LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner, vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The deliberations during
JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents. [G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995]
FACTS:
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine
Army, first met Julia.
On 20 September 1986, the two exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge
Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel
and Julia lived with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City.
On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr.
The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel averred,
because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into the young spouses family
affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number of other things,
like when and where the couple should start living independently from Julia's parents or
whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his own
parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse
despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01
January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She
promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never
did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, where he underwent a training
program under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25
August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with, Julia but all
his efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the RTC of Negros
Oriental a complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code".
JULIA, in her answer (through counsel), opposed the complaint and denied its
allegations, claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner who had, in fact, been
irresponsible and incompetent.
RTC: dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.3
CA: affirmed the decision of the trial court.
LEOUEL argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate
with him, for more than five years are circumstances that clearly show her being
psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life. In his own words, Leouel asserts:
“x x x (T)here is no love, there is no affection for (him) because respondent
Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos failed all these years to communicate with the
petitioner. A wife who does not care to inform her husband about her whereabouts
for a period of five years, more or less, is psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage. Respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-
Santos is one such wife.”
ISSUE: W/N the marriage should be declared void on the ground of psychological
incapacity?
RULING: NO. The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come
close to the standards required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and
understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation.
Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers
to every individual problem.
the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee, which has drafted the Code, can,
however, provide an insight on the import of the provision.
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately deciding to
adopt the provision with less specificity than expected, has in fact, so designed the law
as to allow some resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a
member of the Code Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita
vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus:8
The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear
that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under
the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings
of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive
effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which
reads:
Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essentila
matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. (Emphasis supplied.)
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10 giving an account on how the third
paragraph of Canon 1095 has been framed, states:
The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt that the legislator intended,
indeed, to broaden the rule. A strict and narrow norm was proposed first:
Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage because of a grave
psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychosexualem) are unable to
contract marriage
then a broader one followed:
. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam
psychicam) . . . (cf. SCH/1980, canon 1049);
then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the pope (cf. SCH/1982, canon
1095, 3);
finally, a new version was promulgated:
because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae psychiae).
So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological anomaly, then the term
anomaly was altogether eliminated. it would be, however, incorrect to draw the
conclusion that the cause of the incapacity need not be some kind of psychological
disorder; after all, normal and healthy person should be able to assume the ordinary
obligations of marriage.
Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any precise
definition since psychological causes can be of an infinite variety.
In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written by Ignatius Gramunt,
Javier Hervada and LeRoy Wauck, the following explanation appears:
This incapacity consists of the following:
a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage. Some
psychosexual disorders and other disorders of personality can be the psychic
cause of this defect, which is here described in legal terms. This particular type
of incapacity consists of a real inability to render what is due by the
contract. This could be compared to the incapacity of a farmer to enter a
binding contract to deliver the crops which he cannot possibly reap;
b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of
marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of
mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring;
c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The mere
difficulty of assuming these obligations, which could be overcome by normal
effort, obviously does not constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a
true psychological disorder which incapacitates a person from giving
what is due.
However, if the marriage is to be declared invalid under this incapacity, it must be
proved not only that the person is afflicted by a psychological defect, but that the
defect did in fact deprive the person, at the moment of giving consent, of the
ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and consequently of the
possibility of being bound by these duties.
Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former
Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila
(Branch 1), who opines that psychological incapacity must be characterized by:
(a) gravity: must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying
out the ordinary duties required in marriage
(b) juridical antecedence: it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage
(c) incurability: it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond
the means of the party involved.
The use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not
been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned
by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like
circumstances. Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently
of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus
correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning
of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This pschologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated.
The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have
sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family
Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the
void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a
party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to
Article 46, Family Code.
If drug addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during
the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family
Code.
These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility
of these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and
severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance
that may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that
incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no
precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered
opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological
disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to be
reminded that innate in our society, then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still
indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code, is that —
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man a woman
entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life.
It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation,
except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage
within the limits provided by this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
Our Constitution is no less emphatic:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family
and shall be protected by the State. (Article XV, 1987 Constitution).
The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of our laws on
marriage and the family, and they are doubt the tenets we still hold on to.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. SO ORDERED
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. RODOLFO O. DE
GRACIA, Respondent. [G.R. No. 171557. February 12, 2014]
FACTS
Rodolfo and Natividad were married on February 15, 1969 at the Parish of St. Vincent
Ferrer in Salug, Zamboanga del Norte. They lived in Dapaon, Sindangan, Zamboanga
del Norte and have two (2) children, namely, Ma. Reynilda R. De Gracia (Ma. Reynilda)
and Ma. Rizza R. De Gracia (Ma. Rizza).
On December 28, 1998, Rodolfo filed a verified complaint for declaration of nullity
of marriage (complaint) before the RTC alleging that Natividad was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations.
In support of his complaint, RODOLFO testified, among others, that he first met
Natividad when they were students at the Barangay High School of Sindangan, and
he was forced to marry her barely three (3) months into their courtship in light
of her accidental pregnancy. At the time of their marriage, he was 21 years old, while
Natividad was 18 years of age. He had no stable job and merely worked in the
gambling cockpits as "kristo" and "bangkero sa hantak." When he decided to join and
train with the army,12
- Natividad left their conjugal home and sold their house without his consent.
Thereafter, Natividad moved to Dipolog City where she lived with a certain
Engineer Terez (Terez), and bore him a child named Julie Ann Terez.
- After cohabiting with Terez, Natividad contracted a second marriage on January
11, 1991 with another man named Antonio Mondarez and has lived since then
with the latter in Cagayan de Oro City.
- From the time Natividad abandoned them in 1972, Rodolfo was left to take
care of Ma. Reynilda and Ma. Rizza16 and he exerted earnest efforts to save
their marriage which, however, proved futile because of Natividad’s
psychological incapacity that appeared to be incurable.
NATIVIDAD failed to file her answer, as well as appear during trial, despite service of
summons. Nonetheless, she informed the court that she submitted herself for
psychiatric examination to Dr. Cheryl T. Zalsos (Dr. Zalsos) in response to Rodolfo’s
claims.19 Rodolfo also underwent the same examination.20
In her two-page psychiatric evaluation report,21 Dr. Zalsos stated that both Rodolfo
and Natividad were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations, finding that both parties suffered from "utter emotional
immaturity [which] is unusual and unacceptable behavior considered [as]
deviant from persons who abide by established norms of conduct.”
- As for Natividad: Dr. Zalsos observed that she lacked the willful cooperation
of being a wife and a mother to her two daughters.
- Similarly, Rodolfo failed to perform his obligations as a husband, adding too
that he sired a son with another woman.
- Further, Dr. Zalsos noted that the mental condition of both parties already
existed at the time of the celebration of marriage, although it only manifested
after.
- Based on the foregoing, Dr. Zalsos concluded that the "couple’s union was
bereft of the mind, will and heart for the obligations of marriage."23
OSG: acts committed by Natividad did not demonstrate psychological incapacity as
contemplated by law, but are mere grounds for legal separation under the Family
Code.
RTC declared the marriage between Rodolfo and Natividad void on the ground of
psychological incapacity. It relied on the findings and testimony of Dr. Zalsos,
holding that Natividad’s emotional immaturity exhibited a behavioral pattern
which in psychiatry constitutes a form of personality disorder that existed at the
time of the parties’ marriage but manifested only thereafter. It likewise concurred
with Dr. Zalsos’s observation that Natividad’s condition is incurable since it is
deeply rooted within the make-up of her personality. Accordingly, it concluded that
Natividad could not have known, much more comprehend the marital obligations she
was assuming, or, knowing them, could not have given a valid assumption thereof.27
REPUBLIC appealed to the CA, averring that there was no showing that Natividad’s
personality traits constituted psychological incapacity as envisaged under Article
36 of the Family Code, and that the testimony of the expert witness was not
conclusive upon the court.
CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC, finding that while Natividad’s emotional immaturity,
irresponsibility and promiscuity by themselves do not necessarily equate to
psychological incapacity, "their degree or severity, as duly testified to by Dr.
Zalsos, has sufficiently established a case of psychological disorder so profound
as to render [Natividad] incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations."30
ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in sustaining the RTC’s finding of psychological incapacity.
RULING: YES!
"Psychological incapacity" as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 3632 of the
Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental – not merely physical –
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties
to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 6833 of the Family Code, among
others,34 include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support.
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.
In Santos v. CA36 (Santos), the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must
be characterized by:
(a) gravity (i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable
of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage);
(b) juridical antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating
the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage); and
(c) incurability (i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would
be beyond the means of the party involved).
The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Article 36 of the Family Code in Republic of the Phils. v. CA, to wit:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation
of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact
that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both
the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts
and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires
that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to
such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he
was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not
to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and
its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do’s." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable
at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only
in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the
same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption
of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like
the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts"
cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.
In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates
the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles
68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from
the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095. (Id. at 276-280.)
Based on the evidence presented, there exists insufficient factual or legal basis to
conclude that Natividad’s emotional immaturity, irresponsibility, or even sexual
promiscuity, can be equated with psychological incapacity.
In here, Dr. Zalsos:
1. did not explain in reasonable detail how Natividad’s condition could be
characterized as grave, deeply-rooted, and incurable within the parameters of
psychological incapacity jurisprudence.
2. failed to disclose the types of psychological tests which she administered on
Natividad
3. failed to identify in her report the root cause of Natividad's condition and to show
that it existed at the time of the parties' marriage.
4. Neither was the gravity or seriousness of Natividad's behavior in relation to her
failure to perform the essential marital obligations sufficiently described in Dr.
Zalsos's report.
5. Further, the finding contained therein on the incurability of Natividad's condition
remains unsupported by any factual or scientific basis and, hence, appears to be
drawn out as a bare conclusion and even self-serving.
In the same vein, Dr. Zalsos's testimony during trial, which is essentially a reiteration
of her report, also fails to convince the Court of her conclusion that Natividad was
psychologically incapacitated. Verily, although expert opinions furnished by
psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of parties are usually
given considerable weight by the courts, the existence of psychological
incapacity must still be proven by independent evidence.45
After poring over the records, the Court does not find any such evidence sufficient
enough to uphold the court a quo's nullity declaration. To the Court's mind,
Natividad's refusal to live with Rodolfo and to assume her duties as wife and
mother as well as her emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and infidelity do not
rise to the level of psychological incapacity that would justify the nullification of
the parties' marriage. Indeed, to be declared clinically or medically incurable is one
thing; to refuse or be reluctant to perform one's duties is another. To hark back to what
has been earlier discussed, psychological incapacity refers only to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.46 In
the final analysis, the Court does not perceive a disorder of this nature to exist in the
present case. Thus, for these reasons, coupled too with the recognition that marriage
is an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family,47 the instant petition
is hereby granted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 2, 2005 and
Resolution dated February 3, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69103
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the complaint for declaration of nullity
of marriage filed under Article 36 of the Family Code is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-
TSOI, respondents. G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997
Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey
over troubled waters. Laws are seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has
been placed in the works of the unseen hand of Him who created all things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails? (luuuuuuuuuuuh!)
FACTS
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the GINA LAO-TSOI (plaintiff) married the CHI MING
TSOI (defendant) at the Manila Cathedral, Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their
Marriage Contract.
After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati,
they went and proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.
There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their
married life.
It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as newlyweds
they were supposed to enjoy making love, or having sexual intercourse, with each
other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his
back and went to sleep . There was no sexual intercourse between them during
the first night. The same thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together
during their first week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so
together with her mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all invited
by the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for 4 days. But, during
this period, there was no sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant
avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a
rocking chair located at the living room. They slept together in the same room and
on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But during this period,
there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that she
did not even see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio
Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.
The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a
virgin, while that of her husband's examination was kept confidential up to this time.
While no medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed medications for her
husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment was given to her. For her
husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he never did.
PLAINTIFF claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did
not show his penis. She said, that she had observed the defendant using an
eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. And that,
according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or
maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the
appearance of a normal man.
- PETITIONER contends that the private respondent has the burden of proving the
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.
DEFENDANT maintains that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of
psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several
reasons
(1) that he loves her very much;
(2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable;
and,
(3) since the relationship is still very young and if there is any differences between the
two of them, it can still be reconciled and that, according to him, if either one of
them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not be cured. He
further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured by the intervention of
medical technology or science.
DEFENDANT admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation
on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for
this, according to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual
intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses her
private parts, she always removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he forced
his wife to have sex with him only once but he did not continue because she was
shaking and she did not like it. So he stopped.
There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff filed this case
against him, and these are:
(1) that she is afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother,
and,
(2) that her husband, the defendant, will consummate their marriage.
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still very
young and there is still a chance to overcome their differences.
The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was examined
by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether he is impotent . As a
result thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's Medical Report. It is stated there, that
there is no evidence of impotency, and he is capable of erection.
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether
or not he has an erection and he found out that from the original size of two
(2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the defendant lengthened by
one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had only
a soft erection which is why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is
capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection, the defendant
is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.
RTC: Declared the marriage VOID
CA: affirmed the trial court's decision.
ISSUE: W/N the marriage should be nullified?
RULING: YES
allegations in her complaint; that since there was no independent evidence to
prove the alleged non-coitus between the parties, there remains no other basis
for the court's conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that public policy
should aid acts intended to validate marriage and should retard acts intended to
invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by the trial court on the admissions and
confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in the course of the trial is misplaced
since it could have been a product of collusion; and that in actions for annulment of
marriage, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to
be annulled. This only shows that there is no collusion between the parties. When
petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private respondent) have never had sexual
contact with each other, he must have been only telling the truth. We are reproducing
the relevant portion of the challenged resolution denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration:
The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based on
a stipulation of facts. The issue of whether or not the appellant is psychologically
incapacitated to discharge a basic marital obligation was resolved upon a review
of both the documentary and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant
admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after almost
ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering from
any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to
consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality
disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage'
within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code
PETITIONER further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged
refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each other
constitutes psychological incapacity of both. He points out as error the failure of the
trial court to make "a categorical finding about the alleged psychological
incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the reasons for such refusal which may
not be necessarily due to physchological disorders" because there might have
been other reasons, — i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or other
discomforts, — why private respondent would not want to have sexual intercourse from
May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span of 10 months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a
finding on who between petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual
contact with the other. The fact remains, however, that there has never been coitus
between them. At any rate, since the action to declare the marriage void may be filed
by either party, i.e., even the psychologically incapacitated, the question of who
refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.
PETITIONER claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that
any of the parties is suffering from phychological incapacity. Petitioner also
claims that he wanted to have sex with private respondent; that the reason for private
respondent's refusal may not be psychological but physical disorder as stated
above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with private
respondent or asked her what is ailing her, and why she balks and avoids him
everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse with her. He never did. At least, there
is nothing in the record to show that he had tried to find out or discover what the
problem with his wife could be. What he presented in evidence is his doctor's
Medical Report that there is no evidence of his impotency and he is capable of
erection.5 Since it is petitioner's claim that the reason is not psychological but perhaps
physical disorder on the part of private respondent, it became incumbent upon him to
prove such a claim.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her
essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic
marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn
refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological
incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse
with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To
procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through
sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this
obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the
case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above
marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that the
wife did not want carnal intercourse with him does not inspire belief. Since he
was not physically impotent, but he refrained from sexual intercourse during
the entire time (from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the
same bed with his wife, purely out of sympathy for her feelings, he deserves to
be doubted for not having asserted his right seven though she balked. Besides,
if it were true that it is the wife was suffering from incapacity, the fact that
defendant did not go to court and seek the declaration of nullity weakens
his claim. This case was instituted by the wife whose normal expectations of
her marriage were frustrated by her husband's inadequacy. Considering the
innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard to believe that she would
expose her private life to public scrutiny and fabricate testimony against
her husband if it were not necessary to put her life in order and put to
rest her marital status.
We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved is
the unwillingness or lack of intention to perform the sexual act, which is not
phychological incapacity, and which can be achieved "through proper
motivation." After almost ten months of cohabitation, the admission that the
husband is reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife
whom he professes to love very dearly, and who has not posed any
insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a
hopeless situation, and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes
psychological incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants within the
contemplation of the Family Code.
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor
is actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any
legal mandate or court order". Love is useless unless it is shared with another.
Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could
not have cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The
egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings
spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in
the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and
ensures the continuation of family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private
respondent. That is — a shared feeling which between husband and wife must be
experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of
spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest
in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a long way in
deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two
consenting adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect,
sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a
sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found
themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital
obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate
court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the
petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.
ROBERT F. MALLILIN, Petitioner, vs. LUZ G. JAMESOLAMIN and the REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. [G.R. No. 192718. February 18, 2015]
FACTS
Robert and Luz were married on September 6, 1972. They begot three (3) children.
On March 16, 1994, Robert filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage.
He alleged that at the time of the celebration of their marriage, Luz was suffering
from psychological and mental incapacity and unpreparedness to enter into
such marital life and to comply with its essential obligations and responsibilities.
Such incapacity became even more apparent during their marriage when Luz exhibited
clear manifestation of immaturity, irresponsibility, deficiency of independent rational
judgment, and inability to cope with the heavy and oftentimes demanding obligation of
a parent.
LUZ filed her Answer with Counterclaim contesting the complaint. She averred that it
was Robert who manifested psychological incapacity in their marriage.
ROBERT testified that Luz was already living in California, USA, and had married an
American. He also revealed that when they were still engaged, Luz continued seeing
and dating another boyfriend, a certain Lt. Liwag. He also claimed that from the outset,
Luz had been remiss in her duties both as a wife and as a mother as shown by the
following circumstances:
(1) it was he who did the cleaning of the room because Luz did not know how to
keep order;
(2) it was her mother who prepared their meal while her sister was the one who
washed their clothes because she did not want her polished nails destroyed;
(3) it was also her sister who took care of their children while she spent her time
sleeping and looking at the mirror;
(4) when she resumed her schooling, she dated different men;
(5) he received anonymous letters reporting her loitering with male students;
(6) when he was not home, she would receive male visitors;
(7) a certain Romy Padua slept in their house when he was away; and
(8) she would contract loans without his knowledge.
On May 8, 2000, while the case was pending before the trial court, Robert filed a
petition for marriage annulment with the Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance
for the Archdiocese of Manila (MT).
MT: declared their marriage invalid ab initio on the ground of grave lack of due
discretion on the part of both parties as contemplated by the second paragraph of
Canon 1095. This decision was affirmed by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
(NAMT).
RTC: declared the marriage null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity on
the part of Luz as she failed to comply with the essential marital obligations.
OSG argued that Robert failed to make a case for declaration of nullity of his marriage
with Luz. It pointed out that the real cause of the marital discord was the sexual
infidelity of Luz. Such ground, the OSG contended, should not result in the
nullification of the marriage under the law, but merely constituted a ground for
legal separation.
CA reversed the RTC decision. Closer scrutiny of the records reveals, as correctly
noted by the Solicitor General, sexual infidelity are not rooted on some debilitating
psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.
ROBERT now argues that he has sufficiently proven the nullity of his marriage even in
the absence of any medical, psychiatric or psychological examination of the wife by a
competent and qualified professional. To bolster his claim, he avers that the
Metropolitan Tribunal already declared that Luz exhibited grave lack of discretion in
judgment concerning the essential rights and obligations mutually given and accepted
in marriage. The said decision was affirmed by the NAMT.
Robert further argues that the sexual indiscretion of Luz with different men
coupled with the fact that she failed to function as a home maker to her
family and as a housewife to him incapacitated her from accepting and
complying with her essential marital obligations. For said reason, he
asserts that the case of Luz was not a mere case of sexual infidelity, but clearly
an illness that was rooted on some debilitating psychological condition which
incapacitated her to carry out the responsibilities of a married woman. Robert
avers that a sex maniac is not just a mere sexual infidel but one who is
suffering from a deep psychological problem.
OSG argues that the CA correctly ruled that the totality of evidence presented by
Robert was not sufficient to support a finding that Luz was psychologically
incapacitated. His evidence fell short of establishing his assertion that at the time of
their marriage, Luz was suffering from a psychological defect which deprived her of the
ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities.
With regard to the findings of the Metropolitan Tribunal and the NAMT, the
OSG claims that the same were only given persuasive value and were not
controlling or decisive in cases of nullity of marriage. Further, the decision was
based on grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning matrimonial rights
and obligations due to outside factors other than psychological incapacity as
contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code. The OSG also raises the strong
possibility of collusion between the parties as shown by the events that took
place after the issuance of the March 7, 1996 RTC Decision.
ISSUE: W/N the totality of the evidence adduced proves that Luz was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage warranting the
annulment of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
RULING: The petition is bereft of merit.
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family
Code which provides:
 Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligation of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
"Psychological incapacity," as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental – not merely physical –
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties
to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, among
others, include their mutual obligations to live together; observe love, respect and
fidelity; and render help and support. There is hardly a doubt that the intendment of the
law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage.7
Psychological incapacity as required by Article 36 must be characterized by
(a) gravity: the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in marriage.
(b) juridical antecedence: It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating
the marriage, although the overt manifestations may only emerge after the
marriage.
(c) incurability: It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would
be beyond the means of the party involved.
[Please refer to Republic v. CA and Molina for the guidelines. Paulit-ulit lang]
Guided by these pronouncements, the Court is of the considered view that Robert’s
evidence failed to establish the psychological incapacity of Luz.
First, the testimony of Robert failed to overcome the burden of proof to show the
nullity of the marriage. Other than his self-serving testimony, no other evidence was
adduced to show the alleged incapacity of Luz. He presented no other witnesses
to corroborate his allegations on her behavior. Thus, his testimony was self-serving
and had no serious value as evidence.
Second, the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity of Luz was not
medically or clinically identified, and sufficiently proven during the trial. Based
on the records, Robert failed to prove that her disposition of not cleaning the room,
preparing their meal, washing the clothes, and propensity for dating and receiving
different male visitors, was grave, deeply rooted, and incurable within the parameters
of jurisprudence on psychological incapacity.
The alleged failure of Luz to assume her duties as a wife and as a mother, as well as
her emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and infidelity, cannot rise to the level of
psychological incapacity that justifies the nullification of the parties' marriage.
The Court has repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates
"downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic
marital obligations," not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
will, on the part of the errant spouse.11 Indeed, to be declared clinically or medically
incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to perform one's duties is another.
Psychological incapacity refers only to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.12
As correctly found by the CA, sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do
not, by themselves, constitute grounds for declaring a marriage void based on
psychological incapacity. Robert argues that the series of sexual indiscretion of Luz
were external manifestations of the psychological defect that she was suffering within
her person, which could be considered as nymphomania or "excessive sex hunger."
Other than his allegations, however, no other convincing evidence was adduced to
prove that these sexual indiscretions were considered as nymphomania, and
that it was grave, deeply rooted, and incurable within the term of psychological
incapacity embodied in Article 36. To stress, Robert’s testimony alone is insufficient
to prove the existence of psychological incapacity.
In Sivino A. Ligeralde v. May Ascension A. Patalinghug and the Republic of the
Philippines, the Court ruled that the respondent’s act of living an adulterous life
cannot automatically be equated with a psychological disorder, especially when
no specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at
the inception of marriage. The petitioner must be able to establish that the
respondent’s unfaithfulness was a manifestation of a disordered personality, which
made her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.
Third, the psychological report of Villanueva, Guidance Psychologist II of the
Northern Mindanao Medical Center, Cagayan deOro City, was insufficient to prove
the psychological in capacity of Luz. There was nothing in the records that would
indicate that Luz had either been interviewed or was subjected to a
psychological examination. The finding as to her psychological incapacity was
based entirely on hearsay and the self-serving information provided by Robert.
Fourth, the decision of the Metropolitan Tribunal is insufficient to prove the
psychological incapacity of Luz. Although it is true that in the case of Republic v.
Court of Appeals and Molina,14 the Court stated that interpretations given by the NAMT
of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts, still it is subject to the law on evidence. Thus:
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to
reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be
given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally – subject to our law on
evidence– what is decreed as [canonically] invalid should be decreed civilly
void x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
The belated presentation of the decision of the NAMT cannot be given value since it
was not offered during the trial, and the Court has in no way of ascertaining the
evidence considered by the same tribunal.
Granting that it was offered and admitted, it must be pointed out that the basis of the
declaration of nullity of marriage by the NAMT was not the third paragraph of Canon
1095 which mentions causes of a psychological nature similar to Article 36 of the
Family Code, but the second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to those who
suffer from grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights
and obligations to be mutually given and accepted.
In Najera v. Najera,17 the Court was also confronted with a similar issue of whether to
consider an annulment by the NAMT as also covering psychological incapacity, the
only ground recognized in our law. In the said case, the NAMT decision was also based
on the second paragraph of Canon 1095. The Court ruled that it was not similar to,
and only annulments under the third paragraph of, Canon 1095 should be
considered.
Hence, Robert’s reliance on the NAMT decision is misplaced. To repeat, the decision
of the NAMT was based on the second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers to
those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning
essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted,
a cause not of psychological nature under Article 36 of the Family Code. A cause of
psychological nature similar to Article 36 is covered by the third paragraph of Canon
1095 of the Code of Canon Law (Santos v. Santos 19), which for ready reference
reads:
Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:
3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.
To hold that annulment of marriages decreed by the NAMT under the second
paragraph of Canon 1095 should also be covered would be to expand what the
lawmakers did not intend to include. What would prevent members of other religious
groups from invoking their own interpretation of psychological incapacity? Would this
not lead to multiple, if not inconsistent, interpretations?
To consider church annulments as additional grounds for annulment under Article 36
would be legislating from the bench. As stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina, interpretations given by the NAMT of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines are given great respect by our courts, but they are not controlling or
decisive.
In Republic v. Galang,21 it was written that the Constitution set out a policy of protecting
and strengthening the family as the basic social institution, and the marriage was the
foundation of the family. Marriage, as an inviolable institution protected by the State,
cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties. In petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriage, the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies with the plaintiff.
Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the parties, or one of
them, could not have validly entered into a marriage by reason of a grave and serious
psychological illness existing at the time it was celebrated, the Court is compelled to
uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.
In fine, the Court holds that the CA decided correctly. Petitioner Robert failed to
adduce sufficient and convincing evidence to prove the alleged psychological
incapacity of Luz.
As asserted by the OSG, the allegations of the petitioner make a case for legal
separation. Hence, this decision is without prejudice to an action for legal separation if
a party would want to pursue such proceedings. In this disposition, the Court cannot
decree a legal separation because in such proceedings, there are matters and
consequences like custody and separation of properties that need to be considered
and settled.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 78303-MIN, dated November 20, 2009, and its Resolution, dated June 1,
2010, are hereby AFFIRMED, without prejudice. No costs. SO ORDERED.
BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent. G.R. No.
136490. October 19, 2000
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be
established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however,
that the respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a conditio
sine qua non for such declaration.
FACTS
The parties were married twice: (1) on September 6, 1982 which was solemnized by
Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu at the Municipal Court of Pasig; and (2) on May 8, 1983
which was solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the
Presidential Security Command Chapel in Malacañang Park, Manila. Out of their
marriage, five (5) children were born.
Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1973.
Later on, he was transferred to the Presidential Security Command in Malacañang
during the Marcos Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other hand, joined
the Women's Auxilliary Corps under the Philippine Air Force in 1978. After the Edsa
Revolution, both of them sought a discharge from the military service.
They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the Malacañang
Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President
Ferdinand Marcos. Through telephone conversations, they became acquainted and
eventually became sweethearts.
After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702 Daisy Street, Hulo
Bliss, Mandaluyong, a housing unit which she acquired from the Bliss Development
Corporation when she was still single.
After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and then
engaged in different business ventures that did not however prosper. As a wife, she
always urged him to look for work so that their children would see him, instead of her,
as the head of the family and a good provider. Due to his failure to engage in any
gainful employment, they would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would
hit and beat her. He would even force her to have sex with him despite her
weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight
mistake and was so severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several times
during their cohabitation, he would leave their house. In 1992, they were already living
separately.
All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic uling" and chickens.
While she was still in the military, she would first make deliveries early in the morning
before going to Malacañang. When she was discharged from the military service, she
concentrated on her business. Then, she became a supplier in the Armed Forces of
the Philippines until she was able to put up a trading and construction company, NS
Ness Trading and Construction Development Corporation.
The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16, 1994, when they
had a bitter quarrel. As they were already living separately, she did not want him to
stay in their house anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their house, she was
so angry that she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on
her and even on her mother who came to her aid. The following day, October 17, 1994,
she and their children left the house and sought refuge in her sister's house.
Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver, went to him at
the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to look for their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them,
he got mad. After knowing the reason for their unexpected presence, he ran after them
with a samurai and even [beat] her driver.
At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a house in
Camella, Parañaque, while the appellant was residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.
In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children described
their father as cruel and physically abusive to them.
RTC: found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to support his family and his
violent attitude towards appellee and their children
CA: Reversed RTC. It held that psychological incapacity had not been established by
the totality of the evidence presented.
ISSUES:
1. W/N CA could set aside the findings by RTC of psychological incapacity of a
respondent in a Petition for declaration of nullity of marriage simply because the
respondent did not subject himself to psychological evaluation.
2. W/N the totality of the evidence presented in the present case -- including the
testimonies of petitioner, the common children, petitioner's sister and the social
worker -- was enough to sustain a finding that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated.
RULING:
We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or psychological examination
of respondent is not a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity.
Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she presented does not show such
incapacity.
I. Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination
PETITIONER contends that the testimonies and the results of various tests that were
submitted to determine respondent's psychological incapacity to perform the
obligations of marriage should not have been brushed aside by the Court of Appeals,
simply because respondent had not taken those tests himself. Petitioner adds that the
CA should have realized that under the circumstances, she had no choice but to rely
on other sources of information in order to determine the psychological capacity of
respondent, who had refused to submit himself to such tests.
SC: The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or
clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately
establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual
medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.
[Please refer to Republic v. CA and Molina and Santos v. Court of Appeals for the
guidelines. Paulit-ulit lang]

II. Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented

Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material
support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the
totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on
his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present
at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job
and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this
period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support,
and even left the family home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to
the inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that
his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that
cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to
a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of
the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is
about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to
71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not
be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral
corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
abandonment and the like.12 At best, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only
to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law, this Court laid down
the procedural requirements for its invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however, has not
faithfully observed them.
In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of
petitioner to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by
gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability; and for her failure to observe the
guidelines outlined in Molina.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed Decision AFFIRMED, except that
portion requiring personal medical examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding
of psychological incapacity. No costs. SO ORDERED.
GLENN VIÑAS, Petitioner, vs. MARY GRACE PAREL-VIÑAS, Respondent. [G.R.
No. 208790 January 21, 2015]
FACTS
Dr. Tayag diagnosed Mary Grace to be suffering from a Narcissistic Personality
On April 26, 1999, Glenn and Mary Grace, then 25 and 23 years old, respectively, got
Disorder with anti-social traits. Dr. Tayag concluded that Mary Grace and Glenn’s
married in civil rites held in Lipa City, Batangas. Mary Grace was already pregnant
relationship is not founded on mutual love, trust, respect, commitment and
then. The infant, however, died at birth due to weakness and malnourishment. Glenn
fidelity to each other. Hence, Dr. Tayag recommended the propriety of declaring the
alleged that the infant’s death was caused by Mary Grace’s heavy drinking and
nullity of the couple’s marriage. Dr. Tayag explained that:
smoking during her pregnancy.
The couple lived together under one roof. Glenn worked as a bartender, while Mary
Grace was a production engineer.
Sometime in March of 2006, Mary Grace left the home which she shared with Glenn.
Glenn subsequently found out that Mary Grace went to work in Dubai. At the
time the instant petition was filed, Mary Grace had not returned yet.
On February 18, 2009, Glenn filed a Petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Mary Grace. He alleged that:
1. Mary Grace was insecure, extremely jealous, outgoing and prone to regularly
resorting to any pretext to be able to leave the house. She thoroughly enjoyed the
night life, and drank and smoked heavily even when she was pregnant.
2. Mary Grace refused to perform even the most essential household chores of
cleaning and cooking.
3. Mary Grace had not exhibited the foregoing traits and behavior during their
whirlwind courtship.6
4. Mary Grace was not remorseful about the death of the infant whom she delivered.
She lived as if she were single and was unmindful of her husband’s needs.
She was self-centered, selfish and immature. When Glenn confronted her
about her behavior, she showed indifference. She eventually left their home
without informing Glenn. Glenn later found out that she left for an overseas
employment in Dubai.7
Before Glenn decided to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with
Mary Grace, he consulted the latter’s friends. They informed him that Mary Grace
came from a broken family and was left to be cared for by her aunts and nannies.
The foregoing circumstance must have contributed to her sense of insecurity and
difficulty in adjusting to married life.
To ease their marital problems, Glenn sought professional guidance and submitted
himself to a psychological evaluation by Clinical Psychologist Nedy Tayag (Dr. Tayag).
Dr. Tayag found him as "amply aware of his marital roles" and "capable of maintaining
a mature and healthy heterosexual relationship."9
On the other hand, Dr. Tayag assessed Mary Grace’s personality through the data
she had gathered from Glenn and his cousin, Rodelito Mayo (Rodelito), who
knew Mary Graceway back in college.
Mary Grace is the eldest among four siblings. She is a college graduate. She
belongs to a middle class family. Her father is an overseas contract worker,
while her mother is a housewife. At the time Dr. Tayag prepared her report,
Mary Grace was employed in Dubai and romantically involved with another
man.
According to Rodelito, Mary Grace verbally abused and physically harmed
Glenn during the couple’s fights. Mary Grace is also ill-tempered and carefree,
while Glenn is jolly, kind and family-oriented.
The said disorder [of Mary Grace] is considered to be severe, serious,
grave, permanent and chronic in proportion and is incurable by any form
of clinical intervention. It has already been deeply embedded within her
system as it was found to have started as early as her childhood years.
Because of such, it has caused her to be inflexible, maladaptive and
functionally[-]impaired especially with regards to heterosexual dealings.
Such disorder of [Mary Grace]is mainly characterized by grandiosity,
need for admiration and lack of empathy[,] along with her pattern of
disregard for and violation of the rights of others[,] which utterly distorted
her perceptions and views especially in terms of a fitting marital relationship.
Such disorder manifested in [Mary Grace] through her unrelenting
apathy, sense of entitlement and arrogance. Throughout her union with
[Glenn], she has exhibited a heightened sense of self as seen in her marked
inability to show proper respect for her husband. x x x She is too headstrong
that most of the time[,] she would do things her own way and would not pay
close attention to what her husband needed. She had been a wife who
constantly struggled for power and dominance in their relationship and
[Glenn], being too considerate to her, was often subjected to her control.x x x
She is into many vices and loved hanging out with her friends at night[,] and
she even got involved in an illicit relationship[,] which was still going on up to
the present time.
The root cause of [Mary Grace’s]personality aberration can be said to
have emanated from the various forms of unfavorable factors in her
milieu way back as early as her childhood years[,] which is the crucial
stage in the life of a person as this is the time when the individual’s character
and behavior are shaped. [Mary Grace] came from a dysfunctional family with
lenient and tolerating parents[,] who never impose any restrictions [upon] their
children. Considering such fact, she apparently failed to feel the love and
affection of the nurturing figures that she had[,] who were supposed to bethe
first to show concern [for] her. x x x She has acquired a domineering character
as she was not taught to have boundaries in her actions because of the laxity
she had from her caregivers and also because she grew up to be the eldest in
the brood. She sees to it that she is the one always followed with regards to
making decisions and always mandates people to submit to her wishes. She
has not acquired the very essence of morality [and] has certainly learned set
of unconstructive traits that further made her too futile to assume mature roles.
Morals and values were not instilled in her young mind that as she went on
with her life, she never learned to restrain herself from doing ill-advised things
even if she isamply aware of the depravity of her actions.
 The psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] is of a juridical antecedence as
it was already inher system even prior to the solemnization of her marriage
with [Glenn].
RTC rendered its Decision declaring the marriage between Glenn and Mary Grace as
null and void on account of the latter’s psychological incapacity. The Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the RTC in its
Order18dated December 1, 2010.
CA: Reversed the RTC ruling and declared the marriage between Glenn and Mary
Grace as valid and subsisting.
ISSUE: W/N sufficient evidence exist justifying the RTC’s declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Mary Grace.
GLENN points out that each petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage should be
judged according to its own set of facts, and not on the basis of assumptions,
predilections or generalizations. He argues that in Marcos v. Marcos,24 the Court ruled
that it is not a sine qua non requirement for the respondent spouse to be
personally examined by a physician or psychologist before a marriage could be
declared as a nullity.25 However, if the opinion of an expert is sought, his or her
testimony should be considered as decisive evidence.26 Besides, the findings of the
trial court regarding the credibility of the witnesses should be respected.27
RULING: The instant petition lacks merit.
The lack of personal examination or assessment of the respondent by a
psychologist or psychiatrist is not necessarily fatal in a petition for the declaration
of nullity of marriage. "If the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to."
In the instant petition, however, the cumulative testimonies of Glenn, Dr. Tayag and
Rodelito, and the documentary evidence offered do not sufficiently prove the
root cause, gravity and incurability of Mary Grace’s condition.
The evidence merely shows that Mary Grace is outgoing, strong-willed and not inclined
to perform household chores. Further, she is employed in Dubai and is romantically-
involved with another man. She has not been maintaining lines of communication with
Glenn at the time the latter filed the petition before the RTC. Glenn, on the other hand,
is conservative, family-oriented and is the exact opposite of Mary Grace. While Glenn
and Mary Grace possess incompatible personalities, the latter’s acts and traits do not
necessarily indicate psychological incapacity. Rumbaua v. Rumbaua30 is emphatic
that:
In Bier v. Bier, we ruled that it was not enough that respondent, alleged to
be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his
marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof
of a natal or supervening disabling factor – an adverse integral element in the
respondent’s personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from
complying with his essential marital obligations – had to be shown and was
not shown in this cited case.
In the present case, the respondent’s stubborn refusal to cohabit with the
petitioner was doubtlessly irresponsible, but it was never proven to be
rooted in some psychological illness. x x x Likewise, the respondent’s act
of living with another woman four years into the marriage cannot automatically
be equated with a psychological disorder, especially when no specific
evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the
inception of marriage. In fact, petitioner herself admitted that respondent was
caring and faithful when they were going steady and for a time after their
marriage; their problems only came in later.
To use the words of Navales v. Navales:
Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations. Mere "difficulty,"
"refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of marital obligations or "ill
will" on the part of the spouse is different from "incapacity" rooted on
some debilitating psychological condition or illness. Indeed,
irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity
and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a
person’s refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of
marriage and not due to some psychological illness that is contemplated by
said rule.31 (Citations omitted, underlining ours and emphasis in the original)
It is worth noting that Glenn and Mary Grace lived with each other for more or less
seven years from 1999 to 2006. The foregoing established fact shows that living
together as spouses under one roof is not an impossibility. Mary Grace’s
departure from their home in 2006 indicates either a refusal or mere difficulty, but not
absolute inability to comply with her obligation to live with her husband.
Further, considering that Mary Grace was not personally examined by Dr. Tayag,
there arose a greater burden to present more convincing evidence to prove the
gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability of the former’s condition. Glenn,
however, failed in this respect. Glenn’s testimony is wanting in material details.
Rodelito, on the other hand, is a blood relative of Glenn. Glenn’s statements are hardly
objective. Moreover, Glenn and Rodelito both referred to Mary Grace’s traits and
acts, which she exhibited during the marriage. Hence, there is nary a proof on
the antecedence of Mary Grace’s alleged incapacity. Glenn even testified that, six
months before they got married, they saw each other almost everyday.32 Glenn saw "a
loving[,] caring and well[-]educated person"33 in Mary Grace.
Anent Dr. Tayag’s assessment of Mary Grace’s condition, the Court finds the same as
unfounded.
We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag’s conclusions about the respondent’s
psychological incapacity were based on the information fed to her by only one side –
the petitioner – whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted. While this
circumstance alone does not disqualify the psychologist for reasons of bias, her report,
testimony and conclusions deserve the application of a more rigid and stringent set of
standards in the manner we discussed above. For, effectively, Dr. Tayag only
diagnosed the respondent from the prism of a third party account; she did not actually
hear, see and evaluate the respondent and how he would have reacted and responded
to the doctor’s probes.
Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the petitioner’s narrations, and on this because of psychological incapacity of either or both of the spouses, but because of
basis characterized the respondent to be a self-centered, egocentric, and unremorseful basic incompatibilities and marital developments that do not amount to psychological
person who "believes that the world revolves around him"; and who "used love as incapacity.
a…deceptive tactic for exploiting the confidence [petitioner] extended towards him."
In the case at bar, Dr. Tayag made general references to Mary Grace’s status as the
We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth and eldest among her siblings,her father’s being an overseas contract worker and her very
comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a psychological incapacity tolerant mother, a housewife.37 These, however, are not sufficient to establish and
existed that prevented the respondent from complying with the essential explain the supposed psychological incapacity of Mary Grace warranting the
obligations of marriage. It failed to identify the root cause of the respondent’s declaration of the nullity of the couple’s marriage.
narcissistic personality disorder and to prove that it existed at the inception of the
The Court understands the inherent difficulty attendant to obtaining the statements of
marriage.
witnesses who can attest to the antecedence of a person’s psychological incapacity,
Neither did it explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor show that but such difficulty does not exempt a petitioner from complying with what the law
the respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a requires. While the Court also commiserates with Glenn’s marital woes, the totality of
psychological, not physical, nature. the evidence presented provides inadequate basis for the Court to conclude that Mary
Grace is indeed psychologically incapacitated to comply with her obligations as
Thus, we cannot avoid but conclude that Dr. Tayag’s conclusion in her Report –
Glenn’s spouse.
i.e., that the respondent suffered "Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces of
Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be grave and incurable" – is an unfounded WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 29, 2013
statement, not a necessary inference from her previous characterization and and Resolution dated August 7, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96448
portrayal of the respondent. are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
A careful reading of Dr. Tayag’s testimony reveals that she failed to establish the fact
that at the time the parties were married, respondent was already suffering from a
psychological defect that deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties and
responsibilities of marriage. Neither did she adequately explain how she came to the
conclusion that respondent’s condition was grave and incurable.
First, what she medically described was not related or linked to the respondent’s
exact condition except in a very general way. In short, her testimony and report
were rich in generalities but disastrously short on particulars, most notably on how the
respondent can be said to be suffering from narcissistic personality disorder; why and
to what extent the disorder is grave and incurable; how and why it was already present
at the time of the marriage; and the effects of the disorder on the respondent’s
awareness of and his capability to undertake the duties and responsibilities of
marriage. All these are critical to the success of the petitioner’s case.
Second, her testimony was short on factual basis for her diagnosis because it
was wholly based on what the petitioner related to her. x x x If a psychological
disorder can be proven by independent means, no reason exists why such
independent proof cannot be admitted and given credit. No such independent
evidence, however, appears on record to have been gathered in this case, particularly
about the respondent’s early life and associations, and about events on orabout the
time of the marriage and immediately thereafter. Thus, the testimony and report
appearto us to be no more than a diagnosis that revolves around the one-sided and
meagre facts that the petitioner related, and were all slanted to support the conclusion
that a ground exists to justify the nullification of the marriage. We say this because only
the baser qualities of the respondent’s life were examined and given focus; none of
these qualities were weighed and balanced with the better qualities, such as his focus
on having a job, his determination to improve himself through studies, his care and
attention in the first six months of the marriage, among others. The evidence fails to
mention also what character and qualities the petitioner brought into her marriage, for
example, why the respondent’s family opposed the marriage and what events led the
respondent to blame the petitioner for the death of his mother, if this allegation is at all
correct. To be sure, these are important because not a few marriages have failed, not
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO,
respondent.
G.R. No. 149498 May 20, 2004
FACTS: On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese
national, on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she and Toshio started a common-law
relationship in Japan. They later lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio
went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16, 1987, she
gave birth to their child.
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M. Balderia of the
Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to respondent, Toshio was
psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities, which incapacity
became manifest only after the marriage. One month after their marriage, Toshio
returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with
his family. After sending money to respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving
financial support. She wrote him several times but he never responded. Sometime in
1991, respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he
did not bother to see her and their child.
The summons issued to Toshio remained unserved because he was no longer residing
at his given address. Consequently, on July 8, 1996, respondent filed an ex parte
motion for leave to effect service of summons by publication. The trial court granted
the motion on July 12, 1996. In August 1996, the summons, accompanied by a copy
of the petition, was published in a newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15
days to file his answer. Because Toshio failed to file a responsive pleading after the
lapse of 60 days from publication, respondent filed a motion dated November 5, 1996
to refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation. The trial court granted the motion
on November 7, 1996.
On November 20, 1996, prosecutor Rolando I. Gonzales filed a report finding that no
collusion existed between the parties. He prayed that the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor be allowed to intervene to ensure that the evidence submitted was not
fabricated. On February 13, 1997, the trial court granted respondent’s motion to
present her evidence ex parte. She then testified on how Toshio abandoned his family.
She thereafter offered documentary evidence to support her testimony.
RTC: August 28, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision that the marriage between
petitioner Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and Toshio Hamano, is hereby declared NULL
and VOID.
In declaring the nullity of the marriage on the ground of Toshio’s psychological
incapacity, the trial court held that:
It is clear from the records of the case that respondent spouses failed to fulfill
his obligations as husband of the petitioner and father to his daughter.
Respondent remained irresponsible and unconcerned over the needs and
welfare of his family. Such indifference, to the mind of the Court, is a clear
manifestation of insensitivity and lack of respect for his wife and child which
characterizes a very immature person. Certainly, such behavior could be
traced to respondent’s mental incapacity and disability of entering into marital
life.
The Office of the Solicitor General, representing herein petitioner Republic of the
Philippines, appealed.
CA denied.
The appellate court found that Toshio left respondent and their daughter a
month after the celebration of the marriage, and returned to Japan with the
promise to support his family and take steps to make them Japanese citizens.
But except for two months, he never sent any support to nor communicated
with them despite the letters respondent sent. He even visited the Philippines
but he did not bother to see them. Respondent, on the other hand, exerted all
efforts to contact Toshio, to no avail.
The appellate court thus concluded that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marital obligations to his family, and to "observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support"
pursuant to Article 68 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The appellate
court rhetorically asked:
But what is there to preserve when the other spouse is an unwilling party to
the cohesion and creation of a family as a social inviolable institution? Why
should petitioner be made to suffer in a marriage where the other spouse is
not around and worse, left them without even helping them cope up with
family life and assist in the upbringing of their daughter as required under
Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code?
The appellate court emphasized that this case could not be equated with
Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina and Santos vs. Court of Appeals.
In those cases, the spouses were Filipinos while this case involved a "mixed
marriage," the husband being a Japanese national.
Hence, this appeal by petitioner Republic based on this lone assignment of
error:
Issue: W/N respondent was able to prove the psychological incapacity of Toshio
Hamano to perform his marital obligations, despite respondent’s failure to comply with
the guidelines laid down in the Molina case.
Ruling: No.
According to petitioner, mere abandonment by Toshio of his family and his insensitivity
to them did not automatically constitute psychological incapacity. His behavior merely
indicated simple inadequacy in the personality of a spouse falling short of reasonable
expectations. Respondent failed to prove any severe and incurable personality
disorder on the part of Toshio, in accordance with the guidelines set in Molina.
The Office of the Public Attorney, representing respondent, reiterated the ruling of the
courts a quo and sought the denial of the instant petition.
We rule in favor of petitioner.
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen
the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation
of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
Respondent seeks to annul her marriage with Toshio on the ground of psychological
incapacity. Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides that:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
In Molina, we came up with the following guidelines in the interpretation and application
of Article 36 for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity
of marriage and unity of the family. x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be:
(a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts and
(d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms
may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or
one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them,
could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100,
June 13, 1994), nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s." The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to
the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related
to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence,
a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated
to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of
marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party
to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less
ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within
fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of
the court. The Solicitor-General shall discharge the equivalent function of the
defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. (emphasis supplied)
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the
Court in Santos: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity
(b) juridical antecedence and
(c) incurability."
The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person
to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be
"medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of
evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological condition.
For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding
of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.
We now proceed to determine whether respondent successfully proved Toshio’s
psychological incapacity to fulfill his marital responsibilities.
Petitioner showed that Toshio failed to meet his duty to live with, care for and support
his family. He abandoned them a month after his marriage to respondent. Respondent
sent him several letters but he never replied. He made a trip to the Philippines but did
not care at all to see his family.
We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio
was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities.
Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged
nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. After respondent testified
on how Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented showing that
his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was
no need for an actual medical examination, it would have greatly helped respondent’s
case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness. This
could have been done through an expert witness. This respondent did not do.
We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal separation. There was
no showing that the case at bar was not just an instance of abandonment in the context
of legal separation. We cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that
Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the marriage. As we
ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility
and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of
doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness. There was no proof of a natal
or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
According to the appellate court, the requirements in Molina and Santos do not apply
here because the present case involves a "mixed marriage," the husband being a
Japanese national. We disagree. In proving psychological incapacity, we find no
distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient in the
application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically
incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to
determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human
behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity
should apply to any person regardless of nationality.
In Pesca vs. Pesca, this Court declared that marriage is an inviolable social institution
that the State cherishes and protects. While we commiserate with respondent,
terminating her marriage to her husband may not necessarily be the fitting
denouement.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED.
8 DAVID B. DEDEL, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SHARON L.
CORPUZ-DEDEL a.k.a. JANE IBRAHIM, Respondents.
G.R. No. 151867 January 29, 2004
FACTS: Petitioner David B. Dedel met respondent Sharon L. Corpuz Dedel while he
was working in the advertising business of his father. The acquaintance led to courtship
and romantic relations, culminating in the exchange of marital vows before the City
Court of Pasay on September 28, 1966. The civil marriage was ratified in a church
wedding on May 20, 1967.2
The union produced four children, namely: Beverly Jane, born on September 18,
1968;3 Stephanie Janice born on September 9, 1969;4 Kenneth David born on April
24, 1971;5 and Ingrid born on October 20, 1976.6 The conjugal partnership,
nonetheless, acquired neither property nor debt.
Petitioner avers that during the marriage, Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible and
immature wife and mother. She had extra-marital affairs with several men: a dentist in
the Armed Forces of the Philippines; a Lieutenant in the Presidential Security
Command and later a Jordanian national.
Sharon was once confirmed in the Manila Medical City for treatment by Dr. Lourdes
Lapuz, a clinical psychiatrist. Petitioner alleged that despite the treatment, Sharon did
not stop her illicit relationship with the Jordanian national named Mustafa Ibrahim,
whom she married and with whom she had two children. However, when Mustafa
Ibrahim left the country, Sharon returned to petitioner bringing along her two children
by Ibrahim. Petitioner accepted her back and even considered the two illegitimate
children as his own. Thereafter, on December 9, 1995, Sharon abandoned petitioner
to join Ibrahim in Jordan with their two children. Since then, Sharon would only return
to the country on special occasions.
Finally, giving up all hope of a reconciliation with Sharon, petitioner filed on April 1,
1997 a petition seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity, as defined in Article 36 of the Family Code, before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 149. Summons was effected by publication
in the Pilipino Star Ngayon, a newspaper of general circulation in the country
considering that Sharon did not reside and could not be found in the Philippines.
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, who testified that she conducted a
psychological evaluation of petitioner and found him to be conscientious, hardworking,
diligent, a perfectionist who wants all tasks and projects completed up to the final detail
and who exerts his best in whatever he does.
On the other hand, Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social
Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that she committed
several indiscretions and had no capacity for remorse, even bringing with her the two
children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner. Such immaturity and irresponsibility
in handling the marriage like her repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her
family are indications of Anti-Social Personality Disorder amounting to psychological
incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage.
RTC: declared null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of
the respondent to perform the essential obligations of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
Accordingly, the conjugal partnership of gains existing between the parties is dissolved
and in lieu thereof a regime of complete separation of property between the said
spouses is established in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Family Code,
without prejudice to rights previously acquired by creditors.
Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General,.
CA: set aside the judgment of the trial court and ordered dismissal of the petition for marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the records is a blissful marital union at its
declaration of nullity of marriage. celebration, later affirmed in church rites, and which produced four children.

Hence, the instant petition.
Issue: W/N the totality of the evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated. More specifically, does the aberrant
sexual behavior of respondent adverted to by petitioner fall within the term
"psychological incapacity?"
Ruling: No.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals, it was ruled:
x x x "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity of inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon
the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the
other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which
considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the
void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of
a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant
to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for
legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions, however, do
not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being
themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological incapacity.
Respondent’s sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by
themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the
Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated
with psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of
a disordered personality which make respondent completely unable to discharge the
essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity or
sexual promiscuity.
At best, the circumstances relied upon by petitioner are grounds for legal separation
under Article 5517 of the Family Code. However, we pointed out in Marcos v. Marcos
that Article 36 is not to be equated with legal separation in which the grounds need not
be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, civil
interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the
like. In short, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal
separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
We likewise agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court has no jurisdiction to
dissolve the church marriage of petitioner and respondent. The authority to do so is
exclusively lodged with the Ecclesiastical Court of the Roman Catholic Church.
All told, we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the appellate court. We cannot
deny the grief, frustration and even desperation of petitioner in his present situation.
Regrettably, there are circumstances, like in this case, where neither law nor society
can provide the specific answers to every individual problem. While we sympathize
with petitioner’s marital predicament, our first and foremost duty is to apply the law no
matter how harsh it may be.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED.

Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every

circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent and other conditions
of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no
precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered
opinion of psychiatrists, psychologists and persons with expertise in psychological
disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.

The difficulty in resolving the problem lies in the fact that a personality disorder is a
very complex and elusive phenomenon which defies easy analysis and definition. In
this case, respondent’s sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that she could not have known the obligations she was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given a valid assumption thereof. It
appears that respondent’s promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the inception of the
JUANITA CARATING-SIAYNGCO, petitioner, vs. MANUEL SIAYNGCO,
respondent.
G.R. NO. 158896 October 27, 2004
FACTS: Petitioner Juanita Carating-Siayngco and respondent Manuel were married
at civil rites on 27 June 1973 and before the Catholic Church on 11 August 1973. After
discovering that they could not have a child of their own, the couple decided to adopt
a baby boy in 1977, who they named Jeremy.
On 25 September 1997, or after twenty-four (24) years of married life together,
respondent Manuel filed for the declaration of its nullity on the ground of psychological
incapacity of petitioner Juanita. He alleged that all throughout their marriage, his wife
exhibited an over domineering and selfish attitude towards him which was exacerbated
by her extremely volatile and bellicose nature; that she incessantly complained about
almost everything and anyone connected with him like his elderly parents, the staff in
his office and anything not of her liking like the physical arrangement, tables, chairs,
wastebaskets in his office and with other trivial matters; that she showed no respect or
regard at all for the prestige and high position of his office as judge of the Municipal
Trial Court; that she would yell and scream at him and throw objects around the house
within the hearing of their neighbors; that she cared even less about his professional
advancement as she did not even give him moral support and encouragement; that
her psychological incapacity arose before marriage, rooted in her deep-seated
resentment and vindictiveness for what she perceived as lack of love and appreciation
from her own parents since childhood and that such incapacity is permanent and
incurable and, even if treatment could be attempted, it will involve time and expense
beyond the emotional and physical capacity of the parties; and that he endured and
suffered through his turbulent and loveless marriage to her for twenty-two (22) years.
In her Answer, petitioner Juanita alleged that respondent Manuel is still living with her
at their conjugal home in Malolos, Bulacan; that he invented malicious stories against
her so that he could be free to marry his paramour; that she is a loving wife and mother;
that it was respondent Manuel who was remiss in his marital and family obligations;
that she supported respondent Manuel in all his endeavors despite his philandering;
that she was raised in a real happy family and had a happy childhood contrary to what
was stated in the complaint.
Respondent Manuel first took the witness stand. The early years of their marriage were
difficult years as they had a hard time being accepted as husband and wife by his
parents and it was at this period that his wife started exhibiting signs of being irritable
and temperamental to him and his parents. She was also obsessive about cleanliness
which became the common source of their quarrels. He, however, characterized their
union as happy during that period of time in 1979 when they moved to Malolos as they
were engrossed in furnishing their new house. In 1981, when he became busy with
law school and with various community organizations, it was then that he felt that he
and his wife started to drift apart. He then narrated incidents during their marriage that
were greatly embarrassing and/or distressing to him, e.g., when his wife quarreled with
an elderly neighbor; when she would visit him in his office and remark that the curtains
were already dirty or when she kicked a trash can across the room or when she threw
a ballpen from his table; when she caused his office drawer to be forcibly opened while
he was away; when she confronted a female tenant of theirs and accused the tenant
of having an affair with him; and other incidents reported to him which would show her
jealous nature. Money matters continued to be a source of bitter quarrels. Respondent
Manuel could not forget that he was not able to celebrate his appointment as judge in
1995 as his wife did not approve it, ostensibly for lack of money, but she was very
generous when it came to celebrations of their parish priest. Respondent Manuel then
denied that he was a womanizer16 or that he had a mistress. Lastly, respondent
Manuel testified as to their conjugal properties and obligations.
Next, LUCENA TAN, respondent Manuel’s Clerk of Court, testified that petitioner
Juanita seldom went to respondent Manuel’s office. But when she was there, she
would call witness to complain about the curtains and the cleanliness of the office. One
time, witness remembered petitioner Juanita rummaging through respondent Manuel’s
drawer looking for his address book while the latter was in Subic attending a
conference. When petitioner Juanita could not open a locked drawer she called
witness, telling the latter that she was looking for the telephone number of respondent’s
hotel room in Subic. A process server was requested by petitioner Juanita to call for a
locksmith in the town proper. When the locksmith arrived, petitioner Juanita ordered
him to open the locked drawer. On another occasion, particularly in August of 1998,
witness testified that she heard petitioner Juanita remark to respondent Manuel "sino
bang batang bibinyagan na yan? Baka anak mo yan sa labas?"
As his third witness, respondent Manuel presented DR. VALENTINA GARCIA whose
professional qualifications as a psychiatrist were admitted by petitioner Juanita. From
her psychiatric evaluation, Dr. Garcia concluded:
To sum up, Manuel de Jesus Siayngco and Juanita Victoria Carating-
Siayngco contributed to the marital collapse. There is a partner relational
problem which affected their capacity to sustain the marital bond with love,
support and understanding.
The partner relational problem (coded V61/10 in the Fourth Edition of the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders or DSM IV) is
secondary to the psychopathology of both spouses. Manuel and Juanita had
engaged themselves in a defective communication pattern which is
characteristically negative and deformed. This affected their competence to
maintain the love and respect that they should give to each other.
Marriage requires a sustained level of adaptation from both partners who are
expected to use healthy strategies to solve their disputes and differences.
Whereas Juanita would be derogatory, critical, argumentative, depressive
and obsessive-compulsive, Manuel makes use of avoidance and
suppression. In his effort to satisfy the self and to boost his masculine ego to
cover up for his felt or imagined inadequacies, he became callused to the
detrimental effects of his unfaithfulness and his failure to prioritize the
marriage. Both spouses, who display narcissistic psychological repertoire
(along with their other maladaptive traits), failed to adequately empathize (or
to be responsive and sensitive) to each other’s needs and feelings. The
matrimonial plot is not conducive to a healthy and a progressive marriage.
Manuel and Juanita have shown their psychologically [sic] incapacity to
satisfactorily comply with the fundamental duties of marriage. The clashing of
their patterns of maladaptive traits, which warrant the diagnosis of personality
disorder not otherwise specified (PDNOS, with code 301.9 as per DSM IV
criteria) will bring about more emotional mishaps and psychopathology.
These rigid sets of traits which were in existence before the marriage will tend
to be pervasive and impervious to recovery.25
In her defense, petitioner Juanita denied respondent Manuel’s allegations. She insisted
that they were a normal couple who had their own share of fights; that they were
happily married until respondent Manuel started having extra-marital affairs which he
had admitted to her. Petitioner Juanita professed that she would wish to preserve her
marriage and that she truly loved her husband. She stated further that she has
continuously supported respondent Manuel, waiting up for him while he was in law
school to serve him food and drinks. Even when he already filed the present case, she
would still attend to his needs. She remembered that after the pre-trial, while they were
in the hallway, respondent Manuel implored her to give him a chance to have a new
family.
DR. EDUARDO MAABA, whose expertise as a psychiatrist was admitted by
respondent Manuel, testified that he conducted a psychiatric evaluation on petitioner
Juanita, the results of which were embodied in his report. Said report stated in part:
Based on the clinical interviews and the results of the psychological tests,
respondent Juanita Victoria Carating-Siayngco, was found to be a mature,
conservative, religious and highly intelligent woman who possess [sic] more
than enough psychological potentials for a mutually satisfying long term
heterosexual relationship. Superego is strong and she is respectful of
traditional institutions of society like the institution of marriage. She was also
found to be a loving, nurturing and self-sacrificing woman who is capable of
enduring severe environmental stress in her social milieu. Finally, she is
reality-oriented and therefore capable of rendering fair and sound decision.
In summary, the psychiatric evaluation found the respondent to be
psychologically capacitated to comply with the basic and essential obligations
of marriage.32
CRISPINA SEVILLA, a friend of the spouses Siayngco since 1992 described the
Siayngcos as the ideal couple, sweet to each other. The couple would religiously
attend prayer meetings in the community. Both were likewise leaders in their
community. Witness then stated that she would often go to the house of the couple
and, as late as March 2000, she still saw respondent Manuel there.
RTC: denied respondent Manuel’s petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to
petitioner Juanita holding in part that:
The asserted psychological incapacity of the defendant is not preponderantly
supported in evidence. The couple [was] happily married and after four years
of marital bliss [was] blest with a son. Their life together continued years
thereafter in peace and prosperity.
The psychiatric finding that defendant has been critical, depressed and
obsessive doubtless arose later in the parties’ relationship sometime in the
early 90’s when the defendant-wife started receiving letters that the plaintiff is
playing footsy.
The present state of our laws on marriage does not favor knee-jerk responses
to slight stabs of the Pavlovian hammer on marital relations. A wife, as in the
instant case, may have succumbed, due to her jealousy, to the constant
delivery of irritating curtain lectures to her husband. But, as our laws now
stand, the dissolution of the marriage is not the remedy in such cases. In
contrast to some countries, our laws do not look at a marital partner as a mere
refrigerator in the Kitchen even if he or she sometimes may sound like a
firetruck.
CA: reversed the RTC decision, relying mainly on the psychiatric evaluation of Dr.
Garcia finding both Manuel and Juanita psychologically incapacitated and on the case
of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals. Thus:
The report clearly explained the root cause of the alleged psychological
incapacity of plaintiff Manuel and defendant Juanita. It appears that there is
empathy between plaintiff and defendant. That is – a shared feeling which
between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having
spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion.
Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each other’s
feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a long way in deepening
the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two
consenting adults who view the relationship with love "amore gignit amorem",
sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise conscious of its value
as a sublime social institution (Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA
324).
This court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found
themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital
obligations, can do no less, but reverse and set aside the decision of the lower court.
Plaintiff Manuel is entitled to have his marriage declared a nullity on the ground of
psychological incapacity, not only of defendant but also of himself.
ISSUE: W/N there is psychological incapacity in this case
Ruling: NO.
Our pronouncement in Republic v. Dagdag is apropos. There, we held that whether
or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for the declaration of the
nullity of the marriage depends crucially on the facts of the case. Each case must be
closely scrutinized and judged according to its own facts as there can be no case that
is on "all fours" with another. This, the Court of Appeals did not heed.
The Court of Appeals perfunctorily applied our ruling in Chi Ming Tsoi despite a clear
divergence in its factual milieu with the case at bar. In Chi Ming Tsoi, the couple
involved therein, despite sharing the same bed from the time of their wedding night on
22 May 1988 until their separation on 15 March 1989, never had coitus. The perplexed
wife filed the petition for the declaration of the nullity of her marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity of her husband. We sustained the wife for the reason that an
essential marital obligation under the Family Code is procreation such that "the
senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital
obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity."
On the other hand, sexual intimacy for procreation is a non-issue herein. Rather, we
have here a case of a husband who is constantly embarrassed by his wife’s outbursts
and overbearing ways, who finds his wife’s obsession with cleanliness and the tight
reign on his wallet "irritants" and who is wounded by her lack of support and respect
for his person and his position as a Judge. In our book, however, these inadequacies
of petitioner Juanita which led respondent Manuel to file a case against her do not
amount to psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations.
It was in Santos v. Court of Appeals where we declared that "psychological incapacity"
under Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of
psychoses. It should refer, rather, to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties
to the marriage.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. In Republic v. Court of Appeals we expounded:
(please refer to the above case citing Republic vs CA and Molina)
A. RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF RESPONDENT MANUEL
We reiterate that the state has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in
its recognition of the sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen
the family as a basic autonomous social institution. With this cardinal state policy in
mind, we held in Republic v. Court of Appeals that the burden of proof to show the
nullity of marriage belongs to the plaintiff (respondent Manuel herein). Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity.
In herein case, the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in holding that
respondent Manuel is psychologically incapacitated. The psychological report of Dr.
Garcia, which is respondent Manuel’s own evidence, contains candid admissions of
petitioner Juanita, the person in the best position to gauge whether or not her husband
fulfilled the essential marital obligations of marriage:
She talked about her spouse, "My husband is kind, a good provider, cool,
intelligent but a liar, masamang magalit at gastador. In spite of what he has
done to me, I take care of him whenever he is sick. He is having extra marital
affairs because he wants to have a child. I believe that our biggest problem
is not having a child. It is his obsession to have a child with his girl now. He
started his relationship with this girl in 1994. I even saw them together in the
car. I think that it was the girl who encouraged him to file the petition." She
feels that the problems in the relationship is [sic] "paulit-ulit," but, that she still
is willing to pursue it.
x x x. Overall, she feels that he is a good spouse and that he is not really
psychologically incapacitated. He apparently told her, "You and Jeremy
should give me a chance to have a new family." She answered and said,
"Ikaw tinuruan mo akong to fight for my right. Ipaglalaban ko ang marriage
natin."
What emerges from the psychological report of Dr. Garcia as well as from the
testimonies of the parties and their witnesses is that the only essential marital
obligation which respondent Manuel was not able to fulfill, if any, is the obligation of
fidelity. Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological incapacity
within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that respondent
Manuel’s unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality which makes
him completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state and
not merely due to his ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and blood. In herein
case, respondent Manuel has admitted that: "I had [extra-marital] affairs because I
wanted to have a child at that particular point."
B. RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF PETITIONER JUANITA
As aforementioned, the presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage.
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. In the case at bar, respondent Manuel failed to
prove that his wife’s lack of respect for him, her jealousies and obsession with
cleanliness, her outbursts and her controlling nature (especially with respect to his
salary), and her inability to endear herself to his parents are grave psychological
maladies that paralyze her from complying with the essential obligations of marriage.
Neither is there any showing that these "defects" were already present at the inception
of the marriage or that they are incurable. In fact, Dr. Maaba, whose expertise as a
psychiatrist was admitted by respondent Manuel, reported that petitioner was
psychologically capacitated to comply with the basic and essential obligations of
marriage.
The psychological report of respondent Manuel’s witness, Dr. Garcia, on the other
hand, does not help his case any. Nothing in there supports the doctor’s conclusion
that petitioner Juanita is psychologically incapacitated. On the contrary, the report
clearly shows that the root cause of petitioner Juanita’s behavior is traceable – not
from the inception of their marriage as required by law – but from her experiences
during the marriage, e.g., her in-laws’ disapproval of her as they wanted their son to
enter the priesthood, her husband’s philandering, admitted no less by him, and her
inability to conceive. Dr. Garcia’s report paints a story of a husband and wife who grew
professionally during the marriage, who pursued their individual dreams to the hilt,
becoming busier and busier, ultimately sacrificing intimacy and togetherness as a
couple. This was confirmed by respondent Manuel himself during his direct
examination.
Thus, from the totality of the evidence adduced by both parties, we have been allowed
a window into the Siayngcos’s life and have perceived therefrom a simple case of a
married couple drifting apart, becoming strangers to each other, with the husband
consequently falling out of love and wanting a way out.
An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. Mere
showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no
wise constitutes psychological incapacity. As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos:
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce
law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifests
themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities
of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
We are not downplaying the frustration and misery respondent Manuel might
be experiencing in being shackled, so to speak, to a marriage that is no longer
working. Regrettably, there are situations like this one, where neither law nor
society can provide the specific answers to every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED.
JAIME F. VILLALON, Petitioner, vs. MA. CORAZON N. VILLALON, Respondent.
G.R. No. 167206 November 18, 2005
FACTS: On July 12, 1996, petitioner Jaime F. Villalon filed a petition for the annulment
of his marriage to respondent Ma. Corazon N. Villalon before the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig City where it was docketed as JDRC No. 3917 and raffled to Branch 69. As
ground therefor, petitioner cited his psychological incapacity which he claimed existed
even prior to his marriage.
According to petitioner, the manifestations of his psychological incapacity were:
(a) his chronic refusal to maintain harmonious family relations and his lack of
interest in having a normal married life;
(b) his immaturity and irresponsibility in refusing to accept the essential
obligations of marriage as husband to his wife;
(c) his desire for other women and a life unchained from any spousal
obligation; and
(d) his false assumption of the fundamental obligations of companionship and
consortium towards respondent. Petitioner thus prayed that his marriage to
respondent be declared null and void ab initio.
On September 25, 1996, respondent filed an answer denying petitioner’s allegations.
She asserted that her 18-year marriage to petitioner has been "fruitful and
characterized by joy, contentment and hopes for more growth in their relationship" and
that their marital squabbles were normal based on community standards. Petitioner’s
success in his professional life aided him in performing his role as husband, father,
and provider. Respondent claimed that petitioner’s commitment to his paternal and
marital responsibilities was beyond reproach.
On October 7, 1996, the trial court directed the prosecutor to conduct an investigation
on whether there was collusion between the parties. The report submitted to the trial
court stated that there was no such collusion.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) subsequently entered its appearance in
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines5 and submitted an opposition6 to the petition
on September 23, 1997. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
Petitioner testified that he met respondent sometime in the early seventies when he
applied for a job at Metrobank, where respondent was employed as a foreign exchange
trader. They began dating in 1975 and had a romantic relationship soon thereafter.
After going steady for about two years, petitioner and respondent were married at the
San Pancracio Chapel in Paco, Manila on April 22, 1978. Petitioner claimed that he
married respondent because he believed that it was the right time to raise a family and
that she would be a good mother to his children.
In the middle of 1993, petitioner decided to separate from respondent. According to
him, their marriage reached a point where there was no longer any communication
between them and their relationship became devoid of love, affection, support and
respect due to his constant urge to see other women. Moreover, their relationship
tended to be "one-sided" since respondent was unresponsive and hardly ever showed
her love, needs, wants and emotions.
Petitioner admitted that on certain occasions before his marriage, he had two
girlfriends at the same time. He also saw other women even when he became engaged
to and, later on, married respondent.11 Respondent learned of his affairs but reacted
in a subdued manner. Petitioner surmised that it was respondent’s nature to be silent
and withdrawn.
In January 1994, petitioner left the conjugal abode and moved into an apartment
located five to ten minutes away. Before he left, he and his wife spoke to their three
children who, at that time, were 14, 8, and 6 years old, respectively. Petitioner
consulted a child psychologist before talking to his children. He considered himself as
a good and loving father and described his relationship with the children as "great".
Despite the separation, petitioner would regularly visit his children who stayed with him
on alternate weekends. He voluntarily gave monthly support to the children and paid
for their tuition fees. He also shouldered the children’s medical expenses as well as
the maintenance and miscellaneous fees for the conjugal abode.
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad Dayan, a clinical psychologist, to testify on his
alleged psychological disorder of "Narcissistic Histrionic Personality Disorder" with
"Casanova Complex". Dr. Dayan described the said disorder as "a pervasive
maladaptation in terms of interpersonal and occupational functioning" with main
symptoms of "grand ideation about oneself, self-centeredness, thinking he is unique
and wanting to always be the one followed, the I personality." A person afflicted with
this disorder believes that he is entitled to gratify his emotional and sexual feelings and
thus engages in serial infidelities. Likewise, a person with "Casanova Complex"
exhibits habitual adulterous behavior and goes from one relationship to another.
Dr. Dayan submitted a psychological report on both petitioner and respondent based
on clinical interviews and psychological tests.
Respondent testified that she first learned of her husband’s infidelity in 1980. She
discovered that he was having an affair with one of her friends who worked as a trader
in her husband’s company. The affair was cut short when the woman left for the United
States to work. Eventually, she and petitioner were able to rebuild their relationship
and overcome the crisis.
When asked about the womanizing ways of her husband, respondent averred that she
did not know whether her husband’s acts could be deemed "womanizing" since there
were only two instances of infidelity which occurred 13 years apart. She also theorized
that petitioner wanted to have their marriage annulled so he could marry her old friend.
She stated that she has not closed her doors to petitioner but the latter would have to
give up his extra-marital relationship.
To controvert the findings of petitioner’s expert witness, respondent presented a
psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas, who testified that Dr. Dayan’s findings were
incomplete because a "team approach" was necessary in evaluating an individual’s
personality. An evaluation of one’s psychological capacity requires the expertise of a
psychiatrist and social worker.
RTC: declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent Ma. Corazon N.
Villalon celebrated on April 22, 1978, as null and void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of the petitioner pursuant to Article 36 of the Family
Code.
Accordingly, the conjugal assets and liabilities are hereby ordered to be liquidated and
the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains be effected in accordance with
Article 129 of the Family Code.
CA: REVERSED and SET ASIDE
Contrary to the trial court’s findings, the appellate court held that petitioner failed to
prove the juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of his alleged psychological
incapacity. Although Dr. Dayan testified that petitioner’s psychological incapacity
preceded the marriage, she failed to give sufficient basis for such a finding. Dr. Dayan
also stated that parental marital instability was the root cause of petitioner’s
psychological incapacity but failed to elaborate thereon or link the two variables.
Moreover, petitioner’s sexual infidelity was made to appear as symptomatic of a grave
psychological disorder when, in reality, the same merely resulted from a general
dissatisfaction with the marriage.
Issue: W/N there is psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
RULING: The totality of the evidence in this case does not support a finding that
petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations. On the
contrary, what is evident is the fact that petitioner was a good husband to respondent
for a substantial period of time prior to their separation, a loving father to their children
and a good provider of the family. Although he engaged in marital infidelity in at least
two occasions, the same does not appear to be symptomatic of a grave psychological
disorder which rendered him incapable of performing his spousal obligations. The
same appears as the result of a general dissatisfaction with his marriage rather than a
psychological disorder rooted in petitioner’s personal history.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,31 the court held that psychological incapacity, as a
ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage, must be characterized by juridical
antecedence, gravity and incurability. It should –
... [R]efer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations
to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated....
In the case at bar, although Dr. Dayan testified that petitioner suffered from Narcissistic
Histrionic Personality Disorder with Casanova Complex even before the marriage and
thus had the tendency to cheat on his wife, such conclusion was not sufficiently backed
by concrete evidence showing that petitioner indeed had several affairs and finds it
difficult to be faithful. Except for petitioner’s general claim that on certain occasions he
had two girlfriends at the same time, no details or explanations were given of such
circumstances that would demonstrate petitioner’s inability to be faithful to respondent
either before or at the time of the celebration of their marriage.
Similarly, we agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner failed to establish the
incurability and gravity of his alleged psychological disorder. While Dr. Dayan
described the symptoms of one afflicted with Narcissistic Histrionic Personality
Disorder as "self-centered", "characterized by grandiose ideation" and "lack of
empathy in relating to others", and one with Casanova Complex as a "serial adulterer",
the evidence on record betrays the presence of any of these symptoms.
Moreover, we are not convinced that petitioner is a "serial or habitual adulterer", as he
wants the court to believe. As stated by respondent herself, it cannot be said that two
instances of infidelity which occurred 13 years apart could be deemed "womanizing",
especially considering that these instances involved the same woman. In fact, at the
time of respondent’s testimony, petitioner’s illicit relationship has been going on for six
years. This is not consistent with the symptoms of a person suffering from "Casanova
Complex" who, according to Dr. Dayan, is one who jumps from one relationship to
another.
Sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from
psychological incapacity. It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are
manifestations of a disordered personality which make petitioner completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of marriage. The evidence on record fails to
convince us that petitioner’s marital indiscretions are symptomatic of psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the evidence reveals
that petitioner was a good husband most of the time when he was living with
respondent, a loving father to his children as well as a good provider.
In Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals, we held that the cause of the alleged
psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Further –
The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
In the instant case, it appears that petitioner has simply lost his love for respondent
and has consequently refused to stay married to her. As revealed by his own testimony,
petitioner felt that he was no longer part of respondent’s life and that the latter did not
need or want him. Respondent’s uncommunicative and withdrawn nature apparently
led to petitioner’s discontentment with the marital relationship.
However, as held in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals, refusal to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage is not psychological incapacity within the meaning of
the law. The policy of the State is to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
social institution and marriage is the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should
be resolved in favor of validity of the marriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
MA. ARMIDA PEREZ-FERRARIS, petitioner, vs. BRIX FERRARIS, respondent.
G.R. No. 162368 July 17, 2006
Facts: On February 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 151
rendered a Decision denying the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner's
marriage with Brix Ferraris. RTC: noted that suffering from epilepsy does not amount
to psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Civil Code and the evidence on
record were insufficient to prove infidelity. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was
denied in an Order dated April 20, 2001 where the trial court reiterated that there was
no evidence that respondent is mentally or physically ill to such an extent that he could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof.
CA: affirmed in toto the judgment of the trial court. It held that the evidence on record
did not convincingly establish that respondent was suffering from psychological
incapacity or that his "defects" were incurable and already present at the inception of
the marriage. The Court of Appeals also found that Dr. Dayan's testimony failed to
establish the substance of respondent's psychological incapacity; that she failed to
explain how she arrived at the conclusion that the respondent has a mixed personality
disorder; that she failed to clearly demonstrate that there was a natal or supervening
disabling factor or an adverse integral element in respondent's character that
effectively incapacitated him from accepting and complying with the essential marital
obligations.
ISSUE: whether psychological incapacity exists
RULING: NO.
The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party
even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent
as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond one is about to assume. As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies,
or isolated characteristics associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly
any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage. It is for this reason that the Court relies heavily on psychological experts
for its understanding of the human personality. However, the root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully
explained, which petitioner failed to convincingly demonstrate.
As aptly held by the Court of Appeals:
Simply put, the chief and basic consideration in the resolution of marital
annulment cases is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish
respondent's psychological condition. Here, appellant contends that there is
such evidence. We do not agree. Indeed, the evidence on record did not
convincingly establish that respondent was suffering from psychological
incapacity. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already
present at the inception of the marriage, or that those are incurable.
Quite apart from being plainly self-serving, petitioner's evidence showed that
respondent's alleged failure to perform his so-called marital obligations was
not at all a manifestation of some deep-seated, grave, permanent and
incurable psychological malady. To be sure, the couple's relationship before
the marriage and even during their brief union (for well about a year or so)
was not all bad. During that relatively short period of time, petitioner was
happy and contented with her life in the company of respondent. In fact, by
petitioner's own reckoning, respondent was a responsible and loving
husband. x x x. Their problems began when petitioner started doubting
respondent's fidelity. It was only when they started fighting about the calls
from women that respondent began to withdraw into his shell and corner, and
failed to perform his so-called marital obligations. Respondent could not
understand petitioner's lack of trust in him and her constant naggings. He
thought her suspicions irrational. Respondent could not relate to her anger,
temper and jealousy. x x x.
At any rate, Dr. Dayan did not explain how she arrived at her diagnosis that respondent
has a mixed personality disorder called "schizoid," and why he is the "dependent and
avoidant type." In fact, Dr. Dayan's statement that one suffering from such mixed
personality disorder is dependent on others for decision x x x lacks specificity; it seems
to belong to the realm of theoretical speculation. Also, Dr. Dayan's information that
respondent had extramarital affairs was supplied by the petitioner herself. Notably,
when asked as to the root cause of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity, Dr.
Dayan's answer was vague, evasive and inconclusive. She replied that such disorder
"can be part of his family upbringing" x x x. She stated that there was a history of
respondent's parents having difficulties in their relationship. But this input on the
supposed problematic history of respondent's parents also came from petitioner. Nor
did Dr. Dayan clearly demonstrate that there was really "a natal or supervening
disabling factor" on the part of respondent, or an "adverse integral element" in
respondent's character that effectively incapacitated him from accepting, and, thereby
complying with, the essential marital obligations. Of course, petitioner likewise failed
to prove that respondent's supposed psychological or mental malady existed even
before the marriage. All these omissions must be held up against petitioner, for the
reason that upon her devolved the onus of establishing nullity of the marriage. Indeed,
any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage and the
indissolubility of the marital vinculum.16
We find respondent's alleged mixed personality disorder, the "leaving-the-house"
attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the
sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend
more time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating
psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, where therein respondent preferred to spend more
time with his friends than his family on whom he squandered his money, depended on
his parents for aid and assistance, and was dishonest to his wife regarding his
finances, the Court held that the psychological defects spoken of were more of a
"difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital
obligations and that a mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting
personalities in no wise constitute psychological incapacity; it is not enough to prove
that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is
essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological, not physical, illness.

