Republic of the Philippines On January 2, 1968, the rank and file workers of the Tropical Hut
SUPREME COURT Food Market Incorporated, referred to herein as respondent
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-43495-99 January 20, 1990
TROPICAL HUT EMPLOYEES' UNION-CGW, JOSE
ENCINAS, JOSE LUIS TRIBINO, FELIPE DURAN,
MANUEL MANGYAO, MAMERTO CAHUCOM, NEMESIO
BARRO, TEODULFO CAPAGNGAN, VICTORINO
ABORRO, VIDAL MANTOS, DALMACIO DALDE, LUCIO
PIASAN, CANUTO LABADAN, TERESO ROMERDE,
CONRADO ENGALAN, SALVADOR NERVA, BERNARDO
ENGALAN, BONIFACIO CAGATIN, BENEDICTO
VALDEZ, EUSEBIO SUPILANAS, ALFREDO HAMAYAN,
ASUERO BONITO, GAVINO DEL CAMPO, ZACARIAS
DAMING, PRUDENCIO LADION, FULGENCIO
BERSALUNA, ALBERTO PERALES, ROMEO MAGRAMO,
GODOFREDO CAMINOS, GILDARDO DUMAS, JORGE
SALDIVAR, GENARO MADRIO, SEGUNDINO KUIZON,
LUIS SANDOVAL, NESTOR JAPAY, ROGELIO CUIZON,
RENATO ANTIPADO, GREGORIO CUEVO, MARTIN
BALAZUELA, CONSTANCIO CHU, CRISPIN TUBLE,
FLORENCIO CHIU, FABIAN CAHUCOM, EMILIANO
VILLAMOR, RESTITUTO HANDAYAN, VICTORINO
ESPEDILLA, NOEL CHUA, ARMANDO ALCORANO,
ELEUTERIO TAGUIK, SAMSON CRUDA, DANILO
CASTRO, CENON VALLENAS, DANILO CAWALING,
SIMPLICIO GALLEROS, PERFECTO CUIZON, PROCESO
LAUROS, ANICETO BAYLON, EDISON ANDRES,
REYNALDO BAGOHIN, IRENEO SUPANGAN, RODRIGO
CAGATIN, TEODORO ORENCIO, ARMANDO LUAYON,
JAIME NERVA, NARCISO CUIZON, ALFREDO DEL
ROSARIO, EDUARDO LORENZO, PEDRO ARANGO,
VICENTE SUPANGAN, JACINTO BANAL AND
BONIFACIO PUERTO, petitioners,
vs.
TROPICAL HUT FOOD MARKET, INC., ESTELITA J. QUE,
ARTURO DILAG, MARCELINO LONTOK JR., NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF TRADE UNIONS (NATU), NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), HON.
DIEGO P. ATIENZA, GERONIMO Q. QUADRA,
FEDERICO C. BORROMEO, AND HON. BLAS F.
OPLE, respondents.
Pacifico C. Rosal for petitioners.
Marcelino Lontok, Jr. for private respondents.
Dizon, Vitug & Fajardo Law Office for Tropical Hut Food Market,
Inc. and Que.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to set
aside the decisions of the public respondents Secretary of
Labor and National Labor Relations Commission which
reversed the Arbitrators rulings in favor of petitioners herein.
The following factual background of this case appears from the
record:
company, organized a local union called the Tropical Hut
Employees Union, known for short as the THEU, elected their
officers, adopted their constitution and by-laws and immediately
sought affiliation with the National Association of Trade Unions
(NATU). On January 3, 1968, the NATU accepted the THEU
application for affiliation. Following such affiliation with NATU,
Registration Certificate No. 5544-IP was issued by the Department
of Labor in the name of the Tropical Hut Employees Union —
NATU. It appears, however, that NATU itself as a labor
federation, was not registered with the Department of Labor.
After several negotiations were conducted between THEU-NATU,
represented by its local president and the national officers of the
NATU, particularly Ignacio Lacsina, President, Pacifico Rosal,
Executive Vice-President and Marcelino Lontok, Jr., Vice
President, and respondent Tropical Hut Food Market,
Incorporated, thru its President and General Manager, Cesar
Azcona, Sr., a Collective Bargaining Agreement was concluded
between the parties on April 1, 1968, the term of which expired on
March 31, 1971. Said agreement' contained these clear and
unequivocal terms:
This Agreement made and entered into this __________
day of ___________, 1968, by and between:
The Tropical Hut Food Market, Inc., a corporation duly
organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws
of the Republic of the Philippines, with principal office at
Quezon City, represented in this Act by its President,
Cesar B. Azcona (hereinafter referred to as the Company)
—and—
The Tropical Hut Employees Union — NATU, a
legitimate labor organization duly organized and
existing in accordance with the laws of the Republic of
the Philippines, and affiliated with the National
Association of Trade Unions, with offices at San Luis
Terraces, Ermita, Manila, and represented in this Act by
its undersigned officers (hereinafter referred to as the
UNION)
Witnesseth:
xxx xxx xxx
Article I
Coverage and Effectivity
Sec. 1. The COMPANY recognizes the UNION as the sole
and exclusive collective bargaining agent for all its
workers and employees in all matters concerning wages,
hours of work, and other terms and conditions of
employment.
xxx xxx xxx
Article III
Union Membership and Union Check-off
 Sec. 1 —. . . Employees who are already members of the
UNION at the time of the signing of this Agreement or
who become so thereafter shall be required to maintain
their membership therein as a condition of continued
employment.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3—Any employee who is expelled from the UNION
for joining another federation or forming another union,
or who fails or refuses to maintain his membership
therein as required, . . . shall, upon written request of the
UNION be discharged by the COMPANY. (Rollo, pp.
667-670)
And attached to the Agreement as Appendix "A" is a check-off
Authorization Form, the terms of which are as follows:
We, the undersigned, hereby designate the NATIONAL
Association of Trade Unions, of which the TROPICAL
HUT EMPLOYEES UNION is an affiliate as sole
collective bargaining agent in all matters relating to
salary rates, hours of work and other terms and
conditions of employment in the Tropical Hut Food
Market, Inc. and we hereby authorize the said company
to deduct the amount of Four (P 4.00) Pesos each every
month as our monthly dues and to deliver the amount to
the Treasurer of the Union or his duly authorized
representatives. (Rollo, pp. 680-684)
On May 21, 1971, respondent company and THEU-NATU entered
into a new Collective Bargaining Agreement which ended on
March 31, 1974. This new CBA incorporated the previous union-
shop security clause and the attached check-off authorization
form.
Sometime in July, 1973, Arturo Dilag, incumbent President of
THEU-NATU, was appointed by the respondent company as
Assistant Unit Manager. On July 24, 1973, he wrote the general
membership of his union that for reason of his present position, he
was resigning as President of the THEU-NATU effective that date.
As a consequence thereof, his Vice-President, Jose Encinas,
assumed and discharged the duties of the presidency of the
THEU-NATU.
On December 19,1973, NATU received a letter dated December 15,
1973, jointly signed by the incumbent officers of the local union
informing the NATU that THEU was disaffiliating from the NATU
federation. On December 20, 1973, the Secretary of the THEU,
Nemesio Barro, made an announcement in an open letter to the
general membership of the THEU, concerning the latter's
disaffiliation from the NATU and its affiliation with the
Confederation of General Workers (CGW). The letter was passed
around among the members of the THEU-NATU, to which around
one hundred and thirty-seven (137) signatures appeared as having
given their consent to and acknowledgment of the decision to
disaffiliate the THEU from the NATU.
On January 1, 1974, the general membership of the so-called
THEU-CGW held its annual election of officers, with Jose Encinas
elected as President. On January 3, 1974, Encinas, in his capacity as
THEU-CGW President, informed the respondent company of the
result of the elections. On January 9, 1974, Pacifico Rosal, President
of the Confederation of General Workers (CGW), wrote a letter in
behalf of complainant THEU-CGW to the respondent company
demanding the remittance of the union dues collected by the
Tropical Hut Food Mart, Incorporated to the THEU-CGW, but this
was refused by the respondent company.
On January 11, 1974, the NATU thru its Vice-President Marcelino
Lontok, Jr., wrote Vidal Mantos, requiring the latter to assume
immediately the position of President of the THEU-NATU in place
of Jose Encinas, but the position was declined by Mantos. On the
same day, Lontok, Jr., informed Encinas in a letter, concerning the
request made by the NATU federation to the respondent company
to dismiss him (Encinas) in view of his violation of Section 3 of
Article III of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Encinas was
also advised in the letter that NATU was returning the letter of
disaffiliation on the ground that:
1. Under the restructuring program NOT of the Bureau
of Labor but of the Philippine National Trade Union
Center in conjunction with the NATU and other
established national labor centers, retail clerks and
employees such as our members in the Tropical Hut
pertain to Industry II which by consensus, has been
assigned already to the jurisdiction of the NATU;
2. The right to disaffiliate belongs to the union
membership who — on the basis of verified reports
received by — have not even been consulted by you
regarding the matter;
3. Assuming that the disaffiliation decision was properly
reached; your letter nevertheless is unacceptable in view
of Article V, Section 1, of the NATU Constitution which
provides that "withdrawal from the organization shall he
valid provided three (3) months notice of intention to
withdraw is served upon the National Executive
Council." (p. 281, Rollo)
In view of NATU's request, the respondent company, on the same
day, which was January 11, 1974, suspended Encinas pending the
application for clearance with the Department of Labor to dismiss
him. On January 12, 1974, members of the THEU-CGW passed a
resolution protesting the suspension of Encinas and reiterated
their ratification and approval of their union's disaffiliation from
NATU and their affiliation with the Confederation of General
Workers (CGW). It was Encinas' suspension that caused the filing
of NLRC Case No. LR-2511 on January 11, 1974 against private
respondents herein, charging them of unfair labor practice.
On January 15,1974, upon the request of NATU, respondent
company applied for clearance with the Secretary of Labor to
dismiss the other officers and members of THEU-CGW. The
company also suspended them effective that day. NLRC Case No.
LR-2521 was filed by THEU-CGW and individual complainants
against private respondents for unfair labor practices.
On January 19, 1974, Lontok, acting as temporary chairman,
presided over the election of officers of the remaining THEU-
NATU in an emergency meeting pending the holding of a special
election to be called at a later date. In the alleged election, Arturo
Dilag was elected acting THEU-NATU President together with the
other union officers. On February 14, 1974, these temporary
officers were considered as having been elected as regular officers
for the year 1974.
On January 30, 1974, petitioner THEU-CGW wrote a letter to Juan
Ponce Enrile, Secretary of National Defense, complaining of the
unfair labor practices committed by respondent company against
its members and requesting assistance on the matter. The
aforementioned letter contained the signatures of one hundred
forty-three (143) members.
On February 24,1974, the secretary of THEU-NATU, notified the
entire rank and file employees of the company that they will be
given forty-eight (48) hours upon receipt of the notice within
which to answer and affirm their membership with THEU-NATU.
When the petitioner employees failed to reply, Arturo Dilag
advised them thru letters dated February 26, March 2 and 5, 1974,
that the THEU-NATU shall enforce the union security clause set
forth in the CBA, and that he had requested respondent company
to dismiss them.
