as having reference to incoming
foreign bills of exchange which are
accepted in the Philippines by the drawees thereof, and not as referring
to the common usage of the word asin receiving. Thus, a party
to a taxable transaction who “accepts” any documents or instruments
in the plain
and ordinary meaning does not become primarily liable for the tax.

2. CIR vs Guerrero

FACTS:1.

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue denied the claim for refund in

the sum ofP2,441.93 filed by the administrator of the estate of Paul I.
Gunn.2.

The deceased operated an air transportation business under the

business name and styleof Philippine Aviation Development.3.

61,048.19 liters of gasoline was actually used in aviation during the

period fromOctober 3, 1956 to May 31, 1957.4.

The estate, as claimed, was entitled to the same rights and privileges as
Filipino citizensoperating public utilities including privileges in the
matter of taxation.5.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disagreed.6.

The matter was brought to the Court of Tax Appeals and ordered the
petitioner to refundto the respondent the sum of P2,441.93.7.

Court of Tax Appeals decision was reversed.

ISSUE:1.

Whether or not Section 142 of the National Internal Revenue Code

allowing Filipinos arefund of 50 percentum of the specific tax paid on
aviation oil, could be availed bycitizens of the United States and all
forms of business enterprises owned or controlleddirectly by them in
view of the privilege under the Ordinance to operate public utilities
inthe same manner as to, and under the same conditions imposed
upon, citizens of thePhilippines or corporations or associations owned
or controlled by citizens of thePhilippines.

DECISION:1.

No. The decision of the Court of Tax Appeals is reversed and the case is
remanded to it,to grant respondent Administrator the opportunity of
proving whether the estate couldclaim the benefits of Section 142 of
the National Internal Revenue Code, allowing refundto citizens of
foreign countries on a showing of reciprocity. With costs.

3. Applied food ingredients vs cir

FACTS
Petitioner is a Value-Added Tax (VAT) taxpayer engaged in the
importation and exportation business, as a pure buy-sell trader.
Petitioner alleged that from September 1998 to December 31, 2000, it
paid an aggregate sum of input taxes for its importation of food
ingredients.Subsequently, these imported food ingredients were
exported between the periods of April 1, 2000 to December 31, 2000,
from which the petitioner was able to generate export sales amounting
to P114,577,937.24. The aforestated export sales which transpired
from April 1, 2000 to December 31, 2000 were “zero-rated” sales,
pursuant to Section 106(A (2)(a)(1) of the NIRC of 1997.Petitioner
alleged that the accumulated input taxes for the period of September 1,
1998 to December 31, 2000 have not been applied against any output
tax.
On March 26, 2002 and June 28, 2002, petitioner filed two separate
applications for the issuance of tax credit certificates.On July 24, 2002,
in view of respondent’s inaction, petitioner elevated the case before this
Court by way of a Petition for Review, docketed as C.T.A. Case No.
6513.Trial ensued and the CTA First Division rendered a Decision on 13
June 2007. It denied petitioner’s claim for failure to comply with the
invoicing requirements prescribed under Section 113 in relation to
Section 237 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1997 and
Section 4.108-1 of Revenue Regulations No. 7-95.On appeal, the CTA
En Banc likewise denied the claim of petitioner citing violation of the
invoicing requirements.
ISSUE
Is the petitioner is entitled to the issuance of a tax certificate or refund
representing creditable input taxes attributable to zero-rated sales?

HELD
NO.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) had one hundred twenty
(120) days from the date of submission of complete documents in
support of the application within which to decide on the administrative
claim.Counting 120 days from 26 March 2002, the CIR had until 24
July 2002 within which to decide on the claim of petitioner for an input
VAT refund attributable to the its zero-rated sales for the period April to
September 2000.On the other hand, the CIR had until 26 October 2002
within which to decide on petitioner’s claim for refund filed on 28 June
2002, or for the period covering October to December 2000.
In this case, the judicial claim of petitioner was filed on 24 July
2002. Petitioner clearly failed to observe the mandatory 120-day
waiting period. Consequently, the premature filing of its claim for
refund/credit of input VAT before the CTA warranted a dismissal,
inasmuch as no jurisdiction was acquired by the CTA. In accordance
with the ruling in San Roque and considering that petitioner’s judicial
claim was filed on 24 July 2002, when the 120+30 day mandatory
periods were already in the law and BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 had not
yet been issued, petitioner does not have an excuse for not observing
the 120+ 30 day period. Failure of petitioner to observe the mandatory
120-day period is fatal to its claim and rendered the CT A devoid of
jurisdiction over the judicial claim.

IV. People Vs. Temporada

Facts:
Accused Rosemarie Robles, Bernadette Miranda, Nenita Catacotan,
Jojo Resco and Beth Temporada are all employees of ATTC, a Travel and
Tour Company, recruited and promised overseas employment for a fee
to Rogelio Legaspis Jr, as a technician in Singapore, and other overseas
workers. The accused were holding office in Makati but eventually
transferred to Manila. After paying placements fees, none of the
overseas recruits was able to leave or recover what they have paid, thus
they filed separate criminal complaints against accused in Manila.

The accused were then sentenced to life imprisonment for illegal

recruitment and estafa. Then the case was referred to the CA for
intermediate review, CA affirmed with modification on the penalty. The
penalty was lowered for the lower court due to insufficiency of evidence.

