LANDTITS
REPUBLIC V NOVAL GR NO 170316
The applicants sought the registration of their titles over the
subdivided portions of a land in Barangay Casili.
They relied on the testimony of their predecessor-in-interest
Cecilia, who was 73 years old when she testified. She recalls
that when she was 15 years old, her grandmother was tilling
the land and cultivated, thereby enjoying the fruits of 15
coconut trees.
When her grandmother fdied, her father inherited the land.
When he died, Cecilia inherited. She declared it for taxation.
Soon she sold the property to one Messerli which eventually
sold it to Noval.
OSG opposed stating that:
1. Respondents failed to show DENR certification
2. The possession and occupation was not of the character of
ownership. It was mere casual cultivation.
3. Tax declaration may not be used as bases to grant judicial
confirmation of imperfect title.
First, accordingn to Malabanan, only possession and
coccupation must be reckoned from June 12, 1945.
Classification as AnD must be done prior to the filing.
Second, there are sources of ownership does not immanate
exclusively from State grant. As in the case of Carino,
ownership may be derived from possession and occupation
since time in memorial.
Third, gave credence to the testimony of Cecilia and the period
of prior possession and occupation was satisfied the
requirement of law.
Fourth, the burden of proof that the land sought to be
registered is part of the public domain rests upon the
Republic’s shoulders in this case.
Although the Noval failed to show certification from DENR
that the land was AnD, the state failed to present evidence
aside from a pro forma opposition. 



Having established possession and occupation of the object
land, the presumption is titled against the republc.
REPUBLIC V IAC AND ACME GR NO 73002
ACME filed for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. They
relied on the fact that their predecessor-in-interest Infiels were
part of the cultural minority and had ownership of the subject
lot through occupation and possession since time in memorial.
They bought the land in 1962 where the 1932 constitution was
still in force and has no proscription against Judirical persons
from acquiring land.
OSG did not oppose the facts except as to the land applicable.
It should be the 1975 constitution that should have application
since the application was filed on 1981.
In ruling, the Court discussed the character of the land sought
to be judicially confirmed.
First, the SC overturned the ruling of Meralco which provides
that the land only ceases to be public land when a certificate of
title is issued thereon. SC followed a long line of cases from
Carino to Susi which declares that upon accomplishment of
requisites for application of confirmation of judicial title, the
land ipso jure ceases to be of public domain and is transposed

into a private property, by legal fiction. The application for
confirmation is only a formality.
Thus ACME had the legal right to purchase private property
under the 1935 constitution. Even supposing that technically
the land was still part of public domain, ACME still has the
right for confirmation as there’s nothing in the 1935
constitution which prohibits juridical persons from buying
interests in land of public domain.
Second, the technically that only natural persons are allowed to
apply under PLA is superfluous. It will only clog the dockets
of the courts even further. The filing of the petition by the
natural person (the predecessor-in-interest) would ultimately
lead to the same conclusion that it would be deeded back to
the juridical person after the confirmation.
REPUBLIC V. ROVANCY REALTY GR NO 190817
Rovancy Realty (RRDC) filed for registration of title under the
PRD. It alleges that their predecessor in interest PN Roa
Interprises were in OCEAN possession and occupation of the
land since June 12, 1945 and that they acquired it through a
Deed of Sale executed in their favor.
Heirs of Atty. Avelino opposed stating that their precedessor
was granted a homestead patent.
Republic through opposed stating that neither of the parties
are entitled to the registration as both were not able to comply
with the requirements for registration. The land was part of
public domain and further it violated the constitutional
limitation of 12-hectares for judicial confirmation.
LANDTITS
RTC brushed aside the Heirs of Atty Avelino allegations stating
that it was Atty. Avelino himself who notarized the deed of
sale.
RTC decided to have the land registered. CA affirmed.
SC in deciding the case rule the following:
First, the constitutional limitation of 12-hectares only pertains
to lands of public domain. Cited Republic v. IAC and ACME on
the ruling that lands of public domain ipso jure become private
lands upon occupation and possession since time in memorial,
judicial confirmation is only a formality.
In Republic v. T.A.N. the Court ruled that what is determinative
in the application of corporate individual is that when the
acquisition was made the land was already private by
acquisitive prescription. Thus reference to the evidence
adduced must be done.
Second, registration on PRD sec. 14(1) requires:
1. That the land must be AnD at the time of application
2. OCEAN possession and occupation
3. Under bonafide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945
As to the first requisite, there must be certification of CENRO/
PENRO that the land is AnD, and original classification
approved by the Sec from the NAMRIA.
In this case, RRDC only provided a certification of CENRO/
PENRO. Thus fails the requisite.
As to the second and third, possession and occupation must be
under a bona fide claim of ownership. Possession and
occupation must be actual possession and not merely by