Also, we held in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals that habitual alcoholism, sexual

infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for
declaring a marriage void based on psychological incapacity.

While petitioner's marriage with the respondent failed and appears to be without hope
of reconciliation, the remedy however is not always to have it declared void ab initio on
the ground of psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a
null and void marriage.19 No less than the Constitution recognizes the sanctity of
marriage and the unity of the family; it decrees marriage as legally "inviolable" and
protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are
to be "protected" by the state.

Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, it must
be read in conjunction with, although to be taken as distinct from Articles 35,21 37,22
38,23 and 4124 that would likewise, but for different reasons, render the marriage void
ab initio, or Article 4525 that would make the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55
that could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that these
various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent
on the matter. Article 36 should not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the
marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves.27 Neither it is to be
equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in
psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption,
civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment
and the like.28

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration of the

Resolution dated June 9, 2004 denying the petition for review on certiorari for failure
of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible
error, is DENIED WITH FINALITY.
LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner, vs. MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent. G.R.
No. 155800 March 10, 2006
Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has unsettled
many a love transformed into matrimony. Any sort of deception between spouses, no
matter the gravity, is always disquieting. Deceit to the depth and breadth unveiled in
the following pages, dark and irrational as in the modern noir tale, dims any trace of
certitude on the guilty spouse’s capability to fulfill the marital obligations even more.
Facts: Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years
old and respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they
got married before a minister of the Gospel4 at the Manila City Hall, and through a
subsequent church wedding5 at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig,
Metro Manila on 6 December 1990.6 Out of their union, a child was born on 19 April
1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.
On 8 March 1993, petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared
null and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code
alleging that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondent’s incapacity existed at the time
their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the present.
As manifestations of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed
that respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation,
income, educational attainment and other events or things, to wit:
(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate
son, and instead introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her
family. She only confessed the truth about the boy’s parentage when
petitioner learned about it from other sources after their marriage.
(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to
rape and kill her when in fact, no such incident occurred.
(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr.
Consuelo Gardiner, and told some of her friends that she graduated with a
degree in psychology, when she was neither.
(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with
Blackgold Recording Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her
family ever witnessed her alleged singing activities with the group. In the
same vein, she postulated that a luncheon show was held at the Philippine
Village Hotel in her honor and even presented an invitation to that effect but
petitioner discovered per certification by the Director of Sales of said hotel
that no such occasion had taken place.
(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under
those names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold
and touting her as the "number one moneymaker" in the commercial industry
worth P2 million. Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was the
one who wrote and sent the letters to him when she admitted the truth in one
of their quarrels. He likewise realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez
were only figments of her imagination when he discovered they were not
known in or connected with Blackgold.
(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered
her payslip to make it appear that she earned a higher income. She bought a
sala set from a public market but told petitioner that she acquired it from a
famous furniture dealer. She spent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended
up borrowing money from other people on false pretexts.
(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling
up his officemates to monitor his whereabouts. When he could no longer take
her unusual behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He tried to
attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally left
her for good in November 1991.
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr. Abcede),
a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated,
based on the tests they conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal,
introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other hand, they observed
that respondent’s persistent and constant lying to petitioner was abnormal or
pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that should be based on love, trust
and respect. They further asserted that respondent’s extreme jealousy was also
pathological. It reached the point of paranoia since there was no actual basis for her
to suspect that petitioner was having an affair with another woman. They concluded
based on the foregoing that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform
her essential marital obligations.
In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital obligations
by attending to all the needs of her husband. She asserted that there was no truth to
the allegation that she fabricated stories, told lies and invented personalities. She
presented her version, thus:
(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was
afraid of losing her husband.
(2) She told petitioner about David’s attempt to rape and kill her because she
surmised such intent from David’s act of touching her back and ogling her
from head to foot.
(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been
teaching psychology at the Pasig Catholic School for two (2) years.
(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive
producer of Channel 9 and she had done three (3) commercials with McCann
Erickson for the advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson & Johnson, and
Traders Royal Bank. She told petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist
although she was not under contract with the company, yet she reported to
the Blackgold office after office hours. She claimed that a luncheon show was
indeed held in her honor at the Philippine Village Hotel on 8 December 1979.
(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and
the writers thereof were not fictitious. Bea Marquez Recto of the Recto
political clan was a resident of the United States while Babes Santos was
employed with Saniwares.
(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred
that she merely asked the latter in a diplomatic matter if she was the one
 asking for chocolates from petitioner, and not to monitor her husband’s
whereabouts.
(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost
ten people from her monthly budget of P7,000.00.
In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior to their
marriage, the other lies attributed to her by petitioner were mostly hearsay and
unconvincing. Her stance was that the totality of the evidence presented is not
sufficient for a finding of psychological incapacity on her part.
In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a psychiatrist,
to refute the allegations anent her psychological condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the
series of tests conducted by his assistant, together with the screening procedures and
the Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological Rating Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted,
led him to conclude that respondent was not psychologically incapacitated to perform
the essential marital obligations. He postulated that regressive behavior, gross
neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and poor control of impulses, which are signs that
might point to the presence of disabling trends, were not elicited from respondent.
In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation conducted
by Dr. Reyes as (i) he was not the one who administered and interpreted respondent’s
psychological evaluation, and (ii) he made use of only one instrument called CPRS
which was not reliable because a good liar can fake the results of such test.
RTC: gave credence to petitioner’s evidence and held that respondent’s propensity to
lying about almost anything−her occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her
income, among others−had been duly established. According to the trial court,
respondent’s fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled
her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as
it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage.
RTC: declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void.
CA: reversed the RTC’s judgment. While conceding that respondent may not have
been completely honest with petitioner, the Court of Appeals nevertheless held that
the totality of the evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondent’s
psychological incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the case of Republic v.
Court of Appeals governing the application and interpretation of psychological
incapacity had not been satisfied.
ISSUE: W/N there is psychological incapacity in this case
RULING: yes.
Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36
(HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY) (hindi masyadong importante)
Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The concept of psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage is novel in
our body of laws, although mental incapacity has long been recognized as a ground
for the dissolution of a marriage.
The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage persons "who
are not in the full enjoyment of their reason at the time of contracting marriage."
Marriages with such persons were ordained as void, in the same class as marriages
with underage parties and persons already married, among others. A party’s mental
capacity was not a ground for divorce under the Divorce Law of 1917,53 but a marriage
where "either party was of unsound mind" at the time of its celebration was cited as an
"annullable marriage" under the Marriage Law of 1929. Divorce on the ground of a
spouse’s incurable insanity was permitted under the divorce law enacted during the
Japanese occupation. Upon the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, a marriage
contracted by a party of "unsound mind" was classified under Article 85 of the Civil
Code as a voidable marriage. The mental capacity, or lack thereof, of the marrying
spouse was not among the grounds for declaring a marriage void ab initio. Similarly,
among the marriages classified as voidable under Article 45 (2) of the Family Code is
one contracted by a party of unsound mind.58
Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of consent, just like
insanity impinges on consent freely given which is one of the essential requisites of a
contract. The initial common consensus on psychological incapacity under Article 36
of the Family Code was that it did not constitute a specie of vice of consent. Justices
Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of the Family Code revision committee that
drafted the Code, have opined that psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent,
and conceded that the spouse may have given free and voluntary consent to a
marriage but was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such rights and obligations.60 Dr.
Tolentino likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family Code
that this "psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations does
not affect the consent to the marriage."
There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as phrased by
the Family Code committee. Tolentino opined that "psychologically incapacity to
comply would not be juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the
marriage, which makes the marriage only voidable under Article 45 (5) of the Civil Code
x x x [and thus] should have been a cause for annulment of the marriage only." At the
same time, Tolentino noted "[it] would be different if it were psychological incapacity to
understand the essential marital obligations, because then this would amount to lack
of consent to the marriage."
These concerns though were answered, beginning with Santos v. Court of
Appeals, wherein the Court, through Justice Vitug, acknowledged that
"psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties
to the marriage."
The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the
obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them, was further
affirmed in the Molin case. Therein, the Court, through then Justice (now Chief Justice)
Panganiban observed that "[t]he evidence [to establish psychological incapacity] must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to
such extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming,
or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereto. "Jurisprudence
since then has recognized that psychological incapacity "is a malady so grave
and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities
of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume."
It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity deviates from
the literal wording of Article 36, with its central phase reading "psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage."69 At the
same time, it has been consistently recognized by this Court that the intent of the
Family Code committee was to design the law as to allow some resiliency in its
application, by avoiding specific examples that would limit the applicability of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the preference of the revision
committee was for "the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided
by experience, in the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines,
and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts,
may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law."
We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for
annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law,
on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own
facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of
marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The
trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate
court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that
of the trial court.
The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity, as
intended by the revision committee, was not cast in intractable specifics. Judicial
understanding of psychological incapacity may be informed by evolving standards,
taking into account the particulars of each case, current trends in psychological and
even canonical thought, and experience. It is under the auspices of the deliberate
ambiguity of the framers that the Court has developed the Molina rules, which have
been consistently applied since 1997. Molina has proven indubitably useful in providing
a unitary framework that guides courts in adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity
under Article 36. At the same time, the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the clear
legislative intent mandating a case-to-case perception of each situation, and Molina
itself arising from this evolutionary understanding of Article 36. There is no cause to
disavow Molina at present, and indeed the disposition of this case shall rely primarily
on that precedent. There is need though to emphasize other perspectives as well which
should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.
Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then in Molina, of
the considered opinion of canon law experts in the interpretation of psychological
incapacity. This is but unavoidable, considering that the Family Code committee had
bluntly acknowledged that the concept of psychological incapacity was derived from
canon law, and as one member admitted, enacted as a solution to the problem of
marriages already annulled by the Catholic Church but still existent under civil law. It
would be disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic Church doctrine in the
formulation and subsequent understanding of Article 36, and the Court has expressly
acknowledged that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
of the local Church, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts.75 Still, it must be emphasized that the Catholic Church is hardly the sole
source of influence in the interpretation of Article 36. Even though the concept may
have been derived from canon law, its incorporation into the Family Code and
subsequent judicial interpretation occurred in wholly secular progression. Indeed, while
Church thought on psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on the trial courts,
judicial decisions of this Court interpreting psychological incapacity are binding on
lower courts.
Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the
adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this
Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections
1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively state that "[t]he State
recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total developmen[t]," and that
"[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall
be protected by the State." These provisions highlight the importance of the family and
the constitutional protection accorded to the institution of marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to
marriage as a social institution and the foundation of the family. It remains the province
of the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and
the modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-political influences it deems
proper, and subject of course to the qualification that such legislative enactment itself
adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also falls on
the legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions that protect marriage
and the family. This has been accomplished at present through the enactment of the
Family Code, which defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal
effects, imposes the limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes
the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While it may appear
that the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the
constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a
statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage
is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the
only constitutional considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for
declaration of nullity.
Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a
psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement
of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in
promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the
foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend
against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under
Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as
they promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are
not capacitated to understand or comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present petition.
Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case
As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in the
judicial disposition of petitions for nullity under Article 36. The Court has
consistently applied Molina since its promulgation in 1997, and the guidelines
therein operate as the general rules. They warrant citation in full: (JUST REFER
TO RECEN CASE)
We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological
incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he presented witnesses who
corroborated his allegations on his wife’s behavior, and certifications from Blackgold
Records and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondent’s claims
pertinent to her alleged singing career. He also presented two (2) expert witnesses
from the field of psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of respondent was
tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any event, both courts below considered
petitioner’s evidence as credible enough. Even the appellate court acknowledged that
respondent was not totally honest with petitioner.
As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity under Article
36 must be able to establish the cause of action with a preponderance of evidence.
However, since the action cannot be considered as a non-public matter between
private parties, but is impressed with State interest, the Family Code likewise requires
the participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor
General, to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Thus, even if the petitioner is able establish
the psychological incapacity of respondent with preponderant evidence, any finding of
collusion among the parties would necessarily negate such proofs.
Second. The root cause of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been medically
or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and
clearly explained in the trial court’s decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that
respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior "of
peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, and inventing personalities and
situations," of writing letters to petitioner using fictitious names, and of lying about her
actual occupation, income, educational attainment, and family background, among
others.
These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked to medical
or clinical causes by expert witnesses from the field of psychology. Petitioner
presented two (2) such witnesses in particular. Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist who had
headed the department of psychiatry of at least two (2) major hospitals.
The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the psychological
incapacity of respondent, but also the psychological capacity of petitioner. He
concluded that respondent "is [a] pathological liar, that [she continues] to lie [and] she
loves to fabricate about herself."
These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity on the case
record, particularly the trial transcripts of respondent’s testimony, as well as the
supporting affidavits of petitioner. While these witnesses did not personally examine
respondent, the Court had already held in Marcos v. Marcos that personal examination
of the subject by the physician is not required for the spouse to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. We deem the methodology utilized by petitioner’s
witnesses as sufficient basis for their medical conclusions. Admittedly, Drs. Abcede
and Lopez’s common conclusion of respondent’s psychological incapacity hinged
heavily on their own acceptance of petitioner’s version as the true set of facts.
However, since the trial court itself accepted the veracity of petitioner’s factual
premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity
drawn therefrom by petitioner’s expert witnesses.
Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court explicated its
finding of psychological incapacity in its decision in this wise:
To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage. It has
been shown clearly from her actuations that respondent has that propensity for telling
lies about almost anything, be it her occupation, her state of health, her singing abilities,
her income, etc. She has this fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and
personalities. She practically lived in a world of make believe making her therefore not
in a position to give meaning and significance to her marriage to petitioner. In
persistently and constantly lying to petitioner, respondent undermined the basic tenets
of relationship between spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As concluded
by the psychiatrist presented by petitioner, such repeated lying is abnormal and
pathological and amounts to psychological incapacity.
Third. Respondent’s psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed
at the time of and even before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and
made up letters from fictitious characters well before she married petitioner. Likewise,
she kept petitioner in the dark about her natural child’s real parentage as she only
confessed when the latter had found out the truth after their marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her
disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. It is immediately discernible
that the parties had shared only a little over a year of cohabitation before the
exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever such circumstance speaks of the degree
of tolerance of petitioner, it likewise supports the belief that respondent’s psychological
incapacity, as borne by the record, was so grave in extent that any prolonged marital
life was dubitable.
It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false
pretenses in order to induce petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate
a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by
the truth. Petitioner’s witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on respondent’s
inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic nature of her mistruths, which
according to them, were revelatory of respondent’s inability to understand and perform
the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between
fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the
marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations
attached to marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be
expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments.
The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent allegedly tried her
best to effect a reconciliation, she had amply exhibited her ability to perform her marital
obligations. We are not convinced. Given the nature of her psychological condition, her
willingness to remain in the marriage hardly banishes nay extenuates her lack of
capacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations. Respondent’s ability to even
comprehend what the essential marital obligations are is impaired at best. Considering
that the evidence convincingly disputes respondent’s ability to adhere to the truth, her
avowals as to her commitment to the marriage cannot be accorded much credence.
At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which states that
a marriage may be annulled if the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and
Article 46 which enumerates the circumstances constituting fraud under the previous
article, clarifies that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank,
fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the
annulment of marriage." It would be improper to draw linkages between
misrepresentations made by respondent and the misrepresentations under Articles 45
(3) and 46. The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of the spouse who is lied
to, and does not allude to vitiated consent of the lying spouse. In this case, the
misrepresentations of respondent point to her own inadequacy to cope with her marital
obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity under Article 36.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations
as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins
the spouses to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render
mutual help and support. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an
inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship
between spouses based on love, trust and respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the
fact that the marriage of the parties was annulled by the Catholic Church. The appellate
court apparently deemed this detail totally inconsequential as no reference was made
to it anywhere in the assailed decision despite petitioner’s efforts to bring the matter to
its attention.88 Such deliberate ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which held that
interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts.
As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila decreed the
invalidity of the marriage in question in a Conclusion89 dated 30 March 1995, citing
the "lack of due discretion" on the part of respondent.90 Such decree of nullity was
affirmed by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal,91 and the Roman Rota
of the Vatican.92 In fact, respondent’s psychological incapacity was considered so
grave that a restrictive clause93 was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibiting
respondent from contracting another marriage without the Tribunal’s consent.
In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
pronounced:
The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent is
considered ontologically defective and wherefore judicially ineffective when
elicited by a Part Contractant in possession and employ of a discretionary
judgment faculty with a perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the practical
understanding of the conjugal Covenant or serious impaired from the correct
appreciation of the integral significance and implications of the marriage
vows.
The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required by law
that based on the depositions of the Partes in Causa and premised on the
testimonies of the Common and Expert Witnesse[s], the Respondent made
the marriage option in tenure of adverse personality constracts that were
markedly antithetical to the substantive content and implications of the
Marriage Covenant, and that seriously undermined the integrality of her
matrimonial consent in terms of its deliberative component. In other words,
afflicted with a discretionary faculty impaired in its practico-concrete judgment
formation on account of an adverse action and reaction pattern, the
Respondent was impaired from eliciting a judicially binding matrimonial
consent. There is no sufficient evidence in the Case however to prove as well
the fact of grave lack of due discretion on the part of the Petitioner.
Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only by the trial
court, but also by canonical bodies. Yet, we must clarify the proper import of the Church
rulings annulling the marriage in this case. They hold sway since they are drawn from
a similar recognition, as the trial court, of the veracity of petitioner’s allegations. Had
the trial court instead appreciated respondent’s version as correct, and the appellate
court affirmed such conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic Church on this matter would
have diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factual findings of the judicial trier
of facts, and not that of the canonical courts, that are accorded significant recognition
by this Court.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such
psychological incapacity be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
It was on this score that the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court,
the appellate court noting that it did not appear certain that respondent’s condition was
incurable and that Dr. Abcede did not testify to such effect.
Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he returned
to her, desiring to make their marriage work. However, respondent’s aberrant behavior
remained unchanged, as she continued to lie, fabricate stories, and maintained her
excessive jealousy. From this fact, he draws the conclusion that respondent’s condition
is incurable.
From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that respondent’s
condition is incurable? It would seem, at least, that respondent’s psychosis is quite
grave, and a cure thereof a remarkable feat. Certainly, it would have been easier had
petitioner’s expert witnesses characterized respondent’s condition as incurable.
Instead, they remained silent on whether the psychological incapacity was curable or
incurable.
But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts’ taciturnity on this
point.
The petitioner’s expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial court
rendered its decision on 10 August 1995. These events transpired well before Molina
was promulgated in 1997 and made explicit the requirement that the psychological
incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
requirement was not expressly stated in Article 36 or any other provision of the Family
Code.
On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January 1995, began its
discussion by first citing the deliberations of the Family Code committee, then the
opinion of canonical scholars, before arriving at its formulation of the doctrinal definition
of psychological incapacity.98 Santos did refer to Justice Caguioa’s opinion expressed
during the deliberations that "psychological incapacity is incurable,"99 and the view of
a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Archdiocese of
Manila that psychological incapacity must be characterized "by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. "However, in formulating the doctrinal rule on
psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any reference to incurability as
a characteristic of psychological incapacity.

This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the trial court came
out with its own ruling that remained silent on whether respondent’s psychological
incapacity was incurable. Certainly, Santos did not clearly mandate that the incurability
of the psychological incapacity be established in an action for declaration of nullity. At
least, there was no jurisprudential clarity at the time of the trial of this case and the
subsequent promulgation of the trial court’s decision that required a medical finding of
incurability. Such requisite arose only with Molina in 1997, at a time when this case
was on appellate review, or after the reception of evidence.

We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca, the Court countered an argument that Molina
and Santos should not apply retroactively with the observation that the interpretation
or construction placed by the courts of a law constitutes a part of that law as of the
date the statute in enacted. Yet we approach this present case from utterly practical
considerations. The requirement that psychological incapacity must be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable is one that necessarily cannot be divined
without expert opinion. Clearly in this case, there was no categorical averment from
the expert witnesses that respondent’s psychological incapacity was curable or
incurable simply because there was no legal necessity yet to elicit such a declaration
and the appropriate question was not accordingly propounded to him. If we apply
Pesca without deep reflection, there would be undue prejudice to those cases tried
before Molina or Santos, especially those presently on appellate review, where
presumably the respective petitioners and their expert witnesses would not have seen
the need to adduce a diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in those cases, as in this
case, that the psychological incapacity of a spouse is actually incurable, even if not
pronounced as such at the trial court level.

We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of Article
36 relies heavily on a case-to-case perception. It would be insensate to reason to
mandate in this case an expert medical or clinical diagnosis of incurability, since the
parties would have had no impelling cause to present evidence to that effect at the
time this case was tried by the RTC more than ten (10) years ago. From the totality of
the evidence, we are sufficiently convinced that the incurability of respondent’s
psychological incapacity has been established by the petitioner. Any lingering doubts
are further dispelled by the fact that the Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably
consider incurability as an integral requisite of psychological incapacity, were
sufficiently convinced that respondent was so incapacitated to contract marriage to the
degree that annulment was warranted.

All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for
declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC correctly
ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court.

Marriage, in legal contemplation, is more than the legitimatization of a desire of people

in love to live together.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

JORDAN CHAN PAZ, Petitioner, vs. JEANICE PAVON PAZ, Respondent.
G.R. No. 166579 February 18, 2010
The Facts: Jordan and Jeanice met sometime in November 1996. Jeanice was only
19 years old while Jordan was 27 years old. In January 1997, they became a couple
and, on 10 May 1997, they were formally engaged. They had their civil wedding on 3
July 1997, and their church wedding on 21 September 1997. They have one son, Evan
Gaubert, who was born on 12 February 1998. After a big fight, Jeanice left their
conjugal home on 23 February 1999.
On 15 September 1999, Jeanice filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
against Jordan. Jeanice alleged that Jordan was psychologically incapable of
assuming the essential obligations of marriage. According to Jeanice, Jordan’s
psychological incapacity was manifested by his uncontrollable tendency to be self-
preoccupied and self-indulgent, as well as his predisposition to become violent and
abusive whenever his whims and caprices were not satisfied.
Jeanice alleged that Jordan had a tendency to lie about his whereabouts and had the
habit of hanging out and spending a great deal of time with his friends. Since Jordan
worked in their family business, Jordan would allegedly just stay home, tinker with the
Play Station, and ask Jeanice to lie to his brothers about his whereabouts. Jeanice
further alleged that Jordan was heavily dependent on and attached to his mother. After
giving birth to their son, Jeanice noticed that Jordan resented their son and spent more
time with his friends rather than help her take care of their son. Jordan also demanded
from his mother a steady supply of milk and diapers for their son.
At the early stage of their marriage, Jeanice said they had petty fights but that the
quarrels turned for the worse and Jordan became increasingly violent toward her. At
one point, Jordan threatened to hurt her with a pair of scissors. Jeanice also alleged
that on 22 February 1999, Jordan subjected her to verbal lashing and insults and
threatened to hit her with a golf club. Jeanice added that Jordan has not provided any
financial support or visited their son since she left their conjugal home.
Psychologist Cristina R. Gates (Gates) testified that Jordan was afflicted with
"Borderline Personality Disorder as manifested in his impulsive behavior, delinquency
and instability." Gates concluded that Jordan’s psychological maladies antedate their
marriage and are rooted in his family background. Gates added that with no indication
of reformation, Jordan’s personality disorder appears to be grave and incorrigible.
Jordan denied Jeanice’s allegations. Jordan asserted that Jeanice exaggerated her
statements against him. Jordan said that Jeanice has her own personal insecurities
and that her actions showed her lack of maturity, childishness and emotional inability
to cope with the struggles and challenges of maintaining a married life.
Jordan also objected to the psychological report offered by Jeanice. Jordan pointed
out that he was not subjected to any interview or psychological tests by Gates. Jordan
argued that Gates’ conclusions were mere speculations, conjectures and suppositions
from the information supplied by Jeanice. Jordan alleged that it was patently one-sided
and is not admissible in evidence as it was based on hearsay statements of Jeanice
which were obviously self-serving. Jordan said he wants Jeanice back and prayed for
the dismissal of the petition.
RTC: granted Jeanice’s petition.
The trial court declared that Jordan’s psychological incapacity, which was specifically
identified as "Borderline Personality Disorder," deprived him of the capacity to fully
understand his responsibilities under the marital bond. The trial court found that Jordan
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage,
particularly Articles 686 and 707 of the Family Code. The trial court also declared that
Jordan’s psychological incapacity, being rooted in his family background, antedates
the marriage and that without any sign of reformation, found the same to be grave and
incurable.
Jordan filed a Notice of Appeal. The trial court promptly approved Jordan’s appeal.
Jeanice filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal with the Court of Appeals on the ground that
Jordan failed to comply WITH
(1) Pre-condition. No appeal from the decision shall be allowed unless the
appellant has filed a motion for reconsideration or new trial within fifteen days
from notice of judgment.
CA: dismissed Jordan’s appeal.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: W/N Jordan is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations.
Ruling: No.
Jeanice Failed to Prove Jordan’s Psychological Incapacity
Jeanice’s petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the
Family Code which provides:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the Court first declared that psychological incapacity
must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) judicial antecedence; and (c) incurability. It
must be confined "to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage."
In Dimayuga-Laurena v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained:
(a) Gravity – It must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b) Judicial Antecedence – It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
(c) Incurability – It must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be
beyond the means of the party involved.
In granting Jeanice’s petition, the trial court gave credence to the testimony of Gates
to support its conclusion that Jordan was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations. Gates declared that Jordan was suffering from
"Borderline Personality Disorder" as manifested by his being a "mama’s boy" and that
such was "grave and incurable," "rooted in his family background, [and] antedates the
marriage."
Likewise, Jeanice was not able to establish with certainty that Jordan’s alleged
psychological incapacity was medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Gates’
testimony on the matter was vague and inconclusive.
Gates did not adequately explain how she came to the conclusion that Jordan’s
condition was incurable.