Respondent company, thereafter, wrote the petitioner employees
demanding the latter's comment on Dilag's charges before action
was taken thereon. However, no comment or reply was received
from petitioners. In view of this, Estelita Que, President/General
Manager of respondent company, upon Dilag's request,
suspended twenty four (24) workers on March 5, 1974, another
thirty seven (37) on March 8, 1974 and two (2) more on March 11,
1974, pending approval by the Secretary of Labor of the
application for their dismissal.
As a consequence thereof, NLRC Case Nos. LR-2971, LR-3015 and
an unnumbered case were filed by petitioners against Tropical Hut
Food Market, Incorporated, Estelita Que, Hernando Sarmiento and
Arturo Dilag.
It is significant to note that the joint letter petition signed by sixty-
seven (67) employees was filed with the Secretary of Labor, the
NLRC Chairman and Director of Labor Relations to cancel the
words NATU after the name of Tropical Hut Employee Union
under Registration Certificate No. 5544 IP. Another letter signed
by one hundred forty-six (146) members of THEU-CGW was sent
to the President of the Philippines informing him of the unfair
labor practices committed by private respondents against THEU-
CGW members.
After hearing the parties in NLRC Cases Nos. 2511 and 2521 jointly
filed with the Labor Arbiter, Arbitrator Daniel Lucas issued an
order dated March 21, 1974, holding that the issues raised by the
parties became moot and academic with the issuance of NLRC
Order dated February 25, 1974 in NLRC Case No. LR-2670, which
directed the holding of a certification election among the rank and
file workers of the respondent company between the THEU-
NATU and THEU-CGW. He also ordered: a) the reinstatement of
all complainants; b) for the respondent company to cease and
desist from committing further acts of dismissals without previous
order from the NLRC and for the complainant Tropical Hut
Employees UNION-CGW to file representation cases on a case to
case basis during the freedom period provided for by the existing
CBA between the parties (pp. 91-93, Rollo).
With regard to NLRC Case Nos. LR-2971, LR-3015, and the
unnumbered case, Arbitrator Cleto T. Villatuya rendered a
decision dated October 14, 1974, the dispositive portion of which
states:
Premises considered, a DECISION is hereby rendered
ordering respondent company to reinstate immediately
the sixty three (63) complainants to their former positions
with back wages from the time they were illegally
suspended up to their actual reinstatement without loss
of seniority and other employment rights and privileges,
and ordering the respondents to desist from further
committing acts of unfair labor practice. The respondent
company's application for clearance filed with the
Secretary of Labor to terminate the subject complainants'
services effective March 20 and 23, 1974, should be
denied.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 147-148, Rollo)
From the orders rendered above by Abitrator Daniel Lucas in
NLRC Cases No. LR-2511 and LR-2521 and by Arbitrator Cleto
Villatuya in NLRC Cases Nos. LR-2971, LR-3015, and the
unnumbered case, all parties thereto, namely, petitioners herein,
respondent company, NATU and Dilag appealed to the National
Labor Relations Commission.
In a decision rendered on August 1, 1975, the National Labor
Relations Commission found the private respondents' appeals
meritorious, and stated, inter alia:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the
Order of Arbitrator Lucas in NLRC CASE NOS. LR-2511,
2521 and the decision of Arbitrator Villatuya in NLRC
CASE NOS. LR-2971, 3015 and the unnumbered Case are
hereby REVERSED. Accordingly, the individual
complainants are deemed to have lost their status as
employees of the respondent company. However,
considering that the individual complainants are not
presumed to be familiar with nor to have anticipated the
legal mesh they would find themselves in, after their
"disaffiliation" from National Association of Trade
Unions and the THEU-NATU, much less the legal
consequences of the said action which we presume they
have taken in all good faith; considering, further, that the
thrust of the new orientation in labor relations is not
towards the punishment of acts violative of contractual
relations but rather towards fair adjustments of the
resulting complications; and considering, finally, the
consequent economic hardships that would be visited on
the individual complainants, if the law were to be strictly
enforced against them, this Commission is constrained to
be magnanimous in this instant, notwithstanding its
obligation to give full force and effect to the majesty of
the law, and hereby orders the respondent company,
under pain of being cited for contempt for failure to do
so, to give the individual complainants a second chance
by reemploying them upon their voluntary reaffirmation
of membership and loyalty to the Tropical Hut
Employees Union-NATU and the National Association
of Trade Unions in the event it hires additional
personnel.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 312-313, Rollo)
The petitioner employees appealed the decision of the
respondent National Labor Relations Commission to the
Secretary of Labor. On February 23, 1976, the Secretary of
Labor rendered a decision affirming the findings of the
Commission, which provided inter alia:
We find, after a careful review of the record, no
sufficient justification to alter the decision appealed
from except that portion of the dispositive part which
states:
 . . . this Commission . . . hereby orders
respondent company under pain of being
cited for contempt for failure to do so, to
give the individual complainants a second
chance by reemploying them upon their
voluntary reaffirmation of membership and
loyalty to the Tropical Hut Employees
UNION-NATU and the National Association
of Trade Union in the event it hires
additional personnel.
Compliance by respondent of the above undertaking
is not immediately feasible considering that the same
is based on an uncertain event, i.e., reemployment of
individual complainants "in the event that
management hires additional personnel," after they
shall have reaffirmed their loyalty to THEU-NATU,
which is unlikely.
In lieu of the foregoing, and to give complainants
positive relief pursuant to Section 9, Implementing
Instruction No. 1. dated November 9, 1972,
respondent is hereby ordered to grant to all the
individual complainants financial assistance
equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of
service.
WHEREFORE, with the modification as above
indicated, the Decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission is hereby affirmed.
SO ORDERED.(pp. 317-318, Rollo)
From the various pleadings filed and arguments adduced by
petitioners and respondents, the following issues appear to be
those presented for resolution in this petition to wit: 1)
whether or not the petitioners failed to exhaust administrative
remedies when they immediately elevated the case to this
Court without an appeal having been made to the Office of the
President; 2) whether or not the disaffiliation of the local union
from the national federation was valid; and 3) whether or not
the dismissal of petitioner employees resulting from their
unions disaffiliation for the mother federation was illegal and
constituted unfair labor practice on the part of respondent
company and federation.
We find the petition highly meritorious.
The applicable law then is the Labor Code, PD 442, as
amended by PD 643 on January 21, 1975, which states:
Art. 222. Appeal — . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Decisions of the Secretary of Labor may be appealed
to the President of the Philippines subject to such
conditions or limitations as the President may direct.
(Emphasis ours)
The remedy of appeal from the Secretary of Labor to the Office
of the President is not a mandatory requirement before resort
to courts can be had, but an optional relief provided by law to
parties seeking expeditious disposition of their labor disputes.
Failure to avail of such relief shall not in any way served as an
impediment to judicial intervention. And where the issue is
lack of power or arbitrary or improvident exercise thereof,
decisions of the Secretary of Labor may be questioned in
a certiorari proceeding without prior appeal to the President
(Arrastre Security Association —TUPAS v. Ople, No. L-45344,
February 20, 1984, 127 SCRA 580). Since the instant petition
raises the same issue of grave abuse of discretion of the
Secretary of Labor amounting to lack of or in excess of
jurisdiction in deciding the controversy, this Court can
properly take cognizance of and resolve the issues raised
herein.
This brings Us to the question of the legality of the dismissal
meted to petitioner employees. In the celebrated case of Liberty
Cotton Mills Workers Union v. Liberty Cotton Mills, L-33187,
September 4, 1975, 66 SCRA 512, We held that the validity of
the dismissals pursuant to the union security clause in the
collective bargaining agreement hinges on the validity of the
disaffiliation of the local union from the federation.
The right of a local union to disaffiliate from its mother
federation is well-settled. A local union, being a separate and
voluntary association, is free to serve the interest of all its
members including the freedom to disaffiliate when
circumstances warrant. This right is consistent with the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of association (Volkschel
Labor Union v. Bureau of Labor Relations, No. L-45824, June
19, 1985, 137 SCRA 42).
All employees enjoy the right to self organization and to form
and join labor organizations of their own choosing for the
purpose of collective bargaining and to engage in concerted
activities for their mutual aid or protection. This is a
fundamental right of labor that derives its existence from the
Constitution. In interpreting the protection to labor and social
justice provisions of the Constitution and the labor laws or
rules or regulations, We have always adopted the liberal
approach which favors the exercise of labor rights.
Relevant on this point is the basic principle We have
repeatedly in affirmed in many rulings:
. . . The locals are separate and distinct units primarily
designed to secure and maintain an equality of
bargaining power between the employer and their
employee-members in the economic struggle for the
fruits of the joint productive effort of labor and
capital; and the association of the locals into the
national union (PAFLU) was in furtherance of the
same end. These associations are consensual entities
capable of entering into such legal relations with their
member. The essential purpose was the affiliation of
the local unions into a common enterprise to increase
by collective action the common bargaining power in
respect of the terms and conditions of labor. Yet the
locals remained the basic units of association, free to
serve their own and the common interest of all,
subject to the restraints imposed by the Constitution
 and By-Laws of the Association, and free also to
renounce the affiliation for mutual welfare upon the
terms laid down in the agreement which brought it
into existence. (Adamson & Adamson, Inc. v. CIR,
No. L-35120, January 31, 1984, 127 SCRA 268; Elisco-
Elirol Labor Union (NAFLU) v. Noriel, No. L-41955,
December 29, 1977, 80 SCRA 681; Liberty Cotton Mills
Workers Union v. Liberty Cotton Mills, Inc., supra).
The inclusion of the word NATU after the name of the local
union THEU in the registration with the Department of Labor
is merely to stress that the THEU is NATU's affiliate at the time
of the registration. It does not mean that the said local union
cannot stand on its own. Neither can it be interpreted to mean
that it cannot pursue its own interests independently of the
federation. A local union owes its creation and continued
existence to the will of its members and not to the federation to
which it belongs.
When the local union withdrew from the old federation to join
a new federation, it was merely exercising its primary right to
labor organization for the effective enhancement and
protection of common interests. In the absence of enforceable
provisions in the federation's constitution preventing
disaffiliation of a local union a local may sever its relationship
with its parent (People's Industrial and Commercial
Employees and Workers Organization (FFW) v. People's
Industrial and Commercial Corporation, No. 37687, March 15,
1982, 112 SCRA 440).
There is nothing in the constitution of the NATU or in the
constitution of the THEU-NATU that the THEU was expressly
forbidden to disaffiliate from the federation (pp. 62, 281, Rollo),
The alleged non-compliance of the local union with the
provision in the NATU Constitution requiring the service of
three months notice of intention to withdraw did not produce
the effect of nullifying the disaffiliation for the following
grounds: firstly, NATU was not even a legitimate labor
organization, it appearing that it was not registered at that
time with the Department of Labor, and therefore did not
possess and acquire, in the first place, the legal personality to
enforce its constitution and laws, much less the right and
privilege under the Labor Code to organize and affiliate
chapters or locals within its group, and secondly, the act of
non-compliance with the procedure on withdrawal is premised
on purely technical grounds which cannot rise above the
fundamental right of self-organization.