Issue: Whether the accused were guilty of 5 counts of estafa and illegal
recruitment, and be charged of the penalty of life imprisonment.

Ruling:
The Court affirms the modification of the CA, except for the penalty on
the 5 counts of estafa.

Although Temporada is saying that she is not a principal to the illegal

recruitment and estafa because she is a mere employee of ATTC and
that she was just echoing the requirement of her employer, the Court
believes that Temporada actively and consciously participated in illegal
recruitment.

The Court agrees with the lower court that the accused were guilty of
illegal recruitment by a syndicate with the penalty of life imprisonment.
The accused were convicted separately also for 5 counts of estafa.

2. People vs. Manaba

This is an appeal from a decision of Judge Eulalio Garcia in the Court of
First Instance of Oriental Negros in criminal case No. 1827 dated
November 15, 1932, finding the defendant guilty of rape and sentencing
him to suffer seventeen years and four months of reclusion temporal,
and the accessory penalties of the law, to indemnify the offended party,
Celestina Adapon, in the amount of P500, to maintain the offspring, if
any, at P5 a month until said offspring should become of age, and to pay
the costs.
The defendant appealed to this court, and his attorney de oficio now
makes the following assignments of error:
"1. El Juzgado a quo erro al no estimar en favor del
acusado apelante la defensa de double jeopardy o legal
jeopardy que ha interpuesto.
"2. El Juzgado a quo erro al no declarar insuficientes las
pruebas de identificacion del acusado apelante.
"3. El Juzgado a quo tambien erro al pasar por alto las
incoherencias de los testigos de la acusacion y al no
declarar que no se ha establecido fuera de toda duda la
responsabilidad del apelante.
"4. El Juzgado a quo erro al condenar al acusado apelante
por el delito de violacion y al no acceder a su mocion de
nueva vista."
It appears that on May 10, 1932, the chief of police of Dumaguete
subscribed and swore to a criminal complaint wherein he charged
Pedro Manaba with the crime of rape, committed on the person of
Celestina Adapon. This complaint was filed with the justice of the peace
of Dumaguete on June 1, 1932, and in due course the case reached the
Court of First Instance. The accused was tried and convicted, but on
motion of the attorney for the defendant the judgment was set aside and
the case dismissed on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant or the subject matter of the action,
because the complaint had not been filed by the offended party, but by
the chief of police (criminal case No. 1801).
On August 17, 1932, the offended girl subscribed and swore to a
complaint charging the defendant with the crime of rape. This
complaint was filed in the Court of First Instance (criminal case No.
1827), but was referred to the justice of the peace of Dumaguete for
preliminary investigation. The defendant waived his right to the
preliminary investigation, but asked for the dismissal of the complaint
on the ground that he had previously been placed in jeopardy for the
same offense. This motion was denied by the justice of the peace, and
the case was remanded to the Court of First Instance, where the
provincial fiscal in an information charged the defendant with having
committed the crime of rape as follows:
"Que en o hacia la noche del dia 9 de mayo de 1932, en el
Municipio de Dumaguete, Provincia de Negros Oriental,
Islas Filipinas, y dentro de la jurisdiccion de este Juzgado.
el referido acusado Pedro Manaba, aprovechandose de la
 oscuridad de la noche y mediante fuerza, violencia e
intimidacion, voluntaria, ilegal y criminalmente yacio y
tuvo acceso carnal con una niña llamada Celestina Adapon,
contra la voluntad de esta. El acusado Pedro Manaba ya ha
sido convicto por Juzgado competente y en sentencia firme
por este mismo delito de violacion.
"Hecho cometido con infraccion de la ley."
The defendant renewed his motion for dismissal in the case on the
ground of double jeopardy, but his motion was denied; and upon the
termination of the trial the defendant was found guilty and sentenced
as hereinabove stated.
Whether the defendant was placed in jeopardy for the second time or
not when he was tried in the present case depends on whether or not he
was tried on a valid complaint in the first case. The offense in question
was committed on May 9, 1932, or subsequent to the date when the
Revised Penal Code became effective.
The third paragraph of article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, which
relates to the prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage,
seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness reads as follows:
"The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of
lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a
complaint filed by the offended party or her parents,
grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender
has been expressly pardoned by the above-named persons,
as the case may be."
The Spanish text of this paragraph is as follows:
"Tampoco puede procederse por causa de estupro, rapto,
violacion o abusos deshonestos, sino en virtud de denuncia
de la parte agraviada, o de sus padres, o abuelos o tutor, ni
despues de haberse otorgado al ofensor, perdon expreso
por dichas partes, segun los casos."
It will be observed that the Spanish equivalent of the word "filed" is not
found in the Spanish text, which is controlling, as it was the Spanish
text of the Revised Penal Code that was approved by the Legislature.
The first complaint filed against the defendant was signed and sworn to
by the chief of police of Dumaguete. As it was not the complaint of the
offended party, it was not a valid complaint in accordance with the law.
The judgment of the court was therefore void for lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter, and the defendant was never in jeopardy.
It might be observed in this connection that the judgment was set aside
and the case dismissed on the motion of defendant's attorney, who
subsequently set up the plea of double jeopardy in the present case.
The other assignments of error relate to the sufficiency of the evidence,
which in our opinion fully sustains the findings of the trial judge.
The recommendation of the Solicitor-General is erroneous in several
respects, chiefly due to the fact that it is based on the decision of July
30, 1932 that was set aside, and not on the decision now under
consideration. The accused should not be ordered to acknowledge the
offspring, if should there be any, because the record shows that the
accused is a married man.
It appears that the lower court should have taken into consideration the
aggravating circumstance of nocturnity. The defendant is therefore
sentenced to suffer seventeen years, four months, and one day
of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the offended party, Celestina
Adapon, in the sum of P500, and to support the offspring, if any. As
thus modified, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with the costs of
both instances against the appellant.

