Concerning Recent Trends in the Theory of Historiography

Author(s): Maurice Mandelbaum

Source: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Oct., 1955), pp. 506-517
Published by: University of Pennsylvania Press
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 CONCERNING RECENT TRENDS IN THE THEORY
OF HISTORIOGRAPHY 1

BY MAURICE MANDELBAUM

Thirty years ago, in a presidential address to the American His-

torical Association,2 Charles M. Andrews surveyed the changes which
had occurred in American historiography since the founding of the
Association. Looking back upon that survey of the period between
1884 and 1924, I think one must say that the changes which he noted
in historiographical methods and practices were far more profound
than any changes which have since occurred, or which seem at the
moment to be looming on the horizon. In almost all respects the
methods and practices of historians remain essentially what Andrews
regarded them as properly being,3 and many of his prophecies have
been fulfilled.
However, in the last thirty years the theory of historiography, as
distinguished from its practice, has undergone a series of changes
which were not anticipated by Andrews, and with which (so far as
I know) he himself did not subsequently deal. The theory of his-
toriography which was implicit in his address was more nearly akin to
that of most of his predecessors than it was to that of many of his
most noted successors. And what is true with reference to Andrews'
presidential address is, I believe, quite generally true in this country:
by the end of the first quarter of this century the methods and prac-
tices of historians had become stabilized into the form in which we
now find them, but in the second quarter of the century major con-
troversies arose among historians concerning the theory of historiog-
raphy. It is to certain aspects of the latter controversies that this
paper is addressed.
One can, I believe, say that the theory of historiography-or what
is sometimes known as the formal or critical philosophy of history-
embraces three major types of problem. One concerns the "objec-
tivity" of historical knowledge; that is, it is concerned with what
constitutes valid knowledge of the historical process, and with esti-
mating the extent to which we may be said to possess such knowl-
edge. The second branch involves a consideration of the relations
between historical knowledge and other forms of knowledge or of
1 Based on a paper read at the meetings of the American Historical Association
held in New York, December 28-30, 1954.
2 a These Forty Years," American Historical Review, XXX (Jan. 1925), 225-50.
3 Perhaps the most important exception is his view of the relations between the
discipline of history and the disciplines of government, economics, sociology, law, etc.
(Cf. loc. cit., 233.)
506

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 RECENT TRENDS IN THEORY OF HISTORIOGRAPHY 507

pseudo-knowledge; for example, it is concerned with the r

between history and memory, between history and myth, an
especially) between history and scientific generalization. T
branch deals with what might be termed the pragmatics of h
that is, it attempts to assess the practical uses of a study of t
relating the discipline of history to the political, moral, and
lectual ends which it can or should serve. In the present n
shall only deal with the first two of these branches of the th
historiography; I shall not discuss questions which turn ab
pragmatics of history, since any discussion of these question
far afield. Not only do such discussions presuppose the acc
of views regarding the other two problems, but they also invo
more general considerations as those concerning the dutie
intellectual to the society of which he is a part. Because th
a limited number of positions which can be adopted regar
latter types of question, there have not been any decisively n
regarding the uses to which the study of history should be pu
changes as one can note among discussions of the pragmatics
tory are primarily reflections of changes in views regarding
sibility of objective historical knowledge and regarding the r
between history and other modes of knowledge. It is to a con
tion of these latter changes that I shall now turn.

1. CHANGING VIEWS REGARDING THE OBJECTIVITY OF

HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGE

In tracing the views which have recently been h

the problem of the adequacy of the historian's knowledg
which his inquiries purportedly deal, one must disting
those articles and books which have been written by h
those written by philosophers. I believe it fair to sa
historians the presidential addresses of Becker and
stituted the first major challenges to the previously
that the historian was able to grasp and to delineate
history-as-actuality.5 Thus, it was not until the th
4This topic has been a perennial theme of the presidential
American Historical Association. Cf. H. Ausubel: Historians an
Study of the Presidential Addresses of the American Historical A
1945 (New York, 1950).
5C. L. Becker: "Everyman His Own Historian," Am. Hist.
(Jan., 1932), 221-236; C. A. Beard: "Written History as an Ac
Hist. Rev., XXXIX (Jan., 1934), 219-231. Cf. the wide-ranging cit
Destler: " Some Observations on Contemporary Historical Theory
LV (April, 1950), 503-529.