Respondent Secretary of Labor, in affirming the decision of the
respondent Commission, concluded that the supposed
decision to disaffiliate was not the subject of a free and open
discussion and decision on the part of the THEU-NATU
general membership (p. 305, Rollo). This, however, is
contradicted by the evidence on record. Moreover, We are
inclined to believe Arbitrator Villatuya's findings to the
contrary, as follows:
. . . . However, the complainants refute this allegation
by submitting the following: a) Letter dated
December 20, 1.973 signed by 142 members (Exhs. "B
to B-5") resolution dated January 12, 1974, signed by
140 members (Exhs. "H to H-6") letter dated February
26, 1974 to the Department of Labor signed by 165
members (Exhs. "I to I-10"); d) letter dated January 30,
1974 to the Secretary of the National Defense signed
by 144 members (Exhs. "0 to 0-5") and; e) letter dated
March 6, 1974 signed by 146 members addressed to
the President of the Philippines (Exhs. "HH to HH-5"),
to show that in several instances, the members of the
THEU-NATU have acknowledged their disaffiliation
from NATU. The letters of the complainants also
indicate that an overwhelming majority have freely
and voluntarily signed their union's disaffiliation
from NATU, otherwise, if there was really deception
employed in securing their signatures as claimed by
NATU/ Dilag, it could not be possible to get their
signatures in five different documents. (p. 144, Rollo)
We are aware of the time-honored doctrine that the findings of
the NLRC and the Secretary of Labor are binding on this Court
if supported by substantial evidence. However, in the same
way that the findings of facts unsupported by substantial and
credible evidence do not bind this Court, neither will We
uphold erroneous conclusions of the NLRC and the Secretary
of Labor when We find that the latter committed grave abuse
of discretion in reversing the decision of the labor arbiter (San
Miguel Corporation v. NLRC, L-50321, March 13, 1984, 128
SCRA 180). In the instant case, the factual findings of the
arbitrator were correct against that of public respondents.
Further, there is no merit in the contention of the respondents
that the act of disaffiliation violated the union security clause
of the CBA and that their dismissal as a consequence thereof is
valid. A perusal of the collective bargaining agreements shows
that the THEU-NATU, and not the NATU federation, was
recognized as the sole and exclusive collective bargaining
agent for all its workers and employees in all matters
concerning wages, hours of work and other terms and
conditions of employment (pp. 667-706, Rollo). Although
NATU was designated as the sole bargaining agent in the
check-off authorization form attached to the CBA, this simply
means it was acting only for and in behalf of its affiliate. The
NATU possessed the status of an agent while the local union
remained the basic principal union which entered into contract
with the respondent company. When the THEU disaffiliated
from its mother federation, the former did not lose its legal
personality as the bargaining union under the CBA. Moreover,
the union security clause embodied in the agreements cannot
be used to justify the dismissals meted to petitioners since it is
not applicable to the circumstances obtaining in this case. The
CBA imposes dismissal only in case an employee is expelled
from the union for joining another federation or for forming
another union or who fails or refuses to maintain membership
therein. The case at bar does not involve the withdrawal of
merely some employees from the union but of the whole
THEU itself from its federation. Clearly, since there is no
violation of the union security provision in the CBA, there was
no sufficient ground to terminate the employment of
petitioners.
Public respondents considered the existence of Arturo Dilag's
group as the remaining true and valid union. We, however, are
inclined to agree instead with the Arbitrator's findings when
he declared:
 . . . . Much more, the so-called THEU-NATU under
Dilag's group which assumes to be the original
THEU-NATU has a very doubtful and questionable
existence not to mention that the alleged president is
performing supervisory functions and not qualified to
be a bona fide member of the rank and file union. (p.
146, Rollo)
Records show that Arturo Dilag had resigned in the past as
President of THEU-NATU because of his promotion to a
managerial or supervisory position as Assistant Unit Manager
of respondent Company. Petitioner Jose Encinas replaced
Dilag as President and continued to hold such position at the
time of the disaffiliation of the union from the federation. It is
therefore improper and contrary to law for Dilag to reassume
the leadership of the remaining group which was alleged to be
the true union since he belonged to the managerial personnel
who could not be expected to work for the betterment of the
rank and file employees. Besides, managers and supervisors
are prohibited from joining a rank and file union (Binalbagan
Isabela Sugar Co., Inc. (BISCOM) v. Philippine Association of
Free Labor Unions (PAFLU), et al., L-18782, August 29, 1963, 8
SCRA 700). Correspondingly, if a manager or supervisor
organizes or joins a rank and file union, he will be required to
resign therefrom (Magalit, et al. v. Court of Industrial
Relations, et al., L-20448, May 25, 1965,14 SCRA 72).
Public respondents further submit that several employees who
disaffiliate their union from the NATU subsequently retracted
and reaffirmed their membership with the THEU-NATU. In
the decision which was affirmed by respondent Secretary of
Labor, the respondent Commission stated that:
. . . out of the alleged one hundred and seventy-one
(171) members of the THEU-CGW whose signatures
appeared in the "Analysis of Various Documents
Signed by Majority Members of the THEU-CGW,
(Annex "T", Complainants), which incidentally was
relied upon by Arbitrator Villatuya in holding that
complainant THEU-CGW commanded the majority of
employees in respondent company, ninety-three (93)
of the alleged signatories reaffirmed their
membership with the THEU-NATU and renounced
whatever connection they may have had with other
labor unions, (meaning the complainant THEU-CGW)
either through resolution or membership application
forms they have unwittingly signed." (p. 306, Rollo)
Granting arguendo, that the fact of retraction is true, the
evidence on record shows that the letters of retraction were
executed on various dates beginning January 11, 1974 to March
8, 1974 (pp. 278-280, Rollo). This shows that the retractions
were made more or less after the suspension pending dismissal
on January 11, 1974 of Jose Encinas, formerly THEU-NATU
President, who became THEU-CGW President, and the
suspension pending their dismissal of the other elected officers
and members of the THEU-CGW on January 15, 1974. It is also
clear that some of the retractions occurred after the suspension
of the first set of workers numbering about twenty-four (24) on
March 5, 1974. There is no use in saying that the retractions
obliterated the act of disaffiliation as there are doubts that they
were freely and voluntarily done especially during such time
when their own union officers and co-workers were already
suspended pending their dismissal.
Finally, with regard to the process by which the workers were
suspended or dismissed, this Court finds that it was hastily
and summarily done without the necessary due process. The
respondent company sent a letter to petitioners herein,
advising them of NATU/Dilag's recommendation of their
dismissal and at the same time giving them forty-eight (48)
hours within which to comment (p. 637, Rollo). When
petitioners failed to do so, respondent company immediately
suspended them and thereafter effected their dismissal. This is
certainly not in fulfillment of the mandate of due process,
which is to afford the employee to be dismissed an
opportunity to be heard.
The prerogative of the employer to dismiss or lay-off an
employee should be done without abuse of discretion or
arbitrainess, for what is at stake is not only the employee's
name or position but also his means of livelihood. Thus, the
discharge of an employee from his employment is null and
void where the employee was not formally investigated and
given the opportunity to refute the alleged findings made by
the company (De Leon v. NLRC, L-52056, October 30, 1980, 100
SCRA 691). Likewise, an employer can be adjudged guilty of
unfair labor practice for having dismissed its employees in line
with a closed shop provision if they were not given a proper
hearing (Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Co., Inc.,(BISCOM) v.
Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) et al., L-
18782, August 29, 1963, 8 SCRA 700).
In view of the fact that the dispute revolved around the mother
federation and its local, with the company suspending and
dismissing the workers at the instance of the mother federation
then, the company's liability should be limited to the
immediate reinstatement of the workers. And since their
dismissals were effected without previous hearing and at the
instance of NATU, this federation should be held liable to the
petitioners for the payment of their backwages, as what We
have ruled in the Liberty Cotton Mills Case (supra).
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the
assailed decision of respondent Secretary of Labor is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the respondent company is
hereby ordered to immediately reinstate all the petitioner
employees within thirty (30) days from notice of this decision.
If reinstatement is no longer feasible, the respondent company
is ordered to pay petitioners separation pay equivalent to one
(1) month pay for every year of service. The respondent NATU
federation is directed to pay petitioners the amount of three (3)
years backwages without deduction or qualification. This
decision shall be immediately executory upon promulgation
and notice to the parties.
SO ORDERED.
TROPICAL HUT EMPLOYEES’
UNION-CGW et al vs.TROPICAL
HUT FOOD MARKET, INC., et al
 G.R. No. L-43495-99
January 20, 1990
FACTS: The rank and file workers of the Tropical Hut Food
Market Incorporated (respondent company) organized a local
union called the Tropical Hut Employees Union (THEU) and
immediately sought affiliation with the National Association of
Trade Unions (NATU). The NATU accepted the THEU
application for affiliation.
The CBA between respondent company and THEU-NATU
contains a union security clause:
xx
Union Membership and Union Check-off
Sec. 1 —. . . Employees who are already members of the UNION at
the time of the signing of this Agreement or who become so
thereafter shall be required to maintain their membership therein
as a condition of continued employment.
Xx
Attached to the Agreement is a check-off Authorization Form, the
terms of which are as follows:
We, the undersigned, hereby designate the NATU, of which the
THEU is an affiliate as sole collective bargaining agent in all
matters relating to salary rates, hours of work and other terms and
conditions of employment in the Tropical Hut Food Market,
Inc…xx
Later on, NATU received a letter jointly signed by the incumbent
officers of the local union informing the NATU that THEU was
disaffiliating from the NATU federation. The employees were
dismissed because, as respondent company contended, they
violated the union security clause.
ISSUE: Was the disaffiliation of the local union from the national
federation valid?
HELD: YES
The right of a local union to disaffiliate from its mother federation
is well-settled. A local union, being a separate and voluntary
association, is free to serve the interest of all its members including
the freedom to disaffiliate when circumstances warrant. This right
is consistent with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
association
The inclusion of the word NATU after the name of the local union
THEU in the registration with the Department of Labor is merely
to stress that the THEU is NATU’s affiliate at the time of the
registration. It does not mean that the said local union cannot
stand on its own. Neither can it be interpreted to mean that it
cannot pursue its own interests independently of the federation. A
local union owes its creation and continued existence to the will of
its members and not to the federation to which it belongs.
Further, there is no merit in the contention of the respondents that
the act of disaffiliation violated the union security clause of the
CBA and that their dismissal as a consequence thereof is valid. A
perusal of the CBAs shows that the THEU-NATU, and not the
NATU federation, was recognized as the sole and exclusive
collective bargaining agent for all its workers and employees in all
matters concerning wages, hours of work and other terms and
conditions of employment. Although NATU was designated as
the sole bargaining agent in the check-off authorization form
attached to the CBA, this simply means it was acting only for and
in behalf of its affiliate. The NATU possessed the status of an
agent while the local union remained the basic principal union
which entered into contract with the respondent company. When
the THEU disaffiliated from its mother federation, the former
did not lose its legal personality as the bargaining union under the
CBA. Moreover, the union security clause embodied in the
agreements cannot be used to justify the dismissals meted to
petitioners since it is not applicable to the circumstances obtaining
in this case. The CBA imposes dismissal only in case an employee
is expelled from the union for joining another federation or for
forming another union or who fails or refuses to maintain
membership therein. The case at bar does not involve the
withdrawal of merely some employees from the union but of the
whole THEU itself from its federation. Clearly, since there is no
violation of the union security provision in the CBA, there was no
sufficient ground to terminate the employment of petitioners.
TROPICAL HUT EMPLOYEES’ UNION-CGW vs.