V.

1. Hipe vs COMELEC

The Facts

Petitioner Hector T. Hipe and respondent Ma. Cristina L. Vicencio

were candidates for the mayoralty post in Catubig, Northern Samar in
the May 14, 2007 elections. During the canvass proceedings of the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Catubig, Northern Samar (MBOC),
Vicencio petitioned for the exclusion of seven election returns of
Precinct Nos. 0037B, 0052A, 0053A, 0058A, 0080A, 0081A and 0082A
on the grounds that they were prepared under duress, threats,
intimidation or coercion; and that the election was marred by massive
vote buying, widespread coercion, terrorism, threats, and intimidation,
preventing voters from voting, so that the said returns did not reflect
the will of the electorate.[3] In support of the said petition for exclusion,
Vicencio presented affidavits of some of the members of the Board of
Election Inspectors, a sample ballot and an ISO Assessment.[4]

On May 19, 2007, the MBOC ruled in favor of Vicencio and

excluded the seven election returns adverted to. On the same day,
petitioner Hipe filed a notice of appeal. Thereafter, on May 29, 2007,
petitioner Hipe filed his Verified Appeal with the COMELEC, docketed
as SPC No. 07-206 entitled In the Matter of the Petitions to Exclude
Election Returns, Hector T. Hipe vs. Ma. Cristina L. Vicencio, arguing
that the written petition to exclude the election returns was filed out of
time, and that the grounds used to exclude the questioned returns were
not proper for a pre-proclamation controversy, were not supported by
credible evidence, and were beyond the jurisdiction of the MBOC.[5]

The Issue

Whether or not the COMELEC En Banc acted without or in

excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its
challenged Resolution dated January 30, 2008, which
affirmed the Resolution dated July 11, 2007 issued by its
Second Division dismissing petitioner Hipes appeal for
being filed out of time.

Our Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious.

Appeal Should Be Given Due Course

In its En Banc Resolution, the COMELEC held that the ruling of

the MBOC had already become final and executory; and thus, its
Second Division had not acquired appellate jurisdiction to act on Hipes
verified appeal. In support of its ruling, the COMELEC En Banc relied
on the Certification issued by Renato I. Madronio, Acting Election
Officer II, Catubig, Northern Samar, attesting that hard or printed
copies of the MBOCs ruling to exclude the seven contested election
returns were received by Atty. V.B. Desales, counsel for the
KAMPI-Liberal Party Coalition, at 10:37 p.m. on May 19, 2007 at the
provincial Election Supervisors Office.[13] On this basis, the
COMELEC En Banc opined that when petitioner Hipe filed the Verified
Appeal on May 29, 2009, said filing was already five days late and
should no longer be entertained.

We disagree. Indeed, there is a disputable presumption that

official duty has been regularly performed;[14] and that, corollary thereto,
it is presumed that in its disposition of the contested election returns,
the MBOC has regularly performed its official duty of issuing a written
ruling on the prescribed form, authenticated by the signatures of its
members as required under Section 20(d) of Republic Act No.
7166.[15] In fact, the alleged issuance and service upon the supposed
counsel of petitioner Hipe of the written ruling of MBOC was even
supported by the aforementioned Certification of the Chairperson of the
MBOC.

The records would, however, reveal that Atty. Venerando B.

Desales, the counsel who was supposedly furnished the alleged written
ruling of the MBOC, has denied under oath that he ever received a copy
of the alleged written ruling.[16] He even categorically denied in his
Affidavit that he was the counsel of petitioner Hipe.[17]

Notably, nothing in the Status of Canvass Report[18] or in the

Minutes of the Proceedings of the MBOC on May 19, 2007[19] showed
that a written ruling on the petition for exclusion has been rendered by
the MBOC or received by petitioner Hipe.

On the contrary, a perusal of the Minutes of the Proceedings of

the MBOC on May 19, 2007 would reveal that Election Officer Madronio
even notified the counsels of petitioner Hipe that, as of that time, the
Municipal COMELEC Office still did not have the prescribed form of the
ruling, and that they would still have to get the prescribed forms in
Catarman.[20] This militates against Madronios statement in his
Certification that hard or printed copies of the ruling of the MBOC were
furnished to Atty. Desales on that same day.

When a plaintiffs case depends upon the establishment of a

negative fact, and the means of proving the fact are equally within the
control of each party, then the burden of proof is upon the party
averring the negative fact.[21]

In the case at bar, petitioner Hipe asserted the negative fact, that
is, that no copy of the written ruling of the MBOC was sent to him or his
counsel. Thus, petitioner Hipe has the burden of proof to show that he
was not furnished with a copy of the written ruling of the MBOC, which
he was able to successfully prove in the instant case. Be that as it may,
it then becomes incumbent upon respondent Vicencio to prove
otherwise. This is because the burden of evidence is shifted if the party
upon whom it is lodged was able to adduce preponderant evidence to
prove its claim.[22]

Significantly, other than Madronios statement in his Certification

that hard or printed copies of the ruling of the MBOC were furnished to
Atty. Desales on May 19, 2007, no other evidence was adduced by
respondent Vicencio to support her claim. If indeed such written ruling
exists and was indeed furnished to petitioner Hipe or his alleged
counsel, it would have been very easy for respondent Vicencio to
produce a copy of the written ruling with the signature of petitioner
Hipe or his counsel, which she failed to do in the instant case.