Although there is no requirement that a party to be declared psychologically In sum, the totality of the evidence presented by Jeanice failed to show that Jordan
incapacitated should be personally examined by a physician or a psychologist, there was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations and
is nevertheless a need to prove the psychological incapacity through independent that such incapacity was grave, incurable, and existing at the time of the solemnization
evidence adduced by the person alleging said disorder. of their marriage.

Correspondingly, the presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in- In Republic v. Cabantug-Baguio, we said:
depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive
The Constitution sets out a policy of protecting and strengthening the family as the
diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.
basic social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Marriage, as an
In this case, the Court notes that the report and testimony of Gates on Jordan’s inviolable institution protected by the State, cannot be dissolved at the whim of the
psychological incapacity were based exclusively on her interviews with Jeanice and parties. In petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show
the transcript of stenographic notes of Jeanice’s testimony before the trial court. Gates the nullity of marriage lies on the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
only diagnosed Jordan from the statements of Jeanice, whose bias in favor of her existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
cause cannot be doubted. Gates did not actually hear, see and evaluate Jordan.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition.
Consequently, Gates’ report and testimony were hearsay evidence since she had no
personal knowledge of the alleged facts she was testifying on. Gates’ testimony should
have thus been dismissed for being unscientific and unreliable.

Moreover, contrary to the ruling of the trial court, Jordan’s alleged psychological
incapacity was not shown to be so grave and so permanent as to deprive him of the
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond. At best, Jeanice’s
allegations showed that Jordan was irresponsible, insensitive, or emotionally
immature. The incidents cited by Jeanice do not show that Jordan suffered from grave
psychological maladies that paralyzed Jordan from complying with the essential
obligations of marriage.

What the law requires to render a marriage void on the ground of psychological
incapacity is downright incapacity, not refusal or neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.
The mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" does
not constitute psychological incapacity.

In Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris, we said:

As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated

characteristics associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly a
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to marriage.

Furthermore, Gates did not particularly describe the "pattern of behavior" which
showed that Jordan indeed suffers from Borderline Personality Disorder. Gates also
failed to explain how such a personality disorder made Jordan psychologically
incapacitated to perform his obligations as a husband.
ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD
AVERA represented by her Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R. AVERA, respondents.
G.R. No. 104818. September 17, 1993.
ROMERO, J.:
FACTS: On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a
petition before RTC-Pasig entitled “Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation
of Property” against petitioner Roberto Domingo. The petition which was docketed as
Special Proceedings No. 1989-J alleged among others that: they were married on
November 29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth Center Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage
Contract Registry No. 1277K-76 with Marriage License No. 4999036 issued at
Carmona, Cavite; unknown to her, he had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela
Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still existing; she came to know of
the prior marriage only sometime in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for
bigamy; from January 23, 1979 up to the present, she has been working in Saudi
Arabia and she used to come to the Philippines only when she would avail of the one-
month annual vacation leave granted by her foreign employer; since 1983 up to the
present, he has been unemployed and completely dependent upon her for support and
subsistence; out of her personal earnings, she purchased real and personal properties
with a total amount of approximately P350,000.00, which are under the possession
and administration of Roberto; sometime in June 1989, while on her one-month
vacation, she discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman; she further
discovered that he had been disposing of some of her properties without her
knowledge or consent; she confronted him about this and thereafter appointed her
brother Moises R. Avera as her attorney-in-fact to take care of her properties; he failed
and refused to turn over the possession and administration of said properties to her
brother/attorney-in-fact; and he is not authorized to administer and possess the same
on account of the nullity of their marriage.
The petition prayed that a TRO or a WPI be issued enjoining Roberto from exercising
any act of administration and ownership over said properties; their marriage be
declared null and void and of no force and effect; and Delia Soledad be declared
the sole and exclusive owner of all properties acquired at the time of their void marriage
and such properties be placed under the proper management and administration of
the attorney-in-fact.
Petitioner filed MD on the ground that the petition stated no cause of action. The
marriage being void ab initio, the petition for the declaration of its nullity is, therefore,
superfluous and unnecessary. It added that private respondent has no property which
is in his possession.
On August 20, 1991, Judge Austria (RTC-Pasig) denied the MD for lack of merit stating
that:
“Movant argues that a second marriage contracted after a first marriage by a
man with another woman is illegal and void and no judicial decree is
necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage. Xxx
Xxx with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that
although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was
celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for
judicial declaration
of its nullity.
Finally, the contention of respondent movant that petitioner has no property
in his possession is an issue that may be determined only after trial on the
merits.”
MR was denied. Petitioner was ordered to file an answer. Instead of filing the required
answer, petitioner filed a special civil action of certiorari and mandamus on the ground
that the lower court acted with GAD amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the
MD. CA dismissed the petition.
CA: It observed that the separation and subsequent distribution of the properties
acquired during the union can be had only upon proper determination of the status of
the marital relationship between said parties, whether or not the validity of the first
marriage is denied by petitioner. Furthermore, in order to avoid duplication and
multiplicity of suits, the declaration of
nullity of marriage may be invoked in this proceeding together with the partition and
distribution of the properties involved. Citing Articles 48, 50 and 52 of the Family Code,
it held that private respondent’s prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of their
marriage may be raised together with other incidents of their marriage such as the
separation of their properties. MR was denied.
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner contends that SP. No. 1989-J for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and
Separation of Property filed by private respondent must be dismissed for being
unnecessary and superfluous. Furthermore, under his own interpretation of Article 40
of the Family Code, he submits that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage is required only for purposes of remarriage. Since the petition in SP No. 1989-
J contains no allegation of private respondent’s intention to remarry, said petition
should, therefore, be dismissed.
On the other hand, private respondent insists on the necessity of a judicial declaration
of the nullity of their marriage, not for purposes of remarriage, but in order to provide a
basis for the separation and distribution of the properties acquired during coverture.
ISSUE: WON a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary
RULING: YES.
RATIONALE: There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private
respondent celebrated while the former’s previous marriage with one Emerlina de la
Paz was still subsisting, is bigamous. As such, it is void from the beginning. Petitioner
himself does not dispute the absolute nullity of their marriage.
The cases of People v. Aragon and People v. Mendoza relied upon by petitioner are
cases where the Court had earlier ruled that no judicial decree is necessary to establish
the invalidity of a void, bigamous marriage. It is noteworthy to observe that Justice Alex
Reyes, however, dissented on these occasions stating that:
“Though the logician may say that where the former marriage was void there
would be nothing to dissolve, still it is not for the spouses to judge whether
that marriage was void or not. That judgment is reserved to the courts. ”
This dissenting opinion was adopted as the majority position in subsequent cases
involving the same issue. Thus, in Gomez v. Lipana, the Court abandoned its earlier
ruling in the Aragon and Mendoza cases. In reversing the lower court’s order forfeiting
the husband’s share of the disputed property acquired during the second marriage, the
Court stated that “if the nullity, or annulment of the marriage is the basis for the
application of Article 1417, there is need for a judicial declaration thereof, which
of course contemplates an action for that purpose.”
The Court subsequently held in Vda. De Consuegra v. GSIS, that “although the
second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while
the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration
of such nullity.”
In Tolentino v. Paras, however, the Court turned around and applied the Aragon and
Mendoza ruling once again. In granting the prayer of the first wife asking for a
declaration as the lawful surviving spouse and the correction of the death certificate of
her deceased husband, it explained that “(t)he second marriage that he contracted
with private respondent during the lifetime of his first spouse is null and void
from the beginning and of no force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to
establish the invalidity of a void marriage.”
However, in the more recent case of Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy the Court reverted to the
Consuegra case and held that there was “no need of introducing evidence about
the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they married each
other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a
judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would
still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage
with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel.”
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on
the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly
required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole
basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity
is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee which
drafted what is now the Family Code of the Philippines took the position that parties
to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even
if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of
their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also
for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal
and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her
first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.
As regards the necessity for a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage,
petitioner submits that the same can be maintained only if it is for the purpose of
remarriage. Failure to allege this purpose, according to petitioner’s theory, will warrant
dismissal of the same.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
“ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void.” (n)
Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position in the provision of the
word “solely.” As it is placed, the same shows that it is meant to qualify “final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void.” Realizing the need for careful
craftsmanship in conveying the precise intent of the Committee members, the provision
in question, as it finally emerged, did not state “The absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage . . .,” in which case “solely”
would clearly qualify the phrase “for purposes of remarriage.” Had the phraseology
been such, the interpretation of petitioner would have been correct and, that is, that
the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of
remarriage, thus rendering irrelevant the clause “on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void.”
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that
such final judgment declaring the previous marriage void need not be obtained
only for purposes of remarriage. Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances
where a party might well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes
other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution
and separation of property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the
custody and support of their common children and the delivery of the latters’
presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial
or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage
an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a
court declaring such previous marriage void. Hence, in the instance where a party who
has previously contracted a marriage which remains subsisting desires to enter into
another marriage which is legally unassailable, he is required by law to prove that the
previous one was an absolute nullity. But this he may do on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In other words, for purposes of
remarriage, why should the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous
marriage an absolute nullity be a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void? Whereas, for purposes other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable?
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an “inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family;” as such, it “shall be protected by the State.”
In more explicit terms, the Family Code characterizes it as a “special contract of
permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for
the establishment of conjugal and family life.” So crucial are marriage and the family
to the stability and peace of the nation that their “nature, consequences, and incidents
are governed by law and not subject to stipulation . . .,” As a matter of policy,
therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the purpose of contracting another
cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of both parties or
of one that their union is so defective with respect to the essential requisites of
a contract of marriage as to render it void ipso jure and with no legal effect—and
nothing more. Were this so, this inviolable social institution would be reduced
to a mockery and would rest on very shaky foundations indeed. And the grounds
for nullifying marriage would be as diverse and farranging as human ingenuity and
fancy could conceive. For such a socially significant institution, an official state
pronouncement through the courts, and nothing less, will satisfy the exacting norms of
society. Not only would such an open and public declaration by the courts definitively
confirm the nullity of the contract of marriage, but the same would be easily verifiable
through records accessible to everyone.
That the law seeks to ensure that a prior marriage is no impediment to a second sought
to be contracted by one of the parties may be gleaned from new information required
in the Family Code to be included in the application for a marriage license, viz, “If
previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved and
annulled.”
nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the regime
of property relations governing them. It stands to reason that the lower court before
whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought is likewise clothed with
jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions regarding the couple’s properties.
Accordingly, the respondent court committed no reversible error in finding that the
lower court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to
dismiss SP No. 1989-J.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of respondent
Court dated February 7, 1992 and the Resolution dated March 20, 1992 are
AFFIRMED.

Reverting to the case before us, petitioner’s interpretation of Art. 40 of the Family Code SO ORDERED.
is, undoubtedly, quite restrictive. Thus, his position that private respondent’s failure to
state in the petition that the same is filed to enable her to remarry will result in the
dismissal of SP No. 1989-J is untenable. His misconstruction of Art. 40 resulting from
the misplaced emphasis on the term “solely” was in fact anticipated by the members
of the Committee.

When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein
shall provide for “the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of their
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial
proceedings.” Other specific effects flowing therefrom, in proper cases, are the
following:

“Art. 43. x x x x x x x x x
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the
case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted
said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community
property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the
common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a
previous marriage or, in default of children, the innocent spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the
donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said
donee are revoked by operation of law;
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who
acted in bad faith as a beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such
designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be
disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate
succession. (n)

Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage
shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary
disposition made by one in favor of the other are revoked by operation of law. (n)”

Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondent’s ultimate prayer for separation
of property will simply be one of the necessary consequences of the judicial declaration
of absolute nullity of their marriage. Thus, petitioner’s suggestion that in order for their
properties to be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that purpose
is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of
LEONILA G. SANTIAGO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
G.R. No. 200233. July 15, 2015
SERENO, CJ.:
FACTS: Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on 29 July 1997,3
Leonila G. Santiago and Nicanor F. Santos faced an Information for bigamy. Petitioner
pleaded “not guilty,” while her putative husband escaped the criminal suit.
The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had been married to Estela
Galang since 2 June 1974, asked petitioner to marry him. Petitioner, who was a 43-
year-old widow then, married Santos on 29 July 1997 despite the advice of her brother-
in-law and parents-in-law that if she wanted to remarry, she should choose someone
who was “without responsibility.”
Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that she could not be included as an
accused in the crime of bigamy, because she had been under the belief that Santos
was still single when they got married. She also averred that for there to be a conviction
for bigamy, his second marriage to her should be proven valid by the prosecution; but
in this case, she argued that their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage
license.
11 years after the inception of this criminal case, the first wife, Estela Galang, testified
for the prosecution. She alleged that she had met petitioner as early as March and
April 1997, on which occasions the former introduced herself as the legal wife of
Santos. Petitioner denied this allegation and averred that she met Galang only in
August and September 1997, or after she had already married Santos.
The RTC appreciated the undisputed fact that petitioner married Santos during the
subsistence of his marriage to Galang. Based on the more credible account of Galang
that she had already introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos in March and April
1997, the trial court rejected the affirmative defense of petitioner that she had not
known of the first marriage. It also held that it was incredible for a learned person like
petitioner to be easily duped by a person like Santos.
The RTC declared that as indicated in the Certificate of Marriage, “her marriage was
celebrated without a need for a marriage license in accordance with Article 34 of the
Family Code, which is an admission that she cohabited with Santos long before the
celebration of their marriage.” Thus, the trial court convicted petitioner.
On petitioner’s MR, she contended that her marriage to Santos was void ab initio for
having been celebrated without complying with Article 34 of the Family Code, which
provides an exemption from the requirement of a marriage license if the parties have
actually lived together as husband and wife for at least five years prior to the
celebration of their marriage. In her case, petitioner asserted that she and Santos had
not lived together as husband and wife for five years prior to their marriage. Hence,
she argued that the absence of a marriage license effectively rendered their marriage
null and void, justifying her acquittal from bigamy. MR was denied with RTC holding
that:
Accused Santiago submits that it is her marriage to her co-accused that is
null and void as it was celebrated without a valid marriage license x x x. In
advancing that theory, accused wants this court to pass judgment on the
validity of her marriage to accused Santos, something this court can not do.
The best support to her argument would have been the submission of a
judicial decree of annulment of their marriage. Absent such proof, this court
cannot declare their marriage null and void in these proceedings.
CA affirmed RTC holding that the defense of lack of marriage license was a vain
attempt of petitioner to put the validity of her marriage to Santos in question.
Hence, the present petition before the SC.
Petitioner reiterates that she cannot be a co-accused in the instant case, because she
was not aware of Santos’s previous marriage. But in the main, she argues that for there
to be a conviction for bigamy, a valid second marriage must be proven by the
prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. she contends that her marriage to Santos is
void because of the absence of a marriage license. She elaborates that their marriage
does not fall under any of those marriages exempt from a marriage license, because
they have not previously lived together exclusively as husband and wife for at least five
years. She alleges that it is extant in the records that she married Santos in 1997, or
only 4 years since she met him in 1993. Without completing the five-year requirement,
she posits that their marriage without a license is void.
ISSUE: WON petitioner was guilty of crime of bigamy
RULING: YES, but only as an accomplice.
RATIONALE: In Montañez v. Cipriano, this Court enumerated the elements of bigamy
as follows:
The elements of the crime of bigamy are:
(a) the offender has been legally married;
(b) the marriage has not been legally dissolved x x x;
(c) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites
for validity.
The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or
subsequent marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the
alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be
valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.
For the second spouse to be indicted as a co-accused in the crime, People v.
Nepomuceno, Jr. instructs that she should have had knowledge of the previous
subsisting marriage. People v. Archilla likewise states that the knowledge of the
second wife of the fact of her spouse’s existing prior marriage constitutes an
indispensable cooperation in the commission of bigamy, which makes her responsible
as an accomplice.
The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint liability of two persons who
marry each other while the previous marriage of one of them is valid and subsisting.
As explained in Nepomuceno:
In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended
parties depending on the circumstances, as when the second spouse married
the accused without being aware of his previous marriage. Only if the
 second spouse had knowledge of the previous undissolved marriage of
the accused could she be included in the information as a co-accused.
Therefore, the lower courts correctly ascertained petitioner’s knowledge of Santos’s
marriage to Galang. Both courts consistently found that she knew of the first marriage
as shown by the totality of the following circumstances:
(1) when Santos was courting and visiting petitioner in the house of her in-laws, they
openly showed their disapproval of him;
(2) it was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to not know of his true civil
status; and
(3) Galang, who was the more credible witness compared with petitioner who had
various inconsistent testimonies, straightforwardly testified that she had already told
petitioner on two occasions that the former was the legal wife of Santos.
Given that petitioner knew of the first marriage, this Court concurs with the ruling that
she was validly charged with bigamy. However, we disagree with the lower courts’
imposition of the principal penalty on her. To recall, the RTC, which the CA affirmed,
meted out to her the penalty within the range of prisión correccional as minimum to
prisión mayor as maximum.
Her punishment as a principal to the crime is wrong. Archilla holds that the second
spouse, if indicted in the crime of bigamy, is liable only as an accomplice. In referring
to Viada, Justice Luis B. Reyes, an eminent authority in criminal law, writes that “a
person, whether man or woman, who knowingly consents or agrees to be married to
another already bound in lawful wedlock is guilty as an accomplice in the crime of
bigamy.” Therefore, her conviction should only be that for an accomplice to the
crime.
Under Article 349 of the RPC, as amended, the penalty for a principal in the crime of
bigamy is prisión mayor, which has a duration of six years and one day to twelve years.
Since the criminal participation of petitioner is that of an accomplice, the sentence
imposable on her is the penalty next lower in degree, prisión correccional, which has
a duration of six months and one day to six years. There being neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstance, this penalty shall be imposed in its medium period consisting
of two years, four months and one day to four years and two months of imprisonment.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum
term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, arresto mayor, which has a
duration of one month and one day to six months imprisonment.
Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted of bigamy, the
second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity. If the
accused wants to raise the nullity of the marriage, he or she can do it as a matter of
defense during the presentation of evidence in the trial proper of the criminal case. In
this case, petitioner has consistently questioned below the validity of her
marriage to Santos on the ground that marriages celebrated without the
essential requisite of a marriage license are void ab initio.
Unfortunately, the lower courts merely brushed aside the issue. The RTC stated that it
could not pass judgment on the validity of the marriage. The CA held that the attempt
of petitioner to attack her union with Santos was in vain.
After a perusal of the records, it is clear that the marriage between
petitioner and Santos took place without a marriage license. The absence of this
requirement is purportedly explained in their Certificate of Marriage, which reveals that
their union was celebrated under Article 34 of the Family Code. The provision reads
as follows:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without
any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state
the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he
ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties are found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
Therefore, the marriage of petitioner and Santos would have been exempted from a
marriage license had they cohabited exclusively as husband and wife for at least five
years before their marriage.
Here, respondent did not dispute that petitioner knew Santos in more or less in
February 1996 and that after six months of courtship, she married him on 29 July 1997.
Without any objection from the prosecution, petitioner testified that Santos had
frequently visited her in Castellano, Nueva Ecija, prior to their marriage. However, he
never cohabited with her, as she was residing in the house of her in-laws, and her
children from her previous marriage disliked him. On cross-examination, respondent
did not question the claim of petitioner that sometime in 1993, she first met Santos as
an agent who sold her piglets.
All told, the evidence on record shows that petitioner and Santos had only known each
other for only less than four years. Thus, it follows that the two of them could not have
cohabited for at least five years prior to their marriage.
Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact opposite of this demonstrable fact.
Although the records do not show that they submitted an affidavit of cohabitation as
required by Article 34 of the Family Code, it appears that the two of them lied before
the solemnizing officer and misrepresented that they had actually cohabited for at least
five years before they married each other. Unfortunately, subsequent to this lie was
the issuance of the Certificate of Marriage, in which the solemnizing officer stated
under oath that no marriage license was necessary, because the marriage was
solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code.
The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago, contained the
misrepresentation perpetrated by them that they were eligible to contract marriage
without a license. We thus face an anomalous situation wherein petitioner seeks to be
acquitted of bigamy based on her illegal actions of (1) marrying Santos without a
marriage license despite knowing that they had not satisfied the cohabitation
requirement under the law; and (2) falsely making claims in no less than her marriage
contract.
We chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is basically a bigamous and
illicit marriage in an effort to escape criminal prosecution. Our penal laws on
marriage, such as bigamy, punish an individual’s deliberate disregard of the permanent
and sacrosanct character of this special bond between spouses. In Tenebro v. CA, we
had the occasion to emphasize that the State’s penal laws on bigamy should not be
rendered nugatory by allowing individuals “to deliberately ensure that each marital
contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of
contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the
promise of futurity and commitment.”

Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot countenance petitioner’s illegal acts of feigning a
marriage and, in the same breath, adjudge her innocent of the crime. For us, to do so
would only make a mockery of the sanctity of marriage.

Furthermore, it is a basic concept of justice that no court will “lend its aid to x x x one
who has consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the
cause of action is founded.” If the cause of action appears to arise ex turpi causa or
that which involves a transgression of positive law, parties shall be left unassisted by
the courts. As a result, litigants shall be denied relief on the ground that their conduct
has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the
controversy in issue.

Here, the cause of action of petitioner, meaning her affirmative defense in this
criminal case of bigamy, is that her marriage with Santos was void for having
been secured without a marriage license. But as elucidated earlier, they
themselves perpetrated a false Certificate of Marriage by misrepresenting that
they were exempted from the license requirement based on their fabricated
claim that they had already cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years
prior their marriage. In violation of our law against illegal marriages, petitioner
married Santos while knowing fully well that they had not yet complied with the
five-year cohabitation requirement under Article 34 of the Family Code.
Consequently, it will be the height of absurdity for this Court to allow petitioner
to use her illegal act to escape criminal conviction.

No less than the present Constitution provides that “marriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.” It must
be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. In keeping
therefore with this fundamental policy, this Court affirms the conviction of petitioner for
bigamy.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G.

Santiago is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-
G.R. CR No. 33566 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, petitioner
Leonila G. Santiago is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
bigamy as an accomplice. She is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six
months of arresto mayor as minimum to four years of prisión correccional as maximum
plus accessory penalties provided by law.

SO ORDERED.
LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant, vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO F.
BRILLANTES, JR., Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila, respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706. March 29, 1995
QUIASON,J.:
FACTS: This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance
of Impropriety against Judge Francisco Brillantes, Jr., of the MeTC, Branch 20, Manila.
Complainant alleges that he has 2 children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living
together at No. 34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. He stays
in said house, which he purchased in 1987, whenever he is in Manila.
In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw respondent
sleeping on his (complainant’s) bed. Upon inquiry, he was told by the houseboy that
respondent had been cohabiting with De Castro. Complainant did not bother to wake
up respondent and instead left the house after giving instructions to his houseboy to
take care of his children.
Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his children and even alienated the
affection of his children for him. Complainant claims that respondent is married to one
Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has 5 children, as appearing in his 1986 and 1991
sworn statements of assets and liabilities. Furthermore, he alleges that respondent
caused his arrest on January 13, 1992, after he had a heated argument with De Castro
inside the latter’s office.
For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not married to De Castro and
that the filing of the administrative action was related to complainant’s claim on the Bel-
Air residence, which was disputed by De Castro.
Respondent denies that he caused complainant’s arrest and claims that he was even
a witness to the withdrawal of the complaint for Grave Slander filed by De Castro
against complainant. According to him, it was the sister of De Castro who called the
police to arrest complainant.
Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he admits having
5 children with her. He alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage
ceremony before a Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25, 1965, the same was not a
valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon the request of the parents of
Ongkiko, respondent went through another marriage ceremony with her in Manila on
June 5, 1965. Again, neither party applied for a marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned
respondent 19 years ago, leaving their children to his care and custody as a single
parent.
Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles,
California on December 4, 1991, he believed, in all good faith and for all legal
intents and purposes, that he was single because his first marriage was
solemnized without a license.
Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
marriage before a party thereto can enter into a second marriage. Article 40 of said
Code provides:
“The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purposes
of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void.”
Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply
to him considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the
Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second marriage took place in 1991 and
governed by the Family Code.
ISSUE: WON Article 40 of the Family Code is applicable in the case at bar
RULING: YES.
RATIONALE: Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the
first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given
“retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.” This is particularly true
with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any
vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants’ rights may not
preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application
of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he
is adversely affected (Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 229 [1968]). The
reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from,
procedural laws (Billones v. Court of Industrial Relations, 14 SCRA 674 [1965]).
Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He made a mockery of the
institution of marriage and employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman, who
begot him five children.
Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practice of
law in 1963. At the time he went through the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko,
he was already a lawyer. Yet, he never secured any marriage license. Any law student
would know that a marriage license is necessary before one can get married.
Respondent was given an opportunity to correct the flaw in his first marriage when he
and Ongkiko were married for the second time. His failure to secure a marriage license
on these two occasions betrays his sinister motives and bad faith. It is evident that
respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the
legal profession.
While the deceit employed by respondent existed prior to his appointment as a MeTC
Judge, his immoral and illegal act of
cohabiting with De Castro began and continued when he was already in the judiciary.
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free
of a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to his performance of his judicial
duties but also as to his behavior as a private individual. There is no duality of
morality. A public figure is also judged by his private life. A judge, in order to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must
behave with propriety at all times, in the performance of his judicial duties and
in his everyday life. These are judicial guideposts too self-evident to be
overlooked. No position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and
uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary (Imbing v. Tiongzon, 229
SCRA 690 [1994]).

WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all leave
and retirement benefits and with prejudice to reappointment in any branch,
instrumentality, or agency of the government, including government-owned and
controlled corporations. This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and
HON. JUDGE FLORENTINO TUAZON, JR., being the Judge of the RTC, Branch
139, Makati City, respondents.
G.R. No. 137567. June 20, 2000
BUENA, J.:
This PROC (Rule 45, ROC) seeks to review and set aside the Order issued by Judge
Florentino A. Tuazon, Jr. of the RTC-Makati City, Branch 139 in Special Civil Case No.
98-3056, entitled “Meynardo Beltran vs. People of the Philippines and Hon. Judge
Alden Cervantes of the MeTC-Makati City, Branch 61.” The said Order denied
petitioner’s prayer for the issuance of a WPI to enjoin Judge Cervantes from
proceeding with the trial of Criminal Case No. 236176, a concubinage case against
petitioner on the ground that the pending petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
filed by petitioner against his wife constitutes a prejudicial question.
FACTS: Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix were married on
June 16, 1973 at the Immaculate Concepcion Parish Church in Cubao, Quezon City.
On February 7, 1997, after 24 years of marriage and 4 children, petitioner filed a
petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article
36 of the Family Code before RTC-QC.
In her Answer to the said petition, petitioner’s wife Charmaine Felix alleged that it was
petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named
Milagros Salting. Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal complaint for concubinage
under Article 334 of the RPC against petitioner and his paramour before the City
Prosecutor’s Office of Makati who found probable cause and ordered the filing of an
Information against them. The case was filed before the MeTC-Makati City, Branch 61.
On March 20, 1998, petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant for his
arrest, filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of the Warrant of
Arrest in the criminal case. Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil case
for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the
determination of the criminal case. Judge Alden Vasquez Cervantes denied the
motion. Petitioner’s MR was likewise denied.
Petitioner went to the RTC-Makati City, Branch 139 on certiorari, questioning the
Orders issued by Judge Cervantes and praying for the issuance of a WPI. RTC denied
the petition. MR was likewise denied.
Hence, the instant petition for review.
Petitioner contends that the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of
his marriage based on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code is a prejudicial question that should merit the suspension of the criminal
case for concubinage filed against him by his wife. Petitioner also contends that
there is a possibility that two conflicting decisions might result from the civil
case for annulment of marriage and the criminal case for concubinage. In the civil
case, the trial court might declare the marriage as valid by dismissing petitioner’s
complaint but in the criminal case, the trial court might acquit petitioner because the
evidence shows that his marriage is void on ground of psychological
incapacity. Petitioner submits that the possible conflict of the courts’ ruling regarding
petitioner’s marriage can be avoided, if the criminal case will be suspended, until the
court rules on the validity of marriage; that if petitioner’s marriage is declared void by
reason of psychological incapacity then by reason of the arguments submitted in the
subject petition, his marriage has never existed; and that, accordingly, petitioner could
not be convicted in the criminal case because he was never before
a married man.
ISSUE: WON a prejudicial question exists in the case at bar
RULING: NO.
RATIONALE: The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two
conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements:
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the criminal action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s marriage is not
a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered
prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending
the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil
case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the
aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily
be determined.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
“The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void.”
In Domingo vs. CA, this Court ruled that the import of said provision is that for
purposes of remarriage, the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a
previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage, other
evidence is acceptable. The pertinent portions of said Decision read:
“x x x Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party might
well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than
remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution
and separation of property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an
action for the custody and support of their common children and the delivery
of the latters’ presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be
adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds
rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be
limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous
marriage void.”
So that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner need not
present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the
criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring
his marriage void.

With regard to petitioner’s argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of

concubinage should his marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state that even
a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void from the beginning is not a
defense.

Analogous to this case is that of Landicho vs. Relova cited in Donato vs. Luna where
this Court held that:
“x x x Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on the ground
alleged by petitioner, that fact would not be material to the outcome of
the criminal case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to
judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the
judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is
no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists.
Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy.”

Thus, in the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the
judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he who
cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of
the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage. The lower
court therefore, has not erred in affirming the Orders of the judge of the MeTC ruling
that pendency of a civil action for nullity of marriage does not pose a prejudicial
question in a criminal case for concubinage.

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS, petitioner, vs. ISAGANI D. BOBIS, respondent.
G.R. No. 138509. July 31, 2000
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS: On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with one Maria
Dulce B. Javier. Without said marriage having been annulled, nullified or terminated,
the same respondent contracted a second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-
Bobis on January 25, 1996 and allegedly a third marriage with a certain Julia Sally
Hernandez. Based on petitioner’s complaint-affidavit, an information for bigamy was
filed against respondent on February 25, 1998 before the RTC-QC. Sometime
thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute
nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage
license. Respondent then filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal
case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a
prejudicial question to the criminal case. The trial judge granted the motion to suspend
the criminal case in an Order dated December 29, 1998. Petitioner filed MR but the
same was denied.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner argues that respondent should have first obtained a judicial declaration of
nullity of his first marriage before entering into the second marriage, inasmuch as the
alleged prejudicial question justifying suspension of the bigamy case is no longer a
legal truism pursuant to Article 40 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: WON the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a
previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy.
RULING: NO.
RATIONALE: A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of
which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein. It is a question based on a
fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. It must appear not only that the civil
case involves facts upon which the criminal action is based, but also that the resolution
of the issues raised in the civil action would necessarily be determinative of the criminal
case. Consequently, the defense must involve an issue similar or intimately related to
the same issue raised in the criminal action and its resolution determinative of whether
or not the latter action may proceed. Its two essential elements are:
(1) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the criminal action; and
(2) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
A prejudicial question does not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of
the accused but simply tests the sufficiency of the allegations in the information
in order to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case. A party who
raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all
the essential elements of a crime have been adequately alleged in the
information, considering that the prosecution has not yet presented a single
evidence on the indictment or may not yet have rested its case. A challenge of
the allegations in the information on the ground of prejudicial question is in
effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge through a non-criminal
suit.
Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration of
the second marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous
marriage before a party may remarry. The clear implication of this is that it is not
for the parties, particularly the accused, to determine the validity or invalidity of
the marriage. Whether or not the first marriage was void for lack of a license is
a matter of defense because there is still no judicial declaration of its nullity at
the time the second marriage was contracted. It should be remembered that
bigamy can successfully be prosecuted provided all its elements concur—two
of which are a previous marriage and a subsequent marriage which would have
been valid had it not been for the existence at the material time of the first
marriage.
In the case at bar, respondent's clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity
of his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his
prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an
adventurous bigamist has to do is to disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract
a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first
marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior
judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a marriage aware
of the absence of a requisite—usually the marriage license—and thereafter contract a
subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the
assumption that the first marriage is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the
provisions on bigamy.
As succinctly held in Landicho v. Relova:
(P)arties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its
nullity, only competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration
of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who
contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy.
Respondent alleges that the first marriage in the case before us was void for lack of a
marriage license. Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that her marriage to respondent
was exempt from the requirement of a marriage license. More specifically, petitioner
claims that prior to their marriage, they had already attained the age of majority and
had been living together as husband and wife for at least five years. The issue in this
case is limited to the existence of a prejudicial question, and we are
not called upon to resolve the validity of the first marriage. Be that as it may, suffice
it to state that the Civil Code, under which the first marriage was celebrated,
provides that “every intendment of law or fact leans toward the validity of
marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds.” Hence, parties should not
be permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of their marriage, for the same
must be submitted to the determination of competent courts. Only when the
nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there
is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. No matter
how obvious, manifest or patent the absence of an element is, the intervention
of the courts must always be resorted to. That is why Article 40 of the Family
Code requires a “final judgment,” which only the courts can render. Thus, as
ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for SO ORDERED.
bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of
the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity. In a recent case for concubinage,
we held that the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage is not a
prejudicial question. This ruling applies here by analogy since both crimes presuppose
the subsistence of a marriage.

Ignorance of the existence of Article 40 of the Family Code cannot even be

successfully invoked as an excuse. The contracting of a marriage knowing that
the requirements of the law have not been complied with or that the marriage is
in disregard of a legal impediment is an act penalized by the Revised Penal Code.
The legality of a marriage is a matter of law and every person is presumed to
know the law. As respondent did not obtain the judicial declaration of nullity
when he entered into the second marriage, why should he be allowed to
belatedly obtain that judicial declaration in order to delay his criminal
prosecution and subsequently defeat it by his own disobedience of the law? If
he wants to raise the nullity of the previous marriage, he can do it as a matter of
defense when he presents his evidence during the trial proper in the criminal
case.

The burden of proof to show the dissolution of the first marriage before the
second marriage was contracted rests upon the defense, but that is a matter that
can be raised in the trial of the bigamy case. In the meantime, it should be stressed
that not every defense raised in the civil action may be used as a prejudicial question
to obtain the suspension of the criminal action. The lower court, therefore, erred in
suspending the criminal case for bigamy. Moreover, when respondent was indicted for
bigamy, the fact that he entered into two marriage ceremonies appeared indubitable.
It was only after he was sued by petitioner for bigamy that he thought of seeking a
judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. The obvious intent, therefore, is that
respondent merely resorted to the civil action as a potential prejudicial question for the
purpose of frustrating or delaying his criminal prosecution. As has been discussed
above, this cannot be done.

In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having
obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, can not be said
to have validly entered into the second marriage. Per current jurisprudence, a
marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any
party can marry again; otherwise the second marriage will also be void. The
reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is
presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents
and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second
marriage with petitioner. Against this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil
action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second
marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil
case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore,
not a prejudicial question. As stated above, respondent cannot be permitted to
use his own malfeasance to defeat the criminal action against him.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The order dated December 29, 1998 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 226 of Quezon City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
the trial court is ordered to IMMEDIATELY proceed with Criminal Case No. Q98-75611.
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. EDNA A. AZOTE, respondent.
G.R. No. 209741. April 15, 2015
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS: On June 19, 1992, respondent Edna and Edgardo, a member of the SSS,
were married in civil rites at the RTC, Branch 9, Legazpi City, Albay. Their union
produced 6 children born from 1985 to 1999. On April 27, 1994, Edgardo submitted
Form E-4 to the SSS with Edna and their 3 older children as designated beneficiaries.
Thereafter or on September 7, 2001, Edgardo submitted another Form E-4 to the SSS
designating his 3 younger children as additional beneficiaries. On January 13, 2005,
Edgardo died. Shortly thereafter, Edna filed her claim for death benefits with the SSS
as the wife of a deceased-member. It appeared, however, from the SSS records that
Edgardo had earlier submitted another Form E-4 on November 5, 1982 with a different
set of beneficiaries, namely: Rosemarie Azote (Rosemarie), as his spouse; and Elmer
Azote (Elmer), as dependent, born on October 9, 1982. Consequently, Edna’s claim
was denied. Her children were adjudged as beneficiaries and she was considered as
the legal guardian of her minor children. The benefits, however, would be stopped once
a child would attain the age of 21.
On March 13, 2007, Edna filed a petition with the SSC to claim the death benefits,
lump sum and monthly pension of Edgardo. She insisted that she was the legitimate
wife of Edgardo. In its answer, the SSS averred that there was a conflicting information
in the forms submitted by the deceased. Summons was published in a newspaper of
general circulation directing Rosemarie to file her answer. Despite the publication, no
answer was filed and Rosemarie was subsequently declared in default.
Later, SSC dismissed Edna’s petition for lack of merit basing its decision on Section
24(c) of the SS Law. It explained that although Edgardo filed the Form E-4 designating
Edna and their 6 children as beneficiaries, he did not revoke the designation of
Rosemarie as his wife-beneficiary, and Rosemarie was still presumed to be his legal
wife.
The SSC further wrote that the NSO records revealed that the marriage of Edgardo to
one Rosemarie Teodora Sino was registered on July 28, 1982. Consequently, it opined
that Edgardo’s marriage to Edna was not valid as there was no showing
that his first marriage had been annulled or dissolved. The SSC stated that there must
be a judicial determination of nullity of a previous marriage before a party could enter
into a second marriage.
MR of Edna was denied. It explained that it was incumbent upon Edna to prove that
her marriage to the deceased was valid, which she failed to do. It further opined that
Rosemarie could not be merely presumed dead, and that death benefits under the
SSS could not be considered properties which may be disposed of in a holographic
will.
In the assailed CA decision, CA reversed and set aside the resolution and the order of
the SSC. It held that the SSC could not make a determination of the validity or invalidity
of the marriage of Edna to Edgardo considering that no contest came from either
Rosemarie or Elmer.
The CA explained that Edna had established her right to the benefits by substantial
evidence, namely, her marriage certificate and the baptismal certificates of her
children. It ruled that Edgardo made a deliberate change of his wife-beneficiary in his
1994 E-4 form, as such was clearly his voluntary act manifesting his intention to revoke
his former declaration in the 1982 E-4 form. The 1994 E-4 form submitted by Edgardo,
designating Edna as his wife, superseded his former declaration in his
1982 E-4 form.
CA denied SSC’s MR. Hence, the present petition.
The SSC argues that the findings of fact of the CA were not supported by the records.
It submits that under Section 5 of the SS Law, it is called upon to determine the rightful
beneficiary in the performance of its quasi-judicial function of adjudicating SS benefits.
In fact, it cited a number of cases, where the SSC had passed upon the validity of
marriages for the purpose of determining who were entitled to SS benefits.
The SSC contends that Edna was not the legitimate spouse of deceased member
Edgardo as the CA failed to consider the NSO certification showing that Edgardo was
previously married to Rosemarie. With the death certificate of Rosemarie showing that
she died only on November 6, 2004, it proved that she was alive at the time Edna and
Edgardo were married, and, therefore, there existed a legal impediment to his second
marriage, rendering it void. Edna is, therefore, not a legitimate spouse who is entitled
to the death benefits of Edgardo.
The SSC claims that the right to designate a beneficiary is subject to the SS Law. The
designation of a wife-beneficiary merely creates a disputable presumption that they
are legally married and may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Edna’s
designation became invalid with the determination of the subsistence of a previous
marriage. The SSC posits that even though Edgardo revoked and superseded his
earlier designation of Rosemarie as beneficiary, his designation of Edna was still not
valid considering that only a legitimate spouse could qualify as a primary beneficiary.
ISSUE: WON Edna should be considered as primary beneficiary under the SS Law
RULING: NO.
RATIONALE: The law in force at the time of Edgardo’s death was RA 8282, the
amendatory law of R.A. No. 1161 or the “Social Security Law.” It is a tax-exempt social
security service designed to promote social justice and provide meaningful protection
to members and their beneficiaries against the hazards of disability, sickness,
maternity, old age, death, and other contingencies resulting in loss of income or
financial burden. As a social security program of the government, Section 8(e) and (k)
of the said law expressly provides who would be entitled to receive benefits from its
deceased member.
Applying Section 8(e) and (k) of R.A. No. 8282, it is clear that only the legal spouse of
the deceased member is qualified to be the beneficiary of the latter’s SS benefits. In
this case, there is a concrete proof that Edgardo contracted an earlier marriage with
another individual as evidenced by their marriage contract. Edgardo even
acknowledged his married status when he filled out the 1982 Form E-4 designating
Rosemarie as his spouse.
It is undisputed that the second marriage of Edgardo with Edna was celebrated at the
time when the Family Code was already in force. Article 41 of the Family Code WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The August 13, 2013 Decision and the
expressly states: October 29, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 122933 are
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the petition for entitlement of SS death
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the benefits filed by respondent Edna Azote is DENIED for lack of merit.
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent SO ORDERED.
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger
under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil
Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse.

Using the parameters outlined in Article 41 of the Family Code, Edna, without doubt,
failed to establish that there was no impediment or that the impediment was already
removed at the time of the celebration of her marriage to Edgardo. Settled is the rule
that “whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should
establish his or her right thereto by substantial evidence.” Edna could not
adduce evidence to prove that the earlier marriage of Edgardo was either
annulled or dissolved or whether there was a declaration of Rosemarie’s
presumptive death before her marriage to Edgardo. What is apparent is that
Edna was the second wife of Edgardo. Considering that Edna was not able to
show that she was the legal spouse of a deceased member, she would not
qualify under the law to be the beneficiary of the death benefits of Edgardo.

The Court does not subscribe to the disquisition of the CA that the updated Form E-4
of Edgardo was determinative of Edna’s status and eligibility to claim the death benefits
of deceased member. Although an SSS member is free to designate a beneficiary, the
designation must always conform to the statute. To blindly rely on the form submitted
by the deceased member would subject the entire social security system to the whims
and caprices of its members and would render the SS Law inutile.
Although the SSC is not intrinsically empowered to determine the validity of marriages,
it is required by Section 4(b)(7) of R.A. No. 8282 to examine available statistical and
economic data to ensure that the benefits fall into the rightful beneficiaries. (Rationale:
bogus claims will deplete funds and frustrate the purpose of the law.)

The existence of two Form E-4s designating, on two different dates, two different
women as his spouse is already an indication that only one of them can be the
legal spouse. As can be gleaned from the certification issued by the NSO, there
is no doubt that Edgardo married Rosemarie in 1982. Edna cannot be considered
as the legal spouse of Edgardo as their marriage took place during the existence
of a previously contracted marriage. For said reason, the denial of Edna’s claim
by the SSC was correct. It should be emphasized that the SSC determined
Edna’s eligibility on the basis of available statistical data and documents on their
database as expressly permitted by Section 4(b)(7) of R.A. No. 8282.

It is of no moment that the first wife, Rosemarie, did not participate or oppose Edna’s
claim. Rosemarie’s nonparticipation or her subsequent death on November 11, 200432
did not cure or legitimize the status of Edna.
VINCENT PAUL G. MERCADO a.k.a. VINCENT G. MERCADO
vs. CONSUELO TAN, G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000
Facts: Accused is charged with bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
for having contracted a second marriage with herein complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan
on June 27, 1991 when at that time he was previously united in lawful marriage with
Ma. Thelma V. Oliva on April 10, 1976 at Cebu City, without said first marriage having
been legally dissolved.
Relevant facts are as follows:
Dr. Vincent Mercado and complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan got married on June 27, 1991
before MTCC-Bacolod City Br. 7 Judge Gorgonio J. Ibañez [by reason of] which a
Marriage Contract was duly executed and signed by the parties. As entered in said
document, the status of accused was ‘single’. There is no dispute either that at the time
of the celebration of the wedding with complainant, accused was actually a married
man, having been in lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva in a marriage ceremony
solemnized on April 10, 1976 by Judge Leonardo B. Cañares, CFI-Br. XIV, Cebu City
per Marriage Certificate issued in connection therewith, which matrimony was further
blessed by Rev. Father Arthur Baur on October 10, 1976 in religious rites at the Sacred
Heart Church, Cebu City.
In the same manner, the civil marriage between accused and complainant was
confirmed in a church ceremony on June 29, 1991 officiated by Msgr. Victorino A.
Rivas, Judicial Vicar, Diocese of Bacolod City. Both marriages were consummated
when out of the first consortium, Ma. Thelma Oliva bore accused two children, while a
child, Vincent Paul, Jr. was sired by accused with complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan.
A letter-complaint for bigamy was filed by complainant through counsel with the City
Prosecutor of Bacolod City, which eventually resulted [in] the institution of the present
case before this Court against said accused, Dr. Vincent G. Mercado. More than a
month after the bigamy case was lodged in the Prosecutor’s Office, accused filed an
action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva in RTC-Br.
22, Cebu City, and in a Decision dated May 6, 1993 the marriage between Vincent
G. Mercado and Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was declared null and void.
Petitioner’s contention: While acknowledging the existence of the two marriage[s],
accused posited the defense that his previous marriage ha[d] been judicially declared
null and void and that the private complainant had knowledge of the first marriage of
accused.
He obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code, thereby rendering it void ab initio. Unlike voidable marriages which are
considered valid until set aside by a competent court, he argues that a void marriage
is deemed never to have taken place at all. Thus, he concludes that there is no first
marriage to speak of. Petitioner also quotes the commentaries of former Justice Luis
Reyes that "it is now settled that if the first marriage is void from the beginning, it is a
defense in a bigamy charge. But if the first marriage is voidable, it is not a defense.
Respondent’s contention: Admits that the first marriage was declared null and void
under Article 36 of the Family Code, but she points out that that declaration came
only after the Information had been filed. Hence, by then, the crime had already been
consummated. She argues that a judicial declaration of nullity of a void previous
marriage must be obtained before a person can marry for a subsequent time.
RTC: Petitioner convicted of bigamy.
CA: Agreeing with the lower court, the Court of Appeals stated:
"Under Article 40 of the Family Code, ‘the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may
be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void.’ But here, the final judgment declaring null and void
accused’s previous marriage came not before the celebration of the second marriage,
but after, when the case for bigamy against accused was already tried in court. And
what constitutes the crime of bigamy is the act of any person who shall contract a
second subsequent marriage ‘before’ the former marriage has been legally dissolved."
Issue: Is judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage necessary before a
subsequent one can be legally contracted even if the earlier union is characterized by
statute as "void”?
Ruling: YES.
Rationale: The Court held in those two cases that the said provision "plainly makes a
subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse
illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish
its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annulable marriages."
The provision appeared in substantially the same form under Article 83 of the 1950
Civil Code and Article 41 of the Family Code. However, Article 40 of the Family Code,
a new provision, expressly requires a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous
marriage, as follows:
"ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void."
In view of this provision, Domingo stressed that a final judgment declaring such
marriage void was necessary. Verily, the Family Code and Domingo affirm the earlier
ruling in Wiegel. Thus, a Civil Law authority and member of the Civil Code Revision
Commitee has observed:
"[Article 40] is also in line with the recent decisions of the Supreme Court that the
marriage of a person may be null and void but there is need of a judicial declaration of
such fact before that person can marry again; otherwise, the second marriage will also
be void (Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, Aug. 19/86, 143 SCRA 499, Vda. De Consuegra v.
GSIS, 37 SCRA 315). This provision changes the old rule that where a marriage is
illegal and void from its performance, no judicial decree is necessary to establish its
validity (People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 843; People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033)."
In this light, the statutory mooring of the ruling in Mendoza and Aragon – that there is
no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage -- has been cast aside by
Article 40 of the Family Code. Such declaration is now necessary before one can
contract a second marriage. Absent that declaration, we hold that one may be charged
with and convicted of bigamy.

"It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a
defense in a bigamy charge. As with a voidable marriage, there must be a judicial
declaration of the nullity of a marriage before contracting the second marriage. Article
40 of the Family Code states that x x x. The Code Commission believes that the parties
to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void, even if such
is the fact, but must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage before
they should be allowed to marry again. x x x."

In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no
judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to
have the first marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint
charging him with bigamy. By contracting a second marriage while the first was still
subsisting, he committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code.

That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage
was immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been consummated by then.
Moreover, his view effectively encourages delay in the prosecution of bigamy cases;
an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke
the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot
allow that.

Under the circumstances of the present case, he is guilty of the charge against him.