TROPICAL HUT FOOD MARKET, INC. G.R. No. L-43495-99, 20 January 1990
FACTS:
The rank and file workers of the Tropical Hut Food Market Incorporated orga
nized a local union called the Tropical Hut Employees Union, known for short
as the THEU, elected their officers, adopted their constitution and by-
laws and immediately sought affiliation with the National Association of Trad
e Unions (NATU). The NATU accepted the THEU application for affiliation. Foll
owing such affiliation with NATU, Registration Certificate was issued by the D
epartment of Labor in the name of the Tropical Hut Employees Union —
NATU. It appears, however, that NATU itself as a labor federation, was not re
gistered with the Department of Labor.
Company and THEU-
NATU entered into a new Collective Bargaining which incorporated the previ
ous union-shop security clause and the attached check-
off authorization form. NATU received a letter jointly signed by the incumben
t officers of the local union informing the NATU that THEU was disaffiliating f
rom the NATU federation. On despite being given the chance to affirm their
membership with THEU-
NATU, they did not. The union security clause set forth in the CBA was enfor
ced which says membership is a condition of continued employment. And th
ey were dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not disaffiliation is a violation of union security clause and be the
basis of the dismissal of the employees.
HELD:
No. The union security clause embodied in the Collective Bargaining Agreeme
nt cannot be used to justify the dismissals meted to petitioners since it is not
applicable to the circumstances obtaining in this case. The CBA imposes dismi
ssal only in case an employee is expelled from the union for joining another f
ederation or for forming another union or who fails or refuses to maintain m
embership therein. The case at bar does not involve the withdrawal of merel
y some employees from the union but of the whole THEU itself from its feder
ation. Clearly, since there is no violation of the union security provision in the
CBA, there was no sufficient ground to terminate the employment of said e
mployees.
In view of the fact that the dispute revolved around the mother federation a
nd its local, with the company suspending and dismissing the workers at the i
nstance of the mother federation then, the company’s liability should be limi
ted to the immediate reinstatement of the workers. And since their dis
missals were effected without previous hearing and at the instance of N
ATU, this federation should be held liable to the petitioners for the pay
ment of their backwages, as what We have ruled in the Liberty Cotton
Mills Case.
 SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-25246 September 12, 1974
BENJAMIN VICTORIANO, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs. ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION and
ELIZALDE ROPE FACTORY, INC., defendants,
ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS'
UNION, Defendant-Appellant.
Salonga, Ordonez, Yap, Sicat & Associates for
plaintiff-appellee.
Cipriano Cid & Associates for defendant-
appellant.
ZALDIVAR, J.:
Appeal to this Court on purely questions of law from the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in its Civil
Case No. 58894.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual l
The undisputed facts that spawned the instant case
follow:chanrobles virtual law library
Benjamin Victoriano (hereinafter referred to as Appellee), a
member of the religious sect known as the "Iglesia ni Cristo",
had been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc.
(hereinafter referred to as Company) since 1958. As such
employee, he was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers'
Union (hereinafter referred to as Union) which had with the
Company a collective bargaining agreement containing a
closed shop provision which reads as follows:
Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of
employment for all permanent employees workers covered by
this Agreement.
The collective bargaining agreement expired on March 3, 1964
but was renewed the following day, March 4,
1964.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875, prior
to its amendment by Republic Act No. 3350, the employer was
not precluded "from making an agreement with a labor
organization to require as a condition of employment
membership therein, if such labor organization is the
representative of the employees." On June 18, 1961, however,
Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted, introducing an
amendment to - paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4 of
Republic Act No. 875, as follows: ... "but such agreement shall
not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit
affiliation of their members in any such labor
organization".chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation
of its members with any labor organization, Appellee
presented his resignation to appellant Union in 1962, and
when no action was taken thereon, he reiterated his resignation
on September 3, 1974. Thereupon, the Union wrote a formal
letter to the Company asking the latter to separate Appellee
from the service in view of the fact that he was resigning from
the Union as a member. The management of the Company in
turn notified Appellee and his counsel that unless the Appellee
could achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the Union, the
Company would be constrained to dismiss him from the
service. This prompted Appellee to file an action for injunction,
docketed as Civil Case No. 58894 in the Court of First Instance
of Manila to enjoin the Company and the Union from
dismissing Appellee. 1In its answer, the Union invoked the
"union security clause" of the collective bargaining agreement;
assailed the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3350; and
contended that the Court had no jurisdiction over the case,
pursuant to Republic Act No. 875, Sections 24 and 9 (d) and
(e). 2Upon the facts agreed upon by the parties during the pre-
trial conference, the Court a quo rendered its decision on
August 26, 1965, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is rendered
enjoining the defendant Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. from
dismissing the plaintiff from his present employment and
sentencing the defendant Elizalde Rope Workers' Union to pay
the plaintiff P500 for attorney's fees and the costs of this
action. 3chanrobles virtual law library
From this decision, the Union appealed directly to this Court
on purely questions of law, assigning the following errors:
I. That the lower court erred when it did not rule that Republic
Act No. 3350 is
unconstitutional.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtuw
ibrary
II. That the lower court erred when it sentenced appellant
herein to pay plaintiff the sum of P500 as attorney's fees and
the cost thereof.
In support of the alleged unconstitutionality of Republic Act
No. 3350, the Union contented, firstly, that the Act infringes on
the fundamental right to form lawful associations; that "the
very phraseology of said Republic Act 3350, that membership
in a labor organization is banned to all those belonging to such
religious sect prohibiting affiliation with any labor
organization" 4, "prohibits all the members of a given religious
sect from joining any labor union if such sect prohibits
affiliations of their members thereto" 5; and, consequently,
deprives said members of their constitutional right to form or
join lawful associations or organizations guaranteed by the Bill
of Rights, and thus becomes obnoxious to Article III, Section 1
(6) of the 1935 Constitution. 6chanrobles virtual law library
Secondly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350 is
unconstitutional for impairing the obligation of contracts in
that, while the Union is obliged to comply with its collective
bargaining agreement containing a "closed shop provision,"
the Act relieves the employer from its reciprocal obligation of
cooperating in the maintenance of union membership as a
condition of employment; and that said Act, furthermore,
impairs the Union's rights as it deprives the union of dues
from members who, under the Act, are relieved from the
obligation to continue as such members. 7chanrobles virtual
law library
Thirdly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350
discriminatorily favors those religious sects which ban their
members from joining labor unions, in violation of Article Ill,
Section 1 (7) of the 1935 Constitution; and while said Act
unduly protects certain religious sects, it leaves no rights or
protection to labor organizations. 8chanrobles virtual law
library
Fourthly, Republic Act No. 3350, asserted the Union, violates
the constitutional provision that "no religious test shall be
required for the exercise of a civil right," in that the laborer's
exercise of his civil right to join associations for purposes not
contrary to law has to be determined under the Act by his
affiliation with a religious sect; that conversely, if a worker has
to sever his religious connection with a sect that prohibits
membership in a labor organization in order to be able to join a
labor organization, said Act would violate religious
freedom. 9chanrobles virtual law library
Fifthly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350,
violates the "equal protection of laws" clause of the
Constitution, it being a discriminately legislation, inasmuch as
by exempting from the operation of closed shop agreement the
members of the "Iglesia ni Cristo", it has granted said members
undue advantages over their fellow workers, for while the Act
exempts them from union obligation and liability, it
nevertheless entitles them at the same time to the enjoyment of
all concessions, benefits and other emoluments that the union
might secure from the employer. 10chanrobles virtual law
library
Sixthly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350
violates the constitutional provision regarding the promotion
of social justice. 11chanrobles virtual law library
Appellant Union, furthermore, asserted that a "closed shop
provision" in a collective bargaining agreement cannot be
considered violative of religious freedom, as to call for the
amendment introduced by Republic Act No. 3350; 12and that
unless Republic Act No. 3350 is declared unconstitutional,
trade unionism in this country would be wiped out as
employers would prefer to hire or employ members of the
Iglesia ni Cristo in order to do away with labor
organizations. 13chanrobles virtual law library
Appellee, assailing appellant's arguments, contended that
Republic Act No. 3350 does not violate the right to form lawful
associations, for the right to join associations includes the right
not to join or to resign from a labor organization, if one's
conscience does not allow his membership therein, and the Act
has given substance to such right by prohibiting the
compulsion of workers to join labor organizations; 14that said
Act does not impair the obligation of contracts for said law
formed part of, and was incorporated into, the terms of the
closed shop agreement; 15that the Act does not violate the
establishment of religion clause or separation of Church and
State, for Congress, in enacting said law, merely
accommodated the religious needs of those workers whose
religion prohibits its members from joining labor unions, and
balanced the collective rights of organized labor with the
constitutional right of an individual to freely exercise his
chosen religion; that the constitutional right to the free exercise
of one's religion has primacy and preference over union
security measures which are merely contractual 16; that said
Act does not violate the constitutional provision of equal
protection, for the classification of workers under the Act
depending on their religious tenets is based on substantial
distinction, is germane to the purpose of the law, and applies
to all the members of a given class; 17that said Act, finally, does
not violate the social justice policy of the Constitution, for said
Act was enacted precisely to equalize employment
opportunities for all citizens in the midst of the diversities of
their religious beliefs." 18chanrobles virtual law library
I. Before We proceed to the discussion of the first assigned
error, it is necessary to premise that there are some thoroughly
established principles which must be followed in all cases
where questions of constitutionality as obtains in the instant
case are involved. All presumptions are indulged in favor of
constitutionality; one who attacks a statute, alleging
unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a
reasonable doubt, that a law may work hardship does not
render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be
conceived which supports the statute, it will be upheld, and
the challenger must negate all possible bases; that the courts
are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or
expediency of a statute; and that a liberal interpretation of the
constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation
should be adopted. 19chanrobles virtual law library
1. Appellant Union's contention that Republic Act No.
3350 prohibits and bans the members of such religious sects that
forbid affiliation of their members with labor unions from
joining labor unions appears nowhere in the wording of
Republic Act No. 3350; neither can the same be deduced by
necessary implication therefrom. It is not surprising, therefore,
that appellant, having thus misread the Act, committed the
error of contending that said Act is obnoxious to the
constitutional provision on freedom of
association.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
Both the Constitution and Republic Act No. 875 recognize
freedom of association. Section 1 (6) of Article III of the
Constitution of 1935, as well as Section 7 of Article IV of the
Constitution of 1973, provide that the right to form
associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall
not be abridged. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875 provides
that employees shall have the right to self-organization and to
form, join of assist labor organizations of their own choosing
for the purpose of collective bargaining and to engage in
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
and other mutual aid or protection. What the Constitution and
the Industrial Peace Act recognize and guarantee is the "right"
to form or join associations. Notwithstanding the different
theories propounded by the different schools of jurisprudence
regarding the nature and contents of a "right", it can be safely
said that whatever theory one subscribes to, a right
comprehends at least two broad notions, namely: first, liberty
or freedom, i.e., the absence of legal restraint, whereby an
employee may act for himself without being prevented by law;
and second, power, whereby an employee may, as he pleases,
join or refrain from Joining an association. It is, therefore, the
employee who should decide for himself whether he should
join or not an association; and should he choose to join, he
himself makes up his mind as to which association he would
join; and even after he has joined, he still retains the liberty and
the power to leave and cancel his membership with said
organization at any time. 20It is clear, therefore, that the right to
join a union includes the right to abstain from joining any
union. 21Inasmuch as what both the Constitution and the
Industrial Peace Act have recognized, and guaranteed to the
employee, is the "right" to join associations of his choice, it
would be absurd to say that the law also imposes, in the same
breath, upon the employee the duty to join associations. The
law does not enjoin an employee to sign up with any
association.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
The right to refrain from joining labor organizations
recognized by Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act is, however,
limited. The legal protection granted to such right to refrain
from joining is withdrawn by operation of law, where a labor
union and an employer have agreed on a closed shop, by
virtue of which the employer may employ only member of the
collective bargaining union, and the employees must continue
to be members of the union for the duration of the contract in
order to keep their jobs. Thus Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial
Peace Act, before its amendment by Republic Act No. 3350,
provides that although it would be an unfair labor practice for
an employer "to discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of
employment or any term or condition of employment to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization" the employer is, however, not precluded "from
making an agreement with a labor organization to require as a
condition of employment membership therein, if such labor
organization is the representative of the employees". By virtue,
therefore, of a closed shop agreement, before the enactment of
Republic Act No. 3350, if any person, regardless of his religious
beliefs, wishes to be employed or to keep his employment, he
must become a member of the collective bargaining union.