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508 MAURICE MANDELBAUM

controversies regarding the possibility

edge which had previously occupied Con
any appreciable impact on American t
the members of this Association are a
much discussed. It seems to me that one or another form of the
position which can be characterized as "relativism" has not o
grown in influence among historians, but must be characterized
the dominant position of those practicing American historians w
have written on the problem.7
However, it can scarcely be said that contemporary philosophe
have followed the same trend. To be sure, the later works of Cro
and Collingwood, of Cassirer, and of Dewey, carry out the implic
tions of their earlier writings and foster the conviction that one
another form of relativism is still the dominant mode of thou
among philosophers who deal with the problem. Yet one can ci
host of discussions in which the basic theses of relativism are re-
jected.8 In short, so far as philosophy is concerned, those who ha

6 Cf. W. S. Holt: "The Idea of Scientific History in America," this journ

(June, 1940), 361, n. 26.
7 E.g., the position adopted by the Committee on Historiography of the So
Science Research Council can best be characterized as " objective relativism" (T
ory and Practice in Historical Study: A Report of the Committee on Historiog
phy, Social Science Research Council, Bulletin 54. New York, 1946). Cf. also
articles cited in the bibliography of the foregoing report and by Destler (loc. c
Cf. also Bull. 64 of the Social Science Research Council, 4-13, 15f.
8 For example, all three symposiasts who discussed historical explanation bef
the Aristotelian Society in 1947 rejected the theory of relativism, although ea
represented a different point of view on other topics. A. M. MacIver and M. G
berg hold to a position which I have attempted to defend, and which, I believ
again becoming more widely held, as the succeeding references will show; W.
Walsh's position is more nearly akin to the neo-Kantian position of Windelband
Rickert. (Cf. Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol. XXI [London, 1947], 45ff., 7
65-67, and W. H. Walsh: An Introduction to Philosophy of History [London, 1
116-118.)
Other references (arranged in alphabetical order) are: A. C. Danto: "M
Chronicle and History Proper," Journ. of Phil., L (March 12, 1953), 173-182, a
"On Historical Questioning," Journ. of Phil., LI (Feb., 4, 1954), 89-99; G. C. Fie
"Some Problems of the Philosophy of History," Proc. of the British Acade
XXIV (1938), 55-83; A. O. Lovejoy: "Present Standpoints and Past History
Journ. of Phil. XXXVI (August 31, 1939), 477-489 (for a more extended survey
Lovejoy's thought, cf. my "A. O. Lovejoy and the Theory of Historiography,"
this journal, IX [October, 1948], 412-423); A. I. Melden: "Historical Objectiv
A 'Noble Dream'?" Journ. of General Educ., VII (Oct. 1952), 17-24; E. Na
"Some Issues in the Logic of Historical Analysis," Scientific Monthly, LX
(March, 1952), 162-169; K. Popper: The Open Society and Its Enemies (Lond
1945), vol. II, 246-248, et pass.; L. Reis and P. 0. Kristeller: "Some Remark

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 RECENT TRENDS IN THEORY OF HISTORIOGRAPHY 509

recently written on the question seem far less impressed by

sophic arguments for the relativity of historical knowledge
philosophers of the last generation. Yet it would certainly b
to say that any reasonably complete consensus of opinio
veloped among philosophers on this topic. This, unfortunat
surprise no one. However, the lack of consensus and the inc
tendency to oppose the earlier theories of relativism is a fa
should be borne in mind more often than it sometimes has
those historians who cite philosophic authority to buttr
theories of historiography.
The difficulty with most philosophic discussions of the pr
historical knowledge (and here I include my own work in th
is that they have usually attempted to deal with the issues
of a general theory of knowledge.9 They have been inclined
centrate on those aspects of historiographical method wh
been treated in manuals of historiography, attempting to s
terms of a general theory of knowledge, whether activities
selecting among facts and synthesizing these facts render su
claim that the historian can apprehend what actually occur
past. One major difficulty in this procedure is that the gener
of knowledge which one holds will antecedently determine
of conclusion which one reaches.10 While I believe it to have been