Furthermore, the COMELEC has the discretion to construe its

rules liberally and, at the same time, suspend the rules or any of their
portions in the interest of justice.[23] As aptly stated by Commissioner
Rene V. Sarmiento in his Dissenting Opinion:[24]
It is well settled that election laws should be
reasonably and liberally construed to achieve their purpose
to effectuate and safeguard the will of the electorate in the
choice of their representatives. The courts frown upon any
interpretation that would hinder in any way not only the
free and intelligent casting of votes in any election but also
the correct ascertainment of the results thereof.

Disputes in the outcome of elections involve public

interest. Technicalities and procedural barriers should not
be allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle to the
determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice
of their elective officials. Laws governing such disputes
must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the
people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated
by mere technicalities. Hence, it is submitted that there is a
need to suspend the procedural rules and resolve the
merits of the case to promote justice and safeguard the will
of the electorate of Catubig, Northern Samar.

Accordingly, the COMELEC should have not dismissed the

appeal filed by petitioner Hipe on the ground of belated filing.

The Exclusion of the Seven Election Returns

Was Amply Supported by Evidence

Nevertheless, even if we entertain petitioner Hipes appeal from

the decision of the MBOC on the questioned election returns, the Court
still rules in favor of respondent Vicencio.

Petitioner Hipe claims that no proof was presented nor was there
any showing that the seven election returns in question were
defective.[25] Such contention is not persuasive.
 The COMELEC, after a judicious evaluation of the documents on
record, upheld the findings of the MBOC to exclude the subject election
returns on the basis of the affidavits of the members of the Board of
Election Inspectors. What exactly these documents and evidence are
upon which the COMELEC based its resolution, and how they have
been appreciated in respect of their sufficiency, are beyond this Courts
scrutiny.[26] The rule that factual findings of administrative bodies will
not be disturbed by courts of justice except when there is absolutely no
evidence or no substantial evidence in support of such findings should
be applied with greater force when it concerns the COMELEC, as the
framers of the Constitution intended to place the COMELECcreated and
explicitly made independent by the Constitution itselfon a level higher
than statutory administrative organs.[27] The factual finding of the
COMELEC is, therefore, binding on the Court. As found by the
COMELEC En Banc:

Besides, we do not agree that the exclusion of the

seven (7) election returns in question were not supported
by any iota of evidence. This is amply supported by the
affidavits of the Members of the Board of Election
Inspectors; they were all made in clear and unequivocal
language by public officers who are presumed to have
performed such duties in the ordinary and regular
execution thereof. A careful re-examination of the evidence
on record reveals that there is sufficient justification to
uphold the MBOC ruling to exclude the subject election
returns. The MBOC retains sufficient discretion to avail
itself of all available means to ascertain the results of the
elections through witnesses as well as examination of the
election returns themselves. Where there is no abuse of
discretion the MBOC is presumed to have acted within its
powers and its decision should be treated with some
amount of respect.[28]

This is especially true in the instant case considering that, as

noted by the COMELEC En Banc in its questioned Resolution, one of
the witnesses petitioner Hipe previously presented later on recanted her
testimony and admitted that she had made her previous statement as
to the regularity of the conduct of the May 14, 1007 elections only out of
fear due to threats upon her person.[29] As correctly observed by the
COMELEC En Banc:
We also note that even one of the witnesses
presented by the appellant, Melanie Robion, Chairman of
the BEI for precinct No. 0037B, later on recanted her
testimony. This spells doom to the appellants cause as it
even impacts on the veracity and truthfulness of the other
 affidavits that the appellant submitted. We are reminded of
the legal principle that a falsity in one is a falsity in
all, Falsus in Onum, Falsus in Omnibus and would now be
more inclined to believe the assertions made by the
appellee instead of those presented by the appellant, who
has now been unmasked to have been less than truthful at
one time or another.[30]

Considering the foregoing discussion, there is ample evidence to

support the findings of the COMELEC that the seven election returns in
question should be excluded. The contention of petitioner Hipe that
said election returns were excluded from the canvass merely on the
basis of pure procedural technicalities is, therefore, unfounded.

Respondent Vicencio Substantially Complied with the

Requirement that Objections Be Made in Writing

Petitioner Hipe contends that the written petition to exclude the

election returns was filed beyond the prescribed time or almost 24
hours after the oral petition to exclude was manifested by the counsels
of respondent Vicencio; hence, the latters objections were raised out of
time.[31]

This contention is without merit.

While the records reveal that respondent Vicencio manifested her

oral objections on May 15, 2007 at around 7:00 p.m.,[32] filed the
written objections on May 16, 2007 at 6:40 p.m., and submitted the
documentary evidence in support of the protest at 2:45 p.m. only on the
following day, the Court nevertheless considers the foregoing acts of
Vicencio as substantial compliance with the requirement that
objections be reduced into writing.