Hence, the right of said employee not to join the labor union is
curtailed and
withdrawn.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
To that all-embracing coverage of the closed shop
arrangement, Republic Act No. 3350 introduced an exception,
when it added to Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act
the following proviso: "but such agreement shall not cover
members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of
their members in any such labor organization". Republic Act
No. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the application and
coverage of the closed shop agreement the employees
belonging to any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of
their members with any labor organization. What the
exception provides, therefore, is that members of said religious
sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even
when said unions have closed shop agreements with the
employers; that in spite of any closed shop agreement,
members of said religious sects cannot be refused employment
or dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are
not members of the collective bargaining union. It is clear,
therefore, that the assailed Act, far from infringing the
constitutional provision on freedom of association, upholds
and reinforces it. It does not prohibit the members of said
religious sects from affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves
to said members the liberty and the power to affiliate, or not to
affiliate, with labor unions. If, notwithstanding their religious
beliefs, the members of said religious sects prefer to sign up
with the labor union, they can do so. If in deference and fealty
to their religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so;
the law does not coerce them to join; neither does the law
prohibit them from joining; and neither may the employer or
labor union compel them to join. Republic Act No. 3350,
therefore, does not violate the constitutional provision on
freedom of association.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
2. Appellant Union also contends that the Act is
unconstitutional for impairing the obligation of its contract,
specifically, the "union security clause" embodied in its
Collective Bargaining Agreement with the Company, by virtue
of which "membership in the union was required as a
condition for employment for all permanent employees
workers". This agreement was already in existence at the time
Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted on June 18, 1961, and it
cannot, therefore, be deemed to have been incorporated into
the agreement. But by reason of this amendment, Appellee, as
well as others similarly situated, could no longer be dismissed
from his job even if he should cease to be a member, or
disaffiliate from the Union, and the Company could continue
employing him notwithstanding his disaffiliation from the
Union. The Act, therefore, introduced a change into the express
terms of the union security clause; the Company was partly
absolved by law from the contractual obligation it had with the
Union of employing only Union members in permanent
positions, It cannot be denied, therefore, that there was indeed
an impairment of said union security
clause.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
According to Black, any statute which introduces a change into
the express terms of the contract, or its legal construction, or its
validity, or its discharge, or the remedy for its enforcement,
impairs the contract. The extent of the change is not material. It
is not a question of degree or manner or cause, but of
encroaching in any respect on its obligation or dispensing with
any part of its force. There is an impairment of the contract if
either party is absolved by law from its
performance. 22Impairment has also been predicated on laws
which, without destroying contracts, derogate from substantial
contractual rights. 23chanrobles virtual law library
It should not be overlooked, however, that the prohibition to
impair the obligation of contracts is not absolute and
unqualified. The prohibition is general, affording a broad
outline and requiring construction to fill in the details. The
prohibition is not to be read with literal exactness like a
mathematical formula, for it prohibits unreasonable
impairment only. 24In spite of the constitutional prohibition,
the State continues to possess authority to safeguard the vital
interests of its people. Legislation appropriate to safeguarding
said interests may modify or abrogate contracts already in
effect. 25For not only are existing laws read into contracts in
order to fix the obligations as between the parties, but the
reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also
read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order. All
contracts made with reference to any matter that is subject to
regulation under the police power must be understood as
made in reference to the possible exercise of that
power. 26Otherwise, important and valuable reforms may be
precluded by the simple device of entering into contracts for
the purpose of doing that which otherwise may be prohibited.
The policy of protecting contracts against impairment
presupposes the maintenance of a government by virtue of
which contractual relations are worthwhile a government
which retains adequate authority to secure the peace and good
order of society. The contract clause of the Constitution must,
therefore, be not only in harmony with, but also in
subordination to, in appropriate instances, the reserved power
of the state to safeguard the vital interests of the people. It
follows that not all legislations, which have the effect of
impairing a contract, are obnoxious to the constitutional
prohibition as to impairment, and a statute passed in the
legitimate exercise of police power, although it incidentally
destroys existing contract rights, must be upheld by the courts.
This has special application to contracts regulating relations
between capital and labor which are not merely contractual,
and said labor contracts, for being impressed with public
interest, must yield to the common good. 27chanrobles virtual
law library
In several occasions this Court declared that the prohibition
against impairing the obligations of contracts has no
application to statutes relating to public subjects within the
domain of the general legislative powers of the state involving
public welfare. 28Thus, this Court also held that the Blue
Sunday Law was not an infringement of the obligation of a
contract that required the employer to furnish work on
Sundays to his employees, the law having been enacted to
secure the well-being and happiness of the laboring class, and
being, furthermore, a legitimate exercise of the police
power. 29chanrobles virtual law library
In order to determine whether legislation unconstitutionally
impairs contract obligations, no unchanging yardstick,
applicable at all times and under all circumstances, by which
the validity of each statute may be measured or determined,
has been fashioned, but every case must be determined upon
its own circumstances. Legislation impairing the obligation of
contracts can be sustained when it is enacted for the promotion
of the general good of the people, and when the means
adopted to secure that end are reasonable. Both the end sought
and the means adopted must be legitimate, i.e., within the
scope of the reserved power of the state construed in harmony
with the constitutional limitation of that power. 30chanrobles
virtual law library
What then was the purpose sought to be achieved by Republic
Act No. 3350? Its purpose was to insure freedom of belief and
religion, and to promote the general welfare by preventing
discrimination against those members of religious sects which
prohibit their members from joining labor unions, confirming
thereby their natural, statutory and constitutional right to
work, the fruits of which work are usually the only means
whereby they can maintain their own life and the life of their
dependents. It cannot be gainsaid that said purpose is
legitimate.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
The questioned Act also provides protection to members of
said religious sects against two aggregates of group strength
from which the individual needs protection. The individual
employee, at various times in his working life, is confronted by
two aggregates of power - collective labor, directed by a union,
and collective capital, directed by management. The union, an
institution developed to organize labor into a collective force
and thus protect the individual employee from the power of
collective capital, is, paradoxically, both the champion of
employee rights, and a new source of their frustration.
Moreover, when the Union interacts with management, it
produces yet a third aggregate of group strength from which
the individual also needs protection - the collective bargaining
relationship. 31chanrobles virtual law library
The aforementioned purpose of the amendatory law is clearly
seen in the Explanatory Note to House Bill No. 5859, which
later became Republic Act No. 3350, as follows:
It would be unthinkable indeed to refuse employing a person
who, on account of his religious beliefs and convictions, cannot
accept membership in a labor organization although he
possesses all the qualifications for the job. This is tantamount
to punishing such person for believing in a doctrine he has a
right under the law to believe in. The law would not allow
discrimination to flourish to the detriment of those whose
religion discards membership in any labor organization.
Likewise, the law would not commend the deprivation of their
right to work and pursue a modest means of livelihood,
without in any manner violating their religious faith and/or
belief. 32chanrobles virtual law library
It cannot be denied, furthermore, that the means adopted by
the Act to achieve that purpose - exempting the members of
said religious sects from coverage of union security
agreements - is
reasonable.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
It may not be amiss to point out here that the free exercise of
religious profession or belief is superior to contract rights. In
case of conflict, the latter must, therefore, yield to the former.
The Supreme Court of the United States has also declared on
several occasions that the rights in the First Amendment,
which include freedom of religion, enjoy a preferred position
in the constitutional system. 33Religious freedom, although not
unlimited, is a fundamental personal right and liberty, 34and
has a preferred position in the hierarchy of values. Contractual
rights, therefore, must yield to freedom of religion. It is only
where unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and
grave danger to the security and welfare of the community
that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and
only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the
danger.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
3. In further support of its contention that Republic Act No.
3350 is unconstitutional, appellant Union averred that said Act
discriminates in favor of members of said religious sects in
violation of Section 1 (7) of Article Ill of the 1935 Constitution,
and which is now Section 8 of Article IV of the 1973
Constitution, which provides:
No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and the free exercise
and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination and preference, shall forever be allowed. No
religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or
political rights.