the Method of History," Journ. of Phil., XL (April 29, 1943), 225-245

Swabey: The Judgment of History (New York, 1954), Ch. 1; M. G. Wh
ward an Analytic Philosophy of History," in M. Farber: Philosophic Thoug
France and the United States (Buffalo, 1950), 717ff.; P. P. Wiener: "On Me
ology in the Philosophy of History," Journ. of Phil., XXXVIII (June 5, 19
324. I should also be inclined to include M. R. Cohen in this list, altho
position as stated in The Meaning of Human History (LaSalle, Illinois, 1947
unambiguous. In addition, all of the works referred to in footnote 11 seem
to entail the acceptance of a non-relativistic position.
9 E. W. Strong has attempted to avoid this error. If I understand his po
aright, I should be inclined to class his work among those works cited in
Cf. "Fact and Understanding in History," Journ. of Phil., XLIV (Nov. 6
637-644; "How Is Practice of History Tied to Theory? " ibid., XLVI (Sep
29, 1949), 637-644; " Criteria of Explanation in History," ibid., XLIX (Janu
1952), 57-67; "The Materials of Historical Knowledge," in Y. H. Krik
Naturalism and the Human Spirit (New York, 1944), 154-182; "Reason
tory," in Univ. of California Publications in Philosophy, XXI (1939), 125-1
10 Another difficulty, which is now coming to be more widely recognized
the conventional distinction between analysis and synthesis, as described in
of historiography, is in many respects misleading. Cf. the cited papers of
Strong, Danto, and Reis and Kristeller; also Mandelbaum: The Problem
torical Knowledge (New York, 1938), 293-297 et pass. and "Causal Anal
History," in this journal, III (Jan. 1942), 35-37.

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 510 MAURICE MANDELBAUM

useful to demonstrate that the activitie

are compatible with alternative views
historical knowledge, a continuation o
lines does not, at present, seem profitab

2. THE PROBLEM OF THE PLACE OF HISTORIOGRAPHY IN THE

ECONOMY OF KNOWLEDGE

As is well known, there were many attempts in th

century to assimilate history into the body of the s
of a merger between history and sociology. At the en
this tendency called forth a reaction which is asso
names of Dilthey, Windelband, Rickert, and Croce
been continued in the thought of Collingwood and
original root of the reaction was the idea that the me
of the historian are different from those of the scientist: the his-
torian is interested in understanding the particular, the concrete, th
unique, while the scientist is interested in understanding the genera
the repetitive, the abstract. Thus the historical and scientific ideals
of understanding are different, and the modes of explanation whic
are appropriate in the two fields are also different. This dichotomy
has recently come under severe criticism by a number of philos
phers," and I believe that it can fairly be said that the distinctio
which was drawn by, say, Dilthey and Rickert can no longer be main
tained in its original form.l2 However, a new influence has bee
11Cf. P. Gardiner: The Nature of Historical Explanation (London, 1952);
J. W. N. Watkins: "Ideal Types and Historical Explanation," British Journ. f
the Phil. of Science, III (May, i952), 22-43; C. G. Hempel: "The Function of
General Laws in History," Journ. of Phil., XXXIX (January 15, 1942), 35-48; and
"Problems of Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences," in Science,
Language, and Human Rights (Philadelphia, 1952), 65-86; A. Hofstadter: " Gener-
ality and Singularity in Historical Judgment," Journ. of Phil., XLII (February 1,
1945), 57-65; E. Nagel: op. cit., and "Problems of Concept and Theory Formation
in the Social Sciences," in Science, Language and Human Rights (Philadelphi
1952), 43-64; K. Popper: op. cit., and "The Poverty of Historicism," Economic
N.S., XI (1944), 86-103, 119-137; E. W. Strong (cf. note 9); M. G. White: op. ci
and "Historical Explanation," Mind, N.S., LII (July, 1943), 212-229, and "A No
on the Method of History," Journ. of Phil., XL (June 10, 1943), 317-319; P.
Wiener, op. cit.
Since there has been some misunderstanding of my position (cf. the criticism
made by Gardiner, op. cit., pp. 83ff.) I should like to call attention to my article
"Causal Analysis in History " (loc. cit.).
12 Even the paper of Reis and Kristeller and the book by Walsh (both of which
are inclined to maintain more of a distinction between history and science than th
articles cited in the preceding note) are willing to concede a larger place (though
still a subsidiary one) to the role played by generalizations in the actual practice
of historians.