fiction. Actual possession which manifests dominion over the
property must be shown.
In this case, the Absolute Deed of Sale and the Tax declaration
adduced by RRDC fails to accomplish the requisites.
Third, registration under PRD sec. 14(2) requires that not only
the land be declared as AnD it must be shown that the
property is no longer intended for public service or for the
development of national wealth, in order for prescription to
run.
In this case, RRDC failed to show evidence that the subject
land was transformed into private land. Thus the
constitutional 12-hectares limitation on acquisition of
agricultural land applies in this case.
The application must be denied.
CAWAYAN HILLS V. CA GR NO 20309O
Kawayan Hills is a domestic corporation dealing with real
estate. It is in possession of a 1,461-squaremeter parcel of land
identified as Cad. Lot No. 2512 (Lot No. 2512), located in
Barangay No. 22, Nagbacalan, Paoay, Ilocos Norte. All other
lots surrounding Lot No. 2512 have been titled in Kawayan
Hills' name. On August 7, 2001, Kawayan Hills, through its
President, Pastor Laya, filed an application for confirmation
and registration of Lot No. 2512's title in its name before the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Paoay-Currimao.
The Municipal Circuit Trial Court ruled in favor of Kawayan
Hills, confirmed its title over Lot No. 2512, and ordered Lot
No. 2512's registration in Kawayan Hills' name. The CA
reversed, ruling: “Well[-]settled is the rule that tax declarations
are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to
LANDTITS
possess land when not supported by any other evidence. The
fact that the disputed property may have been declared for
taxation purposes in the name of the applicant for registration
or of their predecessors-in-interest does not necessarily prove
ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership.
ISSUE: WON CA ERRED IS ITS DISMISSIVE
CONSIDERATION OF TAX DEC FROM 1931
YES. The payment of real property taxes since as far back as
1931 by Kawayan Hills' predecessor-in interest, Andres, should
not be dismissed so easily. To the contrary, coupled with
evidence of continuous possession, it is a strong indicator of
possession in the concept of owner.
The Court of Appeals' reduction of the resolution of
petitioner's application to the expedient aphorism that tax
declarations do not absolutely establish ownership fails to
account for composite and uncontroverted aspects of
petitioner's claim. In addition to Andres' declaration of Lot No.
2512 for the payment of real property taxes for almost a decade
and a half ahead of the June 12, 1945 threshold, and his and his
successors-in- interest's unfailing diligence in paying real
property taxes, there are more details that attest to possession
in the concept of owner.
Since the start of Andres' documented possession in 1931, no
one has come forward to contest his and his successors-in-
interest's possession as owners. It was only on September 4,
2001, about a month after petitioner's filing of its application,
that the Republic came forward to contest the confirmation
and registration of title in his name. By then, title to every
single lot surrounding Lot No. 2512 had been issued in
petitioner's name. Throughout the intervening time, Andres
and his successors-in- interest tilled Lot No. 2512. Andres'
grandson, Eufemiano, testified for petitioner before the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court. He unequivocally declared that