The constitutional provision into only prohibits legislation for
the support of any religious tenets or the modes of worship of
any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance
of any creed or the practice of any form of worship, 35but also
assures the free exercise of one's chosen form of religion within
limits of utmost amplitude. It has been said that the religion
clauses of the Constitution are all designed to protect the
broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to
believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to
live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty
of others and with the common good. 36Any legislation whose
effect or purpose is to impede the observance of one or all
religions, or to discriminate invidiously between the religions,
is invalid, even though the burden may be characterized as
being only indirect. 37But if the stage regulates conduct by
enacting, within its power, a general law which has for its
purpose and effect to advance the state's secular goals, the
statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious
observance, unless the state can accomplish its purpose
without imposing such burden. 38chanrobles virtual law library
In Aglipay v. Ruiz 39, this Court had occasion to state that the
government should not be precluded from pursuing valid
objectives secular in character even if the incidental result
would be favorable to a religion or sect. It has likewise been
held that the statute, in order to withstand the strictures of
constitutional prohibition, must have a secular legislative
purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion. 40Assessed by these criteria, Republic Act No. 3350
cannot be said to violate the constitutional inhibition of the
"no-establishment" (of religion) clause of the
Constitution.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
The purpose of Republic Act No. 3350 is secular, worldly, and
temporal, not spiritual or religious or holy and eternal. It was
intended to serve the secular purpose of advancing the
constitutional right to the free exercise of religion, by averting
that certain persons be refused work, or be dismissed from
work, or be dispossessed of their right to work and of being
impeded to pursue a modest means of livelihood, by reason of
union security agreements. To help its citizens to find gainful
employment whereby they can make a living to support
themselves and their families is a valid objective of the state. In
fact, the state is enjoined, in the 1935 Constitution, to afford
protection to labor, and regulate the relations between labor
and capital and industry. 41More so now in the 1973
Constitution where it is mandated that "the State shall afford
protection to labor, promote full employment and equality in
employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of
sex, race or creed and regulate the relation between workers
and employers. 42chanrobles virtual law library
The primary effects of the exemption from closed shop
agreements in favor of members of religious sects that prohibit
their members from affiliating with a labor organization, is the
protection of said employees against the aggregate force of the
collective bargaining agreement, and relieving certain citizens
of a burden on their religious beliefs; and by eliminating to a
certain extent economic insecurity due to unemployment,
which is a serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of
the people of the State, the Act also promotes the well-being of
society. It is our view that the exemption from the effects of
closed shop agreement does not directly advance, or diminish,
the interests of any particular religion. Although the
exemption may benefit those who are members of religious
sects that prohibit their members from joining labor unions,
the benefit upon the religious sects is merely incidental and
indirect. The "establishment clause" (of religion) does not ban
regulation on conduct whose reason or effect merely happens
to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all
religions. 43The free exercise clause of the Constitution has
been interpreted to require that religious exercise be
preferentially aided. 44chanrobles virtual law library
We believe that in enacting Republic Act No. 3350, Congress
acted consistently with the spirit of the constitutional
provision. It acted merely to relieve the exercise of religion, by
certain persons, of a burden that is imposed by union security
agreements. It was Congress itself that imposed that burden
when it enacted the Industrial Peace Act (Republic Act 875),
and, certainly, Congress, if it so deems advisable, could take
away the same burden. It is certain that not every conscience
can be accommodated by all the laws of the land; but when
general laws conflict with scrupples of conscience, exemptions
ought to be granted unless some "compelling state interest"
intervenes. 45In the instant case, We see no such compelling
state interest to withhold
exemption.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
Appellant bewails that while Republic Act No. 3350 protects
members of certain religious sects, it leaves no right to, and is
silent as to the protection of, labor organizations. The purpose
of Republic Act No. 3350 was not to grant rights to labor
unions. The rights of labor unions are amply provided for in
Republic Act No. 875 and the new Labor Code. As to the
lamented silence of the Act regarding the rights and protection
of labor unions, suffice it to say, first, that the validity of a
statute is determined by its provisions, not by its silence 46;
and, second, the fact that the law may work hardship does not
render it unconstitutional. 47chanrobles virtual law library
It would not be amiss to state, regarding this matter, that to
compel persons to join and remain members of a union to keep
their jobs in violation of their religious scrupples, would hurt,
rather than help, labor unions, Congress has seen it fit to
exempt religious objectors lest their resistance spread to other
workers, for religious objections have contagious potentialities
more than political and philosophic
objections.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
Furthermore, let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty
even to the country, and a fortiori to a labor - union assuming
that such unity and loyalty can be attained through coercion -
is not a goal that is constitutionally obtainable at the expense of
religious liberty. 48A desirable end cannot be promoted by
prohibited means.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
4. Appellants' fourth contention, that Republic Act No. 3350
violates the constitutional prohibition against requiring a
religious test for the exercise of a civil right or a political right,
is not well taken. The Act does not require as a qualification, or
condition, for joining any lawful association membership in
any particular religion or in any religious sect; neither does the
Act require affiliation with a religious sect that prohibits its
members from joining a labor union as a condition or
qualification for withdrawing from a labor union. Joining or
withdrawing from a labor union requires a positive act.
Republic Act No. 3350 only exempts members with such
religious affiliation from the coverage of closed shop
agreements. So, under this Act, a religious objector is not
required to do a positive act - to exercise the right to join or to
resign from the union. He is exempted ipso jure without need
of any positive act on his part. A conscientious religious
objector need not perform a positive act or exercise the right of
resigning from the labor union - he is exempted from the
coverage of any closed shop agreement that a labor union may
have entered into. How then can there be a religious test
required for the exercise of a right when no right need be
exercised?chanrobles virtual law library
We have said that it was within the police power of the State to
enact Republic Act No. 3350, and that its purpose was legal
and in consonance with the Constitution. It is never an illegal
evasion of a constitutional provision or prohibition to
accomplish a desired result, which is lawful in itself, by
discovering or following a legal way to do it. 49chanrobles
virtual law library
5. Appellant avers as its fifth ground that Republic Act No.
3350 is a discriminatory legislation, inasmuch as it grants to the
members of certain religious sects undue advantages over
other workers, thus violating Section 1 of Article III of the 1935
Constitution which forbids the denial to any person of the
equal protection of the laws. 50chanrobles virtual law library
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty
of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of
the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid
the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every
man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute.
Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate
operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according
to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality,
not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that
things which are different in fact be treated in law as though
they were the same. The equal protection clause does not
forbid discrimination as to things that are different. 51It does
not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to
which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to
operate.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution
allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other
departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of
things in speculation or practice because they agree with one
another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of
simple inequality. 52The very idea of classification is that of
inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of
inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. 53All that is required of a valid classification
is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification
should be based on substantial distinctions which make for
real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the
law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
that it must apply equally to each member of the class. 54This
Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification
or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational
basis and is not palpably arbitrary. 55chanrobles virtual law
library
In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the
purpose of enacting laws over matters within its jurisdiction,
the state is recognized as enjoying a wide range of
discretion. 56It is not necessary that the classification be based
on scientific or marked differences of things or in their
relation. 57Neither is it necessary that the classification be made
with mathematical nicety. 58Hence legislative classification
may in many cases properly rest on narrow distinctions, 59for
the equal protection guaranty does not preclude the legislature
from recognizing degrees of evil or harm, and legislation is
addressed to evils as they may
appear.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
We believe that Republic Act No. 3350 satisfies the
aforementioned requirements. The Act classifies employees
and workers, as to the effect and coverage of union shop
security agreements, into those who by reason of their
religious beliefs and convictions cannot sign up with a labor
union, and those whose religion does not prohibit membership
in labor unions. Tile classification rests on real or substantial,
not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. There is such
real distinction in the beliefs, feelings and sentiments of
employees. Employees do not believe in the same religious
faith and different religions differ in their dogmas and
cannons. Religious beliefs, manifestations and practices,
though they are found in all places, and in all times, take so
many varied forms as to be almost beyond imagination. There
are many views that comprise the broad spectrum of religious
beliefs among the people. There are diverse manners in which
beliefs, equally paramount in the lives of their possessors, may
be articulated. Today the country is far more heterogenous in
religion than before, differences in religion do exist, and these
differences are important and should not be
ignored.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
Even from the phychological point of view, the classification is
based on real and important differences. Religious beliefs are
not mere beliefs, mere ideas existing only in the mind, for they
carry with them practical consequences and are the motives of
certain rules. of human conduct and the justification of certain
acts. 60Religious sentiment makes a man view things and
events in their relation to his God. It gives to human life its
distinctive character, its tone, its happiness or unhappiness its
enjoyment or irksomeness. Usually, a strong and passionate
desire is involved in a religious belief. To certain persons, no
single factor of their experience is more important to them than
their religion, or their not having any religion. Because of
differences in religious belief and sentiments, a very poor
person may consider himself better than the rich, and the man
who even lacks the necessities of life may be more cheerful
than the one who has all possible luxuries. Due to their
religious beliefs people, like the martyrs, became resigned to
the inevitable and accepted cheerfully even the most painful
and excruciating pains. Because of differences in religious
beliefs, the world has witnessed turmoil, civil strife,
persecution, hatred, bloodshed and war, generated to a large
extent by members of sects who were intolerant of other
religious beliefs. The classification, introduced by Republic Act
No. 3350, therefore, rests on substantial
distinctions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
The classification introduced by said Act is also germane to its
purpose. The purpose of the law is precisely to avoid those
who cannot, because of their religious belief, join labor unions,
from being deprived of their right to work and from being
dismissed from their work because of union shop security
agreements.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
Republic Act No. 3350, furthermore, is not limited in its
application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment.
The law does not provide that it is to be effective for a certain
period of time only. It is intended to apply for all times as long
as the conditions to which the law is applicable exist. As long
as there are closed shop agreements between an employer and
a labor union, and there are employees who are prohibited by
their religion from affiliating with labor unions, their
exemption from the coverage of said agreements
continues.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
Finally, the Act applies equally to all members of said religious
sects; this is evident from its provision. The fact that the law
grants a privilege to members of said religious sects cannot by
itself render the Act unconstitutional, for as We have adverted
to, the Act only restores to them their freedom of association
which closed shop agreements have taken away, and puts
them in the same plane as the other workers who are not
prohibited by their religion from joining labor unions. The
circumstance, that the other employees, because they are
differently situated, are not granted the same privilege, does
not render the law unconstitutional, for every classification
allowed by the Constitution by its nature involves
inequality.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
The mere fact that the legislative classification may result in
actual inequality is not violative of the right to equal
protection, for every classification of persons or things for
regulation by law produces inequality in some degree, but the
law is not thereby rendered invalid. A classification otherwise
reasonable does not offend the constitution simply because in
practice it results in some inequality. 61Anent this matter, it has
been said that whenever it is apparent from the scope of the
law that its object is for the benefit of the public and the means
by which the benefit is to be obtained are of public character,
the law will be upheld even though incidental advantage may
occur to individuals beyond those enjoyed by the general
public. 62chanrobles virtual law library
6. Appellant's further contention that Republic Act No. 3350
violates the constitutional provision on social justice is also
baseless. Social justice is intended to promote the welfare of all
the people. 63Republic Act No. 3350 promotes that welfare
insofar as it looks after the welfare of those who, because of
their religious belief, cannot join labor unions; the Act prevents
their being deprived of work and of the means of livelihood. In
determining whether any particular measure is for public
advantage, it is not necessary that the entire state be directly
benefited - it is sufficient that a portion of the state be benefited
thereby.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
Social justice also means the adoption by the Government of
measures calculated to insure economic stability of all
component elements of society, through the maintenance of a
proper economic and social equilibrium in the inter-relations
of the members of the community. 64Republic Act No. 3350
insures economic stability to the members of a religious sect,
like the Iglesia ni Cristo, who are also component elements of
society, for it insures security in their employment,
notwithstanding their failure to join a labor union having a
closed shop agreement with the employer. The Act also
advances the proper economic and social equilibrium between
labor unions and employees who cannot join labor unions, for
it exempts the latter from the compelling necessity of joining
labor unions that have closed shop agreements and equalizes,
in so far as opportunity to work is concerned, those whose
religion prohibits membership in labor unions with those
whose religion does not prohibit said membership. Social
justice does not imply social equality, because social inequality
will always exist as long as social relations depend on personal
or subjective proclivities. Social justice does not require legal
equality because legal equality, being a relative term, is
necessarily premised on differentiations based on personal or
natural conditions. 65Social justice guarantees equality of
opportunity 66, and this is precisely what Republic Act No.
3350 proposes to accomplish - it gives laborers, irrespective of
their religious scrupples, equal opportunity for
work.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
7. As its last ground, appellant contends that the amendment
introduced by Republic Act No. 3350 is not called for - in other
words, the Act is not proper, necessary or desirable. Anent this
matter, it has been held that a statute which is not necessary is
not, for that reason, unconstitutional; that in determining the
constitutional validity of legislation, the courts are
unconcerned with issues as to the necessity for the enactment
of the legislation in question. 67Courts do inquire into the
wisdom of laws. 68Moreover, legislatures, being chosen by the
people, are presumed to understand and correctly appreciate
the needs of the people, and it may change the laws
accordingly. 69The fear is entertained by appellant that unless
the Act is declared unconstitutional, employers will prefer
employing members of religious sects that prohibit their
members from joining labor unions, and thus be a fatal blow to
unionism. We do not agree. The threat to unionism will
depend on the number of employees who are members of the
religious sects that control the demands of the labor market.
But there is really no occasion now to go further and anticipate
problems We cannot judge with the material now before Us.