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 RECENT TRENDS IN THEORY OF HISTORIOGRAPHY 511

added to the previous forms of the argument, and this infl

not been countered by those who have sought to under
dichotomy between historical and scientific modes of exp
It consists in the increasing stress which has been placed on
cept of " memory ": history is being defined as a form of memo
This tendency to identify history and memory has two co
philosophic sources in contemporary theories of historiogra
the one hand it springs from the metaphysics of idealism, as
and Collingwood; on the other, it springs from existentialis
both cases the historian is viewed as dealing with data wh
have meaning in so far as they reverberate within him, that
far as he rethinks or relives them, or is able, in other ways,
them into his own individual or social experience. In short,
with which the historian actually deals is a living memory
found in the present and is capable of moulding the future
independent of the historian's own thoughts or of his own e
problems. Since the data with which scientists deal, and the
understanding which they set themselves, are not generally
preted as occupying a similar status, those who follow e
idealist or the existentialist traditions will insist that the historian's
activity cannot be, and should not be, assimilated to the current con-
ception of scientific understanding.l4 In fact, within both the idealist
and the existentialist camps there is a tendency to limit the place
which science plays in the total economy to knowledge-a limitation
more severe than that previously placed upon it by, say, Rickert. To
this, of course, those who follow what is usually termed a "natural-
istic " (or " empirical," or " positivistic ") philosophy take strenuous
exception. Thus, once again, it may be said that general philosophic
considerations enter the debate concerning the theory of historiogra-
phy, and play a major role in determining which of the alternative
positions is to be accepted by a given theorist.
While it is almost surely true that disagreements springing from
ultimate philosophic convictions will always bedevil the theory of
13 Cf. R. Niebuhr: Faith and History (New York, 1949); K. Jaspers: The Origin
and Goal of History (New Haven, 1953); E. Rosenstock-Huessy: "The Predica-
ment of History," Journ. of Phil., XXXII (February 14, 1935), 93-100.
I should also be inclined to interpret Cassirer's position on this point as being
closely affiliated with existentialist modes of thought. Cf. his Essay on Man (New
Haven, 1944), Ch. 10.
The clearest expression of this point of view, as espoused by an historian, is to be
found in G. J. Renier: History, Its Purpose and Method (Boston, 1950).
14 For a recent treatment of the problem in an existentialist manner, cf. Fritz
Kaufmann: " Reality and Truth in History," in Perspectives in Philosophy (Ohio
State Univ., 1953), 43-54.

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512 MAURICE MANDELBAUM

historiography, I think that both histor

be well served if the theory of historiogr
variety of concrete problems to discuss t
case. This would not in itself overcome t
which spring from divergences in genera
would have the advantage of forcing us t
specific problems against which our theor
sophic theory, as in science, a theory is
quate if it has been reached after exam
means of dealing with a variety of instan
accepted after examining only a few of
relevant to its conclusions. In my opinion
has been unduly neglected by both phil
though it is relevant to any theory of th
knowledge or to any theory of the rel
science (or between history and literat
Strangely enough, this neglected problem
subject-matter of the discipline of histor

3. THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE DISCIPLINE OF HISTORY

In the recent literature which is concerned with the theory of his

toriography, little attention has been focussed on the question of wh
actually does, or what ideally should, constitute the subject-matter
of the discipline of history. It is not, I believe, difficult to under-
stand why this has been the case. In the first place, the late nin
teenth century controversy over the relative merits of "politica
and " cultural " history merged with the discussion of numerous oth
topics, such as the relation of history to sociology and group psycho
ogy, and the problem of contingency vs. determinism in the historic
process; as a consequence the issues between the two theories we
never sharply defined and were rarely debated in terms of their ow
merits. In the second place, historians broadened the scope of th
subject-matters with which they were concerned, and broadened the
to include so many factors in the social life of man that no commo
thread was easily discernible in all of their studies. As a consequenc
of this we find that the dictum that "history is simply what historia
do " (a dictum which has its analogues in many other fields) is inte
preted to mean that there is no specific, delimited subject-matte
which it is the task of historians to explore. Instead of having led t
inquiries concerning what it is that historians actually do do, the dic
tum seems to have provided a justification for abandoning any
attempt to define the province of history.

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 RECENT TRENDS IN THEORY OF HISTORIOGRAPHY 513

Still, it is not easy to write a manual of historiography

discuss the theory of historiography, without making some
to state, however generally and loosely, what it is that chara
the subject-matter of the discipline of history. In so far as o
find any consensus of opinion among recent works, it appear
the case that the discipline of history is now being defined e
terms of special mode of inquiry, or in terms of that disciplin
seeks to discover and depict all that has occurred during the
of human existence.15 Both of these definitions appear to m
inadequate, and I shall attempt to suggest their weaknesses.
A) It seems to me that the attempt to define the province
discipline of history by means of its method of inquiry is cle
adequate if one wishes to do justice to what historians actu
and what they do not do. If such a definition were to be a
whatever could be investigated by the modes of inquiry used
torians would constitute a subject-matter with which the his
could legitimately be concerned. Thus (to use an illustration o
lingwood's) if the question of who played centre-forward on
soccer team could be investigated by the procedures of the h