Andres had been occupying Lot No. 2512 since World War II.
He affirmed that he had witnessed his grandfather harvesting
fruits. The Municipal Circuit Trial Court categorically stated
that Lot No. 2512 had been used by Andres and his children
"for agricultural production since 1942.”
DIRECTOR OF LANDS V. REYES L27594
Melecio Padilla acquired 16,800 hectares, of land situated at the
municipality of Laur, Nueva Ecija in 1895 by virtue of a
possessory information title issued during the Spanish regime.
Upon his death in 1990 , ownership and possession of the
subject land was transmitted to his daughter and sole heir
Maria Padilla until her death in 1940. Applicant Alipio
Alinsunurin, claiming ownership in fee simple by inheritance
from the late Maria Padilla, sought the registration of title.
Applicant Alipio Alinsunurin filed a motion for substitution of
parties, requesting that the Parañaque Investment and
Development Corporation be considered as the applicant in his
place, it having acquired all his rights, interests, ownership and
dominion over the property subject matter of the application.
The Director of Lands, Director of Forestry, and the Armed
Forces of the Philippines opposed the application, claiming
that the applicant was without sufficient title and was not in
open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession and
occupation of the land in question for at least thirty (30) years
immediately preceding the filing of the application; that
approximately 13,957 hectares of said land consist of the
military reservation of Fort Magsaysay established under
Proclamation No. 237, dated December 10, 1955 of the
President.
LANDTITS
During the trial blueprints of two survey plans were presented,
the first blueprint copy of a plan of land as surveyed for Maria
Padilla, was not formally offered in evidence, and the second
plan of the land, as surveyed for Parañaque Investment and
Development Corporation was submitted by the said
applicant, but it lacks the approval of the Director of Lands.
The lower court rendered decision ordering the land to be
registered in favor of (a) Parañaque Investment and
Development Corporation, two-thirds (2/3) portion, and (b)
Roman C. Tamayo, Filipino citizen, one-third (1/3) portion of
the said property.
The oppositors Director of Lands, Director of Forestry and the
Armed Forces of the Philippines filed a Notice of Appeal from
the said decision to the Supreme Court. Hence, the Supreme
Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents blueprints of the survey plan is
valid to claim ownership.
SC Held:
The submission of a original tracing cloth plan is a mandatory
requirement. Unless a plan and its technical description are
duly approved by the DL, the same is not of much value.
First, the applicant did not present the original tracing cloth
plan of the land applied for. Instead they rely on blueprints of
two survey plans. The first was not formally offered in
evidence. The second was submitted but lacks the approval of
Director of Land.

The applicants justify that the survey plan were checked/
verified by the Land Registration Commission. To this the
Court held that the LRC is without authority to approve
original survey plans.
The blue print copy of the plan which was superimposed in
the military plan was only for the purpose of showing that the
land applied was within the area covered by the military
reservation.
Second, the applicant has not registrable title of the land
applied for.
The Spanish Title relied upon by the applicant does not have
much value. The original nor a duly authenticated copy of the
document was not presented. Only a photocopy of the same
was. The two copies had material difference as to the date of
issuance.
Moreover, there was no record of the predecessor-in-interest as
a holder of a informacion posesoria (spanish title).
This was no compliance with the Spanish Mortgage Law in
order for it to be considered as title of ownership, it is merely a
registration of possession. The applicant died before the
expiration period. Further the SML only allows 1000 hectares,
and not the prayed for 16,800 hectares.
Nor was there evidence that appear that the property was
declared for taxation purposes. The only tax dec present was
only filed on 1958. 
 another already previously covered by a land registration.
In short, the applicant failed to submit convincing proof of
actual, peaceful and adverse possession in the concept of
owner of the area applied for.
LANDTITS
REPUBLIC V GUINTO-ALBANA
Zenaida Guinto-Albana together with other co-respondents
filed with the RTC an application for Registration of Title. In
support of their application respondents submitted a blueprint
of a survey plan + technical descriptions of each lot +
certification from the geodetic engineer and the pertinent Tax
Declaration together with the receipts of payment.
However the original tracing cloth plan was not submitted.
The respondents aver that because of their previous filing for
registration the same was submitted to the court and then to
LRA.
The trial court denied the application on the ground that the
original tracking cloth plan was not submitted and thereby
failing to comply with the requirements of the PRD. CA
however reversed. Hence this petition.
The question in this case is whether or not the failure to submit
the original muniments of titles or copies thereof and a survey
plan approved by the Bureau of Lands is fatal to the present
case
Or does the blueprint copy of the survey plan suffice for
compliance?
The Court held that it is. The reason for the mandatory
submission of the original tracing cloth plan is to establish the
true identity of the land and to ensure it does not overlap
While the best evidence to identity a piece of land is the OTCP,
blueprint copies and other evidence could also provide
sufficient identification.