At any rate, the validity of a statute is to be determined from
its general purpose and its efficacy to accomplish the end
desired, not from its effects on a particular case. 70The essential
basis for the exercise of power, and not a mere incidental result
arising from its exertion, is the criterion by which the validity
of a statute is to be measured. 71chanrobles virtual law library
II. We now pass on the second assignment of error, in support
of which the Union argued that the decision of the trial court
ordering the Union to pay P500 for attorney's fees directly
contravenes Section 24 of Republic Act No. 875, for the instant
action involves an industrial dispute wherein the Union was a
party, and said Union merely acted in the exercise of its rights
under the union shop provision of its existing collective
bargaining contract with the Company; that said order also
contravenes Article 2208 of the Civil Code; that, furthermore,
Appellee was never actually dismissed by the defendant
Company and did not therefore suffer any damage at all
. 72chanrobles virtual law library
In refuting appellant Union's arguments, Appellee claimed
that in the instant case there was really no industrial dispute
involved in the attempt to compel Appellee to maintain its
membership in the union under pain of dismissal, and that the
Union, by its act, inflicted intentional harm on Appellee; that
since Appellee was compelled to institute an action to protect
his right to work, appellant could legally be ordered to pay
attorney's fees under Articles 1704 and 2208 of the Civil
Code. 73chanrobles virtual law library
The second paragraph of Section 24 of Republic Act No. 875
which is relied upon by appellant provides that:
No suit, action or other proceedings shall be maintainable in
any court against a labor organization or any officer or
member thereof for any act done by or on behalf of such
organization in furtherance of an industrial dispute to which it is a
party, on the ground only that such act induces some other
person to break a contract of employment or that it is in
restraint of trade or interferes with the trade, business or
employment of some other person or with the right of some
other person to dispose of his capital or labor. (Emphasis
supplied)
That there was a labor dispute in the instant case cannot be
disputed for appellant sought the discharge of respondent by
virtue of the closed shop agreement and under Section 2 (j) of
Republic Act No. 875 a question involving tenure of
employment is included in the term "labor dispute". 74The
discharge or the act of seeking it is the labor dispute itself. It
being the labor dispute itself, that very same act of the Union
in asking the employer to dismiss Appellee cannot be "an act
done ... in furtherance of an industrial dispute". The mere fact that
appellant is a labor union does not necessarily mean that all its
acts are in furtherance of an industrial dispute. 75Appellant
Union, therefore, cannot invoke in its favor Section 24 of
Republic Act No. 875. This case is not intertwined with any
unfair labor practice case existing at the time when Appellee
filed his complaint before the lower
court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Neither does Article 2208 of the Civil Code, invoked by the
Union, serve as its shield. The article provides that attorney's
fees and expenses of litigation may be awarded "when the
defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff ... to
incur expenses to protect his interest"; and "in any other case
where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees
and expenses of litigation should be recovered". In the instant
case, it cannot be gainsaid that appellant Union's act in
demanding Appellee's dismissal caused Appellee to incur
expenses to prevent his being dismissed from his job. Costs
according to Section 1, Rule 142, of the Rules of Court, shall be
allowed as a matter of course to the prevailing
party.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is dismissed, and the
decision, dated August 26, 1965, of the Court of First Instance
of Manila, in its Civil Case No. 58894, appealed from is
affirmed, with costs against appellant Union. It is so ordered.
Makalintal, C.J, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio,
Esguerra, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J, concurring:chanrobles virtual law library
The decision arrived at unanimously by this Court that
Republic Act No. 3350 is free from the constitutional infirmities
imputed to it was demonstrated in a manner wellnigh
conclusive in the learned, scholarly, and comprehensive
opinion so typical of the efforts of the ponente, Justice Zaldivar.
Like the rest of my brethren, I concur fully. Considering
moreover, the detailed attention paid to each and every
objection raised as to its validity and the clarity and
persuasiveness with which it was shown to be devoid of
support in authoritative doctrines, it would appear that the last
word has been written on this particular subject. Nonetheless, I
deem it proper to submit this brief expression of my views on
the transcendent character of religious freedom 1and its
primacy even as against the claims of protection to labor, 2also
one of the fundamental principles of the
Constitution.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
1. Religious freedom is identified with the liberty every
individual possesses to worship or not a Supreme Being, and if
a devotee of any sect, to act in accordance with its creed. Thus
is constitutionally safeguarded, according to Justice Laurel,
that "profession of faith to an active power that binds and
elevates man to his Creator ...."3The choice of what a man
wishes to believe in is his and his alone. That is a domain left
untouched, where intrusion is not allowed, a citadel to which
the law is denied entry, whatever be his thoughts or hopes. In
that sphere, what he wills reigns supreme. The doctrine to
which he pays fealty may for some be unsupported by
evidence, devoid of rational foundation. No matter. There is no
requirement as to its conformity to what has found acceptance.
It suffices that for him such a concept holds undisputed sway.
That is a recognition of man's freedom. That for him is one of
the ways of self- realization. It would be to disregard the
dignity that attaches to every human being to deprive him of
such an attribute. The "fixed star on our constitutional
constellation," to borrow the felicitous phrase of Justice
Jackson, is that no official, not excluding the highest, has it in
his power to prescribe what shall be orthodox in matters of
conscience - or to mundane affairs, for that matter.
Gerona v. Secretary of Education 4 speaks similarly. In the
language of its ponente, Justice Montemayor: "The realm of
belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's
imagination and thought. So is the freedom of belief, including
religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe
in most anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable
the same may appear to others, even heretical when weighed
in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards." 5There was
this qualification though: "But between the freedom of belief
and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to
travel. If the exercise of said religious belief clashes with the
established institutions of society and with the law, then the
former must yield and give way to the latter. The Government
steps in and either restrains said exercise or even prosecutes
the one exercising it." 6It was on that basis that the daily
compulsory flag ceremony in accordance with a statute 7was
found free from the constitutional objection on the part of a
religious sect, the Jehovah's Witnesses, whose members
alleged that their participation would be offensive to their
religious beliefs. In a case not dissimilar, West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette, 8the American Supreme Court
reached a contrary conclusion. Justice Jackson's eloquent
opinion is, for this writer, highly persuasive. Thus: "The case is
made difficult not because the principles of its decision are
obscure but because the flag involved is our own.
Nevertheless, we apply the limitations of the Constitution with
no fear that freedom to be intellectually and spiritually diverse
or even contrary will disintegrate the social organization. To
believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic ceremonies
are voluntary and spontaneous instead of a compulsory
routine is to make an unflattering estimate of the appeal of our
institutions to free minds. We can have intellectual
individualism and the rich cultural diversities that we owe to
exceptional minds only at the price of occasional eccentricity
and abnormal attitudes. When they are so harmless to others
or to the State as those we deal with here, the price is not too
great. But freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not
matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The
test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch
the heart of the existing order." 9chanrobles virtual law library
There is moreover this ringing affirmation by Chief Justice
Hughes of the primacy of religious freedom in the forum of
conscience even as against the command of the State itself:
"Much has been said of the paramount duty to the state, a duty
to be recognized, it is urged, even though it conflicts with
convictions of duty to God. Undoubtedly that duty to the state
exists within the domain of power, for government may
enforce obedience to laws regardless of scruples. When one's
belief collides with the power of the state, the latter is supreme
within its sphere and submission or punishment follows. But,
in the forum of conscience, duty to a moral power higher than
the state has always been maintained. The reservation of that
supreme obligation, as a matter of principle, would
unquestionably be made by many of our conscientious and
law-abiding citizens. The essence of religion is belief in a
relation to God involving duties superior to those arising from
any human relation." 10The American Chief Justice spoke in
dissent, it is true, but with him in agreement were three of the
foremost jurists who ever sat in that Tribunal, Justices Holmes,
Brandeis, and Stone.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
2. As I view Justice Zaldivar's opinion in that light, my
concurrence, as set forth earlier, is wholehearted and entire.
With such a cardinal postulate as the basis of our polity, it has
a message that cannot be misread. Thus is intoned with a
reverberating clang, to paraphrase Cardozo, a fundamental
principle that drowns all weaker sounds. The labored effort to
cast doubt on the validity of the statutory provision in question
is far from persuasive. It is attended by futility. It is not for this
Court, as I conceive of the judicial function, to restrict the scope
of a preferred freedom.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
3. There is, however, the question of whether such an
exception possesses an implication that lessens the
effectiveness of state efforts to protect labor, likewise, as noted,
constitutionally ordained. Such a view, on the surface, may not
be lacking in plausibility, but upon closer analysis, it cannot
stand scrutiny. Thought must be given to the freedom of
association, likewise an aspect of intellectual liberty. For the
late Professor Howe a constitutionalist and in his lifetime the
biographer of the great Holmes, it even partakes of the political
theory of pluralistic sovereignty. So great is the respect for the
autonomy accorded voluntary societies. 11Such a right implies
at the very least that one can determine for himself whether or
not he should join or refrain from joining a labor organization,
an institutional device for promoting the welfare of the
working man. A closed shop, on the other hand, is inherently
coercive. That is why, as is unmistakably reflected in our
decisions, the latest of which is Guijarno v. Court of Industrial
Relations, 12it is far from being a favorite of the law. For a
statutory provision then to further curtail its operation, is
precisely to follow the dictates of sound public
policy.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
The exhaustive and well-researched opinion of Justice Zaldivar
thus is in the mainstream of constitutional tradition. That, for
me, is the channel to
follow.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J, concurring:
The decision arrived at unanimously by this Court that
Republic Act No. 3350 is free from the constitutional infirmities
imputed to it was demonstrated in a manner wellnigh
conclusive in the learned, scholarly, and comprehensive
opinion so typical of the efforts of the ponente, Justice Zaldivar.
Like the rest of my brethren, I concur fully. Considering
moreover, the detailed attention paid to each and every
objection raised as to its validity and the clarity and
persuasiveness with which it was shown to be devoid of
support in authoritative doctrines, it would appear that the last
word has been written on this particular subject. Nonetheless, I
deem it proper to submit this brief expression of my views on
the transcendent character of religious freedom 1and its
primacy even as against the claims of protection to labor, 2also
one of the fundamental principles of the Constitution.
1. Religious freedom is identified with the liberty every
individual possesses to worship or not a Supreme Being, and if
a devotee of any sect, to act in accordance with its creed. Thus
is constitutionally safeguarded, according to Justice Laurel,
that "profession of faith to an active power that binds and
elevates man to his Creator ...."3The choice of what a man
wishes to believe in is his and his alone. That is a domain left
untouched, where intrusion is not allowed, a citadel to which
the law is denied entry, whatever be his thoughts or hopes. In
that sphere, what he wills reigns supreme. The doctrine to
which he pays fealty may for some be unsupported by
evidence, devoid of rational foundation. No matter. There is no
requirement as to its conformity to what has found acceptance.
It suffices that for him such a concept holds undisputed sway.
That is a recognition of man's freedom. That for him is one of
the ways of self- realization. It would be to disregard the
dignity that attaches to every human being to deprive him of
such an attribute. The "fixed star on our constitutional
constellation," to borrow the felicitous phrase of Justice
Jackson, is that no official, not excluding the highest, has it in
his power to prescribe what shall be orthodox in matters of
conscience - or to mundane affairs, for that matter.