15 Because most theorists of historiography do not take the problem of

the subject-matter of history as constituting a serious and consequential
their statements concerning the topic are less clear and consistent than
wish them to be. Therefore, I shall not attempt to classify the mater
which the following discussion is based. I merely append an alphabeti
references to materials published since 1930:
C. A. Beard: The Discussion of Human Affairs (New York, 1936), C
C. L. Becker: " Everyman His Own Historian," loc. cit.; M. Bloch: The Hist
Craft (New York, 1953), 20-29, 194f., et pass.; E. Cassirer: Essay on M
Haven, 1944), 174-177; R. G. Collingwood: The Idea of History (Oxfor
7-10; P. Gardiner, op. cit., Part II; G. J. Garraghan: A Guide to Historical
(New York, 1946), 4-10; L. Gottschalk: Understanding History (New York
Ch. 2, 3; F. A. Hayek: The Counterrevolution of Science (Glencoe, Ill., 195
73; S. Kent: Writing History (New York, 1941), 1-3; J. Huizinga: "A D
of the Concept of History," in R. Klibansky and H. J. Paton: Philosophy
tory (Oxford, 1936), 1-10; E. M. Hulme: History and Its Neighbors (N
1942), Part I, Ch. 2, and Part II, pass.; H. D. Oakeley: History and the Self
don, 1934), Ch. 1, et pass.; C. Oman: On the Writing of History (New Yor
Ch. 1; G. J. Renier, op. cit., Ch. 1, 2; G. Salvemini: Historian and Scientis
bridge, Mass., 1939), Ch. 1, et pass.; E. W. Strong: op. cit., in Krikorian: N
ism and the Human Spirit (New York, 1944), 154-157; Theory and Pr
Historical Study (Soc. Sci. Res. Council, Bull. 54), Ch. 1, 5; J. M. Vincent:
Historical Research (New York, 1934), Ch. 1; W. H. Walsh: op. cit., Ch
White: op. cit., in Farber: Philosophic Thought in France and the United
The extent to which the neglect of this problem persists can be seen in
64 of the Social Science Research Council. The definition of the specific s
matter of history is there scrupulously avoided (cf. pp. 22, 24f., and 106).

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514 MAURICE MANDELBAUM

(as indeed it can), then it would be as

as is the question of who won the battle
is an arbitrary and misleading view of w
matter of the discipline of history.
B) It is also misleading to hold the al
matter of history embraces all that ha
Historians have been interested in many
decline of nations, in the modes of life c
and time, in economic and intellectual
specific institutions or individuals have p
ing the life of a society, and so on indef
of topics does not signify that historians
tively, have been engaged in the hopeless
all that has ever occurred in the life of m
say in advance of any specific thought o
part of some historian's account, we can
tions which must be fulfilled if it is to
account. These conditions are that it mu
the nature of a specific society, or to ch
or are taking place, within that society.
thoughts or actions of a specific individ
historian under some circumstances, but
in so far as such a physical event influen
it is an occurrence of historical importa
and most of the events in physical natu
within the purview of the historian. Sim
in so far as the specific thoughts or acti
the society of which he is a part, or are
life of that society, such thoughts and ac
of the discipline of history. Yet, most a
not have any demonstrable significance f
to which they belong (nor to the nature
unless they happen to be investigated as
life present in their society, they are n
significance." In short, they do not belo
the discipline of history.