In the case at bar, the SC found that there was substantial
compliance with the legal requirement of ascertaining the
identity of the subject lot.
Further, SC found that the applicants were in actual possession
of the property under a bona fide claim of ownership as
evidenced by the declaration for taxation purposes and
payment.
The registration of title is AFFIRMED.
REPUBLIC V. VILLE ABRILLE GR NO L39248
For an applicant to have his imperfect or incomplete title or
claim to a land to be originally registered under Act 496, the
following requisites should all be satisfied:
1. Survey of land by the Bureau of Lands or a duly licensed
private surveyor;
2. Filing of application for registration by the applicant;
3. Setting of the date for the initial hearing of the application
by the Court;
4. Transmittal of the application and the date of initial hearing
together with all the documents or other evidences attached
thereto by the Clerk of Court to the Land Registration
Commission;
5. Publication of a notice of the filing of the application and
date and place of the hearing in the Official Gazette;
6. Service of notice upon contiguous owners, occupants and
those known to have interests in the property by the sheriff;
LANDTITS
7. Filing of answer to the application by any person whether
named in the notice or not;
8. Hearing of the case by the Court;
9. Promulgation of judgment by the Court;
10. Issuance of the decree by the Court declaring the decision
final and instructing the Land Registration Commission to
issue a decree of confirmation and registration;
11. Entry of the decree of registration in the Land Registration
Commission;
12. Sending of copy of the decree of registration to the
corresponding Register of Deeds, and
13. Transcription of the decree of registration in the registration
book and the issuance of the owner's duplicate original
certificate of title to the applicant by the Register of Deeds,
upon payment of the prescribed fees.
REPUBLIC V GUERRERO
SEC. 38. ― xxx. Every decree of registration shall bind the land,
and quiet title thereto, subject only to the exceptions stated in
the following section. It shall be conclusive upon and against
all persons, including the [Republic of the Philippines] and all
the branches thereof, …. Such decree shall not be opened by