Gerona v. Secretary of Education 4 speaks similarly. In the
language of its ponente, Justice Montemayor: "The realm of
belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's
imagination and thought. So is the freedom of belief, including
religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe
in most anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable
the same may appear to others, even heretical when weighed
in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards." 5There was
this qualification though: "But between the freedom of belief
and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to
travel. If the exercise of said religious belief clashes with the
established institutions of society and with the law, then the
former must yield and give way to the latter. The Government
steps in and either restrains said exercise or even prosecutes
the one exercising it." 6It was on that basis that the daily
compulsory flag ceremony in accordance with a statute 7was
found free from the constitutional objection on the part of a
religious sect, the Jehovah's Witnesses, whose members
alleged that their participation would be offensive to their
religious beliefs. In a case not dissimilar, West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette, 8the American Supreme Court
reached a contrary conclusion. Justice Jackson's eloquent
opinion is, for this writer, highly persuasive. Thus: "The case is
made difficult not because the principles of its decision are
obscure but because the flag involved is our own.
Nevertheless, we apply the limitations of the Constitution with
no fear that freedom to be intellectually and spiritually diverse
or even contrary will disintegrate the social organization. To
believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic ceremonies
are voluntary and spontaneous instead of a compulsory
routine is to make an unflattering estimate of the appeal of our
institutions to free minds. We can have intellectual
individualism and the rich cultural diversities that we owe to
exceptional minds only at the price of occasional eccentricity
and abnormal attitudes. When they are so harmless to others
or to the State as those we deal with here, the price is not too
great. But freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not
matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The
test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch
the heart of the existing order." 9
There is moreover this ringing affirmation by Chief Justice
Hughes of the primacy of religious freedom in the forum of
conscience even as against the command of the State itself:
"Much has been said of the paramount duty to the state, a duty
to be recognized, it is urged, even though it conflicts with
convictions of duty to God. Undoubtedly that duty to the state
exists within the domain of power, for government may
enforce obedience to laws regardless of scruples. When one's
belief collides with the power of the state, the latter is supreme
within its sphere and submission or punishment follows. But,
in the forum of conscience, duty to a moral power higher than
the state has always been maintained. The reservation of that
supreme obligation, as a matter of principle, would
unquestionably be made by many of our conscientious and
law-abiding citizens. The essence of religion is belief in a
relation to God involving duties superior to those arising from
any human relation." 10The American Chief Justice spoke in
dissent, it is true, but with him in agreement were three of the
foremost jurists who ever sat in that Tribunal, Justices Holmes,
Brandeis, and Stone.
2. As I view Justice Zaldivar's opinion in that light, my
concurrence, as set forth earlier, is wholehearted and entire.
With such a cardinal postulate as the basis of our polity, it has
a message that cannot be misread. Thus is intoned with a
reverberating clang, to paraphrase Cardozo, a fundamental
principle that drowns all weaker sounds. The labored effort to
cast doubt on the validity of the statutory provision in question
is far from persuasive. It is attended by futility. It is not for this
Court, as I conceive of the judicial function, to restrict the scope
of a preferred freedom.
3. There is, however, the question of whether such an
exception possesses an implication that lessens the
effectiveness of state efforts to protect labor, likewise, as noted,
constitutionally ordained. Such a view, on the surface, may not
be lacking in plausibility, but upon closer analysis, it cannot
stand scrutiny. Thought must be given to the freedom of
association, likewise an aspect of intellectual liberty. For the
late Professor Howe a constitutionalist and in his lifetime the
biographer of the great Holmes, it even partakes of the political
theory of pluralistic sovereignty. So great is the respect for the
autonomy accorded voluntary societies. 11Such a right implies
at the very least that one can determine for himself whether or
not he should join or refrain from joining a labor organization,
an institutional device for promoting the welfare of the
working man. A closed shop, on the other hand, is inherently
coercive. That is why, as is unmistakably reflected in our
decisions, the latest of which is Guijarno v. Court of Industrial
Relations, 12it is far from being a favorite of the law. For a
statutory provision then to further curtail its operation, is
precisely to follow the dictates of sound public policy.
The exhaustive and well-researched opinion of Justice Zaldivar
thus is in the mainstream of constitutional tradition. That, for
me, is the channel to follow.
VICTORIANO vs. ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION
and ELIZAALDE ROPE FACTORY
G.R. No. L-25246; September 12, 1974; 59 SCRA 54
Ponente: Zaldivar Sec. 18, Article II 1987 Constitution:
"The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall
protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare."
Facts:
Petitioner Victoriano is a member of the Iglesia ni Cristo and
was an employee of Elizalde Rope Factory and was a member
of the Elizalde Rope Workers' Union. Membership with the
Union was mandatory as provided for under a collective
bargaining agreement: "Membership in the Union shall be
required as a condition of employment for all permanent employees
workers covered by this Agreement."
Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875, prior
to its amendment by Republic Act No. 3350, the employer was
not precluded "from making an agreement with a labor
organization to require as a condition of employment
membership therein, if such labor organization is the
representative of the employees." On June 18, 1961, however,
Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted, introducing an
amendment to — paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4 of
Republic Act No. 875, as follows: ... "but such agreement shall
not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit
affiliation of their members in any such labor organization".
Being a member of the INC, a religion that prohibits affiliation
with labor organizations, the Petitioner wrote a letter
informing the Union of his resignation. Thereupon, the Union
wrote a formal letter to the Company asking the latter to
separate Appellee from the service in view of the fact that he
was resigning from the Union as a member.
The CFI ruled in favor of Petitioner and enjoined the company
from dismissing him.
In its appeal, the Union claimed that R.A. no. 3350 was
unconstitutional on the ground that 1) prohibits all the
members of a given religious sect from joining any labor union
if such sect prohibits affiliations of their members thereto; and,
consequently, deprives said members of their constitutional
right to form or join lawful associations or organizations
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and thus becomes obnoxious
[to the] Constitution; 2) Impairs the obligation of contracts; 3)
discriminates in favor of certain religious sects and affords no
protection to labor unions; 4) violates the constitutional
provision that no religious test shall be required for the
exercise of a civil right; 5) violates the equal protection clause;
and 6) the act violates the constitutional provision regarding
the promotion of social justice.
Issue:
Whether or not R.A. No. 3350 violates the Constitutional
mandate to protect the rights of workers and to promote their
welfare notwithstanding the fact that it allows some workers,
by virtue of their religious beliefs, to opt out of Union security
agreements. Held:
NO. R.A. No. 3350 is constitutional on all counts. It must be
pointed out that the free exercise of religious profession or
belief is superior to contract rights. In case of conflict, the latter
must, therefore, yield to the former.
The purpose of Republic Act No. 3350 is secular, worldly, and
temporal, not spiritual or religious or holy and eternal. It was
intended to serve the secular purpose of advancing the
constitutional right to the free exercise of religion, by averting
that certain persons be refused work, or be dismissed from
work, or be dispossessed of their right to work and of being
impeded to pursue a modest means of livelihood, by reason of
union security agreements.
More so now in the [1987 and past in constitutions] [...] where
it is mandated that "the State shall afford protection to labor,
promote full employment and equality in employment,
ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or
creed and regulate the relation between workers and
employers.
We believe that in enacting Republic Act No. 3350, Congress
acted consistently with the spirit of the constitutional
provision. It acted merely to relieve the exercise of religion, by
certain persons, of a burden that is imposed by union security
agreements. It was Congress itself that imposed that burden
when it enacted the Industrial Peace Act (Republic Act 875),
and, certainly, Congress, if it so deems advisable, could take
away the same burden. It is certain that not every conscience
can be accommodated by all the laws of the land; but when
general laws conflict with scrupples of conscience, exemptions
ought to be granted unless some "compelling state
interest" intervenes. In the instant case, We see no such
compelling state interest to withhold exemption.
VICTORIANO VS ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION
Topic: Right to self organization
Extent and Scope of Right
FACTS:
1. Benjamin Victoriano (hereinafter referred to as Appellee), a
member of the religious sect known as the "Iglesia ni Cristo",
had been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc.
(hereinafter referred to as Company) since 1958.
2. As such employee, he was a member of the Elizalde Rope
Workers' Union (hereinafter referred to as Union) which had
with the Company a collective bargaining agreement
containing a closed shop provision which reads as follows:
Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of
employment for all permanent employees workers covered by
this Agreement.
3. The collective bargaining agreement expired on March 3,
1964 but was renewed the following day, March 4, 1964.
4. Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875,
prior to its amendment by Republic Act No. 3350, the
employer was not precluded "from making an agreement with
a labor organization to require as a condition of employment
membership therein, if such labor organization is the
representative of the employees." On June 18, 1961, however,
Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted, introducing an
amendment to — paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4 of
Republic Act No. 875, as follows: ... "but such agreement shall
not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit
affiliation of their members in any such labor organization".
5. Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the
affiliation of its members with any labor organization,
Appellee presented his resignation to appellant Union in 1962,
and when no action was taken thereon, he reiterated his
resignation on September 3, 1974. Thereupon, the Union wrote
a formal letter to the Company asking the latter to separate
Appellee from the service in view of the fact that he was
resigning from the Union as a member.
RULING:
1. NO. R.A. No. 3350 is constitutional on all counts. It must be
pointed out that the free exercise of religious profession or
belief is superior to contract rights. In case of conflict, the latter
must, therefore, yield to the former.
2. No. What the exception provides, therefore, is that members
of said religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join
labor unions even when said unions have closed shop
agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed
shop agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be
refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole
ground that they are not members of the collective bargaining
union.
If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of said
religious sects prefer to sign up with the labor union, they can
do so. If in deference and fealty to their religious faith, they
refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does not coerce them
to join; neither does the law prohibit them from joining; and
neither may the employer or labor union compel them to join.
Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, does not violate the
constitutional provision on freedom of association.
DISPOSITIVE: Benjamin Victoriano Won (Plaintiff)

6. The management of the Company in turn notified Appellee Appeal is dismissed.

and his counsel that unless the Appellee could achieve a
satisfactory arrangement with the Union, the Company would
be constrained to dismiss him from the service. This prompted
Appellee to file an action for injunction, docketed as Civil Case
No. 58894 in the Court of First Instance of Manila to enjoin the
Company and the Union from dismissing Appellee. 1 In its
answer, the Union invoked the "union security clause" of the
collective bargaining agreement; assailed the constitutionality
of Republic Act No. 3350; and contended that the Court had no
jurisdiction over the case, pursuant to Republic Act No. 875,
Sections 24 and 9 (d) and (e).
DOCTRINE: The free exercise of religious profession or belief
is superior to contract rights. In case of conflict, the latter must
yield to the former.
If in deference and fealty to their religious faith, they refuse to
sign up, they can do so; the law does not coerce them to join;
neither does the law prohibit them from joining, and neither
may the employer or labor union compel them to join.

CFI - Manila: enjoining the defendant Elizalde Rope Factory,

Inc. from dismissing the plaintiff from his present employment
and sentencing the defendant Elizalde Rope Workers' Union to
pay the plaintiff P500 for attorney's fees and the costs of this
action

Appeal to this Court on purely questions of law.

ISSUE/S:

WON RA 3350 introducing an amendment to paragraph (4)

subsection (a) of section 4 of Republic Act No. 875, as follows:
... "but such agreement shall not cover members of any
religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in
any such labor organization" is unconstitutional

WON RA 3350 infringes on the fundamental right to form

lawful associations when it "prohibits all the members of a
given religious sect from joining any labor union if such sect
prohibits affiliations of their members thereto" 5 ; and,
consequently, deprives said members of their constitutional
right to form or join lawful associations or organizations
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and thus becomes obnoxious
to Article III, Section 1 (6) of the 1935 Constitution