DOCTRINE: A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before

a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent
marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This
principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statute as "void."
SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO, vs. SUSAN YEE CARIÑO, G.R. No. 132529. February 2,
2001
Facts: The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the two
marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, whose “death
benefits” is now the subject of the controversy between the two Susans whom he
married.
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he contracted two marriages,
the first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño, with whom he had
two offsprings, namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cariño; and the second was on November
10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cariño, with whom he had no children in their
almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in 1982.
Santiago S. Cariño became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by
pulmonary tuberculosis who passed away. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims
for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various
government agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of
P146,000.00 from “MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig. While
respondent Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00 from “GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS)
and burial (SSS).”
Respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of money against
petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to her
at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00)
collectively denominated as “death benefits” which she (petitioner) received from
“MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig.” Despite service of
summons, petitioner failed to file her answer, prompting the trial court to declare her in
default.
Respondent’s contention: Admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place
during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of,
the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed that she
had no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she became aware of it only
at the funeral of the deceased, where she met petitioner who introduced herself
as the wife of the deceased. To bolster her action for collection of sum of money,
respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab
initio because the same was solemnized without the required marriage license.
In support thereof, respondent presented: 1) the marriage certificate of the deceased
and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number; and 2) a certification dated
March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, which reads
– all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of the spouses
SANTIAGO CARINO (sic) and SUSAN NICDAO, who are married in this municipality
on June 20, 1969. Hence, we cannot issue as requested a true copy or transcription
of Marriage License number from the records of this archives.
RTC: ruled in favor of respondent
CA: affirmed the judgement of the RTC
Issue: Whether the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased,
having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license which makes it void
ab initio validates the subsequent marriage of the deceased and the Respondent?
Ruling: NO.
Rationale: Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity
of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a
second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage
to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage
void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as
but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter,
the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties
thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage,
so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. In such instances, evidence
must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds
rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited
solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan
Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a
requisite of marriage, 12 and the absence thereof, subject to certain
exceptions, 13 renders the marriage void ab initio. 14
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased
does not fall within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage
license, therefore, was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This
notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the
deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage
license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that such a certification is
adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance
of suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar
enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased has been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to
prove that their marriage is valid and that they secured the required marriage license.
Although she was declared in default before the trial court, petitioner could have
squarely met the issue and explained the absence of a marriage license in her
pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But petitioner conveniently
avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her case
in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao
and the deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage
license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license
requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the marriage
of petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the “death benefits”
under scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate,
under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a
prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a
party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be
void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage
of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second
marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their
marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the
marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage
of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the
property of the spouses according to the applicable property regime. 16 Considering
that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be
absolute community or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the
provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on “Property Regime of Unions
Without Marriage.”
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous
marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubine, relationships
where both man and woman are married to other persons, multiple alliances of the
same married man, -
“... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions ...”
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint
contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each
party belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of the
home, children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this
regime. 18
Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a
bigamous marriage, having been solemnized during the subsistence of a previous
marriage then presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the deceased), the
application of Article 148 is therefore in order.
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.],
NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations,
incentives and benefits from governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a
police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could
not be said that she contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of these
monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common by respondent and the
deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and respondent has no right whatsoever
to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said “death benefits” of the deceased
shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal wife of the deceased
is not one of them.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of
the Family Code governs. This article applies to unions of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose
marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage license.
Article 147 of the Family Code reads -
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or
under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal
shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall
be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together
shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and
shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did
not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to
have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the
care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
xxx
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party
in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In
case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants,
each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the
absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases,
the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned by
either party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and
will be divided equally between them, even if only one party earned the wages and the
other did not contribute thereto. 19 Conformably, even if the disputed “death benefits”
were earned by the deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a
co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. As
there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case, both parties of the first marriage
are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject “death benefits” under
scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property regime, and the other
half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs,
namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.
ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO vs. MARIETTA CALISTERIO, G.R. No. 136467,
April 6, 2000
Facts: Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving several parcels of land with an
estimated value of P604,750.00. Teodorico was survived by his wife, herein
respondent Marietta Calisterio.
Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who had previously been married to
James William Bounds on 13 January 1946 at Caloocan City. James Bounds
disappeared without a trace on 11 February 1947. Teodorico and Marietta were
married eleven years later, or on 08 May 1958, without Marietta having priorly secured
a court declaration that James was presumptively dead.
On 09 October 1992, herein petitioner Antonia Armas y Calisterio, a surviving sister of
Teodorico, filed with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Quezon City, Branch 104, a
petition entitled, "In the Matter of Intestate Estate of the Deceased Teodorico Calisterio
y Cacabelos, Antonia Armas, Petitioner," claiming to be inter alia, the sole surviving
heir of Teodorico Calisterio, the marriage between the latter and respondent Marietta
Espinosa Calisterio being allegedly bigamous and thereby null and void. She prayed
that her son Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., be appointed administrator, without bond, of
the estate of the deceased and that the inheritance be adjudicated to her after all the
obligations of the estate would have been settled.
Respondent Marietta opposed the petition. Marietta stated that her first marriage with
James Bounds had been dissolved due to the latter's absence, his whereabouts being
unknown, for more than eleven years before she contracted her second marriage with
Teodorico. Contending to be the surviving spouse of Teodorico, she sought priority in
the administration of the estate of the decedent.
RTC: handed down its decision in favor of petitioner Antonia
CA: reversed and held that Marietta Calisterio's marriage to Teodorico is valid.
Issue: Whether Marietta Calisterio's marriage to Teodorico is valid?
Ruling: YES.
Rationale: The marriage between the deceased Teodorico and respondent Marietta
was solemnized on 08 May 1958. The law in force at that time was the Civil Code, not
the Family Code which took effect only on 03 August 1988. Article 256 of the Family
Code 5 itself limited its retroactive governance only to cases where it thereby would not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other
laws.
Verily, the applicable specific provision in the instant controversy is Article 83 of the
New Civil Code which provides:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the
lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such
first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time
of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the
absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less
than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by
the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if
the absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The
marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared
null and void by a competent court.
Under the foregoing provisions, a subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime
of the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled
or dissolved. Paragraph (2) of the law gives exceptions from the above rule. For the
subsequent marriage referred to in the three exceptional cases therein provided, to be
held valid, the spouse present (not the absentee spouse) so contracting the later
marriage must have done so in good faith. 6 Bad faith imports a dishonest purpose or
some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong — it partakes of the nature of fraud,
a breach of a known duty through some motive of interest or ill will. 7 The Court does
not find these circumstances to be here extant.
A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary 8 as long as
the prescribed period of absence is met. It is equally noteworthy that the marriage in
these exceptional cases are, by the explicit mandate of Article 83, to be deemed valid
"until declared null and void by a competent court." It follows that the burden of proof
would be, in these cases, on the party assailing the second marriage.
In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous
marriage may exceptionally be considered valid, the following conditions must
concur; viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the contracting party must have been absent for
four consecutive years, or two years where there is danger of death under the
circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b)
the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead;
and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee for which purpose the spouse present can institute a summary proceeding
in court to ask for that declaration. The last condition is consistent and in consonance
with the requirement of judicial intervention in subsequent marriages as so provided in
Article 41 9 , in relation to Article 40, 10 of the Family Code.
In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent Marietta's first husband,
James William Bounds, had been absent or had disappeared for more than eleven
years before she entered into a second marriage in 1958 with the deceased Teodorico
Calisterio. This second marriage, having been contracted during the regime of the Civil
Code, should thus be deemed valid notwithstanding the absence of a judicial
declaration of presumptive death of James Bounds.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. MARIA FE ESPINOSA CANTOR, G.R. No.
184621, December 10, 2013 (En banc)
Facts: The respondent and Jerry were married on September 20, 1997. They lived
together as husband and wife in their conjugal dwelling in Agan Homes, Koronadal
City, South Cotabato. Sometime in January 1998, the couple had a violent quarrel
brought about by: (1) the respondent’s inability to reach "sexual climax" whenever she
and Jerry would have intimate moments; and (2) Jerry’s expression of animosity
toward the respondent’s father.
After their quarrel, Jerry left their conjugal dwelling and this was the last time that the
respondent ever saw him. Since then, she had not seen, communicated nor heard
anything from Jerry or about his whereabouts.
On May 21, 2002, or more than four (4) years from the time of Jerry’s disappearance,
the respondent filed before the RTC a petition4for her husband’s declaration of
presumptive death, docketed as SP Proc. Case No. 313-25. She claimed that she had
a well-founded belief that Jerry was already dead. She alleged that she had inquired
from her mother-in-law, her brothers-in-law, her sisters-in-law, as well as her neighbors
and friends, but to no avail. In the hopes of finding Jerry, she also allegedly made it a
point to check the patients’ directory whenever she went to a hospital. All these earnest
efforts, the respondent claimed, proved futile, prompting her to file the petition in court.
RTC: issued an order granting the respondent’s petition and declaring Jerry
presumptively dead. It concluded that the respondent had a well-founded belief that
her husband was already dead since more than four (4) years had passed without the
former receiving any news about the latter or his whereabouts.
CA: Affirmed the Decision of the lower court.
Petitioner’s contention: respondent did not have a well-founded belief to justify the
declaration of her husband’s presumptive death. It claims that the respondent failed to
conduct the requisite diligent search for her missing husband. Likewise, the petitioner
invites this Court’s attention to the attendant circumstances surrounding the case,
particularly, the degree of search conducted and the respondent’s resultant failure to
meet the strict standard under Article 41 of the Family Code.
Issue: Whether the respondent had a well-founded belief that Jerry is already dead.
Ruling: NO.
Rationale: Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must
be shown that the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
present spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead.
Under Article 41 of the Family Code, there are four (4) essential requisites for the
declaration of presumptive death:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or
two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger
of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is
dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee.
Notably, Article 41 of the Family Code, compared to the old provision of the Civil Code
which it superseded, imposes a stricter standard. It requires a "well-founded belief "
that the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death
can be granted. We have had occasion to make the same observation in Republic v.
Nolasco,14 where we noted the crucial differences between Article 41 of the Family
Code and Article 83 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been shortened to
four (4) years; however, there is need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death to
enable the spouse present to remarry. Also, Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a
stricter standard than the Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code merely requires either
that there be no news that such absentee is still alive; or the absentee is generally
considered to be dead and believed to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed
dead under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. The Family Code, upon the other
hand, prescribes as "well founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a
petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted.
Thus, mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by the law), lack of
any news that such absentee is still alive, failure to communicate or general
presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not suffice. This conclusion
proceeds from the premise that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present
spouse the burden of proving the additional and more stringent requirement of "well-
founded belief" which can only be discharged upon a showing of proper and honest-
to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent spouse’s
whereabouts but, more importantly, that the absent spouse is still alive or is already
dead.
The Requirement of Well-Founded Belief
The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded belief." It depends upon the
circumstances of each particular case. Its determination, so to speak, remains on a
case-to-case basis. To be able to comply with this requirement, the present spouse
must prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and
inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries,
he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouses already dead. It
requires exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one).
The Court also provided the following criteria for determining the existence of a "well-
founded belief" under Article 41 of the Family Code:
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness
inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether
the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present
acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the
inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the
disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made
by [the] present spouse.18
ii. Republic v. Granada19
Similarly in Granada, the Court ruled that the absent spouse failed to prove her "well-
founded belief" that her absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the
petition. In this case, the present spouse alleged that her brother had made inquiries
from their relatives regarding the absent spouse’s whereabouts. The present spouse
did not report to the police nor seek the aid of the mass media. Applying the standards
in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),20 the Court ruled against
the present spouse, as follows:
Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that
respondent Yolanda did not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent husband.
While her brother Diosdado Cadacio testified to having inquired about the whereabouts
of Cyrus from the latter’s relatives, these relatives were not presented to corroborate
Diosdado’s testimony. In short, respondent was allegedly not diligent in her search for
her husband. Petitioner argues that if she were, she would have sought information
from the Taiwanese Consular Office or assistance from other government agencies in
Taiwan or the Philippines. She could have also utilized mass media for this end, but
she did not. Worse, she failed to explain these omissions.
iii.Republic v. Nolasco21
In Nolasco, the present spouse filed a petition for declaration of presumptive death of
his wife, who had been missing for more than four years. He testified that his efforts to
find her consisted of:
(1) Searching for her whenever his ship docked in England;
(2) Sending her letters which were all returned to him; and
(3) Inquiring from their friends regarding her whereabouts, which all proved
fruitless. The Court ruled that the present spouse’s investigations were too
sketchy to form a basis that his wife was already dead and ruled that the
pieces of evidence only proved that his wife had chosen not to communicate
with their common acquaintances, and not that she was dead.
In the case at bar, the respondent’s "well-founded belief" was anchored on her alleged
"earnest efforts" to locate Jerry, which consisted of the following:
(1) She made inquiries about Jerry’s whereabouts from her in-laws, neighbors
and friends; and
(2) Whenever she went to a hospital, she saw to it that she looked through
the patients’ directory, hoping to find Jerry.
These efforts, however, fell short of the "stringent standard" and degree of diligence
required by jurisprudence for the following reasons:
First, the respondent did not actively look for her missing husband.1âwphi1 It can be
inferred from the records that her hospital visits and her consequent checking of the
patients’ directory therein were unintentional. She did not purposely undertake a
diligent search for her husband as her hospital visits were not planned nor primarily
directed to look for him. This Court thus considers these attempts insufficient to
engender a belief that her husband is dead.
Second, she did not report Jerry’s absence to the police nor did she seek the aid of
the authorities to look for him. While a finding of well-founded belief varies with the
nature of the situation in which the present spouse is placed, under present conditions,
we find it proper and prudent for a present spouse, whose spouse had been missing,
to seek the aid of the authorities or, at the very least, report his/her absence to the
police.
Third, she did not present as witnesses Jerry’s relatives or their neighbors and friends,
who can corroborate her efforts to locate Jerry. Worse, these persons, from whom she
allegedly made inquiries, were not even named. As held in Nolasco, the present
spouse’s bare assertion that he inquired from his friends about his absent spouse’s
whereabouts is insufficient as the names of the friends from whom he made inquiries
were not identified in the testimony nor presented as witnesses.
Lastly, there was no other corroborative evidence to support the respondent’s claim
that she conducted a diligent search. Neither was there supporting evidence proving
that she had a well-founded belief other than her bare claims that she inquired from
her friends and in-laws about her husband’s whereabouts. In sum, the Court is of the
view that the respondent merely engaged in a "passive search" where she relied on
uncorroborated inquiries from her in-laws, neighbors and friends. She failed to conduct
a diligent search because her alleged efforts are insufficient to form a well-founded
belief that her husband was already dead. As held in Republic of the Philippines v.
Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),22 "[w]hether or not the spouse present acted on a well-
founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn
from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the
absent spouse and the natureand extent of the inquiries made by [the] present
spouse."
In the above-cited cases, the Court, fully aware of the possible collusion of spouses in
nullifying their marriage, has consistently applied the "strict standard" approach. This
is to ensure that a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the
Family Code is not used as a tool to conveniently circumvent the laws. Courts should
never allow procedural shortcuts and should ensure that the stricter standard required
by the Family Code is met.

The requisite judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse (and
consequently, the application of a stringent standard for its issuance) is also for the
present spouse's benefit. It is intended to protect him/her from a criminal prosecution
of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code which might come into play if
he/she would prematurely remarry sans the court's declaration.

Upon the issuance of the decision declaring his/her absent spouse presumptively
dead, the present spouse's good faith in contracting a second marriage is effectively
established. The decision of the competent court constitutes sufficient proof of his/her
good faith and his/her criminal intent in case of remarriage is effectively
negated.28 Thus, for purposes of remarriage, it is necessary to strictly comply with the
stringent standard and have the absent spouse judicially declared presumptively dead.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. YOLANDA CADACIO GRANADA, G.R. No.
187512, June 13, 2012
Facts: In May 1991, respondent Yolanda Cadacio Granada (Yolanda) met Cyrus
Granada (Cyrus) at Sumida Electric Philippines, an electronics company in Paranaque
where both were then working. The two eventually got married at the Manila City Hall
on 3 March 1993. Their marriage resulted in the birth of their son, Cyborg Dean
Cadacio Granada.
Sometime in May 1994, when Sumida Electric Philippines closed down, Cyrus went to
Taiwan to seek employment. Yolanda claimed that from that time, she had not received
any communication from her husband, notwithstanding efforts to locate him. Her
brother testified that he had asked the relatives of Cyrus regarding the latter’s
whereabouts, to no avail.
After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared
presumptively dead.
RTC: rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus as presumptively dead.
CA: affirmed the decision of the RTC
Petitioner’s contention: Petitioner argued that Yolanda had failed to exert earnest
efforts to locate Cyrus and thus failed to prove her well-founded belief that he was
already dead.
Issue: Whether the respondent had a well-founded belief that Cyrus is already dead.
Ruling: NO
Rationale: The Civil Code provision merely requires either that there be no news that
the absentee is still alive; or that the absentee is generally considered to be dead and
is believed to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead under Articles 390
and 391 of the Civil Code. In comparison, the Family Code provision prescribes a "well-
founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of
presumptive death can be granted. As noted by the Court in that case, the four
requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under the Family Code are as
follows:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or
two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger
of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is
dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee.
In evaluating whether the present spouse has been able to prove the existence of a
"well-founded belief" that the absent spouse is already dead, the Court in Nolasco cited
United States v. Biasbas,14 which it found to be instructive as to the diligence required
in searching for a missing spouse.
In Biasbas, the Court held that defendant Biasbas failed to exercise due diligence in
ascertaining the whereabouts of his first wife, considering his admission that that he
only had a suspicion that she was dead, and that the only basis of that suspicion was
the fact of her absence.
Similarly, in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Alegro, petitioner Republic sought the
reversal of the CA ruling affirming the RTC’s grant of the Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death of the absent spouse on the ground that the respondent therein
had not been able to prove a "well-founded belief" that his spouse was already dead.
The Court reversed the CA, granted the Petition, and provided the following criteria for
determining the existence of a "well-founded belief" under Article 41 of the Family
Code:
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in
this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice
to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and
that he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the
present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is
meant by a well-grounded belief. Cuello Callon writes that "es menester que su
creencia sea firme se funde en motivos racionales."
Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act. It may be
proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight
degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination probably founded in truth.
Any fact or circumstance relating to the character, habits, conditions, attachments,
prosperity and objects of life which usually control the conduct of men, and are the
motives of their actions, was, so far as it tends to explain or characterize their
disappearance or throw light on their intentions, competence [sic] evidence on the
ultimate question of his death.
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness
inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether
the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present
acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the
inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the
disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made
by present spouse. (Footnotes omitted, underscoring supplied.)
Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that
respondent Yolanda did not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent husband.
While her brother Diosdado Cadacio testified to having inquired about the whereabouts
of Cyrus from the latter’s relatives, these relatives were not presented to corroborate
Diosdado’s testimony. In short, respondent was allegedly not diligent in her search for
her husband. Petitioner argues that if she were, she would have sought information
from the Taiwanese Consular Office or assistance from other government agencies in
Taiwan or the Philippines. She could have also utilized mass media for this end, but
she did not. Worse, she failed to explain these omissions.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. GREGORIO NOLASCO, G.R. No. 94053,
March 17, 1993
Facts: Respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court of Antique,
a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker,
invoking Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition prayed that respondent's wife be
declared presumptively dead or, in the alternative, that the marriage be declared null
and void.
During trial, respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that he had first
met Janet Monica Parker, a British subject, in a bar in England during one of his ship's
port calls. From that chance meeting onwards, Janet Monica Parker lived with
respondent Nolasco on his ship for six (6) months until they returned to respondent's
hometown of San Jose, Antique on 19 November 1980 after his seaman's contract
expired. On 15 January 1982, respondent married Janet Monica Parker in San Jose,
Antique, in Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the Cathedral of San
Jose.
Respondent Nolasco further testified that after the marriage celebration, he obtained
another employment contract as a seaman and left his wife with his parents in San
Jose, Antique. Sometime in January 1983, while working overseas, respondent
received a letter from his mother informing him that Janet Monica had given birth to his
son. The same letter informed him that Janet Monica had left Antique. Respondent
claimed he then immediately asked permission to leave his ship to return home. He
arrived in Antique in November 1983.
Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself whenever his ship
docked in England proved fruitless. He also stated that all the letters he had sent to his
missing spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of
the bar where he and Janet Monica first met, were all returned to him. He also claimed
that he inquired from among friends but they too had no news of Janet Monica.
On cross-examination, respondent stated that he had lived with and later married Janet
Monica Parker despite his lack of knowledge as to her family background. He insisted
that his wife continued to refuse to give him such information even after they were
married. He also testified that he did not report the matter of Janet Monica's
disappearance to the Philippine government authorities.
Respondent Nolasco presented his mother, Alicia Nolasco, as his witness. She
testified that her daughter-in-law Janet Monica had expressed a desire to return to
England even before she had given birth to Gerry Nolasco on 7 December 1982. When
asked why her daughter-in-law might have wished to leave Antique, respondent's
mother replied that Janet Monica never got used to the rural way of life in San Jose,
Antique. Alicia Nolasco also said that she had tried to dissuade Janet Monica from
leaving as she had given birth to her son just fifteen days before, but when she (Alicia)
failed to do so, she gave Janet Monica P22,000.00 for her expenses before she left on
22 December 1982 for England. She further claimed that she had no information as to
the missing person's present whereabouts.
RTC: granted Nolasco's petition
CA: affirmed the decision of RTC
Petitioner’s contention: The Republic argued, first, that Nolasco did not possess a
"well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead,"2 and second,
Nolasco's attempt to have his marriage annulled in the same proceeding was a
"cunning attempt" to circumvent the law on marriage.3
Issue: Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.
Ruling: NO.
Rationale: When Article 41 is compared with the old provision of the Civil Code, which
it superseded,7 the following crucial differences emerge. Under Article 41, the time
required for the presumption to arise has been shortened to four (4) years; however,
there is need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse
present to remarry.8 Also, Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a stricter standard
than the Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code merely requires either that there be no
news that such absentee is still alive; or the absentee is generally considered to be
dead and believed to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead under Article
390 and 391 of the Civil Code.9 The Family Code, upon the other hand, prescribes
as "well founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a petition for
declaration of presumptive death can be granted.
The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his missing
wife with such diligence as to give rise to a "well-founded belief" that she is dead.
United States v. Biasbas, 12 is instructive as to degree of diligence required in
searching for a missing spouse. In that case, defendant Macario Biasbas was charged
with the crime of bigamy. He set-up the defense of a good faith belief that his first wife
had already died. The Court held that defendant had not exercised due diligence to
ascertain the whereabouts of his first wife, noting that:
While the defendant testified that he had made inquiries concerning
the whereabouts of his wife, he fails to state of whom he made such
inquiries. He did not even write to the parents of his first wife, who
lived in the Province of Pampanga, for the purpose of securing
information concerning her whereabouts. He admits that he had a
suspicion only that his first wife was dead. He admits that the only
basis of his suspicion was the fact that she had been absent. . . . 13
In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by
respondent in his attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too
sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already
dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning of Janet Monica's departure,
instead of seeking the help of local authorities or of the British Embassy, 14 he secured
another seaman's contract and went to London, a vast city of many millions of
inhabitants, to look for her there.

The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined to give any
information as to her personal background even after she had married
respondent 17 too convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate her. The same
can be said of the loss of the alleged letters respondent had sent to his wife which
respondent claims were all returned to him. Respondent said he had lost these
returned letters, under unspecified circumstances.

Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's bare assertion that he had
inquired from their friends of her whereabouts, considering that respondent did not
identify those friends in his testimony. The Court of Appeals ruled that since the
prosecutor failed to rebut this evidence during trial, it is good evidence. But this kind of
evidence cannot, by its nature, be rebutted. In any case, admissibility is not
synonymous with credibility. 18 As noted before, there are serious doubts to
respondent's credibility. Moreover, even if admitted as evidence, said testimony merely
tended to show that the missing spouse had chosen not to communicate with their
common acquaintances, and not that she was dead.

Respondent testified that immediately after receiving his mother's letter sometime in
January 1983, he cut short his employment contract to return to San Jose, Antique.
However, he did not explain the delay of nine (9) months from January 1983, when he
allegedly asked leave from his captain, to November 1983 when be finally reached
San Jose. Respondent, moreover, claimed he married Janet Monica Parker without
inquiring about her parents and their place of residence. 19 Also, respondent failed to
explain why he did not even try to get the help of the police or other authorities in
London and Liverpool in his effort to find his wife. The circumstances of Janet Monica's
departure and respondent's subsequent behavior make it very difficult to regard the
claimed belief that Janet Monica was dead a well-founded one.