reason of the absence, minority, or other disability of any
person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court
for reversing judgments or decrees, subject, however, to the
right of any person deprived of the land or of any estate or
interest therein by decree of registration obtained by actual
fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance [now
Regional Trial Court] a petition for review of the decree of
registration within one year after entry of the decree
provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an
interest. Upon the expiration of said term of one year, every
decree or certificate of title issued in accordance with this
section shall be incontrovertible.
Actual or positive fraud proceeds from an intentional
deception practiced by means of the misrepresentation or
concealment of a material fact.
The fraud is extrinsic if it is employed to deprive parties of
their day in court and thus prevent them from asserting their
right to the property registered in the name of the applicant.
only actual and extrinsic fraud had been accepted and is
contemplated by the law as a ground to review or reopen a
decree of registration
Petitioner relies heavily on the verification survey
report20 which stated that respondent Guerrero was entitled to
only 91 square meters of the subject lot instead of 174 square
meters which was awarded to him. There is, however, no proof
that the area eventually awarded to respondent was
intentionally and fraudulently increased. It was never proven
that respondent was a party to any fraud that led to the award
of a bigger area of 174 square meters instead of 91 square
meters. Petitioner even failed to give sufficient proof of any
error which may have been committed by its agents who had
surveyed the subject property nor had petitioner offered a
LANDTITS
sensible explanation as to the reason for such discrepancy.
Thus, the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official functions must be respected.
This Court agrees with the RTC that the issuance of the sales
patent over the subject lot was made in accordance with the
procedure laid down by Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended, otherwise known as the Public Land Act.21  Under
Section 91 thereof, an investigation should be conducted for
the purpose of ascertaining the veracity of the material facts set
out in the application.22 The law also requires sufficient notice
to the municipality and barrio where the land is located in
order to give adverse claimants the opportunity to present
their claims.23
In the instant case, records reveal that on December 22, 1964, a
day after respondent filed his miscellaneous sales application,
an actual investigation and site verification of the parcel of
land was conducted by Land Investigator Alfonso Tumbocon
who reported that the land was free from claims and conflicts.
24 Likewise, the notice of sale of the lot in question was posted
at the District Land Office in San Miguel, Manila, at the
Quezon City Hall, and at Pugad Lawin, Quezon City for 30
consecutive days from February 17, 1965 to March 17, 1965
which was the date scheduled for the sale of the lot. The said
notice was worded as follows:
If there is any adverse claim to the land, such claim must be
filed at the Bureau of Lands, Manila on or before the date of
the sale; otherwise such claim shall forever be barred.25
Further, the "Order of Award"  26 dated May 20, 1971, as well as
the "Issuance of Patent"27  dated June 28, 1982 were both duly
signed by the Director of Lands. The "Order of Award" even
declared that Guerrero has in good faith established his

residence on the land in question. On the other hand, the
"Issuance of Patent" stated that the land consisting of 174
square meters is free from any adverse claim and that Guerrero
has fully paid the purchase price of the lot. Having complied
with all the requirements of the law preliminary to the
issuance of the patent, respondent was thus issued MSP No.
8991 dated August 16, 1982. Thereafter, the corresponding OCT
No. 0-28 was issued on August 27, 1982 in the name of
respondent Guerrero.
At any rate, by legal presumption, public officers are deemed
to have regularly performed their official duties. Thus, the
proceedings for land registration that led to the issuance of
MSP No. 8991 and OCT No. 0-28 in respondent’s name are
presumptively regular and proper. To overturn this legal
presumption will not only endanger judicial stability, but also
violate the underlying principle of the Torrens system. Indeed,
to do so would reduce the vaunted legal indefeasibility of
Torrens titles to meaningless verbiage. 28  Besides, this
presumption of regularity has not been overcome by the
evidence presented by petitioner. We, therefore, cannot sustain
petitioner’s contention that fraud tainted the sales patent
granted to respondent Guerrero, as well as the certificate of
title issued in consequence thereof.
Granting that Guerrero committed extrinsic and actual fraud,
petitioner failed to avail itself of the remedy within the
prescribed period. Under Section 38 of Act No. 496, a petition
for reopening and review of the decree of registration must be
filed within one year from the date of entry of said decree.
In the case of public land grants or patents, the one-year period
commences from the issuance of the patent by the government.
29
LANDTITS
In the instant case, the sales patent was issued to respondent
on August 16, 1982, while petitioner instituted an action to
amend respondent’s certificate of title on November 7, 1989 or
after the lapse of more than seven (7) years from the issuance
of the patent. Clearly, petitioner failed to timely avail of the
remedy to contest Guerrero’s title.
Petitioner argues that the right of the State for the reversion of
unlawfully acquired property is not barred by prescription.
Thus, it can still recover the land granted to respondent.
True, prescription, basically, does not run against the State and
the latter may still bring an action, even after the lapse of one
year, for the reversion to the public domain of lands which
have been fraudulently granted to private individuals.
30 However, this remedy of reversion can only be availed of in
cases of fraudulent or unlawful inclusion of the land in patents
or certificates of title. In the present case, petitioner cannot
successfully invoke this defense for, as discussed earlier, it was
never proven that respondent’s patent and title were obtained
through actual fraud or other illegal means.
Lest it be overlooked, a piece of land covered by a registered
patent and the corresponding certificate of title ceases to be
part of the public domain. As such, it is considered a private
property over which the Director of Lands has neither control
nor jurisdiction.31
Petitioner likewise insists that respondent’s title had yet to
attain the status of indefeasibility. As argued, Angelina
Bustamante was able to timely file a protest on July 29, 1983,
which was well within the one-year prescriptive period.
We do not agree.