In Marabur v. COMELEC,[33] we held that while respondent failed

to submit his written objections, respondents submission of his formal
offer of evidence, including the evidence itself, within the prescribed
period constituted substantial compliance with the requirement that
objections be reduced into writing.

Notably, the relaxation of the rules becomes all the more

necessary in the instant case, considering that respondent Vicencio has
even filed his written objections within the prescribed period; and soon
thereafter, the documentary evidence in support of the written
objections.
 Technicalities and procedural barriers should not be allowed to
stand in the way if they constitute an obstacle to the determination of
the electorates true will in the choice of its elective officials.[34]

It should be borne in mind that the object of the canvass is to

determine the result of the elections based on the official election
returns. In order that the result of the canvass would reflect the true
expression of the peoples will in the choice of their elective officials, the
canvass must be based on true, genuine, correctnay,
untamperedelection returns. [35] It is in these proceedings that the
COMELEC exercises its supervisory and administrative power in the
enforcement of laws relative to the conduct of elections, by seeing to it
that the canvass is based on the election returns as actually certified by
the members of the board of inspectors.[36]

Taking into consideration the findings of the COMELEC En

Banc that there was ample evidence to support the exclusion of the
seven election returns in question based on the grounds raised by
respondent Vicencio, this should suffice in upholding the latters
proclamation, absent a finding of grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the COMELEC En Banc, in order not to frustrate the electorates will.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The January

30, 2008 COMELEC En Banc Resolution and the July 11, 2007
COMELEC Second Division Resolution are hereby SET ASIDE insofar
as they dismissed petitioner Hipes appeal. The January 30, 2008
COMELEC En Banc Resolution is, however, AFFIRMED insofar as it
declared the exclusion of the seven election returns of Precinct Nos.
0037B, 0052A, 0053A, 0058A, 0080A, 0081A and 0082A to be valid.

2. Amora jr. vs. COMELEC

FACTS:

Petitioner Amora filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Candijay,

Bohol. At that time, Amora was the incumbent Mayor of Candijay and
had been twice elected to the post in 2007 and in 2007. Olandria, one of
the candidates for councilor in the same municipality, filed before the
COMELEC a Petition for Disqualification against Amora. Olandria
alleged that Amoras COC was not properly sworn contrary to the
requirements of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) and the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice. Olandria pointed out that, in executing his COC,
Amora merely presented his Community Tax Certificate (CTC) to the
notary public, Atty. Oriculo Granada (Atty. Granada), instead of
presenting competent evidence of his identity. Consequently, Amoras
COC had no force and effect and should be considered as not filed.

Amora countered that:

1. The Petition for Disqualification is actually a Petition to Deny Due

Course or cancel a certificate of candidacy. Effectively, the petition of
Olandria is filed out of time;

2. Olandrias claim does not constitute a proper ground for the

cancellation of the COC;

3. The COC is valid and effective because he (Amora) is personally

known to the notary public, Atty. Granada, before whom he took his
oath in filing the document;

4. Atty. Granada is, in fact, a close acquaintance since they have been
members of the League of Muncipal Mayors, Bohol Chapter, for several
years; and

5. Ultimately, he (Amora) sufficiently complied with the requirement

that the COC be under oath.

The Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition and

disqualified Amora from running for Mayor of Candijay, Bohol.

ISSUE: Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in

upholding Olandria's claim that an improperly sworn COC is equivalent
to possession of a ground for disqualification.

HELD: The petition is meritorious.

POLITICAL LAW Election Law; Certificate of Candidacy

In this case, it was grave abuse of discretion to uphold Olandrias claim

that an improperly sworn COC is equivalent to possession of a ground
for disqualification. Not by any stretch of the imagination can we infer
this as an additional ground for disqualification from the specific
wording of the Omnibus Eleciton Code in Section 68, which reads:

SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from

running for any elective local position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving

moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more
of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;

(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of

allegiance to the Republic;

(d) Those with dual citizenship;

(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or

abroad;

(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have

acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the
same right after the effectivity of this Code; and

(g) The insane or feeble-minded.

It is quite obvious that the Olandria petition is not based on any of the
grounds for disqualification as enumerated in the foregoing statutory
provisions. Nowhere therein does it specify that a defective notarization
is a ground for the disqualification of a candidate. Yet, the COMELEC
would uphold that petition upon the outlandish claim that it is a
petition to disqualify a candidate "for lack of qualifications or
possessing some grounds for disqualification."

Another red flag for the COMELEC to dismiss Olandrias petition is the
fact that Amora claims to personally know the notary public, Atty.
Granada, before whom his COC was sworn. In this regard, the
dissenting opinion of Commissioner Larrazabal aptly disposes of the
core issue. He said that accordind to the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice:

Section 2. Affirmation or Oath. The term "Affirmation" or "Oath" refers

to an act in which an individual on a single occasion:

(a) appears in person before the notary public;

(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the

notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by
these Rules; and

(c) avows under penalty of law to the whole truth of the contents of
the instrument or document.

Therefore, competent evidence of identity is not required in cases where

the affiant is personally known to the Notary Public, which is the case
herein.

In this case, contrary to the declarations of the COMELEC, Amora

complied with the requirement of a sworn COC. He readily explained
that he and Atty. Granada personally knew each other; they were not
just colleagues at the League of Municipal Mayors, Bohol Chapter, but
they consider each other as distant relatives. Thus, the alleged defect in
the oath was not proven by Olandria since the presentation of a CTC
turned out to be sufficient in this instance.