While the Court understands the need of respondent's young son, Gerry Nolasco, for
maternal care, still the requirements of the law must prevail. Since respondent failed
to satisfy the clear requirements of the law, his petition for a judicial declaration of
presumptive death must be denied.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS (TENTH DIVISION), and ALAN B. ALEGRO, Respondents. G.R. No.
159614 December 9, 2005
FACTS:
On March 29, 2001, Alan B. Alegro filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 27, for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife,
Rosalia (Lea) A. Julaton.
At the hearing, Alan adduced evidence that he and Lea were married. He testified that,
on February 6, 1995, Lea arrived home late in the evening and he berated her for being
always out of their house. He told her that if she enjoyed the life of a single person, it
would be better for her to go back to her parents. Alan narrated that, when he reported
for work the following day, Lea was still in the house, but when he arrived home later
in the day, Lea was nowhere to be found. Alan thought that Lea merely went to her
parents’ house. However, Lea did not return to their house anymore.
Alan further testified that he went to the house of Lea’s parents to see if she was there
and to the house of Lea’s friend, but she is nowhere to be found and was told that Lea
went to Manila. When Alan went back to the house of his parents-in-law, he learned
from his father-in-law that Lea had been to their house but that she left without notice.
Alan sought the help of Barangay Captain Juan Magat, who promised to help him
locate his wife. He also inquired from his friends of Lea’s whereabouts but to no avail.
Sometime in June 1995, he decided to go to Manila to look for Lea, but his mother
asked him to leave after the town fiesta of Catbalogan, hoping that Lea may come
home for the fiesta. However, Lea did not show up. He went to a house in Navotas
where Janeth, Lea’s friend, was staying. When asked where Lea was, Janeth told him
that she had not seen her. He failed to find out Lea’s whereabouts despite his repeated
talks with Janeth. Alan decided to work as a part-time taxi driver. On his free time, he
would look for Lea in the malls but still to no avail.
On June 20, 2001, Alan reported Lea’s disappearance to the local police station and
to the NBI.
Barangay Captain Juan Magat corroborated the testimony of Alan. He declared that
on February 14, 1995, at 2:00 p.m., Alan inquired from him if Lea passed by his house
and he told Alan that she did not. Alan also told him that Lea had disappeared. He had
not seen Lea in the barangay ever since. Lea’s father, who was his compadre and the
owner of Radio DYMS, told him that he did not know where Lea was.
LOWER COURT: The court rendered judgment granting the petition. It declared that
Rosalia Julaton is presumptively dead.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent was able to prove his well-founded belief?
RULING: No. The Court finds and so holds that the respondent failed to prove that he
had a well-founded belief that his spouse was already dead.
Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act. It may be
proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight
degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination probably founded in truth.
Any fact or circumstance relating to the character, habits, conditions, attachments,
prosperity and objects of life which usually control the conduct of men, and are the
motives of their actions, was, so far as it tends to explain or characterize their
disappearance or throw light on their intentions, competence evidence on the ultimate
question of his death.
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness
inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether
the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.
Although testimonial evidence may suffice to prove the well-founded belief of the
present spouse that the absent spouse is already dead, in Republic v. Nolasco,29 the
Court warned against collusion between the parties when they find it impossible to
dissolve the marital bonds through existing legal means. It is also the maxim that "men
readily believe what they wish to be true."
In this case, the respondent failed to present a witness other than Barangay Captain
Juan Magat. The respondent even failed to present Janeth Bautista or Nelson Abaenza
or any other person from whom he allegedly made inquiries about Lea to corroborate
his testimony. On the other hand, the respondent admitted that when he returned to
the house of his parents-in-law on February 14, 1995, his father-in-law told him that
Lea had just been there but that she left without notice.
The respondent declared that Lea left their abode on February 7, 1995 after he chided
her for coming home late and for being always out of their house, and told her that it
would be better for her to go home to her parents if she enjoyed the life of a single
person. Lea, thus, left their conjugal abode and never returned. Neither did she
communicate with the respondent after leaving the conjugal abode because of her
resentment to the chastisement she received from him barely a month after their
marriage. What is so worrisome is that, the respondent failed to make inquiries from
his parents-in-law regarding Lea’s whereabouts before filing his petition in the RTC. It
could have enhanced the credibility of the respondent had he made inquiries from his
parents-in-law about Lea’s whereabouts considering that Lea’s father was the owner
of Radio DYMS.
The respondent did report and seek the help of the local police authorities and the NBI
to locate Lea, but it was only an afterthought. He did so only after the OSG filed its
notice to dismiss his petition in the RTC
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73749 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Consequently, the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 27,
is ORDERED to DISMISS the respondent’s petition.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. GLORIA BERMUDEZ-
LORINO, respondent G.R. No. 160258 January 19, 2005
(*Procedural yung discussion)
FACTS:
Respondent Gloria Bermudez-Lorino (Gloria for brevity), and her husband were
married on June 12, 1987. Out of this marriage, she begot three (3) children, namely:
Francis Jeno, Fria Lou and Fatima.
Before they got married in 1987, Gloria was unaware that her husband was a habitual
drinker, possessed with violent character/attitude, and had the propensity to go out
with friends to the extent of being unable to engage in any gainful work.
Because of her husband’s violent character, Gloria found it safer to leave him behind
and decided to go back to her parents together with her three (3) children. In order to
support the children, Gloria was compelled to work abroad.
From the time of her physical separation from her husband in 1991, Gloria has not
heard of him at all. She had absolutely no communications with him, or with any of his
relatives.
On August 14, 2000, nine (9) years after she left her husband, Gloria filed a verified
petition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at San Mateo, Rizal under the rules
on Summary Judicial Proceedings in the Family Law provided for in the Family Code
for the declaration of the presumptive death of her absent spouse.
On August 28, 2000, the RTC issued an order directing, inter alia, the publication of
the petition in a newspaper of general circulation.
LOWER COURT: In a decision dated November 7, 2001, the RTC, finding merit in the
summary petition, rendered judgment granting the same.
Despite the judgment being immediately final and executory under the provisions of
Article 247 of the Family Code, the Office of the Solicitor General nevertheless filed a
Notice of Appeal.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. Without filing any motion for
reconsideration, petitioner Republic directly went to this Court via the instant recourse
under Rule 45, maintaining that the petition raises a pure question of law that does not
require prior filing of a motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether the appeal was correct considering that the decision was rendered
as final and executory.
RULING: No. The Court rules against petitioner Republic.
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary
period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered
thereunder, by express provision of Section 247, Family Code, supra, are "immediately
final and executory". It was erroneous, therefore, on the part of the RTC to give due
course to the Republic’s appeal and order the transmittal of the entire records of the
case to the Court of Appeals.
An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by express
provision of law, is immediately final and executory. As we have said in Veloria vs.
Comelec, "the right to appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of due process, for it
is merely a statutory privilege." Since, by express mandate of Article 247 of the Family
Code, all judgments rendered in summary judicial proceedings in Family Law are
"immediately final and executory", the right to appeal was not granted to any of the
parties therein. The Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor in the petition for
declaration of presumptive death, should not be treated differently. It had no right to
appeal the RTC decision of November 7, 2001.
It was fortunate, though, that the Court of Appeals, acting through its Special Fourth
Division, with Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion as Acting Chairman and ponente, denied
the Republic’s appeal and affirmed without modification the final and executory
judgment of the lower court.
But, if only to set the records straight and for the future guidance of the bench and the
bar, let it be stated that the RTC’s decision dated November 7, 2001, was immediately
final and executory upon notice to the parties. It was erroneous for the OSG to file a
notice of appeal, and for the RTC to give due course thereto. The Court of Appeals
acquired no jurisdiction over the case, and should have dismissed the appeal outright
on that ground.
This judgment of denial was elevated to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45. Although the result of the Court of Appeals’ denial of the appeal would
apparently be the same, there is a big difference between having the supposed appeal
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by virtue of the fact that the RTC decision sought to
be appealed is immediately final and executory, and the denial of the appeal for lack
of merit. In the former, the supposed appellee can immediately ask for the issuance of
an Entry of Judgment in the RTC, whereas, in the latter, the appellant can still raise
the matter to this Court on petition for review and the RTC judgment cannot be
executed until this Court makes the final pronouncement.
The Court, therefore, finds in this case grave error on the part of both the RTC and the
Court of Appeals. To stress, the Court of Appeals should have dismissed the
appeal on ground of lack of jurisdiction, and reiterated the fact that the RTC
decision of November 7, 2001 was immediately final and executory. As it were,
the Court of Appeals committed grave reversible error when it failed to dismiss the
erroneous appeal of the Republic on ground of lack of jurisdiction because, by express
provision of law, the judgment was not appealable.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit
CELERINA J. SANTOS, Petitioner, v. RICARDO T. SANTOS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 187061, October 08, 2014
FACTS:
On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City declared petitioner Celerina
J. Santos (Celerina) presumptively dead after her husband, respondent Ricardo T.
Santos (Ricardo), had filed a petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death
for the purpose of remarriage on June 15, 2007. Ricardo remarried on September 17,
2008.
In his petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death, Ricardo alleged that he
and Celerina rented an apartment somewhere in San Juan, Metro Manila; after they
had gotten married on June 18, 1980.3 After a year, they moved to Tarlac City. They
were engaged in the buy and sell business. Ricardo claimed that their business did not
prosper. As a result, Celerina convinced him to allow her to work as a domestic helper
in Hong Kong. Ricardo initially refused but because of Celerina's insistence, he allowed
her to work abroad. She allegedly applied in an employment agency in Ermita, Manila,
in February 1995. She left Tarlac two months after and was never heard from again.
Ricardo further alleged that he exerted efforts to locate Celerina. He went to Celerina's
parents in Cubao, Quezon City, but they, too, did not know their daughter's
whereabouts. He also inquired about her from other relatives and friends, but no one
gave him any information.
Ricardo claimed that it was almost 12 years from the date of his Regional Trial Court
petition since Celerina left. He believed that she had passed away.
On the other hand, Celerina claimed that she learned about Ricardo's petition only
sometime in October 2008 when she could no longer avail the remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate remedies.
On November 17, 2008, Celerina filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the
Court of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. She argued
that she was deprived her day in court when Ricardo, despite his knowledge of her
true residence, misrepresented to the court that she was a resident of Tarlac
City. According to Celerina, her true residence was in Neptune Extension,
Congressional Avenue, Quezon City. This residence had been her and Ricardo's
conjugal dwelling since 1989 until Ricardo left in May 2008.
Celerina claimed that she never resided in Tarlac. She also never left and worked as
a domestic helper abroad. Neither did she go to an employment agency in February
1995.21 She also claimed that it was not true that she had been absent for 12 years.
Ricardo was aware that she never left their conjugal dwelling in Quezon City. It was he
who left the conjugal dwelling in May 2008 to cohabit with another woman. Celerina
referred to a joint affidavit executed by their children to support her contention that
Ricardo made false allegations in his petition.
LOWER COURT: The Court of Appeals issued the resolution dated November 28,
2008, dismissing Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment for being a wrong mode
of remedy. According to the Court of Appeals, the proper remedy was to file a sworn
statement before the civil registry, declaring her reappearance in accordance with
Article 42 of the Family Code.
Celerina argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance under Article 42 of the Family
Code is appropriate only when the spouse is actually absent and the spouse seeking
the declaration of presumptive death actually has a well-founded belief of the spouse's
death. She added that it would be inappropriate to file an affidavit of reappearance if
she did not disappear in the first place. She insisted that an action for annulment of
judgment is proper when the declaration of presumptive death is obtained fraudulently
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Celerina's petition for
annulment of judgment for being a wrong remedy for a fraudulently obtained judgment
declaring presumptive death.
RULING: Yes. The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of presumptive death
obtained by extrinsic fraud is an action to annul the judgment. An affidavit of
reappearance is not the proper remedy when the person declared presumptively dead
has never been absent
Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court's judgment, order,
or resolution has become final, and the "remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief
(or other appropriate remedies) are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner."
The grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Celerina alleged in her petition with the Court of Appeals sufficient ground/s for
annulment of judgment.
Celerina filed her petition for annulment of judgment on November 17, 2008. This was
less than two years from the July 27, 2007 decision declaring her presumptively dead
and about a month from her discovery of the decision in October 2008. The petition
was, therefore, filed within the four-year period allowed by law in case of extrinsic fraud,
and before the action is barred by laches, which is the period allowed in case of lack
of jurisdiction.
There was also no other sufficient remedy available to Celerina at the time of her
discovery of the fraud perpetrated on her.
The Family Code provides that it is the proof of absence of a spouse for four
consecutive years, coupled with a well-founded belief by the present spouse that the
absent spouse is already dead, that constitutes a justification for a second marriage
during the subsistence of another marriage.
The Family Code also provides that the second marriage is in danger of being
terminated by the presumptively dead spouse when he or she reappears. Thus:
Article 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be
automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent
spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void
ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in
the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the
instance of any interested person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent
marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined
in case such fact is disputed. (Emphasis supplied)
In other words, the Family Code provides the presumptively dead spouse with the
remedy of terminating the subsequent marriage by mere reappearance.
The filing of an affidavit of reappearance is an admission on the part of the first spouse
that his or her marriage to the present spouse was terminated when he or she was
declared absent or presumptively dead.
Moreover, a close reading of the entire Article 42 reveals that the termination of the
subsequent marriage by reappearance is subject to several conditions: (1) the non-
existence of a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio;
(2) recording in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent
marriage of the sworn statement of fact and circumstances of reappearance; (3) due
notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage of the fact of reappearance; and (4)
the fact of reappearance must either be undisputed or judicially determined.
The existence of these conditions means that reappearance does not always
immediately cause the subsequent marriage's termination. Reappearance of the
absent or presumptively dead spouse will cause the termination of the subsequent
marriage only when all the conditions enumerated in the Family Code are present.
Hence, the subsequent marriage may still subsist despite the absent or presumptively
dead spouse's reappearance (1) if the first marriage has already been annulled or has
been declared a nullity; (2) if the sworn statement of the reappearance is not recorded
in the civil registry of the subsequent spouses' residence; (3) if there is no notice to the
subsequent spouses; or (4) if the fact of reappearance is disputed in the proper courts
of law, and no judgment is yet rendered confirming, such fact of reappearance.
When subsequent marriages are contracted after a judicial declaration of presumptive
death, a presumption arises that the first spouse is already dead and that the second
marriage is legal. This presumption should prevail over the continuance of the marital
relations with the first spouse. The second marriage, as with all marriages, is presumed
valid. The burden of proof to show that the first marriage was not properly dissolved
rests on the person assailing the validity of the second marriage.
The choice of the proper remedy is also important for purposes of determining the
status of the second marriage and the liabilities of the spouse who, in bad faith, claimed
that the other spouse was absent.
A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was contracted after a court
declaration of presumptive death, lacks the requirement of a well-founded belief that
the spouse is already dead. The first marriage will not be considered as validly
terminated. Marriages contracted prior to the valid termination of a subsisting marriage
are generally considered bigamous and void. Only a subsequent marriage contracted
in good faith is protected by law.
Therefore, the party who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith is also not
immune from an action to declare his subsequent marriage void for being bigamous.
The prohibition against marriage during the subsistence of another marriage still
applies.58
If, as Celerina contends, Ricardo was in bad faith when he filed his petition to declare
her presumptively dead and when he contracted the subsequent marriage, such
marriage would be considered void for being bigamous under Article 35(4) of the
Family Code.
The provision on reappearance in the Family Code as a remedy to effect the
termination of the subsequent marriage does not preclude the spouse who was
declared presumptively dead from availing other remedies existing in law. This court
had, in fact, recognized that a subsequent marriage may also be terminated by filing
"an action in court to prove the reappearance of the absentee and obtain a declaration
of dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage."
Celerina does not admit to have been absent. She also seeks not merely the
termination of the subsequent marriage but also the nullification of its effects. She
contends that reappearance is not a sufficient remedy because it will only terminate
the subsequent marriage but not nullify the effects of the declaration of her presumptive
death and the subsequent marriage.
Celerina is correct. Since an undisturbed subsequent marriage under Article 42 of the
Family Code is valid until terminated, the "children of such marriage shall be
considered legitimate, and the property relations of the spouse[s] in such marriage will
be the same as in valid marriages." If it is terminated by mere reappearance, the
children of the subsequent marriage conceived before the termination shall still be
considered legitimate.62 Moreover, a judgment declaring presumptive death is a
defense against prosecution for bigamy.
It is true that in most cases, an action to declare the nullity of the subsequent marriage
may nullify the effects of the subsequent marriage, specifically, in relation to the status
of children and the prospect of prosecuting a respondent for bigamy.
However, "a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages may be filed
solely by the husband or wife." This means that even if Celerina is a real party in
interest who stands to be benefited or injured by the outcome of an action to nullify the
second marriage,\5 this remedy is not available to her.
Therefore, for the purpose of not only terminating the subsequent marriage but also of
nullifying the effects of the declaration of presumptive death and the subsequent
marriage, mere filing of an affidavit of reappearance would not suffice. Celerina's
choice to file an action for annulment of judgment will, therefore, lie.
WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for determination of
the existence of extrinsic fraud, grounds for nullity/annulment of the first marriage, and
the merits of the petition.
AURORA A. ANAYA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. FERNANDO O. PALAROAN, defendant-
appellee. G.R. No. L-27930 November 26, 1970
FACTS:
Plaintiff Aurora and defendant Fernando were married on 4 December 1953; that
defendant Fernando filed an action for annulment of the marriage on 7 January 1954
on the ground that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation. that
judgment was rendered therein on 23 September 1959 dismissing the complaint of
Fernando, upholding the validity of the marriage and granting Aurora's counterclaim;
that (per paragraph IV) while the amount of the counterclaim was being negotiated "to
settle the judgment," Fernando had divulged to Aurora that several months prior to
their marriage he had pre-marital relationship with a close relative of his; and that "the
non-divulgement to her of the aforementioned pre-marital secret on the part of
defendant that definitely wrecked their marriage, which apparently doomed to fail even
before it had hardly commenced ... frank disclosure of which, certitude precisely
precluded her, the Plaintiff herein from going thru the marriage that was solemnized
between them constituted 'FRAUD', in obtaining her consent, within the contemplation
of No. 4 of Article 85 of the Civil Code" (sic) (Record on Appeal, page 3). She prayed
for the annulment of the marriage and for moral damages.
Defendant Fernando, in his answer, denied the allegation in paragraph IV of the
complaint and denied having had pre-marital relationship with a close relative; he
averred that under no circumstance would he live with Aurora, as he had escaped from
her and from her relatives the day following their marriage on 4 December 1953; that
he denied having committed any fraud against her. He counterclaimed for damages
for the malicious filing of the suit. Defendant Fernando did not pray for the dismissal of
the complaint but for its dismissal "with respect to the alleged moral damages."
Plaintiff Aurora filed a reply with answer to the counterclaim, wherein she alleged:
(1) that prior to their marriage on 4 December 1953, he paid court to her, and
pretended to shower her with love and affection not because he really felt so
but because she merely happened to be the first girl available to marry so he
could evade marrying the close relative of his whose immediate members of
her family were threatening him to force him to marry her (the close relative);
(2) that since he contracted the marriage for the reason intimated by him, and
not because he loved her, he secretly intended from the very beginning not to
perform the marital duties and obligations appurtenant thereto, and
furthermore, he covertly made up his mind not to live with her;
(3) that the foregoing clandestine intentions intimated by him were prematurely
concretized for him, when in order to placate and appease the immediate
members of the family of the first girl (referent being the close relative) and to
convince them of his intention not to live with plaintiff, carried on a courtship
with a third girl with whom, after gaining the latter's love cohabited and had
several children during the whole range of nine years that Civil Case No. 21589,
had been litigated between them (parties);
LOWER COURT: The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that Aurora's
allegation of the fraud was legally insufficient to invalidate her marriage
ISSUE: Whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital
relationship with another woman is a ground for annulment of marriage?
RULING: No. For fraud as a vice of consent in marriage, which may be a cause for its
annulment, comes under Article 85, No. 4, of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 85. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing
at the time of the marriage:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party
afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely
cohabited with the other as her husband or his wife, as the case may be;
This fraud, as vice of consent, is limited exclusively by law to those kinds or
species of fraud enumerated in Article 86, as follows:
ART. 86. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in
number 4 of the preceding article:
(1) Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of the contracting
parties;
(2) Non-disclosure of the previous conviction of the other party of a
crime involving moral turpitude, and the penalty imposed was
imprisonment for two years or more;
(3) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage,
she was pregnant by a man other than her husband.
No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity
shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of
marriage.
Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one
of the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment; and it
is further excluded by the last paragraph of the article, providing that "no other
misrepresentation or deceit as to ... chastity" shall give ground for an action to annul a
marriage. While a woman may detest such non-disclosure of premarital lewdness or
feel having been thereby cheated into giving her consent to the marriage, nevertheless
the law does not assuage her grief after her consent was solemnly given, for upon
marriage she entered into an institution in which society, and not herself alone, is
interested. The lawmaker's intent being plain, the Court's duty is to give effect to the
same, whether it agrees with the rule or not.
But plaintiff-appellant Anaya emphasizes that not only has she alleged "non-
divulgement" (the word chosen by her) of the pre-marital relationship of her husband
with another woman as her cause of action, but that she has, likewise, alleged in her
reply that defendant Fernando paid court to her without any intention of complying with
his marital duties and obligations and covertly made up his mind not to live with her.
Plaintiff-appellant contends that the lower court erred in ignoring these allegations in
her reply.

This second set of averments which were made in the reply (pretended love and
absence of intention to perform duties of consortium) is an entirely new and additional
"cause of action." According to the plaintiff herself, the second set of allegations is
"apart, distinct and separate from that earlier averred in the Complaint ..." Said
allegations were, therefore, improperly alleged in the reply, because if in a reply a
party-plaintiff is not permitted to amend or change the cause of action as set forth in
his complaint (Calo vs. Roldan, 76 Phil. 445), there is more reason not to allow such
party to allege a new and additional cause of action in the reply. Otherwise, the series
of pleadings of the parties could become interminable.

On the merits of this second fraud charge, it is enough to point out that any secret
intention on the husband's part not to perform his marital duties must have been
discovered by the wife soon after the marriage: hence her action for annulment based
on that fraud should have been brought within four years after the marriage. Since
appellant's wedding was celebrated in December of 1953, and this ground was only
pleaded in 1966, it must be declared already barred.

FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the appealed order is hereby affirmed. No costs.
FERNANDO AQUINO, petitioner, vs. CONCHITA DELIZO, respondent.
G.R. No. L-15853 July 27, 1960
FACTS:
A complaint for annulment of marriage was filed by petitioner alleging that defendant
Conchita Delizo, herein respondent, at the date of her marriage to plaintiff, herein
petitioner Fernando Aquino, on December 27, 1954, concealed from the latter that fact
that she was pregnant by another man, and sometime in April, 1955, or about four
months after their marriage, gave birth to a child. In her answer, defendant claimed
that the child was conceived out of lawful wedlock between her and the plaintiff.
On June 16, 1956, the trial court — noting that no birth certificate was presented to
show that the child was born within 180 days after the marriage between the parties,
and holding that concealment of pregnancy as alleged by the plaintiff does not
constitute such fraud sa would annul a marriage — dismissed the complaint.
Through a verified "petition to reopen for reception of additional evidence", plaintiff tried
to present the certificates of birth and delivery of the child born of the defendant on
April 26, 1955, which documents, according to him, he had failed to secure earlier and
produce before the trial court thru excusable negligence. The petition, however, was
denied.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, that court held that there has been excusable
neglect in plaintiff's inability to present the proof of the child's birth, through her birth
certificate, and for that reason the court a quo erred in denying the motion for reception
of additional evidence. On the theory, however, that it was not impossible for plaintiff
and defendant to have had sexual intercourse during their engagement so that the
child could be their own, and finding unbelievable plaintiff's claim that he did not notice
or even suspect that defendant was pregnant when he married her, the appellate court,
nevertheless, affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.
On March 17, 1959, plaintiff filed a motion praying that the decision be reconsidered,
or, if such reconsideration be denied, that the case be remanded to the lower court for
new trial. In support of the motion, plaintiff attached as annexes thereof the following
documents:
1. Affidavit of Cesar Aquino (Annex A) (defendant's brother-in-law and
plaintiff's brother, with whom defendant was living at the time plaintiff met,
courted and married her, and with whom defendant has begotten two more
children, aside from her first born, in common-law relationship) admitting that
he is the father of defendant's first born, Catherine Bess Aquino, and that he
and defendant hid her pregnancy from plaintiff at the time of plaintiff's
marriage to defendant;
2. Affidavit of defendant, Conchita Delizo (Annex "B") admitting her
pregnancy by Cesar Aquino, her brother-in-law and plaintiff's own brother, at
the time of her marriage to plaintiff and her having hidden this fact from
plaintiff before and up to the time of their marriage;
3. Affidavit of Albert Powell (Annex "C") stating that he knew Cesar Aquino
and defendant lived together as husband and wife before December 27,
1954, the date of plaintiff's marriage to defendant;
4. Birth Certificate of defendant's first born, Catherine Bess Aquino showing
her date of birth to be April 26, 1955;
5. Birth Certificate (Annex "D") of Carolle Ann Aquino, the second child of
defendant with Cesar Aquino, her brother-in-law;
6. Birth Certificate (Annex "E") of Chris Charibel Aquino, the third child of
Cesar Aquino and defendant; and
7. Pictures of defendant showing her natural plumpness as early as 1952 to
as late as November, 1954, the November, 1954 photo itself does not show
defendant's pregnancy which must have been almost four months old at the
time the picture was taken.
Acting upon the motion, the Court of Appeals ordered the defendant Conchita Delizo
and Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, who was representing the Government, to
answer the motion for reconsideration, and deferred action on the prayer for new trial
until after the case is disposed of. As both the defendant and the fiscal failed to file an
answer, and stating that it "does not believe the veracity of the contents of the motion
and its annexes", the Court of Appeals, on August 6, 1959, denied the motion. From
that order, the plaintiff brought the case to this Court thru the present petition
for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the dismissal of the
complaint?
RULING: Yes.
Under the new Civil Code, concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the
marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is
ground for annulment of marriage. (Art. 85, par. (4) in relation to Art. 86, par. (3). In the
case of Buccat vs. Buccat (72 Phil., 19) cited in the decision sought to be reviewed,
which was also an action for the annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud,
plaintiff's claim that he did not even suspect the pregnancy of the defendant was held
to be unbelievable, it having been proven that the latter was already in an advanced
stage of pregnancy (7th month) at the time of their marriage. That pronouncement,
however, cannot apply to the case at bar. Here the defendant wife was alleged to be
only more than four months pregnant at the time of her marriage to plaintiff. At that
stage, we are not prepared to say that her pregnancy was readily apparent, especially
since she was "naturally plump" or fat as alleged by plaintiff. According to medical
authorities, even on the 5th month of pregnancy, the enlargement of a woman's
abdomen is still below the umbilicus, that is to say, the enlargement is limited to the
lower part of the abdomen so that it is hardly noticeable and may, if noticed, be
attributed only to fat formation on the lower part of the abdomen. It is only on the 6th
month of pregnancy that the enlargement of the woman's abdomen reaches a height
above the umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen more general and
apparent. (See Lull, Clinical Obstetrics, p. 122) If, as claimed by plaintiff, defendant is
"naturally plump", he could hardly be expected to know, merely by looking, whether or
not she was pregnant at the time of their marriage more so because she must have
attempted to conceal the true state of affairs. Even physicians and surgeons, with the
aid of the woman herself who shows and gives her subjective and objective symptoms,
can only claim positive diagnosis of pregnancy in 33% at five months. and 50% at six
months. (XI Cyclopedia of Medicine, Surgery, etc. Pregnancy, p. 10).

The appellate court also said that it was not impossible for plaintiff and defendant to
have had sexual intercourse before they got married and therefore the child could be
their own. This statement, however, is purely conjectural and finds no support or
justification in the record.

Upon the other hand, the evidence sought to be introduced at the new trial, taken
together with what has already been adduced would, in our opinion, be sufficient to
sustain the fraud alleged by plaintiff. The Court of Appeals should, therefore, not have
denied the motion praying for new trial simply because defendant failed to file her
answer thereto. Such failure of the defendant cannot be taken as evidence of collusion,
especially since a provincial fiscal has been ordered of represent the Government
precisely to prevent such collusion. As to the veracity of the contents of the motion and
its annexes, the same can best be determined only after hearing evidence. In the
circumstance, we think that justice would be better served if a new trial were ordered.

Wherefore, the decision complained of is set aside and the case remanded to the court
a quo for new trial. Without costs.
JOEL JIMENEZ, plaintiff-appellee, vs. REMEDIOS CAÑIZARES, defendant.
Republic of the Philippines, intervenor-appellant. G.R. No. L-12790 August
31, 1960
FACTS:
In a complaint filed on 7 June 1955 in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga the
plaintiff Joel Jimenez prays for a decree annulling his marriage to the defendant
Remedios Cañizares contracted on 3 August 1950 before a judge of the municipal
court of Zamboanga City, upon the ground that the office of her genitals or vagina was
to small to allow the penetration of a male organ or penis for copulation; that the
condition of her genitals as described above existed at the time of marriage and
continues to exist; and that for that reason he left the conjugal home two nights and
one day after they had been married.
On 14 June 1955 the wife was summoned and served a copy of the complaint. She
did not file an answer. On 29 September 1956, pursuant to the provisions of article 88
of the Civil Code, the Court directed the city attorney of Zamboanga to inquire whether
there was a collusion, to intervene for the State to see that the evidence for the plaintiff
is not a frame-up, concocted or fabricated.
On 17 December 1956 the Court entered an order requiring the defendant to submit
to a physical examination by a competent lady physician to determine her physical
capacity for copulation and to submit, within ten days from receipt of the order, a
medical certificate on the result thereof. On 14 March 1957 the defendant was granted
additional five days from notice to comply with the order of 17 December 1956 with
warning that her failure to undergo medical examination and submit the required
doctor's certificate would be deemed lack of interest on her part in the case and that
judgment upon the evidence presented by her husband would be rendered.
Marriage in this country is an institution in which the community is deeply interested.
The state has surrounded it with safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity and
permanence. The security and stability of the state are largely dependent upon it. It is
the interest of each and every member of the community to prevent the bringing about
of a condition that would shake its foundation and ultimately lead to its destruction. The
incidents of the status are governed by law, not by will of the parties. The law
specifically enumerates the legal grounds, that must be proved to exist by indubitable
evidence, to annul a marriage.
In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in question was decreed upon the
sole testimony of the husband who was expected to give testimony tending or aiming
at securing the annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether the wife is
really impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily established, because
from the commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the decree she had
abstained from taking part therein. Although her refusal to be examined or failure to
appear in court show indifference on her part, yet from such attitude the presumption
arising out of the suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred because
women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a
physical examination unless compelled to by competent authority. This the Court may
do without doing violence to and infringing in this case is not self-incrimination. She is
not charged with any offense. She is not being compelled to be a witness against
herself.1 "Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The
presumption is in favor of potency."2 The lone testimony of the husband that his wife
is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that
have bound them together as husband and wife.
The decree appealed from is set aside and the case remanded to the lower court for
further proceedings in accordance with this decision, without pronouncement as to
costs.

LOWER COURT: The Court entered a decree annulling the marriage between the
plaintiff and the defendant.

On 26 April 1957 the city attorney filed a motion for reconsideration of the decree thus
entered, upon the ground, among others, that the defendant's impotency has not been
satisfactorily established as required by law; that she had not been physically
examined because she had refused to be examined; that instead of annulling the
marriage the Court should have punished her for contempt of court and compelled her
to undergo a physical examination and submit a medical certificate; and that the decree
sought to be reconsidered would open the door to married couples, who want to end
their marriage to collude or connive with each other by just alleging impotency of one
of them. He prayed that the complaint be dismissed or that the wife be subjected to a
physical examination.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage in question may be annulled on the strength only
of the lone testimony of the husband who claimed and testified that his wife was and
is impotent?

RULING: No.