While Angelina Bustamante indeed protested the award of a
sales patent in favor of respondent, the protest was, however,
filed with the Bureau of Lands instead of with the regional trial
court as mandated by the aforequoted provision of Section 38
of Act No. 496. Said provision expressly states that a petition
for review of a decree of registration shall be filed in the
"proper Court of First Instance" (now Regional Trial Court).
The law did not say that such petition may be filed with an
administrative agency like the Bureau of Lands. To be sure,
what the law contemplates in allowing a review of the decree
of registration is a full-blown trial before a regular court where
each party could be afforded full opportunity to present his/its
case and where each of them must establish his case by
preponderance of evidence and not by mere substantial
evidence, the usual quantum of proof required in
administrative proceedings. The concept of "preponderance of
evidence" refers to evidence which is of greater weight, or
more convincing, than that which is offered in opposition to it;
at bottom, it means probability of truth.32On the other hand,
substantial evidence refers to such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might
conceivably opine otherwise.33
As the review of a decree of registration constitutes an attack
on the very integrity of land titles and the Torrens system, a
full-blown trial on the merits before a regular court is
necessary for the purpose of achieving a more in-depth and
thorough determination of all issues involved.
Hence, contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the protest filed by
Bustamante with the Bureau of Lands cannot be considered in
the context of a petition to review the decree of registration
issued to respondent. It was only on November 7, 1989 that
such petition was filed by the Director of Lands with the RTC
LANDTITS
and obviously, it was way beyond the one-year period
prescribed by law.
It is worth stressing that the Torrens system was adopted in
this country because it was believed to be the most effective
measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect
their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established
and recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land on the
assurance that the seller’s title thereto is valid, he should not
run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was
ineffectual after all. This would not only be unfair to him.
What is worse is that if this were permitted, public confidence
in the system would be eroded and land transactions would
have to be attended by complicated and not necessarily
conclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The further
consequence would be that land conflicts could be even more
abrasive, if not even violent. The government, recognizing the
worthy purposes of the Torrens system, should be the first to
accept the validity of titles issued thereunder once the
conditions laid down by the law are satisfied.34
Instead of stabilizing the Torrens system, petitioner, in filing a
suit for the amendment of OCT No. 0-28, derogates the very
integrity of the system as it gives the impression to Torrens title
holders, like herein respondent, that their titles can be
questioned by the same authority who had approved their
titles. In that case, no Torrens title holder shall be at peace with
the ownership and possession of his land, for land registration
officers can question his title any time they make a finding
unfavorable to said title holder. This is all the more frustrating
for respondent Guerrero considering that he had bought the
subject lot from the government itself, the very same party
who is now impugning his title.
 LANDTITS

While the Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring titles to

lands but merely a system of registration of titles to lands,
35 justice and equity demand that the titleholder should not be

made to bear the unfavorable effect of the mistake or

negligence of the State’s agents, in the absence of proof of his
complicity in a fraud or of manifest damage to third persons.
The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land
and put a stop forever to any question as to the legality of the
title, except claims that were noted in the certificate at the time
of the registration or that may arise subsequent thereto.
36  Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens system shall forever

be sullied by the ineptitude and inefficiency of land

registration officials, who are ordinarily presumed to have
regularly performed their duties.37