VI.

1. Dela Cruz vs. Capital Insurance

FACTS:
 Eduardo de la Cruz, employed as a mucker in the Itogon-Suyoc
Mines, Inc. in Baguio, was the holder of an accident insurance
policy "against death or disability caused by accidental means"
 January 1, 1957: For the celebration of the New Year, the
Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc. sponsored a boxing contest for general
entertainment wherein Eduardo, a non-professional boxer
participated
 In the course of his bout with another non-professional boxer of
the same height, weight, and size, Eduardo slipped and was hit by
his opponent on the left part of the back of the head, causing
Eduardo to fall, with his head hitting the rope of the ring
 He was brought to the Baguio General Hospital the following
day. He died due to hemorrhage, intracranial.
 Simon de la Cruz, the father of the insured and who was named
beneficiary under the policy, thereupon filed a claim with the
insurance company
 The Capital Insurance and Surety co., inc denied stating that the
death caused by his participation in a boxing contest was not
accidental
 RTC: favored Simon
ISSUE: W/N the cause of death was accident

HELD:YES.
 Eduardo slipped, which was unintentional
 The terms "accident" and "accidental"
 as used in insurance contracts, have not acquired any
technical meaning and are construed by the courts in their ordinary
and common acceptation
 happen by chance or fortuitously, without intention and
design, and which is unexpected, unusual, and unforeseen
 event that takes place without one's foresight or
expectation
 event that proceeds from an unknown cause, or is an
unusual effect of a known cause and, therefore, not expected
 where the death or injury is not the natural or probable result of
the insured's voluntary act, or if something unforeseen occurs in the
doing of the act which produces the injury, the resulting death is
within the protection of policies insuring against death or injury from
accident
 while the participation of the insured in the boxing contest is
voluntary, the injury was sustained when he slid, giving occasion to
the infliction by his opponent of the blow that threw him to the ropes
of the ring is not
 The fact that boxing is attended with some risks of external
injuries does not make any injuries received in the course of the
game not accidental
 In boxing as in other equally physically rigorous sports, such as
basketball or baseball, death is not ordinarily anticipated to result. If,
therefore, it ever does, the injury or death can only be accidental or
produced by some unforeseen happening or event as what occurred
in this case

Furthermore, the policy involved herein specifically excluded from its
coverage —
 (e) Death or disablement consequent upon the Insured engaging
in football, hunting, pigsticking, steeplechasing, polo-playing, racing
of any kind, mountaineering, or motorcycling.
 Death or disablement resulting from engagement in boxing
contests was not declared outside of the protection of the insurance
contract

2. Qua Chee Gan Vs. Law Union and Rock Insurance

FACTS:
 Qua Chee Gan, a merchant of Albay, owned four bodegas which
he insured with Law Union & Rock Insurance Co., Ltd (Law Union)
since 1937 and the lose made payable to the Philippine National
Bank (PNB) as mortgage of the hemp and crops, to the extent of its
interest
 July 21, 1940 morning: fire broke out in bodegas 1,2 and 4 which
lasted for almost a week.
 Qua Chee Gan informed Law Union by telegram
 Law Union rejected alleging that it was a fraudulent claim that
the fire had been deliberately caused by the insured or by other
persons in connivance with him
 Que Chee Gan, with his brother, Qua Chee Pao, and some
employees of his, were indicted and tried in 1940 for the crime of
arson but was subsequently acquitted
 During the pendency of the suit, Que Chee Gan paid PNB
 Law Union states that ff. assignment of errors:
 1. memo of warranty requires 11 hydrants instead of 2
 2. violation of hemp warranty against storage of gasoline
since it prohibits oils
 3. fire was due to fraud
 4. burned bodegas could not possibly have contained the
quantities of copra and hemp stated in the fire claims
ISSUE: W/N Qua Chee Gan should be allowed to claim.

HELD: YES. Affirmed.

 1. It is a well settled rule of law that an insurer which with
knowledge of facts entitling it to treat a policy as no longer in force,
receives and accepts a preium on the policy, estopped to take
advantage of the forfeiture
 2. oils (animal and/or vegetable and/or mineral and/or their
liquid products having a flash point below 300o Fahrenheit", and is
decidedly ambiguous and uncertain; for in ordinary parlance, "Oils"
mean "lubricants" and not gasoline or kerosene
 by reason of the exclusive control of the insurance
company over the terms and phraseology of the contract, the
ambiguity must be held strictly against the insurer and liberraly in
favor of the insured, specially to avoid a forfeiture
 3. trial Court found that the discrepancies were a result of the
insured's erroneous interpretation of the provisions of the insurance
policies and claim forms, caused by his imperfect knowledge of
English, and that the misstatements were innocently made and
without intent to defraud.
 4. Similarly, the 20 per cent overclaim on 70 per cent of the hemo
stock, was explained by the insured as caused by his belief that he
was entitled to include in the claim his expected profit on the 70 per
cent of the hemp, because the same was already contracted for and
sold to other parties before the fire occurred