4. THE IMPORTANCE OF DEFINING THE SUBJECT-MATTER

OF HIISTORY

It is unnecessary to point out that the foregoing attempt

scribe the boundaries of the discipline of history is by n

16 Collingwood believes that it is. Cf. The Philosophy of History

Association Leaflet, No. 79 (1930). (Quoted by Renier, op, cit., p. 37

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 RECENT TRENDS IN THEORY OF HISTORIOGRAPHY 515

Even today, when the broader definitions of " history " have
such wide currency, the term " social" frequently crops up i
definitions. What I should, however, like to stress is the the
importance which attaches to any definition of the subject-m
the discipline of history. I shall now briefly indicate how
broader definitions of the field necessarily lead to the theory
torical relativism and to certain implications regarding the r
between history and other forms of knowledge.
Take the view that the province of history is to be defined
terms of a special subject-matter, but as a special method of
Such a definition either presupposes or entails the view that t
cedures which an historian follows are unique, and it ther
judges one of the two major problems of the theory of histori
what relations exist between history and science and between
and other modes of knowledge or pseudo-knowledge. Less ob
but no less importantly, it has implications for the question
objectivity of historical knowledge. For if one holds that any
matter which is investigated by the methods of history is a
subject belonging within that discipline as is any other subject
then how can one explain why the historian should sometim
out the identity of a particular soccer player, at other times
information about the battle of Cannae? The only reasonable
which could be given to this question would be that in som
he is interested in the identity of a given soccer player, but
cases he is not. Thus, the importance of the fact to be est
rests on its importance to the historian; it is not important
it is a fact which must be known if one wishes to establish what
occurred within an objectively defined context of historical events
Similarly, a definition of the subject-matter of the discipline
history which states that the goal of the historian is to reconstr
all that has occurred in the human past, leads to a relativistic posi
Such a definition makes the historian's subject-matter inexhaust
and the gap between history-as-written and history-as-actuality
comes immeasurably large. As Louis Gottschalk says: "The rec
struction of the total past of mankind, although it is the goal of
torians, thus becomes a goal they know full well is unattainable.
In other words, this definition of the subject-matter of history m
some form of relativism inescapable. Further, it carries implicat
for the other major problem of the theory of historiography, viz.
place which the discipline of history occupies in the total econom
knowledge. If the subject-matter of history embraces all that
17 Op. cit., p. 42.

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516 MAURICE MANDELBAUM

ever been thought, felt, said, or done by

influenced this inexhaustible material), th
ble relations between history and those o
are concerned with man: either the latte
historical knowledge, or they are differen
matter but by their methods. Both alt
held. On the one hand, the discipline of h
as embracing all of the veridical self-know
hand, it has been viewed as a disciplin
methods, which are different from the
thus is able to yield another "dimension"
of man which is given by the sciences. H
to having either role assigned to their dis
question of the relation between history
not be prejudged by the definition of th
unless one is willing to defend such a def
conforms to the subject-matter with whi
to acknowledge as historians actually dea
lieve that an analysis of historical works
has actually taken his subject-matter to b
felt, said, or done by every individual w
the place with which his account deals.
suggested, it appears to be the case that t
as being unquestionable examples of histo
torians are concerned with understandin
of specific societies and the changes whic
these societies.
I shall not attempt to justify this contention here. I wish only to
point out that it provides an alternative to the two most prevalent
contemporary views of what constitutes the subject-matter of the
discipline of history. And I should like to suggest that just as these
two alternative views have implications both for the problem of the
objectivity of historical knowledge and for the problem of the place
of history as a discipline in the economy of our knowledge, so too doe
this definition of the subject-matter of history.
First, our definition sets the question of historical relativism in a
wider framework than is usually the case. If this definition is ac-
cepted, one cannot confine attention to those features of the his-
torian's task which may appear to methodologists to be particularly
troublesome, or particularly easy of fulfillment: one would have to
consider how, if at all, objectivity may be attained in any of the disci-
plines which are concerned with understanding the nature of specific

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 RECENT TRENDS IN THEORY OF HISTORIOGRAPHY 517

societies. Such an enlargement of the problem would, I believ

to eliminate too sweeping assertions. Further, it would tend
gate the danger of answering the question concerning the obj
of historical knowledge merely in terms of a general theory o
edge: our general theory would have to be shown to be com
with what we are willing to accept concerning other social dis
and not merely with what we antecedently believe concer
objectivity of historiographical practices.18
Second, the view of the subject-matter of history that I ha
posed also has implications for the problem of what place th
pline of history occupies in the total economy of our knowle
sharpens the nature of this question by focussing attention
relations between history and social theory, rather than allow
debate to proceed in terms of such general questions as whet
tory and science are differing ways of viewing reality. Th
relations between historical writing and social theories wo
provide a field for empirical investigations. Such investig
submit, would be more likely to illuminate the relations betw
tory and other forms of knowledge than would any answers
could be reached by discussions of the nature of Time, of Me
of Freedom, or of Uniqueness.
Dartmouth College.

18 One notes, for example, that in Caroline F. Ware's introduction to

tural Approach to History (New York, 1940) almost all of the theses of h
relativism are accepted, and it is then held that the historian can profit
from the approach used by anthropologists. If it is true that the subject-m
history is what I take it to be, relativism would either have to be said to ch
the work of anthropologists, or the thesis of relativism would have to be
or abandoned with respect to historical investigations.

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