VII.
1. Benjamin Co vs Republic

Facts:
Petitioner was born in Abram and his parents are both Chinese. He
owes his allegiance to theNationalistGovernment of China. He is
married to Leonor Go, the marriage having been celebrated inthe
Catholic Church of Bangued. He speaks and writes English as well as
the Ilocano and Tagalog dialects. He graduated from theAbram Valley
College, and finished his primary studies in the “Colegio” in Bangued,
both schools beingrecognized by the government. He has a child two
months old. He has never been accused of any crimeinvolving moral
turpitude. He is not opposed to organized government, nor is he a
member of any subversiveorganization. He does not believe in, nor
practice, polygamy. Since his birth, he has never gone abroad.
Hemingles with the Filipinos. He prefers a democratic form of
government and stated that if his petition is grantedhe would serve the
government either in the military or civil department. He is a merchant
dealing in the buyand sell of tobacco. He also is part owner of a store in
Bangued. In his tobacco business, he has a workingcapital of P10,
000.00 which he claims to have been accumulated thru savings. He
contributes to civic andcharitable organizations like the Jaycees,
Rotary, Red Cross and to town fiestas. He likes the customs of
theFilipinos because he has resided in the Philippines for a long time.

Issue: trial court on the ground that it erred in finding that petitioner
has all the qualifications for naturalization and none of the
disqualifications mentioned in the law.

Held: There is merit in this claim. Indeed, the scope of the word law in
ordinary legal parlance does not necessarily include the constitution
which is the fundamental law of the land, nor does it cover all the
principles underlying our constitution. Thus, our constitution
expressly declares as one of its fundamental policies that the
Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, that the
defense of the State is the prime duty of the government, that the duty
and right of the parents to rear their children for civic efficiency shall
receive the support of the State, and that the promotion of social justice
shall be its main concern. In so stating that he believes merely in our
laws, he did not necessarily refer to those principles embodied in our
constitution which are referred to in the law.

Our law also requires that petitioner must have conducted himself in a
proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his
residence in the Philippines in his relation with the constituted
government as well as with the community in which he is living. It is
contended that petitioner has also failed to comply with this legal
requirement for he failed to show that he has complied with his
obligation to register his wife and child with the Bureau of Immigration
as required by the Alien Registration Act. He has, therefore, failed to
conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner in his relation
with our government.

It furthermore appears that he failed to file his income tax return

despite the fact that he has a fixed salary of P1,440.00 a year and made
a profit of P1,000.00 in his tobacco business, and received an amount
less than P3,000 from his father as one-fourth of the proceeds of the
sale of the store, the total of which is more than what is required by law
for one to file an income tax return, a fact which indicates that he has
not also conducted himself properly in his relation with our government.
His reasoning that he made that earning during the year in which this
case was being heard is not convincing.

Considering that "naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and

strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant"
(Co Quing Reyes v. Republic, 104 Phil., 889), we are constrained to hold
that the trial court erred in granting the petition for naturalization.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed, without

pronouncement as to costs.

2. Velasco Vs. Republic

RICHARD VELASCO
, petitioner-appellant
v.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
,
oppositor-appellee.
G. R. No. L-14214May 25, 1960
FACTS:
- This is a petition for naturalization filed before the Court of First
Instance of Manila which, after trial, was denied forfailure of petitioner
to meet the requirements of the law. Petitioner has appealed.- Petitioner
was born in the Philippines on May 12, 1932 of spouses Peter Velasco
and Miguela Tiu who becamenaturalized citizens in 1956.- He
alleges that since his birth in Manila on May 12, 1932 he continuously
resided in the Philippines, particularly at1441 Magdalena St., Manila;-
that he finished his elementary education at the Francisco Balagtas
Elementary School, and his highschool at the Arellano University;- that
he pursued his collegiate studies at the University of the East where he
graduated in dentistry in 1954;that he is a citizen of the Republic of
China in Formosa;- that he has not followed the citizenship of his father
when the latter became naturalized as he was thenalready 23 years
old;- that he is single, although he is engaged to be married to a Filipino
girl by the name of Noemi Eugenio;- that he is at present employed at
the Wilson Drug Store since February, 1957 with a monthly salary
ofP150.00; that previously he worked as a salesman of his father with
a salary of P2,400.00 per annum, evenif his father was only an agent of
Elizalde and Co.;- that he knows how to speak and write English and
Tagalog; he is a Catholic by faith; and he has neverbeen convicted of
any crime involving moral turpitude;- that he does not believe in
polygamy or in anarchy or the use of violence for the predominance of
men'sideas;- that he does not own any real property although he
allegedly has cash savings amounting to P3,500.00 atthe Republic
Savings Bank, P1,000.00 worth of shares of stocks of the Far Eastern
University, P2,000.00shares of stock of the Marinduque Iron Mines,
and P1,000.00 in cash;- that he is not suffering from any contagious
disease;- that he has mingled socially with the Filipinos;- that he has
shown a desire to embrace the customs and traditions of the Filipinos;
and that he desires tobecome a Filipino citizen because he considered
the Philippines as his country and the Filipinos as hiscountrymen.
ISSUE:
1. WON the petitioner is qualified to become a Filipino citizen.
HELD:

[
The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs
against appellant,]
1.
No
, he is not qualified to become a Filipino citizen.The trial court
found that there are three names mentioned in the petition and in the
documentary evidence submittedin support thereof, namely, Richard
Velasco, Richard C. Velasco, and Richard Chua Velasco, and that
whilepetitioner states in his petition that his full name is Richard
Velasco, the signature thereon is Richard C. Velasco. Again, the
court found that the joint affidavit of said witnesses states that the
affiants personally know and areacquainted with Richard Velasco while
the documentary evidence shows that his name is Richard
Chua Velasco. Onthe other hand, petitioner testified that he
has no
alias
nor other names
and has always been knows as RichardVelasco.
No evidence was submitted to prove that they
are one and the same person
.
The trial court likewise found that Mrs. Paz J. Eugenio, a character
witness, is the prospective mother-in-law ofpetitioner, and such as
her testimony is biased
. It also found that she and her companion witness Santiago
Marianowere also the character witnesses of brother of petitioner in
his petition for naturalization,
a circumstance which inits opinion indicates that petitioner has
a limited circle of Filipino friends
. The court
finally found that thepresent income of petitioner is only P150.00
a month which, considering the present high cost of living andthe
low purchasing power of our peso,
is neither lucrative nor substantial to meet
the requirement of the law
.
Indeed, it appears from the evidence that petitioner was employed at
the Wilson Drug Store
only
on February, 1957with a salary of P150.00 a month, or
barely a month
before he filed the instant petition, and
that said store is partlyowned by his mother who has one-fifth
capital investment therein.
This leads one to believe that petitioner'semployment, even if true,
is but a convenient arrangement planned out by him and his family
in order to showa token compliance with the requirement of the
law that to become a Filipino citizen one must a lucrativeincome
or occupation.
Considering that "naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced
and strictly construed in favor of the government andagainst the
applicant" (Co Quing y Reyes
vs
. Republic, 104 Phil., 889), we are constrained to hold that the trial
courtdid not err in denying the petition for naturalization.

3. Co Y Quing Reyes vs. Republic

Doctrine: For this reason, it is well settled that theprocedure

prescribed by law for thenaturalization of an alien "should be
strictly followed.” In the language of
Corpus Juris Secundum, naturalizationlaws "should be
rigidly enforced andstrictly construed in favor of thegovernment and
against applicant forcitizenship"

Held:
The decision appealed from is hereby reversed, with costs against
petitioner-appellee.The lower court erred in not finding that the
petitioner appellee has failed to complywith all the requisites
prescribed by the law to acquire Philippine citizenship. Court ofFirst
Instance of Manila erred in hearing this case and granting the
petition in the case at bar, despite the undisputed fact that
said petition was publish in the Official Gazette onlyonce, instead of
three (3) times, as required in section 9 of Commonwealth Act
473.Petitioner may contend, however, that the law provides that the
publication of the noticeof hearing should be made for three consecutive
weeks and as the Official Gazette isnow being published monthly, and
not weekly as it was before, petitioner cannotactually comply with law.
While it is true that the notice of hearing in question cannotactually
be published for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette, it is
no lesstrue that said notice may be published three times consecutively,
although not weekly, inthe Official Gazette, and because the true
intent of the law is that the said notice be published 3 times, it is
our considered opinion that in the instant case the
single publication of the notice of hearing in question is not a
sufficient compliance with law."The grant of citizenship is only a
mere privilege, and a strict compliance with law on the part of the
applicant is essential.

VIII.

1. hEIRS OF jUGALBOT VS CA

Doctrine: Statutes expropriating or authorizing theexpropriation of

property are strictlyconstrued against the expropriatingauthority
and liberally in favor ofproperty owners

Held:
In the instant case, no proper notice was given to Virginia A. Roa by
the DAR. Neitherdid the DAR conduct an ocular inspection and
investigation. Hence, any act committed by the DAR or any of
its agencies that results from its failure to comply with the
proper procedure for expropriation of land is a violation of
constitutional due process andshould be deemed arbitrary, capricious,
whimsical and tainted with grave abuse ofdiscretion. Secondly, there
is no concrete evidence on record sufficient to establish that Nicolas
Jugalbot or the petitioners personally cultivated the property under
question orthat there was sharing of harvests, except for their
self-serving statements. Without theessential elements of consent
and sharing, no tenancy relationship can exist between
the petitioner and the private respondents

IX. Tampoy vs Alberastine

Doctrine:

“Statutes prescribing the formalities in

the execution of wills are very strictlyconstrued. A will must
be executed inaccordance with the statutoryrequirements; otherwise
it is entirelyvoid.

Held:
The trial court denied the petition on the ground that the first page of the
will does notbear the thumbmark of the testatrix
. Petitioner now prays that this ruling be set aside forthe reason that,
although the first page of the will does not bear the thumbmark of
thetestatrix, the same however expresses her true intention to give the
property to herwhose claims remains undisputed.
She wishes to emphasize that
no one has filed anyopposition

to the probate of the will and that while the first page does not bear
thethumbmark of the testatrix, the second however bears her
thumbmark and both pageswere signed by the three testimonial
witnesses
. Moreover, despite the fact that the petition for probate is
unopposed, the three testimonial witnesses testified andmanifested to
the court that the document expresses the true and voluntary will of
thedeceased.This contention cannot be sustained as it runs counter to
the express provision of thelaw. Thus,
Section 618 of Act 190, as amended, requires that the testator sign
thewill and each and every page thereof in the presence of the
witnesses
, and that the
latter sign the will and each and every page thereof in the presence
of the testator
and of each other, which requirement should be expressed in
the attestation clause

2. Rodriguez vs. Alcala and 3. Anama vs. CA